[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING PUBLIC AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: STAKEHOLDER
PERSPECTIVES
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 28, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-40
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Clay Higgins, Louisiana William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Ron Estes, Kansas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Charles Cunningham, Director, Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA) Public Safety/
PATCO:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Thomas J. Nestel, III, Chief, Transit Police, Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA):
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Douglas Lemanowicz, Lieutenant, Special Operations Section,
New Jersey State Police, State of New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Christopher Trucillo, Chief, Transit Police, New Jersey
Transit:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
SECURING PUBLIC AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: STAKEHOLDER
PERSPECTIVES
----------
Tuesday, November 28, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Trenton, NJ.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
the City Counsel Chambers, Second floor, Trenton City Hall, 319
E. State Street, Trenton, New Jersey, 08608, Hon. John Katko
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Watson Coleman, and
Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the existing
security measures that safeguard surface transportation systems
and identify ways that the Federal Government can help State
and local transit agencies protect their enormous ridership.
I would like to thank the city of Trenton and the City
Council for allowing us to have this very important hearing in
these beautiful historic chambers.
This is an official Congressional hearing, and as such, we
must abide by the rules of the Committee on Homeland Security
and the House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind the
guests today that demonstrations from the audience, including
applause and verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or
placards are a violation of House rules. It is important that
we respect the decorum and the rules of this committee. I have
also been requested to state that photography and cameras are
limited to access by accredited press only.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I am very pleased to be joined today by two hometowners
here, or close to being hometowners, Ranking Member Bonnie
Watson Coleman and Congressman Fitzpatrick, to discuss a topic
that is vital to the safety and economic vitality of the
northeast region and the greater United States.
I applaud the Ranking Member for her hard work and
dedication to homeland security, and it is an honor to be here
today in your district to hear directly from both you and
Congressman Fitzpatrick's constituents on how to better secure
the transit systems.
Mass transit is critical to the livelihood of many
Americans and provides an integral backbone to this economy.
Recent terror attacks like the one in Brussels that targeted an
international airport and a metro station have made us more
cognizant than ever of the vulnerabilities in our
transportation systems.
Service transportation systems are a very attractive target
due to their large volume of daily ridership and open
infrastructure. Mass transit systems face unique challenges in
screening passengers, closing resource gaps, and targeting
assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. To put
this into context, surface transportation modes serve over 10
billion riders annually compared to an average of 800 million
U.S. aviation passengers a year. More than 12 times the number
of people that fly take part in mass transit other than flying,
and it is our duty to ensure that local stakeholders and law
enforcement have the resources they need to keep their riders
and their systems safe.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess our ability and
readiness to detect and disrupt threats to our Nation's
critical surface transportation systems. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses about the current threat landscape,
as well as the effectiveness of established security measures.
Surface transportation systems are largely owned and
operated by State and local entities, further complicating the
Department of Homeland Security's responsibility as a primary
Federal agency responsible for securing the numerous and
diverse modes of transit. These systems are difficult to secure
due to their open infrastructure, multiple access points, hubs
serving multiple carriers, and in some cases lack of access
barriers.
Additionally, considering the significant volume of daily
ridership via surface transportation modes, delays, or system
shutdowns in response to threats can cripple the local economy.
The multi-layered security approach at airports, including
advance passenger screening, metal detectors, X-ray machines,
and advance imaging technology, explosives detection K-9s, and
armed law enforcement personnel cannot be easily replicated in
the surface transportation sector. The delays and costs
associated with measures would undermine the affordability and
expediency of mass transit. Easy accessibility and relative
affordability are part of what makes mass transit and rail
transportation so popular among the American public and help
keep our local, regional, and National economies humming.
However, these benefits can also be exploited by terrorists
as inherent vulnerabilities in surface transportation. Because
of the difficulties associated with security screening people
and goods on a train, metro, or bus, intelligence-sharing
deterrence and detection measures as well as modern technology
are extremely important.
The security of a transit environment that spans multiple
geographic jurisdictions and that integrates multiple law
enforcement agencies depends upon seamless interagency
coordination. All of you were invited here today because you
are on the front lines, and your first-hand knowledge and
expertise is going to be invaluable to us.
I look forward to hearing from all of you about how the
Federal Government can better coordinate with State and local
surface transportation partners and law enforcement personnel
to protect our traveling public, despite the fact that I
understand that some of you are Philadelphia Eagles fans and I
am a New York Giants fan, but we will have to deal with that as
we move forward.
I now recognize the Ranking Member Mrs. Watson Coleman for
her opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
November 28, 2017
Before I begin I would first like to thank the city of Trenton for
graciously hosting us today. I am pleased to be joined by Ranking
Member Bonnie Watson Coleman and Congressman Brian Fitzpatrick to
discuss a topic that is vital to the safety and economic vitality of
the Northeast region and the greater United States. I applaud the
Ranking Member for her hard work and dedication to homeland security
and it is an honor to be here today in your district to hear directly
from both your and Congressman Fitzpatrick's constituents on how to
better secure transit systems.
Mass transit is critical to the livelihood of many Americans and
provides an integral backbone to the economy of the region. Recent
terror attacks like the one in Brussels that targeted an international
airport and a metro station, have made us more cognizant than ever of
the vulnerabilities in our transportation systems. Surface
transportation systems are a very attractive target due to their large
volume of daily ridership and open infrastructure. Mass transit systems
face unique challenges in screening passengers, closing resource gaps,
and targeting assistance from the Department of Homeland Security.
To put this into context, surface transportation modes serve over
10 billion riders annually compared to an average of 800 million U.S.
aviation passengers per year, and it is our duty to ensure that local
stakeholders and law enforcement have the resources they need to keep
their riders and their systems safe.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess our ability and
readiness to detect and disrupt threats to our Nation's critical
surface transportation systems. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about the current threat landscape, as well as the
effectiveness of established security measures. Surface transportation
systems are largely owned and operated by State and local entities,
complicating the Department of Homeland Security's responsibility as
the primary Federal agency responsible for securing the numerous and
diverse modes of transit. These systems are difficult to secure due to
their open infrastructure, multiple access points, hubs serving
multiple carriers, and in some cases, lack of access barriers.
Additionally, considering the significant volume of daily ridership via
surface transportation modes, delays, or system shutdowns in response
to threats can cripple the local economy. The multi-layer security
approach at airports, including advance passenger screening, metal
detectors, X-ray machines, advanced imagining technology, explosive
detection canines, and armed law enforcement personnel, cannot be
easily replicated in the surface transportation sector. The delays and
costs associated with such measures would undermine the affordability
and expediency of mass transit.
Easy accessibility and relative affordability are part of what
makes mass transit and rail transportation so popular among the
American public and help keep our local, regional, and National
economies humming. However, these benefits can also be exploited by
terrorists as inherent vulnerabilities in surface transportation.
Because of the difficulties associated with security screening people
and goods on a train, metro, or bus, intelligence-sharing deterrence
and detection measures are extremely important. The security of a
transit environment that spans multiple geographic jurisdictions and
that integrates multiple law enforcement agencies depends upon seamless
interagency coordination. All of you were invited here today because
you are on the front lines, and your first-hand knowledge and expertise
is invaluable. I look forward to hearing from all of you about how the
Federal Government can better coordinate with State and local surface
transportation partners and law enforcement personnel to protect the
traveling public.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Good morning. I would like to thank
Chairman Katko for agreeing to hold this hearing today in the
capital city of New Jersey: Trenton, New Jersey.
I would also like to thank Mr. Fitzpatrick for traveling to
my district to join us as we seek to better understand how the
Federal Government can partner more effectively and make our
surface transportation and public areas more secure.
Before I turn to the subject at hand, I would like to
extend a special thank you to our hosts here at City Hall, who
went the extra mile to help ensure that we have a successful
hearing, and I particularly would like to acknowledge the
president of our City Council, Mr. Zachary Chester, for being
here this morning. Thank you.
The 12th Congressional District of New Jersey in which we
sit today is connected by a complex web of transit systems.
Every day thousands of passengers pass through my district on
New Jersey Transit, SEPTA, and Amtrak trains. The safe and
secure operation of transit systems is essential to the social
and economic well-being of the people I serve. Their ability to
travel safely depends upon the security efforts of today's
panelists, who face a daunting task. Terrorists have targeted
soft targets, such as subways, mass transit stations, and
public airport areas in the United States and abroad.
Last year just up the road in Elizabethtown, five pipe
bombs were found near a transit station, and one exploded as
police were attempting to disarm it. Thankfully there were no
injuries, but the need to protect against threats to these
systems is very clear. The emergence of a class of would-be
terrorists who with little to no training, financial support,
or direction carry out crimes of opportunity against innocent
people demands greater vigilance and collaboration at all
levels of government.
Securing these critical transportation systems requires a
layered, risk-based, well-resourced approach. Unfortunately,
the budget that the president has proposed for fiscal year 2018
goes in the opposite direction and calls for draconian cuts to
almost every relevant Federal program. Last year the president
of the American Public Transit Association testified before a
Senate subcommittee that transit agencies across the United
States had identified $6 billion in capital and operational
security needs, yet the President wants to cut the Transit
Security Grant Program, the primary source of Federal security
funds for most transit agencies from $88 billion to just $48
billion.
He also was proposing significant cuts to the TSA's Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response Program, also known as VIPR.
Under this program TSA officials, Federal air marshals, and K-9
teams partner together with transit police and other local law
enforcement to carry out security operations within surface
transportation systems and public airport areas. Under the
President's budget the number of VIPR teams would drop from 31
teams to 8.
Finally, the President is proposing a complete elimination
of the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program. Under
this critical program local law enforcement agencies receive
partial Federal reimbursement for deploying officers at
airports. In 2017 the program was funded at $44 million. The
cuts that the President is seeking would come at the cost of
the security of transportation systems in the 12th
Congressional District and across this country.
Later today when we return to Washington I will be
introducing a bill to push back against these reckless cuts. My
legislation known as the Surface Transportation and Public Area
Security Act of 2017 seeks to not only secure, revamp, and
resource important programs aimed at securing critical soft
targets, but also greatly enhances Federal partnerships with
Federal, State, and local stakeholders to protect those vital
systems and the people who use them.
In addition to authorizing $400 million for the Transit
Security Grant Program, directing TSA to maintain 60 VIPR teams
and restoring funding for Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement
Programs, my bill would also make law enforcement reimbursement
available for surface transportation, increase the deployment
of explosive detection K-9s to surface transportation, require
a review of whether it is appropriate for people to be able to
carry guns into public transportation areas, and direct the
dissemination of best practices for securing against vehicle-
based attacks such as the attack we witnessed recently in New
York. A bill focusing on securing these aspects of our
transportation system is long past due. Today's hearing is a
great opportunity to start a meaningful conversation about how
we can work together to make these systems more secure.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their
security needs and how we can be helpful. Again, I thank my
colleagues for joining me here today in Trenton and hope for a
productive discussion today.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
November 28, 2017
The 12th Congressional District of New Jersey, in which we sit
today, is connected by a complex web of transit systems. Every day,
thousands of passengers pass through my district on NJ Transit, SEPTA,
and Amtrak trains.
The safe and secure operation of transit systems is essential to
the social and economic well-being of the people I serve. Their ability
to travel safely depends upon the security efforts of today's
panelists, who face a daunting task.
Terrorists have targeted soft targets such as subways, mass transit
stations, and public airport areas in the United States and abroad.
Last year, just up the road in Elizabethtown, five pipe bombs were
found near a transit station, and one exploded as police were
attempting to disarm it. Thankfully, there were no injuries, but the
need to protect against threats to these systems is clear.
The emergence of a class of would-be terrorists who, with little to
no training, financial support, or direction carry out ``crimes of
opportunity'' against innocent people demands greater vigilance and
collaboration at all levels of government.
Securing these critical transportation systems requires a layered,
risk-based, well-resourced approach.
Unfortunately, the budget that President Trump proposed for fiscal
year 2018 goes in the opposite direction and calls for draconian cuts
to almost every relevant Federal program.
Last year, the president of the American Public Transit Association
testified before a Senate subcommittee that transit agencies across the
United States had identified $6 billion in capital and operational
security needs.
Yet, President Trump wants to cut the Transit Security Grant
Program--the primary source of Federal security funds for most transit
agencies--from $88 million to just $48 million. He also is proposing
significant cuts to TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) program.
