[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LEBANON AND IRAQ: AFTER THE ELECTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-133
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
ANN WAGNER, Missouri THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida TED LIEU, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Michael Doran, Ph.D., senior fellow, The Hudson Institute........ 7
Ms. Danielle Pletka, senior vice president, Foreign and Defense
Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute.................. 16
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for Middle
East Policy, The Brookings Institution......................... 24
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Michael Doran, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 10
Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement.......................... 19
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 27
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 48
Hearing minutes.................................................. 49
Written response from Ms. Danielle Pletka to question submitted
for the record by the Honorable Ann Wagner, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Missouri............................ 50
LEBANON AND IRAQ: AFTER THE ELECTIONS
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TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Mr. Schneider for our opening
statements, I will then recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses.
Without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will be
made a part of the record and members may have 5 days in which
to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to
the length limitation and the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
This month's parliamentary elections in Lebanon and Iraq
will have lasting implications not just for their citizens but
for the interests of the United States and our allies
throughout the Middle East, especially Israel.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah and its allies have gained a majority
in Parliament, increasing the Iranian influence and the control
over Lebanon's Government. Many of us have been warning about
Hezbollah's growing influence in Lebanon for quite a while now,
suggesting that tough decisions needed to be made about U.S.
assistance, including to the Lebanese Armed Forces, or the LAF.
As I noted in a hearing on Lebanon last year, I've long
been concerned over reports of the LAF-Hezbollah cooperation
and U.S. commitment to the LAF. U.S. law stipulates that no
assistance may be made available to the LAF or Lebanon's
internal security forces if they are controlled by a U.S.-
designated foreign terrorist organization. Hezbollah certainly
classifies. While coalitions are still being formed and it is
not yet certain which ministries Hezbollah or its allies will
control, I hope that this administration, unlike previous
administrations from both parties, takes a clear-eyed approach
to the LAF and reassesses our security assistance to Lebanon.
Proponents of cooperation with the LAF have long argued
that the LAF is the best counterweight against Hezbollah and
the best way to weaken the Hezbollah influence. Yet, after
years of cooperation there is zero evidence that this policy is
working. In fact, we've only seen Hezbollah's influence grow,
including over the LAF. There is no doubt that weakening
Hezbollah should be U.S. policy. The question is whether we are
implementing the correct policies to do so.
I am still having a hard time understanding why the
administration decided to cancel U.S. democracy and governance
assistance in the run-up to the elections, assistance that
could help support Lebanon's moderate forces. When I asked
State about this in October, I was told that the administration
would continue to support these programs. Yet, in report after
report afterward, we heard that Embassy Beirut decided to
cancel them. It is impossible to know what the election results
would have been had these programs been continued. But one
thing is clear: Moderate forces have lost once again in
Lebanon, and Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran, have further
consolidated control.
In Iraq, in a slightly different but no less dangerous a
scenario, the Sadr alliance surprise win has up-ended the
presumed political order there, forcing a lot of people,
including both in the U.S. and in Iran, to scramble. Notorious
for his anti-American views and leadership of a militia that
killed hundreds of American troops in the mid-2000s, Sadr is
now portraying himself as a nationalist and a reformer
committed to rooting out corruption and protecting Iraqi
sovereignty. This is certainly going to put the U.S. in a
difficult position as our future relationship with Iraq is now
at best in limbo.
There are also a lot of questions about Sadr's relationship
with Iran and his professed resistance to Iranian influence.
It's unclear just how strongly he believes in stopping Iranian
interference in Iraq and even if he's capable or willing to do
so. The Iranian Quds Force commander has been making the rounds
over the past week, shoring up ties with pro-Iranian
politicians in an attempt to forge a more favorable coalition
for Tehran--prospects that would severely jeopardize all of the
progress and effort that we have put into Iraq.
As of now, it remains to be seen exactly what type of
coalition we end up with. I do hope we are doing everything we
can to limit or push back against the influence of Iran and, at
the same time, we should also be planning on what to do for all
possible outcomes.
What is clear, however, is that Iran is not going anywhere
anytime soon in the region and, by all accounts, despite
whatever complications Sadr may cause, will maintain a
tremendous amount of influence. In both Iraq and Lebanon, Iran
continues to gain both in power and influence to the detriment
of their citizens, regional stability, and U.S. national
security interest.
With Secretary Pompeo laying out the administration's Iran
strategy just yesterday, I am looking forward to hearing from
our witnesses, their critiques as well as their recommendations
for rolling back Iranian influence in Lebanon, in Iraq, and
throughout the greater Middle East. I am also looking forward
to hearing their assessment on how we can get to this point,
why the U.S. was unable to make more progress in both countries
leading up to the elections, and how we can work with our
allies to counter Iran and advance our mutual interests in the
region.
Thank you so much, and with that I will yield to my friend,
Mr. Schneider, of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and I want
to thank you and Ranking Member Deutch for convening this
meeting. In advance, I will thank the witnesses for sharing
your perspectives and insights on this important issue.
These elections in Lebanon and Iraq are, obviously, very
important for a number of reasons. It has impact in the
countries. It's going to have an impact in the region, and the
outcomes of this election and the directions these countries
take are going to have an impact on United States interests.
The election on May 6th in Lebanon was the first election
since 2009. It should have--perhaps could have been an
important step forward. But I was very disappointed,
personally, by looking at it from the perspective of Congress
to see the gains made by political parties affiliated and
allied with Hezbollah. I have long been concerned by
Hezbollah's operations in Lebanon and its involvement in the
country's government. I am even more concerned by Iran's
growing influence in the region, as evidenced by these recent
events.
I would like to associate myself with Chairwoman Ros-
Lehtinen's comments, and I think we need to make sure we are
looking not just at the short-term implications of Hezbollah's
success but the long-term implications for Lebanon and the
region.
As I turn to Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr's return to prominence--
this rise in this election--should be a concern for all of us.
The future remains unclear, but the influence of--growing
influence of Iran appears almost certain. The common thread
between both these elections appears to be Iran and Iran's
influence in the region.
I think it's critically important that the United States
focus on this and develop a strategy, articulate and share that
strategy not just with Congress but the world.
I want to thank the subcommittee for holding today's
hearing so we can hear from our witnesses on how best to push
back against Iran's increasing malign influence.
We have to find a way to support legitimate aspirations of
Lebanese people, the Iraqi people, to create better lives for
themselves. We have to do it without propping up organizations
like Hezbollah or strengthening Iran's other proxies.
Again, I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member
and our witnesses today for your time. And with that, I yield
back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding
this important hearing, and I will be very brief in my
statement so that we can get to our witnesses.
As former chairman of this committee and having been on the
committee for more than two decades now, I would just note that
whereas it's encouraging to see both Lebanon and Iran hold--
excuse me, Iraq hold elections that it's concerning to see
Iran's growing influence both in Iraq and in Lebanon.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah and their allied factions hold an
increasing number of seats there, a majority in Parliament, and
despite its political influence Hezbollah, let's face it,
remains a terrorist organization that directly threatens our
principal ally in the region, Israel--and it really does
threaten the entire stability throughout the region.
