[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-126
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-016 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., chairman emeritus and
distinguished fellow, The Stimson Center (former Assistant
Secretary for Political Military Affairs, U.S. Department of
State)......................................................... 4
The Honorable Stephen Rademaker, senior of counsel, Covington and
Burling, LLP (former Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and
Assistant Secretary for International Security and
Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State).................... 11
The Honorable Jane Harman, director, president, and chief
executive officer, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars (former Member of Congress)........................... 24
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.: Prepared statement..... 7
The Honorable Stephen Rademaker: Prepared statement.............. 14
The Honorable Jane Harman: Prepared statement.................... 27
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 74
Hearing minutes.................................................. 75
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 77
Written response from the Honorable Jane Harman to question
submitted for the record by the Honorable Dina Titus, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada............ 79
CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 8, 2018
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. All right. We will call this hearing to
order.
Later today, the President will announce whether he intends
to keep the United States in the Iran nuclear agreement. This
is earlier than expected.
Over the past 6 months, the Trump administration has urged
France and Germany and Britain to help address the full range
of threats posed by the Iranian regime.
U.S. negotiators have rightly pushed for fixes to the
deeply-flawed agreement, including stronger inspections, new
sanctions on Iran's ballistic missiles program, and a solution
to the deal's sunset problem.
Addressing these serious shortcomings is a must to keep
Iran from threatening the United States and our allies with a
nuclear weapon.
As I've said, this agreement's fundamental flaw is that it
trades temporary restrictions for permanent sanctions relief.
Today, this committee will examine the decision before the
President. As the members of this committee know, I opposed the
nuclear deal and so did a bipartisan majority of the committee.
And why was this so? Because the Obama administration, in
the negotiations, ditched its key goals. The deal does not shut
off Iran's path to a nuclear weapon. It does not allow
inspectors ``anywhere, anytime, 24/7 access.'' It does not stop
the regime's pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
it gives Tehran an infusion of cash to support more of its
terrorist activities around the world.
That said, I believe the best path forward at this point is
to continue to fix these flaws as we enforce the hell out of
the deal.
The Obama administration has put us in a tough spot.
Roughly, $100 billion was given to Iran. At least $1.7 billion
of that was an apparent cash ransom payment, stacked on pallets
and flown, against the advice of the Justice Department and
other officials, to the Iranian regime at the time when the
three hostages were released.
Much of these funds have likely found their way into the
hands of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tearing up the nuclear
deal will not recover this cash. That toothpaste isn't going
back into the tube.
It also won't help galvanize our allies into addressing
Iran's dangerous activities that threaten us all. I fear a
withdrawal would actually set back these efforts and Congress
has heard nothing about an alternative.
Last week's move by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to
unveil Iran's secret nuclear weapons archive reminds us all
what is at stake. Despite its repeated denials, Iran had a
comprehensive program to design, to test, and to build a
nuclear weapon.
Of course, this begs the question--what is Iran hiding
today? Shouldn't we have better inspections? Remember, the
deal's existing restrictions expire in the short years ahead.
The key restriction--the ability to quickly enrich
uranium--begins to phase out in less than 8 years. We should be
able to get an agreement with the Europeans to fix these
serious flaws.
I understand we have made encouraging progress in recent
weeks. If we don't have an agreement today, let's double down
on diplomacy and get a deal in the weeks ahead. The Europeans
need to get to yes.
And now I'll turn to our ranking member, Mr. Engel of New
York, for his opening statement.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with your
opening statement.
To our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
We are grateful for the decades of public service that all of
you collectively represent, and Jane, it's always good to see
you back on Capitol Hill.
Once again, we find ourselves against a phony deadline
dealing with the Iran nuclear agreement. Once again, the
President has created a crisis where none exists and kept us
all wondering what he's going to do.
This administration has promised a comprehensive approach
for dealing with the regime in Tehran. Yet, 16 months along,
the Trump administration's Iran policy seems to be do nothing
until the clock runs out and make unrealistic demands of
Congress or of our international partners, and up to this
point, kick the can down the road a few more months.
The President has until Saturday to decide whether to
continue waiving nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, though
reporting this morning suggests that he will announce an end to
those waivers today.
I hope he understands the stakes. If he puts those
sanctions back into effect, the United States will be in
violation of our obligations under the nuclear deal and trigger
the deal's collapse.
The argument that the deal would continue without American
participation is simply not true. There is no having it both
ways, and let's be clear, President Trump would be the one who
pulled the plug and undermined American credibility.
I've said more times than I can count that I opposed the
deal when it was announced. I voted against it on the House
floor and I continue to have doubts about the JCPOA, and I have
doubts about whether it will prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon over the long term.
But I know for certain that pulling out of the deal now
will make a nuclear-armed Iran a much more immediate threat.
Some of my chief concerns with the agreement were the sunset
provisions.
But those sunsets come many years in the future. What's the
emergency now? Why the hysterical rush if the United States
undermines the deal for sunsets that expire in 10 or 15 years
would instead expire at the end of the week?
Iran would race headlong toward a bomb while keeping the
cash that's been freed up over the last few years of sanctions
relief.
If we want to extend the sunsets, and many of us do--and
that was one of my major objections to the deal--let's work
cooperatively with our allies rather than ruining any chance we
have of keeping the Iranians from the bomb for a longer time.
Reimposing sanctions would also have far-reaching
consequences besides terminating the JCPOA. We could find
ourselves slapping serious punitive measures on our closest
friends and allies.
Furthermore, it would send a terrible signal that the
United States does not live up to its word and with North Korea
negotiations ramping up, that is the exact wrong time to send
that message.
Why would anyone negotiate with us if the minute we got a
new administration or a new President they ripped up any
agreement in order to get rid of it and start anew?
I think it undermines our credibility and it's the wrong
message to send, and I have to note that President Trump could
not have been more wrong when he said that killing the Iran
deal sends the right message to North Korea.
Frankly, it sends precisely the wrong message, and that
message is that the U.S. won't live up to its commitments. At
the same time that the United States scuttles the deal, we
would lose whatever leverage we have in trying to make the
agreement stronger and addressing all of Iran's other
aggressive activities.
I think there is potential for progress but it requires the
United States to lead, work to bring parties back to the table,
lean into new negotiations, allow the present deal to continue,
and try to build on top of it.
Instead, the administration wants to sit back and say
Europe needs to do the hard work or Congress needs to fix it.
That's just not the way these things work.
Congress has done its part. We have given the
administration all the tools it needs to crack down on Iran for
its illegal ballistic missile program, its support for
terrorism, its atrocious human rights record.
The White House should use these tools to craft what it
promised: A comprehensive Iran strategy rather than bringing us
to the brink of crisis every 3 months.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses views on this
challenge. I, again, thank the chairman and concur with his
remarks, and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
So this morning, I am pleased to welcome our panel. We have
got distinguished guests before this committee including
Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield.
He's the chairman emeritus and distinguished fellow at the
Stimson Center, and he previously served as the Assistant
Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs.
We have Mr. Stephen Rademaker who serves as senior of
counsel at Covington and Burling. Previously, he served as the
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, before that, the
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation, and before that, with this committee.
We have Jane Harman. She leads the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. Previously, she served here
in the U.S. House of Representatives representing the people of
California's 36th District.
And we appreciate all of them being here with us today, and
without objection the witnesses' full prepared statements will
be made part of the record.
Members here are going to have 5 calendar days to submit
any statements or questions or any extraneous material for the
record.
Obviously, the President's announcement yesterday that
he'll be making an announcement on the Iran deal this afternoon
and the strong expectation that he'll be exiting the agreement
changes today's discussion some and it affects, certainly, for
the witnesses, their written testimonies, which I've read.
I appreciate the scrambling and I am hopeful that this
would be all the more reason why we should be concise here
today in terms of your testimony and that way we can hear your
expertise in response to our questions.
And, again, I thank you for being here to discuss these
very important topics. We will start with Ambassador Bloomfield
and we will ask him to please summarize your remarks if you
can.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR., CHAIRMAN
EMERITUS AND DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE STIMSON CENTER (FORMER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking
Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for the honor
of being with you this morning.
Like you, I await the President's announcement this
afternoon whether he will continue to waive nuclear sanctions
on Iran or withdraw the United States from the P5+1 nuclear
agreement.
There are valid reasons to maintain the restraints on
Iran's nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action. There are also strong criticisms of the accord because
it has left the world uncertain as to whether Iran still seeks
to develop nuclear weapons in the future.
I find merit in both points of view and believe that the
legitimate concerns of supporters and critics of the JCPOA can
both be accommodated if the Congress is prepared to act.
The Iranian regime's malign activities domestically and
regionally require a more effective response and the President
is far from alone in his criticism of the nuclear accord.
The question is what would be a successful policy. It is
not enough to be right. The U.S. needs influence, credibility,
and leverage over Iran and the problems it is creating.
If the U.S. pulls out of the JCPOA, I see four serious
consequences that we should hope to avoid.
First, Britain, France, and Germany, our strategic allies
who've spent years negotiating this agreement, will be
disappointed.
Their publics may feel as though we snubbed the best
diplomatic efforts of President Macron, Chancellor Merkel, and
Minister Boris Johnson.
If we end up in disputes, attempting to enforce Iran's
sanctions against European companies, the West will be divided
over the Iran threat.
Secondly, Iran may resume an accelerated rush to build
nuclear weapons with no restraints. The head of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, recently said
that they could resume 20 percent enrichment activities at the
Fordow facility in 4 days.
Third, a nuclear arms race could break out in the Middle
East. Iran's Arab neighbors across the Persian Gulf declared in
2008 that they will match any weapons capability that Iran
possesses--a position reiterated in recent months.
America's pledge to maintain Israel's qualitative military
edge in the region could become meaningless if Iran and its
Arab neighbors are racing to build or acquire nuclear weapons.
The fourth major concern about withdrawing from the JCPOA,
even when the CIA director testified last month that Iran is in
compliance, is the long-term impact on Presidential diplomacy.
The day that other governments conclude that an executive
agreement reached with one administration might easily be cast
aside by the next President, they may insist on a treaty,
requiring ratification by two-thirds of the Senate.
Not only will the House of Representatives be disempowered,
but Presidential power to shape foreign policy including trade
will be diminished.
That is why in my prepared statement I have suggested that
the Congress amend the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of
2015 so that the President no longer has to certify Iran's
compliance every 90 days.
We and our allies should intensify the identification and
inspection of suspicious sites. The reality is that the final
milestone in the JCPOA where the International Atomic Energy
Agency reaches a ``broader conclusion'' that Iran's nuclear
activity is entirely peaceful, will never happen unless all
legitimate suspicions can be put to rest.
If Iran will not extend the duration of sunset clauses in
the accord, we should codify the longstanding bipartisan policy
that Iran must not have nuclear weapons.
The President would leave no room for doubt by declaring
this as a doctrine.
A third area of concern is Iran's ballistic missile
activity. When a 2010 U.N. prohibition was lifted as part of
the accord, Iran immediately began testing missiles.
Scores of missiles have been fired into Saudi Arabia from
Yemen. There must be no financial dealings with any
individuals, companies, banks, and organizations supporting
Iran's ballistic missile program.
Five years have passed since President Obama extended the
offer to Iran to pursue a path to a more respectful
relationship. The nuclear deal was reached.
But Iran has shown no interest in changing its ways. For
decades the clerical dictatorship has been conducting nonstop
geopolitical arson, threatening regional peace and stability,
international norms, and U.S. national security interests.
We, and our allies, must stand together and say, ``no
more.''
I thank the committee and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bloomfield follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Mr. Rademaker.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN RADEMAKER, SENIOR OF
COUNSEL, COVINGTON AND BURLING, LLP (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Mr. Rademaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Engel and members of the committee. It's a pleasure to appear
before you again. I thank you for the invitation.
I want to say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, I agree entirely
with your opening statement. I really couldn't have put it
better.
I have submitted a prepared statement. I think it makes a
lot of excellent points and I urge you to read it. But since
there have been some developments since I wrote the statement,
I think I will depart from it and make a few additional points
to those in my prepared statement.
The President, this afternoon, is going to announce his
decision. According to press reports, he's going to announce
that he's decided not to exercise the waiver authority that he
has under existing law, going forward, and thereby allow
existing U.S. sanctions required under laws passed by this
committee to take effect, which I think would mark a U.S. exit
from the JCPOA.
That will be an unfortunate outcome for all the reasons
that Ambassador Bloomfield has identified and I am sure
Congresswoman Harmon will make those points as well about the
downsides to that outcome.
The point I want to make is there are basically three ways
to avoid that outcome. One is for the President to change his
mind. I don't think he's going to change his mind. He's drawn a
line in the sand and I think today he's going to announce his
determination to adhere to that line.
So we can sit here and complain that his tactics are all
wrong. But I don't think he's going to listen. He's made up his
mind and we know what direction he's going.
The second way to avoid it is the one that you suggested in
your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and that is for the
Europeans to reach an agreement with Trump administration to
fix the agreement and that--you know, I've observed this
closely and I think actually the administration has made a good
faith effort to negotiate with the Europeans and has come up
with what I would describe as a very modest proposal.
For a man who declared that this was the worst deal ever,
when you look at what he's asking from the Europeans, it's a
price for keeping the United States in the deal. It's
relatively modest price and, in my opinion, entirely
defensible, and I will come to that in a moment.
The third way to avoid it--and it was actually I think
President Trump's preferred way to keep the United States in
the deal--was for Congress to pass legislation very similar to
what he's asked the Europeans for.
Now, he really looked to the Senate to act on that
legislation initially. There was a bill introduced by Chairman
Corker and Senator Cotton, and he specifically endorsed that
legislation. This was in October of last year.
He called on the Senate to pass that legislation and it was
clear that if the Congress enacted that legislation he would
keep the United States in the JCPOA.
That legislation stalled in the Senate. One of the reasons
it stalled in the Senate was the Europeans deployed their
diplomats to lobby against them and I think that's what
accounts for the President's decision in January to sort of
shift the onus from the Senate to the Europeans and said, if
you want to work against me in the United States Congress,
well, I am now going to ask something of you.
So I think that's sort of how we got to where we are today.
But a third solution would be to go back to the Corker-Cotton
legislation which, again, I think actually represents a
defensible approach to what to do about the fundamental problem
we face, which is the sunset clause.
I think even supporters of the JCPOA acknowledge that the
sunset clause is a problem, that effective January 2026 Iran's
ability to enrich uranium is going to go up exponentially and
their ability to break out and produce nuclear weapons will
become quite imminent and what do we do about that.