Under this program, TSA officers, Federal Air Marshals, and canine
teams partner with transit police and other local law enforcement to
carry out security operations within surface transportation systems and
public airport areas.
Under President Trump's budget, the number of VIPR teams would drop
from 31 teams to just 8. Finally, President Trump is proposing a
complete elimination of the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement
Program.
Under this critical program, local law enforcement agencies receive
partial Federal reimbursement for deploying officers at airports. In
2017, the program was funded at $44 million.
The cuts that President Trump is seeking would come at the cost of
the security of transportation systems in the 12th Congressional
District and across the country.
Later today, when we return to Washington, I will be introducing a
bill to push back against these reckless cuts. My legislation, the
Surface Transportation and Public Area Security Act of 2017, seeks to
not only restore, revamp, and resource important programs aimed at
securing critical soft targets, but also greatly enhance Federal
partnership with State and local stakeholders to protect these vital
systems and the people who use them.
In addition to authorizing $400 million for the Transit Security
Grant Program, directing TSA to maintain 60 VIPR teams, and restoring
funding for the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program, my bill
would:
Make law enforcement reimbursement available for surface
transportation;
Increase the deployment of explosive detection canines to
surface transportation;
Require a review of whether it is appropriate for people to
be able to carry guns into public transportation areas; and
Direct the dissemination of best practices for securing
against vehicle-based attacks, such as the attack we witnessed
recently in New York.
A bill focused on securing these aspects of our transportation
systems is long past due. Today's hearing is a great opportunity to
start a meaningful conversation about how we can work together to make
these systems more secure.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Other Members of
the committee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
November 28, 2017
I would like to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding
today's hearing.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. We know that
your testimony today will provide the committee with insight as we
focus our efforts on addressing surface transportation security.
Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, resources
were rightfully focused on building a Federal agency to protect the
aviation sector.
However, in the 16 years since the attacks, the threat to surface
transportation has steadily increased.
Both Nationally and internationally, we have seen terrorists target
surface transportation systems.
The 2004 commuter train attacks in Madrid, 2005 London tube
bombings, 2015 Paris train attack, and 2016 metro station attacks in
Brussels underscore that bustling surface transportation hubs are
attractive terrorist targets.
Similarly, the surface transportation terrorist incidents
domestically are trending upward as well.
For example, in 2008, an individual was arrested for sharing
details of the Long Island Railroad with al-Qaeda in an effort to help
bomb New York City's Penn Station.
In September 2009, three individuals were arrested for planning to
detonate backpack bombs at Grand Central Station and Times Square.
In 2016, police successfully detected and removed pipe bombs at a
New Jersey train station.
And, just last month, a terrorist mowed down 19 pedestrians on a
bike path in Lower Manhattan.
That ISIL-inspired attack resulted in the deaths of 8 people.
The Federal Government must do more to help State and local
stakeholders make surface transportation systems more secure.
With each passing terrorist attack on surface transportation, our
enemies grow more emboldened to commit these heinous acts.
Today's hearing provides the opportunity for an honest discussion
about how the Federal Government can be a better partner with key
stakeholders, like the ones represented by today's witnesses, to raise
the bar with respect to protecting at-risk surface transportation
systems.
Certainly, action on the legislation that Representative Watson
Coleman, a leader on transportation security matters on the committee,
will be introducing later today--the ``Surface Transportation and
Public Area Security Act of 2017''--would be a major step forward in
putting the Federal Government on a path to making these systems, which
are essential to our Nation's economy, more secure.
To the witnesses and those in the audience, I hope you will see
today's hearing as a starting point for engaging with the committee on
surface transportation security and continue to have an open dialog
with the committee.
Mr. Katko. We are pleased to have a group of distinguished
witnesses before us today to speak on this timely and important
topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statements will appear in the record.
Our first witness is Mr. Charles Cunningham, the director
of homeland security and emergency management for the Delaware
River Port Authority. Mr. Cunningham previously served in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation--I was a Federal organized
crime prosecution for 20 years, so I like you guys--and more
recently was a national account regional manager at Allied
Universal. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cunningham to testify
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY (DRPA)
PUBLIC SAFETY/PATCO
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, sir.
Good morning, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and Congressman Fitzpatrick. Thank you for inviting me
to discuss security at PATCO and Delaware River Port Authority.
Joining me today is William Shanahan, director of government
relations and grant administration at the Delaware River Port
Authority and chair of the Philadelphia Area Regional Transit
Security Working Group, PARTSWG.
Before joining the DRPA-PATCO in August 2017 as the
director of homeland security and emergency management I served
as a special agent in charge of the Richmond division of the
FBI and was responsible for national security crisis response,
counterterrorism investigations, threats throughout the State
of Virginia. I oversaw and directed the Virginia Joint
Terrorism Task Force as well as counterintelligence matters.
During my 22-year career in the FBI I also served as a
chief of organized crime and chief of violent crime for the
bureau. Before joining the FBI I served as a police officer in
Montgomery County, in Pennsylvania and 4\1/2\ years as
Pennsylvania State trooper. I am proud to have served honorably
in the United States Air Force.
I am responsible for the physical security of the DRPA
PATCO assets. This includes four major river crossings, one
bridge, the Benjamin Franklin is designated as a top transit
asset that connects Philadelphia and South Jersey regions, as
well as the PATCO line. The hallmark of protecting our 100-
square-mile territory is collaboration. We work closely with
numerous other police departments and municipalities to ensure
that capital investments are consistent with current security
and homeland security strategies.
The DRPA and PATCO police departments were unified in
recent years. The department has 150 sworn officers and two K-9
teams. Previously when funds were available we had
strategically and successfully deployed VIPR units, or Visual
Intermodal Prevention and Response teams on the PATCO line and
stations. Currently we routinely parole the entire PATCO rail
transit settlement.
Through our regional transit security working groups,
PARTSWG, we have developed a robust public security awareness
program with our award winning ``Look Up Speak Up'' campaign.
This campaign engages the public through targeted advertising
on both traditional and social media. Results are captured
through the scientific polling by Zogby Analytics. The campaign
teaches the riding public to observe what doesn't appear to be
routine.
Look up and either text, call, or email information and
speak up to train transit intelligence professionals for
analysis. This is coupled with security awareness training for
civilian front-line employees with the focus on education,
educating individuals to be aware of suspicious activity and to
report that behavior.
One critical layer to our security is the structure on
technological hardening of our infrastructure since 9/11. The
DRPA-PATCO leadership has created a robust capital program,
which is dedicated to enhancing our security posture by
hardening our subway and transit rail systems communications
and our bridges.
Another layer of PATCO security strategy is communication
and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level we have an
excellent working relationship with our DHS partners, FEMA, and
TSA. We meet regularly and continually exchange information
with regional partners, and we maintain an outstanding level of
collaboration to thwart potential attacks.
We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on
a daily basis through our PARTSWG group. DRPA-PATCO coordinates
with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes
Unit, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center, the DVIC, the New
Jersey Real-time Crime Center, and many others. We have
benefited from over $60 million in direct and regional support
of our security program from the Department of Homeland
Security since 2005.
This funding was essential in creating a true regional
effort to detect, deter, protect, and mitigate the threat of
terrorism against our regional transportation infrastructure.
But this effort is far from complete. Physical hardening and
regional asset integration must continue. Operational and
sustainability efforts must continue. Investments in cameras,
sensors, et cetera must be protected by continuing maintenance
programs, and digital records must be managed and stored.
We need to continue reaching out to the public. They are
surely the force multiplier that we must continue to engage,
and last but not least specialized intelligence for transit
partners in the center of gravity of this effort.
Stopping those would do our riders--would do riders harm
before an incident is the best-case scenario.
Unfortunately, the trend of shrinking National grant
programs has limited our ability to move forward with our
capital security mitigations. Since to 2005 the National
program is less than half-funded. That means that projects that
met all the criteria funding and were funded and executed
several years ago are no longer eligible because the money is
no longer there. We need to change that narrative and evaluate
security projects based on their merits again, and not solely
on whether there is enough funding to move forward.
I am proud to be part of the proactive Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness DRPA-PATCO team and help to protect
the people who travel on our bridges and rail transit system,
our employees, and the region in general. We have dedicated
personnel who work extremely hard to ensure the safety of all
of our stakeholders and the assets with which we are entrusted,
and we look forward to continuing to work with you, our elected
Representatives in the House.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cunningham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles Cunningham
November 28, 2017
Good Morning Chairmen Katko and King, Ranking Members Watson
Coleman and Rice, and Members of the subcommittees. Thank you for
inviting me to discuss security at PATCO and the Delaware River Port
Authority. Joining me today is William C. Shanahan, director of
government relations and grants administration at the Delaware River
Port Authority, and chair of the Philadelphia Area Regional Transit
Security Working Group (PARTSWG).
Before joining the DRPA/PATCO in August 2017 as the director of
homeland security and emergency management, I served as the special
agent in charge of the Richmond division of the F.B.I., and was
responsible for National security, crisis response, and
counterterrorism investigations/threats throughout the State of
Virginia. I oversaw and directed the Virginia Joint Terrorism Task
Force as well as all counterintelligence matters. During my 22-year
career in the F.B.I., I also served as the chief of organized crime and
chief of violent crime for the Bureau. Before joining the F.B.I., I
served as a police officer in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, spent
4\1/2\ years as a Pennsylvania State Trooper and I am proud to have
served in the U.S. Air Force.
In my present position, I am responsible for the physical security
of the DRPA/PATCO assets. This includes 4 major river crossings (one
bridge, the Benjamin Franklin Bridge is designated as a Top Transit
Asset), that connect the Philadelphia and South Jersey regions, as well
as the PATCO line. PATCO is the only transit rail system that connects
New Jersey with downtown Philadelphia. I also coordinate DRPA/PATCO
efforts with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Pennsylvania and New Jersey National Guard, the New Jersey
State Police (NJSP), the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), the
Philadelphia Police Department, and many other local jurisdictions. I
oversee the Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department and
work closely with the DRPA/PATCO Police Department. The DRPA/PATCO
Police Department has jurisdiction in 2 States (New Jersey and
Pennsylvania), 13 counties, and 12 municipalities. The 4 bridges and
transit rail system covers approximately 100 square miles. I am
responsible for the implementation and execution of an overarching
security strategy that offers maximum protection to the public, DRPA/
PATCO employees, as well as the 4 bridges and the PATCO transit assets.
Before I discuss security in more depth, I would like to set the
stage with some basic facts about the DRPA river crossings and the
PATCO rail transit line. Every year, we move more than 115 million
vehicles and riders on our bridges and rail transit line. We are one of
the few transit systems in the United States that operates 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. If just one of our bridges fail,
it would have an immediate, massive, and detrimental impact on the
regional transportation infrastructure. In addition, the secondary and
tertiary impact on commerce throughout the 6th largest Metropolitan
Region in the country would be devastating. Just rebuilding our assets
alone would cost billions of dollars.
Protecting hundreds of thousands of people a day and multi-billion-
dollar assets is a huge task. I can tell you that the DRPA/PATCO
priority is clear: Ensuring the safety and security of our customers,
assets, and employees. This entails ensuring the regional economic
well-being, protecting iconic assets for future generations and
ensuring resilience and sustainability for the region. To protect them,
the DRPA/PATCO employs a multi-layered security strategy to prevent,
detect, deter, and mitigate the ever-evolving threat against the
transportation sector. Portions of our strategies involve high-
visibility methods, like increased uniformed officer and K-9 patrols,
and Public Security Awareness campaigns. Other methods are less
visible, like structural hardening, advances in technology,
intelligence analytics, and improved communications.
The hallmark of protecting our 100-square-mile territory is
collaboration. Let me explain. The DRPA/PATCO Police Department is
responsible for patrolling the most heavily-used portion of our
network, the Benjamin Franklin, Commodore Barry, Walt Whitman, and
Betsy Ross bridges, as well as the PATCO rail transit system. We work
closely with numerous other police departments and municipalities to
ensure that capital investments are consistent with current security
and homeland security strategies. Our agency has been involved with
developing and employing both anti-terrorism and counter terrorism
strategies and practices since 2001.
