[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 7, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
29-475 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. James F. McDonnell, Assistant Secretary for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. William Bryan, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. Chris P. Currie, Director, Emergency Management, National
Preparedness, and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Homeland
Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability
Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for the Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 31
Questions From Honorable Peter T. King for the Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 34
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for the Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 35
Questions From Congressman James R. Langevin for Chris P. Currie. 36
EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
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Thursday, December 7, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan,
Jr. (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Donovan, Payne, and Watson
Coleman.
Mr. Donovan. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the
Department of Homeland Security's organization to counter
weapons of mass destruction. I now recognize myself for an
opening statement.
Before I do, I would just like to recognize that today is a
day that President Roosevelt said would go down in infamy. This
is the anniversary of the attack of our country at Pearl Harbor
in 1941. I would like us to all keep in mind the memory of
those brave Americans who died that day.
The Department of Homeland Security was created in response
to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the threats to the
homeland posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Since
that time, the scope of the threat has changed dramatically. It
has become much more diverse and diffuse.
We know that terrorist groups have long strived to employ
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials in
their attacks. There have been documented reports of ISIS using
mustard gas in Syria as well as Sarin and chlorine gas used by
the Syrian government itself. A plot to release hydrogen
sulfide via an improvised chemical dispersion device was
uncovered by Australian police.
Kim Jung-un had his own step-brother assassinated using VX
nerve agent. A laptop reportedly retrieved from an ISIS hideout
in Syria in 2014 contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague
and a document discussing the advantages of using biological
weapons. The rapid evolution of new biological techniques, such
as CRISPR CAS-9, pose potential threats, as the new techniques
can be used for both good and evil.
North Korea, a state sponsor of terrorism, continues its
nuclear tests and has expanded its missile program to such an
extent that General Mattis has indicated that now they have the
range to reach the United States. The North Korean Central News
Agency stated that the ICBM can carry a ``super-large heavy
warhead, which is capable of striking the whole mainland of the
U.S.''
This is the context under which we meet today. As the world
of threats becomes more complex, it is incumbent upon the
Department of Homeland Security to assess whether or not it is
optimally organized to best confront the variety of threats it
is expected to counter. Acting Secretary Duke determined that
the Department is, in fact, not currently organized to best
address these threats.
As a result, on October 6, she notified the committee of
her intent to use her 872 reorganization authority to establish
a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, or CWMD office,
headed by an assistant secretary for CWMD. This reorganization
took effect earlier this week, and I am pleased that we are
joined today by the assistant secretary and principal deputy
assistant secretary for CWMD, along with the acting under
secretary for Science and Technology, to discuss this new
office.
I will note that Acting Secretary Duke realized that her
use of 872 authority will only take her so far and legislative
changes are necessary to fully integrate the CWMD Office. This
committee stands ready to work with the Department on this
authorization, as we worked with the Obama administration on
their proposal to establish a similar office.
Last Congress, the House passed the Department of Homeland
Security CBRNE Defense Act, authored by Chairman McCaul. Based
on the Obama administration's proposal, the structure of the
office created by the CBRNE Defense Act differs from the CWMD
Office envisioned in the Department's current proposal.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the
current threat stream informed their proposal and how the
organizational structure envisioned in the proposal will set
DHS up for success in meeting its vital mission.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
December 7, 2017
The Department of Homeland Security was created in response to the
September 11 terrorist attacks and the threats to the homeland posed by
al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Since that time, the scope of the
threat has changed dramatically--it has become much more diverse and
diffuse. We know that terrorist groups have long strived to employ
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials in their
attacks.
There have been documented reports of ISIS using mustard gas in
Syria as well as Sarin and chlorine gas use by the Syrian government. A
plot to release hydrogen sulfide via an improvised chemical dispersion
device was uncovered by Australian police. Kim Jung-Un had his step-
brother assassinated using VX nerve agent.
A laptop reportedly retrieved from an ISIS hide-out in Syria in
2014 contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague and a document
discussing the advantages of using biological weapons. The rapid
evolution of new biological techniques, such as CRISPR CAS-9, pose
potential threats, as the new techniques can be used for good or evil.
North Korea, a state sponsor of terrorism, continues its nuclear
tests and has expanded its missile program to such an extent that
General Mattis has indicated that they now have the range to reach the
United States. The North Korean Central News Agency stated that the
ICBM can carry a ``super-large heavy warhead, which is capable of
striking the whole mainland of the United States.''
And this is the context under which we meet today. As the world of
threats becomes more complex, it is incumbent upon the Department of
Homeland Security to assess whether or not it is optimally organized to
best confront the variety of threats it is expected to counter.
Acting Secretary Duke determined that the Department is, in fact,
not currently organized to best address these threats. As a result, on
October 6, she notified the committee of her intent to use her ``872''
reorganization authority to establish a ``Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction,'' or ``CWMD'' Office, headed by an assistant secretary for
CWMD. This reorganization took effect earlier this week and I am
pleased that we are joined today by the assistant secretary and
principal deputy assistant secretary for CWMD, along with the acting
under secretary for science and technology, to discuss this new office.
I will note that Acting Secretary Duke realized that the use of her
872 authority will only take her so far and legislative changes are
necessary to fully integrate the CWMD Office.
This committee stands ready to work with the Department on this
authorization, as we worked with the Obama administration on their
proposal to establish a similar office.
Last Congress, the House passed the Department of Homeland Security
CBRNE Defense Act, authored by Chairman McCaul. Based on the Obama
administration's proposal, the structure of the office created by the
CBRNE Defense Act differs from the CWMD Office envisioned in the
Department's current proposal.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how the current threat
stream informed their proposal and how the organizational structure
envisioned in the proposal will set DHS up for success in meeting its
vital mission.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes my friend, the
gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member of this
committee, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement that he may
have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Good morning.
I apologize for my tardiness. But it looks like I got here
right on time.
Mr. Donovan. You did.
Mr. Payne. OK. Well, I want to first thank the Chairman for
holding today's hearing to assess the Department's latest
efforts to establish a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
office, CWMD. Great, another acronym. We needed one more.
At the outset, I would like to express my disappointment
that the Department chose to circumvent Congress and
unilaterally organize its activities related to chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear CBRNE defense pursuits to
section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. I appreciate
the Congressional authorization process takes time, but it also
adds value.
This committee has proven itself to be willing to partner
when DHS has wanted to reorganize. In 2015, for example, the
full committee, Ranking Member, and I supported legislation to
consolidate the CBRNE activities despite warranted
reservations, because DHS insisted its proposed realignment
would improve mission capability.
Earlier this year, this committee worked with DHS to draft
important legislation to overhaul the National Protection and
Programs Directorate, NPPD. To be clear, working with the
administration to make DHS operate better is a bipartisan
priority. Fortunately, this committee has passed legislation to
repeal Section 872, so the Department's window of opportunity
to use the Homeland Security Act to avoid Congress appears to
be closing. Nevertheless, I urge you to work with the committee
more collaboratively in the future.
I would also like to express my concern that the
reorganization was announced when DHS and impacted components
lacked permanent leadership. I hope the witnesses here today
will help me understand why the Department rushed to reorganize
without Congressional authorization at a time when permanent
leaders were in place in only one of the impacted offices.
Finally, I look forward to learning more about how the
proposal to reorganize CBRNE activities has evolved since 2015.
Two years ago, I was disappointed when prior DHS leadership
could not point to concrete benefits it anticipated as a result
of consolidating its WMD defenses activities. Instead of
articulating novel plans to leverage capabilities across the
WMD mission space, DHS officials spoke in generalities about
how reorganization advanced the then-Secretary's Unity of
Effort initiative and created a central point of contact for
stakeholders.
Such vague explanations are little justification for
setting a disruptive organization in motion. Additionally, I
would be interested to learn how DHS engaged with internal and
external stakeholders and whether such engagement informed its
reorganization scheme. I look forward to working with the
Department to ensure the successes of its activities in the WMD
space.
With that, I would like to thank the witnesses for being
here today and look forward to their testimony. With that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
December 7, 2017
I would like to express my disappointment that the Department chose
to circumvent Congress and unilaterally reorganized its activities
related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
defense pursuant to Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
I appreciate that the Congressional authorization process takes
time, but it also adds value. And this committee has proven itself to
be a willing partner when DHS has wanted to reorganize.
In 2015, for example, the full committee Ranking Member and I
supported legislation to consolidate certain CBRN activities--despite
warranted reservations--because DHS insisted its proposed realignment
would improve mission capability.
And earlier this year, this committee worked with DHS to draft
important legislation to overhaul the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD).
To be clear, working with the administration to make DHS operate
better is a bipartisan priority. Fortunately, this committee has passed
legislation to repeal section 872, so Department's window of
opportunity using the Homeland Security Act to avoid Congress appears
to be closing.
Nevertheless, I urge you to work with the committee more
collaboratively in the future. I would also like to express my concern
that the reorganization was announced when DHS and impacted components
lacked permanent leadership.
I hope the witnesses here today will help me understand why the
Department rushed to reorganize--without Congressional authorization--
at a time when permanent leaders were in place in only one of the
impacted offices.
Finally, I look forward to learning more about how the proposal to
reorganize CBRN activities has evolved since the 2015 proposal. Two
years ago, I was disappointed when prior DHS leadership could not point
to concrete benefits it anticipated as the result of consolidating its
WMD defense activities.
Instead of articulating novel plans to leverage capabilities across
the WMD mission space, DHS officials spoke in generalities about how
the reorganization advanced the then-Secretary's Unity of Effort
initiative and created a central point of contact for stakeholders.
Such vague explanations are little justification for setting a
disruptive reorganization in motion.
Additionally, I will be interested to learn how DHS engaged with
internal and external stakeholders and whether such engagement informed
its reorganization scheme. I look forward to working with the
Department to ensure the success of its activities in the WMD mission
space.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields. Other Members of the
subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
December 7, 2017
On October 6, 2017, then-Acting Homeland Security Secretary Elaine
Duke notified the committee that DHS was utilizing its authority under
Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish the
Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The Office was
officially stood up earlier this week.
This is not the first time the Department has used its Section 872
authority to execute a reorganization without seeking Congressional
authorization, nor is it the first time that the Department has sought
to consolidate its activities related to countering chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats--but I have
concerns about both.
Since its inception, DHS has undergone several disruptive
reorganizations--many without Congressional authorization and some with
mixed results. In July 2005, for example, Secretary Chertoff announced
sweeping plans to realign DHS to improve mission performance.
Part of Secretary Chertoff's proposal shifted preparedness
functions from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to DHS
headquarters with such disastrous consequences that Congress eventually
restored them to FEMA. I raise this cautionary tale as a reminder that
even the most well-intentioned reorganizations can have unintended
consequences.
In my experience, the rigorous vetting inherent in the
authorization process can help Congress understand the resources and
authorities the Department needs from the outset and root out or
mitigate potential challenges associated with reorganizations.
The authorization process can also clarify what problems a
reorganization aims to resolve and how a realignment can improve
mission capability.
Toward that end, when this committee assessed DHS's proposal to
establish a Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and Explosives
(CBRNE) Defense Office last Congress, I never got a satisfying answer
to two fundamental questions I asked: What problems will this
reorganization solve? How will the proposed reorganization solve the
problems?
Without answers to these questions, it is impossible for the agency
to justify potential disruptions to the workforce, direct resources
appropriately, or measure results.
I hope the witnesses here today have better answers for me,
particularly since DHS acted unilaterally and the reorganization has
already begun. The Department of Homeland Security plays an important
role in the CBRNE defense space, and we cannot afford for a misguided,
poorly-executed reorganization to undermine its ability to carry out
its mission.
Last Congress, I asked the Government Accountability Office to
review the CBRNE reorganization proposal the Department submitted to
Congress in 2015.
