    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER
                          WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                            EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
                          RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 7, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-42

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
                                         ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    29-475 PDF                     WASHINGTON : 2018

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Peter T. King, New York              Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            William R. Keating, Massachusetts
    John Katko, New York                 Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Filemon Vela, Texas
    Martha McSally, Arizona              Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    John Ratcliffe, Texas                Kathleen M. Rice, New York
    Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York     J. Luis Correa, California
    Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin            Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
    John H. Rutherford, Florida
    Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
    Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
    Ron Estes, Kansas
    Don Bacon, Nebraska
                       Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
                       Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
                        Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                      Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

      SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS

                   Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
    Peter T. King, New York              Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
    Martha McSally, Arizona              James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    John H. Rutherford, Florida          Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia     Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex             (ex officio)
        officio)
                 Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
      Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
      on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     2
    The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
      From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
      on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
      Oral Statement.................................................     3
      Prepared Statement.............................................     4
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5

                                   Witnesses

    Mr. James F. McDonnell, Assistant Secretary for Countering
      Weapons of Mass Destruction, Director of the Domestic Nuclear
      Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     6
      Joint Prepared Statement.......................................     8
    Mr. William Bryan, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology
      Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................    12
      Joint Prepared Statement.......................................     8
    Mr. Chris P. Currie, Director, Emergency Management, National
      Preparedness, and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Homeland
      Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability
      Office:
      Oral Statement.................................................    13
      Prepared Statement.............................................    15

                                    Appendix

    Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for the Department
      of Homeland Security...........................................    31
    Questions From Honorable Peter T. King for the Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................    34
    Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for the Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................    35
    Questions From Congressman James R. Langevin for Chris P. Currie.    36

      EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER
                          WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                                  ----------

                           Thursday, December 7, 2017

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
     Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
                                    and Communications,
                                Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
    room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan,
    Jr. (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Donovan, Payne, and Watson
    Coleman.
        Mr. Donovan. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
    Response, and Communications will come to order. The
    subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Homeland Security's organization to counter
    weapons of mass destruction. I now recognize myself for an
    opening statement.
        Before I do, I would just like to recognize that today is a
    day that President Roosevelt said would go down in infamy. This
    is the anniversary of the attack of our country at Pearl Harbor
    in 1941. I would like us to all keep in mind the memory of
    those brave Americans who died that day.
        The Department of Homeland Security was created in response
    to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the threats to the
    homeland posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Since
    that time, the scope of the threat has changed dramatically. It
    has become much more diverse and diffuse.
        We know that terrorist groups have long strived to employ
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials in
    their attacks. There have been documented reports of ISIS using
    mustard gas in Syria as well as Sarin and chlorine gas used by
    the Syrian government itself. A plot to release hydrogen
    sulfide via an improvised chemical dispersion device was
    uncovered by Australian police.
        Kim Jung-un had his own step-brother assassinated using VX
    nerve agent. A laptop reportedly retrieved from an ISIS hideout
    in Syria in 2014 contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague
    and a document discussing the advantages of using biological
    weapons. The rapid evolution of new biological techniques, such
    as CRISPR CAS-9, pose potential threats, as the new techniques
    can be used for both good and evil.
        North Korea, a state sponsor of terrorism, continues its
    nuclear tests and has expanded its missile program to such an
    extent that General Mattis has indicated that now they have the
    range to reach the United States. The North Korean Central News
    Agency stated that the ICBM can carry a ``super-large heavy
    warhead, which is capable of striking the whole mainland of the
    U.S.''
        This is the context under which we meet today. As the world
    of threats becomes more complex, it is incumbent upon the
    Department of Homeland Security to assess whether or not it is
    optimally organized to best confront the variety of threats it
    is expected to counter. Acting Secretary Duke determined that
    the Department is, in fact, not currently organized to best
    address these threats.
        As a result, on October 6, she notified the committee of
    her intent to use her 872 reorganization authority to establish
    a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, or CWMD office,
    headed by an assistant secretary for CWMD. This reorganization
    took effect earlier this week, and I am pleased that we are
    joined today by the assistant secretary and principal deputy
    assistant secretary for CWMD, along with the acting under
    secretary for Science and Technology, to discuss this new
    office.
        I will note that Acting Secretary Duke realized that her
    use of 872 authority will only take her so far and legislative
    changes are necessary to fully integrate the CWMD Office. This
    committee stands ready to work with the Department on this
    authorization, as we worked with the Obama administration on
    their proposal to establish a similar office.
        Last Congress, the House passed the Department of Homeland
    Security CBRNE Defense Act, authored by Chairman McCaul. Based
    on the Obama administration's proposal, the structure of the
    office created by the CBRNE Defense Act differs from the CWMD
    Office envisioned in the Department's current proposal.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the
    current threat stream informed their proposal and how the
    organizational structure envisioned in the proposal will set
    DHS up for success in meeting its vital mission.
        [The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
                                December 7, 2017
        The Department of Homeland Security was created in response to the
    September 11 terrorist attacks and the threats to the homeland posed by
    al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Since that time, the scope of the
    threat has changed dramatically--it has become much more diverse and
    diffuse. We know that terrorist groups have long strived to employ
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials in their
    attacks.
        There have been documented reports of ISIS using mustard gas in
    Syria as well as Sarin and chlorine gas use by the Syrian government. A
    plot to release hydrogen sulfide via an improvised chemical dispersion
    device was uncovered by Australian police. Kim Jung-Un had his step-
    brother assassinated using VX nerve agent.
        A laptop reportedly retrieved from an ISIS hide-out in Syria in
    2014 contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague and a document
    discussing the advantages of using biological weapons. The rapid
    evolution of new biological techniques, such as CRISPR CAS-9, pose
    potential threats, as the new techniques can be used for good or evil.
        North Korea, a state sponsor of terrorism, continues its nuclear
    tests and has expanded its missile program to such an extent that
    General Mattis has indicated that they now have the range to reach the
    United States. The North Korean Central News Agency stated that the
    ICBM can carry a ``super-large heavy warhead, which is capable of
    striking the whole mainland of the United States.''
        And this is the context under which we meet today. As the world of
    threats becomes more complex, it is incumbent upon the Department of
    Homeland Security to assess whether or not it is optimally organized to
    best confront the variety of threats it is expected to counter.
        Acting Secretary Duke determined that the Department is, in fact,
    not currently organized to best address these threats. As a result, on
    October 6, she notified the committee of her intent to use her ``872''
    reorganization authority to establish a ``Countering Weapons of Mass
    Destruction,'' or ``CWMD'' Office, headed by an assistant secretary for
    CWMD. This reorganization took effect earlier this week and I am
    pleased that we are joined today by the assistant secretary and
    principal deputy assistant secretary for CWMD, along with the acting
    under secretary for science and technology, to discuss this new office.
        I will note that Acting Secretary Duke realized that the use of her
    872 authority will only take her so far and legislative changes are
    necessary to fully integrate the CWMD Office.
        This committee stands ready to work with the Department on this
    authorization, as we worked with the Obama administration on their
    proposal to establish a similar office.
        Last Congress, the House passed the Department of Homeland Security
    CBRNE Defense Act, authored by Chairman McCaul. Based on the Obama
    administration's proposal, the structure of the office created by the
    CBRNE Defense Act differs from the CWMD Office envisioned in the
    Department's current proposal.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how the current threat
    stream informed their proposal and how the organizational structure
    envisioned in the proposal will set DHS up for success in meeting its
    vital mission.

        Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes my friend, the
    gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member of this
    committee, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement that he may
    have.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you. Good morning.
        I apologize for my tardiness. But it looks like I got here
    right on time.
        Mr. Donovan. You did.
        Mr. Payne. OK. Well, I want to first thank the Chairman for
    holding today's hearing to assess the Department's latest
    efforts to establish a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
    office, CWMD. Great, another acronym. We needed one more.
        At the outset, I would like to express my disappointment
    that the Department chose to circumvent Congress and
    unilaterally organize its activities related to chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear CBRNE defense pursuits to
    section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. I appreciate
    the Congressional authorization process takes time, but it also
    adds value.
        This committee has proven itself to be willing to partner
    when DHS has wanted to reorganize. In 2015, for example, the
    full committee, Ranking Member, and I supported legislation to
    consolidate the CBRNE activities despite warranted
    reservations, because DHS insisted its proposed realignment
    would improve mission capability.
        Earlier this year, this committee worked with DHS to draft
    important legislation to overhaul the National Protection and
    Programs Directorate, NPPD. To be clear, working with the
    administration to make DHS operate better is a bipartisan
    priority. Fortunately, this committee has passed legislation to
    repeal Section 872, so the Department's window of opportunity
    to use the Homeland Security Act to avoid Congress appears to
    be closing. Nevertheless, I urge you to work with the committee
    more collaboratively in the future.
        I would also like to express my concern that the
    reorganization was announced when DHS and impacted components
    lacked permanent leadership. I hope the witnesses here today
    will help me understand why the Department rushed to reorganize
    without Congressional authorization at a time when permanent
    leaders were in place in only one of the impacted offices.
        Finally, I look forward to learning more about how the
    proposal to reorganize CBRNE activities has evolved since 2015.
    Two years ago, I was disappointed when prior DHS leadership
    could not point to concrete benefits it anticipated as a result
    of consolidating its WMD defenses activities. Instead of
    articulating novel plans to leverage capabilities across the
    WMD mission space, DHS officials spoke in generalities about
    how reorganization advanced the then-Secretary's Unity of
    Effort initiative and created a central point of contact for
    stakeholders.
        Such vague explanations are little justification for
    setting a disruptive organization in motion. Additionally, I
    would be interested to learn how DHS engaged with internal and
    external stakeholders and whether such engagement informed its
    reorganization scheme. I look forward to working with the
    Department to ensure the successes of its activities in the WMD
    space.
        With that, I would like to thank the witnesses for being
    here today and look forward to their testimony. With that, Mr.
    Chairman, I yield back.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
                Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
                                December 7, 2017
        I would like to express my disappointment that the Department chose
    to circumvent Congress and unilaterally reorganized its activities
    related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
    defense pursuant to Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
        I appreciate that the Congressional authorization process takes
    time, but it also adds value. And this committee has proven itself to
    be a willing partner when DHS has wanted to reorganize.
        In 2015, for example, the full committee Ranking Member and I
    supported legislation to consolidate certain CBRN activities--despite
    warranted reservations--because DHS insisted its proposed realignment
    would improve mission capability.
        And earlier this year, this committee worked with DHS to draft
    important legislation to overhaul the National Protection and Programs
    Directorate (NPPD).
        To be clear, working with the administration to make DHS operate
    better is a bipartisan priority. Fortunately, this committee has passed
    legislation to repeal section 872, so Department's window of
    opportunity using the Homeland Security Act to avoid Congress appears
    to be closing.
        Nevertheless, I urge you to work with the committee more
    collaboratively in the future. I would also like to express my concern
    that the reorganization was announced when DHS and impacted components
    lacked permanent leadership.
        I hope the witnesses here today will help me understand why the
    Department rushed to reorganize--without Congressional authorization--
    at a time when permanent leaders were in place in only one of the
    impacted offices.
        Finally, I look forward to learning more about how the proposal to
    reorganize CBRN activities has evolved since the 2015 proposal. Two
    years ago, I was disappointed when prior DHS leadership could not point
    to concrete benefits it anticipated as the result of consolidating its
    WMD defense activities.
        Instead of articulating novel plans to leverage capabilities across
    the WMD mission space, DHS officials spoke in generalities about how
    the reorganization advanced the then-Secretary's Unity of Effort
    initiative and created a central point of contact for stakeholders.
    Such vague explanations are little justification for setting a
    disruptive reorganization in motion.
        Additionally, I will be interested to learn how DHS engaged with
    internal and external stakeholders and whether such engagement informed
    its reorganization scheme. I look forward to working with the
    Department to ensure the success of its activities in the WMD mission
    space.

        Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields. Other Members of the
    subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be
    submitted for the record.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                                December 7, 2017
        On October 6, 2017, then-Acting Homeland Security Secretary Elaine
    Duke notified the committee that DHS was utilizing its authority under
    Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish the
    Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The Office was
    officially stood up earlier this week.
        This is not the first time the Department has used its Section 872
    authority to execute a reorganization without seeking Congressional
    authorization, nor is it the first time that the Department has sought
    to consolidate its activities related to countering chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats--but I have
    concerns about both.
        Since its inception, DHS has undergone several disruptive
    reorganizations--many without Congressional authorization and some with
    mixed results. In July 2005, for example, Secretary Chertoff announced
    sweeping plans to realign DHS to improve mission performance.
        Part of Secretary Chertoff's proposal shifted preparedness
    functions from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to DHS
    headquarters with such disastrous consequences that Congress eventually
    restored them to FEMA. I raise this cautionary tale as a reminder that
    even the most well-intentioned reorganizations can have unintended
    consequences.
        In my experience, the rigorous vetting inherent in the
    authorization process can help Congress understand the resources and
    authorities the Department needs from the outset and root out or
    mitigate potential challenges associated with reorganizations.
        The authorization process can also clarify what problems a
    reorganization aims to resolve and how a realignment can improve
    mission capability.
        Toward that end, when this committee assessed DHS's proposal to
    establish a Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and Explosives
    (CBRNE) Defense Office last Congress, I never got a satisfying answer
    to two fundamental questions I asked: What problems will this
    reorganization solve? How will the proposed reorganization solve the
    problems?
        Without answers to these questions, it is impossible for the agency
    to justify potential disruptions to the workforce, direct resources
    appropriately, or measure results.
        I hope the witnesses here today have better answers for me,
    particularly since DHS acted unilaterally and the reorganization has
    already begun. The Department of Homeland Security plays an important
    role in the CBRNE defense space, and we cannot afford for a misguided,
    poorly-executed reorganization to undermine its ability to carry out
    its mission.
        Last Congress, I asked the Government Accountability Office to
    review the CBRNE reorganization proposal the Department submitted to
    Congress in 2015.
        Although we are here today to review a reorganization that is
    already under way, there are recommendations and best practices GAO
    identified in its 2016 report that remain relevant.
        Moreover, I will be interested to understand why the Department
    executed its section 872 authority prior to fully addressing all of the
    recommendations GAO made.
        Moving forward, committee Democrats are committed to ensuring that
    DHS effectively carries out its mission related to weapons of mass
    destruction threats, and that any Departmental reorganization focuses
    on capability building and preserving a talented workforce.

        Mr. Donovan. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel
    before us today on this important topic. Mr. Jim McDonnell
    serves as the assistant secretary for Countering Weapons of
    Mass Destruction and the director of the Domestic Nuclear
    Detection Office. Thank you for joining us, sir.
        Mr. William Bryan serves as the deputy under secretary for
    Science and Technology and is the senior official performing
    the duties of the under secretary for Science and Technology.
    Thank you for joining us, sir.
        Mr. Chris Currie serves as the director of emergency
    management, National preparedness, and critical infrastructure
    protection issues at the Government Accountability Office. Mr.
    Currie, thank you for joining us.
        We were supposed to be joined today also by Mr. Larry
    Fluty, the principal deputy assistant secretary for CWMD, but
    unfortunately an illness has prevented him from being here this
    morning. We hope he is on the road to recovery and will submit
    questions for him for the record.
        The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
    record, and the Chair now recognizes Mr. McDonnell for a 5-
    minute statement.

       STATEMENT OF JAMES F. MC DONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
        COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, DIRECTOR OF THE
    DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
                                SECURITY

        Mr. McDonnell. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Payne, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is an
    honor to be here today to discuss Department of Homeland
    Security's work to counter the threat of terrorists using
    weapons of mass destruction, otherwise known as WMD. I
    shortened the acronym just a bit.
        Today as we discuss the creation of a new organization in
    DHS, it is on the anniversary of one of the two most
    catastrophic attacks in U.S. history, the surprise attack on
    Pearl Harbor, an attack that caused the United States to enter
    in a global war that would preserve the freedoms of our
    democracy. Like Pearl Harbor, 9/11 also began a war to preserve
    our way of life, a war against terrorism, which continues
    today.
        The purpose of the Countering WMD office will be to work
    every day to prevent another catastrophic attack, one using
    weapons or materials that have the potential to kill our
    citizens in numbers that dwarf previous attacks. In the last
    year, we have observed a credible increase in terrorist
    interest in using WMD against the United States. These threats
    come from all fronts--chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear weapons. Certain WMDs once thought to be impossible for
    non-state actors, non-state groups to acquire are now closer to
    getting in the hands of terrorists.
        Today, as you heard in the committee's recent threats
    hearing, we know that non-state actors have information and
    technology at their disposal that make the threat much more
    dynamic, requiring more flexible and aggressive response.
        The CWMD office is an operational support office. Our
    mission is to assist the Department's front-line operating
    components, first responders and interagency partners. We will
    draw on the WMD expertise within the Department and across
    inter-agency to integrate expertise and operational support.
        In planning for the establishment of the CWMD office, Mr.
    Fluty and I reached out to each of the DHS operating
    components, interagency partners, and State and local officials
    to understand their needs and requirements. We are tailoring
    the CWMD organization to provide the best unified efforts and
    operational support possible. We are working closely with FEMA
    to ensure that actions taken by CWMD in support of first
    responders are coordinated and complementary. Another example
    of early integration and unity of effort into the larger
    Department is a recent move by OHA and DNDO to embed a core
    team of WMD expertise in the CBP National Targeting Center.
        DNDO and OHA leadership have been working closely with DOD
    as it transitions the CWMD mission from STRATCOM to SOCOM. We
    are in near daily contact with the Department of Defense and
    believe this partnership will benefit us in threat awareness
    and the adoption of new technologies and capabilities that can
    be developed into homeland capabilities.
        We are planning against smuggling pathway. Rather than
    limiting our detection of mission to a defense at the 1-yard-
    line strategy, we plan to work through the DHS joint task
    forces and others to push out capability into known smuggling
    pathways. We want to deploy into the environment where we know
    bad guys are operating, be less predictable, and find the
    threat before it reaches our borders.
        The CWMD core leadership team brings decades of operational
    and executive leadership experience. I personally led the
    development of the WMD capability in United States Special
    Operations Command, and Dave Fluty has 23 years as a CBP
    officer, which includes a detail into the DNDO office when it
    was stood up.
        The entire CWMD team has a clear objective to safeguard
    America and understands their contribution to the DHS mission.
    The clarity of purpose and contribution to the homeland
    security mission addresses the feedback from our staffs,
    meetings, and survey results.
        I take seriously the feedback from Congressional oversight
    bodies, the GAO, and the DHS inspector general. These provide
    guidelines and roadmaps to improvement. I continue to meet with
    the GAO regularly. I support the findings of the blue ribbon
    panel on biodefense and a number of their recommendations, for
    example, the recommendation to replace BioWatch. I agree with
    this recommendation. We intend to develop and deploy a system
    that will be innovative and leverage business practices and the
    best practices already resident within DNDO.
        DNDO's solutions development process focuses on gap
    identification and the development of tangible operational
    requirements to drive R&D and expeditious deployment of
    operational capabilities which will close the gaps and reduce
    direct threats. This approach has been successful in the
    deployment of a nuclear detection architecture and will be
    utilized for a biodetection system that uses the latest
    technology and shares the information communications backbone
    that we are already deploying for the nuclear mission.
        We will optimize the integration of the DNDO's solution
    development process with the expertise that resides in the
    Office of Health Affairs. This will be done with our existing
    resources.
        WMD terrorism remains a pressing issue for our National
    security. It is with your support that we may build a world-
    class organization within DHS focused solely on countering the
    threat of WMD terrorism. I look forward to working with you
    further on this matter, and I am happy to answer any questions
    you may have. Thank you.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. McDonnell, Mr. Fluty
    and Mr. Bryan follows:]
      Joint Prepared Statement of James F. McDonnell, Larry D. Fluty, and
                                 William Bryan
                                December 7, 2017
        Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
    Communications, thank you for inviting us to speak with you today. We
    appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland
    Security's (DHS) work to bolster efforts to counter the threat of
    terrorist actors using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the
    homeland. As the leaders of the organizations involved in the
    reorganization of WMD functions into one office within DHS, we
    appreciate your interest in this matter. We also appreciate the support
    from former Secretary John Kelly and Acting Secretary Elaine Duke in
    pursuing a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office aimed
    at elevating and streamlining DHS's role in the WMD mission and further
    unifying associated activities under one office.
                                   background
        As Acting Secretary Elaine Duke stated in her September 27, 2017
    testimony to the Senate, our intelligence professionals have seen a
    renewed terrorist interest in WMD. The United States faces a
    significant danger from threat actors who could use chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to harm Americans
    or U.S. interests. Certain WMD, once viewed as out-of-reach for all but
    nation-states, are now closer to being attained by non-state actors.
    Terrorist groups are already using chemical weapons, using battlefield
    environments to test them, and may consider using such weapons in
    external operations. A WMD terrorist attack against the United States
    would have a profound and potentially catastrophic impact on our
    Nation, increasing our need to invigorate efforts to stop them and
    improve our own capabilities to defend, deter, and detect.
        Since the creation of the Department more than 15 years ago, DHS
    has lacked a focal point in the WMD threat space. Through Presidential
    directives and legislation, various WMD-related programs and projects
    were established within the Department and across multiple components.
    In some cases, components were established through Presidential
    directives and delegations of authority, but lacked full legislative
    authorization to carry out such vested responsibilities. This resulted
    in fragmented missions and uncoordinated activities across the
    Department, ultimately leading to a lack of strategic direction in this
    critical mission. Further, the current structure of CBRN functions
    within the Department resulted in a lack of visibility for the mission
    space, weak internal coordination, and disjointed interagency
    cooperation.
        DHS believes it is imperative to streamline and elevate its
    counter-WMD efforts. Multiple reviews in the last decade--both internal
    and external to the Department--have highlighted the Department's
    shortcomings in this space, as well as the need for a focal point on
    CBRN matters. For instance, 5 years ago, Congress required the
    Department of Homeland Security to study the issue, to rationalize its
    WMD defense efforts, and to report on whether a reorganization was
    needed. The previous administration conducted such a study and made an
    affirmative determination to pursue changes \1\ that resulted in the
    House passing the Department of Homeland Security CBRNE Defense Act of
    2015.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ In the June 2015 ``DHS Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
    Nuclear Functions Review Report'' to House and Senate Appropriations
    Subcommittees, the Department reviewed its CBRN programs' organization,
    operations, and communications pursuant to Congressional direction in
    the Joint Explanatory Statement (JES) and House Report accompanying the
    fiscal year 2013 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
    (Pub. Law No. 113-6). In the JES, Congress identified the need to
    ``elevate and streamline the Department's focus on efforts to address
    [CBRN] threats and deter and counter weapons of mass destruction.''
        \2\ H.R. 3875, Department of Homeland Security CBRNE Defense Act of
    2015, sec. 2 (Passed House amended (12/10/2015)). H.R. 3875 was
    referred to the Senate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This year, the Department again reexamined previous reviews,
    shortcomings in the mission space, and whether a re-organization would
    remedy such issues. As the new leadership team explored these issues,
    they took into consideration challenges associated with advancements in
    chemical and biological defense capabilities. Due to challenges in the
