    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      WORLD-WIDE THREATS: KEEPING AMERICA SECURE IN THE NEW AGE OF TERROR

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 30, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-41

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

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            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

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                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Peter T. King, New York              Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            William R. Keating, Massachusetts
    John Katko, New York                 Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Filemon Vela, Texas
    Martha McSally, Arizona              Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    John Ratcliffe, Texas                Kathleen M. Rice, New York
    Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York     J. Luis Correa, California
    Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin            Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
    John H. Rutherford, Florida
    Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
    Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
    Ron Estes, Kansas
    Don Bacon, Nebraska
                       Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
                       Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
                        Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                      Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   STATEMENTS

    The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
      Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     4
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     6
      Prepared Statement.............................................     7
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas:
      Prepared Statement.............................................     8

                                   WITNESSES
                                    Panel I

    Honorable Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................    15
      Prepared Statement.............................................    16
    Mr. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice:
      Oral Statement.................................................    25
      Prepared Statement.............................................    26
    Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, The National
      Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National
      Intelligence:
      Oral Statement.................................................    31
      Prepared Statement.............................................    33

                                    Panel II

    Mr. David B. Rausch, Chief of Police, City of Knoxville,
      Tennessee:
      Oral Statement.................................................   112
      Prepared Statement.............................................   114
    Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Associate Dean, Director, Global Social
      Action Agenda, Simon Wiesenthal Center:
      Oral Statement.................................................   118
      Prepared Statement.............................................   121
    Mr. J. Richard Cohen, President, Southern Poverty Law Center:
      Oral Statement.................................................   124
      Prepared Statement.............................................   125

                                 FOR THE RECORD

    The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of California:
      Statement of Dr. Erroll G. Southers, Professor of the Practice
        of Governance, Director, Safe Communities Institute,
        Director, Homegrown Violent Extremism Studies, Sol Price
        School of Public Policy, University of Southern California...    52
    The Honorable Clay Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Louisiana:
      Speech by the Ambassador of the State of Israel to the Center
        for Security Policy's Freedom Flame Award Dinner.............    57
      Article, ``Mainstream Conservative Groups Alarmed to be Found
        on `Hate Map' '', Washington Times...........................    61
      Article, ``Wealthy Southern Poverty Law rakes in Hollywood,
        Silicon Valley cash after Charlottesville'', Washington Times    63
    The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of New Jersey:
      Statement of the Feminist Majority Foundation..................    64
    The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Rhode Island:
      Statement of The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
        and Responses to Terrorism...................................    69
    The Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of California:
      Article, ``Border Patrol Says Texas Checkpoints To Remain Open
        During Hurricane Harvey'', Texas Tribune.....................    89
    The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
      From the State of New Jersey:
      Statement of the Anti-Defamation League........................    92
    The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Arizona:
      Letter.........................................................   108
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Statement of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)..   152

                                    APPENDIX

    Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Elaine C. Duke.....   157
    Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Elaine C. Duke..........   161
    Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Elaine C.
      Duke...........................................................   164
    Questions From Honorable Val Demings for Elaine C. Duke..........   169
    Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Christopher A. Wray.....   169
    Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Christopher
      A. Wray........................................................   173
    Questions From Honorable Val Butler Demings for Christopher A.
      Wray...........................................................   174
    Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Nicholas J. Rasmussen...   174
    Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Nicholas J.
      Rasmussen......................................................   175
    Questions From Honorable Val Butler Demings for Nicholas J.
      Rasmussen......................................................   176
    Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Richard Cohen...........   177
    Questions From Honorable Clay Higgins for Richard Cohen..........   182

      WORLD-WIDE THREATS: KEEPING AMERICA SECURE IN THE NEW AGE OF TERROR

                                  ----------

                          Thursday, November 30, 2017

                         U.S. House of Representatives,
                                Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
    room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
    (Chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives McCaul, Rogers, Barletta, Perry,
    Hurd, McSally, Ratcliffe, Donovan, Higgins, Rutherford,
    Garrett, Fitzpatrick, Estes, Bacon, Thompson, Jackson Lee,
    Langevin, Richmond, Keating, Vela, Coleman, Rice, Correa,
    Demings, and Barragan.
        Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
    come to order.
        The committee's meeting today to examine the most serious
    threats confronting our homeland. Before I recognize myself for
    an opening statement, I would like to take a moment to welcome
    the newest member of our committee, Don Bacon. Don has served
    nearly 30 years in the Air Force, and his experience in
    cybersecurity and airborne reconnaissance will prove greatly
    beneficial to this committee.
        Thank you, sir, for being here.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. I now recognize myself for an opening
    statement.
        I would like to thank each of the witnesses: Acting
    Secretary Elaine Duke, FBI Director Christopher Wray, NCTC
    Director Nick Rasmussen for joining us today. You represent
    thousands of patriotic men and women who go to work every day
    to ensure the safety of their fellow Americans. Everyone on
    this committee is extremely grateful for your service.
        Director Rasmussen, for over two decades you have helped
    navigate an unprecedented landscape in combat terrorism around
    the globe. You have been a great partner to me and to this
    committee, and I would like to call you a friend. We all wish
    you the best of luck in--I hate to say retirement because that
    is--in whatever you do after this.
        Mr. Rasmussen. OK.
        Chairman McCaul. This past year has been a particularly
    devastating one. In just the last month, we witnessed another
    terror attack in downtown New York, and over the summer, parts
    of America, including my home State of Texas, were greatly
    impacted by hurricanes and other natural disasters. We also saw
    several heinous acts of violence that included the mass
    shootings in Las Vegas, Sutherland Springs, and the hate-fueled
    homicides in Portland and Charlottesville. Tens of millions of
    Americans also felt the effects of cyber attacks from hackers
    and other cyber criminals. These are just a few of the horrors
    that hit our homeland.
        On Islamist terrorism, over the Thanksgiving break, an
    ISIS-affiliated group attacked a mosque in northern Sinai that
    left 300 people, including 27 children, dead. While this attack
    was thousands of miles away, it was a reminder of the savage
    nature of an enemy that always has our homeland in its sights.
    In the aftermath to 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security
    was created to prevent further attacks, and I believe we are
    better prepared than we were 16 years ago.
        However, in that time, al-Qaeda has expanded its global
    presence, and ISIS has conquered parts of countries,
    slaughtered innocent civilians, and inspired new followers. By
    using encrypted technology and by spreading incessant
    propaganda across the internet, jihadists are recruiting new
    members and planning new attacks. This has been obvious by a
    series of vehicle homicides across Europe. Cities known for
    their history and culture, like Paris, Berlin, London, Nice,
    Barcelona, and Brussels, are becoming more familiar as terror
    targets. The attack on Halloween in New York was proof that our
    homeland is also susceptible to this line of attack.
        Terrorists are answering Sheikh Adnani's call to kill
    Westerners using whatever means necessary wherever they are.
    While our enemies are always adjusting their tactics, we know
    that our aviation sector is still their crown jewel of targets.
        Earlier this month, our committee was briefed about aspects
    of airport security. To our dismay, it was made clear that we
    have a long ways to go. We must do more to address a threat
    also posed by foreign fighters who have fled the battlefield
    and remain one flight away. Consequently, we have identified
    key areas that need improvements, and look forward to working
    with the TSA to see them through.
        To help defeat terrorists, we must work with private tech
    companies to limit their communication capabilities and use all
    of our economic and military resources to dry up their funding
    and crush them on the battlefield.
        When it comes to border security, another on-going
    challenge is keeping our borders secure. Human traffickers,
    gangs like MS-13, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists are
    continually looking for new ways to sneak into our country. We
    must do whatever we can to stop this illegal entry, especially
    those who wish to do us harm.
        In October, this committee took a big step in the right
    direction by passing the Border Security for America Act. This
    legislation, which I introduced, calls for building additional
    physical barriers, including a wall, fencing, new technology,
    and a surge in personnel. It targets drug and human traffickers
    at our ports of entry and will help identify visa overstays
    through the full deployment of a biometric entry-exit system,
    which the 9/11 Commission recommended. Our homeland cannot be
    secure without strong borders. I look forward to getting this
    bill to the floor.
        Natural disasters. This year's hurricane season devastated
    many cities and towns in my home State of Texas, in Louisiana,
    Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. After
    Hurricane Harvey, I personally toured much of the wreckage back
    home. Roads were flooded, homes destroyed, and many people lost
    their lives. However, I was amazed by the strength demonstrated
    by people who braved dangerous conditions to support one
    another. Texans helping Texans. I was also impressed by the
    quick action taken by our heroic first responders and by the
    emergency response at the Federal, State, and local levels,
    thanks to a coordinated effort led by FEMA. A broader recovery
    will take a long time. But I know that if we continue to work
    together, we will be able to successfully rebuild these
    communities that were shattered by these powerful storms.
        On the issue of cybersecurity, America's cybersecurity
    networks are under attack. In September, we learned that
    Equifax had been successfully hacked, and 145.5 million people
    may have been affected by the breach. Last week, it was also
    reported that 57 million people use Uber, that they may have
    had their personal information stolen from a cyber attack in
    2016. This cannot continue. Fortunately, our committee has made
    strengthening DHS cybersecurity a top priority.
        In 2014, bipartisan committee efforts resulted in the
    enactment of legislation that provided DHS expedited hiring
    authorities, ensure DHS is assessing its cybersecurity work
    force, and clarified the Department's role in cybersecurity of
    Federal networks. In 2015, the Cybersecurity Act provided
    liability protections for public-to-private and private-to-
    private cyber threat information sharing. We have had some
    success, but we need to do better. That is why this committee
    passed a bill to elevate the operational capabilities of DHS's
    cyber office to better protect digital America.
        Finally, on the issue of domestic terror attacks. Domestic
    terror attacks and violence ignited by White supremacists, the
    KKK, or anyone else who preaches prejudice must not be
    tolerated. As I have stated before, threatening the safety of
    others and using intimidation tactics to advance political or
    religious beliefs is simply unacceptable in the United States.
    Too often we are seeing that our differences lead to violence,
    and this must be stopped.
        As a Nation, we should stand together and reject any type
    of hatred that seeks to divide our neighbors as enemies. This
    is an issue we will explore further in our second panel.
        In conclusion, Homeland Security must be bipartisan. The
    terrorists don't check our party affiliation. There are
    certainly other threats, from ballistic missiles, weapons of
    mass destruction programs in North Korea and Iran, to the
    continued undermining of American interests by nation-states,
    including Russia. As we face these threats, we must put our
    homeland security before partisanship and politics. I am proud
    to say that this committee has had a long track record of doing
    just that.
        We have improved information sharing for counterterrorism
    efforts, increased support for first responders, and in July,
    passed the first-ever comprehensive reauthorization of DHS with
    an overwhelming bipartisan support. This reauthorization will
    allow DHS to more faithfully carry out its mission of
    safeguarding our homeland, our people, and our values. I am
    hopeful that the Senate will finally take up this vital bill as
    soon as possible.
        So with that, I want to thank again these very prominent
    and important witnesses for appearing here before this
    committee.
        With that, I recognize the Ranking Member.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
                    Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
                               November 30, 2017
        I would like to thank each of the witnesses, Acting Secretary
    Elaine Duke, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and NCTC Director Nick
    Rasmussen for joining us today. You represent thousands of patriotic
    men and women who go to work every day to ensure the safety of their
    fellow Americans.
        Everyone on this committee is extremely grateful for your service.
        Director Rasmussen--for over 2 decades you have helped navigate an
    unprecedented threat landscape and combat terrorism around the globe.
    You have been a great partner to this committee and we all wish you the
    best of luck in retirement.
        This past year has been a particularly devastating one. In just the
    last month we witnessed another terror attack in downtown New York and
    over the summer, parts of America, including my home State of Texas,
    were greatly impacted by hurricanes and other natural disasters.
        We also saw several heinous acts of violence that included the mass
    shootings in Las Vegas and Sutherland Springs, and the hate-fueled
    homicides in Portland and Charlottesville.
        Tens of millions of Americans also felt the effects of cyber
    attacks from hackers and other cyber criminals. These are just a few of
    the horrors that hit our homeland.
                               islamist terrorism
        Over the Thanksgiving break, an ISIS-affiliated group attacked a
    mosque in the northern Sinai that left 305 people, including 27
    children, dead. While this attack was thousands of miles away, it was a
    reminder of the savage nature of an enemy that always has our homeland
    in its sights.
        In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was
    created to prevent further attacks and I believe we are better prepared
    than we were 16 years ago. However, in that time al-Qaeda has expanded
    its global presence and ISIS has conquered parts of countries,
    slaughtered innocent civilians, and inspired new followers.
        By using encrypted technology and by spreading incessant propaganda
    across the internet, jihadists are recruiting new members, and planning
    new attacks. This has been obvious by a series of vehicular homicides
    across Europe. Cities known for their history and culture: Paris,
    Berlin, London, Nice, Barcelona, and Brussels, are becoming more
    familiar as terror targets.
        The attack on Halloween in New York City was proof that our
    homeland is also susceptible to this new line of attack. Terrorists are
    answering Sheik Adnani's call to kill Westerners using whatever means
    necessary wherever they are. And while our enemies are always adjusting
    their tactics, we know that our aviation sector is still their crown
    jewel of targets.
        Earlier this month, our committee was briefed about aspects of
    airport security. To our dismay, it was made clear that we have a long
    way to go.
        We must do more to address the threat posed by foreign fighters who
    have fled the battlefield and remain one flight away.
        Consequently, we have identified key areas that need improvements
    and look forward to working with TSA to see them through.
        To help defeat terrorists, we must work with private tech companies
    to limit their communication capabilities, and use all of our economic
    and military resources to dry up their funding and crush them on the
    battlefield.
                                border security
        Another on-going challenge is keeping our borders secure. Human
    traffickers, gangs like MS-13, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists
    are continually looking for new ways to sneak into our country.
        We must do whatever we can to stop this illegal entry, especially
    of those who wish to do us harm.
        In October, this committee took a big step in the right direction
    by passing the Border Security for America Act.
        This legislation, which I introduced, calls for building additional
    physical barriers, which include a wall, fencing, new technology, and a
    surge in personnel.
        It targets drug and human traffickers at our ports of entry and
    will help identify visa overstays through the full deployment of a
    Biometric Entry-Exit System. Our homeland cannot be secure without
    strong borders and I look forward to getting this bill to the floor.
                               natural disasters
        This year's hurricane season devastated many cities and towns in
    Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
        After Hurricane Harvey, I personally toured much of the wreckage
    back home. Roads were flooded, homes were destroyed, and many people
    lost their lives.
        However, I was amazed by the strength demonstrated by people who
    braved dangerous conditions to support one another; Texans helping
    Texans.
        I was also impressed by the quick action taken by our heroic first
    responders and by the emergency response at the Federal, State, and
    local levels, thanks to a coordinated effort led by FEMA.
        A broader recovery will take a long time. But I know that if we
    continue to work together, we'll be able to successfully rebuild the
    communities that were shattered by these powerful storms.
                                 cybersecurity
        America's cybersecurity networks are also under constant attack.
        In September, we learned that Equifax had been successfully hacked
    and 145.5 million people may have been affected by the breach. Last
    week it was reported that 57 million people who use Uber, might have
    had their personal information stolen from a cyber attack in 2016. This
    cannot continue.
        Fortunately, our committee has made strengthening DHS's
    cybersecurity mission a top priority. In 2014, bipartisan committee
    efforts resulted in enactment of legislation that provided DHS
    expedited hiring authority; ensured DHS is assessing its cybersecurity
    workforce; and clarified the Department's role in the cybersecurity of
    Federal networks.
        In 2015, the Cybersecurity Act provided liability protections for
    public-to-private and private-to-private cyber threat information
    sharing. We have had some success, but we need to do more. And that is
    why this committee passed a bill to elevate and operationalize DHS's
    cyber office to better protect digital America.
                            domestic terror attacks
        Finally, domestic terror attacks and violence ignited by white
    supremacists, the KKK, or anyone else who preaches prejudice, must not
    be tolerated. As I have stated before, threatening the safety of others
    and using intimidation tactics to advance political or religious
    beliefs is simply unacceptable.
        Too often, we are seeing that our differences lead to violence and
    this must be stopped.
        As a Nation, we should stand together and reject any type of hatred
    that seeks to divide our neighbors as enemies. This is an issue we will
    explore further in our second panel.
                conclusion/homeland security must be bipartisan
        There are certainly other threats--from ballistic missiles and WMD
    programs in North Korea and Iran, to the continued undermining of
    American interests by nation-states including Russia. As we face these
    threats we must put our homeland security before partisanship and
    politics.
        I am proud to say that this committee has a long track record of
    doing just that.
        We have improved information sharing for counterterrorism efforts
    and increased support for first responders. In July, the House passed
    the first-ever, comprehensive reauthorization of DHS with an
    overwhelming bipartisan vote.
        This reauthorization will allow DHS to more faithfully carry out
    its mission of safeguarding our homeland, our people, and our values,
    and I am hopeful the Senate will take up this vital bill as soon as
    possible.
        Once again, I'd like to thank today's witnesses for joining us and
    for their continued cooperation with our committee.
        I look forward to discussing how we can best tackle these world-
    wide threats so we can best secure our Nation.

        Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this hearing on keeping America secure from terrorism.
    Hang on just a minute.
        I would also like to thank both panels of witnesses for
    today.
        In the wake of the disturbing rise of domestic terrorism in
    recent years, Democratic Members of this committee have
    repeatedly asked for a hearing on this important topic. While
    this hearing is our annual one examining world-wide threats, a
    great deal of our conversation will likely be focused on a
    terror threat from right here at home. Incidents like the 2015
    killing of 9 churchgoers by a white supremacist at Mother
    Emanuel Church in Charleston and the hate-fueled violence that
    left a young woman dead and 19 others injured during a white
    supremacist rally in Charlottesville earlier this year,
    highlight the threat posed by domestic extremists.
        Domestic terrorist organizations have even adopted some of
    the same techniques for recruitment and radicalization as
    foreign terrorist organizations, using the internet to reach
    followers and coordinate their actions.
        [Video shown.]
        Mr. Thompson. Unfortunately, President Trump insists on
    fueling the fire of hatred and extremism in America calling
    marchers in Charlottesville very fine people. Just yesterday,
    retweeting inflammatory anti-Muslim videos posted by a far-
    right British organization. James Clapper, the former director
    of national intelligence, called Trump's retweeting of the
    videos bizarre and disturbing, and said his action undermines
    our relationship with our friends and allies.
        Americans should be able to look to our President for a
    steady hand and responsible leadership in uncertain times. But
    unfortunately, President Trump consistently conducts himself in
    a way that jeopardizes our security and is not befitting the
    office he holds.
        Also, though they cannot say so themselves, the President's
    actions make the already difficult jobs of the witnesses
    joining us on the first panel today even harder. The Department
    of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
    National Counterterrorism Center play key roles in securing the
    homeland from terrorists, both foreign and domestic. I hope to
    hear from these witnesses today about the challenges they face,
    what emerging threats we should be aware of, and how Congress
    can support them in their mission, consistent with our American
    laws and values.
        Since much of our focus is typically on foreign terrorists,
    today, I am especially interested in hearing how the witnesses
    assess the threat from domestic extremists and terrorist
    groups, and learning what can be done to protect us from this
    rising concern.
        I also look forward to hearing from our second panel of
    witnesses on this topic later this morning. They bring special
    expertise on domestic extremism and terrorism issues, and I
    hope Members will hear what they have to say and engage in a
    thoughtful dialog.
        The Southern Poverty Law Center, in particular, is
    dedicated to fighting hate and seeking justice and equality for
    all Americans. I look forward to their recommendations for
    countering the ideologies that are inspiring violence in
    America.
        I had hoped to have the NAACP testify as well, but the
    invitation was issued less than 24 hours prior to the hearing,
    and the late notice prevents their participation today. I look
    forward to inviting them to testify at a future hearing.
        In closing, I want to say that we know there are those
    around the world who seek to come here and do Americans harm.
    Those charged with preventing such attacks have the unwavering
    support of all the Members of this committee, consistent with
    the laws and values of our Nation. I hope that some attention
    and resources will be dedicated to fighting domestic extremism
    and terrorism here at home to ensure the security of all
    Americans.
        Again, I thank the Chairman for holding today's hearing,
    and look forward to a productive discussion. I yield back.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                               November 30, 2017
        In the wake of the disturbing rise in domestic terrorism in recent
    years, Democratic Members of this committee have repeatedly asked for a
    hearing on this important topic. While this hearing is our annual one
    examining world-wide threats, a great deal of our conversation will
    likely be focused on the terror threat from right here at home.
        Incidents like the 2015 killing of 9 churchgoers by a white
    supremacist at Mother Emmanuel Church in Charleston and the hate-fueled
    violence that left a young woman dead and 19 others injured during a
    white supremacist rally in Charlottesville earlier this year highlight
    the threat posed by domestic extremists.
        Domestic terrorist organizations have even adopted some of the same
    techniques for recruitment and radicalization as foreign terrorist
    organizations, using the internet to reach followers and coordinate
    their actions.
        Unfortunately, President Trump insists on fueling the fire of
    hatred and extremism in America, calling the marchers in
    Charlottesville ``very fine people'' and just yesterday retweeting
    inflammatory anti-Muslim videos posted by a far-right British
    organization. James Clapper, the former director of national
    intelligence, called Trump's re-tweeting of the videos ``bizarre and
    disturbing'' and said his action undermines our relationship with our
    ``friends and allies.''
        Americans should be able to look to our President for a steady hand
    and responsible leadership in uncertain times, but unfortunately
    President Trump consistently conducts himself in a way that jeopardizes
    our security and is not befitting of the office he holds.
        Also, though they cannot say so themselves, the President's actions
    make the already difficult jobs of the witnesses joining us on the
    first panel today even harder. The Department of Homeland Security,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Counterterrorism Center
    play key roles in securing the homeland from terrorists both foreign
    and domestic.
        I hope to hear from these witnesses today about the challenges they
    face, what emerging threats we should be aware of, and how Congress can
    support them in their mission, consistent with our American laws and
    values.
        Since much of our focus is typically on foreign terrorists, today I
    am especially interested in hearing how the witnesses assess the threat
    from domestic extremist and terrorist groups and learning what can be
    done to protect us from this rising concern.
        I also look forward to hearing from our second panel of witnesses
    on this topic later this morning. They bring special expertise on
    domestic extremism and terrorism issues and I hope Members will hear
    what they have to say and engage in a thoughtful dialog.
        The Southern Poverty Law Center in particular is dedicated to
    fighting hate and seeking justice and equality for all Americans, and I
    look forward to their recommendations for countering the ideologies
    that are inspiring violence in America. I had hoped to have NAACP
    testify as well, but their invitation was issued less than 24 hours
    prior to the hearing and the late notice prevents their participation
    today. I look forward to inviting them to testify at a future hearing.
        In closing, I want to say that we know there are those around the
    world who seek to come here and do Americans harm. Those charged with
    preventing such attacks have the unwavering support of all the Members
    of this committee, consistent with the laws and values of our Nation.
        I hope that the same attention and resources will be dedicated to
    fighting domestic extremism and terrorism here at home to ensure the
    security of all Americans.

        Chairman McCaul. The Ranking Member yields back.
        Other Members are reminded opening statements may be
    submitted for the record.
        [The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
                   Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
        Thank you Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for convening
    this hearing and affording us, the Homeland Security Committee, the
    opportunity to hear testimony on ``World-wide Threats: Keeping America
    Secure in the New Age of Terror.''
        Terrorism threats that local, State, and Federal law enforcement
    must be prepared to meet is significantly different than what was seen
    on September 11, 2001.
        I was here on the day of the attacks and I will never forget the
    Members who were there with me as we sang God Bless America on the
    steps of the Capitol.
        The days and weeks following the attacks we were uncertain what
    threat might come and how many lives might be lost as we worked to put
    resources in place to deal with an enemy that might be among us.
        Over the past 16 years we have learned a great deal.
        Those who wish to do us harm can come from any race, religion,
    ethnicity, or political persuasion.
        We are better prepared to face these challenges as one Nation
    united against a common foe.
        My primary domestic security concerns are how to maintain a united-
    United States by:
       preventing foreign fighters and foreign-trained fighters
            from entering the United States undetected;
       countering international and home-grown violent extremism;
       preserving Constitutional rights and due process for all
            persons;
       addressing the uncontrolled proliferation of long-guns that
            are designed for battlefields and not hunting ranges;
       controlling access to firearms for those who are deemed to
            be too dangerous to fly;
       protecting critical infrastructure from physical and cyber
            attack;
       creating equity and fairness in our Nation's immigration
            policies; and
       strengthening the capacity of the Department of Homeland
            Security and the Department of Justice to meet the challenges
            posed by weapons of mass destruction.
        I join my colleagues in welcoming the witnesses for both panels:
        The first panel witnesses are:
       The Honorable Elaine C. Duke, acting secretary, DHS;
       Christopher Wray, director of the FBI; and
       Nicholas J. Rasmussen, director of the National
            Counterterrorism Center will be testifying at the hearing.
        The second panel witnesses are:
       Mr. J. Richard Cohen, president, Southern Poverty Law
            Center;
       Mr. David B. Rausch, chief of police, city of Knoxville,
            Tennessee testifying on behalf of the International Association
            of Chiefs of Police; and
       Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean, director, Global
            Social Action Agenda, Simon Wiesenthal Center.
        I regret that Mr. Derrick Johnson, president and chief executive
    officer, NAACP, was issued an invitation with less than 24 hours before
    today's hearing.
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member I ask that another timely
    invitation to testify be issued to Mr. Derrick Johnson for an
    opportunity to give testimony to the full committee.
        I have served on the Committee on Homeland Security from its
    inception.
        The threats poised to our country by terrorists who seek to do us
    harm is real and needs adequate funding, the support of Congress and
    the professionals that comprise the ranks of the Department of Homeland
    Security, the Department of Justice, the State Department, and the
    Department of Defense to keep our Nation safe.
        I am humbled and inspired by what the men and women of these
    agencies do each day to keep our Nation secure.
        Their efforts have not gone unnoticed and their success is evident
    in that this Nation has not experienced an attack on the scale that was
    carried out on September 11, 2001.
           hurricane harvey recovery needs aggressive action by fema
        Acting Secretary Duke, I thank you and the men and women of the
    Department of Homeland Security for your work to aid areas impacted by
    this year's devastating Hurricane Season to recover.
        The President promised the people of Texas that he would provide
    what was needed to recover; now we need him to keep that promise.
        Residents of the State of Texas who are facing the long road to
    recovery need $55 billion for home flood mitigation, repair,
    replacement, and home buyouts.
        There are other States with pressing needs related to disaster
    recovery.
        The funding being considered is inadequate and unrealistic for the
    scope of the damage caused by the multiple disasters that befell the
    United States earlier this year.
        The President needs to understand that the Texas and Florida
    Delegations are in full agreement regarding the need to meet the
    disaster recovery needs of the States and territories.
        There are particular concerns for our seniors who survived the
    terrible storms that ravaged the Texas Coast, Florida, U.S. Virgin
    Islands, and Puerto Rico because so many of them are alone, while
    trying to the do difficult and hard job of cleaning out their homes, or
    removing debris from their yards.
        The work is not done in my State of Texas.
        Thousands of families have no home because of the storm, and many
    more thousands are living in gutted out shells of structures they once
    called home and too many others are sleeping in cars.
        Houston's response to the immediate disaster was impressive and
    all-encompassing for the size and complexity of the disaster caused by
    unprecedented flooding due to Hurricane Harvey.
        The efforts of Mayor Turner and the work of the public works
    department, police, and first responders, as well as Federal and State
    agencies that were joined by citizen volunteers to help save thousands
    of lives.
        This success gave the impression that everything is working in
    Houston following Hurricane Harvey when the reality could not be
    farther from the truth.
        Over a thousand square miles of Texas Coast was impacted by the
    greatest flood to impact the mainland of the United States in the
    history of the Nation.
        We have communities that are struggling to find the new normal that
    FEMA officials warned Texans would need to accept following the
    historic flood.
        There are particular concerns for our seniors who survived the
    terrible storms that ravaged the Texas Coast, Florida, U.S. Virgin
    Islands, and Puerto Rico because so many of them are alone, while
    trying to the do difficult and hard job of cleaning out their homes, or
    removing debris from their yards.
        The work is not done in my State of Texas there are thousands of
    families who have no home to return to following the historic flood.
        We have communities that are struggling to find the new normal that
    FEMA officials warned Texans would need to accept following the
    historic flood.
        The effort is being made difficult by a lack of appreciation by the
    administration of the true cost of recovery for Texas, Florida, the
    U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.
        We must have full funding for the hard-hit areas of the United
    States so that recovery is not piece-meal.
        The people in my State also need a fair, compassionate, and
    equitable process for requesting and receiving aid.
        FEMA has proven that it is excellent at disaster response, but is
    showing that they are not very good at recovery management for
    individuals and families.
        Fundamentally, recovery for people and families in an impact area
    that is as large are the Hurricane Harvey disaster requires an approach
    that partners with non-profit and civic organizations.
        Houston has a well-established community of aid agencies who could
    aid residence with Harvey damage in successfully navigating the FEMA
    registration.
        Today, thousands of Houstonians and residents throughout the Harvey
    impact zone are being denied assistance because the FEMA process is not
    working.
        Each family in the impact zone should have a non-profit agency
    caseworker who provides support, assesses the health, security, and
    safety of living arrangements as it relates to storm damage then makes
    sure they register for the types of assistance that is appropriate for
    their needs.
        FEMA application process did not account for multiple heads of
    household who lived at one address; nor do the literacy and access to
    transportation that would be needed to reach Recovery Assistance
    Centers.
        A denial from most of my constituents means they give up, when what
    may be needed is a proof of residence or a document about losses
    incurred.
        This is why Community Block Grant dollars are needed to address the
    loss of housing that FEMA is missing due to the flaws in the
    application and approval of assistance process.
        The administration risks a shut-down over not adequately meeting
    the needs of hurricane-impacted areas.
                  future strategies in combating isis/al-qaeda
        The noticeable decline in messages attributed to ISIS and al-Qaeda
    is evidence that they are diminishing in strength on the battle's front
    lines.
        We must be prepared to greet these groups or their re-incarnations
    aggressively as they seek refuge in remote areas around the globe and
    disrupt their attempts to plot violent attacks against our Nation.
        As we see a reduction in large-scale terrorist activity and the
    emergency of lone wolves the mission and the work to successfully fight
    terrorism is going to change.
        Over the last year we have become aware of Russia interference in
    our National elections and witnessed an increasing threat of a nuclear
    ICBM-capable North Korea.
        We must resist the temptation to look for threats where none
    exists; there will be ample work to be done as real security threats
    emerge.
        My concern in this regard are how the tools provided to identify
    and combat terrorism threats might be used to unjustly target.
        It has been brought to my attention that there are cases of airport
    workers who as a condition of employment must have access to the
    sterile areas of airports.
        In one case, brought to my attention by a constituent of the 18th
    Congressional District, who had her security clearances from 2008
    through 2010 and again in 2013 until this year when it came up for
    renewal.
        The renewal was denied by Custom and Border Protection (CPB)
    without an explanation or due process consideration that would allow
    her an opportunity to reply to a specific issue or accusation that may
    have been the reason for the denial.
        My office was informed that the denial is based upon information
    provided by a third-party agency report to CPB regarding my
    constituent.
        It is my concern that we get security protocols right especially in
    cases where the target of an accusation who has a benefit or right that
    is controlled by a Federal agency that is prohibited from providing any
    details regarding the charge or claim made.
        She has gone to the extraordinary effort of getting an FBI
    background check done to see if there was anything that would cause her
    clearance to be denied and it came back without anything to report.
        She stated in her letter seeking my assistance that her attempts to
    get information from CPB resulted, in her words of ``feelings of being
    discriminated against because she was African American and Muslim
    although she is a citizen of the United States.''
        Her overriding concern is the damage being done to her reputation
    for something she is not able to get any information about which
    prevents her from responding.
        The initial days following September 11, 2001 we may have
    considered that to allow agencies in the intelligence and law
    enforcement to share data there needed to be a shield regarding the
    source of information.
        The need for a shield between intelligence and law enforcement
    agencies may still be necessary, but if that is the case an impartial
    third party should review these cases.
        It is important to note that in the case of my constituent she
    continues to go to the airport to work.
        Today, if a person is accused of something that cost a security
    clearance, but never charged with a crime, can be denied employment
    based upon an accusation, which is why there is a need to have greater
    scrutiny to ensure that what is reported has occurred.
        African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, Muslims, Asians,
    Jews, and immigrants are living in an America where intolerance and
    bias are not only becoming more blatant, but in some cases echoed by
    the President of the United States.
        I ask that the leadership of each component and office for the
    Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice be reminded
    that our enemies are not of a particular race, religion, ethnicity, or
    political persuasion.
        We must each be more willing to question, doubt, and challenge
    actions and accusations that puts those who are targets of white
    supremacists at risk.
        Not having to worry about anyone ever challenging the story told or
    revealing the identity of the teller may be shielding a sexual predator
    who was rejected or a bigot who wants to inflict harm on a person
    because of their differences.
        I want to give you a letter and the casework file including a
    privacy act release to you Acting Secretary Elaine Duke and request
    your personal attention to resolving this matter in an equitable
    manner.
                            black identity extremism
        The notion of creating a new phrase without consideration for the
    history of the struggles of people in this Nation who only ask to be
    treated as human beings is incredible.
        The lack of appreciate for what the issues are from the perspective
    of sociologists and criminologists is hard to reconcile.
        The FBI has a diversity problem that it has done all of the right
    things to address--recruiting at Historical Black Colleges and
    Universities.
        There is diversity in the recruitment work done to collect
    applications, but the hiring for the FBI continues a balance of about
    88% white males, 7% Hispanic and 5% African America and 3% other.
        This is why the BIE report was possible, when it should have been a
    non-starter.
        I can tell you that the temperature for racial tolerance in the
    environment is very inhospitable.
        It is easy for a document that has the emblem of the FBI affixed to
    it to have serious and dire consequences for the safety of African
    Americans.
                 history of surveillance & the black community
        This administration continues the same vile tactics used in well-
    documented stories of civil rights leaders who were profiled, targeted,
    and killed for insisting that black people receive equitable treatment
    under the law in a country whose Constitution guarantees it.
        Under FBI Director Edgar Hoover's leadership, the Counter
    Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a covert, often illegal, campaign
    was mounted to break up the civil rights movement and ``neutralize''
    activists they perceived as threatening.
        COINTELPRO was used to surveil and discredit civil rights
    activists, members of the Black Panther Party and any major advocates
    for the rights of black people in our Nation's history.
        COINTELPRO allowed the FBI to falsify letters in an effort to
    blackmail Martin Luther King Jr. into silence.
        This was such a disgraceful period in our Nation's history that our
    recent FBI Director, James Comey, kept a copy of a 1963 order
    authorizing Hoover to conduct round-the-clock surveillance of Martin
    Luther King Jr. on his desk as a reminder of Hoover's abuses.
        The FBI's dedicated surveillance of black activists follows a long
    history of the U.S. Government aggressively monitoring protest
    movements and working to disrupt civil rights groups, but the scrutiny
    of African Americans by a domestic terrorism unit was particularly
    alarming to some free-speech campaigners.
    FBI: Black Lives Matter and the Black Identity Extremists Report
        Today the FBI continues its once intrusive, abhorrent, and illegal
    targeting of black activists by labeling the Black Lives Matter
    movement as Black Identity Extremism.
        We know that the Department of Homeland Security has been
    surveilling Black Lives Matter activists since 2014, but there's no way
    to know what's next.
        With this recent report, the FBI has legitimized the idea that
    black activism is a threat and should be treated accordingly--with
    violent force.
        Despite Charlottesville and all the other harms inflicted by
    emboldened white nationalists, the FBI has instead, chosen to target a
    group of American citizens whom merely decry the injustice seen and
    felt throughout their communities.
        Despite numerous unarmed black individuals, particularly, young
    black men that are disproportionately the victims of police shootings,
    the FBI would like us to believe this is not a reality.
        Instead, the FBI's report claims there is a danger in black
    activism by asserting that violence inflicted on black people at the
    hands of police is ``perceived'' or ``alleged,'' not real.
        This month the Congressional Black Caucus has written to the FBI
    director, Christopher Wray, to express our concern over the recent
    ``Intelligence Assessment'' report.
        We have requested a briefing on both the origins of its research
    and the FBI's next intended step based on its findings. No response as
    of date.
        We should be allowed to exercise our Constitutional and fundamental
    rights of free speech.
        We should not be restricted and criminalized when we demand that
    those we elect to office exercise justice and fairness.
        This FBI report will further inflame an already damaged police/
    community relation under the leadership of Attorney General Jeff
    Sessions.
        Sessions has dismantled all the safeguards installed under Attorney
    General Holder's leadership, thus, returning our justice system to the
    broken system under Ashcroft.
        Sessions has unleashed a merciless approach to ``all'' crimes
    including low-level drug-related cases, and demands that his attorneys
    prosecute every case to the fullest extent of the law.
        In doing so, Sessions has taken away any prosecutorial discretion
    once available to prosecutors throughout our justice system under U.S.
    law.
        The FBI in this Trump administration has returned to the era of
    Director Edgar Hoover, in their unleashing of this damaging,
    discriminative, and unconstitutional COINTELPRO 2.0.
        With these lethal forms of attacks on the African American
    community from both the DOJ and the FBI, where is justice?
    White Supremacy and Hate Groups
        The work of civil rights and equal rights is not easy--pursing non-
    violence when violence is the goal of the groups most opposed to the
    existence of African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, Jews, and
    others.
        The Simon Wiesenthal Center is renowned for its commitment to
    harmony and peace through understanding.
        The Simon Wiesenthal Center is a global human rights organization
    researching the Holocaust and hate in a historic and contemporary
    context.
        The Center confronts anti-Semitism, hate, and terrorism, promotes
    human rights and dignity, stands with Israel, defends the safety of
    Jews world-wide, and teaches the lessons of the Holocaust for future
    generations.
        They have a constituency of over 400,000 households in the United
    States, it is accredited as an NGO at international organizations
    including the United Nations, UNESCO, OSCE, Organization of American
    States (OAS), the Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO) and the Council
    of Europe.
        The Center's educational arm, founded in 1993, challenges visitors
    to confront bigotry and racism, and to understand the Holocaust in both
    historic and contemporary contexts.
        The Museum has served over 5 million visitors with 350,000 visiting
    annually including 150,000 students.
        Over 1.5 million children and youth have participated in the Museum
    experience and its programs.
        Over 200,000 adults have been trained in the Museum's customized,
    professional development programs which include Tools for Tolerance,
    Teaching Steps to Tolerance, Task Force Against Hate, National
    Institute Against Hate Crimes, Tools for Tolerance for Teens, and
    Bridging the Gap.
                      mass shootings in the united states
        In 2015, there were 372 mass shootings and 33,636 deaths due to
    firearms in the United States while guns were used to kill about 50
    people in the United Kingdom. More people are typically killed with
    guns in the United States in a day (about 85) than in the United
    Kingdom in a year.
        We must have an accountable and responsive Government to address
    the number of and level of violence caused by mass shooters who attack
    groups or individuals with weapons of war.
        No one or any place is safe from the mass shooter, including
    Members of the United States Congress who were participating in a
    baseball practice game when a mass shooter attacked.
        Since that shooting targeting Members of Congress occurred we have
    seen hundreds of people either killed or injured by mass shooters
    incidents in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Southerland Springs, Texas.
        We must have a comprehensive approach to addressing access to
    firearms by persons who should not have them and the need for mental
    health services to address underlying causes of suicides and violent
    crime.
     russian interference/the muslim ban/daca/temporary protective status
                                   revocation
    Russia
        President Trump from his first week in office communicated his
    views regarding immigration, immigrants, and Russia interference in our
    Nation's elections.
        Prior to taking the Presidential oath of office, he indicated that
    he had doubts about intelligence community reports that Russia had
    orchestrated a well-coordinated attack of our election.
        His doubts of our own intelligence on Russia's hostile actions
    embolden Russian President Putin to deny the charge, which he continued
    to do so until later Putin acknowledged that some ``patriotic'' element
    inside of Russia may have interfered with the U.S. election.
        We know that no truly patriotic Russian would dare to interfere in
    an American election without the full knowledge of Russia's ever-
    present surveillance agencies.
        As a former KGB chief and spymaster, Vladimir Putin would not allow
    anything to take place of this nature without his knowledge or
    approval.
    DACA and Temporary Protected Status
        Many Members of this committee have questions for the panels
    regarding other important homeland security issues, such as the rise of
    violence from white supremacist groups; mass shootings committed
    against groups and individuals, the temporary protection status of
    Haitians, Hondurans, Salvadorians, and as well as the status of
    Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) other immigrant
    communities who are living in fear of the next Executive Order from
    this administration.
    Immigration
        On Friday, January 27, 2017, the President signed an Executive
    Order suspending all resettlement of Syrian refugees indefinitely, and
    resettlement of all other refugees for 120 days.
        The order also imposed a 90-day ban on entry of nationals from 7
    predominately Muslim countries: Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya,
    Somalia, and Yemen.
        This action triggered public condemnation and resistance that has
    landed the Executive Order in the Federal courts where it has
    repeatedly been ruled to be unconstitutional in both of its iterations
    (e.g., Trump Muslim Ban No. 1, Trump Travel Ban No. 2).
        This was just the beginning of the Trump's administration pattern
    of targeting and profiling people deemed to be unworthy of
    Constitutional protection or consideration of due process.
        In February, reports of heightened Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement actions came to the attention of Members of Congress.
        Immigration and Customs Enforcement made 35 percent more arrests
    Nation-wide in roughly the first 3 months of the Trump administration
    compared to the same period last year.
        Nation-wide, ICE made 41,898 arrests from January 20 through April
    29.
        During this same period in 2016 there were only 31,128 arrests
    according to ICE data.
        Twenty-six percent (26%) of this year's arrests were of people who
    had not been convicted of a crime, which is up from 14 percent last
    year.
        There is little reason to doubt that the motivation behind the
    Trump Executive Orders and immigration policies is to target and remove
    Hispanics and Muslims.
        What is worse is the treatment of pregnant women and girls who are
    placed in detention centers.
        These centers do not have medical facilities or full-time medical
    staff because they are not prisons.
        It is not a crime to be in the United States without documents; it
    is a civil matter.
        We have seen the process turned into a form of punishment when this
    should never have been allowed to happen.
        Women and girls who are pregnant are not getting adequate medical
    care and what is worse of the charges of intention abuse of women with
    difficult pregnancies who are held without access to health care.
        Simply put, the actions taken by this administration are
    jeopardizing long-held tenants of our Nation; that all are created
    equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.
        Trump's actions are not making Americans safer; they are in fact
    making them less safe and more fearful.
        The reports by local law enforcement of a steep decline in the
    number of sexual assault cases from the Hispanic community and in some
    cases an increase in sexual assault cases by non-Hispanics is alarming.
        The corrosive nature of unchecked criminal activity will be felt
    far beyond the communities where violence and crime are allowed to
    fester.
        The impact on our Nation's fiscal health, National security, and
    economic stability as a direct result of these anti-immigrant actions
    are yet to be fully calculated.
        In my efforts to effectively work on the behalf of constituents of
    the 18th Congressional District, I can attest to the human toll.
        Some of the direct impacts are felt most acutely by the most
    vulnerable: Children of parents who left home one morning never to
    return; international medical students planning to come to study
    medicine in the United States; and the security of our Nation's most
    fundamental institution--free and fair public elections.
    Temporary Protected Status
        On November 20, 2017, you announced the administration was ending a
    humanitarian program that has allowed some 59,000 Haitians to live and
    work in the United States since an earthquake ravaged their country in
    2010.
        Haitians with what is known as Temporary Protected Status will be
    expected to leave the United States by July 2019 or face deportation.
        This decision regarding Haitians followed another revocation of
    Temporary Protected Status of for 2,500 Nicaraguans in October.
        These announcements have also caused concern among other groups who
    are in the United States under a Temporary Protected Status.
        The temporary status covers some 435,000 people from 9 countries,
    who came to the United States legally after a natural disaster or war.
        Temporary Protected Status designations were created by a law
    signed by President George Bush in 1990.
        Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, is still
    struggling to recover from the earthquake and relies heavily on money
    its expatriates send to relatives back home.
        The Haitian government had asked the Trump administration to extend
    the protected status.
                 the human toll of trump administration polices
        International medical graduates (IMGs) fill a vital role in the
    U.S. health care system by serving as a source of primary care
    physicians in rural communities throughout the United States.
        They comprise 26% of physicians in practice and 24% of residents in
    specialty programs in the United States.
        All IMGs go through U.S. medical licensing examination and
    credentialing verification to receive certification from the
    Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates to become eligible
    to enter the U.S. graduate medical education process.
        Compared with U.S. graduates, IMGs tend to practice in primary care
    specialties and in underserved and rural areas.
        Severe shortages of primary care physicians in underserved areas of
    the United States were a persistent problem that seemed intractable
    until international medical students began to fill the void.
        There are other impacts that adversely affect small business
    owners, veterans, families in every State where ICE deportations have
    risen.
        There is an important issue regarding ICE enforcement actions
    related to the display of the word ``POLICE'' by ICE agents.
        As a Member of the Committee on Judiciary and Ranking Member for
    the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and
    Investigation, I am acutely aware of the important role law enforcement
    fills.
        I was concerned that ICE's use of ``POLICE'' would link their
    immigration enforcement activity with routine police and crime
    prevention, which would chill the willingness of immigrant communities
    to help police and report crime.
        I am sad to say that my worst fears have been borne out by reports
    by the chiefs of police for Houston and Los Angeles that in fact
    reports of sexual assault have sharply declined.
        My final observation of the first few months of this administration
    is the willingness to cause injury where none needs to be inflicted.
        I appreciate your assistance, Mr. Secretary, in reuniting a child
    from Jordan with his family after he was caught up in the Muslim ban.
        Another constituent, Mr. Jose Ernesto Escobar, who owns a small
    business, has not committed a crime, has complied with requirements
    that he routinely report to DHS, has yet to be reunited with his family
    after having filled an administrative appeal regarding a surprise
    attempt to deport him.
        The administrative appeal is essential to balance immigration
    policies with due process rights, which extend protections to non-
    citizens in our Nation's constitutional democracy.
        Unfortunately, ICE ignored the due process requirements of Mr.
    Escobar's administrative appeal after assurances that the agency would
    comply with the appeals processes and instead deported Mr. Escobar back
    to El Salvador--a country he had not lived in since he was a child
    following devastating earthquakes.
        I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and the
    question-and-answer opportunity that will follow.
        Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

        Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have two distinguished
    panels of witnesses before us. Today, our first panel includes
    the Honorable Elaine Duke, acting secretary of the United
    States Department of Homeland Security; the Honorable
    Christopher Wray, director of the FBI; and the Honorable
    Nicholas Rasmussen, director of the National Counterterrorism
    Center. The witnesses' full written statements will appear in
    the record.
        The Chair now recognizes Secretary Duke for an opening
    statement.

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ELAINE C. DUKE, ACTING SECRETARY, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Ms. Duke. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
    Thompson, and distinguished Members of this committee. It is my
    honor to testify here before you this morning on behalf of the
    men and women of Department of Homeland Security, who shield
    our Nation from threats every single day, often in extremely
    dangerous environments.
        We are reminded of that this past week when we lost Border
    Patrol agent Rogelio Martinez in the line of duty. I truly
    appreciate and know our country appreciates his service and
    sacrifice.
        While we do not know for certain the circumstances of his
    death, we do know that he courageously chose a dangerous job
    with DHS because it was so important to our Nation's security.
    When his father was asked why his son chose the Border Patrol,
    his son said: I want to defend my country from terrorists. I
    want to prevent terrorists and drugs from coming into our
    country, and he loved this job.
        I want to begin by noting right now that the terror threat
    in our country equals and in many ways exceeds the period
    around 9/11. We are seeing a surge in terrorist activity
    because the fundamentals of terrorism have changed. Our enemies
    are crowdsourcing their violence on-line and promoting a do-it-
    yourself approach that involves using any weapons their
    followers can get their hands on. We saw this just last month
    here on our own soil when a terrorist killed and wounded
    pedestrians in New York City using a rented vehicle. But New
    Yorkers rallied and they refused to be intimidated by this
    heinous attack.
        I also want to make it clear that DHS is not standing on
    the side lines as these threats proliferate, and we will not
    allow frequent terrorism to become the new normal. The primary
    international terror threat facing our country is from global
    jihadist groups. However, the Department is also focused on the
    threat of domestic terrorism. Ideologically motivated violence
    here in the United States is a danger to our Nation, our
    people, and our values.
        We are tackling the overall terror threat in the United
    States head-on in two ways. First, we are rethinking homeland
    security for this new age. There is no longer a home game and
    away game. The line is blurred and the threats are connected
    and across borders. That is why DHS is moving toward a more
    integrated approach, bringing together intelligence,
    operations, interagency engagement, and international action
    like never before.
        Second, we are raising the bar in our security posture
    across the board to keep dangerous individuals and goods from
    entering the United States. That includes building a wall in
    the Southwest Border and cracking down on transnational
    criminal organizations that bring drugs, violence, and other
    threats to our communities.
        Illegal immigration puts our communities and country at
    risk, which is why our border security strategy is multi-
    layered and includes robust interior enforcement operations to
    deter and prevent illegal entry.
        We are also strengthening everything from traveler
    screening to information sharing. We now require all foreign
    governments to share critical data with us on terrorists and
    criminals and to help us confidently identify their nationals.
    We must know who is coming into our country and make sure they
    do not pose a threat. That is why I recommended, and the
    President approved, tough but tailored restrictions against
    countries that pose a risk and which are not complying with our
    security requirements.
        We are trying to stay a step ahead of emerging threats. We
    are planning next to launch a new Office of Countering Weapons
    of Mass Destruction next week to consolidate and elevate DHS's
    efforts to guard against chemical, biological, radiological,
    and nuclear threats.
        Separately and additionally, our global aviation security
    plan is making it harder for terrorists to target U.S.-bound
    aircraft with concealed explosive or by using corrupted
    insiders. At the same time, we are rededicating ourselves to
    terrorism prevention to keep terrorists from radicalizing our
    people, and our newly reorganized Office of Terrorism
    Prevention Partnerships will lead this charge.
        Finally, we have stepped up DHS's efforts to protect soft
    targets, which will not only help better defend our country
    against terrorists, but against tragedies we have witnessed
    like that in Las Vegas and Texas.
        Americans are also alarmed by the spike in terrorist
    attacks. DHS is engaging with Congress on legislation that
    would establish a new operating component dedicated to
    cybersecurity.
        On behalf of the entire Department, I appreciate the
    critical role this committee plays. Thank you for holding this
    hearing. I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Duke follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Elaine C. Duke
                               November 30, 2017
        Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members
    of the committee, I would like to thank you for inviting me to testify
    on the threats facing our great Nation and what we are doing to
    confront them. First though, I would like to recognize the service of
    former Secretary John Kelly. While his tenure at the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) ended early, his impact was substantial.
    General Kelly visibly lifted the morale of the Department, set a new
    standard for leadership, and--most importantly--established the
    foundation for historic improvements in our Nation's security. The
    Department has not missed a beat since his departure, and it is my
    honor to continue to advance the work he set in motion until such time
    as the Senate votes to confirm the President's nominee, Kirstjen
    Nielsen.
        Make no mistake, the threats our country faces are serious. Our
    enemies and adversaries are persistent. They are working to undermine
    our people, our interests, and our way of life every day. Whether it is
    the violent menace posed by international and domestic terrorists or
    the silent intrusions of cyber adversaries, the American people will
    not be intimidated or coerced. I am proud that the men and women of DHS
    are driven to address these challenges, and they are more than equal to
    the task.
        I would like to stress three themes today.
        First, we are rethinking homeland security for a new age. We
    sometimes speak of the ``home game'' and ``away game'' in protecting
    our country, with DHS especially focused on the former. But the line is
    now blurred. The dangers we face are becoming more dispersed, and
    threat networks are proliferating across borders. The shifting
    landscape is challenging our security, so we need to move past
    traditional defense and non-defense thinking. This is why DHS is
    overhauling its approach to homeland security. We are bringing together
    intelligence, operations, interagency engagement, and international
    action in new ways and changing how we respond to threats to our
    country.
        Second, we are ``raising the baseline'' of our security posture--
    across the board. DHS is looking at everything from traveler screening
    to information sharing, and we are setting new standards to close
    security vulnerabilities. Since 9/11, we have spoken too often of the
    weaknesses in our systems without taking enough decisive action to fix
    them for the long haul. This administration aims to change that. At the
    Department, we are building an action-oriented, results-centric
    culture. We are pushing our border security strategies and pressing
    foreign partners to enhance their security so that terrorists,
    criminals, and other threat actors are stopped well before they reach
    our shores.
        Third, this unprecedented hurricane season has truly tested us as a
    Nation and tested many of our assumptions about what works in disaster
    response and recovery. While each year the hurricane season officially
    comes to an end on November 30, the lessons that we are learning from
    the response and recovery operations that we are performing this year,
    under the most difficult circumstances possible, will transform the
    field of emergency management forever.
                  homeland security in a new age of terrorism
        Today, the magnitude of the threat we face from terrorism is equal
    to, and in many ways exceeds, the 9/11 period. While we have made it
    harder for terrorists to execute large-scale attacks, changes in
    technology have made it easier for adversaries to plot attacks in
    general, to radicalize new followers, and to recruit beyond borders.
    The problem is compounded by the use of simple, ``do-it-yourself''
    terrorist tactics.
        The rising tide of violence we have seen in the West is clear
    evidence of the serious threat. Acts of terrorism and mass violence
    against soft targets have become so frequent that we associate them
    with the names of cities that have been victimized: Paris, San
    Bernardino, Brussels, Orlando, Istanbul, Nice, Berlin, London,
    Barcelona, and most recently in New York City on Halloween. As our
    Government takes the fight to groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, we
    expect operatives to disperse and focus more heavily on external
    operations against the United States, our interests, and our allies.
        We are seeing an uptick in terrorist activity because the
    fundamentals of terrorism have evolved. This includes changes in
    terrorist operations, the profile of individual operatives, and the
    tactics they use. With regard to operations, terrorist groups
    historically sought time and space to plot attacks. But now they have
    become highly networked on-line, allowing them to spread propaganda
    world-wide, recruit on-line, evade detection by plotting in virtual
    safe havens, and crowd-source attacks. The result is that our
    interagency partners and allies have tracked a record number of
    terrorism cases.
        Terrorist demographics have also created challenges for our front-
    line defenders and intelligence professionals. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and
    other groups have managed to inspire a wide array of sympathizers
    across the spectrum. While a preponderance are young men, they can be
    young or old, male or female, wealthy or indigent, immigrant or U.S.-
    born, and living almost anywhere.
        The change in terrorist tactics has likewise put strain on our
    defenses. Global jihadist groups are promoting simple methods,
    convincing supporters to use guns, knives, vehicles, and other common
    items to engage in acts of terrorism. At the same time, they are
    experimenting with other tools--including drones, chemical weapons, and
    artfully concealed improvised explosive devices--to further spread
    violence and fear. We have also seen a spider web of threats against
    the aviation sector, which remains a top target for global jihadist
    groups. In short, what was once a preference for large-scale attacks is
    now an ``all-of-the-above'' approach to terrorism. This is particularly
    exacerbated by the increased emphasis on so-called soft targets.
    Locations, venues, or events associated with public gatherings are
    increasingly appealing targets for terrorists and other violent
    criminals because of their accessibility and the potential to inflict
    significant physical, psychological, and economic damage.
        The Department is also concerned about violent extremists using the
    battlefield as a testbed from which they can export terror. We continue
    to see terrorist groups working to perfect new attack methods in
    conflict zones that can then be used in external operations. Operatives
    are packaging this expertise into blueprints that can be shared with
    followers on-line. In some cases, terrorists are even providing the
    material resources needed to conduct attacks. We recently saw this in
    Australia, when police foiled a major plot to bring down an airliner
    using a sophisticated explosive device reportedly shipped by an ISIS
    operative overseas.
        The primary international terror threat facing the United States is
    from violent global jihadist groups, who try to radicalize potential
    followers within our homeland and who seek to send operatives to our
    country. However, the Department is also focused on the threat of
    domestic terrorism and the danger posed by ideologically-motivated
    violent extremists here in the United States. Ideologies like violent
    racial supremacy and violent anarchist extremism are a danger to our
    communities, and they must be condemned and countered.
        The Department is not standing on the sidelines as these threats
    spread. And we will not allow pervasive terrorism to become the new
    normal. We are closely monitoring changes to our enemies' tactics, and
    we are working to stay a step ahead of them. This means ensuring that
    our security posture is dynamic, multi-layered, and difficult to
    predict. We are doing more to identify terrorists in the first place,
    changing our programs and practices to adjust to their tactics, and
    working with our interagency and international partners to find
    innovative ways to detect and disrupt their plots.
        DHS is also working to help our State, local, Tribal, territorial,
    and private-sector partners--and the public--to be better prepared. We
    actively share intelligence bulletins and analysis with homeland
    security stakeholders Nation-wide to make sure they understand trends
    related to terrorism and violent extremist activity, know how to guard
    against nascent attack methods, and are alerted to the potential for
    violent incidents. For example, in the days prior to the tragic events
    in Charlottesville, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
    partnered with the Virginia Fusion Center to produce and distribute an
    assessment alerting State and local law enforcement to an increased
    chance for violence at the upcoming demonstration.
        DHS is working closely with private industry and municipalities to
    help secure public venues and mass gatherings that might be targeted by
    terrorism and violent extremist activity. We have also continued to
    refine our outreach to make sure members of the public report
    suspicious activity and don't hesitate to do so. Sadly, we have seen
    many attacks at home and around the world that could have been stopped
    if someone had spoken up. We want to break that pattern of reluctance.
        In many of these areas, we will continue to need Congressional
    assistance. The President's fiscal year 2018 budget calls for a number
    of counterterrorism improvements that need robust funding. But more
    must be done to keep up with our enemies. In some cases, DHS and other
    departments and agencies lack certain legal authorities to engage and
    mitigate the emerging dangers we are seeing. For example, we lack the
    authorities needed to counter threats from unmanned aircraft systems
    (UAS). We know that terrorists are using drones to conduct aerial
    attacks in conflict zones, and already we have seen aspiring terrorists
    attempt to use them in attacks outside the conflict zone.
        Earlier this year, the administration delivered a Government-wide
    legislative proposal to Congress that would provide additional counter-
    UAS authorities to DHS and other Federal departments and agencies to
    legally engage and mitigate UAS threats in the National Airspace
    System. I am eager to share our concerns in a Classified setting, and I
    urge the committee to help champion efforts to resolve this and other
    challenges.
                blocking threats from reaching the united states
        The Department is undertaking historic efforts to secure our
    territory. The goal is to prevent National security threat actors,
    especially terrorists and criminals, from traveling to the United
    States, while better facilitating lawful trade and travel. The
    administration has made it a priority to secure our borders and to
    provide the American people the security they deserve. We are making it
    harder for dangerous goods to enter our country. And as part of our
    across-the-board approach to rethinking homeland security, DHS is
    improving to the screening of all categories of U.S.-bound travelers,
    including visitors, immigrants, and refugees.
        Our forward-leaning counterterrorism approach is exemplified by the
    Department's recent aviation security enhancements. As noted earlier,
    terrorists continue to plot against multiple aspects of the aviation
    sector, in some cases using advanced attack methods. Based on
    carefully-evaluated threat intelligence, DHS took action this year to
    protect passenger aircraft against serious terror threats. This summer,
    we announced new ``seen'' and ``unseen'' security measures,
    representing the most significant aviation security enhancements in
    many years. Indeed, our on-going Global Aviation Security Plan is
    making U.S.-bound flights more secure and will raise the baseline of
    aviation security world-wide--including additional protections to
    prevent our enemies from placing dangerous items in mail or cargo.
        Today, terrorists and criminals are exploiting what they see as a
    borderless world, which is why stepping up our border security must be
    among the highest National priorities. DHS is actively focused on
    building out the wall on the Southwest Border and a multi-layered
    security architecture to keep threats from entering America undetected.
    We are making measureable progress, and we are cracking down hard on
    transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), which are bringing drugs,
    violence, and dangerous goods and individuals across our borders. These
    organizations have one goal--illicit profit, and they couldn't care
    less about the enormous human suffering they cause.
        TCOs pose a persistent National security threat to the United
    States. They provide a potential means for transferring weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) to terrorists or for facilitating terrorists' entry
    into the United States. We have already seen aliens with terror
    connections travel from conflict zones into our hemisphere, and we are
    concerned that TCOs might assist them in crossing our borders. TCOs
    also undermine the stability of countries near our borders, subvert
    their Government institutions, undermine competition in world strategic
    markets, and threaten interconnected trading, transportation, and
    transactional systems essential to free markets.
        The Department is fighting back against this threat by using its
    full authorities and working in concert with other Federal partners.
    DHS is leading the development of a stronger, fused, whole-of-
    Government approach to border security. Stove-piped agencies cannot
    prevail against highly networked adversaries, which is why we are
    bolstering Joint Task Forces to protect our territory and embedding
    border security professionals in other relevant departments and
    agencies. Our components are working together on initiatives such as
    the DHS MS-13 Working Group and the DHS Human Smuggling Cell. The
    former, run by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is identifying gang members
    previously unknown to law enforcement. The latter is a multi-agency
    unit staffed by personnel from across the Department that is allowing
    us to bring together intelligence and operations to go after human
    smuggling organizations more effectively.
        We are also developing comprehensive plans to step up security in
    the Western Hemisphere and to push the U.S. border outward by shutting
    down TCOs and smuggling networks. For example, ICE's Biometric
    Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) is
    helping train and equip foreign counterparts to collect biometric and
    biographic data on persons of interest and potential threats. The data
    allow us to map illicit pathways, discover emerging TCO trends, and
    catch known or suspected terrorists and criminals while they are still
    far from our border.
        Beyond border security, DHS is improving almost every stage of the
    vetting process for U.S.-bound travelers. Front-end investigations of
    applicants are being modified to more quickly detect individuals with
    terror ties, including through ICE's Visa Security Program. Security
    checks are being brought into the digital age with measures like
    continuous immigration vetting, a real-time, systematic process that
    constantly analyzes visa files against law enforcement and intelligence
    holdings to identify possible matches to derogatory information. At the
    same time, we are gathering additional data from prospective travelers
    to more effectively validate their identities and determine whether
    they pose a risk to our country.
        DHS is better leveraging Unclassified and Classified datasets to
    find previously undetected threats. We have already seen real
    successes. I cannot get into the details in this setting; suffice to
    say that these enhancements have allowed us to detect and disrupt
    terror suspects we likely would not have identified otherwise. And at
    our ports of entry, CBP's Tactical Terrorism Response Teams are
    connecting dots and finding suspicious individuals we might also have
    otherwise slipped through the cracks.
        In the medium term, DHS is aiming to streamline how we organize our
    screening activities. We are examining specific ways to consolidate
    screening functions, better integrate intelligence data, leverage law
    enforcement information, and fuse our efforts to protect our country.
    Both of the witnesses here with me today have been critical partners as
    we do this and make sure our National vetting efforts are a top
    priority.
        The administration is also pursuing major initiatives to improve
    international information sharing. Working with the State Department
    and interagency, we are pressing foreign countries to provide us more
    information on terrorists and criminals, and we are urging them to use
    the information our Government already provides to catch global
    jihadists and other threat actors residing in or transiting their
    territory. DHS is exploring additional measures that could be taken to
    require foreign governments to take swifter action and how we can
    better assist them in doing so.
        For the first time ever, DHS established a clear baseline for what
    countries must do to help the United States confidently screen
    travelers and immigrants from their territory. As required under
    President Trump's Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign
    Terrorist Entry into the United States (EO 13780), all foreign
    governments have been notified of the new standards, which include the
    sharing of terrorist identities, criminal history information, and
    other data needed to ensure public safety and National security, as
    well as the condition that countries issue secure biometric passports,
    report lost and stolen travel documents to INTERPOL, and take other
    essential actions to prevent identity fraud.
        DHS assessed whether countries met the new standards, in
    consultation with the Department of State and the Department of
    Justice. Countries that failed to do so were recommended to the
    President for travel restrictions or other lawful limitations, which he
    imposed through a Presidential proclamation in October. Most foreign
    governments have met these minimum standards or are on the path to
    doing so. For those that the President has designated for restrictions,
    we have indicated that we will consider relief, but first they must
    comply with these reasonable, baseline requirements.
        This has nothing to do with race or religion, and our goal is not
    to block people from visiting the United States. America has a proud
    history as a beacon of hope to freedom-loving people from around the
    world who want to visit our country or become a part of our enduring
    democratic republic. Rather, the goal is to protect Americans and
    ensure foreign governments are working with us--and not inhibiting us--
    from stopping terrorists, criminals, and other National security threat
    actors from traveling into our communities undetected.
        We are also focused on working with our foreign partners to close
    overseas security gaps that allow dangerous individuals to travel
    uninhibited. Many countries, for instance, lack the border security
    policies, traveler screening capabilities, intelligence information-
    sharing practices, and legal tools to effectively stop terrorist
    travel. DHS is examining the full array of tools at our disposal to
    incentivize and assist foreign governments in making these improvements
    so these individuals are caught before they reach our borders.
        I commend the House Homeland Security Committee for examining these
    matters as part of its Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the
    United States. As you prepare your final recommendations, the
    Department stands ready to work with you to implement them.
        DHS is not just concerned with threat actors but also threat
    agents, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Our intelligence
    professionals have seen renewed terrorist interest in WMD and are aware
    of concerning developments on these issues, which can be discussed
    further in an appropriate setting. That is one reason why the
    Department is setting up a focal point within DHS for our work to
    protect Americans against chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear (CBRN) threats.
        The Department's previous approach to addressing CBRN threats was
    inadequate and our organization for this mission has been fragmented.
    For nearly a decade, DHS considered internally reorganizing to ensure
    our Department's counter-WMD efforts were unified. Given the growing
    threats and the need to enhance DHS's ability to help respond, I
    notified Congress of our intent to create a Countering Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (CWMD) Office using the Secretary's re-organization
    authority under Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act. We are
    exercising this authority for a limited, internal re-organization to
    achieve unity of command, and we intend to work collaboratively with
    Congress formalize this office and ensure it is postured appropriately
    to confront the threat. We look forward to continuing to engage with
    this committee as we examine how to consolidate our counter-WMD
    efforts, with the goal of ensuring our Nation is safer than ever
    before.
     preventing terrorist radicalization and recruitment in our communities
        In addition to counterterrorism, the Department is rededicating
    itself to terrorism prevention. Americans do not want us to simply stop
    violent plots, they want us to keep them from materializing in the
    first place. As part of this effort, we have launched an end-to-end
    review of all DHS ``countering violent extremism,'' or CVE, programs,
    projects, and activities. In the coming months we will work to ensure
    our approach to terrorism prevention is risk-based and intelligence-
    driven, focused on effectiveness, and provides appropriate support to
    those on the front lines who we rely on to spot signs of terrorist
    activity.
        DHS efforts to combat terrorist recruitment and radicalization fall
    into four primary lanes.
        First, we are prioritizing education and community awareness.
    Before terrorists have a chance to reach into communities and inspire
    potential recruits, we are making sure those communities are aware of
    the threat. This includes extensive outreach to States and localities,
    awareness briefings, intelligence products regarding threats and
    trends, training for front-line defenders and civic leaders, and more.
        Second, we are focused on counter-recruitment. We know that
    terrorists will continue to seek new followers through persuasion and
    propaganda, which is why we must support efforts to actively push back
    against such solicitations. This includes continuing to encourage non-
    Governmental organizations to counter-message terrorist propaganda,
    leveraging credible voices to dissuade potential recruits, working with
    social media companies and supporting their efforts to make on-line
    platforms more hostile to terrorists, and more.
        Last month, I met with the Interior Ministries of the G7 countries
    in Italy and some of the largest technology companies and discussed the
    next steps the companies plan to take in the effort to prevent their
    platforms from being misused by terrorists, including better
    identifying on-line terrorist propaganda and shutting down terrorist
    accounts. The meeting emphasized the importance of working together
    with our foreign partners while we continue to engage industry on this
    important issue. The U.S. Government has already made progress by
    supporting the companies' efforts--including the establishment of the
    Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism--to identify terrorist
    content so they can voluntarily remove content that violates their
    terms of service as soon as it is discovered.
        Many companies, however, still have substantial challenges in
    quickly identifying and addressing the volume of terrorist accounts and
    propaganda on-line. DHS, along with interagency partners, will continue
    sharing information and educating private-sector partners on how to
    more quickly identify and address terrorist content. We will also
    strongly emphasize the importance of counter-messaging and using
    credible voices to fight back against the false narrative of terrorist
    groups. Ultimately, as terrorists crowd-source their violence, the best
    way to fight back is to turn the crowd against them.
        Third, we are emphasizing the importance of early warning. Even
    with strong community awareness and counter-recruitment, terrorist
    groups will succeed in reaching at least some susceptible minds. That
    is why we are working to detect potentially radicalized individuals and
    terrorist activity earlier. This includes building trust between
    communities and law enforcement, expanding ``If You See Something, Say
    SomethingTM''-style campaigns, ensuring there are
    appropriate and confidential means for the public to provide tips
    regarding suspicious activity, and more.
        Finally, DHS is looking at what more can be done to counter-
    terrorist recidivism. It is inevitable that some individuals will be
    recruited, radicalized, and attempt to engage in terrorist activity. So
    we want to make sure that once they are caught they do not return to
    violence. A number of inmates with terrorism affiliations are scheduled
    for release from U.S. prisons in the next few years. We need to work
    with the Department of Justice and its Bureau of Prisons, and other
    interagency partners, to make sure they do not return to violence once
    released. I look forward to engaging with the committee further on this
    subject as we identify effective ways to prevent terrorist recidivism.
        This summer the Department announced the award of $10 million in
    grants to 26 organizations to advance terrorism prevention efforts.
    These grants will help inform our efforts and illuminate what works--
    and what doesn't work--in combating terrorist recruitment and
    radicalization in our homeland. We look forward to sharing the results
    with Congress.
        I also want to note that although our terrorism prevention
    activities will be risk-based, they will also be flexible enough to
    address all forms of terrorism. Any ideologically-motivated violence
    which is designed to coerce people or their governments should be
    condemned, prevented, and countered. That is why our approach must be
    agile so it can help mitigate everything from the global jihadist
    threat to the scourge of violent racial supremacy. It must also engage
    and not alienate communities targeted by these fanatics. This means
    working with people of all races, religions, and creeds as partners in
    the fight against terrorism.
                             securing soft targets
        As I mentioned earlier, terrorists and other violent criminals are
    placing significant emphasis on attacking soft targets. We have seen
    this with recent tragedies in Nevada, New York, and Texas. Although the
    Department has previously focused on enhancing the security of such
    facilities, it has recently placed further emphasis on assisting the
    critical infrastructure community to secure these vulnerable
    facilities. For example, the National Protection and Programs
    Directorate (NPPD) will make the Department the National leader on
    technology, standards, and best practices relating to soft target
    security. The intent of the effort is to:
       Demonstrably reduce the risk of a successful attack on soft
            targets;
       Ensure the Department has the capability to support visible
            efforts to enhance soft target security in order to safeguard
            the American people;
       Develop a center of gravity for Department-wide resources
            available to support the critical infrastructure community in
            securing soft targets;
       Promote a dynamic process to identify and address soft
            target security gaps based on threats and incidents.
        Efforts such as the Hometown Security Initiative, in conjunction
    with our programs that provide training and informational resources
    focused on active-shooter preparedness, play a key role in preparing
    facilities and their employees to proactively think about the role they
    play in the safety and security of their businesses and communities.
        In addition, the S&T SAFETY Act Program provides important legal
    liability protections of qualified anti-terrorism technologies in order
    to encourage the development and deployment of effective products and
    services that enhance security. The Program is intended to provide
    critical incentives for the development and deployment of anti-
    terrorism technologies by providing liability protections for
    ``qualified anti-terrorism technologies.''
                      defending america's digital frontier
        The past year marked a turning point in the cyber domain, putting
    it in the forefront of public consciousness. We have long faced a
    relentless assault against our digital networks from a variety of
    threat actors. But this year, Americans saw hackers, cyber criminals,
    and nation-states take their attacks to another level. Our adversaries
    have and continue to develop advanced cyber capabilities. They have
    deployed them to undermine critical infrastructure, target our
    livelihoods and innovation, steal our secrets, and threaten our
    democracy.
        Cybersecurity has become a matter of National security, and one of
    the Department's core missions. With access to tools that were
    previously beyond their reach, non-state actors now have the ability to
    cause wide-spread disruptions and possibly, destructive attacks. This
    is redefining homeland security as we know it. And it is affecting
    everyone, from businesses and governments to individuals who get swept
    up in data breaches affecting millions of Americans.
        Many of these threats are novel, as illustrated by the attacks on
    the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016, and the use of internet-
    connected consumer devices to conduct distributed denial-of-service
    attacks. Other recent global cyber incidents, such as the WannaCry
    ransomware incident in May and the NotPetya malware incident in June
    2017, exploited known vulnerabilities in software commonly used across
    the globe to create wide-spread disruptive effects and cause economic
    loss.
        DHS defends from these attacks and provides tools to mitigate on-
    going incidents through the National Protection and Programs
    Directorate (NPPD), which is in addition to protecting civilian Federal
    networks collaborates with State, local, Tribal, and territorial
    governments, and the private sector to defend against cyber threats.
    Through vulnerability scanning, NPPD limited the scope of potential
    incidents by helping stakeholders identify the vulnerability on their
    networks so it could be patched before the incident impacted their
    systems. Recognizing that not all users were able to install patches,
    DHS shared additional mitigation guidance to assist network defenders.
    As the incidents unfolded, DHS and our interagency partners led the
    Federal Government's incident response efforts in accordance with
    agencies' responsibilities set forth in Presidential Policy Directive
    41, including providing situational awareness, information sharing,
    malware analysis, and technical assistance to affected entities.
        Cyber actors continue to target the energy sector with various
    goals ranging from cyber espionage to developing the ability to disrupt
    energy systems in the event of a hostile conflict. In one recent
    campaign, advanced persistent threat actors targeted the cyber
    infrastructure of entities within the energy, nuclear, critical
    manufacturing, and other critical infrastructure sectors. In response,
    DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of
    Energy shared information to assist network defenders to identify and
    reduce exposure to malicious activity.
        In the face of these digital threats, it is a DHS priority to work
    with Congress on legislation that would focus our cybersecurity and
    critical infrastructure mission at NPPD. We are pursuing changes that
    would streamline and elevate NPPD's mission. Through transition from a
    headquarters component to a DHS operating component, with better
    structure, the DHS Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency would be
    better-positioned to drive our cybersecurity mission.
        We are also endeavoring to enhance cyber-threat information sharing
    across the globe to stop attacks before they start--and to help
    Americans quickly recover. We work closely with technology providers,
    information-sharing and analysis centers, sector coordinating councils,
    and critical infrastructure owners and operators to brief them on cyber
    threats and provide mitigation recommendations, and our hunt and
    incident response teams provide expert intrusions analysis and
    mitigation guidance to stakeholders who request assistance in advance
    of and in response to a cyber incident.
        In all its cybersecurity efforts, DHS draws upon its experience in
    emergency management and counterterrorism by taking a broad risk
    management approach. DHS considers cybersecurity risk within the
    landscape of overall threats to the Nation and an assessment of the
    likely consequences of cyber incidents which may or may not result in
    physical impacts.
        To increase the security and resilience of non-Federal critical
    infrastructure, DHS leverages information and expertise gained from the
    Federal protective mission. DHS makes technical capabilities and
    programs available to non-Federal entities and provides cybersecurity
    information and recommendations to, and partners closely with, a
    variety of private-sector, State, local, Tribal, and territorial, and
    international stakeholders. This information and technical assistance
    allows our stakeholders to make informed risk management decisions and
    to improve their cybersecurity.
        At the same time, the U.S. Secret Service and ICE Homeland Security
    Investigations work closely with FBI, as well as other law enforcement
    partners, to aggressively investigate, disrupt, and dismantle criminal
    actors and organizations using cyber space to carry out their illicit
    activities. The efforts of the network protection and law enforcement
    experts must be increasingly coordinated within the Department and with
    other agencies and non-Federal entities. Information about tactics and
    trends obtained through law enforcement investigations inform other
    network protection efforts, including those through NPPD, to raise the
    defensive capabilities of the Nation. And the efforts of network
    protectors can identify trends, practices, and potentially new victims
    to shape law enforcement investigations. Together these efforts are an
    important part of an overall National approach to deterrence by denying
    malicious actors access to critical U.S. targets, increasing resilience
    of networks, and by identifying and punishing those who try to use
    cyber space for illicit purposes.
        Bringing together its network protection, law enforcement, risk
    mitigation, and emergency management expertise, DHS plays a lead role
    in the Federal Government's response to cyber incidents. Such incidents
    can result from malicious activity as well as natural or accidental
    causes. NPPD and DHS law enforcement components provide assistance to
    impacted entities. I&A and component intelligence offices play a
    supporting role by providing relevant intelligence support to DHS
    components from across the intelligence community. Sector-specific
    agencies provide unique expertise and insights to response activities
    and help DHS ensure that lessons learned from incidents are
    incorporated into efforts to protect critical information systems. DHS
    works closely with sector-specific agencies, the Department of Defense,
    the Department of Justice, and the FBI before, during, and after
    incidents.
        In support of these operational efforts, DHS also works to
    strengthen the overall security and reliability of the cyber ecosystem.
    As cyber space is inherently global, DHS collaborates with the
    international community to exchange and advocate for best practices and
    promote the development and adoption of normative behavior to increase
    security and reliability. Additionally, in order to build up capacity
    for tackling emerging challenges and supporting the overall
    cybersecurity mission, DHS drives research, development, and technology
    transfer efforts and works with industry stakeholders to make the
    internet and new technologies, like the internet of things, more
    secure. Finally, DHS prioritizes the expansion of its human resource
    programs to recruit, hire, develop, and retain personnel with strong
    cybersecurity skillsets.
                             2017 hurricane season
        To say the 2017 hurricane season has been historic is an
    understatement. To date, we've had four hurricanes make landfall this
    season, three of which have been major hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and
    Maria). Prior to Harvey making landfall on August 25, 2017, FEMA was
    supporting 28 Presidentially-declared disasters. Since Hurricane Harvey
    made landfall in Texas, the President has granted 14 Major Disaster
    declarations and 14 Emergency Declarations, while FEMA has authorized
    25 Fire Management Assistance Grant declarations. Hurricane Irma was
    unique not only because it struck both the U.S. Virgin Islands and
    Puerto Rico, but also because it struck the entire State of Florida.
    Hurricane Maria, following in quick succession, then struck the U.S.
    Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, more than 1,000 nautical miles from the
    mainland United States, devastating an area with already fragile
    infrastructure and facing challenging economic circumstances. In a span
    of 25 days, DHS, FEMA, and our partners deployed tens of thousands of
    personnel across 270,000 square miles in three different regions.
        The impacts of these events are substantial. Roughly 25.8 million
    people were affected by these three storms--8 percent of the entire
    U.S. population. As of November 13, 2017, more than 4.5 million
    survivors registered for FEMA assistance, which is a greater number
    than Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and Sandy combined. FEMA's
    Individual and Households Program (IHP) has thus far approved almost
    $2.5 billion in disaster assistance to respond to the three hurricanes,
    a number we expect to continue to grow. As of mid-November, National
    Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policy holders filed approximately
    121,000 claims, and the NFIP has paid over $5 billion to them.
        DHS and FEMA alone cannot deliver assistance to this vast number of
    survivors. Unity of effort is required for disaster response and
    recovery on any scale, but especially during this historic season. When
    emergency managers call for unity of effort, we mean that all levels of
    government, non-profit organizations, private-sector businesses, and
    survivors must work together--each drawing upon their unique skills and
    capabilities--to meet the needs of disaster survivors.
        For our part on the Federal level, FEMA called upon the vast
    majority of their workforce, while I engaged over 3,800 other Federal
    employees through the DHS ``Surge Capacity Force.'' This is
    significant. FEMA employees come to FEMA knowing they will be deployed
    into disaster areas, work in austere conditions, and assist survivors.
    However, when personnel from other Federal agencies volunteer for the
    Surge Capacity Force, they volunteer to leave their jobs and families,
    receive just-in-time training, and work in an environment that is
    completely unfamiliar and outside of their normal job responsibilities.
    I am incredibly grateful to my colleagues from across the Federal
    Government for supporting this important initiative, and for allowing
    their hard-working and dedicated personnel to support disaster
    survivors who have been impacted by these historic events. Over 22,300
    members of the Federal workforce were deployed to Texas, Florida, the
    U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. This includes 13,892 staff from
    various offices of the Department of Defense, including the military
    services. We could not do this without them.
                                   conclusion
        I want to emphasize that we are overhauling homeland security to
    cope with changes in the threat landscape. Our leadership team is
    breaking down legacy bureaucratic barriers to make DHS operate more
    efficiently and effectively to counter threats to our Nation. We are
    ramping up unity of effort within the Department and tight
    collaboration with law enforcement, the intelligence community, and our
    allies. And we are looking at ways to further integrate intelligence
    and operations, so that our actions are driven by timely information
    and that we respond quickly to new dangers.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for
    your continued support of DHS. I am committed to working with this
    committee to forge a strong and productive relationship as we work to
    achieve the shared objective of securing our homeland.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        The Chair recognizes the FBI director, Christopher Wray.

     STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
               INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
    Thompson, and Members of the committee, for the opportunity to
    talk to you today about the threats that we face and the
    tremendous work that is being done by the people of the FBI.
        I will say that from my prior law enforcement and National
    security experience, I already knew how outstanding and
    dedicated the men and women of the FBI were, but I have to say
    that from the past 3 months here in this job, seeing it from
    this perch, has made me feel even more humbled and inspired to
    work with them. The people that I get to work with every day
    around the country and around the world are mission-focused.
    They are passionate and they are utterly determined to be the
    very best that they can be to protect the American people and
    uphold the rule of law.
        In coming back to Government after being gone for about 12
    years, what struck me the most is some of the changes that I
    have seen: The evolution of the threat, the changes in
    technology, the capabilities that have been built. As I have
    been getting briefed up on the work we are doing and
    encountering first-hand how we do our work in today's
    environment, like we just had in New York, what has really
    struck me is the magnitude of the threats we face and the
    diversity of the threats we face.
        On the terrorism front, in addition to international
    terrorist groups and home-grown violent extremists, we also
    have domestic terrorists intending to influence or coerce our
    Government through violent criminal activity. In the cyber
    arena, we have not only nation-states, but also sophisticated
    criminal actors. In our counterintelligence work, we face
    threats from nation-states targeting not just our National
    security secrets, but also our ideas and our innovation. They
    are doing so not just through traditional intelligence
    operatives, but through nontraditional collectors, like
    scientists and students and businessmen.
        On the terrorism issue in particular, my prior experience
    had been very focused on large, structured organizations like
    al-Qaeda. To be clear, we still confront threats from
    organizations like al-Qaeda, planning large-scale attacks over
    long periods of time. But we also face groups like ISIS, who
    use social media to recruit followers remotely and to inspire
    people to take to the streets with crude but effective weapons,
    like hatchets and vehicles.
        Smaller in scale but greater in volume, these
    organizations, if you can call them organizations, move from
    plotting to action in a very short period of time, with very
    little planning, using low-tech and widely-available attack
    methods. On top of that, these terrorists' use of social media
    and encryption technology has made it harder to find their
    messages of hate and destruction, leaving even fewer footprints
    or dots for us to connect.
        The good news is that I have also been very impressed and
    pleased at the progress that the FBI has made, since I was last
    working with them, particularly in the areas of intelligence
    integration and partnerships. Intelligence is now heavily
    integrated into every program the FBI has, into our overall
    mission, our training, and it drives really everything we do.
    In addition to that, the scope and strength of the partnerships
    that the Bureau now has with our Federal partners, our State
    and local counterparts, members of the intelligence community,
    and our international partners are at a whole new level
    compared to what I saw when I was in Government before.
        So while remarkable progress has been made, we cannot
    become complacent, and we need to keep improving to ensure that
    we are up to the task in getting ahead of the threat.
        As one example, we are now at risk of losing one of the key
    tools in our toolkit that is invaluable to all of our National
    security programs that I just mentioned. As I mentioned at the
    beginning, the speed and agility of our terrorist and
    intelligence adversaries has increased at a tremendous pace,
    putting a huge premium on matching that speed and agility with
    our ability to connect the dots. That is why reauthorization of
    FISA section 702, which expires in just a few weeks, is so
    incredibly important to our work. It is one of the most
    powerful tools that we have to help us evaluate leads and
    prioritize threat information. It can tell us quickly whether a
    person here in the United States has ties to a terrorist
    overseas or if there is someone overseas who is planning an
    attack.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of this committee, I
    look forward to working with you on these and other significant
    challenges. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today
    and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray
                               November 30, 2017
        Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members
    of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss the current threats to the homeland. Our Nation
    continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving threats ranging
    from home-grown violent extremists to cyber criminals to hostile
    foreign intelligence services and operatives. Keeping pace with these
    threats is a significant challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we
    must also be able to stay current with constantly changing and new
    technologies that make our jobs both easier and harder. Our
    adversaries--terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals--
    take advantage of such modern technology to hide their communications,
    recruit followers, plan and encourage espionage, cyber attacks, or
    terrorism, to disperse information on different methods to attack the
    U.S. homeland, and to facilitate other illegal activities. As these
    threats evolve, we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying
    heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, local, and international
    partnerships.
                                counterterrorism
        Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top priority. The
    terrorist threat against the United States remains persistent and
    acute. From a threat perspective, we are concerned with three areas in
    particular: (1) Those who are inspired by terrorist propaganda and act
    out in support; (2) those who are enabled to act after gaining
    inspiration from extremist propaganda and communicating with members of
    foreign terrorist organizations who provide guidance on operational
    planning or targets; and (3) those who are directed by members of
    foreign terrorist organizations to commit specific, directed acts in
    support of the group's ideology or cause. Prospective terrorists can
    fall into any one of these three categories or span across them, but in
    the end the result is the same--innocent men, women, and children
    killed and families, friends, and whole communities left to struggle in
    the aftermath.
        Currently, the FBI has designated the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
    Sham (``ISIS'') and home-grown violent extremists as the main terrorism
    threats to the homeland. ISIS is relentless and ruthless in its
    campaign of violence and has aggressively promoted its hateful message,
    attracting like-minded extremists. The threats posed by foreign
    fighters, including those recruited from the United States, are
    extremely dynamic. These threats remain the highest priority and create
    the most serious challenges for the FBI, the U.S. intelligence
    community, and our foreign, State, and local partners. We continue to
    identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters
    traveling in support of ISIS, as well as home-grown violent extremists
    who may aspire to attack the United States from within. In addition, we
    are confronting a surge in terrorist propaganda and training available
    via the internet and social networking media. Due to on-line
    recruitment and indoctrination, foreign terrorist organizations are no
    longer dependent on finding ways to get terrorist operatives into the
    United States to recruit and carry out acts. Terrorists in ungoverned
    spaces--both physical and cyber--readily disseminate propaganda and
    training materials to attract easily influenced individuals around the
    world to their cause. They encourage these individuals to travel, or
    they motivate them to act at home. This is a significant transformation
    from the terrorist threat our Nation faced a decade ago.
        Unlike other groups, ISIS has constructed a narrative that touches
    on all facets of life, from career opportunities to family life to a
    sense of community. The message isn't tailored solely to those who are
    overtly expressing signs of radicalization. It is seen by many who
    click through the internet every day, receive social media push
    notifications, and participate in social networks. Ultimately, many of
    the individuals drawn to ISIS seek a sense of belonging. Echoing other
    terrorist groups, ISIS has advocated for lone-offender attacks in
    Western countries. Recent ISIS videos and propaganda specifically
    advocate for attacks against soldiers, law enforcement, and
    intelligence community personnel.
        Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital
    communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may be
    susceptible and sympathetic to extremist messages, however, no group
    has been as successful at drawing people into its perverse ideology as
    ISIS. ISIS has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools for
    its nefarious strategy. ISIS uses high-quality, traditional media
    platforms, as well as wide-spread social media campaigns to propagate
    its extremist ideology. Social media also helps groups such as ISIS to
    spot and assess potential recruits. With the wide-spread distribution
    of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize
    vulnerable persons of all ages in the United States either to travel or
    to conduct a homeland attack. Through the internet, terrorists overseas
    now have direct access into our local communities to target and recruit
    our citizens and spread the message of radicalization faster than we
    imagined just a few years ago.
        ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al-Qaeda maintains
    its desire for large-scale spectacular attacks, however continued CT
    pressure has degraded the group, and in the near term al-Qaeda is more
    likely to focus on supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks
    against U.S. and allied interests in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.
    Simultaneously, over the last year, propaganda from al-Qaeda leaders
    seeks to inspire individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United
    States and the West.
        In addition to foreign terrorist organizations, domestic extremist
    movements collectively pose a steady threat of violence and economic
    harm to the United States. Some trends within individual movements will
    shift as most drivers for domestic extremism, such as perceptions of
    Government or law enforcement overreach, socio-political conditions,
    and reactions to legislative actions, remain constant. We are most
    concerned about the lone offender attacks, primarily shootings, as they
    have served as the dominant mode for lethal domestic extremist
    violence. We anticipate law enforcement, racial minorities, and the
    U.S. Government will continue to be significant targets for many
    domestic extremist movements.
        As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves,
    we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on the
    strength of our Federal, State, local, and international partnerships.
    The FBI is using all lawful investigative techniques and methods to
    combat these terrorist threats to the United States. Along with our
    domestic and foreign partners, we are collecting and analyzing
    intelligence concerning the on-going threat posed by foreign terrorist
    organizations and home-grown violent extremists. We continue to
    encourage information sharing, which is evidenced through our
    partnerships with many Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies
    assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country. Be assured,
    the FBI continues to strive to work and share information more
    efficiently, and to pursue a variety of lawful methods to help stay
    ahead of threats to the homeland.
                                  intelligence
        Integrating intelligence in all we do remains a critical strategic
    pillar of the FBI strategy. The constant evolution of the FBI's
    intelligence program will help us address the ever-changing threat
    environment. We must constantly update our intelligence apparatus to
    improve the way we use, collect, and share intelligence to better
    understand and defeat our adversaries. We cannot be content to only
    work the matters directly in front of us. We must also look beyond the
    horizon to understand the threats we face at home and abroad and how
    those threats may be connected.
        To that end, we gather intelligence, consistent with our
    authorities, to help us understand and prioritize identified threats,
    to reveal the gaps in what we know about these threats, and to fill
    those gaps. We do this for National security and criminal threats, on
    both a National and local field office level. We then compare the
    National and local perspectives to organize threats into priorities for
    each of the FBI's 56 field offices. By categorizing threats in this
    way, we place the greatest focus on the gravest threats we face. This
    gives us a better assessment of what the dangers are, what's being done
    about them, and where we should prioritize our resources.
        Integrating intelligence and operations is part of the broader
    intelligence transformation the FBI has undertaken in the last decade
    to improve our understanding and mitigation of threats. Over the past
    few years, we have taken several steps to improve this integration.
    First, we established an Intelligence Branch within the FBI, headed by
    an executive assistant director who drives integration across the
    enterprise. We also developed and implemented a series of integration-
    focused forums that ensure all members of our workforce understand and
    internalize the importance of intelligence integration. We now train
    our special agents and intelligence analysts together at the FBI
    Academy where they engage in joint training exercises and take core
    courses together prior to their field deployments. As a result, they
    are better prepared to integrate their skill sets in the field.
    Additionally, our training forums for executives and front-line
    supervisors continue to ensure our leaders are informed about our
    latest intelligence capabilities and allow them to share best practices
    for achieving intelligence integration.
        I also urge the Congress to renew section 702 of the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA''), which is due to sunset at the
    end of this year. Section 702 is a critical tool that the intelligence
    community uses properly to target non-U.S. persons located outside the
    United States to acquire information vital to our National security. To
    protect privacy and civil liberties, this program has operated under
    strict rules and been carefully overseen by all three branches of the
    Government. Given the importance of section 702 to the safety and
    security of the American people, the administration urges Congress to
    reauthorize title VII of FISA without a sunset provision.
                              counterintelligence
        The Nation faces a rising threat, both traditional and asymmetric,
    from hostile foreign intelligence services and their proxies.
    Traditional espionage, often characterized by career foreign
    intelligence officers acting as diplomats or ordinary citizens, and
    asymmetric espionage, often carried out by students, researchers, or
    business people operating front companies, is prevalent. Foreign
    intelligence services not only seek our Nation's State and military
    secrets, but they also target commercial trade secrets, research and
    development, and intellectual property, as well as insider information
    from the Federal Government, U.S. corporations, and American
    universities. Foreign intelligence services and other State-directed
    actors continue to employ more creative and more sophisticated methods
    to steal innovative technology, critical research and development data,
    and intellectual property, in an effort to erode America's economic
    leading edge. These illicit activities pose a significant threat to
    National security and continue to be a priority and focus of the FBI.
        Our counterintelligence efforts are also aimed at the growing scope
    of the insider threat--that is, when trusted employees and contractors
    use their legitimate access to steal secrets for personal benefit or to
    benefit a company or another country. This threat has been exacerbated
    in recent years as businesses have become more global and increasingly
    exposed to foreign intelligence organizations. We are also
    investigating media leaks, when insiders violate the law and betray the
    Nation's trust by selectively leaking Classified information, sometimes
    mixed with disinformation, to manipulate the public and advance their
    personal agendas.
        In addition to the insider threat, the FBI has focused on a
    coordinated approach across divisions that leverages both our classic
    counter-espionage tradecraft and our technical expertise to more
    effectively identify, pursue, and defeat hostile State actors using
    cyber means to penetrate or disrupt U.S. Government entities or
    economic interests.
        Finally, we have initiated a media campaign to increase awareness
    of the threat of economic espionage. As part of this initiative, we
    have made a threat awareness video, titled ``The Company Man'',
    available on our public website, which has been shown thousands of
    times to raise awareness and generate referrals from the private
    sector.
                                     cyber
        Virtually every National security and criminal threat the FBI faces
    is cyber-based or technologically-facilitated. We face sophisticated
    cyber threats from foreign intelligence agencies, hackers for hire,
    organized crime syndicates, and terrorists. These threat actors
    constantly seek to access and steal our Nation's Classified
    information, trade secrets, technology, and ideas--all of which are of
    great importance to our National and economic security. They seek to
    strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy.
        As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact of cyber
    attacks on our Nation's private-sector and Government networks have
    increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected to continue
    to grow. We continue to see an increase in the scale and scope of
    reporting on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the
    amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable
    information compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims.
    Within the FBI, we are focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber
    activity: High-level intrusions by State-sponsored hackers and global
    organized crime syndicates, as well as other technically sophisticated
    attacks.
        Botnets used by cyber criminals are one example of this trend and
    have been responsible for billions of dollars in damages over the past
    several years. The wide-spread availability of malicious software
    (malware) that can create botnets allows individuals to leverage the
    combined bandwidth of thousands, if not millions, of compromised
    computers, servers, or network-ready devices to conduct attacks. Cyber
    threat actors have also increasingly conducted ransomware attacks
    against U.S. systems, encrypting data and rendering systems unusable--
    victimizing individuals, businesses, and even public health providers.
        Cyber threats are not only increasing in scope and scale, they are
    also becoming increasingly difficult to investigate. Cyber criminals
    often operate through on-line forums, selling illicit goods and
    services, including tools that can be used to facilitate cyber attacks.
    These criminals have also increased the sophistication of their
    schemes, which are more difficult to detect and more resilient.
    Additionally, many cyber actors are based abroad or obfuscate their
    identities by using foreign infrastructure, making coordination with
    international law enforcement partners essential.
        The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats,
    from improving threat identification and information sharing inside and
    outside of Government, to developing and retaining new talent, to
    examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We
    take all potential threats to public and private-sector systems
    seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those
    who pose a threat in cyber space.
                                   going dark
        The rapid pace of advances in mobile and other communication
    technologies continues to present a significant challenge to conducting
    court-ordered electronic surveillance of criminals and terrorists.
    Unfortunately, there is a real and growing gap between law
    enforcement's legal authority to access digital information and its
    technical ability to do so. The FBI refers to this growing challenge as
    ``Going Dark,'' and it affects the spectrum of our work. In the
    counterterrorism context, for instance, our agents and analysts are
    increasingly finding that communications and contacts between groups
    like ISIS and potential recruits occur in encrypted private messaging
    platforms.
        The exploitation of encrypted platforms presents serious challenges
    to law enforcement's ability to identify, investigate, and disrupt
    threats that range from counterterrorism to child exploitation, gangs,
    drug traffickers and white-collar crimes. We respect the right of
    people to engage in private communications, regardless of the medium or
    technology. Whether it is instant messages, texts, or old-fashioned
    letters, citizens have the right to communicate with one another in
    private without unauthorized Government surveillance, because the free
    flow of information is vital to a thriving democracy. Our aim is not to
    expand the Government's surveillance authority, but rather to ensure
    that we can obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the
    legal authority that Congress has provided to us to keep America safe.
    The benefits of our increasingly digital lives, however, have been
    accompanied by new dangers, and we have seen how criminals and
    terrorists use advances in technology to their advantage.
        The more we as a society rely on electronic devices to communicate
    and store information, the more likely it is that information that was
    once found in filing cabinets, letters, and photo albums will now be
    stored only in electronic form. When changes in technology hinder law
    enforcement`s ability to exercise investigative tools and follow
    critical leads, those changes also hinder efforts to identify and stop
    terrorists who are using social media to recruit, plan, and execute an
    attack in our country.
        In the criminal context, we are seeing more and more cases where we
    believe significant evidence resides on a phone, a tablet, or a
    laptop--evidence that may be the difference between an offender being
    convicted, or acquitted. If we cannot access this evidence, it will
    have on-going, significant impacts on our ability to identify, stop,
    and prosecute these offenders. In the first 10 months of this fiscal
    year, the FBI was unable to access the content of more than 6,000
    mobile devices using appropriate and available technical tools, even
    though there was legal authority to do so. This figure represents
    slightly over half of all the mobile devices the FBI attempted to
    access in that time frame.
        Where at all possible, our agents develop investigative workarounds
    on a case-by-case basis, including by using physical world techniques
    and examining non-content sources of digital information (such as
    metadata). As an organization, the FBI also invests in alternative
    methods of lawful engineered access. Ultimately, these efforts, while
    significant, have severe constraints. Non-content information, such as
    metadata, is often simply not sufficient to meet the rigorous
    Constitutional burden to prove crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Developing alternative technical methods is typically a time-consuming,
    expensive, and uncertain process. Even when possible, such methods are
    difficult to scale across investigations, and may be perishable due to
    a short technical life cycle or as a consequence of disclosure through
    legal proceedings.
        Some observers conceive of this challenge as a tradeoff between
    privacy and security. In our view, the demanding requirements to obtain
    legal authority to access data--such as by applying to a court for a
    warrant or a wiretap--necessarily already account for both privacy and
    security. The FBI is actively engaged with relevant stakeholders,
    including companies providing technological services, to educate them
    on the corrosive effects of the Going Dark challenge on both public
    safety and the rule of law.
                          weapons of mass destruction
        The FBI, along with its U.S. Government partners, is committed to
    countering the Weapons of Mass Destruction (``WMD'') threat (e.g.,
    chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) and preventing terrorist
    groups and lone offenders from acquiring these materials either
    domestically or internationally.
        Domestically, the FBI's counter-WMD threat program, in
    collaboration with our U.S. Government partners, prepares for and
    responds to WMD threats (e.g., investigate, detect, search, locate,
    diagnostics, stabilization, and render safe WMD threats).
    Internationally, the FBI, in cooperation with our U.S. partners,
    provides investigative and technical assistance as well as capacity-
    building programs to enhance our foreign partners' ability to detect,
    investigate, and prosecute WMD threats.
                                   conclusion
        Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The
    threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more diverse and
    the expectations placed on the Bureau have never been higher. Our
    fellow citizens look to us to protect the United States from all of
    those threats, and the men and women of the Bureau continue to meet and
    exceed those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their
    dedication and their service.
        Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and committee Members, I
    thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning the threats to the
    homeland. I am happy to answer any questions you might have.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Director.
        The Chair recognizes the NCTC director, Rasmussen.

      STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, DIRECTOR, THE NATIONAL
      COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
                              INTELLIGENCE

        Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Thompson and Members of the committee. As I mentioned during my
    testimony before the committee last year, the array of
    terrorist actors around the globe is broader, wider, and deeper
    than it has been at any point since September 11, 2001. As we
    meet here today, the discipline of terrorism prevention is
    literally changing beneath our feet every day, and it requires
    that we respond with extraordinary agility and flexibility.
        I would like to take the opportunity today to share what I
    have seen in the way of changes in the terrorism landscape
    since I last testified before the committee. I will also say a
    few words about areas where we can do a better job of tackling
    the threat of those in the homeland who are mobilized to
    extremist violence and to strengthen our CT capabilities.
        So let me begin with what has changed or what is new with
    the overall threat. Those developments fall into three primary
    areas. The first of these is the coalition's success in
    shrinking the territory that ISIS controls in Iraq and Syria as
    compared to a year ago.
        The second major trend is an uptick in attacks inspired by
    ISIS that we have seen against Western interests around the
    globe in the last year as compared to attacks that are directed
    by the group from their headquarters in Iraq and Syria.
        The third trend I would point to is the resurgence of
    aviation threats reaching a level of concern that we in the
    intelligence community have not faced since AQAP's printer
    package plot back in 2010.
        So to start first with ISIS's losses on the battlefield.
    ISIS is clearly facing significant battlefield pressure from
    U.S. forces and the coalition, and the size of the territory
    the group controls is shrinking day by bay. As ISIS copes with
    that territorial loss, though, the group will look to preserve
    its capabilities by operating more as a covert terrorist
    organization and as an insurgency from its few remaining
    strongholds in Iraq and Syria. Now, this is undoubtedly good
    news. We are winning on the battlefield, but unfortunately,
    territorial losses have not translated into a corresponding
    reduction in the group's ability to inspire attacks, even
    including here at home.
        In over the last year, ISIS has inspired numerous attacks,
    particularly in the United Kingdom and Europe, and most
    recently right at home, as has been discussed earlier, in New
    York City on Halloween. The number of arrests and disruptions
    we have seen around the globe, while that is a testament to
    effective law enforcement and intelligent work, it also tells
    us that the global reach of ISIS remains largely intact, even
    as the group is being decisively defeated on the battlefield.
        Now that uptick in inspired attacks stands in contrast to
    the pattern of attacks we saw that were directed and enabled by
    the group from Syria in 2015 and 2016. So far this year,
    though, we have not seen the group successfully direct a large-
    scale sophisticated attack like the Paris and Brussels attacks
    in previous years. But the number of inspired attacks, as
    Director Wray mentioned, is clearly on the rise. All of this
    underscores our belief that there is not a direct link between
    the battlefield position of ISIS in Iraq and their capacity to
    continue inspiring external attacks. So battlefield losses are
    not enough, not sufficient to mitigate alone the threat from
    ISIS.
        It is also worth me saying, even as we are focused on ISIS
    as a primary terrorism challenge, that al-Qaeda has never
    stopped being a primary counterterrorism challenge for the
    United States and a top tier priority. So even as we point to
    ISIS, we continue to see the continued evolution of al-Qaeda as
    a resilient organization. We know that al-Qaeda retains the
    capability intent to carry out attacks against our allies
    around the world.
        I will touch quickly now on the third development that has
    stood out in the threat environment: The threat to civil
    aviation. There is a long history to terrorists seeking
    innovative means to carry out aviation attacks. Aviation has
    taken center stage again this year, as evidenced by Australian
    authorities disrupting a plot back in July by terrorists to
    bring explosives aboard an aircraft.
        Terrorists have shown themselves to be persistent, out-of-
    the-box thinkers with respect to aviation. Aviation-related
    threats have long been and will remain near or at the top of
    the things that demand our focused attention.
        This brings me to my final point: We need to do a better
    job of tackling the threat of those mobilized to extremist
    violence, particularly here in the homeland. One of things we
    do in the intelligence world quite well--that we do quite well,
    but we are always looking to improve on--is collecting
    intelligence and sharing it with those who need it. We share it
    across our various Federal agencies and increased partners
    around the country. We also do a great job of pushing
    Unclassified information to partners around the country.
        But beyond just sharing intelligence, there is certainly
    more we can do to prevent home-grown violent extremists from
    becoming radicalized, and we need to improve the toolkit that
    we use to deal with this problem. In short, we must expand our
    investment in terrorist prevention, specifically here in the
    homeland, doing what we can to prevent the recruitment of
    American youth and ensure that communities are equipped to
    respond and prevent all forms of violence.
        Now I am proud of the good work that I do, that my folks at
    NCTC do in this area, along with Director Wray and Secretary
    Duke's teams on this matter, but it is something that I am sure
    we could do better at, and I'm sure we should do on a greater
    scale. By leveraging all aspects of the elements of the Federal
    Government, working with State and local partners, I am certain
    that we can create a better and more significant culture of
    prevention and resilience across the United States.
        I will end there, Mr. Chairman, and once again thank you
    and the committee for your continued support of the work we are
    doing at NCTC. Speaking personally, thank you for your
    friendship, the committee's friendship, and the kind words that
    you used earlier today as I move on from Federal Government
    service and step down from NCTC at the end of December. But
    even though I am grateful for your kind words, I am also
    mindful that, whenever I appear before you, I am standing on
    the shoulders of many hundreds of talented women and men at
    NCTC. Serving alongside those professionals has been the honor
    of my life. It is their amazing work that I bring before you as
    their representative, and I look forward to answering your
    questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen
                               November 30, 2017
        Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of
    the committee, for the opportunity to be with you today. I am pleased
    to be joined by my colleagues and close partners, Acting Secretary
    Elaine Duke from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
    Director Christopher Wray of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
                                threat overview
        Over the past 16 years, we have made tremendous progress in our
    ability to detect and prevent catastrophic attacks like September 11,
    2001. We, along with many of our partners, have built a National
    security apparatus that has substantially expanded our ability to
    protect the safety and security of our communities. We share more
    information--with more frequency and with more partners--than we ever
    would have imagined possible a decade ago. And, we have reduced
    external threats emanating from core al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed
    Islamic State of Iraq al-Sham, or ISIS, due to aggressive
    counterterrorism (CT) actions against these groups.
        However, both ISIS and al-Qaeda have proven to be extremely
    resilient organizations. ISIS's strategy to project its influence
    world-wide, despite geographic losses in Iraq and Syria, by using
    attacks and propaganda perpetuates fear and continues to attract
    violent extremists who wish to do us harm. Other terrorist groups
    around the world also continue to exploit safe havens created by
    ungoverned spaces and threaten the United States and our allies.
    Therefore, despite the progress we have made, it is our assessment that
    the current terrorism threat environment is complex, challenging, and
    geographically expansive, as we saw with recent attacks throughout
    Europe, in Egypt, and of course in New York City on Halloween. It is
    also our assessment that NCTC, along with our Federal partners, must
    expand our investment in terrorism prevention, specifically in the
    homeland to prevent the recruitment of American youth and ensure we are
    equipped to respond to and prevent all forms of violence.
                                      hves
        First, allow me to provide an overview of the most immediate threat
    to the Homeland which is the threat of violence carried out by
    Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs), which unfortunately, the recent
    vehicle attack in New York City made painfully clear. While there are
    multiple factors that mobilize HVEs to violence, ISIS's large-scale
    media and propaganda efforts will likely continue to reach and
    influence HVEs in the United States. Despite the recent tragic events
    in New York, there have been fewer attacks in the United States this
    year than the past 2 years, and we are working to determine the
    potential factors that may be responsible for this decrease in
    successful attacks. Arrests of HVEs remain at similar levels.
        What we have seen over time is that HVEs--either lone actors or
    small insular groups--tend to gravitate toward soft targets and simple
    tactics of opportunity that do not require advanced skills or outside
    training. We expect that most HVEs will continue to focus on soft
    targets, while still considering traditional targets, such as military
    personnel, law enforcement, and other symbols of the U.S. Government.
    Some HVEs--such as the Orlando shooter in June 2016 and the San
    Bernardino shooters in December 2015--may have conducted attacks
    against personally significant targets. The convergence of violent
    extremist ideology and personal grievances or perceived affronts likely
    played a role in motivating these HVEs to attack. We are still working
    to learn more about what may have motivated suspects in other recent
    attacks.
                                      isis
        ISIS continues to pursue multiple avenues of attack with varying
    levels of support provided by the group. Over the course of the year we
    have seen a spectrum of attack plots. This spectrum ranges from those
    ``inspired'' by the group--in which ISIS claims responsibility for
    attacks where the attackers had no direct ties to the group--to attacks
    ``enabled'' by the group--when ISIS reaches out to individuals through
    secure communications to prompt an attack--to ``directed'' ones, in
    which the group provides direct support from Iraq and Syria to attempt
    attacks.
        ISIS's reach and narrative, rooted in unceasing warfare against all
    enemies, extends beyond the Syria-Iraq battlefield. Since 2014, ISIS
    has conducted or inspired attacks ranging in tactics and targets--the
    bombing of a Russian airliner in Egypt; the attacks in Paris at
    restaurants, a sports stadium, and a concert venue; the killing of
    hostages and law enforcement officials at a cafe in Bangladesh; and the
    growing number of vehicle attacks such as those carried out in Europe
    over the past year--all of which demonstrate how ISIS can capitalize on
    local networks on the ground for attacks. The threat landscape is less
    predictable and, while the scale of the capabilities currently
    demonstrated by most of these violent extremist actors does not rise to
    the level that core al-Qaeda had on 9/11, it is fair to say that we
    face more threats originating in more places and involving more
    individuals than we have at any time in the past 16 years.
        As we saw with the July arrests in Australia, and with the attacks
    in Belgium and Istanbul last year, terrorists remain focused on
    aviation targets because they recognize the economic damage that may
    result from even unsuccessful attempts to either down aircraft or
    attack airports, as well as the potential high loss of life, and the
    attention the media devotes to these attacks. ISIS continues to
    innovate and test for security vulnerabilities in order to further its
    external operations and challenge our security apparatus. Since the 9/
    11 attacks, world-wide security improvements have hardened the aviation
    sector but have not entirely removed the threat. Violent extremist
    publications continue to promote the desirability of aviation attacks
    and have provided information on how to target the air domain.
        For these reasons, shrinking the size of territory controlled by
    ISIS, and denying the group access to additional manpower and funds in
    the form of foreign terrorist fighters and operatives, as well as oil
    revenue and other financial resources, remains a top priority. Success
    in these areas will ultimately be an essential part of our efforts to
    continue reducing the group's ability to pursue external attacks and
    diminish its global reach and impact. We have made clear progress in
    these areas: ISIS has lost over 90 percent of the territory it once
    controlled in both Iraq and Syria; the number of fighters it has in
    those countries is significantly down, and its illicit income streams
    are down. But despite this progress, ISIS's ability to carry out
    terrorist attacks in Syria, Iraq, and abroad has not yet been
    sufficiently diminished, and the consistent tempo of ISIS-linked
    terrorist activity is a reminder of the group's continued global reach.
        The group's external operations capability has been building and
    entrenching during the past 2 years, and we do not think battlefield
    losses alone will be sufficient to degrade its terrorism capabilities.
    As we have seen, the group has launched attacks in periods when it held
    large swaths of territory as well as when under significant pressure
    from the defeat-ISIS campaign. In addition to its efforts to conduct
    external attacks from its safe havens in Iraq and Syria, ISIS's
    capacity to reach sympathizers around the world through its robust
    social media capability is unprecedented and gives the group access to
    large numbers of HVEs.
        Over the last 2 years, ISIS has lost several key leaders whose
    deaths deprive the group of senior members with unique skillsets.
    However, the group's effective propaganda continues to inspire violence
    even after the removal of key spokesmen, as we have seen by the range
    of radicalized individuals who continue to look to statements by
    deceased terrorist figures for guidance and justifications to conduct
    attacks. ISIS's media enterprise will probably continue to redirect its
    narrative away from losses to emphasize new opportunities, as seen with
    ISIS's recent media attention to territories outside the areas it
    formerly held in Syria and Iraq. It may also try to paint losses as a
    rallying cry for revenge against local security forces and
    international CT-actors, including the United States. Despite
    international efforts to prevent terrorism on-line, the volume of media
    availability and its spread across a multitude of platforms and
    websites will continue to be a challenge but we are steadfast in our
    containment measures.
        Deceased ISIS spokesman and external operations leader Abu Muhammad
    al-Adnani's final public statement encouraged ISIS supporters in the
    United States to conduct attacks at home instead of traveling to Iraq
    and Syria, suggesting that ISIS recognizes the difficulty in sending
    operatives to the homeland for an attack. ISIS likely views the United
    States as a harder target than Europe because it is further away, U.S.
    ports of entry are under far less stress from mass migration, and U.S.
    law enforcement agencies are not overtaxed by persistent unrest, as are
    some of our counterparts overseas.
        The threat environment in Europe is increasingly being driven by
    Europe-based individuals and small cells who are inspired by ISIS's
    call to act or receive general guidance from ISIS members elsewhere in
    the world. The combination of Europe-based operatives and simpler
    tactics makes identifying, prioritizing, and disrupting these
    individuals' plots more difficult for our European partners to detect
    and, is a dynamic that the U.S. Government must consider in order to
    effectively aid our European counterparts in identifying and disrupting
    future attacks.
        ISIS's leveraging of criminal, familial, and communal ties
    contributes to its ability to advance plotting in Europe. Many
    operatives involved in attacks since 2015 have had similar histories of
    criminal involvement, often petty crime, before becoming radicalized.
        ISIS's cadre of foreign terrorist fighters remains key in planning
    and executing external attacks. While only three of the nearly 50
    attacks in Europe since 2015 involved foreign terrorist fighter
    returnees, those attacks caused over half of the fatalities, suggesting
    that combat experience plays a role in the success of a sophisticated
    attack. Two years ago, we confirmed that ISIS successfully sent several
    operatives--including at least two of the Paris attackers--from Syria
    to Western Europe by having them blend in with the flow of some 1
    million migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees who traveled from Turkey
    to Greece in 2015. We have not seen ISIS successfully replicate this
    attack method in more than a year, probably because of increased border
    security and information sharing among our European partners.
                                    al-qaeda
        We remain concerned about al-Qaeda's safe haven in Syria because of
    the presence of veteran al-Qaeda operatives there, some who have been
    part of the group since before the September 11 attacks, and who are
    exploiting the conflict there to threaten the United States and our
    allies.
        The Nusrah Front, also known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, is al-Qaeda's
    largest affiliate and one of the most capable armed groups operating in
    Syria. Its integration of al-Qaeda veterans provides the group with
    strategic guidance and enhances its standing within the al-Qaeda global
    movement. We believe the Nusrah Front's statement in July 2016
    announcing the separation of the group from the broader al-Qaeda
    movement was in name only and that Nusrah Front remains part of al-
    Qaeda, supporting its ideology and intent to target the West. We will
    continue our efforts to counter this group and the threats it poses to
    the West.
        Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the only known al-Qaeda
    affiliate to have attempted a directed attack against the United
    States, continues to exploit the conflict in Yemen to gain new recruits
    and secure areas of safe-haven, contributing to its enduring threat.
    The group continues to threaten and call for attacks against the United
    States in its prolific media production, which includes its English-
    language Inspire magazine providing instruction and ideological
    encouragement for individual actors.
        We have constrained al-Qaeda's effectiveness and its ability to
    recruit, train, and deploy operatives from its safe haven in South
    Asia; however, this does not mean that the threat from core al-Qaeda in
    the tribal areas of Pakistan or in eastern Afghanistan has been
    eliminated. We believe that al-Qaeda and its adherents in the region
    still aspire to conduct attacks and will remain a threat as long as the
    group can potentially regenerate capability to threaten the homeland
    with large-scale attacks. Al-Qaeda's allies in South Asia--particularly
    the Taliban and the Haqqani Network--also continue to present a high
    threat to our regional interests.
        We are also cognizant of the level of risk the United States may
    face over time if al-Qaeda regenerates, finds renewed safe haven, or
    restores lost capability. We are on alert for signs that al-Qaeda's
    capability to attack the West from South Asia is being restored and
    would warn immediately if we find trends in that direction.
        We also see increasing competition between violent extremist actors
    within South Asia itself, between and among the Taliban, ISIS's branch
    in South Asia, and al-Qaeda. This is an additional dynamic that we are
    working to understand. While conflict among terrorist groups may well
    distract them from their core mission of plotting attacks against
    Western targets, conflict also serves to introduce a degree of
    uncertainty into the terrorism landscape that raises questions that I
    don't think we have answers to yet. This is something we are watching
    very closely.
                                 hizballah/iran
        In keeping with the diverse set of threats we face, I would be
    remiss not to briefly call out the malign activities of Iran and its
    partner, Lebanese Hizballah. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of
    terrorism, providing financial aid, advanced weapons and tactics, and
    direction to militant and terrorist groups across the Middle East, all
    while it cultivates its own network of operatives across the globe as
    part of its international attack infrastructure.
        Lebanese Hizballah during recent years has demonstrated its intent
    to foment regional instability, by deploying thousands of fighters to
    Syria to fight for the Syrian regime; providing weapons, tactics, and
    direction to militant and terrorist groups in Iraq and Yemen; and
    deploying operatives to Azerbaijan, Egypt, Thailand, Cyprus, and Peru
    to lay the groundwork for attacks. The group also has devoted
    significant resources to expanding its arsenal, including advanced
    rocket and missile capabilities that threaten interests along the
    eastern Mediterranean and across the Arabian Peninsula.
        In the homeland, FBI's arrest in June of two operatives charged
    with working on behalf of Hizballah was a stark reminder of Hizballah's
    continued desire to maintain a global attack infrastructure that poses
    an enduring threat to our interests.
                                     trends
        Stepping back, the two trends in the contemporary threat
    environment that I highlighted before the committee last year continue
    to concern us. The first is the ability of terrorist actors to
    communicate with each other outside our reach with the use of encrypted
    communications. Most recently, terrorists have begun wide-spread use of
    private groups in encrypted applications to supplement traditional
    social media for sharing propaganda in an effort to circumvent the
    intelligence collection and private-sector disruption of their public
    accounts. As a result, collecting information on particular terrorist
    activities is increasingly difficult.
        The second is that we're seeing a proliferation of a rapidly-
    evolving threat or plot vectors that emerge simply by an individual
    encouraged or inspired to take action who then quickly gathers the few
    resources needed and moves into an operational phase. ISIS is aware of
    this, and those connected to the group have understood that by
    motivating actors in their own locations to take action against Western
    countries and targets, these actors can be effective, especially if
    they cannot travel abroad to ISIS-controlled areas. In terms of
    propaganda and recruitment, ISIS supporters can generate further
    support for their movement, even without carrying out catastrophic,
    mass-casualty attacks. This is an innovation in the terrorist playbook
    that poses a great challenge. Further, martyrdom videos and official
    ISIS claims of responsibility for inspired individuals' attacks
    probably allow the group to convey a greater impression of control over
    attacks in the West and maximize international media exposure.
                              terrorism prevention
        Given these groups' ability to be innovative, the whole-of-
    Government must respond with innovative approaches to prevent the
    radicalization to violence and recruitment to terrorism of individuals,
    specifically here in the homeland. I would like to talk a bit more
    about what NCTC is doing to prevent terrorism and the work that we
    assess still needs to be done.
        As a Federal Government, we have taken steps to organize and
    resource our efforts to prevent terrorism more effectively, under the
    leadership of DHS and the Department of Justice. We have been
    successful at helping provide communities with the information and
    tools they need to identify potential extremists and to engage with
    them before they reach the point of becoming an actual terrorist.
        NCTC accomplishes this mainly through a series of Community
    Awareness Briefings (CAB) and exercises that are produced and presented
    in cooperation with our interagency partners. As an example, the CAB,
    is an Unclassified presentation on radicalization to violence and
    violent extremist recruitment designed to build awareness and catalyze
    community efforts to prevent individuals from mobilizing to criminal
    activity or violence. We also developed the CAB ``Train-the-Presenter''
    Program, which is designed to train local officials to present the CAB
    themselves to local audiences. Recently, these were expanded to include
    all forms of violent extremism in the United States to respond to a
    growing demand from Federal, State, local, and community partners for
    tools that reflect the full domestic threat picture.
        I am proud of all of the good work our Government--to include my
    colleagues at NCTC--is doing to prevent terrorism here in the homeland,
    but the reality, as was so tragically demonstrated in New York, is that
    we have to do more. The scale at which we undertake these efforts is
    too limited, and it is certainly not sized to tackle the kind of
    problem we are experiencing here in the homeland today. But we do know
    this: Prevention work has a positive impact in the places where we have
    tried it, we are poised to receive significant metrics through the good
    work of DHS that will help us better evaluate these efforts, and
    violent extremism is not a monolith.
        The bottom line is that our Government's work to prevent all forms
    of violent extremism expands the counterterrorism toolkit beyond the
    hard power tools of disruption, it is resource-efficient, and enables
    local partners--including law enforcement, social services providers,
    schools, and communities--to create alternative pathways that can
    protect our youth from a variety of violent foreign and domestic
    ideologies. But, we need to reaffirm and expand our commitment to
    prevention, both resourcing it at the Federal, State, and local level,
    and maintaining a whole-of-Government effort to continue to keep
    Americans safe.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you one this
    morning. As you know, I have announced my retirement from Government
    service effective by the end of this year. It has been a pleasure to
    work with this committee and I appreciate your continued support for
    the counterterrorism mission.
        I am certain my successor, along with our FBI and DHS partners,
    will carry on the tireless work to defeat the efforts of terrorist
    groups around the globe and here at home. There is no doubt that the
    world today is more challenging and more dangerous. But I would also
    argue that we have more capacity to defend ourselves--more capacity to
    keep ourselves safe--than we have ever had before.
        It has been my privilege to work with the dedicated men and women
    of the National Counterterrorism Center and serving as the director of
    this extraordinary organization has been the greatest honor of my
    professional life.
        Thank you all very much, and I look forward to answering your
    questions.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Director. Thank you for your
    service to our country over the years.
        I now recognize myself for questions.
        Secretary Duke, we recently held a hearing with a TSA
    administrator. Nine-eleven was an aviation attack using
    airplanes as guided missiles into the World Trade Center and
    the Pentagon. This is still the crown jewel of ISIS and al-
    Qaeda. The inspector general produced a report on the findings
    in terms of screening at airports, and quite frankly, it was,
    in my words, at the last hearing, disturbing to find that the
    TSA still has received a failing grade, a failed report card,
    when it comes to screening. Now, we heard this in 2015, and now
    we are in 2017.
        As you know, with the laptop threat, the ability to convert
    laptops into bombs and explosive devices to blow up airplanes,
    possibly in-bound flights into the United States, I think I
    speak for almost every Member of this committee that we need to
    take quicker action. There is technology available today. There
    are pilot programs today using computer tomography. It is like
    going from an X-ray to an MRI.
        Now, a lot of us in the committee have seen this, and so I
    sent to you a letter requesting that this technology be
    deployed, not in 2018 or 2019, but as soon as possible, given
    the nature of the threat that exists. Now, can you respond to
    that letter?
        Ms. Duke. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We agree with you that
    computer topography, or CT, is essential as part of our plan to
    raise the baseline of aviation security. We are currently
    developing the algorithms necessary to fully deploy that, and
    agree with you, it is essential for our TSA future.
        Chairman McCaul. What the administrator said was, well, we
    can't deploy the technology today because we would have to
    upgrade the software later. I think we should look at it from
    the other way around. We should deploy the technology today and
    stop procuring these X-ray machines. Deploy that technology
    today and then upgrade the software when it comes available at
    a later date.
        Do you have any thoughts on that?
        Ms. Duke. Yes, I agree. We are moving--we are already
    procuring some. Like I said, the algorithms are running
    different materials through to make sure that the machines can
    detect what we need them to detect. That is in process now, and
    we are, along with our foreign partners, working on making that
    the new standard for passenger baggage.
        Chairman McCaul. I believe that is one of the greatest
    threats to the homeland today. So we will be providing follow-
    up.
        To Director Wray and Rasmussen, you know, the 5 years in my
    Chairmanship on this committee I saw the rise of ISIS and the
    rise of the caliphate and the rise of external operations and
    the threats coming out of that region. I think, fortunately, we
    are now seeing the fall of the caliphate, the defeat of ISIS in
    Iraq and Syria. But how do you see this threat evolving as we
    move on post-caliphate?
        Director Wray.
        Mr. Wray. Mr. Chairman, I think as Director Rasmussen said
    at the beginning, on the one hand, the collapse or the building
    collapse of the caliphate is good news. But I think the way we
    are concerned about a number of different things that could
    come out of that. One is, of course, what everybody in the
    world is concerned about is foreign fighters returning. I think
    in our instance, what we are primarily seeing there as a risk
    is that some of them would return, not directly to the United
    States, but perhaps to countries, say in Europe, and then from
    there, come into the United States.
        Second, we are concerned about home-grown violent
    extremists who continue to be inspired by ISIS, even if not
    directed in the sort-of classic sense. We know that ISIS is
    encouraging fighters who aspired to travel to stay where they
    are and commit attacks at home. So those are some of the issues
    that I think continue to exist, even with the caliphate
    collapsing.
        Chairman McCaul. Well, and I think the power of ISIS as
    opposed to al-Qaeda is the internet. I know you have worked
    with Google, Facebook, Twitter; I have as well. I look forward
    to working with you and the Secretary to try to get this stuff,
    and NCTC, off of the internet.
        Director Rasmussen.
        Mr. Rasmussen. I would echo everything Director Wray said,
    and just make one simple analytic point about a distinction
    that we have observed between al-Qaeda and ISIS over the years.
    Al-Qaeda operated, in most ways, as a clandestine covert
    organization with barriers to entry that made it difficult for
    individuals in many cases to become members. ISIS sought to
    become a mass movement. It sought to reach people, regardless
    of their prior affiliation with extremism, and to literally
    recruit anyone who would come in the door and agree to align
    with the ISIS world view. That means that the ISIS variant of
    this problem has brought us many more individuals who are
    radicalized around the world. So it is a problem that extends
    further and wider than the al-Qaeda problem that we face. That
    is not to stay it is all bad news. There is plenty we have done
    to mitigate the possibility of a large-scale catastrophic
    attack, the kind of directed attacks that Director Wray spoke
    about earlier, so I am not here to solely point to a bad news
    story. I am just pointing out that it is a different kind of
    problem today than what we faced a few years ago.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
        Final question. Secretary Duke, my home State was hit--was
    devastated by Hurricane Harvey, parts of my district. Some
    Members on this committee have been there many times to see the
    devastation. I understand the decision perhaps was not yours
    but made of OMB, the office of OMB, but I have to just express
    my disappointment on the record at the recent $44 billion, I
    think, disaster recovery supplemental request. It was just a
    fraction of what my Governor, Governor Abbott, determined that
    Texas alone needed to recover. Does not adequately take into
    account the devastation in the other areas as well. Of course,
    places in my district have flooded three times over the last 2
    years. We need flood mitigation efforts. This is something that
    Congress will be making decisions on, but we have to entertain,
    not only the response recovery, but the flood mitigation.
        I would like you to respond to that, recognizing that this
    was not probably your decision to make, but I do want to
    register my disappointment with the administration on this
    issue.
        Ms. Duke. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I recognize that the amount in
    the supplemental did not totally address all the future needs
    of the disasters we experienced this summer. What that was
    intended to do is fund the Stafford Act work that needs to be
    done. Currently, I have looked at it, and I think it is
    appropriate and it is enough for the near term. We do have more
    work to do, along with the housing and urban development, and
    will be with Texas and the other areas until that work is done.
    I think that the innovative housing program we are doing that,
    what is known as the section 428 housing program, is going to
    be really helpful in restoring Texas.
        Chairman McCaul. Well, thank you. I look forward to working
    with you on that. Thank you.
        With that, the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In light
    of your question, one of the on-going challenges we have is
    that Stafford Act jurisdiction is in the Transportation and
    Infrastructure Committee, and FEMA is over here with us. Every
    time a problem comes up, people look to us and it is where T&I
    comes. So that is an on-going battle that we have dealt with
    from our inception as a committee, and I hope some of this gets
    resolved fairly soon.
        Ms. Duke, the inspector general recently notified Congress
    that a report on the travel ban was being held up in your
    office. Can you provide us details on why it is being held up?
        Ms. Duke. There was a disagreement between the Office of
    the Inspector General and DHS on privileges, that included
    attorney-client privileges and executive privileges. Because
    the Attorney General does not agree with those privileges, had
    not issued the report. We feel it is important to maintain some
    of those privileges, especially since the matter addressed by
    the report is under litigation.
        I feel comfortable that the privileges we had to assert to
    the report were accurate. However, to be absolutely sure and
    make sure the public is confident too, we have ordered a third-
    party review, independent review, to make sure that the
    privileges that we need to redact that report are sound.
        Mr. Thompson. But you are aware that the inspector general
    concluded that the Department violated certain aspects of the
    law relative to the implementation of it?
        Ms. Duke. The report itself was based on decision making
    that, you know, by practices is executive privilege. So it was
    problematic from the start, but we still are committed to
    working with the Attorney General and making sure that----
        Mr. Thompson. I understand. But you are aware of their
    conclusion?
        Ms. Duke. Yes, I am. Yes.
        Mr. Thompson. All right. Thank you.
        Mr. Wray, good to see you again, since we met in another
    forum yesterday. Can you share with us your analysis of the
    domestic terrorism threat here in America, and what does it
    include?
        Mr. Wray. Yes, Ranking Member Thompson. As we have
    discussed a few times I think, the FBI assesses the domestic
    terrorist threat to be a significant one, a major one. It
    presents some of the same kind of challenges that we see with
    home-grown violent extremists in that you are talking about
    loosely confederated people with less communication, less
    sophistication in the plotting of the attacks. Sometimes you
    have lone offenders, so-called lone wolves, some people like to
    use that expression, which makes it more challenging from a
    detection and prevention perspective.
        At any given time, including right as we sit here today,
    the FBI recently has had in the neighborhood of about 1,000
    pending domestic terrorism investigations. Those cover the
    waterfront, from everything from white supremacists and
    sovereign citizens, militias, all the way to anarchists,
    environmental extremists, et cetera. But the key point with all
    of them is that we are only focused on people who are engaged
    in violent criminal activity. That is what we are
    investigating, that is what we are focused on. We are not
    focused on ideology or opinion or rhetoric.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Can you provide the committee with
    the most recent reporting on the categorization of those
    different terrorists?
        Mr. Wray. I would be happy to have my staff get together
    with yours and see if we can get you some more helpful and
    detailed information on that.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you. One of the things for our
    departing NCTC director that the FBI director talked about was
    home-grown violent extremism. You referenced that in your
    testimony as part of that three-legged stool that you have been
    concerned about. Can you share with us why that is a concern of
    yours?
        Mr. Rasmussen. Absolutely, Mr. Ranking Member. As Director
    Wray noted, many of the individuals who we categorize as home-
    grown violent extremists don't typically engage in the kind of
    behavior that makes detection and disruption easy for the law
    enforcement and intelligence community. They aren't necessarily
    communicating, they aren't necessarily gathering in large
    groups, they aren't necessarily traveling to conflict zones or
    engaging in the kind of behavior that would be good predictors
    that someone might be interested in carrying out a terrorist
    attack. So that puts a tremendous amount of pressure on law
    enforcement at the local level and certainly my FBI colleagues
    to try to figure out who is the person who is just there
    dabbling and sampling and looking at material, and who it the
    person that is actually looking to maybe mobilize and actually
    act on their beliefs and carry out a terrorist attack. So that
    becomes a much different challenge, a much more difficult
    challenge than what we face typically in trying to disrupt
    sleeper--so-called sleeper cells or other terrorist cells that
    might have infiltrated the country from abroad. It is just a
    harder problem.
        Mr. Thompson. So is your testimony that we need more
    funding to address that increasing home-grown terror threat in
    this country since you have identified it as a growing
    vulnerability for us as a country?
        Mr. Rasmussen. I wouldn't necessarily pose it as being only
    measured in funding. I think about the communities around the
    country where I have had conversations with local law
    enforcement, and they clearly desire greater Federal help, I
    believe, in understanding the threat landscape and
    understanding how it is that these home-grown violent
    extremists appear in their midst. So if we can do that through
    information sharing, if we can do that through sharing of
    personnel and best practices, then that to me would be a
    contribution.
        I just don't think--I think the scale of the problem is
    such that we have to put more effort behind it. I wouldn't
    isolate funding alone as the issue.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Alabama, Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wray, in October 2015, Director Comey was testifying
    before this committee, and I asked him if he had the resources
    he needed to handle the terrorism investigations that were
    pending before them, and also to investigate the surge of
    attacks on soft targets that were occurring at the time. His
    response was, ``To be honest, I don't know.''
        So I know the FBI has been stretched thin over the last few
    years and had to pull agents off criminal investigations to
    look into these terrorist attacks. But I would pose that
    question to you. I know you have only been there 3 months, but
    have you been able to determine whether or not you have the
    resources you need to meet the challenges that you face?
        Mr. Wray. Well, at the risk of sounding like my
    predecessor, but combined with the fact that I have only been
    there for 3 months, I am still taking stock of that. I will
    tell you that everywhere I turn, I find people who want the FBI
    to do more of something, and some day I would like to find
    somebody who would identify something they would like the FBI
    to do less of. I haven't met that person yet. So we have a lot
    of challenges, as you say.
        I think we have matured to the point where we are not
    having to pull people off of programs quite the same way that
    used to happen. I think as Director Rasmussen said, it is not
    just a question of funding; I am not convinced we can spend our
    way out of the threat. Some of it is getting smarter, some of
    it is working better collaboratively. I am very pleased with
    how much better the FBI, which wasn't always that way in long
    times past, working with its partners in the Federal law
    enforcement, intelligence community, foreign partners, State
    and local law enforcement, in particular. So we had to be
    smarter, we had to get better technology, and we had to make
    sure we have the right resources. Could we do more if we had
    more? Absolutely.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, we need you to let us know. If you get to
    the point that you determine that you need additional resources
    to be able to meet your needs, we can't fix it if we don't know
    about it, and try to get you what you need. So I would ask you
    to not be shy.
        Mr. Wray. Thank you for your support.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        Secretary Duke, welcome back. A lot of work has gone into
    improving our visa security process, but it is clear that
    vulnerabilities remain, especially identifying those who are
    radicalized over the internet. So can you tell us what, if
    anything, is being done to connect the USCIS and the visa
    process to the latest intelligence to help vet applicants from
    high-risk areas?
        Ms. Duke. Sure. We have instituted many new visa review
    steps that are going to help with making sure that we have the
    true identity of the persons that are applying for visas, and
    also that they don't have a criminal purpose in coming here.
        One of the biggest things we are doing is the 100 percent
    interviews, and also looking at advanced information sharing.
    As we talk about some of the other topics, the speed we are
    moving at, having that information sharing with the other
    countries is absolutely critical, and doing the vetting against
    the databases. Also, social media checks, where applicable,
    have played a huge role in better vetting of visa applicants.
    Those are a few of the areas.
        Mr. Rogers. OK. This may not be dramatically different from
    that answer, but what steps is DHS taking under the Trump
    administration to develop and implement what he has referred to
    as extreme vetting?
        Ms. Duke. Well, it has been a multi-level step. First, we
    decided what vetting should be, what additional steps should we
    take in vetting people. Then we compared the country's
    performance.
        Mr. Rogers. What were those additional steps?
        Ms. Duke. Those additional steps were making sure that
    passports had biometrics, that we had copies of those
    passports, that countries provided us advance information,
    those similar types of steps. We have a full report on that
    that we can provide. Then we compared the--and the country's
    actually using our databases and us using theirs. Then we
    compared the country's performance against that, and we have
    instituted get-well plans, if you will, for the countries that
    don't fully conform to the new vetting standards.
        Mr. Rogers. So would you assert then that this new status
    of extreme vetting is fully implemented now?
        Ms. Duke. It is fully implemented. We always have to get
    better. I think that every time we put a fix in place, the
    enemy gets--adapts to it, but it is in place.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
    here, and thank you for your service. It is much appreciated.
        Secretary Duke, you mentioned that terrorists will use any
    weapon at their disposal, you know, on different terrorist
    threats, so I have a question for Director Wray in that regard.
    There is tens of thousands of individuals, and many of the
    attacks we are talking about, guns were clearly a part of this,
    and firearms and weapons. Tens of thousands of individuals
    removed from the NICS background check, the National Instant
    Criminal Background Check, for guns after the FBI changed its
    interpretation of and limited who is considered a fugitive from
    justice. That decision was made in February. It is now
    December. We have no idea how many people bought firearms this
    year, even though there are outstanding warrants for their
    arrest, just because there is no evidence they crossed State
    lines.
        Now, how did this decision come to be? Isn't this a gap in
    trying to secure our safety and trying to keep these kind of
    weapons away from terrorists and their--you know, we have
    websites that are telling people and directing people how to
    get these kind of weapons, but we have fugitives from justice
    now in our own country that aren't being picked up by the NICS
    system now. Could you just tell us why that was done, and if
    there is something to fix this gap, which I think is a very
    serious one?
        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Congressman. The change that you are
    referring to was the product of several years' long debate, as
    I understand it, between the FBI and the ATF about the
    interpretation of that prohibiter, the fugitive prohibiter
    under the Brady Act. The FBI interpreted it as not requiring
    crossing of State lines, and the ATF had interpreted it
    differently. Under the prior administration, the Justice
    Department came down with a legal determination, prompted in
    part by the inspector general, and resolved that legal
    disagreement about what the statute meant in favor of the
    narrower interpretation that is different from the FBI's
    interpretation at the time.
        So I think it was in January that that change was--legal
    change was declared. The Department, again, under the prior
    administration, as I understand it, sent a notification to both
    the House and Senate Judiciary Committees notifying them of the
    change and the impact of the change and, essentially, inviting
    legislative fix. So it may be the kind of thing that can be
    addressed through legislation. But once that change went in
    place, the FBI promptly complied.
        Mr. Keating. Well, thank you for clarifying that. So that
    is on our watch now as Members of Congress to change this, and
    I hope we do.
        Secretary Duke, thank you too for clarifying and agreeing
    to move forward on the CT technology and getting that in the
    field. That is something our last hearing really had a great
    concern about. Thank you for doing that. But Administrator
    Pekoske too said that the other issue is a budgetary issue in
    moving these things forward. I realized through, you know, the
    monies that people pay for a fee outside of things on their own
    as they board airplanes, that that money was moved, again by
    Congress, away from that.
        But can you tell us right now, if we provided that
    budgetary assistance, you would be able to move quicker for
    that new technology in the field. Do you agree with the
    administrator on that?
        Ms. Duke. Yes. We have the money to deploy, to build out
    complete research and development and deploy some machines. You
    know, as the FBI director said, there is always more to do, but
    right now, I feel comfortable that we are deploying that
    technology. We also have the commitment of some of our foreign
    partners.
        Mr. Keating. If I could, my time is running out. If indeed
    there were more money--he indicated it is a budgetary issue as
    well. Is that correct?
        Ms. Duke. It is a prioritization issue, yes.
        Mr. Keating. All right. I think it is a priority, if we are
    going to keep our people safe here in this country that are
    traveling in the airlines.
        Quickly, the NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in terms
    of cyber attacks, has tried to upgrade requirements for nuclear
    plants. I have one in my district facing, in a few years,
    decommission, and they have applied for a waiver away from
    these cybersecurity upgrades so that it is not there for an
    attack.
        It is my understanding that Homeland Security really
    doesn't have the role, that it is really the NRC. Don't you
    think you should have a direct role in this? I think you
    should. I don't think the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the
    right agency by itself to be making those kind of safety
    considerations in terms of a cyber attack.
        Ms. Duke. Yes. To my knowledge, you are correct, that we
    don't have that specific role in waiving. We do assist the
    critical infrastructure sectors, but do not have that direct
    regulatory role.
        Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. I would like to engage your
    office in terms of trying to suggest ways to shore that up. It
    is another gaping hole.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
        Just a quick clarification, Madam Secretary. Are the monies
    available today to purchase the computer tomography technology?
        Ms. Duke. We have some funding for the CT technology. We do
    not have the funding to deploy it at every airport.
        Chairman McCaul. Would that require a reprogramming by
    Congress?
        Ms. Duke. That would require--to buy for every airport
    would require much more than a reprogramming.
        Chairman McCaul. OK. I would like to follow up with you at
    a later date on that. Thank you so much.
        Ms. Duke. OK.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
        Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, ladies and
    gentlemen, for your attendance and your service.
        Secretary Duke, you talked a little bit about the vetting
    process and the extreme vetting process a little bit. I would
    just like to drill down on that a little bit and ask you: Is
    there a system to investigate or at least query in a minimal
    sense, at least, the intending entrance for an ideological
    affinity to some other alien or hostile legal system opposed to
    the U.S. Constitution, similar to what was done by the United
    States during the Cold War with some of our adversaries whose
    potential entrants wanted to come into our country?
        Ms. Duke. Yes. An affiliation with an ideology or a country
    that is known for ideologies that are contrary to the United
    States is something we look at in terms of the extreme vetting.
        Mr. Perry. So there is literally a question-and-answer
    portion to that? Or when you say you look at it, what does that
    mean in practical terms?
        Ms. Duke. One of the things we look at is where a person
    has traveled to, and if they show a travel pattern in countries
    that have a high degree of terrorism, we look at that. We also
    look at social media, if appropriate, to see if there is
    anything on it that indicates they are following terrorists
    websites, those type of things, for example.
        Mr. Perry. Well, not only just terrorist websites, but
    things that are antithetical to the West and democracy and our
    Constitution is what I would be interested in as well. Not only
    just terrorism, but that. I am wondering, do you literally
    question them? As opposed to just looking at their travel and
    maybe social postings, do you ask them: Do you agree with the
    United States Constitution? Would you uphold and defend the
    United States Constitution? Do you believe that sharia law
    should supersede, for instance, the Constitution?
        Ms. Duke. I do not know the specific questions of the
    interview, but I can get back to you. I do know they adapt
    based on the person's scenario.
        Mr. Perry. Absolutely. I appreciate it, and I will look
    forward to a continuing conversation on that.
        Director Wray, thanks for your service. Good luck to you.
    Just curious if you can tell me if the FBI has taken any steps
    to reverse the previous administration's purge of training
    courses and information about Islamism, jihad, sharia, and the
    Muslim Brotherhood?
        Mr. Wray. Congressman, I am not aware of any on-going
    efforts to purge training material.
        Mr. Perry. They were purged in the last administration. So
    my question is: Have you taken any steps or has the FBI, as you
    know it, taken any steps to reverse that purge or include some
    of those things that allow us to see in totality the threat
    that faces America?
        Mr. Wray. I have not studied what has been done in the
    training, but I appreciate your bringing that issue to my
    attention and I am happy to take a hard look at it.
        Mr. Perry. OK. If we could have a continuing conversation
    on that as well, I would appreciate it.
        Director, antifa operates across the United States in ways
    that involve, at least potentially, criminal inter-State
    activities, such as inciting riot and conspiracy to incite
    riotous behavior. I am wondering if the FBI is doing anything
    to counter antifa in that regard, including and investigating
    their funding sources?
        Mr. Wray. As I mentioned to Ranking Member Thompson, we do
    have a very active domestic terrorism program. While we are not
    investigating antifa as antifa, that is an ideology and we
    don't investigate ideologies, we are investigating a number of
    what we would call anarchist extremists investigations, where
    we have properly predicated subjects of people who are
    motivated to commit violent criminal activity on kind-of an
    antifa ideology. So we have a number of active investigations
    in that space all around the country.
        Mr. Perry. So that space would include individuals, but if
    a group itself, even though, like you said, it is an ideology,
    but if the group is receiving funding to promote that ideology,
    which is not congruent with the law, is that something that you
    delve into, especially when it crosses State lines?
        Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, any time we are doing a domestic
    terrorism investigation, whether it is just into an individual
    or to, let's say, a collection of individuals, we do enterprise
    investigations when there are multiple individuals working
    together. The funding that supports violent criminal activity
    is absolutely something we are keenly interested in.
        Mr. Perry. OK, I appreciate it.
        Finally, Director Rasmussen, regarding antifa and their
    international networks, can you describe how the NCTC acts to
    counter them, if you do?
        Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you for the question, but we actually
    don't. With respect to domestic terrorism issues here in the
    United States, my agency's mandate and authorities are limited
    to matters of international terrorism, and that was in the
    founding legislation that created NCTC. So we defer to FBI in
    this role.
        Mr. Perry. So if there are international connections to
    these groups that are operating domestically, you turn that
    over, you don't take any----
        Mr. Rasmussen. Well, certainly, if there was intelligence
    that tied any individual here in the United States to a foreign
    terrorist organization, that changes the nature of the problem
    and becomes very much a collaborative effort with the FBI.
        Mr. Perry. But if it is not a foreign terrorist
    organization, but foreign organizations or foreign funding,
    does that invoke your authority?
        Mr. Rasmussen. Not to my--I don't believe so, unless it
    would involve a foreign terrorist organization. But if that
    kind of intelligence were to emerge, we would certainly make
    sure our FBI colleagues were aware of it.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, sir.
        I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
    New York, Miss Rice.
        Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So this question is for Director Wray. Earlier this week,
    Karim Baratov, a Canadian citizen, pled guilty to charges that
    he worked for the Russian intelligence service, FSB, as part of
    the 2013 Yahoo hack that led to the theft of 500 million Yahoo
    accounts, one of the largest cyber breaches in history. Three
    other conspirators, including two Russian FSB officers, have
    been indicted, but have evaded arrest. This case is the first
    time the United States has issued criminal charges against
    Russian officials for a cyber attack, even though Russian
    aggression has continued to rise in that area.
        We have seen large-scale cyber attacks on U.S. companies
    Equifax, Uber, Verizon. They are just some of the biggest
    breaches this year. What other cyber attacks do you suspect
    Russian involvement in?
        Mr. Wray. Well, without commenting on any specific
    investigation, I think you have put your finger on what we view
    as one of the more dangerous emerging threats, which we refer
    to as a blended threat, which is the--and it is particularly
    seen in the exact example that you mentioned, the Yahoo attack,
    where you have the blend of a nation-state actor, in that case
    the Russian intelligence service, using the assistance of
    criminal hackers, which you think of almost like mercenaries
    being used to commit cyber attacks.
        One of the reasons we thought that bringing that particular
    case was important, even though, as you say, some of the
    defendants are Russian Government officials who are safely in
    Russia, was to try to highlight to the public the importance of
    being vigilant on this threat. So we are seeing emergence of
    that kind of collaboration, which used to be two separate
    things, really, sort of nation-state actors and criminal
    hackers. Now there is this collusion, if you will, that is
    occurring on a number of instances.
        Miss Rice. What do you think Russia's motivation is for
    these attacks?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I think Russia is attempting to assert its
    place in the world and relying more creatively on a form of
    asymmetric warfare to damage and weaken this country
    economically and otherwise.
        Miss Rice. We have been focused today on terrorist threats
    at home and abroad. Should the American people consider
    Russia's repeated attempts to breach their personal data as a
    terrorist threat?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I think it is certainly a threat we should
    take seriously as a National security matter or a homeland
    security matter. I don't know that we would brand it a
    terrorist threat, but I think that, to me, is sort-of a
    labeling issue more than anything else. It certainly is a very
    serious threat that the public needs to be aware of and that we
    are all working collectively to try to do more to combat.
        Miss Rice. I guess it depends on what you feel the
    motivation is at the end of the day, what their motivation is,
    and is this just a part of getting to that ultimate goal?
        What steps are you taking to, in your department, taking to
    deter these attacks? No. 1. Do you expect any future
    indictments of Russian officials, without naming any? Last--or
    just on this part of the question, do you believe that they
    will ever be extradited and brought to the United States for
    trial?
        Mr. Wray. Well, taking you to the last part of your
    question first, we don't have an extradition relationship with
    Russia. So if they stay in Russia, I wouldn't necessarily
    expect to see them coming to the United States. On the other
    hand, if they travel, that is going to be a challenge for them,
    because they are now, at that point, fugitives wanted by the
    FBI.
        Miss Rice. Would we pursue them then?
        Mr. Wray. Absolutely.
        As far as what we are doing, we have tried to model more
    and more our cyber efforts along the sort-of more developed
    front that we have in the terrorism space. So we have--just
    like we have JTTFs in all 56 offices, we have cyber task forces
    in all 56 field offices that are multi-agency, that have 184
    different agencies participating.
        We have something called CyWatch, which is a lot like our
    National terrorism watch, where we coordinate closely with DHS
    and others. We are trying to do more private-sector outreach,
    because one of the things that is different in the cyber space
    than the terrorist, is the need to kind-of work with the
    private sector.
        Miss Rice. I am glad to hear you say that, because I think
    that is a great idea.
        Finally, Russia's interference in the 2016 election was an
    unprecedented attack on our democracy. What are you,
    specifically your agency, doing to protect our election systems
    in 2018?
        You know, the Chairman has been really, I think, bravely
    outspoken on this issue in talking about how this is not a
    political issue, it is an American issue. It is a democratic
    issue. Are you working with social media companies to prevent
    the dissemination of Russian fake news and limit the effects of
    Russian trolls?
        Mr. Wray. So first, needless to say, I take any effort to
    interfere with our election system by Russia or any other
    nation-state or any non-nation-state extremely seriously
    because it strikes right at the heart of who we are as a
    country. We have, at the FBI, we are focused very much forward-
    looking on the next, you know, couple of election cycles.
        So we are doing a couple of things. We have a foreign-
    influence task force that I have stood up inside the FBI that
    brings together different divisions of the FBI, because it is a
    multidisciplinary kind of problem. So it has got a
    counterintelligence dimension, a cyber dimension, a criminal
    investigation dimension. We coordinate closely with DHS, which
    has responsibility for the critical infrastructure dimension of
    our election system.
        We are coordinating with our foreign partners because,
    happily for me, we don't have elections every year in this
    country, but other countries do, and we can learn from what
    Russians and other countries are trying to do with other
    elections in terms of the tradecraft, et cetera. So we are
    trying to kind of get in front of it and figure out and be on
    the lookout for efforts to interfere going forward. So that is,
    at a high level, a summary of what we are doing.
        Miss Rice. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
    Donovan.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you
    for what you do to protect our Nation, and the sacrifices you
    and your families make for our families.
        Secretary Duke, you noted in your testimony that you are
    rethinking homeland security for a new age. In many cases,
    however, DHS is still operating on the same authority that it
    was issued 15 years ago. Our role, we have to ensure that you
    have the tools and the resources you need to address the ever-
    changing threatened landscape in our Nation.
        As you know, earlier this year, this committee, under the
    leadership of Chairman McCaul, crafted, and the House of
    Representatives approved, the first-ever comprehensive DHS
    reauthorization bill. The bill authorizes vital grant programs
    for first responders. It enhances intelligence and information
    sharing, and it provides authorities for a number of DHS
    components, like ICE, CIS, and the Coast Guard.
        What effect will this reauthorization bill have on the
    Department's ability to meet its mission? How important is it
    that the Senate expeditiously acts on this piece of legislation
    for you in your efforts of the brave women and men who work for
    you?
        Ms. Duke. Thank you. We think the reauthorization bill is
    very important to DHS, and what it will do is it will help us
    partner with Congress in terms of prioritizing and making sure
    that we are focused with laser vision on the homeland security
    issues that face our country. So I think it is very important
    because this is an enduring threat, and to make sure that we
    are unified and focused would be one of the most significant
    effects.
        Mr. Donovan. How is the lack of action over in the Senate
    and the lack of the reauthorization bill that we passed
    handcuffing, curtailing your efforts in what you are trying to
    achieve for our Nation right now?
        Ms. Duke. I think with a lack of authorization, we have
    many different opinions and jurisdictions over what should be
    the priorities for our Nation. So it makes it more complicated
    to move forward crisply and clearly, especially on both the
    authorization and on the appropriations side. Where do we put
    that next dollar toward what risk in which way?
        Mr. Donovan. It sounds to me like there is a lack of
    certainty of what the future will hold for the agency unless
    Congress acts to allow you to plan and prepare for the future.
        Ms. Duke. Yes. It certainly--it does cause--it is a lack of
    clarity, definitely.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much.
        Director, I welcome my fellow New Yorker.
        Ranking Member Thompson and my colleague from Pennsylvania,
    Mr. Perry, were speaking about this crossing of State lines for
    rioting and matters that you are facing now. I am always
    concerned about people using disguises and masks, like they did
    at the Berkeley riots, preventing their identity from being
    revealed to law enforcement.
        We are a legislative body that is charged with creating
    laws to help you protect our Nation. I have always asked
    witnesses at hearings, what tools do you need? What could this
    committee do? What could Congress do to aid the brave agents
    that work for you? What laws would you like to see us create
    that will help you address some of these things, like people
    crossing State lines for rioting, enhancing Federal sentencing
    for that, disguising their identities during these riots?
        I know there are some local laws. I was the prosecutor--I
    was the elected DA, one of the five DAs of New York City for 12
    years. What could we do for you to help you in the efforts to
    protect our Nation and our families?
        Mr. Wray. Needless to say, Congressman, that is a question
    I would love to answer for hours. So I appreciate the question.
    I think, looking down at the clock with the 45 seconds
    remaining, the thing I would say more than anything else, I
    would urge every Member of this committee to support
    reauthorization of section 702, and not to erode the important
    tool that we have there.
        Just to give some context, the reason why that is so
    important, the FBI's ability to query its own database, which
    is what 702 allows us to do, is picture a situation where some
    person in this country buys a huge amount of hydrogen peroxide.
    Nothing wrong with that, necessarily, but we know hydrogen
    peroxide is a precursor for terrorist attacks. It can also be
    used for other things.
        So if the merchant sends the FBI a tip that, hey, somebody
    brought an unusual amount of hydrogen peroxide, here is the
    email address for it, right now, under 702, the FBI agent doing
    a National security investigation can run that email address.
    If it turns out that that person is in contact with a known
    ISIS recruiter overseas, suddenly, that purchase becomes a lot
    more important and we can mobilize the scarce resources we have
    talked about in a way to make that a priority.
        If 702 is eroded, we lose that ability and we make people
    less safe. So there are a lot of tools I think we could add,
    but right now, I am very focused on not losing the one that we
    need and that we have already. Thank you.
        Mr. Donovan. Wonderful. Thank you again for your service.
    By the way, Bill Sweeney is a great SAC in New York. Unless you
    are going to promote him, leave him there, OK? Thank you.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Mr. Correa.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Thompson, for holding this important hearing.
        One of the very important purposes of this committee is to
    assess and address all threats posed to our country. Given the
    ISIS-style attack in Charlottesville by white supremacists, I
    asked this committee to hold a hearing on white supremacists
    terrorism.
        In February 2015, the Department of Homeland Security
    issued an intelligence assessment warning that sovereign
    citizen extremist ideology would prompt violence across the
    United States. In May 2017, the Joint Intelligence Bulletin
    produced by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security
    stated that white supremacists were responsible for 49
    homicides and 26 attacks from 2000 to 2016, more than any other
    domestic extreme movement.
        We must not take our eyes off the ball in regard to threats
    posed to our country. We were unprepared for 9/11, and there is
    no excuse if we are not prepared for another large-scale attack
    like that of Oklahoma City. With that being said, I want to
    thank the FBI and the other agencies.
        I have a New York Times article from August that says,
    ``Bombing plot in Oklahoma City is stopped with the arrest, FBI
    says.'' This individual was looking to take out many, many
    people. It says here Mr. Varnell espoused an anti-Government
    ideology and had expressed an interest in carrying out an
    attack that would echo the bombing of the Federal building in
    Oklahoma City in April 1995 that killed almost 170 people.
        So thank you very much for that very good work, to you and
    the other agencies.
        Director Wray, and Acting Secretary Duke, as you know,
    Congress passed Senate Joint Resolution 49 that was signed by
    the President in September. It condemned the racist violence
    and domestic terror attacks in Charlottesville, and urged the
    President and the administration to use all available resources
    to address a growing prevalence of domestic terrorist groups.
        My questions are, are you in your organizations doing
    anything differently since this resolution was signed?
        Ms. Duke. We support the FBI strongly. I think what we have
    done recently is make sure that we are doing the training and
    the information sharing with the State and local governments.
    We believe that with both domestic terrorism and home-grown
    violent extremists, two different groups, but they are both
    decentralized, and we need the State and local governments,
    especially the local, to be one part. So we are working
    closely----
        Mr. Correa. Acting Secretary, you mentioned earlier as well
    that there was a blurring of lines between domestic and
    international activities. So following up on your coordination
    of locals, do you also--have you put that same effort, will you
    put that same effort in coordinating with our allies and our
    neighbors to the north and to the south?
        Your predecessor here, in this committee, said if those
    threats get to the border, we have essentially lost the fight.
    So, what are we doing to make sure these terrorist threats
    don't get even close to our borders?
        Ms. Duke. The most important thing is information sharing
    and partnering. We need to know about them early on before they
    board planes, before they move.
        Mr. Correa. So are you working with our allies and our
    neighbors to the north and south?
        Ms. Duke. Absolutely. North and south, and also the
    European Union and other European countries. But definitely,
    Canada, Mexico, the Northern Triangle, and South America.
        Mr. Correa. Sir.
        Mr. Wray. So on the white supremacists threat in particular
    in the wake of Charlottesville, we had a conference call with
    all of the SACs, you know, from around the country trying to
    make sure that they had learned--they could learn from the
    experience in Charlottesville, in particular, and people were
    pooling ideas and information about things they were seeing.
        We have JTTFs in every field office, and they have that as
    one of their specific areas of focus.
        Mr. Correa. So I would ask both of you, are you doing
    anything different in terms of following databases, updating
    databases, trying to track white supremacists groups in the
    United States, compared as to the efforts you would put to
    track ISIS-style terrorists that are threatening our citizens?
        I believe both of those groups pose equal threats. An
    American citizen that loses their life to a terrorist attack,
    whether it is motivated by ISIS or it is motivated by white
    supremacists, it doesn't matter, it is still a tragedy in our
    society and our country. So are you doing anything to refocus
    to make sure that these white supremacist groups are being
    followed and being monitored as you would any other group?
        Ms. Duke. One of the major things we have done very
    recently is open the Office of Terrorism Prevention
    Partnerships, which is making sure every piece of information
    we get, the State and local governments have to be at the point
    to notice and deal with any types of hate crimes in these
    groups. Training and information sharing are two of our major
    efforts.
        Mr. Wray. We have stepped up investigative interest, but we
    do not, as I think you may know, we do not, on the domestic
    terrorism front, investigate groups in the same way. In other
    words, because of the First Amendment issues and the freedom of
    expression issues and the somewhat ugly history that the FBI
    has had in the past, we have very specific rules on the
    domestic terrorism front where, in order to open an
    investigation, there has to be credible evidence of Federal
    crime, a threat of force or violence to further a political or
    social goal. If we have all of those three things, then we open
    a very aggressive investigation.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but
    I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit this statement
    for the record. It is by Dr. Erroll Southers from University of
    Southern California. It is a statement, ``World-wide Threats
    Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terrorism.''
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you.
        [The information follows:]
              Submitted for the Record by Honorable J. Luis Correa
       Statement of Dr. Erroll G. Southers, Professor of the Practice of
     Governance, Director, Safe Communities Institute, Director, Homegrown
         Violent Extremism Studies, Sol Price School of Public Policy,
                       University of Southern California
                               September 12, 2017
        Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members
    of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this
    statement. The purpose of this statement is to offer insight into the
    current landscape of domestic terrorism and offer considerations for
    facilitating positive outcomes going forward.
                                  introduction
        The ``Unite the Right rally'' in Charlottesville, Virginia, on
    August 12 ended in an ISIS-style attack, which was glaring evidence
    that the American white nationalist movements have learned from foreign
    terrorist groups and eclipsed ISIS as the principal terrorist threats
    in the United States, both in social media and off-line.
        Three days before the deadly white nationalist rally, the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and
    Analysis (I&A) distributed a confidential warning in coordination with
    local, State, and Federal authorities at the Virginia Fusion Center. It
    stated that an escalating series of confrontations between white
    supremacists and anarchists would likely make the event ``among the
    most violent to date.''
        I&A's warning was presciently accurate, and DHS has for years
    identified right-wing extremism as a pressing domestic terrorist
    threat. In 2009, for example, DHS I&A released ``Right-wing Extremism:
    Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in
    Radicalization and Recruitment,'' which outlined a growing threat from
    white supremacist and violent anti-Government groups, largely fueled by
    the election of the first African-American president, Barack Obama.
        There are many threats to the United States espousing a range of
    political ideologies and citing a list of grievances against the
    country. As the people of Charlottesville, Charleston, Portland, and
    the Maryland campus of Bowie State know all too well, the terrorist
    threat from right-wing extremists is manifest. It is essential that
    administrators and lawmakers commence counterterrorism considerations
    with the solemn acknowledgement that terrorism and violent extremism
    are an existential threat to the Nation no matter whether they are
    informed by a religious, racist, bigoted, or nationalistic ideology.
                          home-grown violent extremism
        The terrorist threat to the United States most often originates
    within the United States. Home-grown violent extremism (HVE) refers to
    violence that is committed to advance an ideology and is perpetrated in
    the country where the attacker embraced the ideology. An American who
    embraces a Muslim Identity ideology within the United States is a home-
    grown violent extremist, and so too is an American who embraces an
    ideology positing racial superiority and advocating violence. As
    tragically demonstrated in a number of victimized communities, the
    greatest violent extremist threat to America is home-grown.
        The home-grown threat is not homogenous, and U.S. policies must not
    treat it as such. Policies prepositioned to focus on the ``other,'' or
    engaging in ``otherism,'' are destined to miss the mark. Too often,
    U.S. counterterrorism efforts have looked narrowly at the threat from
    extremist Muslims. While groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS do present a
    valid and immediate threat to the United States, they are not the only
    threat, nor are their beliefs the only extremist ideology that demands
    violence against the United States and its citizens.
        If we are serious about countering the growth of HVE, we need to
    legitimately focus our efforts on all forms of it. As a starting point
    for that, we need look no further than across the Atlantic to see what
    happens when programs intended to counter HVE focus on only one group
    and community.
                            the failures of prevent
        In 2003, in an effort to reduce the risk of ``al-Qaeda-inspired''
    recruitment, radicalization, and related terrorist incidents, the
    United Kingdom launched the Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy
    (Prevent). It was considered one of the best in the world when it was
    first implemented. At its core, Prevent focused on radicalization and
    recruitment prevention (rather than simply HVE detection) and
    acknowledged the importance of enlisting the community in the fight
    against terrorism. Yet, the Prevent strategy ultimately failed in its
    initial form. It focused exclusively on Muslim communities--not unlike
    some of the counterterrorism efforts that have been more recently
    launched in the United States. Prevent also funded efforts in Muslim
    communities based on the size of the Muslim population in a given area,
    instilling the perception that the program was geared toward
    intelligence gathering in Muslim communities. As a result of poor
    design and implementation, the program engendered mistrust, frustrating
    efforts to collaborate with communities to address the risk of
    recruitment and radicalization.
        In the United States, we have headed down a similar (and ultimately
    futile) path. This is demonstrated by the fact that community-based
    organizations in several cities that were successfully awarded DHS CVE
    grant funding rejected the award after learning of the administration's
    intent to narrow future counterterrorism efforts on Muslim extremism.
    This is one of many consequences of focusing public policy and public
    ire on one group of home-grown violent extremists. And meanwhile, the
    right-wing extremist threat grows bolder, more violent, and greater in
    number.
                   growing threat from right-wing extremists
        Effective homeland security and public safety policy should be
    rooted in data. Numerous studies over many years have repeatedly
    concluded that the home-grown threat to the United States exceeds that
    from foreign nations. Certainly, we must thank the heroic efforts of
    our intelligence community and armed services for so effectively
    thwarting terrorist threats from abroad. As a result, however, our
    greatest terrorist threat is home-grown. If we examine the past 2
    years, the evidence is clear.
        The ADL report, ``Murder and Extremism in the United States in
    2015,'' examined domestic terrorism and extremism in a year that
    claimed victims in Charleston, Chattanooga, Colorado Springs, and San
    Bernardino. It was the deadliest year of domestic extremist killers
    since 1995, the year another home-grown terrorist, Timothy McVeigh,
    bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
        In 2015, domestic extremists killed 52 people, more than the
    numbers killed in 2013 and 2014 combined. The report states that four
    domestic extremist groups perpetrated the 52 murders, with white
    supremacists and extremist Muslims accounting for 38 percent and 37
    percent of the fatalities, respectively.
        The ADL's 2016 report on U.S. extremism was dominated by the
    Orlando nightclub shooting, in which 49 people were murdered by a home-
    grown violent extremist. Importantly, however, the data shows that in
    the same year, 20 other people had already been murdered by white
    supremacists in 11 separate incidents. The Orlando attack was horrific,
    but in terms of which home-grown violent extremist groups constitute
    the most lethal threat, the death toll from Orlando obscured the fact
    that right-wing violent extremism was a far more frequent threat to
    manifest.
        Meanwhile, law enforcement is increasingly facing attacks from
    home-grown extremists. An analysis of ``shots-fired events'' between
    law enforcement and home-grown extremists since 2009 reveals there were
    77 shots-fired incidents attributed to numerous extremist groups. With
    their number of shots-fired events, these included:
       White supremacists (38)
       Anti-Government extremists (25)
       Islamic extremist (9)
       Black nationalist (2)
       Left-wing extremist (1)
       Anti-abortion extremist (1)
       Anti-Muslim extremist (1)
        Local law enforcement has the best finger on the pulse of domestic
    threats in our communities. In that regard, key findings in the ``Law
    Enforcement Assessment of the Violent Extremist Threat'' study (2015)
    of 382 law enforcement agencies in the United States ``consider anti-
    Government violent extremists, not radicalized Muslims, to be the most
    severe threat of political violence they face.''
        Right-wing extremist groups are also showing an affinity for using
    social media to organize and recruit new followers. ISIS was a pioneer
    in the use of social media for extremist radicalization and
    recruitment. However, a recent study reveals that on Twitter (ISIS's
    preferred social platform), American white nationalist movements have
    seen their followers grow by more than 600 percent. Additionally, white
    nationalists and Nazis had substantially higher follower counts than
    ISIS supporters and tweeted more often. In the months leading up to
    Charlottesville, leaked chat room discussions ``reveal an intense level
    of planning and Nation-wide coordination,'' as ``Unite the Right
    demonstrations were dominated by a younger, more tech-savvy generation
    of white supremacists than in past protests.''
                           the importance of formers
        Successful forays into field research can yield extraordinary and
    important connections. The most valuable relationships in the HVE
    domain are those with individuals who have radicalized to an ideology
    and later disengaged from it. These ``formers'' are best able to answer
    questions about why and how their radicalization took place.
        Over several years, the ``formers'' I have interviewed individuals
    who formerly counted themselves among the ranks of neo-Nazis,
    mujahedeen, skinheads, Lashkar-e-Taiba and anti-Government adherents,
    to name a few. The radicalization experiences, as told by formers, are
    as dissimilar as their ideologies, but for two common features. First,
    they all connect their decisions to explore an extremist ideology to a
    ``cognitive opening,'' a period in which one's beliefs are malleable
    and open to radical change.
        Second, their sense of alienation is accompanied with a sense of
    altruism and a desire and belief that the status quo can be changed. We
    are only beginning to learn the processes and openings that lead
    individuals to an extremist ideology. It is only in ``safe spaces''--
    where law enforcement, researchers, health practitioners, and other
    relevant professionals can engage with ``formers''--that we will be
    able to more deeply study why and how radicalization occurs on an
    individual level and from that develop more effective techniques for
    addressing the most pressing HVE threats.
                         a whole-of-community approach
        The current CVE strategy is under fire after years of mistrust,
    based on perceptions about the program's intentions and ultimate goals.
    This should come as no surprise, as the CVE initiative in many ways
    repeated the mistakes of the UK Prevent program in its first iteration.
    Rather than continue down a fruitless path that ultimately alienates
    communities, the United States is well-served to explore other methods
    for collaborating with threatened communities. Importantly, the
    intention should be grounded in the notion that we seek to prevent
    extremist recruitment and radicalization--and not profile terrorists. A
    community-led strategy, for example, provides a way for all community
    stakeholders to identify shared concerns, build consensus and most
    importantly, develop strategies and tactics adapted for a community's
    local, specific concerns.
        Going forward, we must have counseling resources on disengagement
    and deradicalization for the diverse ideologies that threaten our
    Nation. The goal is to draw them back from the violent extremist fold,
    serving as a bridge between the family and institutions like schools,
    social services and, if applicable, prosecutors, law enforcement or
    employers. In that regard, I caution the administration to avoid the
    notion of a ``hotline'' system, and to avoid the use of that term
    altogether, should a resource system be considered. The term may be
    misinterpreted as a line for providing intelligence information,
    removing the critical element of trust, which is desperately needed.
        Appropriate policies, processes, and technologies are the
    foundations of security. Those elements are most effective when
    informed by research and empirical data. This is a complex problem,
    most often as unique as the individuals who walk the radicalization
    pathway. There is only one element we can influence in this process and
    that is the community. Violent extremists do not live in a vacuum, and
    all terrorism is local. If we are to enhance social morality,
    responsibility, and community integrity, with the intended outcome of
    facilitating community-based efforts to identify and explore solutions
    to this challenge, it begins with acknowledging and removing policies
    cultivating community animosity and stoking alienation. The time to
    change our policy toward radicalized Americans is now and that process
    begins here.

