SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
AND POSTURE FOR INTER–STATE
COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA

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CONTENTS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services .................................................. 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. “Mac,” a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ............................................. 1

WITNESSES

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command .......... 3

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M. ........................................................................ 46
Smith, Hon. Adam .......................................................................................... 44
Thornberry, Hon. William M. “Mac” ................................................................ 43

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Banks ...................................................................................................... 73
Mrs. Murphy .................................................................................................. 71
Mr. Panetta ................................................................................................. 75
Ms. Speier .................................................................................................... 71
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee welcomes General Scaparrotti back today to testify on the threats and posture in the European Command’s area of responsibility. There he faces the full range of security challenges, from Russia’s constant modernization of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems to the hybrid and political warfare it wages against the United States and others. Its tactics extend, as we have been reminded this week, to targeted assassinations, as well.

I think that it is clear that the United States has neglected both ends of the warfare spectrum in recent years and much in between. But the recent budget agreement and the new National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review give us the chance to begin to do better.

We must do better across the board. It is not enough to advocate for a more robust cyber response to Russia’s attempts to meddle in our elections, but waiver on our response to their renewed nuclear or territorial ambitions. Likewise, we cannot build up our missile defenses and nuclear deterrent but leave significant cyber intrusions unanswered.

It is essential, in my view, that we face all of these challenges with clear-eyed objectivity and not allow domestic politics to color our view or affect our actions. The United States and our allies and our interests are threatened by the full range of Russian capability and by its increasing belligerence. Our job is to address them in the military sphere in order to protect our Nation’s security, nothing more and nothing less.

I would yield to the ranking member.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Scaparrotti. It is good to see you again. I always appreciated your time out at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and your leadership out there, and certainly your leadership now for us in Europe.

And I certainly agree with the chairman; Russia is the big issue. Not the only, but the big issue in the European Command [EUCOM], and how we counter their increasingly aggressive behavior.

I would disagree slightly—and I do not think the chairman meant it quite this way—it is not just a military challenge. Obviously, we are here in the Armed Services Committee, you are the EUCOM commander, so that is your primary focus.

But it is a broader challenge to confront Russia. And we had the opportunity to have a conversation with you yesterday a little bit about that. In addition to being a military commander, you are also occasionally a diplomat, in terms of being able to stay in touch with your Russian counterparts to try to make sure there are no misunderstandings and we do not stumble into a conflict.

And I would also be remiss again if I did not point out that, in confronting this, diplomacy is enormously important, which means that the State Department is enormously important there, an indispensable partner for what you and what the rest of the Department of Defense are trying to do. And right now the State Department is not in a good place. Certainly they are transitioning from one leader to the next. We are not sure, you know, how the confirmation process is going to go. But it has been a tumultuous year at the State Department. That needs to get figured out, because diplomacy is going to be a big part of this.

I agree with those folks, including many on this panel, who have identified the fact that we have moved back into an era of great power conflict. I do not agree that that conflict necessarily has to be military. You have to handle it in a variety of different ways, in order to try to move it in a different direction.

The one big thing on Russia, yes, they are moving forward in terms of increasing their capabilities in a variety of areas. But the one big area where they are actually acting on a consistent basis is in their disinformation cyber campaign. And there is an area where I think we are behind. And some of these other areas that the chairman mentioned we are worried because the Russians are catching up and potentially getting to the point where they could surpass us in capability. But when it comes to cyber, when it comes to disinformation campaign, we are barely on the playing field at this point.

We have all, you know, read about Russia's efforts to influence our election here in the United States. They are doing it across Western Europe. And it is not just elections. They are spreading a message, and that message is that authoritarian regimes are better than democracy: backing Assad in Syria, the things that they are doing down in Libya. They are undermining the basic tenets of what we stand for, which is political freedom and economic freedom. And we have to counter that.
In fact, General, you said something very interesting yesterday during our classified brief. This was not classified, I do not think, but that a poll of people in Western Europe, asking them how important democracy was, a poll of the younger generation, it was shocking to see that it was not a very high percentage that said it was important. The basic notion that political freedom is the way to govern a country and to govern the world is being eroded.

Now, there is a lot of reasons for that, but I would submit that one of the biggest ones is a concentrated campaign by Vladimir Putin to undermine it. We need to counter that. So I am very interested to hear today what we are doing on that information campaign.

And obviously, as the chairman mentioned, there are military challenges, as well.

But I will just close by saying I think the ideal outcome here is that we figure out a way to work with Russia. I will, oddly, agree with the President, at least in that sentence, not necessarily in the way he has chosen to go about doing it. But the world is a better place if the great powers of the world—the United States, Russia, China, the European Union—get along and confront global challenges.

You know, whether it is terrorism, global warming, if we work together to confront the things that challenge us all, we are better off than if we get involved in conflicts with one another. And I am still optimistic that there are paths to get to that place.

So I look forward to your testimony, I thank you for your leadership, and thank you for being here.

I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]

The CHAIRMAN. Again we welcome back General Scaparrotti, Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

General, without objection, your full written statement will be made part of the record and you are recognized now for any oral comments you would like to give.

STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General Scaparrotti. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you as the commander of the United States European Command. It is an honor to represent more than 60,000 men and women who are forward-deployed supporting the U.S. mission in Europe.

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, coastguardsmen, and civilian workforce continue to demonstrate selfless service and dedication in an increasingly complex and competitive security environment. Our adaptation to this environment has made significant progress, thanks to resourcing provided by Congress, particularly under the European Deterrence Initiative [EDI]. EUCOM deeply appreciates Congress’s support for EDI, which has supported the largest reinforcement of the Euro-Atlantic defense in a generation.
In augmenting our defense, the United States has been joined by the NATO alliance, which remains critical to our national security and a rules-based international order. Every challenge we face as a Nation is best addressed with our allies, and I am proud to report the NATO alliance is strong, it is united, and it is committed to being fit for purpose.

Our European allies and Canada have turned a corner on defense spending, with increases in each of the past 3 years. During this time they have added $46 billion to our collective defense, including a $5 billion increase from 2016 to 2017. In 2018, 8 countries will meet NATO's 2 percent spending target, and by 2024 at least 15 nations are on pace to reach or exceed the 2 percent mark.

As these commitments demonstrate, NATO is adapting to ensure it is vigilant in peace, responsive in crisis, and it possesses the strategic depth for high-end, large-scale, multi-domain conflict.

Together with NATO, the United States has made significant progress. But we have much work to do as we execute our National Defense Strategy, fielding an increasingly lethal, agile, and resilient joint force, in long-term strategic competition with Russia, and ready to counter violent extremist organizations.

Russia is carrying out a campaign of destabilization to change the international order, fracture NATO, and undermine U.S. leadership around the world. At sea, on land, and in the air, Russia increasingly—Russia's increasingly modernized military is operating at levels not seen since the Cold War. At the same time, Russia is using indirect activities to advance its strategic objectives. Throughout Europe, along its periphery, in the Middle East, and beyond, Russia has demonstrated a willingness and capability to use political provocation, spread disinformation, and undermine democratic institutions.

In response to the challenge posed by Russia's pursuit of power, the U.S. has increased its posture in Europe by deploying rotational forces to include an armored brigade combat team [ABCT] and a combat aviation brigade.

Additionally, we have implemented the framework battalion task force for NATO's enhanced forward presence in Poland; we prepositioned equipment for additional ABCT; we have doubled our maritime deployments to the Black Sea; we have exercised theater antisubmarine warfare operations; we have executed bomber assurance and deterrence missions in Europe; and, for the first time, we have deployed fifth-generation fighters to Europe.

The U.S. has taken these actions in coordination with NATO. Since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO has made significant gains in meeting its security commitments and in implementing decisions to enhance our collective defense. NATO has implemented its enhanced forward presence with four multinational battle groups, backed by 29 nations. It has also established a tailored forward presence in the Black Sea region.

Additionally, the U.S. and NATO are putting a spotlight on Russian meddling and interference, countering Russian misinformation with truthful and transparent information, and reinforcing our winning narrative of sovereignty, freedom, the dignity of the individual, and the rule of law.
The second major threat we face throughout the European area of operations is violent extremist terrorist groups. Since 2014, Europe has endured 18 major terrorist attacks. While the Defeat ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] coalition, which includes NATO now, recovers territory that was seized in Iraq and Syria, ISIS remains active and seeks to expand its operations across Europe.

EUCOM provides forces for military operations against ISIS, such as Operation Inherent Resolve, and has increased information and intelligence sharing among U.S. agencies, international partners, and the private sector. With the EU [European Union] and NATO, EUCOM supports a tri-nodal community of action to identify and counter terrorist threats. Also, EUCOM has increased coordination with Europol [EU law enforcement agency] and Interpol [International Criminal Police Organization] to thwart terrorist activities.

Our European allies fight alongside us, deploying forces worldwide to support U.S.-led counterterrorism operations, including OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] and Operation Freedom Sentinel, and to conduct national counterterrorism missions. The allies remain committed to defeating violent extremists, and their support is essential to our ongoing counterterrorism efforts.

Thanks to the resources provided by Congress, particularly through European Deterrence Initiative, EUCOM has made significant headway in establishing a defensive posture that is credible, capable, and relevant to our strategic objectives.

As our National Defense Strategy states, a strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles of democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty, is vital to our security. The service members and civilians at EUCOM are making this strategy a reality. We stand ready to protect the homeland, strengthen the alliance, and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

And Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to the committee’s questions.

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. I want to ask a question about this chemical weapon assassination attempt in Britain, as—at least as far as I know, this particular weapon that was used has only been made by the Russians.

And this morning, in The Washington Post, the British Foreign Secretary writes that it is part of a pattern of behavior: “The common thread that joins the poisonings in Salisbury with the annexation of Crimea, the cyber attacks in Ukraine, the hacking of Germany’s (sic) parliament, and Russian interference in foreign elections is the Kremlin’s reckless defiance of essential international rules.”

My question is do you agree with that statement, that this is a pattern of behavior that has in common the reckless defiance, or maybe even the attempt to undermine international rules? Do you agree with that? And do our NATO allies agree with that?

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman, I agree that it represents Russia’s consistent disregard for international rules and norms, each of those instances that you talked about.
You will note in this specific incident with the nerve agent that NATO has said that they stand by their ally, the U.K. [United Kingdom], and believe it is highly likely that Russia was complicit in this attack. And that was a statement that they made as an alliance of 29, to my understanding.

We also believe that it is highly likely that they are complicit with the chemical weapons use, and we stand by our ally, and we support their efforts to fully determine who the responsible parties were, and hold them accountable.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I just say I—as I mentioned at the beginning, whether it is this incident, or cyberattacks, or Putin’s boasting about new nuclear weapons, I think it is really critical for the alliance to stand together and push back against this whole range of activity. That is the only way for us to counter it.

I am going to yield to the ranking member.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Along those lines, in terms of—because I think the chairman is right, I think a huge part of this is holding Russia accountable—Russia is not altogether that powerful. They have all kinds of internal problems and economic weakness. And even their military is still nowhere near a match for ours. But they will push as far as they can push, if they think there is not a cost to it.

So one specific question about that. The administration has delayed implementation of sanctions against Russia. As I understand it, the loose justification was they are waiting for Putin’s election, like he might lose or something. I do not know.

Does it not make sense at this point to be as aggressive as possible in implementing the sanctions that Congress has made available to the President, precisely to try to impose a cost upon Russia in much the same way that we are doing with Iran and China—or, sorry, Iran and North Korea?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I would—I cannot comment on the speed of the sanctions. I know that they are working.

I would say, as you said earlier, that we have to address their activity with a whole-of-government response. And sanctions would be an appropriate part of that.

Mr. SMITH. Understood. And just something we have not talked about yet, Turkey is perhaps the other, you know, largest issue. Well, that and the whole issue of trying to make sure we keep NATO together and coordinated.

But, you know, the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, while we—Turkey is a valuable ally, without question, so are the Kurds. They were indispensable, in terms of what we did in Syria and Iraq in dealing with ISIS. What is your latest on how we might get to a better place between our two allies there, Turkey and the Kurds?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. As you stated, Turkey is a valued ally in EUCOM, a member of the countries in EUCOM. I work closely with them to continue our close relationship and actually restore the relationship to an extent because of the differences here with respect to the YPG [People’s Protection Units] and their alliance with us in our D–ISIS campaign.

Presently, as you know, the State Department is working closely with them. We have been involved in this. And we are presently, I think, working on a way to attempt to meet their legitimate con-
cerns, their security concerns along the border, the terrorist attacks that they have inherent to their country and have had for some time, as well as meet our interests to ensure that we can complete the D–ISIS campaign which has presented a direct threat to the security of our country, as well.

So that discussion is ongoing. I would prefer not to go into more depth, given that we are right in the midst of them now.

Mr. SMITH. But I think that is crucially important, that we find some way to make that work. And I understand there are legitimate concerns on both sides. I mean the Kurds, you know, have long wanted, you know, as great a degree of independence as they can get. At the same time, you could hardly blame Turkey for being upset that they routinely have terrorist attacks committed in their country.

I will just close, and I do not have any more questions for you, but just with an editorial comment about Russia. I think we need an administration that sends a much clearer signal on Russia. The President’s reluctance in instance after instance—most recently even the one that the chairman just raised—while, you know, our—a number of other government officials—I forget if it was the Secretary of State or the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] director—I think it was the CIA director, who soon will be the Secretary of State, who said there is no question that Russia committed the attack that happened in England against the spies. Our own President was like, could have been, we do not know, might have been somebody else, sort of the same thing that he said about the interference in the elections that Russia has done.

The longer the leader of our country gives Russia a pass and keeps saying, well, maybe they are doing bad stuff, maybe they are not, the tougher your job is going to be, the tougher it is going to be to truly hold them accountable. So whatever the reason for that is—I do not even know, would not even begin to guess—the President needs to speak clearly and forcefully against these Russian actions and stop acting like maybe they did not happen. And I think it really undermines our ability to confront what Russia is doing on all fronts that have been discussed, both by the chairman and me.

And with that I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Scaparrotti, thank you for your successful service. Your mission is absolutely critical, with little room for error.

One of my primary concerns with EUCOM’s ability to successfully defend its area of responsibility surrounds its ability to transport troops and/or equipment expeditiously across Europe. Antiquated infrastructure and inconsistent border crossing standards delay and disrupt our freedom of movement throughout the region, while training and exercising in the theater.

Could you please describe what role the United States is taking in leading the effort to resolve these issues, and what other organizations—NATO, EU—are doing to address the challenge?

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you. I would agree that mobility, as I will call it broadly, within the Euro-Atlantic theater is very important to our deterrence and defensive capabilities. And it was not
invested in through the years that—the past decade or more that we believed that Russia was a partner.

I think we have turned the corner on that in this past year, in the sense that we have focus and energy among our European partners, as you said, to get a focus on improving our infrastructure, our rail and road, our ports, and our capability to handle the movement of military forces throughout Europe.

We have done that in EUCOM through the work of, first, our logistics capacity in an assessment early of our ability to move, and the infrastructure that supports it. We have worked closely with both NATO, the J4 [director of logistics] in my SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force] headquarters and NATO headquarters, as well as with the EU.

So NATO and EU, as one of their primary cooperative efforts, is in fact mobility. That is important because it brings to bear the other elements of national power outside of the military that the EU can bring in economic, diplomatic, et cetera. So I think we have a good start, and we have a broad alliance of nations that are looking at this now.

Mr. WILSON. And I was grateful to be with you in Munich and also in Brussels, where I saw the high regard of our allies for your efforts to address this issue.

In December 2017 the President courageously changed the U.S. policy to provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine, and the State Department has subsequently approved the sale of Javelins to Ukraine. It is said that nearly 10,000 Ukrainians have been killed, as Putin has illegally invaded and occupied Crimea and the eastern portion of Ukraine. High hopes for a democratic and prosperous Russia have been crushed by Putin.

What is your assessment of the impact of the new aid on the fight on the ground in Ukraine? How do you assess Russia’s long-term strategy in Ukraine? And has it changed since the new policy?

General S CAPARROTTI. Well, thank you. I will first start by saying that Ukraine is in a—what I would consider a hot fight right now. It is not a frozen conflict. Daily there is activity along the front and, unfortunately for Ukraine, a loss of life every week. And I fully support what we are doing to help build their capability to defend their own country and reform their security institutions, as well, which they are working closely.

The assets that we have provided, funded by Congress to support them and support their development, has provided them with defensive capabilities, and with the Javelin that you specifically noted, and it—those assets go directly to their improved capability to establish the defense in the east, and become more and more competent and confident of their ability to secure, you know, their nation.

