    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                    LIBYA FRACTURED: THE STRUGGLE FOR UNITY

    =======================================================================

                                     HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 18, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-125

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

      [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
        Wisconsin                        ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 TED LIEU, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                     ------

                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               TED LIEU, California
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
      Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional
      Research Service...............................................     6
    Frederic Wehrey, Ph.D., senior fellow, Middle East Program,
      Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.....................    23
    Ms. Alice Hunt Friend, senior fellow, International Security
      Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........    30

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Christopher Blanchard: Prepared statement....................     8
    Frederic Wehrey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................    25
    Ms. Alice Hunt Friend: Prepared statement........................    32

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    54
    Hearing minutes..................................................    55
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    56

                               LIBYA FRACTURED:
                             THE STRUGGLE FOR UNITY

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2018

                         House of Representatives,

               Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
    p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana
    Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
    After recognizing myself and my friend, the ranking member
    Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statement, I then
    will recognize other members seeking recognition as well.
        We will then hear from our witnesses. Without objection,
    the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the
    record.
        And members may have 5 days to insert statements and
    questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in
    the rules.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
        Nearly 7 years after Qaddafi's removal, Libya remains mired
    in civil conflict, political division, lawlessness, and
    economic crisis, with few signs of abating anytime soon. ISIS
    and al-Qaeda, though seriously degraded, are regrouping, and as
    we have seen in a series of car bombings this year, they are
    still very much capable of violence. Despite backing by the
    United Nations and its partners, the western-based Government
    of National Accord, or GNA, has not been able to provide
    security or consolidate power throughout Libya's vast
    territory, and it continues to clash with eastern-based House
    of Representatives backed by General Haftar and his Libyan
    National Army, or LNA.
        Armed militias, some with ties to the LNA and GNA, profit
    off the lack of security and the rule of law, smuggling drugs,
    weapons and people, and migrants using Libya as a waypoint into
    Europe, suffer horrific treatment at the hands of smugglers,
    including torture, sexual abuse, and enslavement.
        Adding to the chaos, a host of external actors continue to
    back different Libyan factions with the U.S. and the U.N.
    supporting the GNA; Egypt, the UAE, and Russia supporting
    Haftar, and Qatar and Turkey supporting the country's Islamist
    groups. And as we saw when three French soldiers were killed
    fighting ISIS alongside Haftar forces in 2016, even France has
    played both sides, sometimes assisting the U.S. and the GNA
    while at other times supporting Haftar and his factions.
        All of this has made political reconciliation more remote,
    as both sides have dug in their heels and negotiations have
    stalled. The prospect of U.N.-backed elections this year, which
    were probably too soon anyway, also seems to have fallen by the
    wayside.
        There are some encouraging signs, however, including better
    governance at the local and municipal levels and growth in the
    oil sector, which for now has saved Libya's economy from
    collapse. And it remains to be seen how Haftar's now-confirmed
    hospitalization in Paris will impact Libya's fractured state.
    If he is, indeed, incapacitated, will this be the opening that
    Libya needs for reconciliation or will there be more chaos as
    his coalition breaks apart and his backers look for a
    successor?
        With the challenges I have laid out, as well as the
    competing foreign policy priorities elsewhere, it is perhaps
    understandable that this administration would be wary of
    spending political capital in Libya. The administration does so
    at its peril, however, as this is a problem that is not going
    away and is only going to get worse for the region, for Europe,
    and for U.S. interests, if it is not addressed.
        Just last month, our U.S. commander in Africa stated that,
    ``The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most
    significant threat to the U.S. and our allies' interest on the
    continent.''
        Our partners in Tunisia and Egypt are already feeling the
    impact. Mali, Chad, and Sudan have been impacted. And we have
    seen how ISIS networks in Libya can reach into Europe with the
    Manchester and Berlin terror attacks in the last 2 years alone.
        Libya's instability is a major problem for U.S. interests,
    and we need a concerted effort from this administration to make
    it a priority. It is past time to appoint a new U.S. Ambassador
    to Libya. And soon, as it is viable from a security standpoint,
    we need to consider reopening our Embassy in Tripoli to
    increase engagement on the ground. The administration should
    also fill the empty special envoy slot as soon as possible, so
    that the U.S. has another dedicated diplomat who can work with
    our partners and coordinate our Libya policy, whatever that may
    be.
        More than anything, more than military aid, more than
    financial aid, Libya needs U.S. leadership, leadership that can
    corral the various countries' interfering in Libya, leverage
    our connections, and help push the political reconciliation
    process forward. I urge this administration to give Libya the
    attention that it deserves.
        And with that, I am pleased to yield to my friend, Mr.
    Deutch, the ranking member.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this
    hearing and for your continued recognition of Libya's
    importance.
        I also would like to thank our panel of witnesses for
    attending and for their wealth of knowledge on these vital
    topics.
        We have all been shaken and horrified by the images and
    stories coming out of Libya, including slave markets, dismal
    conditions of refugee camps, extrajudicial killings, torture in
    illegal retention facilities, and other human rights violations
    on a shocking scale. These are all issues that desperately need
    to be tackled and are all symptoms of the years without a
    functional government.
        I am proud that this committee unanimously passed House
    Resolution 644 strongly condemning the slave auctions of
    migrants and refugees in Libya, but we acknowledge the only way
    to stop these evil practices is to see Libya set toward a path
    of lasting stability.
        Despite the efforts of the United Nations, the
    internationally brokered Government of National Accord, based
    in Tripoli, has been far from successful. The rise of competing
    strongmen and militias, defined by their quickly changing
    loyalties, and the persistent vacuums allowing terror groups to
    grow, are preventing the country from moving toward stability.
        And these factors of instability are enabling a
    humanitarian crisis to fester and worsen, emphasizing the need
    to address the root causes of Libya's plight. Unfortunately,
    the country's trajectory does not appear to have been altered
    over the previous year in any way that would suggest that
    conditions are improving.
        Attempts to bring together warring parties have been
    hindered by fractured loyalties and varying goals. Libya's
    economy is disjointed and struggling to rise above the
    prevailing black market. This only serves to promote smuggling,
    trafficking, and other illicit activities. Libyans, who once
    benefitted from the country's oil reserves, lack opportunity
    and job prospects, with youth unemployment now over 40 percent.
        Unfortunately, without functioning institutions, the
    government will continue to lack the ability to put basic
    structures in place for economic improvement. A continued
    fractured government and persistent security concerns will also
    prevent investment in the country.
        The implications of Libya's unrest and instability don't
    only apply to its own security. Libya's neighbors are directly
    impacted by the lawlessness, movement in smuggled weapons and
    trafficked people, and a draw for terrorist groups seeking safe
    haven from regions with stronger rule of law.
        As we have seen in Syria, Russia has attempted to expand
    its influence by exploiting the Libyan unrest. With little
    regard for human dignity and international law, Russia will not
    lead Libya toward stability. They only work toward furthering
    their own interests, likely at odds with our own national
    security priorities. That is why a coherent United States
    policy, along with the U.S.'s work with the U.N. to move Libya
    in the right direction, becomes even more pressing.
        The U.S. has long focused on counterterrorism, pressuring
    Libya to combat the various extremist threats plaguing the
    country. This is continuously challenged by the difficulty in
    securing Libya's vast desert borders. Border security is
    further challenged, given the chaos of the Sahel and sub-
    Saharan Africa, the use of Libya as a transit point for ISIS
    and al-Qaeda's allied fighters, and the smuggling of weapons to
    various terror groups. As conflict persists among Libya's armed
    forces and militia groups, it appears less and less likely that
    border security will increase.
        We maintain the goal of setting Libya on a course toward
    stability through a buildup of democratic institutions, the
    resiliency of which is not reliant upon personalities, but upon
    the framework of a functional government. U.S. engagement has
    been a challenge, given that U.S. Embassy personnel continue to
    operate out of Tunis. Nonetheless, we remain committed to
    democracy and governance and civil society programs.
        Of course, the solution for Libya must be ultimately a
    Libyan solution. We must look at the specific population needs,
    cultural dynamics, tribal identities, and social conditions to
    find a path forward that works for Libyans. And despite the
    obvious challenges, it remains in our national security
    interest, and those of international stability, that we
    continue to encourage and assist Libya in moving toward
    stability and preventing dangerous transnational terror groups
    from finding safe haven there. Only once good, honest, and
    comprehensive governance takes hold will the root cause of the
    horrors that we have witnessed be truly addressed.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to how
    Libya can best move forward on the path of reconciliation that
    resists the influence of non-state actors and provides
    stability and opportunity for all of the people of Libya.
        And I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, our
    ranking member.
        And now, I would like to turn to the members of our
    subcommittee for any opening statements they would like to
    make, and we will start with Mr. DeSantis of Florida.
        Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois?
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I don't have a lot to say, except that, obviously, we find
    ourselves in a pretty tough situation there, a lot of debate, a
    lot of questions, but I think it is obvious that, with the part
    of the world that Libya is in, and potentially the
    ramifications for the rest of the world, including Europe, of a
    failed Libyan state, it is important that we stayed engaged.
        Unfortunately, we have been seeing Libya sometimes how we
    have been seeing, for instance, Syria, which is just through
    the lens of a counter-ISIS campaign, which is important, but
    this is a much bigger issue than just a fight against terror.
        So, I appreciate all of you being here, and I want to thank
    the chair for having this hearing.
        And I will yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Adam.
        Mr. Chabot of Ohio?
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding
    this important hearing, and I will be very brief.
        I happened to be the chair of this committee when Qaddafi
    fell, when the so-called Arab Spring was happening, et cetera.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You might have been the cause of all
    these democracy movements.
        Mr. Chabot. Yes, maybe. Maybe. All this democracy.
        But I was in Libya with the Ambassador a month before he
    and three other brave Americans were killed. And so, it was
    obviously a traumatic experience for our country. It is one of
    the, I think, most unfortunate circumstances, not that incident
    necessarily, but just the overall chaos that ensued after the
    fall and where we are now. There is a tremendous amount that
    needs to be done in Libya.
        Hopefully, this hearing will shed some light on that. And
    so, I thank you very much for holding it. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. That was such a
    tragedy. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
        Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and the ranking
    member, for holding this hearing.
        Libya has been a difficult challenge for the United States
    and our allies since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi. As we have
    seen in many other places, it is far easier to topple a
    government than to rebuild a new one. Libya continues to be
    challenged by political fragmentation, rival factions,
    decentralization, terrorist threats, and the challenges of
    migration.
        I want to take a moment in my opening to recognize and
    remember the men who were killed in the attack on our consulate
    in Libya in 2002. Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen
    Doherty, and Tyrone Woods served our country with honor and
    gave their lives in defense of our freedoms.
        I thank our witnesses for appearing here today and look
    forward to hearing your perspectives on what we can do to help
    stabilize Libya and ensure a viable path forward, so the people
    of Libya can live in peace.
        Thank you. And with that, I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline.
        Seeing no other requests for time, I am so pleased to
    recognize our witnesses.
        First, we are delighted to welcome Mr. Christopher
    Blanchard, a specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the
    Congressional Research Service. Mr. Blanchard has covered
    developments in Libya since 2005 and served as an election
    observer for Libya's first post-Qaddafi elections in 2012, very
    historic.
        Thank you for being here today. We appreciate all the work
    you have done over the years at CRS, and we look forward to
    your testimony, Mr. Blanchard.
        Next, we are delighted to welcome Dr. Frederic Wehrey. Did
    I do that right? Thank you. He is senior fellow in the Middle
    East Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and
    a 21-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force.
        Thank you for your service, Dr. Wehrey.
        He has just had a book published about Libya, and has
    written many articles on Libya and the wider Middle East.
        Thank you for your service again, and thank you for your
    testimony today, Doctor.
        And finally, we are delighted to welcome Ms. Alice Friend.
    Is that right? Just like that? Okay. Friend, that is a great
    name.
        She is senior fellow in the International Security Program
    at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    Previously, Ms. Friend served in various roles at the
    Department of Defense, including as Principal Director for
    African Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy. She has also held numerous research positions at
    CSIS and at the Center for New American Security.
        Thank you for being here today, and we also look forward to
    your testimony.
        As I had said previously, your written testimony will be
    made a part of the record. Please feel free to summarize.
        We will start with you, Mr. Blanchard.

     STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE
    EASTERN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION,
                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Mr. Blanchard. Thank you Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
    Member Deutch, members of the committee, for inviting me to
    testify today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service
    on Libya. I will summarize my testimony by briefly making three
    observations.
        First, as you have discussed, several internal and external
    factors are disrupting Libya's post-Qaddafi transition. These
    factors are interrelated and they have been difficult to
    overcome. For example, transitional leaders and institutions
    with competing claims to legitimacy have accumulated in Libya
    since 2011. This challenges U.S. preferences to work with and
    through a single national government partner.
        Since December 2015, the U.N. Security Council and the
    United States have recognized the negotiated GNA as Libya's
    governing authority. This seeks to confer international
    legitimacy on the GNA and to encourage unification. But,
    nevertheless, the GNA and its eastern-Libya-based rivals have
    made little progress, as you have noted. The GNA's reach
    remains limited and, importantly, it relies on militias for
    security support.
        In 2017, U.N. officials launched an action plan to move the
    transition promptly and to renew the legitimacy of these Libyan
    institutions, but its implementation has faltered. Meanwhile,
    the power of armed non-state groups remains unmatched, and
    there is a lawless atmosphere that persists. Militias,
    criminals, and terrorists, including remnants of the Islamic
    State, operate with impunity in some areas, endangering
    civilians and committing human rights abuses. These entities
    exploit instability and state weakness for political and
    financial gain. This creates powerful incentives for them to
    maintain the unstable status quo. Thousands of migrants,
    refugees, and internally displaced persons remain particularly
    vulnerable.
        Many foreign governments are seeking to mitigate
    transnational threats emanating from Libya, and some are
    actively working to shape the transition's outcome in line with
    their preferences. Libya's oil resources, its geographic
    location, and weak institutions all raise the stakes of its
    instability for others. Libyan-based terrorists, traffickers,
    and armed groups pose risks to U.S. partners in North Africa,
    the Sahel, Europe, and beyond. Locally organized Libyan actors
    cooperate and compete amongst themselves and with these
    outsiders. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the European
    states are all engaging directly with different Libyan factions
    for a range of specific purposes.
        As my written testimony and reporting for CRS describe in
    more detail, this produces a complex and opaque web of
    overlapping interests and rivalries. Taken together, these
    challenges and dynamics are likely to last and to have enduring
    effects, even if the current mediation efforts improve.
        Second, U.S. policy in Libya has two main goals. It seeks
    to eliminate Libya-based terrorists and combat other
    transnational threats, and it seeks to support the transition
    to a unified, inclusive, and accountable government as the
    basis for long-term stability. The Trump and Obama
    administrations have used different blends of diplomacy and
    military operations, sanctions, and foreign aid to achieve
    relatively consistent objectives over time. Diplomatically, the
    United States is lending support to U.N. mediation rather than
    seeking to engineer a U.S.-defined solution. Given that zero-
    sum attitudes have divided post-Qaddafi Libya, U.S.
    policymakers judge that an inclusive, Libyan-defined solution
    is more likely to result in stability than solutions imposed by
    force or by outsiders. Current policy also reflects the
    judgment that a settlement can't be reached without
    international support and coordination.
        So, what more can the United States do to support Libya's
    transition? Events since 2011 suggest a series of factors to
    consider. More active U.S. diplomacy and more robust assistance
    could boost actors that share U.S. goals, but also could create
    enduring costs for the United States, link the United States to
    actors that lack domestic legitimacy, or invite others to
    intervene similarly. Less active U.S. involvement could reduce
    diplomatic and financial burdens on the Unites States and could
    simplify relations with outsiders, but it might also result in
    less desirable security outcomes. If security were to
    deteriorate rapidly, containment costs could increase, pressure
    on U.S. partners could rise, and calls for new U.S.
    intervention could emerge.
        Third, for Congress, different scenarios may raise unique
    questions, but certain topics have been shown to have lasting
    relevance in Libya, regardless of how conditions have evolved.
    These include the balance of U.S. diplomatic, military, and
    foreign aid efforts; the roles of other outside actors;
    frameworks defined by the U.N. Security Council; funding and
    terms for U.S. assistance; the selection and vetting of U.S.
    partners, and authorizations for the use of military force.
        This concludes my brief remarks. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Blanchard follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Wehrey?

    STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST
          PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

        Mr. Wehrey. Thank you. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking
    Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege
    to speak with you here today about Libya's ongoing struggle for
    stability, peace, and unity.
        I join you, having visited western Libya in December of
    last year, where I glimpsed firsthand the severity of the
    challenges, the growing power of its predatory armed groups and
    the criminal networks, the plunder of its economy, the
    potential re-emergence of radicalism, to name but a few.
    Underpinning all of these inflictions is the weakness of
    governing institutions and national political fissures.
        I will start with my visit to the central coastal city of
    Sirte, the object of intense American focus in 2016 during the
    war against the Islamic State. While the Islamic State was
    ousted from its stronghold there at the cost of over 700 Libyan
    lives, Sirte faces daunting challenges of reconstruction and
    recovery. Bridging the social damage wrought by the Islamic
    State's divisive rule is especially crucial, as is restoring
    law and order.
        Though the Islamic State has dispersed to the desert
    southwest of the city, it is still potent. It could easily
    exploit Libya's political divisions and the unwillingness of
    armed groups to confront it. We have seen this before where
    Libya's opposing factions where so focused on battling each
    other that they ignored the growing radical presence in their
    midst. That is why national-level reconciliation is so
    important, along with unifying and reforming the security
    sector.
        Another important component of reform lies in the judicial
    and penal sector. Arbitrary detentions, torture, and killings
    in militia-run prisons is a potential time bomb for radicalism.
    In one such prison that I visited, suspected Islamic State
    fighters are detained in the same facility as petty criminals
    and drug addicts, along with the political rivals of the
    militias.
        And, of course, the militia-run detention centers for
    migrants are a wholly different moral tragedy. Thousands of
    migrants are kept in these horrific conditions, which I saw
    firsthand, and many of these detention centers, of course, are
    run by militias affiliated with the Government of National
    Accord. All this must change.
        Though security conditions in the absence of a diplomatic
    presence have constrained our ability to engage, there are
    still plentiful opportunities, especially at the level of
    municipal governance. Elected city councils in Libya are one of
    the country's bright spots. In many cases, they enjoy strong
    legitimacy and they have been engines for reconciliation in a
    way that national actors have not. American aid and assistance
    to municipalities is, therefore, a worthy investment.
        But municipal governance is hampered by corruption in
    national economic institutions. Libya is afflicted by a culture
    of entitlement by its armed groups, many of whom, as I have
    mentioned, are affiliated with the government. The plunder of
    Libya's Central Bank adds to the income that these groups
    already get from illicit activities like smuggling, fuel
    smuggling and human trafficking. A lasting fix to this problem
    requires sustained American diplomatic engagement with
    officials from the Central Bank and other economic
    institutions.
        Now all of these challenges I have outlined hinge upon
    progress on the political front, on national reconciliation.
    The U.S. and its partners must continue to play a strong
    convening and persuading role, especially among its regional
    Arab allies and, also, the Europeans to support the U.N.-led
    roadmap. The U.N.-led roadmap is currently headed toward
    convening national Presidential and parliamentary elections.
    This shows that Libyans have not given up on a democracy,
    despite the turmoil of the past year. However, a word of
    caution is in order. Elections by themselves, if they are held
    hastily without a constitutional framework, risk a return to
    strife. We have seen this before in the past in 2012 and in
    2014.
        Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wehrey follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Doctor.
        Ms. Friend?

