    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 115-86]
        ______________________________________________________

                         SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

                          AND POSTURE FOR INTER-STATE

                            COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 15, 2018

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  _________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    29-490                  WASHINGTON : 2019

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            JACKIE SPEIER, California
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    PAUL COOK, California                RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona              SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California           ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma              STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          RO KHANNA, California
    RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana         TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
    TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            JIMMY PANETTA, California
    MATT GAETZ, Florida
    DON BACON, Nebraska
    JIM BANKS, Indiana
    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    JODY B. HICE, Georgia

                          Jen Stewart, Staff Director
                    Katie Sendak, Professional Staff Member
                     Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
                             Britton Burkett, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M....................................    46
        Smith, Hon. Adam.............................................    44
        Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''..........................    43

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Banks....................................................    73
        Mrs. Murphy..................................................    71
        Mr. Panetta..................................................    75
        Ms. Speier...................................................    71

     SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE AND POSTURE FOR INTER-STATE COMPETITION
                                  WITH RUSSIA

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                              Washington, DC, Thursday, March 15, 2018.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M.
    ``Mac'' Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        The committee welcomes General Scaparrotti back today to
    testify on the threats and posture in the European Command's
    area of responsibility. There he faces the full range of
    security challenges, from Russia's constant modernization of
    its nuclear weapons and delivery systems to the hybrid and
    political warfare it wages against the United States and
    others. Its tactics extend, as we have been reminded this week,
    to targeted assassinations, as well.
        I think that it is clear that the United States has
    neglected both ends of the warfare spectrum in recent years and
    much in between. But the recent budget agreement and the new
    National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review give us
    the chance to begin to do better.
        We must do better across the board. It is not enough to
    advocate for a more robust cyber response to Russia's attempts
    to meddle in our elections, but waiver on our response to their
    renewed nuclear or territorial ambitions. Likewise, we cannot
    build up our missile defenses and nuclear deterrent but leave
    significant cyber intrusions unanswered.
        It is essential, in my view, that we face all of these
    challenges with clear-eyed objectivity and not allow domestic
    politics to color our view or affect our actions. The United
    States and our allies and our interests are threatened by the
    full range of Russian capability and by its increasing
    belligerence. Our job is to address them in the military sphere
    in order to protect our Nation's security, nothing more and
    nothing less.
        I would yield to the ranking member.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
    the Appendix on page 43.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General
    Scaparrotti. It is good to see you again. I always appreciated
    your time out at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and your leadership
    out there, and certainly your leadership now for us in Europe.
        And I certainly agree with the chairman; Russia is the big
    issue. Not the only, but the big issue in the European Command
    [EUCOM], and how we counter their increasingly aggressive
    behavior.
        I would disagree slightly--and I do not think the chairman
    meant it quite this way--it is not just a military challenge.
    Obviously, we are here in the Armed Services Committee, you are
    the EUCOM commander, so that is your primary focus.
        But it is a broader challenge to confront Russia. And we
    had the opportunity to have a conversation with you yesterday a
    little bit about that. In addition to being a military
    commander, you are also occasionally a diplomat, in terms of
    being able to stay in touch with your Russian counterparts to
    try to make sure there are no misunderstandings and we do not
    stumble into a conflict.
        And I would also be remiss again if I did not point out
    that, in confronting this, diplomacy is enormously important,
    which means that the State Department is enormously important
    there, an indispensable partner for what you and what the rest
    of the Department of Defense are trying to do. And right now
    the State Department is not in a good place. Certainly they are
    transitioning from one leader to the next. We are not sure, you
    know, how the confirmation process is going to go. But it has
    been a tumultuous year at the State Department. That needs to
    get figured out, because diplomacy is going to be a big part of
    this.
        I agree with those folks, including many on this panel, who
    have identified the fact that we have moved back into an era of
    great power conflict. I do not agree that that conflict
    necessarily has to be military. You have to handle it in a
    variety of different ways, in order to try to move it in a
    different direction.
        The one big thing on Russia, yes, they are moving forward
    in terms of increasing their capabilities in a variety of
    areas. But the one big area where they are actually acting on a
    consistent basis is in their disinformation cyber campaign. And
    there is an area where I think we are behind. And some of these
    other areas that the chairman mentioned we are worried because
    the Russians are catching up and potentially getting to the
    point where they could surpass us in capability. But when it
    comes to cyber, when it comes to disinformation campaign, we
    are barely on the playing field at this point.
        We have all, you know, read about Russia's efforts to
    influence our election here in the United States. They are
    doing it across Western Europe. And it is not just elections.
    They are spreading a message, and that message is that
    authoritarian regimes are better than democracy: backing Assad
    in Syria, the things that they are doing down in Libya. They
    are undermining the basic tenets of what we stand for, which is
    political freedom and economic freedom. And we have to counter
    that.
        In fact, General, you said something very interesting
    yesterday during our classified brief. This was not classified,
    I do not think, but that a poll of people in Western Europe,
    asking them how important democracy was, a poll of the younger
    generation, it was shocking to see that it was not a very high
    percentage that said it was important. The basic notion that
    political freedom is the way to govern a country and to govern
    the world is being eroded.
        Now, there is a lot of reasons for that, but I would submit
    that one of the biggest ones is a concentrated campaign by
    Vladimir Putin to undermine it. We need to counter that. So I
    am very interested to hear today what we are doing on that
    information campaign.
        And obviously, as the chairman mentioned, there are
    military challenges, as well.
        But I will just close by saying I think the ideal outcome
    here is that we figure out a way to work with Russia. I will,
    oddly, agree with the President, at least in that sentence, not
    necessarily in the way he has chosen to go about doing it. But
    the world is a better place if the great powers of the world--
    the United States, Russia, China, the European Union--get along
    and confront global challenges.
        You know, whether it is terrorism, global warming, if we
    work together to confront the things that challenge us all, we
    are better off than if we get involved in conflicts with one
    another. And I am still optimistic that there are paths to get
    to that place.
        So I look forward to your testimony, I thank you for your
    leadership, and thank you for being here.
        I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 44.]
        The Chairman. Again we welcome back General Scaparrotti,
    Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander
    of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization].
        General, without objection, your full written statement
    will be made part of the record and you are recognized now for
    any oral comments you would like to give.

     STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            EUROPEAN COMMAND

        General Scaparrotti. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
    Smith, distinguished members of the House Armed Services
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
    as the commander of the United States European Command. It is
    an honor to represent more than 60,000 men and women who are
    forward-deployed supporting the U.S. mission in Europe.
        Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, coastguardsmen, and
    civilian workforce continue to demonstrate selfless service and
    dedication in an increasingly complex and competitive security
    environment. Our adaptation to this environment has made
    significant progress, thanks to resourcing provided by
    Congress, particularly under the European Deterrence Initiative
    [EDI]. EUCOM deeply appreciates Congress's support for EDI,
    which has supported the largest reinforcement of the Euro-
    Atlantic defense in a generation.
        In augmenting our defense, the United States has been
    joined by the NATO alliance, which remains critical to our
    national security and a rules-based international order. Every
    challenge we face as a Nation is best addressed with our
    allies, and I am proud to report the NATO alliance is strong,
    it is united, and it is committed to being fit for purpose.
        Our European allies and Canada have turned a corner on
    defense spending, with increases in each of the past 3 years.
    During this time they have added $46 billion to our collective
    defense, including a $5 billion increase from 2016 to 2017. In
    2018, 8 countries will meet NATO's 2 percent spending target,
    and by 2024 at least 15 nations are on pace to reach or exceed
    the 2 percent mark.
        As these commitments demonstrate, NATO is adapting to
    ensure it is vigilant in peace, responsive in crisis, and it
    possesses the strategic depth for high-end, large-scale, multi-
    domain conflict.
        Together with NATO, the United States has made significant
    progress. But we have much work to do as we execute our
    National Defense Strategy, fielding an increasingly lethal,
    agile, and resilient joint force, in long-term strategic
    competition with Russia, and ready to counter violent extremist
    organizations.
        Russia is carrying out a campaign of destabilization to
    change the international order, fracture NATO, and undermine
    U.S. leadership around the world. At sea, on land, and in the
    air, Russia increasingly--Russia's increasingly modernized
    military is operating at levels not seen since the Cold War. At
    the same time, Russia is using indirect activities to advance
    its strategic objectives. Throughout Europe, along its
    periphery, in the Middle East, and beyond, Russia has
    demonstrated a willingness and capability to use political
    provocation, spread disinformation, and undermine democratic
    institutions.
        In response to the challenge posed by Russia's pursuit of
    power, the U.S. has increased its posture in Europe by
    deploying rotational forces to include an armored brigade
    combat team [ABCT] and a combat aviation brigade.
        Additionally, we have implemented the framework battalion
    task force for NATO's enhanced forward presence in Poland; we
    pre-positioned equipment for additional ABCT; we have doubled
    our maritime deployments to the Black Sea; we have exercised
    theater antisubmarine warfare operations; we have executed
    bomber assurance and deterrence missions in Europe; and, for
    the first time, we have deployed fifth-generation fighters to
    Europe.
        The U.S. has taken these actions in coordination with NATO.
    Since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO has made significant gains
    in meeting its security commitments and in implementing
    decisions to enhance our collective defense. NATO has
    implemented its enhanced forward presence with four
    multinational battle groups, backed by 29 nations. It has also
    established a tailored forward presence in the Black Sea
    region.
        Additionally, the U.S. and NATO are putting a spotlight on
    Russian meddling and interference, countering Russian
    misinformation with truthful and transparent information, and
    reinforcing our winning narrative of sovereignty, freedom, the
    dignity of the individual, and the rule of law.
        The second major threat we face throughout the European
    area of operations is violent extremist terrorist groups. Since
    2014, Europe has endured 18 major terrorist attacks. While the
    Defeat ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] coalition, which
    includes NATO now, recovers territory that was seized in Iraq
    and Syria, ISIS remains active and seeks to expand its
    operations across Europe.
        EUCOM provides forces for military operations against ISIS,
    such as Operation Inherent Resolve, and has increased
    information and intelligence sharing among U.S. agencies,
    international partners, and the private sector. With the EU
    [European Union] and NATO, EUCOM supports a tri-nodal community
    of action to identify and counter terrorist threats. Also,
    EUCOM has increased coordination with Europol [EU law
    enforcement agency] and Interpol [International Criminal Police
    Organization] to thwart terrorist activities.
        Our European allies fight alongside us, deploying forces
    worldwide to support U.S.-led counterterrorism operations,
    including OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] and Operation
    Freedom Sentinel, and to conduct national counterterrorism
    missions. The allies remain committed to defeating violent
    extremists, and their support is essential to our ongoing
    counterterrorism efforts.
        Thanks to the resources provided by Congress, particularly
    through European Deterrence Initiative, EUCOM has made
    significant headway in establishing a defensive posture that is
    credible, capable, and relevant to our strategic objectives.
        As our National Defense Strategy states, a strong and free
    Europe, bound by shared principles of democracy, national
    sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of NATO's Washington
    Treaty, is vital to our security. The service members and
    civilians at EUCOM are making this strategy a reality. We stand
    ready to protect the homeland, strengthen the alliance, and
    ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.
        And Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to the
    committee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found
    in the Appendix on page 46.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, General. I want to ask a question
    about this chemical weapon assassination attempt in Britain,
    as--at least as far as I know, this particular weapon that was
    used has only been made by the Russians.
        And this morning, in The Washington Post, the British
    Foreign Secretary writes that it is part of a pattern of
    reckless behavior: ``The common thread that joins the
    poisonings in Salisbury with the annexation of Crimea, the
    cyber attacks in Ukraine, the hacking of Germanys (sic)
    parliament, and Russian interference in foreign elections is
    the Kremlin's reckless defiance of essential international
    rules.''
        My question is do you agree with that statement, that this
    is a pattern of behavior that has in common the reckless
    defiance, or maybe even the attempt to undermine international
    rules? Do you agree with that? And do our NATO allies agree
    with that?
        General Scaparrotti. Chairman, I agree that it represents
    Russia's consistent disregard for international rules and
    norms, each of those instances that you talked about.
        You will note in this specific incident with the nerve
    agent that NATO has said that they stand by their ally, the
    U.K. [United Kingdom], and believe it is highly likely that
    Russia was complicit in this attack. And that was a statement
    that they made as an alliance of 29, to my understanding.
        We also believe that it is highly likely that they are
    complicit with the chemical weapons use, and we stand by our
    ally, and we support their efforts to fully determine who the
    responsible parties were, and hold them accountable.
        The Chairman. Well, I just say I--as I mentioned at the
    beginning, whether it is this incident, or cyberattacks, or
    Putin's boasting about new nuclear weapons, I think it is
    really critical for the alliance to stand together and push
    back against this whole range of activity. That is the only way
    for us to counter it.
        I am going to yield to the ranking member.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Along those lines, in terms of--because I think the
    chairman is right, I think a huge part of this is holding
    Russia accountable--Russia is not altogether that powerful.
    They have all kinds of internal problems and economic weakness.
    And even their military is still nowhere near a match for ours.
    But they will push as far as they can push, if they think there
    is not a cost to it.
        So one specific question about that. The administration has
    delayed implementation of sanctions against Russia. As I
    understand it, the loose justification was they are waiting for
    Putin's election, like he might lose or something. I do not
    know.
        Does it not make sense at this point to be as aggressive as
    possible in implementing the sanctions that Congress has made
    available to the President, precisely to try to impose a cost
    upon Russia in much the same way that we are doing with Iran
    and China--or, sorry, Iran and North Korea?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I would--I cannot comment on the
    speed of the sanctions. I know that they are working.
        I would say, as you said earlier, that we have to address
    their activity with a whole-of-government response. And
    sanctions would be an appropriate part of that.
        Mr. Smith. Understood. And just something we have not
    talked about yet, Turkey is perhaps the other, you know,
    largest issue. Well, that and the whole issue of trying to make
    sure we keep NATO together and coordinated.