Although we are here today to review a reorganization that is
already under way, there are recommendations and best practices GAO
identified in its 2016 report that remain relevant.
Moreover, I will be interested to understand why the Department
executed its section 872 authority prior to fully addressing all of the
recommendations GAO made.
Moving forward, committee Democrats are committed to ensuring that
DHS effectively carries out its mission related to weapons of mass
destruction threats, and that any Departmental reorganization focuses
on capability building and preserving a talented workforce.
Mr. Donovan. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel
before us today on this important topic. Mr. Jim McDonnell
serves as the assistant secretary for Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction and the director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office. Thank you for joining us, sir.
Mr. William Bryan serves as the deputy under secretary for
Science and Technology and is the senior official performing
the duties of the under secretary for Science and Technology.
Thank you for joining us, sir.
Mr. Chris Currie serves as the director of emergency
management, National preparedness, and critical infrastructure
protection issues at the Government Accountability Office. Mr.
Currie, thank you for joining us.
We were supposed to be joined today also by Mr. Larry
Fluty, the principal deputy assistant secretary for CWMD, but
unfortunately an illness has prevented him from being here this
morning. We hope he is on the road to recovery and will submit
questions for him for the record.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record, and the Chair now recognizes Mr. McDonnell for a 5-
minute statement.
STATEMENT OF JAMES F. MC DONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, DIRECTOR OF THE
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. McDonnell. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Payne, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is an
honor to be here today to discuss Department of Homeland
Security's work to counter the threat of terrorists using
weapons of mass destruction, otherwise known as WMD. I
shortened the acronym just a bit.
Today as we discuss the creation of a new organization in
DHS, it is on the anniversary of one of the two most
catastrophic attacks in U.S. history, the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor, an attack that caused the United States to enter
in a global war that would preserve the freedoms of our
democracy. Like Pearl Harbor, 9/11 also began a war to preserve
our way of life, a war against terrorism, which continues
today.
The purpose of the Countering WMD office will be to work
every day to prevent another catastrophic attack, one using
weapons or materials that have the potential to kill our
citizens in numbers that dwarf previous attacks. In the last
year, we have observed a credible increase in terrorist
interest in using WMD against the United States. These threats
come from all fronts--chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons. Certain WMDs once thought to be impossible for
non-state actors, non-state groups to acquire are now closer to
getting in the hands of terrorists.
Today, as you heard in the committee's recent threats
hearing, we know that non-state actors have information and
technology at their disposal that make the threat much more
dynamic, requiring more flexible and aggressive response.
The CWMD office is an operational support office. Our
mission is to assist the Department's front-line operating
components, first responders and interagency partners. We will
draw on the WMD expertise within the Department and across
inter-agency to integrate expertise and operational support.
In planning for the establishment of the CWMD office, Mr.
Fluty and I reached out to each of the DHS operating
components, interagency partners, and State and local officials
to understand their needs and requirements. We are tailoring
the CWMD organization to provide the best unified efforts and
operational support possible. We are working closely with FEMA
to ensure that actions taken by CWMD in support of first
responders are coordinated and complementary. Another example
of early integration and unity of effort into the larger
Department is a recent move by OHA and DNDO to embed a core
team of WMD expertise in the CBP National Targeting Center.
DNDO and OHA leadership have been working closely with DOD
as it transitions the CWMD mission from STRATCOM to SOCOM. We
are in near daily contact with the Department of Defense and
believe this partnership will benefit us in threat awareness
and the adoption of new technologies and capabilities that can
be developed into homeland capabilities.
We are planning against smuggling pathway. Rather than
limiting our detection of mission to a defense at the 1-yard-
line strategy, we plan to work through the DHS joint task
forces and others to push out capability into known smuggling
pathways. We want to deploy into the environment where we know
bad guys are operating, be less predictable, and find the
threat before it reaches our borders.
The CWMD core leadership team brings decades of operational
and executive leadership experience. I personally led the
development of the WMD capability in United States Special
Operations Command, and Dave Fluty has 23 years as a CBP
officer, which includes a detail into the DNDO office when it
was stood up.
The entire CWMD team has a clear objective to safeguard
America and understands their contribution to the DHS mission.
The clarity of purpose and contribution to the homeland
security mission addresses the feedback from our staffs,
meetings, and survey results.
I take seriously the feedback from Congressional oversight
bodies, the GAO, and the DHS inspector general. These provide
guidelines and roadmaps to improvement. I continue to meet with
the GAO regularly. I support the findings of the blue ribbon
panel on biodefense and a number of their recommendations, for
example, the recommendation to replace BioWatch. I agree with
this recommendation. We intend to develop and deploy a system
that will be innovative and leverage business practices and the
best practices already resident within DNDO.
DNDO's solutions development process focuses on gap
identification and the development of tangible operational
requirements to drive R&D and expeditious deployment of
operational capabilities which will close the gaps and reduce
direct threats. This approach has been successful in the
deployment of a nuclear detection architecture and will be
utilized for a biodetection system that uses the latest
technology and shares the information communications backbone
that we are already deploying for the nuclear mission.
We will optimize the integration of the DNDO's solution
development process with the expertise that resides in the
Office of Health Affairs. This will be done with our existing
resources.
WMD terrorism remains a pressing issue for our National
security. It is with your support that we may build a world-
class organization within DHS focused solely on countering the
threat of WMD terrorism. I look forward to working with you
further on this matter, and I am happy to answer any questions
you may have. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. McDonnell, Mr. Fluty
and Mr. Bryan follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of James F. McDonnell, Larry D. Fluty, and
William Bryan
December 7, 2017
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, thank you for inviting us to speak with you today. We
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) work to bolster efforts to counter the threat of
terrorist actors using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the
homeland. As the leaders of the organizations involved in the
reorganization of WMD functions into one office within DHS, we
appreciate your interest in this matter. We also appreciate the support
from former Secretary John Kelly and Acting Secretary Elaine Duke in
pursuing a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office aimed
at elevating and streamlining DHS's role in the WMD mission and further
unifying associated activities under one office.
background
As Acting Secretary Elaine Duke stated in her September 27, 2017
testimony to the Senate, our intelligence professionals have seen a
renewed terrorist interest in WMD. The United States faces a
significant danger from threat actors who could use chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to harm Americans
or U.S. interests. Certain WMD, once viewed as out-of-reach for all but
nation-states, are now closer to being attained by non-state actors.
Terrorist groups are already using chemical weapons, using battlefield
environments to test them, and may consider using such weapons in
external operations. A WMD terrorist attack against the United States
would have a profound and potentially catastrophic impact on our
Nation, increasing our need to invigorate efforts to stop them and
improve our own capabilities to defend, deter, and detect.
Since the creation of the Department more than 15 years ago, DHS
has lacked a focal point in the WMD threat space. Through Presidential
directives and legislation, various WMD-related programs and projects
were established within the Department and across multiple components.
In some cases, components were established through Presidential
directives and delegations of authority, but lacked full legislative
authorization to carry out such vested responsibilities. This resulted
in fragmented missions and uncoordinated activities across the
Department, ultimately leading to a lack of strategic direction in this
critical mission. Further, the current structure of CBRN functions
within the Department resulted in a lack of visibility for the mission
space, weak internal coordination, and disjointed interagency
cooperation.
DHS believes it is imperative to streamline and elevate its
counter-WMD efforts. Multiple reviews in the last decade--both internal
and external to the Department--have highlighted the Department's
shortcomings in this space, as well as the need for a focal point on
CBRN matters. For instance, 5 years ago, Congress required the
Department of Homeland Security to study the issue, to rationalize its
WMD defense efforts, and to report on whether a reorganization was
needed. The previous administration conducted such a study and made an
affirmative determination to pursue changes \1\ that resulted in the
House passing the Department of Homeland Security CBRNE Defense Act of
2015.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In the June 2015 ``DHS Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Functions Review Report'' to House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees, the Department reviewed its CBRN programs' organization,
operations, and communications pursuant to Congressional direction in
the Joint Explanatory Statement (JES) and House Report accompanying the
fiscal year 2013 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
(Pub. Law No. 113-6). In the JES, Congress identified the need to
``elevate and streamline the Department's focus on efforts to address
[CBRN] threats and deter and counter weapons of mass destruction.''
\2\ H.R. 3875, Department of Homeland Security CBRNE Defense Act of
2015, sec. 2 (Passed House amended (12/10/2015)). H.R. 3875 was
referred to the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This year, the Department again reexamined previous reviews,
shortcomings in the mission space, and whether a re-organization would
remedy such issues. As the new leadership team explored these issues,
they took into consideration challenges associated with advancements in
chemical and biological defense capabilities. Due to challenges in the
chemical and biological defense space, and in light of the current
threat environment, DHS determined that steps needed to be taken
expeditiously to improve the effectiveness of our WMD defense
functions. DHS leadership, including former Secretary John Kelly and
Acting Secretary Elaine Duke, decided to establish a CWMD Office to
elevate, streamline, and bolster an internal ``unity of command'' for
CWMD capabilities within the Department.
current cwmd office
As an initial step, the Department established the CWMD Office that
unified the management structure and consolidated the following
components and elements within the Department into one office: The
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the majority of the Office of
Health Affairs (OHA), select elements of the Science & Technology
Directorate (S&T), and select DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
(SPP) and DHS Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) functions and
personnel.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
The CWMD Office subsumed DNDO in total with all current functions
remaining intact. DNDO was chartered, in law and Presidential
Directive, using an interagency construct to coordinate technical
efforts across the U.S. Government to technically detect and protect
against radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO conducts a holistic
program of end-to-end efforts in technical nuclear detection and
nuclear forensics, including planning, research and technology
development, technology acquisition, and support for Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and territorial operators in the field.
The Office of Health Affairs
The CWMD Office also includes the majority of OHA, retaining
biological and chemical defense functions, external coordination of
Department medical preparedness and response activities, health
incident surveillance, and health security intelligence and
information-sharing functions. The CWMD Office is exploring
enhancements to current biodetection technologies with the goal of
identifying new technology that can reduce capability gaps in
biological detection. Through non-reimbursable details, DHS transferred
internal DHS workforce health and medical support functions from OHA to
the DHS Management Directorate. By elevating the mission and unifying
Departmental CWMD efforts, the CWMD Office is optimizing existing DHS
resources to better protect the Nation against WMD threats.
The CWMD Office, through the chief medical officer, is continuing
to provide advice and support to DHS leadership and public and medical
health officials Nation-wide to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from threats to the Nation's health security. Ensuring the first-
responder community receives health-related expertise in a CBRN
incident is vital. The CWMD Office is continuing to provide support for
emerging health and medical issues of National significance and support
for external-facing medical first responder coordination.
The Science & Technology Directorate
The Department reassigned certain non-R&D functions from S&T to the
CWMD Office, specifically the non-R&D functions performed by S&T
related to chemical, biological, and integrated terrorism risk
assessments and material threat assessments as required by Presidential
Directive and the Project BioShield Act of 2004.\3\ This will harmonize
terrorism risk assessment efforts across the WMD spectrum within one
organization, and result in a rigorous requirements development
process. We expect this realignment to improve risk-informed strategy
and policy development and further enhance our Nation's ability to
protect against WMD terror threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. Law No. 108-276.
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The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (SPP) and the Office of
Operations (OPS) Coordination
Last, the Department is executing non-reimbursable details to
assign a limited number of SPP and OPS personnel with WMD defense
expertise to the CWMD Office. These details will allow the CWMD Office
to leverage existing subject-matter experts that had previously been in
other parts of DHS to support effective planning and policy for WMD
threats.
proposed cwmd organization
To fully integrate these capabilities, we are requesting this
Congress' support for this effort, and we fully intend to work
collaboratively with Congress to formalize this office, and ensure it
is postured appropriately to confront the threat. The proposed CWMD
Office would be responsible for advancing CWMD capabilities in DHS by
taking a comprehensive approach to the spectrum of threats.
