[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-74]
TERRORISM AND IRAN: DEFENSE CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 27, 2018
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
28-997 WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee RO KHANNA, California
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin JIMMY PANETTA, California
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JODY B. HICE, Georgia
Jen Stewart, Staff Director
Jennifer Bird, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
on Armed Services.............................................. 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command....... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 48
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 47
Votel, GEN Joseph L.......................................... 50
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cook..................................................... 99
Mr. O'Rourke................................................. 99
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 99
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 99
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TERRORISM AND IRAN: DEFENSE CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 27, 2018.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We welcome back to the committee the commander of the U.S.
Central Command, General Joseph Votel. We are particularly
interested in hearing General Votel's views on the changes that
the new National Defense Strategy brings to his area of
responsibility.
The strategy's emphasis on strategic competition has
implications for a region where Russian influence and presence
is much greater now than it was before the Syrian conflict
began, a region that is one of the targets of the Chinese
whole-of-nation effort to increase its sway, and a region where
the Iranians are aggressively expanding its wide arc of control
to the detriment of its neighbors.
These developments and the continuing threat of terrorism
in and emanating from the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]
region, suggests that the United States cannot afford to remove
our attention or our presence from this vital area.
Fortunately, we have a number of strong allies and partners
that are able and willing to actively defend our joint
interests, but as we have painfully learned in recent years,
there is simply no substitute for the United States.
When we withdraw prematurely, the world, including the
threats to our homeland, can rapidly grow more dangerous. The
challenge, however, is that CENTCOM has received the lion's
share of military resources for some time. And while it is
important to remain, we have to be more active in other vital
areas of the world at the same time. The recent budget
agreement helps, but it will take time to rebuild and field
needed capability. In these circumstances, General Votel has
his hands full in making sure that U.S. national security is
protected.
Let me yield to the acting ranking member, the gentlelady
from California, Mrs. Davis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement
be entered into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
And I would also like to welcome General Votel and thank
him for appearing today.
The Central Command area of responsibility remains critical
to our national interests, and we have to maintain a focus on
security in the region. Reports of continuing military progress
in the counter-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] campaign
are encouraging, but military achievements alone, as I think we
all know, will not guarantee long-term success. We must work
with the international community and employ a whole-of-
government approach to foster and to sustain political,
economic, and social conditions to ensure long-term stability.
We cannot allow the region to fall into violent extremism
again. To truly defeat ISIS, we must be just as determined to
secure a durable peace as we have been to achieve a decisive
military victory.
We have long sought a stable end state in Afghanistan. For
more than 16 years, the United States has concentrated on
eliminating terrorist threats while working closely with our
allies and our partners to train, advise, and assist Afghan
forces to secure the country. Despite significant progress,
Afghan forces are still in need of assistance, so where are we
headed?
Although our commitments to oppose violent extremism in
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan are consuming, we must also remain
alert to other regional security challenges. Despite an
agreement regarding its nuclear program, Iran remains a
designated state sponsor of terrorism, and it exerts
destabilizing influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. We
must deter Iran from precipitating conflict and dissuade it
from engaging in malign activities. And we must also deter
Russia that is increasingly involved in the region as well.
Certainly a complex set of issues, General, and I look
forward to your testimony. Thank you very much for joining us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. General, without objection, your full written
statement will be made part of the record. Welcome back. The
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Votel. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the current
posture and state of readiness of the United States Central
Command.
I come before you today on behalf of the over 80,000
members of the command. It is a dedicated team of military
service members and civilians, along with our coalition
partners, representing 70 nations and 4 international
organizations, many of whom are forward-deployed across some of
the most dangerous areas in the world. They sacrifice and risk
on a daily basis, in many cases for the benefit of not only
American strategic interests, but also the world's.
Our people are the very best at what they do, and they, and
especially their families, deserve our admiration and
gratitude. It is my sincere honor to lead and be a member of
such a fine team of dedicated professionals.
I am approaching the 2-year mark of my time in command.
This period has been both incredibly challenging and immensely
rewarding during what has arguably been one of the most
volatile times in this complex region's history.
It has been 11 months since I last appeared before this
committee, and since then, we have made considerable military
progress in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon, and
the maritime environment. However, we remain very clear-eyed
regarding both the permanence of that progress and the
challenges that we face in the future.
In the past year, we have achieved incredible success
against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi security forces and
Syrian Democratic Forces are operating at their most effective
levels since Operation Inherent Resolve began, and now, over 98
percent of the territory previously held by ISIS in Iraq and
Syria is no longer under their control. The destruction of the
ISIS physical caliphate is imminent, and millions of displaced
persons are returning home and beginning the long process of
rebuilding. Now we must consolidate our gains by investing in
the security forces' relationships and capabilities that will
hold the territory and keep ISIS from returning.