        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Wray, thank you for your service to your country.
    I specifically thank you for bringing up the importance of 702
    as an invaluable tool for your investigative services in
    defense of our Nation. I am a strong supporter of it and shall
    be a vocal voice as the debates move forward.
        Please describe, in at least general terms, what programs
    the FBI currently implements to monitor potentially seditious
    activity inside U.S. mosques and Islamic centers known to be
    affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamic
    extremist organizations.
        Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, we investigate international
    terrorism matters, global jihadi-inspired directed matters, and
    we will follow them wherever they may lead, and in some cases
    that may lead to specific individuals. If they are in a mosque
    and we are investigating them, then we would continue the
    investigation there.
        Mr. Higgins. Do you monitor the advertised appearances of
    known radical imams that speak at Islamic centers across the
    country? I ask this specifically because a known radical imam
    spoke in my district recently, and it was completely under the
    radar. No media, no law enforcement knowledge. I found out from
    my own informant that he appeared within my district and spoke.
        So I am wondering, does the FBI monitor the websites and
    social media announcements of the movements and the appearances
    of known radicalized jihadist imams?
        Mr. Wray. We certainly have a variety of social media
    exploitation efforts under way that are focused on the kind of
    problem you are describing, and we also have, in some cases,
    properly predicated investigations of specific subjects. In
    some cases, those have been even imams. There have been cases
    where we have pursued a matter that even led to, you know,
    arrest, indictment, and conviction.
        I think back to my prior time in Government in the Justice
    Department. There was the case against Abu Hamza, for example,
    who was a very active cleric in that space. So again, that is
    giving an example of the kind of thing we do.
        Mr. Higgins. Just quickly, within this non-Classified
    setting, would your investigative efforts include human assets?
        Mr. Wray. Absolutely. I appreciate you bringing that up,
    because one of the things that I think is increasingly
    important with all the kind of challenges that we have
    described, all three of us have described in the terrorism
    arena, is the ability to use human sources.
        Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wray. We need to be able to work with the communities
    around the country to be able to get people to come forward.
    Because when you have somebody who is radicalized in a very
    short period of time in some cases, the best hope we have of
    finding out before the person commits an attack and kills
    somebody, is to have somebody speak up and talk to law
    enforcement. So it is important that we earn the confidence of
    the community in order to be able to generate human sources,
    and that is a very high priority for us.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you sir. And 702 enhances your ability
    to use human assets. Is that correct?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir.
        Secretary Duke, thank you for your service to your country,
    Madam. I have one question. The U.S. electric grid is
    dangerously unsecured against the threat of electromagnetic
    pulse based on a nuclear explosion. Can you, within this
    setting, please explain what steps the Department of Homeland
    Security is taking to secure the U.S. electric grid on an
    expedited basis? Further, what can this committee and this body
    do to assist in that effort?
        Ms. Duke. Yes. This is a relatively new threat that we have
    been looking at in our critical infrastructure sector. We have
    a strategy that will be completed before the end of this
    calendar year, late in December. We will be sharing that
    strategy that will help us start to better address the EMP
    threat, along with the geomagnetic disturbance threats.
        Mr. Higgins. You have a study that will be concluded by the
    end of this year?
        Ms. Duke. Yes. The target date is December 23 currently.
        Mr. Higgins. You will share that with this committee?
        Ms. Duke. Yes.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I ask that a speech
    from the Freedom Flame Award Dinner and two articles from the
    Washington Times be included for the record, and I yield the
    balance of my time.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
               Submitted For the Record by Honorable Clay Higgins
       speech by the ambassador of the state of israel to the center for
                  security policy's freedom flame award dinner
                               december 14, 2016
        Judge Jeanine, thank you for that kind introduction. And thank you
    for your exemplary service to this country and for your friendship to
    my country.
        I want to recognize my fellow honoree Mort Klein. Thank you for
    your unshakable commitment to the Jewish future. But Mort, I think
    every once in a while, you need to take a stand and tell people what
    you really think.
        I also want to thank another steadfast friend of Israel, Frank
    Gaffney.
        Churchill once famously remarked, ``You have enemies. Good. That
    means you have stood up for something, sometime in your life.''
        Well, if you have enemies, Frank, it's because you have stood up
    for something, many times in your life.
        And that something is freedom--an unwavering commitment to
    freedom--for America, for Europe, for Israel, for everyone.
        I think I speak for the people here tonight and for many who are
    not here when I say thank you for standing up for all of us.
        I also want to thank the Center for Security Policy for giving me
    this prestigious award. I deeply appreciate it, even though I don't
    think I've earned an award won by the likes of Margaret Thatcher and
    Jean Kirkpatrick.
        The magnificent Iron Lady, who once made Britain great again, and
    the brilliant U.N. Ambassador, who understood that defeating
    totalitarianism sometimes meant working with authoritarian regimes,
    were two of the West's most powerful voices of moral clarity during the
    Cold War.
        But while I have not earned this award, the country I have the
    privilege of representing certainly has.
        Because since the day it was established, Israel has been proudly
    holding up freedom's flame in a dark and dangerous Middle East.
        During the Cold War, Israel stood faithfully by America's side in a
    fight against an evil empire. We defeated Soviet client states on the
    battlefield. We safeguarded a vital square on the global chess board.
        And we created an island of liberty in a sea of tyranny.
        No less important, for decades, Israel has manned freedom's front
    lines in the battle against a fanatic ideology that has taken over
    large swathes of the Middle East and which endangers my country, the
    region and the world.
        That ideology is called militant Islam. I use the words militant
    Islam very precisely. The enemy we face is not militancy and it's not
    Islam--it's militant Islam.
        There are many militant individuals and groups. Timothy McVeigh and
    Ted Kaczynski can be aptly described as militants. Terror groups like
    the FARC and the Tamil Tigers who are responsible for the murder of
    tens of thousands of people are militant organizations.
        But while these individuals and groups are extremely dangerous,
    they are not part of a global movement. Militant Islam is.
        The forces of militant Islam have struck in New York and Orlando,
    London and Paris, Bali and Bangkok, Sydney and Buenos Aires, and dozens
    of other places across the world.
        In the Middle East and North Africa, they have struck in every
    country between the Straights of Gibraltar and the Khyber Pass.
        To be sure, militant Islam is not monolithic. There are Sunni
    branches, such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in
    Somalia, and Hamas in Gaza.
        There are Shia branches, such as the Ayatollah regime in Iran, the
    various Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in
    Lebanon.
        These branches have different theologies.
        The militant Sunnis are fixated on the early 7th Century. The
    militant Shiites are fixated on the middle of the 10th Century. Perhaps
    one day they'll compromise and decide to take us all back to the late
    8th Century.
        And while militant Islamists always fight Christians, Jews,
    Yazidis, Kurds, and other non-Muslims, they also ferociously fight one
    another in their battle over who will be the king of the militant
    Islamic hill.
        Yet for all their differences, all the branches and sub-branches of
    militant Islam are rooted in a similar radical ideology and fired by
    the same fanaticism.
        They all seek to reverse history--and the rise of the West--and
    restore Islam to its former glory.
        For all of these groups, the answer to their problems is Islam--in
    one radical form or another.
        That is why the seemingly disparate forces of militant Islam are in
    fact part of the same global threat.
        And that is why they must be countered as part of a global
    strategy.
        But ladies and gentlemen, just as the enemy we face is not mere
    ``militancy,'' the enemy we face is also not Islam.
        Islam is a faith with some 1.7 billion adherents throughout the
    world. And faiths--including the faith of Islam--are malleable things.
        I suspect there are a few people here who disagree with me about
    that. They can rightly point to many differences that set Islam apart
    from Christianity, Judaism, and other faiths. They can rightly argue
    that Islam has a unique theology, has been influenced by a unique
    culture or has been shaped by unique geopolitical forces.
        But as those skeptics point to the intricacies of theology and
    culture, I hope they also consider the historical record--not just of
    Islam but of other faiths.
        To the best of my knowledge, the New Testament was canonized in the
    fourth century.
        While the text of that book has not changed since then, the faith
    practiced by Christians certainly has.
        The Christianity that for centuries justified the slaughter of Jews
    all across Europe, and that spread anti-semitism to every corner of the
    globe, is not the same Christianity that was preached by abolitionists
    who fought slavery in the 19th Century or that is practiced by
    Evangelicals in the 21st Century.
        So too, the relatively tolerant Islam practiced in 12th Century
    Spain and practiced for some 13 centuries in Persia until 1979 is not
    the Islam of ISIS or the Islam of today's Ayatollah regime.
        Admittedly, it is troubling that to find a more tolerant
    Christianity one only need look to the present whereas to find a more
    tolerant Islam one must largely look to the past.
        But my point is that Islam, like other faiths, has evolved--and I
    see no reason why it cannot or will not evolve again.
        So do not assume that the forces ascendant in the Muslim world
    today will be the same forces ascendant in the future.
        Whether that happens or not will mostly depend on changes that will
    come from within the Muslim world. But the pace and extent of those
    changes depends partly on us as well.
        It depends on not painting all Muslims with a single brush and not
    declaring nearly one-quarter of the world's population irredeemable.
        It depends on recognizing that the greatest victims of militant
    Islam are those Muslims who do not accept its unforgiving creed.
        And it depends on helping those who seek to reform Islam from
    within.
        Let me read you the words of one of those reformers.
        ``I'm really offended when people are intimidated, terrified, and
    killed under the pretext that such practices are part and parcel of
    divine teaching ordered by God.
        I feel offended when destruction and sabotage are promoted as a
    heavenly triumph for God on earth. I swear that nothing could ever be
    built on destruction, demolition, or murder.''
        Those words were not scrawled by a dissident languishing away in
    some dungeon in the Middle East.
        Those words were spoken last week at a religious university by
    Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, the president of Egypt.
        And here is another voice from the Middle East commenting about
    terror attacks perpetrated in the name of Islam:

    ``Their only link to Islam is the pretexts they use to justify their
    crimes and their folly. They have strayed from the right path, and
    their fate is to dwell forever in hell . . . They think--out of
    ignorance--that they are engaging in Jihad . . . Is it conceivable that
    God . . . could order someone to blow himself up or kill innocent
    people? Islam, as a matter of fact, does not permit any kind of
    suicide--whatever the reasons or the circumstances.''

        Those words were not spoken by some apologist at a liberal think
    tank in Washington.
        They were delivered 3 months ago in Arabic in a televised speech by
    Mohammed VI, the king of Morocco.
        Ladies and gentlemen, when the president of Egypt and the king of
    Morocco say things like this, something is happening in the Middle
    East.
        It does not mean that the problem of militant Islam has suddenly
    vanished. But it does mean that there are serious partners in the
    region who are fighting militant Islam in ideological terms--partners
    who cannot be dismissed as secular heretics but who are themselves
    devout Muslims who have the credibility to challenge the Islamists'
    claims to represent Islam.
        Ladies and gentlemen, the reformers within Islam are real, and we
    should be doing everything we can to help them.
        You know what one of the best ways to help them is? To confront the
    Islamists they are fighting--and to defeat those Islamists again and
    again and again.
        You know, bin Laden said that people follow the strong horse. If
    you want proof of that concept, just consider how many Chicago Cubs
    fans have suddenly appeared out of nowhere.
        You know, until a few weeks ago, I knew a grand total of four Cubs
    fans. Now they're all over the place.
        Like winning baseball teams, winning ideologies attract more
    followers and terror groups that appear to have the wind at their backs
    gain more recruits.
        That is why the forces of militant Islam must not only be
    confronted. They must be routed and vanquished in every part of the
    world.
        In the Middle East, Israel is engaged in that battle every day
    against Iran's terror proxies Hezbollah and Hamas and against various
    other terror groups that threaten us from Syria, Sinai, and elsewhere.
        Israel will continue to do what is necessary to prevent the
    transfer of game-changing weapons to Hezbollah and to ensure that Iran
    does not open a new terror front against us in Syria.
        Israel would welcome a political settlement in Syria that would
    bring an end to the horrible carnage and suffering there.
        But Israel will oppose a settlement that cedes Syria to Iran and
    its proxies--something that will only increase the threat to us and
    others in the future.
        Israel will also do what is necessary to defend itself against
    Hamas. In Gaza, Iran is helping Hamas and Islamic Jihad develop an
    indigenous rocket manufacturing capability--making them less reliant on
    smuggling weapons.
        To paraphrase an old saying, give a terrorist a rocket and he'll
    fire for a day. Teach him how to make rockets, and he'll fire for the
    rest of his life.
        Besides Israel, there are others Arab states in the region that are
    fighting the forces of militant Islam.
        This battle against a common enemy has turned many in the Arab
    world who were once adamantly opposed to Israel into de facto allies.
        Our sincere hope is that this new alliance will enable us to build
    lasting bridges of coexistence, something Israel hopes to discuss with
    the incoming Trump administration.
        But to seize those opportunities, we must work together to confront
    the greatest danger of all--the marriage of militant Islam and nuclear
    weapons. That is the ultimate game-changer that could lead to the
    ultimate nightmare.
        To assume that a militant Islamic power would obey the rules that
    have been obeyed by all other nuclear powers is to gamble with the
    security of the world.
        Militant Islamists break the rules. They take over embassies. They
    destroy millennial-old statues. They fly into skyscrapers. They make
    the unimaginable imaginable.
        Militant Islam is capable of anything because it is fundamentally
    different. Huntington wrote of a clash of civilizations.
        The truth is that there is a competition of civilizations. The last
    three decades has witnessed the rise of Asia that has brought billions
    of people into the global economy and resulted in a natural realignment
    of power between East and West.
        But wedged between East and West is militant Islam. And this
    civilization--if you want to call it that because it's more like an
    anti-civilization--this anti-civilization is in a clash with all the
    rest.
        Militant Islam does not seek to flex its muscles within the
    international order. It seeks to up-end that order.
        Everyone who cares about peace should do everything to prevent such
    a fanaticism from ever arming itself with nuclear weapons.
        That is why Israel so strongly opposed the nuclear deal with Iran.
    Had that deal blocked Iran's path to the bomb, believe me, Israel would
    have been the first to support it.
        But this deal does not block Iran's path to the bomb. It ultimately
    paves it.
        Rather than dismantle Iran's military nuclear capability, this deal
    merely places restrictions on that capability for a limited time--
    restrictions that are automatically removed even if Iran does not
    change its behavior.
        So in 10 to 15 years--actually now it's 9 to 14 years--Iran could
    remain the foremost sponsor of terror in the world and legitimately
    enrich enough uranium to place it on the cusp of having the material
    for an entire nuclear arsenal.
        In the mean time, without violating a single clause in the nuclear
    deal, Iran can conduct R&D on more and more advanced centrifuges.
        And unless it is stopped, Iran will continue to defy U.N. Security
    Council resolutions to build intercontinental ballistic missiles for
    its future nuclear arsenal.
        Here's a news flash. Iran and Israel are on the same continent. So
    those ICBMs are not for Israel. They're for you.
        As Prime Minister Netanyahu said on ``60 Minutes'' this Sunday,
    Israel looks forward to discussing with the Trump administration the
    nuclear deal with Iran as well as a dangerous Iranian regime it has
    helped strengthen. We hope to forge a common policy with the
    administration that can help advance stability and security in our
    region.
        Ladies and gentlemen, defeating militant Islam will require more
    than confronting and defeating its forces in the Middle East. It will
    also require not allowing people in our own countries to keep us from
    identifying and understanding the enemy.
        Because an enemy you refuse to name is an enemy you will never
    understand. And an enemy you do not understand is an enemy you will
    never defeat.
        I recognize that there are those who believe that by naming the
    enemy militant Islam people will mistakenly believe that the enemy is
    Islam itself rather than a virulent ideology now ascendant in the
    Muslim world.
        But those who speak euphemistically of ``militants'' or ``violent
    extremists'' should not be surprised if others reject such political
    correctness and respond by mistakenly replacing militant Islam with
    Islam itself.
        We must also reject the shameful efforts of some to prevent any
    serious discussion about the nature of the enemy we face.
        I realized the full extent of those efforts only after a
    controversy erupted over my being here tonight.
        The day you announced that I was being given this award, the
    spokesman at my Embassy received an email from the Southern Poverty Law
    Center asking me why I was accepting an award from what they called an
    anti-Muslim hate group.
        I was a bit surprised. First, because I have known Frank Gaffney
    for many years. And while I don't agree with every single thing he says
    and believes, Frank is no hater and no bigot.
        Second, because I have followed the work of the CSP for many years.
    And while I do not agree with every policy position you have taken or
    every view expressed by every member of your organization, the CSP is
    not only an unabashed defender of Israel, it is also no hate group.
        But I must admit, the fact that it was the Southern Poverty Law
    Center that was making this allegation got my attention.
        Because I always thought highly of that organization. After all,
    when I was growing up in this country, the SPLC went after the KKK.
    They used the courts to fight against the evil of racial segregation
    and systematic discrimination. In my mind, they were the ones who
    targeted the real haters of the world. So I read with great interest
    what they sent me. And when it came to their allegations against you,
    there was nothing that justified the wholesale defamation of this
    organization or its leadership.
        But then I read some more. I discovered that the SPLC had made up a
    list of those whom they label anti-Muslim extremists.
        And as I read this list, I was simply stunned.
        Daniel Pipes, one of the great scholars of the Middle East, was on
    it.
        So too was Maajid Nawaz, a former Islamist who now fights against
    Islamists.
        But the biggest shock of all came when I saw a name on that list of
    someone I regard as a hero--Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
        For those of you who do not know Ayaan, she was the Dutch
    parliamentarian who in 2004 produced a film with Theo Van Gogh called
    Submission, which focused on the oppression of women in the Muslim
    world.
        Because of that film, Van Gogh was assassinated by a fanatic Muslim
    and Ayaan was forced into hiding. She has had to live with death
    threats and under constant protection ever since.
        Yet rather than cower in anonymity, Ayaan writes books, publishes
    articles, makes speeches, and fights for her ideas--in particular the
    need for sweeping reform in the Muslim world.
        Today, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one of the world's great champions of
    freedom, pluralism, and tolerance.
        And every self-respecting group that claims to value any of those
    things should be defending her not defaming her.
        Yet in an Orwellian inversion of reality, a woman whose life is
    threatened every day by extremist Muslims is labeled by the SPLC an
    anti-Muslim extremist.
        Have those who put Ayaan on that list no shame? Have they no
    decency?
        The SPLC and others who asked me not to come here tonight claim to
    support free and open debate. But in reality, they seem to want to
    stifle debate.
        They preach tolerance for those who look different. But they are in
    effect practicing intolerance to those who think different.
        Unfortunately, some have amended that famous Voltairian dictum to
    be ``I hate what you say and I will never defend your right to say
    it.''
        I will defame you as an extremist. I will label you a racist and a
    bigot. I will put you on the blackest of lists that should be reserved
    for Nazis, for the Klan, and for the true enemies of mankind.
        Well, ladies and gentlemen, I don't stand with the defamers and the
    blacklisters.
        I stand with Ayaan Hirsi Ali. We all should stand with Ayaan Hirsi
    Ali.
        For if we do not stand with her, then the values she champions--the
    same values we cherish--will be under threat and the dangers we face
    will only grow.
        We must not let the defamers and blacklisters succeed. We must not
    let them turn into pariahs those erudite scholars and courageous
    reformers who are trying to enlighten us about ideologies that threaten
    our way of life.
        For more than our values are at stake. Our lives are at stake.
    Because without the wisdom of those scholars, without the courage of
    those reformers, we will have a much more difficult time winning the
    fateful battle that is under way.
        That is why I am truly honored to accept this freedom flame award
    tonight.
        I accept it in the name of a country that has proudly held up a
    light of liberty and decency in a dark and cruel corner of the world.
        Israel will continue to hold that torch high, steeled by our values
    and confident in our destiny.
        But like free countries everywhere, Israel needs America to hold up
    its torch even higher.
        The battle is far from over. I am not even sure that we've reached
    the end of the beginning.
        But I am confident that with the help of organizations like this,
    with the clarity and courage of people like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and with
    the support of millions of Americans across this great country, that
    the flame of this last best hope on earth will burn brighter than ever
    and help secure out common future.
                                     ______

           Article Submitted For the Record by Honorable Clay Higgins
       mainstream conservative groups alarmed to be found on ``hate map''
    By Valerie Richardson, Washington Times, August 17, 2017.
        Brad Dacus was thousands of miles away in California last weekend
    when the Charlottesville protest erupted, so he was flabbergasted when
    CNN labeled his Pacific Justice Institute a ``hate group.''
        ``Here are all the active hate groups where you live,'' said the
    CNN wire story headline on Chicago's WGN-TV website.
        The article listed the 917 organizations on the Southern Poverty
    Law Center's much-disputed ``hate map,'' which names racist groups like
    the Aryan Nation alongside mainstream conservative organizations such
    as the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Family Research Council.
        Mr. Dacus' conservative Sacramento-based institute, which
    specializes in religious-liberty cases, was featured on the CNN list
    right below the Pacific Coast Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
        ``Why is the Southern Poverty Law Center doing this? It's simple.
    They want to vilify and isolate anyone that doesn't agree with their
    very extremist leftist policy and ideology,'' said Mr. Dacus. ``This
    isn't about defending civil rights; this is about attacking civil
    rights.''
        Other conservative groups blasted CNN and called on the cable
    network to retract the article.
        ``I am shocked that CNN would publish such a false report on the
    heels of the Charlottesville tragedy,'' said Mat Staver, Liberty
    Counsel's founder and chairman. ``To lump peaceful Christian
    organizations, which condemn violence and racism, in with the KKK, neo-
    Nazis and white supremacists is offensive. This is the epitome of fake
    news and is why people no longer trust the media.''
        Conservatives have repeatedly called out media outlets this year
    for uncritically repeating the SPLC's ``hate group'' label, calling it
    inaccurate and arguing that it has put their organizations at risk for
    violence.
        It's not hypothetical.
        In 2012, Floyd Lee Corkins shot and wounded a Family Research
    Council security guard and later told authorities that he wanted to
    kill as many employees as possible after finding the group on the
    SPLC's ``hate map.''
        Tom McClusky, former vice president of government affairs at the
    Family Research Council, took to Twitter to say, ``Thanks for the
    reminder @CNN of this inaccurate map. Last time I saw it one of my
    friends got hit with a bullet. Real responsible reporting.''
        Mr. McClusky, now executive director at March for Life Education
    and Defense Fund, noted in another tweet that ``@CNN decides to reprint
    map that guided shooter to try to kill me & my colleagues because of
    our view on marriage.''
        In June, Liberty Counsel sued the charity tracker GuideStar for
    defamation for adding the SPLC tag to its list of nonprofits. GuideStar
    later removed the labels from its listings but said the information
    would be available upon request.
        ``Using the Southern Poverty Center as a source for information
    shows that CNN is not interested in reporting news but rather creating
    scandal and security threats,'' said Mr. Staver. ``It is well known
    that the SPLC label against peaceful, nonviolent people and
    organizations has motivated some unhinged people to commit violence.
    This is no time to exploit the tragedy of Charlottesville.''
        CNN did not immediately return a request for comment Thursday but
    did add an editor's note to the story saying that the headline was
    changed to make it clear that the information came from the SPLC.
        The new headline said, ``The Southern Poverty Law Center's list of
    hate groups.'' In addition, CNN said it had replaced the list of 917
    ``hate groups'' with links to the SPLC website.
        ``Some critics of the SPLC say the group's activism biases how it
    categorizes certain groups,'' said the CNN story. ``But since the FBI
    doesn't keep track of domestic hate groups, the SPLC's tally is the
    widely accepted one.''
        That ``hate group'' listing may be widely accepted on the left, but
    it's widely rejected on the right.
        Earlier this year, the Philanthropy Roundtable's Karl Zinsmeister
    called the SPLC a ``cash-collecting machine,'' pointing to its $50
    million in contributions in 2015 and $334 million in holdings. In May,
    the Federalist's Stella Morabito called it a ``big-money smear
    machine.''
        The Alabama-based center added to its coffers Wednesday with a $1
    million donation from Apple CEO Tim Cook, who also said he would match
    2-1 donations to the SPLC as well as a list of other designated groups
    until Sept. 30, citing the Charlottesville clash.
        ``Apple has been at the forefront of the fight against hate in the
    tech industry, and we are truly humbled by its support of our work,''
    the SPLC said in a Thursday statement.
        Organizations can land on the SPLC's ``hate map'' for a variety of
    reasons not limited to racism. Categories include being ``anti-
    immigrant'' or ``anti-Muslim,'' as well as being ``racist skinhead,''
    ``neo-Nazi'' or ``neo-Confederate.''
        Most of the conservative groups fall into the SPLC's ``anti-LGBT''
    category for their opposition to, for example, same-sex marriage or
    transgender bathroom laws.
        ``Opposition to equal rights for LGBT people has been a central
    theme of Christian Right organizing and fundraising for the past three
    decades--a period that parallels the fundamentalist movement's rise to
    political power,'' the SPLC said on its website.
        The ADF this week called out Phoenix news outlets that relied on
    SPLC's ``hate map'' for post-Charlottesville stories, including a
    report on the NBC-TV affiliate 12News headlined, ``What are Arizona's
    hate groups?''
        ADF spokeswoman Kerri Kupec said most news outlets may not realize
    that the SPLC is not politically neutral but rather avowedly anti-
    right.
        On its ``Hatewatch'' page, for example, the SPLC states that it
    ``monitors and exposes the activities of the American radical right.''
        ``I don't think that most news organizations that SPLC states on
    its website that it only goes after groups on the right,'' said Ms.
    Kupec. ``They only target people on the right.''
        Last month, the ADF blasted ABC and NBC for using the ``hate
    group'' designation on a story about a no-press speech by Attorney
    General Jeff Sessions at an ADF conference in Dana Point, California.
           Article Submitted For the Record by Honorable Clay Higgins
     wealthy southern poverty law rakes in hollywood, silicon valley cash
                             after charlottesville
    By Valerie Richardson, Washington Times, August 23, 2017.
        The Southern Poverty Law Center has padded its already well-stocked
    coffers with at least $2.5 million in donations from celebrities and
    corporations following the white-nationalist melee in Charlottesville,
    Virginia.
        George and Amal Clooney have donated $1 million to ``combat hate
    groups,'' while Apple CEO Tim Cook announced gifts of $1 million to the
    SPLC and $1 million to the Anti-Defamation League in response to the
    deadly Aug. 12 Charlottesville clash.
        ``We are proud to support the Southern Poverty Law Center in its
    efforts to prevent violent extremism in the United States,'' said the
    Clooneys in a Monday statement. ``What happened in Charlottesville, and
    what is happening in communities across our country, demands our
    collective engagement to stand up to hate.''
        At the same time, others worry that Charlottesville has obscured
    legitimate concerns about the SPLC, which has been accused of juicing
    its fundraising by exaggerating the Ku Klux Klan threat.
        ``These celebrity donations are virtue-signaling. SPLC does not
    need the money,'' said Cornell Law School professor William Jacobson in
    an email. ``Its 2016 annual report shows over $300 million in
    endowment, with program spending (legal and educational) one-tenth that
    amount and more than covered by normal annual fundraising.''
        Indeed, the $2.5 million comes as fairly small change for the SPLC,
    which reported revenue of $54 million in 2015 and spent 22 percent of
    its budget on fundraising, versus 64 percent on programs and services,
    according to Charity Navigator.
        Top-ranked charities ideally spend at least 75 percent of their
    budgets on programs and services, as per CharityWatch, which last year
    downgraded the SPLC from a ``C+'' to an ``F'' for holding more than
    three years' available assets in reserve.
        ``Unfortunately, these virtue-signaling donations reinforce SPLC's
    bad habit of sensationalizing and politicizing `hate' to generate even
    more money for its already bloated coffers,'' said Mr. Jacobson, who
    runs the right-leaning Legal Insurrection blog.
        The criticism has also come from the left. The Nation's Alexander
    Cockburn referred in 2009 to SPLC's Morris Dees as the ``archsalesman
    of hatemongering,'' while Ken Silverstein of Harper's said in 2010 that
    the organization ``shuts down debate, stifles free speech, and most of
    all, raises a pile of money, very little of which is used on behalf of
    poor.''
        In the wake of Charlottesville, however, the SPLC and ADL, which
    has a focus on fighting anti-Semitism, have clearly become the go-to
    charities for prominent donors.
        JPMorgan Chase said in a Monday memo that it would split a $1
    million gift between the SPLC and ADL ``to further their work in
    tracking, exposing and fighting hate groups and other extremist
    organizations.''
        Apple has also launched a fundraising tool to allow donors to give
    to the SPLC through their digital iTunes accounts.
        In accepting the Clooney donation, SPLC president Richard Cohen
    warned that President Trump had reanimated the ``radical right.''
        ``Like George and Amal Clooney, we were shocked by the size,
    ugliness, and ferocity of the white supremacist gathering in
    Charlottesville,'' Mr. Cohen said in a Monday statement. ``It was a
    reflection of just how much Trump's incendiary campaign and presidency
    has energized the radical right. We are deeply grateful to the Clooney
    Foundation for standing with us at this critical moment in our
    country's fight against hate.''
        The SPLC has also faced blowback for its liberal advocacy, starting
    with its ``hate map,'' which lumps mainstream conservative
    organizations with neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan.
        Both ABC and NBC repeated the ``hate group'' label in July in
    reference to the Alliance Defending Freedom, while CNN recently posted
    the SPLC ``hate map'' under the headline, ``Here are all the active
    hate groups where you live.''
        Among those on the map is the Liberty Counsel, led by Mat Staver,
    who denounced the Charlottesville white-supremacist violence and
    accused the SPLC of ``exploiting a serious situation to push a self-
    centered political agenda.''
        ``This false labeling is defamatory and dangerous,'' he said in a
    Monday statement.
        Founded in 1971 to promote civil rights, the SPLC describes itself
    as the ``premier U.S. nonprofit organization monitoring the activities
    of domestic hate groups and other extremists.''
        One woman was killed and 19 injured after an alleged neo-Nazi
    sympathizer drove into a crowd in Charlottesville.

        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes
    the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you to each of you for your testimony and for your service.
        One of the types of far-right extremism that is
    particularly concerning to me has to do with the anti-abortion
    movement and their willingness to engage in very dangerous
    actions to express their position.
        So with that, I would seek unanimous consent to enter a
    statement for the record from the Feminist Majority Foundation,
    ``Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror.''
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
          Submitted For the Record by Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman
                 Statement of the Feminist Majority Foundation
                               November 30, 2017
        The Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) is a National women's rights
    organization dedicated to the elimination of sex discrimination and the
    promotion of women's equality and empowerment in the United States and
    around the world. In 1989, FMF launched the National Clinic Access
    Project with the goal of reducing anti-abortion violence, keeping
    women's health clinics open, keeping physicians, patients, and staff
    safe, and helping to bring violent anti-abortion extremists to justice.
        Anti-abortion violence has plagued U.S. women's reproductive health
    clinics for decades. Between 1977 and 2016, there have been hundreds of
    crimes committed against reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers, including at least 11 murders, 26 attempted
    murders, 54 bombings, 249 arsons, 98 attempted bombings or arsons, 411
    clinic invasions, 100 butyric acid attacks, 239 incidents of assault or
    batteries, and 4 acts of kidnapping. There have also been 663 anthrax
    or bioterrorism threats, 643 bomb threats, 545 death threats or threats
    of harm, and 583 acts of stalking.\1\ These acts are perpetrated by
    extremists who use violence to intimidate doctors, patients, and staff,
    in order to promote a policy goal of ending women's access to legal
    abortion and shutting down women's health clinics.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ National Abortion Federation, 2016 Violence and Disruption
    Statistics, available at https://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/
    violence/violence-statistics-and-history/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Under Federal law, domestic terrorism includes ``activities that
    involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
    criminal laws of the United States or of any State'' and ``that appear
    to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to
    influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to
    affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination
    or kidnapping.''\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 18 U.S.C.  2331(5).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The violent tactics used by anti-abortion extremists, by
    definition, fall under the Federal statutory definition of ``domestic
    terrorism.'' Whether working alone, or in concert with others, violent
    anti-abortion extremists have engaged in criminal activity with the
    purpose of intimidating the civilian population--primarily reproductive
    health clinic doctors, patients, and staff--in order to influence
    Government policy on abortion.
        Violent anti-abortion extremists may be using ``right to life''
    rhetoric, but in reality, they have unleashed a Nation-wide campaign of
    terror. The Feminist Majority Foundation has periodically conducted a
    National Clinic Violence Survey since 1993 to measure anti-abortion
    violence and harassment. Our survey is one of the most comprehensive
    studies of anti-abortion violence and harassment directed at clinics,
    patients, health care workers, and volunteers in the United States and
    includes abortion providers of various organizational affiliations as
    well as independent clinics. Our most recent survey, released in
    February 2017, found that in 2016, abortion providers experienced a
    marked uptick in violence and threats.\3\ Around 34 percent of the
    clinics surveyed reported experiencing the most severe types of anti-
    abortion violence and threats of violence in just the first 6 months of
    2016, up from around 20 percent in the first 6 months of 2014. Some of
    the most frequent types of violence and threats were blocking access to
    and invasions of clinics,\4\ stalking, death threats, and bombing
    threats. One clinic reported that staff and doctors are repeatedly told
    to ``watch our backs'' and ``nobody cares when a murderer gets
    killed.'' Out of the clinics reporting high levels of severe violence
    and harassment, over 17 percent experienced staff resignations as a
    result.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Feminist Majority Foundation, 2016 National Clinic Violence
    Survey, available at http://feminist.org/anti-abortion-violence/images/
    2016-national-clinic-violence-survey.pdf.
        \4\ Blocking access to a reproductive health care clinic, or
    conducting a clinic invasion, may violate the Freedom of Access to
    Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C.  24, which makes it a crime to
    use or attempt to use physical obstruction to intentionally injure,
    intimidate, or interfere with a person obtaining or providing
    reproductive health services.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to severe violence and threats of violence, over 45
    percent of clinics surveyed experienced targeted intimidation and
    threats against staff and physicians, including vandalism of home or
    personal property, harassing phone calls or emails, threats of
    intimidation of family members, including children, and distribution of
    harassing and inflammatory pamphlets--like the ``KILLERS AMONG US''
    leaflets featuring doctors' photographs and their home addresses and
    personal information.
        These types of anti-abortion violence and intimidation must be
    given higher priority in order to bring those who commit acts of
    terrorism to justice and to prevent violence by defusing volatile
    situations, tracing the sources of funding for those who commit anti-
    abortion terrorist acts, and by identifying any potential patterns in
    the activity of violent anti-abortion extremists.
        Many anti-abortion extremists, for example, have been connected
    with other extremist groups that present a threat to the U.S.
    Government or to the public at large. Scott Roeder, the convicted
    killer of Wichita, Kansas abortion provider Dr. George Tiller, was
    associated with the anti-Government Montana Freeman militia group.\5\
    David Wayne Hull, who was convicted on several Federal charges after,
    among other things, he threatened to blow up abortion clinics, self-
    identified as the Imperial Wizard of the White Knights of the Ku Klux
    Klan.\6\ Convicted sex offender and anti-abortion extremist John Burt
    was a member of the Ku Klux Klan.\7\ Burt was the reported ``spiritual
    advisor'' to Michael Griffin, the murderer of Pensacola, Florida
    abortion provider Dr. David Gunn.\8\ Eric Robert Rudolph, who was once
    affiliated with the so-called Christian Identity Movement, a white
    nationalist ideology, bombed abortion clinics in Atlanta, Georgia and
    Birmingham, Alabama as well as a lesbian nightclub after bombing
    Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Amanda Robb, Not A Lone Wolf, Ms. Magazine (Spring 2010),
    http://www.msmagazine.com/spring2010/lonewolf.asp.
        \6\ Southern Poverty Law Center, Terror From the Right (Nov. 1,
    2015), https://www.splcenter.org/20100126/terror-right.
        \7\ Larry Rohter, Towering over Abortion Foes Trial: His Leader,
    New York Times (Mar. 5, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/05/us/
    towering-over-the-abortion-foe-s-trial-his-leader.html.
        \8\ Id.
        \9\ Eric Robert Rudolph: Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://
    www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/us/eric-robert-rudolph---fast-facts/index.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The sharing of intelligence across agencies concerning all types of
    domestic terrorism, including anti-abortion terrorist activity, and the
    robust investigation of anti-abortion crimes and potential anti-
    abortion criminal activity is necessary to proactively investigate the
    connections between those who commit anti-abortion crimes and white
    nationalist or other domestic terrorist groups. In addition, more
    resources are needed to train State and local law enforcement to
    improve their threat assessment investigations.
        There is no indication that anti-abortion violence and intimidation
    will go away on its own. Based on FMF monitoring of anti-abortion
    threats and violence, we expect that the higher level of severe
    violence, harassment, and intimidation of abortion providers has
    continued in 2017. Our law enforcement officials must do more, however,
    to prevent the next violent attack and end the campaign of terror being
    waged against reproductive health care providers, their patients, and
    staff.

        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much.
        I have a series of questions, some of which I really would
    like quick, quick answers to. Thank you.
        This is for you, Secretary Duke, and for you, Director
    Wray, because both of you mentioned the importance of
    information sharing with our foreign allies. Could you just
    elaborate on why that is so significant as quickly as possible?
        Ms. Duke. Because we need to know about people and be able
    to vet them before they move toward the United States.
        Mr. Wray. I would add to that, that in many cases, people
    are either crossing borders themselves to commit attacks or
    communicating across borders, or at a minimum, facing similar
    issues in those countries and in ours so we have to compare
    notes.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Director. So it is really
    important that we at least maintain this open communication
    with people that we have had relationships with that we could
    trust that would share this information.
        So having said that, do you think that the President's
    tweets regarding the British Prime Minister's help further that
    cooperation or impair that cooperation?
        Ms. Duke. I work with the Home Secretary of Great Britain
    and have a very good relationship and focus on that rather than
    speaking on tweets.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well, in dealing with our allies, do
    you find that there is any concern on their part with regard to
    how quickly the President will tweet information that is not
    accurate, including the most recent ones regarding the far
    right supposedly anti-Muslim groups?
        Ms. Duke. My personal experience is that they are anxious
    to work with us for the threats that Director Wray made, and so
    just work on building those toward the mission.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Would you characterize those tweets
    helpful or not?
        Mr. Wray. My experience is similar to Secretary Duke's. In
    fact, I was just over in the United Kingdom less than about 10
    days ago, and met with all of my British counterparts, and I
    think the relationship was very strong and productive.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well, let's hope so.
        Director Wray, you had expressed a strong desire that we
    reauthorize 702, section 702, and that it is very vital for you
    all to be able to do your job. I wanted to just say that I had
    tremendous pause when I read the report on black identity
    extremism and its threat to law enforcement. I still have very,
    very major concerns about what it communicates to law
    enforcement, what to fear, whether or not those fears have been
    developed in terms of the research and the analysis. I look
    forward to meeting with those analysts who discuss what seems
    to be a very skimpy report.
        But that kind-of gives me pause to support that kind of
    authorization to an agency that would, I think, allow this sort
    of poorly-developed report to come out and not demonstrate, in
    my opinion, only in my opinion, I guess a commensurate
    identification or expression of white identity extremism that
    presents a threat to our environment.
        Mr. Wray. I would just add, I appreciated our conversation
    yesterday.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am sorry that I had to leave before
    it was completed.
        Mr. Wray. But I found it a candid and hopefully
    constructive conversation. I look forward to continuing the
    dialog on that issue.
        I would say, on the white supremacist issue, we do put out
    information to State and local law enforcement on that. In
    fact, at the IACP conference recently in Philadelphia that I
    attended and spoke at, we distributed I think something like
    15,000 copies of a video, which I would be happy to make
    available to you, about the white supremacist threat to State
    and local law enforcements to raise their awareness of that
    threat. That is an example, but it is hardly the only example.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. I think it is really important, and I
    know it is a difficult discussion for us to have, but I need to
    agree with my colleague, Mr. Correa, that if we are really
    going to look at the dangers that are confronting our safety
    and security of our citizens here in the homeland, that we need
    to have a serious discussion of who represents that danger.
        While we talk about this on the surface and we kind of skim
    and we include it in the larger discussions on very important
    issues of homeland security, in and of itself, the threat is so
    severe that even organizations who have done research in these
    issues find that the threat to our security is greater with
    these groups than it is with these sort of foreign fighters or,
    you know, foreign-inspired individuals, and we just need to
    confront this.
        So on the record, I need to ask again that we have a
    hearing specifically addressing those issues with those members
    of the administration that weigh in, work on, and have
    consideration of these issues.
        So I thank you. I see that I have gone beyond my time. So,
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back the rest of my time.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
        The Chair recognizes a former FBI agent from Pennsylvania,
    Mr. Fitzpatrick.
        Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all
    for being here, and more importantly, thank you for what you
    do. Your work is not easy. We know that and we are here to
    support you in any way necessary.
        I can report to this committee, regarding Director Wray,
    who is leading my former organization, I have spoken and
    obviously keep in touch with many of my former colleagues from
    the ground all the way up. This is a man that they have come to
    respect tremendously. So, Mr. Wray, thank you for leading the
    organization that I love.
        I think that it warrants further discussion regarding
    section 702. Mr. Higgins brought it up briefly. I want this
    committee to be fully aware, not only of what you just said
    regarding the benefits to the Bureau and to the National
    security apparatus regarding 702, but I think what I would like
    you to address briefly, sir, is the consequences of not
    reauthorizing. What would we not be able to do any more should
    section 702 expire?
        Mr. Wray. So the real value of 702 to the FBI and to the
    protection of the American people is at the front end, at the
    very early stages when a tip comes in and we are in an
    environment right now, as you have heard from every member of
    this panel, where there is a high volume of threats and there
    are so few dots, in many cases, to connect with these smaller,
    more contained, more loosely-organized situations, so that the
    premium on getting the right dots to connect, to understand
    which threats are real, which ones are more aspirational, that
    is when the value of 702 kicks in.
        Right now, under 702, we can query information, and I want
    to be sure everybody understands this, this information that
    the FBI has already lawfully in its possession. There is no
    court that disagrees with that. Right now, they can query that
    information and know that this tip from State and local law
    enforcement or somebody in the private sector, is one that
    really matters, and allows us to mobilize resources to be sure
    that we get in front of the threat.
        If 702 is walked back, we will, in effect, be starting to
    rebuild the wall that existed before 9/11. I implore the
    committee not to go there again, because that is something that
    we learned the hard way, you know, before and after 9/11.
        Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Wray. We have a lot of
    people on this committee asking what we can do to help. This is
    exhibit A where we can help. We have to reauthorize section
    702. It is absolutely imperative.
        Secretary Duke, I had the honor of visiting Puerto Rico
    last week. As you know, this committee has oversight over FEMA.
    I describe the experience as heartbreaking and heartwarming all
    at the same time, walking through the convention center where
    some amazing work is being done, by a great team of Federal
    agencies who have challenges.
        My concern is, and if you could address this, FEMA is
    spread very thin right now. They are responding in Texas; they
    are responding in Florida; and they are also responding to what
    I believe to be the most challenging situation in Puerto Rico,
    logistically being over 1,000 miles off the coast of Florida.
    They had an antiquated infrastructure and electrical grid to
    begin with. They dealt with a Cat 5 hurricane right through the
    island, 190-mile-an-hour sustained winds for a 12-hour period
    of time. The citizens there described it to me as a 12-hour
    long tornado. It was absolutely devastating.
        What are we doing specifically for Puerto Rico, given the
    unique challenges logistically and economically that those
    people face? Because I think it is important that we constantly
    talk about and remind everybody that they are American citizens
    too.
        Ms. Duke. Right. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
    definitely had some unique challenges. The main thing we are
    doing differently is--I will juxtapose it against Texas where
    Governor Abbott had a strong infrastructure in place, both
    physical infrastructure and the people, to lead the effort, and
    we augmented.
        What we have done in Puerto Rico, because of their
    financial concerns and others, Governor Rossello had a weak
    ability to execute his vision. So we have embedded FEMA people
    with the Governor and are bolstering his vision, his recovery
    efforts even more strongly.
        Additionally, we are doing response and recovery
    simultaneously. So we are continuing response. Even though it
    has tailed off, we are still delivering water, still delivering
    meals. But we are actually doing the recovery effort in terms
    of rebuilding the infrastructure, so I would say a much
    stronger role in supporting the Governor.
        Mr. Fitzpatrick. We appreciate it. Please keep the focus on
    Puerto Rico. We don't want them to be forgotten. Anything this
    committee can do to support that role, please let us know.
        Ms. Duke. Thank you.
        Mr. Fitzpatrick. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
    witnesses for your testimony today.
        Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent
    to submit a statement from the START, the National Consortium
    for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
       Statement Submitted For the Record By Honorable James R. Langevin
      Statement of The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
                             Responses to Terrorism
        International terrorism casts a long shadow, reaching the American
    consciousness from violence-torn nations such as Iraq, Syria, and
    Afghanistan, and from our collective memory of the attack of September
    11, 2001. Indeed, the 9/11 attack is the most lethal terrorist attack
    in the past half century and the world has experienced historically
    high levels of terrorist violence over the last 5 years, largely at the
    hands of Islamist extremist organizations operating in Muslim-majority
    countries.