During the reorganizational review of WMD-related support functions
and activities, the Department found that components shared a number of
related lines of effort that could be leveraged. For example, both DNDO
and the Office of Health Affairs have acquisition activities that could
be mutually leveraged. Conversely, the Department also found it lacked
critical acquisition and requirements functions in its chemical and
biological missions. For example, DNDO coordinates with the interagency
on planning and analysis activities related to the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture. Utilizing DNDO's analysis and requirements
generation capabilities for the chemical and biological defense mission
across the U.S. Government is an opportunity to better accomplish this
mission.
The proposed CWMD Office would leverage best practices from across
the Department to fill gaps in the chemical and biological defense
functions by coordinating similar functions prescribed in law for DNDO.
In particular, the CWMD Office will seek to approach chemical and
biological defense activities much as is currently done for
radiological and nuclear threats--from gap and requirement
identification to operational deployment and support.
With regard to the leadership structure of the proposed CWMD
Office, the Office would be optimally organized by having a
Presidentially-appointed assistant secretary to lead the organization
and who would report directly to the Secretary. This leadership
structure would empower the assistant secretary to coalesce and elevate
CWMD matters to the Secretary in support of the DHS operating
components and act as a DHS representative on relevant matters within
the Federal interagency, as well as with external stakeholders at the
State level, local level, and with private-sector partners. The
assistant secretary would be supported by a principal deputy assistant
secretary to serve as the deputy and an advisor on WMD issues.
Another important part of the CWMD reorganization is the role of
the chief medical officer within DHS. Congress authorized a chief
medical officer within DHS in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (Pub. Law 109-295) (``PKEMRA'').\4\ Congress vested
the chief medical officer with primary responsibility within DHS for
medical issues related to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and
other man-made disasters, including serving as the principal advisor to
the DHS Secretary and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
administrator on medical and public health issues, and coordinating DHS
biodefense activities.\5\ Shortly thereafter, DHS reorganized to
implement the various changes in PKEMRA as well as additional
organizational improvements.\6\ Under the 2007 reorganization, the
Department established the Office of Health Affairs, to be led by the
chief medical officer. Since then, the Office of Health Affairs has
been responsible for non-R&D chemical and biological defense
activities, medical readiness, and component services functions.
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\4\ Section 516 of the HSA, codified at 6 U.S.C. 321e.
\5\ Id.
\6\ Notice of Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 and of Additional Changes Pursuant to
872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 from Secretary Michael
Chertoff to Senator Michael B. Enzi (Jan. 18, 2007).
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After re-evaluating the Department's WMD activities, leadership
determined that the chief medical officer would be most effective in
the CWMD Office supporting the assistant secretary. The chief medical
officer will continue to serve as an independent medical advisor to the
Secretary and other senior DHS officials, including the FEMA
administrator. A permanent re-alignment would ensure the chief medical
officer's expertise is regularly leveraged not only on chemical and
biological issues, as is largely the case today, but also on
radiological and nuclear matters. Moreover, this permanent relocation
of the chief medical officer to the CWMD Office would ensure expertise
is utilized on the full range of critical CWMD matters involving
emerging WMD threats of National significance. Last the re-organization
will ensure the Nation's front-line responders are able to prepare for
and respond to all threats, for which the chief medical officer will
provide advice, as appropriate.
Reorganizational Benefits
The Department anticipates the proposed CWMD Office will offer the
following improvements:
1. Enhanced U.S. defenses against CBRN threats.--Integration of
CBRN elements will elevate and streamline DHS efforts to
prevent terrorists and other National security threat actors
from using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
agents to harm Americans and U.S. interests. The Department has
long sought to bring unity of effort to this space, and in
doing so, it will be able to confront these challenges more
decisively. This includes providing better support to DHS
front-line components, which are responsible for keeping such
dangerous agents from entering the United States.
2. Improved strategic direction.--The CWMD Office will help advance
the Department's strategic direction related to CBRN threats.
In particular, U.S. strategies on chemical and biological
defense have lagged behind the threat landscape. The CWMD
Office will help close this gap by better equipping DHS to put
in place effective chemical and biological defenses and
ensuring the Department is able to more effectively drive
forward planned strategies being developed in the interagency.
3. Reform through sharing of best practices.--The CWMD Office will
better leverage related lines of effort, functional activities,
and administrative structures within the Department. This new
construct will allow for seamless sharing of best practices and
create new opportunities for reform. In particular, DNDO's
successful business model will help inform improvements to the
chemical and biological defense mission space.
4. A clear focal point for CWMD within DHS.--The Department's
previous approach to CWMD created policy coordination
challenges, both internally and externally. With the changes
the Department plans to undertake, stakeholders in the
interagency, industry, and at the State and local level will be
able to better engage with DHS to deal with CBRN defense and
detection matters. For example, the CWMD Office will
collaborate closely with interagency partners such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Weapons of Mass
Destruction Directorate, which is the focal point for WMD-
related matters within the FBI.
5. Reduced overlap and duplication.--In the past, the Department
has been forced to reevaluate and terminate major CWMD-related
programs and acquisitions due to under-performance, cost
overruns, or ineffectiveness. In some cases, these failures
could have been avoided with better oversight, leadership, and
strategic planning. The CWMD Office will leverage best
practices and lessons learned to prevent such mistakes from
occurring in the future. Moreover, the reorganization offers
potential efficiencies, such as eliminating duplication of
effort in cross-cutting functions such as operational support
programs, and interagency and intergovernmental coordination.
change management
Recognizing that the success of this reorganization is imperative,
the Department has heeded GAO's prior recommendation to use, where
appropriate, the key mergers and organizational practices identified in
past reports and audits.\7\ Prior to and following the Department's
decision to establish a CWMD Office, the Department actively engaged
internally among DHS components and with external stakeholders.
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\7\ GAO Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives, Homeland Security--DHS's Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Program Consolidation
Proposal Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations, GAO-16-603
(Aug. 2016), p. 18.
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DHS has undertaken a number of activities to ensure compliance with
GAO-identified best practices in organizational changes. First, an
Implementation Team was created with a specific task to engage an
independent and objective party to monitor and examine the Department's
reorganization and consolidation. Second, a methodology was developed,
independent of management, to gather documentation and conduct
interviews across Departmental components. Following the decision to
pursue a re-organization, the independent party started interviewing
employees at the Department to ensure a smooth transition and bolster
employee engagement. The Department intends to continue to use GAO-
identified best practices as benchmarks by which we can measure
progress for the current CWMD Office and the proposed Office.
While we are excited to elevate the Department's CWMD mission, we
have not forgotten about the men and women of DHS who work every day to
ensure our Nation is secure. Departmental reorganizations require
engagement among senior management as well as with staff at the working
level. On numerous occasions, top leadership in the Department have
hosted stakeholder meetings, joint employee town hall events, and
developed internal and external communications strategies to create
shared expectations with all relevant entities.
conclusion
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members
of this subcommittee, thank you again for your attention to this
important mission and for the opportunity to discuss proposed efforts
to enhance support capabilities across the CBRN spectrum. We look
forward to further working with Congress and this subcommittee on fully
integrating WMD capabilities to secure the homeland from WMD terrorism.
With your help, we have full confidence that our Department can improve
our strategic direction in this threat space and ensure our Nation is
safer than ever before. We look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. McDonnell.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bryan for a 5-minute
statement.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BRYAN, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bryan. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. Thank you
for the opportunity to speak to you today.
As you know, the Science and Technology Directorate is the
research and development arm of the Department of Homeland
Security. S&T's mission is to be an enabler. We enable
effective, efficient, and secure operations across all homeland
security missions by applying timely, scientific, and
innovative engineering solutions through research, development,
test and evaluation, and acquisition support.
Since I came to S&T in May of this year, we have been
doubling our efforts on satisfying the R&D needs and the
requirements of our components. We are working hard to ensure a
coordinated and robust program is in place to meet the needs of
the DHS operator, as well as the first responders.
Ever since S&T's inception, we have had a threat-based,
varied, and intricate research portfolio in chemical and
biological defense. One example is our portable vehicle
decontamination system. The system deploys from the back of a
pickup truck. It can clean and disinfect vehicles up to 80 feet
long, including the undercarriages and even inside of the
animal transport compartments. We transitioned this product to
USDA, which is testing the wash tunnel and the autonomous
robots. This project will have a major impact on helping
contain the spread of diseases from vehicles moving from farm
to farm during an outbreak.
We also developed the first-ever licensed and approved
foot-and-mouth disease vaccine for livestock and the companion
diagnostic kit, now available for the National Veterinarian
Stockpile and available for sale internationally. This
diagnostic assay product is faster, more sensitive, and greatly
enhances the preparedness by decreasing the response times to a
foot-and-mouth disease incursion.
Our bio-threat characterization program studies a range of
biological agents that can be used against us now and in the
future. The knowledge gained from this program feeds into the
terrorism risk assessments, the TRAs, which we will be talking
about more today, and the material threat assessments, the
MTAs. It has improved DHS's estimates of consequence and risks.
Currently, all chemical and biological R&D, including
people and resources, will stay with S&T. Historically, the
TRAs and the MTAs that are required by Presidential directive
and the Project BioShield Act of 2004, were previously
conducted by S&T. The non-R&D elements of these assessments
such as the coordination with DHS's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis for the threat awareness and the threat prioritization
have now been transferred to the CWMD office, while the R&D
elements will remain with S&T per the Secretary's guidance.
S&T is already working with representatives from the CWMD
office to identify the chemical and biological R&D requirements
for validation and execution. S&T is committed to ensuring that
R&D spending is driven by our components and the customers and
that we maintain homeland-focused, while being more agile and
responsive. We will leverage existing technologies when
appropriate and clearly define a path for transfer and
commercialization of those capabilities.
Working together with CWMD, we will apply our science and
engineering excellence to counter the threat of weapons of mass
destruction against the homeland. That concludes my remarks,
and thank you very much once again for having this opportunity.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, Mr. Bryan. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Currie for an opening statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT,
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Currie. All right, thank you, Chairman Donovan, Mr.
Payne, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Appreciate the opportunity to be
here today.
The question of how DHS should be organized to combat
weapons of mass destruction has come up numerous times since
the Department's creation 15 years ago. We at GAO are not for
or against the proposed reorganization. Those are decisions for
DHS and for you as the Congress to make. Our work is focused
more on the why and the how of the question.
Our 2016 report evaluated DHS's own assessment of the
benefits and tradeoffs of the reorganization, and maybe more
important for today's hearing, how to implement it
successfully. This committee understands well the need to fully
assess such a change. You require that DHS better assess it in
your recent DHS reauthorization bill you passed this year. We
know at GAO from looking at decades of reorganizations and
transformations in Government--some good, some bad--that
agencies often learn the hard way how difficult these can be.
Many of these lessons were learned from the creation and
transformation of DHS itself over the last 15 years. The bottom
line is that threat and mission need are clearly the most
critical factors for this reorganization. However, if there is
not an honest recognition of the organizational and
administrative challenges and a plan to address it, it will be
way more difficult than it needs to be.
In our report last year, we looked into DHS's assessment
and decision making that led to the reorganization proposal.
What we found is that there was little actual assessment done.
For example, DHS didn't fully assess problems that could occur,
didn't fully consider the costs versus the benefits, and
conducted very limited outreach at that time to external
stakeholders.
DHS actually disagreed with our recommendation at the time
to go back and do these things. Their position then was a
decision had been made and to go back and further assess it was
not necessary. Frankly, this concerned us and didn't sound like
a recipe for success.
But I would like to shift from the past to the present.
While we have not done the same in-depth audit of the current
proposal over the last year that we did a year ago, we have
reviewed the Secretary's notice and talked with DHS several
times to better understand it. Clearly, there are some
promising things in this proposal that the previous one lacked.