The DRPA and PATCO police departments were unified in recent years
and both assets are overseen by the chief of police. The department has
remained consistent over the years at approximately 150 sworn officers
that cover the 4 river crossings and the PATCO rail transit system. We
currently have 2 K-9 teams that are available for use throughout the
rail transit system, and we strategically deploy officers on trains and
at the 14 PATCO stations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Previously,
when funds were available, we had strategically and successfully
deployed VIPR or Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response teams on the
PATCO line and stations as well as the high density multi-
jurisdictional, multi-modal transit hubs. Currently, we routinely
patrol the entire PATCO rail transit system.
Through our regional transit security working group (PARTSWG) we
have developed a robust Public Security Awareness Program with our
award-winning ``Look up . . . Speak up'' campaign. This campaign
engages the public through targeted advertising on both traditional and
social media. Results are captured through scientific polling by Zogby
Analytics. The campaign teaches the riding public to observe what
doesn't appear to be routine, Look Up, and either text, call, or email
information, and Speak Up, to trained, transit intelligence
professionals for analysis. This is coupled with security awareness
training for civilian front-line employees. Since 2008, the Homeland
Security and Emergency Management Department has conducted
``awareness'' training for 100% of new DRPA/PATCO employees. Using the
general riding public and our front-line employees further augments our
sworn police officers' efforts by encouraging vigilance, as well as
educating individuals to be aware of suspicious activity and to report
that behavior.
Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is the
structural and technological hardening of our infrastructure. Since 9/
11, the DRPA/PATCO leadership has created a robust capital program
which is dedicated to enhancing our security posture by hardening our
subway and transit rail system, communications, and our bridges.
Critical stations and vulnerable areas have been identified and secured
with a digital camera system and access control devices.
Another layer of the PATCO security strategy is communication and
intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have an excellent
working relationship with our DHS partners, FEMA, and TSA. We attend
regular meetings and conference calls, and continually exchange
information with regional partners. When potential threats are
identified, they are communicated immediately. National events are
often held within our area of responsibility and this outstanding level
of collaboration, allows the DRPA/PATCO, and its regional, State, and
Federal partners to work in concert to thwart potential attacks.
We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on a daily
basis, through our PARTSWG group. We were selected to host the recent
I-STEP exercise by TSA. DRPA/PATCO coordinates with the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes Unit, the High-Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area program, and the NJSP Counter Terrorism and
Intelligence units, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC), New
Jersey Real-Time Crime Center.
We've benefitted from over $60 million dollars in direct and
regional support of our security program from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) since 2005. This funding was essential in
creating a true regional effort to detect, deter, protect, and mitigate
the threat of terrorism against our regional transportation
infrastructure. But this effort is far from complete. Physical
hardening and regional asset integration must continue. Our systems are
large and spread out and each facility must be prioritized and
hardened. Operational and sustainability efforts must continue.
Investments in cameras, sensors, etc. must be protected by continuing
maintenance programs and digital records must be managed and stored. We
need to continue reaching out to the public--they are surely the
expediential force multiplier we must continue to engage. And last, but
not least, specialized intelligence for transit partners is the center
of gravity of this effort. Stopping those that would do our riders harm
before an incident is the best-case scenario. Unfortunately, the trend
of a shrinking National grant program has limited our ability to move
forward with our capital security mitigations. Since 2005, the National
program is less than half-funded. That means that projects that met all
the criteria for funding, funded, and executed several years ago, are
no longer eligible because the money is no longer there. We need to
change this narrative and evaluate security projects based on their
merits again, and not solely on whether there is enough funding to move
forward.
I am proud to be part of the proactive Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness DRPA/PATCO team and help to protect the people
who travel on our bridges and rail transit system, our employees and
region in general. We have dedicated personnel who work extremely hard
to ensure the safety of all of our stakeholders and the assets with
which we are entrusted. We coordinate with our law enforcement
colleagues and we look forward to continuing to work with you--our
elected representatives in the House--to keep our customers safe and
our system secure. Once again, thank you for inviting me to testify
today. I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham, for your testimony. I
now thank you for your service with the FBI and in your current
position. We definitely appreciate you being here today.
Our second witness is Thomas Nestel, who currently serves
as the chief of transit police at the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority. Previously Mr. Nestel was a chief of
police for the Upper Moreland Township.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Nestel to testify for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. NESTEL, III, CHIEF, TRANSIT POLICE,
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (SEPTA)
Mr. Nestel. Good morning, Chairman Katko, Congresswoman
Watson Coleman, and Congressman Fitzpatrick. I count on the
fact that the statement is part of the record, so I am not
going to read you that statement. I would like to amend one
section, and that is the paragraph regarding the special events
that SEPTA has been responsible for providing service and add
the upcoming Super Bowl Championship parade that we will be
covering.
Mr. Katko. It is nice to dream, Mr. Nestel. That is what I
like to hear or should I say fantasize, one or the other----
Mr. Nestel. I think that everybody that is coming here to
address you today and each of you understands that technology
is the greatest need in mass transit, and second to that is
grant funding, so I am going to steer away from those two
because I don't think that we can more strongly emphasize the
fact that those two are necessary.
I want to bring to your attention a couple of other issues.
I am a fourth-generation police officer. I have been a police
officer for 35 years. When I got up this morning I still love
my job. I love being a police officer. I think that the folks
that are out on the line and working in cities and States
throughout our Nation are dedicated people who are challenged
every day with making the public safe. I have officers that I
admire greatly who keep our system safe with a million rides a
day.
I think that I have learned that presenting complaints is
less memorable than presenting solutions, so I want to be
remembered. I would like to give you some potential solutions
to problems that I have recognized in my jurisdiction.
The first is the need for resources. Everyone needs
resources. I think that the VIPR program was a wonderful
program for us because the Federal air marshals teamed up with
our officers and patrolled high-volume areas during special
events. I think that that can be expanded to a number of
Federal agencies that work in Philadelphia, who could
supplement our patrols during specific times of the day to
provide a counterterrorism front. We have to address crime
control every day. We look to our partners to help us with
terrorism prevention. So that is the first.
The second is communication. I know that every study that
has been done and every investigation since 2001 says that
interoperability and communication between agencies is very
important. There are radios that we purchased that have the
ability to speak in every county that we cover in Pennsylvania.
That is five counties. Those radios are $8,000. The issue that
we have run into is that jurisdictional blockades are presented
in using those radios in some jurisdictions because they don't
want other police agencies communicating on their band. I think
that the FCC could probably become involved and encourage
multijurisdictional areas to be able to communicate on the same
band if the radios are available. SEPTA committed to purchasing
several of those radios, so it wasn't even a grant function,
and yet we can't use it in some places. That is important.
The third issue is jurisdictional issues. Transit agencies
have a unique jurisdictional challenge. During the Pope's visit
a high-ranking police official from a jurisdiction showed up at
a pre-planning meeting and read a letter saying that the
Transit Police Authority ends at the sidewalk, and they do not
possess police authority beyond that sidewalk. That is not the
kind of jurisdictional assistance that needs to be had in
policing and preventing terrorism. We need to have that ability
for transit police to travel across State lines, to travel
within county borders and to have the same police authority as
the jurisdictions that are responsible for protecting that
community.
So those are three recommendations and three issues that I
wanted to bring to your attention aside from the technology and
grant funding issues. I am happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nestel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas J. Nestel, III
November 28, 2017
Good morning Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman,
Congressman Fitzpatrick, and the other Members of the Transportation
and Protective Security Subcommittee. Thank you for holding this
important hearing on securing public areas of transportation systems.
On behalf of our board chairman Pasquale T. ``Pat'' Deon, Sr., general
manager Jeffrey D. Knueppel, and the members of the SEPTA Transit
Police Department, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify today
about security at the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA) and discuss our policing strategies, technology
deployment, and inter-agency partnerships.
My name is Thomas J. Nestel, III. I have served as the chief of the
SEPTA Transit Police Department since August 2012. I began my career in
law enforcement in 1982 as a patrol officer with the SEPTA Transit
Police. I then served on the Philadelphia Police Department for 22
years, attaining the rank of staff inspector, and later as the chief of
police for Upper Moreland Township (Montgomery County, PA). I received
a Bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice from Chestnut Hill College, a
Master of Science in Public Safety from Saint Joseph's University, a
Master of Arts in National Security Studies from the United States
Naval Postgraduate School, and a Master of Science in Criminology from
the University of Pennsylvania. I am currently completing a Doctorate
in Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania.
SEPTA is the sixth-largest public transportation system in the
Nation, and the largest in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, serving
more than 4 million people living across 2,200 square miles in the five
counties of southeastern Pennsylvania (Bucks, Chester, Delaware,
Montgomery, and Philadelphia). The SEPTA system is an expansive
multimodal transit system, operating buses, subways, trolleys, Regional
Rail (commuter rail), trackless trolleys, an interurban high-speed line
and paratransit. Regional Rail service extends to Trenton and West
Trenton, New Jersey and Wilmington and Newark, Delaware. The Authority
maintains 230 active rail stations, over 450 miles of track, and more
than 2,350 bus and rail revenue vehicles. In the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2017, SEPTA provided more than 308 million unlinked passenger
trips--an average of approximately 1 million trips each weekday--on 150
fixed bus and rail routes.
As chief of the SEPTA Transit Police Department, I have the honor
of leading 270 sworn officers whose core mission--providing for the
safety and security of SEPTA's 1 million daily customers, 9,400
employees and the communities we serve--is guided by a commitment to
service, integrity, and professionalism. Formed in 1981, the SEPTA
Transit Police Department is now the fifth-largest police department in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. SEPTA Transit Police officers are
commissioned by the Governor and exercise full police powers in the
five-county area served by SEPTA, as well as New Jersey and Delaware.
SEPTA most recently received the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Gold Standard Award in 2016, scoring in the top 10 percent of
transit agencies evaluated through TSA's Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement (BASE) Program, a voluntary evaluation of 17
security and emergency preparedness action items.
The five southeastern Pennsylvania counties that make up the
majority of the SEPTA service area are the engine of Pennsylvania's
economy, generating 41 percent of the State's economic activity, with
32 percent of its population on just 5 percent of its land. This degree
of productivity would not be possible without safe, reliable, and
accessible public transportation. That accessibility and openness--
hallmarks of what makes SEPTA, and all public transportation, such an
important regional asset--are the very conditions that keep me up at
night.
SEPTA Transit Police officers work hard every day to respond to
public safety matters and personal and property crimes while preparing
for unknown and unthinkable threats. Protecting SEPTA's multi-modal and
heavily-used transit system from terrorism is an immense
responsibility. The urgency of which, I am pleased to say, is
understood and shared by SEPTA leadership, SEPTA Transit Police,
Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners, and our employees
and customers.
Uniformed police officers patrolling the SEPTA system are the most
visible public face of our policing efforts, riding buses and rail
vehicles, patrolling stations and providing a first response to any
incident. Their vigilance and presence has helped reduce crime and make
SEPTA safer.
In addition to regular patrols, SEPTA's policing activities are
augmented by Special Operations Units that assist in the day-to-day
operations of the police department, concentrating law enforcement
efforts on counterterrorism, training, and weapons of mass destruction
detection and prevention. SEPTA special operators serve in a variety of
units:
The members of SEPTA's Special Operations Response Team
(SORT) Unit have received specialized training to handle
situations such as armed hijacking, hostage situations,
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and tactical
response. The SORT unit is comprised of 12 officers, 2
sergeants, and 1 lieutenant.
SEPTA's Canine (K-9) Unit currently has 14 specially-trained
bomb-sniffing dogs (4 TSA-certified), who are deployed along
with an officer to the daily unattended bag reports. These
rapid response teams are the foundation to swiftly evaluate the
threat of an unattended bag.
The Tactical Unit teams of uniform, canine, and plainclothes
officers are specifically deployed during peak travel hours to
address crime patterns and quality of life issues throughout
the transportation system.
The Transit Police Department's Criminal Investigations
Section (CIS) investigates crimes committed on SEPTA property.
The CIS works with many local, State, and Federal law
enforcement departments and has a detective assigned to a
regional FBI Multi-Agency joint Terrorism Task Force.
While well-trained and properly-equipped police personnel are both
the first and last line of defense, technology is an indispensable part
of SEPTA's security and counterterrorism efforts. It expands the reach
of law enforcement to every corner of our service territory, it enables
and maximizes the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination and
communication, and it puts critical information into the hands of
officers patrolling our vehicles and stations.
Closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras are a critical component
of SEPTA's policing strategy, with approximately 27,300 fixed and
mobile cameras deployed throughout the system. Cameras in stations can
be viewed live, allowing SEPTA police and operations personnel in
SEPTA's Control Center to monitor activities and incidents in real
time. These virtual patrols allow Transit Police officers to provide
greater coverage and deliver valuable information to responding
officers. Camera footage on vehicles can be downloaded at the scene of
an incident and this information has aided SEPTA and Philadelphia
Police in the apprehension of suspects and securing convictions.
SEPTA took the lead in developing interoperable communications with
the hundreds of law enforcement and public safety departments in the
communities SEPTA serves. SEPTA developed a radio interoperability
system (RIOS) that allows dissimilar communications systems to
communicate during major incidents when more than one agency responds
to more than one scene. Additionally, because so much of SEPTA's
transit infrastructure in the city of Philadelphia is underground,
SEPTA is investing approximately $25 million to replace 40-year-old
radiax cable in the Market-Frankford Subway and Broad Street Subway,
and procure new radio equipment for the Market Street, Trolley, and
Regional Rail tunnels. This will upgrade SEPTA's subsurface
communications, and will enable Philadelphia police, fire, and
emergency medical services that operate on a different bandwidth from
SEPTA, to communicate both above and below ground.
Earlier this year, SEPTA partnered with a ELERTS Corp. to release
SEPTA Transit Watch, a mobile app that empowers SEPTA customers to
discreetly report security or safety issues directly to SEPTA Transit
Police in a matter of seconds. The National ``If You See Something, Say
Something'' campaign has taught us that our customers play a vital role
in helping secure the transit system as well as their fellow riders,
and the Transit Watch App is a way for them to communicate with SEPTA
Transit Police and provide real-time information that can make a
critical difference to responding personnel.
In partnership with Amtrak, New Jersey Transit and PATCO, SEPTA is
an active participant in the regional ``Look up. Speak Up'' transit
security campaign. Upon being named General Manager in 2015, Jeff
Knueppel renewed and strengthened the Authority's commitment to safety
and security--making safety the foundation of everything we do. Through
the annual ``Make the Safe Choice'' safety awareness day and monthly
safety blitzes, SEPTA provides customers with information and resources
to be safe and observant riders and remind them of the key role they
have in helping keep their fellow customers safe.
Similarly, SEPTA holds two annual ``Never too Busy for Safety''
employee safety days for managers and direct reports to discuss safety
protocols and concerns. SEPTA employees, along with our customers, are
the eyes and ears of the system, last year, our entire workforce
received training on anti-terrorism and security awareness to help
identify suspicious incidents or individuals and how to properly report
them. This year, SEPTA employees received video instruction on what to
do in the event of an active-shooter situation. Because SEPTA regularly
and proactively engages its customers and employees on matters of
safety and security, and not just when issues arise, SEPTA has
credibility when reaching out to customers to ``Look up. Speak up'' or
``See Something, Say Something.''
Securing public areas of transportation systems against terrorism
and mass casualty incidents requires regional, inter-agency
collaboration, training and information sharing. Federal, State, and
local law enforcement coordination proved vital over the past several
years as the Greater Philadelphia region hosted major National and
international events, including the 2013 United States Open, the 2015
Papal Visit, the 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC) and the 2017
National Football League Draft (the Papal Visit and DNC were both
National Special Security Events (NSSE) under the direction of the
United States Secret Service).
Preparedness and tactical assistance from the Department of
Homeland Security, TSA, and FBI are also invaluable resources for local
and regional coordination. Following National or international
terrorism or mass casualty events, TSA shares information and threat
assessments with transportation law enforcement officials that have
helped SEPTA evaluate procedures and develop new responses and
protocols. In response to a recent TSA Security Awareness Message
regarding rail and track infrastructure, SEPTA responded by deploying
aerial drones as a force multiplier in delivering security on our track
network.
However, it is the day-to-day intelligence and resource sharing
that is such an effective law enforcement tool. In this region, we are
fortunate to work effectively with the Philadelphia Police Department,
the Philadelphia Fire Department, the Philadelphia Office of Emergency
Management, the Pennsylvania State Police, county and local law
enforcement, and our partners in public and rail transportation,
including PATCO, NJ Transit, DART--members with SEPTA of the
Philadelphia Area Regional Transit Security Working Group (PARTSWG)--
and Amtrak.
SEPTA is a working partner in the Delaware Valley Intelligence
Center (DVIC) initiative--the regional intelligence fusion center that
integrates Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to
facilitate information and resource sharing to enhance the region's
ability to detect, prevent, and respond to emerging threats, terrorism,
and other suspicious activities. SEPTA has an officer assigned to the
DVIC and video feeds from SEPTA transit facilities are made available
to DVIC personnel in real time.
The Department of Homeland Security's Transit Security Grant
Program (TSGP) is perhaps SEPTA's most effective Federal security
partnership. The TSGP provides funds to operators of public
transportation systems to protect critical surface transportation
assets and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, and to increase
the resilience of transit infrastructure. From this grant program,
SEPTA has funded closed CCTV cameras on vehicles, multi-jurisdictional
counterterrorism emergency simulation drills on various transit modes,
directed SEPTA Transit Police Patrols in strategically-designated areas
during periods of elevated alert using specially trained anti-terrorism
teams, hazardous material identification kits for SORT operations, the
purchase of explosive detection devices, intrusion detection and
surveillance equipment, and bulletproof vests, upgraded mobile
communications and Control Center monitoring equipment, installation of
video surveillance cameras at transit facilities, RIOS implementation,
and maintenance of a computer-aided dispatch and records management
system (CAD/RMS) for the Philadelphia region. The grant has also funded
SORT and K-9 patrol teams. However, as funding for the grant program
has been significantly reduced in recent years, SEPTA has been severely
limited in its ability to use TSGP funding for anything other than
sustaining existing special operations teams.
From fiscal year 2012 to 2017, SEPTA received $15.3 million in TSGP
funding, including $3.8 million in fiscal year 2017. On average, SEPTA
typically receives one-third of the TSGP funding that it applies for,
and while these are 3-year grants, SEPTA generally expends its
allotment during a single fiscal year. Like most Federal programs,
demand for TSGP far outpaces available funding, and funding Nationally
for TSGP has dropped by 75 percent since 2009. If not for SEPTA
absorbing the cost, critical security and antiterrorism activities
would go unfunded. SEPTA, and transit agencies across the Nation, are
partners in securing their communities and preventing acts of
terrorism. We need strong Federal support to ensure our efforts are
effective, and I am grateful to the Members of this subcommittee for
working to preserve the program and authorize increased funding for
transit agencies to support this National priority.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee on SEPTA's efforts to secure our system for our customers,
employees, and the region. I look forward to answering any questions
that you may have.
Mr. Katko. That is amazing. It is almost 5 minutes exactly.
Not bad. Thank you, Mr. Nestel, for your testimony. We
appreciate you taking time to be here today.
Normally I would continue introducing the witnesses, but
Mrs. Watson Coleman I think would like to introduce the next
two, and Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our next witness is Mr. Douglas Lemanowicz. Did I slay that?
Mr. Lemanowicz. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you so much. Mr. Lemanowicz is a
member of the Fairleigh Dickinson University School Safety
Board. He also helps to provide analysis of school violence and
school shootings to Homeland Security personnel. He is a New
Jersey State Trooper, and is currently assigned as a unit head
for the urban search and rescue unit within the emergency
management section.
Prior assignments were on the technical emergency admission
specialist unit with the NJSP Homeland Security branch and
special operations section. Through his specialized training
Mr. Lemanowicz has gained experience in special weapons and
tactics, counterterrorism methods, weapons of mass destruction,
crisis preparedness, and active shooters. We are delighted to
have you here.
Mr. Lemanowicz. Thank you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. We welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS LEMANOWICZ, LIEUTENANT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS
SECTION, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Lemanowicz. Thank you for the opportunity. The New
Jersey State Police is comprised of four primary branches:
Administration, Investigations, Homeland Security, and
Operations. Through these branches and other specialized
offices the division maintains a network of information sharing
and collaborative efforts to conduct effective operations. The
members within these groups also maintain critical relations
with outside agencies to promote abilities to counterterrorists
and criminal activities and numerous critical infrastructure
sectors and countless soft targets.
Presidential Policy Directive 8 National Preparedness
describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats
and hazards that pose the greatest risks to the security of the
United States. National preparedness is defined as the actions
taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build
and sustain capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against,
mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those
threats that pose the greatest risk to the Nation. Through the
guidance of PPD-8 frameworks consideration must be given to
enhancing and fortifying capabilities in preventing, detecting,
and deterring the threats and attacks within the State of New
Jersey.
The threat of terrorism and the acts of violent crime has
become too common in the United States. The New Jersey State
Police assumes the great duty in defending the State against
terrorist attacks and violent crimes. Preparedness is a shared
responsibility and requires a whole community effort to promote
safety and resilience through a common goal. It is vital that
all partners build, organize, and enhance capabilities in a
unified approach to be better prepared to counter all hazard
threats in our communities.
A mission within the division of the State Police is to
develop innovative strategies and partnerships with public and
private entities to prevent, interdict, protect, and respond to
threats that target our State. Through communal target
hardening and coordination protective measure consultation
infrastructure and event vulnerability assessments, real-time
data analysis and situational awareness tracking, interagency
communication, and direct counterthreat operational deployments
our goal is to thwart terror.
The Office of Target Hardening was established in a special
operations section in the Homeland Security branch in July
2016. Their primary mission is to effectively implement and
develop target hardening strategies to deter terrorist
activities. This office works collaboratively with other
specialized groups within the division, as well as with other
Federal, State, county, and local mission partners. This is
demonstrated in the monthly meeting at the Regional Operation
Center known as the ROC where mission partner representatives
assemble to discuss new intelligence, special events, current
threats, lessons learned, best practices, and operational
recommendations. These partners include but are not limited to
the New Jersey State Police Threat Analysis and Critical
Infrastructure Units, Joint Terrorism Task Force, Office of
Homeland Security and Preparedness, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations, Transportation Security Administration, New
Jersey Office of Emergency Management, and the National
Counterterrorism Center. The New Jersey State Police is--excuse
me.
These daily, weekly, and monthly discussions are our cycle
of preparedness where we as a team of teams auto-adapt to the
evolving threat through collaboration, information sharing,
intelligence, prevention, awareness, and response. The Division
of State Police deploys target-hardening missions regularly due
to the shared network from our mission partners. The Office of
Target Hardening organizes and directs New Jersey State Police
units, which specialize in explosive and hazardous materials
detection, suspicious activity detection and interception,
counterassault tactics, maritime security, commercial motor
vehicle and motor coach safety, aviation surveillance and
insertion operations, and highway transportation systems
resilience in two target areas. This office also deconflicts
with other agencies and specialized units in order to conduct
safe, coordinated prevention and protection-based operations.
Today's threat of environment domestically and
internationally is wrought with an ideology committed to the
destruction of established Western culture. The world has seen
a significant spike in foreign and domestic terrorist attacks
resulting in death, destruction, intimidation, and fear. The
United States is the ultimate prize for those seeking to strike
a blow at our way of living. This ideology is evident in the
rise of home-grown violent extremist attacks utilizing both
complex and rudimentary means. As a State we witnessed and
responded to these types of attacks during the September 2016
New Jersey and New York bombings. The terrorist threats we face
are only limited by the creativity and sense of purpose of
those planning and executing them.
In addition, law enforcement officers and military
personnel have become a preferred target of those seeking to do
harm. In order to be able to continue to detect, deter,
prevent, and respond to terrorist and criminal activities our
law enforcement must continue to develop its capabilities.
Collaboration and information sharing are most vital pieces
that need to be nurtured in order to sustain strong relations.
Stakeholders need to be able to train, equip exercise
personnel, as well as provide routine education to develop
decision-making abilities. Our first preventers should be
prepared with the institutional knowledge of the threats of
practices in order to mitigate radicalization and
immobilization phases before our men and women in blue
encounter them as first responders.