What I have seen in Russia is Russia has continued to support what I call a proxy force to include providing regular military commanders in charge at company and above level of the separatists, or the proxy forces on the other side. I think it is too early to say whether or not we have seen a change as a direct result of the decisions that were just taken. But we will watch that closely.

I will close by saying it is not my belief that Russia wants to resolve this conflict at this point. They certainly could do much more
to move along, to move the Minsk Agreement forward, things like offering protection and allowing mobility of the mission that oversees this, which they are not doing. So I think they actually are attempting to just freeze this a bit and—to their advantage.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, again, for your leadership. And the persons serving with you, God bless you.

The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield my time to Mr. Brown of Maryland.

Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for your service and your testimony here today. I appreciate the opportunity to ask questions in a classified setting yesterday.

I recently returned from a CODEL [congressional delegation] in Eastern Europe with Representative Stefanik, where we saw how partners such as Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine are working with your command to deter and counter the threat of and actual Russian aggression and expansionism. A critical component of that is forward deployment of our troops and equipment in the region.

In your written testimony and at the Senate hearing last week you highlighted NATO’s increased presence in the Baltic Region and in Poland and through the European Deterrence Initiative, which includes pre-positioning equipment and deploying enhanced forward-presence battalions along with armored brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigade on heel-to-toe 9-month rotation.

My question: Given Russia’s high tempo of exercises and troop placement on its borders, I would like to hear a little bit more about, you know, your thoughts on our forward force deployment. Is a heel-to-toe 9-month rotation the proper force posture for our forward-deployed units, or would a 1- or 2-year rotation be better? Or what about permanent presence of units?

General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you, sir. And I appreciate your visit to those nations, as well. They are strong allies and, as you know, one of the smaller nations through the Baltics, but strong and active.

First of all, I would say that I think our rotational period of about 9 months is the right one. We have had experience in our forces, and particularly in the Army, of rotating for a year or a year and additional 3 months or less, and we found that 9 months is about right for a number of reasons. And so, I would—in terms of rotation, I would stay with 9 months.

With a rotational force, I get someone specifically trained for that mission, ready to come in. And actually, because of the ranges, et cetera, we have available, I think I return a force that is just as well trained when it returns to the States. So we at least maintain the readiness, if not build some readiness through that experience.

In terms of rotational versus permanent, I do believe we need more forces in Europe. I do not think we are at the posture that I believe appropriate or required yet. And because of that, I think that there are some permanent forces I would like to have.

The first ones I would like to have would be some of our enabling elements. For example, a fires brigade, et cetera, as a permanent force, and then continue the rotation of the mech brigade, until we reach a point that we might consider that, as well.
The last thing I will say is that I lay a requirement out and the service determines how best to fill that. But I think some of these, again, are best provided in a permanent fashion.

Mr. BROWN. And would you include an aviation brigade as a—one of those permanent forces that you would like to see?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would, yes.

Mr. BROWN. Could you discuss some of the logistics and infrastructure challenges facing our forward-deployed troops, such as issues with freedom of movement and military construction in theater? And what steps are you taking under your command to address them?

General SCAPARROTTI. As I said, our J4 has done an assessment in the past year—a little over a year ago we started it—in terms of the infrastructure status across Europe and what was required. With that we now, working with the nations involved, so that they understand their responsibilities, as well, as an ally or as a partner. And there is examples throughout Europe of them taking this on, in terms of their investment in ports, infrastructure, roads, change in rail.

For instance, in NATO, at 29, they agreed to begin working the diplomatic and customs rules that allow the military to move expeditiously with less than 5 days’ notice, for instance. Those are steps that are significant in making forward progress.

We have already, through the—through Congress’ support and the EDI, along with our partners, are investing in critical infrastructure, ports, things of that nature that we identified we need to improve in order to help with our mobility. And in just about all those cases, our ally in that place also invests in that, alongside of us, and invests more than we do, obviously. It is in their country.

So I think we are making very good progress. We have got good examples of that. But there is a lot of work to do.

Mr. BROWN. Red, yellow, or green?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would say yellow.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Scaparrotti, good to see you again. I want to echo Joe Wilson’s comments, having been with you in Munich at the Munich Security Conference, and then your presentation also to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

I think in all—both of those, we were very proud of both your representation of the United States, but also to our allies. You have continued to make clear the threat that Russia poses in all of your presentations, including their meddling in elections, meddling in democracies, the threat that is posed to you and your ability to execute your job and task, and even the forward-deployed troops, what they are experiencing.

On the mobility issue, I would like to expand a little bit on the questions that have been asked. You have done a great job in, I think, informing Congress that there are mobility issues. As we have expanded NATO, we did not undertake plans for how would we defend the space, and make sure that the infrastructure was there.
But I think people would also be surprised at, when we approved the European Reassurance Initiative, that there were funds, there were U.S. funds that were necessary in order to be able to get our troops from point A to point B that went to infrastructure. You mentioned that briefly, that we were working with our NATO partners and allies as to what they need to invest in.

Could you give us some examples of the types of things that you had to fund with the European Reassurance Initiative that you should not be funding, and that we need to work with our allies to make certain that the infrastructure supports so that you do not have to in the future?

General SCAFAROTTI. Yes, sir. An example might be in MK [Mihail Kogalniceanu], which is a base in Romania, a very good base that they have. We are laying a concrete pad off the runway and investing in a little bit of the infrastructure that helps with the movement and mobility of troops through that port. And what they are doing is they agreed, as we improve that tarmac, improve their reception point off the runway, they agreed to include a fuel line and improve the rail line into there, all helpful to make this a good hub for movement of troops and equipment. They also are investing in the base itself, and accommodations for our troops that we rotate through there.

So that is a really good example of where we have worked with another country in a place that we needed some mobility and a site to come in to. And there is others like that that are just improvements to aerial ports or seaports that help our mobility, help us get the capacity in that port.

The other thing I would just like to mention—and I intended to mention earlier—was that the other thing we are doing that is important is we—as we rotate our forces, and the allies do, we are trying to bring them through different ports and move them by different means. And in doing that, we learn where we have issues. We develop that capability in our—in those countries, and their civilian infrastructure that supports that, and build muscle memory. So that has been an important part of this over the past year, as well.

Mr. TURNER. Well, that goes to my next question. Shortly after seeing you, I went to—I was in Germany and saw the Toledo Air Guard, which had just left Estonia. And they reported that, you know, there was a number of their missions that they were unable to accomplish because of some of the issues that you just described.

And the questions that they had, obviously, was how is that captured. How can we be assured that, as we do the forward deployment of troops and they run into these impediments to be able to execute their missions, that it is captured, that it is worked, and that it is resolved so that we do have that future capability?

General SCAFAROTTI. Yes, sir. We capture that in a very deliberate after-action review. And all of those exercises—again, purposeful movement by certain ways, operations out of certain places capture the issues we have, bring it back up through the EUCOM J4, out to NATO J4, and the countries that is involved to capture that. That is exactly how we do it.

We have examples, for instance, in movement of troops here this last summer for exercises where, you know, they were stopped at
a border, put on a sidetrack for, like, 2 days, 3 days. We had to work through customs. First we had to discover that we had troops sitting on a rail alongside, you know, alongside a border.

But those things occur. We capture that, back up, and then we drill back down into it, whether it is a customs issue, a coordination issue, or it is an infrastructure issue.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. Thank you, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General, for your testimony yesterday and today. The Office of Naval Intelligence issued a report in 2015 called “The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition,” and—again, a public document. And it states here that “Submarines are the capital ships of the Russian Navy. This is dictated by Russia’s geography; constrained direct access to major ocean areas everywhere but in the Pacific makes surface ship operations vulnerable to potential enemy action. The inherent covert nature of submarines enhances their survivability, whether operating locally or when transiting into more open sea areas.”

And then it goes on to quote Admiral Chirkov of the navy, stating that the nuclear submarine fleet is the priority of the navy shipbuilding program.

Again, one of your predecessors, Admiral Stavridis, testified here a couple years ago and kind of caught people’s attention by stating that the submarine activity is roughly about 70 percent of what it was during the Cold War era. And he knows what he is talking about, because he sort of was there during a lot of that. And you mentioned in your opening remarks about the fact that antisubmarine activities is now—and, you know, kind of a restart, in terms of our forces, as well as the region.

I realize some of this is classified and you talked about it a little bit yesterday, but I think it is important still to talk—create at least some picture, in terms of what you are dealing with, and what you are seeing. And I was wondering if you could comment a little more.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, thank you. Well, Admiral Stavridis noted—he gave an estimate of what it was in. Just this last year, since the last time I testified here, we have seen activity in the Russian navy, and particularly undersea in their submarine activity, that we haven’t seen since the 1980s. So the level of activity is up yet again. And, as you know, they are producing maritime enhancements to existing ships and new submarine that is definitely more modern and more challenging.

While we remain dominant undersea, we have got to continue our investment, as the Navy has laid out, in order to maintain that dominance, just given their modernization and their increased activity with their forces.

Mr. COURTNEY. And as far as, you know, working with, again, some of our allies in the region, again, this is something, again, sort of a restart, as I mentioned.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. It is important. You know, most of the allies and the United States does not have the same capacity that it had during the Cold War, when we were used to doing this together, particularly antisubmarine warfare, maritime operations.
So we are all rebuilding our capacities, we are improving our capacities to meet the—you know, the challenges we have in this new environment, and Russia’s modernization. Together we can handle this. We have proven that in this past year. But it does take all of us working together.

And the other thing I would mention, it takes a mix of the forces, particularly antisubmarine warfare. You are talking air, surface, subsurface, sensors. It is a mix that allows us, along with our allies and their capabilities, to be successful.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Last year’s NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] we included some language that allowed wounded Ukrainian soldiers to be treated in U.S. medical facilities in accordance with DOD [Department of Defense] rules. And again, I know that was just signed a couple months ago, but I wonder if you had any sort of comment in terms of just, A, how that was received, you know, by our friends in the Ukraine, and you know, whether or not you see that as a process that is actually going to happen.

General SCAPARROTTI. I would say I am sure it was received very well. It is a very deliberate demonstration of our support for them and our close partnership, to care for one of their wounded.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great.

General SCAPARROTTI. And so, without a doubt—and I know their CHOD well, he is their chief of defense, truly cares about his forces and their care, as well as their training, so that they can fight and protect that country.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great, thank you. I yield back.

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you so much for your service. My concerns were we are at an untenable position with Russia right now, and I want to get clarification of Article 5, your interpretation of it, because they have developed a hybrid system, or a sort of a—I guess you could call it hybrid tactics that involve information operations, I guess you could say, an element of psychological warfare, as well as using covert forces as proxies.

And so, when we look at something like the Baltic States that I think have Russian minorities in them, much like the Ukraine, that they could do the same pattern there. And I am concerned that—would—that NATO would acquiesce to that, because they might not consider it a conventional attack under Article 5. What is your interpretation of that?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, first of all, NATO recognizes the difficulty in indirect or asymmetric activity that Russia is practicing, activities below the level of conflict. And, in fact, we have inserted that for the first time into our NATO exercise that we did this past year with some ambiguous activities that are consistent with what they would typically do, in order to bring this about and have that discussion at 29.

And so they are actually dealing with the issue around this and in cyber, and working to define an understanding of what would be a trigger for Article 5. So they are working that, and they recognize it.
I would just share with you that is the most difficult scenario I see, potentially, is because of the way they typically work in a fashion that would be ambiguous, it would be most difficult to come to a decision. But I would share that NATO is aware of this, and they are actually working on it.

Mr. Coffman. But do you not think that—you said that that is the most difficult scenario. Do you not think that is the most probable scenario right now? And do you not think one of the objections—objectives of Russia is—clearly, is to break NATO, and to test us, for instance, in one of the Baltic States?

General Scaparrotti. I think that, absolutely, they are trying to undermine and splinter NATO. It is a difficult situation when they operate that way. But I am confident of NATO. I have seen the discussions. And I think in something that they agree is an attack warranting Article 5, that they can come together. I have seen them come together in other things less than this that was perhaps divisive at the time, but they can reach a conclusion.

Mr. Coffman. Well, let me express to you that I do not necessarily share the confidence in our allies, because of the—there is an agreed-upon 2 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] to be spent on defense, and the majority of our NATO allies are nowhere near that 2 percent requirement. And so it is—you know, is it that—well, obviously, they have other priorities within their budget.

But that is a real concern, why they are not doing that. And there is an overreliance upon the United States. Could you comment on that?

General Scaparrotti. I share your concern. And I press that, as well as the Secretary General. I press it as the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] and as the EUCOM commander every place I go.

They have to demonstrate a change. They have—as I stated in my opening statement, there is—there will be 8 that have made that 2 percent, and 15 that plan to make it, and we will continue to press that, as being a part of the alliance is also contributing as a part of the alliance, both in cash and contributions and capability. So that is what we are watching. And I agree that we need to press that.

I would add that if you look at NATO and say—since Warsaw, for instance, and the adaptation, the recognition as Russia is a threat here, a competitive nation. All of those things that I noted about the forward posture of troops in the east, our air policing activity, a much more increased maritime activity, particularly in the Black Sea and the Baltics, everything that I do there as the SACEUR was agreed at 29. That is why I have confidence in NATO. These are tough decisions for them and within their countries, and they have been able to act over the past year.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.

Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to specifically talk with you about Russia and the Balkans. I know that there have been several investments that Russians have wanted to make in the Balkans. There was a pipeline project, I believe, about a year or so ago that did not quite work out the way they anticipated.
There have also been some credit and remittance issues, some other foreign trade things that did not quite go the Russians’ way, but it is definitely—it is clear that they want to continue to have influence there.

In your opinion, how far are they willing to go to make sure that they can continue to have a certain amount of influence there in that region, even though some of the things that they are working on, economically, just have not [borne] any fruit?

General Scaparrotti. Well, what I see is offers, for instance, of military equipment and military assistance. And sometimes the military equipment is surely below the cost to them.

But as you watch them work in Europe and on the periphery in countries that they work with, they will offer that equipment at a very low cost in order to ensure that they—you know, that they will take it. They will offer then support and bring in troops. And then they will decide that the troops need to stay, as a matter of influence and some leverage, I would say, over time. Those are the things that I see them doing on the military side.

Beyond that, very common disinformation campaigns in the nations, you know, within the Balkans, stirring political debate, support for fringe political parties in order to stir that debate, and a very consistent message that is anti-West, anti-NATO, anti-U.S.

Mr. Veasey. If their demographic crisis is real—and it has been, you know, reported that they are losing population—and these investments that they are offering to people are not going through and, again, they are just—they are not, you know, yielding anything, how long can they continue to keep up that sort of disinformation and continue to be a powerful player there, if they are suffering in all these areas, economically?

General Scaparrotti. You know, there are some that look at their demographics, they look at their economy, health issues, et cetera, and would say that while they are in a great power competition, as you look long range they just cannot sustain this.

My view would be that the—you know, the Russian people are used to adversity. They almost, as a culture, embrace that. And that even with a difficult economy, President Putin has been able to reverse the trend and it is, I think, approaching 2 percent growth. I think they have great resilience.

And that is not what we should count on. We should count on our ensuring that we are strong and we deter their activities.

Mr. Veasey. How do you think that we should continue to try to influence the countries there in the Balkans to make positive steps towards NATO?

General Scaparrotti. I think it is important that we have a whole-of-government approach, diplomatic engagement there, which we do, but also encouragement from our allies there. We need to work with them to build Western democratic institutions. There is clearly a desire among the population in the Balkans to come West. But we have got to show them that we are just as interested in that as they are.

Mr. Veasey. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, it is nice to see you again.

I want to follow up on a little bit of the line of questions that my colleague, Mr. Veasey, was asking. Russia is a huge country—land mass, the largest country—my understanding is—on the Earth. They border, depending on how you count them, over 12 countries, including North Korea and China on the eastern side. But then, when you come back to the part of the world that you are in charge of, they border a number of countries in the European theater.

My question is, are they engaging in malign activities against all of them? And, if not, which countries are they not engaging in these activities against?

General SCAPARROTTI. I think, you know, I have probably seen some activity in most countries. And, you know, those that they do not have a certain focus on, you still see that activity in their media, because their media is laced with—a—you know, an anti-Western, anti-international order kind of message, undercutting democratic countries, undercutting governments that they are in—and that is kind of where they are light, and then focused more particularly in the east, the countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union. You know, they see that as their strategic space, and they think they should have some preferential influence in those nations. So it is much heavier there.

But even in the other countries of Europe, if you go to the west—Italy, France, Germany, et cetera—there is examples there of same, you know, use of disinformation, social media, and those kinds of activities, as well.