There seems to be a realistic acceptance of past problems
that need to be solved. An example of this is the need for a
clear focal point in DHS to strengthen coordination and reduce
fragmentation. This is something we have long recommended
across numerous complicated National security areas, one of
which is biodefense.
Also, this effort looks to be driven from the components
themselves as opposed to the top-down approach that was taken
before from the Office of Policy. However, and emphasis on
however, I am cautiously optimistic. As I alluded to before,
the greatest mission need in the world won't overcome the
organizational challenges to reorganization. In fact, the hard
work begins once the reorganization actually begins. That is
why it is so important that DHS apply best practices from prior
reorganizations.
Some of these will seem obvious, but the key is in the
execution. Here are just some examples. Establishing a coherent
mission and strategic goals and time frames to guide the
transformation. This will be critical to help DHS meet its
broad new goals for chem, bio, rad, and nuke defense and help
internal and external stakeholders see that progress, as well.
Establishing an implementation team and communications
strategy for the transformation are also key. This will help
build trust and make adjustments if they are needed as they go.
The last example is also critical. Involving employees to
obtain their ideas and gain their buy-in. DHS wants to improve
morale through this reorganization and these components.
However, morale doesn't go up just because organizations move
around. Employees need to understand the vision, be consulted,
and see their feedback incorporated into the change.
The good news is that DHS recognizes the challenges--we
have heard that already this morning--and the importance of
these actions. But it will be very important for this committee
to monitor the actual execution of the reorganization over the
next few years. Of course, we are happy to help you with that,
as well.
That concludes my statement, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris P. Currie
December 7, 2017
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) plans to consolidate Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) programs.
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons, and explosives
also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have the potential to
kill thousands of people in a single incident. Over the past 4 years,
the United States has faced significant CBRNE threats to its National
security. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, according
to the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, is a growing and direct threat
to the United States.\1\ Moreover, the use of chemical weapons in Syria
in August 2013 and again in April 2017, and the emergence of
nontraditional chemical agents highlighted the Nation's potential
vulnerability to chemical and biological attacks. Additionally, the
spread of scientific knowledge and capabilities by State and non-State
actors to produce effective chemical and biological weapons further
contributes to the Nation's threats. According to the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
report, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats are
enduring areas of concern and the consequences of such attacks are
potentially high even though the likelihood of their occurrence is
relatively low.\2\
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\1\ DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Mar. 4,
2014).
\2\ DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, (Washington,
DC: June 2014).
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The organizational structure of DHS's CBRNE functions has been
considered and questioned for some time. Specifically, as noted by the
House committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS
appropriations bill, across the U.S. Government, departments and
agencies have combined their WMD programs into more centralized
offices.\3\ Consolidations such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) reorganization of its WMD-related activities into
a single WMD Directorate within its National Security Branch are
intended to unify counterterrorism-related activities.\4\ To this end,
Congress directed DHS to review and report on the Department's WMD
programs, including potential consolidation of mission functions.\5\
DHS conducted its review, and in June 2015 provided a report of its
findings to Congress, including a proposal to consolidate the agency's
core CBRNE functions.
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\3\ H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 12 (2012).
\4\ Several different FBI investigative divisions once conducted
WMD-related activities. In July 2006, the FBI consolidated its WMD
investigation and prevention efforts into a WMD Directorate within its
National Security Branch. Comprised primarily of special agents,
intelligence analysts, program managers, and policy specialists, the
WMD Directorate designs training for employees of the FBI; other
Federal agencies; State and local law enforcement organizations; and
public health, industry, and academia partners. The WMD Directorate
also provides National-level WMD intelligence support to FBI field
divisions and to the larger U.S. intelligence community.
\5\ See Senate explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127
Stat. 198 (2013), 159 Cong. Rec. S1547 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013)., See
also H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 13-14 (2012).
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This testimony summarizes our August 2016 report, which discusses
(1) the extent to which DHS's CBRNE consolidation proposal assessed the
benefits and limitations of consolidation and (2) GAO's key practices
from past organizational transformations that could benefit a CBRNE
consolidation effort. This statement also focuses on recommendation
follow-up activities related to the proposed CBRNE reorganization
conducted through November 2017.\6\ In addition, we are conducting on-
going work for this committee on DHS's efforts to address chemical
terrorism, which may inform DHS's consolidation efforts. That report is
expected to be issued early next year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS's Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Program Consolidation Proposal
Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations, GAO-16-603 (Washington,
DC: Aug. 2016).
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To perform the work for our previous report on DHS's CBRNE
consolidation proposal, among other things, we reviewed DHS's June 2015
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Functions Review Report
and supporting documentation such as DHS's Analysis of CBRNE
Organizational Alternatives, written testimony from DHS officials on
CBRNE threats, DHS's fiscal year 2017 Budget-In-Brief and fiscal year
2017 Congressional Budget Justification. We also examined our prior
work on identifying useful practices and lessons learned from major
private and public-sector mergers, acquisitions, and organizational
transformations and compared it against available documentation related
to DHS's consolidation planning efforts.\7\ Further details on the
scope and methodology for the previously-issued report are available
within the published product. In addition, since the issuance of our
August 2016 report through November 2017, we obtained updated
information from DHS on actions taken to address our recommendations
and additional steps taken to reorganize or consolidate CBRNE
functions. However, we have not fully assessed all of DHS's efforts
during this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When
Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and
Management Functions, GAO-12-542 (Washington, DC: May 2012).
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We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
In June 2015, DHS delivered its CBRNE Functions Review Report to
Congress which proposed consolidating the agency's core CBRNE functions
(see fig. 1), into a new Office of CBRNE Defense.
figure 1: department of homeland security (dhs) components with
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (cbrne)
responsibilities, as of june
Note: In accordance with section 709 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017, DHS's Office of Policy is now the DHS Office of Strategy,
Policy, and Plans. See Pub. L. No. 114-328, 1902, 130 Stat. 2000,
2670-72 (2016); 6 U.S.C. 349.
According to DHS officials, the agency's proposal to consolidate
its CBRNE functions adopts the primary recommendation from a previous
DHS study on CBRNE consolidation conducted in 2013. At that time, DHS
assembled a review team to evaluate CBRNE alignment options and
produced a report on its findings for the Secretary of Homeland
Security. According to DHS officials, the alignment options from the
2013 report were updated in 2015 based on the Secretary's Unity of
Effort Initiative, to include transferring CBRNE threat and risk
assessment functions from the DHS Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T) to the proposed CBRNE Office, as well as including the DHS Office
for Bombing Prevention from the National Protection and Programs
Directorate.
Since we reported on consolidation efforts in August 2016, DHS has
provided notification to Congress of its plan to consolidate certain
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) functions
pursuant to the Secretary's authority under the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 to reorganize functions of the Department.\8\ Specifically, in
October 2017 DHS's Acting Secretary issued a memo notifying Congress
that DHS plans to reorganize its CBRN functions, including workforce
health and medical support functions into a Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD) office.\9\ According to the memo, DHS intends to
consolidate the following functions into a CWMD Office, headed by an
assistant secretary who will report directly to the Secretary of DHS:
(1) The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in its entirety; (2)
the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), with the exception of workforce
health and medical support functions; (3) chemical and biological
defense expertise from the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
(PLCY) and the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS); and (4) certain
non-Research and Development (R&D) functions from S&T. According to the
memo, the reorganization will take effect on December 5, 2017.\10\
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\8\ See Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 872, 116 Stat. 2135, 2243 (2002);
6 U.S.C. Sec. 452. At the time of our August 2016 report, a bill had
been pending before Congress that would have established within DHS a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office. See
H.R. 3875, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). Although passed by the House
of Representatives and referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, the bill was not enacted into law. A
more recent bill passed by the House of Representatives and referred to
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs--the
DHS Authorization Act--would require the Secretary of DHS to, among
other things, assess the organization and management of the
Department's CBRNE activities and submit a proposed organizational
structure to ensure enhanced coordination, effectiveness, and
efficiency by providing strengthened CBRNE capabilities in support of
homeland security. See H.R. 2825, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
\9\ During an initial review of CBRNE functions at DHS, agency
officials determined that DHS's Office of Bombing Prevention should be
included within the WMD consolidation option. As such, we use CBRNE to
denote the inclusion of explosives functions covered by DHS Office of
Bombing Prevention. Subsequent DHS consolidation planning does not
include OBP, so we refer to the consolidation as CBRN, where
appropriate.
\10\ In accordance with section 709 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017, what was the DHS Office of Policy at the time we issued the
August 2016 report is now the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans.
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dhs considered several key factors, but had limited analyses and
documentation underlying the benefits and limitations of its cbrne
consolidation proposal
In August 2016, we found that DHS's June 2015 CBRNE report and
related summaries provide some insights into factors considered for its
consolidation proposal, but did not include associated underlying data
or methodological information, such as how benefits and costs were
compared or the extent to which stakeholders were consulted. According
to DHS officials, DHS could not locate the underlying information
associated with analyses that informed the consolidation proposal due
to staff turnover. Without such underlying documentation, we could not
fully determine the extent to which DHS considered the benefits and
limitations of a CBRNE consolidation as part of its decision-making
process.
According to DHS's June 2015 CBRNE report and the summary documents
provided to us during our previous review, the Department developed
decision-making criteria, identified as ``desired outcomes'' and
``near-term goals'' for its proposed reorganization, and consulted with
DNDO, OHA, S&T, and leadership of other DHS components, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and National Security Council Staff. Also
as we reported in August 2016, an official from DHS's Office of Policy
stated that DHS consulted with the Executive Office of the President as
well as Congressional staff on its consolidation plan. DHS considered
five alignment options, as shown in figure 2, and provided a general
assessment of the effects of reorganization on its CBRNE mission.\11\
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\11\ See Pub. L. No. 114-328, Sec. 1902, 130 Stat. 2000, 2670-72
(2016); 6 U.S.C. Sec. 349.
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figure 2: department of homeland security's (dhs) chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosives (cbrne) alignment options and
decision-making criteria
In May 2012, we identified key questions for agency officials to
consider when evaluating an organizational change that involves
consolidation.\12\ Table 1 provides a summary of the key questions for
evaluating consolidation proposals from this previous work and a
summary of our previous assessment of whether documentation provided to
us and interviews with agency officials indicated whether each question
was addressed.\13\
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\12\ In order to determine the key questions to consider when
evaluating physical infrastructure and management function
consolidation initiatives, we identified and reviewed both GAO reports
on specific consolidation initiatives that have been undertaken and
relevant literature on public-sector consolidations. Further, we
reviewed selected consolidation initiatives at the Federal agency level
to gain insights into how agencies addressed these key questions
representing both inter- and intra-agency activity. GAO-12-542.
\13\ Our prior work on key questions for evaluating consolidation
proposals includes a fifth key question related to change management
practices which asks ``To what extent do plans show that change
management practices will be used to implement the consolidation?'' A
discussion related to change management practices during an
organizational transformation follows later in this report. We
therefore did not include the fifth key question in this table.
TABLE 1.--KEY QUESTIONS FROM GAO'S PRIOR WORK ON EVALUATING
CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS AND OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Addressed in the Department
of Homeland Security's
Chemical, Biological,
Key Questions Radiological, Nuclear, And
Explosives (CBRNE)
Consolidation Decision-Making
Process?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
What are the goals of the consolidation? Partially.
What opportunities will be addressed
through the consolidation and what
problems will be solved? What problems,
if any, will be created?
What will be the likely benefits and No.
costs of the consolidation? Are
sufficiently reliable data available to
support a business-case analysis or cost-
benefit analysis?
How can the up-front costs associated Partially.
with the consolidation be funded?
Who are the consolidation stakeholders Partially.
and how will they be affected? How have
the stakeholders been involved in the
decision, and how have their views been
considered? On balance, do stakeholders
understand the rationale for
consolidation?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--GAO-12-542.
