[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE? STAKEHOLDER
PERSPECTIVES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 7, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-36
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
29-469 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, Deputy Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Timothy Rice, Battalion Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Branch Coordinator, City of New York Fire Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Dr. Gerald W. Parker, Jr., Associate Dean for Global One Health,
College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Texas
A&M University:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Jake Parker, Director of Government Relations, Security
Industry Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Reginald Brothers, Principal, The Chertoff Group, LLC,
Testifying as Former Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE? STAKEHOLDER
PERSPECTIVES
----------
Tuesday, November 7, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Donovan, Payne, Langevin, and
Watson Coleman.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Donovan. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the effectiveness of the Science and Technology Directorate at
the Department of Homeland Security. I now recognize myself for
an opening statement.
I want to welcome our witnesses here today to discuss an
issue that is important to our homeland security: The role of
the Science and Technology Directorate within the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Enterprise.
Science and Technology, by law, is the primary research and
development arm of the Department. However, it seems that over
15 years since its creation, Science and Technology is still
struggling to fulfill its role within DHS and the Homeland
Security Enterprise.
Given the evolving threat we face from terrorist attacks,
from last week's attack in New York City to powerful hurricanes
and expansive wildfires, we need to ensure that there is a
component or office at the Department looking for both the
short-term and long-term innovative solutions to address the
challenges the Nation currently faces. By design, this should
be Science and Technology.
However, budget constraints and the changes to R&D
priorities have restricted Science and Technology's abilities
to meet its mission. The committee has heard concerns about the
lack of coordination between Science and Technology and other
DHS components and offices on R&D.
Additionally, in the past, it was unclear how Science and
Technology prioritizes its R&D. In 2015, DHS reinstituted the
Integrated Product Teams Process. These teams, comprised of a
cross-section of DHS components and offices, identify
capability gaps which direct Science and Technology research
and development priorities. This is a step in the right
direction, but more still needs to be done.
I am troubled that Science and Technology has repeatedly
changed its focus, both on whether to focus on short-term
technology or long-term research on larger unknown threats, and
whether to deal only with DHS components or external
stakeholders. This back-and-forth needs to stop, and there
needs to be a candid conversation on what Science and
Technology's mission should be. I hope this hearing is just the
start of these conversations.
Moving forward, this subcommittee is committed to working
with all relevant stakeholders as we consider the appropriate
mission and structure of Science and Technology. While Science
and Technology has faced constant challenges and obstacles,
there are some Science and Technology programs that have made a
positive impact on the Homeland Security Enterprise. The
National Urban Security Technology Lab, also known as NUSTL, in
New York City, serves as a Federal resource for first
responders by supporting the development and testing and
evaluation of new technology.
I have had the opportunity to visit NUSTL, and have seen
first-hand the remarkable resources NUSTL provides for our
first responders. I was very concerned that the President's
fiscal year 2018 budget request proposed its closure, in
addition to the closure of two other DHS labs that focus on
chemical and biological threats. Now is not the time to be
cutting Federal resources to counter chemical and biological
threats and support for our first responders. I am pleased that
the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Delaney, and I were able to
successfully restore funding for these three vital labs during
the appropriations process on the floor.
I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses on the
current State of Science and Technology and its programs, and
what more needs to be done to ensure that Science and
Technology is an effective and efficient partner with first
responders, academia, and industry, as well as DHS components
and offices. I look forward to our discussion.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan
November 7, 2017
I want to welcome our witnesses here today to discuss an issue that
is important to our homeland security: The role of the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security
and the Homeland Security Enterprise.
S&T, by law, is the primary research and development (R&D) arm of
the Department. However, it seems that over 15 years since its
creation, S&T is still struggling to fulfill its role within DHS and
the Homeland Security Enterprise.
Given the evolving threat we face from terrorist attacks, like last
week's attack in New York City, to powerful hurricanes and expansive
wildfires, we need to ensure that there is a component or office at the
Department looking for both the short-term and long-term innovative
solutions to address the challenges the Nation currently faces. By
design, this should be S&T.
However, budget constraints and the changes to R&D priorities have
restricted S&T abilities to meet its mission. The committee has heard
concerns about the lack of coordination between S&T and other DHS
components and offices on R&D. Additionally, in the past, it was
unclear how S&T prioritized its R&D. In 2015, DHS reinstituted the
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) process. These teams, comprised of a
cross-section of DHS components and offices, identify capability gaps
which directs S&T R&D priorities. This is a step in the right
direction, but more still needs to be done.
I am troubled that S&T has repeatedly changed its focus--both on
whether to focus on short-term technology transferring or longer-term
research on larger unknown threats and whether to deal only with DHS
components or external stakeholders. This back-and-forth needs to stop
and there needs to be candid conversations on what S&T's mission should
be. I hope this hearing is just the start of these conversations.
Moving forward, this subcommittee is committed to working with all
relevant stakeholders as we consider the appropriate mission and
structure of S&T.
While S&T has faced constant challenges and obstacles, there are
some S&T programs that have made a positive impact on the Homeland
Security Enterprise.
The National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL), in New
York City, serves as a Federal resource for first responders by
supporting the development and testing and evaluation of new
technology. I've had the opportunity to visit NUSTL and see first-hand
the remarkable resources NUSTL provides to our first responders. I was
very concerned that the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request
proposed its closure in addition to two other DHS labs that focus on
the chemical and biological threats. Now is not the time to be cutting
Federal resources to counter chemical and biological threats and
support for our first responders. I'm pleased that the gentlemen from
Maryland, Mr. Delaney, and I were able to successfully restore funding
for these three vital labs during the appropriations process on the
House floor.
I'm looking forward to hearing from our witnesses on the current
state of S&T and its programs and what more needs to be done to ensure
S&T is an effective and efficient partner with first responders,
academia, and industry as well as DHS components and offices. I look
forward to our discussion.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes my friend, the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement
that he may have.
Mr. Payne. Good morning. I want to thank the Chairman for
holding this Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications, first hearing to review the activities of
the Science and Technology Directorate. I look forward to
working with S&T and its stakeholders to ensure that components
of the Department, and their State and local partners have the
technology they need to do the jobs better and safer.
I would like to begin, however, by addressing a few matters
not directly related to today's hearing.
First, I would like to send my sympathies to those affected
by the horrific terrorist attack in New York City on Halloween,
and express my gratitude to the brave firefighters, EMS, and
law enforcement personnel who responded.
I would also like to join the people of Sutherland Springs,
Texas in mourning the 26 people murdered for being at the wrong
place at the wrong time--in this case, at church on Sunday. To
those grieving loved ones, we pray for your strength in the
difficult days that are to come.
To those fed up with Members of Congress sending their
thoughts and prayers to victims of mass shootings every time it
happens, and then refusing to do anything to stop it, I stand
with you as well. Instead of letting senseless actions take
place, it is long overdue that we do what makes the most sense
to significantly change, or to stop this from ever happening
again.
Finally, I would like to express my disappointment that
last week's full committee hearing with the FEMA administrator
and the mayor of San Juan was postponed, and join full
committee Ranking Member Thompson in asking that it be
rescheduled as soon as possible. As I said at our last hearing,
our National response doctrine is not working for the people of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and we need to figure
out what we can do to expedite the response and recovery
efforts there. They are American citizens as well.
I have heard first-hand from citizens attempting to get
goods to struggling family members back in Puerto Rico, and
finding unsurmountable financial obstacles at every single
turn. We must do better, and not tomorrow--right now.
Returning to the subject of today's hearing, one thing that
these recent tragedies have taught us is that the threats we
face, from natural disasters to man-made attacks, are
continuing to evolve. From extreme weather events becoming more
frequent and more severe, to terrorists weaponizing cars and
trucks, to bad actors wreaking havoc on soft targets, the kind
of threats facing our country demands Science and Technology
Directorate that is sufficiently innovative and dynamic to be
responsive to the demands of the ever-changing threat
landscape.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today,
particularly Dr. Reggie Brothers, the former under secretary of
science and technology. During the 3 years he spent leading
S&T, Dr. Brothers focused on cultivating relationships with the
Homeland Security industrial base to better leverage off-the-
shelf technologies, coordinating research development
priorities across the Department, and launching programs to
attract business to work with S&T by streamlining the
bureaucratic processes.
Dr. Brothers navigated tight budgets and organizational
challenges within DHS to create incentives for private-sector
engagement, and did so while working to overcome long-held
industry concerns that S&T did not have the budget or clout
within the Department to guarantee a market for homeland
security solutions.
Although S&T matured under Dr. Brothers' leadership, it
continues to face budget challenges, struggles to gain the
confidence of the private-sector partners, and is involved in
large DHS reorganizations of certain chemical, biological, and
radiological and nuclear counterterrorism activities.
Now that Dr. Brothers is a free agent, no longer bound by
OMB, I will be interested in his candid observations on these
issues, and how the committee can help bolster S&T credibility
as the research and development hub that drives acquisition
decisions in the Department.
With that, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
November 7, 2017
I look forward to working with S&T and its stakeholders to ensure
that components of the Department and their State and local partners
have the technology they need to do their jobs better and safer.
I would like to begin, however, by addressing a few matters not
directly related to today's hearing.
First, I would like to send my sympathies to those affected by the
horrific terrorist attack in New York City on Halloween and express my
gratitude to the brave firefighters, EMS, and law enforcement personnel
who responded.
I would also like to join the people of Sutherland Springs, Texas
in mourning the 26 people murdered for being at the place at the wrong
time--in this case, at church on Sunday.
To those grieving loves ones, we pray for your strength in the
difficult days that are to come.
And to those fed up with Members of Congress sending their thoughts
and prayers to the victims of the mass shootings every time it happens
and then refusing to do anything to stop it, I stand with you. Instead
of letting senseless actions take place, it is long overdue that we do
what makes the most sense and take significant action to stop this from
ever happening again.
Finally, I would like to express my disappointment that last week's
full committee hearing with the FEMA administrator and the mayor of San
Juan was postponed, and join full committee Ranking Member Thompson in
asking that it be rescheduled as soon as possible.
As I said at our last hearing, our National response doctrine is
not working for the people of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
and we need to figure out what we can do to expedite the response and
recovery efforts there.
I have heard, first-hand, from citizens attempting to get goods to
struggling family members back in Puerto Rico and find unsurmountable
financial obstacles at every single turn. We must do better and not
tomorrow, right now.
Returning to the subject of today's hearing, one thing these recent
tragedies have taught us is that the threats we face--from natural
disasters to man-made attacks--are continuing to evolve.
From extreme weather events becoming more frequent and more severe,
to terrorists weaponizing cars and trucks, to bad actors wreaking havoc
on soft targets, the kind of threats facing our country demands a
Science and Technology Directorate that is sufficiently innovative and
dynamic to be responsive to the demands of an ever-changing threat
landscape.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today,
particularly Dr. Reggie Brothers, the former under secretary for
science and technology.
During the 3 years he spent leading S&T, Dr. Brothers focused on
cultivating relationships with the Homeland Security Industrial Base to
better leverage off-the-shelf technologies, coordinating research and
development priorities across the Department, and launching programs to
attract businesses to work with S&T by streamlining bureaucratic
processes.
Dr. Brothers navigated tight budgets and organizational challenges
within DHS to create incentives for private-sector engagement and did
so while working to overcome long-held industry concerns that S&T did
not have the budget or clout within the Department to guarantee a
market for homeland security solutions.
Although S&T matured under Dr. Brothers' leadership, it continues
to face budget challenges, struggles to gain the confidence of private-
sector partners, and is involved in a large DHS reorganization of
certain Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
counterterrorism activities.
Now that Dr. Brothers is a free agent, no longer bound by OMB, I
will be interested in his candid observations on these issues and how
the committee can help bolster S&T's credibility as the research and
development hub that drives acquisition decisions in the Department.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields back. I thank him for his
statement.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
November 7, 2017
I want to send my condolences to the families affected by last
week's tragic terrorist attack in New York City and to thank the first
responders for their heroic efforts.
I also want to send my thoughts and prayers to the families of
those killed at the First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas
on Sunday. Over the past 5 years, we have seen mass killings at an
elementary school, a movie theater, a work place, a night club, a
college campus, and a music festival.
No community is immune from the indiscriminate pain that mass
shootings inflict. It is time for Republican leadership to put aside
politics and take meaningful steps to ensure that this Nation`s gun
laws work to protect our citizens and law enforcement.
Turning to the subject of today's hearing, I am pleased that this
subcommittee is continuing the committee's efforts to help S&T mature
into a dynamic research and development organization capable of meeting
the evolving needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise.
When the committee last held a hearing on the Science and
Technology Directorate, I raised concerns about the lack of a unified
DHS policy defining research and development priorities, stakeholder
engagement processes, and on-going budget challenges.
I am pleased that the former under secretary for science and
technology, Dr. Reggie Brothers, is here today to talk about what he
did to tackle those challenges.
From identifying DHS's Visionary Goals and establishing the
Integrated Product Team process to launching the Homeland Security
Innovation Program, Dr. Brothers provided clarity to S&T's long-term
priorities, improved the coordination of research and development
activities, and attracted new industry to the homeland security space.
I commend Dr. Brothers for his efforts to leave S&T a better
organization than it was when he found it.
That said, there are on-going challenges undermining S&T's
potential. First, S&T's budget is not what it should be, and the Trump
administration's fiscal year budget request sought irresponsible cuts
that would have cut into the bone of S&T's activities.
Although I am pleased that some of the funding was restored in the
House spending measure, I remain concerned that research and
development of security technologies is not a top priority of the Trump
administration.
Second, Congress has failed to enact legislation to clarify S&T's
mission and authorities. Despite this committee's efforts to address
long-standing challenges at S&T, our Senate counterparts have so far
refused to act. I hope for a different outcome this Congress.