          STATEMENT OF MS. ALICE HUNT FRIEND, SENIOR FELLOW,
       INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
                         INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Ms. Friend. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
    members of the committee, distinguished colleagues, it is my
    pleasure to be here today to discuss the current situation in
    Libya.
        The complexity of the civil war in Libya is rivaled only by
    the complexity of the related crisis it breeds. The diversity
    and ferocity of the country's domestic politics create
    obstacles for terrorists attempting to establish havens, but
    also make the role of Islam in governance a central and
    contentious object of Libyan politics, amplifying Libya's
    salience to global Islamic terrorism. Libya's oil resources,
    proximity to Europe, and cultural connections to the Middle
    East make it a strategic prize for multiple powerful outside
    actors, and its competing governments and myriad militias fuel
    an international race for Libyan proxies. In the midst of it
    all, an historic volume of migrants is coming through Libya,
    fleeing into the Mediterranean, overwhelming European and
    broader international resources.
        Ending major violence and stabilizing Libyan politics to
    the point where powerful actors accept a single government will
    be the most durable way to address terrorism and humanitarian
    needs. Yet, the path to political equilibrium will likely be a
    long one. The international community, including the United
    States, should have a patient and realistic approach to Libyan
    politics that also accounts for Libyan internal security
    concerns.
        The current challenge for the U.S. is knowing whom and how
    to engage among the constantly shifting array of power brokers
    and would-be national leaders to encourage political
    accommodations and meaningfully address the humanitarian
    crisis. The reported incapacitation of the Libyan National Army
    command and the east-dominant center of power, Khalifa Haftar,
    is likely to generate some political and security realignments
    if Haftar is unable to return to the country.
        Although group alignments with the U.N.-backed Government
    of National Accord should open the door to outsider engagement
    in principle, the persistent dynamism of Libyan politics
    recommends a cautious approach to security assistance. Even if
    the policy remains largely focused on countering ISIS and al-
    Qaeda, the U.S. will need to determine ways to sustain pressure
    on terrorist groups without undermining the prospects for
    Libya's stability.
        With regard to ongoing U.S. efforts to disrupt and
    dismantle ISIS's operations in Libya, I believe the current
    offshore pressure campaign and counterterrorism capacity-
    building efforts among Libya's neighbors strikes the right
    balance between U.S. national security and the prospects for
    Libyan stability.
        Given the range of crises consuming American policymakers'
    time, it seems likely that U.S. efforts in Libya overall will
    remain relatively modest, but continued negotiations and
    implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement are best
    accomplished with the support of the U.S., not only in a
    diplomatic sense and by eventually assisting the development of
    national security forces, but also in a role supporting U.N.
    Security Council prohibitions on disrupting constructive intra-
    Libyan balances of power. This latter effort requires deft
    diplomacy, especially with Gulf partners and Russia, given the
    issue linkages elsewhere, but it would be the kind of
    international leadership only the U.S. can provide.
        Thank you again for calling us together today, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Friend follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you very much. Excellent
    testimony. We are very grateful for it.
        I wanted to follow up on something that I had said in my
    opening statement about Haftar and his health. We have
    discussed the power struggles between the west and the east,
    the GNA and the LNA, and how external actors back different
    factions. With the uncertainty around Haftar, this raises
    serious questions about the direction in which Libya may go if
    he is incapacitated. And we may have already seen the first bit
    of fallout this very afternoon, as news reports indicate that
    the general's chief of staff survived a car bomb today in
    Benghazi.
        So, if you could tell us what the implications could be for
    the political process and for Libya's security if the general
    is out of the picture--and, of course, we don't know that--or
    perceived to be weakened? Of course, Haftar's health scare, and
    the uncertainty that brings, also calls into question the U.N.
    Envoy in Libya's efforts and assertion just last month that he
    believes Libya is still on track to have elections before the
    year is out. I think that was more aspirational than realistic,
    but it does raise questions about the U.N. support mission in
    Libya and the Special Representative's role in all of this, and
    it also underscores the lack of a role the United States has
    thus far played in Libya. Can the U.N. effort be successful
    without the United States leadership in Libya? And how could
    the U.S. use our leverage to bring the external actors together
    to support the U.N. effort to seek political reconciliation?
        And as you know, last month the Foreign Affairs Committee
    passed House Resolution 644 strongly condemning the slave
    auctions that Mr. Deutch talked about of migrants and refugees
    in Libya. This is, obviously, a major concern and a
    reprehensible human rights issue. But I was hoping we could get
    a better understanding of the trafficking picture and the
    actors involved. Who is responsible for detaining migrants and
    refugees in Libya? Are there outside actors involved? How do
    they come in? How do they operate? What role do the Libyan
    factions play in all of this, and how can Congress and the U.S.
    do more to help this awful situation?
        You can tackle one or all of them, as you see fit,
    whichever one is your favorite. Mr. Blanchard?
        Mr. Blanchard. That is a rich agenda. I will try to proceed
    through those quickly.
        I think the danger in the East is a vacuum, both political
    and military, as we have seen or are observing, and you are
    hearing more about what is behind Haftar, right? The LNA is a
    coalition. And so, from a security standpoint, that is quite
    true. The different forces would need to select new leadership
    and that could get messy.
        With regard to politics, Haftar's personal ambitions,
    although not directly and often clearly stated, are a sticking
    point in the negotiations. His desire, at a minimum, to lead
    the security forces, if not play a political role in the
    future, has been a sticking point. And so, his removal could,
    arguably, create an opportunity in that regard.
        In terms of the role of the U.N. mission and the United
    States, I think it is helpful to think about the role that the
    U.S. plays with the U.N. as setting a floor. Our role in the
    Security Council, our vote and diplomacy there with regard to
    things like the arms embargo and things like assets is the
    quiet backstop to what the U.N. mission is trying to do.
        In addition, our diplomacy, the statements that have been
    made in the Security Council are quite clear that this is the
    plan, this is the way we are moving forward. So, while we are
    not taking an active role, if you ask the actors with whom we
    may have challenging relationships, they certainly see our role
    as present.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. That is comforting. Thank you.
        Dr. Wehrey?
        Mr. Wehrey. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        I think Haftar's removal in the East would just underscore
    what we have always known, that his coalition was just a
    coalition. Ever since he launched his operation in May or the
    summer of 2014, tribes, different religious groups and
    different militias attached themselves to his operation for
    their own self-serving purposes. Once he could claim liberation
    of Benghazi, that coalition has started to unravel. So, even
    before his health problems, there was also a lot of dissent
    when I was there in Benghazi, against his style of rule,
    against the empowerment of his sons, against his political
    ambitions, his corruption. So, all of this was building. You
    have different centers of power in the East, three different
    cities. You have different tribes that are maneuvering.
        The bottom line is I think you are going to see jockeying.
    It may devolve into some violence. I think it is also an
    opportunity in the sense that, if some new figure emerges at