We found in our August 2016 report that DHS's June 2015 report to
Congress and the supporting documentation we reviewed included an
evaluation of some, but not all, key questions listed above in Table 1.
These questions are important to consider when evaluating an
organizational change that involves consolidation. Specifically, we
found that DHS's consolidation proposal:
Identified strategic outcomes and goals and considered
problems to be solved, but did not fully assess and document
potential problems that could result from consolidation.
Did not conduct and document a comparison of benefits and
costs. While Congress directed DHS to include an assessment of
whether consolidation could produce cost savings, DHS had not
documented a comparison of benefits and costs for its
consolidation plan.
Did not fully identify or document consideration of up-front
costs. DHS considered potential up-front costs associated with
a CBRNE consolidation, but did not document these costs or how
they were considered during the reorganization decision-making
process.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The President's fiscal year 2017 budget submission for DHS
included the CBRNE reorganization; however, the budget submission for
the proposed CBRNE office did not indicate whether any of the costs in
the submission include up-front costs associated with the
implementation of the consolidation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducted limited external stakeholder consultations. DHS
conducted limited external stakeholder outreach in developing
the consolidation proposal, and thus the proposal may not
sufficiently account for stakeholder concerns.
As a result of these findings, we recommended that DHS complete,
document, and make available analyses of key questions related to its
consolidation proposal, including:
what problems, if any, consolidation may create;
a comparison of the benefits and costs of consolidation; and
a broader range of external stakeholder input including a
discussion of how it was obtained and considered.
DHS did not concur with this recommendation, asserting, among other
things, that our recommendation did not acknowledge the extent to which
these questions were discussed both internally within DHS and
externally with Congress and that DHS's decision to consolidate CBRNE
functions had already been made which would make additional analysis
redundant. However, as we stated in our August 2016 review, in 2013,
Congress had directed DHS to include an assessment of whether
consolidation could produce cost savings. However, as of our 2016
report DHS had not documented a comparison of the benefits and costs
for its consolidation plan. We subsequently closed the recommendation
as not implemented. While we have not fully assessed DHS's most recent
reorganization plans and any additional analyses conducted, we continue
to believe that providing documented information and analyses used to
assess the benefits and limitations of its consolidation plan would
assist DHS in fully demonstrating how its proposal will lead to an
integrated, high-performance organization. We closed this
recommendation as not implemented upon receiving documentation from DHS
in November 2016 stating that they did not intend to address it.
key mergers and organizational transformation practices could benefit
dhs's cbrn consolidation implementation
As we found in our August 2016 report, when implementing a CBRNE
consolidation effort DHS could benefit from incorporating change
management approaches such as the key practices and implementation
steps derived from organizational transformations undertaken by large
private and public-sector organizations identified in our previous
work.\15\ Doing so would help ensure that DHS's consolidation
initiative is results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative in
nature. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, provided that none
of the funds appropriated the fiscal year 2016 Act or any previous
appropriations Acts may be used to establish an Office of CBRNE Defense
until Congress authorized such establishment and, as of the end of
fiscal year 2016, Congress had not approved the proposed
consolidation.\16\ As a result of this restriction, DHS officials told
us at the time of our August 2016 report that they had taken few
concrete steps to plan for or move forward with the consolidation. As
described earlier, DHS subsequently provided notification to Congress
in October 2017 of its plan to consolidate certain CBRN functions
pursuant to its reorganization authorities provided under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ GAO-12-542, GAO-03-669.
\16\ See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. F, 521, 129 Stat. 2242, 2515
(2015) (providing further, however, that the Secretary may transfer
funds for the purposes of executing authorization of the Office of
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Defense).
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, did not contain a provision
precluding DHS from utilizing appropriated funds for the establishment
of such an office. See Pub. L. No. 115-31, div. F, 131 Stat. 135, 404
(2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As DHS was formed, we reported in July 2003 on key practices and
implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations.
The factors listed in Table 2 were built on the lessons learned from
the experiences of large private and public-sector organizations.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ To identify these practices, we interviewed a cross-section of
leaders with experience managing large-scale organizational mergers,
acquisitions, and transformations, as well as academics and others who
have studied these efforts. We asked these individuals about their
experiences managing mergers, acquisitions, and transformations and
reviewed literature on the subject drawn primarily from private-sector
mergers and acquisitions change management experiences to gain a better
understanding of the issues that most frequently occur during such
large-scale change initiatives. We also used our guidance and reports
on strategic human capital management and results-oriented management.
TABLE 2.--KEY PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR MERGERS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Practice Implementation Step
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ensure top leadership drives the Define and articulate a succinct
transformation. and compelling reason for change.
Balance continued delivery of
services with merger and
transformation activities.
Establish a coherent mission and Adopt leading practices for
integrated strategic goals to results-oriented strategic
guide the transformation. planning and reporting.
Focus on a key set of principles Embed core values in every
and priorities at the outset of aspect of the organization to
the transformation. reinforce the new culture.
Set implementation goals and a time Make public implementation goals
line to build momentum and shot and time line.
progress from Day 1. Seek and monitor employee
attitudes and take appropriate
follow-up actions.
Identify cultural features of
merging organizations to increase
understanding of former work
environments.
Attract and retain key talent.
Establish an organization-wide
knowledge and skills inventory to
exchange knowledge among merging
organizations.
Dedicate an implementation team to Establish networks to support
manage the transformation process. implementation team.
Select high-performing team
members.
Use the performance management Adopt leading practices to
system to define responsibility implement effective performance
and assure accountability for management systems with adequate
change. safeguards.
Establish a communication strategy Communicate early and often to
to create shared expectations and build trust.
report related progress. Ensure consistency of message.
Encourage two-way communication.
Provide information to meet
specific needs of employees.
Involve employees to obtain their Use employee teams.
ideas and gain their ownership for Involve employees in planning
the transformation. and sharing performance
information.
Incorporate employee feedback
into new policies and procedures.
Delegate authority to
appropriate organizational levels.
Build a world-class organization. Adopt leading practices to build
a world-class organization.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--GAO-03-669.
The practices outlined in our July 2003 report are intended to help
agencies transform their cultures so that the Federal Government has
the capacity to deliver its promises, meet current and emerging needs,
maximize its performance, and ensure accountability. We found in our
August 2016 report that DHS had not evaluated each of these practices.
According to DHS officials, the agency was awaiting Congressional
approval of the proposed consolidation before developing implementation
steps. We recommended that if DHS's proposed CBRNE program
consolidation is approved by Congress, DHS use, where appropriate, the
key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in
our previous work to help ensure that a CBRNE consolidated office
benefits from lessons learned from other organizational
transformations. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated in a
November 2016 letter to Members of Congress that while DHS's CBRNE
reorganization proposal had yet to be authorized by Congress, DHS
remained committed to evaluating GAO's identified practices when
evaluating its proposals. DHS acknowledged in its October 2017 memo to
Congress that it plans to address this recommendation as part of its
CBRN consolidation efforts by working with entities both internal and
external to DHS to determine where it is appropriate to apply our key
organization transformation practices.
Given the critical nature of DHS's CBRN mission, considering key
factors from our previous work would help inform a consolidation
effort. The lessons learned by other organizations involved in
substantial transformations could provide key insights for agency
officials if they implement reorganization and attention to the factors
we identified would improve the chances of a successful CBRN
consolidation.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Currie. I thank you all for
your statements. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for
questions.
In the past, this committee has done--and we will do it
again--requesting technical assistance from the Department for
the CWMD office. I was wondering if each of you could just
comment on what legislative authorities you believe will be
necessary to fully implement the proposal that we are speaking
of today.
Mr. McDonnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start, take
that first. We are very close to completing technical
assistance language to get to the committee, and I commit to
get that to you quickly.
We are not seeking new authorities in the WMD space. Unlike
the previous recommendation which was essentially a stovepiped
approach to chem, nuke, bio, and explosives, we are looking at
a much more integrated approach. So as we are doing this, we
are taking, for example, the DNDO business model and seeking to
apply those authorities across chem, nuke, and bio. So as we
do, for example, gap analysis, we can be doing it across the
battlespace.
As you know, when we go talk to an NYPD officer, it is not
one for rad-nuke, one for chem-bio, and one--it is the same
officer. It is the same emergency response teams. So we are
looking to extend our authorities across the battlespace rather
than a stovepiped approach as we currently have.
We do seek to codify the Secure the Cities program and
expand that a little bit, and not in scope relative to cost,
but in how we do that program and to reach out more into
pathways and approaches into the target areas, rather than just
focused on the target areas, but to also be able to address any
of the priority mission as it comes up.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you. Mr. Bryan.
Mr. Bryan. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question.
First, let me add that we, within S&T, we already have the
authority for oversight and coordination of S&T R&D across the
Department. We specifically already have authority to do R&D in
the space of chem-bio. Additional authorities that would help
us not just within chem-bio, but others, just a couple requests
that I would throw out to you that would enable us to do this
better, one of them is the authority to do counter T&E
authority for unmanned aerial systems. That seems to be what we
believe could potentially be a system to use to actually employ
any kind of toxic agents. Right now, we can't test UAVs or test
that in a relative environment, so that is one authority that
is something that would really help us out in the area of R&D
to be able to--especially in this mission space.
There is also other transactional authorities. We already
have that, but it is on a yearly basis. So if we should get
into any longer-term processes or projects, we would need that
authority extended. So if that is something that we could have
longer than 1 year at a time, either more permanent or a
longer-term, would be beneficial to all of our programs within
R&D to include the CWMD mission.
Also, the low rate initial production authority, the LRIPs.
I don't suspect this will be an issue with Jim and the work
that they have been doing in DNDO. They understand acquisition.
I don't suspect that will be an issue, but in some cases,
having that low rate initial production authority during that
transition from R&D to actual acquisition provides something
into the field quickly, and if it is at a low rate, to be able
to get it into the hands of the operator.
Mr. Donovan. Would you include all of your recommendations
in the technical report that we are asking for so that we make
sure that we consider all those things that you just mentioned?
Mr. Bryan. Yes, sir, we can do that.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you. Mr. Currie, you have anything you
would like to----
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. Two things that come to mind. One is,
I mean, clearly, legislation is going to be needed for the
Department to fully implement the vision of what they want this
office to look like. What they are doing now is shuffling some
deck chairs at the top within the organization.
So I think in the legislation itself, I think it would be
very important in addition to just the mechanics behind what is
going to be changing and the offices that are going to exist, I
think the committee's expectations and the Congress's
expectations for how this office is going to operate and how it
is going to work with the components and what you expect it to
do--because if it is given a broad mission but without the
authorities to actually do that across DHS and working with
much larger components with more resources and more decision-
making authority, I think it is going to be difficult for it to
establish its place.
The other thing is, the second thing is, in addition to
just the mechanics of how the organization is going to be
changed is building in some of this criteria for how you want
the organization to manage this transformation and how you want
it to measure progress, I think will be really important to
provide you the ability to actually oversee if it is doing what
you want it to do.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much. My time is expired. Being
the dais is so crowded today, maybe we will get a second round
of questions in.
The Chair now recognizes my friend from New Jersey, Mrs.
Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Mr. Ranking Member, for yielding to me.
Mr. McDonnell, first of all, let me say I hope Mr. Fluty is
recovering quickly. Second, I thank GAO for what seems to be an
encouraging prospect for us as we take on this very important
issue of reorganization. However, I do have some questions.
Mr. McDonnell, when the committee considered the
Department's 2015 proposal to consolidate certain chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear activities, Mr. Thompson,
our Ranking Member, expressed concerns about the work force
retention and the morale. The new CWMD--which I also
supported--the new CWMD office raises similar concerns.
Can you talk about what efforts you are undertaking to
preserve work force morale? In particular, can you describe
efforts to ensure that talented individuals from legacy offices
understand the new career paths and opportunities they may have
to advance?