        While the overwhelming majority of that terrorist violence has
    occurred in the context of inter- and intra-state conflicts in the
    Muslim world, these bonfires have thrown sparks that have reached
    Western nation-states in the form of both centrally-planned attacks and
    inspired plots with no material support from a foreign-designated
    terrorist organization. It is easy to understand how this aggregated
    level of global violence, selectively featured in high-definition
    terrorist propaganda and amplified on cable news, in combination with
    the anomalous lethality of 9/11, can obscure our understanding of
    terrorist violence within the United States.
        In the United States, however, the nature of terrorist violence
    differs significantly from the global picture, primarily due to its
    diversity and relative scarcity. In the following passages we draw on
    various Unclassified and objective START datasets to highlight the
    empirical nature of terrorism in the United States, in some cases
    excerpting or adapting text from START publications.\1\ *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ A representative sample of those publications are included as
    appendices to this statement for the record.
        * Supplemental material has been retained in committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These data reveal a simple truth; the perpetrators of terrorism in
    the United States adhere to a wide variety of ideologies, choose
    differing targets and victims, recruit and mobilize violence in
    differing patterns, but all pose a threat to American lives and the
    fabric of American society. The perception of the threat posed by these
    different groups and movements depends largely on ``where one sits'' in
    society, as opposed to the empirical nature of their violent attacks
    relative to one another. To suggest that there is only one salient form
    of terrorism active in the United States is empirically false and puts
    American life, liberty, and prosperity at risk.
       the extremist crime database, and differences in victimology and
                              perceived threat\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The ECDB is led by researchers at John Jay College of Criminal
    Justice, Michigan State University, Seattle University, and Indiana
    University-Purdue University, Indianapolis.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ECDB is a relational database that includes information on all
    publicly-known violent and financial crimes committed in the United
    States by extremists associated with violent Islamist extremists, the
    violent Far-Right (FR), and the Animal and Earth Liberation Fronts (ELF
    and ALF). The ECDB includes information on the incidents themselves, as
    well as their perpetrators, related organizations, and victims. It
    currently covers the period between 1990 and 2016.
        Drawing on ECDB data on ideologically-motivated homicides occurring
    after September 11, 2001 through the end of 2016, we find that 31
    Islamist extremist homicide events have resulted in 119 deaths, while
    89 Far-Right extremist homicide events have caused 158 deaths.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ See Appendix for a START infographic based on ECDB homicide
    data published in February 2017 using preliminary 2016 data, which
    provides similar data as the finalized data reported in this statement.
    During the time of this study, there were no homicides conducted by the
    ALF/ELF, the other ideological group studied in the ECDB.

        Over the last 25 years, when including the ideological victims of
    the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing, Islamist
    extremist offenders have killed nearly 7\1/2\ times more people than
    Far-Right extremists in one-fifth as many incidents. However, when
    these two outliers are removed, another story unfolds. Under these
    circumstances, there are nearly four times as many Far-Right extremist
    victims as Islamist extremist victims.
        Although both sets of victims had disproportionate numbers of
    individuals killed in the line of duty, especially when one considers
    the percentage of the general population engaged in active military or
    law enforcement service at any given point in time, Islamist extremist
    victims were more likely to be military, while Far-Right extremist
    victims were more likely to be law enforcement.
        In some ways, Islamist extremist victims have characteristics that
    are closer to that of ``typical'' homicide victims and even the general
    population. This could be a mechanism of the fact that compared to Far-
    Right extremist victims, Islamist extremist victims are more likely to
    be randomly selected. If an individual is fatally victimized by an
    Islamist extremist offender depends on whether they are in the
    proverbial wrong place at the wrong time. Far-right extremist victims,
    however, are more likely to be targeted purposefully for assassination
    based on the offender's previous knowledge of the individual.
        This differential form of targeting can impact threat perception of
    the various ideological groups; in a separate project START researchers
    surveyed law enforcement professionals who indicated that their
    relative perceived threat of Islamist extremists decreased in
    comparison to the Sovereign Citizen movement following a serious of
    homicides in which police officers were killed.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Carter, David, and Steve Chermak, Jeremy Carter, Jack Drew.
    ``Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes,'' Report to the
    Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START, 2014.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Potential Threat   Potential Threat
               Type of Group                (2013-14)          (2006-07)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sovereign Citizens................           3.20 (1)           2.49 (7)
    Islamic Extremists/Jihadists......           2.89 (2)           3.13 (1)
    Militia/Patriot...................           2.67 (3)           2.61 (6)
    Racist Skinheads..................           2.58 (4)           2.82 (3)
    Neo-Nazis.........................           2.56 (5)           2.94 (2)
    Extreme Animal Rightists..........           2.54 (6)           2.79 (4)
    Extreme Environmentalists.........           2.51 (7)           2.74 (5)
    Klux Klux Klan....................           2.38 (8)           2.47 (8)
    Left-Wing Revolutionaries.........           2.36 (9)          2.04 (13)
    Extreme Anti-Abortion.............           2.36 (9)          2.30 (11)
    Black Nationalists................          2.34 (11)          2.35 (10)
    Extreme Anti-Tax..................          2.33 (12)           2.47 (8)
    Extreme Anti-Immigration..........          2.33 (12)           2.41 (9)
    Christian Identity................          2.19 (13)           2.59 (8)
    Idiosyncratic Sectarians..........          2.19 (13)          2.13 (12)
    Millennial/Doomsday Cults.........          2.17 (15)          1.93 (14)
    Reconstructed Traditions..........          2.13 (16)          2.04 (13)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        These victimization patterns over the last 25 years demonstrate
    that ideological victimization from terrorist and extremist violence
    varies across ideologies and underlines the importance of future
    research in the fields of criminology and victimology in attempting to
    understand these differences and reduce victimization risk.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ This analysis is excerpted and adapted from, Parkin, William
    S., Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, and Jeff Gruenewald.
    ``Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United
    States of America,'' Report to the Office of University Programs,
    Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security. College Park, MD: START, 2016.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        profiles of individual radicalization in the united states, and
                        differences in interdictions \6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ The PIRUS data base is curated by researchers at START at the
    University of Maryland. The database is freely available for download
    on START's webpage or can be accessed through the project's data
    visualization tool at http://www.start.umd.edu/profiles-individual-
    radicalization-united-states-pirus-keshif.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS)
    is a database of 1,867 Islamist, Far-Left, Far-Right, and single-issue
    extremists who have radicalized to violent and non-violent extremism in
    the United States from 1948 through 2016. This analysis draws on the
    full dataset and illustrates the important differences that exist
    across ideological groups, as well as those which distinguish violent
    from non-violent extremists. The PIRUS data can be used to explore the
    radicalization trajectories of individuals from Far-Right, Far-Left,
    and Islamist ideologies.
        Individuals adhering to extreme Far-Right views make up the
    majority of the database (n=746), followed by Islamist extremists
    (n=457), and those on the extreme Far-Left (n=324). However, it is
    important to recognize that radicalization in the United States has
    generally occurred in several waves. These waves roughly correspond to
    the rise of Far-Left extremism in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
    Far-Right extremism in the 1980's and 1990's, and Islamist extremism
    after 2001.

        In addition to the analyses described above, PIRUS captures data on
    the progression of the plots pursued by the individuals included in the
    dataset, providing insight into the relative success and failure of
    individuals from different ideological milieus in perpetrating
    violence. In the chart below we can see that while nearly 76 percent of
    Islamist plots were disrupted before an attack occurs, 52 percent of
    violent Far-Right and 55 percent of violent Far-Left plots, of which
    there have been greater overall numbers, were successfully executed.

        One possible explanation for this differential is that the
    professional counterterrorism community has allocated more resources to
    Islamist terrorism. However, another compelling explanation is that the
    Federal laws associated with material support for a foreign designated
    terrorist organization provides additional tools that the criminal
    justice community can use to open investigations and disrupt
    international terrorist plots at an earlier stage in the plot
    progression than are available for domestic terrorist plots.
        Due to Constitutional protections associated with freedom of speech
    and freedom of assembly, many of the same behaviors that allow for the
    arrest of an al-Qaeda supporter prior to a violent attack are not
    chargeable offenses for members of ``domestic'' terrorist groups and
    movements like the Environmental Liberation Front or the White
    Supremacist movement. The different legal standards for domestic
    terrorism and international terrorism generate different criminal
    justice outcomes, but also generate confusion about what constitutes
    terrorism versus a hate-crime and the relative threat of domestic
    terrorism versus international terrorism. Furthermore, it has
    contributed to accusations against the U.S. Government of placing an
    unwarranted focus on Islamist extremism at the expense of other
    threats.
       the american terrorism study, and differences in mobilization of
                                  violence \7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ The American Terrorism Study (ATS) is led by researchers at the
    Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ATS is an empirical relational database consisting of data on
    Federal terrorism-related court cases, persons indicted in these court
    cases, and related officially designated terrorism incidents. Variables
    include demographic information, terrorist group designations, and
    temporal and geospatial data on incidents and antecedent activities
    leading to terrorist attacks.
        In 2016, the ATS team studied how the planning process affects
    outcomes of terrorist plots. Analysis was conducted on 504 terrorism
    plots in the United States from 1980-2015.

        Data for the analysis included information from:
       132 Far-Right terrorism plots
       84 Far-Left plots
       75 Islamist extremist plots,
       126 environmental extremist plots, and
       The remaining plots include activities by a variety of other
            nationalist/separatist groups as well as single-issue plots.
        By studying terrorism across ideologies, as well as the nature of
    lone actors versus group-based actors, the ATS team was able to
    identify differing geographical and temporal patterns of violence
    mobilization that can inform law enforcement interdictions and
    investigations when dealing with threats emanating from different
    ideological groups active in the United States. For example, AQ-related
    and Far-Left perpetrators committed more than half (55 percent and 52
    percent, respectively) of their precursor behaviors within 30 miles of
    where they lived. In contrast, Far-Right perpetrators committed less
    than one-third (31 percent) and environmental perpetrators about one-
    fourth (24 percent) of their precursor behaviors within 30 miles of
    their residences.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Smith, Brent L., and Paxton Roberts, Kelly Damphousse. ``Update
    on Geospatial Patterns of Antecedent Behavior Among Perpetrators in the
    American Terrorism Study (ATS),'' Report to Resilient Systems Division,
    DHS Science and Technology Directorate. College Park, MD: START, 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    the global terrorism database, and the relative scarcity and diversity
                             of u.s. terrorism \9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ This section is adapted from the START Background Briefs,
    ``Overview: Terrorism in 2016,'' published in August 2017 and
    ``Ideological Motivations of Terrorism in the United States, 1970-
    2016,'' published in November 2017. These are included in the Appendix.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to START's Global Terrorism Data (GTD), 61 terrorist
    attacks occurred in the United States in 2016 resulting in the death of
    61 victims and 7 perpetrators. As a region, North America experienced
    the eighth-largest number of attacks out of 12 regions across the
    globe.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Percent                          Percent
                        Region                        Total     Percent     Change     Total     Percent     Change
                                                     Attacks    of Total  from 2015    Deaths    of Total  from 2015
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Middle East & North Africa....................      6,088        45%        +2%     19,121        55%        +8%
    South Asia....................................      3,628        27%       -21%      7,774        22%        -6%
    Sub-Saharan Africa............................      2,051        15%        +6%      6,591        19%       -37%
    Southeast Asia................................      1,078         8%        +1%        635         2%        -2%
    Western Europe................................        269         2%       -20%        238         1%       +39%
    South America.................................        133         1%       -24%         71         0%       -44%
    Eastern Europe................................        132         1%       -81%        112         0%       -86%
    North America.................................         72         1%       +14%         73         0%       +38%
    Central Asia..................................         16         0%       +78%         20         0%       +54%
    Australasia & Oceania.........................         10         0%       -29%          0         0%      -100%
    East Asia.....................................          8         0%       -71%         32         0%       -74%
    Central America & Caribbean...................          3         0%      +200%          9         0%  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total...................................     13,488       100%        -9%     34,676       100%       -10%
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The majority (85 percent) of the terrorist attacks that took place
    in the United States in 2016 were non-lethal, and in three additional
    attacks, the only people killed were the assailants. A total of 61
    victims were killed in attacks that took place in Orlando (49), Dallas
    (5), Baton Rouge (3), New York City (2), Philadelphia (1), and Bristol
    (1).
        Religious figures and institutions were most frequently targeted in
    terrorist attacks in the United States in 2016. These attacks mainly
    involved churches, mosques, and synagogues, typically using incendiary
    weapons. Nine attacks targeted police in the United States in 2016, 4
    of which resulted in the deaths of 9 police officers and 1 bystander.
    The assailants in these cases were not affiliated with formal
    perpetrator organizations, but espoused racist (anti-white), anti-
    police, or jihad-inspired motivations.
        In June 2016 an assailant armed with an assault rifle and a handgun
    opened fire at Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The
    assailant then held a number of people hostage inside the nightclub for
    3 hours. Forty-nine people were killed and more than 50 people were
    injured before law enforcement officers shot and killed the assailant,
    identified as Omar Mateen. During the course of the attack, Mateen
    pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
    and indicated that he carried out the attack in retaliation for U.S.
    airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.
        Between 1970 and 2016 terrorist attacks in the United States were
    motivated by a variety of ideological perspectives. The following
    charts and paragraphs present information from the GTD on terrorist
    attacks classified by ideology as part of the Terrorism and Extremist
    Violence in the United States (TEVUS) project.

        In comparison to the 2000's, there was a sharp decline in the
    proportion of terrorist attacks carried out by left-wing,
    environmentalist extremists during the first 7 years of the 2010's
    (from 64 percent to 12 percent). At the same time, there was a sharp
    increase in the proportion of attacks carried out by right-wing
    extremists (from 6 percent to 35 percent) and religious extremists
    (from 9 percent to 53 percent) in the United States.
        The lethality of terrorism in the United States between 1970 and
    2016 was characterized by thousands of non-lethal attacks (91 percent)
    that were punctuated by relatively rare but deadly, or even
    exceptionally deadly, attacks. Although the lethality of attacks during
    the 2010 to 2016 time period did not nearly match that of the two prior
    decades, this basic pattern remained. For example, of the 68 people
    killed in attacks carried out by jihadi-inspired extremists during this
    period, 49 died in the Orlando, Florida attack in 2016. Fourteen others
    died in San Bernardino, California in a 2015 attack by Syed Farook and
    Tashfeen Malik. Likewise, 9 of the 18 people killed by white
    supremacists or white nationalists died as a result of Dylann Roof's
    2015 attack at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in
    Charleston, South Carolina. Six others were killed when Wade Michael
    Page attacked worshippers at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.
    This demonstrates that the overall trends in terrorism in the United
    States with respect to ideology are highly sensitive to the influence
    of individual mass-casualty attacks.
        Terrorist attacks attributed to formal organizations in the United
    States were relatively rare in the years following the September 11
    attacks. In particular, attacks that took place between 2010 and 2016
    were typically carried out by individual perpetrators who were only
    loosely linked to a specific organization or ideological movement. The
    motivations for attacks were both diverse and overlapping. In some
    cases, they were narrowly focused on issues and in other cases inspired
    by broad belief systems. They included both oppositional (anti-) and
    affirmative (pro-) views, or sometimes both.
        When focusing on formal terrorist organizations that have conducted
    attacks in the United States enumerated in the GTD, we again find a
    diversity of actors emerging each decade from 1970 through 2013.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ This chart is based on data from a derivative dataset of the
    GTD that looks at the groups responsible for attacks in the United
    States, called the Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United
    States (PPT-US). See Appendix for PPT-US Research Highlight.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        dominant ideologies of terrorist groups that emerged each decade

                                  conclusions
        Based on several different databases funded through July 1, 2017 by
    the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. State Department and
    the National Institute of Justice, we are able to examine terrorism in
    the United States across a range of ideological types. In general, this
    analysis shows that the nature of terrorist violence in the United
    States differs significantly from the global picture, primarily due to
    its diversity and relative scarcity. In particular, the perpetrators of
    terrorism in the United States represent a wide variety of ideologies.
    Attacks in the 1970's were dominated by Far-Left groups; Far-Right
    attacks dominated the 1980's and 1990's; and Islamist groups became
    increasingly important following the 9/11 attacks. We also find
    important differences in target selection, tactics, and lethality
    across different ideological groups. These important differences by
    ideology suggest that focusing on only one form of terrorism active in
    the United States will result in less effective counterterrorism and
    increased risk for American citizens.
        Funding for most of the data reported here has now ended but START
    is actively seeking support to allow us to keep these data current and
    useful for policy makers, counterterrorism professionals, students, and
    researchers.

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So to Director Wray and Secretary Duke, for both of you, in
    your testimony, you reference two major cybersecurity incidents
    this year, WannaCry, and NotPetya, under the National Cyber
    Incident Response Plan. When a significant cyber incident
    occurs, the Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, is
    the lead agency for threat response, and DHS is the lead agency
    for asset response.
        So can you and Director Wray describe how your two agencies
    collaborated in response to these incidents and your lessons
    learned? How do you see the cyber threat evolving? What gaps do
    you see in U.S. defenses in response to recovery efforts?
        Ms. Duke. Well, I think the main division is that DHS is
    responsible for securing the systems and remediating any
    malware. So we are more on the technical side of addressing the
    threat, such as WannaCry. We are embedded with the FBI in their
    National Cyber Joint Task Force, and then we have our own end-
    take.
        I think that what we are having to do is really understand,
    as the director said earlier, the difference between state
    actors, just persons looking for maybe financial gain, and
    those hybrid actors. That has become much more difficult. I
    think just information sharing and the co-location is huge for
    us working together in the future.
        Mr. Wray. I would just add that just as the DHS has the
    lead in asset protection and asset mitigation, the FBI has the
    lead in threat response, which we understand to mean sort of
    the pursuit and the attribution and the investigation of the
    incident.
        I have been encouraged by how much progress has been made
    about the cooperation between DHS and FBI on this issue. It has
    been a challenge for everybody because it is such an evolving,
    challenging technical area. But because of the various
    interagency task forces that exist--and there are ones that are
    both at the policy coordination level that are sort-of
    standing, and then there are specific ones that get stood up in
    response to a significant cyber incident. I think the better we
    get, and we need to keep getting better, at information sharing
    and kind-of cooperation, and including involving the private
    sector wherever possible, I think that is how we are going to
    ultimately get in front of the threat.
        Mr. Langevin. Any gaps in particular?
        Ms. Duke. I think one of the biggest gaps is that the role
    that critical infrastructure plays in this issue in protecting
    our country. So as the director said, having to involve the
    private industry in key critical infrastructure sectors.
        Mr. Langevin. OK. So, Secretary Duke, while model aircraft
    have been available to the general consumer for decades, the
    injection of precision navigation and simple-to-use control
    interfaces has rapidly expanded the user base of unmanned
    aerial vehicles. Combined with the capability to carry small
    payloads, such as improvised explosives, these devices now can
    be used to commit acts of terror, sadly.
        So I have worked with my colleague, Senator Whitehouse from
    Rhode Island, to introduce legislation criminalizing the
    reckless operation of drones. But that in and of itself cannot
    stop committed violent actors. So how is DHS assessing the
    rapid increase and the quantities and capabilities of small
    UAVs and the potential to be used as an attack vector?
        In case my time doesn't run out, Director Wray, as you note
    in your testimony, integrating intelligence is the critical
    strategic pillar of the FBI strategy. I want to thank you for
    your efforts in this domain.
        In the international space, the United States provides a
    significant amount of intelligence to our foreign partners that
    enables them to better protect their own nations from attacks.
    Can you and Director Rasmussen comment on how these partners
    are reciprocating in information sharing, and what can be done
    to improve this cooperation?
        Ms. Duke. A quick answer on the unmanned aircraft systems.
    This is an area where we lack authority. If there is anything I
    would ask of the committee it would be to assist us in getting
    authority. We can't even do testing of anti-UAS systems with
    our current authorities, and we think this is a major
    increasing threat.
        Mr. Wray. On the foreign cooperation point, one of the
    things that we are doing better now that has, I think,
    significantly improved the amount of intelligence flowing back
    the other way is through our legat program. We have legats in--
    80 legats serving 200 countries. That is our foreign offices of
    the FBI.
        A lot of those, I just came back from Europe, in
    particular, where we are starting to get more and more two-way
    flow of information, in particular, from the Brits, but also
    from other countries. As they learn more about what would be
    valuable, and we get more and more embedded and the level of
    trust both ways between the two countries matures, I think that
    is another place where, when I look at the kind of cooperation
    that exists now between intelligence services and the way it
    was back when I was in Government before, it is like night and
    day. Doesn't mean it can't be better, and it needs to keep
    getting better, but I really feel like we are on the right
    track there.
        Mr. Rasmussen. I would just add to that that if there was
    any modest silver lining in the difficult threat environment
    that we face driven by ISIS over the last few years, it has
    been the dramatic increase in information sharing globally that
    we have seen. Many more countries than ever before view this as
    their problem too and simply not something that they can shut
    off and ignore and say that is an American problem or that is a
    British problem.
        So the array, the number of countries that we have active
    intelligence sharing arrangements with is in the many, many
    dozen now, rather than just a handful of very close partners.
    Again, the foreign fighter phenomenon has also helped drive
    that kind of information sharing as well. So it is a modest
    silver lining, but it is something we can build on for the
    range of terrorism threats that we will face in the future.
        Mr. Langevin. I want to thank you all for your testimony,
    your insights.
        Secretary Duke, I think it is pretty outrageous that DHS
    can't even do testing on drones and their capabilities.
        Mr. Chairman, maybe that is something that we can work on
    together to help to change.
        Chairman McCaul. I have been looking at this issue for
    quite some time. We have seen drones being used in Iraq and
    Syria. We have seen drones at the White House, the Capitol. I
    do think it is time for us to consider legislation to move some
    authorities from the FAA to the Department of Homeland
    Security, and I would very much like to work with you.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the
    opportunity.
        With that, thank you to our witnesses. I will yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Nebraska, General Bacon, is recognized
    for the first time.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be on
    the committee. Defending our Constitution and strengthening our
    National security are my most important priorities, and it is
    an honor to be on this committee to put some focus on that.
        Secretary Duke, I wanted to ask you about what I consider
    as one of the most important threats to our country, and that
    is the cyber penetration from Russia and China into our energy
    infrastructure, our--perhaps our financial networks. How would
    you assess the threat that Russia and China poses, say, on a 1
    to 10 scale, 10 being the worst? Because what I fear is the
    next December 7 we face will be preceded by an energy attack or
    a financial sector attack like that. Thank you.
        Ms. Duke. It is very strong. On a scale of 1 to 10, I would
    say probably a 7 or 8, because what we know is daunting and we
    don't know what we don't know. But looking at using cyber to
    attack the control systems of critical infrastructure is a
    major area of concern that we are working with the critical
    infrastructure on.
        Mr. Bacon. It seems apparent to me that they are putting a
    foundation in to have that capability, if needed. I think we
    should be concerned. Do you think we are doing enough to build
    resilience in the system or to have back-ups, or is there a lot
    more that we can do?
        Ms. Duke. I think that it is to the point where the
    critical infrastructure sector has really recognized the threat
    recently, so I think everyone has the attention. Now it is
    implementing the safeties to help try to prevent this.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        Director Wray, when I go and talk to the law enforcement in
    the Omaha area, I ask them: What is the one thing that we can
    do more to help you with, gun violence and things like that? I
    hear two things: Do more about straw man purchases. Not enough
    is being done there. Also to help off-duty law enforcement to
    be able to carry their weapons, or retired.
        Would you share those sentiments from our law enforcement
    from Omaha?
        Mr. Wray. Well, certainly on the straw purchasing side,
    when I was a line prosecutor back--as a baby prosecutor, I used
    to do a lot of straw purchaser cases. I do think that is a
    place where more aggressive enforcement of laws on the books
    would be very helpful. Most of that responsibility lies with
    ATF. But we work collaboratively with the ATF, who is a great
    partner on more organized criminal activity that involves some
    of the same kind of firearms crime that you are talking about.
        As you may know, the Attorney General is revitalizing
    Project Safe Neighborhoods that was a very effective Federal,
    State, and local program that existed in the early 2000's that
    kind of built off of Project Exile that had been in Richmond to
    really try to more strategically focus on gun violence. So I
    think that will help the folks in Omaha, among other places.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I am going to be working on some
    legislation toward that end. Thank you.
        Director Rasmussen, as you know, Secretary of Defense
    Mattis has changed our strategy. When we get to an area where
    ISIS is operating, our policy previously had been to take over
    the city, but they would be able to get out, retreat, regroup
    somewhere else. Now his strategy is to kill them where they are
    at and not let them get out.
        Are you seeing effects of the strategy where we are seeing
    less of these terrorists leaving Syria, trying to come back
    this direction or going to Europe, or are you seeing a
    reduction in this terrorist flow?
        Mr. Rasmussen. Well, certainly, the territorial aspect of
    the fight that I mentioned in my prepared remarks has
    accelerated over the course of this year with the dramatic
    reduction in the amount of territory ISIS controls. One of the
    difficulties and challenges, though, has been that that
    campaign has taken a period of time to play out in a sense that
    the bad guys, in many cases, knew where we were headed next.
        They knew that the effort was focused on Mosul, the largest
    city in Iraq that was under ISIS control. They knew we were,
    over time, going to move toward Raqqa, the city in eastern
    Syria that served as the headquarters for ISIS. That,
    unfortunately, allowed many of the actors we would be most
    concerned about to bleed out over time ahead of that campaign.
    Many chose to fight, to stay and fight, and they chose to stay
    and fight and die in defense of the caliphate. But others we
    are concerned about have made their way into either the Iraqi
    countryside or are trying to find their way out of the conflict
    zone.
        So it is not necessarily a volume question as much as it is
    a quality and quantity question. If the wrong individuals get
    out, the wrong individuals who have particular capability or
    skill and experience with weapons of mass destruction, those
    are the ones we are the most concerned about.
        But, yes, I agree. We are absolutely focused on making sure
    these individuals do not escape the battlefield.
        Mr. Bacon. One last question, if I may. I think we are
    doing a lot on the kinetic side, going into the cyber mode for
    recruitment, going after the financial end of it. But I have
    yet to see how we can do better at undermining the ideology
    that recruits lone wolves to help sustain ISIS and al-Qaeda
    overseas.
        What more can we be doing to undermine the ideology that
    does this recruiting?
        Mr. Rasmussen. I think there, a soft touch and a little bit
    of subtlety is required, because I think we will be most
    effective if we are enabling and empowering credible actors who
    can speak credibly to those potentially vulnerable populations,
    rather than something coming out from the State Department or
    with the brand of the United States on it saying this is how
    you should behave, this is how you should believe. But if we
    can identify and empower and support credible voices within the
    communities where this is a problem, it is a better solution.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Director, I just wanted to comment, in addition to doing
    counterterrorism work as a Federal prosecutor, I was also an
    exile prosecutor. Please relay to the Attorney General my
    thanks for reviving that program. It is very good. It works. So
    thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
    Jackson Lee.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. Let me start out by thanking
    each and every one of you for your service to this Nation. My
    time is short, and so I will be pointed in my questions.
        Secretary Duke, let me first of all offer my sympathy
    publicly again as I have done for the loss of life of a Border
    Patrol agent just a few weeks ago, and as well, one that is
    injured and mending. Thank you for all of the men and women
    that work in the Homeland Security Department.
        Let me focus on Hurricane Harvey, which, by connection, I
    think it impacts the Virgin Islands, and as well, Puerto Rico
    and Florida and others.
        FEMA certainly is an agency that we owe a great debt of
    gratitude to, but let me be very clear. I have been asked how
    Houston is doing, how Texas is doing. We are a strong group of
    people, but we are devastated. It is so difficult dealing with
    FEMA and the repeated denials, people who have not heard from
    FEMA. FEMA is good for the immediacy, but it is not good for
    recovery, and you are listed as a recovery agency. We need help
    down in Texas. We need more FEMA, DRCs. We need more people
    dealing with the appeal process. It is absolutely absurd.
        The second question is dealing with the appropriations. I
    would ask that you would ask the President of the United States
    to consider that $44 billion is shameful. The President came to
    Texas and said that we would provide you with everything you
    need. This is $44 billion for the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto
    Rico, Texas, and everyone else.
        So if you would answer that question after. Let me go to
    Director Wray. I will put the questions on the record very
    quickly.
        The questions on the record are, Director Wray, as you well
    know, there have been some anti-Muslim videos that have been
    offered by the Commander-in-Chief. My question is, as the world
    has condemned this, how difficult it makes the work of the FBI
    that deals with domestic terrorism with these kinds of videos
    being associated with the United States.
        Second, I am interested in the commitment to not do reverse
    targeting under 702. I know that it is an international issue,
    but the FBI is involved in terrorism, in the fight against
    terrorism, and may use the 702 law. I want to know your
    position on reverse targeting of a U.S. citizen.
        Finally, the black identity extremists. We have had some
    conversations on that. I believe it is crucial that there be a
    clarification so that individuals expressing themselves in the
    First Amendment understand the parameters of the FBI.
        Ms. Duke, if you would, please, Secretary Duke.
        Ms. Duke. I will check into the specific inquiries. I will
    work with Governor Abbott's office to make sure that we are
    keeping in Texas. The $44 billion is the current supplemental.
    We do expect that there will be needed additional
    supplementals. But for now, we do have adequate resources to do
    all the recovery efforts.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I vigorously disagree with you. We do not
    have the adequate resources, and this is going to be on the
    verge of a Government shutdown if Texas and all of the other
    victims of these hurricanes do not have a compromise where we
    can work together. I would encourage you to tell the President
    that it is not enough. It simply is not.
        May I also just leave with you Ms. Temitope N. Jimoh, J-i-
    m-o-h, who is a United Airlines supervisor, who has not been
    able to determine why she has been denied official background
    checks. She has filed two appeals, so I would like to speak
    with your leg affairs on that. Thank you.
        Ms. Duke. Yes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Director Wray, thank you.
        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Congresswoman. If I can take your
    questions in rapid-fire fashion here. The first one, I think we
    try very hard at the FBI, and will continue to try very hard,
    to earn the trust and confidence of every community we serve
    and protect, including the Muslim-American community. We are
    trying, as I mentioned in response to an earlier question, to
    encourage people to come forward as potential sources and
    witnesses, and we will continue to do that.
        On the reverse targeting point, my position is there should
    not be and we do not permit reverse targeting under section
    702.
        On the black identity extremist issue, I thought our
    conversation yesterday was candid and constructive, at least I
    hope you felt the same way. I can assure you and the rest of
    the American people that we do not investigate people for
    rhetoric, for ideology, for First Amendment expression, for
    association. What we do is when people are engaged in--when
    there is credible evidence of Federal crime involving the
    credible threat of force or violence to further a political or
    social goal, that is our focus. We have no interest
    investigating any group for expressing strong views, no matter
    who might consider them extremist, about any important social
    issue, including racial injustice.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you answer that last question--I have
    got 9 seconds--about 702?
        Mr. Wray. Oh, I am sorry. On 702, I was just saying we do
    not permit reverse targeting and would not.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Florida, Mr. Rutherford.
        Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, I want to thank the panel for your service to the
    country and particularly your service here this morning in this
    long testimony. You know, there is an old saying that everybody
    uses, ``don't beat a dead horse,'' and of course, then we turn
    right around and beat the dead horse.
        So, Secretary Duke, I too am going to ask about the OMB's
    recommendation of the $44 billion for storm recovery. Here is
    the issue in Florida. We are a very large agricultural State.
    Most people don't realize that. But we took a very hard hit,
    about $1.5 billion, and almost $700 million of that was to our
    citrus industry.
        This is why a supplemental to follow is not adequate,
    because these citrus farmers need the money now for the next
    crop coming. If they don't have that--those assets right now,
    then they are not going to be prepared for the next growing
    season. I spoke with one citrus grower who lost 36,000 trees--
    36,000 trees. That is going to take some time to replace, and
    more delays is going to have a tremendous negative impact on
    our recovery in Florida.
        So I would like you to carry that back to the
    administration and the OMB, and let them know the impact that
    that is going to have on these growing seasons that don't wait
    for the next supplemental. So thank you for that.
        Now I would like to shift over to and follow up on cyber,
    as many of my colleagues have. You know, not just asset
    protection, but also the ideological fight that I think needs
    to go on within the cyber war.
        Director Wray, you mentioned the cyber squads that you have
    now in all 56 regional offices. What I would like to know is
    what are the difficulties--you know, one of the challenges, I
    think, in the world of cyber is getting that great talent and
    being able to pay for it and pull them away from, you know,
    private industry. How--is there anything that we can do to help
    you get the best of the best for your cyber war?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I was--as you started to ask the question,
    I was thinking, before you got to the talent, that was going to
    be my answer as the principal challenge. There is just not
    enough people who really have that sort of genius-level talent
    for anybody, including the private sector. Of course, we can't
    compete with the hefty paychecks that the private sector can
    offer those same people. But I do believe that people--we can
    compete with anybody on mission. I think we have found that the
    bright, young talent that we are able to attract in this base
    join us for the right reasons, which is our commitment to the
    mission.
        We clearly need more of them. We are trying to do more to
    raise the level of what I will call sort-of cyber literacy
    across our work force, because one of the things that we
    struggle with right now is that our sort-of our cyber black
    belts, if you can call them that, get diverted into having to
    help out with other kinds of criminal investigation work that
    has a cyber component. But if we could raise the basic level of
    literacy across the organization, and I assume Secretary Duke
    would say the same thing within hers, then we could really have
    the most talented people focus on the really sophisticated,
    cutting-edge stuff, and that is where I am hoping to take the
    organization.
        Mr. Rutherford. I am glad you referenced homeland security,
    because I know the Secret Service, for example, had some great
    success in going after transnational organizations with money
    laundering and those kind of things. It is important to have
    that cyber attack.
        Director Rasmussen, how about you, is there anything--you
    know, what can we do to help you all with this recruiting,
    anything?
        Mr. Rasmussen. Well, Director Wray made a very good point.
    With the mission that we have before us, whether it is
    counterterrorism we are dealing with, cyber crime, or cyber
    threats to the United States, motivating young people to want
    to do this for a living is not a challenge. When we put out
    announcements for job openings, we get hundreds and hundreds of
    very high-quality applicants from all over the country.
        One of the challenges we are facing in the intelligence
    community is getting them through the security clearance
    process quickly enough so we don't make someone wait 18 months
    to start embarking on their Federal career, and that is
    something we are working on internally. But I would tell you,
    the biggest thing that you could give us as all Federal
    agencies is a predictable funding environment so that we didn't
    have to wonder year-to-year, will I be able next year to have
    an entry-level cadre of young people coming in or am I stuck
    with this year's class and I have to hold onto them that much
    longer? So year-to-year predictability is very, very important.
        Mr. Rutherford. Yes. Let me ask one other thing in the
    little bit of time I have left. The National Cyber Incident
    Response Plan. As was mentioned earlier, DHS is responsible for
    the asset response, but FBI and DOJ are responsible for the
    threat response. What is the involvement of private industry in
    that partnership in response? Do we need some further
    clarification and definition of roles in the cyber war?
        Mr. Wray. I would say that while there was a time when the
    definition was murkier and there was more confusion about the
    lanes in the road, that after PPD-41, the lanes in the road, I
    think, are much more clearly defined. So I haven't seen as much
    of that as an issue.
        I think the private-sector engagement piece is something
    that we in DHS work on together a lot more and more. We are
    always trying to figure out ways to balance the desire to get
    with the private sector faster, but at the same time, to make
    sure we are both providing accurate information and that we are
    not compromising an existing investigation. In many cases, the
    information that we are getting, at least on the FBI side, is
    either Classified or involves coordination with our foreign
    partners, as I said earlier, and there may be restrictions on
    our ability to share it.
        So we are all learning collectively, the interagency
    community and the private sector, about how to kind-of adapt to
    this comparatively new threat still.
        Mr. Rutherford. OK. Well, again, I thank all of you for
    your time.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, is recognized.
        Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
    Member, for having this meeting. Thank you, Director Wray, for
    the meeting yesterday which was very thorough, and I hope we
    continue to follow up.
        Let me just ask you all, and maybe Director Rasmussen or
    Director Wray would have more insight. I am concerned about the
    new and reemerging slave trade in Libya, and the question is:
    Have you all--do you all have any intelligence on it? Do you
    have any reason to believe that it is not, in fact, happening?
        Mr. Rasmussen. Obviously, the fact that there is as much
    political chaos and a vacuum of authority in Libya opens the
    door to all kinds of criminal and other illicit activity. Human
    trafficking is obviously a component of that, as groups try to
    move individuals up through Libya and potentially into Europe
    and contribute to the migrant problem--migrant challenge in
    Europe. We follow that pretty closely from a terrorism
    perspective because those same networks can be used to move
    extremists who want to do us harm or do harm to our allies and
    friends also.
        So we could arrange to share some more Classified
    information with you or your staff in terms of what we know
    about those challenges. Unfortunately, what we know and what we
    can do about it are two separate things. We don't have a lot of
    capability on the ground.
        Mr. Richmond. I agree. But almost like in a medical
    situation, you first have to diagnose that there is a problem
    and acknowledge there is a problem. I think that there is more
    that Congress can do. I just wanted to know from experts
    whether it is something you all would say is fact, that it is
    happening.
        Mr. Rasmussen. It is certainly true.
        Mr. Richmond. OK. Thank you for that.
        Director Wray, and actually all of you all have employees
    that have to fill out the SF-86 form. You talked about the
    process of 18 months to actually get through the process. But
    my question is, at what point--and maybe, Director Wray, as a
    former agent, you can comment on this--at what point do
    omissions become willful and deliberate omissions that rise to
    violating, I think it is title 18, section 1001, which is
    penalties for inaccurate or false statements on the security
    clearance form?
        Mr. Wray. Well, first, while I would love to claim to
    having been a former agent, I can claim to be a former
    prosecutor. So I wouldn't want any of my--many of the many
    agents who work for me to view me as a poseur.
        Mr. Richmond. Got it.
        Mr. Wray. But I am very proud of my credentials now,
    however.
        Second, on the SF-86 point, you know, really it is going
    depend on all the facts and circumstances of the particular
    case. You know, willfulness requires a level of conscious
    knowledge and intent, a knowing falsehood and a recognition
    that the person is making a material omission or false
    statement and recognizing that that is what they are doing when
    they do it, I guess is the way I think of it. That is layman's
    speak, and you as a former defense lawyer can appreciate some
    of the nuances there.
        Mr. Richmond. I guess, if we look at the administration and
    take the most obvious example, which is Kushner's form that has
    been amended, you know, over 100 times, and usually after it
    comes to light that it was inaccurate, the question becomes
    people who apply to your agencies who may leave off, you know,
    high school eviction, you know, college eviction from an
    apartment or something like that, who may get prosecuted for
    it, at what point do we start to get to selective prosecution
    if we don't set the example at the top level with willful
    omissions that don't get corrected until after they are brought
    to the public?
        Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, I think it is important to
    respond truthfully and completely on an SF-86, and I would
    expect all my folks to do that. It is a bear of a form to fill
    out, if you have ever seen one. The older you are and the more
    time periods you have got to cover, it is a challenge. I am not
    aware of a whole lot of prosecutions that have occurred of
    people for their SF-86 responses, but certainly, I do think it
    is important for everybody at any level to try to be as
    truthful and complete and accurate as possible in filling out
    the SF-86.
        Mr. Richmond. With my last 15 seconds, let me just thank
    you all for the job you do. We know how complicated it is from
    how do we secure drones or unmanned aircraft now. Mr. Higgins
    would relate, in my district, I probably have the largest
    petrochemical footprint in the country. That is a concern of
    how we protect it from flying objects that can be directed. So
    no one professes that what you do is easy, but we thank you for
    your service, because the safety of the homeland depends on it.
    For those people who work for you all, please let them know
    that this Congress--and I think I can speak for everybody--
    surely appreciates their service and sacrifice for the country,
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe, is recognized.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me start off where my friend and colleague from
    Louisiana left off, and that is thanking our entire panel
    today.
        Director Rasmussen, let me just tell you that I believe
    that our Nation is safer and better because of your service,
    and I will just tell you that you will be missed.
        Secretary Duke, as the Chairman of the Cybersecurity and
    Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee here, I have enjoyed
    working with you, and I have appreciated your leadership on
    what I believe is our greatest National security threat in the
    long term: Cybersecurity. Having said that, while I look
    forward to working with you, I have a limited time today. While
    I believe that cybersecurity is our greatest National security
    threat, I believe that our most urgent National security threat
    right now relates to section 702 that has been mentioned a
    number of times.
        So let me turn to you, Director Wray. The reason I call 702
    the most urgent National security matter is I think it has been
    mentioned that it is about to expire. We have 9 legislative
    days left here in this Congress before the section 702 of FISA
    expires at the end of the year. Now, it has been mentioned that
    702, broadly speaking, targets foreign intelligence from non-
    U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside of the United
    States.
        But quantifying exactly how important 702, I think, has
    been left out of some of the discussion, I want to give you the
    opportunity to expound on that or maybe refute it. Our
    intelligence agencies estimate that 25 percent of our
    actionable foreign intelligence comes directly from 702. Do you
    believe that to be accurate?
        Mr. Wray. I am not sure that I know what the percentage is,
    but that doesn't surprise me, that estimate. I would have no
    reason to question it. I will tell you that every person I talk
    to who has actually seen the operation of section 702
    internally, up close--and I have sat with agents at the
    terminal watching how they use it so that I could be sure that
    I was really understanding it--every single one of them is just
    horrified at the thought that we would lose that valuable tool.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, let's assume our intelligence agencies
    are correct and 25 percent is an accurate number, are you aware
    of any legal authority that would provide us a greater
    percentage of actionable foreign intelligence than section 702?
        Mr. Wray. No.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. OK. So we established that it is very, very
    important to our National security. Now let's talk about how
    effective 702 really is. I participated last week in a debate
    at the Judiciary Committee as Congress moved forward and the
    Judiciary Committee moved forward something called the USA
    Liberty Act, which seeks to reauthorize but significantly
    modify 702.
        In the course of that discussion, I found some of the well-
    intentioned criticism to be misguided and unfair, because some
    folks are conflating section 215 in telephony metadata with
    section 702. Would you agree with me that those comparisons are
    misguided and unfair?
        Mr. Wray. Yes, I would.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. All right. So one of the, I think,
    legitimate concerns and questions that has been raised about
    section 702 relates to the issue of incidental collection of
    information on Americans and even non-U.S. persons who are in
    the United States. We know that that happens. But again, I
    think what has been left out of much of the public debate, and
    I want to give you the opportunity to weigh in and clarify, as
    we Members of Congress and the public watches this debate move
    forward, there is oversight of this incidental collection that
    takes place. It takes place through an oversight board, a
    nonpartisan board called the Privacy and Civil Liberties
    Oversight Board, or PCLOB, correct?
        Mr. Wray. Correct.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. PCLOB has actually issued a very specific
    report reviewing section 702 and the incidental collection that
    has taken place, correct?
        Mr. Wray. Correct.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. All right. To your knowledge, does that
    report from an independent oversight board, has it found--in
    the 7 years that 702 has been in place, has it found any
    intentional abuse of section 702?
        Mr. Wray. Not to my knowledge, no.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Over 7 years, no intentional abuses of
    section 702. I would think that that is essentially a record of
    success for a Government authority that is unrivaled, certainly
    in my experience. So I guess you agree with me that 702 is our
    most important law enforcement and counterintelligence tool
    with respect to foreign intelligence?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. It is our most effective?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. It is our least abused?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Given that, if we not only failed to
    reauthorize, but failed to reauthorize section 702 in as close
    to its form as it possibly is right now, would we as Members of
    Congress be jeopardizing National security for all 320 million
    Americans, in your opinion, as America's top law enforcement
    official?
        Mr. Wray. That is definitely my view. I appreciate the
    question, because I think, when I talk about the importance of
    reauthorizing section 702, it is exactly as you say. It is the
    importance of reauthorizing it in as close to the current form
    as possible.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. My time has expired. I thank you all.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Let me echo those sentiments. I believe reauthorization of
    702 as close as possible to current law is vitally important to
    the security of the United States.
        With that, the Chair now recognizes Ms. Barragan.
        Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Duke, thank you for being here today. I just was,
    last week, visiting our troops overseas for Thanksgiving. I was
    in Afghanistan. I am just amazed at how these young men and
    women are on the front lines fighting terrorism, doing so with
    the mission of protecting our homeland.
        Earlier this year, I was disturbed to learn that if you are
    not a citizen in this country and you pick up a weapon and you
    go fight overseas and you die there, we will make you an
    automatic citizen. But if you survive and you come back to this
    country, you can still be deported. When I was out there, I was
    talking to a few of our soldiers who were telling me about some
    of their concerns and their problems with family members who
    are going through proceedings.
        Can you tell me if any veterans are being deported right
    now under your watch?
        Ms. Duke. I would have to get back for the record. I do
    know that DOD, Department of Defense, is looking at
    reinstituting the program of paths for citizenships for
    soldiers. But in terms of recently returning veterans, I would
    have to get back. They are not a priority, for sure.
        Ms. Barragan. OK. Great. If you could do so in writing, I
    would appreciate that.
        You know, I have introduced a bill to address this so that
    we can just make sure we are protecting those who are on the
    front lines and are serving.
        I wanted to ask you a little bit about Hurricane Harvey in
    Texas. My understanding from reports that I had read is that
    there was some confusion about in directives on whether
    immigration checkpoints were going to remain or not. So I
    wanted to ask if you were aware of the confusion that was
    created from the directives?
        Ms. Duke. We early on issued that there would be no active
    immigration control, that other than criminal acts that needed
    to be addressed, that we would not do proactive immigration
    enforcement.
        Ms. Barragan. OK. I am going to go ahead and enter into the
    record an article covered by NPR and some other organizations
    that kind-of highlighted the confusion that caused even the
    Mayor, I think, of Houston to have to come out to go on record
    to make a statement about this. I am hoping that this will be
    something that won't become an issue as another, you know,
    emergency disaster happens. Because we want to certainly make
    sure that people feel safe and secure in following authorities
    when they are being asked to leave. In that regard, I have
    introduced a bill on that. Hopefully, my colleagues will take a
    look at that.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
      Article Submitted For the Record by Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan
     Border Patrol Says Texas Checkpoints To Remain Open During Hurricane
                                     Harvey
    By Julian Aguilar, Texas Tribune, August 25, 2017.
    https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/24/border-patrol-texas-
    checkpoints-remain-open-hurricane-harvey/
    Customs and Border Patrol agents constantly patrol wide gravel roads
    along the border fence. The traffic--which has increased as border
    enforcement budgets have soared--is another threat to border wildlife,
    according to scientists and conservationists.--Callie Richmond for The
    Texas Tribune
        The devastation was swift, and the recovery is far from over.
        Editor's note.--This story has been updated with statements from
    the U.S. Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection on Friday, Aug. 25.
        As thousands of Texans prepare to evacuate their cities due to
    Hurricane Harvey, the United States Border Patrol said it is not
    planning to close its roadside immigration checkpoints north of the Rio
    Grande Valley unless there is a danger to travelers or its agents.
        ``Border Patrol checkpoints will not be closed unless there is a
    danger to the safety of the traveling public and our agents. Border
    Patrol resources, including personnel and transportation, will be
    deployed on an as-needed basis to augment the efforts and capabilities
    of local-response authorities,'' the agency said in a statement.
        ``The Border Patrol is a law enforcement agency and we will not
    abandon our law enforcement duties.''
        When asked to elaborate on the statement, CBP public affairs
    officer Roberto Rodriguez said officers would prioritize public safety
    but keep intact the goals of the agency's mission.
        ``We're not going to impede anybody getting out of here, but at the
    same time we're a law enforcement agency, so we still have to conduct
    our duties,'' he said.
        On Friday, the agency offered a little more insight into when
    checkpoint closures could be expected.
        ``U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints in the path of Hurricane Harvey in
    Texas will close as state highways close. These closures will occur in
    a manner that ensures the safety of the traveling public and our
    agents,'' the statement reads. But the agency also made clear that
    checkpoints outside of Hurricane Harvey's path would remain open.
        The American Civil Liberties Union of Texas quickly admonished the
    agency for putting policy ahead of safety.
        ``Safety should be a priority regardless of immigration status,''
    said ACLU policy strategist Astrid Dominguez. ``This is very concerning
    for the community. It sends a wrong message.''
        Also on Friday, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and
    Border Protection said in a joint statement that ``non-criminal''
    enforcement activities will not occur at assistance shelters or
    evacuation sites. But they would remain vigilant ``against any effort
    by criminals to exploit disruptions caused by the storm.''
        On Thursday, Southeast Texas and the state's coastal bend regions
    were expected to be the hardest hit by Hurricane Harvey. But the Rio
    Grande Valley and its surrounding areas are also bracing for possible
    severe flooding or worse if the path of the storm shifts.
        As of Thursday afternoon, the National Weather Service said the
    threat to life and property for Brownsville and the surrounding areas
    was high and that ``Emergency plans should include a reasonable threat
    for hurricane force wind of 74 to 110 mph of equivalent Category 1 to 2
    intensity.'' But in an updated advisory on Friday, the weather service
    downgraded that threat to moderate after winds began to recede in the
    area.
        The Border Patrol's statement on Thursday came the same day
    Brownsville Mayor Tony Martinez issued a disaster declaration for the
    city and activated its emergency operations center.
        Dominguez said she was still hopeful that if the hurricane
    intensified and a mass evacuation was ordered, the federal government
    would ease up on enforcement.
        That happened as recently as 2016, when ICE and U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection temporarily suspended enforcement measures during
    evacuations prompted by Hurricane Matthew.
        ``There will be no immigration enforcement initiatives associated
    with evacuations or sheltering related to Matthew, including the use of
    checkpoints for immigration enforcement purposes in impacted areas
    during an evacuation,'' a 2016 statement read. ICE put out a similar
    message ahead of Hurricane Isaac in 2012.
        In its news release Thursday, the Border Patrol said it would work
    to evacuate residents if called upon to do so.
        ``If there is a time when we have to unite with our emergency
    preparedness partners to evacuate community members, we assure you that
    we will act quickly ensuring that the safety of those requiring
    evacuation remains paramount,'' the release states.

        Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
        I wanted to follow up on some of the questions about gun
    violence and really their connection to terrorism. I think I
    remember hearing former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson
    once made a comment--and I am going to quote him--it said:
    ``meaningful, responsible gun control is now part and parcel of
    homeland security, especially given the prospect of home-grown,
    home-born violent extremism in this country.''
        Do you agree with that assessment?
        Ms. Duke. What we are seeing now is really an agnostic look
    at tools. Guns are not necessarily the primary vehicle by which
    terrorism is occurring.
        Ms. Barragan. Well, would you say that the guns are part of
    what terrorists are using, and that it certainly could be
    perceived as access to guns could be part of the issue?
        Ms. Duke. Guns, knives, vehicles are among the top, yes.
        Ms. Barragan. Great. Thank you.
        Director Wray, I wanted to ask you--you know, I have to
    first agree with some of my colleagues who echoed, you know,
    having more hearings on the threats presented by domestic
    terrorism and home-grown terror. I also wrote a letter to the
    Chairman asking that we do a hearing just on that. Instead, it
    is harder to get to all these issues with the short amount of
    time. But, Director Wray, terrorists are getting their hands on
    and using high-assault weapons. It is a repeated occurrence,
    costing American lives. We have seen it happen in San
    Bernardino and Orlando at the Pulse nightclub. In particular,
    there was an alarming statistic I saw that GAO reported that,
    between February 2004 and December 2015, known or suspected
    terrorists initiated background checks to purchase a weapon, I
    think it was about 2,500 times. Ninety-one percent of the
    transactions were allowed to proceed. Does this concern you?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I am not familiar with the specific report
    that you mention. I will say that, much as Secretary Duke has
    said, we are really focused on the terrorists themselves,
    whether they be domestic or international. They seem in many
    ways hell-bent on committing attacks that kill as many people
    as possible by whatever means they can get their hands on.
        Ms. Barragan. So without looking at the report, would it be
    concerning to you that people who are on the known or suspected
    terrorist list are purchasing guns, and 91 percent of those
    people are allowed to purchase guns? Is that concerning at all
    to you?
        Mr. Wray. Certainly. The way you describe it is very
    concerning to me, yes.
        Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
        Mr. Garrett from Virginia is recognized.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would commend the gentlelady on pointing out these
    deported veterans issues. I was reading about that, and I saw
    that one was deported after he was convicted of shooting into
    an occupied vehicle in 2010. I am not sure who the President
    was then, but it is nice to see the attention getting brought
    on this subject matter now. So I would commend her for pointing
    that out, and cite a Los Angeles Times story that points out
    that each of the individuals in question deported between 2008
    and 2016 had committed a crime, and there might be up to 350
    such individuals.
        But back to the testimony at hand, I am curious, I saw in
    Ms. Duke's testimony that the Federal agencies had coordinated
    prior to the events in Charlottesville. I think that is a good
    thing, certainly more is needed. But when you have large
    gatherings of people, say, for example, Saturday at 2 p.m. at
    my high school, which is in Congressman Brat's district and not
    my own, a State semi-championship football game will be held,
    probably about 8,000 people will be in attendance. Is there any
    Federal coordination for security for that sort of event?
        Ms. Duke. Unless it is a declared a National security
    event, our coordinations with the responsible local officials,
    we call that a soft target, and we do quite a bit of training,
    coordination, and assistance in advance to help them secure.
        Mr. Garrett. Right. I apologize for the way this is going
    because it is not intended to be a gotcha, and I am going that
    way almost reflexively. Too much time as a courtroom lawyer.
    But obviously, an event like that presents a soft target, as
    you indicated, and a collaboration--or a gathering of people in
    close proximity to one another. Yet technology recently has
    demonstrated, via numerous videos on the internet, of the
    ability to use drones as weapons, et cetera. There are numerous
    Unclassified videos in sites ranging from The New York Times to
    the Washington Post of 40-millimeter hand grenades being
    dropped through the cupolas of M1 tanks, et cetera. We have all
    seen them. Yet the anti-drone gun technology that currently
    exists is limited in its capacity to be sold specifically and
    exclusively to Federal law enforcement entities.
        I would submit for any of you to comment on that the first
    line of defense at that football game on Saturday will be local
    law enforcement, with probably some augmentation by State law
    enforcement, but that we do a historically wonderful job of
    preparing for the last conflict to the last attack, and we
    generally do a relatively poor job, which has been brought to
    the forefront, post-9/11, of contemplating what that next
    attack might be. For example, the weaponization of vehicles
    that members of the panel have made reference to that we have
    now seen all too many times, not only in Europe, but most
    recently in the United States.
        Can somebody tell me why the Virginia State Police or the
    Henrico County Police department or the Albemarle County Police
    Department can't purchase anti-drone technology when things
    like UVA football games or the NASCAR race at Richmond motor
    speedway occur under the protection of these entities? Can
    somebody give me a good reason why local and State law
    enforcement can't avail themselves of anti-drone technology? I
    want you to say no, but if there is a good reason, I want to
    hear it too.
        Ms. Duke. No, there is no good reason. I think it goes, as
    the Chairman said, to legacy of authorities and not having the
    authorities because of the--it is conflated with the signal
    waves of cellphones and how they are tracked. So it needs to be
    addressed.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you very much. Again, I am on the same
    team as all of you guys here, and I apologize again for my
    tone. I am going to try to snap out of it.
        Would it, in your estimation, be a good policy area to
    consider to power down the ability to purchase anti-drone
    technology to State and local authorities, given that they are
    the first line of defense on so many soft-target events that
    occur every single day in this country? Not to the civilian on
    the street perhaps, but to law enforcement entities at the
    State and local level.
        Ms. Duke. I think also their ability to use them in
    antiterrorism use, and the Federal Government as well. We are
    limited just as State and local governments are.
        Mr. Garrett. Absolutely. So what you are suggesting then is
    that we should review en masse the employment doctrine as it
    relates to these particular technological advances?
        Ms. Duke. Yes.
        Mr. Garrett. I would yield back early, Mr. Chairman, just
    because I want to set a precedent today.
        Chairman McCaul. Well, we certainly appreciate that, as do
    the witnesses.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Payne.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, I would ask unanimous consent to submit a statement
    from the Anti-Defamation League.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
      Statement Submitted For the Record by Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr.
                    Statement of the Anti-Defamation League
                                     November 30, 2017.
    The Honorable Michael McCaul,
    Chair, House Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20515.
    The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
    Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC
            20515.
        Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: As the House
    Committee on Homeland Security holds hearings on ``World-Wide Threats:
    Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror,'' we write to provide
    the views of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and ask that this
    statement be included as part of the official hearings record.
                           the anti-defamation league
        Since 1913, the mission of the Anti-Defamation League has been to
    ``stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and
    fair treatment for all.'' For decades, the League has fought against
    bigotry and anti-Semitism by exposing extremist groups who spread hate
    and incite violence. The League is now the foremost non-governmental
    authority on domestic terrorism, extremism, organized hate groups, and
    hate crimes. Through our Center on Extremism, whose experts monitor a
    variety of extremist and terrorist movements, ADL plays a leading role
    in exposing extremist movements and activities, while helping
    communities and Government agencies alike in combatting them. ADL's
    team of experts--analysts, investigators, researchers, and linguists--
    use cutting-edge technology to track and disrupt extremists and
    terrorists world-wide. The League provides law enforcement officials
    and the public with extensive resources, such as its analytic reports
    on extremist trends and its Hate Symbols \1\ and Terror Symbols
    databases.
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        \1\ https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols.
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                           assisting law enforcement
        ADL is the largest non-governmental provider in the United States
    of training for law enforcement on hate crimes, extremism, and
    terrorism, as well as on building trust between police and the people
    and communities they serve. Each year, ADL experts deliver customized,
    in-depth training on these subjects to more than 15,000 Federal, State,
    and local law enforcement personnel at hundreds of agencies. ADL's dual
    role as a preeminent civil rights organization, and as a strong and
    trusted partner of law enforcement, gives us the credibility to offer a
    continuum of service that influences the way law enforcement fights
    hate and interacts with the communities they serve. ADL provides law
    enforcement with information, expertise, and actionable intelligence to
    prevent, disrupt, and respond to those extremists who cross the line
    from espousing hateful ideologies to committing violent, criminal acts,
    thus protecting the Jewish community and all Americans. ADL's Advanced
    Training School, a highly acclaimed and sought after 3-day program on
    domestic and international terror threats, has trained more than 1,100
    senior law enforcement executives since it was launched in 2003.
                             identifying the threat
        In the United States, adherents of a variety of extremist
    movements--from white supremacists to black nationalists to Islamist
    extremists--perceive Jews as their enemy and target the Jewish
    community with propaganda, violence, or both. Extremists also target
    other communities of minorities, as well as the democratic foundations
    of Government that protect everybody's rights. Understanding the
    diverse list of perpetrators that threaten the Jewish and other
    minority communities is the first step to protecting them from violent
    extremism.
    the impact and disturbing prevalence of anti-semitism and hate violence
        All Americans have a stake in effective response to violent
    bigotry. These crimes demand priority attention because of their
    special impact. Bias crimes are intended to intimidate the victim and
    members of the victim's community, leaving them feeling fearful,
    isolated, and vulnerable. Failure to address this unique type of crime
    often causes an isolated incident to explode into wide-spread community
    tension. The damage done by hate crimes, therefore, cannot be measured
    solely in terms of physical injury or dollars and cents. By making
    members of targeted communities fearful, angry, and suspicious of other
    groups--and of the power structure that is supposed to protect them--
    these incidents can damage the fabric of our society and fragment
    communities.
        Data must drive policy. The first step in addressing the problem of
    anti-Semitism and hate violence is to know its nature and magnitude.
                      adl audit of anti-semitic incidents
        Since 1979, the Anti-Defamation League has been compiling an annual
    Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents (``the Audit''). We track anti-Semitic
    incidents not only because we are a Jewish community civil rights
    organization, but because anti-Semitism, the longest and most
    persistent form of prejudice, threatens security and democracy and is
    an indicator of the health of a society as a whole.
        The Audit includes both criminal and non-criminal acts of
    harassment and intimidation, including distribution of hate propaganda,
    threats, and slurs. Compiled using information provided by victims, law
    enforcement, and community leaders, each recorded incident specifically
    was evaluated by a member of ADL's professional staff who personally
    verified the information. In short, our Audit provides an annual
    snapshot of one specific aspect of the Nation-wide bias crime problem
    and sheds light on broader trends. The Audit assists ADL in developing
    and enhancing our education, training, and outreach programs to counter
    and prevent the spread of anti-Semitism and other forms of hate and
    bigotry.\2\
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        \2\ For example, after 3 years of tracking significant data
    increases, ADL drafted the first model State hate crime penalty-
    enhancement law and promoted its enactment across the country. Today,
    the Federal Government and 45 States and the District of Columbia have
    enacted hate crime laws, modeled on, or similar to, our original draft.
    https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-
    hate/ADL-updated-2016-Excel-State-Hate-Crime-Statutes.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Through the Audit, ADL has modeled the role that communities can
    take in elevating the need for monitoring and reporting hate crime. We
    strongly have promoted the notion that if the Jewish community wants
    law enforcement officials to take anti-Semitic acts seriously, we must
    do so--and report them to the police.
        New Audit data released earlier this month shows that the number of
    anti-Semitic incidents remains significantly higher in 2017 compared to
    2016, with an increase of 67 percent over the first three quarters of
    the year. In addition to the significant bump in the first quarter of
    this year, we also saw a distinct increase after the ``Unite the
    Right'' rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in August.
        Specifically, our report \3\ documented that from January 1 to
    September 30 there were 1,299 anti-Semitic incidents across the United
    States, including physical assaults, vandalism, and attacks on Jewish
    institutions. And the total already exceeds the 1,266 incidents
    reported in all of last year.
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        \3\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-data-shows-anti-
    semitic-incidents-continue-surge-in-2017-compared-to-2016.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Compared to 2016, each of the first three quarters of 2017 had a
    higher number of incidents. These incidents peaked during the first
    quarter of 2017, and the pace slowed somewhat in the second and third
    quarters. Of all 1,299 anti-Semitic incidents so far in 2017, a
    majority (667) occurred in the first quarter of the year. An additional
    632 anti-Semitic incidents were reported in the second and third
    quarters of the year, surpassing the 488 incidents reported during the
    same period in 2016.
        From January through September 30, there were:
       703 incidents of harassment, including 162 bomb threats
            against Jewish institutions in three dozen States;
       584 incidents of vandalism, including 52 against Jewish
            institutions; and
       12 physical assaults.