    the head of the LNA, the Libyan National Army, that could be
    more amenable to western Libya, that could be an opportunity
    for reconciliation. It is important to underscore in western
    Libya just how demonized Haftar was because of his baggage,
    because of his political ambitions.
        I think the United States has an important role to play
    with the regional Arab states that backed Haftar, the United
    Arab Emirates and Egypt. They had already been cooling about
    General Haftar a bit. He was not delivering for them. I think
    this just underscores the point that, if these regional states
    want influence in the new Libya, they need to support the
    backing of a new figure in the East that is more amenable to
    reconciliation and unifying the country.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Wehrey.
        Ms. Friend?
        Ms. Friend. Ma'am, I agree with what my colleagues have
    said. I think there will be a real fight for control of the LNA
    if he doesn't return. I think who takes over will really matter
    because, if it is a contentious figure, then the infighting
    will continue, and if it is a powerful figure----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me just interrupt. When you say
    ``fight for control,'' will that be a bloody fight for control,
    an electoral fight for control?
        Ms. Friend. I think it will be bloody, ma'am. I think, as
    you pointed out in your comments, we are already perhaps
    starting to see some of the struggles in today's car bomb
    attack.
        And so, I think there will be several consequences to this
    that are possible. There could be reduced pressure on violent
    Islamist groups in the area. Governance of Benghazi will
    certainly be very different going forward. I think it will
    interrupt reconciliation between the east and the west, simply
    because it is unclear who westerners now negotiate with. But it
    may help continuance of the LPA, which Haftar had announced in
    December was now defunct. So, I also agree it might be an
    opportunity. I also think it is going to interrupt Russian
    influence, at least for a time. They are going to have to
    figure out where they are going to put their investments now.
        On the U.S. side, I tend to focus on the counterterrorism
    piece. I think it is important the U.S. continue to be
    extremely discriminating in targeting, because, again, as all
    of these groups are realigning on the ground, we need to know
    exactly who we are watching and who the enemies are, and who is
    simply caught up in a fight, as it were.
        When it comes to trafficking, I would just say there is
    great variance among groups across the Sahel in how much they
    benefit from and are involved in trafficking, but it does allow
    them to blend in, if you will. And they are part of a larger
    illicit criminal network and lawlessness problem. And so,
    again, from a targeting perspective and figuring out who it is
    that we are most interested in from an American national
    security perspective, that just complicates matters.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very difficult to figure that out.
        Thank you so much.
        And I am pleased to yield to Mr. Cicilline.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses.
        The U.N.-appointed Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, plans to
    amend the 2015 political agreement establishing the current
    government, hold a national conference, call a referendum on
    the constitution, and hold elections this year, as I am sure
    that you are aware and, Dr. Wehrey, you mentioned this. Human
    Rights Watch warned last month that Libya is not ready to hold
    free and fair elections, setting concerns about potential
    coercion, discrimination, and intimidation.
        So, I would like to know from each of you, what milestones
    does Libya need to reach to demonstrate that it is ready,
    actually, for fair elections? And I suppose, what can the U.S.
    do to help create the conditions for them to achieve those
    milestones?
        Mr. Blanchard. So, to begin, the Libyan electoral
    authorities have conducted a new voter registration drive, and
    that is one of the sort of highlights that SRSG Salame points
    to, that 2.5 million Libyans stepped forward to participate.
    That shows a baseline of a desire to participate in an
    election.
        The laws surrounding a referendum, the setting of
    districts, the balance, all that needs to be agreed, and hasn't
    been. Again, as the Special Representative points out, I think
    he said at the meeting in Saudi Arabia, some of our Libyan
    brothers are very creative in their means of preventing action
    on those electoral issues, the nuts and bolts, right, the
    electoral structure. That needs to be taking place. So, I would
    watch that quite carefully.
        We saw participation decline over the past electoral
    exercises. And so, to the extent that we see turnout, that is
    something to watch very closely. Because, really, what this is
    about is the legitimacy, the lack of legitimacy in domestic
    institutions. That is what needs to be reset here.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
        Mr. Wehrey. I think there are a number of key danger
    points. The first one is the lack of a constitutional
    framework. I mean, my discussions with Libyans is, without a
    constitution, whatever government is produced is going to be
    yet another transitional government that is going to lack
    legitimacy, lack real authority.
        The other key milestones are voting laws, security. My
    visits to especially eastern Libyan underscored a degree of
    disenchantment with democracy, that we tried these elections
    before. Some people want a strongman, and that is why Khalifa
    Haftar was able to step into the void. And so, people saw that
    after the 2012, and especially the 2014, voting, there were
    parliaments that could not deliver to their constituents that
    were locked in committee disputes, and that led to strife. So,
    overcoming that popular aversion to elections is important.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
        Anything that you have?
        Ms. Friend. Yes, sir. I would say that I think a study of
    the conditions prior to the 2014 elections would be very useful
    because, of course, those elections were what, then, led to
    greater disillusion politically inside the country.
        And then, just from my own narrow purview, I always say
    capacity for electoral security is extremely important because
    elections marred by violence, as we have seen in Kenya and
    elsewhere, have very poor outcomes as well.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
        Some have argued that, based on the highly fractured nature
    of Libyan politics, governance may be better suited for a
    federalized system, granting relative autonomy for various
    regions. I am wondering whether you believe some manner of
    federalized Libya might bring about increased security and
    popular confidence in governance compared to a strong
    centralized government, where they have had so much, I think,
    disappointment with that model. Is that a feasible thing to
    consider?
        Mr. Blanchard. Decentralization has been a core theme of
    the political conversation in Libya since 2011. As Fred
    mentioned, municipalities have stepped forward and into the
    void to a certain extent. While a Federal arrangement or a
    decentralized political arrangement may emerge, difficult
    questions about state resources, the distribution of funding,
    management of security, all those would remain to be decided
    and dealt with. And it is likely that those will remain
    difficult.
        Mr. Cicilline. If I could just have one final question,
    with the chairman's indulgence? We have heard a lot about
    outside actors in Libya, and I want to focus for a moment on
    Russia, which appears to be playing several sides in this
    conflict. There are claims that Russia has facilitated the
    delivery of weapons to Haftar's forces, sometimes through legal
    sales to Egypt, and the Russian special forces are reported to
    be operating in the porous border region between Egypt and
    Libya. So, if you could give me your assessment of what is
    Russia's goal with respect to Libya and what does it have to
    gain in Libya? And what does the U.S. risk by Russia increasing
    its influence, or attempting to increase its influence, in the
    various warring Libyan groups long term?
        Mr. Wehrey. I think Russia wants to undercut European and
    U.S. influence. I think this is an opportunity for them. I
    think they have a number of financial goals in mind regarding
    arms contracts, many of which they had before the revolution.
    Gas deals, they had infrastructure projects. So, I think partly
    it is monetary, but it is also a political opportunity. I don't