Mr. SCOTT. That is—I have only been over there a few weeks in the last couple of years. But the perception that I had was that they are engaged in all of those, and basically they are going to stir chaos wherever they can. And then, when they see a weakness, they would take advantage of it.

And you answered this question earlier, when Mr. Veasey asked it, but the question I had is how long can they sustain that against all of the countries? And how long do all the other countries go without at some point taking an action against Russia to actually stop, stop this? I mean——

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, I cannot answer how long they could go. I would say they are a resilient nation and a culture. And so I think we have to take action to—in order to establish a deterrent effect. And that is to respond to demonstrate capability and demonstrate the will to use it, if necessary.

Mr. SCOTT. I worry—and I am just making this as a statement—with regard to Turkey being on their border. I worry about them using their activities to create a disturbance in Turkey, potentially a coup there, where somebody friendly to them took over, even if they took over for only a day or two, with our assets in that country, the potential damage that they could do, simply by seizing some of our assets.

Are you comfortable that that relationship with Turkey is strong enough, and we have enough insight into that, that if that began to happen, that we would have the ability to protect all of our assets in that country?
General SCAPAROTTI. Yes, sir. I am comfortable with that. We have a very good mil-to-mil relationship with Turkey. I speak to their chief of defense often. Our staffs have interchange. They have been very responsive to us, in terms of force protection, as well. So any concern that either through their intelligence or ours about a threat to our forces that are stationed there, et cetera, they have taken immediate action.

So I—in terms of their demonstration, the relationship we have, I am confident of that, and the protection of our force there.

If I could follow up on the other when I talk about we have to demonstrate, I want to emphasize that we, as the alliance and our partners—because our strength, you know, versus Russia’s, strategically, really is the fact that we have such a great alliance and such great partners. That is important. And they recognize that.

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. And they do not seem to be—they do not seem to have many, which is good.

Well, I want to just thank you for your service and for being here, and I look forward to making it back to that part of the world to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, could you briefly give us an idea of what the capacity is on the Russian side to continue or accelerate this level of military spending?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, I think that, you know, just from what I understand of their budget and what they are doing, they—their budget is improving. But they do have a difficult hand to play here.

So—and what we have seen is they have slowed down their modernization. I think you will continue to see decisions in that regard, but not enough to make a huge difference. In other words, it will draw it out by maybe 2 to 5 years, but I think they know what they want to establish, the capabilities they need, and they have been very focused on that over a number of years.

So I think you may see it drawn out, but I do not think you will see them stop in terms of what they believe they need as a part of their military capabilities.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. In February, Admiral Rogers, head of Cyber Command and NSA [National Security Agency], said—and I am quoting him—“President Putin has come clearly to the conclusion that there is little price to pay. And therefore”—and then he is quoting Putin—“‘I can continue this activity.’” Clearly, what we have done has not been enough in regards to what action we have taken to deter Russia and election meddling. And perhaps we could extend that to Syria, to Crimea, to Ukraine, to involvement in European elections, to the involvement in the 2018 elections in the United States, to the involvement in the 2020 elections.

You said to the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, “I don’t believe there is an effective unification across the interagency with the energy and focus that we could attain.” How can you assure us that we are going to achieve that and, to follow up on the ranking member’s question, that there is a price to pay for Russia that will deter this kind of activity, going forward?
General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I can tell you that within Department of Defense, and as far as I am concerned, we are working closely within the interagency to develop both the structure and enhance the energy that I talked about. I think that is the issue. We have got to—we have a lot of capacity, we have a lot of talent.

Particularly, that was directly from a question about activity below the level of conflict. And so, when it comes to information operations, our capacity in cyber, our ability in diplomacy, and truthful media, we have great capacity. We have got to focus that capacity as a whole of government on this problem set, so that they know there is a response, and we can overcome that.

And, you know, we have seen instances in Europe now where we have developed the structure and the volume at specific times within the media to influence their disinformation, to influence their actions as a result. This can be done, we have got to pull this together and get after it.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes. I am convinced of your intent, and the will, and the dedication, excellence of those who serve under you. I am not convinced of the strategy or the efficacy at this point. I do not understand—I would not expect you to tell me that everything is okay, because it is—definitely not. And you, yourself, have said that it is not. You said, “We are getting a better understanding of it. I would not characterize it as a good picture at this point, not satisfactory to me.”

You have talked about Russian activity related in the United States to infrastructure reconnaissance, et cetera. You said, “I will leave it at that.” What I would like, though, is not to be assured that it is okay, but to have some assurance in a strategy that we can all understand and articulate, and a commitment to this threat articulated by the President on down.

And I am not seeing that, my constituents are not seeing that. I am getting asked those questions. That is why I am asking them of you today, so that I can go back to them and have an understanding of what that is. It does not sound, it does not look like, if we just connect the dots from Russia’s activity from Georgia to today, that anything we have done has deterred them. Convince me to the contrary.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I cannot, you know—broadly, they have not been deterred. They act today in the information realm. They continue to take activity below the level of conflict.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Is there anything you are doing now, or plan to do in the near future, that will deter them?

General SCAPARROTTI. We are taking actions that do deter them, as I said, in specific areas. We have the capacity to do this. We are taking all kinds of activities. And I think it is across the whole of government, as well.

We have a deterrent effect in the East, no doubt about it, with respect to—and it is not just the military component that does that. You know, we have a deterrent effect, conventionally. Within information cycle, it is a new domain. It is in a—it is a domain today that is connected, it is fast. So this is not easy, and it is new. And that is the area that we—and probably one of the toughest areas to deter and act.

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you for your answers and for your service.
General SCAPARROTTI. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne.
Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I am over here. First of all, thank you for your service to our country. We genuinely appreciate what you continue to do for us every day.

All of us have watched with dismay what has happened in Eastern Ukraine. Over 10,000 people are dead. And I am glad to see that we are now beginning to give them the help that they have been asking for for some time. But as you know, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, whereas there are other countries in that region—and I am thinking specifically of the Baltics—that are members of NATO, and to which, by virtue of the fact that we are members of NATO, we owe them a substantial obligation if somebody does something to them, somebody invades them.

So, two questions. Do you think something like what has happened in Eastern Ukraine could happen in the Baltics? And, if so, what would U.S. involvement look like to honor our obligations to those countries?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, in answer to that, I do not want to speculate about, you know, what we would do, et cetera. I would just say this: We have an agreement at—with members in NATO that an Article 5 attack on one is an attack on all. And we would honor that. There is no doubt in my mind about it. We would come to their assistance.

I think Russia is deterred from taking an action like that, like trying to seize a portion of one of the countries on the border, because they know NATO is 29 nations, it is much stronger, and that we would win that conflict. They do not want a conflict in that regard. So I personally do not believe they would take that step.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I would hope they would not, as well.

General SCAPARROTTI. I would hope not, too.

Mr. BYRNE. But hoping is not a plan, as you know. I assume, whether you can tell us about the details of it or not, I assume that there is a plan if they try to do something.

General SCAPARROTTI. There is a plan.

Mr. BYRNE. Good. Are we providing you—is Congress providing you with the authorization and resources you need to implement that plan?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, the budget that is presented here—and when I talk about the budget, I am also looking at the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], you know, the out-years. Since I have been in this job, this is the first time in the budget that I have said, “Here are my requirements,” and they are being addressed in some way throughout the FYDP. So I am very pleased with this. And I think, with that regard, it is sufficient.

But, listen, it will take us those years to really put us in a posture that I believe that we should be in, and we are best in to assure deterrence of Russia and any idea that they might have to take an act, to assure that we deter any thoughts or opportunities they might think they have.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I want to make sure that—I believe with all my heart you are doing and the people under you are doing what they are supposed to be doing. But sometimes you have to tell us
what we need to do to provide you with both the authorization and the resources to do what you need to do. And I hope you will not be reticent about telling us what you need, because until we know that, it is hard for us to do what we have got to do.

There was—as you probably know, we had quite an effort to get the level of spending up for the Department of Defense for both this fiscal year and next fiscal year. That did not come about by happenstance, and it took an enormous amount of effort. We need the information and the push sometimes from you and people that are working with you so that we get what we need to get done here in Congress for you.

General Scaparrotti. Sir, first of all, thank you. I understand this has not been easy. My message to you is you will know clearly what my assessments are. And in a number of these things, in a classified document, I will tell you exactly what my requirements are, and to the extent that you can look at it across the FYDP and see actually whether they are being addressed and how quickly they are being addressed. But I will be very clear about that, and I appreciate, you know, Congress and the committee’s diligence in this. Thank you.

Mr. Byrne. Well, I think everybody on the committee appreciates your directness with us. Sometimes the more direct you are, the more likely we are to be responsive to you. And I just want to encourage you to do that, because I believe you do have a plan. We probably will learn about it another time, when it is appropriate. But I always worry that you have got a great plan, and we have not always given you the authorization and the appropriations you need. Tell us what you need, and I think you will find this committee ready to work with you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.

Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, one of the things that I have been advocating for since getting here is moving the EDI from being based on OCO [overseas contingency operations] funds to the base budget. I certainly think that if we want to talk about a commitment and a show of force, at least to Russia, that we are committed to Europe, that would be the route to do it. And, of course, also to assure our NATO allies that we are there with them in the fight, and not just in a 1-year process.

What would change, from your perspective, in terms of planning, if we moved EDI out of OCO and into the base budget?

General Scaparrotti. First of all, I would support going to a base budget out of OCO. What would change in that is that at some point it would be under the services to then prioritize and fund and deliver the assets within their service.

And that is my one concern, is that the way that we develop EDI today, between I and the Department, is that we lay out the priorities from a commander’s perspective—EUCOM—and that is a bit different than a service perspective, because I am looking at the synchronization and the combination of all the services and resources to get the best benefit, in terms of deterrence and defense.
And so, as we move to the budget, I would like some means within the planning to protect that prioritization by the combatant commander.

Mr. GALLEGO. In terms of the message it would send to our allies if they—if we actually went that route, in your opinion?

General Scaparrotti. Well, I—you know, I think that the message would be that we are committed to funding our needs, and particularly those needs that have to do with the Euro-Atlantic, where we are a member of NATO and we have partners in Europe as a part of the base budget. But again, the key there would be that they see the investment that is also inherent in our alliance activity and capabilities.

Mr. GALLEGO. Excellent. I would like to talk, moving on, into—especially what we recently just saw occur in England. Russia will likely never, in my opinion, present a clear violation of NATO’s Article 5, but they will always, you know, try to be like the petulant teenager that they are, and just kind of testing and probing below actually crossing the line.

So what are we doing with our NATO members and with our non-NATO partners like Finland and Sweden to kind of build up the resilience of the alliance, of their capabilities, of their domestic capabilities, and to prevent Russian incursion that—the pre-Russian incursion that happens when there—such activities around hybrid warfare, things like that. So the overall steps—I would say, I guess, the inoculation that we should be doing to stop Russia incursion or influence on our allies and near allies.

General Scaparrotti. So there is a number of activities ongoing in Europe right now that are United States to partners and United States within the alliance.

I would first point out with any alliance that, you know, we have noted that cyber is a domain, and we are now working as a domain, both at a diplomatic level, as well as the military aspects of that. And we have established cyber centers, we are beginning to take—we are beginning to conduct activities in that regard, and that touches all 29 nations, but it also touches the partners of NATO, which there are about 40.

Within NATO you have got a hybrid center of excellence, we have got a cyber center of excellence among different nations. Those also are in place to help assess the environment, determine best responses, educate the other nations’ capabilities in this, and then help them in applying it. And within NATO all of our actions are to help us do this in a synchronized pattern.

So, while there is much work to do, there is a lot of good work going on right now in each of these areas that shares information, shares best practices, shares information so that we are fully aware of what is going on in our environment. And so, you know, I am positive about this. But there is a lot of work that needs to be done.

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General, for the great work that you are doing. I had to be in another committee, so please excuse me if you already addressed this question. But feel free to amplify. I would like to ask you about Iran.
As North Korea continues to expand its ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities, it has also been testing newly developed systems, which I think is a real problem. While the United States has arguably shifted focus in the last 2 to 5 years to address the threats from North Korea, how would you assess our ability to counter an Iranian threat to U.S. interests in EUCOM, including the ability to protect our deployed forces in your area of responsibility?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I would assess, you know, our capabilities as good. As you know, our defense system, particularly our air and missile defense system, has as a focus Iran, as well.

We do in EUCOM watch closely Iranian activity, and particularly their malign influence, as Israel is a part of EUCOM. And Iran is—they consider Iran an existential threat to them. And I—one of my responsibilities is to support the defense of Israel. So we work closely with Israel, and we keep a very close eye on Iran’s capabilities and activities, in close coordination with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command].

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And as kind of a follow-on to that, we have Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. What are we doing to protect them from cruise missile or other kinds of attacks?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, that is addressed among a layered defensive system—I will leave it at that—and steps that we are taking in that regard. And I would prefer to give you that response more fully than that, you know, in a classified document, if I could.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. That would certainly work.

And lastly, on Asian modernizations, give us an update on the Russian military modernization programs. And, you know, General—excuse me—President Putin talked about these, I think, kind of far-fetched nuclear-tipped torpedoes, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, things like that. But what are they realistically doing that you are concerned about?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, they—you know, they are modernizing their force. So let us go to the—you know, the conventional and nuclear force first. And just generally, in this environment, I can talk to you—I can provide you a more in-depth response in a classified document.

But you know, it is well known that they are modernizing their conventional force. They are primarily doing that through a respect of—with the weapons systems that they put on them, as well as the missiles that they have developed to give them greater range, greater precision. And in most of these systems that they employ, they can be either conventional or nuclear.

So in many ways, they are improving the ships that they have in the maritime, they are improving the planes that they have, their bombers, and their submarines, with advanced systems that we need to—you know, we need to pace and be able to deal with. They are improving their nuclear capability across all their systems, and modernizing those. That is why NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] is so important for us to maintain our nuclear deterrent across the range of scenarios that they might present.

The last thing I would note is that, you know, they are working hard to modernize both their C4 systems—you know, their command, control, communications [and computers]—and also capabilities in space. And then hypersonics, as well.
Mr. Lamborn. When it comes to the Nuclear Posture Review, I believe that it is a good thing that it is being proposed that we have more options, like low-yield weapons or sea-launched intermediate cruise missiles. Some people think that we should have fewer options, just as a philosophical matter. Where do you come down on the number of options that we should or should not have?

General Scaparrotti. Oh, I support the Nuclear Posture Review that we should close any gaps, that we should have a deterrent that can respond across the spectrum of scenarios that they might present us, or an adversary might present us. I think this design is a tailorable force that does just that, and it does not lower the threshold. Actually, by closing those gaps and ensuring they understand that we have a deterrent, a capable posture, that it raises that, and it raises that threshold, in my view.

Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Panetta.

Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, good morning, thank you for being here. Thank you for your testimony. As you can tell by most of the questioning, hybrid warfare is a concern as to what is going on, obviously, with Russia and what they are doing.

When you look at Article 5, though—and I—you know, I just looked it up, to be frank—you know, it says “armed attack.” Each goes through that. In your opinion, do you think Article 5 needs to be updated in order to deal with this hybrid warfare, so that there can be more of a joint response?

General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I would—I am not going to try and get in—that is really the North Atlantic Council’s job, there. But, you know, I talk to them. I think they are actually working on the structures and the definitions that inform that treaty. And I am confident that they are wrestling with the hard question that you are talking about. Whether or not it is a change to the—literally to the wording of Article 5, or whether it is the—you know, the process and the understandings that they develop short of that, I will let them be the determinant of that.

Mr. Panetta. Do you feel it limits you now, in its current state, in regards to your response to this hybrid warfare?

General Scaparrotti. No, I do not think it limits me. I think there is an understanding of the basis, the spirit of Article 5, and an understanding that the character of warfare is changing.

Mr. Panetta. Fair enough.

General Scaparrotti. Yes.

Mr. Panetta. Fair enough. Great. Thank you. Pivoting, moving up north in regards to the Arctic, can you speak to the Russian buildup up there, and our response?

General Scaparrotti. Clearly, they are modernizing some of their older bases there, they are building some new ones. They are placing radar systems, et cetera, in place, and they have moved air defense systems back and forth, as a part of their exercises, as well. They are developing capabilities, in terms of ships capable to operate in that environment in numbers that will outpace us, if we are not diligent here.

And so, in the instate, you know, in several years they probably would be in a position, given their modernization, that they could,
if they chose to, control the Northern Sea Route. They state their intent is for safety, security, economy, rescue of those at sea, et cetera. But I think we have to pay attention to what we are seeing there.

Mr. Panetta. And we are paying attention, clearly.

General Scaparrotti. We are. But we need to—we also need to look with our allies and across our government at what assets and capabilities we should have in place, given their modernization.