    chemical and biological defense space, and in light of the current
    threat environment, DHS determined that steps needed to be taken
    expeditiously to improve the effectiveness of our WMD defense
    functions. DHS leadership, including former Secretary John Kelly and
    Acting Secretary Elaine Duke, decided to establish a CWMD Office to
    elevate, streamline, and bolster an internal ``unity of command'' for
    CWMD capabilities within the Department.
                              current cwmd office
        As an initial step, the Department established the CWMD Office that
    unified the management structure and consolidated the following
    components and elements within the Department into one office: The
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the majority of the Office of
    Health Affairs (OHA), select elements of the Science & Technology
    Directorate (S&T), and select DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
    (SPP) and DHS Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) functions and
    personnel.
    The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
        The CWMD Office subsumed DNDO in total with all current functions
    remaining intact. DNDO was chartered, in law and Presidential
    Directive, using an interagency construct to coordinate technical
    efforts across the U.S. Government to technically detect and protect
    against radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO conducts a holistic
    program of end-to-end efforts in technical nuclear detection and
    nuclear forensics, including planning, research and technology
    development, technology acquisition, and support for Federal, State,
    local, Tribal, and territorial operators in the field.
    The Office of Health Affairs
        The CWMD Office also includes the majority of OHA, retaining
    biological and chemical defense functions, external coordination of
    Department medical preparedness and response activities, health
    incident surveillance, and health security intelligence and
    information-sharing functions. The CWMD Office is exploring
    enhancements to current biodetection technologies with the goal of
    identifying new technology that can reduce capability gaps in
    biological detection. Through non-reimbursable details, DHS transferred
    internal DHS workforce health and medical support functions from OHA to
    the DHS Management Directorate. By elevating the mission and unifying
    Departmental CWMD efforts, the CWMD Office is optimizing existing DHS
    resources to better protect the Nation against WMD threats.
        The CWMD Office, through the chief medical officer, is continuing
    to provide advice and support to DHS leadership and public and medical
    health officials Nation-wide to prepare for, respond to, and recover
    from threats to the Nation's health security. Ensuring the first-
    responder community receives health-related expertise in a CBRN
    incident is vital. The CWMD Office is continuing to provide support for
    emerging health and medical issues of National significance and support
    for external-facing medical first responder coordination.
    The Science & Technology Directorate
        The Department reassigned certain non-R&D functions from S&T to the
    CWMD Office, specifically the non-R&D functions performed by S&T
    related to chemical, biological, and integrated terrorism risk
    assessments and material threat assessments as required by Presidential
    Directive and the Project BioShield Act of 2004.\3\ This will harmonize
    terrorism risk assessment efforts across the WMD spectrum within one
    organization, and result in a rigorous requirements development
    process. We expect this realignment to improve risk-informed strategy
    and policy development and further enhance our Nation's ability to
    protect against WMD terror threats.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Pub. Law No. 108-276.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (SPP) and the Office of
            Operations (OPS) Coordination
        Last, the Department is executing non-reimbursable details to
    assign a limited number of SPP and OPS personnel with WMD defense
    expertise to the CWMD Office. These details will allow the CWMD Office
    to leverage existing subject-matter experts that had previously been in
    other parts of DHS to support effective planning and policy for WMD
    threats.
                           proposed cwmd organization
        To fully integrate these capabilities, we are requesting this
    Congress' support for this effort, and we fully intend to work
    collaboratively with Congress to formalize this office, and ensure it
    is postured appropriately to confront the threat. The proposed CWMD
    Office would be responsible for advancing CWMD capabilities in DHS by
    taking a comprehensive approach to the spectrum of threats.
        During the reorganizational review of WMD-related support functions
    and activities, the Department found that components shared a number of
    related lines of effort that could be leveraged. For example, both DNDO
    and the Office of Health Affairs have acquisition activities that could
    be mutually leveraged. Conversely, the Department also found it lacked
    critical acquisition and requirements functions in its chemical and
    biological missions. For example, DNDO coordinates with the interagency
    on planning and analysis activities related to the Global Nuclear
    Detection Architecture. Utilizing DNDO's analysis and requirements
    generation capabilities for the chemical and biological defense mission
    across the U.S. Government is an opportunity to better accomplish this
    mission.
        The proposed CWMD Office would leverage best practices from across
    the Department to fill gaps in the chemical and biological defense
    functions by coordinating similar functions prescribed in law for DNDO.
    In particular, the CWMD Office will seek to approach chemical and
    biological defense activities much as is currently done for
    radiological and nuclear threats--from gap and requirement
    identification to operational deployment and support.
        With regard to the leadership structure of the proposed CWMD
    Office, the Office would be optimally organized by having a
    Presidentially-appointed assistant secretary to lead the organization
    and who would report directly to the Secretary. This leadership
    structure would empower the assistant secretary to coalesce and elevate
    CWMD matters to the Secretary in support of the DHS operating
    components and act as a DHS representative on relevant matters within
    the Federal interagency, as well as with external stakeholders at the
    State level, local level, and with private-sector partners. The
    assistant secretary would be supported by a principal deputy assistant
    secretary to serve as the deputy and an advisor on WMD issues.
        Another important part of the CWMD reorganization is the role of
    the chief medical officer within DHS. Congress authorized a chief
    medical officer within DHS in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
    Reform Act of 2006 (Pub. Law 109-295) (``PKEMRA'').\4\ Congress vested
    the chief medical officer with primary responsibility within DHS for
    medical issues related to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and
    other man-made disasters, including serving as the principal advisor to
    the DHS Secretary and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
    administrator on medical and public health issues, and coordinating DHS
    biodefense activities.\5\ Shortly thereafter, DHS reorganized to
    implement the various changes in PKEMRA as well as additional
    organizational improvements.\6\ Under the 2007 reorganization, the
    Department established the Office of Health Affairs, to be led by the
    chief medical officer. Since then, the Office of Health Affairs has
    been responsible for non-R&D chemical and biological defense
    activities, medical readiness, and component services functions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Section 516 of the HSA, codified at 6 U.S.C.  321e.
        \5\ Id.
        \6\ Notice of Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency
    Management Reform Act of 2006 and of Additional Changes Pursuant to
    872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 from Secretary Michael
    Chertoff to Senator Michael B. Enzi (Jan. 18, 2007).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        After re-evaluating the Department's WMD activities, leadership
    determined that the chief medical officer would be most effective in
    the CWMD Office supporting the assistant secretary. The chief medical
    officer will continue to serve as an independent medical advisor to the
    Secretary and other senior DHS officials, including the FEMA
    administrator. A permanent re-alignment would ensure the chief medical
    officer's expertise is regularly leveraged not only on chemical and
    biological issues, as is largely the case today, but also on
    radiological and nuclear matters. Moreover, this permanent relocation
    of the chief medical officer to the CWMD Office would ensure expertise
    is utilized on the full range of critical CWMD matters involving
    emerging WMD threats of National significance. Last the re-organization
    will ensure the Nation's front-line responders are able to prepare for
    and respond to all threats, for which the chief medical officer will
    provide advice, as appropriate.
    Reorganizational Benefits
        The Department anticipates the proposed CWMD Office will offer the
    following improvements:
        1. Enhanced U.S. defenses against CBRN threats.--Integration of
            CBRN elements will elevate and streamline DHS efforts to
            prevent terrorists and other National security threat actors
            from using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
            agents to harm Americans and U.S. interests. The Department has
            long sought to bring unity of effort to this space, and in
            doing so, it will be able to confront these challenges more
            decisively. This includes providing better support to DHS
            front-line components, which are responsible for keeping such
            dangerous agents from entering the United States.
        2. Improved strategic direction.--The CWMD Office will help advance
            the Department's strategic direction related to CBRN threats.
            In particular, U.S. strategies on chemical and biological
            defense have lagged behind the threat landscape. The CWMD
            Office will help close this gap by better equipping DHS to put
            in place effective chemical and biological defenses and
            ensuring the Department is able to more effectively drive
            forward planned strategies being developed in the interagency.
        3. Reform through sharing of best practices.--The CWMD Office will
            better leverage related lines of effort, functional activities,
            and administrative structures within the Department. This new
            construct will allow for seamless sharing of best practices and
            create new opportunities for reform. In particular, DNDO's
            successful business model will help inform improvements to the
            chemical and biological defense mission space.
        4. A clear focal point for CWMD within DHS.--The Department's
            previous approach to CWMD created policy coordination
            challenges, both internally and externally. With the changes
            the Department plans to undertake, stakeholders in the
            interagency, industry, and at the State and local level will be
            able to better engage with DHS to deal with CBRN defense and
            detection matters. For example, the CWMD Office will
            collaborate closely with interagency partners such as the
            Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Weapons of Mass
            Destruction Directorate, which is the focal point for WMD-
            related matters within the FBI.
        5. Reduced overlap and duplication.--In the past, the Department
            has been forced to reevaluate and terminate major CWMD-related
            programs and acquisitions due to under-performance, cost
            overruns, or ineffectiveness. In some cases, these failures
            could have been avoided with better oversight, leadership, and
            strategic planning. The CWMD Office will leverage best
            practices and lessons learned to prevent such mistakes from
            occurring in the future. Moreover, the reorganization offers
            potential efficiencies, such as eliminating duplication of
            effort in cross-cutting functions such as operational support
            programs, and interagency and intergovernmental coordination.
                               change management
        Recognizing that the success of this reorganization is imperative,
    the Department has heeded GAO's prior recommendation to use, where
    appropriate, the key mergers and organizational practices identified in
    past reports and audits.\7\ Prior to and following the Department's
    decision to establish a CWMD Office, the Department actively engaged
    internally among DHS components and with external stakeholders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
    Security, House of Representatives, Homeland Security--DHS's Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Program Consolidation
    Proposal Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations, GAO-16-603
    (Aug. 2016), p. 18.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DHS has undertaken a number of activities to ensure compliance with
    GAO-identified best practices in organizational changes. First, an
    Implementation Team was created with a specific task to engage an
    independent and objective party to monitor and examine the Department's
    reorganization and consolidation. Second, a methodology was developed,
    independent of management, to gather documentation and conduct
    interviews across Departmental components. Following the decision to
    pursue a re-organization, the independent party started interviewing
    employees at the Department to ensure a smooth transition and bolster
    employee engagement. The Department intends to continue to use GAO-
    identified best practices as benchmarks by which we can measure
    progress for the current CWMD Office and the proposed Office.
        While we are excited to elevate the Department's CWMD mission, we
    have not forgotten about the men and women of DHS who work every day to
    ensure our Nation is secure. Departmental reorganizations require
    engagement among senior management as well as with staff at the working
    level. On numerous occasions, top leadership in the Department have
    hosted stakeholder meetings, joint employee town hall events, and
    developed internal and external communications strategies to create
    shared expectations with all relevant entities.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members
    of this subcommittee, thank you again for your attention to this
    important mission and for the opportunity to discuss proposed efforts
    to enhance support capabilities across the CBRN spectrum. We look
    forward to further working with Congress and this subcommittee on fully
    integrating WMD capabilities to secure the homeland from WMD terrorism.
    With your help, we have full confidence that our Department can improve
    our strategic direction in this threat space and ensure our Nation is
    safer than ever before. We look forward to answering your questions.