        These incidents \4\ took place across the country, but consistent
    with prior reports, the States with the highest number of incidents
    tend to be those with the largest Jewish populations. These include New
    York State (267 incidents); California (197); Massachusetts (117);
    Florida (69); and Pennsylvania (58).\5\
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        \4\ https://www.adl.org/news/domestic-anti-semitism-selected-
    incidents-across-the-country-in-2017.
        \5\ A State-by-State breakdown of the incidents in the Audit is
    here: https://www.adl.org/news/adl-2017-audit-of-anti-semitic-
    incidents-a-breakdown-of-the-numbers-state-by-state.
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          tracking and responding to hate crimes in the united states
        The FBI has been tracking and documenting hate crimes reported from
    Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials since 1991 under
    the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA).\6\ Though clearly
    incomplete (as discussed below), the Bureau's annual HCSA reports
    provide the best single National snapshot of bias-motivated criminal
    activity in the United States.\7\
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        \6\ 28 U.S.C. 534 (1990).
        \7\ The Act has also proven to be a powerful mechanism to confront
    violent bigotry, increasing public awareness of the problem and
    sparking improvements in the local response of the criminal justice
    system to hate violence--since in order to effectively report hate
    crimes, police officials must be trained to identify and respond to
    them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2016, the most recent report available, the FBI documented 6,121
    hate crimes reported by 15,254 law enforcement agencies across the
    country--a 5 percent increase over 2015 figures (5,850), with nearly
    one hate crime committed every 90 minutes of every day.\8\ Of the 6,121
    total incidents, 2,922 were motivated by racial bias (47.7 percent),
    1,076 by sexual orientation bias (17.6 percent), and 1,273 by religious
    bias (20.8 percent).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ http://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016. The FBI's HCSA training
    manual is now the single most important, most inclusive hate crime
    training resource available for law enforcement officials. https://
    ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime-data-collection-guidelines-and-training-
    manual.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Crimes directed against Jews increased 3 percent,\9\ and reported
    crimes against Muslims increased 16.3 percent, from 257 in 2015 to 307
    in 2016. The number of reported anti-Muslim hate crimes in 2016 was, in
    fact, the second-most ever--second only to the series of backlash
    crimes in 2001 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.\10\
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        \9\ As has happened every year since 1990, a disturbingly high and
    disproportionate percentage of the total number of reported religion-
    based crimes (54 percent) were directed against Jews and Jewish
    institutions. In fact, since 1990, anti-Jewish hate crimes have been
    between 50 and 85 percent of the religious-based hate crimes--an
    especially disturbing fact when you consider that Jews are less than 3
    percent of Americans.
        \10\ Primarily because of mistrust of police, crimes against Muslim
    Americans are underreported. Muslim Advocates has earned a reputation
    as an essential complement to FBI numbers, the most important non-
    governmental source of information on anti-Muslim hate crimes and
    vandalism directed against Mosques. The organization maps anti-Muslim
    hate crimes and maintains a portal for individuals to report incidents
    on-line. https://www.muslimadvocates.org/map-anti-muslim-hate-crimes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2016, 15,254 law enforcement agencies participated in the HCSA
    data collection effort--more than ever before. However, the FBI report
    documented 92 cities over 100,000 in population that either
    affirmatively reported zero (0) hate crimes--or did not participate in
    the program at all.\11\ Accurate, reliable data is essential to build
    community trust and shape law enforcement tactics and deterrent
    policies.
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        \11\ https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/
    FBI%20HCSA%202015%20Cities%20-
    that%20DNR%20or%20Reported%20Zero%20ML.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     extremists and hate groups emboldened
        It is important to understand that the vast majority of anti-
    Semitic incidents and other hate crimes are not carried out by
    extremists or organized hate groups. But the extraordinarily polarizing
    and divisive election campaign--which featured harshly anti-Muslim and
    anti-immigrant rhetoric, as well as anti-Semitic dog whistles--
    coarsened the public discourse and fostered an atmosphere in which
    white supremacists and other anti-Semites and bigots felt emboldened
    and believed that their views were becoming more broadly acceptable.
    This trend has continued with the Trump administration's repeated
    flirtation with these elements--retweeting their content and quoting
    their heroes. And the President's repeated reluctance to address
    extremism, hate, and anti-Semitism--or implied approval of the same--
    has helped to mainstream these toxic ideas.
                              right-wing extremism
        Over the past 10 years (2007-2016), domestic extremists of all
    kinds have killed at least 372 people in the United States. Of those
    deaths, approximately 74 percent were at the hands of right-wing
    extremists such as white supremacists, sovereign citizens, and militia
    adherents.\12\ Right-wing extremists have been responsible for plotting
    at least 150 acts of terror in the United States over the past 25
    years.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/murder-and-
    extremism-in-the-united-states-in-2016.
        \13\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-report-exposes-
    right-wing-terrorism-threat-in-the-us.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Right-wing extremists choose many targets for their anger, most
    frequently Government, law enforcement, and racial and religious
    targets. The most common religious targets are Jews and Muslims, while
    the most common racial targets were African Americans, including multi-
    racial targets.
        The white supremacists who target minority communities for acts of
    terror and violence include adherents of every major segment of their
    movement, including neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, the religious sect
    Christian Identity, and the Alt-Right. The militia movement has
    especially embraced a particular type of bigotry: Anti-Muslim hatred.
    This Islamophobia has taken numerous forms, from armed protests in
    front of mosques to a major terrorist plot in October 2016 in Garden
    City, Kansas, where three militia members were arrested in connection
    with an alleged plot to blow up an apartment complex that primarily
    housed Muslim Somali-American residents. We should be concerned that
    the militia movement could produce similar terror attempts aimed at
    Muslims in the future.\14\
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        \14\ https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-
    rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-united-states.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The social networking revolution from 2006-2009 made it easier for
    extremist ideas and tactics to spread very far, very quickly. This
    facilitated the emergence of new extremist movements, such as the white
    supremacist alt-right, to quickly gain followers, and helped
    established movements, such as the sovereign citizen movement, to
    rapidly resurge. Social networking has also provided opportunities for
    extremists to meet each other and even to plot on-line. The October
    2008 school attack plot in Tennessee and the Georgia militia plot of
    February 2014 are two examples where extremists who connected on-line
    later met in person to plot terrorist acts.\15\
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        \15\ https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-
    rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-united-states.
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     white supremacists on campus: unprecedented recruitment efforts under
                                      way
        ADL has documented that white supremacists are engaged in
    unprecedented outreach efforts on American college campuses--another
    sign that these hate groups feel emboldened by the current political
    climate.\16\ ADL's Center on Extremism has documented 309 incidents of
    white supremacist flyers, posters, stickers, or banners on 201
    different college campuses in 42 States since September 1, 2016. Of
    those 309 incidents, 127 have occurred since the beginning of the fall
    semester this year (September 1, 2017). This is a significant increase
    compared to the same period in 2016 (from September 1, 2016, to
    November 27, 2016, we counted 30 incidents). Furthermore, Richard
    Spencer continues to make efforts to speak at public universities
    around the country in an attempt to promote white nationalism to young
    audiences.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-on-campus-
    unprecedented-recruitment-efforts-underway.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        White supremacists are mobilizing in hopes of translating their on-
    line activism to ``real world'' action, and campuses--and young
    people--are prime targets, in part because they are still figuring out
    who they are, and what they believe. Extremists also undoubtedly see
    value in recruiting a new generation that can carry the movement for
    years to come.
        Longtime white supremacist Jared Taylor recently wrote on his
    website, American Renaissance, that colleges are of special interest
    ``because they are bastions of anti-white propaganda.'' Before he
    imploded publicly in February, Islamophobic and misogynist gadfly Milo
    Yiannopoulos told CNN, ``I am speaking on college campuses because
    education . . . is really what matters. It's a crucible where these bad
    ideas are formed. Bad ideas like . . . progressive social justice,
    feminists, Black Lives Matter . . . ''.\17\
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        \17\ http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/02/us/milo-yiannopoulos-ivory-
    tower/index.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Yiannopoulos' appearances (some of which were canceled) seem to
    have had an energizing impact on other racists. Nathan Damigo, founder
    of the white supremacist group Identity Evropa, has called Yiannopoulos
    ``an inspiration,'' and showed up at the (ultimately canceled)
    Yiannopoulos speech at UC Davis, hoping to poach a few fans for his own
    cause, which he outlined in a tweet: ``We will not rest until Alt-Right
    ideas are represented on campuses nationwide.''
        While the vast majority of white supremacist campus actions involve
    hateful fliers (e.g., ``Imagine a Muslim-Free America,'') and stickers
    (e.g., ``Make America White Again''), white supremacists have also sent
    anti-Semitic faxes and, in the case of white supremacist Richard
    Spencer, delivered speeches on campus. Many of these incidents are
    linked to larger coordinated promotional efforts by white supremacist
    groups, like Identity Evropa's ``Project Siege,'' which includes actual
    campus recruitment visits, and American Vanguard's ``Northern
    Propaganda Campaign.'' Not coincidentally, these two groups are
    responsible for the majority of the white supremacist fliers and events
    tracked over the last several months.
        In January, American Renaissance launched a hate-filled campus
    campaign, which for now seems to be limited to hanging ``pro-white''
    propaganda posters. ``Racial activists,'' Jared Taylor wrote on the
    American Renaissance website, should place the ``attractive posters''
    in ``high-traffic areas'' around campus. Racist fliers and posters have
    adorned parking garages, street signs, billboards, utility poles, and
    corridors.
        Andrew Auernheimer, a white supremacist hacker known as ``Weev,''
    took targeting to the next technological level when he sent out anti-
    Semitic and racist fliers via many thousands of campus printers across
    the country. One flier, decorated with swastikas, read in part, ``I
    unequivocally support the killing of children. I believe that our
    enemies need such a level of atrocity inflicted upon them . . . So the
    hordes of our enemies from the blacks to the Jews to the Federal agents
    are deserving of fates of violence so extreme that there is no limit to
    the acts by which can be done upon them in defense of the white race.''
    The fliers referenced The Daily Stormer, Andrew Anglin's notoriously
    hateful neo-Nazi website.
        These days, white supremacists are taking more forceful steps to
    establish a physical presence on campus. Identity Evropa was clear in
    its goals--and used fittingly ``academic'' language--when describing
    its ``Project Siege'' plans for the 2016-17 school year of talking to
    actual students: ``Project Siege is the beginning of a long-term
    cultural war of attrition against the academia's cultural Marxist
    narrative that is maintained and propagated into society though the
    indoctrination of the future managerial class. If we are to be
    successful in combating the current paradigm,'' the on-line message
    read. ``It is imperative that we create space for our ideas at
    universities across the country. Speaking with students and helping
    them unpack some of their assumptions while gaining name recognition
    for our organizations are the ways in which we will create the
    foundation for that space.''
        White supremacist events on campus face particular scrutiny and, in
    some cases, speakers are able to circumvent the school altogether,
    avoiding heated debates over free speech rights. In December, when
    Richard Spencer spoke on the Texas A&M campus, he wasn't there as a
    guest of the University. Instead, he spoke to supporters and on-lookers
    in a room rented for the occasion by local neo-Nazi Preston Wiginton.
                                 the alt-right
        The alt-right is the newest segment of the white supremacist
    movement, a movement that already encompasses neo-Nazis, racist
    skinheads, ``traditional'' white supremacists such as Ku Klux Klan
    groups, Christian Identity adherents, and white supremacist prison
    gangs. The alt-right emerged in the late 2000's from a variety of
    sources, including the on-line subculture of message boards and image
    boards like 4chan, 8chan, and Reddit, the on-line gaming subculture,
    the so-called men's rights movement, and others. Richard Spencer
    emerged as its most well-known American spokesperson.
        The ideology of the alt-right, such as it is, is based on standard
    white supremacist beliefs about the need to protect the white race from
    a ``rising tide of color,'' combined with anti-Semitism, Islamophobia,
    xenophobia, nationalism, misogyny, and anti-LGBTQ beliefs.
    Demographically, the alt-right is quite young and largely male;
    significantly, most adherents of the alt-right are new to white
    supremacy and have not previously been part of other segments of the
    movement.
        For most of its brief history, the alt-right has largely existed
    on-line, with few entities that could be considered alt-right
    ``groups,'' and few events related to the alt-right taking place in the
    physical world. The 2016 Presidential election campaign, however,
    changed the trajectory of the alt-right, luring it more into the real
    world. Generally speaking, the alt-right strongly supported Donald
    Trump's candidacy and became active in supporting Trump and attacking
    his foes. After his victory, the alt-right--mistakenly thinking it had
    played a significant role in Trump's election, but correctly realizing
    it had grown considerably in 2016 thanks in large part to all the media
    attention it garnered--became emboldened, with many alt-right activists
    more eager to organize or attend events in the real world.
        As the alt-right became more and more identified as part of the
    white supremacist movement, those adherents who shared most or all of
    its convictions--except overt white supremacy--sought to distance
    themselves from the white supremacists. Some of them began to refer to
    themselves as the ``New Right,'' but alt-right white supremacists
    derisively referred to them as the ``alt-lite.'' A public feud
    developed between the two factions in 2017.
        One thing the factions could still agree on was hatred of the left.
    Left and progressive groups and movements in the United States reacted
    negatively to the election of Donald Trump, holding large protests
    after the election, at the inauguration, and afterwards. In particular,
    the antifa (short for anti-fascist), a collection of anarchist and far
    left groups, networks and individuals, became active protesting at some
    events involving hateful speakers such as Milo Yiannopoulos and Ann
    Coulter.
        As antifa targeted what they perceived as bigotry and hate speech,
    the alt-right and alt-lite began showing up in public to confront them.
    So too did another segment of the far right, the militia movement. Part
    of the anti-Government extremist sphere of the American far right
    rather than the white supremacist sphere, the militia movement has
    historically concentrated its anger on the Federal Government, which it
    views through a hostile, suspicious, and highly conspiratorial lens.
    However, the election of Trump, a candidate supported by the militia
    movement, caused the movement to look for new enemies other than the
    Federal Government and it quickly found them in the antifa, whom they
    described as ``domestic terrorists,'' and claimed were being trained in
    Syrian terrorist training camps, and who were covertly led and funded
    by liberal, Jewish philanthropist George Soros in an attempt to
    undermine and overthrow the Trump administration.
        Throughout 2017, then, adherents from these various far right
    movements showed up at events, or arranged their own events, designed
    to clash with protesters from the left, especially antifa. From Boston
    to Berkeley, Portland to Houston, these confrontations took place, some
    of them violent. Often the only meaningful result from these events was
    to leave people wanting even more confrontation.
        It is against this backdrop that the events at Charlottesville
    played themselves out.
              spotlight on charlottesville: what happened and why
        In the broadest sense, what took place in Charlottesville was due
    primarily to two factors: (1) The growth of the alt-right and its
    transition from being largely an on-line phenomenon into one also
    active in ``real world'' events and activities, and (2) the effects the
    2016 Presidential election results have had on a number of ideological
    movements in the United States.
        On August 11-12, 2017, a large white supremacist event dubbed
    ``Unite the Right'' occurred in Charlottesville, Virginia, ostensibly
    to protest the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee in a local park. A
    torch-lit parade the first evening of the event became violent, with
    clashes between white supremacists/neo-Nazis and counter-protesters;
    the violence continued and increased the next day, with the white
    supremacists responsible for the bulk of it. The worst example of such
    violence occurred when a white nationalist from Ohio drove his car into
    a crowd of protesters, killing one woman and injuring many more.
        The Unite the Right rally was actually the third white supremacist
    event Charlottesville residents had had to endure this year. The first
    event occurred on May 13, when around 100 white supremacists gathered
    to protest the city council's decision to remove Confederate monuments
    from local parks. In the afternoon, they arranged a ``flash mob'' march
    to the Robert E. Lee monument, where speakers such as Richard Spencer
    and Nathan Oamigo addressed the crowd of white supremacists. The crowd,
    in turn, chanted slogans such as ``they will not replace us'' and
    ``Russia is our friend.'' That evening, the white supremacists returned
    to the park, with Tiki torches, to hold a torchlight parade.
        That torchlight parade got considerable attention from both
    traditional and social media, causing organizers of the event to
    consider it a major success and to seek more of the same.
        On July 8, the Loyal White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan staged their
    own rally in Charlottesville, with around 50 Klan members and
    supporters attending. They were opposed by more than a thousand
    counter-protesters, but law enforcement used physical barriers to
    separate the sides and escorted the white supremacists in and out of
    the park where they rallied. Several counter-protesters were arrested
    prior to the event for trying to block entrance to the park, while more
    were arrested after the event. Eventually police fired several tear gas
    canisters into the crowd to force its dispersal. Overall, 22 people
    were arrested at the event. Authorities were criticized after the event
    by counter-protesters for what they termed an overreaction. These two
    circumstances--counter-protesters trying to get at the Klan members and
    criticism of the police response--may have had an effect on efforts to
    control the Unite the Right rally the following month.
        Indeed, well before the Klan event took place, organizers of the
    May Charlottesville event and others had already begun to plan and
    organize the United the Right rally, which they viewed as a larger and
    grander sequel to their May event. They began their preparations months
    in advance, reaching out for speakers, publicizing the event on social
    media, and getting groups and individuals alike interested in
    attending.
    The Violence
        Historically, white supremacists are often on the defense in
    clashes at events involving white supremacists and counter-protesters,
    in part because they are typically heavily outnumbered and in part
    because antifa are often determined to physically confront the white
    supremacists.
        Unite the Right was different, however. In part, this was because
    there were more than 10 times as many white supremacists at the event
    than at a typical public white supremacist event, giving them numbers
    they do not usually have. Indeed, ADL identified white supremacists
    from at least 35 States at the Unite the Right rally. Another factor
    was that throughout the spring and summer, far right groups at such
    events had increasingly been adopting ``street fighting `` stances,
    including manufacturing or purchasing a wide variety of offensive and
    defensive gear to employ during street confrontations. In fact, a
    significant number of white supremacists and supporters came to the
    Unite the Right rally openly carrying firearms. The right-wing
    extremists had been unusually aggressive at a number of events in 2017,
    compared to past years.
        The white supremacists were outnumbered by counter-protesters, but
    the great bulk of the people opposing the white supremacists were
    peaceful protesters, many from local church or community groups. There
    were some antifa, as well as representatives of other confrontational
    left-wing groups such as Redneck Revolt, but the ratio of forces was
    quite different than at other events, including the previous Klan event
    in Charlottesville.
        The violence started on the evening of August 11, when the torch-
    carrying marchers arrived at the University of Virginia's Rotunda
    building, where they encountered and overpowered a small group of
    counter-protesters at the Jefferson monument, some using their torches
    as bats. The marchers dispersed after law enforcement finally stepped
    in, and there are reports, particularly from leaders in the faith
    community, of counterprotestors providing protection from white
    supremacist violence when law enforcement was unavailable.
        The next morning, Unite the Right rally goers began to show up at
    Emancipation Park, in groups small and large, from a variety of
    locations and staging areas (rather than, as at the previous event,
    arriving at one staging area and being brought to the event area by law
    enforcement). As counter-protesters were doing the same, numerous
    encounters occurred between the white supremacists and counter-
    protesters, some of which turned violent. Most of the violence seemed
    to have been started by the white supremacists.
        The most notorious occurred when James Alex Fields, Jr., of Maumee,
    Ohio, allegedly drove his vehicle into a crowd of counter-protesters,
    injuring large numbers of them and killing Heather Heyer. In another
    incident captured on video, several white supremacists and hate group
    members severely beat a Black counter-protestor, DeAndre Harris, in a
    parking garage. Harris was later arrested based only on the word of one
    of his assaulters, a hate group leader, that Harris actually attacked
    him.
    The Significance of Charlottesville
        First and foremost, Charlottesville was a tragedy, involving an
    assault on a community, the attempted intimidation of marginalized
    people across the country, and the murder of Heather Heyer. Adding to
    that is the tragic loss of Lieutenant H. Jay Cullen and Trooper-Pilot
    Berke M.M. Bates, two Virginia State troopers who died in a helicopter
    crash while on their way to monitor the event.
        But the event also served--and needs still to serve--as an
    important wake-up call, alerting people to the problems that radical
    right-wing movements legitimately pose in the United States. The year
    2017 is not yet over, but the country has already seen a variety of
    murders, shootings, hate crimes, and violent plots and acts by white
    supremacists, anti-Government extremists, and other right-wing
    extremists.
        The events in Charlottesville that weekend captured the attention
    of and shocked most Americans, many of whom had no idea that right-wing
    extremists had become so numerous or so bold. One of the most enduring
    moments related to Charlottesville was President Trump's statement that
    there were ``very fine people on both sides'' of the Unite the Right
    rally, a statement that further emboldened the extremists and added
    injury to those already under assault. Though violence stemming from
    right-wing extremism actually occurs frequently in the United States,
    such incidents are not always well-reported by the National media, and
    people often have little understanding of its scope. Thus,
    Charlottesville, and the concerning response to it from the White
    House, came as a wake-up call for many.
        The events in Charlottesville also had an outsize impact on the
    Jewish community. For many younger Jews, hearing white supremacists
    chanting ``Jews will not replace us'' may have been their first
    encounter with public anti-Semitism.\18\ For Jewish adults and seniors,
    watching Nazi salutes and hearing chants of ``sieg heil and ``blood and
    soil'' (the latter is a translation of the Nazi slogan ``Blut und
    Boden'') evoked memories or family recollections of the most
    overwhelming trauma in modern Jewish history. The white supremacist
    groups that participated in the Charlottesville rally have a well-
    established record of anti-Semitism, and individual leaders of the
    movements present at the rally, including former Klansman David Duke,
    are prolific promoters of anti-Semitism in the United States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ https://www.adl.org/blog/anti-semitism-on-full-display-in-
    charlottesville.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Anti-Semitic incidents spiked on the days of the Charlottesville
    march and rally and immediately following. Of the 306 incidents
    documented in our Audit that were reported in the third quarter, 221
    took place on or after the August 11 rally.
        While not ignoring other types of extremist threats to the peace
    and tranquility of the United States, Charlottesville requires us to
    ask what the country can do to better combat the threat of right-wing
    extremist violence, as well as how to demonstrate conclusively that
    such violence goes against what the American experiment stands for.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ The fact that Congress enacted a joint resolution addressing
    the violence, with specific policy recommendations and objectives, also
    distinguishes the impact of the violence in Charlottesville. https://
    www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ58/PLAW-115publ58.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    left-wing and black nationalist violence
        While in no way comparable to the nature and magnitude of the
    threat posed by right-wing and white supremacist groups, we have taken
    note of several recent incidents of violent activity by left-wing
    groups and individuals with black nationalist beliefs.
        On Wednesday, June 14, a Congressional baseball team in the midst
    of a morning practice in Alexandria was attacked by a lone gunman. The
    U.S. House Majority Whip, Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), was seriously
    injured, and several others were also shot. In recent months, the ADL
    has been warning law enforcement personnel about the possibility of an
    increase in left-wing violence as a result of the growing anger
    directed at President Trump, his administration, and political allies.
    The shootings in Alexandria appear to be an example of this.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ https://news.vice.com/story/extremism-experts-are-starting-to-
    worry-about-the-left.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Over the course of the past year, at least 2 individuals with Black
    Nationalist beliefs have violence has taken a deadly toll, responsible
    for the deaths of 8 police officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge in
    2016.\21\ In July 2016, Micah Xavier Johnson, who had ties to black
    nationalist groups such as the New Black Panther Party, killed 5 police
    officers (and injured 9 others) in Dallas, Texas, in an ambush attack
    aimed at police who were maintaining public order at a Black Lives
    Matter protest. That same month, Gavin Eugene Long ambushed and shot 6
    police officers, 3 of them fatally, in Baton Rouge. Long, like Johnson,
    was an adherent of Black Nationalism and a military veteran, as well as
    a member of the anti-Government sovereign citizen movement. Both
    incidents appear to have been motivated by anger in response to police
    shootings of African American men.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ https://www.adl.org/educational/resources/reports/murder-and-
    extremism-in-the-united-states-in-2016.
        \22\ https://www.adl.org/blog/fresno-shootings-latest-incident-in-
    rise-of-black-nationalist-violence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As described above, law enforcement officers across the United
    States have recently faced the challenge of keeping the peace at a
    number of far-right rallies and demonstrations. Their task, to secure
    both safety and First Amendment rights, has been made more difficult
    not only by the white supremacists and other bigots who have shown up
    in Charlottesville,\23\ Berkeley, and Boston, but also by a relatively
    small number of counter-protesters who engage in confrontational
    tactics, including violence, in their opposition to the right-wing
    extremists. For example, the August 27 anti-racist march in Berkeley,
    attended by thousands of peaceful counter-protesters, turned chaotic
    when a number of anarchists appeared and allegedly attacked several
    right-wing or pro-Trump attendees.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ https://www.adl.org/blog/violence-and-hate-unite-the-right.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             extremism sparked by radical interpretations of islam
        One of the most striking elements of today's domestic threat
    picture is the role that a growing number of American citizens and
    residents motivated by radical interpretations of Islam have played in
    criminal plots to attack Americans in the United States and abroad.
    Over the past 10 years, about 24 percent of victims killed by domestic
    terrorists were at the hands of domestic Islamic extremists. Just last
    month, 8 people were killed and almost a dozen others injured when a
    29-year-old Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov ran people over with a truck
    on a busy bicycle path near the World Trade Center in Manhattan.
    Authorities found a note near the truck claiming the attack was made in
    the name of the Islamic State (ISIS). ADL's report earlier this year,
    titled ``A Changing Landscape of Threats,'' outlined changing tactics
    of such extremists, including how more extremists are using non-
    traditional weapons (knives, cars) in their attacks and how plots are
    increasingly focused on public spaces rather than symbolic targets.\24\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/
    CR_5062_Domestic%20Islamic- %20Extremism%20Report_vF1.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Indeed, four of the five deadliest ideologically-motivated attacks
    in the United States have been inspired by Islamic extremist ideology,
    including attacks in Fort Hood, TX, San Bernardino, CA, and Orlando,
    FL, the worst mass shooting in American history, in which Omar Mateen
    opened fire inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, killing 49
    people. During the shooting, Mateen, an American citizen born in New
    York, declared his allegiance to ISIS. As demonstrated by this horrific
    shooting, it is clear that there are deliberate attempts by
    international terrorist groups that justify and sanction violence to
    appeal to and engage sympathizers in the United States.
        A disturbing number of cases also demonstrate the degree to which
    hatred of Jews and Israel play a part in the radicalization process of
    home-grown extremists. However, efforts to explore these legitimate
    security concerns should not be overwhelmed by the kind of unfair
    stereotyping and prejudice that has too-frequently accompanied recent
    public debates.
                     terrorist exploitation of social media
        As internet proficiency and the use of social media grow ever-more
    universal, so too do the efforts of terrorist groups to exploit new
    technology in order to make materials that justify and sanction
    violence more accessible and impactful. Terrorist groups are not only
    using various on-line and mobile platforms to spread their messages,
    but also to actively recruit adherents who live in the communities they
    seek to target.
        While the fundamental ideological content of terrorist propaganda
    has remained consistent for two decades--replete with militant
    condemnations of perceived transgressions against Muslims world-wide,
    and appeals for violence and anti-Semitism--terrorist groups are now
    able to reach, recruit, and motivate extremists more quickly and
    effectively than ever before by adapting their messages to new
    technology.
        In the past, plots were directed by foreign terrorist organizations
    or their affiliates, and recruitment and planning generally required
    some direct, face-to-face interaction with terrorist operatives.
    Indoctrination came directly from extremist peers, teachers, or
    clerics. Individuals would then advance through the radicalization
    process through constant interaction with like-minded sympathizers or,
    as the 2007 New York Police Department report on radicalization
    described, with a ``spiritual sanctioner'' who gave credence to those
    beliefs. Today, individuals can find analogous social networks,
    inspiration, and encouragement on-line, often packaged neatly together
    with bomb-making instructions. This enables adherents to self-
    radicalize without face-to-face contact with an established terrorist
    group or cell.
        Individual extremists, or lone wolves, are also increasingly self-
    radicalizing on-line with no physical interactions with established
    terrorist groups or cells--a development that can make it more
    difficult for law enforcement to detect plots in their earliest stages.
    Terror groups are taking full advantage of this virtual audience, and
    regularly publish detailed instructions for lone-wolf terror attacks
    \25\ using knives, as well as cars, trains,\26\ and other modes of
    transportation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ https://www.adl.org/blog/isis-supporters-distributes-series-
    of-articles-encouraging-lone-wolf-attacks.
        \26\ https://www.adl.org/blog/al-qaedas-latest-inspire-magazine-
    details-train-derail/operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Approximately half of the 150 terrorist incidents described in a
    2017 ADL report on 25 years of right-wing terrorism were perpetrated by
    lone-wolf offenders.\27\ Today, thanks to the internet, it is easier
    than ever for someone to become steeped in extremist ideologies, even
    to the point of being willing to commit acts of great violence, without
    ever being involved in an organized extremist group. The overwhelming
    majority of American citizens and residents linked to terrorist
    activity motivated by Islamic extremism in the past several years--
    including at least 63 U.S. residents in 2015--actively used the
    internet to access propaganda or otherwise facilitate their extremist
    activity.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-
    rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-united-states.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
               funding cve--and the need for a holistic approach
        Because modern technology has provided new fuel for extremists,
    including using ``cyberhate'' to attack marginalized groups on social
    media and coordinate terror attacks more easily, ADL supports properly
    crafted Countering Violent Extremism (``CVE'') programs. We believe an
    ``all hands on deck'' holistic approach is required to confront the
    sophisticated recruitment efforts employed by domestic extremist groups
    and by ISIS and other terror groups. Through the CVE program launched
    under President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security had
    administered Federal grants to nongovernmental organizations and
    higher-education institutions to carry out programs that counter the
    potential for violence from domestic terrorists and home-grown violent
    extremists.
        In May, the League expressed concerns about press reports that the
    administration was proposing to cut funding for its CVE programs
    entirely.\28\ And in June, ADL expressed concerns as DHS announced
    their 2017 2-year CVE funding grantees.\29\ Funding for Life After
    Hate, a successful and in-demand program to de-radicalize neo-Nazis,
    white supremacists, and others, was not renewed. Politico reported
    that, since Election Day, Life After Hate has seen a twenty-fold
    increase in requests for help ``from people looking to disengage or
    bystanders/family members looking for help from someone they
    know.''\30\ At a time when right-wing extremist groups are experiencing
    rising membership and expanding influence, we believe DHS must invest
    in community-based organizations that work to counter these groups.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-concerned-over-
    reports-of-trump-administration-proposing-to-cut-entire.
        \29\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-welcomes-homeland-
    security-grants-to-counter-terrorist-recruitment-and.
        \30\ http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/playbook/2017/06/23/what-
    mcconnell-is-thinking-winners-losers-in-gop-health-care-bill-obama-
    speaks-dawsey-download-wapo-trump-talks-russia-every-morning-pelosis-
    future-220996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, the 2017 list of CVE grantees \31\ indicates a shift
    in funding focus away from community-based civil society organizations
    and toward law enforcement agencies. Police play a critical role, but
    we cannot enforce our way out of this problem. Community-based
    organizations must help lead this work. These groups are much more
    likely to have credibility and trust needed to reach the targets of
    extremists, which include many disaffected or vulnerable youth. The
    League called on DHS to clarify its funding criteria and demonstrate
    that it is committed to funding the full range of programs--domestic
    and international--designed to counter all forms of violent
    extremism.\32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants.
        \32\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-welcomes-homeland-
    security-grants-to-counter-terrorist-recruitment-and.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Importantly, ADL has also strongly advised the administration
    against focusing its CVE program solely on extremism motivated by
    radical interpretation of Islam. We responded to press reports \33\
    that the administration wanted to change the name of the Government
    initiative from ``Countering Violent Extremism'' to ``Countering
    Islamic Extremism'' or ``Countering Radical Islamic Extremism'' by
    stating that such a change would be damaging to the American Muslim
    community and dangerously narrow.\34\ Singling out Muslims and the
    American Muslim community for special scrutiny or suspicion is
    discriminatory, offensive, ineffective, and counterproductive. In fact,
    one essential focus of our Nation's CVE programs should be to build
    trust within Muslim communities to reduce radicalism, not to further
    foster mistrust.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-
    program-exclusiv-idUSKBN15- G5VO.
        \34\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-limiting-scope-of-
    countering-violent-extremism-programs-places-nation-at.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is especially true now, because over the past few months, ADL
    and others have documented an objectionable, intensified level of anti-
    Muslim bigotry in a variety of public forums. For example, according to
    a recent Pew Research Center publication on Muslim Americans' place in
    society,\35\ nearly half of Muslims (48 percent) say they have
    experienced at least one form of discrimination over the past year. Of
    those whose appearance is identifiably Muslim, nearly two-thirds (64
    percent) say they have experienced at least one of the specific types
    of discrimination asked about in the survey. Three-quarters (75
    percent) of Muslim respondents say there is ``a lot'' of discrimination
    against Muslims in the United States, with Muslim women more likely
    than Muslim men to hold this view (83 percent versus 68 percent). These
    findings reinforce an ADL survey on anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim
    discrimination published this past year.\36\ Our survey revealed that
    89 percent of Muslim Americans are concerned about violence directed at
    them and Islamic institutions in the United States, and 64 percent said
    that they do not believe the Government is doing enough to ensure their
    safety. While most Muslims don't feel the need to hide their faith, 66
    percent said they feel less safe in America since President Trump was
    elected.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-
    centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/.
        \36\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/in-first-new-adl-poll-
    finds-majority-of-americans-concerned-about-violence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Limiting CVE programs to only focus on Islamic extremism would not
    only isolate the Muslim American community, but would also exacerbate
    the problem of how little prevention-based programming right-wing
    extremists are receiving.\37\ At a time when our research indicates
    that right-wing extremists are more visible and emboldened,\38\ the
    Government should focus on all types of extremism, whether it comes
    from terrorists motivated by extreme interpretations of Islam or white
    supremacists.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ http://time.com/4671901/donald-trump-extremism-terrorism-
    muslims/.
        \38\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-report-exposes-
    right-wing-terrorism-threat-in-the-us.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      relationship with the tech industry
        Over the past decade, the League has worked closely with the
    internet industry and they have been very responsive to information
    regarding terrorist and extremist exploitation of their platforms. Our
    relationship has led to increased successes in mitigating the
    exploitation of platforms by groups such as ISIS. In addition, working
    with industry officials, the League developed the ADL Cyber-Safety
    Action Guide,\39\ a user-friendly on-line platform where consumers can
    learn how and where to report bigoted, bullying, or hateful speech to
    the major internet providers and social media platforms.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ http://www.adl.org/press-center/press-releases/discrimination-
    racism-bigotry/new-adl-platform-helps-consumers-take-action-against-
    internet-hate-speech.html#.Vi58MX6rTct.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The League has also convened a Working Group on Cyberhate to
    develop recommendations for the most effective responses to
    manifestations of hate and bigotry on-line.\40\ The Working Group
    includes representatives of the internet industry, civil society, the
    legal community, and academia. The Working Group input and guidance has
    been invaluable and is reflected in a set of Best Practices \41\ that
    provides useful and important guideposts for all those willing to join
    in the effort to address the challenge of cyber hate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ For a comprehensive review of the League's work addressing the
    scourge of on-line anti-Semitism since pre-internet days--when dial-up
    bulletin boards were a prominent communications tool--see Report of the
    Anti-Defamation League on Confronting Cyberhate to the 5th Global Forum
    for Combating Anti-Semitism, May, 2015, http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/
    combating-hate/ICCA-report-2015-With-hyperlinks-May-8-2015_final.pdf.
        \41\ http://www.adl.org/combatinq-hate/cyber-safety/best-practices/
    #.Vi58F36rTcs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             legislative and administrative policy recommendations
    Bully Pulpit
       The President, cabinet officials, and Members of Congress
            must call out bigotry at every opportunity, especially when it
            comes from our public officials. The right to free speech is a
            core value, but the promotion of hate should be vehemently
            rejected. Simply put, you cannot say it enough: America is no
            place for hate.
       The administration must send loud, clear, and consistent
            messages that violent bigotry is unacceptable--and ensure that
            the FBI and the Civil Rights Division will enforce relevant
            Federal laws and vigorously investigate and prosecute hate
            crimes.
    Improved Coordination
       The Department of Justice should host periodic interagency
            meetings to promote cross-agency collaboration and to address
            prevention of and response to extremism and hate violence. This
            initiative should involve both lead enforcement agencies and
            agencies working to expand anti-bias and hate crime prevention
            training and outreach--including Department of Education,
            Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of
            Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Health and Human
            Services (HHS).
    Countering Violent Extremism
       The administration and Congress should do all in their power
            to promote trust and encourage stronger relationships to
            counter attempts by both international terrorist organizations
            and domestic hate groups to recruit disaffected or alienated
            Americans. The administration should fully resource and staff
            efforts at both security and non-security Executive branch
            agencies to implement programs aimed at preventing and
            intervening in the process of radicalization to violence. DHS
            should clarify its funding criteria and demonstrate that it is
            committed to funding the full range of programs--domestic and
            international--designed to counter all forms of violent
            extremism.\42\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-welcomes-homeland-
    security-grants-to-counter-terrorist-recruitment-and.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Improved Federal Hate Crime Data Collection
       DoJ should incentivize and encourage State and local law
            enforcement agencies to more comprehensively collect and report
            hate crimes data to the FBI, with special attention devoted to
            large underreporting law enforcement agencies that either have
            not participated in the FBI Hate Crime Statistics Act program
            at all or have incorrectly reported zero hate crimes.
       To create incentives for participation in the FBI's HCSA
            program, certain Department of Justice funds should only be
            made available to agencies that are demonstrating credible
            participation in the HCSA program. Whether a specific State or
            local law enforcement agency is participating in the HCSA
            program should be included in the rating and scoring criteria
            as applications for Justice Department funding are considered.
       The administration, DHS, and DoJ should take steps to ensure
            that it is efficient and safe for all crime victims to contact
            the police. If marginalized or targeted community members--
            including immigrants, people with disabilities, LGBT community
            members, Muslims, Arabs, Middle Easterners, South Asians, and
            people with limited language proficiency--cannot report, or do
            not feel safe reporting crimes, law enforcement cannot
            effectively address these crimes, thereby jeopardizing the
            safety of all.
       Congress should support Congressional legislation to improve
            hate crime data collection and reporting, such as the NO HATE
            ACT.\43\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \43\ H.R. 1566/S. 662 https://www.Congress.gov/115/bills/hr1566/
    BILLS-115hr1566ih.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, the
            Justice Department should comprehensively implement the
            implicit bias training initiative announced in June for all
            Federal law enforcement officials and Federal prosecutors.\44\
            The training should include how to recognize, investigate, and
            respond to hate crimes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \44\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-
    new-department-wide-implicit-bias-training-personnel.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Improved Training on Campus
       In recent months, ADL Regional Directors and our Campus and
            Center on Extremism professionals have met with university
            administrators to tailor best practices for addressing white
            supremacist and other extremist rallies and outreach on campus.
            Our outreach is intended to ensure that administrators,
            faculty, staff, and students all understand that they have a
            direct responsibility to respond to hate speech and extremism--
            and that they have the resources, tools, and intervention
            strategies to do so most effectively.
                                   conclusion
        Sixteen years after the September 11 terrorist attacks, we very
    much hope that these hearings--and any that come after them--will
    acknowledge and highlight the extraordinary, successful efforts of
    Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials to prevent and
    deter terrorism on our shores. But police and counterterrorism
    officials do not work in a vacuum; they cannot do their job without
    community relationships, cooperation, trust, and a shared sense of
    responsibility for public safety. ADL will continue to advocate--in
    Congress and in the courts--for law enforcement officials to have
    investigative tools sufficient to deter and prevent terrorism, while
    appropriately balancing National security and individual rights.
        As the committee and Congress continue to examine the nature of the
    current threat to our Nation, the Anti-Defamation League hopes to play
    an on-going, helpful, and constructive role by offering its expertise
    in documenting the domestic and international terror threats from
    across the ideological spectrum, while urging Members of Congress and
    other public officials to make every effort to explore this serious
    issue without creating an atmosphere of blame and suspicion.
                Sincerely,
                                        Jonathan A. Greenblatt,
                                                                   CEO.
       Attachment.--Selected ADL Resources on Hate Groups, Terrorism and
                                  Extremism *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The attached documents have been retained in committee files.

        Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
        I would just like to thank all the witnesses for their
    service to this Nation to this point. I am going to be very
    brief, because in the interest of time, I know we have another
    panel. But I just--and excuse me if this has already been
    answered, but I came in late. This, what is it, the black--what
    is this new term, black extremist radical--what is it?
        Mr. Wray. I believe the term you are reaching for there is
    there is a term, ``black identity extremists,'' which is an
    intelligence product that was--that I spent, you know, about 2
    hours, I guess, discussing yesterday with some of your
    colleagues.
        Mr. Payne. Right. Sorry I missed that. Could you give me a
    brief definition or an example of who would fall in that
    category?
        Mr. Wray. So the intelligence product in question refers to
    individuals who are committing violent criminal acts where the
    motivation is retaliation or retribution for injustices
    committed by law enforcement. So the focus is on law
    enforcement as victims in those situations.
        Mr. Payne. OK. And you see growing incidents in this
    situation?
        Mr. Wray. The piece in question, which was issued right
    before I joined the FBI, was based on a snapshot in time over
    the course primarily of 2016, and that was what the FBI was
    seeing during that period.
        Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you for that.
        I would just like to ask the three, I am the Ranking Member
    on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, and I
    would like to just ask--I have done a lot of work around
    interoperability, and I know you are each a different entity.
    But how well--and your communication is probably pretty good on
    your level, but through your different departments, how is the
    communication between your different agencies?
        Ms. Duke. I think our communication is much better than it
    was when I was here before, and I think that is a lot to the
    centers of bringing these centers together where people are co-
    located. So it is not just the integration of systems. I think
    in the public sector, the FirstNet public safety network is
    going to be huge going forward. I do think we are working at
    DHS more on declassifying products earlier, so through our
    fusion centers and other tools, we can have better
    collaboration between Federal and State and local law
    enforcement. That is a major focus for us.
        Mr. Wray. I would agree that the technological part of the
    interoperability has improved significantly, although it can
    always get better. For us, and particularly on the FBI side,
    the Classified nature of so much of what we do does complicate
    our ability to communicate, less so with either of the folks
    here on the panel, but as Elaine says, with the State and local
    law enforcement it can get complicated. Certainly with the
    private sector, which as we discussed on the cyber side, that
    presents some significant challenges.
        Mr. Payne. OK. Yes, sir. Sir?
        Mr. Rasmussen. The only thing I would add is that level of
    integration that probably wasn't there among the Federal
    agencies 10 or 12 or 15 years ago has in some ways been
    addressed, because at this point, so many of our senior leaders
    have served in each other's organizations over the last dozen
    years. Several of my senior leaders are veterans of the
    Department of Homeland Security. I have senior FBI personnel
    inside my organization and have--my personnel have served
    inside their organizations. That counts for a lot because it
    makes that integration much easier.
        Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back real quick.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. McSally.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for
    your patience.
        Director Rasmussen, thanks for your service. I too agree
    that our country is safer because of your service.
        Many vulnerabilities have been talked about today that
    radical Islamists, terrorists, can use and have used in order
    to hurt America, attack us and our citizens and our way of
    life. You and all the people on your teams are out there every
    single day on the front lines keeping us safe.
        One of those vulnerabilities was just used 30 days ago,
    when Sayfullo Saipov killed 8 people and injured dozens in New
    York City on a bike path. He came from Uzbekistan and came
    through the visa lottery program. For those who are not
    familiar, this was created in 1995, specifically to help Irish
    immigrants. Since 2007, it is estimated 29,000 people from
    countries that sponsor terrorism--Syria, Sudan, Iran--have
    actually used this program to come to America. No other country
    that admits immigrants like we do--1 million a year, we are an
    immigrant-friendly country--has their visas handed out by
    chance. Not no other, but many others, like Canada, Australia,
    Austria, the United Kingdom, they don't have program like this.
    By chance and lottery, people can gain access to come into our
    country.
        So my question, Director Duke--sorry, Acting Secretary
    Duke, is if he had come to the United States today, versus 10
    years ago, what checks would he have encountered or how would
    it be different from the process he went through 10 years ago?
    Would the fact that he came from a country that has a history
    of terrorism impacted that?
        Ms. Duke. Yes, it would have. We also see that the
    diversity program is ripe for fraud. Today, it would be better,
    but we still agree with your sentiments on it isn't the best
    use of our immigration system.
        What would be different is we have biographics, we have the
    ability to search social media, those type of things. But it is
    still one that would introduce risk.
        Ms. McSally. So I recently introduced legislation to
    eliminate the lottery, convert a portion of them to merit-
    based, which I believe is the right thing to do. President
    Trump has called for the elimination of this program. Acting
    Secretory Duke, do you agree with the elimination of this
    program?
        Ms. Duke. Yes, I support that.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I do want to change gears on another topic that is deeply
    troubling to me. I know we are in an Unclassified setting, but
    this is the MAVNI program. This is a program where non-green
    card holders, which traditionally we allow green card holders
    to serve in the military, but non-green card holders, starting
    in 2008, were allowed to start serving. It was supposed to be
    in specific critical career fields, like language and other
    things, to boost our National security. Unfortunately--I am on
    the Armed Services Committee, and so we have gotten multiple
    Classified briefings on this, and I know we can't speak in
    great detail in this setting. But unfortunately, it looks like
    the Army basically used this to meet its recruiting goals well
    beyond the intent. Many of these individuals were not vetted
    properly and many come from countries that are our adversaries
    with very sophisticated foreign intelligence operations,
    getting a fast track to citizenship in basic training before
    any vetting went on. I am deeply concerned about the impacts.
        Now, I am sure there are many good people that served our
    country through this program, but the potential and the
    vulnerabilities have caused the DOD to halt this program. I am
    just--I am so concerned about the implications of those who
    were already in it and the fact that they were not vetted, and
    now they are U.S. citizens, so they clearly have Constitutional
    rights. So I just would like to hear all of your thoughts on
    were you aware of this program? What are we doing now to
    mitigate any of these vulnerabilities and these threats for
    those that have already been through it because of the
    buffoonery of what happened that is potentially impacting our
    National security?
        Ms. Duke. I am aware of the program and that it is
    suspended. DHS and I believe we have to vet every individual.
    We believe in a legal immigration system, but have to balance
    security and make sure we vet all persons coming into the
    United States, permanently or temporarily.
        Ms. McSally. Director Wray, in counterintelligence roles,
    is there any part that you are playing right now even to try
    and mitigate and address these potential threats?
        Mr. Wray. Well, we try to investigate wherever we can. We
    get intelligence about people of the sort you are describing
    and trying to pursue those and share that information working
    with our fellow colleagues in the interagency.
        Ms. McSally. So I would like to maybe follow up in a
    Classified setting with you as to whether there is any open
    investigation specifically related to this issue.
        I do want to ask, Mr. Chairman, to insert into the record,
    we did write a letter together to USCIS and we have got the
    response here. I would like to put that in the record.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
          Letter Submitted For the Record by Honorable Martha McSally
                                     September 5, 2017.
    Mr. James McCament,
    Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department
            of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20008.
        Dear Mr. McCament: We have concerns regarding the Military
    Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) program, which began as a
    Department of Defense (DOD) pilot program in 2009 to assist the U.S.
    military in filling certain specialized job categories determined to be
    vital to the national interest.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Policy Alert:
    Department of Defense Military Accessions Vital to National Interest
    Program. Found at https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Updates/20160803-
    MAVNI.pdf. Last accessed on August 2, 2016.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The United States has a proud history of honoring foreign-born
    individuals who serve in the military with expedited citizenship
    benefits. According to the United States Citizenship and Immigration
    Services (USCIS), between October 2001 and September 2015, the U.S. has
    naturalized 109,321 members of the military.\2\ As you know, robust
    vetting is essential for all immigration programs, especially those
    involving the U.S. military where individuals may have access to
    specialized training and classified information.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Naturalization
    Through Military Service: Fact Sheet. Found at https://www.uscis.gov/
    news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet.
    Last accessed on August 3, 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to media reports, the Department of Defense has enlisted
    over 10,000 non-U.S. citizens into the military since the MAVNI pilot
    started,\3\ the vast majority in the U.S. Army. Several recent media
    reports have raised concerns about security vetting for individuals in
    this program. It is our understanding that DOD suspended the program in
    September 2016 due to these security concerns.\4\ An excerpt from a
    memo reported to be from DOD states, ``The previous execution of the
    MAVNI Pilot Program presents a significantly elevated risk to the
    Department from a CI/S and insider threat perspective, to include a
    considerable burden on limited intelligence assets.''\5\ The memo
    further states that DOD is in the process of developing a replacement
    program.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ James Rosen, ``Pentagon investigators find `security risks' in
    government's immigrant recruitment program, `infiltration' feared,''
    Fox News, August 1, 2017, Found at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
    2017/08/01/pentagon-investigators-find-security-risks-in-governments-
    immigrant-recruitment-program-infiltration-feared.html. Last accessed
    on August 3, 2017.
        \4\ Alex Horton, ``Foreign-born recruits, promised citizenship by
    the Pentagon, flee the country to avoid deportation,'' The Washington
    Post, July 17, 2017, Found at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
    checkpoint/wp/2017/07/17/foreign-born-recruits-promised-citizenship-by-
    the-pentagon-flee-the-country-to-avoid-deportation/
    ?tid=hybrid_collaborative_2_- na&utm_term=.34d67cd4cb4a. Last accessed
    on August 2, 2017.
        \5\ Agnes Constante, ``Immigrant Military Recruits Wait in Limbo As
    Defense Program's Future Unclear,'' NBC News, July 31, 2017, Found at
    http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/immigrant-military-recruits-
    wait-limbo-defense-program-s-future-unclear-n787121?cid=sm_npd-
    _nn_tw_ma. Last accessed on August 2, 2017.
        \6\ Constante, supra note 5.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As the Government agency responsible for overseeing lawful
    immigration to the United States, USCIS played a vital role in ensuring
    that applicants in the MAVNI program were properly vetted prior to
    receiving naturalization benefits. Please respond to the following
    questions no later than October 5, 2017 (provide a classified annex if
    required to fully answer):
        1. How many applications has USCIS received under the MAVNI
            program? Please provide a breakdown by country, year, and
            military service.
        2. How many individuals became U.S. citizens through the MAVNI
            program? Please provide a breakdown by country, year, and
            military service.
        3. How many MAVNI applicants are currently in deferred military
            entry status? Please provide a breakdown by country and
            military service. What is the immigration status of these
            individuals?
        4. What is the average timeline from when a MAVNI applicant begins
            basic training to becoming a U.S. citizen?
        5. How many MAVNI applications are pending?
        6. How many MAVNI applicants were denied citizenship and what were
            the reasons for such denials?
        7. What screening and vetting procedures does USCIS apply to MAVNI
            applicants?
        8. Please provide detailed information on the scope of the
            screening USCIS conducted under this program, including whether
            the screening is limited to the background of the applicant
            since arriving in the U.S. or if it includes thorough review of
            the applicant's background, affiliations, contacts, and
            activities prior to arrival in the U.S.?
        9. Are foreign contacts of MAVNI applicants self-reported only or
            corroborated with other U.S. Government agency information?
        10. Does USCIS conduct enhanced screening of MAVNI applicants from
            countries known to be hostile to the U.S. or known to conduct
            intelligence gathering activities on the U.S.? If yes, please
            provide details.
        11. Did USCIS conduct in-person interviews with MAVNI applicants?
        12. Did USCIS utilize any deception detection technology as part of
            the screening and vetting procedures?
        13. The MAVNI program was intended to be limited to ``certain
            health care professionals and foreign nationals fluent in
            certain foreign languages.''\7\ However, it appears the Army
            specifically may have used MAVNI in a much broader way to meet
            recruiting goals in a wide array of careers. Does USCIS vetting
            include a review of the specialized skill the applicant is
            filling to ensure it is within the limits of the program?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. USCIS Policy Manual,
    Volume 12--Citizenship & Naturalization, Part I--Military Members and
    their Families. Found at https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/
    PolicyManual-Volume12-PartI-Chapter3.html. Last accessed on August 3,
    2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        14. To what extent has USCIS reviewed the immigration benefits
            awarded through the MAVNI program to determine if any
            derogatory information, including false statements or national
            security concerns, existed at the time of application and/or
            award that would be grounds for denying naturalization
            benefits? Have any benefits been revoked?
        15. Is USCIS working with the DoD and other agencies to review
            previous MAVNI applicants who are now U.S. citizens to ensure
            that foreign intelligence agencies did not use MAVNI infiltrate
            the U.S. military ranks as a way to access sensitive and
            classified information? What are the legal considerations of
            such a review due to constitutional rights of these now U.S.
            citizens?
        16. Were any MAVNI applications referred to the USCIS Fraud
            Detection and National Security Directorate? If so, how many?
            Please provide a breakdown by country, year, and military
            service.
        17. Please provide a copy of any agreements, communications,
            letters, or memorandum of understanding between USCIS, or
            another DHS entity, and DOD regarding the MAVNI program.
        18. Are there other initiatives where other agencies or departments
            are able to offer expedited immigration benefits? If so, please
            list them and the corresponding statutory authority.
        19. Is USCIS or another DHS element involved in DOD's development
            of a replacement to the MAVNI pilot? If yes, what is the status
            of these efforts?
        20. Does the Department of Homeland Security employ any individuals
            naturalized through the MAVNI program?
        Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
                Sincerely,
                                             Michael T. McCaul,
                                 Chair, Committee on Homeland Security.
                                                Martha McSally,
                Chairman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security.

        Ms. McSally. Director Rasmussen, any comments?
        Mr. Rasmussen. The only thing I would add is I was not
    aware of particular vulnerability. One thing that I think might
    contribute to identifying potential sources of concern in this
    population is, depending on their status, some individuals now
    are subject to recurrent vetting, vetting that goes on long
    after they have been through the initial admission process.
    That changes, obviously, when they gain status as a citizen for
    the reasons you suggest. But it could mean that some members of
    this population are still subject to some vetting process.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks. I am over my time, but I would like to
    follow up in a Classified setting with all of you. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. Let me just say I echo the gentlelady from
    Arizona's concerns. I am glad to hear this program is
    suspended. I met with the director of USCIS yesterday and
    encouraged him to get the Classified briefing on this program.
        With that, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher.
        Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you
    for being here.
        So we talked a lot about sort-of the evolving terrorist
    threat abroad. It does seem that ISIS is steadily losing
    territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria, which opens up an
    opportunity for us to exploit a lot of valuable intelligence on
    the battlefield in the form of biometrics, fingerprints,
    documents, media devices. This is vital that we collect it and
    then find a way to get that information to those outposts that
    are vetting people who want to come into this country: Visa
    applicants, refugees, asylees. Because in the past, we have had
    examples where people have come into the country who are tied
    to terrorist groups.
        To what extent--I guess I would direct this to Acting
    Secretary Duke--to what extent do you think this battlefield
    information that is being captured by our military operators
    and other intel folks in the field being incorporated into your
    respective agency's operations and investigations?
        Ms. Duke. I think this is one of the areas that has
    improved most, to be honest with you. DHS is now an active
    member of the National Security Council, as is Director
    Rasmussen, and we get the same intelligence both before and
    after an incident. I think that counterterrorism efforts
    overseas lead by the Department of Defense are probably the
    area I have seen the most progress in.
        Mr. Rasmussen. What I would add to that is that the
    battlefield intelligence of the sort that you are describing,
    Mr. Gallagher, is most useful to us when it contains specific
    identity intelligence, when we can learn names, dates of birth,
    passport numbers, identity documented information, and so that
    that can be used to feed our database of known and suspected
    terrorists. That is the intelligence database that all of
    Acting Secretary Duke's immigration programs is bouncing off of
    as they are making decisions and vetting potential admissions
    to the country. So the better, the richer, the deeper that
    database, the more likely it is we are going to have the
    information that will identify a potential bad actor.
        It still is imperfect in that you can never have the
    totality of the information that you would want, but there is
    no question that what has happened in Iraq over the last
    several months has given us a wealth of new information that is
    helpful in this regard.
        Mr. Wray. I would just add that--and I agree with the
    sentiments that both of my co-panelists have expressed, but I
    would also add that the FBI has people forward-deployed with
    the military so that we are trying to collect biometric
    information wherever we can, and that has turned out to be very
    useful in some cases to identify people who are then returning
    or going elsewhere who weren't on people's lists, whether in
    the United States or in our foreign partners as well. I think
    going forward that is going to be another place where we can be
    more effective.
        Mr. Rasmussen. Let me jump in on one other issue that has
    come up quite a bit in the hearing today. Much of what we have
    learned about terrorists potential use of UAVs or UAS devices
    as an aviation threat has been learned from what we have seen
    on the battlefield in Iraq. Rapid exploitation of that
    material, rapid sharing here in the homeland so that local law
    enforcement does know that there is a threat to a high school
    football game of the sort that we were talking about, a lot of
    that is derived directly from battlefield intelligence.
        Mr. Gallagher. Well, it is heartening to hear that you all
    three seem to think it is headed in the right direction, though
    there is room for improvement. As a veteran of the NCTC ops
    center, and many a nights have we spent from 5 p.m. to 5 a.m.
    poring over those databases, so I am glad to hear your
    sentiments on that.
        Acting Secretary Duke, I thank you for highlighting in your
    testimony the important work of the committee's Task Force on
    Denying Terrorists Entry Into the United States. As Chairman of
    that task force, I would also like to thank the Department for
    your cooperation while we have been conducting the review. We
    are looking forward to releasing the task force's final report
    in the near future. I look forward to working with all of you
    to implement its recommendations or shore up any areas that you
    don't think we paid enough focus to.
        Earlier, you discussed how some of our foreign partners
    lacked the necessary capabilities to close gaps in their
    security and stop terrorist travel. This actually matches one
    of the key findings in our task force report, and some of the
    recommendations will focus on DHS's cooperation with our
    foreign partners.
        Can you briefly describe some of the work DHS is currently
    doing with our foreign partners to address any overseas
    vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our homeland?
        Ms. Duke. Well, one of main areas is using systems that
    either we have and offered them to use that track people, that
    track known terrorists. What Director Rasmussen talked about,
    we have international partners feeding into that same known
    terrorist database. We think that that info sharing is No. 1.
    Additional documentation, having the right documentation with
    the biometrics. Actually, the other part is not only inputting,
    but using the databases to make their own determinations with
    the borders so open, especially in Europe. Those are a few of
    the areas.
        Mr. Gallagher. I thank you.
        I yield the balance of my time.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Before I close, I want to also share the concern, Secretary
    Duke, that you raised in your prepared testimony about the
    relationship potentially between transnational criminal
    organization and potential terrorists that could bring
    terrorists into the United States, but also weapons of mass
    destruction that we saw highlighted in Dabiq magazine, where
    they talk about the ease with which that could be accomplished.
    I think that that certainly raises a warning sign and I think
    demonstrates a need to get the borders secured.
        I also want to thank Director Wray. I also share your
    concern about 702. As for me, this Member, this Chairman, I
    will be working closely with other like-minded Members to make
    sure that happens.
        Director Rasmussen, this will be your last testimony before
    this committee. I just want to commend you on----
        Mr. Rasmussen. This or any committee.
        Chairman McCaul. Or any committee, hopefully. I just want
    to thank you for your service. You will be missed, but I know
    you will be close by.
        I want to thank all three of you for your service and, most
    importantly, the men and women who serve in your organizations.
        With that, this--we are going to take a brief break and
    then begin with our second panel.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman McCaul. The committee will come to order.
        We have votes scheduled probably in about 5 to 10 minutes,
    so I am going to try to get through this as quickly as I can,
    and then we will come back after votes and start with our Q-
    and-A series.
        I am pleased to welcome our second panel of witnesses on
    domestic terrorism. Our second panel includes Mr. David Rausch,
    the chief of police for the city of Knoxville, Tennessee; Rabbi
    Abraham Cooper, associate dean and director of the Global
    Social Action Agenda at the Simon Wiesenthal Center; and Mr.
    Richard Cohen, president of the Southern Poverty Law Center.
        I want to thank all of you for being here today.
        The Chair now recognizes Police Chief Rausch for his
    testimony.

        STATEMENT OF DAVID B. RAUSCH, CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF
                          KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE

        Chief Rausch. Good afternoon, Chairman McCaul. Thank you,
    Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee. Thank
    you for the opportunity to speak with you today about world-
    wide threats, specifically, domestic terrorism and the threat
    posed by extremist groups.
        My name is Chief David Rausch. I am currently the chief of
    police in Knoxville, Tennessee. I am also a member of the
    executive board of directors for the International Association
    of Chiefs of Police, and currently the general chair for the
    IACP Midsize Agencies Division, which represents agencies with
    50 to 999 sworn officers.
        The IACP is the world's largest association of law
    enforcement leaders with more than 30,000 members in 150
    different countries. I have been fortunate to have been trained
    by the FBI in domestic and international terrorism, as well as
    participated in training at the U.S. Army War College, in
    addition to my over 28 years of experience in law enforcement.
        Today's law enforcement officers face an incredible set of
    challenges. One of the many myriad of challenges we confront is
    how to best respond to planned rallies, spontaneous crowds, and
    civil disturbances by extremist groups, while balancing First
    Amendment rights. All too often, what may have been started as
    a peaceful demonstration can spawn protests and counter-
    protests that can lead to civil disorder.
        Groups with varying social and political agendas that wish
    to express their concerns over war, abortion, environmental
    issues, policy decisions, and numerous other issues can and
    have sparked violent and even deadly actions and reactions.
    Most recently, we witnessed that in Charlottesville, Virginia.
        A few short weeks after that incident, on August 26, we had
    a protest over a monument in Knoxville, and we used what we
    learned from Charlottesville, from Boston, and from Durham,
    North Carolina, to ensure a safe, peaceful gathering. Each of
    these cities were faced with the realities addressing Civil War
    statutes or monuments and free speech by groups known for hate.
        I will share what we learned from those events, and I will
    discuss some of the challenges law enforcement faces when it
    comes to policing extremist groups and where we could benefit
    from assistance from the Federal Government.
        Civil disturbances and demonstrations have changed over the
    years, as have the tactics and techniques of extremist groups
    that organize these protests and gatherings. Demonstrations in
    public protest have taken on a more systemic organized nature
    and have invoked tools that were not available in past decades.
    Social media is now commonly used to rapidly mobilize and
    manage participants prior to enduring demonstrations and civil
    disturbances. Communities--while some of the issues there, of
    course, are with the social media allowing the expression of
    hate in forms that we have noticed recently.
        Law enforcement needs the assistance and cooperation of
    those who manage the social media mediums to monitor their
    sites and not allow them to be used for this purpose. The
    companies need protection from frivolous lawsuits that prevent
    them from taking needed action to do this. We need the ability
    to have those who are pushing a violent hate agenda to be held
    accountable for violence that results from their efforts.
        Additionally, continued resources through the Department of
    Homeland Security and the Department of Justice in the form of
    community policing grants, safe streets funding, and other
    resources are vital for the continuation of being able to
    address these efforts to prevent and intervene violent
    extremists. It is vital that all levels of government and the
    private sector work together to identify and address
    individuals and organizations that are involved in violence and
    hate. This information needs to be provided immediately in real
    time to all who may be impacted, especially those who are
    responsible for the safety of our communities.
        There should be no barriers to the sharing of information.
    Fusion centers have been effective at providing this
    information, but they are only as good as the information that
    they are provided or they learn through their efforts. The
    ability to gather intelligence information must not be
    hindered. We certainly understand the concerns of too much
    Government intrusion, but we can't allow this distrust of
    Government to allow those who seek to harm us to thrive. There
    can be appropriate intelligence gathering that is properly
    monitored to protect us all. We must ensure that we are
    watching and not allow those tools that law enforcement use to
    get taken away.
        The ability of a local community to control events in their
    jurisdiction is vital. The power to require notice of an event
    to assess the level of concern for our communities is
    paramount. Permitting is a process that allows this to be done
    effectively. The process gives local government the opportunity
    to appropriately protect all who wish to participate, or to
    make a decision to decline a permit based on factual concerns
    for the overall safety of a community.
        A failure to obtain a permit should be reason to declare a
    gathering illegal. Permitting allows for clearer communication
    between the jurisdiction and the event organizers. Contact with
    leaders of a demonstration is important to gather information
    and establish ground rules for the event, in particular,
    nonnegotiable matters, with the intention that a common
    understanding be reached by both parties on the ground rules.
        In our protest in Knoxville, it was advertised on social
    media. A local white supremacist group announced that they
    would be holding a support-the-monument rally at a Civil War
    monument that had been vandalized after Charlottesville. We
    were familiar with the group planning this, and they had
    gatherings previously. Then three other groups began organizing
    counter-protests against the white supremacist hate group. We
    were familiar with some of these groups. The support for the
    counter-protesters were substantially larger than the white
    supremacist hate groups.
        Our intelligence unit began monitoring all the known
    problem groups in our area, and they were inciting each other
    by posing as members of the opposite group and making
    statements about the need for violence.
        One of the counter-protest groups contacted us to request
    approval to conduct a march, and that was denied because of the
    recent events that we had seen in other locations. The support-
    the-monument group never sought a permit. They advised they
    were just going to meet at the monument, and then we decided to
    take control of that.
        To me, these groups who gather to spew hate and violence
    now hide under the cloak of the First Amendment. We need to be
    able to delineate between exercising freedom of speech and
    violent behavior. Having the ability to put reasonable rules in
    place and control these gatherings is important.
        I know I have gone over my time there, Mr. Chair. I will
    just tie it up just saying that we believe that there are a lot
    of tools that could be made available to us. As, you know, I am
    sure there will be some questions, I can get further into that.
        [The prepared statement of Chief Rausch follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of David B. Rausch
                               November 30, 2017
        Good afternoon Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
    Members of the committee.
        Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about world-
    wide threats--specifically domestic terrorism and the threat posed by
    extremist groups.
        My name is Chief David Rausch am currently the chief of police of
    the Knoxville, Tennessee Police Department. I am also a member of the
    executive board of directors for the International Association of
    Chiefs of Police (IACP) and currently the general chair of the IACP
    Midsize Agencies Division, which represents agencies with 50 to 999
    sworn officers. The IACP is the world's largest association of law
    enforcement leaders, with more than 30,000 members in 150 different
    countries.
        I have been fortunate to have been trained by the FBI in Domestic
    and International Terrorism, as well as participate in training at the
    U.S. Army War College in addition to my over 28 years of experience in
    law enforcement.
        Today's law enforcement officers face an incredible set of
    challenges. One of the many myriad of challenges we confront is how to
    best respond to planned rallies, spontaneous crowds, and civil
    disturbances by extremist groups while balancing First Amendment
    rights.
        All too often, what may have been started as a peaceful
    demonstration can spawn protests and counter protests that can lead to
    civil disorder. Groups with varying social or political agendas that
    wish to express their concerns over war, abortion, environmental
    issues, policy decisions, and numerous other issues can and have
    sparked violent--even deadly--actions and reactions. Most recently, we
    witnessed this occur in Charlottesville, Virginia.
        A few short weeks after that incident, on August 26 we had a
    protest over a monument in Knoxville and we used what we learned from
    Charlottesville, Boston, Durham, North Carolina to assure a safe
    peaceful gathering. Each of these cities were faced with rallies
    addressing civil war statues or monuments and ``free speech'' by groups
    known for hate. I will share what we learned from those events and I
    will discuss some of the challenges law enforcement faces when it comes
    to policing extremist groups, and where we could benefit from
    assistance from the Federal Government.
                          recruitment and organization
        Civil disturbances and demonstrations have changed over the years,
    as have the tactics and techniques of the extremist groups that
    organize these protests and gatherings. Demonstrations and public
    protests have taken on a more systemic, organized nature and have
    invoked tools that were not available in past decades. Social media is
    now commonly used to rapidly mobilize and manage participants prior to
    and during demonstrations and civil disturbances.
        Social media and the internet provide extremists with an
    unprecedented ability to spread hate and recruit followers, similar to
    what we have witnessed with terrorist organizations. Individual racists
    and organized hate groups now have the power to reach a global audience
    of millions and to communicate among like-minded individuals easily,
    inexpensively, and anonymously. Equally troubling, internet users,
    particularly young people, have never been more exposed and vulnerable
    to the efforts of these extremists to influence, recruit, and
    intimidate. Moreover, there is significant evidence that the internet
    is playing an increasing role in facilitating self-radicalization.
        Combating Violent Extremism is an effort led by the CVE Task Force
    which is made up of the Department of Homeland Security in
    collaboration with the Department of Justice, the Department of State,
    Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Health
    and Human Services, Department of Labor, as well as the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the
    National Counterterrorism Center. Model efforts for how to engage
    communities to prevent radicalization and recruitment are collected and
    shared by this group. Partnering with State and local law enforcement
    is a key to the effort, specifically those utilizing community policing
    strategies. Successful prevention efforts have included a mix of
    positive community engagement and early identification of potential
    recruiters and recruits.
        Communities rely on education through classrooms, faith
    organizations, and the media. Educating parents and youth on the
    efforts and dangers of these hate organizations and ideologies is a
    core prevention effort. Expressing the dangers of these groups and
    their bullying behaviors is key. There needs to be an understanding
    that radicalization is not just about religion, it's about beliefs.
    Relationships between the community and law enforcement must continue
    to be built and managed. Currently, hate has the stage. It is getting
    all the attention. It has a megaphone and is being allowed to spew in
    many forms taking advantage of divisions that have been created. This
    does not have to be the case. The vast majority of Americans believe
    and know that we are all more alike than we are different and that we
    accomplish things in this country working together.
        Law enforcement needs the assistance and cooperation of those who
    manage the social media mediums to monitor their sites and not allow
    them to be used for this purpose. These companies need protection from
    frivolous lawsuits that prevent them from taking needed action to do
    this. We need the ability to have those who are pushing a violent hate
    agenda to be held accountable for violence that results from their
    efforts. Law enforcement also needs the assistance of those in our
    community who learn of or know individuals who are engaged in these
    violent hate agendas to report them to us, so that we can do our jobs
    to protect our neighbors.
        Additionally, continued resources through the Department of
    Homeland Security and the Department of Justice in the form of
    Community Policing Grants, Safe Streets funding, and other resources
    are vital for the continuation of being able to address these efforts
    to prevent and intervene violent extremists.
                pre-event intelligence gathering and management
        It is vital that all levels of Government and the private sector
    work together to identify and address individuals and organizations
    that are involved in violence and hate. This information needs to be
    provided immediately in real time to all who may be impacted,
    especially those who are responsible for the safety of our communities.
    There should be no barriers to the sharing of this information. Fusion
    Centers have been effective at providing this information, but they are
    only as good as the information that they are provided or they learn
    through their efforts.
        The ability to gather intelligence information must not be
    hindered. We certainly understand the concerns of too much Government
    intrusion, but we can't allow this distrust of Government to allow
    those who seek to harm us to thrive. There can be appropriate
    intelligence gathering that is properly monitored to protect all of us.
    We must assure that we are watching and not allow the tools that law
    enforcement uses to be taken away.
        The ability of a local community to control events in their
    jurisdiction is vital. The power to require notice of an event to
    assess the level of concern for a community is paramount. Permitting is
    a process that allows this to be done effectively. The process gives
    the local government that opportunity to appropriately protect all who
    wish to participate or to make a decision to decline a permit based on
    factual concerns for the overall safety of a community. A failure to
    obtain a permit should be reason to declare a gathering illegal and
    assure that everyone is made aware and given an opportunity to disperse
    before any other course of action. Permitting allows for clear
    communication between the jurisdiction and the event organizers.
    Contact with leaders of a demonstration is important to gather
    information and establish ground rules for the event. In particular,
    non-negotiable matters, with the intention that a common understanding
    be reached by both parties on the ground rules.
        A new challenge to this process is that groups are organizing on
    social media sites and have no real leaders and are just gathering to
    express their concerns. Many having the same ideology of hate. These
    should be addressed as an illegal gathering.
        In our protest in Knoxville, it was advertised on social media. A
    local white supremacists group announced that they would be holding a
    ``support the monument'' rally at a Civil War Memorial Monument that
    was placed to remember 813 Confederate soldiers who were killed in the
    Battle of Fort Sanders that has been vandalized after the
    Charlottesville protest. We were familiar with the group planning this,
    as they had conducted gatherings in the past. Then three groups began
    organizing a counter protest against the white supremacist hate group.
    We were familiar with some of these groups. The support for the counter
    protestors was substantially larger than the white supremacist hate
    group. We monitored the on-line activities of these groups, as well as
    hate groups on both sides that were planning to attend. Our
    Intelligence Unit began monitoring all of the known problem groups in
    our area as well. They were inciting each other by posing as members of
    the opposite group and making statements about the need for violence.
        One of the counter protest groups contacted us to request approval
    to conduct a march to the site on a State Route that is a main route
    through the University of Tennessee. They advised that they would have
    2,000 participants. Because of the concerns of what we had seen from
    recent events in other jurisdictions and the fact that this is a major
    route in our city, we denied the request and advised the organizer that
    if they marched that they would have to do so on the sidewalks and
    follow all laws. The ``support the monument'' group never sought a
    permit. They advised that they were just going to gather around the
    monument on the sidewalk. We decided that we would take control of the
    area and set the rules to avoid any possible violence.
                 balancing freedom of speech with public safety
        All persons in the United States have the right to march,
    demonstrate, protest, or undertake similar activities protected under
    the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Freedom of
    speech, association, assembly, and the right to petition the Government
    are subject only to reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
    manner of their expression. The content of the speech or message does
    not provide the basis for imposing limitations on these rights. Law
    enforcement has the difficult task of maintaining the peace during
    incidents, while also protecting the rights of assembly and free speech
    guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
        The challenging part for law enforcement is we must protect groups
    that we may not agree with. We must protect groups that oppose us and
    have ideas that are counter to ours. But, our oath requires us to
    protect the rights of everyone.
        Too many of these groups who gather to spew hate and violence now
    hide under the cloak of the First Amendment. We need to be able to
    delineate between exercising freedom of speech and violent behavior.
    Having the ability to put reasonable rules in place to control these
    gatherings is important. Not allowing individuals to bring items that
    can be used as weapons, including sticks, bats, bottles of urine,
    frozen water bottles, bricks, rocks, helmets, shields, face coverings
    and masks, provides the ability to prevent violence from happening.
    These are all tools of intimidation and attack. Protests are
    emotionally charged events with people who are passionate about their
    cause. They are events that extremists take advantage of to push their
    violent agendas. Jurisdictions need the ability to control these events
    and set reasonable rules to avoid dangerous conditions. Even in the
    jurisdictions where firearms are allowed to be carried openly or with a
    permit, the ability to ban them at these events is necessary. Again,
    the emotional aspect of these gatherings calls for the ability to
    regulate them to assure the safety of all involved, including law
    enforcement.
        After watching video from the protests in Charlottesville, Boston,
    and Durham we decided that we would put reasonable rules in place for
    the area of the protest. These included prohibiting all items that
    could be used as weapons, no face coverings, and no masks. Because we
    decided to control the area we were also able to prohibit firearms,
    even by those who had carry permits, as a new State law set the rules
    for this and we set up the area to meet the requirements. This set the
    stage to prevent potentially violent situations from happening. We also
    communicated this information in advance of the event to assure that
    those who would gather knew the rules as well as those in the community
    who lived and worked in the area knew what steps were being taken to
    keep the area safe.
                        tools and procedures for success
        Some of the key elements that proved successful for our event was
    to take control of the area early to prevent either side from taking
    control of the area before law enforcement. Because of the new threat
    of vehicle-borne attacks we utilized heavy equipment trucks from our
    Public Service Department to cut access to the area from all streets.
    We set up physical barriers, ``cattle racks'', to separate the areas
    where the two sides would be allowed and the center of the street to be
    controlled by law enforcement. We set up the entrances on each side of
    the area for a search of all who entered. We had law enforcement on the
    outside of the controlled area watching over both sides as well as law
    enforcement inside both areas. Riot Control teams in full gear were on
    the inside between the two sides.
        The planning and preparation consisted of utilizing all available
    resources on the local, State, and Federal levels. Additional resources
    were necessary and were obtained from several agencies including other
    local and State law enforcement and emergency services. In our event we
    utilized the city law department, communications department, service
    department, fire department, emergency management, sheriff's office, a
    nearby local police department, Tennessee Highway Patrol, Tennessee
    Emergency Management Agency, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, and
    worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on intelligence
    gathering.
        Current laws mostly provide what is needed to conduct these events
    and hold persons accountable. Laws addressing domestic terrorism and
    hate crimes exist. Some thought should be put into making hate crimes
    as an enhancement to the original crimes as there are challenges with
    proving hate in some situations as the primary offense. Most
    prosecutors will tell you that they will charge the primary crime of
    assault, vandalism, etc. as they find it difficult to prove the
    motivation for the crime at times. If they could get the verdict for
    the crime and then use the motivation of hate to enhance the punishment
    it may be more effective. Consideration should be made for passing laws
    regulating protests and the costs associated with them. These events
    are very expensive to communities. I realize that there are challenges
    with determining who pays when most of these events are not organized
    by a specific group or person. California recently passed a State law
    to limit what can be carried during a protest and should be considered
    as an example of what other States may want to accomplish.
                legislative, policy, and action recommendations
    Provide Federal Program and Funding Assistance
       Training.--Law enforcement officers need training to
            mitigate and to de-escalate these events.
       Equipment.--Law enforcement needs funding for equipment to
            help respond and manage these events. Equipment such as
            protective gear, cameras, and radios not only help to keep
            officers safe but also allow them the ability to keep the
            public safe.
       Specialized Units and Task Forces.--Funding to create
            specialized units or to help agencies team up to develop multi-
            agency task forces.
       Fusion Centers and Information Sharing.--Fusion centers play
            a unique role in protecting their communities, informing
            decision making, and enhancing information-sharing activities
            among law enforcement and homeland security partners. Federal
            support is needed to fund these fusion centers.
       Intelligence Gathering.--Those of us who are charged with
            protecting the public aren't always able to access the evidence
            needed to prosecute crimes and prevent acts of terror. Social
            media is a particularly difficult challenge for law
            enforcement. Law enforcement needs, wherever possible,
            assistance from Congress in ensuring that social media
            providers are both willing and able to share necessary
            information that would help protect our communities and
            citizens. Law enforcement simply needs to be able to lawfully
            access information that has been duly authorized by a court in
            the limited circumstances prescribed in specific court orders.
    Speak Out Against Hate
        The President, Members of Congress, State and local elected
    officials all need to condemn acts of bigotry every chance they can. As
    elected officials, you hold important roles, and the Nation and your
    communities want to hear from you. Use your role to speak out against
    the hateful incidents that are plaguing our communities and send a
    message that these acts will not be tolerated. All of us, law
    enforcement included, must work together to put an end to hate and
    tensions are brewing.
                                   conclusion
        On behalf of the IACP, I conclude by thanking you again for the
    opportunity to appear before you today. I would be happy to answer any
    questions you may have.