Mr. Panetta. And beyond looking, are we actually doing something?

General Scaparrotti. We are.

Mr. Panetta. Okay, all right. Thank you, I appreciate it.

I yield back.

The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Great to see you again, General Scaparrotti. You stated recently that you do not believe that the United States has an effective and unified approach to dealing with Russia's cyber threat: specifically, “I don’t believe there is an effective unification across the interagency with the energy and the focus that we could attain.” What are we doing to address this? And what specifically do we need to do?

General Scaparrotti. Well, I will speak, you know, from my point of view here, as a EUCOM commander.

What we are doing is we are working with the Russian Information Group, which is the RIG, commonly called. It is an interagency board. I co-chair that with the Under Secretary of State. That gives us a platform to bring together the interagency in a whole-of-government approach and response to activity below the level of warfare, for instance.

The GEC is under State, which is the Global——

Ms. Stefanik. Engagement Center.

General Scaparrotti [continuing]. I think is probably, at least in my view, the central point now within the government—State being responsible for particularly information countering disinformation.

So that is what we are doing. And the GEC has been—received additional funding and guidance.

My point that you quoted is I think we have the structure that we could expand on, but we are not—we just do not have the focus and the energy that I think that we are capable of, or we should put into this in order to deter this disinformation campaign that is going on.

Ms. Stefanik. So I agree with you, but I want to hear specifically what steps we need to take to ensure that we have the focus and the energy.

And I know I have concerns with the lack of implementation of the appropriations, when it comes to the GEC. But I want to hear from you specifically what steps we need to take so a year from now the answer to this question is not the same.

General Scaparrotti. Okay, I am going to give you my response. I am not in State. This is really a question that, you know, frankly—I will admit here publicly that this is their business. But from someone that takes part in this, as a part of DOD, you know, I per-
sonally believe that, you know, greater clarity in role, greater direction across the interagency with respect to how this will work as a—you know, as the central agency for information, and perhaps resources in order to develop the energy and the focus that I talked about.

I would prefer not to go beyond that, because, again, I am—you know, this is really a question for State. But I think, you know, from my point of view in working with them, they are good people, we are making good headway. But we could do more.

Ms. Stefanik. You and I have discussed—and I think it would be worthy for the committee to hear your assessment. Are we seeing new trends—and the context of this question comes from we are heading into the midterm elections. Are we seeing new trends when it comes to Russia’s use of disinformation among our allies?

Obviously, we saw that leading up to the French elections and the German elections. And I think both countries were pretty capable, in terms of how they ensured that this disinformation campaign from Russia did not meddle with their electoral process.

What can we learn from that? What trends do we need to look for, as we head to the midterms?

General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the one that is apparent is just use of social media and using factories in order to get out a lot of volume with disruptive messaging. And that was seen here, it was seen in Europe in the elections there, as well.

But that is one of the trends that has been identified. And as other nations, as we progress through some of the elections in Europe, they were better able to handle because they recognized this may be coming about. And they have learned how to begin to counter that, how to be prepared to counter it, et cetera. So there is progress being made. But that is one of those that I would note.

And I think, as an alliance, you know, we have assisted with their elections, et cetera, and they have exchanged information, as well, from what they have learned. And my general view is that we have been better able—at least in Europe—to deal with this, as this has progressed.

Ms. Stefanik. And my last question, if I have time, is who, from your perspective, has the central responsibility when it comes to countering propaganda, whether it is from Russia or, frankly, other adversaries?

General Scaparrotti. My understanding, it is State.

Ms. Stefanik. Okay. And are there country-specific strategies that are being developed that work effectively with DOD counterparts?

General Scaparrotti. Yes. What we have done within the information group and with the GEC and across the interagency is we have developed nations that are vulnerable or under threat, ones that we thought we could have the best benefit. And from a U.S. perspective now, we have gone to the ambassador in our country team and said, “What are your objectives, and how do we support those?”

Ms. Stefanik. My time has expired.

General Scaparrotti. So we are focusing on that.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good to see you again, and thank you for your service.
So I know that my colleague just talked about the Global Engagement Center, but I want to address it as well, because I think it is an important topic. From its inception, I have certainly believed that it has a critical role to play when it comes to countering the messages perpetuated by our adversaries, both terrorist organizations and nation-states.

I am certainly glad that the State Department has finally accepted the allocated transfer of funds from the Department of Defense to assist in the effort, and—but I find it somewhat problematic that there still exists a lack of leadership within the State Department, from the bottom all the way to the top, as we have seen within the past few days, to leverage its capabilities to disrupt destabilization campaigns aimed at the United States and our allies.

So, can you answer for me and touch on the topic a little more how are you working with the Global Engagement Center, and how can we better use its capabilities?

General Scaparrotti. Well, I can comment on our relationship. It is a very good one, and we work with them consistently. They are a member of the RIG, which I talked about. And through that, that is the direct connection with the work that the RIG does. But even on a daily basis we know who to go to with respect to the information operations we in EUCOM are doing, or the things that we see. So it is a—you know, it is a very good relationship.

My comments have been directed on I think we need a more robust effort within the GEC. And in terms of how to do that, that is really State's portfolio.

Mr. Langevin. Okay. So you noted in your testimony that Russia is advancing its indirect and asymmetric capabilities in accordance with its concept of warfare, commonly referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine. The concept here states that non-military means have grown or surpassed the use of force to achieve political or strategic goals, non-military factors outweigh military factors in that doctrine by a ratio of 4 to 1.

Do you feel comfortable that the non-military assets of U.S. national power are being utilized effectively to adequately counter the threats posed by Russia? And can you describe the extent of your relationship with those in the United States responsible for the coordinating of the non-military elements with you and your staff?

General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, you know, I will underscore that Russia has a doctrine that, in my view, sees these activities below the level of conflict as a part of the full spectrum, with an intent that, if they could undermine a target country through these types of means, political destabilization, et cetera, never having to use a military force, that is their objective.

We work every day across the interagency. I have interagency representatives that are talented and capable and working hard with us to ensure that what we do is an interagency effort, a whole-of-government effort.

And so, I do not mean to imply that we do not work that way, we do. But that is—you know, that is hard government work, because most of our agencies, to include DOD, are formed and focused on doing what we do best. And DOD is the same way. So you
have got to break some cultural barriers here and work on crossed interests.

We can do this. We have done it in the past. So I would say we continue to do what we have set out to do, as a government. We continue to reinforce the capabilities that allow us to approach these things as an interagency.

Mr. LANGEVIN. So let me follow up with this. The recently published National Defense Strategy states that we are competing with Russia. And I have a feeling that Russia may think it is already in a type of informational or political war with the United States.

As a part of the Gerasimov Doctrine, information operations are presented as an—as integral to all six main phases of Russian conflict development, the only non-military measure spanning the entire spectrum. But as Europe is absent active armed conflict, we lack certain authorities to conduct our own information operations.

So how are youcountering Russian disinformation in Europe without the broader authorities granted in larger operations, or execute orders understanding you likely cannot get into details about how you feel we are adequately challenging Russia in this space?

General SCAPARROTTI. I will briefly answer that, just by saying that we and EUCOM engage through NATO and EU, as well as our partners and individual countries in countering the Russian message. All of this is truthful print. Much of it can be done through public affairs.

And then, in other ways, we have military information support teams that we provide to specific countries. And all of this is in support of the embassy and their message, as well as foreign countries. So we work directly with some of these foreign countries and what they see, and how best to counter this disinformation. So I would leave it at that.

And, well, the last thing is you mentioned authorities. I have asked for authorities with respect to information operations, etc. And those that I have requested I have been granted. And in this forum I will just leave it at that. But I do want you to know that where I have asked for specific authorities to this point, I have received what I have asked for.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the latitude, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hice.

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is EUCOM prepared for the United States to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem?

General SCAPARROTTI. Say again, sir. I am sorry, I—is EUCOM——

Mr. HICE. Are we prepared, do you believe, to move our embassy to Jerusalem?

General SCAPARROTTI. Today we are preparing to do that. And again, this should be a question that goes to State first, as the lead in that. I was just there, so I am aware of the planning that is going on, and I would respectfully go to them for the question of the preparation.
Mr. HICE. Okay, fair enough with that. Going back, then, to Russia and your understanding, what are Russia’s goals in the Baltic Seas?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think it is consistent with other places, and that is that they establish themselves as a respected global power; they undermine the democratic values and the values of the West; they attain, to the extent that they can, some privileged influence over the nations that border them, particularly the ones who were in the former Soviet Union. And even in the Baltics I think they have that similar objective.

Mr. HICE. Okay. Of those type of things, what would you consider in—as far as their influence in that region, what troubles you most?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think there is—you know, the presence of their, again, disinformation campaign, some political provocation. You know, we see where they purchase social media or TV stations, et cetera.

And in a couple of the Baltic countries you have a Russian population that, obviously, they target their message to and can share, through language. It is a—you know, that population is harder to penetrate by the government itself in some cases. So it is a—you know, it is a population that is easier for Russia to influence. And, of course, they target that and take advantage of it.

Mr. HICE. What tools can we utilize to help aid our allies over there against Russian operations and cyber operations, that type of thing?

General SCAPARROTTI. Very close working relationship across our government, not simply in the military realm, but through the other forms of government in order to help them assess, respond to, and understand the environment, and also learn from them. Estonia Cyber Center is an excellent center. The Baltic nations, since we are talking about them in particular, you know, they have an understanding of Russia and that threat in ways that we do not. So we rely on them.

So it is a team effort here, and I think it works both ways, and that is the way we approach it.

Mr. HICE. Do you believe it is working well, those communication lines? Are you pleased?

General SCAPARROTTI. I am, yes.

Mr. HICE. Okay. How, then, along those lines, how does EUCOM work with other U.S. agencies to utilize a whole-of-government approach?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well——

Mr. HICE. Against Russia, in particular.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. Well, through—in all of our challenges in EUCOM we first approach it from a whole-of-government approach.

And just to set the stage, my civilian deputy is an experienced, you know, foreign diplomat. He just—was just last the U.S. ambassador to Italy, Phil Reeker, Ambassador Phil Reeker.

Mr. HICE. Right.

General SCAPARROTTI. So that tells you something right there. And he gives us a direct connection into the interagencies, and particularly State.
And then we have a number of interagency—Treasury, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]—we have a number of interagency persons that are a part of my staff that work day to day. So our counter-transnational threat cell, for instance, it is a lot more civilian workforce than it is anybody in a uniform, as an example. And that is how we pull them in and we make sure we have their expertise in this.

Mr. HICE. Very good. Well, thank you for all you do. And we appreciate it very much.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Halleran.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here today, thank you for your service to our country. I want to go back a little bit to the 2 percent issue in Europe.

I guess what I heard you say is that it is going to be—Russia, over the next 5 years, is going to eventually have some issues with continuing to fund their military. You had mentioned it is going to take us about 30 years to get where the plan wants to be. And I was wondering. Does 2 percent get our European allies to where they need to be? And what is the real number to get them to where they need to be?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, I have not looked at it in the—in, you know, in that depth, in terms of a real number. It would take an assessment of each and every country to do that. I would say that, you know, an investment at 2 percent will make a significant difference in these other—in the other nations.

And the way that we make sure that we have what we need is, within NATO, we do a capabilities assessment. We just completed this cycle. And then we determine what the requirements are in NATO to have an effective deterrence and defense in the Euro-Atlantic. And we assign each of the nations capability targets that they have to meet as a part of that 2 percent and 20 percent. And through that, we can provide the force in NATO that we need. We know that now. We just have to ensure that they make those investments and the capabilities that have been outlined.

If they want to invest in other areas in their military, that is fine, but they need to meet those capabilities first, that we have a synchronized and coherent force for the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. I thank you, General. The sustainability of that effort, though, as we saw in the last economic downturn here in the United States and around the world, plays a big role in that, I would imagine. I do not know if you have assessed to that level yet, but these economic cycles are something that is part of our history. They will occur again. And a lot of these countries were hit pretty hard during the last downturn.

So how much time is it going to take some of these countries to get up to speed at the 2 percent? I think you mentioned 15 are not there yet. How are we going to get—how are they going to get there?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think if you—you know, and this—I could respond to this in a written form in more detail.
But generally, you know, we have taken a look at—NATO has taken a look at the countries and, you know, there is a grouping of, say, five to seven that, given their financial plan at present and the—in some cases, if they are in EU, the standards that they have to meet with respect to debt, et cetera, they will have a very difficult time meeting the 2024 2 percent if they adhere to both EU and NATO requirements. So there is a group of countries that, with analysis, you know will have a more difficult time.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. The—one of the issues that came up was how we can address some of our issues with them and with their ability to impact citizens in other countries, how we can do it to them. And you mentioned something about—that we have an advantage because of people's representation of us as having a truthful media.

And here, internally, in the United States, we have this ongoing division over the media here. How is—how do we let people know over there that we are truthful, when within our country we are having this struggle on the truthfulness of the media?

General SCAPARROTTI. That is a difficult question to answer. I would say that this—the issue of truth in media is not just the United States. It is a global issue now. With the development of our social media and the internet, et cetera, we have lost what we once had when we had print media largely that had editors that had editorial standards, et cetera. There is much of this that has no discipline within it.

I think that is something that, internationally, we need to come to grips with and determine how we are going to begin to discipline that. And it is particularly important for democracies because of the role that, you know, truthful media and journalism plays in a vibrant democracy.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. Thank you, General, and I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. General, for being here. I have kind of a general question concerning Eastern Europe, if you will. And I do not expect a deep-dive answer, but you mentioned a team approach to nations in Europe. And from your perspective, what are the Eastern European nations, for example, wanting and needing from—say, if we go down the list of the DIME, right—what do they want diplomatically, militarily, information sharing, economically? What kind of things are they wanting? What can we provide? And I know that is a pretty broad question.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. And frankly, I need to probably focus most on the military aspect of that.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Sure.

General SCAPARROTTI. You know, the first thing is that they want a close partnership. I am speaking as a EUCOM commander now. They want a close partnership with the United States, because they recognize our leadership, they recognize our capabilities. They want to have a close partnership so they can also develop their capabilities.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Militarily and otherwise, or——

General SCAPARROTTI. Diplomatically, et cetera. I mean they are—those nations are great allies. They are small, but they are working very hard. And you will note that they are the ones that
are above 2 percent very quickly. So they are also investing in the capabilities that they believe they need to nest with ours. That is what we need to continue to do, and we need to continue to help them in that regard.

And I think also our presence there reinforces their population's confidence in the West, and their decision to be NATO members in some cases, or to align with the West, generally.

Dr. Wenstrup. Obviously, all those things intertwine with our success there, and when I talk about economics and things like that. And I have always had a concern of the dependency upon Russia for, say, natural gas, et cetera. And the stronger their economy is, the better our military relationship can be, et cetera, et cetera.

Are there things, from where you sit, that you feel like you are hampered if we only did more economically, like tried to alleviate some of that dependency on Russia in some way?

General Scaparrotti. Yes, I think we are working toward relieving some of the dependency on Russia. And I know those countries are, as well.

So, particularly in liquified natural gas, there is facilities being built that will allow us to transport that. And frankly, I think we should continue to do that. Because, as you know, Russia uses energy to coerce and compel at times. Thank you.

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I appreciate it, General. I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Khanna.

Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for your service. In discussing Ukraine, I think it is important to look at some of the historical context. When Secretary Baker met with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev there was a discussion about the expansion of NATO. Our country made no formal commitments to Gorbachev, as Putin claims, but Gorbachev recently did say that the spirit of the conversations very much suggested that we would not expand NATO.

And when Yanukovych came to power in Ukraine and wanted to do business with the European Union, the Russians asked the United States whether we would be okay with a tri-patriot economic agreement, where Europe would do business with Yanukovych and with Russia. The European Union rejected that.

Then, when Yanukovych was ousted, Yanukovych came to the United States and said, “Why don’t we call early elections and have a coalition,” it is unclear whether we worked diplomatically for that. We then supported the regime change against Yanukovych.

So I guess my first question in sort of three parts is do you think we made a strategic mistake by insisting that Ukraine join NATO? Do you believe we made a mistake by recognizing the coup against Yanukovych? And do you think we made a mistake by not having a tri-patriot agreement with Russia and Yanukovych on the economic agreement?

General Scaparrotti. Yes, I will be honest. I have not looked at that in enough detail in the specific instances that you pointed out to give you an answer here. If you would like, I will give you one as a written statement after the hearing here.

Mr. Khanna. I would appreciate that. More broadly—and this goes to your expertise—I mean, one of the things that has served
us really well in this Nation is the Monroe Doctrine made by John Quincy Adams. And we believe that no one should interfere in our region.