        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. McDonnell.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bryan for a 5-minute
    statement.

    STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BRYAN, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
      TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Bryan. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
    Payne, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on
    Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. Thank you
    for the opportunity to speak to you today.
        As you know, the Science and Technology Directorate is the
    research and development arm of the Department of Homeland
    Security. S&T's mission is to be an enabler. We enable
    effective, efficient, and secure operations across all homeland
    security missions by applying timely, scientific, and
    innovative engineering solutions through research, development,
    test and evaluation, and acquisition support.
        Since I came to S&T in May of this year, we have been
    doubling our efforts on satisfying the R&D needs and the
    requirements of our components. We are working hard to ensure a
    coordinated and robust program is in place to meet the needs of
    the DHS operator, as well as the first responders.
        Ever since S&T's inception, we have had a threat-based,
    varied, and intricate research portfolio in chemical and
    biological defense. One example is our portable vehicle
    decontamination system. The system deploys from the back of a
    pickup truck. It can clean and disinfect vehicles up to 80 feet
    long, including the undercarriages and even inside of the
    animal transport compartments. We transitioned this product to
    USDA, which is testing the wash tunnel and the autonomous
    robots. This project will have a major impact on helping
    contain the spread of diseases from vehicles moving from farm
    to farm during an outbreak.
        We also developed the first-ever licensed and approved
    foot-and-mouth disease vaccine for livestock and the companion
    diagnostic kit, now available for the National Veterinarian
    Stockpile and available for sale internationally. This
    diagnostic assay product is faster, more sensitive, and greatly
    enhances the preparedness by decreasing the response times to a
    foot-and-mouth disease incursion.
        Our bio-threat characterization program studies a range of
    biological agents that can be used against us now and in the
    future. The knowledge gained from this program feeds into the
    terrorism risk assessments, the TRAs, which we will be talking
    about more today, and the material threat assessments, the
    MTAs. It has improved DHS's estimates of consequence and risks.
        Currently, all chemical and biological R&D, including
    people and resources, will stay with S&T. Historically, the
    TRAs and the MTAs that are required by Presidential directive
    and the Project BioShield Act of 2004, were previously
    conducted by S&T. The non-R&D elements of these assessments
    such as the coordination with DHS's Office of Intelligence and
    Analysis for the threat awareness and the threat prioritization
    have now been transferred to the CWMD office, while the R&D
    elements will remain with S&T per the Secretary's guidance.
        S&T is already working with representatives from the CWMD
    office to identify the chemical and biological R&D requirements
    for validation and execution. S&T is committed to ensuring that
    R&D spending is driven by our components and the customers and
    that we maintain homeland-focused, while being more agile and
    responsive. We will leverage existing technologies when
    appropriate and clearly define a path for transfer and
    commercialization of those capabilities.
        Working together with CWMD, we will apply our science and
    engineering excellence to counter the threat of weapons of mass
    destruction against the homeland. That concludes my remarks,
    and thank you very much once again for having this opportunity.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, Mr. Bryan. The Chair now
    recognizes Mr. Currie for an opening statement of 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT,
    NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
          HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT
                         ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Currie. All right, thank you, Chairman Donovan, Mr.
    Payne, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Appreciate the opportunity to be
    here today.
        The question of how DHS should be organized to combat
    weapons of mass destruction has come up numerous times since
    the Department's creation 15 years ago. We at GAO are not for
    or against the proposed reorganization. Those are decisions for
    DHS and for you as the Congress to make. Our work is focused
    more on the why and the how of the question.
        Our 2016 report evaluated DHS's own assessment of the
    benefits and tradeoffs of the reorganization, and maybe more
    important for today's hearing, how to implement it
    successfully. This committee understands well the need to fully
    assess such a change. You require that DHS better assess it in
    your recent DHS reauthorization bill you passed this year. We
    know at GAO from looking at decades of reorganizations and
    transformations in Government--some good, some bad--that
    agencies often learn the hard way how difficult these can be.
        Many of these lessons were learned from the creation and
    transformation of DHS itself over the last 15 years. The bottom
    line is that threat and mission need are clearly the most
    critical factors for this reorganization. However, if there is
    not an honest recognition of the organizational and
    administrative challenges and a plan to address it, it will be
    way more difficult than it needs to be.
        In our report last year, we looked into DHS's assessment
    and decision making that led to the reorganization proposal.
    What we found is that there was little actual assessment done.
    For example, DHS didn't fully assess problems that could occur,
    didn't fully consider the costs versus the benefits, and
    conducted very limited outreach at that time to external
    stakeholders.
        DHS actually disagreed with our recommendation at the time
    to go back and do these things. Their position then was a
    decision had been made and to go back and further assess it was
    not necessary. Frankly, this concerned us and didn't sound like
    a recipe for success.
        But I would like to shift from the past to the present.
    While we have not done the same in-depth audit of the current
    proposal over the last year that we did a year ago, we have
    reviewed the Secretary's notice and talked with DHS several
    times to better understand it. Clearly, there are some
    promising things in this proposal that the previous one lacked.
        There seems to be a realistic acceptance of past problems
    that need to be solved. An example of this is the need for a
    clear focal point in DHS to strengthen coordination and reduce
    fragmentation. This is something we have long recommended
    across numerous complicated National security areas, one of
    which is biodefense.
        Also, this effort looks to be driven from the components
    themselves as opposed to the top-down approach that was taken
    before from the Office of Policy. However, and emphasis on
    however, I am cautiously optimistic. As I alluded to before,
    the greatest mission need in the world won't overcome the
    organizational challenges to reorganization. In fact, the hard
    work begins once the reorganization actually begins. That is
    why it is so important that DHS apply best practices from prior
    reorganizations.
        Some of these will seem obvious, but the key is in the
    execution. Here are just some examples. Establishing a coherent
    mission and strategic goals and time frames to guide the
    transformation. This will be critical to help DHS meet its
    broad new goals for chem, bio, rad, and nuke defense and help
    internal and external stakeholders see that progress, as well.
        Establishing an implementation team and communications
    strategy for the transformation are also key. This will help
    build trust and make adjustments if they are needed as they go.
        The last example is also critical. Involving employees to
    obtain their ideas and gain their buy-in. DHS wants to improve
    morale through this reorganization and these components.
    However, morale doesn't go up just because organizations move
    around. Employees need to understand the vision, be consulted,
    and see their feedback incorporated into the change.
        The good news is that DHS recognizes the challenges--we
    have heard that already this morning--and the importance of
    these actions. But it will be very important for this committee
    to monitor the actual execution of the reorganization over the
    next few years. Of course, we are happy to help you with that,
    as well.
        That concludes my statement, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Chris P. Currie
                                December 7, 2017
        Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
    subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department
    of Homeland Security's (DHS) plans to consolidate Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) programs.
        Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons, and explosives
    also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have the potential to
    kill thousands of people in a single incident. Over the past 4 years,
    the United States has faced significant CBRNE threats to its National
    security. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, according
    to the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, is a growing and direct threat
    to the United States.\1\ Moreover, the use of chemical weapons in Syria
    in August 2013 and again in April 2017, and the emergence of
    nontraditional chemical agents highlighted the Nation's potential
    vulnerability to chemical and biological attacks. Additionally, the
    spread of scientific knowledge and capabilities by State and non-State
    actors to produce effective chemical and biological weapons further
    contributes to the Nation's threats. According to the Department of
    Homeland Security's (DHS) 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
    report, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats are
    enduring areas of concern and the consequences of such attacks are
    potentially high even though the likelihood of their occurrence is
    relatively low.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Mar. 4,
    2014).
        \2\ DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, (Washington,
    DC: June 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The organizational structure of DHS's CBRNE functions has been
    considered and questioned for some time. Specifically, as noted by the
    House committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS
    appropriations bill, across the U.S. Government, departments and
    agencies have combined their WMD programs into more centralized
    offices.\3\ Consolidations such as the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation's (FBI) reorganization of its WMD-related activities into
    a single WMD Directorate within its National Security Branch are
    intended to unify counterterrorism-related activities.\4\ To this end,
    Congress directed DHS to review and report on the Department's WMD
    programs, including potential consolidation of mission functions.\5\
    DHS conducted its review, and in June 2015 provided a report of its
    findings to Congress, including a proposal to consolidate the agency's
    core CBRNE functions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 12 (2012).
        \4\ Several different FBI investigative divisions once conducted
    WMD-related activities. In July 2006, the FBI consolidated its WMD
    investigation and prevention efforts into a WMD Directorate within its
    National Security Branch. Comprised primarily of special agents,
    intelligence analysts, program managers, and policy specialists, the
    WMD Directorate designs training for employees of the FBI; other
    Federal agencies; State and local law enforcement organizations; and
    public health, industry, and academia partners. The WMD Directorate
    also provides National-level WMD intelligence support to FBI field
    divisions and to the larger U.S. intelligence community.
        \5\ See Senate explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated
    and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127
    Stat. 198 (2013), 159 Cong. Rec. S1547 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013)., See
    also H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 13-14 (2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This testimony summarizes our August 2016 report, which discusses
    (1) the extent to which DHS's CBRNE consolidation proposal assessed the
    benefits and limitations of consolidation and (2) GAO's key practices
    from past organizational transformations that could benefit a CBRNE
    consolidation effort. This statement also focuses on recommendation
    follow-up activities related to the proposed CBRNE reorganization
    conducted through November 2017.\6\ In addition, we are conducting on-
    going work for this committee on DHS's efforts to address chemical
    terrorism, which may inform DHS's consolidation efforts. That report is
    expected to be issued early next year.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS's Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Program Consolidation Proposal
    Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations, GAO-16-603 (Washington,
    DC: Aug. 2016).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To perform the work for our previous report on DHS's CBRNE
    consolidation proposal, among other things, we reviewed DHS's June 2015
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Functions Review Report
    and supporting documentation such as DHS's Analysis of CBRNE
    Organizational Alternatives, written testimony from DHS officials on
    CBRNE threats, DHS's fiscal year 2017 Budget-In-Brief and fiscal year
    2017 Congressional Budget Justification. We also examined our prior
    work on identifying useful practices and lessons learned from major
    private and public-sector mergers, acquisitions, and organizational
    transformations and compared it against available documentation related
    to DHS's consolidation planning efforts.\7\ Further details on the
    scope and methodology for the previously-issued report are available
    within the published product. In addition, since the issuance of our
    August 2016 report through November 2017, we obtained updated
    information from DHS on actions taken to address our recommendations
    and additional steps taken to reorganize or consolidate CBRNE
    functions. However, we have not fully assessed all of DHS's efforts
    during this time.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO, Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When
    Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and
    Management Functions, GAO-12-542 (Washington, DC: May 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
    evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
                                   background
        In June 2015, DHS delivered its CBRNE Functions Review Report to
    Congress which proposed consolidating the agency's core CBRNE functions
    (see fig. 1), into a new Office of CBRNE Defense.
        figure 1: department of homeland security (dhs) components with
      chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (cbrne)
                          responsibilities, as of june

    Note: In accordance with section 709 of the Homeland Security Act of
    2002, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2017, DHS's Office of Policy is now the DHS Office of Strategy,
    Policy, and Plans. See Pub. L. No. 114-328,  1902, 130 Stat. 2000,
    2670-72 (2016); 6 U.S.C.  349.
        According to DHS officials, the agency's proposal to consolidate
    its CBRNE functions adopts the primary recommendation from a previous
    DHS study on CBRNE consolidation conducted in 2013. At that time, DHS
    assembled a review team to evaluate CBRNE alignment options and
    produced a report on its findings for the Secretary of Homeland
    Security. According to DHS officials, the alignment options from the
    2013 report were updated in 2015 based on the Secretary's Unity of
    Effort Initiative, to include transferring CBRNE threat and risk
    assessment functions from the DHS Science and Technology Directorate
    (S&T) to the proposed CBRNE Office, as well as including the DHS Office
    for Bombing Prevention from the National Protection and Programs
    Directorate.
        Since we reported on consolidation efforts in August 2016, DHS has
    provided notification to Congress of its plan to consolidate certain
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) functions
    pursuant to the Secretary's authority under the Homeland Security Act
    of 2002 to reorganize functions of the Department.\8\ Specifically, in
    October 2017 DHS's Acting Secretary issued a memo notifying Congress
    that DHS plans to reorganize its CBRN functions, including workforce
    health and medical support functions into a Countering Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (CWMD) office.\9\ According to the memo, DHS intends to
    consolidate the following functions into a CWMD Office, headed by an
    assistant secretary who will report directly to the Secretary of DHS:
    (1) The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in its entirety; (2)
    the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), with the exception of workforce
    health and medical support functions; (3) chemical and biological
    defense expertise from the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
    (PLCY) and the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS); and (4) certain
    non-Research and Development (R&D) functions from S&T. According to the
    memo, the reorganization will take effect on December 5, 2017.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ See Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 872, 116 Stat. 2135, 2243 (2002);
    6 U.S.C. Sec. 452. At the time of our August 2016 report, a bill had
    been pending before Congress that would have established within DHS a
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office. See
    H.R. 3875, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). Although passed by the House
    of Representatives and referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland
    Security and Governmental Affairs, the bill was not enacted into law. A
    more recent bill passed by the House of Representatives and referred to
    the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs--the
    DHS Authorization Act--would require the Secretary of DHS to, among
    other things, assess the organization and management of the
    Department's CBRNE activities and submit a proposed organizational
    structure to ensure enhanced coordination, effectiveness, and
    efficiency by providing strengthened CBRNE capabilities in support of
    homeland security. See H.R. 2825, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
        \9\ During an initial review of CBRNE functions at DHS, agency
    officials determined that DHS's Office of Bombing Prevention should be
    included within the WMD consolidation option. As such, we use CBRNE to
    denote the inclusion of explosives functions covered by DHS Office of
    Bombing Prevention. Subsequent DHS consolidation planning does not
    include OBP, so we refer to the consolidation as CBRN, where
    appropriate.
        \10\ In accordance with section 709 of the Homeland Security Act of
    2002, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2017, what was the DHS Office of Policy at the time we issued the
    August 2016 report is now the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and
    Plans.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dhs considered several key factors, but had limited analyses and
      documentation underlying the benefits and limitations of its cbrne
                             consolidation proposal
        In August 2016, we found that DHS's June 2015 CBRNE report and
    related summaries provide some insights into factors considered for its
    consolidation proposal, but did not include associated underlying data
    or methodological information, such as how benefits and costs were
    compared or the extent to which stakeholders were consulted. According
    to DHS officials, DHS could not locate the underlying information
    associated with analyses that informed the consolidation proposal due
    to staff turnover. Without such underlying documentation, we could not
    fully determine the extent to which DHS considered the benefits and
    limitations of a CBRNE consolidation as part of its decision-making
    process.
        According to DHS's June 2015 CBRNE report and the summary documents
    provided to us during our previous review, the Department developed
    decision-making criteria, identified as ``desired outcomes'' and
    ``near-term goals'' for its proposed reorganization, and consulted with
    DNDO, OHA, S&T, and leadership of other DHS components, the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB), and National Security Council Staff. Also
    as we reported in August 2016, an official from DHS's Office of Policy
    stated that DHS consulted with the Executive Office of the President as
    well as Congressional staff on its consolidation plan. DHS considered
    five alignment options, as shown in figure 2, and provided a general
    assessment of the effects of reorganization on its CBRNE mission.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ See Pub. L. No. 114-328, Sec. 1902, 130 Stat. 2000, 2670-72
    (2016); 6 U.S.C. Sec. 349.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    figure 2: department of homeland security's (dhs) chemical, biological,
      radiological, nuclear, and explosives (cbrne) alignment options and
                            decision-making criteria

        In May 2012, we identified key questions for agency officials to
    consider when evaluating an organizational change that involves
    consolidation.\12\ Table 1 provides a summary of the key questions for
    evaluating consolidation proposals from this previous work and a
    summary of our previous assessment of whether documentation provided to
    us and interviews with agency officials indicated whether each question
    was addressed.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ In order to determine the key questions to consider when
    evaluating physical infrastructure and management function
    consolidation initiatives, we identified and reviewed both GAO reports
    on specific consolidation initiatives that have been undertaken and
    relevant literature on public-sector consolidations. Further, we
    reviewed selected consolidation initiatives at the Federal agency level
    to gain insights into how agencies addressed these key questions
    representing both inter- and intra-agency activity. GAO-12-542.
        \13\ Our prior work on key questions for evaluating consolidation
    proposals includes a fifth key question related to change management
    practices which asks ``To what extent do plans show that change
    management practices will be used to implement the consolidation?'' A
    discussion related to change management practices during an
    organizational transformation follows later in this report. We
    therefore did not include the fifth key question in this table.