In my prepared statement I identify, basically, five
options for addressing that problem. One of them is just to
accept that idea that Iran will be able to have nuclear weapons
if it's wants to after 2026.
I think that's probably the worst of the options. I don't
think many people will endorse that option.
The second is to threaten to bomb them if they get close to
a nuclear weapon and a lot of very respectful people have urged
that option.
There was a statement here that lots of prominent foreign
policy leaders signed onto in 2015 calling for that--just
threatened military force if they get close to a nuclear
weapon, notwithstanding that they're able, under the JCPOA,
after 2026 to get close to having a nuclear weapon.
Third option, threaten them with sanctions, and that's what
President Trump is calling for--threaten them with sanctions if
they get close to a nuclear weapon after 2026. I mean, that's
the key point. He's asking for agreement on what's going to be
our policy after 2026.
So, the idea that he's asking for something that's contrary
to the JCPOA is simply inaccurate--something that would put us
in breach of the JCPOA is inaccurate because it is a policy
statement about what would happen after 2026. Until we get to
2026, there's no argument that we've taken steps contrary to
the JCPOA.
The fourth option I identify is to negotiate with the
Iranians. I am here to predict that before the Trump
administration is over he's going to negotiate with the
Iranians.
He's getting ready next month to sit down with Kim Jong-un.
I think he's going to negotiate with the Iranians.
Everything that's going on now is him laying the groundwork
for a negotiation with the Iranians, I believe he's posturing.
The JCPOA is a pitiful platform from which to negotiate with
the Iranians.
So he's trying to change the baseline of that negotiation.
That's what's going on here and he's asking the Europeans to
help him change that baseline. He's asking the Congress to help
him change that baseline.
He's not getting cooperation on either of those things and
that's what's leading him to make his announcement this
afternoon which, as I said at the outset, is a very unfortunate
development.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Congresswoman Jane Harman.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT,
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR SCHOLARS (FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS)
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and warm greetings to
so many good friends on this committee, and especially to you.
We were classmates elected in the same year. Mr. Engel was a
few terms ahead of us.
We served together here for nine terms and my able
successor, Ted Lieu, is on the bottom row of this committee
smiling at me. So I appreciate that.
But to so many of you, we were together in so many battles
and I continue to care about this committee very much and wish
you well as you enter your next chapter. Thank you for your
really valuable service to the United States.
Like my two panelmates, I agree on where we should go. I
disagree with many of you on the merits of the deal. Had I been
here, I would have supported the deal.
But nonetheless, at this point, I agree strongly with you
and with Mr. Engel that we should stay in the deal and proceed
with many of the things that have been discussed here.
Obviously, I had prepared testimony arguing that that's not
likely to happen. But I have adjusted my testimony to make a
few points, some of which have already been made.
I think that, while the deal isn't perfect, if we withdraw,
Iran could, and has said they will, withdraw too,
notwithstanding an additional protocol which prohibits them
from returning to the nuclear weapons program. I am not sure
they would follow that.
Some fear that Iran might also withdraw--and you mentioned
this--from the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty under which
191 countries have agreed to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and related technology.
To me, that would be a major setback and potentially
provoke a nuclear arms race in the region, which has been
mentioned. We would be far worse off under that scenario.
And let's not forget that there are four U.S. citizens and
two green card holders in captivity now in Iran. Their chances
of being released just got or just will get worse.
For sure the transformation that the Obama administration
hoped for in our relationship with Iran has failed. Iran's
malign behavior has not improved. It has gotten worse. We
should accept that fact and address those problems with careful
attention to Iranian involvement in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and
its provocative behavior to its neighbor, Israel, our
democratic ally in the region.
The results being tallied now from Sunday's Lebanese
parliamentary election suggest that Hezbollah has gained
seats--at least one seat--and surely gained influence in that
country and that is worrisome.
There is a reason, as has been pointed out, that President
Macron and Chancellor Merkel picked last week to visit the
United States and that British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson
visited yesterday.
Three of our closest allies urged the U.S. to stick with
the JCPOA. They made clear that they are open to a four-party
side agreement. The assumption would be that China and Russia,
the other parties, would not join.
But the recommendations for that agreement I think we all
agree on and they would make the deal better. They certainly
include extending the expiration date.
There should be no expiration date requiring inspection of
military sites, a moratorium on ballistic missile testing and
development, and Iran ending its support of terror groups and
other operations across the Middle East region.
It remains my view that addressing Iran's meddling across
the Middle East won't get easier to manage without a deal.
We still lack a comprehensive strategy to address the
Iranian challenge, which also evaded the Obama administration.
What is our Plan B?
I think that's something this committee has a chance to
address on a bipartisan basis. To me, Congress can't continue
to be AWOL from the discussion of the authorization of use of
military force--an AUMF.
Most of us were here when the 2001 AUMF passed. I surely
voted for it, as did every member of this House except for one,
and it is the basis of continued U.S. military action in the
region.
My view is that it was limited in time and space and it is
time for Congress to step up and address the secondary and
tertiary effects of withdrawing from the Iran agreement and
some of the other activities, many of them military--many of
them using military technology like drones or train and assist
missions in the greater Middle East, and Congress can and
should do this.
I also wonder--and this was raised--whether the Trump
administration has adequately considered the linkage of
withdrawing here and the conversation President Trump will
have, hopefully, soon with North Korea.
Obviously, the Kim regime is watching closely. By walking
away from the JCPOA, we send an important message about how
seriously we do or do not respect the deals to which we agree.
The contours of President Trump's decision are not yet
clear. If he waives secondary sanctions against our European
allies, they will likely continue to trade with Iran and that
could reduce the chance that Iran withdraws from the deal.
If he doesn't waive the secondary sanctions, then he has
invited, in my view, a major trade dispute with Europe, which
will be amplified if he decides to impose aluminum and steel
tariffs on the EU next month.
We should not underestimate the need for our allies. The
Europeans are disappointed, if not dismayed, by the U.S.
decision to leave the Paris Climate Accord.
They helped to construct the world order after World War II
and we will pay a huge price if they move to align elsewhere.
So, in conclusion, this is a time, in my view, for Congress
to step up and insist that secondary and tertiary ramifications
of these issues be considered.
It is also a time for Congress to put the country first on
a bipartisan basis. The stakes couldn't be higher.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Harman follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you very much, Jane.
Okay. So we'll focus here on some of the points that Steve
Rademaker made and both of the other witnesses made.
If we go to the January 12th statement that the President
made, he called for a new U.S.-EU3 supplemental agreement is
what he called the addendum agreement--that would impose new
multilateral sanctions if Iran develops or tests long-range
missiles, thwarts inspections--these are his words--or makes
progress toward a nuclear weapon, requirements that should have
been in the nuclear deal in the first place and these
provisions must never expire.
So these were his comments. Some of the European leaders
have similar concerns. We've heard them raise those concerns
with us.
So at this point, what could be done to encourage European
partners to address this very important issue? I would say this
is the crux of it.
The other thing that concerns me is the ballistic missile
program Iran is running and what it means in terms of their
transfer of ballistic missiles into Syria and into Lebanon, et
cetera, et cetera, into the hands of Hezbollah and other
militias.
But the key question here is just to get back to the fact
that we've heard these concerns raised by the Europeans. Back
in January, the President said that this kind of an addendum
would be a way to resolve this.
Is there a way to get our European allies here more focused
on just such a solution?
Steve, if you want to begin.
Mr. Rademaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The crux of the problem is that beginning January 2026,
Iran, under the terms of the JCPOA, basically can have a
nuclear weapon at a time of its choosing.
They will be able to produce the fissile material that they
would want or that they would need to do that, and probably not
just one nuclear weapon but lots of nuclear weapons and they
could do it in such a short time that we wouldn't even be able
to detect it before it happened.
What do you do about that? You know, a lot of leading
experts said, well, not a problem--we'll just threaten to bomb
them if they do that.
What President Trump has said, and what he called for in
his January speech, was no, let's threaten them with economic
sanctions if they do that.
And the Europeans have hesitated to agree to what he's
asked for, you know, an agreement about what we would do
beginning January 2026 if they use flexibility under the
agreement.
Their first concern, as I understand it, is some of them
say, well, this would violate the JCPOA. And the point I want
to make about that is Iran has declared that they're not going
to allow inspections of military sites and it's clear that the
JCPOA requires them to allow inspections of military sites.
So is Iran in violation of the JCPOA by having said today,
we will never do something we are required to do under the
agreement?
Chairman Royce. Well, that's what the Ayatollah says.
Mr. Rademaker. Well----
Chairman Royce. And, of course, he makes the decision. The
difficulty is that the Ayatollah took a different position,
really, Steve, than his chief negotiator.
His position was, I will make the final decision--you won't
be allowed on any military base.
But on that, we seem to have consensus. The Europeans agree
with us on inspections. The Europeans seemingly agree with us
on the ICBM aspect of it. So we can probably get there. In my
view, we can get there on those two issues.
The crux of it, as you say--and I would like to hear from
the other two witnesses, too--is this issue of the sunset--is
there a way to phrase this, or is there a conclusion we can
come to that if they roll out an aggressive nuclear weapons
program at the end of the agreement that there's going to be
some kind of response and, you know----
Mr. Rademaker. Well, I think the two reservations the
Europeans have----
Chairman Royce. Yes.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. Is, first, there's an argument
that it would be a violation of the JCPOA for them to agree to
what President Trump has asked for.
Chairman Royce. Yes.
Mr. Rademaker. And on that point, I am saying just as I
don't think the Iranians have violated the JCPOA yet by saying
they're not going to allow these inspections.
It would not be a violation of the JCPOA for us to declare
with the Europeans what our policy is going to be starting in
2026.
Chairman Royce. Got it. Yes.
Mr. Rademaker. And I think some of the Europeans are still
confused and they still make the argument that, no, that would
violate the agreement today for us to declare that policy that
we are going to follow starting in 2026.
Chairman Royce. I understand.
Mr. Rademaker. So, satisfying them on the legal point I
think is the first thing. Then the second is----
Chairman Royce. Let's go to Jane--yes.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. Will the Iranians withdraw from
the agreement if we do that and, there, you know, look, it's in
Iran's interest to bluff, right. I mean, they're going to want
us to think that they would withdraw if we took that position.
The question is, would they actually withdraw?
I don't think it's in their interest to go back to the days
of sanctions and isolation and confrontation, which is what the
reimposition of U.S. sanctions would mean.
So I think actually the risk of Iranian withdrawal is much
less than some have suggested.
Chairman Royce. I tend to agree with you. But my time has
expired. I am going to have to go to Mr. Engel for his
questions.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In his January 12th speech, President Trump said if Iran
does not comply with any of these provisions, American nuclear
sanctions would automatically resume.
The next waivers that are due of the 2012 NDAA sanctions
which require the President to prevent foreign banks from
opening accounts in the United States or impose strict
limitations on existing U.S. accounts.
If those banks process payments through Iran's central
bank, the law exempts those countries who significantly reduce
their purchases of Iranian oil from the previous reporting
period.
Ms. Harman, let me ask you this. How would this affect
countries like Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, which
have not reduced their importation of Iranian oil?
Ms. Harman. Well, that's what I was trying to address in my
testimony. President Trump could say that he's decertifying the
deal today but he could waive the imposition of those secondary
sanctions.
I surely hope he does that. I think that would be a better
result. But let me also agree with Mr. Rademaker that he had
better options. I mean, there's no reason to withdraw from the
deal now.
There is every reason to work with our European allies who
said they were willing to do it, on making the deal stronger
before it expires. It's not expiring tomorrow.
And let me just add, finally, that Secretary of State
Pompeo, when he was the head of the CIA, said that Iran is
complying with the deal--with the four corners of the deal.
Let's understand, as the senior vice president at the
Wilson Center, Rob Litwak, who's very knowledgeable about this,
always says, the deal was a transaction, not a transformation.
It was a transaction to end Iran's program to pursue
nuclear weapons for a finite period of time. I wish that had
been infinite and I still hold out hope that that could be
achieved if we took a different path.
Mr. Engel. Well, I would hope that it could be achieved
because, as I mentioned before, that was my major objection to
the JCPOA--that it didn't really prevent Iran from having a
nuclear weapon, it just postponed it 15 years.
In relation to what we just mentioned, if the U.S. were to
sanction companies in Asia for doing business with Iran, as we
would be required to do under law, how would these sanctions
affect U.S. strategy on North Korea?
Ms. Harman. Well, I think that this action will hurt our
ability to strike a better deal--what President Trump would
consider a better deal, and we all would, with North Korea
because they're watching, and if they think we don't abide by
the deals we make, why would we abide by a much tougher deal
with them?
And I would just point out that I think it was a front page
article yesterday and the Washington Post pointed out how tough
it will be to administer any deal we make with North Korea.
They have a much more advanced nuclear program than Iran.
Iran had zero bombs. North Korea has, depending on how you
count, up to 60.
Plus, we should anticipate that they have deep tunnels all
over the country which would be very hard to identify, and our
intelligence on North Korea has been extremely poor up to now.
We have, basically, no ground truth in North Korea.
So taking this action this afternoon I think just made the
North Korea deal which, by President Trump's standards, would
be--and I agree--a crowning achievement of his presidency
harder to achieve.
Mr. Engel. Let me ask a question about Iran's permanent
presence in Syria. Let me ask either Ambassador Bloomfield or
Mr. Rademaker.
How would you advise President Trump to approach the crisis
in Syria after the fight against ISIS without U.S. influence
and presence? Iran is likely to benefit.
Yet, the administration, in my opinion, appears to be
handing Syrian territory over to the Assad regime, negotiating
de-escalation zones on Israel's border that could give Iran a
permanent presence in Syria, and how would a permanent Iranian
presence in southern and eastern Syria affect U.S. interests in
the region and affect Israel's interests in the region?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you, Ranking Member Engel.
The first point I would make is that the JCPOA, the nuclear
agreement, dealt solely with the nuclear sector, and at a time
when President Obama thought that the Iranians wanted to turn a
page and reform, they didn't pay much attention to the human
rights abuses at home that you mentioned and the activities in
the region.
Five years have passed. As I said, it's time to look at the
non-nuclear side of Iran policy. In Syria, what has occurred is
nothing short of the greatest war crime of the 21st century.
Iran's Quds Force commands militia that I would estimate at
60,000 or 70,000 inside Syria made up of Shi'a militia from
several countries.
The payroll comes from Tehran. The command comes from
Soleimani. And he has 80,000 in Iraq as well. We've never
addressed this point.
I think that what Bashar al-Assad has done cannot pass
without consequences. We should be building a war crimes
tribunal case against the Assad regime.