Assume for a second that Russia is acting in a similar strategic interest. Do you really believe, even if we have arms going to Ukraine of 50 million, 200 million, like the President wants, that we could ever out-compete the Russians in Ukraine? Would they not just increase their arms? Do they not have far more of a strategic interest to fight us than we do in Ukraine?

General Scaparrotti. If one looks at proximity, et cetera, that is an advantage for Russia, and it is an advantage militarily, as you suggest.

But what I go back to is that what we believe as a fundamental principle is that people have a right to determine their own government and how that government is led, whether it is a democracy, or what type of democracy it might be. And I think that is the principle we fundamentally support here.

Mr. KANNA. General, I agree with you. And John Quincy Adams had a very famous passage saying the United States supports the self-determination of people around the world, and we should extend our prayers and our hopes, but we should not be going out for monsters to destroy, because that is not in the United States strategic interest.

What do you think is our national security strategic interest? What is being served by putting more weapons in Ukraine? I mean how does that make the United States more secure? How does it make constituents in my district more secure?

General Scaparrotti. The United States is—has come to the assistance of a people and a nation that seeks to establish themselves with the West in a democratic way and make reforms to do that. And we have committed to that.

I think it is important the United States be seen as a good ally in that. And of course, where that takes us here in the future will be set against, you know, our vital interest in this country, as we move forward. But I think it is important that we support those who seek democratic values and ways in the world, as well. Otherwise, we forfeit that movement to others like Russia, who would like to undermine and establish a world order that is counter to our interest and, as we have seen in past history, typically leads to conflict.

Mr. KANNA. I respect your perspective. I would just say that no one disagrees that we should recognize self-determination and human rights. The question is just strategically, militarily, whether that is the most in our national interest.

My final question is do you really think being bogged down there—is Russia really our most strategic competitor, or is it China? And does putting resources here hurt our ability against China or against fighting the war on terrorism?

General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, I would just say I do not know that we are bogged down there. And I would remind you that we are also not fighting. They are fighting for their own sovereignty. We are providing capability, capacity building, and reform to their government.
Russia and China are both competitors. I particularly believe that, you know, in the shorter term here, Russia is an immediate threat at this point. They are a more consistent threat. And maybe in the longer term, China. But that is a debate that many will have. But I think we need to pay attention to both.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for being here.

I wonder if, first of all, if you have any thoughts or if you could explain at all why Macedonia is having such a hard time in their hopes of being admitted into NATO. And would you agree that, if they are admitted into NATO, they could be a somewhat important ally to the United States and our efforts?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, I would probably refer you to State on that, in terms of the detail of this. They are—they would like to seek a means to enter NATO. I have talked to their minister of defense about that. And I think it is a—you know, it is a matter, foremost, of being able to establish the ability to meet the MAP [Membership Action Plan], or the accession principles that you have within NATO to do that, and you know, being confident in showing that there is a confident means to do that.

Mr. BANKS. I appreciate that. My next question: as you know, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program has been a key nonproliferation enabler of EUCOM and the world for over 25 years. As part of your overall security cooperation efforts, CTR has been fundamental to greatly reducing the threat of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation.

However, we continue to see WMD proliferation threat grow through terrorist networks and state sponsors. Recent efforts in Moldova and Ukraine highlight the security challenges the European grey zone nations face.

So, with that, can you comment at all on the success of CTR? And maybe any CTR efforts that have been effective in your AOR [area of responsibility], or ways that we, as Congress, might change a program that is now 25 years old to confront the threats that we face in the future?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, I would like to take that for a response, as well to you. To get into the detail of how we might change it, you know, we addressed this and we work within NATO—or within EUCOM, with NATO, with our partners to counter proliferation of transnational threats. That cell that I noted before, the transnational threat cell, has that as one of its fundamental tasks.

I think we are having an effect. I think it is positive. But I think today, more so than ever, we probably need to be more focused on this because, you know, we have non-state actors today that now have the funding and the capability to attain some of these weapons systems, whereas before it was fundamentally a nation-state capability that was passing those. So terrorists, violent extremist organizations.

So I think it is important that we maintain this focus, and that we work, again, you know, with our partners and as an alliance, to do this.
Mr. BANKS. And my last question. In your written testimony you talked about the growing maritime threat in your AOR. And I wonder if you could maybe comment more extensively about that. With the resurgent Russia—maybe comment specifically related to the antisubmarine capabilities under your review.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. If you wanted detail on that, I would prefer to do that in a classified document, as well.

Just generally, the activity level of their maritime forces is up in Europe. They are active now, coming out of the high north in their northern fleet into the Mediterranean, for instance. That is—that has not been—while not alarming, it is not necessarily something they could not do, it is just not something they have normally done in, you know, say, recent history.

So they are deploying more, and they are deploying at a higher rate. The forces that they are deploying are being modernized, primarily with weapons systems. So, you know, most of their ships now, you know, have a Kalibr [cruise missile] system on them. It is both conventional and can be nuclear, if they choose to do so. It is a very good system, provides reach and precision. And, of course, wherever they have a ship, whether it is undersea or on the surface, many of their ships now have the Kalibr system on them.

Mr. BANKS. I appreciate that. Thanks for your leadership.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you very much for holding the line for us in Europe. I appreciate your service.

I served under General Jim Mattis, current Secretary of Defense, and our division motto at the time was “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy.” And I often found that it was the first half of that that was sometimes harder to maintain. People understood the Marines were a tough enemy. But they were not always sure if they could trust us.

How do you make our Eastern European allies trust us in the fight against Russia when we are not really willing to stand up to Russia right here at home? This is a consistent theme that I have heard as I traveled around the globe, is that a lot of our allies right now are just not sure whether they can trust America. So give us a window into how you fight this fight on the day-to-day in Europe.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, first of all, I will tell you I do not see that issue, particularly in the East within NATO, in terms of their—any distrust.

The first way that I do it is look at what we are doing. We have—we are rotating an——

Mr. MOULTON. So you do not think that when the President comes out against NATO and says that we might not even be a part of NATO, maybe should not even be a part of NATO, that does not contribute to any distrust?

General SCAPARROTTI. The President has stated support for Article 5 and full support for NATO. And in this time we have deployed a lot of force in this past year to Europe on behalf of NATO.

So, you know, I—what I am trying to say is that, you know, what I point to is what we are doing. EDI, which Congress has budgeted, for instance, is a substantial investment. And——
Mr. Moulton. Well, let's——

General Scaparrotti. And our allies recognize that.

Mr. Moulton. So, General, let's talk about that for a second. The EDI—and we have—I have witnessed this in Eastern Europe myself—seems to be very heavily focused on conventional forces, which is not the way that Russia is attacking us. I mean Russia is attacking our Eastern European allies through the internet, through partisans, by undermining their political process, by sowing disinformation, as you earlier described.

It does not seem like our effort is calibrated to really meet that threat at all. It certainly was not when I visited there in 2015, and I know that we on the committee have tried to make some modifications. I am not sure that we have gone far enough. What could we do to improve our ability to stand up to the type of warfare that Russia is actually exercising today?

General Scaparrotti. First of all, sir, I would say that, you know, we need to have all of that. So we do need that conventional capability in place, as a deterrent. And it is an absolute signal to them of our commitment to Article 5 and our commitment to NATO and them, as partners.

Many of the things that we are doing is what we need to continue to do. We are providing those nations, particularly in the East, with direct military information support, coupled with our embassies working with them, as well. The nations themselves work with us closely, in terms of their public affairs messaging, et cetera. That is all a part of this. And EDI does fund some of the information operations that I do in EUCOM, as well.

Mr. Moulton. What percentage of the budget for EDI goes to those types of activities?

General Scaparrotti. A very small part of that. I can give it to you if I sit down and figure it out. But it is a small part of that. I would first say, though, that, you know, information operations is not that expensive.

Mr. Moulton. What percentage of the attacks that you see, whether they be hybrid-type attacks, the disinformation campaigns, the attacks from Russia, what percentage are these hybrid types of attacks versus conventional attacks?

General Scaparrotti. Well, we do not—you know, in terms of attacks within NATO, I mean, most of this activity is below the level of conflict.

Mr. Moulton. Right.

General Scaparrotti. There are——

Mr. Moulton. I mean they are not rolling any tanks into Eastern Europe.

General Scaparrotti. Well, no. And—but they did annex, you know, portions of the Ukraine, for instance, and Georgia in 2008. But you are correct. I mean today's activity is purposely below the level of conflict on the Russians' part.

Mr. Moulton. Are there other things that we should be doing on the committee to better meet this threat? It sounds to me like we could better apportion the budget. Are there other things that we should reinforce, or ways that we could give more confidence to our allies that we will help them stand up to this, to this serious threat?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. Well, you know, I would applaud Members of Congress for their trips to Europe, for instance, and to see our allies, like the one you took in 2015. Those visits and open discussion with them is very important, and is a direct demonstration of the United States interest in, you know, in their security. So I would encourage those, as well.

Secondly, continue to do what you are doing today, and that is to have a good assessment of our security needs and what should be funded and how you fund them. This budget has been very important to enabling me to do what I do with our allies and the security of the Euro-Atlantic. You need to continue that.

Towards the budgeting, I would say this again. Information operations is not overly expensive, when compared to, for instance, conventional force structure, rotational forces, et cetera. And, for my part, my request through EDI is structured on what I believe we most need for deterrence today. And so I take into account—is at least my portion of this, as I put it forward to DOD, the percentages of what is required and best used for a coherent defense. And I take that deliberately as I present this—my portion of that budget to Department of Defense.

Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. Garamendi. General, thank you very much for yesterday's discussion, as well as today's. My apologies for not being here. There is another general at the Army Corps of Engineers that—to whom I had to give some attention this morning.

The EDI fund, should that be part of the base? Or should it continue to be in OCO?

General Scaparrotti. I have said I think eventually it should go to the base in order to get us into the base as a fundamental part of our security. And, as I stated earlier, I would just like to ensure that it is protected, you know. Congress has set this aside as EDI, you know, specifically for specific objectives to be attained and, as we go into the budget, to protect that clarity.

Mr. Garamendi. So either way, you need EDI specifically for the work you are doing in Eastern Europe.

General Scaparrotti. We do, absolutely. I need it because I do not have the force posture I need—that I believe I need, and it is going to take EDI to build that or that funding within the budget to do so.

Mr. Garamendi. I just want to make it clear we are going to be dealing with this in the next couple of months, and we talked about it a little yesterday. It seems to me that we want to keep it separate, at least that word you used, “eventually.” And I will just let that hang out there. But at least for the near term, I would think we need EDI and OCO separate and available to you to carry out—which, incidentally, in a tour of the Eastern European countries in the summer, you and your troops are doing an extraordinary job.

General Scaparrotti. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi. And the heel-to-toe makes a lot of sense, I think, in the near term, as you have said in your testimony.
A couple of other things. LNG [liquefied natural gas], which was mentioned, it is a tool—well, gas is a tool used by Russia for economic, political purposes. We are exporting gas here in the United States. It seems to me that something we ought to consider is the strategic tool to deter Russia. And it would be in our interests to subsidize natural gas, LNG, to Europe as a way of deterring Russia and pushing back in the most meaningful of ways—that is, their economy.

I suspect we ought to do a little economic equation here and see what it would cost to provide LNG to Europe at a cost similar to what Russia is providing gas. It could give us significant leverage.

With one final question and—do you need a new low-yield nuclear weapon to deter Russia?

General Scaparrotti. Sir, in regards to the Nuclear Posture Review, the supplemental weapons systems that are a part of that are required. What it does is it ensures that we can be confident in a response across any scenario that might be projected. So I do believe we need those systems.

Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will yield back. Thank you very much.

General Scaparrotti. Thank you.

The Chairman. General, you have answered lots of questions about hybrid information, political warfare. Part of the reason is I think we all are challenged by thinking of warfare in non-traditional ways, and the role of the military in doing that.

You answered a number of questions about EDI, and I think that conversation was very interesting.

I just wanted to ask, to Mr. Garamendi’s last question on nuclear deterrent, can you step back from particular weapons systems and talk more generally about the value of having a credible nuclear deterrent with an adversary who openly talks about using nuclear to counter conventional, about escalating to de-escalate, a—in a region where a lot of allies depend on our nuclear deterrent for their security?

And one of my concerns is most—many of us thought that we did not have to worry about that stuff any more, and a lot of the—not only the weapons and the delivery systems, but the thinking atrophied after the fall of the Soviet Union. We have to pay more attention to it now.

And so can you just, in a broader sense, talk about the role that a credible nuclear deterrent plays in what you are having—what you are trying to do every day?

General Scaparrotti. Well, if I could, I will just focus on—you know, as you step back and look at a credible deterrent, and the importance of having one that—a credible deterrent that they understand is responsive across the spectrum, when you look at escalation management, you talked about, you know, the Russian comment that they will escalate to de-escalate, or escalate to dominate. This is a—you know, it is a cognitive exercise. It is an influence on the decision maker, on Putin on the other side.

A credible nuclear capacity, a credible one, and our will to use it, if necessary, for the extreme case, known by the adversary, is paramount here—and then across the spectrum.
You know, I think their escalate to de-escalate comments were centered on a capability at a low end to perhaps gain leverage. And what we are saying through the NPR is you won't have that leverage. We are going to drive this back to a higher threshold. And he can be confident in that, as we enter—if we would enter any kind of an escalation at all.

So that is why it is important, because it is the mental approach to this to begin with.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would just say, from my standpoint, we talked yesterday, I guess, about deterrence when it comes to space. We talk about deterrence when it comes to cyber. One of the challenges, I think, for all of us is to reinvigorate our deterrence thinking and intellectual—because, as you said, deterrence is in the mind of the adversary, and whatever domain we are talking about. And I think we have got some making up to do, maybe, there.

Unless you have something else, I am good.

Thank you, sir, for answering our questions. And the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 15, 2018
Statement of Chairman William M. “Mac” Thornberry
House Armed Services Committee Hearing:
“Security Challenges in Europe and Posture for Inter-State
Competition with Russia”
March 15, 2018

The Committee welcomes General Scaparrotti back today to testify on the
threats and posture in the European Command’s area of responsibility. There he
faces the full range of security challenges, from Russia’s constant modernization of
its nuclear weapons and delivery systems to the hybrid and political warfare it
wages against the U.S. and others. Its tactics extend, as we have been reminded
this week, to targeted assassination.

I think that it is clear that the U.S. has neglected both ends of the warfare
spectrum in recent years and much in between. But the recent budget agreement
and the new National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review give us the
chance to begin to do better.

We must do better across-the-board. It is not enough to advocate for a more
robust cyber response to Russia’s attempts to meddle in our elections but waiver on
our response to their renewed nuclear or territorial ambitions. Likewise, we cannot
build up our missile defenses and nuclear deterrent but leave significant cyber
intrusions unanswered.

It is essential, in my view, that we face all of these challenges with clear-
eyed objectivity and not allow domestic politics to color our view or affect our
actions. The United States and our allies and our interests are threatened by the
full range of Russian capability and by its increasing belligerence. Our job is to
address them in the military sphere in order to protect our nation’s security,
nothing more or less.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. General Scaparrotti, welcome. I look forward to your insights on the security challenges in Europe and how we can confront the threat that Russian activities in the region present.

As I’ve expressed in our series of posture hearings, I’m particularly interested in how we can enhance cooperation with our partners and allies to best posture our forces to address security challenges. Per the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, strengthening and expanding our relationships with our partners and allies in Europe is an essential component of our effort to achieve the strategy’s objectives.

The Russian Federation’s influence operations aimed at undermining Western democracies have not abated. In fact, Russia’s destabilizing actions are ever more apparent. As our senior intelligence officials have said, Russia interfered with the 2016 U.S. elections and has every intention of doing so again in our 2018 midterm elections, after its perceived success two years ago.

Russian interference is not limited to the United States. The Russian Federation is also actively operating to influence European politics. As part of his campaign to undermine democratic values and render the world safe for autocratic dictatorships, President Putin has intervened in a long list of countries’ political processes ranging from Britain, France, and Germany, to Bulgaria and Montenegro.

To confront this challenge, it is absolutely essential that we work hand-in-glove with our European partners and allies, particularly as Russia seeks to undermine our shared democratic values and the rules-based international order. To succeed against our common security challenges in Europe, we must be committed to maintaining close cooperation with, and support to, organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and respond collectively to Russian aggression. This is a commitment that must be reinforced at all levels of our government.