The intelligence community, in fact, now believes that
Iranian proxies are the primary threat to our personnel in
Iraq. So after we spent so much blood and treasure, we must not
let Iran reap the benefits of those sacrifices that were made
at such a high cost by so many of your troops there, and then
the effort that was made to finally destroy, for the most part,
ISIS. So let's make sure that Iran is not the entity that
ultimately benefits from the blood and the hard work of so many
Americans and our allies.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
And now, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
One of my biggest worries is that in the Western world we
are kind of tired of defending democracy and freedom and we
think we are exhausted. We are not, but we think we are.
We convince ourselves we are sometimes and, in fact, when I
came out of Iraq in 2009 that's actually when I made the
decision to run for Congress, because I had seen between 2008
and 2009 massive improvements because of the surge in Iraq, and
I knew that Iraq could be successful but we'd have to stick
with it for a little bit.
And I heard the President at the time--the new President,
Obama--say that he wanted to get out of Iraq, and I remember in
2011, in fact, he said we are leaving behind a stable
democratic free--all these great adjectives--Iraq and we left.
And pretty soon we had ISIS, we had the collapse of the
government and we are back. So my biggest concern right now,
Madam Chair, is that as we look at the behavior of Iran in the
region I think we've done the right thing by pulling out of the
Iran deal because of their bad behavior. But I think it's
important that no matter what happens in Iraq we be careful not
to leave it behind because I've got another 5 years in the
military and people I know are going to be in there even
longer. I don't want to go back again. It's better to stay than
leave and come back.
So with that, Madam Chair, I thank you for holding this, I
thank the guests for being here and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Kinzinger.
And now I am pleased to yield to our ranking member, Mr.
Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for calling this
hearing. I also want to welcome back our panel of experts, all
familiar faces to this committee. We appreciate your being here
today and we look forward to your insight.
This has been a thought-provoking few weeks in the Middle
East, to say the least. We've watched as elections were held in
Lebanon and Iraq. Clashes erupted between Israel and Iran on an
unprecedented level. The U.S. Embassy moved to Jerusalem,
Hamas' violence renewed near Gaza in its aftermath, and the
U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA--all of this gives us on this
committee much to consider and all of this impacts the
discussion we are going to be having here today.
Both Lebanon and Iraq are strategic interests to the United
States. Both have teetered on fully entering Iran's sphere of
influence in recent years, and while the results of the
elections invite concern over the success of anti-U.S. Shi'a
groups, we commend both countries for holding what we at this
time believe to have been fair and honest elections. Democracy
as an institution must be led from within and we congratulate
Lebanon and Iraq for continuing on the path toward democracy.
Dr. Wittes, you co-led the National Democratic Institute's
delegation to observe the Lebanese elections and I look forward
to your take on democracy in action as you saw it.
As we wait to see how the elections will impact the
formation of new governments in both countries, there are a lot
of questions for us to think about in addition to the lingering
questions about these countries' stability and the trajectory
they're taking. We are concerned about the possible impact of
the outcome of these elections to the Lebanese and Iraqi
relationships with the United States.
In Lebanon, where the U.S. has dedicated significant
assistance in its economic and security sectors, we watched as
a very low voter turnout, estimated at less than 50 percent,
voted for traditional Hezbollah-allied partners.
And I reiterate my long-standing position that Hezbollah is
a terrorist organization in its entirety and efforts to
normalize Hezbollah and similar groups under the guise of
politics is both misguided and it is dangerous.
Nevertheless, I believe we must remain committed to helping
those legitimate government institutions and forces in Lebanon
that can counter Hezbollah and, ultimately, Iran's malign
influence.
I am deeply concerned about Iran's intentions to promote
the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. The United States
must work to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent
military presence in Syria from which we have now seen it
directly and brazenly attack Israel, and from continuing to
transfer weapons and capabilities to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In Iraq, the recent elections propped up the anti-U.S.
cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, whose violent insurgencies against
U.S. forces resulted--has resulted in so many U.S. military
deaths and we are deeply concerned by the Iranian voices
permeating from Baghdad and the calls for the U.S. to disengage
from the region where we have expended so much blood and
treasure.
The conventional defeat of ISIS is a tremendous victory but
for long-term success to take hold Baghdad and the United
States must remain vigilant.
A strong democratic Iraq cannot be achieved under the
influence of the tyrannical Iranian regime and Iran's attempts
to sway Iraq in its direction are concerning.
Apart from foreign influence concerns, both Lebanon and
Iraq have economic and security concerns that cannot be
ignored. ISIS and the effort to defeat the group left Iraqi
cities in rubble with over 2 million Iraqis displaced.
Lebanon is struggling with the impacts of a mass surge of
Syrian refugees. Economic growth is vital to stability in both
countries and I am concerned about government services failing
to provide for citizens who may then turn to groups like
Hezbollah or ISIS to fill the gap.
We've got to examine the domestic issues and concerns that
led to the outcomes produced by these elections if we are going
to fully understand how the ultimately formed governments will
orient themselves.
There is a great deal to unpack here and I thank our panel
of experts for their time and expertise in helping us do that,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And now we turn to Ambassador Wagner for an opening
statement.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for hosting this
hearing.
It's encouraging to see Iraq and Lebanon hold democratic
elections. I am, however, deeply concerned to see Iran's
influence increasing steadily, if slowly, in Iraq and Lebanon's
governing bodies.
Iran does not hesitate to sow discord in its democratic
neighbors to undermine our regional initiatives. Democracy
flourishing in the Middle East is good for American interests
and long-term stability of the region. It is clear to me that
any strategy to contain Iran must include a democratic
independent Iraq and Lebanon.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and the
questions that will ensue. I thank you, Madam Chair, for your
indulgence and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wagner.
Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, thank you very much for holding the
hearing today and if we are concerned about Iran--excuse me,
Iraq and Lebanon and we are concerned about the expansion of
Iranian influence, again, let me remind us, as I have in this
hearing room so often, Iran is not our enemy.
The mullah regime in Iran is our enemy, and the reason why
we see that we are losing ground--that we are losing ground in
Lebanon and in Iraq is because we have let the mullahs off the
hook. They don't have any internal worries so they are on the
offensive.
When we could be helping the Kurds--there are more Kurds in
Iran than there are in Iraq--but we should be helping the Kurds
in both Iran and Iraq. There are Baloch. There are people in
Iran who hate the mullah regime and they're getting not the
type of support that they need, and if we started that strategy
we would have the mullah regime probably defeated within a
short period of time or at least not engaging in these
activities in Lebanon and Iraq that are--that are threatening
to our security and the stability of that region.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Seeing no other requests for time, now I am delighted to
welcome our panellists.
First, we thank Dr. Michael Doran, senior fellow at the
Hudson Institute, where he specializes in Middle East security
issues.
Prior to this position, Dr. Doran was a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institute, held positions at NYU, Princeton, and
the University of Central Florida--finally, a good university--
and served as a senior director in the National Security
Council.
Thank you so much for being here today, sir. We look
forward to your testimony.
And next we are delighted to welcome back Danielle Pletka,
senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at
the American Enterprise Institute and an adjunct professor at
Georgetown University.