We should have had a defection program against the Syrian
armed forces. We should have been making a lot of noise about
Russia's reckless and promiscuous use of weapons that they give
to the Syrians to bomb children and women. Over 27 hospitals
were bombed when the Russians came in, along a cordon sanitaire
around Damascus. Where was America's voice?
So I think it's never too late to speak up for what is
right and I think the Europeans would join us in putting
together a series of political measures, informational
measures, and put the spotlight on Iran's aggression and let
the people of Iran know where all the money's been going,
because it certainly hasn't been going to the people who are
protesting in Iran today.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of our panellists, all good friends.
When this administration came in, it made clear that fixing
the JCPOA was going to be a top priority. We knew from the
outset that there was a lot of work left to do, much of which
the administration very clearly outlined in January, as we've
heard, when it said this was perhaps the last chance to fix it.
The administration had simple and common sense requirements
that everyone should have been able to support. But it isn't
just what is in the JCPOA that the administration has rightly
said needs to be addressed.
Iran's other malign activities, which you have addressed,
including its ballistic missile program, its support for terror
around the globe, have largely been ignored by our P5+1
partners ever since the nuclear deal was concluded, looking the
other way.
Despite years of diplomacy and despite assurances from
official after official during the last administration that
this would not be a problem, our European allies have been
reluctant to join us in holding Iran accountable.
The administration must succeed in getting our European
partners to act on the need to address Iran's malign
activities.
Our European friends must agree that getting rid of sunsets
that allow Iran to be a nuclear weapon state in just a few
years is in all of our interests.
But if, for some reason, our partners believe that it is
more important for them to pursue their economic interest with
a state sponsor of terror, then the President must reimpose
sanctions on Iran or withdraw altogether from the accord.
Should we not get tougher enforcement and verification
measures and should we not get our partners to look at the
totality of the Iranian threat, then we need to start looking
at what comes next.
We still have many tools at our disposal and it is clear
that Iran will continue to give us every opportunity to
sanction it for its illicit activity. It simply doesn't care.
No matter whether we think the JCPOA is working or not,
Iran is only getting stronger in the region as it expands its
influence and becomes more capable of threatening U.S.
interests.
Just look at the Lebanon elections that took place a few
days ago and those that are coming in Iraq this weekend.
If we keep wishing and hoping that we are going to fix the
JCPOA but nobody takes any action to do so, then we'll soon be
in a far worse situation than when we started, if we aren't
there already.
We may need another way to ensure Iran's nuclear program is
kept in check. As the chairman stated, the challenge is in how
to get the Europeans on board and exert maximum pressure on the
Iranian regime.
So my question then--I probably will only have time for
Ambassador Bloomfield--if the President does decide to walk
away from the deal--I know that Congresswoman Harman already
addressed this--do you envision the need for imposing secondary
sanctions?
Ambassador Bloomfield. My metric of success for foreign
policy, Congresswoman, would be unity among the allies. If they
are on board with us on what we bring forward then we have a
chance of pressuring Iran.
I want to point out that I don't think that Iran's Supreme
Leader is acting from a position of strength at all. I think
they are on thin ice at home. There were over 450
demonstrations last month in a country one-fourth the
population of the United States.
Other Ayatollahs are sounding off against Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei. I believe a case can be made that they brought on
the secret nuclear program not for military purposes but to
give the Supreme Leader some status that he wasn't receiving
from the Shi'a community in the Middle East.
So they are trying to put on a revolutionary front for the
people back home and it's not working.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And on the issue of secondary sanctions--
--
Ambassador Bloomfield. So on the issue of secondary
sanctions, if we lose the Europeans by going after their
companies or any other companies in the world, the way to do
that is to point out the suspicious sites.
We can point out any site where we have credible
information, and we can insist that the rest of the world
support us in demanding inspection. But it has to be based on
real information.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and thank you to our excellent
panellists.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Brad Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I want to associate myself with the
opening statement of the chair and the ranking member.
A number who support the JCPOA have said that we should
always regard the signature of the President of the United
States as binding on our country--that the President gives our
word and that word is binding on us.
I would hope that Congress would reject that view. For
example, this President might sign an agreement with Russia
that said we will never base American soldiers in Poland or the
Baltic.
Unless that is approved by Congress, it should not be
regarded as binding on the American people. So I think it is
legal for the President to renounce the JCPOA. It's just a
terrible idea at this time.
It will meet the President's psychological needs. This
agreement has the scent of Obama on it. It will meet, perhaps,
his political needs. It is terrible statecraft.
The President would be doing so in order to say he wants to
sanction Iran. Just a few weeks ago, a bipartisan letter was
sent to the President urging him to use the existing sanctions
from 2010 to sanction those who give spyware to the Iranian
government to suppress its people. He has not sanctioned a
single company nor has his predecessor.
It doesn't seem like the President wants to sanction Iran
in order to sanction Iran. He wants to sanction Iran in order
to desecrate a document signed by his predecessor.
If we are going to renounce this deal, we have to ask what
rights does each party acquire if the deal is voided.
Well, Iran gets to go forward with its nuclear program. No
inspectors, heavy water, unlimited centrifuges, and they can
seek a return--I will get to this in a second--of the stockpile
of fissile material that they shipped abroad under the deal.
What do we get? Well, we know that sanctions can change
Iran's behavior. There are many reasons to sanction Iran.
Does voiding the deal allow us to impose sanctions we
couldn't impose otherwise? Well, we know that voiding the deal
angers Europe and Japan and makes it incredibly difficult to
have effective multilateral sanctions.
But some of us--well, many of were here when John Kerry sat
at that table and told us that even under the deal, adhering to
the deal, we can sanction Iran in full proportion to its non-
nuclear wrongdoing.
They are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in
Syria, tens of thousands of deaths in Yemen. They stone people
to death for who they love. If they had never have thought of a
nuclear program we would be coming up with every possible
sanction and if we said we are doing it because of Syria and
Yemen we'd have European support.
There are plenty of reasons to sanction Iran to change its
behavior. Staying in the deal allows us to sanction Iran and
have the hope and expectation of European and Japanese support.
Voiding the deal liberates them and reduces the effectiveness
of our sanctions.
I don't even know why we are talking about this. But I,
believe it or not, do have a question. This deal is the good,
the bad, and the ugly. Good and bad at the beginning--it gets
ugly next decade.
The best part was that Iran shipped 16,000 pounds of low-
enriched uranium--a little bit of mid-enriched uranium--out of
the country.
They had the fissile material which, if further refined,
could create several nuclear bombs. They shipped it to Russia.
Ms. Harman, would Mr. Putin--if we voided this agreement,
would he entertain a request from Tehran to return that fissile
material which was shipped to Russia? Would he tease us? Would
he return part of it in return for more control of Syria?
How would we empower Putin, if he's sitting on 1,600 pounds
of low-enriched uranium that he may or may not return to Iran?
Ms. Harman. First of all, let me commend Congress for
something it did last year by a veto-proof margin and that was
to pass the sanctions law against Russia, Iran, and North Korea
that dramatically increased sanctions against all three
countries.
And I think that law has been very effective and Congress
did this on a bipartisan basis, so there is something to
celebrate there.
What would the newly sworn-in President of Russia do? He
would make mischief. I am not exactly sure how he would do it
but I think that is his MO and, oh by the way, there has been a
vacuum in the Middle East as U.S. leadership, in my view, has
reduced that has allowed Russia to increase its power in Syria
and elsewhere to our detriment.
So I think leaving the deal on a unilateral basis, if
that's where this comes out, even if we do--and I hope we do--
waive secondary penalties that permit Europe and Iran to keep
the deal--further isolates us and that that's a mistake in
terms of U.S. strategy.
Mr. Sherman. If the clock is accurate, I have time for one
more question. But I am not sure it is.
If we simply don't enforce the secondary sanctions and all
we are doing is cutting off trade with the United States, would
that be significant enough for Iran to withdraw from the deal
if all they're losing is the U.S. caviar market?
Ms. Harman. Well, I actually don't think so. But let's
understand, it does have significant effects on at least one
U.S. company. That would be Boeing, which has sold a number of
airplanes to Iran, and I think that deal would be in jeopardy
and thousands of jobs in various locations in the U.S. would be
in jeopardy.
So I don't understand--I think none of us understands what
the advantage to the U.S.--and I think that's the point of your
question is--from the way the administration seems to want to
proceed this afternoon.
We are all in favor of a better deal, and I think there is
a path to get a better deal.
Chairman Royce. We go to Chris Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to this very distinguished panel for your insights.
Let me just ask you--Ambassador Bloomfield, you talked
about the payroll for the Quds Force of 60,000. Did any of that
come from sanctions relief or any of the moneys that were
conveyed and do we have an accounting yet as to how much money
has actually gone from us and the Europeans to Iran and where
that money has gone?
Secondly, maybe all of you, quickly, your assessment of
Netanyahu's disclosures--was that positive? Negative? Was it
insightful? Did it give you something that you had not seen
before?
And then, finally, I met with Hua Qu, who's the wife of Xi
Wang, who's a Princeton graduate student. I met with him for
hours.
She was practically in tears, talking about her husband,
who has now gotten a 10-year sentence for espionage--absolutely
trumped up, part of the ongoing campaign of Iran to incarcerate
Americans in order to get some kind of benefit. Because it's
trumped up.
We know that Bob Levinson still remains unknown. You know,
he's 70. He's got diabetes. He needs help. All of the
Americans--and the green card members, as you mentioned, Ms.
Harman--need help.
And yet, we look at the Magnitsky Act. The last tranche in
December had no Iranians on there. It seems to me we are
missing an opportunity. We've got the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act passed last year. There are
tools.
I hope the administration uses that. I think my friend from
California a moment ago made a good point. I remember hearing
John Kerry say all the other issues--human rights, you know, go
all out on the sanctioning and yet, that seemingly has not
happened with the previous administration or this one. Your
thoughts on that as well.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you, Congressman. So let me
start off by, first of all, making a recommendation. The first
place I ever worked in Washington was the Congressional
Research Service.
I urge you to ask them to do a compendium of every law and
norm that Iran has broken since 1979, as long as they don't run
out of paper. It will be instructive to both sides.
As for the accounting for funds, this is another piece of
homework that I think the Congress, on a bipartisan basis,
should ask for. Some say that up to 80 percent of the Iranian
economy is controlled either by the religious foundations or,
since 2005, by the paramilitary. They own the banks. They run
the contracting. You can't get something big done without it
going through them.
So when we talk about whether to sanction an Indian
company, a European company, an American company, I think
that's the wrong way to enter the conversation.
The question is, where is the money going, and if it's
going to the people who are building ballistic missiles and
shooting them into Saudi Arabia, if it's going into militia
which are calling in air strikes on Syrian cities and towns,
then that has to be an issue for us and the Europeans to sit
down and say, ``You can't be doing business if the money is
going to these individuals, these companies, these entities,
and these organizations.''
I think if we take it that way, if we ask the
administration to work with Congress on an intensive accounting
of where the money goes, I think the sanctions issue will sort
itself out.
Ms. Harman. Could I make a comment on human rights? Mr.
Smith, you and I were in China together at the fourth U.N.
Conference--I remember that--on Women, making similar points
about human rights for women. It was a historic conference, and
I applaud you for staying focused on that issue.
As I mentioned, there are four U.S. citizens and two green
card holders presently in Iran. I think this action by the
President makes it harder for us to get them out.
And this issue is really personal for the Wilson Center.
One of our most famous scholars, Haleh Esfandiari, who's an
Iranian American, was imprisoned in Evin Prison in 2007, and it
took an international effort, in which I participated and I am
sure you did, as Members of Congress, to get her out of that
prison. She had gone home to visit her ailing mother.
So we have to keep an eye on this. We have to think about
ways in which we can help Americans who are unfairly detained
there, especially those who are ill, and it seems to me that
our strategy should include that as one of the goals to achieve
in the near term, and I don't think this strategy to be
announced this afternoon does in an effective way.
Mr. Rademaker. Quickly, on the human rights issue,
Congressman, let me just congratulate Congressman Sherman for
recalling how Secretary Kerry and other officials of the Obama
administration, at the time Congress was considering the JCPOA,
emphasized that there was nothing in the JCPOA that would
prevent Congress from enacting sanctions with respect to human
rights violations, with respect to missile proliferation, with
respect to other malign activities by Iran.
Partly in reliance on those assurances, the agreement was
approved under the legislative mechanism that governed the
congressional review.
But no sooner had that agreement taken effect then many
officials of the Obama administration came to argue against
imposing sanctions because it would be too upsetting to the
Iranians and it might create problems for JCPOA implementation.
And I think that's highly regrettable and I guess--I think
with Congressman Sherman I would urge Congress to listen to
what the Obama administration initially said, not what they and
their alumni have said subsequently.
Chairman Royce. Albio Sires of New Jersey.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for being
here. Welcome back, Congresswoman.
I've been in this committee now the whole time I've been
here--12 years--and it seems that we vote periodically on all
these sanctions against Iran. But why does it seem to take so
long to implement all these sanctions? I don't understand it.
We just did sanctions on the generals that own sign (phonetic)
business to see if we can get them to stop what they're doing.
Why does it seem that it takes so long to implement these
sanctions against Iran? Anyone?
Ms. Harman. I think the----
Mr. Sires. It's frustrating to me.
Ms. Harman [continuing]. Both people to my right are
perhaps more expert on this. But I don't think it takes that
long.
I actually think the sanctions have been very effective and
economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is an asymmetric
strength of the United States.
In places where we impose them we generally get results. I
would say North Korea is more interested in making a deal with
us because of the sanctions and Iran was more interested 5
years ago in making a deal because of the sanctions.
Was it a perfect deal? Absolutely not. But imposing
sanctions and continuing to impose them on Iran's malign
behavior in the region, which is permissible, is the right way
to go.
Mr. Sires. Well, I don't oppose sanctions. I just wanted
the sanctions that we pass here to be implemented quicker so we
can be more effective, and that's my concern, not that I am
against it. I mean----
Mr. Rademaker. Since the subject is sanctions let me just
make an observation about this. There are, basically, two types
of sanctions that the United States--and by the United States I
really mean Congress and by Congress I really mean this
committee, because most of the Iran sanctions came out of this
committee--there are two types.
There's the primary U.S. embargo, which is restrictions
that we've imposed by law on American citizens, American
companies with regard to their dealings with Iran, and then the
secondary sanctions, which are instances where Congress has
said for people not subject to U.S. jurisdictions, so for
foreign companies, foreign individuals we are going to sanction
you if you do something with Iran.