Based upon that progress, CENTCOM is conducting an
operational alignment and rebalancing effort to achieve three
specific goals. The first goal is to complete major combat
operations in Iraq and Syria and bring the defeat-ISIS campaign
to a responsible close. Military success in the campaign up to
this point presents us an opportunity to reposition some of our
resources from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan in a manner that
keeps the pressure on ISIS, but also sets us up to break the
stalemate in Afghanistan.
We retain sufficient capability to continue our efforts
against ISIS despite the increasingly complex situation across
Syria and especially in the northwest province of Afrin. We are
fully engaged with our mission partners and the Department of
State to carefully balance our objectives. Our partners on the
ground in Syria have advanced us a long way towards our
objectives, and we will stick with them through the completion
of this fight. In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces are rapidly
consolidating gains and preparing to support elections later
this spring.
The second goal is to prioritize the implementation of the
South Asia strategy in Afghanistan. This strategy reaffirms the
U.S. Government's enduring commitment to Afghanistan by
reinforcing the two complementary military missions: The NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]-led train, advise, and
assist mission, and the U.S. counterterrorism mission. We are
making sure that, with our support, the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces are well-postured to begin operations to
seize the initiative, expand population control, and secure
credible elections.
Part and parcel of this effort is our regionalized approach
to engage all countries with a stake in Afghanistan's
stability, especially Pakistan. Our goal here is to develop a
productive and trustful relationship that benefits both of our
militaries and supports our objectives in the region.
The third goal is to ensure that we have aligned our
military efforts with our broader interagency and international
efforts to neutralize, counterbalance, and shape the
destabilizing impact that Iran has across the region. Make no
mistake, while we continue to confront the scourge of
terrorism, Iran's malign activities across the region pose a
long-term threat to stability in this part of the world.
We view ourselves, the military, as supporting the many
other and more effective resources and capabilities of the U.S.
Government and its partners in this endeavor. The recently
published National Defense Strategy rightly identifies the
resurgence of great power competition as our principal national
security challenge, and we in CENTCOM see the effects of that
competition throughout the region.
Russia's support of the Assad regime has not only propped
him up, but has also added complexity to the defeat-ISIS
campaign. Diplomatically and militarily, Moscow plays both
arsonist and firefighter, fueling tensions among all parties in
Syria, the Syrian regime, Iran, Turkey, the Syrian Democratic
Forces, the United States, and other coalition partners, then
serving as an arbiter to resolve disputes attempting to
undermine and weaken each party's bargaining positions.
Despite the key role that our partners on the ground, the
Syrian Democratic Forces, and the coalition have played in
dealing defeat to ISIS, Russia has placed this progress at risk
with their activities, which are not focused on defeating ISIS
but, rather, on preserving their own influence and control over
the outcome of the situation. It is clear that Russia's
interests in Syria are Russia's interests, and not those of the
wider international community.
China is pursuing long-term, steady economic growth in the
region through its One Belt, One Road policy, but it is also
improving its military posture by connecting ports, such as
Gwadar in Pakistan, with its first overseas military base in
Djibouti, adjacent to the critical Bab-el-Mandeb. While Beijing
claims both locations support peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations, the new military base and port bolsters China's
force projection into the region.
Both China and Russia seek to fill in perceived gaps in
U.S. interests by increasing defense cooperation and sales of
their equipment to our regional partners. They both are also
cultivating multidimensional ties to Iran. The lifting of U.N.
[United Nations] sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action [JCPOA] open the path for Iran to resume membership
application to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
In addition, Russia, supported by Iran, continues to
bolster a friendly regime in Syria, attempt to limit our U.S.
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and creates friction
among NATO partners. Against this backdrop of increasing great
power interaction are the enduring issues of the region:
social, economic, and political challenges; high unemployment;
falling oil prices; a youth bulge; large numbers of refugees
and internally displaced persons; and long-standing border
conflicts.
We in CENTCOM stand ready with all of our partners to
defend U.S. interests against these and other threats. Our
strategic approach of preparing the environment, pursuing
opportunities, and working to prevail wherever we can is
working. We are postured for purpose, proactive in pursuing
opportunities, and resolve to win.