Last, I am not confident we are fully leveraging the expertise of
all of the colleges and universities that are capable of contributing
in this space, and I hope to learn more about how S&T can better work
with academic institutions.
Before I close, I want to echo Ranking Member Payne's comments
regarding the need to reschedule the full committee hearing on the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's preparedness and response
capabilities as soon as possible.
The Federal response to the devastation caused by hurricanes in
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands is not what it should be, and
American citizens are suffering as a result. If we can put a man on the
moon and bring him back, surely we can turn the power back on and
provide reliable access to clean water within 7 weeks.
Mr. Donovan. We are pleased to have a very distinguished
panel before us today on this important topic, and I assure you
all that your testimony is very important to us. This
subcommittee has used testimony in every hearing that we have
conducted in the last 2\1/2\ years to come up with some
results, so your efforts here today will be taken into
consideration, and a product will be developed from them.
Chief Timothy Rice serves as the weapons of mass
destruction branch coordinator for the New York City Fire
Department. He currently serves on New York City's Radiological
Response and Recovery Committee, and New York City BioWatch
Stakeholders Working Group.
Dr. Gerald Parker, Jr. is the associate dean for Global One
Health at the College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical
Sciences, and campus director for Global One Health at Texas
A&M University. Dr. Parker also serves on several advisory
boards, including the Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee, and Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel.
Mr. Jacob Parker is the director of government relations
for the Security Industries Association, and leads the
development of the association's legislative and regulatory
programs. Before coming to SIA, Mr. Parker served for more than
a decade on Capitol Hill, covering homeland security, defense,
foreign policy and other issues.
Dr. Reginald Brothers served as the under secretary for
science and technology from April 2014 to January 2017. Prior
to leading S&T, Dr. Brothers served in the U.S. Department of
Defense's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense for
Research and Engineering as the deputy assistant secretary of
defense for research. In this position, he was responsible for
policy and oversight of the Department's science and technology
programs, from basic research through the advanced technology
development.
The witnesses' full statements will appear on the record,
and the Chair now recognizes Chief Rice for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY RICE, BATTALION CHIEF, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION BRANCH COORDINATOR, CITY OF NEW YORK FIRE
DEPARTMENT
Mr. Rice. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications. My name is
Battalion Chief Timothy Rice, and I am the weapons of mass
destruction branch coordinator for the New York City Fire
Department. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
relationship between the FDNY and the Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology Directorate.
In May 2001, FDNY's chief of Hazardous Materials
Operations, Jack Fanning, appeared and testified before
Congress on the topic of Government capabilities against
terrorism. Chief Fanning was one of the firefighters who
responded to the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Beginning
with that attack, the role of the fire service began to shift
into the area of disaster preparedness and responding to acts
of terrorism. In his testimony, Chief Fanning described this
shift, and he detailed some of the plans and coordination that
the FDNY and Federal partners were undertaking as a result. He
made it clear that those efforts were the tip of the iceberg,
and that much work remained to be done.
I have seen the value of S&T in my own career. As a young
firefighter in Washington Heights, I remember our fires had a
radiation survey meter. It was kept in the office under the
captain's bunk, and we were not sure quite how to use it.
However, today we have radiation equipment on every apparatus,
and every firefighter carries not just the equipment, but the
competency to employ it.
As the range of threats against New Yorkers has grown and
the risk of terror incidents broadens, the department continues
to adapt. We confront a wide variety of challenges beyond the
traditional view of firefighters running into burning
buildings. As Chief Fanning put it in 2001, ``At mass casualty
incidents, no matter the scale, firefighters and other first
responders will be there within minutes, and they will do what
they have always done: Act to protect the public they serve.''
Knowing this, he urged Congress, ``Let us provide them with the
tools they need to perform their duties safely and
effectively.''
Four months after delivering that testimony, Chief Fanning
made the ultimate sacrifice at the World Trade Center. However,
his tremendous legacy endures, as has the point that he made
during that Congressional hearing. Members of the FDNY, NYPD,
emergency management, and all first responder agencies are
going to show up and protect the public, and we are
tremendously appreciative of the ways in which our Federal
partners, such as our colleagues at S&T, provide us with the
tools to perform our duties safely and effectively.
For more than 15 years, the National Urban Science and
Technology Laboratory, NUSTL, in New York City has been a
valuable resource to the FDNY. NUSTL is our conduit to S&T, and
it helps the FDNY develop capabilities necessary to provide the
highest levels of security for the New York UASI region.
The scientific data, equipment testing, training, and
support provided by NUSTL assist the FDNY in navigating the
thousands of products, equipment, technology, and reports that
we would otherwise be left to evaluate our own. We have
invested heavily in all hazards and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear preparedness in units throughout the
department, including hazmat and marine resources.
In addition to our partnerships, I must also highlight the
critical importance of homeland security grants, particularly
UASI, in facilitating the FDNY's ability to make many of these
investments. We pride ourselves on being good stewards of those
programs, and with the support of S&T, have been very
successful.
NUSTL also helps to enhance the fire department's
capabilities to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate potential
radiological and nuclear threats. Incidents around the world
like Goiania, Chernobyl, and Fukushima have all shown that
radioactive contamination will lead to wide-spread public
panic. By working together with our partners at S&T and the
scientific community, we have been able to operationalize
procedures such as the deployment of community reception
centers, which will enable us to rapidly screen nearly a
million people or more who may fear contamination. We have also
provided input into an S&T operational guide titled ``RDD
Guidance for the First 100 Minutes.''
The knowledge we have gained and the plans we have
developed inform first responder agencies across the Nation.
New York City agencies have broad outreach, and it is through
these avenues that we disseminate what we have learned, gain
valuable feedback, and consistently work to improve
preparedness.
The NUSTL lab's location in lower Manhattan enables fire
department personnel to access it with regularity. Our members
attend monthly meetings for first responders, and periodic
forums such as the New York Area Science and Technology Forum.
NUSTL personnel also travel to fire department facilities
across the city, and provide critical on-site guidance and
evaluation.
Homeland security is an immense challenge, and the New York
City Fire Department is in a constant state of assessing and
improving our resources to meet that challenge. Through our
frequent and valuable interactions with NUSTL, the FDNY has
greatly benefited from our partnership with S&T. The advantages
of this relationship, both tangible and intangible, strengthen
the department's ability to save life and property, and
ultimately, make the people of New York and millions of
visitors to the region safer each day.
I thank you for your invitation to share experience with
the Science and Technology Directorate, and that is the end of
my statement, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy Rice
November 7, 2017
Good afternoon Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members
of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications. My name is Battalion Chief Timothy Rice and I am the
weapons of mass destruction branch coordinator for the New York City
Fire Department (FDNY). Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
relationship between the FDNY and the Department of Homeland Security's
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).
In May of 2001, FDNY's Chief of Hazardous Materials Operations--
Jack Fanning--appeared and testified before Congress on the topic of
Government Capabilities Against Terrorism. Chief Fanning was one of the
firefighters who responded to the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.
Beginning with that attack, the role of the fire service began to shift
into the area of disaster preparedness and responding to acts of
terrorism. In his testimony, Chief Fanning described this shift and he
detailed some of the plans and coordination that the FDNY and Federal
partners were undertaking as a result. He made it clear that these
efforts were the tip of the iceberg and that much work remained to be
done.
I have seen this first-hand throughout my own career. As a young
firefighter in Engine 84 in Manhattan, I remember that our firehouse
had a radiation survey meter. At the time, we kept it in the office
under the Captain's bunk. However, as the range of threats against New
Yorkers has grown and the risk of terror incidents broadened, the
Department has had to adapt. We now confront a wide variety of
challenges beyond the traditional view of firefighters running into
burning buildings. As Chief Fanning put it in 2001, at mass casualty
incidents--no matter the scale--firefighters and other first responders
will be there within minutes and they will do what they have always
done: Act to protect the public they serve. Knowing this, he urged
Congress, ``let's provide them with the tools they need to perform
their duties safely and effectively.''
Four months after delivering that testimony, Chief Fanning made the
ultimate sacrifice at the World Trade Center. However, his tremendous
legacy endures, as does the point that he made during that
Congressional hearing. Members of the FDNY, NYPD, Emergency Management,
and all first responder agencies are going to show up and protect the
public, and we are tremendously appreciative of the ways in which our
Federal partners such as our colleagues at S&T provide us with the
tools to perform our duties safely and effectively.
It is not an easy task for a fire department to evolve from a role
of traditional firefighting to a department that is also responsible
for disaster preparedness, including acts of terrorism and the
deliberate release of chemical and/or radiological materials and
explosives. To stay ahead of emerging threats, the FDNY sought a
partner in the scientific community to provide independent scientific
research, data, expertise, and testing.
For more than 15 years, the National Urban Security Technology
Laboratory (NUSTL) in New York City has been a valuable resource to the
FDNY. NUSTL is our conduit to S&T and it helps the FDNY develop
capabilities necessary to provide the highest levels of security for
the New York Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) region. The
scientific data, equipment testing, training, and support provided by
NUSTL assists the FDNY in navigating the thousands of products,
equipment, technology, and reports that we would otherwise be left to
evaluate on our own. We have invested heavily in All Hazards
preparedness and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
preparedness in units throughout the Department including HazMat and
Marine resources. In addition to our partnerships, I must also
highlight the critical importance of Homeland Security grants--
particularly UASI--in facilitating the FDNY's ability to make many of
these investments. We pride ourselves on being good stewards of those
programs, and with the support of S&T, we have been very successful.
NUSTL also helps to enhance the Fire Department's capabilities to
prepare for, respond to, and mitigate potential radiological and
nuclear threats. Incidents around the world like Goiana, Chernobyl, and
Fukushima, have all shown that radioactive contamination will lead to
wide-spread public panic. By working together with our partners at S&T
and the scientific community, we have been able to operationalize
procedures that will greatly assist the response and recovery from
incidents of this magnitude, such as the deployment of Community
Reception Centers (CRCs), which will enable us to rapidly screen nearly
a million people or more who may fear contamination. By performing
screenings at CRCs, we will avoid flooding area hospitals and emergency
rooms and preserve resources for the seriously injured, thereby saving
more lives. We've also provided input to an S&T operational guide
covering RDD Guidance for the First 100 Minutes.
The knowledge we have gained and the plans we have developed inform
first responder agencies across the Nation. New York City agencies have
broad outreach and it is through these avenues that we disseminate what
we have learned, gain valuable feedback, and consistently work to
improve preparedness.
To give one example, understanding the impact of a dirty bomb on
the city involves understanding and predicting a number of scientific
factors. Firefighters do not receive intensive training to study the
physics of radiological material or to model plume clouds. NUSTL and
other partners within S&T help first responders to understand the
relationship between modeling and ground truth data, and they provide
us with the capability to use data to better inform our radiation
modeling. This allows us to respond in a more informed and effective
manner. It is a collaboration that empowers the FDNY to make educated
decisions about where we should set up equipment, create zones in which
first responders may safely operate, and understand dangerous areas to
be avoided. The Department benefits from having access to subject-
matter experts in close proximity and in turn we share the knowledge
and experience we have gained with first responder agencies Nation-
wide.
The NUSTL lab's location in lower Manhattan enables Fire Department
personnel to access it with regularity. Our members attend monthly
meetings for first responders and periodic forums on CBRN preparedness
and emerging threats. NUSTL hosts and manages the New York Area Science
and Technology Forum, which brings together Government and private-
sector resources to promote and discuss advances in science and
technology. NUSTL personnel also travel to Fire Department facilities
across the city to provide critical on-site guidance and evaluation.
NUSTL plays a key role in the Department's preparedness and response
planning for terrorist incidents, industrial accidents, and routine
emergencies.
This level of on-going support and engagement with NUSTL has helped
the Department build a preparedness cycle of continuous learning and
training. The more we train for specific scenarios, the more prepared
we are to face them when they arise.
With the help of NUSTL, the Department developed the Tiered
Response System, which functions as a force-multiplier, outfitting FDNY
with a mechanism to scale and adapt the appropriate expertise to the
incident or emergency. We also build systems of collaboration,
partnering with other city agencies and regional responders to share
lessons learned and to develop interagency plans, protocols, and
drills. Members of the Department have acquired a tremendous amount of
knowledge and know-how since 9/11 and this knowledge is helping the
city plan and prepare for extreme hazards and emergencies.
Specific NUSTL programs that FDNY participates in include:
Radiological/Nuclear Response and Recovery (RNRR) Research
and Development
This project is aimed at improving State and local
response to radiological and nuclear events. FDNY and other
New York-area agencies participate in working groups and
coordinate to develop guidance and tools to enhance
preparedness and response capabilities.
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder
(SAVER)
The SAVER program provides first responder agencies with
the results of NUSTL testing and assessments of
commercially-available emergency response technologies. As
a city agency, the SAVER program is useful for learning
about the existence of new technology as well as the
availability and performance of that technology. This
enables us to redeploy resources that may otherwise have
been consumed by the process of investigating, testing, and
assessing potential advances in the market. In addition,
FDNY and other New York-area agencies have the opportunity
to articulate gaps and needs and receive guidance about
potential solutions.
Critical Incident Management Technology Assessment (CIMTA)
The Critical Incident Management Technology Assessment is
an annual event that is staged by NUSTL in order to provide
FDNY and other New York-area agencies with an opportunity
to test cutting-edge first responder technologies on a
large scale under real-life conditions. In the course of
the event, first responder agencies are able to provide
training, field-test equipment, understand the strengths
and weaknesses of preparedness training, and collaborate
with technology developers to fill potential equipment
gaps. Past examples have included testing handheld mobile
detection and collection equipment, wide-angle thermal
imaging cameras, and video content analysis and video
analytics.