    think they have got all their eggs in the Haftar basket. I
    think they are diversifying their contacts to include Misurata,
    to include Tripoli. They see themselves as a potential power
    broker. They could certainly undercut the U.S. and the
    Europeans.
        Ms. Friend. Yes, sir, I would agree with that. I think they
    are playing as many sides as possible, so that they will have
    influence in the eventual government that wins out.
        Mr. Blanchard. Yes, I mentioned the Security Council
    earlier. The Russians have the same quiet role that we have and
    the ability to delay and obstruct.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much. Thank you, Madam
    Chairman, and I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Excellent
    questions and great answers.
        And now, I am pleased to yield to one of our favorite
    veterans on our subcommittee----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thanks.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. Mr. Kinzinger.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. That is very nice. Thank you,
    Madam Chair.
        As I said in the opening, thank you all for being here.
        I actually think Libya is an interesting study. With all
    the challenges we have, it actually could end up, if we figure
    out how to handle it--it is a very wealthy country with a
    relatively small population. I also used Libya as kind of the
    example when people argued, although the situation on the
    ground has changed a little bit much now, against intervention
    in Syria. I said, well, you have \1/2\ million dead Syrians.
    You don't have that level of instability in Libya, even though
    there is a major challenge.
        The problem with Libya is our failure to follow through, I
    think, what was rightfully an intervention. And then, we just
    kind of assumed it would all work itself out, and it didn't.
        So, I think leaving Libya with no strategy, if we are
    dealing with a post-Qaddafi world, we can look back in 2020 and
    say, here is everything. I think it is important for us to talk
    about, though, what we could have done differently post-Libya,
    because it would be naive of us to think we will never be in
    this kind of situation again.
        So, Mr. Blanchard, if you have ideas of what we could have
    done differently? Or else we will go down the panel. I am
    curious of what you guys would say. If you could go back in
    time, what would you have changed in order to try to create a
    better post-Qaddafi scenario?
        Mr. Blanchard. I think perhaps Alice might be better suited
    to talk about the Obama administration's view and what the
    conversation may have been. The President himself has been
    clear in terms of what he saw as the failure, and it really
    was, as you mentioned, the assumption not just that it would
    work itself out, but that the European partners and Arab states
    would step forward in a coordinated manner.
        If we look at the diplomatic level, it really is what SRSG
    Salame calls too many cooks in the kitchen, and too many cooks
    maybe with bad intent or their own selfish intent. So, it is
    that coordinating function, the speaking with one voice, and
    making sure that there wasn't daylight such that those
    individual interests could begin to play themselves out and
    amplify the internal dilemma. So, early coordinated action may
    have been something that I would focus on.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Ms. Friend, actually, if you want to jump
    into that? And then, we will go to you, sir.
        Ms. Friend. Yes, sir. By the time I stepped into my
    Pentagon job in the Africa office, from a DoD perspective, we
    were already quite cautious because the empowerment of
    militias, of course, was off and running. And so, it was very
    hard to know from a security assistance perspective which party
    not only was aligned with a legitimate government we recognized
    at the time, but also would continue to be aligned and would
    continue to be a good-faith actor, which was something that
    AFRICOM certainly emphasized as well.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Did you guys discuss peacekeepers at all,
    and was that even a possibility?
        Ms. Friend. I don't recall us discussing peacekeepers at
    that point. I know that it has been in the ether, especially
    among some Europeans, for quite a long time. Peacekeeping
    itself has its own sort of difficult track record as well.
    Peacekeeping is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do, and
    it really depends on the parties on the ground wanting to have
    a peace to keep. And I don't think we were there with Libya
    yet.
        And so, I think the complexity and difficulty of the
    environment was something that we simply did not recognize long
    enough into it. And by the time we did, it was very hard to be
    able to have meaningful influence on the ground, particularly
    given the security situation for our own personnel.
        So, I do wish, if I could rewind the clock, I wish that the
    U.S. had perhaps taken a more forceful role at the United
    Nations, that we had been more involved among the parties,
    although I know Ambassador Stevens could not have been a better
    person to be there and working that issue.
        So, it is possible that Libya is a case where forces on the
    ground were such that it would have been very, very hard for
    the United States to do anything unilaterally, but I do think
    the international community could have put in much more focus
    and effort in the early days between 2011 and 2012 to perhaps
    head off the worst of the violence and get the negotiations
    started sooner.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
        Sir?
        Mr. Wehrey. I think in the first year there was an
    excessive focus on elections as a success marker. And so, the
    U.N. was entirely focused on elections, to the detriment of
    dealing with the DDR problem, with the militias, with the
    security sector. I think the U.S. handed this off to the
    Europeans and the United Nations, who were both unable and
    unwilling to address it.
        So, you had these elections, but, then, you had no way to
    protect the democratic institutions from the power of militias.
    That raises the question of a stabilization force, which I
    agree brings a whole host of other consequences, but perhaps
    even a limited stabilization force to secure key facilities in
    Tripoli, the parliaments, economic institutions, to protect
    them from militia pressure.
        But the huge challenge of demobilizing the militias was
    made worse when the Libyan Government itself started paying the
    militias with oil wealth in late 2011. That was a disastrous
    decision. So, perhaps more U.S. oversight of Libya's use of its
    oil wealth could have stopped this disaster. I think by the
    time we got around to trying to train and equip a Libyan
    military force, the General Purpose Force, it was too late.
    That effort led to disaster because the militias were too
    strong. So, again, the bottom line is I think we missed a key
    window in that first year to exert more of a presence.
        Mr. Kinzinger. And I think it is somewhat to the extent of
    the mistake made in Iraq, where we went in and there was a
    sense of lawlessness after the invasion instead of law, and
    people turned.
        And, Madam Chair, if I could ask just one more question
    with leniency?
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. Go ahead.
        Mr. Kinzinger. We talk about Haftar. Whoever has the
    knowledge on it--maybe all three of you--how would you compare
    him and how you would see a Libya under the rule of Haftar, if
    you will, versus like Qaddafi? Is he more benevolent? Is he as
    ruthless? I mean, what is kind of the sense there? And I am
    sure there is no way to really know, but what are your
    thoughts?
        Mr. Blanchard. Muammar al-Qaddafi was a very unique
    individual. So, I would be reticent to compare or expect anyone
    to equate quite that way.
        The fact of the matter is that, personality aside, Libya
    has changed. The political and security power has been
    atomized, and any individual and/or ruling arrangement that
    emerges from this process is going to have to recognize that.
    In an odd sense, the Libya of Qaddafi's imagination, with
    individual communities leading themselves and feeding upward.
    That is, ironically, now more the case than it was when he was
    there. And so, whoever is leading Libya in the future is going
    to have to deal with, as I said, this atomization that has
    occurred.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Fair point.
        Mr. Wehrey. I think Haftar's support was already weakened.
    So, he didn't have the sort of total control that Qaddafi had.