        Chairman McCaul. I appreciate it, Chief Rausch. Your full
    statement will be included in the record.
        The Chair now recognizes Rabbi Cooper.

     STATEMENT OF RABBI ABRAHAM COOPER, ASSOCIATE DEAN, DIRECTOR,
          GLOBAL SOCIAL ACTION AGENDA, SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER

        Rabbi Cooper. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
    Member Thompson and the rest of the distinguished Members of
    Congress.
        I want to thank you for allowing us to be here on behalf of
    our 400,000 constituents of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. We are
    named first in honor and now in memory of Simon Wiesenthal, the
    great Nazi hunter who lost 89 members of his family during
    World War II. When he was liberated by U.S. troops at
    Mauthausen, he was too weak to stand and embrace his
    liberators. He dedicated the rest of his life seeking justice
    and not vengeance. Brought 1,100 of the perpetrators before the
    bar of justice and changed the way civilization looked at the
    responsibilities of dealing with the crimes of genocide. He
    warned, ``I know that the hate did not die with Hitler in the
    Berlin bunker.'' Tragically, how right he proved to be.
        Before I go on, I just think this is also an appropriate
    moment to thank your father, Mr. Chairman, who I learned from
    you flew 32 missions over Europe, participated in D-Day,
    representing the greatest generation. It might be a little bit
    late, but it is the appropriate time to say thank you.
        The threats of extreme anti-Semitism in the United States
    in our time trace back to the 1980's. The small but extremely
    violent order assassinated Denver talk show host, Alan Berg, in
    1984, and planned to foment a race war in our country. Neo-
    Nazi, skinhead, and militia movements in the late 1980's and
    1990's often combined white separatist doctrine with anti-
    Jewish theory and practice.
        It has already been 30 years, but anti-Jewish hate crimes
    forced many Jewish institutions across our country to undertake
    costly security measures to protect people at prayer and kids
    at school. For a generation, Jews attending synagogue services
    or dropping their children off at a school have accepted the
    necessity of having guards, often armed, security cameras, and
    other paraphernalia. Annual FBI stats prove that it is not
    paranoia. Jews, unfortunately, every year are the No. 1 target
    of religion-based hate crimes. I would add that African
    Americans, unfortunately, every year are the No. 1 continuing
    target of race-based hate crimes.
        In 1999, Buford Furrow, trained in William Pierce and Tom
    Metzger's doctrine of leaderless resistance, came down to Los
    Angeles with the plan to attack our Museum of Tolerance. He
    landed up using a softer target, which was a Jewish summer day
    camp. Children as young as 6 years old were shot before he
    murdered a Filipino-American U.S. Postal Service employee. Two
    years later,
    9/11 changed our world forever. It is one of the reasons we are
    here today.
        Against this backdrop, earlier this year, there were over
    120 bomb threats made to--against Jewish community centers
    across our country. These threats evoke painful memories of
    earlier deadly attacks at JCCs, including Granada Hills,
    California; Seattle, Washington; and Overland, Kansas.
    Thousands of young families, including a young colleague of
    mine at the Wiesenthal Center, were deeply traumatized as their
    4- and 5-year-olds were suddenly and hurriedly evacuated from
    their classrooms.
        Despite strenuous efforts in Federal and local law
    enforcement, for which we are incredibly grateful, it took
    months to identify the main culprit of these threats of
    domestic terrorism. The majority of those threats emanated not
    from here, but from overseas, and traced back to one young
    suspect in Israel.
        But 2017 has witnessed more than bomb threats. It was a
    year where the oldest hate manifested on too many of our
    Nation's campuses, were delivered to our personal emails, and
    spouted from pulpits of religious leaders.
        The sources? Extremist elements of the new alt-right, self-
    proclaimed white nationalists and outright Nazis, theologically
    fueled and validated Islamist hate rhetoric, extreme anti-
    Israel campaigns on campus that demonize the Jewish State and
    her Zionist supporters.
        What has changed? Well, we heard a phenomenal panel before
    detail in--great professionals--the internet. The internet is
    used to incubate and validate hate, to inspire and empower, and
    even train lone-wolf attackers. It has created new global
    relationships among extremists unimaginable 20 years ago. It
    offers anonymity.
        We saw that the new generation of young Nazis were able to
    utilize Charlottesville in a way to capture National and global
    attention by staging Nazi-like torch light parades and
    uploading video in real-time via social media with little or no
    consequences to the perpetrators.
        I want to go directly to the fact that, a few weeks ago, we
    participated in hearings at the House Judiciary Committee,
    which was considering undertaking some steps to help Jewish
    kids endangered on campus. Unfortunately, to this point, a bill
    which passed 100 to nothing in the Senate, is still being held
    up by Chairman Goodlatte. As a result, the U.S. Department of
    Education has not adjudicated a single case involving anti-
    Semitism in the United States against students on campus.
        Then the Islamist rhetoric attacks, such as the one in
    Davis, California, in which people have used religious pulpits
    in order to call for genocide against the Jewish community. I
    am a Rabbi, so I am very sensitive to the fact that we don't
    want to curtail either the First Amendment or tell religious
    leaders what they should do. But I am also a sports fan and I
    believe in a level playing field.
        The kind of rhetoric that has been used to attack our
    community and Christians by certain Islamist personalities,
    imams in our country, has simply not elicited the kind of
    response that the Muslim leadership in this country should
    show, especially since the American Muslims themselves have
    suffered a spike in hate crimes targeting them in the last
    year.
        Finally, is there a role for DHS? I am aware that DHS's
    role in combating domestic terrorism and anti-Semitism is
    secondary to that of the DOJ and FBI. I am also aware that
    DHS's role is not to dictate policies that would hold
    extremists accountable for their acts.
        Nonetheless, DHS was born in wake of the brutal lessons
    wrought from the ashes and agony of 9/11. We learned as a
    Nation that America had to move to correct serious flaws in our
    fundamental approach to securing our Nation from ever-morphing
    multiple threats. It is our view that local hate crime units,
    State homeland security, and relevant Federal agencies must be
    able to quickly update and expand their understandings of
    extremist ideologies from the far right to the extreme left.
    That would actually help them better understand the raw
    intelligence that comes their way.
        The Simon Wiesenthal Center is urging the committee, and
    through you, Mr. Chairman and the Ranking Member, to consider
    ways to enable the homeland security operation to be able to
    intake from NGO's, human rights advocates, and other community-
    based groups throughout the United States with the kind of
    information which I think would better help the brilliant and
    committed people we have heard who deal with materials we will
    never see. But by virtue of the fact that the Wiesenthal Center
    looks only at open-source material, sometimes we can provide a
    little bit of perspective, since we are not doing industrial
    phishing. We actually do it the old-fashioned way.
        So it is our hope that together with all of the other
    organizations and those who were not able to attend here today,
    would be given an opportunity to have a platform where the
    agencies that we heard from earlier today and the other
    relevant groups, probably through fusion centers, would be able
    to have access to the kinds of perspective information that we
    would like to share with them. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Rabbi Cooper follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Rabbi Abraham Cooper
                               November 30, 2017
        Thank you for the opportunity to represent the 400,000 constituent
    families of the Simon Wiesenthal Center at today's House Homeland
    Security Committee hearings. Now in our 40th year, our Center is named
    in honor of and inspired by the legacy of Simon Wiesenthal, the late
    Nazi hunter. He lost 89 members of his family during the Nazi
    Holocaust. When U.S. forces entered Mauthausen Concentration Camp,
    Simon weighed under 90 pounds and was too weak to even stand to embrace
    the liberating American GIs.
        He dedicated the rest of his life seeking justice, not vengeance
    and succeeded in bringing Nazi War Criminals before the bar of justice,
    helping to bring 1,100 to trial and ensuring a largely uncaring world
    would not be allowed to forget the victims or the perpetrators of the
    Nazi Genocide. And when he bestowed his good name on our institution he
    warned, ``I know that hate did not die with Hitler in the Berlin
    Bunker.''
        How right he proved to be. The threats of extreme anti-Semitism in
    the United States in our time trace back to the 1980's. The small but
    extremely violent order assassinated Denver talk show host Allen Berg
    in 1984, and planned to foment a race war in America. Assorted Neo-
    Nazi, skinhead, and Militia movements of the late 1980's and 1990's
    often combined white separatist doctrine with anti-Jewish theory and
    practice.
        Decades ago, anti-Jewish hate crimes forced many Jewish
    institutions across the Nation to undertake costly security measures to
    protect people at prayer and kids in school. For a generation, Jews
    attending synagogue services or dropping their children off at a Jewish
    School, have accepted the necessity of having guards--often armed--
    security cameras and other paraphernalia. Annual FBI stats prove that
    it's not paranoia--Jews every year are the No. 1 target of religion-
    based hate crimes.
        Indeed, in 1999, Buford O. Furrow, trained in William L. Pierce's
    and Tom Metzger's doctrine of ``leaderless resistance'' to the ZOG or
    so-called ``Zionist Organized Government, journeyed from the white
    separatist Aryan Nations Compound in Idaho to Los Angeles. There, he
    intended to assault the Simon Wiesenthal Center Museum of Tolerance, to
    ``send a message to the Jews,'' but settled for a softer target at a
    Jewish Community Center day camp where he shot children as young as 6
    before murdering a Filipino-American U.S. postal Service employee.
        Two years later, 9/11 changed our world forever.
        Against this background, earlier this year there were over 100 bomb
    threats made against Jewish Community Centers, home to many pre-schools
    and kindergartens. These threats evoked painful memories of earlier
    deadly attacks at JCC's, including in Granada Hills, California (1999)
    Seattle, Washington (2006), and Overland, Kansas (2014). Thousands of
    families--including a young colleague of mine at the Simon Wiesenthal
    Center were deeply traumatized as their 5-year-olds were suddenly and
    hurriedly evacuated from their classrooms. Despite strenuous efforts of
    Federal and local law enforcement--for which we are incredibly
    grateful--it took months to identify the main culprit of these
    ``threats of domestic terrorism.'' The majority of the threats emanated
    from overseas, eventually traced to one young suspect in Israel.
        Coupled with attacks against Jewish cemeteries in Missouri,
    Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, many of our communities further expanded
    their security measures.
        But 2017 witnessed more than bomb threats. It was a year where
    history's oldest hate manifested on our too many of our Nation's
    campuses, were delivered to our personal emails, and spouted from
    pulpits of religious leaders.
        The sources? Extremist elements of the new alt-right, self-
    proclaimed white nationalists and outright Nazis; theologically-fueled
    and validated Islamist hate rhetoric; extreme anti-Israel campaigns on
    campuses that demonize the Jewish State and her Zionist supporters.
                           what has changed in 2017?
        The internet--it's used to incubate and validate hate; to inspire,
    empower, and even train lone-wolf attackers; it creates new global
    relationships among extremists unimaginable 20 years ago. It offers
    anonymity and encryption for evil-doers and largely renders the targets
    of hate virtually helpless from a tsunami of personalized screeds and
    threats.
        Gone are the days when neo-Nazis were relegated to leafleting car
    windshields. No need to hide mailing of hate propaganda in non-descript
    brown paper. The new generation of extreme far-right racists are tech-
    savvy. Perhaps inspired by the success of European xenophobes and
    bigots, they have succeeded in penetrating the mainstream of culture,
    adopting new vocabularies, and project a sleek and sophisticated on-
    line presence. They market everything from T-shirts to hate music to
    impressionable young people.
        Recently they have dropped the still-taboo swastika for sunwheel or
    runes--symbols deployed by racists across Europe. Other times their
    sophisticated on-line skills are on horrific display when Jewish
    reporters are pummeled with hundreds of personalized anti-Semitic
    attacks delivered to the victim via email or Twitter for the ``crime''
    of reporting the news or writing op-eds.
        The new generation of Nazis also showed in Charlottesville that
    they can capture National and global attention by staging Nazi-like
    torchlight parades--and uploading video in real time, via social media,
    with little or no consequence to the perpetrators.
                             *campuses have changed
        In the past several years, Jewish students on a large number of
    college campuses have been subjected to unprecedented levels of anti-
    Jewish sentiment, leading many to feel uncomfortable participating in
    Jewish campus life or other campus activities whose participants are
    especially hostile to Jewish students.
        Jewish students can't table for their organizations at student
    events fairs without being physically surrounded and shouted down by
    extremist anti-Semitic campus organizations.
        They can't bring speakers to school like every other students group
    and gender, racial, and ethnic group can, because the speakers will be
    heckled into silence.
        They're often reluctant to run for student government at some
    schools because they've seen the numerous times in just the past few
    years that Jewish students have been called out because they are Jews
    and often excluded from student government expressly due to their
    involvement in Jewish life on campus.
        These incidents of hate and intimation are wide-spread and impact
    on campuses with large and small Jewish constituencies. They impact on
    Jewish support groups like Hillel and Jewish fraternity members of
    AEPi.
        These problems are too often compounded by University
    administrators who have been tolerating a level of harassment and
    intimidation of Jewish students that they would never dream of allowing
    against other demographic groups, because they know there are no
    consequences.
        The failure of schools and the Federal Government to protect Jewish
    students on campus from harassment has become a long-standing scandal
    and one of the most pressing issues in the American Jewish community.
        That is why the Simon Wiesenthal Center and every mainstream,
    credible Jewish organization in the Nation came together last year to
    demand equal protection under the law for Jewish students. And that is
    why the U.S. Senate passed our bill unanimously, but unfortunately your
    distinguished colleague, Congressman Goodlatte, Chair of the House
    Judiciary Committee, has refused to allow the bill to be voted on.
        In my home State of California: A rock hurled at a student wearing
    a T-shirt saying ``Everybody loves a Jewish boy'' as he passed by an
    anti-Israel display; a female Jewish student stalked by anti-Israel
    activists and taunted with the words ``slut'' and ``whore,'' and other
    Jewish students called ``dirty Jew,'' ``f***ing Jew'' and told to ``go
    back to Russia'' and ``burn in Hell''; three Jewish female students
    assaulted and injured when a mob of anti-Israel activists stormed
    through a pro-Israel event.
        These are just a few of the anti-Semitic incidents reported at the
    University of California, but they are not unique to that school.
    Jewish students on many campuses from coast to coast report severe,
    persistent, and pervasive harms at the hands of anti-Israel activists.
    The harassment includes physical and verbal assaults, destruction of
    property, bullying and intimidation, denigration, discrimination, and
    suppression of speech and often takes place regardless of the victim's
    personal feelings on Israel. Jewish students report fearing displaying
    their Jewish star necklaces, wearing their Jewish sorority or
    fraternity letters and walking to Hillel for Sabbath dinner.
        The problem had become so severe that at the University of
    California, for example, in 2011, then President Mark Yudof,
    commissioned a fact-finding team to interview Jewish students on seven
    UC campuses in order to objectively assess the campus climate for them.
    According to the team's report, Jewish students were indeed
    ``confronting significant and difficult climate issues as a result of
    activities on campus which focused on Israel, its right to exist and
    its treatment of Palestinians.'' The team found that on every UC campus
    they visited Jewish students ``described an environment in which they
    feel isolated and many times harassed and intimidated by students,
    faculty, and outsiders.''
        As the University of California Board of Regents explained in its
    landmark Statement of Principles Against Intolerance, historic
    manifestations of anti-Semitism have changed over time and ``expression
    of anti-Semitism are more coded and difficult to identify. In
    particular, opposition to Zionism often is expressed in ways that are
    not simply statements of disagreement over politics and policy, but
    also assertions of prejudice and intolerance toward Jewish people and
    culture.''
        Despite the undeniably hostile environment that many Jewish
    students were experiencing at the University of California, complaints
    filed under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on behalf of Jewish
    students on three UC campuses--Irvine, Santa Cruz, and Berkeley--were
    unceremoniously dismissed on the same day in August 2013.
        And UC's Jewish students are not alone. In the dozen years since
    the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) committed
    to investigating anti-Semitism under Title VI, OCR has not found a
    single civil rights violation in any claim filed on behalf of Jewish
    students on college or university campuses.
        Bottom line--again, little or no consequences for anti-Semitism on
    campus.
                                islamist attacks
        Tragically, some of the most vile and threatening anti-Jewish
    rhetoric in 2017 has been delivered from within the American Muslim
    community, that itself has suffered an increase in hate crimes in 2016.
    From campuses in Tennessee to pulpits in our Nation's most populist
    State, California. Such ``sermons'' failed to elicit much protest from
    within the Muslim community, nor to the best of our knowledge, have
    generated any serious action by authorities--local, State, or Federal--
    despite the explicit calls for violence and worse, made against Jews by
    such individuals.
                            is there a role for dhs?
        Mr. Chairman, I am aware that the DHS's role in combating domestic
    terrorism and anti-Semitism is secondary to that of the DOJ and FBI.
        I am also aware that DHS is not in a position to dictate policies
    that would hold extremists accountable for their anti-Semitic acts.
        Nonetheless, the DHS was born in wake of the brutal lessons wrought
    from ashes and agony of 9/11. We learned as a Nation that America had
    to move to correct serious flaws in our fundamental approach to
    securing our Nation from ever-morphing, multiple threats.
        The Simon Wiesenthal Center, through its Digital Terrorism and Hate
    Project and Tools for Tolerance law enforcement training is keenly
    aware of the continuing important contributions that fusion centers are
    playing in ensuring that relevant intelligence and other information,
    reaches in a timely fashion, the appropriate agency or agencies
    dedicated to keeping the homeland and our citizens safe.
        As we look at the growing threats from extremists across the full
    spectrum of our society, it is clear that in a world increasingly
    dominated by the internet and especially social media, National borders
    mean less and less in the transmission of the viruses of hate and
    terrorism.
        It is our view that local hate crimes units, State homeland
    security and relevant Federal agencies must be able to quickly update
    expand their understanding of extremist ideologies--from the far right
    to the extreme left. This includes identifying the new generation of
    extremist leaders overseas and the increasing interaction between U.S.-
    based extremists and like-minded individuals and groups beyond our
    shores. Looking for who or what motivates or ``trains'' a U.S.-based
    ``lone wolf'' seeking to target fellow Americans, could often lead to
    individuals or groups beyond our borders.
        The DHS, through the already-established fusion centers could
    provide effective platforms to educate all relevant agencies on the
    changing nature of, and threats, from extremist groups.
        Mr. Chairman we still await the appointment of a new State
    Department Special Envoy on anti-Semitism. Assuming that U.S. Secretary
    of State Tillerson finally appoints someone for that task and fully
    funds that office, the State Department could produce valuable real-
    time updates as well overviews of anti-Semitic activities around the
    world that often inspire anti-Semitic activity in the United States.
        The Simon Wiesenthal Center and other Jewish NGO's are willing and
    able to offer real-time information and perspective, but we need a
    serious address. It is our hope that this committee under your guidance
    Mr. Chairman, could provide the leadership to make it happen.
       additional selected articles on recent anti-semitic incidents on
                              major u.s. campuses
        1. Rutgers (http://www.mycentraljersey.com/story/news/local/2017/
            10/26/rutgers-michael-chikindas-anti-semitic/801989001/)
        2. Cornell (http://cornellsun.com/2017/10/23/anti-semitic-posters-
            appear-on-campus-advertising-apparently-fake-hate-group/)
        3. Colorado State (https://collegian.com/2017/10/csu-jewish-
            community-marches-against-anti-semitism-incidents-on-campus/)
        4. UC Berkeley (http://www.dailycal.org/2017/10/25/editors-note-
            regarding-editorial-cartoon-depicting-alan-dershowitz/)
        5. University of Houston (https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/09/17/
            antisemitic-fliers-found-at-university-of-houston-as-neo-nazis-
            continue-college-recruitment-efforts/)
        6. Others (http://www.thejewishstar.com/stories/fresh-wave-of-anti-
            semitism-hits-campuses,14506)
        7 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/04/24/
            the-hotbed-of-anti-semitism-isnt-a-foreign-country-but-u-s-
            college-campuses-report-says/?utm_term=.68c222c7d8dc

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Rabbi.
        We have about 2 minutes on the clock to vote. So what I
    would like to do is go vote. That is why I think the Ranking
    Member and I are the only two left here. So we are going to go
    vote. There are four votes.
        We will come back and then we will hear from Mr. Cohen.
        We will stand in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman McCaul. The committee will come to order.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cohen for his testimony.

    STATEMENT OF J. RICHARD COHEN, PRESIDENT, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
                                 CENTER

        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ranking
    Member Thompson and Members of the committee. It is an honor to
    be here today.
        Charlottesville truly was a wake-up call for our country.
    It was a reminder that the oldest form of terrorism our country
    has ever known is still with us. It was proof that the white
    supremacist movement has been energized by Mr. Trump's
    campaign, proof that Mr. Trump's campaign has, ``unearthed some
    demons,'' to use Congressman Sanford's words. The marchers'
    chant in Charlottesville, ``You will not replace us,'' was an
    expression of paranoia over cultural displacement. It reminds
    us of what Dylann Roof said when he murdered 9 people in a
    Charleston church: ``You are taking over our country.'' The
    marchers' chant ``blood and soil.'' Their anti-Semitism reminds
    us of one of the darkest chapters in modern history.
        In my written testimony, I called the threat associated
    with groups like ISIS the most acute ones we face. So I
    certainly don't take issue with Director Wray calling it our
    main terrorism threat. But I worry that calling the threat from
    domestic extremist groups, like those in Charlottesville,
    merely a steady one, as Director Wray has called it, may lead
    us to underestimate the danger that the current white
    supremacist movement poses, not just to our physical safety,
    but to the very soul of our Nation. I worry that calling the
    domestic extremist threat merely a steady one may lead us, once
    again, not to give it the attention it deserves.
        That is why I think the joint resolution that this Congress
    passed unanimously in September and that the President signed
    is so important. The resolution recognizes the growing threat
    from racist anti-Semitic and xenophobic hate groups in our
    country. It urges the President and his administration to use
    all available resources to address that threat, and it calls on
    the Attorney General to vigorously prosecute criminal acts from
    the radical right and to improve the reporting of hate crimes.
        That reporting, I would note, is woefully inadequate. The
    FBI's recent report counted approximately 6,000 hate crimes in
    2016. Yet the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that as
    many as a quarter-million hate crimes may be occurring
    annually. So clearly, we have a disconnect here.
        As you know, the Charlottesville resolution urges various
    things, but has no enforceable provisions. That is why it is so
    critical that this committee hold oversight hearings in the
    very near future to ensure that the President is living up to
    the commitments he made when he signed the resolution. I would
    also ask this committee to recommend legislation, similar to
    that which Senator Durbin has proposed, that would
    institutionalize the focus on terrorism from the radical right
    within our Federal law enforcement agencies. That threat is the
    oldest our country faces.
        Charlottesville demonstrates that it is lethal, and it is
    likely to be with us long after we hopefully have addressed the
    threat of terror from groups like ISIS. It deserves the full
    measure of our attention.
        Senator Durbin's bill would do many other things, including
    preserving funding for the State and Local Anti-Terrorism
    program, SLATT, for short, a critical program that has been on
    this chopping block.
        As I mentioned in my written testimony, my colleagues and I
    at the Southern Poverty Law Center are representing Susan Bro,
    the mother of Heather Heyer, the young woman who was killed
    when a white supremacist drove his car into a crowd of
    protesters in Charlottesville. At the funeral of her daughter,
    Susan said, ``They tried to kill my child to shut her up. But
    guess what, you just magnified her. I would rather have my
    child,'' she said, ``but by golly, if I have to give her up, we
    are going to make it count.''
        I will see Susan next week in Charlottesville, and I look
    forward to telling her that this committee is committed to
    doing everything in its power to curb the threat of radical
    right terrorism in our country and to make Heather's death
    count.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of J. Richard Cohen
                               November 30, 2017
        My name is Richard Cohen. I am an attorney and the president of the
    Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a civil rights organization founded
    in 1971. For more than three decades, my colleagues and I have been
    monitoring, issuing reports about, and training law enforcement
    officials on far-right extremist activity in the United States. I have
    litigated numerous cases against hate groups and their leaders and am
    currently representing the mother of Heather Heyer, the young woman who
    was killed in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, 2017. I have
    served on the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Violent
    Extremism Working Group, am a past recipient of the FBI Director's
    Community Leadership Award, and have testified before many
    Congressional committees, including this one on July 15, 2015, on
    issues relating to domestic terrorism. I am honored to appear before
    you today.
        My testimony will focus on the threat of domestic terrorism--more
    specifically, the threat of terrorism from white supremacist groups and
    their adherents. In doing so, I do not mean to minimize other threats
    our country faces, including those associated with extremist forms of
    Islam or those directed at law enforcement officers.
     congress has recently recognized the growing white supremacist threat
                     and has called on the president to act
        When I testified before this committee at its hearing on ``The Rise
    of Radicalization: Is the Government Failing to Counter International
    and Domestic Terrorism'' in July 2015, I emphasized two points: First,
    that the threat of radical-right terrorism in our country is a serious
    one; and second, that there had been a bipartisan failure to devote
    sufficient resources to address that threat in the aftermath of the
    tragic events of September 11, 2001. In the joint resolution passed
    unanimously in September after the unprecedented events in
    Charlottesville, Congress
       acknowledged the ``growing prevalence'' of ``hate groups
            that espouse racism, extremism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and
            white supremacy'';
       urged the President and his administration to ``use all
            available resources'' to address the threats from such groups;
            and
       called on the attorney general and other Federal agencies to
            vigorously prosecute criminal acts by white supremacists and to
            improve the collection and reporting of hate crimes.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ S.J. Res 49, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On September 14, the President signed the joint resolution. Now,
    the questions are what will the President and his administration do to
    fulfill the commitments the President made by signing the resolution
    and, just as importantly, what will Congress do to ensure that the
    President and his administration live up to those commitments and have
    the necessary resources to do so? Before turning to these questions,
    however, it will be useful to describe the nature of the threat of
    white supremacist violence that the country is facing and the
    bipartisan failure in recent years to devote more attention to it.
        the white supremacist movement, a domestic terror threat since
       reconstruction, has been energized by president trump's campaign
                                    rhetoric
        Although the threat of terrorism from extremist forms of Islam may
    be the most acute one the country currently faces, the threat from
    white supremacists is undoubtedly the most persistent one in our
    country's history. Indeed, since the founding of the Ku Klux Klan in
    the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, our country has faced
    terrorism--including thousands of lynchings--from those determined to
    preserve white hegemony. Those who marched in Charlottesville this
    summer chanting ``You will not replace us'' and ``Jews will not replace
    us'' were motivated by the same goal. Even if some of the new energy in
    the white supremacist movement were to dissipate in a few years, the
    threat of white supremacist violence is likely to be with us for many
    years to come.
        Since the start of 2001, the death toll in our country from
    terrorism associated with extremist forms of Islam has been far higher
    than that from far-right extremism; however, the number of homicidal
    incidents actually has been greater from the latter source. In a 2016
    study, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
    to Terrorism (START) found that between 1990 and 2014, far-right
    domestic extremists were responsible for four times as many
    ideologically-based homicidal incidents as extremists associated with
    al-Qaeda and related movements.\2\ During the 2005-2014 period, the
    ratio was 3-to-1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the
    United States of America, Report to the Office of University Programs,
    Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security, March 2016, at http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/
    START_CSTAB_ECDB_25YearsofIdeologicalHomicideVictimizationUS_March2016.p
    df.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This past February, START reported that, from 1990 to 2016, if the
    two deadliest terrorist incidents--the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/
    11 attacks--are removed from the count, far-right extremists have
    killed more than twice as many people in the United States as have
    Islamist extremists (272 versus 130). Using the same criteria, START
    found that far-right extremists killed 57 law enforcement officers
    during the same approximate period, compared to 7 killed by Islamist
    extremists.\3\ A General Accountability Office study released in April
    reached similar conclusions.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Parkin, William S., and Jeff Gruenewald, Brent Klein, Joshua D.
    Freilich, Steven Chermak. 2017. ``Islamist and Far-Right Homicides:
    Infographic,'' National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
    Responses to Terrorism, at http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/
    START_ECDB_IslamistFarRightHomicidesUS_Infographic_Feb2017.pdf.
        \4\ Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy
    and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts, Government Accountability
    Office, April 2017, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since the turn of the century, we have documented an increase in
    the number of hate groups--the majority of which have white supremacist
    beliefs or leanings.\5\ In our view, the most important factor driving
    the increase has been a backlash to our country's changing
    demographics. For many on the radical right, President Obama--our
    Nation's first president of color--represented the kind of ``change''
    they feared.\6\ The day after President Obama was first elected, for
    example, Stormfront--a popular neo-Nazi web forum whose members have
    been responsible for many deadly attacks \7\--reported that it was
    getting six times its normal traffic. ``There are a lot of angry white
    people out there looking for answers,'' added the Stormfront publisher,
    a former Klansman.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ The SPLC identified 917 hate groups in 2016, up from the 457
    groups documented in 1999. Out of those in 2016, 471 groups subscribed
    to white supremacist ideologies. Mark Potok, ``The Year in Hate and
    Extremism,'' Intelligence Report, Spring 2017, at splcenter.org/
    fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism;
    ``Active Hate Groups,'' Intelligence Report, Spring 2017, at
    splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/active-hate-
    groups-2016.
        \6\ In addition to the growth in hate groups, President Obama's
    election coincided with the resurgence of a far-right anti-Government
    movement that produced numerous acts and plots of domestic terrorism
    targeting Federal officials and facilities in the 1990's. In 1996, we
    counted 858 conspiracy-minded anti-Government groups; in 2008, 149. But
    by 2012, we counted 1,360 such groups, an increase of more than 800
    percent.
        \7\ Heidi Beirich, White Homicide Worldwide, Southern Poverty Law
    Center, March 2014, at https://www.splcenter.org/20140401/white-
    homicide-worldwide.
        \8\ Stormfront website, at https://www.stormfront.org/forum/
    t521647/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        During the last 2 years--a period that coincided with the
    Presidential campaign--we documented a surge in the number of hate
    groups.\9\ The growth in the number of hardline anti-Muslim groups last
    year was particularly dramatic, a near-tripling.\10\ At the same time,
    hate crimes targeting Muslims have doubled over the last 2 years,
    according to the FBI.\11\ As former President George W. Bush noted
    during a speech last month, ``bigotry seems emboldened.''\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ ``Hate Groups Increase for Second Consecutive Year as Trump
    Electrifies Radical Right,'' Southern Poverty Law Center, Feb. 15,
    2017, https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/15/hate-groups-increase-
    second-consecutive-year-trump-electrifies-radical-right.
        \10\ Mark Potok, ``The Year in Hate and Extremism,'' Intelligence
    Report, Southern Poverty Law Center, Feb. 15, 2017, at https://
    www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-
    extremism.
        \11\ ``2015 Hate Crime Statistics,'' FBI, at https://ucr.fbi.gov/
    hate-crime/2015/topic-pages/incidentsandoffenses_final.pdf; ``2016 Hate
    Crime Statistics,'' FBI, at https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/topic-
    pages/incidentsandoffenses.
        \12\ Rebecca Savransky, ``George W. Bush: `Bigotry seems emboldened
    in U.S.','' The Hill, Oct. 19, 2017, at http://thehill.com/homenews/
    news/356212-george-w-bush-bigotry-seems-emboldened-in-us.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Although the growth in hate groups began before President Obama
    took office, his election did coincide with another phenomenon: The
    dramatic resurgence of a far-right, anti-Government movement that has
    been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks and plots. Many of the
    beliefs prevalent in this movement are rooted in the racist, anti-
    Semitic ideology that animated the Posse Comitatus (Latin for ``power
    of the county'') in the 1970's. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh,
    for example, held both white supremacist and radical, anti-Government
    beliefs. For a number of reasons, including law enforcement crackdowns,
    the movement declined significantly after the 1995 Oklahoma City
    bombing, only to re-emerge during the Obama administration. Although
    the number of groups has once again fallen, the movement remains a
    threat. On the same day that Heather Heyer was killed in
    Charlottesville, the FBI arrested a man in Oklahoma City who was
    attempting to detonate what he believed to be a 1,000-pound truck bomb
    outside a bank building.\13\ The suspect reportedly was attempting to
    replicate McVeigh's bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
    Building.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ ``Man Arrested for Trying to Detonate What He Thought was a
    Vehicle Bomb at Downtown Oklahoma City Bank,'' Department of Justice
    press release, Aug. 14, 2017, at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/pr/
    man-arrested-trying-detonate-what-he-thought-was-vehicle-bomb-downtown-
    oklahoma-city.
        \14\ Manny Fernandez, ``Bombing Plot in Oklahoma City is Thwarted
    with Arrest, F.B.I. Says,'' The New York Times, Aug. 14, 2017, at
    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/oklahoma-van-bomb-domestic-
    terrorism.html?_r=0.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        President Trump's campaign energized the white supremacist
    movement--``unearthed some demons,'' to borrow Representative Mark
    Sanford's words.\15\ Although white supremacists typically eschew the
    political process, seeing both parties as irredeemably corrupt, they
    took the unusual step of rallying around Mr. Trump's candidacy and
    celebrating his victory. On his radio show in February 2016, for
    example, former Klan chief David Duke told his listeners that ``voting
    against Donald Trump . . . is really treason to your heritage.''\16\ On
    election night, he tweeted that ``our people played a HUGE role in
    electing Trump!''\17\ During a gathering of white nationalists just
    blocks from the White House shortly after the election, white
    nationalist leader Richard Spencer--who later played a prominent role
    in the Charlottesville demonstrations--prompted sieg heils from
    audience members after quoting Nazi propaganda in German. He responded
    by shouting, ``Hail Trump! Hail our people! Hail victory!''\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Karen Tumulty and Robert Costa, ``The GOP Inherits What Trump
    has Wrought'', The Washington Post, May 26, 2017, https://
    www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-gop-inherits-what-trump-has-
    wrought/2017/05/26/4e1943ea-4177-11e7-adba-394ee67a7582_story.-
    html?utm_term=.bc5a926d86fa.
        \16\ ``David Duke Says a Vote against Trump is Treason to White
    Heritage,'' Hatewatch, Feb. 26, 2016, https://www.splcenter.org/
    hatewatch/2016/02/26/david-duke-says-vote-against-trump-treason-white-
    heritage.
        \17\ David Duke (@DrDavidDuke), Twitter (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:14 AM),
    https://twitter.com/drdavidduke/status/796249464826687488?lang=en.
        \18\ Joseph Goldstein, ``Alt-Right Gathering Exults in Trump
    Election with Nazi-Era Salute,'' The New York Times, Nov. 20, 2016,
    https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/alt-right-salutes-donald-
    trump.html?_r=0.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the 10 days following the election, we documented nearly 900
    bias-related acts of harassment, intimidation, and violence.\19\ Many
    of the perpetrators invoked the President-elect's name or his slogans.
    Cf. supra note 15 (quoting Rep. Sanford) (``I've talked to a number of
    people about it back home. They say, `Well, look, if the President can
    say whatever, why can't I say whatever?' He's given them license.'').
    During the Charlottesville demonstrations, David Duke stated, ``We are
    determined to take our country back. We are going to fulfill the
    promises of Donald Trump.''\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Ten Days After: Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath
    of the Election, Southern Poverty Law Center, Nov. 29, 2016, https://
    www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-
    aftermath-election.
        \20\ Libby Nelson, `` `Why we voted for Donald Trump': David Duke
    explains the white supremacist Charlottesville protests,'' Vox, Aug.
    12, 2017, https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138358/charlottesville-
    protests-david-duke-kkk.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The violence in Charlottesville was not, by any means, the only
    example of deadly white supremacist violence this year.\21\ Over the
    Memorial Day weekend, for example, a white supremacist stabbed two men
    to death on a Portland, Oregon, train after the men attempted to help
    two women who were the targets of the perpetrator's anti-Muslim
    slurs.\22\ The previous weekend, a white University of Maryland
    student--a member of a racist Facebook group called Alt-Reich Nation--
    was arrested for stabbing to death a black ROTC student attending Bowie
    State University.\23\ In March, a white man from Baltimore fatally
    stabbed a black man with a sword in New York City after traveling there
    specifically with the intention of killing a black man.\24\ In
    February, a white man in Kansas went to a bar and shot two men from
    India, one fatally, after reportedly telling them to ``get out of my
    country.''\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ For a synopsis of radical-right terrorist plots, conspiracies,
    and racist rampages, see Terror from the Right, Southern Poverty Law
    Center, at https://www.splcenter.org/20100126/terror-right.
        \22\ Jim Ryan, ``2 killed in stabbing on MAX train in Northeast
    Portland as man directs slurs at Muslim women, police say,'' The
    Oregonian, May 27, 2017, at http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/
    index.ssf/2017/05/police_responding_to_ne_portla.html.
        \23\ Colin Campbell and Tim Prudente, ``Suspect in University of
    Maryland fatal stabbing held without bail, students say school must
    address racial tensions,'' The Baltimore Sun, May 22, 2017, at http://
    www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-college-park-monday-
    20170522-story.html.
        \24\ Ashley Southall, ``Suspect in Manhattan Killing Hated Black
    Men,'' The New York Times, March 22, 2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/
    2017/03/22/nyregion/manhattan-nyc-james-harris-jackson-hate-crime.html.
        \25\ Tony Rizzo, Toriana Porter, Laura Bauer, Matt Campbell, Ian
    Cummings, and Judy L. Thomas, ``First-degree murder charge filed in
    possible hate crime shooting at Olathe's Austins bar,'' The Kansas City
    Star, Feb. 23, 2017, at http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/
    article134459444.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Looking ahead, we agree with the recent DHS/FBI assessment that the
    country will continue to see lethal attacks from white
    supremacists.\26\ Indeed, we think it's likely that the level of
    violence may increase in the near term. There is currently an
    extraordinarily high level of energy in the white supremacist movement.
    If the political process does not yield the results that those in the
    movement expect--and we fervently hope that it does not--some may leave
    the movement. But others may resort to extra-legal means to pursue
    their objectives or to vent their frustrations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Joint Intelligence Bulletin: White Supremacist Extremism Poses
    Persistent Threat of Lethal Violence, Federal Bureau of Investigation
    and Department of Homeland Security, May 2017, at https://
    www.documentcloud.org/documents/3924852-White-Supremacist-Extremism-
    JIB.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the long run, the underlying dynamics that have led to the
    current state of the white supremacist movement are not likely to
    change. As our country continues to grow more racially and ethnically
    diverse, we are likely to see a backlash from those who wish to
    preserve white hegemony. And, although we commonly refer to the white
    supremacist movement as a domestic one, it is not confined to the
    United States. The reality today is that the white supremacist movement
    is roiling democracies across the Western world.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ Morris Dees and J. Richard Cohen, ``White Supremacists Without
    Borders,'' The New York Times, June 22, 2015, at https://
    www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/opinion/white-supremacists-without-
    borders.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     there has been a bipartisan failure to devote sufficient resources to
                        the threat of domestic terrorism
        After the deadly Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, then-
    Attorney General Reno formed a special task force, the Domestic
    Terrorism Executive Committee, to coordinate the country's response to
    the threat of domestic terrorism. The task force was scheduled to hold
    one of its monthly meetings on September 11, 2001, but did not do so
    for obvious reasons. But the task force did not miss just one meeting.
    As the country's focus shifted to the new threat, the task force did
    not meet again for 13 years. Only after a white supremacist killed
    three people in Overland Park, Kansas, in 2014 did the attorney general
    reconvene it.
        Like the Justice Department, DHS cut resources devoted to
    countering the threat of domestic terrorism after 9/11. In April 2009,
    the DHS released an Unclassified intelligence assessment to law
    enforcement officials entitled Right-wing Extremism: Current Economic
    and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and
    Recruitment.\28\ Yet, despite the report's accuracy, then-DHS Secretary
    Janet Napolitano withdrew it following an outcry by those who claimed,
    falsely, that the report tarred conservatives as potential domestic
    terrorists. More significantly, the DHS unit responsible for the report
    was allowed to wither. In the wake of the controversy over the report,
    The Washington Post reported that DHS ``cut the number of personnel
    studying domestic terrorism unrelated to Islam, canceled numerous State
    and local law enforcement briefings, and held up dissemination of
    nearly a dozen reports on extremist groups.''\29\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ PDF on Southern Poverty Law Center website, at http://
    www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/
    DOJ_rwextremism2009.pdf.
        \29\ ``Homeland Security Department Curtails Home-Grown Terror
    Analysis,'' The Washington Post, June 7, 2011, at http://
    www.washingtonpost.com/politics/homeland-security-department-curtails-
    home-grown-terror-analysis/2011/06/02/AGQEaDLH_story.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2010, the year after the DHS Right-wing Extremism report was
    withdrawn, I was asked to serve on Secretary Napolitano's Countering
    Violent Extremism Working Group.\30\ At my request, one of my
    colleagues, a Federally-certified law enforcement trainer, was invited
    to serve as a subject-matter expert for the Advisory Council. Neither
    of us had success in getting the group to focus on the threat of
    terrorism from the radical right.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Homeland Security
    Advisory Committee, Spring 2010, at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
    assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommen- dations.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In February 2015, when President Obama addressed the White House
    Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, the first terrorist incident he
    mentioned was the Oklahoma City bombing. But the discussion at the
    summit itself focused almost exclusively on the threat associated with
    extremist forms of Islam. Similarly--just 2 weeks after the 2015
    Charleston massacre--this committee released a Terror Threat Snapshot
    that contained no mention of Charleston or the threat of terror from
    the radical right.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/
    documents/July%20Terror%20- Threat%20Snapshot%20_0.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Trump administration also appears to have minimized the threat
    from the radical right at various times. A few days before the events
    in Charlottesville in August, for example, Sebastian Gorka, then a top
    terrorism adviser to President Trump, ridiculed the notion of lone-wolf
    terrorists and suggested that white supremacists are not ``the
    problem.''\32\ A month before Charlottesville, DHS canceled a number of
    grants, including one to an organization called Life After Hate, whose
    mission is to rehabilitate former neo-Nazis and other domestic
    extremists.\33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ Judd Legum, ``White House adviser says people should stop
    criticizing white supremacists so much,'' ThinkProgress, Aug. 10, 2017,
    at https://thinkprogress.org/white-house-adviser-says-people-should-
    stop-criticizing-white-supremacists-so-much-ddd587767d60/.
        \33\ Jennifer Hansler, ``DHS shifts focus of funding to counter
    violent extremism,'' CNN, July 4, 2017, at http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/
    01/politics/cve-funding-changes/index.html; Jessica Schulberg,
    ``Controversial Trump Aide Katharine Gorka Helped End Funding for Group
    That Fights White Supremacy,'' HuffPost, Aug. 15, 2017, at https://
    www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/katharine-gorka-life-after-hate-us-
    59921356e4b09096429943b6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another program being slashed--even as the FBI and DHS are warning
    about further white supremacists violence--is the State and Local Anti-
    Terrorism Training program. Bob Paudert, a former police chief in West
    Memphis, Arkansas, whose son and another officer were killed by far-
    right extremists during a routine traffic stop in 2010, called it ``one
    of the best training programs in the country.''\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ Judy L. Thomas, ``As domestic terrorism like Charlottesville
    rises, Federal program to fight it shuts down,'' The Kansas City Star,
    Aug. 20, 2017, at http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/
    article168110172.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We applaud Attorney General Sessions for speaking out forcefully
    and promising vigorous prosecutions after Charlottesville. Well before
    the passage of the post-Charlottesville joint resolution, he had formed
    a task force to examine ways to improve hate crime reporting.\35\ (The
    Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that there are as many as
    250,000 hate crimes in our country each year.\36\ Yet, in its 2016
    report, the FBI counted just 6,121 hate crimes.\37\) We also appreciate
    Kirstjen Nielsen's unequivocal condemnation of white supremacy, anti-
    Semitism, and Islamophobia at the recent hearing on her nomination to
    serve as the next DHS Secretary.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ U.S. Department of Justice announcement, at https://
    www.justice.gov/crt/hate-crimes-subcommittee.
        \36\ Lynn Langton, ``Hate Crime Victimization, 2004-2015,'' Bureau
    of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
    Justice, June 29, 2017, at https://www.bjs.gov/
    index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5967.
        \37\ ``2016 Hate Crime Statistics,'' FBI, at https://ucr.fbi.gov/
    hate-crime/2016/topic-pages/incidentsandoffenses.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      the president and his administration must fulfill their commitments
           under the charlottesville joint resolution; congress has
                            responsibilities as well
        The Charlottesville joint resolution is important because it
    recognizes that the threat of white supremacist terrorism is grave and
    calls on the President to address it. Although the resolution was
    passed unanimously and signed by the President, it is nevertheless a
    ``soft'' law, because it has no enforceable provisions. Thus, it is
    incumbent on Congress to ensure that the President and his
    administration live up to their commitments.
        In March 2018--6 months after passage of the Charlottesville
    resolution--this committee should exercise its oversight responsibility
    by holding a hearing to ensure that the President and administration
    are following through on their various commitments under the
    resolution. We would urge particular attention to their commitment to
    ``use all resources available . . . to address the growing prevalence
    of . . . hate groups in the United States.''\38\ One aspect of the
    resolution, a directive to improve the collection and reporting of hate
    crime data, could be the subject of an earlier hearing, given that Mr.
    Sessions' hate crimes task force report is expected in January.\39\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \38\ See supra note 1.
        \39\ ``Attorney General Jeff Sessions' Statement on the FBI's 2016
    Hate Crimes Statistics,'' Department of Justice press release, Nov. 13,
    2017, at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-
    statement-fbis-2016-hate-crimes-statistics.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to exercising its oversight responsibility, there are
    many other ways in which Congress can and should address the threat of
    domestic terrorism from the radical right. Given that the white
    supremacist movement has represented a deadly threat for more than 150
    years and the likelihood that it will continue to do so into the
    foreseeable future, Congress should institutionalize the focus on the
    threat of this form of terrorism within Federal law enforcement
    agencies so it will always be given the attention it deserves. The
    Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act, which has been introduced by Senator
    Durbin, would provide a mechanism for accomplishing this by requiring
    DHS, the Justice Department, and the FBI to establish offices to
    analyze and monitor domestic extremist threats.
        Among the Act's provisions is a requirement that the Justice
    Department, the DHS and the FBI jointly provide an annual assessment of
    the threat so that Congress can provide the oversight needed. The Act
    also ensures the continued operation of the State and Local Anti-
    Terrorism Training program, which provides critical training and
    resources to assist local, State, and Tribal law enforcement agencies
    in detecting and investigating domestic terrorism. These resources also
    help law enforcement identify, investigate, and respond to hate crimes.
    Mike Sena, president of the National Fusion Center Association, has
    called the Trump administration's elimination of this program ``an
    egregious error.''\40\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ Judy L. Thomas, ``As domestic terrorism like Charlottesville
    rises, Federal program to fight it shuts down,'' The Kansas City Star,
    Aug. 20, 2017, at http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/
    article168110172.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In its Charlottesville joint resolution, Congress spoke out clearly
    and unequivocally in condemning ``white nationalism, white supremacy,
    and neo-Nazism as hateful expressions of intolerance that are
    contradictory to the values that define the people of the United
    States'' and called on the President to do so as well.\41\ It is
    vitally important that Members of Congress and other political leaders
    continue to speak out against racism and other forms of extremism that
    lead to terrorism and hate crimes. The President, in particular, must
    forcefully reject the white supremacist movement, as is his obligation
    under the joint resolution. There is no room for confusion or
    equivocation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ See supra note 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is also critically important that our commitment to and
    enforcement of our Nation's civil rights laws mirror our commitment to
    fighting domestic terrorism. While we appreciate Mr. Sessions' focus on
    hate crimes, we would note the anomalies evident in the
    administration's actions. The administration commits to vigorous hate
    crime enforcement, even as it cuts funding for civil rights
    enforcement.\42\ Mr. Sessions promises a focus on hate crimes against
    the transgender community, even as the Justice Department withdraws
    protections for transgender children in public schools.\43\ Mr.
    Sessions emphasizes the prosecution of those who burn mosques,\44\ yet
    the administration vilifies Muslims through its attempts to bar them
    from entering the country.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ Juliet Eilperin, Emma Brown, and Darryl Fears, ``Trump
    administration plans to minimize civil rights efforts in agencies,''
    The Washington Post, May 29, 2017, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
    politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-civil-rights-efforts-
    in-agencies/2017/05/29/922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-
    ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.5bad- 24f61736.
        \43\ Ariane de Vogue, Mary Kay Mallonee, and Emanuella Grinberg,
    ``Trump administration withdraws Federal protections for transgender
    students,'' CNN, Feb. 23, 2017, at http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22/
    politics/doj-withdraws-Federal-protections-on-transgender-bathrooms-in-
    schools/index.html.
        \44\ Beth Reinhard, ``Jeff Sessions Pledges Support for Hate-Crime
    Laws,'' The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2017, at https://www.wsj.com/
    articles/jeff-sessions-pledges-support-of-hate-crime-laws-1498773053.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On April 23, 1990, when President George H.W. Bush signed the
    Federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act, he linked the elimination of hate
    crimes to the ``guarantee of civil rights for all Americans,'' saying
    that the latter was ``one of the greatest obligations'' of his
    administration and the Justice Department. Combating domestic terrorism
    based on hate is just as important to the goal of protecting the civil
    rights of all Americans. Violence perpetrated against vulnerable
    populations based on factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, or
    sexual orientation rips apart the very fabric of our country, dividing
    us along our most fragile lines. As President Bush said that day,
    ``hate breeds violence, threatening the security of our entire
    society.''
        Today, the white supremacist movement is as energized and
    emboldened as it has been in decades--and we are seeing increased
    violence against vulnerable populations as a result. We must speak out
    strongly, and we must act decisively.
        There should be no question about where any of our elected leaders
    stand.
        Thank you.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I think this is a
    very important hearing. I think we have seen it before with Tim
    McVeigh.
        Rabbi, thank you for pointing out my father's sort-of, as I
    view, his legacy of 32 bombing missions over the Nazis. For the
    life of me, I don't understand this mindset of hatred and
    revival of the Nazi spirit that I thought we crushed in World
    War II.
        I was recently in Auschwitz, 6 months ago, to see the pure
    evil that was perpetrated by the Nazis that my father and his
    generation fought to defeat. So when I see skinheads and neo-
    Nazis and white supremacists assemble, not only am I sort of
    just confounded as to how this could happen, but I just find it
    completely immoral and unacceptable for this Nation.
        My grandfather was also persecuted by the Klan because he
    was Catholic. So hatred in all forms, whether it be radical
    Islamist ideology or this type of hatred, cannot stand in this
    country. We need to unite, I think, as a Nation. So I want to
    thank all three of you for your testimony.
        First, I want to ask Chief Rausch. I mean, you had what
    could have been a similar Charlottesville on your hands. You
    had 3,000 people show up to protest a Confederate monument in
    Fort Sanders, Tennessee. Clearly, it is foreseeable that both
    of these factions are going to come together. You are going to
    have a lot of heat and emotion and the potential for great
    violence. Yet over a period of a 2\1/2\-hour rally, we saw no
    violence.
        I think what you did is a model of leadership for how law
    enforcement, perhaps working with State law enforcement, can
    successfully prevent this kind of violence in the future. I
    just wanted you to comment on what you did that may have been
    different from Charlottesville that maybe law enforcement
    officers across the country can learn when this situation
    enters into their hometowns.
        Chief Rausch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First and foremost,
    I think we learned from watching what happened in other
    locations, and so we literally took the game tape from
    Charlottesville, from Boston, and from Durham, North Carolina,
    and sat down and went through it and talked about those things
    that were right and the things that were wrong. We then
    strategized on how we address that with what we had coming at
    us.
        So some of the things we saw that were right: Boston, their
    mayor and their chief did a great job of getting out in front
    and putting out the rules of what they would allow. They made a
    press release on Thursday before the Saturday rally and said
    these are the things that will be allowed at this rally.
        Now, in our assessment, they didn't go far enough. They had
    some violence still at that--not as much, but they had some
    violence at that rally. So we looked at all of that to
    determine how we would do ours.
        So first and foremost was getting the information out
    through the media, to the public, and to these groups that were
    converging of what would be allowed.
        Second was taking complete control of the area that they
    were going to be in. We took control of that early on. So one
    of the things that we had heard from Charlottesville was, you
    know, they had some challenge with the areas they were showing
    up, that they didn't have control of. So we went in and took
    complete control and we cordoned off the area. You know, the
    vehicle threat was real, and so we took care of that by
    utilizing our public service, putting dump trucks at every
    vehicle access point to keep those types of vehicle-borne
    attacks from being able to take place.
        A lot of coordination and control. The coordination with
    our State partners, with our local and Federal partners as
    well, on looking at intelligence information of these groups,
    what they were planning, what they were saying to each other
    early on was important.
        Some of the other things was putting the rules in place.
    You know, we said there would be--you know, none of the things
    that we saw that caused the problems. So no sticks, no rocks,
    no bricks, no bottles, no firearms. All of that--no masks,
    nothing to cover yourself to keep yourself, your identity from
    being known. All of that was important that we put that in
    place immediately so that people knew these are the rules.
        We learned that a lot of the supremacists, the white
    supremacists didn't show up because of the rules. They didn't
    want to follow those rules so they didn't come, which was OK
    for our community. So I think the success was a result of that,
    and then a well-executed plan by our team. They did a great job
    of making sure that we had everyone safe, and we kept control
    of the area. It was just a well-executed plan.
        Chairman McCaul. Well, let me commend you for that. I think
    it is a textbook model of how to do it right. I hope other
    police departments will learn from the good things that you
    did. I mean, I think it is a great model.
        Rabbi, I am a student of counterterrorism. I was a
    counterterrorism Federal prosecutor. I remember Ramzi Yousef.
    His first target was not the World Trade Center. It was 12
    Jewish synagogues symbolizing the 12 tribes of Israel. Pretty
    chilling. He did not--he decided to change that plan and go
    after the greatest symbol of financial might in New York, and
    that is the World Trade Center. When he almost successfully
    brought the Twin Towers down, of course, he came--his uncle
    Khalid Sheikh Mohammed came back and finished it.
        Rabbi Cooper. Finished the job.
        Chairman McCaul. Sadly. I know your community suffered
    greatly, and this whole country did, and that is why this
    committee was formed in the first place.
        But the Jewish community centers have been under threats
    constantly. I am proud to say that this committee, working with
    the Ranking Member, doubled the authorization amount from
    fiscal year 2017 for $50 million; a 100 percent increase over
    the fiscal year 2017, also to what are called non-UASI
    jurisdiction. So I hope that is a step in the right direction
    for you. We, I think, made great progress on that.
        But I would like for you to describe the threats that you
    are seeing currently to the centers and synagogues in this
    country right now.
        Rabbi Cooper. Well, first of all, I think this is an
    appropriate time for the community to say thank you. Obviously,
    it is passed by law. There are appropriations. There are
    hearings. But I think for the Jewish community, especially for
    younger families who never experienced it before, it is
    traumatic, it is long-lasting, like any hate crime. It has both
    the personal and the communal impact. It may be difficult for
    our non-Jewish neighbors to understand.
        As I mentioned in my testimony, that it has been three
    decades since Jewish kids would be dropped off at a school
    where there wasn't an armed guard. On a regular Saturday
    morning--I pray in a relatively modest-size synagogue on Pico
    Boulevard in Los Angeles. We were actually targeted by a
    radicalized Islamist terrorist from California prisons for an
    attack that, thank God, was interdicted before it took place.
        So, you know, the mindset for Jewish community leaders,
    JCCs, schools, temples, and synagogues is to do your best with
    perimeter defense and to always have in mind--I was listening
    carefully about, you know, the Friday night football game, and
    especially if it is going to be a playoff, and there is this
    tremendous energy. Our security has to be in place 52 weeks a
    year. That, in a society--here we are in the Capital of our
    Nation that is based--one of our basic freedoms is freedom of
    religion.
        As I mentioned in my testimony, this is not paranoia. It is
    just reality. I know there is a lot of give-and-take, important
    discussions here about what is a greater threat, from ISIS or
    is it from the Nazi-like types. Unfortunately, we have to
    grapple with both of them. We rely very heavily on local law
    enforcement, the anti-crime, the anti-hate, and terrorist
    units.
        I think maybe the most important point I would like to
    sort-of bring back to the one committee that actually still has
    it, we really need bipartisanship moving forward if we are
    fighting hate in America to have some sort of, you know, what
    is a greater threat and to whom? I think we need to quantify
    what the threats are, but we have to move forward together as
    Americans to confront the bigots, the racists, or the
    terrorists. Otherwise, they win and we lose.
        If you look at Charlottesville, the Nazis came that night
    or whatever--you know, the groups came. They had a game plan.
    They weren't worried about the law. They knew what they were
    going to do on the internet. They even had a way to place
    themselves, in their own minds, as victims that night. Did you
    know that they complained that they were actually pushed by law
    enforcement into the antifa and that is how the whole violence
    began?
        So when I look at that horrific piece of theater that was
    so incredibly effective for them, that was the group that did
    their own planning. They understand the rules of the game. They
    knew what they wanted to violate. We live in a day in which,
    because of the internet, everything local is global and
    everything global is local.
        As a result, whether it is something in the Middle East or
    the horrific events that took place on the bicycle path in New
    York, when those things take place, every single security
    officer of every Jewish institution across the United States
    has an immediate conversation with the Rabbi, with the
    executive director. These are concerns that are not far removed
    from us on a daily basis.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Rabbi.
        The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to
    our panel of witnesses for this hearing.
        Mr. Cohen, can you give the Southern Poverty Law Center's
    experience with domestic terrorist organizations here in the
    United States, whether you see a proliferation of that ideology
    or organization, and to what extent, what region of the country
    is it peculiar to, if so?