Prior to this, Ms. Pletka served as a staffer for the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Thank you for being here.
We look forward to your testimony, and we see that your two
daughters are there behind you--two out of three. Thank you
very much for being here today. We'll try to embarrass you as
much as possible, daughters.
And finally, we are delighted to welcome back Dr. Tamara
Cofman Wittes. It doesn't matter how many times you come here.
I am still going to slaughter your name. Wittes? Wittes--there
we go--senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at
the Brookings Institute.
Previously, Dr. Wittes served as deputy assistant secretary
of state for Near Eastern affairs as well as Middle East
specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace and director of
programs at the Middle East Institute.
Thank you so much, all of you, for being here. We look
forward to your testimony. As I said, your written statement
will be made a part of the record. So please feel free to
summarize, and we will begin with you, Dr. Doran.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DORAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, THE HUDSON
INSTITUTE
Mr. Doran. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Move your microphone just a little bit.
Mr. Doran. How's that?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member--Ranking Member
Deutch, members of the committee--of the subcommittee, it's a
privilege to speak to you today.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
implications of the elections in Iraq and Lebanon. In both
countries the results represent a setback for the United
States.
In Lebanon, they have, obviously, strengthened the hand of
Hezbollah. In Iraq, opinion is divided about the extent to
which Muqtada al-Sadr's rise represents a victory for Iran.
Even if the results turn out to be less damaging than the
pessimists predict, there is nevertheless little doubt that
they complicate American efforts to contain Iran.
These setbacks, however, are but the latest in a long
string of Iranian advances and they are by no means the
greatest advances. With your permission, I will concentrate on
how the United States might, in broad strategic terms, rebound
and reverse the trend. I will focus my remarks in particular on
the strategic implications of President Trump's decision to
withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That
decision certainly lays the groundwork for a more effective
American policy. It will not, however, prove sufficient to turn
the tables on Tehran.
The United States, I will argue, should adopt a two-speed
approach to its competition with Iran. I will argue it should
adopt a two-speed approach to its competition with Iran--
aggressive and uncompromising in some areas such as Syria and
Lebanon, where it enjoys a freer hand, and more nuanced in
countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, where conditions are not
conducive to an unfettered competition.
Yesterday, Secretary Pompeo laid out a broad strategy or a
broad policy of rolling back Iranian power throughout the
region, not just in the nuclear program, but also in terms of
its support for terrorism and its influence in the region. I
strongly welcome this approach. I think it correctly defined
the Iranian problem and I think it dispensed with a lot of the
illusions of the last 4 or 5 years in which we have seen
ourselves engaging with moderates in Iraq and strengthening
them and bringing them into the family of nations.
And I think that Secretary Pompeo's speech spoke with
admirable clarity about the essence of our strategy now, which
is one of coercing Iran. Now, the critics of this policy are
presenting it as a choice of war over peace but I think that's
a false depiction, because what they are calling peace was
actually appeasement, as, I think, all of the--everyone who
spoke today on the subcommittee said.
Iran has been on the march and, unfortunately, that march
has been facilitated by the enrichment of Iran that the JCPOA
made possible. So the administration is to be--the
administration is to be credited with seeing things clearly and
for laying the groundwork for a policy of seriously containing
Iran. However, we have to be clear about the fact that Iran is
not going to be coerced simply by reimposing the sanctions,
which the JCPOA--which the decision about the JCPOA will
entail.
Coercion means actual coercive policies--the use of hard
power to make Iran pay a price for the--for its military
adventurism around the region.
In Secretary Pompeo's remarks, he actually spoke about
crushing Hezbollah and proxies. The word was very evocative. It
stood out. But I am afraid that it didn't strike fear in the
hearts of any Iranian leaders because they have been treated to
this kind of frightful rhetoric before and they have developed
a number of--a number of clever mechanisms for defeating
American hardliners or, let's just say, hardline policies. They
have come with ways of waiting us out and wearing us down.
The two-speed strategy that I suggest is one in which we
can actually bring hard power to bear against Iran in some
arenas and in other arenas, like Lebanon and Iraq, having a
somewhat lighter touch. The essence of it, as I describe in my
written testimony, is that we should be relying, especially in
Syria and in Yemen, on allies who are already in the hard power
fight against Iran and Israel, in particular.
I note that our military is very reluctant to get directly
involved in the conflict against Iran and it complains that it
doesn't have an authorization of force. Given that fact--given
the difficult politics around it, I think where we should be
focusing our attention in terms of raising the cost to the
Iranians across the board is by strengthening the Israelis in
Syria and strengthening the Saudis in Yemen through military
support, intelligence support, diplomatic support, and other
forms of assistance.
In Iraq and Lebanon in particular I think we have to be
aware--we have to admit that our influence has been somewhat
diminished and that the complex nature of our interests in
those--in those countries will make it difficult for us to
carry out a hard-power competition with the Iranians there.
But we have to do much more. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, you
mentioned the--withdrawing support or reviewing support to the
LAF. The LAF, in my view, is actually the--should be of
secondary concern to us. The primary concern to me is the
control or the influence that Iran and Hezbollah have in the
banking and finance sector in Lebanon. That's where it would
put the emphasis.
I'll just end by saying this--that the Bipartisan Policy
Center issued a report on Iran policy recently which laid out
three basic options without choosing one of them. Option one
was roll back, option two was containment, and option three was
modus vivendi. Under the Obama administration, we had a policy
that sought modus vivendi with Iran without acknowledging it.
The effect was that we realigned our policy from Baghdad to
Beirut in parallel with the Iranians. When the Trump
administration came in, it didn't have a roll back option in
any of the--in Iraq and Syria or in Lebanon.
I don't think that this decision that it has made is going
to make roll back possible. I think, however, containment in
those--in Lebanon and Iraq is possible. Roll back is possible
in Syria. But the administration has yet to announce that it is
actually going to engage in that kind of hard power roll back,
which I think is absolutely essential to the success.
If we don't raise the price to Iran across the board, then
the strategy that they have outlined will not succeed.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Doran follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Ms. Pletka.
STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE
Ms. Pletka. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Deutch, members of
the committee, thank you so much for asking me to join you here
today. It's really a pleasure to be back and thank you for
embarrassing my children. It's really been my life's work and I
am always happy to have help.
A few months ago, I wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street
Journal asking whether the United States intended to lose Iraq
as we have lost Lebanon. The question really feels all the more
apropos today in the wake of the troubling elections we've been
talking about here today in both those countries.
So let's skip to the punch line. In both these cases, the
United States has, or once had, a chance to challenge Iran at a
relatively low cost. But as we have already done in Lebanon and
Iraq, too, I fear, we will miss that chance because we are
focused elsewhere, myopic about our potential influence, and
really too willing to lie to ourselves about the status quo. We
are really, apparently, indifferent in too many cases to the
march of the Islamic Republic of Iran across the greater Middle
East.
Beginning with Lebanon, the results of the election are as
depressing as they were predictable. Prime Minister Saad
Hariri's party lost and their allies lost about 15 seats, which
was a rout rooted in both Lebanon's own dysfunction, Hariri's
own lackluster performance and the somewhat bizarre interlude
during which he was kidnapped to Saudi Arabia.