        But, you know, the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds,
    while we--Turkey is a valuable ally, without question, so are
    the Kurds. They were indispensable, in terms of what we did in
    Syria and Iraq in dealing with ISIS. What is your latest on how
    we might get to a better place between our two allies there,
    Turkey and the Kurds?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. As you stated, Turkey is a
    valued ally in EUCOM, a member of the countries in EUCOM. I
    work closely with them to continue our close relationship and
    actually restore the relationship to an extent because of the
    differences here with respect to the YPG [People's Protection
    Units] and their alliance with us in our D-ISIS campaign.
        Presently, as you know, the State Department is working
    closely with them. We have been involved in this. And we are
    presently, I think, working on a way to attempt to meet their
    legitimate concerns, their security concerns along the border,
    the terrorist attacks that they have inherent to their country
    and have had for some time, as well as meet our interests to
    ensure that we can complete the D-ISIS campaign which has
    presented a direct threat to the security of our country, as
    well.
        So that discussion is ongoing. I would prefer not to go
    into more depth, given that we are right in the midst of them
    now.
        Mr. Smith. But I think that is crucially important, that we
    find some way to make that work. And I understand there are
    legitimate concerns on both sides. I mean the Kurds, you know,
    have long wanted, you know, as great a degree of independence
    as they can get. At the same time, you could hardly blame
    Turkey for being upset that they routinely have terrorist
    attacks committed in their country.
        I will just close, and I do not have any more questions for
    you, but just with an editorial comment about Russia. I think
    we need an administration that sends a much clearer signal on
    Russia. The President's reluctance in instance after instance--
    most recently even the one that the chairman just raised--
    while, you know, our--a number of other government officials--I
    forget if it was the Secretary of State or the CIA [Central
    Intelligence Agency] director--I think it was the CIA director,
    who soon will be the Secretary of State, who said there is no
    question that Russia committed the attack that happened in
    England against the spies. Our own President was like, could
    have been, we do not know, might have been somebody else, sort
    of the same thing that he said about the interference in the
    elections that Russia has done.
        The longer the leader of our country gives Russia a pass
    and keeps saying, well, maybe they are doing bad stuff, maybe
    they are not, the tougher your job is going to be, the tougher
    it is going to be to truly hold them accountable. So whatever
    the reason for that is--I do not even know, would not even
    begin to guess--the President needs to speak clearly and
    forcefully against these Russian actions and stop acting like
    maybe they did not happen. And I think it really undermines our
    ability to confront what Russia is doing on all fronts that
    have been discussed, both by the chairman and me.
        And with that I will yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And General Scaparrotti, thank you for your successful
    service. Your mission is absolutely critical, with little room
    for error.
        One of my primary concerns with EUCOM's ability to
    successfully defend its area of responsibility surrounds its
    ability to transport troops and/or equipment expeditiously
    across Europe. Antiquated infrastructure and inconsistent
    border crossing standards delay and disrupt our freedom of
    movement throughout the region, while training and exercising
    in the theater.
        Could you please describe what role the United States is
    taking in leading the effort to resolve these issues, and what
    other organizations--NATO, EU--are doing to address the
    challenge?
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you. I would agree that
    mobility, as I will call it broadly, within the Euro-Atlantic
    theater is very important to our deterrence and defensive
    capabilities. And it was not invested in through the years
    that--the past decade or more that we believed that Russia was
    a partner.
        I think we have turned the corner on that in this past
    year, in the sense that we have focus and energy among our
    European partners, as you said, to get a focus on improving our
    infrastructure, our rail and road, our ports, and our
    capability to handle the movement of military forces throughout
    Europe.
        We have done that in EUCOM through the work of, first, our
    logistics capacity in an assessment early of our ability to
    move, and the infrastructure that supports it. We have worked
    closely with both NATO, the J4 [director of logistics] in my
    SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]
    headquarters and NATO headquarters, as well as with the EU.
        So NATO and EU, as one of their primary cooperative
    efforts, is in fact mobility. That is important because it
    brings to bear the other elements of national power outside of
    the military that the EU can bring in economic, diplomatic, et
    cetera. So I think we have a good start, and we have a broad
    alliance of nations that are looking at this now.
        Mr. Wilson. And I was grateful to be with you in Munich and
    also in Brussels, where I saw the high regard of our allies for
    your efforts to address this issue.
        In December 2017 the President courageously changed the
    U.S. policy to provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine,
    and the State Department has subsequently approved the sale of
    Javelins to Ukraine. It is said that nearly 10,000 Ukrainians
    have been killed, as Putin has illegally invaded and occupied
    Crimea and the eastern portion of Ukraine. High hopes for a
    democratic and prosperous Russia have been crushed by Putin.
        What is your assessment of the impact of the new aid on the
    fight on the ground in Ukraine? How do you assess Russia's
    long-term strategy in Ukraine? And has it changed since the new
    policy?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you. I will first start by
    saying that Ukraine is in a--what I would consider a hot fight
    right now. It is not a frozen conflict. Daily there is activity
    along the front and, unfortunately for Ukraine, a loss of life
    every week. And I fully support what we are doing to help build
    their capability to defend their own country and reform their
    security institutions, as well, which they are working closely.
        The assets that we have provided, funded by Congress to
    support them and support their development, has provided them
    with defensive capabilities, and with the Javelin that you
    specifically noted, and it--those assets go directly to their
    improved capability to establish the defense in the east, and
    become more and more competent and confident of their ability
    to secure, you know, their nation.
        What I have seen in Russia is Russia has continued to
    support what I call a proxy force to include providing regular
    military commanders in charge at company and above level of the
    separatists, or the proxy forces on the other side. I think it
    is too early to say whether or not we have seen a change as a
    direct result of the decisions that were just taken. But we
    will watch that closely.
        I will close by saying it is not my belief that Russia
    wants to resolve this conflict at this point. They certainly
    could do much more to move along, to move the Minsk Agreement
    forward, things like offering protection and allowing mobility
    of the mission that oversees this, which they are not doing. So
    I think they actually are attempting to just freeze this a bit
    and--to their advantage.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, again, for your
    leadership. And the persons serving with you, God bless you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield my time
    to Mr. Brown of Maryland.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General, for your service and your testimony here
    today. I appreciate the opportunity to ask questions in a
    classified setting yesterday.
        I recently returned from a CODEL [congressional delegation]
    in Eastern Europe with Representative Stefanik, where we saw
    how partners such as Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine are working with
    your command to deter and counter the threat of and actual
    Russian aggression and expansionism. A critical component of
    that is forward deployment of our troops and equipment in the
    region.
        In your written testimony and at the Senate hearing last
    week you highlighted NATO's increased presence in the Baltic
    Region and in Poland and through the European Deterrence
    Initiative, which includes pre-positioning equipment and
    deploying enhanced forward-presence battalions along with
    armored brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigade on
    heel-to-toe 9-month rotation.
        My question: Given Russia's high tempo of exercises and
    troop placement on its borders, I would like to hear a little
    bit more about, you know, your thoughts on our forward force
    deployment. Is a heel-to-toe 9-month rotation the proper force
    posture for our forward-deployed units, or would a 1- or 2-year
    rotation be better? Or what about permanent presence of units?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you, sir. And I appreciate
    your visit to those nations, as well. They are strong allies
    and, as you know, one of the smaller nations through the
    Baltics, but strong and active.
        First of all, I would say that I think our rotational
    period of about 9 months is the right one. We have had
    experience in our forces, and particularly in the Army, of
    rotating for a year or a year and additional 3 months or less,
    and we found that 9 months is about right for a number of
    reasons. And so, I would--in terms of rotation, I would stay
    with 9 months.
        With a rotational force, I get someone specifically trained
    for that mission, ready to come in. And actually, because of
    the ranges, et cetera, we have available, I think I return a
    force that is just as well trained when it returns to the
    States. So we at least maintain the readiness, if not build
    some readiness through that experience.
        In terms of rotational versus permanent, I do believe we
    need more forces in Europe. I do not think we are at the
    posture that I believe appropriate or required yet. And because
    of that, I think that there are some permanent forces I would
    like to have.
        The first ones I would like to have would be some of our
    enabling elements. For example, a fires brigade, et cetera, as
    a permanent force, and then continue the rotation of the mech
    brigade, until we reach a point that we might consider that, as
    well.
        The last thing I will say is that I lay a requirement out
    and the service determines how best to fill that. But I think
    some of these, again, are best provided in a permanent fashion.
        Mr. Brown. And would you include an aviation brigade as a--
    one of those permanent forces that you would like to see?
        General Scaparrotti. I would, yes.
        Mr. Brown. Could you discuss some of the logistics and
    infrastructure challenges facing our forward-deployed troops,
    such as issues with freedom of movement and military
    construction in theater? And what steps are you taking under
    your command to address them?
        General Scaparrotti. As I said, our J4 has done an
    assessment in the past year--a little over a year ago we
    started it--in terms of the infrastructure status across Europe
    and what was required. With that we now, working with the
    nations involved, so that they understand their
    responsibilities, as well, as an ally or as a partner. And
    there is examples throughout Europe of them taking this on, in
    terms of their investment in ports, infrastructure, roads,
    change in rail.
        For instance, in NATO, at 29, they agreed to begin working
    the diplomatic and customs rules that allow the military to
    move expeditiously with less than 5 days' notice, for instance.
    Those are steps that are significant in making forward
    progress.
        We have already, through the--through Congress' support and
    the EDI, along with our partners, are investing in critical
    infrastructure, ports, things of that nature that we identified
    we need to improve in order to help with our mobility. And in
    just about all those cases, our ally in that place also invests
    in that, alongside of us, and invests more than we do,
    obviously. It is in their country.
        So I think we are making very good progress. We have got
    good examples of that. But there is a lot of work to do.
        Mr. Brown. Red, yellow, or green?
        General Scaparrotti. I would say yellow.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Scaparrotti,
    good to see you again. I want to echo Joe Wilson's comments,
    having been with you in Munich at the Munich Security
    Conference, and then your presentation also to the NATO
    Parliamentary Assembly.
        I think in all--both of those, we were very proud of both
    your representation of the United States, but also to our
    allies. You have continued to make clear the threat that Russia
    poses in all of your presentations, including their meddling in
    elections, meddling in democracies, the threat that is posed to
    you and your ability to execute your job and task, and even the
    forward-deployed troops, what they are experiencing.
        On the mobility issue, I would like to expand a little bit
    on the questions that have been asked. You have done a great
    job in, I think, informing Congress that there are mobility
    issues. As we have expanded NATO, we did not undertake plans
    for how would we defend the space, and make sure that the
    infrastructure was there.
        But I think people would also be surprised at, when we
    approved the European Reassurance Initiative, that there were
    funds, there were U.S. funds that were necessary in order to be
    able to get our troops from point A to point B that went to
    infrastructure. You mentioned that briefly, that we were
    working with our NATO partners and allies as to what they need
    to invest in.
        Could you give us some examples of the types of things that
    you had to fund with the European Reassurance Initiative that
    you should not be funding, and that we need to work with our
    allies to make certain that the infrastructure supports so that
    you do not have to in the future?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. An example might be in MK
    [Mihail Kogalniceanu], which is a base in Romania, a very good
    base that they have. We are laying a concrete pad off the
    runway and investing in a little bit of the infrastructure that
    helps with the movement and mobility of troops through that
    port. And what they are doing is they agreed, as we improve
    that tarmac, improve their reception point off the runway, they
    agreed to include a fuel line and improve the rail line into
    there, all helpful to make this a good hub for movement of
    troops and equipment. They also are investing in the base
    itself, and accommodations for our troops that we rotate
    through there.
        So that is a really good example of where we have worked
    with another country in a place that we needed some mobility
    and a site to come in to. And there is others like that that
    are just improvements to aerial ports or seaports that help our
    mobility, help us get the capacity in that port.
        The other thing I would just like to mention--and I
    intended to mention earlier--was that the other thing we are
    doing that is important is we--as we rotate our forces, and the
    allies do, we are trying to bring them through different ports
    and move them by different means. And in doing that, we learn
    where we have issues. We develop that capability in our--in
    those countries, and their civilian infrastructure that
    supports that, and build muscle memory. So that has been an
    important part of this over the past year, as well.
        Mr. Turner. Well, that goes to my next question. Shortly
    after seeing you, I went to--I was in Germany and saw the
    Toledo Air Guard, which had just left Estonia. And they
    reported that, you know, there was a number of their missions
    that they were unable to accomplish because of some of the
    issues that you just described.
        And the questions that they had, obviously, was how is that
    captured. How can we be assured that, as we do the forward
    deployment of troops and they run into these impediments to be
    able to execute their missions, that it is captured, that it is
    worked, and that it is resolved so that we do have that future
    capability?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. We capture that in a very
    deliberate after-action review. And all of those exercises--
    again, purposeful movement by certain ways, operations out of
    certain places capture the issues we have, bring it back up
    through the EUCOM J4, out to NATO J4, and the countries that is
    involved to capture that. That is exactly how we do it.
        We have examples, for instance, in movement of troops here
    this last summer for exercises where, you know, they were
    stopped at a border, put on a sidetrack for, like, 2 days, 3
    days. We had to work through customs. First we had to discover
    that we had troops sitting on a rail alongside, you know,
    alongside a border.
        But those things occur. We capture that, back up, and then
    we drill back down into it, whether it is a customs issue, a
    coordination issue, or it is an infrastructure issue.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, General. Thank you, Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your testimony yesterday and today.
    The Office of Naval Intelligence issued a report in 2015 called
    ``The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition,'' and--again, a
    public document. And it states here that ``Submarines are the
    capital ships of the Russian Navy. This is dictated by Russia's
    geography; constrained direct access to major ocean areas
    everywhere but in the Pacific makes surface ship operations
    vulnerable to potential enemy action. The inherent covert
    nature of submarines enhances their survivability, whether
    operating locally or when transiting into more open sea
    areas.''