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you for the question. To answer the last
    part first, there is no region of our country that is not
    affected by hate groups. None. That is quite unfortunate. Over
    the last 15, 20 years, we have seen an increase in the number
    of hate groups driven, we think, primarily by the country's
    changing demographics. There is a backlash to it. You saw it
    during President Obama's administration where he represented
    the kind of change that some people were scared of. It preceded
    him, but was intensified during his period of time.
        After 9/11, unfortunately, I think we saw in the country a
    retreat from a focus on the threat of traditional forms of
    domestic terrorism, partly for an understandable reason: The
    horror and carnage of 9/11. But I think the pendulum had swung
    too far. You know, hopefully, after Charlottesville, which I
    think is a wake-up call, you know, the pendulum will begin to
    swing back where we can take that form of threat more
    seriously.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
        The other two witnesses talked a little bit about social
    media and how that has become the weapon of choice, if you
    please, for a lot of these hate groups. Chief, can you give us
    your experience about this or your organizational experience?
        Chief Rausch. Absolutely. Social media has become the
    platform. It has intensified the voice of hate. It has become
    the location that has basically made hate a megaphone to the
    rest of the world. It is a place where, as the earlier panel
    had mentioned, it is where people are being radicalized. As the
    video that you showed earlier shows, that is the type of
    information that is being shared widely with individuals
    throughout the country.
        Before, you would have to be, as you mentioned, in an area
    that may have a large group of these types of individuals. Now,
    it is wide open. Our experience is that they are constantly
    bombarding individuals with those types of videos and trying to
    normalize that mindset and that behavior.
        Mr. Thompson. Rabbi, what has been your experience?
        Rabbi Cooper. Thank you, Congressman. I am here with my
    colleague, Rick Eaton, who I consider one of the world's great
    experts on this issue. We put on an annual report that gives a
    snapshot. It is called Digital Terrorism and Hate. That is the
    project. Included over the last few years have been report
    cards, so we named names. For a number of years, Twitter would
    get an across-the-board F for doing nothing. Facebook has
    generally done a lot more than others, but they are grappling
    with 1.5 billion separate pages.
        We have always felt, and continue to be convinced, that an
    important component of fighting this virus has to be Silicon
    Valley, the individual companies. They cannot and should not
    hide behind the First Amendment. They are in business. They are
    doing very nicely, thank you. I think increasingly, they
    recognize or have recognized some of their responsibilities,
    but they can do, in their way, a whole lot more than the
    combined membership of the U.S. House, Senate, and the
    Executive branch. They are very powerful. They have
    collectively created the most powerful marketing tool ever.
        While after 9/11 we were extremely worried that our far
    right here would be mimicking the Islamists, well, it turns out
    that al-Qaeda and ISIS actually landed up mimicking our
    extremists when it came to the lone wolf. That was a U.S. idea,
    then was brought over to Yemen, and we know the results. But
    the internet empowers and validates the individuals, the
    conspiracies, et cetera.
        It is not so much at this point passing new laws. We have
    to really insist that our partners here, the collective genius
    that is giving us all these bells and whistles and social media
    and beyond, they have to be directly involved in degrading the
    marketing capabilities of the bigots, both local, National, and
    globally.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
        Mr. Cohen, what has been your experience with those
    individuals and organizations and their use of social media?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, not surprisingly, you know, the hate
    exists now on the net. In 2008, when President Obama was
    elected, there were about 140,000 registered users on
    Stormfront, one of the oldest neo-Nazi websites. Today, there
    are over 330,000 registered users. It gives you some sense of
    kind-of the growth of it.
        I would echo what Rabbi Cooper said about kind-of the
    digital platforms in the Silicon Valley. They are private
    businesses. They can do what they want. But all of them say in
    their terms of service that they are not going to allow hate.
    Sometimes they say that as merely a public relations ploy?
    Right. So we try to get them to live up to their terms of
    service, sometimes by embarrassing them publicly. PayPal, for
    example, was very slow to live up to its terms of service, but
    after Charlottesville, when they got some bad press, they did.
        So, you know, we think it is important to recognize that
    hate is growing on the net. The anonymity, the ease of finding
    hate on the net fuels it, the echo chamber, as Rabbi Cooper
    said. I think it is critically important for groups like us,
    not so much the Government, but groups like us, to hold those
    companies to their terms of service.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Perry.
        Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen, for
    your attendance.
        Mr. Cohen, I was looking at your organization's mission
    statement. It says the SPLC is dedicated to fighting hate and
    bigotry, among other things. I would say that probably every
    Member of this body agrees with you on those principles.
        Where we seem to disagree is that, I think for most of us,
    certainly for myself, I don't quantify or qualify like some
    hate and bigotry is OK if it is this organization, but it is
    not OK if it is that organization. But it seems to me, in
    looking at your information----
        Let me ask you this: Why does it seem there are no left-
    wing hate groups on your list? For example, on campus groups
    like Students for Justice in Palestine that have advocated for
    violence against Jews, why aren't they on your list?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I don't know about that particular group.
    I couldn't answer that question. There are left-wing groups on
    our list.
        Mr. Perry. Who are they?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, first, it depends, of course, on what you
    mean by left-wing. But, you know, for example, the Nation of
    Islam, the New Black Panther Party are on our list. We also
    have certain anti-Semitic groups that identify with groups like
    ISIS.
        So I think that it is not the case that our group doesn't
    include--our listing doesn't include any left-wing groups. We
    try to call hate as we see it. We limit our list, not by left
    versus right, but by groups that vilify others for issues or
    for factors such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
    religion, or the like.
        Mr. Perry. So your group--your list also includes as hate
    groups mainstream, nonviolent public policy groups like the
    Family Research Council, and the public interest law firms like
    Alliance Defending Freedom, but it doesn't list antifa or other
    anarchist groups that actually call for--literally call for
    violence against individuals. Does that seem to comport?
        To me, that reduces your credibility. Does it not to you?
        Mr. Cohen. No. Let me speak to both of those issues, if I
    could, sir. You know, we list the Family Research Council, not
    because it opposes gay marriage, but because it relentlessly
    vilifies the LGBT community and demonizes them with known lies
    and propaganda. That is why we list them.
        Mr. Perry. But you don't list antifa.
        Mr. Cohen. I was going to finish.
        Mr. Perry. OK.
        Mr. Cohen. That is OK. Our listing of hate groups doesn't
    necessarily mean that they engage in violence, although we
    think that the anti-LGBT propaganda is one of the factors that
    makes the LGBT community in our country the most likely to be
    victimized by hate crimes.
        If you are familiar with our work, we write about antifa
    often. We condemn their tactics. I have said so publicly, and
    we do so always. But antifa is not a group that vilifies people
    on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or the like.
        Mr. Perry. So you are OK with antifa, as long as they don't
    say things that you don't agree with, but it is OK if they hit
    people on the head with a bike lock or set things on fire or
    riot and flout the law by wearing face masks, and incite
    riotous--you are OK with that?
        Mr. Cohen. Of course not. I said we condemn groups like
    antifa. We write about them often.
        Mr. Perry. But you don't list them.
        Mr. Cohen. Could I finish?
        Mr. Perry. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cohen. We don't list them as hate groups.
        Mr. Perry. Are they on the hate map?
        Mr. Cohen. No.
        Mr. Perry. OK.
        Mr. Cohen. Because they are not----
        Mr. Perry. Let's move on here. Let's move on here.
        Mr. Cohen. OK.
        Mr. Perry. Google revealed in a blog post that it is using
    machine language or learning regarding hate groups and events
    and is partnering with the SPLC and others in that regard. How
    does the SPLC work with Google or its subsidiaries to modify
    search results of SPLC-designated people or groups?
        Mr. Cohen. What we try to get Google to do is not
    prioritize hate groups. I will give you an example. A few years
    back, Google's algorithm was manipulated to have to rename the
    White House with a racist name. It used to be the case that
    when you would search for Holocaust or Jews, you would get a
    rash of information of anti-Semitic information. We try to
    bring these kinds of issues to their attention.
        When Dylann Roof, for example, googled black-on-white
    crime, he didn't get FBI statistics telling him the truth of
    the matter. Instead, he got hate websites, such as that of the
    Council of Conservative Citizens. So we are trying to say to
    Google, your algorithm is flawed or easily manipulated to give
    people incorrect----
        Mr. Perry. But isn't that based on your opinion, sir?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I don't think there is any question but
    what Mr. Roof ran across when he googled black-on-white crime.
        Mr. Perry. What about when Mr. Corkins googled your website
    and then went and shot up the Family Research Council,
    including shooting an individual there, and then said that he
    was inspired by your website?
        Mr. Cohen. Look, we are no more responsible for what Mr.
    Corkins did based on reading our website than Martin Scorsese
    is for what John Hinckley did.
        Mr. Perry. You are no more responsible, but yet Dylann Roof
    read whatever he read, and that is held as responsible for what
    he did.
        I am not saying any of them are correct, but it seems like
    a breathtaking double standard of which you are used as a
    credible source for law enforcement and you are testifying in
    front of Congress, when it appears, obviously, that it is only
    your opinion that you base your hate groups and citations on.
        Mr. Cohen. Well, it is our opinion. It is an opinion that I
    think has a tremendous amount of credibility.
        Mr. Perry. But no empirical evidence for data to back it
    up.
        Mr. Cohen. I think that is incorrect. I think if you look
    at our hate group listing and look at the people who we list as
    hatemongers, that you would agree with 99 percent of them.
        Mr. Perry. Sir, my time has expired. I yield.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Correa from California.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I
    want to thank the gentlemen for being here today on this
    important issue of addressing terrorism, domestic terrorism,
    white supremacist terrorism.
        Earlier, the earlier panel spoke and made some points about
    preparedness, what they were doing, what they were not doing. I
    would like to ask you essentially the same kind of questions,
    which is, from your perspective, is there something that the
    Federal Government, the FBI, that Homeland Security can be
    doing that we are not doing to address the issue of following
    these hate groups and making sure that they are not successful
    like they were in Oklahoma City?
        Yes, I open it up for quick answers to that question from
    the three of you.
        Mr. Cohen. I think there are a number of things that the
    Federal Government can and should do. One, I think
    institutionalizing a focus on the oldest form of terrorism that
    our country has seen. We don't want it to fall off, you know,
    the radar of the Federal agencies.
        Mr. Correa. Do you see it falling off the radar now?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I don't think there is any question but
    that it has, after 9/11, to one degree or another under both
    administrations. I think there has been a bipartisan failure to
    devote the attention that it deserves.
        You know, I mentioned Senator Durbin's bill. There are
    other vehicles that could do that. One of the good features
    about Senator Durbin's bill is not only that it was required
    institutionalizing the focus on it, it also requires annual
    reports on the threat of white supremacist violence.
        I know Mr. Rogers, who is not here today, there was a bill
    that went through this committee and was passed in the House
    talking about having annual reports on hate, on issues of
    terrorism. It should include a focus on domestic terrorism as
    well.
        Mr. Correa. I am glad to hear you say that, because Acting
    Secretary Duke just mentioned the blurring of that line. I
    think it is absolutely correct. You can't focus on one versus
    the other. You know, every American life is sacred. Like all
    life, we have got to make sure we go after every threat that
    there is to our citizenry.
        Rabbi.
        Rabbi Cooper. Congressman, I would like to come back to a
    point. I don't know about anyone else. I was very humbled and
    impressed by the first panel and how they have stepped up, over
    the course of the last 15 years, at a whole different level to
    protect our citizens.
        But they were very careful to emphasize, at every
    opportunity, that they are not in the, ``ideology business.''
    When you start getting that level where you have that kind of
    power to find out what citizens are doing, it is a good idea to
    have that kind of red line and firewall between that kind of
    activity.
        I think what this committee could look at, and certainly
    the Wiesenthal Center, and I am sure everyone here, NAACP, all
    of the NGO's, everyone involved with civil society, we stand
    ready to try to fill in some of that on a volunteer basis if
    there would be an appropriate, whether it is through the fusion
    centers, the appropriate platform to actually inform the
    various Federal, State, and local agencies about who is who in
    hate. Who are the players overseas who are impacting on
    individuals here, then go about threatening people in the local
    community? There is a lot of information that is available----
        Mr. Correa. See, that is a very interesting concept,
    because that is essentially what we need to do with the
    Googles, the Facebooks of the world, which is on a volunteer
    basis. We can't legislate to keep up with technology, but if we
    can figure out how to get these folks to step up and volunteer
    and say, this does not smell correctly, something is afoot
    here, maybe you can take part of that responsibility as well
    and help us help the Federal Government keep our citizens safe.
        Rabbi Cooper. Well, I can already report to you that some
    of the most powerful companies in the Silicon Valley are always
    happy to see me leaving their offices. So we are there. I do
    think that there is an important role, a bridge role for this
    committee to help, you know, create the appropriate input
    platform and, you know, probably through the fusion center
    concept, to make sure that if we actually come up with
    important ideas, or if the NAACP has statistics that are not
    necessarily available to a local anti-hate crimes agency, I
    think it would help, you know, lift the efforts, make them more
    focused, and hopefully help protect Americans from the hate
    that we are now dealing with.
        Mr. Correa. Mr. Rausch.
        Chief Rausch. I would just add in terms of the cooperation
    between the Federal, local, and State agencies, the JTTFs are
    vital. They are working together to address those things that
    you have concerns with. They are looking at the domestic
    terrorist.
        My office, I have two officers assigned to the JTTF that
    specifically, that is what they do, is they look at our
    domestic terrorists working with our Federal partners. So they
    work very closely with them.
        I also serve on the IACP's task force that is looking at
    enhancing law enforcement's response to hate crimes. One of the
    things that I suggested there is we look at tools that we need.
    I have talked with several prosecutors and asked them about
    what tools they could use to better our opportunity to go after
    these who are committing these hate crimes. What they said was
    they have a hard time proving ideology. Right? What is in the
    mind. Hard time proving that part of the statute. So they will
    charge them with the crime that they have committed, right,
    which would be maybe an assault or a vandalism or something of
    that nature. Then, you know, they said that they are easier
    able to get that conviction.
        So the hate part is a little challenging. So what I have
    suggested is for your body to look at, similar to what we do
    with gangs, and that is make it an enhancement. Right? We
    charge the crime, but make hate an enhancing crime. So after
    you have charged them with the A crime, then you come back and,
    after you get that conviction, you come back and you enhance it
    with the hate crime. I think that would be much more effective,
    and you would see an increase in holding people accountable for
    their ideologies.
        Mr. Correa. Mr. Chair, I yield.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Donovan.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chief, I was the elected district attorney of Staten Island
    and indicted the very first hate crime on Staten Island in its
    history, and it resulted in my first death threat as well. So
    that was my reward for it. But I am still here, so----
        Chief, as you heard, I was asking the FBI director about
    the whole idea of people disguising themselves with masks and
    crossing State lines to cause mayhem, whatever, in places, and
    how would codifying some of those prohibitions be helpful.
        You were very successful, Chief, in the experience that you
    just described to us in your opening remarks. Is there a
    Federal codification of some of these things that you think--I
    think the Chairman asked, Chief, could other law enforcement
    agencies learn from your good experience. Do you think there
    are codifications that may be helpful to you and others who are
    trying to protect our Nation?
        Chief Rausch. Yes, absolutely. I think looking at a couple
    of areas, and I know they are controversial, but I think it is
    important when you talk about these protests and where they
    have gotten today. You know, obviously, we shouldn't restrict a
    person's ability to express their opinion. I think, you know,
    we have got to be careful with that fine line as we talk about
    what is--what we do to limit a person's ability to express
    themselves.
        But I think we also have to look out for the greater good
    and the safety of our communities. Covering your face for these
    events, clearly, as we have seen, is for one purpose and one
    purpose only, and that is to remain anonymous and have the
    ability to do whatever you want to do and to try to get away
    with it.
        I was having a conversation as you all were on your voting,
    and that is, you know, if you think about it back to when you
    were a child and Halloween, masking up makes you anonymous.
    That is why children don't worry about throwing eggs at the
    neighbor's house or throwing toilet paper in the neighbor's
    tree, is because they are anonymous. So masking up clearly
    causes problems. I think, obviously, if there is something
    codification-wise that the Congress could do, I think that
    would be great.
        The other area would be--I know this is controversial, and
    I will say it--but it is firearms. I think during these
    protests, the open carry of firearms, all it is, is adding
    gasoline to the fire. You are talking about emotional
    situations. People are emotional about their thoughts, and you
    are going to add in a firearm into that emotional powder keg.
        So I think as you talk about how we regulate and how we
    ensure people have their First Amendment right to express
    themselves, we need to look about how we can do that where they
    can do it safely with proper regulation.
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Donovan, if I could.
        Mr. Donovan. Yes, certainly, please, sir.
        Mr. Cohen. You know, there were--we put out a video after
    Charlottesville and made it available to police officers, we
    will send out 50,000 free copies in January of it, about
    mistakes that were made in Charlottesville. I think there were
    mistakes that were made.
        But as Chief Rausch says, they had a tremendous handicap,
    and that was the Virginia open carry law that prohibited towns,
    counties, and cities from having anything that would be
    contrary to the open carry law.
        The University of Virginia could do it because it is an arm
    of the state. But the city of Charlottesville had its hands
    tied when people walked into that city with hate in their
    hearts and open guns. It is a real problem, and it is a problem
    in more than 30 States.
        I would add, not to contradict anything that the chief
    said, but the history of mask laws in our country is
    complicated. You know, there is this notion that I should
    perhaps be able to protest anonymously in order to protect
    myself from retaliation for expressing an unpopular view. I
    can't tell you I know what the state of the law is today. It
    may vary under the circumstances, but it is not an
    uncomplicated point.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
        Are there any other, Rabbi, situations that were described
    earlier, the tragedies that we have experienced in our country,
    maybe the more recent ones, do you see any other things,
    mistakes that may have happened if we had something in place,
    may have prevented some of the harm that was created?
        Rabbi Cooper. I think the key, we heard from the first
    panel, is intelligence, information, and access of that
    information to the people, especially to local hate crimes
    units. They have an incredible learning curve they have to
    master as they are thrown in from other arenas in order to be
    able to deal with the hate and hate groups in their
    communities. So they could certainly use some more help, but I
    just wanted to actually say something positive, if I may.
        Mr. Donovan. Sure.
        Rabbi Cooper. That is that the concept of hate crime is
    always under assault. The concept is under assault. Saying,
    well, someone is raped; they are raped. If they break a window,
    so you pay. But I think whether you are talking to African
    Americans or Jews or other minorities, when someone in your
    community is attacked, and it may only, you know, bring about
    the breaking of a $100 window, when that takes place during a
    Friday night service or in a church or in a school, an entire
    community is impacted.
        Hate crimes has not been universally embraced as a society
    idea or as a legal concept in other democracies, and is always
    being sniped at here in the States by a variety of individuals.
    So I think keeping focus on it, keeping the level playing
    field, so whether it is from the left or the right, you have to
    make sure it is not being used, you know, to bludgeon one
    political point or another. I think it is an extremely
    important and powerful tool that gives a sense of, not so much
    redress, but when a community is hurting, they get the message
    that the rest of the community is generally with them. That is
    part of an important healing process and one of the ways of
    keeping social peace.
        Mr. Donovan. You are right about the attitude toward hate
    crimes. As I said, I was in office for 3 weeks when we
    indicted--and we indicted a Caucasian man for viciously
    assaulting another Caucasian young man who happened to be in
    the company of a black woman. Thank you.
        Mr. Perry [presiding]. The Chair thanks the gentleman from
    New York.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
    Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all
    of our witnesses for being here today.
        In follow-up on the firearm discussion just a moment ago
    with respect to how weapons have complicated some of these
    situations, each of you did highlight in your testimony the
    threat of domestic extremists and terrorism. In recent domestic
    terrorist attacks, such as the incidents in Las Vegas, Orlando,
    and Sutherland Springs, firearms have been the weapon of
    choice. So what steps should Congress take to ensure that
    firearms don't end up in the hands of terrorists? Let's start
    with Mr. Cohen.
        Mr. Cohen. I would defer to the chief on this one, if I
    could.
        Chief Rausch. That is a great question. I am not sure there
    is an easy answer to that. I think that--you know, clearly, I
    think the challenge we have in background checks, as we have
    seen, the system is flawed at best. So I think that is probably
    our first step, is tightening up the background check process
    to ensure that it is what it is supposed to be. When you can
    identify somebody that is a member of an organization, if you
    can identify that, that is another part of that challenge.
        It is a difficult situation. I think we have to be careful.
    I know that, you know, there is some legislation moving now
    about reciprocity of moving guns across borders in terms of
    hand gun reciprocity, hand gun carry. That is a challenge. You
    know, not every State has the same level of restriction in
    terms of who can carry a firearm. So that is concerning to
    those of us in law enforcement.
        So I would tell you that I would--I am not the perfect
    expert on that, I don't think. I tell you, it is a challenging
    topic, and I would tell you we have got to do better than what
    we are doing now.
        Mr. Langevin. I agree with you, and you are on the front
    lines. I agree with your answers, and I appreciate your
    perspective in the job you are doing to try to keep us all
    safe.
        Let me turn to Mr. Cohen. In the recent election, Russia
    utilized social media to influence and interfere with our
    democratic process, demonstrating how a properly orchestrated
    on-line campaign can leverage a small investment into an
    outsized effect. How have we seen domestic terrorist groups
    utilize the same tools and methods to spread their message?
        Mr. Cohen. Look, all of these groups that we talk about are
    very, very active on social media because it is easy. Before
    Charlottesville, the message went out to white supremacists
    throughout the country to come and gather there. I think it was
    obvious, prior to the event, that there were going to be
    hundreds of white supremacists at that event.
        So, you know, as the Rabbi said, any--a local thing can
    quickly become National in scope or global in scope with a
    click of a button. I don't think there is any easy answer to
    deal with that.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Rabbi Cooper. I would like to just add to that. We have
    been talking to the companies about these issues for well over
    a decade. Let's be honest, the ads, the digital ads, basically
    an ATM machine, just for money making. When we brought--the
    first case we brought to them was when a couple of ads for a
    Hezbollah-sponsored game that kids could get ahold of, I think,
    showed up on a Washington Post just as a bot. You know, just
    showed up on various locations, undertakings from a known
    terrorist group. So the particular company in mind did figure
    out a way to remove it.
        I hate to keep coming back to it, but if we are talking
    about ads and the impact of ads, the bad players are looking at
    each other out there and saying, well, look, this looks like an
    easy mark. If we invest a certain amount of money, we are going
    to be able to get our message into the mainstream directly to
    the kind of audience we are looking for. Obviously, Hezbollah
    is not a state player, and you get Russia much more
    sophisticated with its own view. I think a great deal of this
    responsibility comes right back at other companies. To a
    certain extent, it also comes right back to the consumer.
        I will just give you one other example to think about
    because these are not easy issues. One of the companies around
    a short-term project in which they sent emails to teenagers
    saying that, we have reason to believe you may be a target of
    on-line bullying. We hope if that is true, you are talking to
    an adult, your parent, whatever. But if you need help, email us
    and we will send you a list of resources that you can turn to.
        Now, at first blush, that is a great idea. But you think
    about it, you ask yourself one question, how does this company
    know that this teenager has been bullied? Sort-of like the
    unaddressed issue here is that the collect--these companies,
    not because they forced anyone, because we gave the information
    voluntarily, know a lot more about predictive behavior than
    maybe some of our own Federal agencies. They don't like to talk
    about it. It is not a Big Brother mentality, they are out to
    make money, but the potential is always there. When you have a
    bad player like Russia understanding that potential and
    manipulating it, the next time it could be another victim, it
    may be from another state player or a non-state player.
        Mr. Langevin. Great insights. I appreciate you all for
    being here today. Thank you for your testimony.
        My time has expired, so I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman, Mr. Langevin.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
    Higgins.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Rabbi Cooper, I am going to speak on the connection between
    domestic extremism and international terrorism, specifically
    the BDS movement, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction
    movements that attempt to shut down peaceful support of Israel
    are connected--my studies show are connected with international
    terrorism movements.
        What connections have you seen, sir, can you refer to
    between BDS groups and a global terrorist and anti-Israel
    movement?
        Rabbi Cooper. Well, you know, there is no question that
    since BDS movements, Boycott, Divestment--in its current form.
    Back in the late 20th Century, this kind of approach was used
    to great effect to pressure the apartheid regime in South
    Africa. I happened to be present as a delegate in 2001, just
    before 9/11, at the U.N. conference against racism where the
    mantle was transferred; not the halo, but the opposite. The new
    devil was the state of Israel. That approach of demonizing a
    democracy, our ally, has been part and parcel of antipeace
    forces of Hezbollah, of Hamas, of Iran, and others.
        Mr. Higgins. Did you see that connection between domestic
    BDS movements and international terrorism?
        Rabbi Cooper. Right. The connection may not always be
    operational, but these are not movements that came, you know,
    out of the thin air.
        I will give one other example, if I may. There is a piece
    of potential legislation before the House right now called the
    Palestinian Children's Protection Act. That basically, if it
    went into law, would say that the United States would reduce
    aid to Israel if it caused any violence to any Palestinian
    under the age of 18, even if they were involved in a terrorist
    act.
        Now, that did not come out of thin air either. There is
    now, and you might say in honor of Israel's upcoming 70th
    birthday or the 70th anniversary of Nakba, you have new themes
    that are being brought forward in the international community
    and right here in the halls of Congress. Again, they don't come
    from thin air. It is part of an overall global campaign to
    demonize the Jewish state. That is a part of the reality that
    we are struggling against. Our own State Department has
    recognized that some of these efforts do cross the line from
    legitimate criticism of a state or of a group of people into
    hate and anti-Semitism.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you for your very thorough answer.
        In the interest of time, Mr. Cohen, I would like to--I have
    further concerns, but the constraints of time will not allow me
    to address them, so I am going to jump into money, sir.
        The Southern Poverty Law Center is--the IRS recognizes SPLC
    as a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization. Is that correct?
        Mr. Cohen. It is.
        Mr. Higgins. Since SPLC is not subject to taxation, why
    would there be a need for the SPLC to have offshore accounts
    reported up to $69 million in areas like the Cayman Islands? As
    a tax-exempt nonprofit organization, the SPLC has no need for
    lawful tax avoidance, so what would be the legitimate reason
    that the SPLC would have millions and millions of dollars
    deposited in offshore accounts?
        Mr. Cohen. I appreciate the question. I think there has
    been some confusion in the press about this. It is common for
    nonprofit organizations, including universities, big
    foundations, to have money in offshore accounts. It avoids two
    things. First, it avoids a lot of certain kinds of filings, and
    it avoids unrelated business income tax. If I could finish very
    quickly.
        Mr. Higgins. I appreciate your answer.
        Will you state before this Congressional committee
    definitively that all SPLC funds are received, held, and used
    for lawful purposes under U.S. law?
        Mr. Cohen. I will.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Does the SPLC receive foreign
    money?
        Mr. Cohen. Not that I know of. We may have had some donors
    in foreign countries. I am sure we have some donors in England,
    for example, but we don't receive any money from governments,
    including the U.S. Government.
        Mr. Higgins. Final question. Has the SPLC received money
    from any individual, entity, or organization that the State
    Department or Treasury Department has identified as connected
    to organized crime or terrorism?
        Mr. Cohen. Not that I know of, of course.
        Mr. Higgins. Not that you know of. Would you be prepared to
    present a full report regarding that?
        Mr. Cohen. No. I don't think we are going to present a
    listing of all of our donors to this committee or any other.
        Mr. Higgins. I am specifically asking about donors that may
    have been identified by the U.S. Government as terrorist
    organizations or international crime----
        Mr. Cohen. I am not sure--Mr. Higgins, if you have some
    information that makes you think that, I would be happy to
    check into it.
        Mr. Higgins. That is what I am asking, sir.
        Mr. Cohen. Well, if you have some information that tells
    you that that is a possibility, I would want to look into it,
    because we would not want to do that.
        Mr. Higgins. Are you suggesting that I provide your
    organization with your data on----
        Mr. Cohen. No. No. What I was suggesting was that if you
    think that we get money from, you know, criminal sources, I
    have no knowledge of that. I would appreciate your letting me
    know who you think it is who is giving us money who we
    shouldn't.
        Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I would
    like to submit in writing further questioning for the panel. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Perry. Without objection.
        The Chair thanks the gentleman from Louisiana.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
    Jackson Lee.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        First, allow me to introduce into the record a letter from
    53 members of the civil rights--the civil rights community--
    coalition of 53 civil rights and civil liberties groups. I ask
    unanimous consent to submit this statement in the record.
        Hello?
        OK. I need to get extra time because----
        Mr. Perry. I am sorry. Without objection.*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The information has been retained in committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Ms. Jackson Lee. OK. So I need some extra time on that.
    Thank you so very much.
        Let me also express my disappointment that the NAACP was
    not able to testify and that their invitation was issued less
    than 24 hours prior to the hearing, and the late notice has
    kept them from participating.
        I want to acknowledge the new president of the NAACP, who
    is a stellar leader on civil rights issues, Mr. Derrick
    Johnson. His voice needs to be heard in this committee, and I
    certainly hope that we will have the opportunity to hear from
    him as soon as possible.
        Let me go quickly to our very esteemed guests. Rabbi, first
    of all, allow me to acknowledge Simon Wiesenthal and this
    center and to put on the record that he lost 89 members of his
    family. We have known of the center both in Texas but in the
    Nation. I cannot thank you for the non-violent approach that
    you have taken, and the peaceful approach you have taken but
    the firm approach that you have taken against anti-Semitism,
    which certainly is both related and it's a deafening sound in
    this Nation.
        So my question to you is, basically, in an area where I
    have worked, and that is the attack on religious institutions
    or religious-affiliated community centers. We have had
    circumstances like that in Texas. My question to you is how can
    Congress be stronger on protecting those religious affiliated
    institutions who welcome all of us? There is not one of us that
    has not been in a synagogue and have been welcomed, and I might
    say and you know, in a mosque and have been welcomed, because I
    know how your center works. How can we protect these
    facilities?
        Rabbi Cooper. You know, I think we are at an interesting
    crossroad in America, because you can also add churches.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely. I have worked on those issues.
        Rabbi Cooper. Houses of worship are, in America, by
    definition, community centers, and that is one of the key
    points that bigots, racists, and anti-Semites, and terrorists
    understand. That makes--that automatically puts them on the
    front line.
        I have read with great sympathy the, you know, church
    leaders who are trying to decide whether or not they have to
    put perimeter security in their houses of worship. For us, it
    hasn't been an option. I would imagine that for African
    Americans, because of the reality of racist hate crimes in this
    country, it is not really an option.
        At the end of the day, as we hear it now more as ISIS is
    being defeated on the battlefield, that the ultimate victory
    will only be when we defeat the ideas that fuel and feed the
    terrorists. The truth is that it is not so much on Congress, it
    is on Americans to try to come together and figure out ways how
    to drain the swamp of hatred, how to learn, you know, to act
    together in concert, even though we may have different ways of
    praying or different political views.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
        Rabbi Cooper. That is not something you can legislate; that
    is on us.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I take you up on that. That is certainly
    the reflection of the greatness of the center.
        Let me pose my two questions. I ask the Chairman to indulge
    me for the time that I might have lost. So I will pose the two
    questions, first to the chief. Thank you so very much.
        Chief, you may have known that we were in Judiciary with a
    reciprocal concealed weapons bill. Thank you to the Major
    Chiefs for their letter.
        So I think the way I will pose the question on the issue of
    guns is that the proliferation of such guns do make it a little
    more dangerous. I take, for example, the individual that
    attacked the church in Charleston, South Carolina. That is the
    question I am going to ask you. I also made mention in
    Judiciary of my concern for law enforcement officers.
        The question I have for--Mr. Cohen, first of all, thank you
    for your work. You were trying to explain that antifa, in your
    view, does not spew anti-anybody. They come dressed as they do,
    but they are dealing with the justice issues and trying to
    protect. So my question to you is, what tone is set when the
    leader of the free world offers or spews out words such as son
    of a Bs or uses a video of alt-right and neo-Nazi so much that
    the world condemns that utilization? What tone is set? How do
    we thwart that as people, because I believe America is a great
    Nation?
        Chief, would you comment on the question I asked you? Then
    if I could allow Mr. Cohen to answer his question.
        Thank you so very much.
        Chief Rausch. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. So in terms of guns, I
    think, first and foremost, all law enforcement will tell you
    responsible gun ownership is what we expect.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
        Chief Rausch. Unfortunately, what we have seen in many
    communities throughout the country, and we have seen it in our
    State, and that is the relaxation of gun laws and allowing guns
    everywhere at any time. You know, the Heller decision by the
    Supreme Court said that there can be reasonable regulation.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
        Chief Rausch. That is what we should have. We have seen an
    increase, since the Castle doctrine was moved from the home to
    the car in Tennessee, we have seen an increase in gun violence.
    We have seen more guns stolen out of vehicles. Because, again,
    responsible gun ownership also means keeping it safe from other
    people. So we have seen an increase in guns being stolen. We
    have seen an increase in shootings in our community ever since
    that law was changed.
        So I think we have got to be--we have got to be more
    methodical in how we regulate our firearms, and that is a
    challenge that I would put before you and Congress. I thank
    you.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Chief.
        Mr. Cohen.
        Mr. Cohen. Briefly, I would agree with Rabbi Cooper that it
    is the responsibility of each and every person in our country
    to drain the swamp of hate. But I would add that it would help
    a lot if the person who has the biggest bully pulpit in our
    country were to take the lead in consistently condemning hate
    rather than energizing it.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I join you in that. I would like to make a
    commitment that personally and I know many of my colleagues
    will join you in standing up against hate. We thank you for the
    testimony.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for yielding to me. I yield back.
        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Garrett.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to hit on a few things, and I hate to be constrained
    so by time, but each other Member has as well. First, I would
    commend the chief on his suggestion as it relates to criminal
    enhancements for certain things. I think we have a criminal
    justice situation in this country that begs reform. We are
    happy to be moving in a bipartisan manner toward that. We don't
    necessarily need new crimes; we need to enforce the ones that
    are on the books, but an enhancement makes real sense. It is
    not giving you that burden at trial.
        Second, the masked discussions, the guns discussions, et
    cetera, I am loathed in this body to suggest a Federal
    legislative answer to what should be doctrinally and
    Federalism-wise a State-level or a local-level problem. Now, I
    am sympathetic to the arguments made by the folks on the panel
    that, indeed, localities and States should be empowered to make
    these decisions for themselves, but I would hate, and I can
    assure you I would not vote in favor of a Federal mask law. It
    is draconian in its nature and perhaps in its application and I
    don't even want to contemplate it.
        Having said that, I have no problem with the locality
    enforcing time, place, manner of restrictions on otherwise
    protected rights.
        Tertiarily, Rabbi Cooper, I would correct you in respect
    where you say Hezbollah is not a state actor, but for the IRGC
    in Iran there is no Hezbollah. Hezbollah came to be 3 years
    after the Iranian revolution, and while they are not a direct
    state actor----
        Rabbi Cooper. They are an actor of a state.
        Mr. Garrett. Yes, sir. Again, that is with all due respect
    and no disrespect intended.
        To Mr. Cohen, you gave a number of users of the website
    Stormfront, which is a Nazi affiliate, a national socialist-
    affiliated website, prior to and after the Obama
    administration. Do you remember those numbers off the top of
    your head?
        Mr. Cohen. I do.
        Mr. Garrett. What were they?
        Mr. Cohen. In 2008, it was 140,000 registered users.
        Mr. Garrett. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cohen. Today, over 330,000. That doesn't mean--there
    are many millions of visitors----
        Mr. Garrett. I have got so little time. I am not trying to
    be rude. Right, you have got million of visitors, but you have
    almost doubled your registration. We wouldn't prescribe that,
    though, that is not a result of the Obama administration?
        Mr. Cohen. Oh, no, no, no, no, no. As I said, it is the
    continuing backlash to our country's changing demographics.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, I think that is your opinion.
        Mr. Cohen. That is correct.
        Mr. Garrett. Again, with due respect. So are you familiar
    what type of organization is the most prominent and preeminent
    numerically on your hate watch list of 900 and some-odd groups?
        Mr. Cohen. I think it would probably be the Daily Storm or
    the Nation of Islam.
        Mr. Garrett. No. I mean, by number, how many----
        Mr. Cohen. That is what I was trying to answer.
        Mr. Garrett. I am sorry. Go ahead, real quick.
        Mr. Cohen. I was saying it would probably--the current
    count would probably be the Daily Storm or the Nation of Islam.
        Mr. Garrett. So by definition on your list, about 22
    percent of the entire list are Black separatist groups?
        Mr. Cohen. That is correct.
        Mr. Garrett. Again, I don't--look, hate is hate is hate is
    hate is hate.
        Mr. Cohen. I agree.
        Mr. Garrett. When we move to put in a law to make Barbara
    Johns Day a holiday in Virginia, one of my colleagues said that
    is Black history. I said, you can't have it, that is American
    history. We need to know that.
        Simon Wiesenthal, I think, was wise in his words to suggest
    that, for our benefit, we should learn from the Jewish tragedy
    because the next victims very well may not well be Jewish. So
    that is the point that I make that there was been an uptick. In
    fact, in 2000, the number of Black separatist groups was about
    \1/12\ of your list. Is that about right?
        Mr. Cohen. I don't remember the ratio.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, off your website, it would indicate that
    48 out of 610 extremist groups listed by Hate Watch in 2000
    were Black separatists, and now it is almost 200 out of about
    900.
        Mr. Cohen. Right. We report those numbers----
        Mr. Garrett. Again, this isn't President Obama's fault.
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I mean----
        Mr. Garrett. It is not, is it? I mean, I don't think it is.
        Mr. Cohen. I wasn't claiming it was his fault. I was trying
    to explain.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, I guess what I am suggesting is that
    there is no doubt, right, that there are real, live, living,
    breathing Nazis. Tragically, we saw them in my Congressional
    district. But to ascribe the presence of despicable,
    reprehensible individuals who can't grasp the basic concept of
    Dr. King's premise that we should judge individuals based on
    the content of their character, not the color of their skin,
    but to say, well, this is because of the rhetoric of one
    individual, I think, oversimplifies the problem. Correct?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I am not sure I--I am not sure I was
    guilty of what you are suggesting.
        Mr. Garrett. I am not suggesting you were. If someone were
    to say that the prevalence of these groups is because the
    rhetoric of one individual, that would be oversimplifying the
    problem. Would it not?
        Mr. Cohen. Depending on the individual. I think----
        Mr. Garrett. So here is my concern, because what your
    organization has done and done well is attack evil in the form
    of things like the Klan. However, would you be shocked if I
    told you that from the public records, as it relates to the
    leadership of your organization, the political giving is almost
    exclusively and to the tune of almost 100 percent in one
    direction? Would that surprise you?
        Mr. Cohen. I don't think it is accurate.
        Mr. Garrett. If I were to tell you that it were, would that
    surprise you?
        Mr. Cohen. It would. We have many Republican donors of----
        Mr. Garrett. No, no, no, no, sir. I am talking about the
    gifts from the people in your organization to political causes.
        Mr. Cohen. Oh, I think that is absolutely true. I am sure
    that is right.
        Mr. Garrett. OK.
        Mr. Cohen. There are not that many people in Southern
    Poverty Law Center who make political contributions.
        Mr. Garrett. But some do.
        Mr. Cohen. Sure.
        Mr. Garrett. It wouldn't surprise you to learn that they
    were almost exclusively in one direction?
        Mr. Cohen. It would not.
        Mr. Garrett. OK. You have worked with other groups, for
    example, Media Matters, the Center for New Community, and
    ReThink Media, to come up with lists. Correct?
        Mr. Cohen. We have.
        Mr. Garrett. OK. Would it surprise you if I were to tell
    you that, based on public records, the political giving of the
    leadership of those organizations was also almost exclusively
    in one direction?
        Mr. Cohen. No, it would not.
        Mr. Garrett. OK. Would you contest the assertion, and I
    would categorize national----
        Mr. Cohen. You haven't given up your days as a trial
    lawyer, have you, Mr. Garrett? Go ahead.
        Mr. Garrett. No, sir. But again, it is an interesting
    paradigm I find myself in because I respect what you do.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
        Mr. Garrett. I am concerned with how you are doing it. Here
    is where I am going with this.
        Mr. Cohen. Please.
        Mr. Garrett. I think it is a fair historical fact to say
    that the deadliest collective force in human history, probably
    just after national socialism, would be communism, which
    inarguably is a dogma of the left. I am not ascribing values to
    anyone. I am suggesting, however, that it troubles those to see
    an entity that has essentially been de facto made responsible
    for determining what is and isn't hate that skews almost
    exclusively, as do their collaborators, in a particular
    direction.
        So I guess I admonish you to listen to folks like Mr. Perry
    who says--I don't even remember the name of the organization--
    are you familiar with them and become familiar with them. Now--
    --
        Mr. Cohen. I am not sure who you are talking about, Mr.
    Perry. I am sorry.
        Oh, I am sorry, Congressman.
        Mr. Garrett. It is OK. So let me finish.
        Mr. Cohen. Please.
        Mr. Garrett. Because I have just kind of poked at you----
        Mr. Cohen. Just a little bit.
        Mr. Garrett [continuing]. But it is not with malice.
        You deserve credit at SPLC for being the first group to
    point out, for example, that Jason Kessler, who was the
    organizer of the Unite the Right rally, with which I would take
    exception to the name, because, again, I am an individualist in
    the Randian sense. I think the individual is the ultimate
    minority, and everyone has the right to be left alone, so long
    as they are not hurting someone else. But you were the first
    people to point out that his previous affiliations have been
    with the Occupy movement, and you deserve credit for that.
    Right? So I hope and ask that you recognize that hatred in any
    form is hatred, that violence in any form is violence, and that
    victims in any form are victims.
        Mr. Cohen. We always have.
        Mr. Garrett. I encourage you to continue to, but the
    perception by outside individuals, and I think based on life
    experience, is that if all the leadership of an organization
    skews in a particular political direction, there might be a
    bias, which then gives rise to a lack of credibility for what
    you do that should be important work. Do you understand why
    that might be a concern?
        Mr. Cohen. I understand why it is a concern to you.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, do you understand why that might be a
    concern to people?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, look, look, you know, the liberal
    tradition is an inclusive one. Hate is the opposite of that
    liberal tradition of inclusivity. So it is not surprising to me
    that people at the Southern Poverty Law Center, people at other
    inclusive organizations, tend to give money to liberal
    organizations. It seems obvious to me.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, again, we could sit and discuss the
    origins of classical liberalism versus modern liberalism all
    day long, but my life philosophy is treat everyone as you would
    want to be treated.
        Mr. Cohen. Of course.
        Mr. Garrett. And do no harm.
        Mr. Cohen. Absolutely.
        Mr. Garrett. And that the Jeffersonian concept of liberty
    should be adhered to, which is so long as you are not hurting
    someone else, who cares who you sleep with, who cares how you
    worship, et cetera, et cetera. But it strikes me, as I look at
    the groups that are chosen, Liberty Counsel, Family Research
    Council----
        Mr. Cohen. Yes, yes.
        Mr. Garrett. When Flanagan walks in with Chick-fil-a
    sandwiches to rub in the faces of his victims, that is not your
    fault?
        Mr. Cohen. That is absolutely true.
        Mr. Garrett. But I mean, you know, I would hope that the
    important work you do not be co-opted by an any ideological
    drive that causes you to miss other threats.
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I appreciate your concern about our work.
    I am sure that if you knew as much as we did about the Family
    Research Council, you too would keep them at arm's length.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, I am way over time. I would love to have
    the opportunity to sit and talk more. I thank all three of the
    panelists.
        Mr. Cohen. I look forward to seeing you in Charlottesville.
        Mr. Garrett. Yes. And invite you guys to come by the office
    any time. Give me a little bit of an advanced notice so I can
    make sure I can be there.
        But thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. I thank the
    witnesses for their testimony and the Members for their
    questions.
        The Members of the committee may have some additional
    questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
    these or those questions in writing.
        The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
        I would like to include in the record, and ask unanimous
    consent to do so, a statement from the Council on American-
    Islamic Relations.
        Mr. Perry. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]
             Statement Submitted For the Record by Ranking Member
                               Bennie G. Thompson
         Statement of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
                               November 30, 2017
        Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for the
    opportunity to submit this testimony to the record of today's hearing
    on keeping our Nation safe. While there are many substantive issues to
    discuss, we will focus this brief testimony on Countering Violent
    Extremism Programs.
        We do this in response to growing Congressional calls to expand CVE
    to include white supremacist groups. Such a move would only serve to
    legitimate a program that actively surveils, profiles, censors, and
    divides the American Muslim community.
        In September, more than a dozen national Arab, Middle Eastern,
    Muslim, and South Asian civil liberties and human rights organizations,
    and more than 20 activists, academics, and community leaders joined in
    signing a statement opposing the expansion of the Federal Government's
    Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program.\1\ In the same period, the
    Brennan Center for Justice, along with more than 50 other human rights,
    civil liberties, and community-based organizations sent a letter urging
    leadership in the House of Representatives and the Senate to reject
    proposals to expand existing CVE programs to focus on white supremacist
    extremism.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Council on American-Islamic Relations. ``Groups, activists say
    expanding CVE to include white supremacists hurts Muslims, `` 9/07/
    2017, available at: https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-releases/
    14587-groups-activists-say-expanding-cve-to-include-white-supremacists-
    hurts-muslim-communities.html.
        \2\ Ibid. Original letter available at: https://
    www.brennancenter.org/analysis/citing-civil-liberties-concerns-brennan-
    center-and-over-50-groups-oppose-expanding-countering.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Years of research has failed to determine any set of
    characteristics that identifies pre-terrorists.--While academic
    interviews with people who have committed terrorist acts have resulted
    in a set of characteristics that describe each individual person, they
    have not produced a profile or any evidence-based set of predictive
    characteristics.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Additional examples: ``The profiles of individuals involved in
    ISIS-related activities in the U.S. differ widely in race, age, social
    class, education, and family background. Their motivations are equally
    diverse and defy easy analysis.'' Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes.
    ISIS in America: from retweets to Raqqa, George Washington University
    Program on Extremism, December 2015, available at https://cchs.gwu.edu/
    sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-
    %20Full%20Report.pdf. Also, ``Tools that purport to have a psychology
    evidence base are being developed and placed under statutory duty while
    their `science' has not been subjected to proper scientific scrutiny or
    public critique.'' Karen Armstrong et al. Anti-Radicalization Strategy
    Lacks Evidence Based in Science, The Guardian, September 28, 2016,
    available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/29/anti-
    radicalisation-strategy-lacks-evidence-base-in-science. Also, the
    recommendation that the UK government ``End the use of empirically
    unsupported indicators of vulnerability to being drawn into
    terrorism.'' Amrit Singh. Eroding Trust: The UK's Prevent Counter-
    Extremism Strategy in Health and Education, Open Society Justice
    Initiative, 2016, available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
    sites/default/files/eroding-trust-20161017_0.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In its 2016 Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local
    Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, the
    Department of Homeland Security conceded, ``There is no single cause of
    or pathway to violent extremism.''
        The FBI's Strategic Plan to Curb Violent Extremism, obtained via a
    Freedom of Information Act request by the Brennan Center for Justice,
    concurs: ``There is neither one path or personality type, which is
    prone to adopting extremist views of exhibiting violent tendencies, nor
    is there a singular path or personality that leaves an individual
    vulnerable to others who may seek to impress these views or tendencies
    upon them. There are no individually unique behavioral changes for
    those who mobilize to violent extremism.''
        CVE program results are ``not easy to quantify'' and ``lack
    meaningful metrics.''--A May 2014 National Counterterrorism Center
    (NCTC) document notes that the impact of CVE programs is ``not easy to
    quantify.'' After making this qualification, the document's authors
    offer a scoring system for measuring an individual's susceptibility to
    violent extremism. These include measures such as ``Parent-Child
    Bonding, Empathic Connection,'' ``Presence of Emotional or Verbal
    Conflict in Family'' and ``Talk of Harming Self or Others.'' These
    measures likely encompass most American families at some point,
    rendering them near useless for the stated goal.
        Other measures in the NCTC document, such as ``Family Involvement
    in Community Cultural and Religious Activities,'' are problematic as
    the person filling out the form may subjectively perceive mosque
    attendance itself as a risk factor.
        In 2016, the National Security Critical Issues Task Force at
    Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies concluded, ``the
    lack of meaningful metrics to evaluate CVE initiatives complicates
    evidence-based program design and funding.''\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Challgren et al. ``Countering Violent Extremism: applying the
    public health model,'' October 2016, available at: http://
    georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-
    Report-on-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Labeling routine community programming as CVE is problematic and
    stigmatizing.--A Government program to combat terrorism disbursed
    $300,000 in CVE funds to Minnesota community groups in March 2016. The
    funded projects included ``youth sports activities,'' ``soccer and
    Somali arts classes for male students,'' and efforts to ``engage
    youth'' and ``address the stigma of mental illness.''\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Amy Forliti. ``6 Somali organizations receive grants to combat
    terrorism,'' Associated Press, March 10, 2016, https://www.mprnews.org/
    story/2016/03/10/six-somali-groups-grants-combat-terrorism.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These are important, yet wholly standard community development
    programs for the empowerment of marginalized and disadvantaged people.
    Such fundamental services should not be securitized and classified as
    CVE. Doing so unfairly implies that the participants are an inherent
    threat to National security.
        Most simply stated, ``Why does `soccer and Somali arts classes for
    male students' constitute a counter-terror program, but the same thing
    for white youth is simply soccer and art classes?
        While appealing in concept, once its problematic details emerge
    community leaders frequently pull away from CVE.--In all three Obama
    administration CVE pilot cities, local community leaders who support
    efforts to secure our Nation and engaged in the U.S. attorney-led
    meetings aimed at shaping local CVE frameworks distanced themselves
    from the project as they formed a deeper understanding of its
    problematic realities.
        In Los Angeles, both the Islamic Shura Council of Southern
    California, an umbrella organization of Mosques and Muslim
    organizations serving the Muslims of Southern California, and the
    Muslim Students Association of the West Coast (MSA West), with 27
    Muslim Student Associations of West Coast universities as signatories,
    voted to oppose the narrow scope of the Federal Government's CVE
    program.
        In Minnesota, almost 50 Muslim organizations signed on to a
    statement urging law enforcement to ``consider our grave concerns about
    the Government's proposed [CVE] pilot program in Minnesota and
    discontinue this stigmatizing, divisive, and ineffective initiative.''
        A ``top leader of Boston's Muslim community'' opted against the
    local framework because it targeted only the American Muslim community
    and was ``founded on the premise that your faith determines your
    propensity toward violence.''
        The United States Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO), a
    coalition of leading National and local Muslim organizations, gathered
    some 50 U.S. Muslim leaders at a full day forum on CVE that included
    presentations by both Government and civil liberties representatives.
    Following a discussion of the information presented, the council issued
    a statement that in part said, ``Given the low-level of confidence in
    Government-led CVE, the USCMO believes it is best to identify and
    support community-driven best practices.''
        Opposition to the U.S. Government's CVE initiative does not mean
    ignoring threats.--Opposition to violent extremism is consistent among
    American Muslim leadership. Former FBI Director Comey, former U.S.
    Attorney General Holder, former FBI director Mueller and former
    National Counterterrorism Center Director Leiter have all acknowledged
    this opposition.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ FBI Director Comey: ``They do not want people committing
    violence, either in their community or in the name of their faith, and
    so some of our most productive relationships are with people who see
    things and tell us things who happen to be Muslim.'' Source: Huffington
    Post, 6/16/2016. Former FBI Director Mueller: ``Many of our cases are a
    result of the cooperation from the Muslim community in the United
    States.'' Source: FBI Director Robert Mueller's 2008 testimony before
    the House Judiciary Committee. Former Attorney General Holder: ``Muslim
    cooperation `has been absolutely essential in identifying, and
    preventing, terrorist threats.' '' Source: Attorney General Eric
    Holder's December 10, 2010, speech to the Muslim Advocates' Annual
    Dinner. Former National Counterterrorism Center Director Leiter: ``Many
    of our tips to uncover active terrorist plots in the United States have
    come from the Muslim community.'' Source: February 9, 2011 hearing
    before the House Homeland Security Committee.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CAIR specifically is a natural enemy of violent extremists. Our
    record of success discredits violent extremist arguments that
    minorities cannot receive fair treatment in our Nation. Our statements
    and actions opposing those groups and individuals who claim Islam
    sanctions terrorism contributed to ISIS including CAIR's National
    Executive Director among a short-list of Western Muslim leaders it
    wants assassinated.
                         considerations for legislators
        Follow investigative leads, do not police ideology.--Government and
    other programs to counter violent extremism which incorporate steps for
    ``intervention'' can too easily slip into policing ideology. The
    Establishment Clause prohibits any Governmental vilification or
    endorsement of a particular religious ideology. The Government should
    avoid involvement in questions as to which religious ideologies are
    acceptable as this defies the First Amendment.
        Empower law enforcement to investigate cases where there is
    evidence of criminal wrongdoing.--Rather than sifting through an entire
    minority population looking for pre-terrorists, law enforcement should
    focus on investigating cases where there is evidence of wrongdoing.
    Checklists of risk factors have no foundation in scientific research.
    Expecting teachers, mental health professional and other social service
    providers in identifying pre-terrorists is problematic. Trained FBI
    agents missed the Boston Marathon bombers and the Orlando Pulse
    shooter, even though they had investigated both. All this overbroad
    action will do is produce a mass of false positives. Additionally,
    placing social service provider into positions of being de facto law
    enforcement undermines the common trust put in those positions.
        Preserve free speech.--Free Speech, even when despicable, should be
    permitted. In the absence of an implied or inferred threat, speech in
    and of itself should not trigger a report to law enforcement. Community
    leaders should prepare for difficult conversations in advance.
    Isolating an at-risk individual, for instance by banning him or her
    from a facility without any attempt at engaging him or her, may simply
    drive the individual underground. Subjecting an individual's views to
    debate can help them to become aware of alternative viewpoints, facts
    that conflict with their ideas, or simply help avoid a situation where
    going on the internet to share their views with like-minded individuals
    is the only option. In certain communities fear of surveillance has
    caused leaders to ban problematic individuals or topics rather than
    engage them.
        Expand government services, but delink this expansion from law
    enforcement.--Governments at all levels can and should expand outreach
    to all communities, but particularly those who are needy or
    marginalized, and to provide a host of services include mental health
    treatment, job training and placement, youth sports leagues and other.
    However, this should be routine programming and not classified as
    somehow a National security program. For additional safeguards, law
    enforcement should not be part of these services. Law enforcement
    efforts to partner with community groups are too often accompanied by
    parallel intelligence collection or agent provocateur actions. As CVE
    expert Humera Khan wrote in Foreign Affairs in February 2015, ``Many
    police departments consider community policing as an avenue for finding
    informants to help detect rather than prevent criminal activity.''
    Revelations show that a Minnesota police department applied to the
    Department of Justice for a grant to fund outreach programs that would
    have an intelligence-gathering \7\ component. The police chief in
    Montgomery County, Maryland is reported to view a controversial CVE
    program in that locality as a ``conduit of information.''\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Cora Currier. ``Spies Among Us,'' The Intercept, 1/21/2015,
    Available at: https://theintercept.com/2015/01/21/spies-among-us-
    community-outreach-programs-muslims-blur-lines-outreach-intelligence/.
        \8\ Hena Zuberi. ``Area Masajid Unknowingly Expose Youth to Federal
    Intelligence Gathering Program,'' The Muslim Link, 8/25/2017, Available
    at: http://www.muslimlinkpaper.com/community-news/4371-muslim-link-
    exclusive-area-masajid-unknowingly-expose-youth-to-Federal-
    intelligence-gathering-program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Protect Good Samaritans.--The U.S. Congress should pass laws, or
    the Department of Justice (DOJ) should issue guidelines, similar to
    Good Samaritan laws to protect those who act in good faith to prevent
    violent extremism by engaging with those considering it in order to
    dissuade them. DOJ policies should make clear that those who intervene
    to help others should not suffer for it by being subjected to
    prosecution, watch-listing, or surveillance because of their
    association with a potential violent extremist.
        Ensure clear safeguards and protections to prevent abuse.--
    Programming helping self-identified extremists, such as that which
    helps white supremacists exist the movement may be helpful. Certainly,
    in the next few years a number of convicted terrorists will be leaving
    the prison system and may need counseling. In any CVE program, there
    must be clear standards and safeguards to prevent abuses. These
    standards should be reviewed by attorneys with expertise in privacy and
    civil rights and made available to the public for review.