The winners were two: A protest vote for the Lebanese
forces, which shouldn't be confused with the Lebanese Armed
Forces--they picked up seven seats--and the other was Hezbollah
with its own party and allies picking up about 15 seats. Tammy
noted to me that Walid Jumblatt's party also picked up seats.
Where Walid will stand is always a question in everybody's
mind, but he has stood with Hezbollah.
This is the same Hezbollah that's amassed an arsenal that
would be the envy of many countries. Israel estimates Hezbollah
has more than 150,000 rockets in the south of Lebanon, built up
in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Worse
still, I understand that Iran is changing its arms transfer
modus operandi. Because it recognizes the difficulty of
transferring weapons to its proxies over land, through air,
over sea, it is instead concentrating on transferring know-how:
Rocket, missile building, guidance system, things like that. If
Hezbollah or the Houthis or Hamas or any of Iran's many proxies
throughout the region have the know-how to build more and more
advanced weaponry and the operational latitude to do so, as
they do now on Lebanese soil, what does the future hold?
The last elections confirmed for us that the next
Government of Lebanon will be run, largely, by Hezbollah, which
means, of course, it will be run, largely, by Tehran. I know,
as Mike said, that the Treasury Department is concerned about
the integrity of Lebanon's banking system. In addition, we
should be worried about the fact that Hezbollah reportedly
wants the Interior Ministry, the Public Works Ministry, and the
Economy Ministry as for itself using the cash that they can get
out of those ministries to ease the burden on their sponsor in
Iran, which is having some economic difficulties.
So that leaves for us the Lebanese Armed Forces. The
Lebanese military claims not to coordinate with Hezbollah but
there's evidence to the contrary. Last year, Hezbollah's
military parade in Syria included a U.S. M-113 armored
personnel carrier. Did it come from the Lebanese Armed Forces?
Intelligence sources in some countries say yes. The U.S. says
it doesn't think so. But we know that in southern Lebanon the
LAF have allowed Hezbollah to restock, shared intelligence with
them, and have jointly manned checkpoints.
Given the weight of the evidence--and there's more, I am
pretty sure, in a classified setting--is it not appropriate to
worry the Government of Lebanon is effectively itself becoming
a proxy of Iran?
In light of that, consider we've given more than $1.5
billion to Lebanon in security assistance and even more in
development and economic support.
Defenders of the U.S. posture in Lebanon including some in
the White House, the State Department, and at the Pentagon
suggest the LAF are an effective fighting force against ISIS.
General Votel, the commander of CENTCOM, has been very
insistent on that regard. But if fighting ISIS is our sole
standard, why should we not arm and support Hezbollah? They're
pretty good at that, too.
That's the challenge we face. The enemy of our enemy isn't
always our friend and the same is true, unfortunately, in Iraq.
In part assisted by an alliance with the Iraqi military and
the so-called popular mobilization forces, we were able to
secure a victory against ISIS in Iraq. But this pact with
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Forces-supported Iraqi
units will mean the U.S. and the Government of Iraq ultimately
pay a very heavy price, and look no further than the results of
these elections in which our ally, Haider al-Abadi, came in
third place, trailing the leader of the Popular Mobilization
Force's Hadi al-Amiri and Muqtada al-Sadr.
Unlike in Lebanon, we don't know what the outcome of the
Iraqi election is going to be and it may not be a slam dunk for
Iran. But there's an underlying point here, and that is the
lesson unlearned by the United States in Lebanon and,
apparently, still unlearned in Iraq today. The Islamic Republic
of Iran has a foreign policy model. They do not seek to
dominate. They seek to influence and, if necessary,
destabilize. They do so through their proxies and,
increasingly, through their proxies in Iraq as well. These are
Iranian expeditionary forces not only loyal to their own
countries but answering to command in Tehran.
If I may have just another 30 seconds.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, go ahead.
Ms. Pletka. Iran is no Soviet Union. Its economy is weak
and its hold over its own people is tenuous, as you yourselves
have noted. But victory after victory in the Middle East should
suggest to us that Iran has a winning formula, one that would
be--one that could be countered with a serious U.S. strategy of
engagement, a theory of our own victory, and one that would not
contemplate an every decade return for war in the Middle East.
We must shore up the Iraqi Government as we fail to shore
up the Lebanese against Iran. We must do so without wavering in
our commitments, and by offering them choices: Us or them. Us
must mean genuine political and economic engagement and
leadership. This is what you were talking about that both the
Obama administration and, unfortunately, the Trump
administration has cut back on. That kind of engagement is far
cheaper than war. It must start with aiding the battle against
corruption, which erodes confidence in democracy and markets in
Beirut and Baghdad, and it must continue with a commitment to
institutions of government.
You may well ask, because I know we are going to talk about
this, whether that is not what we have done with the Lebanese
Armed Forces in Lebanon, and my answer is no.
We've looked away as that country has been sucked into the
Iranian vortex, and failed to bolster those who naturally
despise Iran and its terrorist proxies.
We've allowed weak leaders to take our money and our
weapons while serving a foreign master--perhaps not always
directly but, certainly, indirectly.
We've never put it to our nominal allies that they must
stand against Iran and Hezbollah, not simply rhetorically but
actually. We've never laid the burden on them to prove they're
not working with a designated terrorist organization.
I believe we failed in Lebanon and I believe we've lost.
Now we are faced with the same choice in Iraq. We can either
force these countries to choose between Washington and Tehran,
or we can continue to bury our heads in the sand and allow Iran
to win again and again.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER
FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Wittes. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch,
distinguished members of the committee, good afternoon and
thank you for inviting me.
I must begin, as always, by noting that I represent only
myself before you today. Brookings does not take institutional
positions on policy issues and although, as Congressman Deutch
noted, I was a leader of the NDI observer delegation in
Lebanon, I am not representing NDI today either.
The elections in Iraq and Lebanon earlier this month, I
think, present a fragile but important counterpoint to a region
in turmoil. Extremists claim that only violence can bring
change, and these elections promise another path, and when
Lebanon and Iraq pull off free elections under such trying
circumstances as these, I think it's harder for strongmen
elsewhere to argue that they can't afford the risk to stability
of allowing their own peoples a choice in who governs them.
The political outcomes from these votes offer both risks
and opportunities for American policy. I think we need to be
wary of drawing strong conclusions from ambiguous results and I
don't think we have yet lost in either place.
There are some developments worth nurturing. To curtail
Iranian influence to advance our own interest in stability and
counterterrorism, the U.S. needs to stay engaged using
diplomatic and economic tools and working together with
regional partners who share our goals of promoting stability
and tempering Iranian influence.
The greatest risk for American policy toward Lebanon and
Iraq right now would be to embark on blunt force policies
either by walking away from the fight or by squeezing these
fragile countries into unwelcome crisis. I think those tactics
would actually give away American influence and advantage Iran
further across the region. Let me describe a couple of trends
that I saw in both countries that I think are worth noting and
building on.