Urban Operational Experimentation (OpEx)
Urban Operational Experimentation provides first responder
agencies such as FDNY an opportunity to view demonstrations
of innovative products and a chance to experiment with
those products in an urban environment. The program brings
private-sector partners in contact with first responder
agencies, serving as a catalyst to allow agency feedback to
spur advances in technology.
New York Area Science and Technology Forum (NYAST)
The New York Area Science and Technology Forum convenes
Federal, State, and local first responders as well as
groups from academia and the private sector to meet and
discuss advances in science and technology. These regular
meetings bring together a wide variety of groups and lead
to critical sharing and learning among the participants,
helping the entire first responder community stay up-to-
date on advances in the field.
Performance Test and Evaluation (PTEN)
NUSTL's Performance Test and Evaluation program provides
testing of radiation detection equipment to ensure that it
works properly and that all supporting accessories and
devices are functional. Performed in conjunction with the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Securing the Cities
program, PTEN involves not only equipment testing but also
provides first responder agencies with technical guidance
and support and expert advice regarding storage and
deployment of the devices. This includes equipment such as
personal radiation detectors, backpack detectors, mobile
detection units, and isotope identifiers.
Responder Training and Exercise (RTE)
Also performed in conjunction with the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's Securing the Cities program, NUSTL's
Responder Training and Exercise program provides first
responder agencies with radioactive sources, training
equipment, and technical expertise to enhance training on
radiation detection equipment. This includes supplying
health physicists and technical staff, training equipment,
and materials.
Homeland security is an immense challenge and the New York City
Fire Department is in a constant state of assessing and improving our
resources to meet that challenge. Through our frequent and valuable
interactions with NUSTL, FDNY has greatly benefited from our
partnership with S&T. The advantages of this relationship--both
tangible and intangible--strengthen the Department's ability to save
life and property and ultimately make the people of New York and
millions of visitors to the region safer each day.
I thank you for your invitation to share our experience with the
Science and Technology Directorate and I am happy to answer your
questions at this time.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief Rice.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Parker for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GERALD W. PARKER, JR., ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR GLOBAL
ONE HEALTH, COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
SCIENCES, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Mr. Gerald Parker. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to
appear before you today to provide my perspectives on the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate.
The complexity and changing nature of the threats we face
today, from terrorism to pandemics, are compounded by the
complexity of our Nation's vast Homeland Security Enterprise
that extends far beyond the Department of Homeland Security.
The S&T Directorate has a critical role in helping unlock our
Nation's creative imagination and innovative spirit, which is
vital to defending against the known and unknown threats to
homeland security. I believe our Nation's universities must be
strong partners with S&T in this effort, either through the
Centers of Excellence programs, or other programs.
The S&T Directorate has made great strides since its
founding, and particularly more recently, under the leadership
of my panel colleague, Dr. Brothers. Dr. Brothers applied sound
leadership principles that effectively brought focus to the
Department's evolving near and longer-term needs. He also
placed priority on the employee morale that improved the
command culture of the directorate.
Although the S&T Directorate is in better shape than ever,
continued evolution is essential, as the threats and challenges
will evolve, too. But harnessing the broader interagency
Homeland Security Science and Technology Enterprise,
particularly for biodefense, is also an important policy
question.
What is the role of the S&T Directorate? To serve only the
DHS components, or to help drive the broader interagency
research enterprise, to include funding shared homeland
security gaps that may be a primary purview of another Federal
agency? Examples include defense against animal agriculture
from bioterror attacks, and biological attribution.
I believe DHS/S&T interagency leadership is essential. As
originally envisioned, the S&T Directorate should have assumed
a larger biodefense leadership role through biological risk
assessments. But a link between risk assessments to interagency
homeland security priorities and appropriations remains
elusive. It is now clear this will require White House
leadership coupled to a new National strategy, as recommended
by the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel.
The administration's pending biodefense strategy and
decisional leadership may result in renewed interest in a need
to reboot the DHS/S&T risk assessments, and play a larger
interagency role. A near-term concern, the President's 2018
budget request, proposed to eliminate agricultural and animal-
specific homeland security research by the S&T Directorate, and
has recommended closure for the National Biodefense and
Analysis Countermeasures Center, or NBACC, to provide savings
for other priorities.
DHS, with substantial contributions from the State of
Kansas, will spend well over $1 billion to construct the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF. The homeland
security research needs of NBAF have been documented. However,
NBAF will not reach its potential without Federal funding for
the critical research its planners envisioned. That included
USDA and DHS/S&T research programs.
Recommended closure of the NBACC also raises questions
about the NBAF that is still under construction. Does the same
fate await the NBAF?
These examples signaled diminished DHS and Executive branch
support for agricultural biosecurity research specifically, and
biodefense in general at a time that we should elevate this
issue, not push it off until next outbreak or bioterror attack,
when it will be too late. The recent Ebola and avian flu
outbreaks demonstrate this threat.
Beyond biodefense, these two homeland security examples--
the need for interagency leadership and adequate funding
support--may be symptomatic of a larger policy issue for the
S&T Directorate. Is the S&T Directorate saddled with legacy
laboratory infrastructure that does not fit the DHS internal
priorities today, even if these assets are important to the
broader enterprise? It may be better policy to transfer it to
the appropriate lead Federal agency to own, operate, and
maintain critical laboratory infrastructure, such as the NBAF,
NBACC, or other laboratories, rather than proposed closure, or
maintaining the status quo within DHS/S&T. It is a policy
question.
There are many issues to consider in such a policy option
where pursued, but the end result may be better stewardship of
critical laboratory assets needed for the broader Homeland
Security Enterprise. It may also allow the S&T Directorate to
focus on a research innovation portfolio that can more easily
flex to changing needs over time, and better engage university
scientists.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
will be happy to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerald Parker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald W Parker, Jr.
November 7, 2017
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today for this
hearing entitled, ``How Effective is the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate? Stakeholder
Perspectives''.
As a matter of full disclosure, I am a member of the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC), but I
appear before you today representing my own perspectives, and not of
the HSSTAC nor Texas A&M University. I will offer insights from my role
as a public servant that spanned 26 years active-duty military service
primarily in Army medical research & development at the Unites States
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and the United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; 10 years in the
career senior executive service (DHS, HHS, and DOD); and now as
faculty/administrator at Texas A&M University.
I do not have to tell you how difficult the homeland security
mission is today. You are well aware of the challenges, and the
difficult decisions that must be made regarding authorizations, budget
allocation, and appropriations for the many competing demands.
The homeland security mission is extremely complex and the threats
we face are constantly evolving and range from terrorism, natural
disasters, and pandemics. Threats from terrorism and violent extremism
include the use of weapons of mass destruction against our Nation, the
civilian population, and our critical infrastructure.
Today, I am more concerned than ever about the risks from
biological threats--including bioterrorism and naturally-occurring
transboundary emerging infectious diseases that could affect humans,
animals, and our economy. Although we are much better prepared today,
partly due to the dedicated efforts of the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate and many others across the vast U.S. Government
interagency; State, local, territorial, and Tribal governments; and
non-government organizations. However, recent reports by the Biodefense
Blue Ribbon Panel tell us that we have a long way to go; These reports
include ``A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Reform
Needed to Optimize Efforts''\1\ and ``Defense of Animal Agriculture: A
Report of the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel''\2\. Recent high-
consequence infectious disease outbreaks, to include the Ebola outbreak
of 2014-2016 and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks in the
United States from 2014 to 2016, also tell us we are not prepared, and
remain highly vulnerable to naturally-occurring transboundary
infectious diseases, as well as bioterror attacks.
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\1\ Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for
Biodefense: Leadership and Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October
2015.
\2\ Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. Defense for Animal
Agriculture. October 2017.
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I previously testified before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, and I will
repeat a statement I made then in my testimony today:\3\
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\3\ Gerald W Parker, Jr., DVM PhD. Hearing of the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
Attacks, Outbreaks and Attacks. February 12, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Biological threats are real, and the bioterror threat has the
potential to cause mass casualties on a scale similar to a
nuclear weapon;
2. The inter-epidemic period, or time between outbreaks, requires
urgent action to optimize available resources and
biopreparedness; and
3. Strong centralized leadership will be necessary to drive urgent
action in the inter-epidemic period.
This statement has relevancy to the topic today regarding the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate. We cannot afford to remain
complacent about biological threats, nor can we afford to continue
business as usual. Innovation, creative imagination, and leadership are
more important than ever.
The complexity and changing nature of the threats we face today,
including from biological threats, are confounded by the complexity of
the vast homeland security enterprise. The homeland security enterprise
extends far beyond the Department of Homeland Security. Other Federal
department/agencies have homeland security responsibilities, as do
State, local, territorial, and Tribal governments, and the private
sector. I also believe that communities, families, and individuals have
homeland security and preparedness responsibilities, too.
Science and Technology will play a key, if not a vital, role in
defending against the many threats to homeland security. But,
harnessing the interagency science and technology enterprise that
extends beyond the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate to take urgent action on the highest priorities
in a focused manner that optimizes available resources remains elusive.
I am also concerned that Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate may not give biological threats priority
consideration. I am particularly concerned that the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate may eliminate funding for research and
development for animal agriculture defense, and that the National
Biodefense and Analysis Countermeasures Center may be closed.
Finally, funding for the University Centers of Excellence is
significantly reduced by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in
the President's budget request on a yearly basis only to be restored by
Congress; I can understand the Science and Technology Directorate's
need to have more budget discretion for research and development
accounts, but if the S&T Directorate is not satisfied with the
performance of the University Centers of Excellence then the whole
program should be considered for elimination, rather than a slow
attrition through reduced funding for the centers. That uncertainty
only serves as a disincentive for university participation. However,
the original intent of the Science and Technology Directorate to engage
university scientists in homeland security solutions remains unchanged
and should be valued and embraced by the Department rather than
continually reduced in the budget exercise. I strongly recommend
maintaining the University Centers of Excellence program, or an
alternative strategy that maintains meaningful university involvement
to ensure our best and brightest academicians are included in homeland
security solutions in a manner to how the Defense Department ensures
that universities are included in National security solutions.
Fortunately, the Trump administration is developing a new National
strategy for Biodefense as recommended by the Biodefense Blue Ribbon
Panel.\4\ Although the new strategy has not been released, I am hopeful
that the biodefense strategy will be comprehensive, and include
strategies for the defense against attacks, outbreaks, and accidents;
linked to a unified interagency budget; and include strong White House
leadership with clearly-identified lead and supporting accountability
metrics for all Departments and Agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security and the underpinning Science and Technology
Directorate.
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\4\ Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for
Biodefense: Leadership and Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October
2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interagency coordination and leadership for the homeland security
science and technology enterprise is an important policy question that
hopefully will be addressed in the new National strategy. The strategy
should include a clearly-identified role for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate.
Regarding the primary question for this hearing, I believe the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate
has made great strides since its establishment by the original homeland
security act, and particularly in recent years under the leadership of
Dr. Brothers and Dr. O'Toole. Dr. Brothers established new, visionary
goals and areas of focus that included: (1) Responder of the future;
(2) Enabled decision makers; (3) Screening at speed; (4) Trusted Cyber
Future; (5) Transformed airport borders; (6) Resilient communities; and
(7) CBRN defense. Dr. Brothers also extended the APEX Program initiated
by Dr; O'Toole, and brought a sense of priority to meeting near-term
requirements of the Department of Homeland Security components over
those needs of the broader homeland security enterprise. Command
culture and worker satisfaction of the Science and Technology
Directorate also made great strides during Dr. Brother's tenure as the
under secretary. I know several program managers and scientists in the
Science and Technology Directorate. They are dedicated professionals
working hard to make a difference, and I believe they are making a
difference.
Performing organizations supported or funded by the Science and
Technology Directorate--whether from National laboratories,
universities, and the private sector--are also making a difference, and
I believe largely enjoy the working relationship they have with the
Science and Technology Directorate. However, I also believe the
uncertainty of not having a new under secretary for the Directorate is
causing apprehension for the Directorate's staff and performing
organizations. It is critical that a new under secretary be appointed
and approved soon.
Despite the hard work by many and the progress to date, I believe
the Science and Technology Directorate has ceded responsibility to be a
lead coordinator for the broader science and technology homeland
security enterprise. I believe an interagency lead role for the broader
homeland security enterprise is required as originally envisioned when
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate was established--
particularly for biodefense. It is clear now that strong leadership for
the interagency biodefense enterprise is needed now more than ever
before.
To provide context, I joined the Department of Homeland Security's
Science and Technology Directorate in 2004. There was a true sense of
urgency at that time as the Directorate was established after the
terrorist's attacks on September 11, 2001, the anthrax letter attacks a
few weeks later, enactment of Project BioShield, and issuance of
Homeland Presidential Directives 9 and 10. The Science and Technology
Directorate placed high priority on defense against weapons of mass
destruction--including biological threats--and assumed an interagency
leadership role for the homeland security scientific enterprise.
Biodefense threat, risk, and net assessments were established with the
intent to drive interagency requirements and provide leadership for
biodefense programs across the interagency. The National Security
Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy also provided
effective White House-level policy leadership that relied on early DHS
risk assessments. Initial attempts by DHS S&T to lead, coordinate, and
fund, where appropriate, the broader science and technology homeland
security enterprise were initially successful. However, over time it
became clear that other agencies were not receptive to being
``coordinated'' by DHS S&T. In defense of the interagency, the style of
leadership practiced by DHS S&T as time went on was not as collegial
and transparent as it could have been for success.