Counterterrorism and target-hardening operations need
effective means of communications and plans that are
interoperable and standardized. The State of New Jersey lacks
digital technologies and personnel to support planning and
operational phases and providing consistent real-time
interagency communications during a multi-agency phase to an
incident or an event. We collectively must continue to foster
sustainable relationships, enable efficient information
exchange, and implement an integration and analysis function to
inform planning and operational decisions in order to protect
our citizens and critical infrastructure in unified approach.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lemanowicz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Lemanowicz
November 28, 2017
The New Jersey State Police (NJSP) is comprised of four primary
branches: Administration, Investigations, Homeland Security, and
Operations. Through these branches and other specialized offices, the
division maintains a network of information sharing and collaborative
efforts to conduct effective operations. The members within these
groups also maintain critical relations with outside agencies to
promote abilities to counter terrorist and criminal activities in
numerous critical infrastructure sectors and countless soft targets.
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8)
describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats and
hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United
States. National preparedness is defined as the actions taken to plan,
organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain capabilities
necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond
to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the
Nation. Through the guidance of PPD-8 frameworks, consideration must be
given to enhancing and fortifying capabilities in preventing,
detecting, and deterring of threats and attacks within the State of New
Jersey.
The threat of terrorism and acts of violent crime has become too
common in the United States. The New Jersey State Police assumes a
great duty in defending the State against terrorist attacks and violent
crimes. Preparedness is a shared responsibility and requires a whole-
community effort to promote safety and resilience through a common
goal. It is vital that all partners build, organize, and enhance
capabilities in a unified approach to be better prepared to counter
all-hazards threats in our communities. A mission within the Division
of State Police is to develop innovative strategies and partnerships
with public and private entities to prevent, interdict, protect, and
respond to threats that target our State. Through communal target-
hardening coordination, protective measure consultation, infrastructure
and event vulnerability assessments, real-time data analysis and
situational awareness tracking, interagency communication, and direct
counter-threat operational deployments, our goal is to thwart terror.
The Office of Target Hardening was established in the Special
Operations Section within the Homeland Security Branch in July of 2016.
Their primary mission is to effectively implement and develop target
hardening strategies to deter terrorist activity. This office works
collaboratively with other specialized groups within the division as
well as with other Federal, State, county, and local mission partners.
This is demonstrated in the monthly meeting at the Regional Operations
Intelligence Center (ROIC) where mission partner representatives
assemble to discuss new intelligence, special events, current threats,
lessons learned, best practices, and operational recommendations. These
partners include, but are not limited to: the NJSP Threat Analysis and
Critical Infrastructure Units, Joint Terrorism Task Force, Office of
Homeland Security and Preparedness, Federal Bureau of Investigations,
Transportation Security Administration, New Jersey Office of Emergency
Management, and National Counterterrorism Center.
These daily-weekly-monthly discussions are our ``cycle of
preparedness'' where we, as a team of teams, auto-adapt to the evolving
threat through collaboration, information sharing, intelligence,
prevention, awareness, and response. The Division of State Police
deploys target-hardening missions regularly due to the shared network
from mission partners. The Office of Target Hardening organizes and
directs NJSP units, which specialize in explosive and hazardous
materials detection, suspicious activity detection and interception,
counter assault tactics, maritime security, commercial motor vehicle
and motor coach safety, aviation surveillance and insertion operations,
and highway transportation systems resiliency, into targeted areas.
This office also deconflicts with other agencies and specialized units
in order to conduct safe, coordinated prevention and protection-based
operations.
Today's threat environment domestically and internationally is
wrought with an ideology committed to the destruction of established
Western culture. The world has seen a significant spike in foreign and
domestic terrorist attacks resulting in death, destruction,
intimidation, and fear. The United States is the ``ultimate prize'' for
those seeking to strike a blow to our way of living. This ideology is
evident by the rise in Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) attacks,
utilizing both complex and rudimentary means. As a State, we witnessed
and responded to these type of attacks during the September 2016 New
Jersey and New York Bombings. The terrorist threats we face are only
limited by the creativity and sense of purpose of those planning and
executing them. In addition, law enforcement officers and military
personnel have become a preferred target for those seeking to do harm.
In order to be able to continue to detect, deter, prevent, and
respond to terrorist and criminal activities, our law enforcement must
continue to develop its capabilities. Collaboration and information
sharing are most vital pieces that need to be nurtured in order to
sustain strong relations. Stakeholders need to be able to train, equip,
and exercise personnel as well as provide routine education to develop
decision-making abilities. Our ``first preventers'' should be prepared
with the institutional knowledge of the threats and practices in order
to mitigate radicalization and mobilization phases before our men and
women in blue encounter them as ``first responders.'' Counterterrorism
and target-hardening operations need effective means of communications
and plans that are interoperable and standardized. The State of New
Jersey lacks digital technologies and personnel to support planning and
operational phases and in providing consistent real-time, interagency
communications during a multi-agency response to an incident or event.
We collectively must continue to foster sustainable relationships,
enable efficient information exchange, and implement an integration and
analysis function to inform planning and operational decisions in order
to protect our citizens and critical infrastructure in a unified
approach.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Lemanowicz, for your testimony.
We appreciate you taking the time to be here today, and you
definitely are thought-provoking like the others have testified
before you. Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much for your
testimony, and thank you for emphasizing the need to be
collaborative and to interact because Mr. Katko and I are
constantly talking about whether or not information is being
shared in real time and best practices and things of that
nature, so thank you.
Our next witness is Mr. Trucillo, Mr. Christopher Trucillo.
Mr. Trucillo was sworn in as the chief of New Jersey Transit
Police Department on July 26, 2010. He began his law
enforcement career in 1978 as a municipal police officer in
Harrison, New Jersey. In 1986 he joined the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey Police Department where he rose to the
ranks to become the chief of the department. Chief Trucillo was
instrumental during the aftermath of September 11, 2001,
transforming the transit police into an antiterror force.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Trucillo for his testimony,
and thank you for being here today, sir.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER TRUCILLO, CHIEF, TRANSIT POLICE, NEW
JERSEY TRANSIT
Mr. Trucillo. Thank you, Congresswoman. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman and Members of the subcommittee. I welcome this
opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the
challenges of securing passengers utilizing surface
transportation in New Jersey, New York, and this region.
As the Congresswoman mentioned, before joining the Transit
Police Department I served as the chief of the department for
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and while there
I was the commanding officer of the the port authority bus
terminal in Manhattan and Newark International Airport. As the
chief of that department I was responsible for the busiest
aviation system in our Nation, as well as the PATH system where
at that time we moved 240,000 people a day between New York and
New Jersey.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me. We
appreciate the important role this committee has in matters
related to transportation security, and I and the agency look
forward to working with you.
Just a little background on New Jersey Transit. We are the
third-largest transit agency in the Nation. We are also the
Nation's largest State-wide transportation system. We encompass
over 5,000 square miles. We provide almost a million trips a
day. We have 257 bus routes, 12 commuter lines, three light
rail systems and our paratransit system. We have 166 heavy rail
stations, 62 light rail stations in this State, and over 19,000
bus stops.
Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by New
Jersey Transit are vital to the economic well-being of our
State and the region. We provide an essential service to the
nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey commuters who use and
depend on New Jersey Transit. It is important to note that
these services reduce traffic congestion by providing commuters
alternatives to our crowded highways and trans-Hudson
crossings.
Mr. Chairman, as you know public transit agencies have
unique security challenges due to the large numbers of people
we serve in publicly-accessible facilities traveling on
predictable schedules. Over and over we have seen carnage
inflicted by radicalized extremists on innocent people using
publicly-accessible spaces. Just recently on a public bike path
in nearby Manhattan and unfortunately mass transit systems
world-wide continue to be a preferred target of terrorists. Our
most important priority is keeping our customers and employees
safe, as we continue to provide essential transportation
services.
Safety and security are obviously the top priority for
everyone in New Jersey Transit and within the transit police
department. Counterterrorism is this police department's No. 1
priority, and we take that mission very seriously. New Jersey
Transit utilizes a risk-based approach to our security efforts.
In all hazards and threats the police department's
intelligence section provides the agency with strategic-level
risk management tools in support of our counterterrorism
efforts and coordinates intelligence collection analysis and
production efforts, including reporting and monitoring of
suspicious activity and individuals. They work cooperatively
and collaboratively with the FBI offices in Newark, New York
City, Philadelphia, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
TSA, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security, NYPD, and the
State Police State Fusion Center.
Mr. Chairman, Members, almost all of our over 11,000
employees at New Jersey Transit have received security
awareness training. From conductors, the bus operators, to
office staff, our employees are force multipliers, extra eyes
and ears for the police department. We also work in cooperation
with the hundreds of businesses located near train stations to
encourage them to report suspicious activity.
We also continue to work closely with those first responder
agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels. To give
you an example, several times a year we take partner agencies
to Texas A&M at a DHS center of excellence for incident command
so we can train together for an event, God forbid, that may
happen here at home. To date we have trained over 600 New
Jersey Transit employees from all business lines, not just the
police, as well as over 500 of our partner agencies, some of
whom are at this table today. To assure that we are prepared
and able to respond adequately to a terrorism incident, the
Office of Emergency Management conducts 5 to 7 exercises every
year within the State with those partners.
Our ability to respond quickly and capably has been
enhanced further because this year we opened an emergency
operations center. State-of-the-art operations center, which we
have already used this past summer with Amtrak work out of Penn
Station New York.
The EOC provides information and support to incident
management and coordinates all response and recovery efforts
when there is an incident. We, as my partners have mentioned,
also promote our customers to see something and say something.
We have 800 lines, text tip lines. We also have a new mobile
app that people can buy tickets and use a digital ticketing,
and on that app it gives them an opportunity with one press of
a button to report something into our police department.
While we don't give out specific deployment information
about how we deploy our police officers, we use as my partners
have mentioned many different tools that are seen and some not
seen to protect our passengers. We have specialized police
officers who are all fully certified in urban search-and-
rescue. Their skill sets came to bear recently when we had the
Hoboken train accident in Hoboken, New Jersey.
We have explosive detection K-9s, which are probably our
most important deterrence. We are also a test bed for TSA's
office of requirements and capabilities analysis formerly
science and technology.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, every one of
these efforts that I have spoken of requires resources. We
simply could not carry out our mission without the help and
support of Congress and the Department of Homeland Security. We
believe that increased Federal investment in public
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical to that
effort.
New Jersey Transit has made great strides in transit
security improvements in the recent years, but much more needs
to be done. So we are very grateful for the interest and focus
of this committee and the subcommittee and very grateful to
Representative Coleman for her efforts. They are not only most
welcome, they are essential.
We look forward to building on our cooperative working
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and
Congress to further these needs. On behalf of New Jersey
Transit and the New Jersey Transit Police Department I again
thank you and the committee for allowing us to submit testimony
on these critical issues.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trucillo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Trucillo
November 28, 2017
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I
welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
challenges of securing passengers utilizing surface transportation in
New Jersey, New York, and the region.
Before joining New Jersey Transit in July 2010 as the chief of
police for the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I served for 5
years as the chief of department for the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey Police Department. During my 23-year career with the Port
Authority I served as the commanding officer of internal affairs and
special investigations, the commanding officer of the Port Authority
bus terminal in Midtown Manhattan, as well as the commanding officer of
Newark Liberty International Airport.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing,
``Securing Public Areas of Transportation Systems: Stakeholder
Perspectives.'' We appreciate the important role of this committee in
matters relating to transportation security, and we look forward to
working with you on these issues.
about nj transit
NJ TRANSIT is the third-largest transit system in the country and
also the Nation's largest State-wide public transportation system
serving an area encompassing 5,325 square miles. We provide more than
915,000 weekday trips on 257 bus routes, three light rail lines, 12
commuter rail lines, and through Access Link, our paratransit service.
We serve 166 rail stations, 62 light rail stations and more than 19,000
bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York, and
Philadelphia.
Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by NJ TRANSIT
are vital to the economic well-being of our State and the region. We
provide an essential service to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey
commuters who use and depend on the NJ TRANSIT system. It's important
to note that these services reduce traffic congestion by providing
commuters with alternatives to our crowded highways and trans-Hudson
crossings.
overview
Mr. Chairman, as you know, public transit agencies have unique
security challenges due to the large numbers of people we serve in
publicly-accessible facilities, traveling on advertised predictable
schedules.