Mr. McDonnell. Thank you, Congressman Watson Coleman, and
appreciate the question. We are essentially an intellectual
property organization, so the people are the capability. We
have within the Office of Health Affairs and DNDO a tremendous
amount of expertise and talent that is unique in the Federal
Government. Bringing those together is going to make us a much
more powerful organization.
As an example, I think in the morale space, the most
important thing is communications, people understanding what is
going on, and them feeling like they have an input in what the
outcome is going to be. The approach that we have taken right
now which has been a very limited change in the senior
leadership, as the Ranking Member mentioned, enables a process
that we envision taking several months with a lot of staff
discussing how best to optimize this organization. The real
goal is to make them feel like, at the end of the day, they are
doing things to make America safe. They are not just coming
into an office and churning and not feeling like there is a
positive outcome.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. It is good to hear that,
because as Mr. Currie----
Mr. Currie. Currie.
Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing.] Stated, this whole buy-in
from employees is so very important, considering the fact that
you do have very high intellectual property. That is your
asset, the people and their brains and their willingness to
work together, but the morale has been a challenge.
Also last Congress, I supported the bipartisan bill to
consolidate your offices' activities, despite the reservations
that we had about advancing the measure without seeing the
forthcoming GAO assessment. I am wondering--and importantly,
that analysis indicated--that DHS had not done all of its due
diligence in its proposal.
In October, Acting Secretary Duke notified Congress that
DHS planned to unilaterally execute a similar reorganization,
would implement GAO's recommendations as the reorganization was
under way. Why not fully address those assessments,
recommendations, prior to executing the reorganization? What is
the reason for that?
Mr. McDonnell. Thank you for that question, as well. I
think it is important to note that we see this very much as a
two-step process. The initial 872 notification was limited to
just the executive leadership, so myself, as the assistant
secretary, and Dave Fluty, who is currently running health
affairs, will be the No. 2 person in the organization.
We didn't want to get out in front of the committee and
other stakeholders and come in with some big, elaborate
reorganization. We just wanted to get in a position where you
could have an executive that you could say, what is the plan
for this? How are you working it?
Mr. Currie's comments, there is nothing in there that I
disagree with that he said. I personally had 87 meetings since
the committee asked for technical assistance on this back in
March. I have met with--the first thing we did the other day on
the 5th, when this became official, was myself and my chief of
staff walked over to the Office of Health Affairs and had an
all-hands meeting.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Have you--I just need a yes-or-no on
this, because I have one more really important question. Let me
ask that question. First of all, I am going to want to know
whether or not you did entertain the possibility of dealing
with their recommendations and findings before actually getting
this far, but second, tell me about the chief medical officer.
In 2006, Congress authorized the provision of the council--
the Secretary--to the Secretary and FEMA administrator on
public health issues, among other things. Can you confirm that
this CMO is going to continue to have direct access to the
Secretary to advise on these public health issues?
Mr. McDonnell. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Chairman, could I use a
little extra time to answer this?
Mr. Donovan. Absolutely.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McDonnell. Thank you very much. Thank you, ma'am. The
chief medical officer had a great deal of discussion about how
we were going to do that when we started this back in March.
Then-Adviser Duke, before she was deputy secretary, said one of
the red lines for this organization was to ensure that the
chief medical officer function was maintained as a critical
component of the organization.
The way we have chosen to do that, the chief medical
officer will continue to be a Presidential appointee, very high
stature, and have the gravitas in the interagency and will be
the adviser, the principal adviser to--direct report to me
organizationally, but much like the FEMA administrator during
an emergency, the FEMA administrator can report directly to the
President. We envision the chief medical officer being an asset
for the Secretary, for the FEMA administrator, for working with
Dr. Kadlec over at HHS, but for being the person that can get
out there and represent us and make good strategic decisions
when it comes to public health issues.
The distinct difference from what was before with the
Office of Health Affairs is the doctor is not going to be
saddled with the administration of an organization. They are
going to be free to be the chief doctor for the Department and
have the freedom to be able to focus on that solely and not
worry about day-to-day administration and all the other things
that come with line management responsibilities.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McDonnell, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, I am concerned that the
Department use its Section 872 authority to execute the CWMD
reorganization. Should we expect the Department to pursue
unilateral reorganizations until Section 872 of the Homeland
Security Act is repealed?
Mr. McDonnell. Sir, I have no direct knowledge of any other
intention of using 872. In fact, the discussions leading up to
the use of 872 on this one was a lot of deliberation and
ensuring that it was extremely limited, because we knew that
the sensitivities on the Hill relative to the use of that
section of the Homeland Security Act. So we really were very
cautious in the approach and wanted it to be very limited so we
could respect the legislative process and the actual ultimate
reorganization.
Mr. Payne. Why did the Department initiate the
reorganization under 872 instead of engaging with Congress?
Mr. McDonnell. So we--prior to the notification--so I guess
one way to address this best is, we were in a transition,
bringing on a new leadership team. We had been requested
technical assistance on the CBRNE legislation that had passed
in 2015. We wanted to come in with a different approach.
But we didn't at the same time want to build with the new
organization--knowing that we were going to do a
reorganization, build OHA as it had been before and DNDO as it
had been before. But we immediately started thinking how we can
do this to unify command and effort but not get too far out in
front and take on new authorities that we don't already have.
Mr. Payne. So I guess what you are saying to me is that to
have engaged Congress would have taken you too much time, and
you needed to come and engage us with--waste some of your time
or----
Mr. McDonnell. No, sir, absolutely not. If I implied that,
then I apologize.
Mr. Payne. Oh, no, it was no implication. I was just
asking.
Mr. McDonnell. No, sir.
Mr. Payne. You know, and I say that because, you know--as
you said, it is a new administration. You know, there have been
some instances where this has played out across the
administration and other departments, as well. It is a slippery
slope. The Constitution of this great Nation was put in place
for a reason. Congress has its role. To continually circumvent
this body that represents the American people, it is very
dangerous and a slippery slope.
So I would just suggest to the administration that, you
know, it tread lightly on this, because it is not the way it
has been set up. I understand there are certain times with a
Department such as Homeland where things have to be done in
that manner, but it shouldn't be the precedent and it should
not become the way things are done. I heard you say that you
wanted to do things in a different way. I don't know if this is
necessarily the best way.
Mr. McDonnell. Thank you, sir. May I respond real quickly?
Mr. Payne. Sure.
Mr. McDonnell. One thing that I would like to highlight was
in my opening statement and the Chairman mentioned, is the
threat that is very real right now, and that is the prime
driver for getting us organized in a way to be flexible and be
able to respond and deal with the threats that are out there.
But, again, we wanted to respect the committee and the
legislative process and not do too much.
Mr. Payne. OK. OK. Let's see. Also, in October 2017, DHS
notified Congress that it planned to establish the Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction office. DHS sought a similar
reorganization of its CBRNE activities in 2015. Can you walk us
through the differences in the Department's current
reorganization plan and the 2015 proposal?
Mr. McDonnell. Yes, sir. The 2015 proposal was a stovepiped
approach to the organization. In fact, if you look at page 6 of
the GAO audit, it shows a series of blocks and the language in
there as far as responsibilities for each officer essentially
identical. So you have a bio block that has a policy
responsibility, a chem block that has a policy responsibility.
If you really--if you look across those stovepipes, it is
sort-of hard to see any capacity-building, any enhancement in
efficiencies, capabilities. What we have done is we have said
we are going to do a horizontal integration. As an example, I
had an all-hands meeting with our acquisition folks in DNDO.
Had about 50 people in the room, and I said, so how many people
are actually nuclear experts? Probably about 5 people raised
their hand.
Now, that means about 45 people in that room are
acquisition, program planning, and execution experts. So if I
get 5 people from OHA and plug them into that 45-person group,
now I have got a 55-person organization that can do nuclear and
biological product acquisition and development. We don't need
to duplicate the DNDO model for biodefense. What we need to do
is take advantage of the things that we already have that are
very good, bring the exceptional talent from OHA.
So OHA does not have the type of infrastructure and
resources that DNDO does to manage big programs and deliver
products and services, but they have a tremendous amount of
individual expertise. So what we have done is instead of saying
we are just going to make everything equal, so we are going to
get talented people in the same room focused on a problem
together.
Mr. Payne. All right. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I have
gone way over my time, as I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. No need to apologize. There is--if we engage
you for--maybe we could do more question each, just because
there are a few of us here and this is such an important issue.
You started to describe, Mr. McDonnell, about the differences.
I know the proposal of 2015 divided responsibilities, I guess,
by threat rather than by function.
Acquisition of resources was one of the reasons why I
believe you stated it is better to do it by function rather
than threat. Are there other reasons why this is a better
method, better structure than the previous 2015 proposal?
Mr. McDonnell. Yes, sir. So sort of moving left to right
across the organization, we actually started threat analysis
and understanding what the battlespace is, what adversaries are
doing. As we both mentioned in our opening statements, there
are terrorist organizations, ISIS, that wants to use chemical,
nuclear, and biological.
That expertise is one set of folks that we work with. So,
for example, for NCTC, National Counterterrorism Center, they
have a WMD organization. They don't have a chem, nuke, bio
organization. The DOD is similar. The FBI, we work with the WMD
division.
So the people that we have to work with to identify the
threat and think about how we are going to deal with the threat
and start doing operational plans and support the components
are combined. It isn't stovepiped in the rest of the
organizations.
As I mentioned, a first responder--a member of a bomb
squad--I had the privilege of visiting the stabilization team
up in New York City that the NYPD and Nassau and Suffolk County
works with the FBI on. Those guys, they respond to a device. It
doesn't matter what type of device it is.
So we want to have a business model that provides support
to the folks that are in the field and allows us to interact
with other people. But it just doesn't make sense to duplicate
everything and just have--you know, build another organization
that is not necessary.
Mr. Donovan. Wonderful, thank you. You visited us in New
York during that. The other thing, Mr. Bryan, I have had the
privilege of visiting was NUSTL and the work that they are
doing in the lab in New York. How will their work support,
supplement, enhance what you guys are doing at Science and
Technology in this area of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Bryan. First, Mr. Chairman, I do want to thank you and
the committee for your support of the labs and your recognition
of the importance that labs bring to this mission space.
As you know, NUSTL provides a lot of products and services,
primarily to the first responders, to help them in their role
to protect, respond, prepare for homeland security threats. We
also conduct a lot of tests, evaluations, and assessments of
first-responder technologies using our full spectrum of
laboratory capability and field testing services.
Unique and special, I think, to the area of CWMD is we are
the DHS--NUSTL, I should say, is also the DHS sponsor for R&D
for the response and recovery part of the rad-nuke mission. So
both NUSTL's test and evaluation mission, the R&D sponsorship
piece of that will need to be closely coordinated with the CWMD
office to ensure that we minimize any duplication of effort and
ensure any seamless unity of effort.
So I would defer to my colleague, if there are any other
views he has on the utilization of NUSTL.
Mr. Donovan. I thank you for your insight. I yield the
balance of my time and ask my friend from New Jersey if he has
one final question before we let you guys get out of here
within the hour that I promised you.
Mr. Payne. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Currie, the
last time DHS sought to consolidate its CBRNE activities, many
touted potential cost savings resulting from efficiencies. From
your previous review, do you anticipate any cost savings
associated with this kind of reorganization?
Mr. Currie. In short, no. When we looked at it in the
past--well, the problem was there was no cost-benefit analysis
done, so there was really no data and information to see
whether there was going to be cost savings. There were high-
level statements made in certain documents about streamlining
and cost savings, but we didn't see any data that backed that
up.
Mr. Payne. OK. Can you describe some of the potential costs
agencies incur as they undertake reorganizations?