I would like to close by sharing three dynamics that we
assess are essential to prevailing in this region. First, as I
have previously testified, in the conduct of our campaigns in
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, as well as our operations in
places like Yemen, Lebanon, and Egypt, we have adopted a by,
with, and through approach that places a heavy reliance on
indigenous partner nation forces. Our partners do not always
want us to solve their problems for them, so we enable them to
stand on their own. And while this approach does present its
own challenges and can be more time consuming, it provides
local solutions to local problems. This approach is not without
risk, as we are seeing unfold in Syria today. But in general,
it is proving very effective and will likely pay significant
dividends going forward.
Secondly, successful pursuit of U.S. objectives in this
region only comes from an integrated approach aligned with
interorganizational partners. Defense of the Nation is a team
sport. This applies not just within the command, but with our
fellow combatant commands, our component commands, our
established combined and joint task forces, the Central
Region's 18 country teams, and other departments, agencies, and
organizations of the U.S. Government who have provided
unwavering support over almost two decades of persistent
conflict.
Our allies in the region and the wider international
community are equally as critical to supporting our mission.
They directly support the CENTCOM headquarters with more than
200 foreign military officers from 49 nations, all of whom are
part of the success of CENTCOM, and we are grateful for and
largely depend upon their partnership. As the National Defense
Strategy captures clearly, strengthening existing relationships
and building new ones will be key to our future success. We are
doing this in CENTCOM every day.
Finally, we could not do what we do on a daily basis
without the support of Congress, and by extension, the American
people. We sincerely appreciate this committee's continued
strong support for our operations, authorities, and resources,
and especially the same to the services, Special Operations
Command, and other defense agencies that we rely upon for our
military wherewithal.
Your support will remain important as we contend with what
potentially are generational struggles to defend our homeland
from the threats outlined in our National Defense Strategy.
U.S. Government commitment to the CENTCOM area of
responsibility [AOR] is more important now than ever. For our
part, we will support the third pillar of the National Defense
Strategy, business reform, by continuing to be good stewards of
the resources and authorities that Congress provides us.
To close, I want to once again thank the outstanding men
and women who comprise the United States Central Command,
easily our finest and most precious resource. They continue to
make great sacrifices and contributions to ensure the command
meets our strategic objectives and protects our Nation's
interests. We must ensure they have everything they need to do
their jobs as effectively and efficiently as possible.
We are also keenly aware and grateful for the sacrifices
made by our families. They are vital members of the team, and
we could not accomplish our mission without them. They, too,
make important contributions and tremendous sacrifices every
day to support us. I thank them on behalf of the command and a
grateful Nation.
Thank you again, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in
the Appendix on page 50.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Let me remind members that immediately upon conclusion of
this open hearing, we will regather with General Votel upstairs
in a classified session. So be in touch to know exactly when
this open hearing ends.
Since General Votel and I have had a chance to visit
recently, I am going to yield 5 minutes, initially, to the
gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
General Votel, for your service and for being here today.
I wanted to ask you to elaborate in particular on the
threat from Iran. And, you know, one of the many grave flaws of
the JCPOA is the fact that it failed to deal with Iran's
ballistic missile threat. And we are now seeing across the
region increasingly evidence that Iran is transferring
ballistic missiles and other conventional equipment to its
allies in the region. Can you talk about exactly what you are
seeing in this regard and what the Department of Defense [DOD]
is in a position to be able to do to defend us and our allies
against that threat?
General Votel. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think you have
highlighted one of the principal concerns that we have, the
increasing, not just quantity, but quality of their ballistic
missiles, and the export and movement of those capabilities to
other groups and locations around the region. Certainly, as we
have seen with Ambassador Haley in her demonstration most
recently with some of the items recovered from Saudi Arabia,
these weapons pose the threat of widening the conflict out of
Yemen, and, frankly, put our forces, our embassy in Riyadh, our
forces in the United Arab Emirates, at risk, as well as our
partners. So I think first and foremost about their threat is
the quality and the quantity that they have been pursuing over
the last several years, particularly with respect to this.
Their direct introduction of asymmetric capabilities
concerns me as we look at places like the Bab-el-Mandeb where
we see the introduction of coastal defense cruise missiles,
some that have been modified. We know these are not
capabilities that the Houthis had, so they have been provided
to them by someone. That someone is Iran. The presence of
explosive boats, the increased presence of mines in this area
are all very similar to the layered threat that Iran has posed
in the Straits of Hormuz, and we hold them accountable for
that. So that is a second aspect of this.
The third, of course, is their continually changing power
projection model, not only their own forces, but their proxies
and the partners that they are attempting to create around the
region. I think these all give us very significant concerns.