In both Iraq and Lebanon, elections yielded low turnout--49
percent in Lebanon, 44 percent in Iraq. Both those who voted
and those who stayed home expressed impatience with established
political movements who are more interested in dividing the
spoils of government than in actually governing. And in both
places, security gains have increased citizens' appetite for
effective governance--for governance that meets their core
needs. In both countries the military and the security services
are relatively trusted national institutions, certainly
compared to other parts of the government, and in both
countries we see in public opinion polls nationalism is growing
relatively to sectarianism.
And these are trends that present some opportunities for
new moderating political forces to emerge. But they also
present the risk that if citizen needs aren't addressed, those
citizens might just give up on politics and on government as a
source of solutions to their problems.
So we have a stake in supporting healthy political
competition. Now, in neither country did I see an electoral
outcome that significantly shifts the balance of power between
Iran's allies and its adversaries.
As I said, that battle is not over. In Iraq, the process of
government formation will be much more important, I think, to
determining Iran's role than the election itself was. And I
think that the U.S. can be clear about the principles it
expects a new government to embrace, and we can work with
regional partners to create incentives for Iraqi party leaders
to move in the right direction.
In Lebanon, I don't think it's quite right to say Hezbollah
won these elections. I think, in fact, Hezbollah won the
political game a couple of years ago in October 2016 when, a
few months after Saudi Arabia cut off its aid to the Lebanese
Government and to Hariri's political movement, Hariri cut a
deal with Hezbollah to return as prime minister and that's the
deal that seems to hold now.
But I have to note that Hezbollah's heavy engagement in
Syria has costed over 1,000 battle dead. It's weakened its
focus on providing for Shi'a communities in Lebanon, and this
political campaign showed that even Hezbollah had trouble
getting its loyal voters to the polls, and it faced new
independent political challenges it hadn't seen before. I think
the failure of Saudi Arabia's ``my way or the highway''
approach to Lebanon over the last couple of years should be
instructive to us now. Walking away from the table is a good
way to ensure you lose the game.
And just to slightly correct the view that Dany ascribed to
me, it was actually Geagea's Lebanese forces that increased its
vote that I was pointing out to you. Jumblatt is about the
same.
One final note, if I may, about our approach to Iran and
how these elections fit into the picture. Secretary Pompeo's
speech yesterday laid out a list of desiderata for changed
Iranian policies that I think we can all agree are worthy
goals. But a strategy links goals to means and yesterday's
speech did not lay out a realistic path by which we can achieve
the goals that we seek.
The Trump administration's declaration of maximum pressure
on Iran I think is likely to be tested very quickly by the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ratcheting up conflict in
existing areas of tension around the region, and while
sanctions are important, they have not historically done much
to constrain the IRGC's regional activities.
Sadly, those activities are relatively cheap for the IRGC
and the Iranian regime. What troubles me is that at the same
moment the Trump administration is looking to walk away from
key arenas in Syria, abandoning local allies, and freeing up
space for both Iranian proxies and Sunni extremists who feed
off one another, it's hard for me to understand the recent
White House decisions to withdraw our special forces fighting
ISIS, to freeze $200 million in pledged reconstruction
assistance, or to cut aid to areas in Idlib Province that have
been freed from ISIS rule. So I worry that the determination to
neglect our hard-won gains in Syria risks the resurgence of
ISIS, cuts directly against our ability to shape this ongoing
competition for influence against Iran, and weakens our ability
to support our anxious regional partners and protecting their
own security against Iranian depredation.
We've got to stay engaged. We need a strategy that's long
term and one that combines military and intelligence assets
with diplomacy and economic support.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Doran, Ms. Pletka,
and Dr. Wittes. Got them all now.
I would like to get your opinion on U.S. policy on our aid
to Iraq. If the Sadr organization or any Iranian-linked entity
continues to control Iraq's Interior Ministry, is it in the
interests of the United States to continue aiding Iraq's
interior security force?
Mr. Doran. I think it is. I think in the--in the short term
we don't know who Sadr is and it's really a competition now
between us and Iran over the direction of Sadr. I think it
would be too early to make any kind of precipitous change to
the policy until we can stand Sadr before a couple of tests and
see which way things are going.
You know, when you look at the core experiences of the
Iranian regime, it all goes back to the Iran-Iraq war and the
threats that emanated from Iraq. So the key desire of the
Iranians I think--the key strategic desire is to make sure that
there isn't an independent Iraqi military that can ever
threaten Iran again. And that's got to be the key area of
competition, and my fear is the same is Tammy's, that if we
leave the game we are just going to hand it over to them.
The fact of the matter is we have to play the game a little
bit more like they do, which is when the Iraqis do something
that the Iranians don't like, the Iranians threaten their lives
or the lives of their loved ones. When the Iraqis do something
that we don't like, we send a demarche.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, let's not adopt their strategy,
though.
Mr. Doran. We have to threaten things that the Iranians
hold dear. How's that?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. All right. That's better. Thank you.
Ms. Pletka.
Ms. Pletka. I am going to make a slightly less bloodthirsty
comment than Mike. I mean, Muqtad al-Sadr has tried to
refashion himself as an anti-corruption crusader. I am not
quite sure it's true but, on the other hand, it's certainly a
role that's much needed to be filled in Iraq, as I think we
could probably all agree.
You know, one of the things that was very interesting that
happened in Lebanon some years back--two decades back--was that
Lebanon had been riven into very--in the wake of the civil war
had been riven into all of these different militias who
answered to different sects and to different religious parties
and to different political parties and to different outside
powers.
It's not an unanalogous situation to the one that we see in
Iraq today, although Iran is the dominant player for sure, and
the one thing that I believe we could do to some good effect is
to try to help the Iraqi military become a military that serves
the government and the people of Iraq and not the people and
its masters in the IRGC. That's something that they're only
going to be able to do with our support. So I think that that
engagement is vital.
I think that the right way to think about this is
competition. We actually do need to compete with Iran on the
territory that they designate is important to them in order to
ensure that the people stand with us--an infinitely preferable
ally than with the Iranians.
Ms. Wittes. Just briefly, I think Dany's correct to say
that that Lebanese model of a government is essentially a
patronage mechanism for the parties within it. That is the
model that Iraqi Governments have followed for the last several
cycles. It's possible they don't need to follow that model this
time and I think that there is actually increased pressure from
voters to see a more effective government and that's why Sadr
kind of rebranded himself in this campaign. So I think that
that gives us something we can build on if we can create the
incentives.
The other thing I would say is that I think all of these
Iraqi parties know that this government is not going to yield
enough patronage for them if security is not maintained. They
all know that they need effective internal security and they
know that they need American help to do it. I think that that
does give us quite a bit of leverage if we maintain those
relationships.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I was struck, Ms. Pletka, by the way you described Iran's
interests, seeking not to destabilize--seeking not to dominate
but to destabilize and influence, and which then made me think
that that seems to be the same approach that some other
countries take. It's the Russian approach.
And I read through the secretary's speech again just now
and I would like to just couch this discussion--take a step out
and view it through Iran's activities in Syria--Iran, on the
ground in Syria, attempting and very clearly--in Syria perhaps
it might be different, much closer to domination than
destabilisation.