        And then it goes on to quote Admiral Chirkov of the navy,
    stating that the nuclear submarine fleet is the priority of the
    navy shipbuilding program.
        Again, one of your predecessors, Admiral Stavridis,
    testified here a couple years ago and kind of caught people's
    attention by stating that the submarine activity is roughly
    about 70 percent of what it was during the Cold War era. And he
    knows what he is talking about, because he sort of was there
    during a lot of that. And you mentioned in your opening remarks
    about the fact that antisubmarine activities is now--and, you
    know, kind of a restart, in terms of our forces, as well as the
    region.
        I realize some of this is classified and you talked about
    it a little bit yesterday, but I think it is important still to
    talk--create at least some picture, in terms of what you are
    dealing with, and what you are seeing. And I was wondering if
    you could comment a little more.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, thank you. Well, Admiral
    Stavridis noted--he gave an estimate of what it was in. Just
    this last year, since the last time I testified here, we have
    seen activity in the Russian navy, and particularly undersea in
    their submarine activity, that we haven't seen since the 1980s.
    So the level of activity is up yet again. And, as you know,
    they are producing maritime enhancements to existing ships and
    new submarine that is definitely more modern and more
    challenging.
        While we remain dominant undersea, we have got to continue
    our investment, as the Navy has laid out, in order to maintain
    that dominance, just given their modernization and their
    increased activity with their forces.
        Mr. Courtney. And as far as, you know, working with, again,
    some of our allies in the region, again, this is something,
    again, sort of a restart, as I mentioned.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. It is important. You know,
    most of the allies and the United States does not have the same
    capacity that it had during the Cold War, when we were used to
    doing this together, particularly antisubmarine warfare,
    maritime operations. So we are all rebuilding our capacities,
    we are improving our capacities to meet the--you know, the
    challenges we have in this new environment, and Russia's
    modernization. Together we can handle this. We have proven that
    in this past year. But it does take all of us working together.
        And the other thing I would mention, it takes a mix of the
    forces, particularly antisubmarine warfare. You are talking
    air, surface, subsurface, sensors. It is a mix that allows us,
    along with our allies and their capabilities, to be successful.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Last year's NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] we included some language that allowed
    wounded Ukrainian soldiers to be treated in U.S. medical
    facilities in accordance with DOD [Department of Defense]
    rules. And again, I know that was just signed a couple months
    ago, but I wonder if you had any sort of comment in terms of
    just, A, how that was received, you know, by our friends in the
    Ukraine, and you know, whether or not you see that as a process
    that is actually going to happen.
        General Scaparrotti. I would say I am sure it was received
    very well. It is a very deliberate demonstration of our support
    for them and our close partnership, to care for one of their
    wounded.
        Mr. Courtney. Great.
        General Scaparrotti. And so, without a doubt--and I know
    their CHOD well, he is their chief of defense, truly cares
    about his forces and their care, as well as their training, so
    that they can fight and protect that country.
        Mr. Courtney. Great, thank you. I yield back.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you so much for your service. My concerns
    were we are at an untenable position with Russia right now, and
    I want to get clarification of Article 5, your interpretation
    of it, because they have developed a hybrid system, or a sort
    of a--I guess you could call it hybrid tactics that involve
    information operations, I guess you could say, an element of
    psychological warfare, as well as using covert forces as
    proxies.
        And so, when we look at something like the Baltic States
    that I think have Russian minorities in them, much like the
    Ukraine, that they could do the same pattern there. And I am
    concerned that--would--that NATO would acquiesce to that,
    because they might not consider it a conventional attack under
    Article 5. What is your interpretation of that?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, NATO recognizes
    the difficulty in indirect or asymmetric activity that Russia
    is practicing, activities below the level of conflict. And, in
    fact, we have inserted that for the first time into our NATO
    exercise that we did this past year with some ambiguous
    activities that are consistent with what they would typically
    do, in order to bring this about and have that discussion at
    29.
        And so they are actually dealing with the issue around this
    and in cyber, and working to define an understanding of what
    would be a trigger for Article 5. So they are working that, and
    they recognize it.
        I would just share with you that is the most difficult
    scenario I see, potentially, is because of the way they
    typically work in a fashion that would be ambiguous, it would
    be most difficult to come to a decision. But I would share that
    NATO is aware of this, and they are actually working on it.
        Mr. Coffman. But do you not think that--you said that that
    is the most difficult scenario. Do you not think that is the
    most probable scenario right now? And do you not think one of
    the objections--objectives of Russia is--clearly, is to break
    NATO, and to test us, for instance, in one of the Baltic
    States?
        General Scaparrotti. I think that, absolutely, they are
    trying to undermine and splinter NATO. It is a difficult
    situation when they operate that way. But I am confident of
    NATO. I have seen the discussions. And I think in something
    that they agree is an attack warranting Article 5, that they
    can come together. I have seen them come together in other
    things less than this that was perhaps divisive at the time,
    but they can reach a conclusion.
        Mr. Coffman. Well, let me express to you that I do not
    necessarily share the confidence in our allies, because of
    the--there is a--was an agreed-upon 2 percent of GDP [gross
    domestic product] to be spent on defense, and the majority of
    our NATO allies are nowhere near that 2 percent requirement.
    And so it is--you know, is it that--well, obviously, they have
    other priorities within their budget.
        But that is a real concern, why they are not doing that.
    And there is an overreliance upon the United States. Could you
    comment on that?
        General Scaparrotti. I share your concern. And I press
    that, as well as the Secretary General. I press it as the
    SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] and as the EUCOM
    commander every place I go.
        They have to demonstrate a change. They have--as I stated
    in my opening statement, there is--there will be 8 that have
    made that 2 percent, and 15 that plan to make it, and we will
    continue to press that, as being a part of the alliance is also
    contributing as a part of the alliance, both in cash and
    contributions and capability. So that is what we are watching.
    And I agree that we need to press that.
        I would add that if you look at NATO and say--since Warsaw,
    for instance, and the adaptation, the recognition as Russia is
    a threat here, a competitive nation. All of those things that I
    noted about the forward posture of troops in the east, our air
    policing activity, a much more increased maritime activity,
    particularly in the Black Sea and the Baltics, everything that
    I do there as the SACEUR was agreed at 29. That is why I have
    confidence in NATO. These are tough decisions for them and
    within their countries, and they have been able to act over the
    past year.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to
    specifically talk with you about Russia and the Balkans. I know
    that there have been several investments that Russians have
    wanted to make in the Balkans. There was a pipeline project, I
    believe, about a year or so ago that did not quite work out the
    way they anticipated. There have also been some credit and
    remittance issues, some other foreign trade things that did not
    quite go the Russians' way, but it is definitely--it is clear
    that they want to continue to have influence there.
        In your opinion, how far are they willing to go to make
    sure that they can continue to have a certain amount of
    influence there in that region, even though some of the things
    that they are working on, economically, just have not [borne]
    any fruit?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, what I see is offers, for
    instance, of military equipment and military assistance. And
    sometimes the military equipment is surely below the cost to
    them.
        But as you watch them work in Europe and on the periphery
    in countries that they work with, they will offer that
    equipment at a very low cost in order to ensure that they--you
    know, that they will take it. They will offer then support and
    bring in troops. And then they will decide that the troops need
    to stay, as a matter of influence and some leverage, I would
    say, over time. Those are the things that I see them doing on
    the military side.
        Beyond that, very common disinformation campaigns in the
    nations, you know, within the Balkans, stirring political
    debate, support for fringe political parties in order to stir
    that debate, and a very consistent message that is anti-West,
    anti-NATO, anti-U.S.
        Mr. Veasey. If their demographic crisis is real--and it has
    been, you know, reported that they are losing population--and
    these investments that they are offering to people are not
    going through and, again, they are just--they are not, you
    know, yielding anything, how long can they continue to keep up
    that sort of disinformation and continue to be a powerful
    player there, if they are suffering in all these areas,
    economically?
        General Scaparrotti. You know, there are some that look at
    their demographics, they look at their economy, health issues,
    et cetera, and would say that while they are in a great power
    competition, as you look long range they just cannot sustain
    this.
        My view would be that the--you know, the Russian people are
    used to adversity. They almost, as a culture, embrace that. And
    that even with a difficult economy, President Putin has been
    able to reverse the trend and it is, I think, approaching 2
    percent growth. I think they have great resilience.
        And that is not what we should count on. We should count on
    our ensuring that we are strong and we deter their activities.
        Mr. Veasey. How do you think that we should continue to try
    to influence the countries there in the Balkans to make
    positive steps towards NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it is important that we have a
    whole-of-government approach, diplomatic engagement there,
    which we do, but also encouragement from our allies there. We
    need to work with them to build Western democratic
    institutions. There is clearly a desire among the population in
    the Balkans to come West. But we have got to show them that we
    are just as interested in that as they are.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, it is nice to
    see you again.
        I want to follow up on a little bit of the line of
    questions that my colleague, Mr. Veasey, was asking. Russia is
    a huge country land mass, the largest country--my understanding
    is--on the Earth. They border, depending on how you count them,
    over 12 countries, including North Korea and China on the
    eastern side. But then, when you come back to the part of the
    world that you are in charge of, they border a number of
    countries in the European theater.
        My question is, are they engaging in malign activities
    against all of them? And, if not, which countries are they not
    engaging in these activities against?
        General Scaparrotti. I think, you know, I have probably
    seen some activity in most countries. And, you know, those that
    they do not have a certain focus on, you still see that
    activity in their media, because their media is laced with a--
    you know, an anti-Western, anti-international order kind of
    message, undercutting democratic countries, undercutting
    governments that they are in--and that is kind of where they
    are light, and then focused more particularly in the east, the
    countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union. You know,
    they see that as their strategic space, and they think they
    should have some preferential influence in those nations. So it
    is much heavier there.
        But even in the other countries of Europe, if you go to the
    west--Italy, France, Germany, et cetera--there is examples
    there of same, you know, use of disinformation, social media,
    and those kinds of activities, as well.
        Mr. Scott. That is--I have only been over there a few weeks
    in the last couple of years. But the perception that I had was
    that they are engaged in all of those, and basically they are
    going to stir chaos wherever they can. And then, when they see
    a weakness, they would take advantage of it.
        And you answered this question earlier, when Mr. Veasey
    asked it, but the question I had is how long can they sustain
    that against all of the countries? And how long do all the
    other countries go without at some point taking an action
    against Russia to actually stop, stop this? I mean----
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I cannot answer how long they
    could go. I would say they are a resilient nation and a
    culture. And so I think we have to take action to--in order to
    establish a deterrent effect. And that is to respond to
    demonstrate capability and demonstrate the will to use it, if
    necessary.
        Mr. Scott. I worry--and I am just making this as a
    statement--with regard to Turkey being on their border. I worry
    about them using their activities to create a disturbance in
    Turkey, potentially a coup there, where somebody friendly to
    them took over, even if they took over for only a day or two,
    with our assets in that country, the potential damage that they
    could do, simply by seizing some of our assets.
        Are you comfortable that that relationship with Turkey is
    strong enough, and we have enough insight into that, that if
    that began to happen, that we would have the ability to protect
    all of our assets in that country?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I am comfortable with that.
    We have a very good mil-to-mil relationship with Turkey. I
    speak to their chief of defense often. Our staffs have
    interchange. They have been very responsive to us, in terms of
    force protection, as well. So any concern that either through
    their intelligence or ours about a threat to our forces that
    are stationed there, et cetera, they have taken immediate
    action.
        So I--in terms of their demonstration, the relationship we
    have, I am confident of that, and the protection of our force
    there.
        If I could follow up on the other when I talk about we have
    to demonstrate, I want to emphasize that we, as the alliance
    and our partners--because our strength, you know, versus
    Russia's, strategically, really is the fact that we have such a
    great alliance and such great partners. That is important. And
    they recognize that.
        Mr. Scott. Absolutely. And they do not seem to be--they do
    not seem to have many, which is good.
        Well, I want to just thank you for your service and for
    being here, and I look forward to making it back to that part
    of the world to see it.
        The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, could you briefly give us an idea of what the
    capacity is on the Russian side to continue or accelerate this
    level of military spending?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that, you know, just
    from what I understand of their budget and what they are doing,
    they--their budget is improving. But they do have a difficult
    hand to play here.
        So--and what we have seen is they have slowed down their
    modernization. I think you will continue to see decisions in
    that regard, but not enough to make a huge difference. In other
    words, it will draw it out by maybe 2 to 5 years, but I think
    they know what they want to establish, the capabilities they
    need, and they have been very focused on that over a number of
    years.
        So I think you may see it drawn out, but I do not think you
    will see them stop in terms of what they believe they need as a
    part of their military capabilities.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. In February, Admiral Rogers, head
    of Cyber Command and NSA [National Security Agency], said--and
    I am quoting him--``President Putin has come clearly to the
    conclusion that there is little price to pay. And therefore''--
    and then he is quoting Putin--`` `I can continue this
    activity'.'' Clearly, what we have done has not been enough in
    regards to what action we have taken to deter Russia and
    election meddling. And perhaps we could extend that to Syria,
    to Crimea, to Ukraine, to involvement in European elections, to
    the involvement in the 2018 elections in the United States, to
    the involvement in the 2020 elections.
        You said to the Senate Armed Services Committee last week,
    ``I don't believe there is an effective unification across the
    interagency with the energy and focus that we could attain.''
    How can you assure us that we are going to achieve that and, to
    follow up on the ranking member's question, that there is a
    price to pay for Russia that will deter this kind of activity,
    going forward?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I can tell you that within
    Department of Defense, and as far as I am concerned, we are
    working closely within the interagency to develop both the
    structure and enhance the energy that I talked about. I think
    that is the issue. We have got to--we have a lot of capacity,
    we have a lot of talent.