Further, Russia continues its illegal occupation of Crimea, exacerbating conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, and stymying progress toward full implementation of the Minsk agreements. I was very pleased to see the announcement that the State Department has approved a $47 million Foreign Military Sale of Javelin Missiles and Javelin Command Launch Units to Ukraine. I have been a strong proponent of lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine for years and have pushed for the inclusion and renewal of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative in the annual NDAA from the start.
In addition, it’s important to note that transatlantic security is a shared commitment. It is very positive to see the increasing number of NATO member states that have taken on additional budgetary commitments to align their spending with the agreed target of two percent of GDP for defense. Calls for NATO members to meet this goal are not new, and were incorporated as a pledge in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration. Forward-looking defense investments will enhance each NATO country’s security as well as our ability to provide a strong collective defense.

It is also imperative that the United States continues to make necessary investments to deter Russian aggression and, together with its allies and partners, works to align the defensive posture accordingly. NATO deterrence measures include several multinational enhanced forward presence (eFP) battalions in the Baltic countries and a U.S.-led eFP battalion in Poland.

Further, in the FY2018 NDAA, Congress authorized $4.6 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), and the administration has requested $6.3 billion in EDI funding for FY2019.

As we look to the future, it is important that we strike the proper balance regarding force presence, combined exercises, prepositioned hardware, infrastructure, and the building of partner capacity. In particular, it would be helpful to understand how we might optimize forward deployments of U.S. forces to deter Russia without undermining strategic stability. It seems clear that there is strategic value in maintaining a perpetually forward U.S. presence to bolster conventional deterrence, but do we have the balance right? While heel-to-toe rotational forces may satisfy EUCOM’s requirements, would permanent forces provide greater deterrent value, facilitate closer cooperation with partner countries, or yield commanders additional time and space for rapid response needs?

Russia’s apparent doctrine of “escalate-to-deescalate” and continuing violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty demand a strong, credible U.S. presence in, and commitment to, Europe and ensuring unity within the NATO alliance. Further, implementing effective sanctions targeted at Russian arms control violation represent an additional tool to help press Russia back into compliance. Maintaining strategic stability also means reducing the risk of miscalculation that could precipitate a nuclear war. Engaging in military-to-military dialogue and senior-level political dialogue with Russia on key measures to avoid an unintentional escalation in a crisis, and finding common ground on reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, benefit both U.S. and Russian security. The Cold War taught us that security cooperation is possible and even necessary in the midst of confrontation.

The security challenges in Europe remain complex. Our allies and partners continue to face homegrown terrorist threats and threats from the potential return of foreign fighters. Those threats are often closely linked to instability in North Africa and the Middle East, and it is important that we continue to work with our allies and partners to combat ISIL on those fronts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving the General’s testimony.
STATEMENT OF

GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, UNITED STATES ARMY

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

March 15, 2018
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you as the Commander of the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It is an honor to represent the more than 60,000 men and women who are forward-deployed supporting our USEUCOM mission. Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilian workforce continue to demonstrate selfless service and dedication in an increasingly contested and complex security environment, both in Europe and around the globe. We greatly appreciate the continued support of this committee.

The Trans-Atlantic alliance is a keystone of our national security. USEUCOM, fully aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), supports each of the President’s four National Security Strategy (NSS) objectives by strengthening and safeguarding this alliance. Europe provides essential strategic access in support of U.S. global operations to protect the homeland and the ability to pursue potential threats to their source. As our most significant trading partner, Europe is vital to promoting American prosperity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enables us to preserve peace through strength as alliance unity fundamentally deters the aggression of potential adversaries. With shared history and values, Europe is also a critical partner in advancing American influence throughout the world.

There are real threats, however, to U.S. interests in Europe and to Israel (which also falls within the USEUCOM area of responsibility). These threats are trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. Additionally, the speed, complexity, and breadth of new threats and challenges are increasing.

USEUCOM continues to adjust to this dynamic strategic environment, aggressively adapting our thinking and approaches to meet our assigned missions. In doing so, the Command’s focus has shifted from engagement and assurance to deterrence and defense. USEUCOM has adapted its plans, posture, activities, and strategic communications to shape
the operational environment and prepare forces to respond to crisis at speed. In all these efforts, we are guided by Secretary Mattis’s direction to sharpen our military edge, expand the competitive space with Russia, and provide a combat-credible military force to deter war and protect the security of our Nation.

Our adaptation to the new European security environment has made significant progress thanks to the resourcing provided by Congress, particularly under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). USEUCOM deeply appreciates Congress’ support for EDI, which remains crucial to preserving peace and stability in Europe. We have accomplished much, but we have much work to do to support an increasingly lethal, agile, and resilient Joint Force in long-term, strategic competition with Russia and in combat with violent extremist organizations.

USEUCOM STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Russia

Russia continues to destabilize regional security and disregard international norms, which have preserved the peace in Europe since 1945. Russia seeks to change the international order, fracture NATO, and undermine U.S. leadership in order to protect its regime, re-assert dominance over its neighbors, and achieve greater influence around the globe. To achieve these ends, the Kremlin is prepared to employ the full spectrum of Russia’s power, to include forcefully using its increasingly capable military. Russia has demonstrated its willingness and capability to intervene in countries along its periphery and to project power – especially in the Middle East. Additionally, Russia aggressively uses social media and other means of mass communication to push disinformation, test the resolve of the United States, and erode our credibility with European partners.

The Russian military is improving and modernizing its capabilities, enhancing its ability to be a more agile force capable of executing operations across the entire spectrum of modern
warfare. Moscow’s strategic armament program has led to increased defense spending with an estimated investment of $285 billion in modernization from 2011 through 2020. Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and to develop and deploy long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons systems. In the Baltic and Black Sea regions, and in the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia is expanding its anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities threatening freedom of movement to our land forces, our ships, and our aircraft. In the maritime domain, Russia is making rapid progress with its new Severodvinsk nuclear attack submarine, more capable Kilo submarines, and Kalibr cruise missiles. Russia continues to hold snap exercises and to limit transparency of planned exercises. Additionally, Russia continues to intercept our routine reconnaissance flight operations over the Baltic and Black Seas, flying dangerously close to our aircraft and occasionally causing unsafe conditions for our pilots operating in international airspace.

Along with military modernization, Russia is advancing its indirect and asymmetric capabilities in accordance with its concept of warfare, which envisions the coordinated use of military and non-military elements of national power to shape the strategic environment. Throughout Europe, Russia exercises malign influence to disrupt and attempt to fracture NATO, undermine trans-Atlantic cohesion, and erode democratic foundations. Russia interferes in the electoral process across numerous states, including supporting a plan to violently disrupt elections in Montenegro, the newest member of NATO. Russia works to influence the geopolitical environment through the use of key acquisitions, proxies, and other agents of influence. Using indirect action, particularly against countries along its periphery, Russia seeks to use information operations and cyberspace operations to manipulate and influence the information domain and to shape a narrative of its choosing.

Russia’s strategy of malign influence also includes prolonging unresolved conflicts across Europe and Eurasia. In Ukraine, Russia continues to train and equip proxy forces in the east and refuses to implement its commitments to the Minsk Agreements. As part of Russia’s
effort to destabilize Ukraine, the Russian military launched the destructive and costly NotPetya cyber-attack in June 2017. Russia maintains its presence in Moldova, preventing a resolution of the conflict in Transnistria. Russia stations roughly 5,000 troops in Armenia and sells weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan despite ongoing tensions over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In Georgia, Russia maintains 7,000 troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and has recognized both regions as independent states with military, economic, and social linkages to the Russian Federation, despite the fact that Georgia, supported by the international community, has opposed this recognition. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia uses relationships with the leadership of Republika Srpska to undermine the state institutions established by the Dayton Accords.

The threat from Russia is not limited to the European theater but extends all along its periphery and beyond. Russia is exerting its influence in the Middle East, where its intervention in the Syrian civil war bolstered the Assad regime, enabling the expansion of Iranian influence across the Levant. Russia is also increasing aid to Middle-East states, deepening collaboration with Iran, and extending its influence in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, and Cyprus. These efforts are changing regional dynamics, adversely affecting Israeli’s security, stability in Lebanon, and other U.S. interests in the region.

In the Arctic, Russia is revitalizing its northern fleet and building or renovating military bases along their Arctic coast line in anticipation of increased military and commercial activity. Russia also intends to assert sovereignty over the Northern Sea route in violation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although the chances of military conflict in the Arctic are low in the near-term, Russia is increasing its qualitative advantage in Arctic operations, and its military bases will serve to reinforce Russia’s position with the threat of force.

Our highest strategic priority as a Combatant Command is to deter Russia from engaging in further aggression and exercising malign influence over our allies and partners.
accordance with the NDS, and thanks to Congressional support, we are working to create a combat-credible posture in Europe that will underpin our deterrence. We are updating our operational plans to provide military response options to defend our European allies against Russian aggression. Finally, we are increasing our efforts to counter Russia’s malign influence in Europe and compete below the level of armed conflict. This includes supporting the Russian Information Group (RIG), an interagency effort to counter Russia’s propaganda and misinformation campaigns.

To effectively expand our competitive space with Russia we must have a whole of government approach that employs all elements of our national power. Visible political, economic, and military commitments are critical in deterring Moscow while reassuring allies. Continued Congressional support is essential to our Nation’s ability to successfully compete with Russia over the long-term, shore up the international order, and preserve European security.

Violent Extremist Organizations and Terrorism

Violent extremists remain a significant threat to our allies and partners throughout the Euro-Atlantic. Decentralized transregional terrorist organizations thrive in the security vacuums of failed states. Additionally, violent extremists continue to pose a threat to U.S. personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure in Europe and around the globe.

As coalition actions recover ISIS-seized territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS remains active and seeks to expand its operations across Europe. ISIS operatives and sympathizers are targeting European citizens for radicalization and recruitment. In cyberspace, ISIS reaches across geographic boundaries to entice new followers, direct acts of terrorism, and spread their extremist ideology.

USEUCOM works directly with our European partners and our Combatant Command counterparts to identify and counter threats to the U.S. and U.S. interests. USEUCOM provides
forces for military operations against ISIS, such as Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), in the Middle East. In addition, we continue to increase information and intelligence-sharing among U.S. agencies, international partners, and the private commercial sector. We also continue to pursue radicals in the digital domain where they are able to hide and recruit others. These efforts help close the seams exploited by terrorist networks and link global counterterrorism efforts to reduce the Homeland’s vulnerability to terrorism emanating from Europe and to reduce the terrorist threat to our allies.

Coordination among NATO, partner nations, and international organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL is central to defeating VEOs. For example, information sharing and coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has assisted investigations in more than 80 countries to date. Our EU, NATO, and USEUCOM-shared Tri-nodal Community of Action targets existing VEO networks and facilitates expanded intelligence and law enforcement information-sharing.

European allies provide essential strategic access for U.S., allied, and coalition counter-terrorism operations in the AFRICOM and CENTCOM Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The U.S. depends on countries in the USEUCOM AOR to grant overflight and use of host-nation facilities in countries where we do not have permanent basing. U.S. facilities in the USEUCOM AOR are not sovereign U.S. territory, and therefore basing and access permissions to conduct operations from these facilities are subject to limitations in bilateral agreements with host-nations. In addition to providing critical strategic access, European allies deploy forces worldwide to support U.S.-led counter-terrorism operations, including OIR and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), as well as to conduct national counter-terrorism missions. Allies are committed to this fight, and their support is essential to our ongoing counter-terrorism efforts.

Deterring Russia and defeating violent extremist organizations constitute USEUCOM’s two main priorities. Supporting these main efforts, within the NATO alliance and throughout the
AOR, we are working to strengthen strategic relationships, bolster regional security, and reinforce a free and open international order.

NATO

NATO allies are adapting to new strategic realities, recognizing their need to remain fit for purpose. They are making significant gains in meeting their security commitments and implementing decisions made at the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw Summits. Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have joined the United States, Greece, Poland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom in meeting NATO’s 2% defense spending target, and by 2024, 15 allies are expected to reach or exceed the 2% guideline. Additionally, in 2018, 22 NATO members will meet the 20% target for defense expenditures devoted to investment in major equipment and related research and development. We have now seen three consecutive years of growth among European allies and Canada, adding approximately $46 billion (USD) to defense.

Another aspect of burden sharing is contributions to operations, missions, and other activities. Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom serve as Framework Nations for NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia respectively. The United Kingdom, Romania, and Croatia contribute forces to the U.S.-led eFP battle group in Poland, and Italy is the Framework Nation for the 2018 NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force brigade. Allies are committing personnel to fill gaps in the Resolute Support Mission and Kosovo Forces (KFOR). Nations are also adding capabilities and skills in cyber, joint effects, and asymmetric action to remain relevant to the changing character of warfare in the new strategic environment. Allies are also working together to ensure the credibility and readiness of our nuclear deterrent, which requires continued commitment and investment.

Given the realities of this strategic environment, the alliance has undertaken a NATO Command Structure Adaptation (NCS-A) effort. The new NCS design will account for the complexity stemming from the interrelation of crises and threats, the emergence of new warfare
domains, the speed and breadth of combat action, and the requirements for the timely fusion of information and decision-making from the tactical to strategic levels. Proposed changes include increased manpower at command headquarters for situational awareness, planning, and targeting capabilities, a third Joint Force Command focused on the Atlantic maritime space, and a Joint Support and Enabling Command to facilitate multi-directional force maneuver and support in conflict. Combined, the proposed organizations, enablers, and processes will improve the capability and capacity of the Alliance for vigilance in peace, responsiveness in crisis, and strategic depth in a large-scale, multi-domain conflict.

USEUCOM is supporting NATO’s augmentations in deterrence and defense forces. Since April 2017, USEUCOM’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR), based in Vilseck, Germany, and has fulfilled the U.S. commitment as the Framework Nation for the NATO eFP battle group in Poland. 2CR will hand off the eFP mission in September 2018 to the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Tennessee Army National Guard. In the fall of 2017, USEUCOM’s 493 Fighter Squadron deployed to Lithuania to conduct the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission. In addition to operational deployments, we are contributing to NATO defense and operational planning in such areas as NATO operational fires, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), and hand-over/take-over between U.S. and NATO headquarters. Finally, USEUCOM support to the NATO exercise program includes leading the planning for U.S. participation in the TRIDENT JUNCTURE 18 exercise in Norway scheduled for late October 2018. Approximately 30,000 U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel are expected to participate in TRIDENT JUNCTURE 18.

With the close support of other Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Missile Defense Agency, USEUCOM and its Service components are augmenting NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense. The implementation of European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 will increase NATO’s strategic depth. Recent multi-national deployments in support of Operation ACTIVE FENCE in Turkey, and
NATO’s ongoing development of complementary BMD capabilities demonstrate clear progress on a combined IAMD architecture.

To enhance freedom of movement in the European theater, USEUCOM has formulated a military mobility strategy that will enable US and Allied forces to respond to crises at speed. We have leveraged Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) rotations to refine our understanding of the requirements and timelines for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) of forces deploying into the theater. Through bilateral and multilateral key leader engagements, we have encouraged our European allies to address policies and procedures that impede freedom of movement.

USEUCOM complements its support to NATO with bilateral partnership and capacity building efforts with allies and partners. In FY17, USEUCOM conducted over 2,500 military-to-military engagements, including over 700 State Partnership Program events in 22 countries, and under Section 1251 authority, USEUCOM trained nine allies in 22 exercises. These activities directly support ongoing U.S. and NATO operations, increase interoperability, promote partner nation integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, and foster relationships that enhance U.S. strategic access. Our partnership focus helps allies and partners in Eastern and Southern Europe meet emerging security challenges. For example, along with British and German counterparts, USEUCOM implements the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) initiative, which synchronizes the contributions of more than a dozen NATO allies in the Baltic states and Poland across the joint, land, air and maritime domains. Additionally, with approximately $35M of FY17 Section 333 support and $18M in FY15 State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) support, USEUCOM is launching the Georgia Defense Readiness Program this spring. The program will augment Georgia’s military readiness and ability to support both national and NATO missions. Through these and other activities, USEUCOM helps to ensure that NATO hones its operational edge that allies meet defense obligations, and that partners are equipped to defend their sovereign territory.
Ukraine

USEUCOM continues its strong support of Ukraine's efforts to build its defense capacity to defend itself from Russian aggression. Following the occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of eastern Ukraine, Russia has done little to nothing to implement the commitments it made in the Minsk agreements. Russia remains satisfied with the status quo in the hope that its multifaceted effort to destabilize Ukraine will eventually succeed so that Russia can reassert its sphere of influence. Russia continues to foment the conflict in eastern Donbas, where it arms, trains, leads, and fights alongside Russian-led forces. In Crimea, Russia has increased its post-annexation military posture, forming a new Army Corps with reconnaissance and coastal defense forces and increasing capabilities.