We don't have jurisdiction over you but we are going to
deny you benefits under U.S. We are going to make your life
difficult.
And, not surprisingly, those secondary sections are highly
controversial when they were enacted starting in 1996 under the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The Europeans were very upset about
that. But they're also highly effective and they had a lot to
do with getting the agreement that the Obama administration was
able to negotiate.
Under the JCPOA the United States was required to waive the
secondary sanctions. And so when we are talking today about the
President letting sanctions come back into force we are talking
about secondary sanctions.
The primary sanctions were never relaxed. The primary U.S.
embargo on Iran has been in effect since the Reagan
administration. It's still in effect today.
So, Congresswoman, your idea of well, maybe the President
should let the snap back occur but exempt the secondary
sanctions, I think basically everything that's snapping back is
secondary sanctions.
So the way to avoid that is for him to exercise the waiver,
which is what President Obama did and what he's done up until
now, but he's saying he's not going to do that, going forward.
There really are no primary sanctions that are snapping
back if the President doesn't exercise the waiver.
Ms. Harman. Well, just, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just
respond to that. I was talking about with respect to Europeans.
It's not to say that there isn't a broader point there.
But if we don't have European allies, going forward, and we
have a large trade war with Europe, I worry that not only our
policy toward Iran but our policy in many areas of the world
will be harmed and they may move ahead and align with others
and leave us isolated.
Mr. Sires. How likely is it that all the other members of
the agreement are willing to alter parts of the agreement?
Ambassador Bloomfield. If I could make a comment--if we are
talking about secondary sanctions that say you can't trade with
Iran, that's one thing, and I think that may get us in trouble
with the Europeans and others.
If, however, we look at how the Treasury Department, for
example, cites individuals, entities, and what not, and we have
intelligence that say, ``These are the people who are doing all
the malign activities,'' then that's the conversation we have
with companies and say, ``Your deal is through this front
company or through this bank or through this holding company in
Iran and they're the ones who our intelligence shows are paying
for the Syrian operation.''
So that's the conversation I would prefer.
Mr. Sires. I was thinking when we did the financial
sanctions that it seems to take forever to take effect. I am
sorry. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Rademaker. Well, your question was how willing will
foreign--I heard your question--how willing will foreign
countries be to change the deal, and I just want to stress,
President Trump has not asked for anybody to change the deal.
I think, ultimately, he'd like to renegotiate it. But what
he's calling for is a supplemental agreement that wouldn't
change the deal but it would be a declaration of policy between
us and the Europeans about what we'll do if Iran deploys
missiles or tests missiles in a way that we find threatening--
what we'll do if they violate their sanctions--I am sorry,
their inspection obligations, and I don't think that's
controversial.
And then, thirdly, with regard to the sunset clause, what
our joint policy will be, starting in 2026. So he's not--he's
not saying let's, you know----
Mr. Sires. Well we don't need Iran.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. That everybody agree to--it
would be let's declare a policy about what we are going to--
what our countries will do, starting in 2026. But it's not a
change to the JCPOA.
Mr. Sires. Okay. I am out of time right now but thank you
very much.
Chairman Royce. We now go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of
California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Secretary Bloomfield, do I call you
Secretary?
Ambassador Bloomfield. No. Call me Linc.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. There you go. You went through a
litany of some of the things that Iran has been doing that are
very disturbing throughout the region.
Let us just note that what you're talking about costs a lot
of money and what we are also talking about here is the Obama
decision and as manifested in this treaty to provide $150
billion to the disposal of the Iranian regime.
And so everything that you just talked about can be traced
back to a funding mechanism that we provided them.
But I would like to disagree with you on one note. You kept
noting how strong Iran is. The mullah regime that controls Iran
is incredibly weak, and you mentioned that as well.
You have had uprisings throughout that country, and I hate
to sound like Cato the Elder. The mullah regime has to go. This
is not an anti-Iranian statement. This is a pro-Iranian
statement.
The people of Iran hate the mullah regime. It is corrupt.
It is brutal, and all we talk about are these periphery actions
when we never mention and go right to the heart of the matter,
which is we should be supporting those elements in Iran that
hate the regime and will replace it with a more civilized
government, which they all support.
Iran is not our enemy. The mullah regime is our enemy, and
while we are discussing this issue today, we should understand
that. The last administration provided $150 billion to that
mullah regime--not to the people of Iran, to that regime.
Let's note that my colleague mentioned the Magnitsky Act.
Just so everyone will know, I support the Magnitsky Act. I
didn't support calling it the Magnitsky Act because I thought
that particular case had yet to be proven.
But the point is we have that power and, again, we have not
designated any of the mullah regime gangsters to be punished by
an act that we put forward and have passed in this Congress.
So we've been inactive in anything aimed at the mullah
regime but instead broadly attacking Iran. I don't believe
that's a strategy that will work.
Let me ask you--no one got around to the question about
whether Netanyahu's briefing for the American people and the
American government was a positive or a negative.
Maybe I could have each one of the panellists just give us
a very short on their reaction to Israel.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thanks, Congressman Rohrabacher.
On the Netanyahu release of information, I think--from what
I understand--I've not read it all--it demonstrates a serious
program to build nuclear weapons and so then it calls into
question what is the intention of the regime.
I really think the United States needs to speak with one
voice and stand united. So as a centrist, let me give President
Obama his due.
I think he was wrong in his assessment of Iran. In 2013, he
quoted a fatwa from the Supreme Leader in front of the United
Nations that they forbid nuclear weapons.
Everything that Prime Minister Netanyahu has released
suggests that the Iranians were never going to give up nuclear
weapons--that they would keep the knowledge in perpetuity.
So I think that there's an issue of intent and trust. Going
back to what the chairman said, if I were advising President
Trump, I would say whenever you get a message that comes from
President Rouhani or Foreign Minister Zarif, the answer should
be, I need to hear it from the Supreme Leader. He's the one and
only decision maker. It's time for Iran to stop talking out of
two sides of its mouth.
Going back to your final point, Congressman, about the
mullah regime, I am going to quote you from Grand Ayatollah
Abdollah Javadi-Amoli. He is a source of emulation.
He's a Grand Ayatollah in Qom. On April 27, he said,
``Better beware that if the nation rises up the people will
sweep us into the sea. Many have already fled or found a place
to escape. But we have nowhere to escape to.''
Mr. Rohrabacher. And there is our solution and we've
ignored that over and over again to try to get around the idea
that we are recognizing the mullah regime is not Iran and we
should be supporting Iran and the Iranian people.
Just really quickly, Israel's briefing--good, bad,
positive? Should pay attention to it, not----
Mr. Rademaker. I took it as further confirmation that Iran
has had a long-standing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons
and in that sense to me it didn't come as news because that's
been my belief for a long time. But it does underscore the need
to have a serious deliberate global policy to confront the
challenge we face.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Jane?
Ms. Harman. I, too, always thought Iran's intention was to
acquire a nuclear weapon so I wasn't surprised by it.
But I would make two other points, one on regime change. I
think we should be very, very careful, given the Iraq
experience, and if the people of Iran who elected their
government by more than 50 percent in a four-way field want to
change their government, then let them do that.
But I don't think calling for that from outside is going to
improve the situation. That's my personal view.
But final point on North Korea, North----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Unless the people who support that--the
calling down the regime--end up in jail, end up having their
families beaten up----
Ms. Harman. I think that is dreadful. That's a human rights
issue and we should impose sanctions against those who do that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Ms. Harman. But on North Korea, talk about their
intentions--they built 60 nuclear weapons. So let us not be
naive as we do a deal with them and I am in favor of doing the
right deal with North Korea.
Let us not be naive about their intentions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And we noted in Korea, we paid for that as
well. We--again, another Democratic administration--I am sorry
to sound political here--they insisted on paying money to a
dictatorship in North Korea.
They used the money to what, to put us in a position where
they're building nuclear weapons again, probably with the money
that we gave them.
And one last thing--Netanyahu has given us an alarm bell.
He's ringing the alarm bell. I am proud that our President
seems to be listening to that. Looking forward to see if we act
upon that alarm.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
We now go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and I thank the chair for
holding this hearing on a day that I think is a very momentous
day in terms of foreign policy in which the President is about
to make a decision fraught with consequences and that could
lead to the very thing we are trying to avoid--a nuclear Iran.
The fracturing of our ability to have meaningful dialogue
and agreements with our allies and with our adversaries--let us
remember P5 included Russia and China.
My friend from California, who chokes on criticizing a
Democratic administration, nonetheless feels compelled to do
so, wants to have us believe that the money released pursuant
to the Iran nuclear agreement somehow was some kind of pay off
for all kinds of evil things.
Primarily, it was the release of funds that had been frozen
pursuant to sanctions and I got news for my friend from
California--you got to have carrots and sticks if you're going
to have an agreement.
If it's all carrots, I don't know what compels anybody to
agree to anything, and most of that money was used to pay off
huge debts the Iranian regime had incurred because of the
plummeting price of oil and the effect of sanctions.
Ms. Harmon, welcome back. So listening to Mr. Rademaker,
you'd think the President's just kind of making some reasonable
things here. I don't think our allies are going to be all that
upset.
Now, I don't know--correct me if I am wrong--I thought I
saw the President of France speak before a joint session of
Congress warning us not to do precisely what, apparently,
President Trump is going to do this afternoon. Is my memory
faulty on that?
Ms. Harman. I don't think so. It's also true that
Chancellor Merkel made a 1-day trip from Germany and that the
foreign minister of Britain came yesterday to talk to a number
of people. I guess the Brits thought that he would be----
Mr. Connolly. All importuning President Trump and his
administration not to do it.
Ms. Harman. Right. But they also expressed a willingness so
far as I know--and I think we are all in agreement here and I
think most of the committee is--to enter into a side agreement
that addresses problems that I think everyone here has with the
deal.
Mr. Connolly. Now, Mr. Rademaker also made the assertion
that Obama administration alum--the ink was barely dry on JCPOA
in terms of congressional action when they begged us not to
impose sanctions on nonrelated nuclear activity.
Is it not true that there was a lot of concern up here that
some people who have been overtly critical of JCPOA turned
around and introduced sanctions legislation that would have in
fact unravelled the agreement because they dealt indirectly or
kind of almost directly with sanctions that were covered by the
agreement?
Ms. Harman. Well, I think there was a lot of conversation
about which sanctions should be imposed.
Mr. Connolly. That's right.
Ms. Harman. There was never any doubt that sanctions
against Iran's malign behavior outside the four corners of the
deal, which is just a transaction to freeze Iran's nuclear
program.
Mr. Connolly. And forgive me. I am running out of time. But
pursuant to your point, many of us turned around and voted for
the comprehensive sanctions you referenced in your testimony.
Ms. Harman. Right.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Rademaker, let me--let me talk about
compliance in the time I have left.
In the agreement--the JCPOA agreement--Iran was required to
go from 19,000 centrifuges to 6,104 at the old IR1 designation.
Have they complied?
Mr. Rademaker. So far as I am aware, they've complied with
their obligations.
Mr. Connolly. They have complied. On enrichment they have
to go down a 3.67 percent for 15 years. Have they complied?
Mr. Rademaker. So far as I am aware, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Stockpile--they had to reduce their stockpile
of enriched uranium from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms and
ship it out of the country. Did they comply?
Mr. Rademaker. So far as I am aware, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Mm-hmm. Reprocessing--they won't conduct
reprocessing or reprocessing research on spent fuel, and that's
indefinite. Have they complied?
Mr. Rademaker. So far as I know, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Fordow--have they stopped enrichment at
Fordow?
Mr. Rademaker. I believe they have.
Mr. Connolly. You believe they have. On the Natanz again,
they were required to limit the amount of centrifuges for
research and the level of enrichment and, again, returning
models to an earlier generation. Did they comply?
Mr. Rademaker. I can save you time. I think they've
complied with all their agreements.
Mr. Connolly. Well, let me just run through it because, you
know----
Mr. Rademaker. All their obligations.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. I am trying to pay attention to
your testimony here. I am trying to find flaws in their
compliance.
Iraq, the plutonium production reactor, they're required to
concretize their reactor and redesign and rebuild the heavy
water research facility. Did they comply?
Mr. Rademaker. I believe they have.
Mr. Connolly. Are you aware of any inspection of a nuclear
facility they have not complied with?
Mr. Rademaker. No, I am not aware.
Mr. Connolly. No. And has the IAEA and the international
community certified 11 different times they are in full
compliance with the agreement?
Mr. Rademaker. The IAEA has not found any fault with this.
Mr. Connolly. And were there six Presidential
certifications including with President Trump saying the same?
Mr. Rademaker. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. I rest my case.
Chairman Royce. We go to Joe Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Ed Royce, for
having this very important hearing today and thank all of the
witnesses for being here.
And, Ambassador Bloomfield, to amplify further your view,
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently had a revelation of
Iran's secret nuclear archive, highlighting the limits to the
IAEA inspections.
The archives were apparently unknown to IAEA and other
nuclear sites may have been similarly unknown.
I believe that President Donald Trump is being correct that
the Iranian nuclear deal is dangerous to American families and
to our allies of Israel.
Considering the information located in these archives,
should the IAEA reopen its investigation into the possible
nuclear dimensions--PMD--of Iran's nuclear program?
What other steps should the IAEA make to address the
concerns raised by these documents hidden by the Iranian
dictatorship?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you, Congressman.
I think we have to wait and see what details come out of
the information that the prime minister of Israel has released
and other information that may be available to us.
The point that I wanted to make is that, while the Iranians
came to the table and said certain things can be inspected and
certain things cannot be inspected, that if we find what's
known as plausible information, under their language, that
there may be nuclear-related activity--it may not be fissile
material that's detectable through nuclear machinery--it may be
designs for warheads, how to marry it with a ballistic missile,
how to make the missile hit a target and to do what we've done
with our ICBMs--that kind of research could be happening
anywhere and more likely is under the control of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps--which is a possible military
dimension and would be on a military site.
So if we have any kind of plausible information, we have
every right to go to the Europeans and together go to the IAEA
and say, we have to inspect this.
And as I pointed out earlier, you can't get to the end
point of the JCPOA--the broader conclusion at the end of
several years that Iran is peaceful in intent unless you answer
those questions.
So we should focus on detection, investigation, inspection,
verification and be more relentless than we have been.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate your emphasis on verification.
And Mr. Rademaker, how would you characterize Iran's
current ballistic missile capabilities and what would you
expect the trajectory of their continuing missile development
to be if they're not impeded by sanctions or other diplomatic
measures?