Today, I see a Science and Technology Directorate that is more
concerned with staying in their ``lane'' and serving only the DHS
components as more important than playing a broader homeland security
enterprise leadership coordinating role. I also see a broader
interagency homeland security enterprise that does not place value on
the DHS threat and risk assessments in driving their own homeland
security requirements. From what I can discern, DHS S&T seems to have
also abandoned their practice of conducting interagency biodefense net
assessments, too.
In defense of the S&T Directorate, competing and ``siloed''
interagency biodefense interests are now common-place, leading to a
relative lack of interagency coordination and inefficient use of
available resources for the growing biological threats.\5\ Departmental
and Congressional pressures have also led to an inward, DHS-only
component focus. These issues only highlight the critical importance
for a new biodefense strategy and renewed strong White House leadership
for Biodefense.
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\5\ Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for
Biodefense: Leadership and Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October
2015.
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There are two other concerns of the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate that I will highlight in my testimony. Defense of Animal
Agriculture and Biological Attribution.
The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Director
assumed operations for the Plum Island Animal Disease Laboratory and
has embarked on an aggressive construction campaign to move those
unique large animal research and defense functions from Plum Island in
New York to the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) at Kansas
State University in Manhattan, Kansas. Construction is well under way
and promises to provide a state-of-the-art facility to enable critical
animal health and biodefense research. The DHS S&T Directorate also
supported critical research and development funding for defense against
agriculture bioterrorism that is filling critical gaps identified by
USDA and other key homeland security stakeholders that otherwise would
not have been funded by USDA.
The President's 2018 budget request eliminates DHS Science and
Technology funding for animal agriculture bioterrorism defense. This is
a concern not only of mine, but several animal health stakeholders,
that include State veterinarians, as well as animal health and
production industries that have homeland security responsibilities. As
a policy option, there is merit to shifting DHS S&T requirements and
funding to USDA under existing USDA authorities and appropriations. If
this is done, DHS S&T should also consider transferring the NBAF to
USDA. But it is not apparent that DHS research and development
requirements and programs have been coordinated with USDA for an
effective transition. Rather, it appears that on-going research and
development programs supported by DHS S&T for agriculture bioterrorism
defense will be terminated. This will not only cause a research and
development gap, but it also causes uncertainty for the business and
operations model envisioned for the NBAF, as well as on-going
commitments to the importance, or not, of defense against agriculture
bioterrorism. Time will tell if the new biodefense strategy and
Congressional intent will address this gap. It is hoped that the new
National biodefense strategy will incorporate the recommendations of
the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel on issues related to animal health,
and incorporate the practice of one health into that strategy. If not,
the business and operations model of the NBAF could be in jeopardy, as
well as our capability to conduct research and diagnostics for high-
consequence foreign animal diseases. I hope that latter is not the case
as it could be a costly mistake to our economy and well-being in the
long run.
The President's DHS S&T budget request for fiscal year also
eliminates funding that would force closure of a state-of-the-art, one-
of-a-kind biocontainment laboratory--the National Biological Analysis
and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at Fort Detrick, MD. This decision
seems short-sighted and not well-considered.
Naturally-occurring and man-made biological threats pose a grave
risk to our health and National security. Globalization, population
growth, urbanization, and other factors are creating a perfect storm
for the emergence of high-consequence infectious diseases. A terrorism
nexus also exists in many of these same global disease ``hot spots'',
and together, are changing the nature of biological risks.
This is exacerbated by the diffusion of technical expertise coupled
with the biotechnology revolution, drastically increasing the threat of
bioterrorism. New technologies have decreased resources and financial
requirements for entry, and increased capabilities that could be
misused by a determined bioterrorist.
There are many that believe we need to strengthen infectious
disease surveillance and laboratory capabilities to detect threats
early--an area that DHS also plays a role. Similarly, we need core
microbial forensic laboratory capabilities to enable attribution--an
area that DHS has a primary role.
As stated earlier in my testimony, I am more concerned than ever
about the risk of biological threats--whether from outbreaks,
accidents, or attacks. This includes a need to underpin no-regret
attribution decisions with a sound scientific foundation in microbial
forensics.
The anthrax letter attacks marked the first significant act of
bioterrorism in the United States. That attack was one of the easiest
bioterror attacks to confront, yet the impact was far-reaching. As bad
as it was, it could have been much worse had the pathogen involved been
a contagious agent, resistant to antibiotics, an unknown pathogen, or
delivered in a covert wide-spread aerosol attack across multiple
jurisdictions. As it was, the anthrax letters shut down the Hart Senate
Office Building for 3 months, wreaked havoc with the U.S. Postal
Service, reduced business productivity, cost the Nation more than $1
billion, and tragically, took 5 lives and sickened 17 more. More than
30,000 people required post-exposure antibiotics.
Many still recall frightening moments experienced during that time,
particularly those who were potentially exposed to anthrax spores in
the Hart Senate Office Building, postal processing facilities, and
media offices.
This event also forever changed our notions of laboratory
biosecurity, biosafety, and personal reliability in the biological
sciences, and the emerging science of microbial forensics. An
understanding of the importance of microbial forensics was greatly
accelerated at that time. I, along with many others at the FBI and in
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate were involved in defining
the laboratory requirements needed to support a core capability for
microbial forensics. Unfortunately, decisions being made today
regarding the NBACC seem to have lost our lessons learned from first-
hand experience during that era.
The follow-on FBI Anthrax investigation applied the emerging
science of microbial forensics, and along with traditional
investigative procedures, ultimately attributed the attack to a lone
U.S. scientist.
Attribution to determine who is responsible for an attack, whether
a crime, act of terror, or warfare is essential to hold those
responsible accountable for their actions, prevent future attacks, and
serve as a deterrent. Attribution and the supporting microbial forensic
sciences are also important to exonerate--and rule out--suspected
perpetrators, whether a nation-state, terror group, or criminal that is
innocent.
The stakes could be very high, particularly when a nation-state is
involved or suspected--and a rush to judgment before the science and
evidence are in, should be avoided. Decisions to attribute, especially
a nation-state, will be consequential, no-regret decisions--that must
be guided by a strong scientific and evidentiary foundation.
It is similarly important to differentiate a naturally-occurring
infectious diseases outbreak from an attack. It may not be readily
apparent that an outbreak was natural or due to an intentional cause at
the first sign of disease--or even after an outbreak has run its
course--whether in people or animals.
Prior to 9/11 and the anthrax letter attacks, scientists and
operators from the FBI, CDC, and DOD had already begun establishing
needed protocols to enable collaboration to account for public health
and law enforcement requirements for sample collection and analysis,
and imitated what we know today as the science of microbial forensics.
This same group also began planning for unique laboratory
capabilities and the scientists that would be needed to support
attribution--whether for an attack, accident, or outbreak--and to
uncover and document illicit proliferation activities. The facilities
envisioned then and soon after the anthrax attacks include the
laboratory that was subsequently constructed and in use today at Fort
Detrick--The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center,
or NBACC.
I cannot overstate the importance of having dedicated, core
laboratory capabilities and scientists that are focused on microbial
forensics to support attribution. It is not a part-time job, or other-
duties-as-assigned function.
Microbial forensics is still, and will always be an evolving
science--perhaps not well understood outside of the relatively few
professionals in their field. But, prosecutors and National command
authorities who will one day be thrust into the position of making no-
regret attribution decisions will quickly grasp the importance of
microbial forensics as essential to underpin their pending difficult
decisions.
The science of microbial forensics will only get more complex with
the continued rapid advancement of new biotechnology tools that are
readily available, and as new examples of dual use research of concern
emerge from our scientific enterprise that could be misused to do harm.
A recent example is the report by Canadian scientists on the synthesis
of the horse pox virus.
There was considerable thought that went into the establishment of
the NBACC laboratory to support law enforcement and National security
attribution. To my knowledge, those original planning assumptions have
not substantially changed. I strongly recommend that those strategies
and needed capabilities are not abandoned.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate has made great strides; the Directorate's
program managers, scientist, and their contract performers are doing
everything in their power to help keep our homeland safe and secure.
But, we must acknowledge that the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate has a difficult task. Budget limitations and other
pressures will not allow them to satisfy all competing needs of the
vast homeland security enterprise, not to mention those needs of just
the DHS components. Given that, the Science and Technology Directorate
should focus available resources on those programs that only the
Federal Government must do, and address threats that are more
existential in nature that the private sector cannot or will not be
able to address. Biological threats, and other weapons of mass
destruction largely fit this category. The Directorate should also take
a longer-term view and imbed creative imagination, innovation,
university scientist, and sound leadership practices in their programs.
A true DARPA-type approach as originally envisioned for HSARPA is
needed. Business as usual will not get the job done.
Recommendations:
1. The committee should ensure that the administration develops a
comprehensive biodefense strategy that is tied to a unified and
transparent budget, with clearly-identified lead and supporting
roles--and support a strong White House leadership role to
elevate the importance of biodefense to homeland security and
drive interagency coordination and optimal use of available
resources.
2. The committee should ensure that the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate reestablishes leadership role in the new National
strategy to help drive broader homeland security biodefense and
homeland security requirements through a transparent and
trusted bio-risk threat assessment and net assessment process
that White House leadership can use to enforce interagency
outcomes, performance, and accountability.
3. The committee should ensure the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate does not eliminate their animal agriculture
bioterrorism defense research and development programs unless
there is a plan in place to transition those R&D requirements
and programs to USDA. The committee should also work with DHS
and USDA to also consider transferring NBAF to USDA if DHS does
not maintain animal defense R&D programs.
4. The committee should work with the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate to ensure that the National Biodefense and Analysis
and Countermeasures Laboratory is not closed and to ensure that
a plan for transition of ownership and operations of the
laboratory to either the FBI, DOD, or the intelligence
community is completed and implemented.
5. The DHS S&T Directorate and the broader DHS department should
implement recommendations of the Biodefense Blue Ribbon
Report.\6\ \7\
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\6\ Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for
Biodefense: Leadership and Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October
2015.
\7\ Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. Defense for Animal
Agriculture. October 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The DHS S&T Directorate should ensure that there is an effective
mechanism to keep university scientists engaged on homeland
security solutions, whether that is sustainment of the Centers
of Excellence model or an alternate strategy.
7. The DHS S&T Directorate should continue implementing a more
innovative, DARPA-type culture for the homeland security
science and technology enterprise.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the hearing of the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications
today.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Dr. Parker.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Parker for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAKE PARKER, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,
SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
Mr. Jake Parker. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking
Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I
am Jake Parker, director of government relations for the
Security Industry Association, which represents nearly 800
companies that provide security technology solutions.
Thanks for the opportunity to speak about the important
partnership between DHS S&T and its stakeholders in the private
sector. The input I am providing here is based broadly on the
experiences and perspectives that SIA member companies have
shared with me, including both small and large businesses. I
have tried to summarize these for you, and provide an
unfiltered way as possible.
Technology provided by our industry plays a key role in DHS
component operations in protecting critical infrastructure.
Since November, this month, is Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience Month, I first wanted to highlight S&T's work
through the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies Act, known as the SAFETY Act. This is the most
common interface between our member companies and S&T.
As you know, the SAFETY Act was passed in the aftermath of
the September 11 attacks to establish a way to encourage the
development and deployment of security technologies to protect
critical infrastructure, and the vast majority of that
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. It
provides liability protections for certified suppliers and end-
users against claims arising from terrorist attacks, which this
has been identified as a major obstacle to the deployment of
the effective security measures at that time.
Not only does the SAFETY Act provide liability protections,
but the designation and certification provides assurances that
a product or system meets high standards of safety and
effectiveness, and that it works as intended. Our industry
provides manufactured products, as well as systems integration
services, and even software, such as cybersecurity programs.
All of these are potentially eligible, but more recently,
owners and operators of facilities, such as sports stadiums,
are making use of the SAFETY Act designation for their entire
system of security measures as a comprehensive program, and in
this, our security technology plays a key role as well.
So over the past year, we understand that 91 applications
were approved by the SAFETY Act Office out of 133 submitted,
taking an average of nearly 4 months to get through the
process, and this has a significant jobs and economic impact.
The office projected that the approval of these technologies
will support 87,000 jobs, and greatly increase local business
revenue.
So we believe that Congress should work to ensure this
important program continues to be successful, and is provided
with the resources necessary to meet the demand. Specifically,
we believe that Congress should provide the SAFETY Act Office
with a line item appropriation. This will provide budgetary
certainty and program continuity, as well as help measure the
return on investment.
On the broader array of S&T programs, we are encouraged
with the recent signs the directorate is strengthening its
efforts to coordinate research across DHS components and
industry stakeholders.
Two years ago, when Dr. Brothers, who we are honored to
have with us here today, was serving as under secretary, the
integrated product teams were reestablished to track and
harmonize Department-wide research and development efforts,
which the Chairman highlighted was a step in the right
direction, which we agree with. The most recent IPT report is
only the second since this data has begun to be gathered, and a
new process has been implemented for involving the operational
components and identifying the gaps where S&T efforts will be
the most effective. According to this most recent report, IPT's
are intended to sustain a year-round process in which a
specific component is designated to shepherd the process for
each gap that is identified, from the point it is identified to
the transition to solutions that close it.
We think this is really encouraging, because in the view of
our member companies, the business case for involvement in S&T
programs would be much stronger if each effort was championed
by a DHS operational component that is involved at some level
from the beginning of the process, and committed to making use
of the technologies explored. This may result from the fact
that there is a perception out there that the S&T programs only
infrequently impact the operational procurement activities of
DHS components in a significant way. More involvement from the
components up front could help improve this perception, as well
as efforts to increase industry awareness of these new
initiatives by S&T, which are more focused.