        Particularly, that was directly from a question about
    activity below the level of conflict. And so, when it comes to
    information operations, our capacity in cyber, our ability in
    diplomacy, and truthful media, we have great capacity. We have
    got to focus that capacity as a whole of government on this
    problem set, so that they know there is a response, and we can
    overcome that.
        And, you know, we have seen instances in Europe now where
    we have developed the structure and the volume at specific
    times within the media to influence their disinformation, to
    influence their actions as a result. This can be done, we have
    got to pull this together and get after it.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Yes. I am convinced of your intent, and the
    will, and the dedication, excellence of those who serve under
    you. I am not convinced of the strategy or the efficacy at this
    point. I do not understand--I would not expect you to tell me
    that everything is okay, because it is--definitely not. And
    you, yourself, have said that it is not. You said, ``We are
    getting a better understanding of it. I would not characterize
    it as a good picture at this point, not satisfactory to me.''
        You have talked about Russian activity related in the
    United States to infrastructure reconnaissance, et cetera. You
    said, ``I will leave it at that.'' What I would like, though,
    is not to be assured that it is okay, but to have some
    assurance in a strategy that we can all understand and
    articulate, and a commitment to this threat articulated by the
    President on down.
        And I am not seeing that, my constituents are not seeing
    that. I am getting asked those questions. That is why I am
    asking them of you today, so that I can go back to them and
    have an understanding of what that is. It does not sound, it
    does not look like, if we just connect the dots from Russia's
    activity from Georgia to today, that anything we have done has
    deterred them. Convince me to the contrary.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I cannot, you know--broadly,
    they have not been deterred. They act today in the information
    realm. They continue to take activity below the level of
    conflict.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Is there anything you are doing now, or plan
    to do in the near future, that will deter them?
        General Scaparrotti. We are taking actions that do deter
    them, as I said, in specific areas. We have the capacity to do
    this. We are taking all kinds of activities. And I think it is
    across the whole of government, as well.
        We have a deterrent effect in the East, no doubt about it,
    with respect to--and it is not just the military component that
    does that. You know, we have a deterrent effect,
    conventionally. Within information cycle, it is a new domain.
    It is in a--it is a domain today that is connected, it is fast.
    So this is not easy, and it is new. And that is the area that
    we--and probably one of the toughest areas to deter and act.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you for your answers and for your
    service.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes.
        The Chairman. Mr. Byrne.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I am over here. First of all, thank you for your
    service to our country. We genuinely appreciate what you
    continue to do for us every day.
        All of us have watched with dismay what has happened in
    Eastern Ukraine. Over 10,000 people are dead. And I am glad to
    see that we are now beginning to give them the help that they
    have been asking for for some time. But as you know, Ukraine is
    not a member of NATO, whereas there are other countries in that
    region--and I am thinking specifically of the Baltics--that are
    members of NATO, and to which, by virtue of the fact that we
    are members of NATO, we owe them a substantial obligation if
    somebody does something to them, somebody invades them.
        So, two questions. Do you think something like what has
    happened in Eastern Ukraine could happen in the Baltics? And,
    if so, what would U.S. involvement look like to honor our
    obligations to those countries?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, in answer to that, I do not want
    to speculate about, you know, what we would do, et cetera. I
    would just say this: We have an agreement at--with members in
    NATO that an Article 5 attack on one is an attack on all. And
    we would honor that. There is no doubt in my mind about it. We
    would come to their assistance.
        I think Russia is deterred from taking an action like that,
    like trying to seize a portion of one of the countries on the
    border, because they know NATO is 29 nations, it is much
    stronger, and that we would win that conflict. They do not want
    a conflict in that regard. So I personally do not believe they
    would take that step.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, I would hope they would not, as well.
        General Scaparrotti. I would hope not, too.
        Mr. Byrne. But hoping is not a plan, as you know. I assume,
    whether you can tell us about the details of it or not, I
    assume that there is a plan if they try to do something.
        General Scaparrotti. There is a plan.
        Mr. Byrne. Good. Are we providing you--is Congress
    providing you with the authorization and resources you need to
    implement that plan?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, the budget that is presented
    here--and when I talk about the budget, I am also looking at
    the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], you know, the out-
    years. Since I have been in this job, this is the first time in
    the budget that I have said, ``Here are my requirements,'' and
    they are being addressed in some way throughout the FYDP. So I
    am very pleased with this. And I think, with that regard, it is
    sufficient.
        But, listen, it will take us those years to really put us
    in a posture that I believe that we should be in, and we are
    best in to assure deterrence of Russia and any idea that they
    might have to take an act, to assure that we deter any thoughts
    or opportunities they might think they have.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, I want to make sure that--I believe with
    all my heart you are doing and the people under you are doing
    what they are supposed to be doing. But sometimes you have to
    tell us what we need to do to provide you with both the
    authorization and the resources to do what you need to do. And
    I hope you will not be reticent about telling us what you need,
    because until we know that, it is hard for us to do what we
    have got to do.
        There was--as you probably know, we had quite an effort to
    get the level of spending up for the Department of Defense for
    both this fiscal year and next fiscal year. That did not come
    about by happenstance, and it took an enormous amount of
    effort. We need the information and the push sometimes from you
    and people that are working with you so that we get what we
    need to get done here in Congress for you.
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, first of all, thank you. I
    understand this has not been easy. My message to you is you
    will know clearly what my assessments are. And in a number of
    these things, in a classified document, I will tell you exactly
    what my requirements are, and to the extent that you can look
    at it across the FYDP and see actually whether they are being
    addressed and how quickly they are being addressed. But I will
    be very clear about that, and I appreciate, you know, Congress
    and the committee's diligence in this. Thank you.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, I think everybody on the committee
    appreciates your directness with us. Sometimes the more direct
    you are, the more likely we are to be responsive to you. And I
    just want to encourage you to do that, because I believe you do
    have a plan. We probably will learn about it another time, when
    it is appropriate. But I always worry that you have got a great
    plan, and we have not always given you the authorization and
    the appropriations you need. Tell us what you need, and I think
    you will find this committee ready to work with you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General, one of the things that I have been advocating for
    since getting here is moving the EDI from being based on OCO
    [overseas contingency operations] funds to the base budget. I
    certainly think that if we want to talk about a commitment and
    a show of force, at least to Russia, that we are committed to
    Europe, that would be the route to do it. And, of course, also
    to assure our NATO allies that we are there with them in the
    fight, and not just in a 1-year process.
        What would change, from your perspective, in terms of
    planning, if we moved EDI out of OCO and into the base budget?
        General Scaparrotti. First of all, I would support going to
    a base budget out of OCO. What would change in that is that at
    some point it would be under the services to then prioritize
    and fund and deliver the assets within their service.
        And that is my one concern, is that the way that we develop
    EDI today, between I and the Department, is that we lay out the
    priorities from a commander's perspective--EUCOM--and that is a
    bit different than a service perspective, because I am looking
    at the synchronization and the combination of all the services
    and resources to get the best benefit, in terms of deterrence
    and defense.
        And so, as we move to the budget, I would like some means
    within the planning to protect that prioritization by the
    combatant commander.
        Mr. Gallego. In terms of the message it would send to our
    allies if they--if we actually went that route, in your
    opinion?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I--you know, I think that the
    message would be that we are committed to funding our needs,
    and particularly those needs that have to do with the Euro-
    Atlantic, where we are a member of NATO and we have partners in
    Europe as a part of the base budget. But again, the key there
    would be that they see the investment that is also inherent in
    our alliance activity and capabilities.
        Mr. Gallego. Excellent. I would like to talk, moving on,
    into--especially what we recently just saw occur in England.
    Russia will likely never, in my opinion, present a clear
    violation of NATO's Article 5, but they will always, you know,
    try to be like the petulant teenager that they are, and just
    kind of testing and probing below actually crossing the line.
        So what are we doing with our NATO members and with our
    non-NATO partners like Finland and Sweden to kind of build up
    the resilience of the alliance, of their capabilities, of their
    domestic capabilities, and to prevent Russian incursion that--
    the pre-Russian incursion that happens when there--such
    activities around hybrid warfare, things like that. So the
    overall steps--I would say, I guess, the inoculation that we
    should be doing to stop Russia incursion or influence on our
    allies and near allies.
        General Scaparrotti. So there is a number of activities
    ongoing in Europe right now that are United States to partners
    and United States within the alliance.
        I would first point out with any alliance that, you know,
    we have noted that cyber is a domain, and we are now working as
    a domain, both at a diplomatic level, as well as the military
    aspects of that. And we have established cyber centers, we are
    beginning to take--we are beginning to conduct activities in
    that regard, and that touches all 29 nations, but it also
    touches the partners of NATO, which there are about 40.
        Within NATO you have got a hybrid center of excellence, we
    have got a cyber center of excellence among different nations.
    Those also are in place to help assess the environment,
    determine best responses, educate the other nations'
    capabilities in this, and then help them in applying it. And
    within NATO all of our actions are to help us do this in a
    synchronized pattern.
        So, while there is much work to do, there is a lot of good
    work going on right now in each of these areas that shares
    information, shares best practices, shares information so that
    we are fully aware of what is going on in our environment. And
    so, you know, I am positive about this. But there is a lot of
    work that needs to be done.
        Mr. Gallego. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for the great work that you are doing.
    I had to be in another committee, so please excuse me if you
    already addressed this question. But feel free to amplify. I
    would like to ask you about Iran.
        As North Korea continues to expand its ballistic missile
    and nuclear capabilities, it has also been testing newly
    developed systems, which I think is a real problem. While the
    United States has arguably shifted focus in the last 2 to 5
    years to address the threats from North Korea, how would you
    assess our ability to counter an Iranian threat to U.S.
    interests in EUCOM, including the ability to protect our
    deployed forces in your area of responsibility?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I would assess, you know, our
    capabilities as good. As you know, our defense system,
    particularly our air and missile defense system, has as a focus
    Iran, as well.
        We do in EUCOM watch closely Iranian activity, and
    particularly their malign influence, as Israel is a part of
    EUCOM. And Iran is--they consider Iran an existential threat to
    them. And I--one of my responsibilities is to support the
    defense of Israel. So we work closely with Israel, and we keep
    a very close eye on Iran's capabilities and activities, in
    close coordination with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command].
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And as kind of a follow-on to that,
    we have Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. What are we
    doing to protect them from cruise missile or other kinds of
    attacks?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, that is addressed among a layered
    defensive system--I will leave it at that--and steps that we
    are taking in that regard. And I would prefer to give you that
    response more fully than that, you know, in a classified
    document, if I could.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. That would certainly work.
        And lastly, on Asian modernizations, give us an update on
    the Russian military modernization programs. And, you know,
    General--excuse me--President Putin talked about these, I
    think, kind of far-fetched nuclear-tipped torpedoes, nuclear-
    powered cruise missiles, things like that. But what are they
    realistically doing that you are concerned about?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, they--you know, they are
    modernizing their force. So let us go to the--you know, the
    conventional and nuclear force first. And just generally, in
    this environment, I can talk to you--I can provide you a more
    in-depth response in a classified document.
        But you know, it is well known that they are modernizing
    their conventional force. They are primarily doing that through
    a respect of--with the weapons systems that they put on them,
    as well as the missiles that they have developed to give them
    greater range, greater precision. And in most of these systems
    that they employ, they can be either conventional or nuclear.
        So in many ways, they are improving the ships that they
    have in the maritime, they are improving the planes that they
    have, their bombers, and their submarines, with advanced
    systems that we need to--you know, we need to pace and be able
    to deal with. They are improving their nuclear capability
    across all their systems, and modernizing those. That is why
    NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] is so important for us to maintain
    our nuclear deterrent across the range of scenarios that they
    might present.
        The last thing I would note is that, you know, they are
    working hard to modernize both their C4 systems--you know,
    their command, control, communications [and computers]--and
    also capabilities in space. And then hypersonics, as well.
        Mr. Lamborn. When it comes to the Nuclear Posture Review, I
    believe that it is a good thing that it is being proposed that
    we have more options, like low-yield weapons or sea-launched
    intermediate cruise missiles. Some people think that we should
    have fewer options, just as a philosophical matter. Where do
    you come down on the number of options that we should or should
    not have?
        General Scaparrotti. Oh, I support the Nuclear Posture
    Review that we should close any gaps, that we should have a
    deterrent that can respond across the spectrum of scenarios
    that they might present us, or an adversary might present us. I
    think this design is a tailorable force that does just that,
    and it does not lower the threshold. Actually, by closing those
    gaps and ensuring they understand that we have a deterrent, a
    capable posture, that it raises that, and it raises that
    threshold, in my view.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Panetta.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, good morning, thank you for being here. Thank you
    for your testimony. As you can tell by most of the questioning,
    hybrid warfare is a concern as to what is going on, obviously,
    with Russia and what they are doing.
        When you look at Article 5, though--and I--you know, I just
    looked it up, to be frank--you know, it says ``armed attack.''
    Each goes through that. In your opinion, do you think Article 5
    needs to be updated in order to deal with this hybrid warfare,
    so that there can be more of a joint response?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I would--I am not
    going to try and get in--that is really the North Atlantic
    Council's job, there. But, you know, I talk to them. I think
    they are actually working on the structures and the definitions
    that inform that treaty. And I am confident that they are
    wrestling with the hard question that you are talking about.
    Whether or not it is a change to the--literally to the wording
    of Article 5, or whether it is the--you know, the process and
    the understandings that they develop short of that, I will let
    them be the determinant of that.
        Mr. Panetta. Do you feel it limits you now, in its current
    state, in regards to your response to this hybrid warfare?
        General Scaparrotti. No, I do not think it limits me. I
    think there is an understanding of the basis, the spirit of
    Article 5, and an understanding that the character of warfare
    is changing.
        Mr. Panetta. Fair enough.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes.
        Mr. Panetta. Fair enough. Great. Thank you. Pivoting,
    moving up north in regards to the Arctic, can you speak to the
    Russian buildup up there, and our response?