But the Russians very clearly are interested in
destabilization in Syria, a policy that extends throughout the
region, I would think, and I would like you just to speak to
that combination and the fact, as Dr. Wittes says, that a
strategy needs to show us how we are going to satisfy our goals
and what means we are going to use to satisfy those goals.
And if we are not--if we are talking about the outcome of
the elections but we are not talking about what's happening
Syria and the role that Russia plays, then is it even worth
having a conversation about Iran at all if we ignore that
critical relationship?
Ms. Pletka. I couldn't agree with you more. Let me be
honest, I don't think that any strategy that looks at Iran can
be through a soda straw in which we--this, to my mind, was what
was wrong with the JCPOA. The JCPOA was something that
compartmentalized certain things in Iran and left others in
their baskets to be dealt with later but, of course, they
weren't dealt with later.
Now, you know, we can talk about whether that was a good
choice or the right way done but that is, in some ways, water
under the bridge. But we are about to depart on a new strategy
toward the Iranians that is going to crush them and their
regime and their economy.
Isn't the right place to start in Syria? This has been
inexplicable to me since 2011, frankly. There are those who
suggest that there's an opportunity for us in Yemen. I think
that's a slightly more complex environment. The Saudis and the
Emiratis are there. But for as long as the Iranians are
victorious in Syria, whether it's for themselves or for their
allies in the Assad regime, we are not going to be rolling them
back.
And your note about the Russians is exactly correct. The
Russians are opportunists. The Russians are there because we
are not. The Russians have stepped in not because the costs are
high to them but because the opportunities are disproportionate
to the costs, and we have not done enough to raise the cost to
the Russians for their adventures overseas.
So----
Mr. Deutch. So, Dr. Wittes, what is the right approach
then, particularly vis-a-vis Russia? How is it--what--in the
strategy that you're looking for, in the strategy that all of
us are waiting for, what should that strategy--how does that
strategy include Russia? How do we--and then--and then how does
that affect the way we deal with Iran in Lebanon and in Iraq?
Ms. Wittes. You know, I think for a number of years the
Russians have played this double game with the U.S. and the
West in Syria where they have simultaneously taken advantage of
all the opportunities that Dany just laid out, but in addition
to that, said, well, when push comes to shove, we can help
deliver the Iranians on a solution here--we can constrain them.
And the question I've always had is even were they willing,
which they have yet to really demonstrate they are willing to
do, could they, in fact, deliver Iran. And this week, I think,
is instructive in that regard where you had a clear statement
out of Moscow about the need for foreign forces to depart
Syria, and the Iranians turned around immediately and said,
well, I don't know who you're talking about--we are not going
anywhere.
So, you know, it may be that American strategy needs to
push the Russians to make a choice and then see that the
Iranians are not actually going to go along with their
preferences and, therefore, that Russia needs to work with us
to contain Iran's role here.
Mr. Deutch. I just want to make sure I understand America's
role. America should push Russia to make what choice?
Ms. Wittes. Rather than simultaneously saying to us,
``We'll deliver the Iranians,'' and saying to the Iranians,
``We'll get the West off your back,'' that they need to make a
clear--that they need to repeat what they did this week. They
need to make some clear--set some clear expectations and some
clear constraints on the Iranians. Now, they have incentive to
do that right now because of this prospect of escalation
between Israel and Iran, because Israel has made so clear that
it will not tolerate IRGC embedding themselves near the Israeli
border, and this is threatening Russia's own gains in Syria.
Why is it there? It's there because it wants a permanent
military presence. It wants to play spoiler against us and it
wants to make money in Syria's reconstruction. And if there
ends up being a hot Iranian-Israeli war over Syrian territory,
Russia is not going to make any money. So I think this is
actually a moment where we can push them to push the Iranians,
and they will see they cannot deliver Iran and they're going to
have to take a harder stance.
Mr. Deutch. And doesn't that have to be--does that have to
be a public pronouncement and if it needs to be a public
pronouncement wouldn't that be the kind of--the kind of
pronouncement--the kind of pressure to make a decision that
would belong in, say, a big speech about Iran policy also?
Ms. Wittes. Yes.
To me, one of the biggest missing pieces of the speech from
Secretary Pompeo this week was that coalition. He kept talking
about an international coalition that agrees with our goals,
that's going to work with us to advance their goals--our goals,
and yet he could not specify any track of American policy or
activity beyond we are going to go out to capitals and talk to
them that would actually produce that result.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Dr. Doran, I appreciate your book, ``Ike's Gamble,'' on
what the U.S. can learn from Eisenhower's administration as we
examine how to treat our friends and partners in the region.
I am curious what you think about Iraq's election results
and I am even more curious to hear your thoughts on the impact
that President Trump's Iran deal decision will have on our
friends in the region.
Mr. Doran. Thanks for mentioning my book. [Laughter.]
For me, the main takeaway from the Iraq election is that
Iraq cannot be the primary arena in which we are pushing back
against the Iranians. But it is absolutely--it is absolutely
vital that we engage in very significant competition with the
Iranians in Iraq but more so that there are--there are arenas
in which we have--we have aggressive unfettered competition
with the Iranians. If we don't show all of our allies in the
region that we are really serious about rolling back Iranian
power, not just--not just causing them some pain but rolling
them back, I am afraid we'll lose the competition.
There was actually in my--in my book, since you mentioned
it, one of my favourite moments in the--in Eisenhower's
experience with the Middle East came in 1958 after the Iraqi
revolution, which took Iraq away from the West, and Eisenhower
decided to intervene in Lebanon.
And he met with Sam Rayburn, and Sam Rayburn said, I'm--you
know, Mr. President, I am worried about two things. Number one,
I am worried about the Russians--that this will provoke them,
and number two, I am worried that our--we are going to alienate
Arab public opinion, both of which are important, and I am
afraid--actually, three things--I am also afraid that there's
no end game, basically, and that this will all end badly.
And Eisenhower said--and I think it was a great moment of
tremendous honesty--he said, ``Oh, it's going to end badly--I
can assure you of that.''
The only question is, does it end badly with us reassuring
our allies that we are with them against their enemy or does it
end badly with us not supporting our--not supporting our
allies?
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Mr. Doran. And that's the situation that we are in now. We
have to demonstrate to the region that we really mean business.
Reimposing the sanctions is good but we have to really push
back against the Iranians where they are pushing hard, which is
Syria.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. I agree.
Dr. Wittes, you just returned from observing Lebanon's
elections. I am sure we both agree that Lebanon's successful
elections are a promising sign for Middle East democracy.
But the real source of democratic longevity is bottom-up
support, and that takes a long time to develop. Are Lebanon's
young people engaged in the democratic process? And to what
extent has Iran and Hezbollah stunted democratic growth in
Lebanon?
Ms. Wittes. Thank you, Congresswoman Wagner. That's a
fantastic question.
I would say that over the years I have been visiting
Lebanon, and I also observed the 2009 elections, there's been
quite a flowering of civic engagement and activism among
Lebanese youth. The main domestic observer organization, LADE,
is basically a youth-run organization. The Lebanese
Transparency Association also represents that rising generation
of Lebanese, and there were about 800,000 new voters. The age
of voting is 21 in Lebanon, and because it had been 9 years
since the last election, 800,000 new voters had entered the
rolls.