Over and over, we have seen carnage inflicted by radicalized
extremists on innocent people using the most publicly accessible of
spaces, just recently on a public bike path in nearby Manhattan.
Unfortunately, mass transit systems world-wide continue to be preferred
targets of terrorists.
Our most important priority is keeping our customers and employees
safe as we continue to provide our essential transportation services.
Safety and security are the top priority for all of NJ TRANSIT and
within the New Jersey Transit Police Department--counterterrorism is
our primary mission, and we take that mission very seriously.
NJ TRANSIT utilizes a risk-based approach to maximizing our
security efforts to protect our trains, buses, light rail vehicles, and
stations from all hazards and threats. The Police Department's
Intelligence Section provides the agency with strategic-level risk
management tools in support of our counterterrorism efforts and
coordinates intelligence collection, analysis, and production efforts,
including the reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity and
individuals, with the FBI's Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
and the TSA, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, the NYPD, the New Jersey State fusion center and other
partners.
Almost all of our 11,000 employees have received security awareness
training. From conductors to bus operators to office staff, our
employees are ``force multipliers''--extra eyes and ears for our
police. We also work in cooperation with the thousands of businesses
located near train stations to report suspicious activity.
In addition, we continue to work closely with first responding
agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels. To give you just
an example, several times per year members of New Jersey Transit's
police, operations, and administrative staff partner with local police,
fire, and EMS agencies in Incident Command Training at Texas A&M
University. To date, more than 600 transit employees and over 500 of
our partners have participated in these joint exercises.
To ensure that we are prepared for and are able to respond
adequately to a terrorism incident, the NJTPD Office of Emergency
Management conducts regular drills and exercises that ensures that our
response to terrorism incidents is both effective and well-coordinated
with our local, State, regional, and Federal partners.
Our ability to respond quickly and capably has been further
enhanced with the opening earlier this year of a new, state-of-the-art
Emergency Operations Center, which is a critical tool that allows
effective, efficient, and economical management of any event in one
central location that could (or does) impact transit operations. The
EOC provides information and support to incident management and
response/recovery coordination activities.
NJ TRANSIT also promotes a campaign urging customers who see
suspicious activity or unattended packages at stations, aboard trains
or buses, or near transit facilities to call the NJ TRANSIT security
hotline at 1-888-TIPS-NJT, text us at NJTPD, or notify a New Jersey
Transit Police officer.
The NJ TRANSIT mobile app for smartphones includes convenient one-
touch access to call or text the New Jersey Transit Police Department
directly. So, not only can customers purchase digital tickets by using
the app, they can also easily say something if they see something. All
calls are investigated, and all information is confidential.
Mr. Chairman, while we do not release details about police
deployments or specific countermeasures, our uniformed police patrol
officers remain vigilant in monitoring our system. I am pleased to say
we recently graduated 25 new officers (who happened to attend the
nearby Mercer County Police Academy, which I'm sure Representative
Coleman is familiar with), and we have another class of 16 recruits
which will graduate from the Essex County Police Academy on December 14
of this year. Our uniformed officers are supported by plain clothes
detectives and anti-crime officers throughout the NJ TRANSIT system.
Our Special Operations Division provides enhanced capabilities to
protect and respond to terrorism on our system. Random baggage
screening performed by our Emergency Services Units provides us with
the capability to detect and respond to incidents involving chemical,
biological, radiological, and explosive materials. ESU along with our
Train Patrol Units and Conditions Tactical Unit also provide a
specialized tactical response capability with unique training and
capabilities specific to the mass transit environment.
Our canine unit officers along with their explosive detection dogs
perform perhaps some of our most important functions. These officers
along with their canine partners do not just detect explosives
throughout the NJ TRANSIT system but their presence provides an
effective visible deterrent against our adversaries.
Every member of the department is equipped with radiation pagers
and we have tripled the number of officers trained in the use of long
guns. We continue to work closely with the TSA's Office of Science and
Technology to test the next generation of technology that will be
utilized to secure surface transit.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, every one of these
efforts that I have spoken of requires resources. We simply could not
carry out our mission without the help and support of Congress and the
Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs;
we believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation
security by Congress and DHS is critical. NJ TRANSIT has made great
strides in transit security improvements in recent years, but much more
needs to be done. So we are very grateful for the interest and focus of
the committee and the subcommittee, and very grateful to Representative
Coleman for her efforts. They are not only welcome--they are essential.
We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship
with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to further
address these needs. On behalf of NJ TRANSIT and the New Jersey Transit
Police Department, I again thank you and the committee for allowing us
to submit testimony on these critical issues, and look forward to
working with you on safety and security issues.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Trucillo, for your testimony, and
I appreciate you being here, as well. The normal protocol at
this time is for the Chair of the subcommittee to start with
questioning, but given the fact that Mrs. Watson Coleman and
myself work in such a fine and bipartisan manner, and given the
fact this this is the home turf, I am going to give her the
honor of going first with questions. Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
thanks, each and every one of you for your testimony. I did
read your testimony, and I am very impressed with the kind of
robust and comprehensive training that the people that work for
you have, not only those on the front lines, but even some of
those who were in support capacities. It does make us feel
better that these issues are being addressed.
I have a couple of general questions. One question, I don't
know if you have had the opportunity to travel into other
countries and to see what sort of security measures or
technologies they employ in Europe and other places that would
be very helpful to us here and very helpful to you that you
don't have access to now. So I am wondering if you could just
quickly share with me some of those things that you have
observed if you have, and I will start----
Mr. Cunningham. Yes, I don't mind answering that question
myself, also. I traveled extensively with the FBI and what I
noticed in most of the European, as well as Asian is that there
is a presence on the platforms absolutely. In Europe it is
mostly an armed presence with K-9s actively walking and
patrolling the entire length. It is not just one. It is
multiple, and they have teams. That is the biggest that I have
seen.
The other thing is, is that they also have a propensity for
cameras, and I just know that--and assuming this position that
I have now, the cost of maintaining them is also a
consideration, and that is what sort-of happens. If you employ
cameras from 2003, 2005 they are pretty much outdated and now,
you know, are needed to be revamped, and so it is a big cost,
but that is what I have noticed internationally is the presence
on the platforms, and it is manpower. It is putting them out
there, and meanwhile doing the other things that you have to
do.
Mr. Nestel. I think that if you go anywhere outside of the
country you see a very robust camera network. We would love to
have that. That doesn't exist for most transit agencies, I
think, in the United States right now.
They also have things that you don't see, and those are
chemical detection systems on trains and on platforms and also
scanners, weapon scanners. All of that technology is being used
elsewhere and is not as prevalent here in the United States.
Mr. Lemanowicz. In many ways our operations are there to
support the different sectors, so in terms of us looking at a
transportation sector we come in as a deployment model as a
strike team to support the on-site, but the cameras would be a
big piece, and when we are there we are bolstering that effect
of having resources on scene, but when we are not, again, they
are at their minimums that they are able to sustain.
I would also recommend that digital technology is
continually on the rise, and it is not just--if we can put
members out on the platforms or in terminals and things like
that, but it is the accountability of our members, so from a
management side, so when you have a critical incident, a
catastrophic incident, that you know real-time where your
people are and because of the radio traffic just gets
overwhelmed.
So we are--in many ways we have come, we have improved
since 9/11 with our communications, but in many ways we haven't
made it to that point, and there are some simple systems out
there that other countries are using, and it is not being Big
Brother and where is my personnel, it is more of when something
happens how do we quickly get them and communicate to them what
is going on? Then you have a real-time two-way feedback of that
situation.
Mr. Trucillo. I have had the opportunity while at the port
authority to travel to London and to Israel to see how they
handle security. In London the big difference that I noticed
was the camera system that my colleagues mentioned, very
robust, very coordinated, all the disparate systems no matter
where they are are tied in, so it literally is one system, and
operationally it was very good.
In Israel it is the mindset that everyone understands how
important security is to their nation, and that I took back
with me and that is why I mentioned earlier counterterrorism is
the No. 1 mission of every New Jersey Transit police officer.
They have to know that, not because I say it but because they
are trained to that, and our training reflects that.
The other thing that I noticed in Israel, again, was the
randomness of the way they do their patrols. The difficult
thing we deal with in mass transit is not having the people to
necessarily cover everywhere we have risk, and none of us can
afford, nor do I believe as a Nation we can afford to put a
police officer everywhere.
But we should be able to in a random way have someone who
is preoperatively looking at a target, have a risk that a
police officer is going to be there, that they should not be
able to observe a target for a week and never have seen a
police officer at that location because that is a very bad
message to send to an adversary, that this is a very easy
target. So I believe that was what I picked up from being
overseas.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So it seems to me that both additional
personnel, so that there is a robust presence, obviously K-9s
that can detect explosives and gases and things of that nature,
and so my question is, have you had a chance to review the
sort-of proposed budget and have any idea how it would impact
what you think you need as opposed to what you would be getting
in any of those categories? For instance, the budget proposes
just reducing VIPR teams to 8 teams.
It doesn't even propose necessarily the kind of support to
the surface transportation facilities. The grants that would
help you to hire people and I guess get other things has gone
from $88 million proposed to $48 million. I am going to
introduce a bill today that--you know, I am hoping that Mr.
Katko gets a chance to look at and find areas in which he can
support because both of us are very interested in ensuring as
well as Mr. Fitzpatrick.
It is very important to us that these surface
transportation facilities, the infrastructures and operations
are given the kind of attention that TSA doesn't seem to be
giving them now and that the resources don't seem to be bearing
out.
Mr. Trucillo. If I may, I can mention it very directly in
two specific areas in terms of the decrease in the transit
security grant program. You heard me talk about the training we
do, and this training is critical. The drills, the exercises,
you know, there is a saying that my colleagues and I all know.
You don't want there to be a major event, all show up, and that
is the first time you are seeing folks.
You need to have these relationships, get this
collaborative working knowledge before you ever get to that
scene, and through the drills and exercises that we are able to
do, and the only way we do it is through the transit security
grant program where we train together. We travel to a
specialized facility to train together. These relationships are
incredible.
I am going to go back just for a quick moment to that
Hoboken train accident. We had over 350 people on this train
when it crashed into Hoboken. They were all extricated from
that train, evacuated from that train in a half-hour. There
were 107 injuries in that incident. They were all triaged and
transported to hospitals in under 1 hour.
In emergency management that is a remarkable job. That
happened because everybody who responded to that scene has
worked together before, has drilled together before.
The second item that would be critical and we would not be
able to do what we do now if we lost the grant program my
colleague from SEPTA mentioned it earlier special events. For
instance, transit we have a train station within 100 yards of a
football stadium. We have 16 football games every Sunday. NFL,
AFL, every Sunday there is a game, and we have trains that go
out to that stadium that we have to protect. We have concerts,
festivals, fairs. They are all targets of opportunity. They are
all where large crowds gather. Without the ability to put
officers as a deterrent at these events, we are vulnerable, and
those are two specific ways that a decrease in that grant
program is going to have a tangible impact.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I guess one question I have is to what
extent do you rely upon the local police to participate in
whatever needs you have in securing your surface facilities at
events, at special events or just, you know, under normal
circumstances because that particular program is slated for
elimination, and we think that that is particularly
problematic? Anyone.
Mr. Nestel. I think that police departments and local
jurisdictions are already stretched thin and have way too many
responsibilities, which is why we ended up being formed in the
first place. They can't assume the responsibilities that we are
responsible for.
The gaps that exist because of the grant funding decrease
from nearly $200 million to $80 million is very painful for the
transit agencies. We have a significant K-9 explosive detection
function, and, Congresswoman, if a bag is left unattended, if
we don't get to that bag quickly we have to stop the system.
This happens every day. So we have multiple K-9 units
throughout our system that can respond within minutes to clear
that bag to make sure that it is not a threat.
For us at SEPTA we have a special operations response team,
which is basically a SWAT and rescue team that was funded
through the transit grant program. We are not getting those
funds now. So it has a dramatic effect on those specialized
functions that are so important to transit right now.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I will yield back at the
moment. I hope we have another round.
Mr. Katko. We will be happy to do so, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Thank you very much, and thank all of you gentlemen for being
here today, as I said earlier.