So in October, S&T released a new industry guide which I
think does a great job at providing industry with the road map,
teaching the ways they can participate, and summarizes the
directorate's current and future needs. We understand this is
the first step toward providing a centralized on-line interface
for industry.
Members also tell us that for many smaller companies,
responding to the call for proposals needs to be aligned with
something they are already doing in order to help justify the
use of resources to apply. This is especially true if the
responding to grant proposals and other research opportunities
is not a normal and significant part of a technology company's
business model. Whether large or small, though, companies tell
us that it would benefit them greatly if the process of working
with S&T was easier and less bureaucratic.
We are optimistic about plans to update and improve S&T's
long-range broad agency announcements process, which is
sustaining requests to the private sector to develop needed
technology, and it is available for funding over multi-year
periods.
We understand that early next year, S&T is planning to make
significant changes to this process, based on industry
feedback, as it is retooled for 2019 and beyond. This includes
a more direct linkage to component needs, administrative
simplification, shortened review times, and clarification of a
streamlined application process, and actually, an involvement
from program managers prior to submission to make sure that
there is the highest quality.
When it comes to the S&T research and divestment outlook
for the next 4 years, the security industry is poised to
contribute significantly, particularly when it comes to areas
like biometrics collection and utilization, robotics and
autonomous systems, enhanced situational awareness, identity
credentialing and access management, automated vetting, and
other technologies.
We applaud S&T's goals, outlining its 2017 innovation
strategy to ensure the industry is fully engaged in meeting the
demands of the Homeland Security Enterprise, and that the end-
users of homeland security technology in both the public and
private sectors have access to the best available products.
So we are committed to doing our part as an association to
help engage industry with this effort, and look forward to
answering any questions you may have. I will do my best, but if
I can't, I will definitely go back to our members and provide
you an answer. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jake Parker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jake Parker
November 7, 2017
Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am Jake Parker, director
of government relations for the Security Industry Association, a non-
profit international trade association representing nearly 800
companies that develop, manufacture, and integrate security solutions,
and employ thousands of technology leaders.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the
partnership between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and its stakeholders in the
private sector. The input I am providing is based, broadly, on the
experiences and perspectives SIA member companies have shared with me,
which include both small companies and large corporations.
Technology provided by the security industry plays a key role in
DHS component operations, and in protecting critical infrastructure
such as chemical facilities, airports, seaports, mass transit systems,
the energy sector, Federal offices, and even K-12 schools and
universities.
Since November is Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
Month, I want to first highlight S&T's work through the Support Anti-
Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act Office,
which is the most common interface between SIA member companies and the
Directorate. As you know, the SAFETY Act of 2002 established a process
to encourage the development and wide-spread deployment of security
technologies addressing the terrorist threat by providing liability
protections for qualified providers against claims arising from
terrorist attacks. The potential for such claims was identified as
major obstacle to the deployment of effective security solutions
following the attacks of September 11.
From our point of view, the program has been a major success and a
catalyst for adoption of new technology in many ways. The private
sector owns and operates the vast majority of critical infrastructure
in the United States. Not only does the SAFETY Act protect these end-
users from liability for deploying technology, SAFETY Act designation
and certification provides a level of assurance that a product or
system meets high standards of safety and effectiveness, and works as
intended.
Our industry provides manufactured products, and well as systems
integration services and software such as cybersecurity programs--all
of which are potentially eligible for SAFETY Act designation or
certification. In addition, owners or operators of critical
infrastructure are making increasing use of the SAFETY Act designation
for their comprehensive security programs, in which security technology
plays a key role.
According the SAFETY Act Office, during fiscal year 2017, 91
applications were approved out of 133 submitted, taking an average of
nearly 4 months to get through the process. The Office projects that
approval of these technologies will support 87,000 jobs and
significantly increase revenue for providers.
We believe that Congress should work to ensure this important
program continues, and importantly, is provided with the resources
necessary to meet demand. Specifically, Congress should provide the
SAFETY Act Office with a line item appropriation. This will provide
budgetary certainty and program continuity, as well as help measure the
return on investment.
As far as the broader array of S&T programs, we are encouraged with
recent signs the Directorate is strengthening efforts to better
coordinate research and development (R&D) activities across DHS
components and with industry stakeholders. Two years ago, when Dr.
Brothers--who we are honored to have with us here today--was serving as
under secretary, Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) were re-established to
track and harmonize Department-wide research and development efforts
between S&T and the components. The most recent IPT report for fiscal
year is based upon only the second round of data gathering across DHS
components, as well as a new process for involving operational
components in the identification of capability gaps on which to focus
R&D efforts. IPTs are aimed at sustaning a year-round process in which
a designated component ``shepherds each gap from the identification of
needs to the transition of solutions to close the gap'' according to
the report.
In gathering feedback from our member companies, a recurring theme
was the importance of bolstering the business case for participation in
S&T programs. Our members tell us that for S&T programs to be truly
successful from their standpoint, each effort needs to be of championed
by a DHS operational component, and accompanied by some form of
commitment to make use of the technologies being explored if the
Government is the intended end-user. The component should have some
level of involvement in the project being executed from the beginning
of the process, and prior to making any significant expenditures.
There is a perception among some in the industry that S&T programs
only infrequently significantly impact the operational or procurement
activities of the DHS components, even with a successful engagement.
For this reason, the choice may be made to devote more time and
resources to focus primarily on relationships with the program offices
on the component side.
More involvement from the components up front could help address
this perception, as well as efforts to increase industry awareness of
S&T's new initiatives. Last month, S&T released its new Industry Guide,
which very effectively summarizes current needs and programing,
providing a future R&D outlook and linking industry to each of the ways
to participate. We understand from discussions with personnel at S&T
that they are working toward a providing a centralized on-line
interface for industry to pull together information about opportunities
that is currently listed in disparate locations.
Successful engagement with industry also depends on the business
model of companies that possess the expertise S&T is seeking. For many
smaller companies, the topic often needs to be aligned with something
they are already doing to justify the use of resources to apply,
especially those with limited experience with grant proposals and
similar processes. S&T should do everything possible to simplify and
streamline the process to make it easier for companies that do not have
this expertise to participate.
Whether large companies or small, industry would benefit from
making the process of working with S&T easier and less bureaucratic.
This is one reason we are optimistic about plans to update and improve
S&T's Long-Range Broad Agency Announcements (LRBAA) process. We
understand that early next year S&T is planning to make significant
changes to the process based on in industry feedback, as LRBAAs are
initiated for 2019 and beyond. This includes a clarification of
priorities that are linked directly to component needs, a simplified
and streamlined application process, increased communications with
program managers prior to submission, shortened review time as well as
feedback to submitters. This feedback is particularly important for
accepted proposals that are unfunded, to increase the chance of success
with future submissions. Further, we think the evaluation process can
be improved to the extent it can be aided by personnel with product
development experience.
As you know, the Government is challenged by the fact that
technology is now evolving so quickly that it often outpaces
traditional Government R&D and acquisition vehicles. Meanwhile,
technology-based solutions are more important than ever to achieving
DHS component missions. According to the 2017 S&T Innovation Strategy,
among the Directorate's goals are to ensure that industry applies its
resources toward meeting the demands of the Homeland Security
Enterprise (HSE), as well as to ensure that technology end-users are
more satisfied with products available on the commercial market.
When it comes to the S&T R&D investment outlook for the next 4
years, the security industry is poised to contribute significantly,
particularly when it comes to priority areas like biometrics collection
and utilization, robotics and autonomous systems, enhanced situational
awareness, identity credentialing and access management, automated
vetting and other technologies.
SIA and S&T have maintained a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
that facilitates information sharing on the adaptation of electronics-
related technological innovation for use at the Federal, State, and
local level for homeland security applications. SIA is committed to
continuing to do our part to facilitate the participation of our
industry in helping meet HSE needs, and we look forward to working with
S&T in new and more effective ways in the future as new leadership is
appointed.
On behalf of the Security Industry Association, I appreciate the
opportunity to provide collective input from our industry on working
with S&T. I will do my best to answer any questions you may have,
however if there is any information requested I cannot provide today, I
will be happy to work with our members to provide helpful responses.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Parker.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Brothers for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REGINALD BROTHERS, PRINCIPAL, THE CHERTOFF GROUP,
LLC, TESTIFYING AS FORMER UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Brothers. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, and Ranking
Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the role
and effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate.
We are now living in a post-industrial age with a globally
interconnected web leading to a highly integrated world with
supply chains that reach thousands of miles. Things that were
previously done only by nation-states are now accomplished by
sub-state actors, gangs, groups, and even individuals. Our new
reality is an asymmetric threat environment, where individuals
attack government institutions, and nation-states attack
civilian infrastructure with little fear of retaliation, or
even attribution.
In the past, we discussed precision targeting of kinetic
weapons. We are now discussing precision targeting of
individuals and content on Facebook.
Technology continues to accelerate with artificial
intelligence, the internet of things, commercial drones,
synthetic biology and quantum computing, all promising
tremendous benefits to society, but also the potential to
create complex and vulnerable threat surfaces. This global
threat context informs us that the Nation needs its efficiently
and consistently funded agile, adaptive, and relevant and rapid
innovation engine to confront the current and future threats to
our National security.
DHS S&T has worked hard to focus on being highly relevant,
shifting from the past focus on long-term basic research to
near-term operational impact. S&T can now be an important asset
for the Secretary as one of the few cross-departmental
entities. S&T create a laboratory as a Department-wide resource
for leading-edge data analytic and machine-learning software,
where operational personnel work with S&T staff to evaluate and
co-develop mission-centric solutions.
This capability resulted in a tool, using advanced facial
recognition that identified 475 child sex victims, leading to
their rescue from abusers.
In partnership with the New York Police Department and
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, S&T installed a
permanent test bed in New York City's Grand Central Terminal,
an extension of our pilot demonstrations that successfully
measured and mapped how and where a bioagent would be
transported in the event of a terrorist attack in the subway
system.
S&T completed a Tucson border security operational exercise
for Customs and Border Protection and ICE to evaluate border
security technology capabilities, looking at Border Patrol,
HIS, and industry.
S&T also provided support of the response and recovery
efforts from hurricanes Irma and Harvey with training, decision
support software, and communications equipment.
Starting in December 2015, S&T initiated the Silicon Valley
Innovation Program as an effort to engage creative
technologists from across the world in solving pressing
problems in National security. At the present time, an
awareness has been built with more than 1,000 start-ups,
accelerators, and venture capitalists. Six topic calls have
been published, ranging from internet of things security to
airport passenger processing. Applications have been received
from across the country and from the international community.
To date, there have been nine Phase 1 awards, and four Phase 2
awards, with the average time to award being only 45 days.
For operational relevance, collaboration with users and
industry is essential. The Cybersecurity Division has developed
specific and relevant industry collaborations with the energy,
financial, and automotive sectors.
With the initiatives discussed above, S&T is demonstrating
that it is working toward being the agile, adaptive, and rapid
innovation engine I described. That said, there is a second
context to consider when evaluating the potential of S&T to be
effective. That second context is funding.
If the fiscal year 2018 budget cuts were to remain in
effect, there would be severe impacts to the ability of DHS S&T
to do its job. For example, these budget cuts would reduce the
funding of the Cyber Security Division by 20 percent, the
Chemical Biological Division by approximately 60 percent.
Cybersecurity is a challenge that is exponentially
increasing with time. Observed malware has increased 40 times
in the past 10 years. Observed attacks on critical
infrastructure have increased 1.5 times in just the past 3
years. With the emergence of the internet of things, autonomous
vehicles, and other networked innovations, the threat surface
of our National security are rapidly expanding.
While awareness of the need for cybersecurity is
increasing, the same is not necessarily true for chemical and
biological security. Threats from chemical and biological
threat agents, known and yet-unknown synthetic variations are
real, and becoming more attractive to terrorist organizations.
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Centers,
NBACC, and Chemical Security Analysis Center, CSAC, are
recognized within the United States as the Nation's focal
points for biological and chemical defense awareness and
response. But the funding for these centers is threatened to be
cut due to the fiscal year 2018 budget pressures, as well as
the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory.
Given the threats to National security that our current
global context mandates, I am very concerned about the impact
of these potential budget cuts. From my personal experience, I
know that one of the most disruptive forces for technologists
and innovation organization is uncertain and unstable funding.
This challenge is magnified at DHS, because a threat
environment can change on a frequent basis, which can call for
rapid change of investment across the R&D portfolio to meet an
immediate or near-term threat.
However, while I am concerned, I also believe with the
appropriate support of the Department and Congress, S&T can
meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brothers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reginald Brothers
November 7, 2017
Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today on the role and effectiveness of the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T). S&T's mission is to deliver effective and innovative
insight, methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the Homeland
Security Enterprise (HSE). Technology simultaneously enables both
homeland security operators and malevolent actors and, as a result, has
a significant and expanding impact on current and future threat
environments. Having served in both the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security in senior leadership positions in science and
technology, I'd like to start by giving my thoughts on the current and
future threat environment as a way of providing context for the work of
S&T.
We are now in a post-industrial age, with a global interconnected
web leading to a highly integrated world with supply chains that reach
thousands of miles. Things that previously were done only by nation-
states are now accomplishable by sub-state actors, gangs, groups, and
even individuals.