           TABLE 1.--KEY QUESTIONS FROM GAO'S PRIOR WORK ON EVALUATING
                   CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS AND OUR ASSESSMENT
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Addressed in the Department
                                                   of Homeland Security's
                                                   Chemical, Biological,
                  Key Questions                  Radiological, Nuclear, And
                                                     Explosives (CBRNE)
                                               Consolidation Decision-Making
                                                          Process?
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What are the goals of the consolidation?   Partially.
     What opportunities will be addressed
     through the consolidation and what
     problems will be solved? What problems,
     if any, will be created?
    What will be the likely benefits and       No.
     costs of the consolidation? Are
     sufficiently reliable data available to
     support a business-case analysis or cost-
     benefit analysis?
    How can the up-front costs associated      Partially.
     with the consolidation be funded?
    Who are the consolidation stakeholders     Partially.
     and how will they be affected? How have
     the stakeholders been involved in the
     decision, and how have their views been
     considered? On balance, do stakeholders
     understand the rationale for
     consolidation?
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source.--GAO-12-542.

        We found in our August 2016 report that DHS's June 2015 report to
    Congress and the supporting documentation we reviewed included an
    evaluation of some, but not all, key questions listed above in Table 1.
    These questions are important to consider when evaluating an
    organizational change that involves consolidation. Specifically, we
    found that DHS's consolidation proposal:
       Identified strategic outcomes and goals and considered
            problems to be solved, but did not fully assess and document
            potential problems that could result from consolidation.
       Did not conduct and document a comparison of benefits and
            costs. While Congress directed DHS to include an assessment of
            whether consolidation could produce cost savings, DHS had not
            documented a comparison of benefits and costs for its
            consolidation plan.
       Did not fully identify or document consideration of up-front
            costs. DHS considered potential up-front costs associated with
            a CBRNE consolidation, but did not document these costs or how
            they were considered during the reorganization decision-making
            process.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ The President's fiscal year 2017 budget submission for DHS
    included the CBRNE reorganization; however, the budget submission for
    the proposed CBRNE office did not indicate whether any of the costs in
    the submission include up-front costs associated with the
    implementation of the consolidation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Conducted limited external stakeholder consultations. DHS
            conducted limited external stakeholder outreach in developing
            the consolidation proposal, and thus the proposal may not
            sufficiently account for stakeholder concerns.
        As a result of these findings, we recommended that DHS complete,
    document, and make available analyses of key questions related to its
    consolidation proposal, including:
       what problems, if any, consolidation may create;
       a comparison of the benefits and costs of consolidation; and
       a broader range of external stakeholder input including a
            discussion of how it was obtained and considered.
        DHS did not concur with this recommendation, asserting, among other
    things, that our recommendation did not acknowledge the extent to which
    these questions were discussed both internally within DHS and
    externally with Congress and that DHS's decision to consolidate CBRNE
    functions had already been made which would make additional analysis
    redundant. However, as we stated in our August 2016 review, in 2013,
    Congress had directed DHS to include an assessment of whether
    consolidation could produce cost savings. However, as of our 2016
    report DHS had not documented a comparison of the benefits and costs
    for its consolidation plan. We subsequently closed the recommendation
    as not implemented. While we have not fully assessed DHS's most recent
    reorganization plans and any additional analyses conducted, we continue
    to believe that providing documented information and analyses used to
    assess the benefits and limitations of its consolidation plan would
    assist DHS in fully demonstrating how its proposal will lead to an
    integrated, high-performance organization. We closed this
    recommendation as not implemented upon receiving documentation from DHS
    in November 2016 stating that they did not intend to address it.
     key mergers and organizational transformation practices could benefit
                    dhs's cbrn consolidation implementation
        As we found in our August 2016 report, when implementing a CBRNE
    consolidation effort DHS could benefit from incorporating change
    management approaches such as the key practices and implementation
    steps derived from organizational transformations undertaken by large
    private and public-sector organizations identified in our previous
    work.\15\ Doing so would help ensure that DHS's consolidation
    initiative is results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative in
    nature. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, provided that none
    of the funds appropriated the fiscal year 2016 Act or any previous
    appropriations Acts may be used to establish an Office of CBRNE Defense
    until Congress authorized such establishment and, as of the end of
    fiscal year 2016, Congress had not approved the proposed
    consolidation.\16\ As a result of this restriction, DHS officials told
    us at the time of our August 2016 report that they had taken few
    concrete steps to plan for or move forward with the consolidation. As
    described earlier, DHS subsequently provided notification to Congress
    in October 2017 of its plan to consolidate certain CBRN functions
    pursuant to its reorganization authorities provided under the Homeland
    Security Act of 2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ GAO-12-542, GAO-03-669.
        \16\ See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. F,  521, 129 Stat. 2242, 2515
    (2015) (providing further, however, that the Secretary may transfer
    funds for the purposes of executing authorization of the Office of
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Defense).
    The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, did not contain a provision
    precluding DHS from utilizing appropriated funds for the establishment
    of such an office. See Pub. L. No. 115-31, div. F, 131 Stat. 135, 404
    (2017).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As DHS was formed, we reported in July 2003 on key practices and
    implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations.
    The factors listed in Table 2 were built on the lessons learned from
    the experiences of large private and public-sector organizations.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ To identify these practices, we interviewed a cross-section of
    leaders with experience managing large-scale organizational mergers,
    acquisitions, and transformations, as well as academics and others who
    have studied these efforts. We asked these individuals about their
    experiences managing mergers, acquisitions, and transformations and
    reviewed literature on the subject drawn primarily from private-sector
    mergers and acquisitions change management experiences to gain a better
    understanding of the issues that most frequently occur during such
    large-scale change initiatives. We also used our guidance and reports
    on strategic human capital management and results-oriented management.

        TABLE 2.--KEY PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR MERGERS AND
                          ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Practice                       Implementation Step
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ensure top leadership drives the       Define and articulate a succinct
     transformation.                      and compelling reason for change.
                                           Balance continued delivery of
                                          services with merger and
                                          transformation activities.
    Establish a coherent mission and       Adopt leading practices for
     integrated strategic goals to        results-oriented strategic
     guide the transformation.            planning and reporting.
    Focus on a key set of principles       Embed core values in every
     and priorities at the outset of      aspect of the organization to
     the transformation.                  reinforce the new culture.
    Set implementation goals and a time    Make public implementation goals
     line to build momentum and shot      and time line.
     progress from Day 1.                  Seek and monitor employee
                                          attitudes and take appropriate
                                          follow-up actions.
                                           Identify cultural features of
                                          merging organizations to increase
                                          understanding of former work
                                          environments.
                                           Attract and retain key talent.
                                           Establish an organization-wide
                                          knowledge and skills inventory to
                                          exchange knowledge among merging
                                          organizations.
    Dedicate an implementation team to     Establish networks to support
     manage the transformation process.   implementation team.
                                           Select high-performing team
                                          members.
    Use the performance management         Adopt leading practices to
     system to define responsibility      implement effective performance
     and assure accountability for        management systems with adequate
     change.                              safeguards.
    Establish a communication strategy     Communicate early and often to
     to create shared expectations and    build trust.
     report related progress.              Ensure consistency of message.
                                          Encourage two-way communication.
                                           Provide information to meet
                                          specific needs of employees.
    Involve employees to obtain their      Use employee teams.
     ideas and gain their ownership for    Involve employees in planning
     the transformation.                  and sharing performance
                                          information.
                                           Incorporate employee feedback
                                          into new policies and procedures.
                                           Delegate authority to
                                          appropriate organizational levels.
    Build a world-class organization.      Adopt leading practices to build
                                          a world-class organization.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source.--GAO-03-669.

        The practices outlined in our July 2003 report are intended to help
    agencies transform their cultures so that the Federal Government has
    the capacity to deliver its promises, meet current and emerging needs,
    maximize its performance, and ensure accountability. We found in our
    August 2016 report that DHS had not evaluated each of these practices.
    According to DHS officials, the agency was awaiting Congressional
    approval of the proposed consolidation before developing implementation
    steps. We recommended that if DHS's proposed CBRNE program
    consolidation is approved by Congress, DHS use, where appropriate, the
    key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in
    our previous work to help ensure that a CBRNE consolidated office
    benefits from lessons learned from other organizational
    transformations. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated in a
    November 2016 letter to Members of Congress that while DHS's CBRNE
    reorganization proposal had yet to be authorized by Congress, DHS
    remained committed to evaluating GAO's identified practices when
    evaluating its proposals. DHS acknowledged in its October 2017 memo to
    Congress that it plans to address this recommendation as part of its
    CBRN consolidation efforts by working with entities both internal and
    external to DHS to determine where it is appropriate to apply our key
    organization transformation practices.
        Given the critical nature of DHS's CBRN mission, considering key
    factors from our previous work would help inform a consolidation
    effort. The lessons learned by other organizations involved in
    substantial transformations could provide key insights for agency
    officials if they implement reorganization and attention to the factors
    we identified would improve the chances of a successful CBRN
    consolidation.
        Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
    subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
    respond to any questions you may have at this time.