        General Scaparrotti. Clearly, they are modernizing some of
    their older bases there, they are building some new ones. They
    are placing radar systems, et cetera, in place, and they have
    moved air defense systems back and forth, as a part of their
    exercises, as well. They are developing capabilities, in terms
    of ships capable to operate in that environment in numbers that
    will outpace us, if we are not diligent here.
        And so, in the instate, you know, in several years they
    probably would be in a position, given their modernization,
    that they could, if they chose to, control the Northern Sea
    Route. They state their intent is for safety, security,
    economy, rescue of those at sea, et cetera. But I think we have
    to pay attention to what we are seeing there.
        Mr. Panetta. And we are paying attention, clearly.
        General Scaparrotti. We are. But we need to--we also need
    to look with our allies and across our government at what
    assets and capabilities we should have in place, given their
    modernization.
        Mr. Panetta. And beyond looking, are we actually doing
    something?
        General Scaparrotti. We are.
        Mr. Panetta. Okay, all right. Thank you, I appreciate it.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Great to see you again, General Scaparrotti. You stated
    recently that you do not believe that the United States has an
    effective and unified approach to dealing with Russia's cyber
    threat: specifically, ``I don't believe there is an effective
    unification across the interagency with the energy and the
    focus that we could attain.'' What are we doing to address
    this? And what specifically do we need to do?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I will speak, you know, from my
    point of view here, as a EUCOM commander.
        What we are doing is we are working with the Russian
    Information Group, which is the RIG, commonly called. It is an
    interagency board. I co-chair that with the Under Secretary of
    State. That gives us a platform to bring together the
    interagency in a whole-of-government approach and response to
    activity below the level of warfare, for instance.
        The GEC is under State, which is the Global----
        Ms. Stefanik. Engagement Center.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. I think is probably, at
    least in my view, the central point now within the government--
    State being responsible for particularly information countering
    disinformation.
        So that is what we are doing. And the GEC has been--
    received additional funding and guidance.
        My point that you quoted is I think we have the structure
    that we could expand on, but we are not--we just do not have
    the focus and the energy that I think that we are capable of,
    or we should put into this in order to deter this
    disinformation campaign that is going on.
        Ms. Stefanik. So I agree with you, but I want to hear
    specifically what steps we need to take to ensure that we have
    the focus and the energy.
        And I know I have concerns with the lack of implementation
    of the appropriations, when it comes to the GEC. But I want to
    hear from you specifically what steps we need to take so a year
    from now the answer to this question is not the same.
        General Scaparrotti. Okay, I am going to give you my
    response. I am not in State. This is really a question that,
    you know, frankly--I will admit here publicly that this is
    their business. But from someone that takes part in this, as a
    part of DOD, you know, I personally believe that, you know,
    greater clarity in role, greater direction across the
    interagency with respect to how this will work as a--you know,
    as the central agency for information, and perhaps resources in
    order to develop the energy and the focus that I talked about.
        I would prefer not to go beyond that, because, again, I
    am--you know, this is really a question for State. But I think,
    you know, from my point of view in working with them, they are
    good people, we are making good headway. But we could do more.
        Ms. Stefanik. You and I have discussed--and I think it
    would be worthy for the committee to hear your assessment. Are
    we seeing new trends--and the context of this question comes
    from we are heading into the midterm elections. Are we seeing
    new trends when it comes to Russia's use of disinformation
    among our allies?
        Obviously, we saw that leading up to the French elections
    and the German elections. And I think both countries were
    pretty capable, in terms of how they ensured that this
    disinformation campaign from Russia did not meddle with their
    electoral process.
        What can we learn from that? What trends do we need to look
    for, as we head to the midterms?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the one that is apparent
    is just use of social media and using factories in order to get
    out a lot of volume with disruptive messaging. And that was
    seen here, it was seen in Europe in the elections there, as
    well.
        But that is one of the trends that has been identified. And
    as other nations, as we progress through some of the elections
    in Europe, they were better able to handle because they
    recognized this may be coming about. And they have learned how
    to begin to counter that, how to be prepared to counter it, et
    cetera. So there is progress being made. But that is one of
    those that I would note.
        And I think, as an alliance, you know, we have assisted
    with their elections, et cetera, and they have exchanged
    information, as well, from what they have learned. And my
    general view is that we have been better able--at least in
    Europe--to deal with this, as this has progressed.
        Ms. Stefanik. And my last question, if I have time, is who,
    from your perspective, has the central responsibility when it
    comes to countering propaganda, whether it is from Russia or,
    frankly, other adversaries?
        General Scaparrotti. My understanding, it is State.
        Ms. Stefanik. Okay. And are there country-specific
    strategies that are being developed that work effectively with
    DOD counterparts?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. What we have done within the
    information group and with the GEC and across the interagency
    is we have developed nations that are vulnerable or under
    threat, ones that we thought we could have the best benefit.
    And from a U.S. perspective now, we have gone to the ambassador
    in our country team and said, ``What are your objectives, and
    how do we support those?''
        Ms. Stefanik. My time has expired.
        General Scaparrotti. So we are focusing on that.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, good to see you again, and thank you for your
    service.
        So I know that my colleague just talked about the Global
    Engagement Center, but I want to address it as well, because I
    think it is an important topic. From its inception, I have
    certainly believed that it has a critical role to play when it
    comes to countering the messages perpetuated by our
    adversaries, both terrorist organizations and nation-states.
        I am certainly glad that the State Department has finally
    accepted the allocated transfer of funds from the Department of
    Defense to assist in the effort, and--but I find it somewhat
    problematic that there still exists a lack of leadership within
    the State Department, from the bottom all the way to the top,
    as we have seen within the past few days, to leverage its
    capabilities to disrupt destabilization campaigns aimed at the
    United States and our allies.
        So, can you answer for me and touch on the topic a little
    more how are you working with the Global Engagement Center, and
    how can we better use its capabilities?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I can comment on our
    relationship. It is a very good one, and we work with them
    consistently. They are a member of the RIG, which I talked
    about. And through that, that is the direct connection with the
    work that the RIG does. But even on a daily basis we know who
    to go to with respect to the information operations we in EUCOM
    are doing, or the things that we see. So it is a--you know, it
    is a very good relationship.
        My comments have been directed on I think we need a more
    robust effort within the GEC. And in terms of how to do that,
    that is really State's portfolio.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. So you noted in your testimony that
    Russia is advancing its indirect and asymmetric capabilities in
    accordance with its concept of warfare, commonly referred to as
    the Gerasimov Doctrine. The concept here states that non-
    military means have grown or surpassed the use of force to
    achieve political or strategic goals, non-military factors
    outweigh military factors in that doctrine by a ratio of 4 to
    1.
        Do you feel comfortable that the non-military assets of
    U.S. national power are being utilized effectively to
    adequately counter the threats posed by Russia? And can you
    describe the extent of your relationship with those in the
    United States responsible for the coordinating of the non-
    military elements with you and your staff?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, you know, I will
    underscore that Russia has a doctrine that, in my view, sees
    these activities below the level of conflict as a part of the
    full spectrum, with an intent that, if they could undermine a
    target country through these types of means, political
    destabilization, et cetera, never having to use a military
    force, that is their objective.
        We work every day across the interagency. I have
    interagency representatives that are talented and capable and
    working hard with us to ensure that what we do is an
    interagency effort, a whole-of-government effort.
        And so, I do not mean to imply that we do not work that
    way, we do. But that is--you know, that is hard government
    work, because most of our agencies, to include DOD, are formed
    and focused on doing what we do best. And DOD is the same way.
    So you have got to break some cultural barriers here and work
    on crossed interests.
        We can do this. We have done it in the past. So I would say
    we continue to do what we have set out to do, as a government.
    We continue to reinforce the capabilities that allow us to
    approach these things as an interagency.
        Mr. Langevin. So let me follow up with this. The recently
    published National Defense Strategy states that we are
    competing with Russia. And I have a feeling that Russia may
    think it is already in a type of informational or political war
    with the United States.
        As a part of the Gerasimov Doctrine, information operations
    are presented as an--as integral to all six main phases of
    Russian conflict development, the only non-military measure
    spanning the entire spectrum. But as Europe is absent active
    armed conflict, we lack certain authorities to conduct our own
    information operations.
        So how are you countering Russian disinformation in Europe
    without the broader authorities granted in larger operations,
    or execute orders understanding you likely cannot get into
    details about how you feel we are adequately challenging Russia
    in this space?
        General Scaparrotti. I will briefly answer that, just by
    saying that we and EUCOM engage through NATO and EU, as well as
    our partners and individual countries in countering the Russian
    message. All of this is truthful print. Much of it can be done
    through public affairs.
        And then, in other ways, we have military information
    support teams that we provide to specific countries. And all of
    this is in support of the embassy and their message, as well,
    as well as foreign countries. So we work directly with some of
    these foreign countries and what they see, and how best to
    counter this disinformation. So I would leave it at that.
        And, well, the last thing is you mentioned authorities. I
    have asked for authorities with respect to information
    operations, et cetera. And those that I have requested I have
    been granted. And in this forum I will just leave it at that.
    But I do want you to know that where I have asked for specific
    authorities to this point, I have received what I have asked
    for.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    the latitude, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Hice.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Is EUCOM prepared for the United States to move its embassy
    in Israel to Jerusalem?
        General Scaparrotti. Say again, sir. I am sorry, I--is
    EUCOM----
        Mr. Hice. Are we prepared, do you believe, to move our
    embassy to Jerusalem?
        General Scaparrotti. Today we are preparing to do that. And
    again, this should be a question that goes to State first, as
    the lead in that. I was just there, so I am aware of the
    planning that is going on, and I would respectfully go to them
    for the question of the preparation.
        Mr. Hice. Okay, fair enough with that. Going back, then, to
    Russia and your understanding, what are Russia's goals in the
    Baltic Seas?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think it is consistent with
    other places, and that is that they establish themself as a
    respected global power; they undermine the democratic values
    and the values of the West; they attain, to the extent that
    they can, some privileged influence over the nations that
    border them, particularly the ones who were in the former
    Soviet Union. And even in the Baltics I think they have that
    similar objective.
        Mr. Hice. Okay. Of those type of things, what would you
    consider in--as far as their influence in that region, what
    troubles you most?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think there is--you know, the
    presence of their, again, disinformation campaign, some
    political provocation. You know, we see where they purchase
    social media or TV stations, et cetera.
        And in a couple of the Baltic countries you have a Russian
    population that, obviously, they target their message to and
    can share, through language. It is a--you know, that population
    is harder to penetrate by the government itself in some cases.
    So it is a--you know, it is a population that is easier for
    Russia to influence. And, of course, they target that and take
    advantage of it.
        Mr. Hice. What tools can we utilize to help aid our allies
    over there against Russian operations and cyber operations,
    that type of thing?
        General Scaparrotti. Very close working relationship across
    our government, not simply in the military realm, but through
    the other forms of government in order to help them assess,
    respond to, and understand the environment, and also learn from
    them. Estonia Cyber Center is an excellent center. The Baltic
    nations, since we are talking about them in particular, you
    know, they have an understanding of Russia and that threat in
    ways that we do not. So we rely on them.
        So it is a team effort here, and I think it works both
    ways, and that is the way we approach it.
        Mr. Hice. Do you believe it is working well, those
    communication lines? Are you pleased?
        General Scaparrotti. I am, yes.
        Mr. Hice. Okay. How, then, along those lines, how does
    EUCOM work with other U.S. agencies to utilize a whole-of-
    government approach?
        General Scaparrotti. Well----
        Mr. Hice. Against Russia, in particular.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. Well, through--in all of our
    challenges in EUCOM we first approach it from a whole-of-
    government approach.
        And just to set the stage, my civilian deputy is an
    experienced, you know, foreign diplomat. He just--was just last
    the U.S. ambassador to Italy, Phil Reeker, Ambassador Phil
    Reeker.
        Mr. Hice. Right.
        General Scaparrotti. So that tells you something right
    there. And he gives us a direct connection into the
    interagencies, and particularly State.
        And then we have a number of interagency--Treasury, USAID
    [U.S. Agency for International Development], FBI [Federal
    Bureau of Investigation]--we have a number of interagency
    persons that are a part of my staff that work day to day. So
    our counter-transnational threat cell, for instance, it is a
    lot more civilian workforce than it is anybody in a uniform, as
    an example. And that is how we pull them in and we make sure we
    have their expertise in this.
        Mr. Hice. Very good. Well, thank you for all you do. And we
    appreciate it very much.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. O'Halleran.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for being here today, thank you for your
    service to our country. I want to go back a little bit to the 2
    percent issue in Europe.
        I guess what I heard you say is that it is going to be--
    Russia, over the next 5 years, is going to eventually have some
    issues with continuing to fund their military. You had
    mentioned it is going to take us about 30 years to get where
    the plan wants to be. And I was wondering. Does 2 percent get
    our European allies to where they need to be? And what is the
    real number to get them to where they need to be?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, I have not looked at it in
    the--in, you know, in that depth, in terms of a real number. It
    would take an assessment of each and every country to do that.
    I would say that, you know, an investment at 2 percent will
    make a significant difference in these other--in the other
    nations.
        And the way that we make sure that we have what we need is,
    within NATO, we do a capabilities assessment. We just completed
    this cycle. And then we determine what the requirements are in
    NATO to have an effective deterrence and defense in the Euro-
    Atlantic. And we assign each of the nations capability targets
    that they have to meet as a part of that 2 percent and 20
    percent. And through that, we can provide the force in NATO
    that we need. We know that now. We just have to ensure that
    they make those investments and the capabilities that have been
    outlined.
        If they want to invest in other areas in their military,
    that is fine, but they need to meet those capabilities first,
    that we have a synchronized and coherent force for the
    deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic.
        Mr. O'Halleran. I thank you, General. The sustainability of
    that effort, though, as we saw in the last economic downturn
    here in the United States and around the world, plays a big
    role in that, I would imagine. I do not know if you have
    assessed to that level yet, but these economic cycles are
    something that is part of our history. They will occur again.