At this point, what needs to be done to safeguard against
the ballistic missile threat to Europe today and as they're
targeting America tomorrow?
Mr. Rademaker. Yes. Well, Iran has a very active ballistic
missile program and over time they've been increasing the range
of their ballistic missiles I believe with the ultimate goal of
deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would be
missiles that could strike the United States.
I think a critical point that needs to be made, and I think
this connects back to what Prime Minister Netanyahu revealed,
it makes absolutely no sense for Iran to have an ICBM if it
doesn't have a nuclear weapon.
Missiles of that range--I mean, first, they're not going to
be very accurate and even if they were accurate, I mean,
they're not going to do that much damage.
You have ICBMs like we do to attack your adversaries with
an atomic warhead, and so the fact that they're continuing to
pursue these longer-range missiles I think speaks to their
ultimate intentions.
They wouldn't be doing this if they did not ultimately have
the intention of putting a nuclear warhead on the top of that
ICBM.
Mr. Wilson. And hey, for a diplomat, I appreciate that you
were very clear that ICBMs and nuclear weapons are tied
together and just simply can't be separated.
And I appreciate that we've actually had bipartisan
cooperation. Congressman Seth Moulton and I had an amendment to
the NDAA to ask for analysis of the ICBM capabilities of Iran.
And Congresswoman Harman, thank you to have the alumni
return. The current estimates that Iran has provided Hezbollah
$800 million annually for their efforts, and they actually now
have 150,000 missiles in southern Lebanon--a threat--and the
capability of building missiles. So the threat is almost
incalculable.
Following the elections last week in Lebanon, what can we
do to promote a moderate influence in Lebanon?
Ms. Harman. Well, let me say two things.
On the missile capability of Iran, it is worrisome, and
it's not just that they, over time, if this deal somehow ends,
can put miniaturized warheads on top of missiles but they can
also proliferate the missiles.
And let's understand that there has been proliferation
between Iran and North Korea, which now has a highly advanced
missile capability.
In the '90s when I served on the House Armed Services
Committee, I worked with Former Senator Jon Kyl to try to block
Russian technology transfers to Iran, which occurred at the
time, which made their missile capability more effective.
So that's one very sad chapter in U.S. history. On this
question, I am worried about Hezbollah. I mentioned the
Lebanese election.
Hezbollah ran in the election. It had candidates for
Parliament and it increased its seats by at least one but plus,
apparently, five other seats from another party are technically
under--in the Hezbollah orbit.
So not only does it have some political participation in
the Lebanese government but you are correct about the missile
placement in southern Lebanon and we've already seen one war
between Lebanon and Israel where Hezbollah managed to lob a lot
of missiles from basements of civilian houses along the border.
Those were not very smart missiles. Now the missiles are
smarter and have longer range. So it's very, very worrisome.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you all for being here today.
Chairman Royce. We got to Ted Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses for being here.
Mr. Chairman, we have three thoughtful witnesses, all of
whom provided distinguished service to our country and
government.
We have a chairman and ranking member of this committee and
a good number of members of our committee on both sides of the
aisle who are quite concerned about Iran--Iran's nuclear
program and Iran's activities--destabilizing activities in the
region.
And for an awful lot of us there is consensus that if the
President chooses to walk away from the Iran deal--a deal that
I opposed but have repeatedly said needs to be strictly
enforced--the President walks away, we abdicate American
leadership in all of the areas where Iran poses an immediate
threat to us, to our allies, and to our security interests.
So I would just ask our witnesses, going through each of
these, if I may, again, the idea being how do we retain
American leadership. We can predict what Iran might do or not
if the President chooses to not certify, to withdraw.
We can predict the inclinations of our allies might be. But
I want to talk about what we can do to help lead those allies
and if the President goes in one direction what can the rest of
us--what can Congress do to continue to play that role?
So on ballistic missiles, for example, on this we heard
over and over throughout the negotiation of the deal that the
deal didn't cover ballistic missiles.
The President today if he wanted to could impose even
tougher sanctions with respect to ballistic missiles in Iran.
Isn't that right, Congresswoman Harman?
Ms. Harman. Yes, that's right, and should the deal have
covered ballistic missiles? Of course. If they had been able to
strike that deal it should have.
Should it have been term limited? No, it shouldn't have
been.
Mr. Deutch. Right.
Ms. Harman. Should it have addressed Iran's other malign
behavior? Yes, it should, and it still could, if this side
agreement were entered into.
But can I just make one other comment?
Mr. Deutch. Of course.
Ms. Harman. And that is the need for an authorization to
use military force. I think that Congress can finally construct
the strategy that has been missing from everything we've been
doing in the region.
The Obama administration didn't have a strategy either.
They did a transaction. That's what this deal was, and other
transactions as well--some correct, some less correct.
But Congress has a storied history of being able to hold
hearings and get the American people engaged to understand the
trade-offs in a larger U.S. role and I think that would be a
huge service.
Mr. Deutch. Right. I think it's the most important foreign
policy debate that we should be having on the floor of the
House that we're not. I couldn't agree with you more.
On ballistic missiles, if we are going to be serious about
ballistic missiles, don't we want our European allies to work
with us to impose sanctions against Iran, Mr. Rademaker?
Mr. Rademaker. I think absolutely we do and, in fact, I
think the agreement that the Trump administration has been
trying to negotiate with the Europeans, one of the three
elements was to address ballistic missiles.
Mr. Deutch. So--right. So let's just go through that for a
second because I think there's been confusion, and I would just
like to sort this out.
The fact is for the very real concerns we have about Iran's
behavior, this is not just about whether the Iran deal is a
good thing or a bad thing or whether Iran is complying with it
or not.
The fact is that while Iran complies with the nuclear deal,
they continue to hold Americans hostage. They continue to
develop ballistic missiles. They continue to support terror
throughout the region.
And so that deal that we've been working toward that
perhaps the President may find some opportunity to push for one
last time, just to be clear, doesn't violate the terms of the
nuclear deal, does it?
If we give, with our European allies, a very clear signal
about what will happen, as several of you have pointed out, at
the end of this deal so that the sunset clause may be a sunset
under the deal but we make clear with our allies that we will
not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, something that we've
said.
So why would that be a violation of the deal? It wouldn't.
Ballistic missiles were not part of the deal. Why wouldn't we
work with our allies to make clear what we will not accept
right now in terms of threats to Europe and the United States?
And on inspections, again, if--instead of arguing back and
forth over how we interpret the inspection regime that's in the
deal, why wouldn't we make clear with our allies that if we
believe we need to get onto a military site then we are going
to work with them and if access is blocked it is Iran's fault
and Iran is then in violation of the deal, from our
perspective?
How are any of those unreasonable?
Mr. Rademaker. Congressman, I don't think any of those
things are unreasonable. I think we would want to work with the
Europeans on all those issues.
I do think of the three issues that we are--and here I am
going to defend the Europeans, which I haven't done much of
this morning--I think of the three issues that were under
discussion with the Europeans, two of them were not hard, as I
understand it, for the sides to reach agreement on on the issue
of inspections and on the issue of ballistic missiles.
Where--the sticking had to do with how to address the
sunset clause.
Mr. Deutch. Well--yes, Ambassador Bloomfield, I have just a
second.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you. Sorry to go overtime.
But I believe ballistic missiles were implicated under the
JCPOA agreement. There was a 2010 U.N. Security Council
resolution that prohibited Iran from engaging in ballistic
missile development which was lifted 6 days after the agreement
was reached in June 2015 in favor of recommendatory language
that was nonbinding----
Mr. Deutch. Right.
Ambassador Bloomfield [continuing]. And Iran immediately
started testing missiles. And just so you know, Secretary of
State Kerry said, oh, there must be a mistake here--let's have
a new arrangement.
Foreign Minister Zarif called his complaints ``baseless.''
Defense Minister Dehghan called them ``nonsense.'' In other
words, off they went.
We've been threatened by the head of the IRGC to hit all
U.S. troops within 2,000 kilometres if they feel like it.
So I think we have every right to defend ourselves and to
work the with Europeans to push back on their program.
Mr. Deutch. I greatly appreciate all our witnesses being
here.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that whatever the President does today
at 2 o'clock I hope he will keep in mind that the most
important thing for us to do to stand up to Iran's malign
behavior is to retain American leadership and I worry that he
will take an action today that will weaken American leadership.
That puts all of us in a weaker position.
I thank you and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good to see the
witnesses, especially my former colleague. Jane, nice to see
you.
I travelled with my former colleague, Mike Pompeo, to the
Middle East. Met with Netanyahu. We talked about the Shi'a
Crescent--Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, coming out of Iran.
And at the time we were talking about this Iran deal we
were opposed to it for a couple of reasons, all of which are
being negotiated in this E3 agreement.
He and I didn't think the inspections were sufficient
enough. It didn't include military sites where most likely
that's where they would build a nuclear weapon.
The ICBM capability was not addressed. I asked Secretary
Kerry right here why that wasn't in the deal and he simply said
it just couldn't be done.
Sunset provisions have been talked about and the terror
financing, from a chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee standpoint, hundreds of billions of dollars
unleashed, and now look what we have.
So we are in a bit of a dilemma, I think. I think this E3
agreement was a good idea. I was hopeful it would happen. I
know the sunset provisions were a problem in reaching a
consensus.
But I think the question is--well, a couple. I mean, my
understanding is Iran would have to agree to this as well.
Do you think if the E3 reached an agreement with the United
States that Iran would join in that agreement?
Mr. Rademaker. So the sunset clause is a problem and I
actually think the Trump administration came up with a clever
way to address that problem, because implicit in your question
is, would Iran ever agree to eliminate the sunset clause?
They might agree to it but not for free and I will talk
about that in a moment. I talked about it in my prepared
remarks.
But the Trump solution, at least what he's been trying to
negotiate with the Europeans and what he asked the Congress to
do is forget about the Iranians--we'll just declare what our
policy is going to be once the sunset clause kicks in.
They don't have to agree to that. We just declare this is
what we are going to do, and what we are going to do is we are
not going to threaten to bomb them as some people say we should
threaten, although maybe--we don't necessarily not threaten to
do that. But the threat we will bring to bear is the threat
that we'll impose economic sanctions if they enrich uranium in
a way that would get them a very short breakout capability.
No need for the Iranians to agree to that. So all it
requires is the agreement of the three governments in Europe.
So realistically achievable concept, I think.
Now, while we are talking about negotiations, though, I
predicted in my initial statement here that before this
administration is over I think President Trump probably is
going to negotiate with the Iranians because he's negotiating
next month with the North Koreans.
And among those who have argued that the President should
not allow or should not walk away from the JCPOA, many have
said, well, what he should do is negotiate the problem of the
sunset clause with Iran.
I think there will be such a negotiation but as things
stand today, we are going to have to give them something to
give up on the sunset clause.
The only thing I think realistically we have to give them--
well, we could write them enormous checks. Okay. We could give
them a bunch of money. I don't think we are going to do that.
The other--so the other thing----
Mr. McCaul. Well we sort of are yes. I've got a minute and
a half. So----
Mr. Rademaker. The other thing we could give them is relief
from the primary embargo----
Mr. McCaul. Okay.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. Which is what we imposed
because of their support for terrorism and so we could trade
our policy--our counterterrorism policy for concessions from
them on their nuclear program.
The question I ask in my prepared statement is then what's
left of our antiterrorism policy if we've given away our
primary embargo in order to get additional concessions on----
Mr. McCaul. I agree, the sunset clause--I mean, that's the
big sticking point. But is it better to get out entirely or do
we want to extend the deadline on these negotiations rather
than pull out completely?
Ms. Harman. I think that everyone shares the goal of--
except, perhaps, Iran--of extending the deadline.
But the question we are all raising is what's the best way
to achieve the goal, and pulling out or at least decertifying
the deal today is not the best way to achieve the goal.
And I would just make one other point, which is
negotiations are tough. Each party has to give up something to
get to a deal. I am sure that John Kerry and others would say
they wanted a stronger deal than they got.
They got the deal that they got and, as a mother of four, I
know that perfection is not an option. You have got to
negotiate with your own kids to get a little--to get some
progress and----
Mr. McCaul. And I have five.
Just one last question--I worry too, Jane, that it will
shift attention away from Iran and put it on the United States.
That's one of my concerns from a foreign policy standpoint.
Finally, you talk about congressional inaction and if we
can't reach this E3 agreement that perhaps Congress should take
action and deal with this issue head on, whether it be with
sanctions or, as you mentioned, the AUMF, and I would like to
get your thoughts on that.
Ms. Harman. Well, I mentioned the AUMF a couple of times
because I think Congress is AWOL and Congress should be doing
this, and the 2001 AUMF that most of us who are here voted for
it seems to me doesn't apply to this situation at all, and a
future with a renuclearized Iran or Iran building the bomb it
stopped building is one that will require some kind of military
response.
So I want Congress to set the contours.
Second point, though, what is our strategy in the Middle
East? What do our allies perceive our strategy is? I think it
should be working, as we've all said, with Europe, who are in
this deal in the first place, and hopefully with China and
Russia, too, to contain nuclear developments in the region.
And if a result of this is that the Saudis or others decide
to build a nuclear weapon and the Saudis could acquire
technology from Pakistan, or at least that's the rumour, I
don't think the Middle East becomes more stable.
So there are very serious problems, it seems to me, with
pulling out, as might happen today.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you so much.
Chairman Royce. Yes. I think, for the record, in response
to one our members' earlier points, the International Atomic
Energy Agency is in fact currently unable to verify the
provision relating to--and this is from Section T--``activities
which could contribute to the design and development of a
nuclear explosive device,'' and Russia, of course, says they
have no obligation to do so.
With that said, I should go to Karen Bass of California.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to
thank all of our witnesses here today.
I guess--well, my colleague just showed me that the New
York Times is now reporting that President Trump told the
President of France that he is going to withdraw.
So assuming that, I just wanted to know if you three could
each really paint the picture of what this looks like.
For example, Ambassador and Mr. Rademaker, how specifically
would you propose to ensure that Iran is prevented from
developing a nuclear weapon when it's no longer in effect,
assuming that that's--again, what the New York Times is
reporting is accurate? Where do we go from here is the
question.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Congresswoman Bass, I have already
testified that I believe there are some downsides which we
should avoid and whatever happens I think I want to give the
President a chance to make his announcement.
It appears that there are some subtleties--that it may not
be something that we can summarize in one sentence.
My hope is that whatever--the metric of success of a
foreign policy is whether it is strategically credible--whether
the leverage is against Iran and Iran's nuclear breakout and
not against us and not dividing Republicans, Democrats,
Americans, and Europeans. We should be one team. We should have
a policy that goes beyond the nuclear domain to the non-nuclear
domain, which everyone has acknowledged today.