    But, that said, there were a number of similarities that his
    opponents have drawn and that I witnessed when I was in
    Benghazi. I mean, he was cultivating his sons. He did sort of
    enact a cult of personality where you would go around Benghazi
    and see billboards of Haftar's picture everywhere. The police
    state, people were not free to speak their minds in Benghazi.
    People who criticized them disappeared. Censorship of the
    press. He brought back the old police, secret police. He relies
    on tribes. He tries to manage tribes, play them off against
    each other. So, there are some similarities. That said, as we
    have seen with his failing health and his diminishing
    influence, I don't think it compares to Qaddafi.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Did you have anything else?
        Ms. Friend. No.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Okay. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and I
    yield back.
        Thank you all.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Kinzinger.
        Mr. Connolly of Virginia?
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        And welcome to our panel.
        Dr. Wehrey, let me start with you. You said one of the
    bright spots potentially, not to overstate it, but were kind of
    at the local level in terms of elections, function. And that
    was music to my ears. I come from local government. I think it
    is long neglected. I think a lot of our democracy promotion
    programs start at the top and we start with the Parliament, as
    opposed to starting at the village level and working the way
    up.
        Can we build on that, do you think? Could that maybe affect
    our strategy moving forward, maybe a different course for us in
    terms of what we pursue in Libya, given the fact there is a
    hopeful sign, but it is working at the local level?
        Mr. Wehrey. Absolutely. I mean, we have seen a number of
    positive developments where there has been reconciliation
    between towns that were previously fighting. Towns enjoy strong
    legitimacy with their elected councils. This was true in 2012
    through to the present, although I will caveat this that in the
    east there are non-elected mayors that have been appointed by
    the army.
        So, American engagement through USAID and through other
    channels, is absolutely the right way to go; however, not
    necessarily these non-elected councils. But I think, I mean,
    helping them to deliver services, the problem, though, also, it
    goes back to the national level, where they don't get their
    budgets. They are criticizing the Government of National Accord
    for the way it distributes its budget. So, I think American
    engagement has to be from both levels. I mean, the local is
    important, but it can only get you so far. There has to be
    engagement at the national level.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes, but the thing about local government
    that all over the world some institutions just don't get it,
    but if you want to build democracy, it is built on a social
    contract.
        Mr. Wehrey. Absolutely.
        Mr. Connolly. I pay my taxes, and you pick up my trash. I
    pay my taxes; the clinic is open when I need it. I pay my
    taxes; the road gets paved. I pay my taxes; there is a clean
    source of water.
        If, on the other hand, there is no respect for that and
    there is no culture of, well, what do you mean we are supposed
    to make all that work, we don't do that, it is corrupt, not our
    business, well, then you are going to completely erode
    confidence in the basic institution of governance, and it is
    why it exists, let alone democracy and what kind of government.
    And I think often that gets overlooked. That is why I picked up
    on what you said as one maybe helpful sign that we could build
    upon, expand; God forbid we invest in it.
        Mr. Blanchard, we have met before and we had a talk about
    terrorism in the Maghreb. And one of the things I recall you
    and I talking about, and I want to give you an opportunity to
    talk about it on the record here, but Libya is kind of key. I
    mean, if we are going to get at terrorists, well, instability
    in parts of Tunisia, parts of Nigeria, parts of Morocco, you
    cannot ignore the big, huge, festering sore of Libya. It is
    kind of key to addressing all the other potential hotspots in
    the region.
        Could you elaborate a little bit on that and how what we
    are talking about relates to other things we also care about in
    the region?
        Mr. Blanchard. Sure. As I said earlier, I think the United
    States is one actor among many outside Libya that is seeking to
    mitigate transnational threats, terrorism in particular. I
    think terrorism is the key driver of Egypt's desire to back
    ``the strongman approach'' to security in eastern Libya.
        I think the continued availability of weapons, the ability,
    particularly on the southern and southwest borders, of people
    to transit back and forth allows a place for the ISIS fighters
    that Fred talked about being displaced from Sirte to hide,
    regroup, to reorganize. I also think that, in terms of our
    investment, the Department of Defense is, to the extent that we
    are investing in a sort of long-range counterterrorism
    approach, it is a containment strategy, and it is built
    entirely on this. So, it is a draw on our resources as well.
        With regard to local communities, I did just want to
    observe the USAID programs, the Transition Initiatives Programs
    have a lot of components that are focused precisely on aspects
    that you raised, you know, helping local communities and local
    government improve services, take the temperature of the town
    and see what they need. So, that kind of grassroots approach is
    one component of our policy. But, as Fred observed, in the
    absence of a nationwide national political accord, it is going
    to be difficult for those to really prosper.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes, it is harder, and I am a big supporter
    of both NDI and IRI, and I think they are necessary. But I
    think sometimes it is easier to work with parliamentarians in
    the national capital than it is to roll up your sleeves and go
    down to the village level and try to help them do their jobs,
    and do it in a way that incorporates accountability and
    transparency, which are elements of democratic institution-
    building.
        From my own personal experience of working on some projects
    before I had this job, sometimes we do it well; sometimes we
    don't. I believe the building block of democracy starts at the
    local level, not the other way around.
        Can I just ask one last question? This is the big
    philosophical one. But I was in Libya a few years ago with our
    former colleague, David Dreier, under the House Democracy
    Project. What struck me about Libya was, unlike some other
    places, you essentially have three population centers. They are
    all near the coast. You don't have a huge interior population.
    It is, relative to some other places, not all that
    heterogeneous; it is a pretty homogeneous population. Tribal
    divisions, yes, but they used to, I mean, they are just coming
    off one-man rule for quite a long time. You could call that
    stability, not one we desire, but it is not like it is a novel
    thought that there could be a government, a central government,
    that exercises authority. It is a small population.
        So, why is this so hard? Why has it already been so long
    that we see this kind of chaos, this inability to put together
    meaningful coalitions that can govern and into which the
    population can invest and support? Why is it so hard?
        Mr. Wehrey. Congressman, thank you.
        I agree. I mean, these were all things that led to our
    optimism after the 2011 revolution. I think the fundamental
    problem is Qaddafi ruined this country. He gutted it of
    institutions. So, Libyans had no experience in self-governance.
    The entire muscle fiber you need to run a country was missing.
    Qaddafi ruled this in a highly personalized way.
        So, things like civil society, unions, elected municipal
    councils, they were all starting from scratch. And the
    fundamental vacuum is also the security sector. I mean, there
    was no army. So, you had the growth of these militias. You had,
    unfortunately, during the revolution and after, you did have
    real divisions growing between these different towns that acted
    like autonomous statelets that coalesced with their own
    militias, their own sources of income.
        I agree it is a small population; it should be easier. But
    the final thing I will add is the management of the economy. As
    the U.N. has mentioned, at its core, this is a contest for
    plunder, for access to economic resources. So, the economy is
    both, I think, a blessing and a curse.