For the period of the Cold War, it was possible to develop
strategic nuclear weapons, stealth platforms and precision weaponry and
retain a competitive advantage for a decade or more. However, with the
hyper-connectedness of our world and the subsequent democratization of
technology, it no longer possible to develop technology-based
capabilities for National security that have any significant temporal
advantage. The power to inflict harm is no longer based solely with
nation-states. Our new reality is an asymmetric threat environment
where individuals attack government institutions and nation-states
attack civilian infrastructures with little fear of retaliation or even
attribution. With easily accessible technologies such as cyber tools,
drones, and potentially bio-weapons, it is possible for individuals to
cause significant financial and physical damage as well as endanger
human life. While we are used to discussions of precision targeting of
kinetic weapons, we are now discussing precision targeting of
individuals and content on Facebook. And technology continues to
accelerate with artificial intelligence, the internet of things,
commercial drones and satellite constellations, synthetic biology,
blockchain and quantum computing all promising tremendous benefits to
society but with also the potential to create devastating threat
vectors and complex and vulnerable threat surfaces.
What this context tells us is that the nation needs a sufficiently
and consistently funded, agile, adaptive, relevant, and rapid
innovation engine to confront the current and future threats to our
National security. DHS S&T has worked hard to focus on being highly
relevant--shifting from the past focus on long-term basic research to
near-term operational impact. I think S&T is now an important asset for
the Secretary as one of the few cross-Departmental entities. I'd like
to now provide a few examples.
DHS S&T created the Data Analytics Engine (DA-E) which is a
Department-wide resource for leading-edge data analytic and machine
learning technologies applied to Homeland Security mission sets. A
laboratory has been developed where operational personnel can work with
S&T staff to evaluate and co-develop technological solutions. Using
this capability S&T helped NPPD deploy a social media capability to
monitor publicly-available posts regarding critical infrastructure and
public health. S&T delivered over 370 requests for help to emergency
responders. The S&T DA-E provided solutions using advanced facial
recognition tools that identified 475 child sex trafficking victims,
leading to their rescue from abusers.
At the direct request of the NYPD, conducted further experiments in
identifying and characterizing live streaming social media sources that
are affiliated with terrorist or other criminal activity. In addition,
outside of New York, S&T will evaluate an even more extensive selection
of social media analytical tools on behalf of I&A, CIS, and CBP for
screening and vetting to detect, characterize, and locate source(s) of
content of interest on social media platforms like Periscope and
Facebook Live.
In partnership with the New York Police Department and Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA), S&T installed a ``permanent'' testbed
in New York City's Grand Central Terminal, an extension of S&T's pilot
demonstrations successfully measuring and mapping how and where a
bioagent would be transported in the event of a terrorist attack in the
subway system.
On behalf of TSA, S&T conducted three live-fire exercises to better
understand Home Made Explosives (HME) capabilities and impacts on
critical infrastructure.
S&T completed the SkyNet Field Experiment, a Tucson Border Security
Operational Exercise for CBP and ICE to evaluate border security
technology capabilities linking Border Patrol, HIS, and industry. This
field exercise will be used to further develop and deploy tactical data
and video from Border Patrol sensors and Small UAS platforms. S&T
developed sensors for Field Agents at the Tactical Operations Center,
the Border Patrol eGIS system, and remote locations such as the Air
Marine Operations Center. The FE was a series of scenarios centered on
illegal entry by walkers, vehicles, and air platforms such as ULAs
(Ultra Light Aircraft) in a Southern Border environment.
S&T finalized the stand-up of the Common DHS UAS Test Site for use
by S&T, FEMA, Coast Guard, CBP, and Secret Service for testing and
training on UAS technologies. Unlike the counter UAS program this test
site will allow for development of UAS technologies by DHS operational
components. In addition, S&T will finalize counter UAS agreements with
DOD to consolidate all UAS threat databases and libraries under the
JIDO umbrella.
S&T deployed the Counter Small Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS)
Advisory and Review Toolkit (C-SMART) to the Secret Service. C-SMART is
a suite of computer models, databases, and analysis tools to analyze
and plan C-UAS security postures for specific operations--this
capability has helped Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) partners
understand the C-UAS threat, and optimize security posture plans. C-
SMART has been used in direct support of National Special Security
(NSSE) and Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) identified events,
such as the Inauguration and the Super Bowl.
S&T deployed the Next Generation Incident Command Center (NICS) to
even more emergency operational centers across the Nation and world.
NICS is a web-based communication platform that enables responders on
scene to share data and information using open standards, and request
and receive assistance from remote experts in real-time. Developed in
collaboration with MIT Lincoln Labs and the Coast Guard, S&T's NICS is
in use by Coast Guard assets, Cal Fire, California OES, State of
Victoria Australia, and NATO member and partner countries as part of
NATO's Science for Peace and Security Project Advanced Regional Civil
Emergency Coordination Pilot. S&T received funding from Australia and
NATO for further development of this platform. S&T has made NICS
available on GitHub, the world's leading software development platform.
S&T transitioned the National Hurricane Program Technology
Modernization HURREVAC-eXtended (HVX) to FEMA. HVX enables emergency
managers to visualize hurricane risks associated with their specific
evacuation zones, resulting in reliable and better-informed evacuation
decisions. Two major improvements for HVX include providing a web-
enabled system to make training widely available to emergency managers
on-line, as well as accessible via mobile phone--a FEMA requirement.
The initial HVX Beta will complete its transition in May 2017. Once
fully operational at FEMA in 2018, substantial savings are expected by
avoiding unnecessary ``over'' evacuations and saving lives by
preventing ``under'' evacuations. HVX makes it possible for web-based
training allowing FEMA to train hundreds of thousands of emergency
managers compared to less than 100 per year with the previous system,
greatly reducing training costs and making it possible for greater
numbers of emergency managers to gain critical skills in evacuation
decision making.
S&T developed the First Responder Jamming Exercise. The focus of
the work are the technical and operational challenges of commercially
available jamming technologies on first responder communications. This
work done with NPPD, FEMA, Coast Guard, Los Angeles, Houston, Arizona,
NYPD among others, and brings industry to the field to work through
this growing threat. S&T and OGC have 16 limited purpose Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) in place to test equipment.
From last year's exercise S&T was able to develop a training module
with FLETC which was used at the inauguration to train first responders
to identify and mitigate use of jamming technologies.
S&T also provided support to the response and recovery efforts from
Hurricanes Irma and Harvey:
As of Sept 12, 9 S&T surge capacity volunteers had been
deployed. A system the S&T First Responders Group (FRG) and
NPPD collaborated on is preparing reports on the number of
businesses open and progress of business restoration.
Information from the reports is being shared to emergency
managers and others.
FRG has provided approximately $76K in communications
equipment to emergency managers in Georgia to support Irma
recovery. As of 11 September, the Program Manager, Shawn
McDonald, the Irma ATAK server is in full deployment more than
a hundred organizational users.
S&T is providing the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK)
technology and training to DHS components and responders
Supporting Hurricanes Irma that allows them to see where
and collaborate with responders and support personnel in
real-time as well as to plan and track multiple locations
where support/response is needed.
S&T has used a software program to develop aerial and
satellite photos that maps high-risk structures in Florida,
Georgia, and South Carolina to allow for better response and
recovery and made these photos available to FEMA and search and
rescue teams as well.
Flood APEX Map data sets have been completed for Georgia
and South Carolina as well as Florida, in support of Irma.
Flood apex has worked with ORNL to put together building
outlines datasets from high-resolution satellite imagery
for the GA and SC coastal counties. Previously completed
initial map data sets of building structure outlines for
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and south Florida and
assisted FEMA with publishing those data to the web for
broad community access as well as distribution to search
and rescue and volunteer teams.
S&T FRG is providing additional access to the HVX prototype
system, which allows emergency managers, FEMA response
officials and others to make timely and accurate evacuation
related decisions more efficiently.
200+ FEMA, State, and local users have been given access
to HVX Prototype.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a HVX user.
S&T is providing a social media monitoring tool and training
to allow NPPD analysts real-time updates on threats and issues
including health issues, people requesting medical assistance
or rescue, status of utilities and resources, and more, to
allow better allocation of resources and response.
The S&T-funded storm surge software (ADCIRC) provides
emergency managers early and accurate predictions about storm
surge and coastal flooding to allow them be make better
decisions on evacuations, positioning of resources, and other
response and recovery issues.
RADM Peter Brown is using the ADCIRC results to plan for
evacuation of USCG staff from Key West USCG housing. On
September 6, told Dr. Rick Leuttich, CRC leader, ``The
[ADCIRC] model was key to my decision regarding aircraft
protection in Puerto Rico and our COOP decision for Miami.
I'll be watching it with every update.''
The DHS S&T Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (CRC)
worked closely with the Texas State Operations Center and NOAA
to provide modeling and storm surge predictions to better
enable prepositioning of resources, evacuations, and recovery.
The CRC ADvanced CIRCulation (ADCIRC) storm surge/coastal
flooding modeling team is providing models for Texas/Gulf of
Mexico. DA-E social media analysis tools: S& T's HSARPA Data
Analytics Engine (DA-E) continues generating reports from open-
source and social media data. The tool, requested by NPPD,
monitors social media for emergent threats and augments
situational awareness regarding public health and critical
infrastructure. It provides automated, real-time monitoring of
social media data related to public health, communications,
dams, electricity, oil and natural gas and water. Urgent
requests for help (e.g., infant not breathing) were forwarded
to FEMA's National Watch Center. Updated reports and documents
were provided approximately every 3 hours to NPPD. As of August
28, nearly 4,000 posts had been collected and analyzed to
identify approximately 250 of the most relevant. DA-E also
established a new collection effort on August 28 to identify an
additional 100+ posts specifically focused on calls for help
and will be sending these posts to FEMA. The DA-E team
continues to analyze information related to infrastructure
protection interests and producing regular reports. HSARPA DA-E
has initiated transition of technical capabilities for
situation awareness regarding critical infrastructure using
open-source and social media data to NPPD.
silicon valley innovation program
Starting in December 2015, DHS S&T initiated the Silicon Valley
Innovation Program as an effort to engage creative scientists,
engineers, and technologists from across the world in solving pressing
problems in National Security. As of the present time, an awareness has
been built with more than 1,000 start-ups accelerators and venture
capitalists. Six topic calls have been published: IoT Security, K9
Wearables, sUAS Capabilities, Enhancements to the Global Travel
Assessments System (GTAS), and Enhancing CBP, Airport Passenger
Processing, Financial Services Cyber Security Active Defense (FSCSAD).
One hundred sixteen Phase I and 5 Phase II applications have been
received. Applicants have been from across the country and
international. There have been 9 Phase I awards and 4 Phase II awards
to date.
collaborations
For operational relevance, collaboration with users and industry is
essential. The DHS S&T Cyber Security Division has developed specific
and relevant collaborations with the Energy, Financial, and Automotive
sectors:
Energy sector
Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cybersecurity
(LOGIIC) is an on-going collaboration of oil and natural
gas companies and DHS S&T.
LOGIIC facilitates cooperative research, development,
testing, and evaluation procedures to improve cybersecurity in
petroleum industry digital control systems.
Financial sector
The Next Generation Cyber Infrastructure (NGCI) Apex
program will identify, test, evaluate, and deploy cutting-
edge technologies to deter cyber attacks against the
financial sector. The program will concentrate on
delivering capabilities identified by the financial sector
to address five primary functional gaps
Stakeholders: U.S. Department of the Treasury, the
Financial Services Sector, the OTA Contractor and private
technology vendors.
Automotive Sector
The (Cyber Physical Systems Security) CPSSEC program
focuses include working collaboratively with automakers and
leading researchers to increase vehicle cybersecurity,
funding research projects to enhance auto cybersecurity,
and helping to upgrade the Federal Government's fleet of
automobiles.
With the successes discussed above, it is clear that DHS S&T is
working towards being the agile, adaptive, and rapid innovation engine
I described. That said, there is a second context to consider when
evaluating the potential of S&T to be effective.
That second context is the breadth and depth of its mission and the
level of appropriated funds. The S&T Budget for DoD for fiscal year
2018 is approximately $14 billion while that of DHS S&T is
approximately $600 million. DoD has a significant National laboratory
infrastructure for evolutionary capability improvements and the Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency funded at approximately $3 billion for
revolutionary/disruptive improvements. In contrast S&T is asked to
provide all R&D across both evolutionary and revolutionary domains with
less than an order of magnitude of funding. While there is some cross-
pollination possible between the departments, in many cases mission
specificity and affordability factors limit the ability of DHS
components to procure and sustain DoD technologies. As such, I believe
that S&T is underfunded for its stated responsibilities across all of
the DHS mission sets.
In fact, if the fiscal year 2018 budget cuts remain in effect there
will be severe impacts to S&T ability to do its job. For example, these
budget cuts will reduce the funding of the Cyber Security Division by
20% and the Chemical Biological Division by approximately 60%.
Cybersecurity is a challenge that is exponentially increasing with
time. Observed malware has increased 40 times in the past 10 years.
Observed attacks on critical infrastructure have increased 1.5 times in
just the past 3 years. With the emergence of the internet of things,
autonomous vehicles, and other networked innovations, the threat
surfaces of our National security are rapidly expanding.
While awareness of the need for cybersecurity is increasing, the
same is not necessarily true for chemical and biological security.
Threats from chemical and biological threat agents--known and yet
unknown synthetic variations--are real, growing in potential and
consequence, and becoming more attractive to terrorist organizations.
As law enforcement organizations around the world make it more
difficult to acquire materials to make explosives and gain access to
quantities of firearms, chemical agents and eventually, biological
agents will become the terror weapons of choice.
Recently, researchers at the University of Alberta announced the
artificial synthesis of Horse Pox, a close ``relative'' of Small Pox. A
number of prestigious scientific journals have refused to publish the
details of this accomplishment for fear that if a step-by-step
procedure were to become available, those with skills in this
technology could easily produce the human Small Pox virus and unleash
this terror on an unsuspecting world population.