So I think wherever we go from here there's a lot of past
pieces that have been brought up, some with regret. We have to
move forward.
And if I may--I know your time is valuable----
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Ambassador Bloomfield [continuing]. I think we need a
better analysis of what Iran is all about. The Supreme Leaders'
followership in the Shi'a Crescent may be extremely weak.
The Supreme Leaders' readiness to come forward and
negotiate with the American President----
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Ambassador Bloomfield [continuing]. Or present himself may
be nonexistent----
Ms. Bass. All right. I do need to move on.
Ambassador Bloomfield [continuing]. So we need to analyze
who we are dealing with.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. You ask a very good question. I do think we
need to all bear in mind our President believes that, above all
else, he is a negotiator. He wrote a book about ``The Art of
the Deal.'' He wrote a book about that.
Ms. Bass. Well, he hasn't demonstrated that so far, but go
right ahead.
Mr. Rademaker. But so, I think what is going to happen this
afternoon, well, technically what happens if he announces that
``I am not exercising any more waivers'' then on, I believe,
Saturday of this week, May 12th, one of the U.S. sanctions laws
will snap back into effect and it's the one called Menendez-
Kirk. It was the first sort of oil sanctions--financial oil
sanctions.
Well, the other sanctions don't snap back into effect until
July and so I think there's a good chance what we'll hear from
the President is I am letting this one law snap back into
effect but the real deadline now is July, right.
Let's negotiate against a July deadline because that's when
the other sanctions snap back into effect, and I hope I am
right about that because what I want to see here is a
negotiated solution with the Europeans. I don't want to----
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. See us go back to a sanctions
realm and I just hope that----
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. The President's psychology
probably lends itself to that.
Ms. Bass. And Congresswoman, perhaps you could continue to
explain that. I mean, if the sanctions snap back that impacts
Europe, doesn't it?
Ms. Harman. Well, yes. I am hoping that there won't be a
snap back and my colleagues might ask then what will he be
announcing.
He'll be announcing the fact that he's unhappy with the
deal, which we've heard before, but that he's waiving its worst
effects.
And I am still hoping that what this entire committee seems
to want--surely I do and I think all of us want--is a side deal
gets negotiated with our European partners and that becomes the
basis over time of improving the deal.
But I think it would be a big mistake to blow up the deal
totally or blow up the U.S. role in the deal. Even if Iran
stays in the deal that would have the effect of isolating us.
Ms. Bass. So how do you pull out of the deal and then put
it back together and then have a side deal? I don't--you know
what I mean?
Ms. Harman. Well, I think it takes a lot of legal
maneuvering. But I think there is possibly a way to thread the
needle and I am sure he's looking at it in terms of stating his
intention, not recertifying it. Remember, he said he didn't
want to recertify it last time. But having its effects be
minimized against our European partners, perhaps not our Asian
partners--I think that would not be the wisest course but
perhaps that's the way he will go.
Starting a major trade war right now with Europe and
possibly in June, as I mentioned in my testimony, also allowing
these proposed tariffs on steel and aluminum to be in effect
against Europe is a huge, I think, mistake.
Mr. Rademaker. I think--to the extent you're asking a
technical question--if he allows the sanctions to be reimposed
how does he get out from under that if he later changes his
mind--and actually the answer to that is very simply he will
still have the waiver authority.
So if sanctions could snap back into effect but if an
acceptable deal is negotiated at some point thereafter he can
just exercise the waiver authority again and restore the
situation that exists today.
Ms. Bass. Yeah. I don't know----
Mr. Rademaker. I will be surprised if this afternoon he
doesn't--I would be surprised if he closes the door to
negotiations.
I would expect him to say, I am doing this because we
haven't gotten satisfaction in the negotiations but I am still
here. I still want to negotiate. I still hope--you know, and--
--
Ms. Bass. And so the problem is none of us know what he's
going to do from day to day. That's the problem.
Thank you.
Chairman Royce. We go to Lee Zeldin of New York.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all
the witnesses for your service
Mr. Rademaker, one of the comments that you made with the
questioning with Mr. Connolly you said you believe--your
understanding is that Iran has complied with all of their
obligations.
We are aware, though, that the IAEA has found them twice to
be over their heavy water limit, right?
Mr. Rademaker. That's correct. That was a problem that the
Obama administration solved by buying excess heavy water from
Iran.
Mr. Zeldin. Yes. So that was one of the violations, I just
want to correct the record on a few different items, and I
don't want to embarrass anyone here but just a few components
that are important to point out with regards to Iran's
compliance or lack thereof.
So Annex 1 Paragraph 61 of the JCPOA states, ``Iran will
only engage in production of centrifuges to meet the enrichment
R&D requirements.''
Iran has acquired more than the necessary amount of IR8
centrifuge rotor assemblies for R&D purposes with 16 times more
capacity than the IR1 to enrich uranium.
With regards to exceeding IR6 centrifuge allowance, as part
of the JCPOA an enrichment research and development plan was
submitted to the IAEA that permitted, roughly, 10 IR6
centrifuges.
Iran has assembled 13 to 15 IR6 centrifuges, which should
have been limited or destroyed under the plan.
With regard to conducting mechanical testing of advanced
centrifuges in violation of the JCPOA Iran has exploited the
conditions governing the quality assurance of advanced
centrifuges to conduct mechanical testing of advanced
centrifuges.
With regards to refusing IAEA access to military sites,
under Annex 1 Paragraph 76 of the JCPOA, the IAEA can request
access to military locations such as Parchin to verify
compliance.
The Iranian regime has made crystal clear before, during,
and after the negotiations that they will not allow access to
any of their military sites.
With regards to possessing chemically manmade particles of
natural uranium, in September 2015 Iranian officials granted
limited access to the IAEA inspectors at the Parchin facility.
The environmental samples revealed chemically manmade
particles of natural uranium. The IAEA did not pursue an
explanation.
The IAEA director general stated that the agency wants Iran
to fully implement the JCPOA which, by implication, covers
Section T, as was referenced by our chairman of Annex 1 of the
JCPOA, which prohibits any activities that could contribute to
the development of the--of a nuclear explosive device.
It should be noted that when we went to Parchin and we
noticed that there were some particles consistent with what
they are not allowed to have, they did not allow further access
to their site following that.
So we were not actually allowed to get our inspectors there
to follow up on those--on those particles.
So I just wanted to correct the record on those few things.
Mr. Chair, I have 2 minutes. Do you want me to yield to you
for the remainder?
Chairman Royce. No. No, that's quite all right. Go ahead
with your line of questioning if you wish.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. So I would just add a couple of quick
points then. One is I am deeply troubled by the activities of
the Secretary of State--Former Secretary of State John Kerry.
He's no longer the Secretary of State and his activities right
now really are deeply troubling.
He wasn't very good when he was the Secretary of State. He
shouldn't be acting like one still today. There was some back
and forth earlier with regards to ransom and the payment that
was made, and that was money that was owed to the Iranians.
But the part that was left out was that that money had to
be given to the Iranians in cash simultaneously with the
release of American hostages.
So, that part--again, just completing the record from an
earlier exchange--was left out. This was money that was owed.
This wasn't ransom. In order to release the hostages, money in
cold hard cash had to arrive in pallets simultaneously in order
to release the hostages.
I have 30 seconds left. Anyone--did you want to respond,
Mr. Rademaker, to the earlier point?
Mr. Rademaker. Well, since I was the one who was sort of
dragged into conceding that Iran is in compliance with the
JCPOA, let me just observe, I think you pointed to some
potential technical violations.
But big picture--my view has always been that the JCPOA is
such a great deal for Iran that they would have to be out of
their minds to cheat on it.
Now, that doesn't mean we shouldn't scrutinize them because
they've cheated on plenty of agreements in the past--they might
be tempted to cheat on this one.
But rationally--the rational thing for them to do is comply
fully, comply scrupulously, and then reap the dividend of the
sunset clauses starting in about the tenth year because then
they'll be able to have everything they want. So why jeopardize
that by cheating to gain some small advantage today when they
get enormous advantages by operation of time?
And, we are almost 2\1/2\ years into the agreement at this
point. So we are a quarter of the way to them being able to
reap all the benefits.
So the closer we get to the 10 years, which is January
2026, the less incentive they'll have to cheat because they
just wait a little bit more time and they won't have to cheat.
Mr. Zeldin. Yes. Important points. Thank you for mentioning
all of them. I think, in a way, Iran can't help themselves but
to cheat and to test the limits and see what they can get away
with.
But I just--I need to correct the record because it was--it
has been stated way before today's hearing by many people that
Iran has not violated the letter of the JCPOA and we could
debate over how significant one might think all the violations
are. But it's just inaccurate to say Iran has not violated the
letter of the JCPOA. There actually have been many different
violations of the letter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Bill Keating of Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, most of the attention today will go with the
President's decision to pull out of the agreement. I wish there
was more attention on this hearing because I do believe
Congress has a role. This committee has a role, a major role,
and if you listen to this morning's testimony you'd see,
generally speaking, bipartisan agreement that pulling out is
the wrong approach and has consequences that are going to be
deleterious and there's room to go and I just want to talk
about a few of those things.
Now, people cavalierly just say, well, 8 years and they can
do whatever they want. Well, that's not true under the
agreement. There are limitations that are for 10 years, 15
years, 25 years, and permanent limitations. Those are in the
agreement.
Now, the sunset issue is one that there are some
restrictions on this, going forward, limitations on this. And
our approach to this and to the inspections issue, which
Secretary Mattis said, in his own words, ``pretty robust
verification''--his words.
So the inspection process is enforcing these limitations
under the sunset. We should take a policy with our allies of
extremely and aggressively pushing inspections, certifications.
That is already at our disposal if we work together and
work hard, and if they're violating it that coalition coming
together can make adjustments themselves and that's where we
should be going with this.
Now, there are issues with the ballistic missile program
and the activities of the Quds Force--the malign activities of
the Quds Force.
But within that coalition--and independently we can deal
with that--but working with the coalition we can be more
effective dealing with those issues.
And here's my point--by pulling out--and I've talked to the
leaders in the other countries--there's no surprise here--
they're staying in, our allies, and the division that that's
going to cause is just going to undercut our ability to do what
I just said--aggressively enforce what's there. Stand together
and make sure that's being done. That's being ripped apart with
that.
Can you comment on the real harmful effect of us being able
to enforce this strongly as a coalition being undercut by this
pulling away from the agreement?
Ms. Harman. Well, I am not sure if that's addressed to me
but I totally agree with the comments and I think I've tried to
make the point several different ways.
You also made a point that I hadn't mentioned yet, which is
that Former Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz, who was a key
negotiator here--he was the actual nuclear scientist in the
room--claims that a number of provisions in the deal are
permanent.
For example, he says that because of the way we track
plutonium production Iran will never be able to--never, not in
10 years, not in 15 years, not in 25 years--ever be able to
produce a plutonium weapon which is a--certainly, a form of
nuclear weapon that has devastating consequences and that some
other provisions, as you said, last more than 10 years. So----
Mr. Keating. And I would agree with you, Secretary Moniz,
and any scientist will tell you that we are concerned about
inspections----
Ms. Harman. Right.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. And the 28-day delay. That
material is around for a lot longer than we are going to be
here and it's totally detectable. So that delay is not going to
hurt our ability to do it.
That's in there, in the agreement as well. So there are
things in here that we can deal with and work together with and
maybe expand the issues that surround it. But we have to do it
with that coalition that was so successful. We can't do it
alone.
Ms. Harman. And--right. One of the real selling points of
the deal was the P5+1--the fact that it's the permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, and that includes
China and Russia.
And the fact that we could get to a deal even if not a
perfect deal--I made the point before----
Mr. Keating. I am in my last minute so I am sorry--I
apologize to interrupt but you just mentioned something else
that's important.
Right now in Russia Putin has had a pretty good week with
his ceremony being reinstalled as their leader. This really
completes his week.
This division with the West is exactly what Russia has been
gearing toward and continues to undercut a coalition that's
been there since the end of World War II that's brought more
peace and prosperity to this world than any other time period.
He's trying to undercut it quickly.
Putin must be having a pretty good laugh about this
happening right now, don't you think?
Ms. Harman. Yes. I was asked what are his intentions and I
said to make mischief.
Ambassador Bloomfield. If I could answer, Congressman,
since I am from Massachusetts--I think one of the deficits here
is that we didn't really focus on Russia's interest in the P5+1
negotiation.
Here he was sitting on our side of the table and somehow
the arms embargo got lifted for conventional weapons. I used to
be in charge of arms sales in the State Department.
And suddenly old deals were being carried out, deliveries
were being made, and now he's got a new market for the Russian
arms industry. We've never really commented on that and that's
a bit of cynicism.
They weren't exactly in the same place strategically that
we were with the Western Europeans. So that's a problem.
I also think, though, that it's important to give a
political explanation for what was happening at the negotiating
table on the Iranian side. We've been talking about what they
can do in 8 years, 6 years, et cetera.
That's true. But what they really did was to transition
from being an illegal outlaw nuclear rogue state to being a
legal nuclear power.
That was the big thing. It already happened. They became
fully legal in 2015-2016. So I personally--and I go back to the
things I've said before--don't look at this regime in Tehran as
sort of planning for 2026.
They're trying to get through 2018, and I think that
knowledge, that sensibility, could help us come together on a
policy on Iran that puts leverage and pressure on them to back
off and looks at their vulnerabilities.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Okay. We are going to go to Ann Wagner of
Missouri.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely
hearing. I want to also thank the witnesses for their service.
When the last administration signed its very flawed nuclear
deal with Iran, many hoped that the economic incentives would
entice Iran to leave its destabilizing violent agenda behind
and to join the community of responsible nations.
I, quite frankly, never shared that optimism. Nearly 3
years later, Iran's behavior remains deeply disturbing. Iran's
support for Assad and for terrorist groups throughout the
region compromises U.S. interests and, frankly, the security of
our allies.
It is absolutely critical that the United States use its
strength and its economic clout to hold Iran accountable for
its proxy army of terrorist groups and extremists militias.
Ambassador Bloomfield, U.S. policy makers see factionalism
in Iranian domestic politics as kind of a ray of hope. But you
have criticized Washington's long-standing kind of naivete in
this regard and I agree. Wishful thinking has impaired policy
makers' ability to assess the Iranian threat with clear eyes.
Dissenting factions within Iran have yet to succeed in
modifying the regime's behavior abroad, it seems. However,
that's not to say that meaningful change can never happen.