        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Currie. I thank you all for
    your statements. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for
    questions.
        In the past, this committee has done--and we will do it
    again--requesting technical assistance from the Department for
    the CWMD office. I was wondering if each of you could just
    comment on what legislative authorities you believe will be
    necessary to fully implement the proposal that we are speaking
    of today.
        Mr. McDonnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start, take
    that first. We are very close to completing technical
    assistance language to get to the committee, and I commit to
    get that to you quickly.
        We are not seeking new authorities in the WMD space. Unlike
    the previous recommendation which was essentially a stovepiped
    approach to chem, nuke, bio, and explosives, we are looking at
    a much more integrated approach. So as we are doing this, we
    are taking, for example, the DNDO business model and seeking to
    apply those authorities across chem, nuke, and bio. So as we
    do, for example, gap analysis, we can be doing it across the
    battlespace.
        As you know, when we go talk to an NYPD officer, it is not
    one for rad-nuke, one for chem-bio, and one--it is the same
    officer. It is the same emergency response teams. So we are
    looking to extend our authorities across the battlespace rather
    than a stovepiped approach as we currently have.
        We do seek to codify the Secure the Cities program and
    expand that a little bit, and not in scope relative to cost,
    but in how we do that program and to reach out more into
    pathways and approaches into the target areas, rather than just
    focused on the target areas, but to also be able to address any
    of the priority mission as it comes up.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you. Mr. Bryan.
        Mr. Bryan. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question.
    First, let me add that we, within S&T, we already have the
    authority for oversight and coordination of S&T R&D across the
    Department. We specifically already have authority to do R&D in
    the space of chem-bio. Additional authorities that would help
    us not just within chem-bio, but others, just a couple requests
    that I would throw out to you that would enable us to do this
    better, one of them is the authority to do counter T&E
    authority for unmanned aerial systems. That seems to be what we
    believe could potentially be a system to use to actually employ
    any kind of toxic agents. Right now, we can't test UAVs or test
    that in a relative environment, so that is one authority that
    is something that would really help us out in the area of R&D
    to be able to--especially in this mission space.
        There is also other transactional authorities. We already
    have that, but it is on a yearly basis. So if we should get
    into any longer-term processes or projects, we would need that
    authority extended. So if that is something that we could have
    longer than 1 year at a time, either more permanent or a
    longer-term, would be beneficial to all of our programs within
    R&D to include the CWMD mission.
        Also, the low rate initial production authority, the LRIPs.
    I don't suspect this will be an issue with Jim and the work
    that they have been doing in DNDO. They understand acquisition.
    I don't suspect that will be an issue, but in some cases,
    having that low rate initial production authority during that
    transition from R&D to actual acquisition provides something
    into the field quickly, and if it is at a low rate, to be able
    to get it into the hands of the operator.
        Mr. Donovan. Would you include all of your recommendations
    in the technical report that we are asking for so that we make
    sure that we consider all those things that you just mentioned?
        Mr. Bryan. Yes, sir, we can do that.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you. Mr. Currie, you have anything you
    would like to----
        Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. Two things that come to mind. One is,
    I mean, clearly, legislation is going to be needed for the
    Department to fully implement the vision of what they want this
    office to look like. What they are doing now is shuffling some
    deck chairs at the top within the organization.
        So I think in the legislation itself, I think it would be
    very important in addition to just the mechanics behind what is
    going to be changing and the offices that are going to exist, I
    think the committee's expectations and the Congress's
    expectations for how this office is going to operate and how it
    is going to work with the components and what you expect it to
    do--because if it is given a broad mission but without the
    authorities to actually do that across DHS and working with
    much larger components with more resources and more decision-
    making authority, I think it is going to be difficult for it to
    establish its place.
        The other thing is, the second thing is, in addition to
    just the mechanics of how the organization is going to be
    changed is building in some of this criteria for how you want
    the organization to manage this transformation and how you want
    it to measure progress, I think will be really important to
    provide you the ability to actually oversee if it is doing what
    you want it to do.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much. My time is expired. Being
    the dais is so crowded today, maybe we will get a second round
    of questions in.
        The Chair now recognizes my friend from New Jersey, Mrs.
    Watson Coleman.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you, Mr. Ranking Member, for yielding to me.
        Mr. McDonnell, first of all, let me say I hope Mr. Fluty is
    recovering quickly. Second, I thank GAO for what seems to be an
    encouraging prospect for us as we take on this very important
    issue of reorganization. However, I do have some questions.
        Mr. McDonnell, when the committee considered the
    Department's 2015 proposal to consolidate certain chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear activities, Mr. Thompson,
    our Ranking Member, expressed concerns about the work force
    retention and the morale. The new CWMD--which I also
    supported--the new CWMD office raises similar concerns.
        Can you talk about what efforts you are undertaking to
    preserve work force morale? In particular, can you describe
    efforts to ensure that talented individuals from legacy offices
    understand the new career paths and opportunities they may have
    to advance?
        Mr. McDonnell. Thank you, Congressman Watson Coleman, and
    appreciate the question. We are essentially an intellectual
    property organization, so the people are the capability. We
    have within the Office of Health Affairs and DNDO a tremendous
    amount of expertise and talent that is unique in the Federal
    Government. Bringing those together is going to make us a much
    more powerful organization.
        As an example, I think in the morale space, the most
    important thing is communications, people understanding what is
    going on, and them feeling like they have an input in what the
    outcome is going to be. The approach that we have taken right
    now which has been a very limited change in the senior
    leadership, as the Ranking Member mentioned, enables a process
    that we envision taking several months with a lot of staff
    discussing how best to optimize this organization. The real
    goal is to make them feel like, at the end of the day, they are
    doing things to make America safe. They are not just coming
    into an office and churning and not feeling like there is a
    positive outcome.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. It is good to hear that,
    because as Mr. Currie----
        Mr. Currie. Currie.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing.] Stated, this whole buy-in
    from employees is so very important, considering the fact that
    you do have very high intellectual property. That is your
    asset, the people and their brains and their willingness to
    work together, but the morale has been a challenge.
        Also last Congress, I supported the bipartisan bill to
    consolidate your offices' activities, despite the reservations
    that we had about advancing the measure without seeing the
    forthcoming GAO assessment. I am wondering--and importantly,
    that analysis indicated--that DHS had not done all of its due
    diligence in its proposal.
        In October, Acting Secretary Duke notified Congress that
    DHS planned to unilaterally execute a similar reorganization,
    would implement GAO's recommendations as the reorganization was
    under way. Why not fully address those assessments,
    recommendations, prior to executing the reorganization? What is
    the reason for that?
        Mr. McDonnell. Thank you for that question, as well. I
    think it is important to note that we see this very much as a
    two-step process. The initial 872 notification was limited to
    just the executive leadership, so myself, as the assistant
    secretary, and Dave Fluty, who is currently running health
    affairs, will be the No. 2 person in the organization.
        We didn't want to get out in front of the committee and
    other stakeholders and come in with some big, elaborate
    reorganization. We just wanted to get in a position where you
    could have an executive that you could say, what is the plan
    for this? How are you working it?
        Mr. Currie's comments, there is nothing in there that I
    disagree with that he said. I personally had 87 meetings since
    the committee asked for technical assistance on this back in
    March. I have met with--the first thing we did the other day on
    the 5th, when this became official, was myself and my chief of
    staff walked over to the Office of Health Affairs and had an
    all-hands meeting.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Have you--I just need a yes-or-no on
    this, because I have one more really important question. Let me
    ask that question. First of all, I am going to want to know
    whether or not you did entertain the possibility of dealing
    with their recommendations and findings before actually getting
    this far, but second, tell me about the chief medical officer.
        In 2006, Congress authorized the provision of the council--
    the Secretary--to the Secretary and FEMA administrator on
    public health issues, among other things. Can you confirm that
    this CMO is going to continue to have direct access to the
    Secretary to advise on these public health issues?
        Mr. McDonnell. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Chairman, could I use a
    little extra time to answer this?
        Mr. Donovan. Absolutely.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McDonnell. Thank you very much. Thank you, ma'am. The
    chief medical officer had a great deal of discussion about how
    we were going to do that when we started this back in March.
    Then-Adviser Duke, before she was deputy secretary, said one of
    the red lines for this organization was to ensure that the
    chief medical officer function was maintained as a critical
    component of the organization.
        The way we have chosen to do that, the chief medical
    officer will continue to be a Presidential appointee, very high
    stature, and have the gravitas in the interagency and will be
    the adviser, the principal adviser to--direct report to me
    organizationally, but much like the FEMA administrator during
    an emergency, the FEMA administrator can report directly to the
    President. We envision the chief medical officer being an asset
    for the Secretary, for the FEMA administrator, for working with
    Dr. Kadlec over at HHS, but for being the person that can get
    out there and represent us and make good strategic decisions
    when it comes to public health issues.
        The distinct difference from what was before with the
    Office of Health Affairs is the doctor is not going to be
    saddled with the administration of an organization. They are
    going to be free to be the chief doctor for the Department and
    have the freedom to be able to focus on that solely and not
    worry about day-to-day administration and all the other things
    that come with line management responsibilities.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McDonnell, as I
    mentioned in my opening statement, I am concerned that the
    Department use its Section 872 authority to execute the CWMD
    reorganization. Should we expect the Department to pursue
    unilateral reorganizations until Section 872 of the Homeland
    Security Act is repealed?
        Mr. McDonnell. Sir, I have no direct knowledge of any other
    intention of using 872. In fact, the discussions leading up to
    the use of 872 on this one was a lot of deliberation and
    ensuring that it was extremely limited, because we knew that
    the sensitivities on the Hill relative to the use of that
    section of the Homeland Security Act. So we really were very
    cautious in the approach and wanted it to be very limited so we
    could respect the legislative process and the actual ultimate
    reorganization.
        Mr. Payne. Why did the Department initiate the
    reorganization under 872 instead of engaging with Congress?
        Mr. McDonnell. So we--prior to the notification--so I guess
    one way to address this best is, we were in a transition,
    bringing on a new leadership team. We had been requested
    technical assistance on the CBRNE legislation that had passed
    in 2015. We wanted to come in with a different approach.
        But we didn't at the same time want to build with the new
    organization--knowing that we were going to do a
    reorganization, build OHA as it had been before and DNDO as it
    had been before. But we immediately started thinking how we can
    do this to unify command and effort but not get too far out in
    front and take on new authorities that we don't already have.
        Mr. Payne. So I guess what you are saying to me is that to
    have engaged Congress would have taken you too much time, and
    you needed to come and engage us with--waste some of your time
    or----
        Mr. McDonnell. No, sir, absolutely not. If I implied that,
    then I apologize.
        Mr. Payne. Oh, no, it was no implication. I was just
    asking.
        Mr. McDonnell. No, sir.
        Mr. Payne. You know, and I say that because, you know--as
    you said, it is a new administration. You know, there have been
    some instances where this has played out across the
    administration and other departments, as well. It is a slippery
    slope. The Constitution of this great Nation was put in place
    for a reason. Congress has its role. To continually circumvent
    this body that represents the American people, it is very
    dangerous and a slippery slope.
        So I would just suggest to the administration that, you
    know, it tread lightly on this, because it is not the way it
    has been set up. I understand there are certain times with a
    Department such as Homeland where things have to be done in
    that manner, but it shouldn't be the precedent and it should
    not become the way things are done. I heard you say that you
    wanted to do things in a different way. I don't know if this is
    necessarily the best way.
        Mr. McDonnell. Thank you, sir. May I respond real quickly?
        Mr. Payne. Sure.
        Mr. McDonnell. One thing that I would like to highlight was
    in my opening statement and the Chairman mentioned, is the
    threat that is very real right now, and that is the prime
    driver for getting us organized in a way to be flexible and be
    able to respond and deal with the threats that are out there.
    But, again, we wanted to respect the committee and the
    legislative process and not do too much.
        Mr. Payne. OK. OK. Let's see. Also, in October 2017, DHS
    notified Congress that it planned to establish the Countering
    Weapons of Mass Destruction office. DHS sought a similar
    reorganization of its CBRNE activities in 2015. Can you walk us
    through the differences in the Department's current
    reorganization plan and the 2015 proposal?
        Mr. McDonnell. Yes, sir. The 2015 proposal was a stovepiped
    approach to the organization. In fact, if you look at page 6 of
    the GAO audit, it shows a series of blocks and the language in
    there as far as responsibilities for each officer essentially
    identical. So you have a bio block that has a policy
    responsibility, a chem block that has a policy responsibility.
        If you really--if you look across those stovepipes, it is
    sort-of hard to see any capacity-building, any enhancement in
    efficiencies, capabilities. What we have done is we have said
    we are going to do a horizontal integration. As an example, I
    had an all-hands meeting with our acquisition folks in DNDO.
    Had about 50 people in the room, and I said, so how many people
    are actually nuclear experts? Probably about 5 people raised
    their hand.
        Now, that means about 45 people in that room are
    acquisition, program planning, and execution experts. So if I
    get 5 people from OHA and plug them into that 45-person group,
    now I have got a 55-person organization that can do nuclear and
    biological product acquisition and development. We don't need
    to duplicate the DNDO model for biodefense. What we need to do
    is take advantage of the things that we already have that are
    very good, bring the exceptional talent from OHA.
        So OHA does not have the type of infrastructure and
    resources that DNDO does to manage big programs and deliver
    products and services, but they have a tremendous amount of
    individual expertise. So what we have done is instead of saying
    we are just going to make everything equal, so we are going to
    get talented people in the same room focused on a problem
    together.
        Mr. Payne. All right. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I have
    gone way over my time, as I yield back.
        Mr. Donovan. No need to apologize. There is--if we engage
    you for--maybe we could do more question each, just because
    there are a few of us here and this is such an important issue.
    You started to describe, Mr. McDonnell, about the differences.
    I know the proposal of 2015 divided responsibilities, I guess,
    by threat rather than by function.
        Acquisition of resources was one of the reasons why I
    believe you stated it is better to do it by function rather
    than threat. Are there other reasons why this is a better
    method, better structure than the previous 2015 proposal?
        Mr. McDonnell. Yes, sir. So sort of moving left to right
    across the organization, we actually started threat analysis
    and understanding what the battlespace is, what adversaries are
    doing. As we both mentioned in our opening statements, there
    are terrorist organizations, ISIS, that wants to use chemical,
    nuclear, and biological.
        That expertise is one set of folks that we work with. So,
    for example, for NCTC, National Counterterrorism Center, they
    have a WMD organization. They don't have a chem, nuke, bio
    organization. The DOD is similar. The FBI, we work with the WMD
    division.
        So the people that we have to work with to identify the
    threat and think about how we are going to deal with the threat
    and start doing operational plans and support the components
    are combined. It isn't stovepiped in the rest of the
    organizations.
        As I mentioned, a first responder--a member of a bomb
    squad--I had the privilege of visiting the stabilization team
    up in New York City that the NYPD and Nassau and Suffolk County
    works with the FBI on. Those guys, they respond to a device. It
    doesn't matter what type of device it is.
        So we want to have a business model that provides support
    to the folks that are in the field and allows us to interact
    with other people. But it just doesn't make sense to duplicate
    everything and just have--you know, build another organization
    that is not necessary.
        Mr. Donovan. Wonderful, thank you. You visited us in New
    York during that. The other thing, Mr. Bryan, I have had the
    privilege of visiting was NUSTL and the work that they are
    doing in the lab in New York. How will their work support,
    supplement, enhance what you guys are doing at Science and
    Technology in this area of weapons of mass destruction?
        Mr. Bryan. First, Mr. Chairman, I do want to thank you and
    the committee for your support of the labs and your recognition
    of the importance that labs bring to this mission space.
        As you know, NUSTL provides a lot of products and services,
    primarily to the first responders, to help them in their role
    to protect, respond, prepare for homeland security threats. We
    also conduct a lot of tests, evaluations, and assessments of
    first-responder technologies using our full spectrum of
    laboratory capability and field testing services.
        Unique and special, I think, to the area of CWMD is we are
    the DHS--NUSTL, I should say, is also the DHS sponsor for R&D
    for the response and recovery part of the rad-nuke mission. So
    both NUSTL's test and evaluation mission, the R&D sponsorship
    piece of that will need to be closely coordinated with the CWMD
    office to ensure that we minimize any duplication of effort and
    ensure any seamless unity of effort.
        So I would defer to my colleague, if there are any other
    views he has on the utilization of NUSTL.
        Mr. Donovan. I thank you for your insight. I yield the
    balance of my time and ask my friend from New Jersey if he has
    one final question before we let you guys get out of here
    within the hour that I promised you.
        Mr. Payne. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Currie, the
    last time DHS sought to consolidate its CBRNE activities, many
    touted potential cost savings resulting from efficiencies. From
    your previous review, do you anticipate any cost savings
    associated with this kind of reorganization?
        Mr. Currie. In short, no. When we looked at it in the
    past--well, the problem was there was no cost-benefit analysis
    done, so there was really no data and information to see
    whether there was going to be cost savings. There were high-
    level statements made in certain documents about streamlining
    and cost savings, but we didn't see any data that backed that
    up.
        Mr. Payne. OK. Can you describe some of the potential costs
    agencies incur as they undertake reorganizations?
        Mr. Currie. Sure. Well, a lot of it tends to be
    administrative sometimes, so sometimes there is a conception
    that when you put organizations together, that somehow they are
    going to immediately streamline, but sometimes that is the
    opposite. When you put organizations together, administratively
    especially at first sometimes you need more support to support
    more people, for example, in your human capital office or more
    IT services. Or if you expand your footprint, where people are
    located in buildings, you have to expand your support structure
    for that.
        So sometimes we have seen in prior reorganizations that
    when there is an assumption there will be no cost, just because
    existing organizations come together, that is not always true.
        Mr. Payne. OK. All right, well, Mr. Chairman, since you
    promised them that we would be done in an hour, I will yield
    back.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I want to thank our
    witnesses, first of all, for your service to our Nation. You
    are charged with protecting our homeland. There is no greater
    cause than the sacrifices in time and probably compensation and
    other matters in which you and your families are willing to
    ensure for the safety of our families. It is much appreciated.
    I would also like to thank you for your valuable testimony
    today and for answering our questions in a forthcoming manner.
        The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
    questions for our witnesses, and we will ask that you respond
    to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the
    hearing record will remain open for 10 days. Without objection,
    the subcommittee now stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