So all of the parties had to respond to the frustration
that young people were expressing--that these tired sectarian
patronage systems were not meeting their needs--and I think
that does offer the opportunity for shift away from sectarian
politics to something that's more focused on government
effectiveness.
Now, the U.S. Government has made long-term investments in
Lebanese civil society and youth engagement and empowerment, in
civic education, and sadly, those investments have flagged in
the last year and I really do believe those are important and
worthwhile to sustain.
Mrs. Wagner. Great. Well, thank you for that answer.
And I am about out of time. Ms. Pletka, I have a question
to you but I will spare your daughters and I--Madam Chairman, I
will--I will submit it for the record and I thank our witnesses
very much and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and again, thank
you to the witnesses for sharing your perspectives today.
Dr. Wittes, I will start with you. You made the statement
that the strategy should be linked to goals--links goals to
means, and that in this region the United States appears to
lack a strategy.
I will start with you but I will open the whole panel: What
are the implications of not having a strategy and the
consequences that if we don't get one shortly we are going to
face?
Ms. Wittes. Well, thank you.
I think the primary consequence, in addition to simply
being ineffective in achieving our goals, is in our
relationships with those in the region who rely on their
partnerships with us and on our support.
And over the course of the last 5 months, I've been to
Saudi Arabia twice. I've been to Kuwait. I've been to Lebanon.
I will be in Israel next month. And I would say that I hear
across the board anxiety about American policy and American
leadership. The intentions are there. The rhetoric sounds
great. None of them loved the Iran deal, although the Gulf
accepted it and I think all of them had some anxieties about
letting it go.
But what they really want to know is are you there for us
for the long haul--can we count on you when it matters, and
there, I think, there are real anxieties emerging and I would
say that the recent Trump administration decisions on Syria
have piqued that anxiety even farther.
Mr. Schneider. Ms. Pletka.
Ms. Pletka. The consequences of not having a strategy are,
you know, as we've all described, which is that we--our allies
in the region are full of doubt that people who are
fundamentally well intentioned at any particular level, whether
in governance or in economics or in civil society, are worried
that there's not going to be a power that stands by them and
that those who are there are going to--are going to take
advantage of our absence in order to push the region back
toward the direction of autocracy, or worse, in the case of
Iraq and, I would say, in Lebanon as well.
But there's another problem here and that's a problem of
continuity from the Obama administration. Barack Obama famously
told the Saudis that they were going to need to learn to share
the region with the Iranians, as if somehow the two of them
should split everything up while we go home. That's not a
policy and it's not a strategy, and it was a mistake then and,
unfortunately, subcontracting to our allies in the region to do
what they think is right in the absence of a strategy is not a
great idea either.
The bottom line is--and I hope all of us, actually, agree
on this no matter where we stand on the political spectrum--the
bottom line is that there is no substitute for U.S. leadership.
Our values, the things we stand for--and that does not mean as,
I think, our previous President too often insisted, a choice
between abandoning the region and war. It really means
engagement. It means standing up for the kinds of things that
matter to the future of the region in the long term so we don't
to go back. Good governance, markets--you know, those are the
things that matter and we need a strategy to get to those
things.
Mr. Schneider. I agree with you, and if I could take a step
to Dr. Doran--that might be the segue to you. I think--and I
don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think what I heard
you say is that we should allow Israel to push back against
Iran and Syria. I will raise the question. Absent a strategy,
is Israel confronting Iran on the border between Israel and
Syria has one dynamic and the United States working with our
allies in the region to keep Iran out of Syria has another
dynamic. I think the former carries as lot more risk and
negative consequence than the latter. I would welcome your
thoughts on that.
Mr. Doran. Yes. In an ideal world, I would prefer that the
United States defined the end state that it wants in Syria, and
put together the coalition to achieve it, assigned roles and
missions, and so on.
But after watching our politics over the last--over the
last 5 years, I doubt that's going to happen and I see, on both
sides of the political aisle, not a lot of appetite for nation
building in Syria. So I worked from the assumption that
that's--that that's the baseline and I have to work within that
parameter and that's why I--that's why I am talking about
supporting the Israelis.
I was struck a couple months ago--then Secretary of State
Tillerson made a statement--a prepared statement about our Iran
policy in which he said that the United States was working to
counter Iran across the region, and then General Votel, the
commander of U.S. CENTCOM, was testifying before Congress and
was asked what the military is going to counter Iran in Syria,
and he said it's not a U.S. military mission to counter Iran in
Syria.
Mr. Schneider. I think what he said was he hasn't been
given instructions.
Mr. Doran. So but it's also clear to me that the military
doesn't really want to do it. So----
Mr. Schneider. And I am out of time.
Mr. Doran. The basic line--the basic point is, if we are
not going to do it directly then the next best thing is to
support our allies who will.
And yesterday Secretary Pompeo said we want an Iran--we
want Syria devoid of Iranians. So do the Israelis. So let's
associate ourselves directly with Israeli red lines and support
them.
Mr. Schneider. Well, I agree with that. I agree that we
need to support Israel. It's our most important ally in the
region, one of our most important allies in the world.
But I would just argue that it would be better if Israel
doesn't have to confront an Iran with permanent bases in Syria,
and instead we work with Israel and our other allies to make
sure that Iran can't establish that permanent presence in
Syria.
Mr. Doran. I totally agree with you.
Mr. Schneider. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know we discuss the Middle East it
seems so mind boggling in its various parts and I think that we
have gotten so far away from trying to deal with reality in
order to keep in place lines that were drawn by colonialists
100 years ago.
Here we have--basically, we are, you know, on the verge of
war. Not on the verge of war--we are engaged, dramatically
engaged, with violent and warlike activities, all based on
alliances--on these lines that were drawn.
Correct me if I am wrong, but Iraq was not a country until
the colonialists made it a country, and here we are talking
about how we are going to keep faith with Iraq. There is no
Iraq. The fact is is that there are different nationality
groups in Iraq that have--that are--that go many centuries.
To be very bold, I think that perhaps if we are ever going
to have peace in that region or be a force for peace in the
region, it's not going to be because we are taking sides and we
are involved with the unrelenting confusion and chaos that
we've seen going on there.
We don't need to say that we support the Iraqis. But what
we do need is to find those nationalities that are at play. The
Kurds are a nationality. They are people who recognize
themselves as Kurds. The Iraqis don't see themselves that way.
Am I wrong? They see themselves as Kurds. They have various
different groups within Iraq and that's how they see
themselves.
In Lebanon, we know that you have had--well, you had the
Druze, you had the Muslims, and you had Christians. I don't
know--I guess it's been a good thing to try to keep Lebanon
together.
But I remember when I was in the White House when Ronald
Reagan sent the Marines into Beirut and I remember that my
brother's best friend, who joined the Marine Corps right after
they graduated from Camp Lejeune High School, was blown to bits
in that little incident, and Ronald Reagan knew immediately
that was not the right tactic to use.