        Mr. Perry. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing
    record will be held open for 10 days.
        Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

          Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Elaine C. Duke
        Question 1a. The Halloween attack in New York City was perpetrated
    by Sayfullo Saipov, an Uzbek national who came to the United States
    through the diversity lottery. As of the day of the attack, Saipov had
    lived in the United States for 10 years as a legal permanent resident.
        If Saipov had come to the United States today, what checks would he
    have encountered and how is this different from the checks he
    encountered 10 years ago?
        Question 1b. Would the fact that he came from a country with a
    history of terrorism have played a role?
        Question 1c. How does DHS review legal permanent residents to
    ensure that they do not become radicalized or determine whether they
    have?
        Answer. A decade ago, background checks often consisted of
    adjudicating officers performing manual checks of databases using
    primarily the applicant's full name. Other identifying information such
    as date of birth, country of birth, and alien number (A number) were
    used to link the applicant to the information found in particular
    databases. While adjudicating officers checked databases containing law
    enforcement information and databases containing intelligence community
    (IC) information, coordination with law enforcement agents or members
    of the IC only occurred when a concern was identified.
        Today, checks are highly coordinated with the IC and law
    enforcement agencies (LEAs). Improvements in Federal screening and
    vetting protocols over the last decade have been implemented largely as
    a result of advances in screening technologies and increased
    interagency cooperation. The U.S. Government has the ability to use
    multiple data points to perform recurrent vetting of immigration, IC,
    and LEA databases rather than performing manual name checks at a single
    point in time. At the same time, inspecting and adjudicating officers
    use their expertise to review individual cases and identify concerns.
    When a concern is identified at any step in the process, agencies
    across the government, including immigration, IC and law enforcement
    agencies, coordinate for the appropriate action including denial of
    benefit or entry, prosecution, and/or deportation.
        All applicants for diversity immigrant visas are subject to
    recurrent vetting (i.e., daily, automated comparison of visa data
    against updated IC, LEA, and immigration data) rather than checks
    performed at a single moment in time. This recurrent vetting involves a
    sophisticated comparison of multiple data identifiers drawn from the
    visa application against IC and LEA databases in order to identify
    terrorism concerns. If a concern is identified through this screening,
    the adjudication of the diversity immigrant visa is stopped and the
    case is submitted for an interagency review by the Department of State,
    the Department of Homeland Security, the IC, and LEAs.
        In addition to this recurrent vetting, the adjudicating officer
    performs manual checks of the applicant's immigration and travel
    history, including past visa applications. Adjudicating officers
    receive significant training in country conditions, including knowledge
    of historic, internal conflicts, and any identified concerns relating
    to both terrorism and trans-national organized crime. Any identified
    concern automatically stops the adjudication and issuance of the
    benefit. The case is then sent to the interagency for review and
    adjudication.
        Coordination of biometric comparisons has also significantly
    increased over the last decade. Applicants for diversity immigrant
    visas between the ages of 14 and 79 must submit fingerprints and these
    prints are compared against immigration, Department of Defense, law
    enforcement, and IC databases.
        Applicants from high-risk countries also receive more in-depth
    vetting. Since
    9/11, the U.S. Government has conducted additional specialized
    screening of foreign nationals from countries determined to be high-
    risk, including those that have been determined to be terrorist safe
    havens. This allows DHS and interagency partners to focus resources
    where they are needed most and to better detect individuals that may
    pose a threat to public safety and National security.
        DHS works with law enforcement and immigration agencies in its
    effort to combat radicalization to violence of U.S. citizens, U.S.
    Lawful Permanent Residents, and other non-citizens. This includes the
    sharing of information relating to individuals who seek to radicalize
    others, and criminal or terrorist activities undertaken or attempted as
    a result of, or in furtherance of, radicalization to violence.
    Moreover, DHS is enhancing its terrorism prevention efforts focused on
    better countering terrorist recruitment in the United States through
    improvements to threat awareness, counter-recruitment activities, early
    warning, and intervention. If any FBI investigation involves non-
    citizens, including legal permanent residents, the FBI will coordinate
    with DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services, as appropriate, especially in cases in which this
    activity involves criminal or other activities that will render the
    subject ineligible for immigration benefits and potential deportation.
        Question 2a. In Europe, we see terrorist attacks taking place at an
    alarming rate. In 2017, we have witnessed 9 vehicular attacks by ISIS.
        What are we doing to make sure radicalized Europeans do not come to
    the United States via the Visa Waiver Program?
        Answer. The Department maintains close cooperation with European
    allies to combat terrorism, including the threat posed by known and
    suspected terrorists (KST). DHS cooperates with our international
    counterparts in a range of ways to ensure Europeans radicalized to
    violence are unable to travel to the United States via the Visa Waiver
    Program (VWP).
        Most European allies--including 23 of 28 European Union (EU) member
    states and 7 non-EU countries--participate in the VWP. Since 1986, the
    VWP has evolved from a travel facilitation program into a comprehensive
    security partnership between the United States and VWP countries.
    Program countries must meet stringent security requirements to ensure
    their designation does not pose a risk to U.S. National security, law
    enforcement, or immigration enforcement interests. These requirements
    include, but are not limited to: Implementing a series of arrangements
    to share terrorism information; cooperating on criminal threats;
    improving identity management procedures; and reporting lost and stolen
    travel document information. To ensure compliance with VWP
    requirements, DHS conducts assessments of each VWP country at least
    once every 2 years--and engages in continuous monitoring between formal
    assessments--to evaluate participants' counterterrorism, law
    enforcement, immigration enforcement, border management, and identity
    document security capabilities.
        The United States and all VWP countries have committed to share
    information on KSTs through both formal bilateral arrangements (e.g.,
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6)), though the amount
    of sharing varies per country. Additionally, sharing occurs via
    informal intelligence and law enforcement channels, as well as through
    international organizations, such as International Criminal Police
    Organization (ICPO-INTERPOL) and Europol. This sharing adds to the
    derogatory information that the United States uses to perform screening
    activities, which enables the United States to more effectively
    identify KSTs and take appropriate action to safeguard the United
    States.
        On December 15, 2017, Secretary Nielsen announced additional
    targeted enhancements that further strengthen the Program. These
    enhancements will not only raise security standards, but also further
    deepen existing security partnerships, therefore making it much
    likelier for countries to detect terrorist travel and safeguard
    themselves in the aviation security environment. These enhancements
    include:
       Requiring VWP countries to fully implement their existing
            information-sharing arrangements by systematically screening
            travelers crossing their respective borders against U.S.
            counterterrorism information.
       Improving the assessments DHS conducts on the effectiveness
            of VWP countries' safeguards against insider threats in the
            aviation security environment; and,
       Requiring VWP countries having a higher rate of visitors
            overstaying the terms of their admission into the United States
            to initiate a public information campaign to educate their
            nationals on the conditions for admission into the United
            States.
        In addition to the aforementioned new requirements, Secretary
    Nielsen called on Congress to codify existing VWP requirements to
    bolster efforts in the following areas:
       Reporting of foreign terrorist fighters to multilateral
            organizations, such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL;
       Systematically collecting and analyzing passenger travel
            data (Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Records);
            and
       Concluding arrangements to permit U.S. Federal Air Marshals
            to operate on-board U.S. air carriers for last-point-of-
            departure flights to the United States.
        As in earlier rounds of enhancements, initial implementation will
    focus on cooperative steps to support VWP countries meeting the new
    requirements. This announcement starts an engagement process wherein
    the U.S. Government will work with each VWP country on a bilateral
    basis to inform them of the new requirements, assess their current
    levels of compliance, and develop strategies geared to implement any
    outstanding requirements. This approach has yielded substantial
    economic and security benefits for the United States and its partner
    countries.
        Further, the U.S. Government conducts extensive vetting of all in-
    bound travelers. All individuals seeking legitimate air or maritime
    travel to the United States are known to the Department prior to their
    departure because of Advance Passenger Information (API) reporting
    requirements by all airlines and ships bound for the United States, and
    in the case of non-immigrants, either the submission of an Electronic
    System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application for travel under the
    VWP or a visa application. The Department vets this data to determine
    whether the prospective traveler should receive additional screening or
    be denied boarding. In all instances, U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) Officers retain final authority on granting admission
    to individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry.
        In addition, individual European partner countries and the European
    Union collectively have taken significant steps to improve
    counterterrorism and border security capabilities across Europe over
    the past 2 years, to include: Creating a new European Border and Coast
    Guard Agency (effective October 2016); enhancing external border
    controls to require systematic database checks of all persons crossing
    Europe's external Schengen borders (effective April 2017); and passing
    the E.U. Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive in April 2016 (to be
    implemented by May 2018). European partners also established the
    European Counterterrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol in January 2016; the
    ECTC supports and facilitates E.U. member states in sharing terrorism-
    related information. Additionally, the European Union is building its
    own ESTA-like pre-travel screening system, known as the European Travel
    Information and Authorization System (ETIAS), which will allow for
    greater interoperability amongst its databases, and working to
    implement an E.U.-wide biometric entry/exit system. The European Union
    expects ETIAS to be operational by 2020.
        The Department continuously looks for new ways to build on existing
    partnerships with European allies to respond to current and emerging
    threats. For example, the Department has offered its expertise and
    technical assistance to assist European partners in developing air
    passenger data collection and analysis capabilities, and has conducted
    numerous workshops for sharing best practices and collaborating on
    travel trends and passenger targeting. The Department is also working
    with a number of European partners to leverage both existing and new
    information-sharing agreements to cooperate directly on vetting
    priority travelers against our respective immigration, law enforcement,
    and National security data at a system-to-system level. In addition,
    the Department is working with 9 European countries to establish
    Preclearance facilities at last-point-of-departure airports. Countries
    participating in a Preclearance arrangement adopt a close and
    continuous partnership with the United States that allows the
    Department to leverage its full authorities and capabilities at
    overseas locations to screen travelers prior to their departure for the
    United States.
        Multilateral partnerships, such as INTERPOL and Europol, facilitate
    U.S.-European cooperation. INTERPOL provides an efficient and
    accessible way for U.S. and European partners to share information on
    lost and stolen passports and report foreign terrorist fighters and
    criminals--both requirements for participation in the VWP--thereby
    enhancing participating countries' screening capabilities. Following
    the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, DHS worked
    closely with Europol to share terrorist-related information and provide
    investigatory support. The Department has assigned officers to Europol,
    and to its ECTC, to facilitate the exchange of information with
    European counterparts and to enhance cooperation on investigations of
    terrorist and criminal networks.
        Question 2b. Are we doing enough to assist our European allies in
    their own counter-terrorism efforts?
        Answer. In coordination with the Department of State, the
    Department of Homeland Security has been working closely with European
    allies and partners to enhance their counterterrorism efforts and
    advance the Department's priorities in Europe. The Department's actions
    range from Departmental leadership engagement to operational
    collaboration with European counterparts across a wide range of
    homeland security areas. Over the past few years, DHS efforts with
    European partners have focused on enhancing border management and
    screening, increasing information sharing, identifying and disrupting
    terrorist travel, strengthening aviation security, and ensuring
    European and E.U. initiatives are compatible with DHS policies and
    programs.
        The Department's active and on-going leadership engagement, as well
    as subject-matter expert-level efforts, have helped European partners
    take significant steps in improving counterterrorism capabilities over
    the past 2 years. Significant achievements include: Enhancing border
    controls to require systematic database checks of all persons crossing
    the European Union's external Schengen borders (effective April 2017);
    passage of the E.U. Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive in April 2016
    (to be implemented by May 2018); creating a new European Border and
    Coast Guard Agency (effective October 2016); developing an ``E.U.
    ESTA'' (the European Travel Information and Authorization System--
    ETIAS, with a January 2020 implementation date); and improving the
    interoperability of European law enforcement and immigration databases.
    The European Union also established the European Counter Terrorism
    Centre (ECTC) at Europol in January 2016 to support and facilitate E.U.
    members to share terrorism-related information. DHS components work
    closely with Europol and the ECTC to share terrorist-related
    information and provide investigatory support.
        Currently, DHS has been emphasizing the importance of providing
    actionable intelligence information to front-line law enforcement and
    border officials. The Department is also emphasizing the importance of
    deploying PNR collection and analysis capabilities, as expeditiously as
    possible. DHS has years of experience collecting and analyzing Advanced
    Passenger Information (API, which is an airline manifest) and PNR (the
    airline's reservation data) data and is providing expertise, lessons
    learned, best practices, and technical assistance as European partners
    develop similar systems. Most recently, the Department has been
    prioritizing aviation security to address current and evolving threats,
    and has been working closely with European allies to strengthen
    aviation security globally. DHS has also reached agreements with
    European partners to deploy technology, such as the Secure Real-Time
    Platform (SRTP), to assist allies in conducting biometric checks on
    travelers and migrants to help them detect terrorists, criminals, and
    other nefarious actors at their borders. The United States works
    closely with partners to ensure all CT traveler security programs are
    harmonized and socialized broadly so that all available capabilities
    are leveraged in this most effective way possible.
        Much of the Department's efforts with European partners is
    facilitated by the long-standing operational relationships established
    through DHS component personnel deployed overseas in Europe. However,
    the progress achieved over the past several years, and continued
    efforts to advance DHS security and counter-terrorism priorities in
    Europe, require active and sustained engagement at the Departmental
    level to coordinate Department-wide efforts and assist European
    partners and governing institutions in a complex and challenging
    political environment. The Department's efforts must include continued
    engagement with individual European countries, the governing
    institutions of the European Union, and numerous European regional
    security organizations.
        The State Department has also supported the exchange of best
    practices on countering violent extremism (CVE) through two-way
    exchanges and the Strong Cities Network (SCN), a global network of 120
    subnational governments. Through workshops, an on-line hub, and an
    annual global meeting, SCN has built the capacity of local-level
    practitioners in communities in Europe with known cases of
    radicalization to violence in the European Union and its member states,
    non-E.U. European countries, and numerous European regional security
    organizations.
        Question 3a. DHS supports a number of grants through the Office for
    Community Partnerships to assist with Countering Violent Extremism.
    Describe what benchmarks are in place to determine the success of these
    grants?
        Answer. The CVE Grant Program (CVEGP) through the Office for
    Community Partnerships (now the Office for Terrorism Prevention
    Partnerships) funded innovative projects in five focus areas that set
    the baseline for future evaluation of terrorism prevention projects.
    Given the diversity of these projects and the organizations
    implementing them, each individual project has tailored performance
    metrics and benchmarks for success over time. Prior to receiving access
    to their project funds, each recipient was required to develop a
    Project Implementation and Evaluation Plan (PIEP), which included
    deliverable time lines, output and outcome measures, and evaluation
    methods.
        Some projects have very specific deliverables, such as training
    curricula for law enforcement or community members and models for how
    to implement terrorism prevention activities into existing public
    health infrastructure. Where applicable, DHS has sought to ensure that
    each grantee's deliverables present a unified and non-duplicative
    approach, consistent with DHS messaging and existing programs, and
    ensure that materials are cost-effectively leveraged for use by all DHS
    grantees. DHS will evaluate the quality of these products and analyze
    the successes and challenges found in piloting them and will determine
    what is needed to package the products and deliver them to similar
    communities for replication outside of the grant program.
        To date, DHS has completed the review of the proposed metrics and
    PIEPs. DHS is now mapping the performance measures from the individual
    projects to the overall goals of the CVEGP to assess the grant program
    as a whole, combine measures from similar projects, and compare the
    relative impacts of different projects.
        Question 3b. What success have you observed with these programs in
    mitigating the recruitment of individuals to Foreign Terrorist
    Organizations?
        Answer. As noted above, the period of performance for the grants
    started on August 1, 2017 and will run through at least the end of July
    2019. Grantees' first quarterly reports were due on October 30,
    covering August and September. Much of the activity in the first 2
    months of performance has been administrative startup work (including
    the drafting and submission of PIEPs), training development, content
    development, community outreach, and planning. At this time, all the
    projects appear to be on a solid footing to begin to deliver their core
    work in the next couple of quarters, and to begin reporting output and
    outcome measures in the late spring/early summer 2018.
            Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Elaine C. Duke
        Question 1a. Please describe the Department of Homeland Security's
    current programs, if any, to educate/train its officers about the
    domestic jihad threat. Which individuals and/or groups does DHS use for
    such training?
        Question 1b. If there is no such training currently, please tell us
    when you expect to begin such training.
        Answer. DHS undertakes a very wide range of activities designed to
    increase awareness and understanding among front-line defenders--
    including DHS personnel--regarding the terror threat. This includes
    frequent intelligence reporting, analysis, and trends related to global
    jihadist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Such information is
    essential to helping law enforcement and homeland security
    professionals identify suspicious activity, signs of violent
    radicalization, pre-operational terrorist planning, and more. Such
    information is also incorporated into exercises, training, and other
    activities designed to make sure we are prioritizing the highest risks
    to the homeland and are prepared to defend against emerging terrorist
    tactics. DHS also delivers a range of terrorism-prevention briefings
    Nation-wide that help increase threat awareness for those on the front
    lines protecting our communities, and these briefings highlight the
    threat from global jihadist groups, as well as other violent
    organizations seeking the threaten the American people and our
    homeland.
        Although the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) does
    not provide training programs exclusively focused on terrorism
    prevention issues, FLETC delivers a broad spectrum of counterterrorism
    training that encompasses myriad topics. FLETC's terrorism curriculum
    covers areas such as terrorism prevention, the National
    counterterrorism strategy, funding and material support, internet
    exploitation, modes/methods of attack (i.e. Improvised Explosive
    Devices, Weapons of Mass Destruction), surveillance detection,
    Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR), the attack planning cycle, and
    aircraft countermeasures. This curriculum resides within FLETC's three
    primary basic programs. During fiscal year 2017, law enforcement
    personnel from the following DHS entities attended a basic training
    program at FLETC that includes curriculum in counterterrorism: Office
    of Chief Security Officer, Federal Emergency Management Agency (Office
    of Security), Federal Protective Service, Office of the Inspector
    General, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
    Secret Service, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This
    terrorism curriculum is also delivered via several advanced programs
    such as the Commercial Vehicle Counterterrorism Training Program, Land
    Transportation Antiterrorism Training Program, Critical Infrastructure
    Security and Resilience Training Program, Physical Security Training
    Program, and the Protective Service Operations Training Program.
        Through the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), DHS
    has partnered with the State Department since 2011 on the City Pair
    Program, which connects U.S. cities with international counterparts
    through two-way exchanges. In the past year this program has included
    Boston, Denver, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and other U.S. cities. In
    January, the State Department organized a Strong Cities Network
    workshop in Washington that connected more than 50 leaders from Canada,
    Germany, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States for
    a workshop. Such engagements have led to increased connectivity between
    local-level communities domestically and internationally.
        Question 2. What steps has DHS taken under the Trump administration
    to develop & implement a system of ``extreme vetting'' for those who
    seek entry as immigrants, non-immigrants, or refugees into the United
    States?
        Question 3. Please explain what is the DHS process for implementing
    ``extreme vetting'': For example, is there a system to investigate or
    at least query intending entrants for ideological affinity to some
    other alien or hostile legal system opposed to the U.S. Constitution,
    like Islamic Law, as there was in the time of the Cold War for
    communist associations?
        Question 4. Does DHS question whether an individual holds beliefs
    that may be antithetical to the U.S. Constitutions and its ideals? What
    questions are included in the extreme vetting process?
        Question 5. If DHS does not yet have such a system, please advise
    when you will be ready to implement one.
        Answer. The administration has improved every stage of the
    screening and vetting process for U.S.-bound individuals. We have
    launched sweeping efforts to improve our ability to detect terrorists,
    criminals, and other nefarious actors trying to enter the United
    States. These enhancements span virtually every pathway an individual
    could use to travel to the United States--whether as a tourist,
    business visitor, immigrant, or refugee. Applications have become more
    rigorous. Background checks are being intensified. Travel and arrival
    screening are being tightened. In addition, all countries must now
    comply with a historic, first-ever U.S. information-sharing baseline--
    or face travel restrictions and other consequences.
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with its
    U.S. Government (USG) partners, seeks to identify support for terrorism
    or terrorist ideologies as part of its vetting programs. Applicants for
    immigration and travel benefits--on the written application and during
    the in-person interview process--must answer multiple questions
    relating to terrorist activity; membership in groups hostile to the
    United States; willingness to take action on behalf of the United
    States (such as military service); criminal history; and other
    questions in order to gauge potential National security and/or public
    safety threat. Adjudicating officers also query immigration,
    intelligence community (IC), and law enforcement databases that contain
    data relating to criminal and terrorist activity. Further, DHS is
    developing its capability to investigate social media postings and
    other information relating to the applicant in order to examine this
    information for evidence of a terrorism nexus. In each of these
    activities, DHS operates within the strong framework of safeguards,
    training, and policies needed to ensure respect for privacy, civil
    rights, and civil liberties.
        More broadly, DHS continues to advance its capabilities to ensure
    that all visitors, immigrants, and cargo are thoroughly vetted before
    admission to the United States or a potential benefit is granted.
    Accelerating previously planned initiatives and responding to
    directives called for by the President's Executive Order (EO) 13780,
    ``Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
    States,'' the Department has embarked on a path that comprehensively
    addresses all aspects of the vetting continuum in close cooperation
    with partner departments and agencies.
        Executive Order 13780, Section 2 established--for the first time--
    direct requirements for all countries' cooperation to support USG visa
    and immigration vetting and adjudication. Among other factors
    considered, it during the review, the USG established unprecedented
    criteria for the exchange of identity and risk information with foreign
    partners to help confirm a traveler is who they say they are and
    whether they pose a criminal or terrorist threat. DHS is working with
    interagency stakeholders and foreign partners to address information-
    sharing deficiencies identified through the Section 2 review. As a
    follow-on to these activities, Presidential Proclamation 9645 calls for
    persistent monitoring of countries' compliance with the requirements.
        DHS led the development of uniform baseline standards for screening
    and vetting called for by the President in EO 13780, Section 5 through
    enhancements to processes involving applications, interviews, and
    system checks for immigration applicants. As a result, DHS is working
    to standardize, as appropriate, the information collected on
    immigration and foreign traveler forms and/or information systems.
        Under Section 6(a) of EO 13780, the USG has reviewed the U.S.
    Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) application and adjudicative
    processes to determine what additional procedures should be used to
    ensure that individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a
    threat to the security and welfare of the United States. At the
    conclusion of this review, the Secretaries of State and Homeland
    Security and the Director of National Intelligence issued a Joint
    Memorandum entitled ``Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions
    Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities.'' The Addendum to the Joint
    Memorandum provides a summary of additional security enhancements that
    were adopted as a result of the 120-day review that are applicable to
    refugee applicants seeking resettlement in the United States.
        DHS will continue to regularly review its screening processes in
    order to improve the screening and vetting of subjects attempting to
    enter the country.
        Question 6. The U.S. electric grid is dangerously unsecured against
    the threat of a nuclear Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) attack or the
    similar effects that can be generated by the sun. Please explain what
    steps you & DHS are taking to secure the U.S. electric grid on an
    expedited basis.
        Answer. DHS continues to carefully assess the risk of
    electromagnetic incidents to the homeland, including those posed by a
    potential Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack or a Geomagnetic
    Disturbance (GMD). Although the intelligence community currently
    assesses the likelihood of a high-altitude EMP attack is low, the
    consequences of a successful EMP attack or a major GMD could include
    significant damage to portions of the Nation's electric grid and
    communications infrastructure. Pursuant to law, and working closely
    with our interagency partners such as the Department of Energy, DHS is
    finalizing a strategy to protect the Nation's critical infrastructure
    from EMP and GMD. The strategy will outline the Department's approach
    to improve EMP and GMD risk awareness, promote preparedness actions to
    reduce the impacts from EMP, and facilitate response and recovery
    should an incident occur. Additionally, DHS, in collaboration with
    other partners, is working to help critical infrastructure owners and
    operators manage EMP and GMD risk within existing structures for all-
    hazards and all-threats risk management.
        Question 7. Understanding that there is a ``Red-Green Axis'' of
    domestic enemies that includes the Muslim Brotherhood--arguably the
    oldest and largest Sharia-supremacist organization in the world--as
    well as the Black Lives Matter movement and myriad anarchist/communist
    entities operating in a collaborative way in the United States, what
    steps has DHS taken to confront that Axis? Does DHS have an organized
    training program for its agencies & officers that familiarizes them
    with the elements, ideology & operations of the Red-Green Axis? If so,
    please describe that training program. If not, why not & when do you
    expect to have such a program in place?
        Answer. DHS prepared its officers and front-line defenders to be
    aware of--and prepared to respond to--a wide range of threats to the
    United States, including from terrorist organizations that may target
    Americans. DHS looks to the actions and intentions of a range of actors
    who pose, or may pose, a threat to the homeland, pursuant to the U.S.
    Constitution and DHS's statutory authorities, and makes judgments based
    on intelligence and law enforcement information. DHS assesses
    operational and ideological connections between a variety of threat
    actors, institutes policies, and carries out operations to address
    threats or violations of law. In doing so, DHS respects the privacy,
    civil rights, and civil liberties of all Americans. DHS terrorism
    prevention activities are broad enough to address the spectrum of
    terrorist activity in the United States, including through awareness
    trainings and other programs.
        Question 8. Please describe your understanding of Antifa, its
    component elements, ideology, international connections, tactics & the
    DHS operational plan to counter its activities & influence.
        Answer. DHS regularly reports on threats to the homeland, including
    both domestic violent extremists and terrorist groups. Specifically, on
    August 9, 2017, prior to the events in Charlottesville, Virginia, the
    DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis disseminated to its Federal,
    State, local, Tribal, and territorial customers a product referencing
    ``antifa,'' noting that: ``We assess that anarchist extremists' use of
    violence as a means to oppose racism and white supremacist extremists'
    preparations to counterattack anarchist extremists are the principal
    drivers of violence at recent white supremacist rallies. Anarchist
    extremists planned to violently oppose the rallies via social media and
    flyer campaigns after they were announced by the white supremacist
    organizers . . . We assess that a heavily promoted white supremacist
    rally planned for 12 August 2017 in Charlottesville, Virginia, could be
    among the most violent to date . . . Anarchist extremists and white
    supremacist extremists on-line are calling on supporters to be prepared
    for or to instigate violence at the 12 August rally. For instance, a
    probable white supremacist posted on-line a ` . . . call to arms . . .
    antifa must be destroyed,' according to DHS open-source reporting. We
    judge `antifa' in this context to mean probable anarchist extremists,
    who often identify as `antifa' or anti-fascists.'' The Office of
    Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTPP) and other DHS operational
    components will continue to work with our State and local partners to
    enhance their operational capabilities to prevent those who seek to
    radicalize or inspire violent extremism in our communities. While the
    current review of terrorism prevention policy and programs is reshaping
    the DHS operational plan, the plan will largely focus on programs that
    cover at least one of four lines of effort: (1) Prioritizing education
    and community awareness; (2) focusing on counter-recruitment; (3)
    emphasizing the importance of early warning; and (4) looking at what
    more can be done to intervene with individuals whom might commit acts
    of violence.
      Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Elaine C. Duke
        Question 1. DHS has stated that we are pushing our border security
    strategies and pressing foreign partners to enhance their security. On
    November 30, 2015, the Obama administration implemented several new
    enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program that increased security and
    improved the efficiency of traveler screening under this popular
    program. On December 15, 2015, the House passed H.R. 158, the Visa
    Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act, which
    was signed into law on December 18, 2015. How are you building on such
    efforts to work most effectively with our European counterparts to aid
    them in identifying and disrupting future attacks?
        Answer. The Department maintains close cooperation with European
    allies to combat terrorism, including the threat posed by known and
    suspected terrorists (KST). DHS cooperates with our international
    counterparts in a range of ways to ensure Europeans radicalized to
    violence are unable to travel to the United States via the Visa Waiver
    Program (VWP).
        Most European allies--including 23 of 28 European Union (EU) member
    states and 7 non-E.U. countries--participate in the VWP. Since 1986,
    the VWP has evolved from a travel facilitation program into a
    comprehensive security partnership between the United States and VWP
    countries. Program countries must meet stringent security requirements
    to ensure their designation does not pose a risk to U.S. National
    security, law enforcement, or immigration enforcement interests. These
    requirements include, but are not limited to: Implementing a series of
    arrangements to share terrorism information; cooperating on criminal
    threats; improving identity management procedures; and reporting lost
    and stolen travel document information. To ensure compliance with VWP
    requirements, DHS conducts assessments of each VWP country at least
    once every 2 years--and engages in continuous monitoring between formal
    assessments--to evaluate participants' counterterrorism, law
    enforcement, immigration enforcement, border management, and identity
    document security capabilities.
        The United States and all VWP countries commit to share information
    on KSTs through both formal bilateral arrangements (e.g., Homeland
    Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6)), though the amount of
    sharing varies per country. Additionally, sharing occurs via informal
    intelligence and law enforcement channels, as well as through
    international organizations, such as International Criminal Police
    Organization (ICPO-INTERPOL) and Europol. This sharing enriches U.S.
    holdings, which enables the United States to more effectively identify
    KSTs and take appropriate action to safeguard the United States.
        Additionally, on December 15, 2017, Secretary Nielsen announced
    additional targeted enhancements that further strengthen the Program.
    These enhancements will not only raise security standards, but also
    further deepen existing security partnerships, therefore making it much
    likelier for countries to detect terrorist travel and safeguard
    themselves in the aviation security environment. These enhancements
    include:
       Requiring VWP countries to fully implement their existing
            information sharing arrangements by systematically screening
            travelers crossing their respective borders against U.S.
            counterterrorism information.
       Improving the assessments DHS conducts on the effectiveness
            of VWP countries' safeguards against insider threats in the
            aviation security environment; and,
       Requiring VWP countries having a higher rate of visitors
            overstaying the terms of their admission into the United States
            to initiate a public information campaign to educate their
            nationals on the conditions for admission into the United
            States.
        In addition to the aforementioned new requirements, Secretary
    Nielsen called on Congress to codify existing VWP requirements to
    bolster efforts in the following areas:
       Reporting of foreign terrorist fighters to multilateral
            organizations, such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL;
       Systematically collecting and analyzing passenger travel
            data (Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Records);
            and
       Concluding arrangements to permit U.S. Federal Air Marshals
            to operate on-board U.S. air carriers for last-point-of-
            departure flights to the United States.
        As in earlier rounds of enhancements, initial implementation will
    focus on cooperative steps to support VWP countries meeting the new
    requirements. This announcement starts an engagement process wherein
    the U.S. Government will work with each VWP country on a bilateral
    basis to inform them of the new requirements, assess their current
    levels of compliance, and develop strategies geared to implement any
    outstanding requirements. This approach has yielded substantial
    economic and security benefits for the United States and its partner
    countries.
        Further, the U.S. Government conducts extensive vetting of all in-
    bound travelers. All individuals seeking legitimate air or maritime
    travel to the United States are known to the Department prior to their
    departure because of Advance Passenger Information (API) reporting
    requirements by all airlines and ships bound for the United States, and
    in the case of non-immigrants, either the submission of an Electronic
    System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application for travel under the
    VWP or a visa application. The Department vets this data to determine
    whether the prospective traveler should receive additional screening or
    be denied boarding. In all instances, U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) Officers retain final authority on granting admission
    to individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry.
        In addition, individual European partner countries and the European
    Union collectively have taken significant steps to improve
    counterterrorism and border security capabilities across Europe over
    the past 2 years, to include: Creating a new European Border and Coast
    Guard Agency (effective October 2016); enhancing border controls to
    require systematic database checks of all persons crossing Europe's
    external Schengen borders (effective April 2017); and passing the E.U.
    Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive in April 2016 (to be implemented
    by May 2018). European partners also established the European
    Counterterrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol in January 2016; the ECTC
    supports and facilitates E.U. member states to share terrorism-related
    information. Additionally, the European Union is building its own ESTA-
    like pre-travel screening system, known as the European Travel
    Information and Authorization System (ETIAS), allowing for greater
    interoperability amongst its databases, and working to implement an
    E.U.-wide biometric entry/exit system. The European Union anticipates
    ETIAS being operational by 2020.
        The Department continuously looks for new ways to build on existing
    partnerships with European allies to respond to current and emerging
    threats. For example, the Department has offered its expertise and
    technical assistance to assist European partners in developing air
    passenger data collection and analysis capabilities, and has conducted
    numerous workshops for sharing best practices and collaborating on
    travel trends and passenger targeting. The Department is also working
    with a number of European partners to leverage both existing and new
    information-sharing agreements to cooperate directly on vetting
    priority travelers against our respective immigration, law enforcement,
    and National security data at a system-to-system level. In addition,
    the Department is working with 9 European countries to establish Pre-
    clearance facilities at last-point-of-departure airports. Countries
    participating in a Pre-clearance arrangement adopt a close and
    continuous partnership with the United States that allows the
    Department to leverage its full authorities and capabilities at
    overseas locations to screen travelers prior to their departure for the
    United States.
        Multilateral partnerships, such as INTERPOL and Europol, facilitate
    U.S.-European cooperation. INTERPOL provides an efficient and
    accessible way for U.S. and European partners to share information on
    lost and stolen passports and report foreign terrorist fighters and
    criminals--both requirements for participation in the VWP--thereby
    enhancing participating countries' screening capabilities. Following
    the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, DHS worked
    closely with Europol to share terrorist-related information and provide
    investigatory support. The Department has assigned officers to Europol,
    and to its ECTC, to facilitate the exchange of information with
    European counterparts and to enhance cooperation on investigations of
    terrorist and criminal networks.
        Question 2a. In previous Congressional testimony, DHS officials
    have described a shift in DHS countering violent extremism (CVE)
    efforts, including changing the name of the Office for Community
    Partnerships (OCP) to the Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships
    (OTPP) and reporting to the Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE),
    rather than the Secretary. How will this shift and reconfiguration of
    the program differ from the previous administration's CVE efforts?
        Answer. The Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTPP),
    formerly named the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP), continues
    to facilitate and support State, local, Tribal, territorial, and non-
    Governmental, community-based efforts to implement prevention programs
    within the United States that target radicalization and mobilization to
    violence for all forms of terrorism. OTPP also provides greater clarity
    about our mission of preventing terrorist recruitment and
    radicalization to violence.
        Since its establishment, and as appropriated by Congress, the
    office had been funded through the Office of Partnership and Engagement
    (OPE) for budget and administrative purposes, but previously reported
    directly to the Secretary for policy and programmatic purposes during
    its start-up phase. Now that the organization has matured, OTPP has
    become a formal component of OPE, which will increase efficiency and
    bolster resources and support for its role in the critical mission of
    terrorism prevention. When OCP was established, it temporarily reported
    to the Secretary on progress even though operational offices are not
    typically part of the Office of the Secretary. This move completes the
    expected transition, aligning with Congressional expectations.
        OTPP is working with a broad range of stakeholders to implement,
    mature, and strengthen its terrorism prevention programs and to improve
    collaboration and coordination of Department activities. With this
    institutionalized position, OTPP has greater resources and support to
    strengthen the critical mission of terrorism prevention. OTPP's
    alignment with OPE entities, including the Office of Intergovernmental
    Affairs (IGA), the Private Sector Office (PSO), and the Office of State
    and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), enhances engagement opportunities
    with stakeholders across the country.
        This renewed purpose emphasizes the mutual benefits of partnership
    tools and objectives to advance DHS terrorism prevention programs. This
    includes enhancing education and community awareness regarding the
    threat, providing resources to support terrorism prevention
    stakeholders where applicable, coordinating relevant DHS terrorism
    prevention activities, actively countering terrorist radicalization and
    recruitment, and promoting early warning so that our front-line
    defenders can intervene to stop attacks and help prevent individuals
    from going down the path to violence.
        Question 2b. What factors drove your reexamination of CVE?
        Answer. The persistent and evolving nature of the terror threat
    demanded that we reexamine terrorism prevention programs and assess how
    they could be strengthened. Groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and its affiliates are focused on inspiring,
    enabling, and directing attacks in our homeland, including by crowd-
    sourcing attacks on social media and through the use of secure
    communications to avoid detection. They are promoting do-it-yourself
    tactics to more easily spread terror, such as the use of vehicle
    ramming, guns, knives, and other methods. DHS has made it a top
    priority to actively prevent terrorists from radicalizing and
    recruiting individuals to violence within the homeland, and the
    Department sought to ensure terrorism-prevention activities were
    keeping up with the danger.
        The following have been key principles guiding our reexamination:
       Combating all forms of terror--in a threat- and risk-based,
            intelligence-driven manner;
       Prioritizing support to front-line defenders;
       Measuring and evaluating effectiveness;
       Complementing broader efforts to prevent other forms of
            violence in our communities; and
       Preserving civil rights and civil liberties.
        Question 2c. What is the plan and time line for the CVE grant
    program?
        Answer. The plan and time line for the CVE grant program remain
    unchanged. By way of review, former Secretary Kelly approved the CVEGP
    awards in June 2017, making 26 grants totaling $10 million for 2 years
    of programming to organizations that will work to improve the security
    of our communities and prevent terrorism. Performance started on August
    1, 2017 and will run through at least the end of July 2019. First
    quarterly reports were due on October 30, covering August and
    September. Much of the activity in the first 2 months of performance
    has been administrative start-up work, training development, content
    development, community outreach, and planning. At this time, all the
    projects appear to be on a solid footing to deliver their core work in
    the next few quarters, and to begin reporting output and outcome
    measures in the late spring/early summer 2018.
        Question 2d. Has DHS articulated an official strategy to replace
    the previous administration's CVE strategy?
        Question 2e. If not, does DHS intend to develop a new strategy?
        Question 2f. If so, when will this strategy be delivered and
    implemented?
        Answer. DHS is conducting an in-depth review of its OTPP-run
    terrorism prevention programs to ensure our efforts, and those of our
    Federal, State, local, territorial, and private partners, are
    integrated and coordinated to best address the threat. The resulting
    posture will outline goals, objectives, and approaches for preventing
    the radicalization and inspiration to violence from all forms of
    violent extremism. Currently, DHS anticipates four primary lines of
    effort: (1) Prioritizing threat awareness through education and
    community engagement; (2) focusing on counter-recruitment; (3)
    emphasizing the importance of early warning; and (4) focusing on
    improving intervention and countering terrorist recidivism.
        Pursuant to the most recent National Defense Authorization Act, the
    administration is required to produce a National strategy on countering
    violent extremism. DHS will participate in the development of this
    strategy and develop clear guidance on how it is implementing the
    administration's terrorism-prevention policies.
        Question 2g. How will the new Office of Terrorism Prevention
    Partnerships conduct its training for field representatives differently
    than past DHS CVE efforts?
        Answer. OTPP field representation and the development and
    deployment of community awareness trainings have not been altered at
    this time. OTPP continues to work with other DHS components and its
    interagency partners to develop, update, and deploy Community Awareness
    Briefings and other training packages when requested in the field.
    However, we are actively examining ways to help States and localities
    stand up terrorism prevention programs Nation-wide, as it is clear one
    of the primary shortfalls of CVE policy previously was that such
    efforts were too centrally managed and failed to keep pace with the
    diffuse nature of the threat.
        Question 3. In DHS testimony on November 30, 2017, we heard that
    ``One of the major things we've done very recently is open the Office
    of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships, which is making sure every piece
    of information we get, the State and local governments have, to be at
    the point to notice and deal with any types of hate crimes and these
    groups. And training and information sharing--is two of our major
    efforts.'' Please explain in detail what this means and how this
    process will be carried out.
        Answer. As I noted before the committee, in addition to
    counterterrorism, the Department is re-dedicating itself to terrorism
    prevention. Americans do not want us to simply stop violent plots, they
    want us to keep them from materializing in the first place. As part of
    this effort, we have launched an end-to-end review of all DHS
    ``countering violent extremism,'' or CVE, programs, projects, and
    activities. In the coming months we will work to continue to ensure our
    approach to terrorism prevention is risk-based and intelligence-driven,
    focused on effectiveness, and provides appropriate support to those on
    the front lines who we rely on to spot signs of terrorist activity.
        DHS efforts to combat terrorist recruitment and radicalization to
    violence fall into four primary lanes.
        First, we are prioritizing education and community awareness.
    Before terrorists have a chance to reach into communities and inspire
    potential recruits, we are making sure those communities are aware of
    the threat. This includes extensive outreach to States and localities,
    awareness briefings, intelligence products regarding threats and
    trends, and training for front-line defenders and civic leaders.
        Second, we are focused on counter-recruitment. We know that
    terrorists will continue to seek new followers through persuasion and
    propaganda, which is why we must support efforts to actively push back
    against such solicitations. This includes continuing to encourage non-
    governmental organizations to counter-message terrorist propaganda,
    leveraging credible voices to dissuade potential recruits, working with
    social media companies and supporting their efforts to make on-line
    platforms more hostile to terrorists, and more.
        Third, we are emphasizing the importance of early warning. Even
    with strong community awareness and counter-recruitment, terrorist
    groups will succeed in reaching at least some susceptible minds. That
    is why we are working to detect individuals on the path to
    radicalization to violence earlier. This includes building trust
    between communities and law enforcement, expanding ``If You See
    Something, Say SomethingTM''-style campaigns, and ensuring
    there are appropriate and confidential means for the public to provide
    tips regarding suspicious activity.
        Finally, DHS and DOJ are looking at what more can be done to
    intervene to prevent suspects from committing acts of violence and also
    to counter terrorist recidivism. It is inevitable that some individuals
    will be recruited, radicalized, and attempt to engage in terrorist
    activity. So we want to make sure that the right stakeholders can
    intervene before they do so--and that once they are caught they do not
    return to violence. Our grant programs have focused on some of these
    intervention efforts, and DHS is also working with interagency partners
    on ways to better combat terrorist recidivism.
        This summer the Department announced the award of $10 million in
    grants to 26 organizations to advance terrorism prevention efforts.
    These grants will help inform our efforts and illuminate what works--
    and what doesn't work--in combating terrorist recruitment and
    radicalization in our homeland. We look forward to sharing the results
    with Congress.
        I also want to note that although our terrorism prevention
    activities will be risk-based, they will also be flexible enough to
    address all forms of terrorism. Any ideologically-motivated violence
    which is designed to coerce people or their governments should be
    condemned, prevented, and countered. That is why our approach must be
    agile so it can help mitigate everything from the global jihadist
    threat to the scourge of violent racial supremacy. It must also engage
    and not alienate communities targeted by these violent extremists. This
    means working with people of all races, religions, and creeds as
    partners in the fight against terrorism.
        Question 4. Do you believe that HVEs present an emerging threat to
    the homeland? How can we be more effective in preventing these attacks
    and ``lone-wolf'' attacks?
        Answer. The Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) threat remains a
    primary focus of terrorism prevention efforts, and the work of the
    Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTPP) focuses on improving
    efforts to bring an end to the radicalization and recruitment to
    violence by individuals in the United States. To that end, OTPP
    constantly re-assesses its programs against the latest information and
    research on these topics. For example, recent DHS Science & Technology
    Directorate-funded research has noted that law enforcement plays an
    important role in early detection and disruption of plots in the United
    States, and that early warning and awareness by friends and family is
    also important. DHS is working to support these early warning systems,
    particularly mechanisms that allow for bystanders to report early
    concerns and bolster intervention efforts, through our current research
    funding as well as through our grant programs such as the CVE grant
    program. DHS also works closely with our partners at the FBI through
    the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) that bring Federal, State, and
    local agencies together on one team. The JTTFs allow members to
    leverage one another's skills, authorities, and accesses to prevent and
    disrupt terrorist attacks across the country. The JTTFs also build
    relationships between the community and law enforcement on the front
    line, which is particularly important to combatting terrorism.
        Question 5a. The FBI and DHS produced an intelligence bulletin on
    May 11, 2017, that purported to warn about the ``persistent threat of
    lethal violence'' from white supremacist groups. The data reported in
    the bulletin claimed there were 49 homicides in 26 attacks from 2000 to
    2016, but these numbers are significantly lower than those reported by
    academics who study this issue.
        Please provide a full list of the 49 homicides in 26 attacks from
    2000 to 2016.
        Answer. DHS defers to the Department of Justice and the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation as this is their data.
        Question 5b. Do these discrepancies affect local law enforcement
    efforts to police such groups?
        Answer. This is a local law enforcement question. DHS defers to
    local law enforcement agencies as to how they deploy investigative and
    financial resources to combat domestic terrorism.
        Question 6a. Between 1977 and 2016, there have been hundreds of
    crimes committed against reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers, including at least 11 murders, 26 attempted
    murders, 42 bombings, 186 arsons, 98 attempted bombings or arsons, and
    411 clinic invasions. Please provide any data that your agency has used
    to track crimes targeting reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers.
        Does violence aimed at reproductive health care clinics, doctors,
    patients, and staff fall under the Federal statutory definition of
    ``domestic terrorism''?
        If not, when would anti-abortion violence rise to the level of
    ``domestic terrorism''?
        Answer. DHS does not track crimes related to reproductive health
    care facilities or abortion providers. The FBI is the lead agency for
    the investigation of both criminal and terrorism acts and is better
    positioned to respond to this question.
        We would defer to DOJ for this response.
        See answer above.
        Question 6b. Are the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and
    the National Counterterrorism Center currently committing funding and
    staff to investigate violence against reproductive health care clinics,
    doctors, patients, and staff in order to identify whether any patterns
    and practices emerge?
        If yes, please explain what level of personnel and budget is being
    provided.
        If not, why not?
        Answer. We would defer to the FBI and NCTC for further response.
        The Attorney General, generally acting through the FBI, has lead
    responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or threats
    where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the
    United States.
            Questions From Honorable Val Demings for Elaine C. Duke
        Question 1. Most of the administration's CVE efforts to date have
    been focused on Muslim communities. However, recent reports, arrests,
    and convictions indicate that new recruits to ISIS do not have a
    particular ethnic background and are not always familiar with Islam.
    Moreover, as we have seen in the recent tragic events in
    Charlottesville and Las Vegas, not all ``extremists'' are adherents of
    Islam. How are the CVE programs being tailored to target a wider
    audience to reach would-be perpetrators of extremist attacks?
        Answer. As underscored in my testimony, the Department's terrorism
    prevention efforts address all forms of terrorism. DHS constantly
    updates our organizational and operational response to the threat from
    radicalization and recruitment to violence in the United States, and so
    acts to ensure its terrorism prevention programs focus on the threat,
    not a particular geographic, religious, or other community.
        Question 2a. The agencies engaged in CVE programs have both law
    enforcement and intelligence-gathering responsibilities. However, the
    purpose of CVE programs is to foster substantive relationships with the
    community and to reach vulnerable populations prior to radicalization.
    Are there are other Federal agencies that are better equipped to carry
    out that mission?
        Answer. OTPP specifically does not have a law enforcement or
    intelligence gathering mission. DHS community partnership terrorism
    prevention efforts do not include gathering intelligence for the
    purpose of potential criminal prosecution. OTPP works closely with a
    number of non-security Federal agencies that may have equities and
    interest in supporting terrorism prevention efforts through the
    office's leadership of the interagency CVE Task Force. These include,
    but are not limited to, the Department of Health and Human Services,
    Department of Education, and the U.S. Digital Service. To make their
    contributions effective, OTPP believes that continued and regular
    coordination through the CVE Task Force is required to build an
    effective interagency response to the threat. However, it is also
    important to note that State and local law enforcement agencies must
    remain a part of this effort, especially given their community policing
    and engagement activities that support numerous forms of violence
    prevention without gathering intelligence for criminal justice or other
    purposes.
        Question 2b. How do you disengage your law enforcement and
    intelligence-gathering mission when participating in CVE activities?
        Answer. The DHS terrorism prevention programs that are operated by
    OTPP do not have a law enforcement or intelligence-gathering mission,
    as OTPP terrorism prevention efforts do not include gathering
    intelligence for the purpose of potential criminal prosecution.
        Question 2c. What safeguards are in place to protect the civil
    liberties of the communities that your agencies are engaging?
        Answer. OTPP works closely with our DHS Office of Civil Rights and
    Civil Liberties to ensure that we protect the civil liberties of the
    communities with whom we are engaging.
          Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Christopher A. Wray
        Question 1a. How many supervisory agents or analysts are in the
    entire FBI?
        Question 1b. Do you think that number is adequate?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2a. What is the ratio of supervisory positions in the
    field versus at headquarters?
        Question 2b. Do you think that ratio is adequate?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 3. How many levels of command are between desk analysts
    and the director, to get the director to sign off on substantial
    techniques?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 4. How many levels of command are between the line level
    and director?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 5a. How many assistant directors are in the FBI?
        Question 5b. How have the numbers of assistant directors grown from
    2 to 16 since about 2001?
        Question 5c. Do you believe that this growth is justified?
        Question 5d. What do you plan to do about it?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 6a. Where did the FBI get the personnel to staff these
    assistant directorates at headquarters?
        Question 6b. Did the personnel come from supervisory agents and
    analysts in the field?
        Question 6c. Do you consider it effective to take an agent who
    worked 3-6 years on a case in the field, and remove that agent from the
    field to spend the rest of his or her career as a bureaucrat?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 7. Why did highly-trained field agents with specific
    skills seek transfers to cities where their skills were not needed?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 8. Why has the FBI leadership reassigned end-of-career
    bureaucrat supervisory agents, who have spent years out of the field,
    and sent them back to run field investigations?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 9. The Secret Service has thwarted 100 percent of
    terrorist attacks and assassination attempts on those under its
    protection since 1981. How many terrorist attacks has the FBI thwarted
    since that time?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 10a. How many ``lone wolf'' terrorists were known to the
    FBI before they murdered and maimed innocent Americans?
        Why is this number so high?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 10b. If you have so many agents and analysts, why does the
    FBI let so many extremists remain under observation so that they are
    free to kill?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 11. How many successful terrorist attacks did the FBI know
    about before they occurred?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 12. If the FBI used Secret Service methods against its
    targets, would the FBI have had greater success?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 13. It appears that the FBI, for the past decade or more,
    has taken a political or policy decision not to move against
    individuals who espouse violent jihad in this country, and has chosen
    to wait until after not-yet-violent jihadists go violent before the FBI
    takes action. Why is this so?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 14a. Are you satisfied that FBI training is free from bias
    that would blind agents and analysts to certain ideological threats?
        Question 14b. Will you commit to a full-ranging review of FBI
    training curriculum concerning domestic terrorist threats, including
    jihadists?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 15a. Does the FBI have a doctrine and mechanism for
    considering foreign non-governmental organizations that function like
    intelligence services, to be essentially a non-governmental foreign
    intelligence service?
        Question 15b. How can Congress help you improve these capabilities?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 16a. How many terrorists in the United States have had
    connections with, indoctrination or training from, or other ties with
    the Muslim Brotherhood or its operatives and fronts?
        Question 16b. Do you think the Muslim Brotherhood should be
    designated as a terrorist organization? Why or why not?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 17a. What is the formal or informal name of the FBI
    grouping that had been assigned to monitor the Muslim Brotherhood in
    the United States?
        When was that grouping created?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 17b. How many agents and analysts were assigned to that
    grouping at its peak?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 17c. How many agents and analysts are assigned to monitor
    the Muslim Brotherhood and its fronts and affiliates now?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 17d. Who in the FBI made the decision to slash monitoring
    of the Muslim Brotherhood and its fronts and affiliates?
        The committee is told that Deputy Director McCabe made the
    decision. Why is he still there?
        Was the decision fact-driven or need-driven, or was it politically
    or ideologically driven?
        When was that decision made?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 18. Does the FBI use membership in the Muslim Brotherhood
    or its fronts or controlled organizations as criteria when evaluating
    the recruitment of FBI agents, analysts, contractors, and personnel?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 19a. When did the FBI admit known Muslim Brotherhood
    operatives and assets to train agents and analysts?
        What has been the FBI's screening procedures against Muslim
    Brotherhood operatives and assets seeking to influence the FBI through
    training and other programs?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 19b. What are the FBI's successes over the past 10 years
    in preventing Muslim Brotherhood operatives and agents from penetrating
    the Federal Government?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 19c. How many Muslim Brotherhood loyalists are employed as
    FBI agents, analysts, and staff?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 20. Does the FBI consider Russia to be an ally against
    Islamic-inspired terrorism?
        How has the FBI relied on the Russian security and intelligence
    services for information on terrorists who threaten the United States?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 21a. I think all of us want to salute the FBI for its
    brilliant Operation Ghost Stories, which tracked a Russian SVR
    ``illegals'' penetration network for about a decade, ending in 2010.
        How does the FBI describe the difference between counterespionage
    and counterintelligence?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 21b. What is the percentage of FBI resources devoted to
    counterespionage, as opposed to counterintelligence?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 22. How many Chinese influence operations--not espionage
    operations--has the FBI uncovered or disrupted over the past 10 years?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 23. What is the FBI's assessment of the resources that the
    Russian and Chinese intelligence services are using to conduct covert
    influence operations aimed at the American public and leadership?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 24a. Did the FBI exhaust all reasonable means to complete
    a full damage assessment of the Robert Hanssen penetration?
        A witness has come forward to state that he attempted on multiple
    occasions to alert the Hanssen Damage Assessment Team of compromises to
    FBI methods against Chinese intelligence operations, and that the FBI
    was not interested. Would you comment?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 24b. Witnesses say that FBI Director Mueller wanted the
    Hanssen Damage Assessment Team to wrap up quickly and shut down because
    it was uncovering so much information damaging to the FBI. Would you
    comment?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 24c. How confident is the FBI that the Russians have made
    no further Hanssen-style penetrations of the FBI or other Federal
    agencies?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 24d. How does the FBI arrive at such a level of
    confidence?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 25a. Are you satisfied with the quality and thoroughness
    of background investigations for Government contractors to receive
    security clearances?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 25b. How can these background investigations be improved?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 26a. What criminal and National security investigations
    did the FBI conduct in to Chinese hacking of the Office of Personnel
    Management's database, that included all Classified information on
    individuals who had applied for or received clearances?
        Is/are those investigations still under way?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 26b. Why were no criminal charges recommended for the
    Justice Department to pursue?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27a. How is the FBI's foreign defector program working?
    Does the FBI have sufficient human and material resources to attract
    foreign defectors, debrief them, and help them start new lives without
    threat of revenge or assassination?
        Why did the FBI not seek to induce any of the 10 SVR agents
    (illegals) arrested in 2010 under Operation Ghost Stories to defect?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27b. Why did the FBI go along with the near-immediate
    repatriation of the 10 SVR illegals to Russia after they were arrested,
    and not push for a better trade with Moscow, or other concessions?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27c. Since the United States has been squeezing members of
    Putin's inner circle, what is the FBI's strategy to induce more
    defections from the Russian services and political leadership?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27d. Why did Russian defector Mikhail Lesin, a longtime
    Putin insider, begin talks with the FBI to defect in about 2015?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27e. Was Lesin under FBI supervision in October-November
    2015?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27f. Lesin died a violent death at the Dupont Circle Hotel
    in November, 2015. The Russian government seemed undisturbed by the
    death and immediately dismissed Lesin's death as due to natural causes.
    A lengthy medical examination ruled in 2016 that he died of multiple
    blunt-force trauma to the head, neck, torso, and extremities. The cause
    of death was later said to have been due to natural causes.
       How does the FBI account for this discrepancy?
       Why did the FBI fail to protect Lesin as he negotiated his
            defection?
       Do you think that the Russian government may have Lesin
            assassinated?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 28. We understand that the upper management of the FBI,
    until your appointment as director, was the cause of unusual morale
    problems in field offices across the country. What do you intend to do
    to improve FBI morale?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 29. From a National security perspective, do you think
    it's an urgent priority for the FBI to consolidate to a new
    headquarters?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 30. The GSA and FBI have been working for years on the FBI
    headquarters consolidation project, and in July announced that they
    would cancel procurement due to lack of sufficient funding. Does the
    FBI have a planned viable site for the new headquarters?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 31. How can the FBI combine headquarters consolidation
    with managerial and training reforms to improve the Bureau's
    capabilities against hostile foreign intelligence, subversion, and
    terrorism, and other threats to homeland security?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 32. What steps has the FBI taken to reverse the Obama
    administration's purge of training courses & information about Islam,
    jihad, shariah & the Muslim Brotherhood?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 33. What training programs has the FBI instituted on these
    topics since the beginning of the Trump administration?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 34. Who specifically by name & affiliation are the
    contract training instructors the FBI uses to provide instruction to
    its agents about the domestic threat from the Islamic Movement?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 35. Please describe in at least general terms what
    programs the FBI currently implements to monitor potentially seditious
    activity inside U.S. mosques & Islamic Centers known to be affiliated
    w/the Muslim Brotherhood. Does the FBI currently have a law enforcement
    objective and program to investigate material support to terrorism as
    enabled by the financial institution of zakat, which we know under
    Islamic Law to be a funding mechanism for jihad terror?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 36. Antifa operates across the United States in ways that
    involve at least potentially criminal interstate activities, such as
    inciting a riot & conspiracy to incite a riot. What is the FBI doing to
    counter Antifa, including to investigate & shut down its funding
    sources?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 37. Understanding that there is a ``Red-Green Axis'' of
    domestic enemies that include the Muslim Brotherhood, the Black Lives
    Matter movement & myriad anarchist/communist entities operating in a
    collaborative way in the United States, what steps has the FBI taken to
    confront that Axis?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 38. Please describe your understanding of Antifa, its
    component elements, ideology, international connections, tactics & the
    FBI's operational plan to counter its activities & influence.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 39. Does the FBI have an organized training program for
    its agencies & officers that familiarizes them with the elements,
    ideology & operations of the Red-Green Axis?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 40. If so, please describe that training program. If not,
    why not & when do you expect to have such a program in place?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
             Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for
                              Christopher A. Wray
        Question 1a. The FBI has previously opened investigations into
    leaders of the Black Lives Matter Movement. Could you explain whether
    Black Lives Matter members fall under the umbrella of Black Identity
    Extremists?
        Question 1b. Does the FBI consider the Black Lives Matter movement
    a violent extremist movement?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2a. Is it a priority for you to ensure that intelligence
    products are free from racial, cultural, and religious biases?
        Question 2b. Will the Bureau conduct a comprehensive racial,
    cultural, and religious review of all intelligence products and
    materials within the next year?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 3. Are far right-wing groups responsible for the most
    domestic terrorist acts and attempted domestic terrorist acts in the
    United States? Please explain.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 4. Please provide a full breakdown of the number of open
    domestic terrorism assessments, preliminary investigations, and full
    investigations. For comparison, provide the same information for
    international terrorism assessments, preliminary investigations, and
    full investigations.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 5a. Being that there is no criminal statute of ``domestic
    terrorism,'' how does the FBI track charges stemming from domestic
    terrorism investigations?
        Question 5b. For instance, is there data that tracks how many cases
    investigated as domestic terrorism result in murder charges, or
    racketeering charges, etc.?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 6a. It is often said that the United States cannot rely on
    investigations and arrests to thwart terrorism in the homeland.
        What is the FBI doing to terms of CVE programing and operations?
        Question 6b. Please confirm, FBI has dismantled and ended all
    operations related to Shared Responsibility Committees program.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 7a. In June 2014, the DOJ, under former Attorney General
    Holder, announced the reestablishment of its Domestic Terrorism
    Executive Committee, which had been defunct for several years. The
    committee includes DOJ leadership and is co-chaired by a member of the
    U.S. Attorney community, the DOJ National Security Division, and the
    FBI. It is designed to promote information sharing and collaboration in
    Federal efforts to fight domestic terrorism. Additionally, in April,
    Attorney General Sessions established a Hate Crimes Subcommittee as
    part of DOJ's Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety.
        Please provide an update on the work of this group.
        Question 7b. What specifically is the FBI's role?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 8a. Do you believe that HVEs present an emerging threat to
    the homeland?
        Question 8b. How can we be more effective in preventing these
    attacks and ``lone wolf'' attacks''?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 9a. The FBI and DHS produced an intelligence bulletin on
    May 11, 2017, that purported to warn about the ``persistent threat of
    lethal violence'' from white supremacist groups. The data reported in
    the bulletin claimed there were 49 homicides in 26 attacks from 2000 to
    2016, but these numbers are significantly lower than those reported by
    academics who study this issue.
        Please provide a full list of the 49 homicides in 26 attacks from
    2000 to 2016.
        Question 9b. How do you account for these discrepancies?
        Question 9c. Do these discrepancies affect local law enforcement
    efforts to police such groups?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 10a. Between 1977 and 2016, there have been hundreds of
    crimes committed against reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers, including at least 11 murders, 26 attempted
    murders, 42 bombings, 186 arsons, 98 attempted bombings or arsons, and
    411 clinic invasions. Please provide any data that your agency has used
    to track crimes targeting reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers.
        Does violence aimed at reproductive health care clinics, doctors,
    patients, and staff fall under the Federal statutory definition of
    ``domestic terrorism''?
        If not, when would anti-abortion violence rise to the level of
    ``domestic terrorism''?
        Question 10b. Are the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and
    the National Counterterrorism Center currently committing funding and
    staff to investigate violence against reproductive health care clinics,
    doctors, patients, and staff in order to identify whether any patterns
    and practices emerge?
       If yes, please explain what level of personnel and budget is
            being provided.
       If not, why not?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Questions From Honorable Val Butler Demings for Christopher A. Wray
        Question 1. Most of the administration's CVE efforts to date have
    been focused on Muslim communities. However, recent reports, arrests,
    and convictions indicate that new recruits to ISIS do not have a
    particular ethnic background and are not always familiar with Islam.
    Moreover, as we have seen in the recent tragic events in
    Charlottesville and Las Vegas, not all ``extremists'' are adherents of
    Islam. How are the CVE programs being tailored to target a wider
    audience to reach would-be perpetrators of extremist attacks?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2a. The agencies engaged in CVE programs have both law
    enforcement and intelligence-gathering responsibilities. However, the
    purpose of CVE programs is to foster substantive relationships with the
    community and to reach vulnerable populations prior to radicalization.
        Are there are other Federal agencies that are better equipped to
    carry out that mission?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2b. How do you disengage your law enforcement and
    intelligence-gathering mission when participating in CVE activities?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2c. What safeguards are in place to protect the civil
    liberties of the communities that your agencies are engaging?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
         Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Nicholas J. Rasmussen
        Question 1. What do you consider to be the most critical threat to
    U.S. National security today?
        Answer. Within the counterterrorism mission space, the National
    Counterterrorism Center believes that the most immediate terrorist
    threat to the homeland is the threat of violence carried out by Home-
    grown Violent Extremists (HVEs)--a threat we expect will persist
    through the next year.
        Question 2. Given that terrorism is merely a tactic--and thus, we
    are not fighting terrorism--whom would you say are the most dangerous
    enemies we face today & why?
        Answer. We believe that HVEs pose the most immediate terrorism-
    related threat in the homeland. The individualized nature of the
    radicalization and mobilization to violence process makes it difficult
    to identify in advance and disrupt individuals seeking to commit acts
    of terrorism. Over the next year, we expect that most HVEs will
    continue to focus on soft targets, while still considering traditional
    targets, such as military personnel, law enforcement, and other symbols
    of the U.S. Government. Additionally, networks aligned with the
    predominant global Sunni and Shia terrorist groups--ISIS, al-Qaeda, and
    Lebanese Hizballah--remain potent transnational threats to U.S. global
    interests. In particular, ISIS's intent to target aviation poses a
    continuing threat to the United States and other partners world-wide.
        Question 3a. Would you agree that the United States faces a
    domestic insurgency from the forces of Islamic jihad?
        If so, what do you think are the most urgent steps the United
    States must take to protect ourselves from that threat?
        Question 3b. If not, why not & what would you say is the most
    critical domestic security threat we face at this time?
        Answer. NCTC believes that the United States is not facing a
    domestic insurgency from Islamic terrorist elements. We believe that
    the perpetrators of acts of terrorism in the homeland, who in some
    cases have been inspired by Sunni violent extremist ideologies, have
    generally not been directed by Foreign Terrorism Organizations. HVEs in
    the United States are not typically networked and are geographically
    dispersed with no major population densities; a central command
    authority does not direct and/or coordinate operations; and as a group,
    they do not present a threat to the functioning of government, either
    State or local.
        Question 4. Islamic jihad terror spans the globe & crosses national
    borders at will, both in the movement of people & by way of the
    internet. What are the steps you believe most critical for the NCTC to
    implement in order to stay ahead of the global Islamic Movement & its
    myriad domestic U.S. operatives?
        Answer. We believe it is critical for NCTC and our Intelligence
    Community (IC) counterparts to strengthen our biometric collection,
    sharing, and screening capabilities, and to constantly look for ways to
    adapt and enhance our processes as new technologies and sources of
    information become available. In addition, as terrorists look to move
    out of conflict zones and seek refuge in other countries, we need to
    expand our information-sharing relationships with foreign partner
    intelligence, law enforcement, and border security services as they
    pertain to known or suspected terrorists, and when necessary, offer or
    provide guidance on implementing advanced screening technologies to
    ensure we are identifying these individuals well in advance of any
    attempts to travel to the homeland.
        As terrorist groups increasingly take to the internet to expand
    their global support base, it will be critical for our IC, State,
    local, and private-sector partners to take action in addressing
    terrorists' exploitation of U.S. technologies. During the past year, we
    have expanded our capacity to better understand how terrorists are
    operating on-line and continue to share those insights within the IC
    and with technology-sector companies to better inform their independent
    efforts to take action against violent extremist propaganda. We are
    also providing intelligence support to partners in the Department of
    Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Global
    Engagement Center and elsewhere who are working to apply these insights
    to support military operations, counter-messaging campaigns, and law
    enforcement disruptions.
        Question 5. Please describe your understanding of Antna's
    international networks & how NCTC acts to counter them.
        Answer. We defer to FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    for a response to this question, as they are the primary organizations
    in the U.S. Government responsible for domestic terrorism. In general,
    NCTC ensures that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive
    all-source intelligence support needed to accomplish their assigned
    activities, including to execute their counterterrorism plans or
    perform independent, alternative analysis.
       Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Nicholas J.
                                   Rasmussen
        Question 1a. Do you believe that HVEs present an emerging threat to
    the homeland?
        Answer. The first recognized HVE attack was conducted in July 2002,
    and since that time, there have been at least 25 more attacks. We saw
    an increase in the number of attacks with the announcement of ISIS'
    caliphate in 2014. We continue to face a persistent threat from HVEs,
    as individuals heed calls for attacks from ISIS, al-Qaeda, and these
    groups' branches and on-line supporters. NCTC believes that HVEs are
    motivated by a combination of factors, including terrorist propaganda,
    extremist ideology, grievances against the U.S. Government's actions,
    and personal factors such as unmet psychological needs that can cause
    an individual to seek such things as adventure or a sense of purpose.
    HVEs are often self-initiating, making their plotting hard to detect if
    they minimize statements of support for extremist groups and refrain
    from reaching out to like-minded individuals for support or capability
    building. HVEs most often operate alone or with one close associate or
    family member and tend to gravitate toward soft targets and simple
    tactics that do not require advanced skills or outside training.
        Question 1b. How can we be more effective in preventing these
    attacks and ``lone-wolf'' attacks?
        Answer. Developing and resourcing a spectrum of locally-tailored
    prevention and intervention programs that increase public awareness of
    terrorist recruitment, build trust between communities and law
    enforcement, and leverage a multi-disciplinary approach will be key to
    enhancing our ability to prevent lone-actor attacks. Departments and
    agencies currently lack sufficient funding to develop and sustain
    prevention programming and initiatives, which constitute about 0.01
    percent of the overall annual U.S. CT budget.
       Prevention programs are most effective when they include and
            support educators, mental health professionals, local
            government officials, religious leaders, social service
            providers, and others who are involved in public safety.
       Prevention programs that proactively address root causes of
            mobilization generally lead to more durable, long-term
            solutions.
        To support appropriate agencies in fulfillment of their
            responsibilities to disseminate terrorism information, NCTC
            offers several programs to increase awareness of radicalization
            and recruitment and to empower State and local partners to
            develop locally-tailored CT programs. These specific tools
            include the Community Awareness Brief (CAB) and the Terrorism
            Prevention Planning Workshop. NCTC and FBI case study research
            has found that in 75 percent of HVE cases at least one person--
            usually a peer or family member--became aware of a subject's
            violent extremist views or activities, but more than half did
            not report their concerns to law enforcement. Academic research
            suggests these individuals do not report their concerns to
            Countering Violent Extremist service providers or law
            enforcement primarily because they do not want to get their
            friend, family member, or themselves in trouble; however, we
            believe opportunities exist to increase reporting by improving
            public understanding of the factors that contribute to
            radicalization and mobilization to violence, as well as
            enabling multiple options to report concerning behavior.
        Question 2a. The FBI and DHS produced an intelligence bulletin on
    May 11, 2017 that purported to warn about the ``persistent threat of
    lethal violence'' from white supremacist groups. The data reported in
    the bulletin claimed that there were 49 homicides in 26 attacks from
    2000 to 2016, but these numbers are significantly lower than those
    reported by academics who study this issue.
        Please provide a full list of the 49 homicides in 26 attacks from
    2000 to 2016.
        Question 2b. How do you account for these discrepancies?
        Question 2c. Do these discrepancies affect local law enforcement
    efforts to police such groups?
        Answer. NCTC defers to FBI and DHS to address this question, as
    they are the primary organizations in the U.S. Government responsible
    for domestic terrorism.
        Question 3a. Between 1977 and 2016, there have been hundreds of
    crimes committed against reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers, including at least 11 murders, 26 attempted
    murders, 42 bombings, 86 arsons, 98 attempted bombings or arsons, and
    411 clinic invasions. Please provide any data that your agency has used
    to track crimes targeting reproductive health care facilities and
    abortion providers.
        Does violence aimed at reproductive health care clinics, doctors,
    patients, and staff fall under the Federal statutory definition of
    ``domestic terrorism''?
        If not, when would anti-abortion violence rise to the level of
    ``domestic terrorism''?
        Question 3b. Are the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and
    the National Counterterrorism Center currently committing funding and
    staff to investigate violence against reproductive health care clinics,
    doctors, patients, and staff in order to identify whether any patterns
    and practices emerge?
        If yes, please explain what level of personnel and budget is being
    provided.
        If not, why not?
        Answer. NCTC defers to FBI and DHS to address this question, as
    they are the primary organizations in the U.S. Government responsible
    for domestic terrorism.
     Questions From Honorable Val Butler Demings for Nicholas J. Rasmussen
        Question 1. Most of the administration's CVE efforts to date have
    been focused on Muslim communities. However, recent reports, arrests,
    and convictions indicate that new recruits to ISIS do not have a
    particular ethnic background and are not always familiar with Islam.
    Moreover, as we have seen in the recent tragic events in
    Charlottesville and Las Vegas, not all ``extremists'' are adherents of
    Islam. How are the CVE programs being tailored to target a wider
    audience to reach would-be perpetrators of extremist attacks?
        Answer. In response to growing demand from Federal, State, local,
    and community partners for tools and programs that reflect a
    comprehensive view of the domestic terrorist threat picture, NCTC and
    its other interagency partners worked with the interagency CVE Task
    Force in early 2017 to update all of our programs--including the
    Community Awareness Brief (CAB), the CAB Training Program, and
    Terrorism Prevention Planning Workshop--to ensure that they are
    responsive to the full spectrum of violent ideologies in the United
    States, from ISIS-inspired ideologies, to violent anarchist ideologies,
    to violent white supremacist ideologies. In support of DRS, Department
    of Justice (DOJ), and FBI, NCTC has integrated information on the full
    spectrum of violent extremist ideologies into our preventing terrorism
    workshops, which are presented to a wide variety of audiences and not
    just to any particular faith group.
        Question 2a. The agencies engaged in CVE programs have both law
    enforcement and intelligence-gathering responsibilities. However, the
    purpose of CVE programs is to foster substantive relationships with the
    community and to reach vulnerable populations prior to radicalization.
        Are there other Federal agencies that are better equipped to carry
    out that mission?
        Answer. In light of the dynamic threat posed by all forms of
    violent extremists targeting Americans, the whole-of-Government, not
    just security agencies, must respond with innovative approaches to
    prevent radicalization to violence in the United States. No one agency
    has all of the authorities or resources to tackle this on its own.
       The interagency CVE Task Force was established in January
            2016 to serve as a coordinating body to manage and synchronize
            the integration of whole-of-Government efforts to empower local
            partners to prevent violent extremism.
       The CVE Task Force was established to include full-time
            staff from NCTC, FBI, DHS, and DOI, as well as participation
            from non-security agencies including HHS, Education, State, and
            United States Agency for International Development (USAID.) As
            of fiscal year 2018, the CVE Task Force continued to seek the
            interagency staffing support and resources to execute its
            mission. The current levels of staffing have severely inhibited
            the Task Force's ability to operate, set policy objectives and
            coordinate whole-of-Government CVE issues.
        NCTC has supported the interagency--including DOJ, FBI, DHS, and
    the interagency CVE Task Force--to convene and facilitate Prevention
    initiatives, training, and tools to raise awareness and counter
    terrorist recruitment efforts.
        Question 2b. How do you disengage your law enforcement and
    intelligence-gathering mission when participating in CVE activities?
        Answer. NCTC, for its part, does not have a law enforcement
    mission. Additionally, the 2016 Strategic Implementation Plan for the
    National CVE Strategy clearly outlined a separation between community
    engagement and intelligence collection.
        Question 2c. What safeguards are in place to protect the civil
    liberties of the communities that your agencies are engaging?
        Answer. NCTC has instituted multiple safeguards to protect the
    civil liberties of members of the communities we engage. First, NCTC's
    staff involved in CVE activities do not have an intelligence collection
    function, therefore none of our staff would be engaging for that
    purpose. Second, only our staff who work on policy and/or strategy, and
    not intelligence analysis, conduct terrorism prevention briefings with
    communities. Third, all of the material we present is cleared by our
    civil rights office prior to distribution. Last, all of our training
    material has been vetted by the interagency to ensure it adheres to
    interagency civil rights and civil liberties standards.
             Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Richard Cohen
        Question 1. How does the SPLC work with a major internet search
    engine like Google to adjust its algorithms to produce search results
    that either highlight SPLC-designated hate groups, or push those
    results further down the search chain?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2. How does the SPLC work with Google or its subsidiaries,
    including YouTube, to modify search results of SPLC-designated people
    or groups?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 3. How does the SPLC work with Facebook, Twitter, and
    other social media to block, suspend, or ban individuals or groups the
    SPLC designates as ``haters?''
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 4. How does the SPLC work with internet companies like
    YouTube and Facebook to single out people and groups it designates as
    undesirable, and deprive them of revenues from advertisements,
    subscriptions, or payments?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 5. How does the SPLC work with credit card, money
    transfer, and banking services to deprive its designated
    ``undesirables'' from legitimate and lawful financial transactions and
    revenue receipts?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 6. Does the SPLC condemn attempts to pressure or persuade
    Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover, PayPal, Square, J.P.
    Morgan Chase, and other financial services companies to deprive
    innocent people and organizations, who are engaged in lawful activity,
    of lawful income?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 7. Since news organizations, research groups, and until
    recently, Federal agencies have used SPLC data to determine whether an
    organization is considered a hate group or an extremist group, what are
    your scientific methodologies and criteria for designating an
    organization as a ``hate group''?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 8. What are your scientific methodologies and criteria for
    designating an individual or organization as an ``extremist''?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 9. Is intent to overthrow the Constitution of the United
    States a major factor in the SPLC's designation of a person or
    organization as ``extremist''?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 10. What are the SPLC criteria for designating non-violent
    and peaceful groups like the Family Research Council as extremist, yet
    not designating violent groups like Antifa as extremist?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 11. Below are some individuals and organizations that the
    SPLC has listed as ``extremists'' or ``hate groups'' in your Field
    Guide to Anti-Muslim Extremists. and will ask you to describe the
    methodologies the SPLC has used to make those designations:
       Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee and victim of female
            genital mutilation. Why does SPLC classify her as an extremist?
       Steve Emerson, whom the SPLC denigrates as a ``self-
            described'' terrorism expert, when in fact he is a widely-
            regarded terrorism expert. None of the information the SPLC
            provides in its profile shows that Emerson is either ``anti-
            Muslim'' or an ``extremist.'' What is SPLC's basis for
            designating Emerson in those terms?
       Robert Muise, a free-speech attorney with the non-profit
            American Freedom Law Center. He has litigated to oppose
            unconstitutional Sharia law in the United States, and defended
            controversial figures on First Amendment grounds. Why does the
            SPLC consider him an ``anti-Muslim extremist''?
       Family Research Council, an organization dedicated to
            protecting traditional American values. What scientific
            methodology did the SPLC use to designate the FRC as an
            extremist or hate group?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 12. Why have you included in your hate groups list
    mainstream, non-violent public policy groups like the Family Research
    Council and public interest law firms like Alliance Defending Freedom,
    but not Antifa or Black Lives Matter, which actually call for violence
    against individuals?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 13. While I think many Americans would agree that some of
    the groups on your list, like the KKK, are objectionable, would you
    agree--yes or no--that you list some groups as haters or extremists
    simply because you find objectionable the fact that they are pro-
    Israel, pro-Christian, or pro-police?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 14. Do you stand by former SPLC employee Mark Potok's
    statement that a purpose of the SPLC Hate Group list is to ``destroy''
    the groups included on it?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 15. I want to calibrate your methodology by asking you to
    respond ``yes'' or ``no'' on whether the SPLC considers the following
    organizations to be hate groups or extremist groups:
       Antifa
       Workers World Party
       Revolutionary Communist Party
       Muslim Brotherhood
       ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh
       American Family Association
       Family Research Council
       Federation for American Immigration Reform
       Traditional Values Coalition
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 16. Are you aware that Floyd Lee Corkins, who was
    convicted of domestic terrorism in Federal court, used your hate map
    for his list of targets when he entered Family Research Council with
    the intention of killing as many of the people there as possible, and
    actually shot Leo Johnson, the building manager of Family Research
    Council?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 17. In 2012, Mr. Corkins, the domestic terrorist who shot
    the building manager of the Family Research Council, and who intended
    to murder as many Family Research Council staff as he could, said that
    the SPLC website inspired him to target the organization.
       Did the SPLC ever condemn the terrorist attack on the Family
            Research Council?
       Did the SPLC ever contact the Family Research Council to
            express its concern?
       Did the SPLC use the shooting as an opportunity to further
            attack FRC and make them even more a target for violence?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 18. In 2017, an armed violent extremist attempted to
    assassinate several Members of the U.S. Congress and Senate, severely
    wounding our colleague, Congressman Steve Scalise. The would-be
    assassin had ``liked'' the SPLC on social media, leading to concerns
    that the SPLC could have inspired him to try to murder Federal
    lawmakers, as the Family Research Council shooter had been inspired.
    What has SPLC done to ensure that its material does not radicalize
    people to become violent?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 19. How many of the groups you designate as ``hate''
    groups actually have fewer ties to domestic terrorist attacks then the
    SPLC itself?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 20. The SPLC has done considerable reporting on the
    extremist ``Unite the Right'' rally in Charlottesville last month that
    resulted in a clash between white supremacists and Antifa, the homicide
    of a protester, and the accidental deaths of two police officers. SPLC
    has a biography of Unite the Right organizer Jason Kessler, who SPLC
    terms as ``a relative newcomer to the white nationalist scene.'' SPLC
    goes back at least 12 years in Kessler's biography and draws from
    police reports. Then it says, ``Regardless of Kessler's past politics,
    the rightward shift in his views was first put on display in November
    2016 . . . ''. That was only 10 months ago.
       Why did the SPLC not describe Kessler's ``past politics''
            before November 2016?
       Is it because Kessler had, at least to that point, been a
            prominent leftist activist involved in ``progressive''
            politics, including voting for Barack Obama?
       Doesn't this selective reporting obscure the possibility
            that Kessler was more likely to have been a provocateur than a
            recent convert to ``white supremacist'' views he had until
            recently found anathema?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 21. What is SPLC's approach to Islamist and left-wing
    extremists who pose a danger to the public and the Nation?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 22. It is important to note for the record that the SPLC
    has identified the Nation of Islam as one of several ``incubators of
    radical fanaticism.'' Therefore, I am asking questions about the Muslim
    Brotherhood and whether it is also an incubator of radical fanaticism.
       A search of the SPLC's website does not find the SPLC to
            have identified the Muslim Brotherhood, or any of its fronts or
            controlled organizations, to be extremist groups or hate
            groups. Is this correct?
       Given that the Muslim Brotherhood's stated objective is a
            global caliphate, a dictatorship under the totalitarian Islamic
            law known as Sharia. Such a dictatorship would exterminate or
            repress all religious and political minorities, including other
            Muslims. Why does SPLC not consider this extremist?
       Establishment of a global caliphate requires the overthrow
            of the Constitution of the United States. Since the Muslim
            Brotherhood's end-state therefore requires the overthrow of the
            Constitution of the United States, does the SPLC not consider
            the Muslim Brotherhood to be an extremist organization that is
            dangerous to our country?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 23. On October 19 of this year, the Southern Poverty Law
    Center sent out a fundraising email, signed by Richard Cohen, that
    stated ``We've always believed it's important to take on groups like
    the FRC that have a foothold in the mainstream. In many ways, they're
    more dangerous to our country than hatemongers who wear robes and
    hoods.''
       Please explain Cohen's statement that mainstream
            conservative organizations are more dangerous than the KKK (ie,
            ``hatemongers who wear robes and hoods''), specifically the
            Family Research Council. Please cite the prevailing legal
            authority the SPLC uses to define ``dangerous'' in this
            statement.
       Please list which organizations the SPLC includes as
            ``groups like the FRC that have a foothold in the mainstream''
            and explain, for each one, why it is more dangerous than the
            KKK (i.e., ``hatemongers who wear robes and hoods'').
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 24. The SPLC has published numerous statements claiming
    that Donald Trump's campaign and election ``energized'' and
    ``coincided'' with a statistical increase in hate crimes and ``hate
    groups''. Here are two examples:
        Richard Cohen published an editorial on November 13, 2017 on the
    FBI's hate crime report, in which he stated [emphasis added]: ``The
    significant increase over the last 2 years coincides with Donald
    Trump's racist, xenophobic campaign and its immediate aftermath. We
    reported a surge in hate crimes and other bias-related incidents--many
    of them carried out in Trump's name--in the days after the election.
    The new FBI report confirms our findings, showing a 25 percent rise
    during the final 3 months of 2016.'' https://www.splcenter.org/news/
    2017/11/13/hate-crimes-rise-second-straight-year-anti-muslim-violence-
    soars-amid-president-trumps
        Similarly, in Richard Cohen's testimony before the committee
    November 30, 2017 he stated, ``the white supremacist movement has been
    energized by Mr. Trump's campaign, proof that Mr. Trump's campaign has
    `unearthed some demons,' to use Congressman Sanford's words.'' https://
    www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/cohen.homeland_security-final.pdf
        However, on November 27, 2017--3 days before Mr. Cohen's
    testimony--The Washington Post carried an article on statistical trends
    in reported hate crimes. The article stated:

    ``Those increases [i.e. increases in reported hate crimes] occurred
    alongside an increase in the number of hate groups nationally, as
    tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center. In 2014, the SPLC tracked
    784 hate groups. In 2016, the number rose to 917, up nearly 17 percent.
    While the SPLC argues that the increase is a function of right-wing
    groups being `energized' by Donald Trump's Presidential campaign, we
    hasten to note that there is no strong correlation between the
    frequency of victimization and politics. Many States in the Northeast
    showed higher rates of hate crimes in 2016. Nor was there a pattern in
    the increase from 2014 to 2016 by State.'' https://
    www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/27/why-treating-white-
    nationalists-as-normal-americans-is-unacceptable/?utm_term=.8d1af-
    4209d52.

       Why did Richard Cohen testify that there was a correlation
            between Donald Trump's campaign and increases in hate crimes 3
            days after The Washington Post demonstrated that this SPLC
            assertion is a false correlation?
       Will SPLC publish a retraction of their earlier claims about
            President Trump and hate crimes, including that made in the
            November 30 testimony before this committee, given The
            Washington Post's findings that refute the SPLC's claims?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 25. The annual SPLC hate map identifies towns across
    America as locations ``for hate groups.'' Local law enforcement
    agencies in many towns have expended significant resources to follow up
    on SPLC accusations that a ``hate group'' is in their communities.
    According to media reports, these agencies have found no evidence or
    only sparse or discredited evidence. Local newspapers have also
    documented a history of the SPLC's refusal to respond expeditiously to
    local law enforcement requests for evidence of SPLC's claims.
        Here are examples of five American towns that have refuted the
    SPLC's claims:
       In 2015, the Altamont, NY police, along with the FBI, the
            New York State Police, the Albany County Sheriff's Office, and
            the Guilderland Police Department, spent significant time
            trying to verify the SPLC's claim that a KKK group was in
            Altamont. They could find no evidence of the claim. According
            to The Altamont Enterprise, the police chief ``expressed
            frustration that he, along with members of other local law
            enforcement agencies, had not had calls returned from the
            Southern Poverty Law Center.'' The SPLC eventually did talk to
            the Altamont Enterprise and claimed that the SPLC's source was
            an anonymous ``law enforcement source,'' who, the SPLC stated,
            refused to talk to either the newspaper or local law
            enforcement. According to the Altamont Enterprise, all law
            enforcement agencies that the newspaper contacted said they
            were not the anonymous source. The mayor stated, ``The last
            thing I want to see happen is that the village's reputation as
            a wonderful, safe, and welcoming community is destroyed in the
            process of seeking to assess the validity of these claims.''
       April 2015: ``Is the KKK in Altamont?'' https://
            altamontenterprise.com/04022015/kkk-altamont
       In August 2017, two small towns in Michigan--Trenton and
            Wyandotte--disputed being called hate centers by the SPLC. The
            SPLC claimed a KKK group was in Trenton, and a Neo-Nazi group
            was in Wyandotte. In Trenton, a single individual, known to the
            police, had twice distributed fliers. As the Trenton police
            chief said, ``An individual in an apartment with a copy machine
            does not accurately represent the title'' of a ``hate group,''
            and called the SPLC's claim irresponsible. The Wyandotte police
            chief was puzzled why they were even on the list and was
            unaware of any Neo-Nazi groups or incidents. Both towns are
            still on the SPLC hate map.
       August 18: ``Downriver police reject notion that their
            cities have ties to hate groups'' http://www.thenewsherald.com/
            news/downriver-police-reject-notion-that-their-cities-have-
            ties-to/article_ba5c4802-5879-5a7d-aede-70e69b227bb6.- html.
       Also in August 2017, the police chief in Gurnee, Illinois--
            which the SPLC had identified as hosting a KKK group--
            repudiated the SPLC's claim, after expending significant local
            police resources, as well as consulting the Illinois State
            Police State-wide Terrorism and Intelligence Center. Gurnee
            police contacted the SPLC but didn't hear back until a week
            later. The SPLC stated that an individual had registered at a
            KKK site and used Gurnee as his address. Gurnee police said an
            investigation into the name concluded there is no record of
            anyone by that name having been a Gurnee resident. Nonetheless,
            the SPLC refused to remove Gurnee as the site of a KKK ``hate
            group,'' stating that they only review and revise the map once
            a year, and that Gurnee's listing will be reviewed again in
            January 2018. The SPLC did not return calls to The Chicago
            Tribune reporter covering the Gurnee case. Gurnee is still on
            the SPLC Hate Map.
       August 31: ``Lester: Gurnee says no evidence of reported
            Klan activity'' http://www.dailyherald.com/news/20170831/
            lester-gurnee-says-no-evidence-of-reported-klan-activity.
       September 8: ``Maybe next year: Gurnee continues battle to
            remove its name from hate-group map'' http://
            www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-county-news-sun/news/ct-
            lns-gurnee-hate-map-st-0909-20170908-story.html.
       But only 1 week earlier in August 2017, for a different
            town, the SPLC applied a completely opposite policy on
            revisions to the Hate Map. The SPLC's assertion to the Gurnee
            law enforcement agency--that they'd have to wait until 2018 to
            get off the Hate Map--was 100 percent contradicted by an action
            the SPLC had taken just 1 week before in Clear Creek, Iowa. In
            that case, which received wide-spread publicity and public
            pressure (unlike Gurnee and the other towns), the SPLC removed
            Clear Creek from the Hate Map after police and elected
            officials repudiated the SPLC's claims that Clear Creek was
            hosting a Neo Nazi group. The SPLC's ``evidence'' was a mention
            in an on-line forum of a meeting of a Nazi book club at the
            Amana Colonies. Clear Creek is now removed from the SPLC Hate
            Map.
       August 21: ``Amana leaders seek explanation for being called
            home of hate group'' http://www.press-citizen.com/story/news/
            local/amana-clear-creek/2017/08/21/amana-leaders-seek-
            explanation-being-called-home-hate-group/586229001/.
       August 22: ``Group stands behind claims of Iowa neo-Nazi
            group'' http://www.press-citizen.com/story/news/local/amana-
            clear-creek/2017/08/22/splc-stands-behind-claims-amana-neo-
            nazi-group/591491001/.
       August 28: ``SPLC removes Amana from hate group map'' http:/
            /www.press-citizen.com/story/news/local/amana-clear-creek/2017/
            08/28/splc-removes-amana-hate-group-map/610471001/.
       Given this documented history of discredited SPLC claims and
            the SPLC's lack of cooperation with local law enforcement, it
            appears that the SPLC's annual listing of ``hate groups''
            potentially wastes law enforcement resources and risks
            negligently damaging the reputation and local economies of
            American communities.
        Given these risks, will the SPLC improve its policies on the
    quality, verification, and transparency of evidence for the 2018 Hate
    Map, to prevent similar failures in the future?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 26. Will the SPLC commit that the 2018 Hate Map will show
    the evidence for each ``hate group'' and ``hate incident'' claim, with
    on-line links or uploaded documents that are available for immediate
    public review?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 27. Will the SPLC commit that the 2018 Hate Map will
    provide an accountable and transparent process for local media, law
    enforcement, and elected leaders to request that their towns be removed
    from the SPLC Hate Map within a week of the request--as the SPLC did
    for Clear Creek--if the SPLC's ``evidence'' is demonstrated either to
    be non-existent or misleading, or if local law enforcement repudiates
    the SPLC claim that a local group is in fact a so-called ``Hate
    Group''?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 28. Since 2009, SPLC ``hate incident'' and ``hate group''
    data has been incorporated in the Extremist Crime Data Base at the
    Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
    (START), which is primarily funded by the Department of Homeland
    Security. Between 2010 and 2017, over 35 academic papers were published
    using the Extremist Crime Data Base, for which SPLC had provided
    various types of data on ``hate incidents'' and ``hate groups.'' At
    least three of these published academic papers focused primarily on the
    SPLC ``hate group'' lists.
        In the years since SPLC provided the data now incorporated in the
    Extremist Crime Data Base, START staff presented numerous briefings on
    the Extremist Crime Data Base findings, based in part on this SPLC
    data, to the CIA, FBI, Secret Service, Transportation Safety
    Administration, the director of national intelligence, and the House
    Committee on Homeland Security. These briefings potentially affected
    policy decisions.
        However, for decades, mainstream media, academic experts, and local
    law enforcement in towns across America have raised serious questions
    about the accuracy and evidence associated with SPLC ``hate group'' and
    ``hate incident'' data. To list representative examples from just 3
    months ago, the police chiefs and elected officials in Trenton, MI,
    Wyandotte, MI, Gurnee, IL, and Clear Creek, IA have all repudiated the
    SPLC's claims about ``hate incidents'' and ``hate groups'' in their
    towns.
        Therefore, the use of discredited SPLC ``hate incident'' and ``hate
    group'' data in a Government-funded intelligence resource should be of
    grave concern to policy makers. The potential discrediting of a key
    Government database by introducing inadequately validated and verified
    data imposes real risks on our ability to make accurate threat
    assessments for homeland security.
        In spite of years of concerns expressed about SPLC's data
    integrity, on September 16, 2016 Richard Cohen presented testimony
    based on the Extremist Crime Data Base to the Subcommittees on National
    Security and Government Operations, of the House Committee on Oversight
    and Government Reform. In his written testimony for the November 30,
    2017 House Homeland Security Committee, Cohen again cited studies based
    on the START Extremist Crime Data Base research. In neither of these
    testimonies did he disclose that the database has incorporated SPLC
    data, nor that the SPLC's data may have substantial errors.
        Given that local law enforcement is repudiating SPLC ``hate
    incident'' and ``hate group'' data, will SPLC notify the START
    Consortium about the risks SPLC data has introduced to the integrity of
    the Extremist Crime Data Base?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 29. Will SPLC notify DHS and the other agencies and
    Congressional committees who were briefed, and who may have made policy
    decisions based on discredited data?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 30. Will SPLC provide to this committee the evidence for
    every ``hate incident'' and ``hate group'' that SPLC has provided to
    the START group, for an independent risk assessment as to the integrity
    of the data that has been used since at least 2009 in intelligence
    assessments for homeland security?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
            Questions From Honorable Clay Higgins for Richard Cohen
        Question 1a. News organizations, research groups, and law
    enforcement organizations have used Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)
    data to determine whether an organization is considered a hate group or
    an extremist group. I am concerned about the apparent absence of
    scientific methodologies and criteria for designating an organization
    as a hate group.
        What are your scientific methodologies and criteria for designating
    an individual or organization as an ``extremist''?
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 1b. Please explain how your methodology provided as an
    answer to question 1a was applied in your determination to classify,
    Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee and victim of female genital
    mutilation as an extremist.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 2a. Please provide the committee with a cross-referenced
    accounting of your donor list with the following groups identified on
    U.S. Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
    list,\1\ for any group appearing on both your donor list and the
    official FTO listing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For your convenience the FTO list is as follows: Abu Sayyaf Group
    (ASG); Aum Shinrikyo (AUM); Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA); Gama'a
    al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG); HAMAS; Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM);
    Hizballah; Kahane Chai (Kach); Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-
    Gel); Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); National Liberation Army
    (ELN); Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); Palestinian Islamic Jihad
    (PIJ); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF); PFLP-
    General Command (PFLP-GC); Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
    (FARC); Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C); Shining
    Path (SL); al-Qaeda (AQ); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Real
    Irish Republican Army (RIRA); Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM); Lashkar-e Tayyiba
    (LeT); Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB); Asbat al-Ansar (AAA); al-Qaeda
    in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Communist Party of the Philippines/New
    People's Army (CPP/NPA); Jemaah Islamiya (JI); Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ);
    Ansar al-Islam (AAI); Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA); Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly al-Qaeda in Iraq); Islamic Jihad
    Union (IJU); Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B); al-Shabaab;
    Revolutionary Struggle (RS); Kata'ib Hizballah (KH); al-Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI); Tehrik-e
    Taliban Pakistan (TTP); Jundallah; Army of Islam (AOI); Indian
    Mujahedeen (IM); Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT); Abdallah Azzam Brigades
    (AAB); Haqqani Network (HQN); Ansar al-Dine (AAD); Boko Haram; Ansaru;
    al-Mulathamun Battalion; Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shari'a
    in Darnah; Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia; ISIL Sinai Province (formally
    Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis); al-Nusrah Front; Mujahidin Shura Council in the
    Environs of Jerusalem (MSC); Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi
    (JRTN); ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's
    Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya); al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent;
    Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).
        Question 2b. Please also include any donations by senior members or
    people in leadership positions of groups or organizations listed in 2a.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 3a. During the hearing, you stated that the SPLC does in
    fact utilize offshore accounts for many millions of dollars of funds
    and that your organization does this to avoid having to comply with
    ``certain kinds of filings'' and ``unrelated business income tax.''
        Please provide the committee with a detailed list of the ``filing''
    requirements SPLC is avoiding through its utilization of offshore
    accounts.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Question 3b. Please provide the committee with a detailed list of
    the ``unrelated business income'' taxes that SPLC is avoiding through
    its utilization of offshore accounts.
        Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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