As I was sitting here I was thinking you have 12\1/2\ times
the number of passengers that travel on the airlines every
year, and not only do you have the safety and prevention aspect
you also have a law enforcement aspect that they don't have to
deal with at airports very much, that is the unruly passenger,
the unruly crowds at Eagles games, things like that.
So you really are wearing more than one hat, and I really
commend you for the job you are doing. It is quite remarkable,
given the target of opportunity that daily presents itself in
your realm that you have kept people as safe as you have, and
our Nation really owes you all a debt of gratitude and all your
colleagues, so I want to thank you for all you do to keep
people safe every day.
One thing I learned when I was a Federal organized crime
prosecutor is that task forces are critical. Task forces at
Federal, State, and local law enforcement are the force
multiplier you need to really draw on the expertise and the
manpower issues to get the job done. So it is really heartening
to hear how well that concept works and it seems like necessity
is the mother of invention, and everyone knows you want to keep
people safe, so it is a lot easier to get them to work together
under those circumstances, but that is really very important.
One thing that I was concerned with in my days as a
prosecutor was the interoperability issue with radios, as well.
We had a lot of those concerns, and I heard that from I think
it was you Mr. Nestel or----
Mr. Nestel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. I would like to hear a little more about that
and how we can help fix that because to me that should be an
easy fix, and it is frustrating at times to me that when, you
know, not all law enforcement agencies were on the same
frequencies, and it is just maddening that we can't fix
something as easy as that, so I would like to hear something we
can do to fix that first of all.
Mr. Nestel. Look, Congressman, the technology is there. It
is expensive. Once it is expensive it is getting over the
hurdles of jurisdictional acceptance. When a different
jurisdiction is speaking on your radio band, it is the
different languages, it is the control of those conversations.
It is access to information. You know, there is always a
concern when your radio communication is being monitored by
others that you don't know.
So there are obvious hurdles that have to be crossed before
we can have that ability to communicate. During an emergency we
have interoperability where we can plug in from SEPTA
headquarters, we can plug in all the local jurisdictions on to
one band to handle that emergency. It exists. We have it.
This is the normal day-to-day communication. You know, a
suspicious person in a track area between Warminster and
Hatboro in Bucks County, would warrant communication with that
jurisdiction, and we would have the ability to just switch a
radio band and the officers responding would then be on the
band of that jurisdiction, who is also responding. That is a
huge benefit for us. Huge benefit. So it would be cost and it
would be logistics of acceptance.
Mr. Katko. OK. Thank you. Anybody else want to add to that?
Mr. Lemanowicz. There is a, it is called Statecom, which
most of all our agencies across the State, as well as all local
municipal county resources can all jump on.
We are in a process right now in trying to identify certain
channels and right now so like a target-hardening channel where
it is made up of different agencies, and they are going around
with VIPR teams and other groups in an overt and covert
capacities in a prevention and protection-based model; not
response, prevention and protection.
So that is the collaboration part, but how do we talk? It
is through these group channels. It is not taking ownership of
another agency's primary, it is just giving an opportunity that
they can quickly click over to this channel and speak.
So in terms of a special event, the Papal 2 years ago, we
operate off of Statecom, Super Bowl, Statecom all these
different special events. Now we think of a significant
incident, you think about the Seaside and the bombings in New
York, we were able to now move to a Statecom channel to now
collaborate all resources on to that.
So now it is a point of education and training and
exercising and you get everybody to get comfortable in using
it, but like you said, it does exist.
Mr. Nestel. Congressman, one----
Mr. Katko. Sure.
Mr. Nestel. One follow-up. Manufacturer, there are several
manufacturers of radios and what we have seen is that when we
try to integrate those systems using different manufacturers
there is often another hurdle that comes up that there is a
concern that there will be communication interference or not a
smooth transition using different manufacturers. I am not a
communications expert. I don't know if that is a realistic
concern, but I know that it is an organizational concern.
Mr. Katko. OK. OK. Now I am going to briefly touch on K-9s.
It is amazing in this era of modern technology, which I will
get to in a moment, that people often get back to saying K-9s
are one of the most effective methods and tools we have in our
arsenal, and it is also amazing to me how little they are
really utilized. So does anyone want to kind-of share some
opinions as to why that is, that K-9s aren't more readily used?
Mr. Trucillo. I won't speak to why they are not used. I
will reaffirm what you mentioned, Congressman, about how
important they are. I believe that it is probably the single
best deterrent that we could have.
Mr. Katko. We hear that all the time in the airport realm,
as well, isn't that amazing?
Mr. Trucillo. You asked me what we can do to protect--the
singular thing we can do to protect mass transit I would say
put a K-9 and a trained partner in every train station, and I
don't think you would have a better deterrent than that.
Mr. Katko. OK. Anybody else?
Mr. Cunningham. We have used the K-9 dogs when we shut down
the bridge or we have a race that is being run like Loch Run or
one of the other ones we searched 7,000 bike riders' bags with
those dogs and were able to get them down to the shore before
they arrived. I mean 7,000 bags, so irreplaceable.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Mr. Nestel. I think that it cuts the needs for staffing
because ordinarily you would have a two-officer team. That dog
serves as a partner. It also serves multiple functions. It is
not just an explosives detection, it is tracking of escaping
persons. It is community relations. The dog has multiple
functions, and the dog is much cheaper than electronic
technology. It does the same thing.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Mr. Lemanowicz. Captain Scott Poulton in the audience. He
was pretty much one of the supervisors in building this task
force, this detection render safe task force for the K-9s
State-wide capability in recalling in a preventative or in a
response function for a special event or incident. But as
everybody here at the table has said, they are a phenomenal
resource, and many times it might just be seen that they are
scent tracking a--you know, trying to find a suspicious item,
but many times we start to think about the tactics that they
are using overseas now it is not just an article of an item, it
is an individual, it is a vehicle, and what we are finding now
is we have to adapt, and that is going to require funding and
training and exercise to now adapt to our threat, and that is a
moving vehicle, that is a moving individual.
We don't have air--you know scent trackers that are moving
with an individual. They come on to an article or an item and
they scent it, but in terms of a moving subject our K-9s across
the State at a local, county, and State, Federal level they
still need that extra training so that is a huge piece for our
future in combatting any type of terrorist.
Mr. Katko. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. Three words; funding, training, exercising,
essential.
Mr. Katko. The fourth word is savings, right, in some
respects in compared to technology you are going to try, that
may not work. Let's get to the technology a little bit. I am
constantly frustrated, I think I might share this sentiment to
my colleagues, when I note that Homeland Security is not the
best at procurement, and it is not the best at getting
technology to the front lines, and I will give you an example.
We are at an airport in Amsterdam where they have American-made
technology 3D scanners that are being implemented now. Now.
Now. They are on the front line. They are working now. They are
using them now. The Homeland Security Agency wants to study
them until 2019, and hopefully get them on-line by 2019.
In the meanwhile the technology is probably going to
advance because the bad guys are always advancing, and we know
that what it takes to bring down an airplane is getting a
smaller and smaller device. So with that being said, is there
any one thing that we can get Homeland Security to do to get--
help you get the technology to the front lines quickly other
than money? Is there something in the process that is flawed
that needs to be addressed or adjusted that we are missing
because we are constantly on them, but it just seems to me that
they can't get that process going in a timely manner.
I mean, Mrs. Watson Coleman and I were at a refugee camp on
the border with Syria, and each refugee got $28 a month. They
never got the $28 a month, but they had a $28 voucher, and they
would go into like this collective grocery store, 85,000 people
on the Syrian border in the middle of the desert in the middle
of nowhere they used American iris scan technology to detect
who was using the money and how much was left in their account,
and we don't even use that at airports today.
So with that being said, anyone want to share any thoughts
on that?
Mr. Cunningham. I have one thing. We have 732 cameras on
either the PATCO line or on the bridges. Integration, they are
not integrated. What is the sense of having those cameras? Who
can monitor that many? The ability, the analytics is--the
capability is there, but the integrative factor of intrusion
detection and alarm systems and the cameras themselves is
essential, and so that is something that I am looking forward
to trying to hoping the grant program, and that is why I
brought Mr. Shanahan along with me----
Mr. Katko. The grant man.
Mr. Cunningham [continuing]. To just force the situation
that funding is essential and integration is essential, and I
know that Tommy Nestel, this is a key thing for all of us on a
regional level.
Mr. Katko. Gotcha.
Mr. Nestel. Congressman, I don't think anybody at this
table is going to say that technology isn't one of the biggest
pieces for securing mass transit, it truly is. I don't know
where Homeland Security is testing it, but I will tell you I
will push my peers out of the way and volunteer that it be on
SEPTA.
We all need this technology. It is expensive. None of us
can afford it. We look forward to the time where the tested
opportunity becomes a reality, but it just doesn't seem to
happen for us.
You know, each one of these agencies spends its own dollars
to move forward with technology now rather than wait until, you
know, that 5, that 10 years later when it is going to be at the
point where we really need it because in 5 or 10 years it is
going to change.
Mr. Katko. Right. The TSA does the innovation lanes in our
airports, but I don't know if they do much in the way of
innovation with respect to service transportation, that is
perhaps what I am going to get them to go with, but the bottom
line is when the ideas are there and it takes so long to get
them implemented because of their internal processes that is
very frustrating for us.
Mr. Trucillo. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, New Jersey Transit, we volunteered to be a test bed
for science and technology, the division within TSA.
We have been working hard with them, testing things like
chem biodetection undercarriage screening. For instance, when
we had to safeguard rail cars for the Super Bowl it was bomb
detection, and we can get in the car and we can visually see
the exterior of the car, but we were worried about the
undercarriage. So they developed an undercarriage screening
that at speed could read the underside of the rail car and give
us a level of comfort before we sent that car within the secure
perimeter to the State police.
So they are making some strides, but it is frustrating
because those strides are coming very, very slow. I am not a
science guy, but I believe technology has got to be the answer,
but unfortunately, that technology is apparently not here yet.
Mr. Katko. Yes. The problem is a lot of times it is here,
it is just not getting implemented in a timely manner. Well, do
you have anything to offer?
Mr. Lemanowicz. In making the transition in my career from
urban search-and-rescue to special operations, and as a former
special operations operator, and now as an operations officer
and coordinator, the main thing is to go by the KISS method,
and keep it simple; and for me, keep it simple, stupid. So all
of our personnel are being tasked probably more than they can.
Do more with less. For us to try to keep up with technology and
deploy it the way we would envision it where the we see in the
movies and it is not practical.
But in terms of going back to communications, so, and not
talking prevention-based but talking about a response incident,
they are on the rails, they are in some type of terminals, and
they are now the immediate actors, you know, counter-assault
personnel. They are trying to deal with a threat. How do you
bring in the resources that are needed? We have actors now that
are calling in SWAT incidents SWATing incidents to see how we
respond to make, you know, to now try to--how can we counter
their capabilities?
So it is very important for us to look at it in terms of
making it very clear across all channels of the communication
aspects of radio, but how could we use digital technology to
make it very simple in terms of what is happening right now and
then when you have additional resources coming in how can you
provide a GIS layout of what the area of operation it is to
make it very simplified to immediate point of contact? Very
simple things. From there these men and women are trained in
their tactics, and they can handle it.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. I went well over my time,
so I won't ask any questions in the second round, but, Mr.
Fitzpatrick, the floor is yours sir.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our
region. To the Ranking Member, thanks for hosting us in your
district and thank you all of you for being here. No. 1, thank
you for what you do. I know it is not easy. It is a very, very
significant responsibility under difficult circumstances, so I
want to thank you for that and also thank you for testifying
today because the recommendations that you share with us are
very, very important. They become part of the Congressional
Record for one, and second, we really do take these
recommendations back to our committee, back to the floor of the
House and they do in some form or fashion influence the final
product, which is relevant to keeping everybody safe here in
this country.
I want to touch on two issues. No. 1 is interagency
cooperation. I formally was Mr. Cunningham's colleague in the
bureau, and I know he can attest to the importance of task
forces and the role that they play, and it is not just State-
to-State, Federal-to-Federal, but it is Federal-to-State. I can
tell you that in the area of Safe Streets task forces, bank
robbery task forces, JTTFs the synergy that was developed not
only the camaraderie and the relationships but everybody bought
something unique to the table. Every single agency on different
levels had something unique to offer to those investigations,
and when we talk about force multipliers I think that plays
into that.