Mr. Currie. Sure. Well, a lot of it tends to be
administrative sometimes, so sometimes there is a conception
that when you put organizations together, that somehow they are
going to immediately streamline, but sometimes that is the
opposite. When you put organizations together, administratively
especially at first sometimes you need more support to support
more people, for example, in your human capital office or more
IT services. Or if you expand your footprint, where people are
located in buildings, you have to expand your support structure
for that.
So sometimes we have seen in prior reorganizations that
when there is an assumption there will be no cost, just because
existing organizations come together, that is not always true.
Mr. Payne. OK. All right, well, Mr. Chairman, since you
promised them that we would be done in an hour, I will yield
back.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I want to thank our
witnesses, first of all, for your service to our Nation. You
are charged with protecting our homeland. There is no greater
cause than the sacrifices in time and probably compensation and
other matters in which you and your families are willing to
ensure for the safety of our families. It is much appreciated.
I would also like to thank you for your valuable testimony
today and for answering our questions in a forthcoming manner.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for our witnesses, and we will ask that you respond
to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the
hearing record will remain open for 10 days. Without objection,
the subcommittee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for the Department of
Homeland Security
Question 1. The previous administration's proposal included
``explosives'' and moved the National Protection and Programs
Directorate's Office for Bombing Prevention into the consolidated
office.
Why did you determine not to include explosives in the Countering
WMD Office?
Question 2a. What outreach have you done to other DHS offices and
components on this proposal?
Question 2b. What outreach have you done to external stakeholders,
as recommended by GAO?
Answer. The CWMD Office intends to be fully engaged with DHS
components and interagency partners in the Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device (C-IED) mission space. Other DHS components, including (but not
limited to) the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
United States Secret Service (USSS), and Customs and Border Protection
have robust explosives detection capabilities and technical expertise
in their respective mission spaces. It was decided that explosives
detection functions that currently exist within either DHS components
or National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) would not be
transferred to the new CWMD Office. Specifically, the NPPD Office for
Bombing Prevention (OBP) was not transferred to the CWMD office as
their mission is primarily focused on training and outreach to critical
infrastructure owners and operators. CWMD works closely with the FBI
Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), which houses the FBI Counter-
IED programs, and with Department of Defense Special Operations Command
(DOD/SOCOM) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on C-IED
planning and response programs. The Counter-WMD programs in both the
Federal Government and at State and local agencies build on existing C-
IED efforts as a baseline, enabling a natural support role for the CWMD
Office.
Question 3. This CWMD Office is being established based on the
rising WMD threat. However, the President's fiscal year 2018 budget
request sought to eliminate a number of programs and laboratories
working to address these threats.
As you are working to craft the fiscal year 2019 budget request,
can you assure us that the request we receive will reflect the severity
of the threat you described?
Answer. While the Department is unable to comment on specific
details during the pre-decisional/deliberative phase of the fiscal year
budget request, we look forward to providing a Classified briefing to
better illuminate key details on the threat as well as DHS CWMD actions
to counter the threat once the budget is submitted to Congress.
DHS CWMD developed the fiscal year President's budget request for
all program areas within the DHS CWMD mission space, and have spoken
with the S&T Directorate's Chemical-Biological Defense Division
regarding the CWMD Office's requirements, as developed through the use
of the WMD Requirements Oversight Council (WROC). The WROC is an
executive-level body that is chaired by the assistant secretary for
CWMD, with representatives from all of the operating components and DHS
S&T. We look forward to briefing you on the DHS CWMD Office budget
request within the President's fiscal year budget request.
Question 4. While we are aware of terrorist's interest in using,
and actual use, of chemicals in attacks, the budget for chemical
defense programs at DHS is significantly less than those for biological
or nuclear programs.
How will the establishment of the CWMD Office help to enhance the
Department's programs to address the chemical threat?
Answer. To better understand and address chemical threats, the CWMD
Office will leverage key aspects of the legacy Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) business model as well as authorities of the
legacy Office of Health Affairs. Similar to DNDO's success in the
development and deployment of domestic nuclear detection capabilities
and support for our Federal partners' missions regarding global nuclear
detection capabilities, the new CWMD Office intends to support Federal
partners detecting biological and chemical weapon threats before they
reach our shores through assessing the operational requirement for,
then acquiring and deploying, needed chemical detection equipment, as
appropriate.
The CWMD Office has already taken measures to counter an emerging
chemical threat challenge, and we would welcome the opportunity to
provide a Classified briefing to the committee. It is noteworthy that
the first significant action by the new CWMD Office is focused on the
chemical threat. The ability to do this is based on leveraging the
expertise brought together under the limited CWMD reorganization
established by the Secretary.
Question 5. From a management perspective, DNDO and OHA each employ
different methods of managing their human capital, acquisitions,
information technology, and financial needs.
What efficiencies will be gained when these management functions
are combined?
Answer. DHS has identified significant cost avoidances that can be
realized by merging DNDO and OHA functions into the new CWMD Office.
For example, rather than having two offices individually managing human
capital, acquisitions, information technology, and financial needs, the
horizontal integration of the CWMD Office would create inherent
efficiencies. In addition, by leveraging legacy DNDO's successful
requirements, resource allocation and program acquisition model,
acquisitions will leverage the programmatic expertise and governance
that has been successfully implemented in legacy DNDO. The CWMD Office
anticipates similar efficiencies with human capital, information
technology, and financial management reporting to the consolidated
enterprise services organization.
Question 6a. This subcommittee has held numerous hearings on the
BioWatch Program and we have been promised, for years, that the Office
of Health Affairs and Science and Technology Directorate are working
together to field updated, more effective technology. However, to date,
we don't have much to show for it.
What is the status of OHA and S&T's work to deploy more effective
biodetection systems?
Answer. The new CWMD Office is committed to replacing the BioWatch
system that was deployed in 2003 with a new state-of-the-art system
that leverages modern detection technology and data analytics. CWMD is
working closely with DHS S&T, DOD DTRA and SOCOM, and others to
identify possible Commercial Off-the-shelf Technologies (COTS) that can
be used to replace the current BioWatch system. In the future, the WMD
Requirements Oversight Council (WROC) will develop the requirements for
S&T's work pertaining to biodetection technologies that meet the
operational needs of DHS stakeholders. We look forward to keeping the
committee advised on this work as progress is made.
Question 6b. How will the CWMD Office help address some of the
shortcomings of BioWatch?
Answer. As described in response to Question No. 5, the CWMD Office
is committed to replacing the BioWatch system that was deployed in 2003
with a new state-of-the-art system that leverages modern detection
technology and data analytics. CWMD is working closely with HHS, DOD,
and others to identify possible Commercial Off-the-shelf Technologies
(COTS) that can be used to replace the current BioWatch system.
To this end, DHS is actively working to identify technological
capabilities that enhance the ability to detect biological attacks in a
timelier manner and at a fraction of the present cost per location. The
CWMD-chaired WMD Requirements Oversight Council (WROC) will generate
R&D requirements that address some of the technical and operational
shortcomings of BioWatch.
Question 7. Both the Science and Technology Directorate and the
CWMD Office will conduct research and development to combat weapons of
mass destruction--S&T for chemical and biological threats and CWMD for
radiological and nuclear threats.
How will CWMD and S&T ensure the coordination of the various types
of research and development?
Answer. The CWMD Office-chaired WMD Requirements Oversight Council
(WROC) will manage the process for prioritizing R&D and program
acquisition for the CWMD mission space. S&T and DHS operating
components will participate in the WROC and be accountable for meeting
the requirements specified in the WROC process.
Question 8a. In the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request,
the administration proposed eliminating NUSTL in addition to two other
laboratories that focus on biological and chemical threats.
How will the potential closure of these three laboratories affect
the CWMD Office's operations?
Answer. The WROC described above will be the process for managing
CWMD's operations. S&T will be responsive to requirements generated
through the WROC process.
Question 8b. If these laboratories were to close, will the CWMD
Office assume the responsibility of taking over those laboratories'
CBRN capabilities? If not the CWMD Office, then who?
Answer. The CWMD Office will work with DHS S&T, the DHS operational
components and other National laboratory assets across the interagency
to identify any priority CWMD R&D activities--and options to accomplish
these efforts--through its WROC process.
Question 9. The Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) was not to
be funded in the President's budget proposal issued earlier this year.
It is my understanding that CSAC has done substantial research on
certain chemicals, the results of which have been (1) shared with
various stakeholders, such as private enterprise, State and local
governments and (2) used to inform its risk assessments, some of which
are used by private industry and other Federal customers, such as DHS's
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program.
What are your plans for integrating products developed by CSAC if
the research side of CSAC remains in the Science and Technology
Directorate and the risk assessment side migrates to CWMD?
Answer. The CWMD Office will work with DHS S&T and the DHS
operating components to identify priority CWMD R&D activities--and
options to accomplish these efforts--through its WROC process.
Question 10a. In its August 2016 report on a DHS proposal to
consolidate its Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosives (CBRNE) programs, GAO found that DHS did not fully assess
and document potential problems that could result from consolidation or
include a comparison of the benefits and costs associated with this
potential change. GAO recommended that DHS complete, document, and make
available analyses of key questions related to its consolidation
proposal.
For the consolidation that occurred on December 5, 2017, what did
DHS do to assess and document potential problems that could result from
consolidation?
Answer. The Department had a series of meetings at the component-
head level and with interagency partners. The incoming CWMD leadership
team met with DOD, the FBI and other agencies that have done similar
reorganizations. The team met with other technical agencies such as
NNSA and DTRA, had internal and external stakeholder meetings, and
reviewed years of various plans and proposals for a CWMD-like
organization. We considered potential internal problems, such as
affected morale that the reorganization may cause, and continue to take
steps to mitigate these through proactive communication and employee-
staffed working groups. The acting assistant secretary has managed CWMD
organizational and capability development in the DOD special operations
community and the leadership team has decades of experience. All of
this information informed the Secretary's decision and has been applied
to assess and document potential problems.
DHS CWMD leadership regularly engages with its staff and
stakeholders to identify and resolve potential problems from the
organizational change; moreover, the Department has heeded the GAO's
prior recommendation to use, where appropriate, the key mergers and
organizational practices identified in past reports and audits.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives, Homeland Security--DHS's Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Program Consolidation
Proposal Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations, GAO-16-603
(Aug. 2016), p. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 10b. Did DHS do a comparison of the benefits and costs of
doing this consolidation?
Answer. Yes. DHS leadership assessed that significant cost
avoidances and synergies would be realized through the CWMD
reorganization. The primary components of the CWMD Office, DNDO and
OHA, share a number of related lines of effort, functional activities,
and administrative structures. Bringing them under a unified command
will allow for sharing of best practices and create new opportunities
for reform. In particular, leadership in the Department assessed that
DNDO's successful business model will help inform improvements to the
chemical and biological defense mission space.
Question 11a. As authorized in section 516 of the Homeland Security
Act, the chief medical officer serves as the principal advisor to the
Secretary and FEMA administrator on medical and public health issues.
Under the reorganization, the chief medical officer will report to the
assistant secretary for CWMD.
When will a permanent chief medical officer be appointed?
Answer. The process of appointing a permanent chief medical officer
is currently under way. During the pre-decisional/deliberative phase of
the appointment process, the Department is unable to comment on the
administration's final decision or date.
Question 11b. Can you assure this subcommittee that the CMO will
retain his or her direct access to the Secretary and FEMA administrator
under the new CWMD organization, as required by law?
Answer. Yes. The CMO will retain direct access to the Secretary and
to the FEMA administrator under the new CWMD Office reorganization.
These statutorily vested authorities are critical to the mission of the
CMO. For this reason, in the Technical Drafting Assistance provided to
the Committee for the CWMD Office, the Department recommended the CMO
retain direct access authorities to the Secretary and to the FEMA
administrator, when appropriate.
Question 12. The chief medical officer will remain in the new CWMD
Office while the workforce health and medical support functions will
move to the Management Directorate.
Will the chief medical officer retain his or her oversight over
these functions?