Despite Russia's destabilizing actions, Ukraine is making progress toward its goal to achieve NATO interoperability, but much remains to be done. USEUCOM, working with DOD and the interagency, supports Ukraine's development of capable, accountable, and transparent institutions. The Ukrainian government recognizes its need to develop a capable, sustainable, professional defense force interoperable with Euro-Atlantic military structures. Ukraine's defense reforms will improve its ability to deter and defend against Russian aggression. The Multinational Joint Commission (MJC) for Defense Reform and Security Cooperation in Ukraine is the primary vehicle for U.S. and allied security assistance. The MJC meets semiannually with representatives from Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Canada, Lithuania, Poland, and the U.S. to identify Ukrainian requirements and prioritize training, equipment, and advisory initiatives.

USEUCOM support to Ukraine falls into three broad areas. First, we lead the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) program to train Ukrainian forces. Under U.S. Army Europe and Special Operations Command Europe, the JMTG-U provides individual and collective training to conventional battalions and special operations units within Ukraine's Armed Forces. JMTG-U also supervises train-the-trainer efforts, which will allow Ukraine to assume full
Second, USEUCOM provides recommendations on the utilization of security assistance funds to support Ukraine’s self-defense capacity. Since 2014, the United States has provided over $850 million in security assistance to Ukraine through Department of State and Defense authorities. These funds have provided counter-battery radar support, medical assistance, communications, command and control, HMMWVs, night vision devices, and training and advising assistance. The President recently decided to provide enhanced defensive capabilities to Ukraine, as part of the US effort to help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity, to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to deter further aggression. Third, USEUCOM supports broader Presidential and Ministerial-level reform activity directed at Ukraine's defense institutions.

Balkans

In the Balkans, our command directly supports U.S. efforts to promote regional stability. USEUCOM is assisting the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) with implementing its Security Sector Review transformation recommendations. Security cooperation activities include developing English language capability, leadership training, equipment to support the KSF core competencies in search and rescue, explosive ordinance disposal and demining, hazardous material response, and fire-fighting.

USEUCOM also continues to support the U.S. contribution of approximately 600 personnel to Kosovo Forces (KFOR). In accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, KFOR’s mission is to contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement throughout Kosovo for citizens of all ethnicities, as well as for NATO and EU personnel. KFOR helps ensure conditions remain conducive for continued EU-facilitated dialogue to normalize relations between Pristina and Belgrade, while Serbia sees KFOR as a way to ensure the security of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. As a nonpartisan,
professional presence, KFOR is essential to the security and stability of Kosovo and the greater region.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, our security cooperation activities focus on assisting the Bosnian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces meet NATO standards and interoperability goals, while supporting their aspirations to join the Alliance. Troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina already support NATO operations, such as the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

EUCOM works closely with interagency partners such as the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, and State to facilitate and enhance support for democratic institutions and processes in the Balkans and to counter malign influence. Balkan nations view the United States as a major supporter of their efforts to develop institutions and processes that promote the rule of law and strengthen governmental systems.

Russia is exerting its influence in the Balkans to prevent individual nations from progressing on a Euro-Atlantic path. We must assist our NATO Allies in the region as they seek to increase their resiliency in the face of Russian malign influence. We must also support our non-NATO partners as they pursue a brighter future as part of the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.

Turkey

Turkey is a strategic ally for the U.S. and NATO, a proven enabler for combat operations, and a pivotal player in our long-term competition for a favorable balance of power. USEUCOM actively participates in several ongoing efforts to explore strategic issues and find bi-lateral solutions mutually supporting U.S. and Turkish interests. Through increased intelligence sharing, continued counter-terrorism coordination, and regular military-to-military dialogue, USEUCOM is committed to strengthening the trust between the U.S. and Turkey.
Situated within Europe’s strategic southeastern security zone, Turkey is a key stakeholder of regional security, stability, and access. Turkey provides the United States with proven logistical support, as demonstrated in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and now INHERENT RESOLVE. Turkey also supports Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE and NATO activities in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, while securing one of the region’s most important sea lines of communication through the Turkish Straits.

A major customer of our defense technology, Turkey has 334 open foreign military sales (FMS) cases, valued at over $9.9B. These sales are important components of the broad U.S.-NATO effort to ensure interoperability of equipment and combined training in Western tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Turkey’s geographic location also puts it at the crossroads of the theater’s two primary security challenges—Russian subversion and the terrorist threat from ISIS. With instability along its southern border and more than 3 million Syrian refugees within its borders, Turkey has been affected by the Syrian war more than any other NATO country. Meanwhile, Russia benefits from political disputes between Turkey and NATO allies that it can exploit to undermine trust and unity. In alignment with the National Defense Strategy’s direction to fortify the Trans-Atlantic alliance, USEUCOM will safeguard and strengthen the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Israel

The United States’ commitment to the security of Israel is unwavering. Our ongoing support and commitment to Israel is focused on enhanced mil-to-mil cooperation to ensure our Israeli partners maintain a qualitative military edge. Israel continues to be the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, and in September 2016, the United States and Israel signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that provides $3.8B a year in military assistance over the FY2019 – FY2028 period. As the executor of the U.S.-Israel military-to-military relationship, USEUCOM maintains a robust series of senior leader engagements, constant coordination, and
multiple joint exercises. This bond has assumed greater significance as the regional security environment has become increasingly volatile and complex.

THE WAY AHEAD

USEUCOM is determined to address the diverse challenges in the European theater by capitalizing on our strengths, building new capabilities, and leveraging relationships with European allies and partners. We are working to optimize the force posture of land, air, maritime, and cyberspace units. We are enhancing the resiliency and redundancy of our infrastructure network to enable reliable and flexible response options. We are improving cyberspace security and operations through joint defense activities with allies and partners. However, we cannot accomplish our assigned missions without the continued support of Congress. The resources requested in DOD’s FY 2018 and FY 2019 Budget requests are needed to implement the National Defense Strategy, especially to deter, defend, and expand our competitive space with Russia.

Deterring adversaries is contingent on U.S. forces retaining a decisive edge in combat capabilities, agility and flexibility, on our ability to respond rapidly in a crisis, and on U.S. presence as a constant reminder of the costs of aggression and miscalculation. U.S. force posture in Europe has been augmented by increased rotational presence, enhanced pre-positioning of equipment, and military infrastructure improvements. Posturing a combat-credible force in Europe as called for in the NDS is essential to deterring future aggressors, preserving stability, and reassuring allies and partners. A combat-credible force includes a combination of assigned and rotational combat forces, flexible basing options, and pre-positioned equipment in the theater.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)

USEUCOM’s preparedness and agility to respond amidst the uncertainty posed by the current strategic environment is contingent upon adequate and predictable resourcing. The European Deterrence Initiative provides resources that are essential to deterring Russian aggression while assuring European allies of the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5. These resources, in addition to the base budget funding that supports USEUCOM, enable our headquarters and Service components to: 1) increase presence through the use of rotational forces; 2) increase the depth and breadth of exercises and training with NATO allies and theater partners; 3) preposition supplies and equipment to facilitate rapid reinforcement of U.S. and allied forces; 4) improve infrastructure at key locations to improve our ability to support steady state and contingency operations; and 5) build the capacity of allies and partners to contribute to their own deterrence and defense.

EDI-funded land forces capabilities are resourcing USEUCOM’s requirement for an ABCT presence along with a Division Mission Command Element and combat support and service support enablers. Coupled with CAB rotations, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) enhancements, ISR initiatives, and eFP support, this increased in-theater presence across Eastern Europe has fundamentally improved our readiness and posture.

In the air domain, we leverage EDI to deploy theater security packages of bombers as well as 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft to execute deterrence missions and train with ally and partner nation air forces. We are building prepositioned kits for the Air Force’s European Contingency Air Operation Sets (ECAOS) and making improvements to existing Allied airfield infrastructure, which will afford us the ability to rapidly respond with air power in the event of a contingency.

In the maritime domain, we are expanding our theater antisubmarine warfare capabilities both by improving our sensor capabilities as well as increasing our capability to surge P-8
antisubmarine assets to critical areas. Additionally, EDI dollars help fund USEUCOM’s mission partner environment, which successfully linked into NATO’s federated mission network during exercise STEADFAST COBALT last year. This was a significant step in improving interoperability with NATO.

Finally, EDI supports mil-to-mil engagements and exercises that improve interoperability and build partner capacity. Joint exercise SABER GUARDIAN 17, a U.S Army Europe led event in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria focused on building readiness and improving interoperability under a unified command and control framework. In total, nearly 25,000 U.S., Ally, and partner nation personnel from 21 European countries demonstrated the ability to execute the full range of military missions in the Black Sea Region.

To retain our competitive edge and build on the progress made over the last few years since the implementation of the European Reassurance Initiative and EDI, we continue to work within Departmental processes to meet our posture requirements across warfare domains, with consistent targets and a long-term view.

Land Forces

We continue to enhance our assigned and rotational land forces to meet the requirement for an armored division accompanied by critical enablers, such as a fully sourced combat aviation brigade, long-range fires, engineers, and sustainment brigades. This armored capability will be comprised of forward stationed and persistent rotational units as well as prepositioned stocks and infrastructure that enable us to rapidly aggregate these capabilities.

Air Forces

USEUCOM requires additional combat and aviation support air assets, to include prepositioned assets, airfield infrastructure improvements, and dispersed basing. The FY18 and FY19 budget requests have begun the process of funding investments that enable the rapid
reception of fourth and fifth generation fighters, close air support, bombers, and air mobility aircraft in a contingency. We have detailed these requirements in our ECAOS concept, funded through the Administration’s EDI request.

Maritime Forces

Additional maritime capabilities are being requested to increase our lethality in the maritime domain and to counter Russian maritime capabilities. Similar to the land and air domains, this necessitates infrastructure improvements to sea ports of debarkation (SPOD) as well as prepositioning critical naval capabilities such as munitions. The FY19 request also provides additional capability for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) sensors and platforms such as the P-8s. Additionally, USEUCOM is working with the Department to increase the rotational presence of guided missile destroyers, a Carrier Strike Group, and attack submarines, all of which provide lethal combat power to deter our adversaries and counter growing threats in the undersea domain.

Amphibious Forces

USEUCOM has requested enhancements to Marine Corps Prepositioned Program-Norway to allow the rapid deployment of naval expeditionary forces. USEUCOM has also asked the Department to assess the role that an increased Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) presence could play in the AOR, recognizing that deployments in the Mediterranean allow for response to threats in three Geographic Combatant Commands.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)

It is essential that our assigned and rotational multi-domain forces are protected by a robust, layered IAMD capability. The FY19 budget calls for the development of an IAMD
architecture that begins to address USEUCOM's requirements for capabilities such as those provide by Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot batteries. These capabilities will ensure we can effectively maneuver forces throughout the AOR. Our approach to IAMD must be inclusive with our NATO allies and key partners as we face a growing ballistic missile threat from regional adversaries.

C4ISR

C4ISR is a fundamental capability set for the Global Operating Model articulated by the NDS. To this end, the FY19 budget helps to reverse the long-term reductions in ISR platforms, in manning, and in processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) capabilities. This includes growing our cadre of intelligence linguists and analysts, adding permanently stationed ISR platforms to the theater, and expanding our satellite footprint.

USEUCOM’s command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) networks must also become more resilient and survivable. More work is needed to ensure the sustainment of operations and to maintain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. We are working with the Services to develop infrastructure that will significantly increase C4I capability and resilience.

Freedom of Movement

The ability to rapidly surge combat ready forces into and across the theater is critical to deterring future Russian aggression. Improving freedom of movement and force maneuver both prior to and during conflict requires enhancing our logistics infrastructure. Additional organic logistical assets are being deployed to reduce reliance on commercial providers, mitigate distribution gaps, and accelerate steady state operations. We are also increasing our close coordination among U.S. agencies, NATO, the EU, and individual European nations.
If fully funded, and once the necessary access agreements are in place, the FY18 and FY19 EDI program requests will increase freedom of maneuver for the Joint Force by establishing critical logistical hubs capable of supporting maritime operations in the North Atlantic and increasing pre-positioned forward stocks of equipment and munitions. USEUCOM will maximize cost sharing initiatives, such as the NATO Security Investment Program, and increase coordination with European nations and commercial entities to further enhance mobility.

Complex Exercises

A key pillar of our overall deterrence approach is a campaign of high end, multi-domain exercises. We will continue to coordinate our Joint Exercise Program with NATO allies and partner nations to enhance our high-end combat capabilities, promote interoperability, and sustain strategic access.

Cyber

USEUCOM is expanding its cyber capabilities and integrating cyber operations into full-spectrum military activities. USEUCOM is focused on refining cyberspace information sharing tactics, techniques and procedures. To ensure wartime interoperability, USEUCOM is engaged with NATO Allies' and partners' logistics and cyberspace experts to develop a shared framework for cybersecurity.

CONCLUSION

In closing, I want to again thank Congress for its continued support for USEUCOM – especially for the European Deterrence Initiative – and for helping us to articulate to the Nation the very real challenges that the United States and NATO face in the European theater. Russia is engaged in strategic competition with the United States, pursuing a strategy that undermines
the international order and erodes U.S. leadership and influence. Violent extremists, also intent on destroying a Western, rules-based system, remain a significant threat. Faced with these challenges, we must reestablish our military competitive advantage and ensure our forces are prepared to address the challenges of this complex, dynamic, and competitive strategic environment. The Service members and civilians of USEUCOM stand ready to do so. We are fully committed to being the agile, lethal, and resilient force needed to protect and defend the Homeland while supporting a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
General Curtis M. Scaparrotti  
Commander, U.S. European Command and  
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe  

U.S. Army Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti assumed duties as Commander of European Command and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in late spring of 2016.

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti is a native of Logan, Ohio, graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1978, and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army.

A career infantry officer, General Scaparrotti was previously assigned as the Commander, United Nations Command I Combined Forces Command I United States Forces Korea. He also served as the Director, Joint Staff. Prior to his tour with the Joint Staff, General Scaparrotti served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In addition, General Scaparrotti has served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of the United States military to include Director of Operations, United States Central Command and as the 69th Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy. He has commanded forces during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire/Rwanda), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia).

His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a Master's Degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and the Army Meritorious Service Medal. He has earned the Combat Action Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 15, 2018
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. The Pentagon’s FY19 budget request includes $6.5 billion for the European Defense Initiative, more than doubling the FY17 budget of $3.4 billion. While the need to ensure deterrence and provide updated equipment in Europe is clear, it is also obvious this is a great deal of money. What are some examples protocols and procedures you have implemented at EUCOM to ensure that this money is and will be utilized appropriately?

General SCAPARROTTI. USEUCOM is very appreciative of Congress’ continued support for EDI. USEUCOM endeavors to be the best possible steward of these critical funds. USEUCOM reviews and prioritizes all EDI requests prior to submission to the Department’s consideration in the budget submission. We work with our service components, who have the vast majority of the funds. In doing so, we work hard to ensure that all items submitted support one of EDI’s five lines of effort and meet the intent of EDI to deter Russian aggression and/or assure our Allies and partners. USEUCOM has also encouraged and actively supported the OSD (CAPE) led reviews of both the FY18 and FY19 EDI budget submissions to validate operational requirements, cost estimates, and feasibility of EDI requests. In the year of execution, all Repurposing and/or Reprogramming requests are reviewed and approved by USEUCOM at the General Officer level to ensure their alignment with the intent of EDI prior to being submitted to either the Comptroller or Congress respectively. As EDI potentially transitions to the Base budget, USEUCOM is working with OSD (CAPE) to explore additional ways USEUCOM can maintain awareness and oversight of EDI spending to ensure the integrity of the funding provided.

Ms. SPEIER. What are your cyber warfare and cyber operations requirements? How is EUCOM working with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)? Are there any policy or authority concerns?

General SCAPARROTTI. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Ms. SPEIER. What are examples where EUCOM successfully provided information to an ally on a terrorist threat and where EUCOM successfully combated digital terrorism?

General SCAPARROTTI. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY

Mrs. MURPHY. In your testimony, you highlighted that EUCOM’s Joint Exercise Program and our Building Partnership Capacity activities with our allies have significantly improved our interoperability with NATO. You also mentioned that EUCOM is working with allies and partners to develop a shared framework for cybersecurity to ensure wartime interoperability. I represent a district in central Florida that is a hub for modeling, simulation, and training, including the focal point of the Army’s new cyber training mission. My question is, how exactly does EUCOM integrate cyber defense and cyberspace operations into our joint exercises with our NATO allies?

Also, are we seeing an increased demand signal for cyber training and capacity building from our allies and partners in the AOR? If so, how are we managing that demand, and what further resources could we apply—from a manpower, authority, or cyber range perspective?