Technology is important. K-9s are important. We talk about
the force multiplier aspects. I think task forces are really
important, which gets to my question. For task forces to work
the relationships have to be good. We all know, and this isn't
unique to law enforcement, it exists in all sorts of
organizations, but often times there can be competitive
jurisdictional battles, sometimes battles over funding that can
hold back the success of task forces.
So my first question is: What can you share about what is
working and what is not working in respective areas that you
work with the task forces on both the State and Federal level?
The second is when it comes to the budget often times it is
an issue of prioritization, and a lot of times those edicts
come from the top of the Executive branch, and they may or may
not be consistent with what you all are seeing based on you
having your ears and eyes to the ground, knowing the threats on
a more intricate basis than maybe the people that are at the
top making the decisions and issuing the priorities that impact
your funding and where it is going and what you can and can't
do in keeping us safe.
So if we can just address those two issues, the task force
and sort-of the relationship aspect to it, and second, on is
there any disconnect between the priorities that sometimes are
issued on high that affects the priority of where your funding
streams are going and whether there is a disconnect between
what you really need?
Mr. Cunningham. Well, first, the task force for us kind-of
thing is our working group. For Tom Nestel and myself the DART
team, we also have New Jersey Transit, and part of--is part of
our group, the regional group, that works tremendously well. I
will say one thing, though I found out that we had funding for
two analysts who were working at the DVIC and providing transit
transportation surface work as well, you know, processes and
intelligence threats they were working on. That grant is
running out, so we are not going to be able to fund it anymore,
so those two analysts that were working and doing some things
for us are now not going to be there.
We spoke to the people at the DVIC and the commanding
officer there, and they are going to try to pick up that, but,
again, there is a gap that causes there. Working together and
cooperatively is fantastic as far as as I see, and the openness
is there. It is what do we need, and we get back to the same
thing. It is funding and direct, you know directed patrol
funding, it is money to put systems in. It is the integrated.
It is to make us better, you know, jointly, and that seems to
be what is lacking, mainly the funding.
The camaraderie, the ability or the willingness is there.
It is no longer a divided field, if you will. If I need
something from the New Jersey State Police I feel very
comfortable that I can go there and get whatever it is that we
need, intelligence-wise or whatever. So I will open it to Tom.
Mr. Nestel. I am going piggyback on exactly what you said,
Congressman, and that was the value of task forces is beyond
just the investigative function that they are serving is the
development of the people that you assign to that task force is
huge. The personal relationships that they develop in that
Federal organization, State organization, local organization.
The added resource. I know that I can call the detective on the
Joint Terrorism Task Force on the FBI Violent Crime Task Force,
on the DEA Task Force, I can call any of those detectives and
immediately get resources from those organizations because of
our participation and because of the relationships that are
built.
When it comes to the transit group, this transit group, we
have a phenomenal relationship, and, you know, it might be a
case in other places where there is sparring over grant funds,
that doesn't occur with our group. There is great collaborative
effort when it comes to the grant funding and the group
efforts, but Charlie hit the nail on the head. Somewhere above
our group one of the most important parts of preventing
terrorism is the intelligence element. You know, if we are
relying on that cop on a platform to stop it, then a lot of
things have failed to get to that point. We no longer will have
an analyst after January, and that was funded by grant funding
that we all agreed on, and it is gone.
Mr. Lemanowicz. The concept of the task force is what gets
the job done. I have seen it with the USAR task forces. I was
involved with that for 7 years. When a local or a county entity
needed a good resource--they call it the USAR task force in the
State. It is usually Task Force 1.
Now in terms of operations we have a bomb task force, we
have a K-9 task force. You want the job done, you call the task
force. Now we are in the process of the last year of building
it is not called a task force yet, but we are essentially a
planning task force that has built up at the ROC where you have
all these entities and all these different agencies and offices
coming together, sharing intelligence, and trying to develop a
strategy to combat terrorism.
In itself it is a planning task force, and then that is
what now gets put into the operational theater of how can we
through operations prevent and detect and deter.
Mr. Trucillo. I think in terms of the task forces I agree
with Charles in the south it is very good, and you heard the
chiefs talk about it.
In the north the regional chief's task force with the
transit part, NYPD Transit, New Jersey Transit, Amtrak, Port
Authority, the MTA, I have been in this business for a long
time, and I have been in the transit business for a long time,
and I remember when TSA was stood up.
Those were difficult times. That was a head-butting time I
gotta tell you. Thankfully we are beyond that, I believe. We
are working together and cooperatively. That is the good news.
To your first point, Congressman, about the prioritization,
I am very worried about that because transit agencies are not
well-heeled. We all know the economic troubles that all transit
agencies have. When you are trying to move people, your top
priority every day, things will fall by the wayside, but my
colleagues and I, our job is safety and security of those
people who are using the buses and the rails.
We can't necessarily look at the budget and say, well, we
are not going to put somebody there because we can't afford to
put somebody there. If the situation and the intelligence
dictates that somebody needs to be there, they need to be
there. The grant funding gives us that ability to put that
officer there. Without that grant funding we are putting people
in harm's way, I believe.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. So beyond, and I think everybody not just
on this panel, but in the room probably agrees that funding is
the priority. Beyond that what is it, and this is a tough
question, I acknowledge that, but beyond the funding
constraints what is it that is frustrating when you are out
doing your job every day, what is it that is holding you back?
What is the causes of frustration beyond the resource issue?
Mr. Trucillo. I think from my perspective, and you touched
on it earlier, we all deal with other issues. In transportation
facilities we see a very high level of homelessness, drug
addiction, mental issues, and we cannot say that our primary
mission is counterterrorism, therefore, we are not going to
deal with these issues. We have to deal with those issues. When
we are dealing with those issues as best we can, we are being
taken away from that primary mission.
So that is frustrating that in certain cases there aren't
the services available to treat those with addiction, with
homelessness issues. The mental health issue is probably the
biggest problematic issue. People that come back day after day
after day that you can't seem to move away from the transit
facility to get them the help that they need. So that is my
biggest frustration.
Mr. Nestel. I am jumping right on that. Homelessness,
poverty, and the opioid crisis are what takes up all of our
time during the course of the day and redirects our efforts
from crime control and terrorism prevention. Those social ills
are absolutely the things that are most frustrating for us.
Mr. Cunningham. Just to change the tone of that for us and
for transit that is traveling again it is jurisdiction, it is
the ability to smoothly transition from location to location.
Our officers cover in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. I think that
is a factor that weighs on this kind of thing. We don't have
necessarily the kind of issues that they were mentioning there,
but one of the things that needs to get out is that--and I
think Mr. Nestel said it about what happens in Israel,
everybody feels like they are part of the solution, that they
are all contributing no matter they are a store clerk or, you
know, working as a police officer or a military person. They
all have the same goal.
We try to put that out through our PSA kind of information,
but if it came from like a National kind of method, as well,
like to foster that attitude that because when I ride the
train, too, even though we want them to look up and speak up
and we want them to see something, say something, nobody is
looking up. They are looking at their phones. The message has
to be somehow we get it to them through that system or, but we
have got to get them to communicate, too.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Well, I want to thank you all for sharing
that, and I think it is a reminder to us up here that issues we
deal with outside of the Homeland Security Committee are very
relevant to what we deal with in the Homeland Security
Committee.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much, and I happen to chair the
Mental Health Task Force, and I think you will probably--I am
not sure you even know this, what is the No. 2 cause of death
for people 24 and younger? Suicide. Number 10 cause of death
for all Americans is suicide, and for every suicide attempt
there is about 22--every suicide there is about 22 attempts,
and you think about the cost to society and how little is being
spent on mental health in this country and the crisis that it
is. It far outstrips the opioid crisis, and look at what that
is doing to our country.
So just be shocking to the mind going forward, but Mrs.
Watson Coleman is going to have the last word here, so Mrs.
Watson Coleman, you are up.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, and thank you Mr.
Fitzpatrick for coming here and Mr. Katko for holding this
hearing. This has been very illuminating, and I thank you very
much, you have been very helpful.
VIPR teams is something that I don't know because I am a
dog lover or what but I recognize that they are vitally
important, and in the piece of legislation that we are
proposing--that I am proposing today it does include a
significant increase in those teams somewhere upwards of 200
dogs in that situation.
Thank you for raising those sort-of cultural issues that
also impact your ability to do your job and made me think about
the budget and what could possibly happen as a result of some
of the proposals that are taking place, including this tax
reform proposal and what it might do to those people who are
homeless, you know, who are addicted and who are impoverished.
It certainly makes their life a little bit more difficult.
The last thing is that I just wanted to ask you this
question, what do you have to say about sharing best practices
and knowing whatever information exists that can help prepare
us for things like what happened with that truck that ran into
those bicyclists? It concerns me because it doesn't take a lot
of education, it takes no education, obviously it takes no core
value, it doesn't take any training, it just means that you are
hell-bent on killing somebody, so these sort-of automobile-
related terrorist attacks weaponizing our cars and our trucks,
if you have anything that you would like to share that we might
be thinking about as we move forward and what we need to do.
That is my only last question other than to thank you. Anybody?
Mr. Trucillo. I will take a stab at that, and it deals with
my trip to Israel. This was post-9/11 in 2005 where everyone,
everyone was aware of the possibility of terrorism. My host
said to me, ``Chris, I can't believe that in America you are
not doing more of this.'' I said to him, ``Nicky, as horrible
as 9/11 was, it would take many more 9/11s for Americans to
give up their freedoms.'' I think we are torn as a Nation
between giving up our freedoms and dealing with this specter of
terrorism that keeps tapping on our shores.
I think we just as a people need to be more aware. It
sounds simplistic, but we need to be very aware every day at
all times of our surroundings, and that sounds very simplistic,
but unfortunately, I believe that that is where we are in
society today.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Kind-of connected to that National
message you were talking about, see something, say something.
Yes, yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Katko. I yield back. Sorry,
sorry, sorry.
Mr. Lemanowicz. I am a fan of education, and you have your
front-line men and women, and many times in terms of what they
gather through their own experience, however, there is a way of
changing that mindset from a first responder to a first
preventer, and that is through education. Not just the
experience. If we can always chase TTPs the terrorists'
tactics, techniques, and procedures, and sometimes, you know,
you have a couple hits the same type of tactic in Rumiyah be
published in the ISIS magazine and they are pretty much telling
their people how to put it out, and now you will see it, you
know, being conducted the same type of tactic in each country,
including here in the United States.
It comes down to education. There is a program now CTCs,
the counterterrorism coordinators. So it is trying to get down
from a Federal down to a local level and educate them in terms
of what are the best protective measures, so when you talk
about a train platform or you talk about a special event, no
matter what the theater of operational area is they know what
the best means of, hey, how do I create a strong perimeter?
A reason why, because of these vehicles, because of these
suicide bombers, because of what they could potentially bring
in, and it is that. So that is something again it is
developing, but it always needs support and that is providing
education across all from Federal right down to local and using
these counterterrorism coordinators as that mechanism to branch
out to the municipalities.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Cunningham. Just one point. I totally agree with what
the lieutenant said, and terrorism is asymmetrical now, I mean
very asymmetrical with the advent of domestic terrorism and
home-grown kind of things.
So I do believe that that kind of--that it is a constant
training because the methodologies and the methods that are
being employed now we have to plan for hotel rooms and
apartments and parking lots above us to be looking out for
whether it is going to be an active shooter, if you will, from
above.
So everything has to be changed, and we have to adjust on
the fly. All the officers have to adjust and learn from
everything else, and it is important the sharing of
information, best practices things like that is essential to
our business in the transit and transportation industry.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Katko. Thank you all very much. I want to thank the
witnesses for their testimony today. It was excellent. It was
very thought-provoking, and it gives us a lot of things to talk
about and go back and take a look at what we can do to further
help you in your mission to keep all of us safe.
So we want to thank you for that. The Members of the
committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses,
and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rules the hearing record will be held
open for 10 days. Before I adjourn I just want to thank, once
again, my colleagues from the local area here Mr. Fitzpatrick
and Mrs. Watson Coleman for putting this on and Mrs. Watson
Coleman in particular for your leadership on this one.
It is a very important issue. We spent an awful lot of time
looking at airports and air travel, but this is another huge
area that we need to make sure we pay attention to. So thank
you very much, and with that the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]