     Questions From Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. for the Department of
                               Homeland Security
        Question 1. The previous administration's proposal included
    ``explosives'' and moved the National Protection and Programs
    Directorate's Office for Bombing Prevention into the consolidated
    office.
        Why did you determine not to include explosives in the Countering
    WMD Office?
        Question 2a. What outreach have you done to other DHS offices and
    components on this proposal?
        Question 2b. What outreach have you done to external stakeholders,
    as recommended by GAO?
        Answer. The CWMD Office intends to be fully engaged with DHS
    components and interagency partners in the Counter-Improvised Explosive
    Device (C-IED) mission space. Other DHS components, including (but not
    limited to) the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
    United States Secret Service (USSS), and Customs and Border Protection
    have robust explosives detection capabilities and technical expertise
    in their respective mission spaces. It was decided that explosives
    detection functions that currently exist within either DHS components
    or National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) would not be
    transferred to the new CWMD Office. Specifically, the NPPD Office for
    Bombing Prevention (OBP) was not transferred to the CWMD office as
    their mission is primarily focused on training and outreach to critical
    infrastructure owners and operators. CWMD works closely with the FBI
    Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), which houses the FBI Counter-
    IED programs, and with Department of Defense Special Operations Command
    (DOD/SOCOM) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on C-IED
    planning and response programs. The Counter-WMD programs in both the
    Federal Government and at State and local agencies build on existing C-
    IED efforts as a baseline, enabling a natural support role for the CWMD
    Office.
        Question 3. This CWMD Office is being established based on the
    rising WMD threat. However, the President's fiscal year 2018 budget
    request sought to eliminate a number of programs and laboratories
    working to address these threats.
        As you are working to craft the fiscal year 2019 budget request,
    can you assure us that the request we receive will reflect the severity
    of the threat you described?
        Answer. While the Department is unable to comment on specific
    details during the pre-decisional/deliberative phase of the fiscal year
    budget request, we look forward to providing a Classified briefing to
    better illuminate key details on the threat as well as DHS CWMD actions
    to counter the threat once the budget is submitted to Congress.
        DHS CWMD developed the fiscal year President's budget request for
    all program areas within the DHS CWMD mission space, and have spoken
    with the S&T Directorate's Chemical-Biological Defense Division
    regarding the CWMD Office's requirements, as developed through the use
    of the WMD Requirements Oversight Council (WROC). The WROC is an
    executive-level body that is chaired by the assistant secretary for
    CWMD, with representatives from all of the operating components and DHS
    S&T. We look forward to briefing you on the DHS CWMD Office budget
    request within the President's fiscal year budget request.
        Question 4. While we are aware of terrorist's interest in using,
    and actual use, of chemicals in attacks, the budget for chemical
    defense programs at DHS is significantly less than those for biological
    or nuclear programs.
        How will the establishment of the CWMD Office help to enhance the
    Department's programs to address the chemical threat?
        Answer. To better understand and address chemical threats, the CWMD
    Office will leverage key aspects of the legacy Domestic Nuclear
    Detection Office (DNDO) business model as well as authorities of the
    legacy Office of Health Affairs. Similar to DNDO's success in the
    development and deployment of domestic nuclear detection capabilities
    and support for our Federal partners' missions regarding global nuclear
    detection capabilities, the new CWMD Office intends to support Federal
    partners detecting biological and chemical weapon threats before they
    reach our shores through assessing the operational requirement for,
    then acquiring and deploying, needed chemical detection equipment, as
    appropriate.
        The CWMD Office has already taken measures to counter an emerging
    chemical threat challenge, and we would welcome the opportunity to
    provide a Classified briefing to the committee. It is noteworthy that
    the first significant action by the new CWMD Office is focused on the
    chemical threat. The ability to do this is based on leveraging the
    expertise brought together under the limited CWMD reorganization
    established by the Secretary.
        Question 5. From a management perspective, DNDO and OHA each employ
    different methods of managing their human capital, acquisitions,
    information technology, and financial needs.
        What efficiencies will be gained when these management functions
    are combined?
        Answer. DHS has identified significant cost avoidances that can be
    realized by merging DNDO and OHA functions into the new CWMD Office.
    For example, rather than having two offices individually managing human
    capital, acquisitions, information technology, and financial needs, the
    horizontal integration of the CWMD Office would create inherent
    efficiencies. In addition, by leveraging legacy DNDO's successful
    requirements, resource allocation and program acquisition model,
    acquisitions will leverage the programmatic expertise and governance
    that has been successfully implemented in legacy DNDO. The CWMD Office
    anticipates similar efficiencies with human capital, information
    technology, and financial management reporting to the consolidated
    enterprise services organization.
        Question 6a. This subcommittee has held numerous hearings on the
    BioWatch Program and we have been promised, for years, that the Office
    of Health Affairs and Science and Technology Directorate are working
    together to field updated, more effective technology. However, to date,
    we don't have much to show for it.
        What is the status of OHA and S&T's work to deploy more effective
    biodetection systems?
        Answer. The new CWMD Office is committed to replacing the BioWatch
    system that was deployed in 2003 with a new state-of-the-art system
    that leverages modern detection technology and data analytics. CWMD is
    working closely with DHS S&T, DOD DTRA and SOCOM, and others to
    identify possible Commercial Off-the-shelf Technologies (COTS) that can
    be used to replace the current BioWatch system. In the future, the WMD
    Requirements Oversight Council (WROC) will develop the requirements for
    S&T's work pertaining to biodetection technologies that meet the
    operational needs of DHS stakeholders. We look forward to keeping the
    committee advised on this work as progress is made.
        Question 6b. How will the CWMD Office help address some of the
    shortcomings of BioWatch?
        Answer. As described in response to Question No. 5, the CWMD Office
    is committed to replacing the BioWatch system that was deployed in 2003
    with a new state-of-the-art system that leverages modern detection
    technology and data analytics. CWMD is working closely with HHS, DOD,
    and others to identify possible Commercial Off-the-shelf Technologies
    (COTS) that can be used to replace the current BioWatch system.
        To this end, DHS is actively working to identify technological
    capabilities that enhance the ability to detect biological attacks in a
    timelier manner and at a fraction of the present cost per location. The
    CWMD-chaired WMD Requirements Oversight Council (WROC) will generate
    R&D requirements that address some of the technical and operational
    shortcomings of BioWatch.
        Question 7. Both the Science and Technology Directorate and the
    CWMD Office will conduct research and development to combat weapons of
    mass destruction--S&T for chemical and biological threats and CWMD for
    radiological and nuclear threats.
        How will CWMD and S&T ensure the coordination of the various types
    of research and development?
        Answer. The CWMD Office-chaired WMD Requirements Oversight Council
    (WROC) will manage the process for prioritizing R&D and program
    acquisition for the CWMD mission space. S&T and DHS operating
    components will participate in the WROC and be accountable for meeting
    the requirements specified in the WROC process.
        Question 8a. In the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request,
    the administration proposed eliminating NUSTL in addition to two other
    laboratories that focus on biological and chemical threats.
        How will the potential closure of these three laboratories affect
    the CWMD Office's operations?
        Answer. The WROC described above will be the process for managing
    CWMD's operations. S&T will be responsive to requirements generated
    through the WROC process.
        Question 8b. If these laboratories were to close, will the CWMD
    Office assume the responsibility of taking over those laboratories'
    CBRN capabilities? If not the CWMD Office, then who?
        Answer. The CWMD Office will work with DHS S&T, the DHS operational
    components and other National laboratory assets across the interagency
    to identify any priority CWMD R&D activities--and options to accomplish
    these efforts--through its WROC process.
        Question 9. The Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) was not to
    be funded in the President's budget proposal issued earlier this year.
    It is my understanding that CSAC has done substantial research on
    certain chemicals, the results of which have been (1) shared with
    various stakeholders, such as private enterprise, State and local
    governments and (2) used to inform its risk assessments, some of which
    are used by private industry and other Federal customers, such as DHS's
    Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program.
        What are your plans for integrating products developed by CSAC if
    the research side of CSAC remains in the Science and Technology
    Directorate and the risk assessment side migrates to CWMD?
        Answer. The CWMD Office will work with DHS S&T and the DHS
    operating components to identify priority CWMD R&D activities--and
    options to accomplish these efforts--through its WROC process.
        Question 10a. In its August 2016 report on a DHS proposal to
    consolidate its Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
    Explosives (CBRNE) programs, GAO found that DHS did not fully assess
    and document potential problems that could result from consolidation or
    include a comparison of the benefits and costs associated with this
    potential change. GAO recommended that DHS complete, document, and make
    available analyses of key questions related to its consolidation
    proposal.
        For the consolidation that occurred on December 5, 2017, what did
    DHS do to assess and document potential problems that could result from
    consolidation?
        Answer. The Department had a series of meetings at the component-
    head level and with interagency partners. The incoming CWMD leadership
    team met with DOD, the FBI and other agencies that have done similar
    reorganizations. The team met with other technical agencies such as
    NNSA and DTRA, had internal and external stakeholder meetings, and
    reviewed years of various plans and proposals for a CWMD-like
    organization. We considered potential internal problems, such as
    affected morale that the reorganization may cause, and continue to take
    steps to mitigate these through proactive communication and employee-
    staffed working groups. The acting assistant secretary has managed CWMD
    organizational and capability development in the DOD special operations
    community and the leadership team has decades of experience. All of
    this information informed the Secretary's decision and has been applied
    to assess and document potential problems.
        DHS CWMD leadership regularly engages with its staff and
    stakeholders to identify and resolve potential problems from the
    organizational change; moreover, the Department has heeded the GAO's
    prior recommendation to use, where appropriate, the key mergers and
    organizational practices identified in past reports and audits.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
    Security, House of Representatives, Homeland Security--DHS's Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Program Consolidation
    Proposal Could Better Consider Benefits and Limitations, GAO-16-603
    (Aug. 2016), p. 18.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Question 10b. Did DHS do a comparison of the benefits and costs of
    doing this consolidation?
        Answer. Yes. DHS leadership assessed that significant cost
    avoidances and synergies would be realized through the CWMD
    reorganization. The primary components of the CWMD Office, DNDO and
    OHA, share a number of related lines of effort, functional activities,
    and administrative structures. Bringing them under a unified command
    will allow for sharing of best practices and create new opportunities
    for reform. In particular, leadership in the Department assessed that
    DNDO's successful business model will help inform improvements to the
    chemical and biological defense mission space.
        Question 11a. As authorized in section 516 of the Homeland Security
    Act, the chief medical officer serves as the principal advisor to the
    Secretary and FEMA administrator on medical and public health issues.
    Under the reorganization, the chief medical officer will report to the
    assistant secretary for CWMD.
        When will a permanent chief medical officer be appointed?
        Answer. The process of appointing a permanent chief medical officer
    is currently under way. During the pre-decisional/deliberative phase of
    the appointment process, the Department is unable to comment on the
    administration's final decision or date.
        Question 11b. Can you assure this subcommittee that the CMO will
    retain his or her direct access to the Secretary and FEMA administrator
    under the new CWMD organization, as required by law?
        Answer. Yes. The CMO will retain direct access to the Secretary and
    to the FEMA administrator under the new CWMD Office reorganization.
    These statutorily vested authorities are critical to the mission of the
    CMO. For this reason, in the Technical Drafting Assistance provided to
    the Committee for the CWMD Office, the Department recommended the CMO
    retain direct access authorities to the Secretary and to the FEMA
    administrator, when appropriate.
        Question 12. The chief medical officer will remain in the new CWMD
    Office while the workforce health and medical support functions will
    move to the Management Directorate.
        Will the chief medical officer retain his or her oversight over
    these functions?
        Answer. Yes. It is critical that the functions statutorily vested
    in the CMO continue as part of the CWMD Office, including ensuring the
    Nation's front-line responders are able to prepare for and respond to
    all threats, for which the CMO will provide advice and guidance, as
    appropriate. The CMO's delegated functions, with the exception of
    workforce health functions, will be subsumed into the CWMD Office. This
    adjustment makes the CMO a more agile asset. Rather than being required
    to manage a major office focused only on certain WMD issues, the CMO
    will provide expertise on the full range of critical CWMD defense
    matters and emerging WMD threats of National significance with the
    potential to affect the United States.
        Question 13. How will the CWMD Office work with the Office of
    Intelligence and Analysis to ensure appropriate information sharing of
    CBRN threats with State and local stakeholders?