Answer. Yes. It is critical that the functions statutorily vested
in the CMO continue as part of the CWMD Office, including ensuring the
Nation's front-line responders are able to prepare for and respond to
all threats, for which the CMO will provide advice and guidance, as
appropriate. The CMO's delegated functions, with the exception of
workforce health functions, will be subsumed into the CWMD Office. This
adjustment makes the CMO a more agile asset. Rather than being required
to manage a major office focused only on certain WMD issues, the CMO
will provide expertise on the full range of critical CWMD defense
matters and emerging WMD threats of National significance with the
potential to affect the United States.
Question 13. How will the CWMD Office work with the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis to ensure appropriate information sharing of
CBRN threats with State and local stakeholders?
Answer. The CWMD Office intends to work very closely with the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis to support intelligence-driven
operations to counter WMD threats, by providing timely and actionable
information to State and local stakeholders, when appropriate. The
Department is willing to provide more detailed information in a
Classified setting.
Question 14. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 required the completion of a Biodefense Strategy.
What role will the CWMD Office play in the Department of Homeland
Security's implementation of the Biodefense strategy once it is
completed?
Answer. The new CWMD Office will have a high level of engagement
during finalization of the strategy and development and oversight of
the whole-of-Government and implementation plan. The legacy Office of
Health Affairs had been heavily involved in the development of the
National Biodefense Strategy, working with the DHS strategy development
lead in the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, and other
Federal partners.
Question 15a. In October, the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, published a paper entitled
``North Korea's Biological Weapons Program: The Known and Unknown,'' in
which the authors discuss North Korea's intent and capability to
sustain a biological weapons program.
What is your view of the threat of biological weapons from North
Korea?
Question 15b. Does DHS have adequate resources and authority to
prepare for and respond to this threat?
Answer. DHS is unable to provide details on the threat of
biological weapons from North Korea in an Unclassified document.
However, the Department is willing to provide more detailed information
in a Classified briefing to Members and staff of the committee on this
threat.
Questions From Honorable Peter T. King for the Department of Homeland
Security
Question 1. Last December, the President signed the First Responder
Anthrax Preparedness Act into law. This bill, of which I was the House
sponsor, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a
pilot program to provide anthrax vaccinations to first responders on a
voluntary basis.
What is the status of the pilot program?
Answer. This program is currently unfunded. DHS conducted limited
preliminary planning, but there has been no pilot program execution.
Question 2a. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Securing the
Cities Program provides vital assistance and training to high-risk
areas around the country to detect and protect against radiological and
nuclear threats. This program has been invaluable for New York, the top
terrorist target. As you work to establish the Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction Office, we must ensure that successful DNDO programs,
like Securing the Cities, are maintained.
How will the creation of the CWMD Office impact the Securing the
Cities program?
Answer. In the CWMD Technical Drafting Assistance provided to the
committee, formal authorizing language for the Securing the Cities
Program was included. The Technical Drafting Assistance builds on
successes of the current and on-going Securing the Cities Program by
proposing its expansion to all WMD threats--chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear. Moreover, the CWMD Technical Drafting
Assistance proposes expansion of Securing the Cities functions into
smuggling and conventional supply chain pathways and approaches to
high-target risk areas, including, but not limited to, the New York
Metropolitan Area. Consistent with the President's National Security
Strategy and as an operational support organization, the CWMD Office
will bolster efforts to defend against all WMD in the Homeland, and
before the threats reach our borders.
Question 2b. What are your plans to further expand Securing the
Cities to additional jurisdictions?
Answer. The CWMD Office will focus Securing the Cities more toward
potential WMD pathways and approaches to high-target risk areas. This
includes applications both in the continental United States as well as
in supply chain and smuggling pathways into high-target risk
jurisdictions. The Department looks forward to collaborating with the
committee to discuss its plans for the Securing the Cities program.
Question 2c. How will DNDO continue to support and sustain the
capabilities gained by original jurisdictions, like New York?
Answer. Legacy DNDO Securing the Cities (STC) support, through
subject-matter expertise and technical assistance, to original
jurisdictions like New York will continue. As a support organization,
the CWMD Office fully intends to support first responders and operators
in the field--original STC jurisdictions like New York remain critical
in CWMD's commitment to the men and women on the front lines of our
counterterrorism mission.
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for the Department of
Homeland Security
Question 1. The President's DHS S&T budget request for fiscal year
proposed eliminating funding for a state-of-the-art, one of a kind
biocontainment laboratory--the National Biological Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at Fort Detrick, MD. However, Congress
has taken steps in both the NDAA and appropriations to ensure that this
capability is not lost.
Can you elaborate on the impact to our National security and our
ability to counter biological threats if this facility were to close?
How has the NBACC supported DHS in countering biological threats?
Answer. The functions performed at the NBACC, including providing
reach-back and analytical capabilities, have supported multiple
departments and agencies responsible for conducting National security
missions. Should the facility remain operating, the CWMD Office will
assist S&T in identifying interagency funding sources, developing a
more efficient operational model, and driving DHS mission requirements.
Like many WMD-related activities that may seem underutilized when an
attack does not happen, facilities such as the NBAAC are a key
component to understanding the impact of an attack, the source of the
material, and the testing of mitigation strategies. It is not a
capability that we can build after an attack happens.
CWMD, as an organization that oversees requirements through the
WROC process, recognizes the value and support these facilities bring
to addressing the WMD threats for both DHS and other agencies.
Understanding the difficult budget decisions that must be made, it is
just as important that future fiscal matters are informed and balanced
with mission needs and comparable laboratory capabilities.
Question 2. In your testimony, you state that you expect the new
office will allow greater sharing of best practices, particularly
leveraging successes from DNDO.
Can you detail these successes and elaborate on how they will be
applied to the domains of chemical and biological weapons?
Answer. CWMD has identified significant cost avoidances by merging
DNDO and OHA functions. Rather than having two offices individually
managing human capital, acquisitions, information technology, and
financial needs, the horizontal integration of the CWMD Office creates
inherent efficiencies. The legacy DNDO model of developing, acquiring,
and fielding capabilities to operators will be applied across the CBRN
spectrum. This best practice was previously limited to R/N detection in
DNDO. By following DNDO's structural model and best practices, legacy
OHA acquisitions can report to a single product acquisition and
deployment group, and the same is true with human capital, information
technology, and financial management reporting to an enterprise
services directorate.
Question 3. As I'm sure you're aware, change can be difficult for
any organization even if it results in positive benefits. To ease these
challenges, GAO has identified nine key practices for mergers and
organizational transformation and I appreciate that DHS has adopted
several of them in this transition, including the creation of an
implementation team and a communication strategy.
As we consider moving forward with this reorganization, can you
detail your implementation time line, cultural barriers that you've
identified, and your plan for attracting and retaining key talent?
Answer.
Implementation timeline:
December 2017.--Initial standing up of the CWMD Office.
January-October 2018.--Continuing engagements with
stakeholders and Congress on CWMD mission and strategic
outlook.
January-March 2018.--Establish and utilize CWMD-wide Working
Groups for all Federal personnel to engage in planning and
organizing the programs of CWMD.
October 2018.--Finalizing stages of the CWMD reorganization.
Staff are adapting to the organizational changes within the new
CWMD office. Given the importance of addressing employee morale,
cultural changes, and other stress factors for personnel in a
reorganization, the CWMD Office leadership have developed a plan to
communicate mission priorities to all personnel and include Federal
employees in the programmatic planning process through working groups.
DHS anticipates better morale--and leadership recruitment and
retention as a result of the Department's CWMD reorganization.
Establishing a focal point to implement the Department's WMD defense
mission cannot only lead to increased mission effectiveness, but also
increased morale. DHS anticipates that elevating its WMD defense
efforts with more measurable results will inspire employee engagement.
In the past, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
experts had the incentive to seek out positions at departments and
agencies where the mission space is more visible. Looking forward, the
reorganization and mission elevation will better attract and maintain
key talent.
Question 4. In your testimony you note that the biological and
chemical defense strategies have lagged behind the threat landscape.
What are the threat challenges in these areas that concern you the
most today, and how will your strategy to address them change under the
new organization?
Answer. While DHS is unable to provide details on the WMD threat in
an Unclassified document, the Department is willing to provide Members
and staff of the committee a Classified WMD threat briefing.
Question 5. Can you discuss the trade-offs for including the full
set of CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosives) in a new office versus including a subset?
In particular, why were explosives excluded from the office's
purview?
Answer. Please see the response to question No. 1.
Questions From Congressman James R. Langevin for Chris P. Currie
Question 1. Of the key practices that DHS has not implemented in
this effort, what needs to be prioritized to ensure a successful and
efficient reorganization?
Answer. According to our prior work, implementing large-scale
change management initiatives, such as mergers and organizational
transformations, are not simple endeavors and require the concentrated
efforts of both leadership and employees to realize intended synergies
and to accomplish the new organizational goals.\1\ Involving employees
to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation
is a key practice that DHS should prioritize. Implementation steps for
this practice include using employee teams, involving employees in
planning, incorporating employee feedback into new policies and
procedures, and delegating authority to appropriate organizational
levels. Such steps will be helpful in a consolidated CBRN environment.
For example, overall employee morale differs among the components to be
consolidated, as demonstrated by the difference in employee
satisfaction and commitment scores of DNDO and S&T, making employee
involvement to gain their ownership for the transformation a key step
to consider.\2\ Given the critical nature of DHS's CBRN mission,
prioritizing employee involvement in the transformation would help
inform the consolidation effort and improve the chances of a successful
CBRN consolidation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO-03-669.
\2\ According to the Partnership for Public Service's Best Places
to Work in the Federal Government 2015 rankings, employee satisfaction
and commitment index scores at DNDO and S&T were 71 and 39.5
respectively. These scores are calculated using responses to three
different questions in the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. Based on your analysis of previous reorganization
activities in the Federal Government, what challenges will DHS likely
face if it proceeds with this transition?
Answer. In August 2016, we found that DHS's June 2015 CBRNE report
and related summaries provide some insights into factors considered for
its consolidation proposal, but did not include associated underlying
data or methodological information that would illuminate consideration
of key concerns, such as potential problems that could result from
consolidation. Component officials we interviewed provided several
examples of potential problems due to consolidation. For example,
officials told us that merging staff into one office could result in a
need for additional support staff to manage day-to-day functions such
as human resources, contracting, and financial management for a larger
number of employees. Officials further stated that they may not have
sufficient staff to complete these mission needs in a consolidated
CBRNE unit. Additionally, component officials expressed concern over
the potential allocation of resources in the consolidated office.
According to these officials, there is a difference between components
with missions that focus on potential terrorism events that are more
likely to occur but with limited consequence versus components that
focus on potential events that are not as likely to occur but have the
potential to be far more catastrophic. These officials added that
consolidating these components may complicate resource allocation
decisions due to the varying degree to which certain CBRNE activities
are seen as a priority over others. According to a DHS official, Office
of Policy officials met with two of the five affected CBRNE components
to determine potential unintended problems and to develop mitigation
measures. However, not all affected components were included in the
discussions and the problems and measures were not documented.
The practices outlined in our prior work are intended to help
agencies transform their cultures so that the Federal Government has
the capacity to deliver its promises, meet current and emerging needs,
maximize its performance, and ensure accountability. We continue to
believe that providing documented information and analyses used to
assess the benefits and limitations of its consolidation plan would
assist DHS in fully demonstrating how its proposal will lead to an
integrated, high-performance organization. Until DHS completes this
analysis and documents its findings, we continue to believe that
potential challenges have yet to be mitigated. A lack of these
practices within agencies makes it more difficult for them to collect
the data necessary to calculate precisely the costs and benefits of a
consolidation. This limitation can increase a consolidation's risk and
an agency's vulnerability to unintended consequences, such as increased
costs or heightened stakeholder skepticism.
[all]