    And a lot of these countries were hit pretty hard during the
    last downturn.
        So how much time is it going to take some of these
    countries to get up to speed at the 2 percent? I think you
    mentioned 15 are not there yet. How are we going to get--how
    are they going to get there?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think if you--you know, and
    this--I could respond to this in a written form in more detail.
        But generally, you know, we have taken a look at--NATO has
    taken a look at the countries and, you know, there is a
    grouping of, say, five to seven that, given their financial
    plan at present and the--in some cases, if they are in EU, the
    standards that they have to meet with respect to debt, et
    cetera, they will have a very difficult time meeting the 2024 2
    percent if they adhere to both EU and NATO requirements. So
    there is a group of countries that, with analysis, you know
    will have a more difficult time.
        Mr. O'Halleran. The--one of the issues that came up was how
    we can address some of our issues with them and with their
    ability to impact citizens in other countries, how we can do it
    to them. And you mentioned something about--that we have an
    advantage because of people's representation of us as having a
    truthful media.
        And here, internally, in the United States, we have this
    ongoing division over the media here. How is--how do we let
    people know over there that we are truthful, when within our
    country we are having this struggle on the truthfulness of the
    media?
        General Scaparrotti. That is a difficult question to
    answer. I would say that this--the issue of truth in media is
    not just the United States. It is a global issue now. With the
    development of our social media and the internet, et cetera, we
    have lost what we once had when we had print media largely that
    had editors that had editorial standards, et cetera. There is
    much of this that has no discipline within it.
        I think that is something that, internationally, we need to
    come to grips with and determine how we are going to begin to
    discipline that. And it is particularly important for
    democracies because of the role that, you know, truthful media
    and journalism plays in a vibrant democracy.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, General, and I yield.
        The Chairman. Dr. Wenstrup.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for being here. I have kind of a
    general question concerning Eastern Europe, if you will. And I
    do not expect a deep-dive answer, but you mentioned a team
    approach to nations in Europe. And from your perspective, what
    are the Eastern European nations, for example, wanting and
    needing from--say, if we go down the list of the DIME, right--
    what do they want diplomatically, militarily, information
    sharing, economically? What kind of things are they wanting?
    What can we provide? And I know that is a pretty broad
    question.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. And frankly, I need to probably
    focus most on the military aspect of that.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Sure.
        General Scaparrotti. You know, the first thing is that they
    want a close partnership. I am speaking as a EUCOM commander
    now. They want a close partnership with the United States,
    because they recognize our leadership, they recognize our
    capabilities. They want to have a close partnership so they can
    also develop their capabilities.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Militarily and otherwise, or----
        General Scaparrotti. Diplomatically, et cetera. I mean they
    are--those nations are great allies. They are small, but they
    are working very hard. And you will note that they are the ones
    that are above 2 percent very quickly. So they are also
    investing in the capabilities that they believe they need to
    nest with ours. That is what we need to continue to do, and we
    need to continue to help them in that regard.
        And I think also our presence there reinforces their
    population's confidence in the West, and their decision to be
    NATO members in some cases, or to align with the West,
    generally.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Obviously, all those things intertwine with
    our success there, and when I talk about economics and things
    like that. And I have always had a concern of the dependency
    upon Russia for, say, natural gas, et cetera. And the stronger
    their economy is, the better our military relationship can be,
    et cetera, et cetera.
        Are there things, from where you sit, that you feel like
    you are hampered if we only did more economically, like tried
    to alleviate some of that dependency on Russia in some way?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I think we are working toward
    relieving some of the dependency on Russia. And I know those
    countries are, as well.
        So, particularly in liquified natural gas, there is
    facilities being built that will allow us to transport that.
    And frankly, I think we should continue to do that. Because, as
    you know, Russia uses energy to coerce and compel at times.
    Thank you.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I appreciate it, General. I yield
    back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Khanna.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your service. In discussing Ukraine,
    I think it is important to look at some of the historical
    context. When Secretary Baker met with Shevardnadze and
    Gorbachev there was a discussion about the expansion of NATO.
    Our country made no formal commitments to Gorbachev, as Putin
    claims, but Gorbachev recently did say that the spirit of the
    conversations very much suggested that we would not expand
    NATO.
        And when Yanukovych came to power in Ukraine and wanted to
    do business with the European Union, the Russians asked the
    United States whether we would be okay with a tri-patriot
    economic agreement, where Europe would do business with
    Yanukovych and with Russia. The European Union rejected that.
        Then, when Yanukovych was ousted, Yanukovych came to the
    United States and said, ``Why don't we call early elections and
    have a coalition,'' it is unclear whether we worked
    diplomatically for that. We then supported the regime change
    against Yanukovych.
        So I guess my first question in sort of three parts is do
    you think we made a strategic mistake by insisting that Ukraine
    join NATO? Do you believe we made a mistake by recognizing the
    coup against Yanukovych? And do you think we made a mistake by
    not having a tri-patriot agreement with Russia and Yanukovych
    on the economic agreement?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I will be honest. I have not
    looked at that in enough detail in the specific instances that
    you pointed out to give you an answer here. If you would like,
    I will give you one as a written statement after the hearing
    here.
        Mr. Khanna. I would appreciate that. More broadly--and this
    goes to your expertise--I mean, one of the things that has
    served us really well in this Nation is the Monroe Doctrine
    made by John Quincy Adams. And we believe that no one should
    interfere in our region.
        Assume for a second that Russia is acting in a similar
    strategic interest. Do you really believe, even if we have arms
    going to Ukraine of 50 million, 200 million, like the President
    wants, that we could ever out-compete the Russians in Ukraine?
    Would they not just increase their arms? Do they not have far
    more of a strategic interest to fight us than we do in Ukraine?
        General Scaparrotti. If one looks at proximity, et cetera,
    that is an advantage for Russia, and it is an advantage
    militarily, as you suggest.
        But what I go back to is that what we believe as a
    fundamental principle is that people have a right to determine
    their own government and how that government is led, whether it
    is a democracy, or what type of democracy it might be. And I
    think that is the principle we fundamentally support here.
        Mr. Khanna. General, I agree with you. And John Quincy
    Adams had a very famous passage saying the United States
    supports the self-determination of people around the world, and
    we should extend our prayers and our hopes, but we should not
    be going out for monsters to destroy, because that is not in
    the United States strategic interest.
        What do you think is our national security strategic
    interest? What is being served by putting more weapons in
    Ukraine? I mean how does that make the United States more
    secure? How does it make constituents in my district more
    secure?
        General Scaparrotti. The United States is--has come to the
    assistance of a people and a nation that seeks to establish
    themselves with the West in a democratic way and make reforms
    to do that. And we have committed to that.
        I think it is important the United States be seen as a good
    ally in that. And of course, where that takes us here in the
    future will be set against, you know, our vital interest in
    this country, as we move forward. But I think it is important
    that we support those who seek democratic values and ways in
    the world, as well. Otherwise, we forfeit that movement to
    others like Russia, who would like to undermine and establish a
    world order that is counter to our interest and, as we have
    seen in past history, typically leads to conflict.
        Mr. Khanna. I respect your perspective. I would just say
    that no one disagrees that we should recognize self-
    determination and human rights. The question is just
    strategically, militarily, whether that is the most in our
    national interest.
        My final question is do you really think being bogged down
    there--is Russia really our most strategic competitor, or is it
    China? And does putting resources here hurt our ability against
    China or against fighting the war on terrorism?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, I would just say I do not
    know that we are bogged down there. And I would remind you that
    we are also not fighting. They are fighting for their own
    sovereignty. We are providing capability, capacity building,
    and reform to their government.
        Russia and China are both competitors. I particularly
    believe that, you know, in the shorter term here, Russia is an
    immediate threat at this point. They are a more consistent
    threat. And maybe in the longer term, China. But that is a
    debate that many will have. But I think we need to pay
    attention to both.
        The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
        Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for
    being here.
        I wonder if, first of all, if you have any thoughts or if
    you could explain at all why Macedonia is having such a hard
    time in their hopes of being admitted into NATO. And would you
    agree that, if they are admitted into NATO, they could be a
    somewhat important ally to the United States and our efforts?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I would probably refer you to
    State on that, in terms of the detail of this. They are--they
    would like to seek a means to enter NATO. I have talked to
    their minister of defense about that. And I think it is a--you
    know, it is a matter, foremost, of being able to establish the
    ability to meet the MAP [Membership Action Plan], or the
    accession principles that you have within NATO to do that, and
    you know, being confident in showing that there is a confident
    means to do that.
        Mr. Banks. I appreciate that. My next question: as you
    know, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program
    has been a key nonproliferation enabler of EUCOM and the world
    for over 25 years. As part of your overall security cooperation
    efforts, CTR has been fundamental to greatly reducing the
    threat of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation.
        However, we continue to see WMD proliferation threat grow
    through terrorist networks and state sponsors. Recent efforts
    in Moldova and Ukraine highlight the security challenges the
    European grey zone nations face.
        So, with that, can you comment at all on the success of
    CTR? And maybe any CTR efforts that have been effective in your
    AOR [area of responsibility], or ways that we, as Congress,
    might change a program that is now 25 years old to confront the
    threats that we face in the future?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I would like to take that for a
    response, as well, to you. To get into the detail of how we
    might change it, you know, we addressed this and we work within
    NATO--or within EUCOM, with NATO, with our partners to counter
    proliferation of transnational threats. That cell that I noted
    before, the transnational threat cell, has that as one of its
    fundamental tasks.
        I think we are having an effect. I think it is positive.
    But I think today, more so than ever, we probably need to be
    more focused on this because, you know, we have non-state
    actors today that now have the funding and the capability to
    attain some of these weapons systems, whereas before it was
    fundamentally a nation-state capability that was passing those.
    So terrorists, violent extremist organizations.
        So I think it is important that we maintain this focus, and
    that we work, again, you know, with our partners and as an
    alliance, to do this.
        Mr. Banks. And my last question. In your written testimony
    you talked about the growing maritime threat in your AOR. And I
    wonder if you could maybe comment more extensively about that.
    With the resurgent Russia--maybe comment specifically related
    to the antisubmarine capabilities under your review.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. If you wanted detail on
    that, I would prefer to do that in a classified document, as
    well.
        Just generally, the activity level of their maritime forces
    is up in Europe. They are active now, coming out of the high
    north in their northern fleet into the Mediterranean, for
    instance. That is--that has not been--while not alarming, it is
    not necessarily something they could not do, it is just not
    something they have normally done in, you know, say, recent
    history.
        So they are deploying more, and they are deploying at a
    higher rate. The forces that they are deploying are being
    modernized, primarily with weapons systems. So, you know, most
    of their ships now, you know, have a Kalibr [cruise missile]
    system on them. It is both conventional and can be nuclear, if
    they choose to do so. It is a very good system, provides reach
    and precision. And, of course, wherever they have a ship,
    whether it is undersea or on the surface, many of their ships
    now have the Kalibr system on them.
        Mr. Banks. I appreciate that. Thanks for your leadership.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you very much for holding the line for us in
    Europe. I appreciate your service.
        I served under General Jim Mattis, current Secretary of
    Defense, and our division motto at the time was ``No Better
    Friend, No Worse Enemy.'' And I often found that it was the
    first half of that that was sometimes harder to maintain.
    People understood the Marines were a tough enemy. But they were
    not always sure if they could trust us.
        How do you make our Eastern European allies trust us in the
    fight against Russia when we are not really willing to stand up
    to Russia right here at home? This is a consistent theme that I
    have heard as I traveled around the globe, is that a lot of our
    allies right now are just not sure whether they can trust
    America. So give us a window into how you fight this fight on
    the day-to-day in Europe.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I will tell you I
    do not see that issue, particularly in the East within NATO, in
    terms of their--any distrust.
        The first way that I do it is look at what we are doing. We
    have--we are rotating an----
        Mr. Moulton. So you do not think that when the President
    comes out against NATO and says that we might not even be a
    part of NATO, maybe should not even be a part of NATO, that
    does not contribute to any distrust?
        General Scaparrotti. The President has stated support for
    Article 5 and full support for NATO. And in this time we have
    deployed a lot of force in this past year to Europe on behalf
    of NATO.
        So, you know, I--what I am trying to say is that, you know,
    what I point to is what are we doing. EDI, which Congress has
    budgeted, for instance, is a substantial investment. And----
        Mr. Moulton. Well, let's----
        General Scaparrotti. And our allies recognize that.
        Mr. Moulton. So, General, let's talk about that for a
    second. The EDI--and we have--I have witnessed this in Eastern
    Europe myself--seems to be very heavily focused on conventional
    forces, which is not the way that Russia is attacking us. I
    mean Russia is attacking our Eastern European allies through
    the internet, through partisans, by undermining their political
    process, by sowing disinformation, as you earlier described.
        It does not seem like our effort is calibrated to really
    meet that threat at all. It certainly was not when I visited
    there in 2015, and I know that we on the committee have tried
    to make some modifications. I am not sure that we have gone far
    enough. What could we do to improve our ability to stand up to
    the type of warfare that Russia is actually exercising today?
        General Scaparrotti. First of all, sir, I would say that,
    you know, we need to have all of that. So we do need that
    conventional capability in place, as a deterrent. And it is an
    absolute signal to them of our commitment to Article 5 and our
    commitment to NATO and them, as partners.
        Many of the things that we are doing is what we need to
    continue to do. We are providing those nations, particularly in
    the East, with direct military information support, coupled
    with our embassies working with them, as well. The nations
    themselves work with us closely, in terms of their public
    affairs messaging, et cetera. That is all a part of this. And
    EDI does fund some of the information operations that I do in
    EUCOM, as well.
        Mr. Moulton. What percentage of the budget for EDI goes to
    those types of activities?
        General Scaparrotti. A very small part of that. I can give
    it to you if I sit down and figure it out. But it is a small
    part of that.
        I would first say, though, that, you know, information
    operations is not that expensive.