        Answer. The CWMD Office intends to work very closely with the
    Office of Intelligence and Analysis to support intelligence-driven
    operations to counter WMD threats, by providing timely and actionable
    information to State and local stakeholders, when appropriate. The
    Department is willing to provide more detailed information in a
    Classified setting.
        Question 14. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2017 required the completion of a Biodefense Strategy.
        What role will the CWMD Office play in the Department of Homeland
    Security's implementation of the Biodefense strategy once it is
    completed?
        Answer. The new CWMD Office will have a high level of engagement
    during finalization of the strategy and development and oversight of
    the whole-of-Government and implementation plan. The legacy Office of
    Health Affairs had been heavily involved in the development of the
    National Biodefense Strategy, working with the DHS strategy development
    lead in the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, and other
    Federal partners.
        Question 15a. In October, the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center
    for Science and International Affairs, published a paper entitled
    ``North Korea's Biological Weapons Program: The Known and Unknown,'' in
    which the authors discuss North Korea's intent and capability to
    sustain a biological weapons program.
        What is your view of the threat of biological weapons from North
    Korea?
        Question 15b. Does DHS have adequate resources and authority to
    prepare for and respond to this threat?
        Answer. DHS is unable to provide details on the threat of
    biological weapons from North Korea in an Unclassified document.
    However, the Department is willing to provide more detailed information
    in a Classified briefing to Members and staff of the committee on this
    threat.
     Questions From Honorable Peter T. King for the Department of Homeland
                                    Security
        Question 1. Last December, the President signed the First Responder
    Anthrax Preparedness Act into law. This bill, of which I was the House
    sponsor, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a
    pilot program to provide anthrax vaccinations to first responders on a
    voluntary basis.
        What is the status of the pilot program?
        Answer. This program is currently unfunded. DHS conducted limited
    preliminary planning, but there has been no pilot program execution.
        Question 2a. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Securing the
    Cities Program provides vital assistance and training to high-risk
    areas around the country to detect and protect against radiological and
    nuclear threats. This program has been invaluable for New York, the top
    terrorist target. As you work to establish the Countering Weapons of
    Mass Destruction Office, we must ensure that successful DNDO programs,
    like Securing the Cities, are maintained.
        How will the creation of the CWMD Office impact the Securing the
    Cities program?
        Answer. In the CWMD Technical Drafting Assistance provided to the
    committee, formal authorizing language for the Securing the Cities
    Program was included. The Technical Drafting Assistance builds on
    successes of the current and on-going Securing the Cities Program by
    proposing its expansion to all WMD threats--chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear. Moreover, the CWMD Technical Drafting
    Assistance proposes expansion of Securing the Cities functions into
    smuggling and conventional supply chain pathways and approaches to
    high-target risk areas, including, but not limited to, the New York
    Metropolitan Area. Consistent with the President's National Security
    Strategy and as an operational support organization, the CWMD Office
    will bolster efforts to defend against all WMD in the Homeland, and
    before the threats reach our borders.
        Question 2b. What are your plans to further expand Securing the
    Cities to additional jurisdictions?
        Answer. The CWMD Office will focus Securing the Cities more toward
    potential WMD pathways and approaches to high-target risk areas. This
    includes applications both in the continental United States as well as
    in supply chain and smuggling pathways into high-target risk
    jurisdictions. The Department looks forward to collaborating with the
    committee to discuss its plans for the Securing the Cities program.
        Question 2c. How will DNDO continue to support and sustain the
    capabilities gained by original jurisdictions, like New York?
        Answer. Legacy DNDO Securing the Cities (STC) support, through
    subject-matter expertise and technical assistance, to original
    jurisdictions like New York will continue. As a support organization,
    the CWMD Office fully intends to support first responders and operators
    in the field--original STC jurisdictions like New York remain critical
    in CWMD's commitment to the men and women on the front lines of our
    counterterrorism mission.
       Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for the Department of
                               Homeland Security
        Question 1. The President's DHS S&T budget request for fiscal year
    proposed eliminating funding for a state-of-the-art, one of a kind
    biocontainment laboratory--the National Biological Analysis and
    Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at Fort Detrick, MD. However, Congress
    has taken steps in both the NDAA and appropriations to ensure that this
    capability is not lost.
        Can you elaborate on the impact to our National security and our
    ability to counter biological threats if this facility were to close?
    How has the NBACC supported DHS in countering biological threats?
        Answer. The functions performed at the NBACC, including providing
    reach-back and analytical capabilities, have supported multiple
    departments and agencies responsible for conducting National security
    missions. Should the facility remain operating, the CWMD Office will
    assist S&T in identifying interagency funding sources, developing a
    more efficient operational model, and driving DHS mission requirements.
    Like many WMD-related activities that may seem underutilized when an
    attack does not happen, facilities such as the NBAAC are a key
    component to understanding the impact of an attack, the source of the
    material, and the testing of mitigation strategies. It is not a
    capability that we can build after an attack happens.
        CWMD, as an organization that oversees requirements through the
    WROC process, recognizes the value and support these facilities bring
    to addressing the WMD threats for both DHS and other agencies.
    Understanding the difficult budget decisions that must be made, it is
    just as important that future fiscal matters are informed and balanced
    with mission needs and comparable laboratory capabilities.
        Question 2. In your testimony, you state that you expect the new
    office will allow greater sharing of best practices, particularly
    leveraging successes from DNDO.
        Can you detail these successes and elaborate on how they will be
    applied to the domains of chemical and biological weapons?
        Answer. CWMD has identified significant cost avoidances by merging
    DNDO and OHA functions. Rather than having two offices individually
    managing human capital, acquisitions, information technology, and
    financial needs, the horizontal integration of the CWMD Office creates
    inherent efficiencies. The legacy DNDO model of developing, acquiring,
    and fielding capabilities to operators will be applied across the CBRN
    spectrum. This best practice was previously limited to R/N detection in
    DNDO. By following DNDO's structural model and best practices, legacy
    OHA acquisitions can report to a single product acquisition and
    deployment group, and the same is true with human capital, information
    technology, and financial management reporting to an enterprise
    services directorate.
        Question 3. As I'm sure you're aware, change can be difficult for
    any organization even if it results in positive benefits. To ease these
    challenges, GAO has identified nine key practices for mergers and
    organizational transformation and I appreciate that DHS has adopted
    several of them in this transition, including the creation of an
    implementation team and a communication strategy.
        As we consider moving forward with this reorganization, can you
    detail your implementation time line, cultural barriers that you've
    identified, and your plan for attracting and retaining key talent?
        Answer.
        Implementation timeline:
       December 2017.--Initial standing up of the CWMD Office.
       January-October 2018.--Continuing engagements with
            stakeholders and Congress on CWMD mission and strategic
            outlook.
       January-March 2018.--Establish and utilize CWMD-wide Working
            Groups for all Federal personnel to engage in planning and
            organizing the programs of CWMD.
       October 2018.--Finalizing stages of the CWMD reorganization.
        Staff are adapting to the organizational changes within the new
    CWMD office. Given the importance of addressing employee morale,
    cultural changes, and other stress factors for personnel in a
    reorganization, the CWMD Office leadership have developed a plan to
    communicate mission priorities to all personnel and include Federal
    employees in the programmatic planning process through working groups.
        DHS anticipates better morale--and leadership recruitment and
    retention as a result of the Department's CWMD reorganization.
    Establishing a focal point to implement the Department's WMD defense
    mission cannot only lead to increased mission effectiveness, but also
    increased morale. DHS anticipates that elevating its WMD defense
    efforts with more measurable results will inspire employee engagement.
    In the past, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
    experts had the incentive to seek out positions at departments and
    agencies where the mission space is more visible. Looking forward, the
    reorganization and mission elevation will better attract and maintain
    key talent.
        Question 4. In your testimony you note that the biological and
    chemical defense strategies have lagged behind the threat landscape.
        What are the threat challenges in these areas that concern you the
    most today, and how will your strategy to address them change under the
    new organization?
        Answer. While DHS is unable to provide details on the WMD threat in
    an Unclassified document, the Department is willing to provide Members
    and staff of the committee a Classified WMD threat briefing.
        Question 5. Can you discuss the trade-offs for including the full
    set of CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
    explosives) in a new office versus including a subset?
        In particular, why were explosives excluded from the office's
    purview?
        Answer. Please see the response to question No. 1.
        Questions From Congressman James R. Langevin for Chris P. Currie
        Question 1. Of the key practices that DHS has not implemented in
    this effort, what needs to be prioritized to ensure a successful and
    efficient reorganization?
        Answer. According to our prior work, implementing large-scale
    change management initiatives, such as mergers and organizational
    transformations, are not simple endeavors and require the concentrated
    efforts of both leadership and employees to realize intended synergies
    and to accomplish the new organizational goals.\1\ Involving employees
    to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation
    is a key practice that DHS should prioritize. Implementation steps for
    this practice include using employee teams, involving employees in
    planning, incorporating employee feedback into new policies and
    procedures, and delegating authority to appropriate organizational
    levels. Such steps will be helpful in a consolidated CBRN environment.
    For example, overall employee morale differs among the components to be
    consolidated, as demonstrated by the difference in employee
    satisfaction and commitment scores of DNDO and S&T, making employee
    involvement to gain their ownership for the transformation a key step
    to consider.\2\ Given the critical nature of DHS's CBRN mission,
    prioritizing employee involvement in the transformation would help
    inform the consolidation effort and improve the chances of a successful
    CBRN consolidation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO-03-669.
        \2\ According to the Partnership for Public Service's Best Places
    to Work in the Federal Government 2015 rankings, employee satisfaction
    and commitment index scores at DNDO and S&T were 71 and 39.5
    respectively. These scores are calculated using responses to three
    different questions in the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's
    Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Question 2. Based on your analysis of previous reorganization
    activities in the Federal Government, what challenges will DHS likely
    face if it proceeds with this transition?
        Answer. In August 2016, we found that DHS's June 2015 CBRNE report
    and related summaries provide some insights into factors considered for
    its consolidation proposal, but did not include associated underlying
    data or methodological information that would illuminate consideration
    of key concerns, such as potential problems that could result from
    consolidation. Component officials we interviewed provided several
    examples of potential problems due to consolidation. For example,
    officials told us that merging staff into one office could result in a
    need for additional support staff to manage day-to-day functions such
    as human resources, contracting, and financial management for a larger
    number of employees. Officials further stated that they may not have
    sufficient staff to complete these mission needs in a consolidated
    CBRNE unit. Additionally, component officials expressed concern over
    the potential allocation of resources in the consolidated office.
    According to these officials, there is a difference between components
    with missions that focus on potential terrorism events that are more
    likely to occur but with limited consequence versus components that
    focus on potential events that are not as likely to occur but have the
    potential to be far more catastrophic. These officials added that
    consolidating these components may complicate resource allocation
    decisions due to the varying degree to which certain CBRNE activities
    are seen as a priority over others. According to a DHS official, Office
    of Policy officials met with two of the five affected CBRNE components
    to determine potential unintended problems and to develop mitigation
    measures. However, not all affected components were included in the
    discussions and the problems and measures were not documented.
        The practices outlined in our prior work are intended to help
    agencies transform their cultures so that the Federal Government has
    the capacity to deliver its promises, meet current and emerging needs,
    maximize its performance, and ensure accountability. We continue to
    believe that providing documented information and analyses used to
    assess the benefits and limitations of its consolidation plan would
    assist DHS in fully demonstrating how its proposal will lead to an
    integrated, high-performance organization. Until DHS completes this
    analysis and documents its findings, we continue to believe that
    potential challenges have yet to be mitigated. A lack of these
    practices within agencies makes it more difficult for them to collect
    the data necessary to calculate precisely the costs and benefits of a
    consolidation. This limitation can increase a consolidation's risk and
    an agency's vulnerability to unintended consequences, such as increased
    costs or heightened stakeholder skepticism.

                                     [all]