After the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. Government recognized that
defensive measures had to be implemented and maintained to protect
civilians from these methods of terror attack. To this end, Congress
and President Bush created a dedicated organization and facilities
within the Department of Homeland Security to work closely with law
enforcement and the intelligence community to identify growing threats,
develop technologies to detect threats and support first responders if
the unthinkable ever happened. In addition to establishing a
specialized Federal and contractor workforce in chemical and biological
defense technology development, two unique facilities, the National
Biodefense Analysis & Countermeasures Center (NBACC) and Chemical
Security Analysis Center (CSAC) were approved and funded by Congress.
Each of these facilities is recognized within the United States as the
Nation's focal points for biological and chemical defense awareness and
response. These centers not only support many domestic Government
agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels but also work closely
with international partners in thwarting potential terrorists from
using chemical and biological warfare agents. There is wide-spread
agreement that the DHS capabilities in chemical and biological defense
science and technology are unique and needed to provide a foundation
for this critical area of National security. But the funding for these
centers is being cut due the fiscal year 2018 budget pressures.
Given the threats to National security that our current global
context mandates, I am very concerned about the impact of the fiscal
year 2018 budget cuts. From my personal experience I know that one of
the most disruptive forces for a technologist and an innovation
organization is uncertain and unstable funding. This challenge is
magnified at DHS, because the threat environment can change on a
frequent basis which can call for rapid change of investment across the
R&D portfolio to meet the immediate threat. However, while I am
concerned, I also believe with the appropriate support from the
Department and Congress, S&T can meet the challenges of the 21st
Century.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Dr. Brothers.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
We have a unique opportunity here. We have representatives
of first responders, academia, industry, and the insight from
Dr. Brothers of having served in that agency for 3 years. I
would just like to ask the panel if you could share with us, if
there is one thing you would like to see going forward from
S&T. You certainly deal with it on a daily basis. You study it.
Industry creates it. Doctor, you have seen it in use. What
would you like to see this agency do? What would you like to
see this committee do? What would you like to see Congress do?
Aside from funding, what direction would you like to see? What
is needed for our country's security from S&T that, if you had
the ability, what one thing, or two things would you like to
see, from each of your perspectives?
Chief.
Mr. Rice. Thank you. I would say, just from my personal
experience in working on Rad/Nuc projects and planning issues
around the region, I think in the chemical sector and the bio
sector, a lot of the technology and data integration that we
have seen with Rad/Nuc, there is a lot of discussions about it,
a lot of the conferences that we go to, a lot of the meetings
we attend, and I would like to see the same amount of effort
that we have seen in that Rad/Nuc integration of technology
apply to the chem and bio world. It seems that that reach-back
capability, a common operating picture, visuals for incident
commanders, it has been breaking over the last couple of years
for the Rad/Nuc forum.
But when it comes to chem-bio, there is still some
disconnect between the first responders and what command or
emergency management might be seeing in the back. So I would
like to see a greater effort in that regard, to bring those
other threats up into the same level that the Rad/Nuc
preparedness is.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you for sharing that.
Dr. Parker.
Mr. Gerald Parker. Well, I would first, maybe, echo my
colleague, that many of these, I would call it common operating
picture-type things were actually called out HSPD-9 and HSPD-10
quite some time ago, so that is something else that remains
elusive, and it really should not continue to remain elusive.
I think one thing, though, that I think S&T ought to be
positioned so it can be a real driver of innovation. It needs
to be unencumbered, and unfortunately, funding is part of that,
and Dr. Brothers said it best. It is the budget uncertainty
that is so disruptive. But it really needs to focus on a DARPA-
esque research and innovation that can really attract the best
and brightest minds across the country, whether that is in
universities, whether it is in a private sector, and it has got
to be nimble and agile.
I did make a comment about laboratory infrastructure in my
opening remarks. Now, laboratory infrastructure, like the NBAF,
NBACC, and the other laboratory, they are all necessary for the
Homeland Security Enterprise. But I think one question is, are
they best placed in DHS, where there may be threats of closure,
or are they best placed in their lead Federal agency for--that
may have responsibility, say, for animal health, or
attribution, the FBI, or DOD command authorities? Those are
policy questions.
But S&T must be really agile, and innovative, and drive
cutting-edge solutions that if this is impossible to do to meet
near-term and longer-term needs. But we have got to be thinking
about the unknown threats of the future.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Parker.
Mr. Jake Parker. I guess from our perspective, you know, in
our industry, the security industry, we see a lot of innovation
happening in the private sector for the commercial market, and
I think that the pace of that is such that a focus on
operationalizing some of these advances and innovations for
Government missions would be a really high-value activity, and
a focus on that.
If you look at the R&D outlook, many of those that S&T has
put forward, a lot of those technology areas have seen really
swift advances in the last year or 2. I think that, you know,
often, you know, the Government mission requires something
different, and the mission for first responders requires
something slightly different, but it can be adapted for those
uses, so----
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, sir.
Doctor.
Mr. Brothers. Sure. I appreciate the question. I really do
appreciate the question. I think, Ranking Member, you asked a
question about, you know, some of my thoughts since having been
served as the under secretary. Here is one of the big things I
ran into.
So S&T has to, obviously, report--I am sorry? Oh, it is not
close enough? How is that? Better? Great.
What I am saying is that S&T has to report very
specifically, in terms of the kinds of spends it does across
the portfolio. Dr. Parker mentioned a good point; that we need
kind of a DARPA-esque kind of agility.
One of the challenges, having served at DARPA and DOD, is
that with the way S&T has to report early commitments and
obligations of funding makes it difficult when things happen.
So let me give you an example.
When I was there we had, if you probably remember, the
drone landed on the White House lawn. So all of a sudden, there
is concern. Now, so I have got a portfolio where all my funding
has been reported where I am spending all this money. But now,
I have got to respond to an emerging threat. How do I do that?
So the agility that Dr. Parker is talking about, and I
applaud, I don't have the tools to make that happen, because I
can't move money like that, even though there is an observed
threat.
So I think one of the things that we need help with is how
do we understand your role as a short oversight, and the
effective and efficient use of funding? How do we also give S&T
the ability to be agile with this funding, when we have these
emerging threats that we didn't necessarily predict, you know,
the so-called black swan events happen? How do we handle that?
It is an issue.
I think more specifically, we have done a good job. S&T has
done a good job of reaching out to industry through the Silicon
Valley Program, for example. One of the tools for doing that,
the investment vehicles, calls it other transactions authority,
other transactions.
This has come up a number of times. I think S&T does need
the authority for that, as opposed to going through management,
so I think that is something that S&T could definitely use as
well.
Something that is more inside the Department, but could be
encouraged, is better integration into the acquisition process
itself. Because I think you are probably familiar that with all
S&T organizations, whether you are talking about DARPA, or the
DOD laboratories, or S&T itself, fundamental challenge is what?
It is the valley of death, as people call it, right? That
valley of death is when you have to come up with a research
prototype. A prototype has a lot of the capabilities you need,
but it is not manufacturable at that point.
How do you get that prototype, that concept in the actual
acquisition process? That is a challenge all research
organizations has. But I think it would be an encouragement to
actually better integrate that into the Department's way of
thinking, the Joint Requirements Council, for example, which is
part of the way the Department is moving toward some of the
more process-oriented ways of doing requirements that the
Department of Defense has. How do you integrate these systems
better?
You mentioned the IPT process, and the IPT process, I
think, is an important process, and it is, for the first time,
really tried to give S&T an opportunity to focus on agreed-upon
Department capability priorities. There are challenges there
though, right? The challenges there are that that is a year-
long process. So that means that you do not really start
working on those until the next year. So again, you have a
delay.
So how do we get more speed in this innovative process?
That is a start, but we need to be able to handle these type,
like I said, these emerging technologies, emerging threats in a
much more rapid basis.
So I think those are some of the areas I would encourage
you to look at.
Mr. Donovan. Well, I thank you all for your insight.
My time is expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brothers, as you know, the Science and Technology
Directorate is still operating without a permanent under
secretary. How important is it that S&T have a strong
leadership and clear direction in place, as it carries out its
mission?
Mr. Brothers. Sure, thanks for the question. I think it is
very important, and the reason why I say that is even though
there is fully capable leadership from career, as well as
acting under secretary currently, typically, what you find
happens is that changes don't happen, because everyone is
waiting for the political appointee to actually come on board.
Until that happens, you know, not a lot changes, and I
think one of the challenges we have, as I think many of the
panelists here have agreed: We have a very fluid threat
environment, and we have to be ready to adapt to this. Without
strong leadership on top, that is not really possible right
now. So even though I think we have made good changes, I think
we need leadership that is going to be able to keep up with the
change that we are seeing in our threat environment.
Mr. Payne. Let us see. Mr. Parker, would you like to weigh
in on that?
Mr. Jake Parker. Absolutely. I think that is, I would
definitely agree with Dr. Brothers that, you know, there has
definitely been, you know, the folks we have worked with, the
S&T, I think, many of them are new in their positions in the
last couple months. They have some great ideas about what they
want to do, but they need, you know, leadership from the top to
give them their green light to proceed, and so that is, I
think, what Dr. Brothers was getting at.
Mr. Payne. Dr. Parker.
Mr. Gerald Parker. I totally agree. There is outstanding
professionals there in the Department that are keeping things
moving. But the--it is, again, it is the uncertainty. Who it is
going to be, when are they going to come in? They are ready to
roll up their sleeves and work very hard, but it is the
uncertainty that is, it is really, I think, an issue.
Mr. Payne. Possibly going in a totally different direction
than they have been?
Mr. Gerald Parker. Well, you know, I don't know that, but I
think it is really more the uncertainty. I think Dr. Brothers
did a whole lot to steady the ship, so to speak, in S&T. The
command culture has greatly improved, and people are happy to
come to work, and they are working hard, and you don't want to
lose that momentum. We have threats that we face every day, and
we can't wait 'til--we can't wait.
Mr. Payne. Chief Rice.
Mr. Rice. Thank you. Yes, I would have to agree with my
colleagues here, that that leadership needs to be there, and it
needs to be strong. On a personal level, and in our
interactions with the folks down at NUSTL, it came as quite a
shock that, you know, they may have been on the cut side of
this. But, you know, they rolled up their sleeves, and they
continue to work on their portfolios, and continue to
contribute and make positive impacts for us on the responder
side. So having that leadership in place so that they can
reaffirm their mission and continue this work going forward is
critical.
Mr. Payne. OK. Dr. Brothers, when you first were named
under secretary of science technology, you told me that one of
your priorities was to energize the homeland security
industrial base. What are some of the challenges that you
experienced trying to attract businesses to participate in the
homeland security industrial base?
Mr. Brothers. You know, one of the biggest challenges--and
Mr. Parker brought this up--with the new outreach to industry
that you were mentioning. It is communication, right? I think
one of the biggest challenges is that industry would, of
course, like to solve these challenges. They don't necessarily
know what those challenges are. They don't necessarily know who
to talk to in a department, who to email. They don't
necessarily know what the funding looks like.
I think that is still an issue. It is not just unique to
DHS/S&T. But I think one of the biggest challenges I have had
was actually communicating what are our needs, who do you talk
to, and what kind of funding is out there.
Mr. Payne. OK. Let us see. As you know, the President's
fiscal year 2018 budget submission was criticized for its
massive cuts to the Science and Technology Directorate budget.
What message did the budget send to the stakeholder community
about the administration's commitment to research and
development at S&T?
Mr. Brothers. Well, I mean, the way I take that is that it
is much lower priority, and I think as I mentioned in my
opening statement, my concern is when we are in an environment
where the threats are increasing, that, I think, is the wrong
message. I think we need to be messaging that we see this
research and development working with industry as essential for
our defense. I don't think that is the message that the budget
shows.
Mr. Payne. Mr. Parker.
Mr. Jake Parker. Yes, I would agree. I mean, the message
would be uncertainty about the future, and that is the, you
know, very concerning. Obviously, there are other things in
that submission, too, really, the DHS, particularly FEMA grants
that we would be very concerned with as well. But uncertainty
would be the message that I would send.
Mr. Payne. Dr. Parker.
Mr. Gerald Parker. Yes, there is no doubt that the threats
that we face are actually going to require a strong innovative
science and technology approach. No doubt, our emergency
operations and so forth are part of it as well, but we have a
lot of unknown threats, and it will require the scientific
engine of this country to address these threats. So the budget
cuts to research and development, S&T does not send a good
signal to the community that I come from.
Mr. Payne. OK.
Chief Rice.
Mr. Rice. I agree with everything my colleagues said. I
have no further comment at this time.
Mr. Payne. Well, I see that my time has expired, so I will
yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes the
gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
all for being here today.
I want to follow up, I guess, on both what the Chairman and
the Ranking Member were talking about, but perhaps from a
different perspective. As--and this has to do with the Trump
administration's fiscal year 2018 budget cuts. I know some of
those cuts have been restored through an appropriations
process, but we still are grappling with some serious
underfunding.
You all have been asked by the Chairman on the first sense
what is it that you think--what is it you would like for us to
do? What is you think that the agency should do? What would be
the priorities?
I would like to know, from your perspective, based upon
some the things that you said--agility, innovation, identifying
the brightest and the best, working with private sector, et
cetera. Tell me, from your perspectives, each of you, if you
don't mind, what this budget does specifically to accomplishing
those things that you said were vitally important, from an
operations perspective.
I will start with you, Chief.
Mr. Rice. Specifically, what the S&T Directorate does for
us, from an operations perspective, or was it a budgetary
question?
Ms. Watson Coleman. What is, yes. How does this budget
impact those things that you are interested in in this
directorate? Responding to the Chairman having said what would
you think we need to do, and then you indicated some issues
with regard to agility, and innovation, and, you know, to be
able to move and respond to different threats.