        Ms. Friend. Sir, can I just say, historically thinking, the
    idea of Libya as one unified country is actually an anomaly. It
    is a very regional organization. In fact, there was no, there
    still is no rail line between eastern and western. It is very
    hard to drive. There is just not a lot of infrastructure
    integration between east and west. And the Fezzan in the south
    has always been isolated.
        And so, I think, at least from a regional perspective, even
    though it is a small population, there actually isn't a
    tradition of integration across regions in Libya. And so, to
    some extent, this is a project that is imposing a new concept
    on Libya, Qaddafi notwithstanding. I mean, I think he papered
    over a lot of things and just did it through strength of arms.
        And I was intrigued by what Mr. Blanchard had said about
    how the hangover from Qaddafi is such that there is now a deep
    suspicion of centralized authority. So, it is not a historical
    tradition, and with Qaddafi as their example, why should the
    average person in Benghazi or Derna trust the Tripoli
    government? And this is what folks there have to overcome.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
        Mr. Blanchard. I wouldn't want to let the international
    community off the hook. As I said, seeking to mitigate
    transitional threats or pursuing their own agendas, political,
    regional, ideological, has led to a lot of interference, and it
    has amplified the real internal challenges and difficult
    dilemmas, zero-sum behavior, security threats, that Libyans are
    facing. When you have outsiders coming in, observing a
    difficult situation, and saying, well, ``I need to back this
    person to solve my problem,'' that has an amplifying effect,
    and it has really, I think, helped account for what we have
    seen subsequently.
        Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairman, you have been so gracious,
    but it has been a very thoughtful conversation.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Connolly. And thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I pay my taxes, and I want clean water. I
    pay my taxes. I got it.
        Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly.
        I would like to ask, if you would allow me, the questions
    that Mr. Deutch had. And they have kind of been covered a
    little bit, but I want to make sure that his are covered
    extensively.
        First, ``The U.N. Refugee Agency estimates that there are
    1.1 million people in Libya in need of humanitarian assistance.
    Displaced families, refugees, and those living without basic
    services or health care continue to demonstrate Libya's need
    for assistance.''
        So, Mr. Deutch asks, ``Do you think the U.S. is providing
    adequate levels of humanitarian assistance to Libya, and what
    gaps remain where the U.S. or our international partners could
    step up?''
        Mr. Blanchard?
        Mr. Blanchard. I am looking for the data points that I
    brought with me because I want to get this right.
        So, there is an International Humanitarian Response Plan
    for Libya. The United States is the top contributor in 2016 and
    2017 of humanitarian funding by just a hair. The Germans and
    the Italians, the Europeans also put forward funds to support
    that.
        The needs that have been identified I think were 70 percent
    met last year. Could more be done, particularly with regard to
    the migrant situation? The United States approach has been, I
    think, to let European states and the European Union take the
    lead there. Working together, the European Union, the African
    Union, and the U.N. have taken some steps to address that
    problem. Again, the United States, I think, declaratory policy
    is quite supportive of that, and behind the scenes we are
    making a contribution.
        Mr. Wehrey. Chairman, I would defer to Mr. Blanchard on the
    actual specifics, but let me just underscore that the refugee
    displacement issue is so profound, and I saw it firsthand. I
    mean hundreds of families displaced from the city of Benghazi
    are crowded into other cities in the west, Misrata and Tripoli.
    There are refugees from the south that are in the capital. So,
    these refugees are straining the ability of the government in
    the capital.
        You have other local communities that have been displaced
    through fighting. The city of Tawergha is the main example, and
    I have been in their camps. There are truly horrific
    conditions, you know, young kids growing up year after year in
    these squalid refugee camps. So, it is a huge moral problem.
        The U.S. I think can always be doing more. I think its
    role, however, should be focused on Libyan economic
    institutions that can better address the plight of those
    displaced economically. So, there again, that leads me back to
    U.S. engagement with the Central Bank.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Ms. Friend?
        Ms. Friend. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch mentioned
    root causes. I think in this case it is important to
    distinguish between the humanitarian needs from the Libyan
    population as a result of the violence and, then, the
    humanitarian needs of the migrant population coming from sub-
    Saharan African largely.
        And when it comes to humanitarian needs for the Libyans, to
    address that, of course, involves addressing the root causes of
    the violence. And so, that, again, gets us back to these
    reconciliation efforts.
        And when it comes to the sub-Saharan Africans, then that is
    also its own set of root humanitarian and governance issues
    that are driving people out of their homes. So, we think of
    about Eritreans crossing the desert in Sudan to get to Libya,
    to get across the Mediterranean. Addressing what is happening
    in Eritrea or what is happening in Niger, or Mali, I think is
    as important as catching the problem by the time it gets to
    Libya.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        And his second question--thank you for those answers--``The
    U.S. and the U.N. continue striving to work through the
    existing framework established under the Libyan Political
    Agreement to establish and move Libya forward. Some, however,
    do not recognize this agreement's legitimacy. In your opinion,
    do you believe this framework is viable or does a new path need
    to be forged?''
        Mr. Blanchard. I think the SRSG's current approach is
    driven by, as I said in my opening statement, a desire to
    refresh the legitimacy of institutions, in particular, so that
    decisions can be taken by a recognized authority. So, in terms
    of a legitimacy deficit, it is clear--not necessarily that we
    in the United States get to decide that or point to it; it is
    the Libyans themselves who think that various institutions lack
    legitimacy. And so, this entire exercise is, arguably, aimed at
    that.
        Mr. Wehrey. I agree. I mean, I think this was an important
    starting point. It was flawed. Certainly, it was opposed. But
    it was at least a mark on the wall. And so, before you peer
    into the abyss and jump into it, you have to have something to
    replace it. So, I think the U.N.'s approach with amendments,
    with reviving it, giving it new legitimacy, is the right
    approach. Of course, there are multiple actors across the board
    that benefit from the status quo, and spoiling it. Some of
    these actors are backed by international states. And that is
    why I think the U.S. has an important convening role to get
    everyone on the same page to say, let's move forward on this
    roadmap. This LPA certainly was flawed, but was signed up to,
    and it needs to be the basis.
        Ms. Friend. Ma'am, I addressed in my written testimony the
    security elements of the LPA, which I think in principle are
    very good. The problem with the implementation has been making
    the leap, as I say, from militias to a national military force.
        In particular for the HOR and Tobruk that works with
    Haftar, the issue has been command and control and the
    Presidential Council being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
    forces with which elements of the HOR are not comfortable.
        So, I think in these discussions, if these issues can be
    worked out, the framework of the LPA from a security
    perspective is quite sound.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, we alternate between high hopes,
    low expectations, and it is just some kind of wild ride. And
    unfortunately, so many lives are at stake.
        Thank you so much for excellent testimony.
        And please tell Mr. Deutch that I did comply with his
    questions. I did my homework.
        Excellent witnesses. Thank you.
        With that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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