Can you assess here briefly the long-term possibilities for
internal reforms in Iran, please?
Ambassador Bloomfield. I will. Thank you very much, and I
agree with all of your comments, Congresswoman.
There are several countries in this world which are one-
party authoritarian states--Russia, China, Syria, North Korea,
Iran.
These are circles of power that have similarities, even
though the culture is different. They never intend to lose
power.
This regime has been in power for nearly 39 years. It's the
same people. Some of them become hardliners and then 10 years
later they're reformists.
I am not saying that they are all identical drones. No
human race produces people who agree on everything. We fight
about politics in Washington. They fight about politics in
Tehran.
But if the people push hard enough and complain about the
economic deprivation, the lack of rights, the abuse, the
executions--more than 50 percent of the executions in the
Middle East are Iranian executions--the Tier 3 trafficking in
persons, how they're hanging people from ropes for trafficking
drugs but we are catching IRGC 18-wheelers in Europe with
drugs.
Mrs. Wagner. Right.
Ambassador Bloomfield. And so there's so much that could be
said about what they've done. If this ever catches up to them,
not one of the reformists--not one of the moderates--can walk
down the street and not be told, ``You were part of the 39-year
reign of terror.''
So I think they all know that. Everything that they do is
to stay in power, and I think when you start with that piece of
wisdom, and consider the JCPOA, they came to the table maybe
because of economic duress.
But let me just say that even if we hadn't given them all
that money, they have huge oil reserves. They share one of the
largest gas fields on the planet.
They have tens of billions--upwards of 100 billion,
probably, in the religious foundations. The issue is not
whether we are giving them the money, although I know it upsets
people. The issue is, they have the money.
They're just not spending it on the people, and that's a
fight between the Iranian people, 80 million of them, and this
circle of clerics that has held power for 39 years.
Mrs. Wagner. I appreciate that perspective very much and
appreciate it being in the record.
Mr. Rademaker, I haven't seen the preannouncements of the
President's announcement but let's just say that the President
does decide to either reimpose sanctions or walk away from the
Iranian deal at this point.
How can we use it to our advantage to perhaps strengthen
his hand in the North Korean denuclearisation talks? Do you see
any way, shape, or form in doing that?
Mr. Rademaker. That's an interesting question. The
conventional wisdom--and I think we've heard it expressed here
today--is that walking away from the JCPOA makes it harder to
strike a deal with North Korea because they'll assume that
President Trump can't be trusted to honor commitments that the
United States makes.
I think there's a lot to be said for that argument. But I
think that's probably not President Trump's analysis.
I think probably his analysis is the opposite--that it will
be a signal of strength and determination that he sends to the
North Koreans--that by walking away from a deal that didn't
adequately address the nuclear threat from Iran he's showing
them that he's going to settle for something that's inadequate.
Now, I think a lot of people would disagree that that's the
effect but I do think actually----
Mrs. Wagner. I think it is. I will say this. I believe that
it is America's strength. I believe it is the maximum pressure
campaign.
I spent some time in the Korean Peninsula and on the China-
North Korea border and I do believe that our strength, the
sanctions package, has brought players to the table, especially
Kim Jong-un, and it'll be interesting to see what dynamic this
has I think going forward.
So Ms. Harman, please--Congresswoman.
Ms. Harman. If I just might add to that, though, as Linc
Bloomfield just said, regime survival is hugely important to
the Iranian regime.
I think regime survival is just as important to the Kim
regime in North Korea, and they've been in power for 70 years
and presided over the most atrocious human rights abuses and so
forth. We all agree with that.
So if they're interested in regime survival, why would they
voluntarily give up a pretty highly-developed nuclear industry
to a goal of denuclearization? Why----
Mrs. Wagner. Because their people are suffering. Their
people are starving. Their people are under such oppression
from both the human rights and economic standpoint.
I believe that's why--certainly why North Korea has come to
the table.
Ambassador Bloomfield, do you agree? No? Good.
Ms. Harman, please. You can finish up.
Ms. Harman. Just to respond, I think the regime is
responsible for a lot of that starvation----
Mrs. Wagner. It is.
Ms. Harman [continuing]. And deprivation of rights, and I
think if it gives up its nuclear weapons and allows for an
entry into the normal world by North Korea, it risks its
survival. I am not making that case. I don't want that to turn
out to the be true.
But I am saying from the perspective of the Kim regime, I
think they will be reluctant to now restore or provide for the
first times rights to their people because they could easily be
overthrown.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you for your perspective.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time and I will yield back.
Chairman Royce. Okay. We go to David Cicilline of Rhode
Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses.
I think the President's behavior in this context is
dangerous. It is undermining the security of the United States
and our interests around the world.
His antics demonstrate a tremendous lack of understanding
of the implications of withdrawing from this agreement and
using this deal as a rhetorical wedge for political gain and
playing a will he, won't he game of certification is a
distraction from the very serious issues including keeping our
ally, Israel, safe, combatting terrorism in the region, having
a strategy for success in Syria, and opposing Iran's various
malign activities throughout the region.
And while we are dithering about certification of sanctions
waivers and bullying our European allies, the Iranians, in
concert with Russia and Syria, have set up a sphere of
influence that stretches from Tehran to Damascus.
The New York Times is now reporting that the President is
actually going to reimpose all the sanctions, and so this hope
that somehow he was going to be a great negotiator--we were
just going to add to the deal, Mr. Rademaker, doesn't seem very
likely.
And it's not the language the President has been using.
He's been talking about it being the worst deal in the world
and he's going to fix it, and what he's going to do is
undermine our ability to really provide leadership in
responding to Iranian aggression around the world.
Many of us saw making certain that nuclear weapons were off
the table would actually enable the United States to lead an
effort to really respond to the malign behavior of the Iranians
in various parts of the world and their effort to really
enlarge their sphere of influence.
All of that is thrown out now. It's hard to imagine how
anyone will be willing to work with the United States in
developing a real strategy to do that when we aren't keep our
word in this international agreement.
So I know, Congresswoman, you have mentioned this in your
testimony. We are in the middle of this discussion about
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
If you're Kim Jong-un and you're watching this and thinking
oh, here was an international agreement led by the United
States in which they promised to give up their nuclear program
in exchange for certain things.
Everyone admits they have complied with the agreement. This
idea of, like, well, maybe not with the spirit--it's just not
true. Everyone who has reviewed it said they are in compliance.
When you have an agreement, you have terms. You either comply
with them or you don't.
And so I just wonder what it means in terms of our ability
to actually resolve another very difficult question on the
Korean Peninsula when we have some challenges now with our
partnership with our allies as a result of this walk away
coupled with some credibility as to whether we'll keep our
word.
So, Congresswoman, I would love your thoughts on that.
Ms. Harman. I think that if President Trump can reach a
strong deal with the North Koreans he will deserve enormous
credit. That will be huge, as he discusses it, and I give him
credit all the time for making North Korea the first focus of
his foreign policy.
So I am all for a strong deal with the North Koreans and I
am all for the conversation which will take place soon
somewhere.
But I do think, as you said, that decertifying this deal or
at least in some way pulling away from this deal is going to
make it harder to negotiate with the North Koreans. I just made
that point.
I think that the Kim regime in North Korea has regime
survival as its first tenet--not helping its people but regime
survival--and it figures that by doing a deal that will welcome
it back into the community of nations it will enhance its
ability to survive.
I also think a second goal is somehow unifying the Korean
Peninsula, which could be achieved because South and North
Korea are finally talking to each other and may finally end the
Korean War, which has never had a formal end.
So those goals are achievable but by watching what happens
today they may be fading farther away on the horizon.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
The other question is there are mechanisms that are
available to the administration today under the Global
Magnitsky Act as well as CAATSA.
Now, whether any of the witnesses know how many Iranians
are being sanctioned under those two provisions currently?
You know, this idea of, like, we already have these
vehicles and is the administration making use of them. Does
anyone know? Are there any?
Ambassador Bloomfield. I don't know the answer to that. It
appears that we don't know but----
Mr. Cicilline. All right.
Ambassador Bloomfield [continuing]. But I would say that
our military leaders have constantly said that all tools of
national power should be mobilized in support of U.S. policies
and I am not sure we are quite there yet.
Mr. Cicilline. Yeah. Thank you.
And finally, I know there has been some discussion about
what I would put in quotes as ``evidence'' submitted by Prime
Minister Netanyahu last week about the prior intentions of the
Iranians some--almost two decades ago.
It was clear to everyone who was studying that deal that
that was information that was known to U.S. intelligence
agencies, known to negotiators.
In fact, if we didn't have some believe that they were
intending to do that we wouldn't need the JCPOA. So this was
not any surprise to anybody on the panel, I take it?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Can I respond to that, please?
Mr. Cicilline. Sure.
Ambassador Bloomfield. First of all, I am a centrist and I
like bipartisanship. And in that spirit, if we go back to the
beginning of the nuclear talks, I am not as hard on President
Obama for seeing an opening when the Iranians reached out to
see if we could reduce their nuclear threat and maybe move
relations to a better place.
He went before the United Nations and he not only said we
want to negotiate a nuclear agreement but in 2013 the President
also said we would like to see if we can follow a path to
better understanding between the two countries.
What we have is the answer from Iran. It's 2018. We have a
different President. We have the nuclear agreement. That was
done.
But the rest of it--Iran's intentions, Iran's nature--has
been revolutionary. It has been to export and foment trouble,
to try to destroy the ability of the Syrians to get to a
constitutional government.
With the Iraqis that we bled and died for to have a
constitutional government, they have committed sectarian
warfare to undermine that, because the next stop is Tehran.
That's my view.
So I think it's appropriate for this President to say,
``Wait a minute--this isn't enough.'' Now, I don't know what
he's going to say about the JCPOA.
My own view is that it only talks about part of the
problem. If there's no restraint, we have a crisis. If there is
restraint, let's move to the rest of it, and that's what I've
tried to explain today.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Congresswoman.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add a comment to that. I
applaud the statement, but let's remember what the deal was. It
was a transaction to get Iran to stop its development of
nuclear weapons for a finite period of time. That's it.
It was not a transformation of the relationship. That was
aspirational and, sadly, those aspirations did not come to
pass.
But my view is we should still keep the transaction and
negotiate a stronger transaction, meanwhile, working with our
allies to keep the whole area more stable through an
authorization to use military force, which Congress could
enact.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Tom Garrett of Virginia.
Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to say to
the three honorable and distinguished members of the panel that
I apologize in advance.
As a junior member, I am going to covetously guard my 5
minutes. I won't get six or seven.
So I want to start, Ms. Harman, with a comment that you
made. If the people--and I quote verbatim--``If the people of
Iran who elected their government by more than 50 percent in a
four-way field want to change their government let them do
it.''
Are you implying that there are free and fair elections in
Iran?
Ms. Harman. No.
Mr. Garrett. Okay.
Ms. Harman. But I am implying that----
Mr. Garrett. I am going to covetous--I am not trying to be
rude and I respect your immense service to this body. But I
want to be clear, because the Iranians watch these hearings,
right.
So the Guardians Council approves individuals who wish to
run for office in Iran and, as an example, 496 individuals
wanted to run for President in 2009. Four were approved. So
it's not so simple--regime change--as winning an election, and
I don't want to--and, again, not meant to be disrespectful.
I want to read from the comments of my colleague, who I
think was nearly prescient when he wrote in 2015 the following:
Now, under U.S.--now as the law--under U.S. law the only thing
that's binding on the U.S. is a tree that's designed as a
treaty. So it says it's a treaty submitted to the Senate for
ratification, it gets two-thirds positive vote. This deal is
not a treaty. It has no standing under U.S. law except as a
handshake from the President.
I continue from my colleague--the Vienna Convention of Law
of Treaties provides a hierarchy of agreements.
This deal is not a ratified treaty. It's not an unratified
treaty. It's not an executive legislative agreement. It's the
lowest form of international handshake.
So I continue from my same colleague: You can be sure that
Iran will violate this agreement or not, based on whether it's
in their interest, whether they think they'll get caught. No
one around the Ayatollah will say no, no, that would be a
violation of international law.
And so I want to thank my colleague, Mr. Sherman, because I
think he's really been sort of omniscient as it relates to
foreseeing what happens.
Mr. Rademaker, do we know, to a metaphysical certainty,
that Iran is in compliance with the terms of the JCPOA?
Mr. Rademaker. No, I don't think we----
Mr. Garrett. And, again, not trying to be rude. I got a
finite amount of time.
And we don't know that because military sites are off
limits to inspections, correct?
Mr. Rademaker. They've declared that they will be off
sites. There's been no request to inspect military----
Mr. Garrett. And if there is an inspection request, how
much time do the Iranians have to prepare?
Mr. Rademaker. I am not sure, but they would have--they
would have some time. The bigger question, though, is are there
other sites that we don't know about at all that we don't to
inspect.
Mr. Garrett. That would be the next question. And initially
contemplated was 24 days to prepare. My colleague, Mr. Sherman,
very humorously but I think accurately said, ``I could clean
out my garage in 24 days.''
And so, again, I commend him for sort of being--having
foresight.
Let me ask you this. Linc--because that's what you said
somebody to call you--is a nuclear-armed Iran consistent with
the rhetoric from the mullahs an existential threat to entities
in the region as well as the nation state of Israel and,
depending upon the delivery mechanism, an existential threat to
millions and millions of people in the United States?
Ambassador Bloomfield. As a technical physical matter, of
course it is.
Mr. Garrett. Okay.
Ambassador Bloomfield. I've already explained why I think
they need it for political reasons more than military reasons.
Mr. Garrett. I understand, again, and I know I am sort of
limiting these questions but I am limited in time.
Does Iran have a documented history, Mr. Rademaker, of
violating international agreements?
Mr. Rademaker. Well, when it came to--in the nuclear area
they have a long history of deception and cheating on their
international obligations with regard to nuclear safeguards.
Mr. Garrett. And my good friend and colleague, Mr. Engel,
pointed out that the--well over $100 million--in previous
statements that there are well over $100 million that we
released to Iran would go to fund activities that the Iranians
have engaged in for perpetuity to include Hamas, Hezbollah
wreaking havoc in the region and globally.
Can anyone on the panel, just for my own sort of
intellectual curiosity, name a single terrorist entity other
than Hezbollah, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Iranian government which has the dubious distinction of having
murdered people on every single inhabited continent? Can
anybody, or is Hezbollah--are the Iranians the only ones?
Australia? South America? So I suppose, in conclusion, Mr.