So I want to know, with the cuts that are proposed, so this
budget that is proposed, what specifically impact would it have
on where you think this directorate should be going?
Mr. Rice. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. So I think, as my
colleague mentioned, you know, the emerging technology is going
at such a rapid pace, as is the evolving threats, and that cuts
to this program, and cuts to S&T will hamper our ability to
keep up with those technologies and those threats, and as our
equipment comes to reach its life expectancy, and as further
threats evolve, we will start to lose pace with those, and not
be on the cutting edge of preparedness and response.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Dr. Parker.
Mr. Gerald Parker. Yes, I may mention something that hasn't
been mentioned yet in regards to the cuts. There is also a
proposed cut to the university Centers of Excellence effort. So
what will that mean? I don't know, but as possibilities are
decreased numbers of Centers of Excellence, decreased funding
to that. So there is decreased university input as being part
of the solution for homeland security.
I think it has another effect, and that is affecting the
next generation. I know one of things that we do at Texas A&M
is really focus on, and we have been able to leverage having a
Center of Excellence to make sure that we give opportunities to
students and student interns, graduate students. So they get
exposed to homeland security issues, and maybe take a career in
homeland security. So I think this is also going to have an
effect on the next generation, and diminish the number of
people who take a career path in this area.
As I said in my opening statement, and thankfully, some of
the budget has been restored to save closure of the NBACC. But
I can't imagine if that were closed, what our ability to be
able to bring to bear microbial forensics and attribution for
potential biological attack, or trying to differentiate a
natural from a biological attack. That could be catastrophic.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Parker.
Mr. Jake Parker. So I know, you know, much of what was
proposed in the budget has been restored through the
appropriations process, as my colleagues mentioned. But, you
know, as proposed, as Dr. Brothers mentioned, the budget would
have cut chem/bio by 60 percent, cybersecurity by 40 percent. I
think that, I guess, the impact of that could be that you would
slow the development of some really important technologies.
I was just talking recently with one of our member
companies, who was working on a project funded through the
chem/bio portion, about--that would basically now enable smart
buildings to detect chem and bio threats on an affordable
basis. Something that our industry is working on, you know,
generally, is building security. That would be, you know, a
great addition there that could, especially in urban areas,
that could be important also.
On the cybersecurity front, there is a company that is
involved in application security in mobile devices at a very
high level. It is something that they could possibly be
affected by, so----
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Dr. Brothers.
Mr. Brothers. So I think I can be general, and then get to
some specifics. Mr. Parker just mentioned specific budget cuts
to both cyber--well, to cyber and the bio division.
So the bio division, they are interested in expanding the
work they are doing in New York City to not just look in the
subways, but also to look at a test-bed for bio security. The
challenge is, how do you do this when your budget is being
severely cut? How do you do that, starting kind-of a new
initiative? How do you do that? It is a challenge.
The cybersecurity division: I mentioned how they are
reaching out to industry--financial, automotive sectors, energy
sectors. Again, this all takes funding. They are doing this to
increase the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure. They
are also reaching out to industry, this in Silicon Valley,
Austin's, Boston's, District of Columbia's, et cetera, to reach
out to the creative communities around the world. Again, need
the funding for that.
I think there are a number of challenges with--actually, I
want to go back to what Dr. Parker said about the Centers of
Excellence. Let me give you an example, if I can.
I was at USC, and actually, before that, I was at LAPD.
They have instituted something called predictive policing. In
predictive policing, they were using technology to actually
reduce crime by 14 percent in certain areas.
I then went to USC, which was one of DHS's Centers of
Excellence. What they showed was that using game theoretic
techniques, they were able to improve that to almost 25
percent.
So the importance of university research shouldn't be
understated at all. It is part of the S&T ecosystem--the
laboratories, universities, Government, industry, et cetera. So
I think these budget cuts impact that entire ecosystem. But in
specific ways, you can look at programs that DHS has, S&T has
instituted, and they get impacted directly.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you. I see my time is
up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony this
morning.
I thank my colleague, Ms. Watson Coleman, for addressing a
lot of the things that I have in my questions, so I am going to
give you an opportunity to elaborate on some of those topics,
both chem/bio in particular, and cyber.
Dr. Parker, I would like to just start with you, if I
could. As you mentioned in your testimony, the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2018 ends DHS's S&T funding for
the state-of-the-art, one-of-a-kind biocontainment laboratory,
the National Biological Analysis and Countermeasures Center,
the NBACC facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and without
transferring the responsibility for operating the facility to
different a department or agency. So can you elaborate on the
impacts on National security and law enforcement if this
facility were to close?
Mr. Gerald Parker. Yes, thank you for the question. The
NBACC, and then specifically--actually, both missions of the
NBACC, the threat assessment and the forensics, bioforensics
mission was--actually, I had something to do with the original
vision, back when I was at the United States Army Medical
Research and Material Command, and then subsequently, in DHS's
S&T. It was a strong collaboration between the FBI, law
enforcement, the intelligence community, Defense, and then it
was the Office of Homeland Security, before it became the
Department of Homeland Security.
So this laboratory facility has had a lot of thought that
went into why it was needed, what capabilities it required to
support what was a new science that was born out of the anthrax
letter attacks, and that was microbial forensics. So it really
is a very key mission in trying to determine who may be
responsible for a biological attack, whether it is an
individual, whether it is a terrorist, whether it is a nation-
state. Those are no-regret decisions, as well. So the science
and everything associated with what is needed for a law
enforcement investigation has got to be beyond reproach.
So there was a lot of thought that went into this, and I
certainly would not want to be in the National Command
Authority, and we had to make decisions about retaliation, say,
for a nation-state bioattack--that is not out of the realm of
possibility today--unless I knew that science behind the
microbial forensics was solid. It is a no-regret decision. That
is the impact that we have with that laboratory potentially
closing.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I appreciate the answer, and I
agree. I hope that that is going to be something that will be
reversed as we go through the budget process, and get through
the appropriations process. That is something that I hope is
going to reverse itself, so, and so it is something that I will
advocate for.
Dr. Brothers, if I could thank you for being here. It is
good to see you again before the panel. I always appreciate
your candor, and your testimony. I just want to thank you for
all your work securing the homeland, and all the things you
have done to improve DHS.
So DHS specifically, the Science and Technology Directorate
has funded important cybersecurity research to protect the
homeland. I know you had this conversation just a minute ago.
For instance, though, S&T grants have played an important role
in catalyzing research to catalog free and open-source projects
that represent the core internet structure, infrastructure.
Obviously, it is vital to understand which libraries are
integral to critical infrastructure in order to ensure that
they are adequately secured, and which is why the S&T support
really has been so important.
So needless to say, this research is just one example of
many that the directorate supports in this emerging security
domain. You know, just to further elaborate on the
cybersecurity front, based on your experience, how would
cutting-edge--how would cutting the cybersecurity research
budget, as proposed by the Trump administration, affect the
ability of DHS to secure the homeland?
Mr. Brothers. So I think one of the challenges that we run
into--and the panel, we have said this a couple times--is
emerging threats coming out. One of the things that DHS/S&T,
the Cyber Security Division as well, is try to think ahead,
right? Think ahead.
So here is an example, autonomous vehicles that I mentioned
a little bit earlier. A number of years ago, the Cyber Security
Division started working with industry to think about, what are
going to be some of the challenges securing not just autonomous
vehicles, but networked vehicles? So there are a lot of
conversations about smart transportation, right? This is where
you have got cars that are communicating with infrastructure to
improve the transportation experience, if you will, right?
The challenge is, what if you hacked into that? One of the
things that Cyber Security Division did was to start thinking
about that early on, and develop a consortium of automotive
makers to try to address some of those issues.
The same is true getting the oil and gas companies together
in a program called LOGIIC to think through, what are some of
the threats to the infrastructure?
So the challenges you run into is that when you look at
infrastructure that is privately owned, there is not necessary
the motivation to start thinking ahead for these kinds of
things. But the motivation is there for the Cyber Security
Division and the rest of S&T.
So in thinking about 20 percent budget cuts to the Cyber
Security Division, those are the kinds of things that get
impacted, is that ability to look ahead, the ability to invest
moneys to understand what potential problems there will be with
emerging technologies and develop mitigating solutions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have one brief last question. Would that be
all right?
So Dr. Brothers, one last question. So cybersecurity,
obviously, is an international issue by its nature. How
essential to securing our Federal networks and critical
infrastructure is cooperative research and development with our
international allies? What are some of the examples of
successful projects that S&T has supported in that?
Mr. Brothers. Yes, that is a great question. I think one of
the things that we have to realize is that because of the
hyperconnected nature that we live in, technology, this kind of
engineering side of expertise is really democratized. Everyone
has this. So we don't necessarily have the only best ideas. It
is important that we reach out to all the people--our friends,
our allies--to try to understand what some of the best ideas
are out there.
We have relationships. We have 13 bilateral relationships
across the world, and we leverage all of those, in cyber as
well as in some of the other areas as well to try to get some
of the best advantages. We have actually started the idea of
having, with the Netherlands, with having a mutual--with joint
BAs, broad area announcements, meaning that we now work with
the Netherlands to put out solicitations to the international
community.
So it is that kind of joint work that DHS is doing--DHS/S&T
is doing to leverage the entire global ecosystem of creative
thinkers.
Mr. Langevin. Dr. Brothers, thank you very much.
Thank you all, the witnesses, for your testimony, and Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the latitude in being able to ask that
last question.
Mr. Donovan. Absolutely.
We have such an advantage of having the four of you here. I
just asked the ranking Chairman; I think we are going to just
let each Member have 2 more minutes with you, just because we
have you here. My one question to all you, because your
testimony was incredible. Your efforts to protect our Nation,
we are so grateful for.
As you are doing this research, Doctor, as you were
speaking about reaching out to others, how do we protect what
we discover? Everything we create, the bad guys try to intrude
on. So without divulging trade secrets or National security
issues--and I promised my colleagues, we are only going to get
2 minutes each, because we have to let you go. I know the chief
has to get to another part of our Nation right now.
The challenge I see, besides creating these great things
you are speaking of, is how do we keep them to us? If you just
have a thought about that, and then I am going to pass the
questions on to my colleagues.
Mr. Gerald Parker. Yes, I will just, I will start. You
know, it is an excellent question. I am not sure if I have the
best answer, but it is a must that we protect our science, and
secure our science.
I would actually maybe recommend that you talk to a very
good colleague and friend of mine from the FBI, Special Agent
Ed Woo, who has thought about this topic a lot. He used to
think about it just in the terms of biosecurity, but it is
really emerged into how do we--it is protecting our science.
How do we do it securely? Perhaps, maybe universities have the
biggest challenge, but it is an area that I know that Texas A&M
takes very, very seriously, and----
Mr. Donovan. I suspect you have to report on your research
if you are using Federal monies for it----
Mr. Gerald Parker. Of course.
Mr. Donovan [continuing]. And do you protect your----
Mr. Gerald Parker. Yes, of course. Of course
Mr. Donovan [continuing]. Your research. Doctor, how do we
protect this stuff?
Mr. Brothers. It is hard. It is hard, and we all know about
the cyber intrusions, that kind of thing. I think there are a
number of people, including S&T, looking at different
architectures for cyber defense. There are people looking at
different ways of encrypting information, whether that
information is in storage, transit, or in computation. That can
help.
But I think you also have to consider there are different
paradigms, because of democratization of all this knowledge.
You can't keep everything secret. So the question is: How do
you continue to innovate even more rapidly? Because part of it
is going to be not just keeping things secret, but it is going
to be outpacing the innovation of our adversaries, and never
stopping, and that is what requires the agility and
adaptability we were talking about earlier.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Doctor.
I already violated my 2-minute rule. The Chair recognizes
the Ranking Member from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brothers, during your term as under secretary of
science and technology, you took a number of steps like
reinstituting the integrated product teams to create formal
channels of R&D coordination among DHS components. Can you
elaborate on some of the obstacles the directorate faces when
it comes to streamlining and coordinating R&D throughout the
Department?
Mr. Brothers. Sure. One of challenges just is a large
organization, large bureaucracy, right? So you have a lot of
different stakeholders. So the IPT, again, the Secretary signs
that out. That is excellent, because that gives some top-level
mandate to that.
But then you have other processes. You have got the Joint
Requirements Council is a process. It has to be approved
through the DMAG, these kinds of things.
So a lot of it is messaging and socialization, and I think
those--it is all in culture, right? I mean, a lot of these big
organizations, they struggle because of culture. You look at an
organization like DHS has multiple cultures because of the way
it was created. How do you create a joint culture that
understands what S&T is doing in the larger context, as well as
the context that each individual component has? I think that is
one of the biggest problems. It is not so much the IPT process,
or convincing people it is a good idea. It is how do they
accept it, and how do you message to them how this is a good
thing for them as well? It is a work in progress.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have more of a statement than another
question. I think, as we have gone through this process, we see
how important S&T is with the evolving threats that we have in
this area, and with the world. I think it is incumbent upon us
to continue to have the administration, whichever
administration it is, understand how important this is, because
when we are attacked, and God forbid, when we are, we are
always sorry and remorseful after it. But if we can do the
things that we need to do to thwart it, then we wouldn't find
ourselves in that position.
We have to get the administration, regardless of whatever
administration it is, to take this seriously, and put in place
a budget that is consistent, and would allow S&T to do the work
and the type of things that it needs to do to make sure that we
are successful in this area, and I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields, and I hope that your
testimony didn't scare my colleagues, who left to go protect
themselves somewhere in a bunker.
I want to thank our witnesses, first of all, for your
valuable testimony; second, for your contributions to the
safety of our Nation. I would like to also to thank my
colleagues for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(D), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without
objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]