        Mr. Moulton. What percentage of the attacks that you see,
    whether they be hybrid-type attacks, the disinformation
    campaigns, the attacks from Russia, what percentage are these
    hybrid types of attacks versus conventional attacks?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, we do not--you know, in terms of
    attacks within NATO, I mean, most of this activity is below the
    level of conflict.
        Mr. Moulton. Right.
        General Scaparrotti. There are----
        Mr. Moulton. I mean they are not rolling any tanks into
    Eastern Europe.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, no. And--but they did annex, you
    know, portions of the Ukraine, for instance, and Georgia in
    2008.
        But you are correct. I mean today's activity is purposely
    below the level of conflict on the Russians' part.
        Mr. Moulton. Are there other things that we should be doing
    on the committee to better meet this threat? It sounds to me
    like we could better apportion the budget. Are there other
    things that we should reinforce, or ways that we could give
    more confidence to our allies that we will help them stand up
    to this, to this serious threat?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. Well, you know, I would applaud
    Members of Congress for their trips to Europe, for instance,
    and to see our allies, like the one you took in 2015. Those
    visits and open discussion with them is very important, and is
    a direct demonstration of the United States interest in, you
    know, in their security. So I would encourage those, as well.
        Secondly, continue to do what you are doing today, and that
    is to have a good assessment of our security needs and what
    should be funded and how you fund them. This budget has been
    very important to enabling me to do what I do with our allies
    and the security of the Euro-Atlantic. You need to continue
    that.
        Towards the budgeting, I would say this again. Information
    operations is not overly expensive, when compared to, for
    instance, conventional force structure, rotational forces, et
    cetera. And, for my part, my request through EDI is structured
    on what I believe we most need for deterrence today. And so I
    take into account--is at least my portion of this, as I put it
    forward to DOD, the percentages of what is required and best
    used for a coherent defense. And I take that deliberately as I
    present this--my portion of that budget to Department of
    Defense.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. General, thank you very much for yesterday's
    discussion, as well as today's. My apologies for not being
    here. There is another general at the Army Corps of Engineers
    that--to whom I had to give some attention this morning.
        The EDI fund, should that be part of the base? Or should it
    continue to be in OCO?
        General Scaparrotti. I have said I think eventually it
    should go to the base in order to get us into the base as a
    fundamental part of our security. And, as I stated earlier, I
    would just like to ensure that it is protected, you know.
    Congress has set this aside as EDI, you know, specifically for
    specific objectives to be attained and, as we go into the
    budget, to protect that clarity.
        Mr. Garamendi. So either way, you need EDI specifically for
    the work you are doing in Eastern Europe.
        General Scaparrotti. We do, absolutely. I need it because I
    do not have the force posture I need--that I believe I need,
    and it is going to take EDI to build that or that funding
    within the budget to do so.
        Mr. Garamendi. I just want to make it clear we are going to
    be dealing with this in the next couple of months, and we
    talked about it a little yesterday. It seems to me that we want
    to keep it separate, at least that word you used,
    ``eventually.'' And I will just let that hang out there. But at
    least for the near term, I would think we need EDI and OCO
    separate and available to you to carry out--which,
    incidentally, in a tour of the Eastern European countries in
    the summer, you and your troops are doing an extraordinary job.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        Mr. Garamendi. And the heel-to-toe makes a lot of sense, I
    think, in the near term, as you have said in your testimony.
        A couple of other things. LNG [liquefied natural gas],
    which was mentioned, it is a tool--well, gas is a tool used by
    Russia for economic, political purposes. We are exporting gas
    here in the United States. It seems to me that something we
    ought to consider is the strategic tool to deter Russia. And it
    would be in our interests to subsidize natural gas, LNG, to
    Europe as a way of deterring Russia and pushing back in the
    most meaningful of ways--that is, their economy.
        I suspect we ought to do a little economic equation here
    and see what it would cost to provide LNG to Europe at a cost
    similar to what Russia is providing gas. It could give us
    significant leverage.
        With one final question and--do you need a new low-yield
    nuclear weapon to deter Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, in regards to the Nuclear Posture
    Review, the supplemental weapons systems that are a part of
    that are required. What it does is it ensures that we can be
    confident in a response across any scenario that might be
    projected. So I do believe we need those systems.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will yield back. Thank you very
    much.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        The Chairman. General, you have answered lots of questions
    about hybrid information, political warfare. Part of the reason
    is I think we all are challenged by thinking of warfare in non-
    traditional ways, and the role of the military in doing that.
        You answered a number of questions about EDI, and I think
    that conversation was very interesting.
        I just wanted to ask, to Mr. Garamendi's last question on
    nuclear deterrent, can you step back from particular weapons
    systems and talk more generally about the value of having a
    credible nuclear deterrent with an adversary who openly talks
    about using nuclear to counter conventional, about escalating
    to de-escalate, a--in a region where a lot of allies depend on
    our nuclear deterrent for their security?
        And one of my concerns is most--many of us thought that we
    did not have to worry about that stuff any more, and a lot of
    the--not only the weapons and the delivery systems, but the
    thinking atrophied after the fall of the Soviet Union. We have
    to pay more attention to it now.
        And so can you just, in a broader sense, talk about the
    role that a credible nuclear deterrent plays in what you are
    having--what you are trying to do every day?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, if I could, I will just focus
    on--you know, as you step back and look at a credible
    deterrent, and the importance of having one that--a credible
    deterrent that they understand is responsive across the
    spectrum, when you look at escalation management, you talked
    about, you know, the Russian comment that they will escalate to
    de-escalate, or escalate to dominate. This is a--you know, it
    is a cognitive exercise. It is an influence on the decision
    maker, on Putin on the other side.
        A credible nuclear capacity, a credible one, and our will
    to use it, if necessary, for the extreme case, known by the
    adversary, is paramount here--and then across the spectrum.
        You know, I think their escalate to de-escalate comments
    were centered on a capability at a low end to perhaps gain
    leverage. And what we are saying through the NPR is you won't
    have that leverage. We are going to drive this back to a higher
    threshold. And he can be confident in that, as we enter--if we
    would enter any kind of an escalation at all.
        So that is why it is important, because it is the mental
    approach to this to begin with.
        The Chairman. Well, I would just say, from my standpoint,
    we talked yesterday, I guess, about deterrence when it comes to
    space. We talk about deterrence when it comes to cyber. One of
    the challenges, I think, for all of us is to reinvigorate our
    deterrence thinking and intellectual--because, as you said,
    deterrence is in the mind of the adversary, and whatever domain
    we are talking about. And I think we have got some making up to
    do, maybe, there.
        Unless you have something else, I am good.
        Thank you, sir, for answering our questions. And the
    hearing stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 15, 2018

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 15, 2018

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    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 15, 2018

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Ms. Speier. The Pentagon's FY19 budget request includes $6.5
    billion for the European Defense Initiative, more than doubling the
    FY17 budget of $3.4 billion. While the need to ensure deterrence and
    provide updated equipment in Europe is clear, it is also obvious this
    is a great deal of money. What are some examples protocols and
    procedures you have implemented at EUCOM to ensure that this money is
    and will be utilized appropriately?
        General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM is very appreciative of Congress'
    continued support for EDI. USEUCOM endeavors to be the best possible
    steward of these critical funds. USEUCOM reviews and prioritizes all
    EDI requests prior to submission to the Department's consideration in
    the budget submission. We work with our service components, who have
    the the vast majority of the funds. In doing so, we work hard to ensure
    that all items submitted support one of EDI's five lines of effort and
    meet the intent of EDI to deter Russian aggression and/or assure our
    Allies and partners. USEUCOM has also encouraged and actively supported
    the OSD (CAPE) led reviews of both the FY18 and FY19 EDI budget
    submissions to validate operational requirements, cost estimates, and
    feasibility of EDI requests. In the year of execution, all Repurposing
    and/or Reprogramming requests are reviewed and approved by USEUCOM at
    the General Officer level to ensure their alignment with the intent of
    EDI prior to being submitted to either the Comptroller or Congress
    respectively. As EDI potentially transitions to the Base budget,
    USEUCOM is working with OSD (CAPE) to explore additional ways USEUCOM
    can maintain awareness and oversight of EDI spending to ensure the
    integrity of the funding provided.
        Ms. Speier. What are your cyber warfare and cyber operations
    requirements? How is EUCOM working with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)?
    Are there any policy or authority concerns?
        General Scaparrotti. [The information is classified and retained in
    the committee files.]
        Ms. Speier. What are examples where EUCOM successfully provided
    information to an ally on a terrorist threat and where EUCOM
    successfully combated digital terrorism?
        General Scaparrotti. [The information is classified and retained in
    the committee files.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
        Mrs. Murphy. In your testimony, you highlighted that EUCOM's Joint
    Exercise Program and our Building Partnership Capacity activities with
    our allies have significantly improved our interoperability with NATO.
    You also mentioned that EUCOM is working with allies and partners to
    develop a shared framework for cybersecurity to ensure wartime
    interoperability. I represent a district in central Florida that is a
    hub for modeling, simulation, and training, including the focal point
    of the Army's new cyber training mission. My question is, how exactly
    does EUCOM integrate cyber defense and cyberspace operations into our
    joint exercises with our NATO allies?
        Also, are we seeing an increased demand signal for cyber training
    and capacity building from our allies and partners in the AOR? If so,
    how are we managing that demand, and what further resources could we
    apply--from a manpower, authority, or cyber range perspective?
        General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM incorporates cyber training objectives
    as they are linked to our top priority plans in all Joint Exercise
    Program exercises. We also include cyber mission sets within the
    command and control portions of exercise STEADFAST COBALT, NATO'S
    Mission Partner Network certification event. This annual exercise
    validates and certifies NATO's standby mission network requirements.
    EUCOM has seen a consistent increase in requests for cyber training and
    capacity building from both Allies and partners. We address this demand
    by partnering with the military services and defense agencies for
    access to training in the same manner we support training in the
    traditional warfighting domains. EUCOM partners with these DOD
    components to build courses tailored to cyber defense, including an
    International Cyberspace Operations Planners Course that we launched
    last year. We also leverage combined training events to build capacity
    and capability. These events range from bilateral cyber defense table-
    top exercises up to and including efforts to integrate cyber defense
    and cyberspace operations into all major NATO training exercises.
    Interoperability at all levels is essential for effective cyber
    defense, and EUCOM is willing to train with Allies and partners at
    every level. For example, during the LOCKED SHIELDS cyber defense
    exercise and competition, we did not field a U.S. team; rather, U.S.
    cyber operators competed on combined teams with Estonia, Latvia,
    Canada, and Lithuania. EUCOM could use congressional assistance in
    clarifying which authorities must be used for security cooperation in
    the cyber domain, for example 10 USC 333 for building the capacity for
    foreign security forces. Added clarity will streamline approvals for
    rapidly building combined cyber defense capabilities, including the
    protection and defense of national infrastructure supporting combined
    operations.
        Mrs. Murphy. In your testimony, you mentioned that EUCOM is
    increasing its efforts to counter Russia's propaganda and
    misinformation campaigns through an interagency effort called the
    Russian Information Group. Would you tell us a little more about the
    Russian Information Group? Does this group amplify, or run counter to,
    the State Department's Global Engagement Center's mission to counter
    state-sponsored propaganda from Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM co-hosts with the Department of State,
    the Russia Information Group (RIG), an interagency working-level
    network established to respond collaboratively to the challenges posed
    by Russia in the information space in Europe. The RIG seeks to identify
    particular vulnerabilities, recognize malign influence, leverage
    particular agency responses, and ensure a coordinated U.S. government
    effort. The RIG is enabling collaboration in support of U.S. embassy
    country teams to counter malign influence using all instruments of
    national power. The RIG supports U.S. national level strategy. The
    Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act directs combatant
    commands to develop, in coordination with State Department, a regional
    information strategy and interagency coordination plan for carrying out
    the strategy. The RIG has a critical role in developing this strategy
    in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
    Department of State. The RIG also shares lessons learned with NATO and
    the EU to build a common understanding and increase cooperation. EUCOM
    and Department of State co-chair monthly teleconferences to exchange
    information and coordinate efforts relating to specific RIG projects,
    exchange current Intelligence Community (IC) updates, request IC
    support, and discuss current or emerging events and issues.
    Participants include: the National Security Council, Department of
    State, EUCOM, Joint Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Director of
    National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Denial and
    Deception Committee, Department of Justice, Department of Energy,
    Central Command, Northern Command, Southern Command, Special Forces
    Command, Strategic Command, the Global Engagement Center and several
    embassies. The RIG also hosts biannual Senior Leader Steering Boards,
    which I co-chair with the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The
    board is composed of senior leaders from each of the departments and
    agencies represented at the RIG. The primary purpose of these meetings
    is to evaluate efforts over the past quarter and guide the RIG's
    forthcoming efforts over the next quarter. The RIG reinforces rather
    than duplicates the work of the Global Engagement Center (GEC). The GEC
    is a core member of the RIG and seeks to align organizational efforts
    in support of national strategy. The GEC has a legislative mandate to
    lead, synchronize, and coordinate USG counter-propaganda and
    disinformation efforts. Authorities granted to the GEC in NDAA enable
    it to conduct additional activities that other groups, like the RIG,
    cannot do such as, transfer funds, hire specialists, and gain wider
    data mining access.
        Mrs. Murphy. Many of our allies in Eastern Europe remain reliant on
    Russian military equipment. This reliance subsidizes the Russian
    defense industry, reduces interoperability with other NATO countries,
    and places NATO's frontline of defense at risk in the event of a
    conflict with Russia. Many of these states would like to purchase U.S.
    military equipment, but lack the resources to do so. Simply buying the
    equipment, in the numbers necessary to completely modernize eastern
    NATO militaries, would be prohibitively expensive, but there is another
    way. Instead, the United States could revive defense lending and
    offering financing to help eastern NATO members buy the equipment
    themselves. In time, this program could even become profitable. Has
    EUCOM considered this or other alternative ways to help eastern NATO
    allies modernize their militaries and reduce reliance on Russian
    military equipment?