General SCAPARROTTI. USEUCOM incorporates cyber training objectives as they are linked to our top priority plans in all Joint Exercise Program exercises. We also include cyber mission sets within the command and control portions of exercise STEADFAST COBALT; NATO’s Mission Partner Network certification event. This annual exercise validates and certifies NATO’s standby mission network requirements. EUCOM has seen a consistent increase in requests for cyber training and capacity building from both Allies and partners. We address this demand by partnering with the military services and defense agencies for access to training in the same manner we support training in the traditional warfighting domains. EUCOM partners with these DOD components to build courses tailored to cyber de-
fense, including an International Cyberspace Operations Planners Course that we launched last year. We also leverage combined training events to build capacity and capability. These events range from bilateral cyber defense table-top exercises up to and including an International Cyberspace Operations Planners Course that we launched last year. We also leverage combined training events to build capacity and capability. These events range from bilateral cyber defense table-top exercises up to and including efforts to integrate cyber defense and cyberspace operations into all major NATO training exercises. Interoperability at all levels is essential for effective cyber defense, and EUCOM is willing to train with Allies and partners at every level. For example, during the LOCKED SHIELDS cyber defense exercise and competition, we did not field a U.S. team; rather, U.S. cyber operators competed on combined teams with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Lithuania. EUCOM could use congressional assistance in clarifying which authorities must be used for security cooperation in the cyber domain, for example 10 USC 333 for building the capacity for foreign security forces. Added clarity will streamline approvals for rapidly building combined cyber defense capabilities, including the protection and defense of national infrastructure supporting combined operations.

Mrs. Murphy. In your testimony, you mentioned that EUCOM is increasing its efforts to counter Russia’s propaganda and misinformation campaigns through an interagency effort called the Russian Information Group. Would you tell us a little more about the Russian Information Group? Does this group amplify, or run counter to, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center’s mission to counter state-sponsored propaganda from Russia?

General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM co-hosts with the Department of State, the Russia Information Group (RIG), an interagency working-level network established to respond collaboratively to the challenges posed by Russia in the information space in Europe. The RIG seeks to identify particular vulnerabilities, recognize malign influence, leverage particular agency responses, and ensure a coordinated U.S. government effort. The RIG is enabling collaboration in support of U.S. embassy country teams to counter malign influence using all instruments of national power. The RIG supports U.S. national level strategy. The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act directs combatant commands to develop, in coordination with State Department, a regional information strategy and interagency coordination plan for carrying out the strategy. The RIG has a critical role in developing this strategy in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State. The RIG also shares lessons learned with NATO and the EU to build a common understanding and increase cooperation. EUCOM and Department of State co-chair monthly teleconferences to exchange information and coordinate efforts relating to specific RIG projects, exchange current Intelligence Community (IC) updates, request IC support, and discuss current or emerging events and issues. Participants include the National Security Council, Department of State, EUCOM, Joint Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Director of National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Denial and Deception Committee, Department of Energy, Central Command, Northern Command, Southern Command, Special Forces Command, Strategic Command, the Global Engagement Center and several embassies. The RIG also hosts biannual Senior Leader Steering Boards, which I co-chair with the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The board is composed of senior leaders from each of the departments and agencies represented at the RIG. The primary purpose of these meetings is to evaluate efforts over the past quarter and guide the RIG’s forthcoming efforts over the next quarter. The RIG reinforces rather than duplicates the work of the Global Engagement Center (GEC). The GEC is a core member of the RIG and seeks to align organizational efforts in support of national strategy. The GEC has a legislative mandate to lead, synchronize, and coordinate USG counter-propaganda and disinformation efforts. Authorities granted to the GEC in NDAA enable it to conduct additional activities that other groups, like the RIG, cannot do such as, transfer funds, hire specialists, and gain wider data mining access.

Mrs. Murphy. Many of our allies in Eastern Europe remain reliant on Russian military equipment. This reliance subsidizes the Russian defense industry, reduces interoperability with other NATO countries, and places NATO’s frontline of defense at risk in the event of a conflict with Russia. Many of these states would like to purchase U.S. military equipment, but lack the resources to do so. Simply buying the equipment, in the numbers necessary to completely modernize eastern NATO militaries, would be prohibitively expensive, but there is another way. Instead, the United States could revive defense lending and offering financing to help eastern NATO members buy the equipment themselves. In time, this program could even become profitable. Has EUCOM considered this or other alternative ways to help eastern NATO allies modernize their militaries and reduce reliance on Russian military equipment?
General SCAPARROTTI. EUCOM is acutely aware of the issues caused by our Allies’ reliance on Russian military equipment. We certainly communicate these concerns to our Allies to make sure they understand the issues. We leverage the full spectrum of security assistance tools made available to us by Congress and the Department of State, including defense lending and financing. Should more options become available, we would leverage those as well. EUCOM fully supports revising the defense lending and financing rules to a more friendly approach to partner and Ally defense spending, especially as more of our NATO Allies move closer to meeting their defense spending and modernization goals. One such concept, which is a more cost effective approach, is lead nation procurement through a consortium, where the defense articles are shared among the consortium members. The current solution approach of one-to-one replacements is cost prohibitive. Unfortunately, current legislation only allows for a consortium among NATO Allies. EUCOM sought, but the Department disapproved, a change to legislation that would permit consortia of Allies and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. I encourage Congress to consider such a modification in 2019 so we can better facilitate and accelerate the replacement of Russian equipment in the countries which are the most susceptible to malign Russian influence.

Mrs. MURPHY. Since readiness is a top priority in your AOR, would you find value in increased funding for home station training capabilities to modernize instrumentation and simulation capabilities to train at home?

General SCAPARROTTI. Your question conflates USEUCOM’s operational readiness with Service readiness and might be answered best by our Service headquarters. A preponderance of USEUCOM’s assigned forces are CONUS based rotational forces, consequently, efforts to modernize “home station” training capabilities may benefit USEUCOM by increasing the proficiency and number of units available for sourcing, but these efforts would not necessarily equate to a marked increase in USEUCOM’s readiness to execute operational plans. A top priority for USEUCOM and the Service Headquarters is to ensure the highest readiness of our deployed forces prior to leaving home-station, and while in theater. Due to environmental and host nation restrictions throughout USEUCOM’s Area of Responsibility, the opportunity to train combat tasks is limited from the individual crew to the joint battle staff level. Therefore, any efforts to modernize and increase simulation capabilities would prove beneficial to our goal of maintaining the highest readiness of our forces. Some areas of opportunity where simulation capabilities could be of added training value are fires coordination, close air support, navigation, seamanship, ship handling, and unit and battle staff wargaming.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS

Mr. BANKS. Macedonia has demonstrated its resolve through its participation in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan and has been by our side in Iraq. As NATO adapts to an increasingly complex security environment exacerbated by strategic competition with Russia, admitting Macedonia as a full member to our key alliance is imperative.

1) What is your position on admitting Macedonia as a full member of NATO?
2) What can we do to assist Macedonia in attaining full membership?

General Scaparrotti, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been a key nonproliferation enabler for EUCOM and the world for over 25 years. As part of your overall security cooperation efforts, CTR has been fundamental to greatly reducing the threat of WMD proliferation.

3) General, where do you see successes in the CTR program historically, and now?
4) General, how could the CTR program be more effective in your AOR?
5) General, how would you reform US government nonproliferation efforts?

You mention this maritime threat in your testimony, so I would like to focus my questions on the current and foreseeable anti-submarine threat from Russia.

6) What are some of the challenges that you are seeing from a resurgent Russia related to anti-submarine capabilities?
7) How is that nation developing in the field of anti-submarine warfare, and how would you characterize the maritime threats they pose to the United States, our allies, and our partners? What are we doing to defend and where can we invest more resources?

General SCAPARROTTI. (1 and 2) EUCOM fully supports Macedonia’s NATO membership aspirations. The path to Alliance membership helps Macedonia more fully integrate into the Euro-Atlantic family of nations, energizes its govern-
equipped Kilo diesel-electric submarines (SS) have been transferred to the Black Sea Fleet, located at Sevastopol, Ukraine and Novorossiysk, Russia. Six KALIBR-the Eastern Mediterranean by strengthening the force posture of the Black Sea to U.S. forces, allies, and interests. Moscow increased its ability to project force in surface, anti-submarine, and land attack roles.

2023. This KALIBR-equipped submarine is multi-mission capable to include anti-

plans to commission five more Severodvinsk SSGNs by 2020, with the seventh by

Severodvinsk SSGN is currently operational in the Northern Fleet, and Russia

submarines, the Severodvinsk class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines

system which will increase the efficiency of detecting and tracking submarines. Another

significant success of the program was the destruction of 66 metric tons of chemical agents and precursor materials declared by Syria when they acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. This was the first time the program executed activities in the former Soviet Union and led to program determinations which enabled the Department of Defense to address proliferation prevention across multiple Combatant Commands’ Areas of Responsibility. Expansion of the program as a proliferation prevention tool to other regions is a significant success and we hope this flexibility will continue. As CTR activities reach their culmination in the former Soviet Union nations, it is critically important we leverage the expertise and agility of response authorities the program provides to address proliferation challenges elsewhere in Europe. Expanding the authority to use the program in other nations in our area of responsibility would allow us to focus CTR activities on places where we see proliferation concerns, thereby increasing the overall effectiveness of proliferation prevention theater-wide. The U.S. government collaborates with other nations on preventing proliferation through multiple departments to include the Department of Defense. Much progress has been made to ensure these efforts are synchronized to prevent duplication of effort. We must promote interagency collaboration to attain efficiencies and to maximize the effectiveness of our tax dollars as we combat the WMD proliferation problem globally.

(6 and 7) The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has accelerated its deployment of highly capable submarines into the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Russia has worked diligently to increase the lethality and reduce the acoustic characteristics of their submarines which makes countering this threat significantly more challenging. Those vessels have expanded the reach of the Russian fleet and are integrated into ongoing Russian operations. Given the increased number and frequency of deployments, having sufficient forces with the appropriate capabilities available to hold RFN submarines at risk is essential.

The RFN is continuing to modernize their forces by prioritizing multi-mission platforms capable of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), as well as other naval warfare disciplines such as land attack and surface warfare. As part of this effort, Moscow plans to complete three Grigorovich frigates in addition to the three that have been fielded in the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. No timeline has been given due to delays caused in part by sanctions, but construction will resume using Russian-made engines. Grigorovich frigates are armed with KALIBR, Russia’s advanced precision guided-missile system which includes an anti-submarine missile. Furthermore, these frigates are equipped with an ASW helicopter, which improves their ability to locate and track our submarines. The Kremlin also has five Steregushchyi I guided-missile frigates under construction in addition to the three Steregushchyi IIIs assigned to the Baltic Fleet. While the operational Steregushchyiis are not KALIBR capable, future vessels likely will be. These vessels are capable of anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare, and also field ASW helicopters. Concurrently with ASW surface vessel construction, the Kremlin plans to upgrade 28 IL–38s, an anti-submarine patrol aircraft by 2020. This improved aircraft will field an improved search-and-track system which will increase the efficiency of detecting and tracking submarines.

In addition to bolstering their surface fleet, Moscow is building fourth-generation submarines, the Severodvinsk class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines (SSGNs), and Dolgorukiy class strategic-missile submarines (SSBNs). One Severodvinsk SSGN is currently operational in the Northern Fleet, and Russia plans to commission five more Severodvinsk SSGNs by 2020, with the seventh by 2023. This KALIBR-equipped submarine is multi-mission capable to include anti-surface, anti-submarine, and land attack roles.

In regards to the eastern Mediterranean, Russia is postured as a credible threat to U.S. forces, allies, and interests. Moscow increased its ability to project force in the Eastern Mediterranean by strengthening the force posture of the Black Sea Fleet, located at Sevastopol, Ukraine and Novorossiysk, Russia. Six KALIBR-equipped Kilo diesel-electric submarines (SS) have been transferred to the Black Sea
Fleet, with two of these currently stationed in Tartus, Syria. In the fall of 2017, these two Kilos launched land attack cruise missile strikes into Syria. Additionally, in March 2018, Russia deployed two Black Sea Fleet frigates to the Mediterranean. As part of this increase in operations, Tu-142s, long range anti-submarine aircraft, conducted submarine detection training exercises over the eastern Mediterranean in late March.

The current submarine Naval Order of Battle presents significant challenges to the U.S. and its allies, which will only increase as additional Dolgorukiy SSBN and Severodvinsk SSGN hulls enter service. Multiple Severodvinsk SSGNs will very likely strengthen the Russian Fleet's ability to project naval power, while additional Dolgorukiy SSBNs will bolster the Kremlin's strategic deterrence. USEUCOM, Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), and the U.S. Sixth Fleet have been working tirelessly to improve our presence and posture in the region to deter and defend against a resurgent Russia. Specifically, with the help of Congress, European Deterrence Initiative funding has been critical in supporting improved anti-submarine warfare efforts and infrastructure.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PANETTA**

Mr. PANETTA. Do you believe the National Guard Partnership Program is valuable in helping you achieve your strategic objectives? How could it be more effective?

General SCAPAROTTI. Yes, the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) remains one of European Command’s most effective programs to promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and reinforce principles of responsible governance in support of the EUCOM’s strategic priorities. USEUCOM's interlocking security relationships with a range of partners are an important source of stability in the region. One of our enduring priorities, “Strengthen Strategic Partnerships and Build Partner Capacity, Capability and Interoperability” is a benchmark for the SPP. The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows active participation in a wide range of security cooperation activities, such as emergency management and disaster response, border and port security, natural resource protection, and containing transnational threats. Additionally, SPP has proven vital to the rapid integration of major defense articles into the force structure of our Allies and partners, which accelerates the timeline to achieving full operational capacity. To increase the value of SPP, we will continue to apply SPP activities to theater-level objectives with a focus on regional approaches. This will allow us to leverage SPP to find commonalities among countries for ready and postured forces. NATO identifies capabilities and promotes their development and acquisition by Allies so it can meet security and mutual defense objectives. This regional approach will empower SPP engagements to focus on aiding partner nations and Allies to develop NATO capability targets to meet their collective defense obligations. The SPP can become even more responsive to the requirements in theater through expanded authorities to cover the costs of National Guard salaries. I encourage Congress to support broader authorities and resources to enable expansion of the National Guard as a force provider.

Mr. PANETTA. With limited Active Component forces in Europe, how are you utilizing the National Guard and Reserves to enhance U.S. presence?

General SCAPAROTTI. USEUCOM continues to leverage all available sources of personnel and forces to support our theater requirements. The U.S. supports NATO’s augmentations in deterrence and defense forces, and the National Guard is starting its first rotations in support of the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission. The Army’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment will hand off the eFP mission to the National Guard in September 2018. The 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Tennessee Army National Guard will lead the NATO eFP battle group in Poland also lead the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine. The unit from Tennessee is on a mobilization order for 365 days, and is expected to lead the training and support mission for nine months. Additionally, the Air National Guard provides significant theater support totaling approximately 120,000 man days historically. This supports the Polish AvDet, Theater Security Packages, Joint/Component and other exercises/events, tanker and airlift augmentation, and other miscellaneous requirements stemming from increased activities funded through EDI. The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides key National Guard presence in Europe. The state partners are not only critical force providers for military-to-military engagements but also have the most enduring relationships with our Allies and partners. USEUCOM sees the addition of mobilized forces as an alternative force provider demonstrating the professionalism of our citizen soldiers and looks forward to continued support from the National Guard and Reserves.
Mr. Panetta. Is our current force posture in Ukraine sufficient to meet the strategic priority of deterring Russian aggression? Would a more robust train, advise, and assist mission provide greater deterrent value?

General Scaparrotti. I believe our current force posture is sufficient to meet our national partnership goals with Ukraine, which are to assist the Ukrainians with building a modern, sustainable, and NATO-oriented training system and training infrastructure in support of their own national defense requirements. We have been conducting the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine since 2016 with the support of Active Component and National Guard soldiers, to include soldiers from the California National Guard. These efforts are complemented by the efforts of civilian and ministry advisory teams who assist Ukraine with establishing sustainable force management, logistics, medical, and other key capabilities. We appreciate the continued efforts of the California National Guard through the State Partnership Program over the last 25 years to build a strong and enduring relationship to support EUCOM priorities. I would like to reemphasize the essential role of our Reserve Component, in particular the National Guard, in Ukraine and in our efforts in Europe overall, particularly given our limited permanently-stationed forces. EUCOM has benefitted by provisions in the European Deterrence Initiative that allow for funding reserve component pay and allowances for security force assistance and other deterrent activities. I encourage Congress to sustain or even expand these kinds of provisions in future legislation.