And that's when he worked with--and I am going to brag
here--he worked with myself and a number of people, maybe five
or six others, who established an alternative strategy to
sending American troops everywhere and that was called the
Reagan Doctrine, and it seems to me it worked because it
brought down our primary enemy, which was the Soviet Union.
I guess my question to you folks is that, number one, there
is a Persian entity that--a nationality. You have Iran but,
again, we are trying to deal transactionally with a nation-
state that doesn't exist.
You have got Boloch. You have got Kurds. You do have a
Persian heart of Iran. Should we not be going into the reality
of trying to--instead of trying to deal transactionally with
what are actually nonnations with this--with the colonial
leftover designations of territory under what jurisdiction,
wouldn't it be better for us to try to restructure and work
with those people on restructuring borders by siding with those
nationalities like Persians as compared to the Iranian mullah
regime, like the Kurds, like the various Christian--there's
Christian elements there in Syria as well and we know--I guess
we are trying to work with them.
I don't know if that makes any sense to you or not, but
what doesn't make sense to me is what we are doing--when
hearing over and again, oh, we are siding with that group. We
are going to hope that this group wins the election and there's
no, really, substance historically to any of the groups that we
are talking about.
So, as I say, as compared to selecting the Persians,
selecting the Baloch, selecting the Kurds, selecting those
groups--the Druze, who are people who have a real nationality
about them.
And sorry if I've gone on too long on this question but if
you want to have a comment to show me how naive I am, thinking
that we can deal with a Kurdish nation instead of Iraq.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You did take up the entire 5 minutes with
the question but we'll have--who's the designated answerer? Dr.
Doran.
Mr. Doran. I won't take more than 10 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay.
Mr. Doran. The----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Pardon me. I am sorry for going on too
long.
Mr. Doran. I don't--I don't actually agree with you in this
sense that, yes, those states were created by the--by the
colonialists. But they've been there for a century and that's
what we've got. And any attempt to redraw the borders is going
to be highly controversial, and it's going to affect the lives
of millions and it's going to be an act of imperialism at least
as great as the act that created those states to begin with.
And it's only going to hold if the United States military is
there in force to hold it. And so, I mean, you're talking about
another George W. Bush style invasion of the region in order to
redraw the--redraw the boundaries.
So I think we are stuck with what we've got, which is
working with those states which are recognized but also
recognizing, as you say, that there are some state actors who
have--some state actors who have their own--their own
independent organization and ability to influence things. So
it's--you know, it's an art of balancing the two. But redrawing
the boundaries I don't think will get us out of the--get us out
of the fire.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, at least we should be dealing with
people who we can make--who are our--could be our friends in
order to defeat the primary enemy, which is what happened when
we defeated the Soviet Union.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses.
I would like to first turn to Iraq and ask you, Dr. Wittes,
is it possible for the U.S. to work with al-Sadr and his allies
if they do form a government in terms of achieving our short
and long-term objectives in Iraq? And what are your assessments
of his true motivations and where do his loyalties lie? And
assuming his coalition does take control of the government, can
the U.S. be expected to work in concert with the same coalition
who murdered American troops and our partners in droves during
the height of the Iraq war? Do we have any mutual interests
that would make that a possibility, and what's your assessment?
Ms. Wittes. Well, Congressman, I think it's a crucial
question. I don't think there's an obvious answer.
But I would say that yes, I think we do have some interests
in common. We'll have to see how Muqtad al-Sadr chooses to play
his cards.
He has demonstrated a great deal of political agility--let
me put it that way--over the years. He's quite an opportunist,
and he now sees the political opportunity in moving away from
militancy, moving away from Iran declaring independence, moving
against the corruption visible in other parties, including some
of the traditional Shi'a parties that are more closely allied
with the popular mobilization units, the militias, and more
closely allied with Tehran.
So let's see what we can do--let's see, first of all, what
his intentions are in terms of government alliances and then
let's see how we can work with that.
I think our interests are, number one, maintaining security
and counterterrorism cooperation with the Iraqi Government;
number two, an Iraqi Government that is committed to neutrality
and regional conflicts for--to give you a very specific
example, we do not want an Iraqi Government that would be
willing to tolerate these Iraqi militias helping transfer
militias into Syria, for example. That simply is something we
can't afford to see again. We want an Iraqi Government that
will work to resolve the conflict with Kurdistan and we want an
Iraqi Government that will advance reform, especially in the
economy.
I--at least what we hear from al-Sadr right now I think is
encouraging on all of those fronts and I think we need to press
for clarity.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
And what is your opinion with respect to Iranian goals in
Iraq, and what are they doing to achieve those objectives?
Ms. Wittes. So I think their goals are a few.
Fundamentally, I agree with Dany that they are more interested
in having a veto than in having overwhelming control.
But I think that the situation in Syria is such that they
now seek to use Iraq as well as a sort of staging ground and
that's something that we must prevent. I think there's also
money, frankly, to be made there both for them and for their
allies and I think that we need to ensure that that doesn't
destabilize the country.
And so, you know, the goal, from an American perspective,
of an Iraqi Government that is neutral in regional conflicts
itself is a goal that heads off Iranian interests. It's a goal
that will require Iraqi Shi'a parties in a coalition government
to push back against Iranian requests on a number of important
fronts and I think that's worth investing in.
Mr. Cicilline. And, finally, the Iranian representative,
obviously, vying of Iranian interests in Baghdad is General
Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force.
Considering al-Sadr's anti-Iran stance, do you think
General Soleimani can successfully vie for a pro-Iran
Government, and if not, if they're not successful in securing a
pro-Iranian Government in Baghdad, what will the ramifications
be for Iran's land bridge and what are the implications of
that?
Ms. Wittes. Okay. So here we get into a little bit of
speculation in Iraqi politics, which is very, very
unpredictable.
I think there are two major possibilities for government
formation. One would be a Sadr alliance with Abadi that might
exclude all, if not most, of those more pro-Iranian political
factions.
It's possible they could also put together a big unity
government. But I think Sadr's initial inclination is an
alliance with Abadi that would keep some of those guys out. I
think what Soleimani would probably like to do is put together
a grand coalition of pro-Iranian Shi'a parties, bring in some
other non-Shi'a parties who want to feed at the government
trough, and keep Sadr out.
And so it's--to me, I think there's a bit of a zero sum
there, and I think Sadr is going to be looking to see what's on
the table, not only for himself and his political allies, but
for an Iraqi Government in which he would participate.
Our Gulf allies, for example have put on the table
significant potential economic investments. The Saudis have
done, I think, a very creditable job of courting Sadr over the
last year, including welcoming him in the kingdom. They've
opened a consulate in Basra. They've opened their border to
trade with Iraq. The Kuwaitis are also suggesting that they
could do a lot more business in southern Iraq.
And so there are incentives in play and I think the
American role here is important as well. I think it's important
that we not make the mistake of saying, well, our
counterterrorism fight against ISIS is over--let's cut economic
engagement--let's cut diplomatic engagement--let's go home.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline.
Thank you to our witnesses and let's hope for the best. But
we fear the worst about the implications of these elections.
Thank you so much and with that, the subcommittee is
adjourned.
Thank you. Bye, daughters.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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