        General Scaparrotti. EUCOM is acutely aware of the issues caused by
    our Allies' reliance on Russian military equipment. We certainly
    communicate these concerns to our Allies to make sure they understand
    the issues. We leverage the full spectrum of security assistance tools
    made available to us by Congress and the Department of State, including
    defense lending and financing. Should more options become available, we
    would leverage those as well. EUCOM fully supports revising the defense
    lending and financing rules to a more friendly approach to partner and
    Ally defense spending, especially as more of our NATO Allies move
    closer to meeting their defense spending and modernization goals. One
    such concept, which is a more cost effective approach, is lead nation
    procurement through a consortium, where the defense articles are shared
    among the consortium members. The current solution approach of one-to-
    one replacements is cost prohibitive. Unfortunately, current
    legislation only allows for a consortium among NATO Allies. EUCOM
    sought, but the Department disapproved, a change to legislation that
    would permit consortia of Allies and Partnership for Peace (PfP)
    countries. I encourage Congress to consider such a modification in 2019
    so we can better facilitate and accelerate the replacement of Russian
    equipment in the countries which are the most susceptible to malign
    Russian influence.
        Mrs. Murphy. Since readiness is a top priority in your AOR, would
    you find value in increased funding for home station training
    capabilities to modernize instrumentation and simulation capabilities
    to train at home?
        General Scaparrotti. Your question conflates USEUCOM's operational
    readiness with Service readiness and might be answered best by our
    Service headquarters. A preponderance of USEUCOM's assigned forces are
    CONUS based rotational forces, consequently, efforts to modernize
    ``home station'' training capabilities may benefit USEUCOM by
    increasing the proficiency and number of units available for sourcing,
    but these efforts would not necessarily equate to a marked increase in
    USEUCOM's readiness to execute operational plans. A top priority for
    USEUCOM and the Service Headquarters is to ensure the highest readiness
    of our deployed forces prior to leaving home-station, and while in
    theater. Due to environmental and host nation restrictions throughout
    USEUCOM's Area of Responsibility, the opportunity to train combat tasks
    is limited from the individual crew to the joint battle staff level.
    Therefore, any efforts to modernize and increase simulation
    capabilities would prove beneficial to our goal of maintaining the
    highest readiness of our forces. Some areas of opportunity where
    simulation capabilities could be of added training value are fires
    coordination, close air support, navigation, seamanship, ship handling,
    and unit and battle staff wargaming.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
        Mr. Banks. Macedonia has demonstrated its resolve through its
    participation in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan and has been
    by our side in Iraq. As NATO adapts to an increasingly complex security
    environment exacerbated by strategic competition with Russia, admitting
    Macedonia as a full member to our key alliance is imperative.
        1) What is your position on admitting Macedonia as a full member of
    NATO?
        2) What can we do to assist Macedonia in attaining full membership?
        General Scaparrotti, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
    (CTR) program has been a key nonproliferation enabler for EUCOM and the
    world for over 25 years. As part of your overall security cooperation
    efforts, CTR has been fundamental to greatly reducing the threat of WMD
    proliferation.
        3) General, where do you see successes in the CTR program
    historically, and now?
        4) General, how could the CTR program be more effective in your
    AOR?
        5) General, how would you reform US government nonproliferation
    efforts?
        You mention this maritime threat in your testimony, so I would like
    to focus my questions on the current and foreseeable anti-submarine
    threat from Russia.
        6) What are some of the challenges that you are seeing from a
    resurgent Russia related to anti-submarine capabilities?
        7) How is that nation developing that its maritime forces,
    particularly in the field of anti-submarine warfare, and how would you
    characterize the maritime threats they pose to the United States, our
    allies, and our partners? What are we doing to defend and where can we
    invest more resources?
        General Scaparrotti. (1 and 2) EUCOM fully supports Macedonia's
    NATO membership aspirations. The path to Alliance membership helps
    Macedonia more fully integrate into the Euro-Atlantic family of
    nations, energizes its governance reform efforts, and increases its
    capacity as a contributor to multi-national operations. EUCOM is
    working hand-in-hand with the Macedonian Armed Forces as they prepare
    for membership. Our security cooperation programs, such as
    International Military Education & Training, Foreign Military
    Financing, and multinational exercise program allow us to promote
    military professionalization, increase the capacity of defense
    institutions, and improve interoperability between Macedonian, U.S. and
    Alliance Member Armed Forces. The combination of all of these efforts
    greatly assist Macedonia in their aspirations for NATO membership.
        (3, 4 and 5) The CTR program initially targeted the former Soviet
    Union, and was very successful in eliminating WMD threats and assisting
    those nations in preventing the proliferation of chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear threats. These efforts included elimination
    of nuclear warheads, delivery systems such as missiles and aircraft,
    and launch tubes in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as well as
    the destruction of Albania's chemical agent stockpile. Another
    significant success of the program was the destruction of 66 metric
    tons of chemical agents and precursor materials declared by Syria when
    they acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. This was the
    first time the program executed activities outside of the former Soviet
    Union and led to program determinations which enabled the Department of
    Defense to address proliferation prevention across multiple Combatant
    Commands' Areas of Responsibility. Expansion of the program as a
    proliferation prevention tool to other regions is a significant success
    and we hope this flexibility will continue. As CTR activities reach
    their culmination in the former Soviet Union nations, it is critically
    important we leverage the expertise and agility of response authorities
    the program provides to address proliferation challenges elsewhere in
    Europe. Expanding the authority to use the program in other nations in
    our area of responsibility would allow us to focus CTR activities on
    places where we see proliferation concerns, thereby increasing the
    overall effectiveness of proliferation prevention theater-wide. The
    U.S. government collaborates with other nations on preventing
    proliferation through multiple departments to include the Department of
    Defense. Much progress has been made to ensure these efforts are
    synchronized to prevent duplication of effort. We must promote
    interagency collaboration to attain efficiencies and to maximize the
    effectiveness of our tax dollars as we combat the WMD proliferation
    problem globally.
        (6 and 7) The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has accelerated its
    deployment of highly capable submarines into the Atlantic and
    Mediterranean. Russia has worked diligently to increase the lethality
    and reduce the acoustic characteristics of their submarines which makes
    countering this threat significantly more challenging. Those vessels
    have expanded the reach of the Russian fleet and are integrated into
    ongoing Russian operations. Given the increased number and frequency of
    deployments, having sufficient forces with the appropriate capabilities
    available to hold RFN submarines at risk is essential.
        The RFN is continuing to modernize their forces by prioritizing
    multi-mission platforms capable of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), as
    well as other naval warfare disciplines such as land attack and surface
    warfare. As part of this effort, Moscow plans to complete three
    Grigorovich frigates in addition to the three that have been fielded in
    the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. No timeline has been given due to
    delays caused in part by sanctions, but construction will resume using
    Russian-made engines. Grigorovich frigates are armed with KALIBR,
    Russia's advanced precision guided-missile system which includes an
    anti-submarine missile. Furthermore, these frigates are equipped with
    an ASW helicopter, which improves their ability to locate and track our
    submarines. The Kremlin also has five Steregushchiy II guided-missile
    frigates under construction in addition to the three Steregushchiy IIs
    assigned to the Baltic Fleet. While the operational Steregushchiys are
    not KALIBR capable, future vessels likely will be. These vessels are
    capable of anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare, and also field ASW
    helicopters. Concurrently with ASW surface vessel construction, the
    Kremlin plans to upgrade 28 IL-38s, an anti-submarine patrol aircraft
    by 2020. This improved aircraft will field an improved search-and-track
    system which will increase the efficiency of detecting and tracking
    submarines.
        In addition to bolstering their surface fleet, Moscow is building
    fourth-generation submarines, the Severodvinsk class guided-missile
    nuclear attack submarines (SSGNs), and Dolgorukiy class strategic-
    missile submarines (SSBNs). One Severodvinsk SSGN is currently
    operational in the Northern Fleet, and Russia plans to commission five
    more Severodvinsk SSGNs by 2020, with the seventh by 2023. This KALIBR-
    equipped submarine is multi-mission capable to include anti-surface,
    anti-submarine, and land attack roles.
        In regards to the eastern Mediterranean, Russia is postured as a
    credible threat to U.S. forces, allies, and interests. Moscow increased
    its ability to project force in the Eastern Mediterranean by
    strengthening the force posture of the Black Sea Fleet, located at
    Sevastopol, Ukraine and Novorossiysk, Russia. Six KALIBR-equipped Kilo
    diesel-electric submarines (SS) have been transferred to the Black Sea
    Fleet, with two of these currently stationed in Tartus, Syria. In the
    fall of 2017, these two Kilos launched land attack cruise missile
    strikes into Syria. Additionally, in March 2018, Russia deployed two
    Black Sea Fleet frigates to the Mediterranean. As part of this increase
    in operations, Tu-142s, long range anti-submarine aircraft, conducted
    submarine detection training exercises over the eastern Mediterranean
    in late March.
        The current submarine Naval Order of Battle presents significant
    challenges to the U.S. and allies, which will only increase as
    additional Dolgorukiy SSBN and Severodvinsk SSGN hulls enter service.
    Multiple Severodvinsk SSGNs will very likely strengthen the Russian
    Fleet's ability to project naval power, while additional Dolgorukiy
    SSBNs will bolster the Kremlin's strategic deterrence.
        EUCOM, Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), and the U.S. Sixth Fleet have
    been working tirelessly to improve our presence and posture in the
    region to deter and defend against a resurgent Russia. Specifically,
    with the help of Congress, European Deterrence Initiative funding has
    been critical in supporting improved anti-submarine warfare efforts and
    infrastructure.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PANETTA
        Mr. Panetta. Do you believe the National Guard Partnership Program
    is valuable in helping you achieve your strategic objectives? How could
    it be more effective?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, the National Guard State Partnership
    Program (SPP) remains one of European Command's most effective programs
    to promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve
    interoperability, and reinforce principles of responsible governance in
    support of the EUCOM's strategic priorities. USEUCOM's interlocking
    security relationships with a range of partners are an important source
    of stability in the region. One of our enduring priorities,
    ``Strengthen Strategic Partnerships and Build Partner Capacity,
    Capability and Interoperability'' is a benchmark for the SPP. The
    unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows active
    participation in a wide range of security cooperation activities, such
    as emergency management and disaster response, border and port
    security, natural resource protection, and containing transnational
    threats. Additionally, SPP has proven vital to the rapid integration of
    major defense articles into the force structure of our Allies and
    partners, which accelerates the timeline to achieving full operational
    capacity. To increase the value of SPP, we will continue to apply SPP
    activities to theater-level objectives with a focus on regional
    approaches. This will allow us to leverage SPP to find commonalities
    among countries for ready and postured forces. NATO identifies
    capabilities and promotes their development and acquisition by Allies
    so it can meet security and mutual defense objectives. This regional
    approach will empower SPP engagements to focus on aiding partner
    nations and Allies to develop NATO capability targets to meet their
    collective defense obligations. The SPP can become even more responsive
    to the requirements in theater through expanded authorities to cover
    the costs of National Guard salaries. I encourage Congress to support
    broader authorities and resources to enable expansion of the National
    Guard as a force provider.
        Mr. Panetta. With limited Active Component forces in Europe, how
    are you utilizing the National Guard and Reserves to enhance U.S.
    presence?
        General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM continues to leverage all available
    sources of personnel and forces to support our theater requirements.
    The U.S. supports NATO's augmentations in deterrence and defense
    forces, and the National Guard is starting its first rotations in
    support of the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission. The Army's 2nd
    Cavalry Regiment will hand off the eFP mission to the National Guard in
    September 2018. The 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Tennessee
    Army National Guard will lead the NATO eFP battle group in Poland also
    lead the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine. The unit from
    Tennessee is on a mobilization order for 365 days, and is expected to
    lead the training and support mission for nine months. Additionally,
    the Air National Guard provides significant theater support totaling
    approximately 120,000 man days historically. This supports the Polish
    AvDet, Theater Security Packages, Joint/Component and other exercises/
    events, tanker and airlift augmentation, and other miscellaneous
    requirements stemming from increased activities funded through EDI. The
    State Partnership Program (SPP) provides key National Guard presence in
    Europe. The state partners are not only critical force providers for
    military-to-military engagements but also have the most enduring
    relationships with our Allies and partners. USEUCOM sees the addition
    of mobilized forces as an alternative force provider demonstrating the
    professionalism of our citizen soldiers and looks forward to continued
    support from the National Guard and Reserves.
        Mr. Panetta. Is our current force posture in Ukraine sufficient to
    meet the strategic priority of deterring Russian aggression? Would a
    more robust train, advise, and assist mission provide greater deterrent
    value?
        General Scaparrotti. I believe our current force posture is
    sufficient to meet our national partnership goals with Ukraine, which
    are to assist the Ukrainians with building a modern, sustainable, and
    NATO-oriented training system and training infrastructure in support of
    their own national defense requirements. We have been conducting the
    Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine since 2016 with the support
    of Active Component and National Guard soldiers, to include soldiers
    from the California National Guard. These efforts are complemented by
    the efforts of civilian and ministry advisory teams who assist Ukraine
    with establishing sustainable force management, logistics, medical, and
    other key capabilities. We appreciate the continued efforts of the
    California National Guard through the State Partnership Program over
    the last 25 years to build a strong and enduring relationship to
    support EUCOM priorities. I would like to reemphasize the essential
    role of our Reserve Component, in particular the National Guard, in
    Ukraine and in our efforts in Europe overall, particularly given our
    limited permanently-stationed forces. EUCOM has benefitted by
    provisions in the European Deterrence Initiative that allow for funding
    reserve component pay and allowances for security force assistance and
    other deterrent activities. I encourage Congress to sustain or even
    expand these kinds of provisions in future legislation.