Rademaker, would you feel better about this agreement as was
indicated by my colleague, Ms. Frankel, as well as Mr. Deutch
and Mr. Sires in 2015, if the inspection were more robust?
Mr. Rademaker. Certainly.
Mr. Garrett. Would each of you feel better about this
agreement if the fungible moneys weren't freed to Iran that
have historically gone to fund radical elements that murder
people across the globe, quite literally, like Hamas,
Hezbollah, et cetera? Ms. Harman, I saw you reaching for the
button.
Ms. Harman. Of course I would.
Mr. Garrett. And so if we can maintain some agreement and
yet get a stronger agreement as it relates to things like
ballistic missile technology that would, in the estimation of
all folks on the panel, be a step in the right direction?
Ms. Harman. Absolutely, but the question we raised is
whether the President's anticipated action this afternoon helps
or hinders that goal.
Mr. Garrett. Well, Ms. Harman, I will wrap up.
Again, with complete respect for everybody on the panel, I
would read from my friend and colleague, Mr. Deutch, who wrote
in 2015, ``Many of my colleagues are trying to turn this into a
partisan fight.'' People of good faith can disagree. Honestly,
they should stop.
We do not know what the actions of the President will be
circa 2:00 p.m. this afternoon. I will be completely candid in
speaking for or against them once I understand what they are.
But in the meantime, trying to score political points, I
think you'd all agree, is a bad idea and we can do a little bit
better with this thing that has been referred to as a deal and
an agreement but not a treaty and it is indeed within our legal
purview to attempt to do so by virtue of the nature of the
underlying agreement.
Is that not correct, ma'am? Anybody?
Ms. Harman. Yes, it's correct, and this committee, on a
bipartisan basis has stated a general position, which I
certainly would commend and I commended at the outset of my
testimony the bipartisanship, the long history of it--of this
committee. I think it's an exemplary part of the House.
Mr. Garrett. The only thing I would submit, and not to poke
at you at all, is that we should not judge what the President
is going to say before he said it.
That's all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Garrett.
Lois Frankel from Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Schneider, thank you for still being here because it's
usually just myself and the chairman at the end.
All right. So there is a benefit to lasting a couple of
hours of the hearing because there's always something
happening, which is I got a news alert that Russia opens the
door to rework Iran deal.
Apparently, their foreign minister just said that they're
interested in the French proposal. I don't know what that
means. I just thought I would bring that out. Maybe I will ask
a question about it.
So, listen, here's the point that we all agree. First off,
thank you for being here. I know we all agree, everybody, that
Iran should never get a nuclear weapon, and there's no conflict
between believing that and those of us who agree that the deal
was flawed.
I personally did not like the deal because I thought Iran's
dangerous actions were left unaddressed, the sunset clauses and
so forth--all these things that are still pressing.
With that said, I think we need to fix, not nix, and I--as
much as I disagree with this President on almost everything, I
really--even though he's going to today say he's going to
impose sanctions--apparently he's going to impose all the
sanctions back--I really--I find it hard to believe that he's
really going to do that. Maybe it's diplomatic chess.
But here's my question. I hope that's what it is. From a
practical point of view, first, I wanted to ask you this. Let's
say he imposes sanctions--reimposes them.
How long does it take to get them--the consequences, which
I think he's trying to get to, which is a better deal--so from
a practical effect, what does the administration have to do to
make the imposition of the sanctions actually work? What are
the next steps?
Ambassador Bloomfield. It may be, Congresswoman, that
they've already done some homework on this and so it's very
hard to predict. I think the bureaucracy will work very hard
and probably very well.
The effect will be immediate. The rial--the Iranian
currency--is very weak right now and dropping. A news flash at
2 o'clock from Washington that the President is unsatisfied
with this regime's behavior will resonate throughout the
country and out of fear people just not knowing what the
sanctions will do will have a negative effect on their
currency.
Ms. Frankel. Okay. So what do you think is the risk of them
starting up the--to try to have a nuclear weapon that actually
is effective?
Ambassador Bloomfield. Could I just, for the record, point
out that in January, before the Israeli Knesset, Vice President
Pence made a ``solemn promise'' that the United States will
never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. That's a check we
have written--this administration has written.
That's why in my testimony I suggested perhaps the
President should enshrine it as a doctrine. We hope that Iran
will agree not to develop a nuclear weapon under these
arrangements.
But if they do, this is a promise that the Obama
administration also made. This is bipartisan. We have said they
will never have the bomb.
Well, we have to hold to that. That's a red line.
Ms. Frankel. Ms. Harman, 1 second before you answer the
question, okay, let me--okay, answer that question because I do
have another one. Go ahead.
Ms. Harman. Well, I think it has always been U.S. policy at
least as long as we've worried about Iran. First it was U.S.
policy that they could not--should not--it certainly was my
view, get intercontinental ballistic missile technology and
transfer it to others. They did get that. That's the point.
But I think the Obama agreement, as we have discussed, was
transactional and it should--if it remains in effect in some
effect, that would be a positive.
What I was going to say is that one of the downsides of an
announcement that we are leaving the deal is the reaction of
our allies.
Let's understand this deal is much more effective because
we had three European countries plus China and Russia in the
deal, and what happens next? Maybe some new mischief from
Russia is going to be fascinating. But we probably will not be
in the driver's seat.
Ms. Frankel. What do you think the actions will be by Iran
and do you think there's any possibility that they would agree
to a new agreement--a new add-on?
Mr. Rademaker. So I don't even know yet what the
President's going to announce at 2 o'clock. So it's hard for me
to----
Ms. Frankel. I am assuming he's going to announce the
worst. I don't know whether he'll follow through but----
Mr. Rademaker. Assuming the United States reimposes
sanctions that's a breach by the United States of its
obligations under the JCPOA, then as a legal matter Iran, if it
wants to walk away from its obligations, it's entitled to do
so. Whether they will do that or not, I don't know.
They may benefit politically by playing the aggrieved party
and continue to comply and asking for compensation in other
areas. That would be a shrewd clever strategy on their part.
Would they be open to a new negotiation? You know, I think
absolutely, and the--you should read my prepared statement on
this. I talk about what negotiations on a follow-on agreement
would look like.
From today's baseline, if the baseline is the JCPOA and we
are asking Iran to make additional concessions, they're going
to naturally say, well, what are you prepared to give us in
exchange and what I point out in my testimony is the main thing
we have to give them in exchange is relaxation or elimination
of our primary embargo.
In other words, we promise, okay, we are going to stop
treating you like an economic pariah. American companies,
American individuals will be able to trade with Iran in the
future just like any other country.
That would be a good deal for Iran. But then my question,
which I asked in my prepared statement, is what's left of our
counter terrorism policy because----
Ms. Frankel. Right.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. We imposed those sanctions to
stop them from supporting Hezbollah, to get them to back off
from their commitment to destroy Israel.
And if we decide to rehabilitate them, turn them into a
normal nation because they make some additional concessions in
the nuclear area, what's left of our efforts to stop them from
supporting terrorism?
Ms. Frankel. Right, and----
Mr. Rademaker. And that's the question----
Ms. Frankel [continuing]. And you can't--how can you
renegotiate--can't in 5 minutes? It doesn't take 5 minutes to
get a deal. We need to try to stop their terrorism, and I am
just worried what they're going to do in the meantime.
Chairman Royce. All right. We go now to Mr. Brad Schneider
of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, and I want to thank the chairman
and the ranking member for having this hearing and, like my
colleagues before, I associate myself with your remarks.
I want to thank the witnesses both for staying here and
sharing your perspectives but also for your past service to our
country.
About eight witnesses ago--because we now have instant
alerts on our watches--New York Times reported that the
President is going to withdraw, moments ago, Haaretz is
quoting, France is denying that President Trump told Macron
that they're going to withdraw.
So I think we are at a point where we have absolutely
clarity from this. But I think where there is clarity and,
among the committee and on both sides as well as the witnesses,
we talked about that there's agreement Iran should never ever
have a nuclear weapon.
That was true before the JCPOA. It is true for the terms of
the JCPOA and I believe it should be true after elements of the
JCPOA sunset.
Ambassador Bloomfield, you, in your written testimony,
talked about the fact that the United States has the ability--
and I believe it should and I felt this way before the JCPOA--
we should make clear that we will never ever allow Iran to have
a nuclear weapon--not now, not during the terms of this
agreement, not afterwards.
Is there anything preventing the President or, for that
matter, Congress from making that statement?
Ambassador Bloomfield. I am not aware of any nor was I
aware of any when President Carter called the defense of the
Persian Gulf a vital interest to the United States. These are
things that Presidents do.
Mr. Schneider. And I think that would be true long, long
into the future.
Earlier, there was talk about compliance--Iran's compliance
with the nuclear arrangement and that there weren't flaws in
the compliance.
I just want to make clear--my issues with Iran's compliance
or flaws at the moment it's when there are sunsets. The flaws,
I believe, are within the deal. And I believe that, like any
deal, there are inherent risks in the JCPOA. I believe there
are gaps in the JCPOA and, particularly, with sunsets and some
of the other issues there are flaws.
But I also think it's important that we recognize that the
JCPOA has bought us time. In fact, Gadi Eizenkot, in January
2016--the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces--said
that we need to use this time to develop a strategy and create
the leverage.
We've pushed Iran back for a year for up to 15 years.
That's a good thing. But we have to keep Iran back and
permanently away from a nuclear weapon.
Does pulling out of the deal now create any more leverage?
I will look to you, Mr. Rademaker, if you can touch on that.
Mr. Rademaker. President Trump may calculate that
negotiating some follow-on agreement from the baseline of the
JCPOA is a losing proposition because the only thing we have to
give them is additional sanctions relief of our primary embargo
and he doesn't want to do that.
So he wants to change the baseline. That's sort of how I
interpret what he's been doing.
Can I comment on this related issue, though?
Mr. Schneider. Yes.
Mr. Rademaker. Declaring a policy that we are not going to
allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon--I mean, look, that sounds
right. Let's declare it.
But you need to answer the question, what are you going to
do about it, okay. If they--and I think the implication of this
declaration is we are going to attack them, okay--that we will
attack Iran if it gets close to having a nuclear weapon. I am
fine with that declaration. Okay.
But what President Trump has been asking for, what he asked
the Congress to legislate and what he asked the Europeans to
agree to was not join us in threatening to attack Iran.
He said join us in threatening to impose sanctions on Iran
if they get close to having a nuclear weapon.
The Europeans said, oh, no, no, that might upset the
Iranians--we can't do that. Legislation to do that stalled in
the Senate----
Mr. Schneider. If I can----
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. And I guess, you know, if
you're going to declare this policy you got to put some teeth
in it and if----
Mr. Schneider. Fair enough.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. The only teeth are the threaten
to--we are going to threaten to attack them, that's safe--
threatening to oppose sanctions on them, that's dangerous, I
don't----
Mr. Schneider. Well, let me reclaim my time because in your
testimony you talked about we either accept it or reject it. I
don't believe we should accept the flaws. I think there are
things we can do to close the gaps, reduce the risks, and try
to fix the flaws.
But I don't think it's either-or. I think there's a
sequence, and I think what we need to do is say how do we put
pressure on Iran to change its behaviors--change its behaviors
around ICBMs, change its behaviors around their efforts to
expand within the region--change its behaviors on support of
terror and human rights, and that should be a full-throated
across-the-board pressure.
But behind that there also, I believe, has to be ways to
box Iran in and the credible threat of military action has to
be a part of that.
We said before all options--all options have to be on the
table. But most importantly, within that, I believe, we need to
create strategic options--create leverage for the United States
to force Iran to change its goals, to understand that we are
not going to accept a nuclear Iran and that means working with
our allies, maintaining the relationship and, as my colleague,
Mr. Deutch, said earlier, ensuring that American leadership is
indispensable and enforced.
I am sorry.
Ms. Harman. Well, if I could just enthusiastically embrace
that, that's why I think Congress has to enact an authorization
to use military force for the region, which would identify the
trade-offs and how to create a strategy for United States
leadership that puts maximum pressure not just on Iran--and by
the way, we can curb its malign behavior outside the contours
of the deal and we should be done more--but against other
parities in the region who are engaged in nefarious activities
in any country where they are.
And we should dispel this notion that the U.S. is leaving
the region and retreating from our responsibilities, that we
have developed since the end of World War II with allies that
have created an order in the world that's valuable and we
should try to maintain.
Mr. Schneider. I think our leadership is more important now
than ever.
Mr. Rademaker, do you have a response----
Mr. Rademaker. Just a concluding thought. Authorization for
use of military force--fine idea. What President Trump asked
for, I would say--asked the Senate to do--would properly be
characterized as an authorization to impose economic sanctions,
and the Senate wouldn't do it. So----
Mr. Schneider. Well, that's why--I think there's a sequence
of things. We need to be able to apply the pressure, have the
critical threat, and work to build the strategy long-term well
beyond 2025, well beyond 2030, to make sure Iran never gets a
nuclear weapon.
Ms. Harman. The American people deserve a voice in this.
They have to understand what the trade-offs are in terms of
resources and loss of life, and they haven't been included in
the conversation the way they could be if Congress, on a
bipartisan basis, led by this committee, would debate seriously
and, hopefully, help pass an authorization to use military
force.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Well, if I could just offer a final
thought. I support what you're saying about strong American
leadership, about authorization for use of military force,
about having a debate, about doing the right thing on the
nuclear issue.
I also feel that we need a much stronger view of the
vulnerability of the Iranian regime, and I think what you're
saying is we need to understand their legitimacy problems,
their economic mismanagement problems, their criminal record,
the accountability for all of the things that they've done not
only to us but to the rest of the region and the world.
We've never held them to account. We've never even had a
full accounting of what this regime has done. If we do that, we
will see a very weak and isolated group of leaders who are on
thin ice and who are trying to make a lot of noise and hold up
bright shiny objects in order to gain a little bit of
legitimacy and buy some time.
I think if we do that, we can put together a comprehensive
strategy that uses the wisdom that my two panelists have
offered. I support much of their wisdom of what they put
forward on the nuclear side.
But let's also have a comprehensive policy that says once
and for all that this malign actor needs to be pushed back in
the box.
Chairman Royce. And, Ambassador, we'll--we will be--Brad,
you and I, Ambassador, this committee will be further engaged
in that discussion with you and with all three of our witnesses
today.
I really want to thank you for your testimony and we thank
the members also for your questions.
So in about an hour the President will let us know his
decision with respect to sanctions and, by extension, the
nuclear deal, and we'll see what he has to say and go from
there.
And this committee will stay engaged. But for now, we stand
adjourned and thank you, again.
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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