With respect to your question about what we are doing, we
are working with Saudi Arabia and some of our partners to
ensure that they are optimizing their capabilities that they
have, many of them U.S.-provided capabilities, to ensure that
they can defend themselves. And I would report to you in this
session that we are seeing some progress in that regard.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, General. And in respect to Syria,
could you talk a little bit about, there have been reports that
we have seen facilities, for example, being built in Syria,
reports in open source, Iranian missile facilities. Obviously,
the threat there is significant, not just to U.S. interests,
but also to allies like Israel. And could you talk more about
what we might be able to do, particularly on the ground in
Syria, as we see the challenge of--we have been very effective
against ISIS there, but, obviously, our interests are still
significantly threatened given the failed state situation we
are facing.
General Votel. Thank you, Congresswoman. As you know,
countering Iran is not one of the coalition missions in Syria.
That said, I think one of the most effective things that we can
do in this particular area is build strong relationships.
Ms. Cheney. General, I am sorry, could you just--I
understand it is not potentially formally part of the mission,
but it seems to me if we are focused on countering Iran, we
need to be doing it every place our interests are threatened.
General Votel. Absolutely. And one of the key ways that we
are doing that is through our strong relationships that we are
building with the Government of Iraq military forces, that
include, not only forces that are in the interior, but
certainly along their border. Our strong relationship with the
Syrian Democratic Forces in the east and in the northern part
of the country puts us in a position where we can impede Iran's
objectives of establishing lines of communication through these
critical areas and trying to connect Tehran to Beirut, for
example.
So I think, first and foremost, some of these indirect
things we are doing are very, very important to that. I think
beyond that, I think also continuing to highlight and
illuminate their activities is extraordinarily important so
that they can be addressed, not just with military means, but
certainly with the other means that are available to us across
government.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much.
I will yield back the balance of my time and look forward
to discussing this further in the closed session.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Votel,
again, thank you for joining us.
As you just mentioned, and certainly in your written
statement, the National Defense Strategy stated that great
power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of
U.S. national security. Could you elaborate for us on those
comments, and also talk about the shift in this national
strategy? How exactly will it impact CENTCOM? And what, if any,
significant changes will actually materialize as a result of
the shift? And how will Central Command's capacity to perform
its mission be affected?
General Votel. Well, thanks, Congresswoman. I think that,
you know, the shifts that are outlined in the National Defense
Strategy are things that will take place over time. And so, you
know, one of the principal ways that we are trying to manage
that, of course, is through the development of and continued
relationship building that we have in place with partners in
the region and continuing to strengthen those relationships.
One of the things that we have learned through this by,
with, and through approach is that we can do a lot through our
partners by providing advice, by providing expertise in areas
where we have experience, and we can do that with the smaller
footprint and with the, you know, correspondingly smaller
investment. So I think one of the principal ways that we will
address this going forward is continuing to build on these
relationships and continuing to empower our partners in the
region.
Mrs. Davis. Can you just speak to the key challenges in
doing that?
General Votel. Well, you know, I think, certainly, one of
the key challenges will be making sure that we don't create the
impression that we are abandoning CENTCOM. And this, of course,
is a key talking--or the region. And so this, of course, is a
key talking point, not only for me, but for all leaders that
come in there. We recognize that the interest that we have, the
national interest that we have in this region for preventing
attacks on the homeland, for preventing proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, for ensuring freedom of navigation
and commerce through the critical straits, for ensuring other
countries can't destabilize, those are enduring interests that
we will always have. And so this will always require us to
continue to be engaged there to some aspect. But, of course,
the Secretary will make decisions on shifting resources in
accordance with the National Defense Strategy.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. You also talked about local
solutions, and we know how critical that is, as you have just
mentioned. I am wondering if you could also talk about the
inclusion of women as a critical strategy that advances
countering terrorism, national security, and democratization
and economic and social development. Some of those programs
have been successful, but there certainly is more to be done.
How can we increase the effectiveness of these programs?
General Votel. Well, I think the best way we can do it is
by sharing our experiences with this. We learned by our
inability to include women into many of our counterterrorism
operations back in the beginning of these fights that we have
been involved in, that we are missing 50 percent of the
population in doing that. And when we began to introduce them
into positions where they could have influence, we learned a
lot from that. So I think one of the key things that we can do
is continue to lead by example in this area and demonstrate how
this is valued by us.
We do see partners in the region doing this. The Afghans
are doing this. The Iraqis are doing this. We certainly see
this with the Syrian Democratic Forces that we are working with
in Syria. And I would highlight to you that one of the
principal commanders that they have, a very successful
commander, is a female. And so it is very much recognized that
contributions come from the entirety of the force.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think that a
number of us have participated in those efforts, and I hope
that we can continue to do more of that. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, recently, the United Nations released a
remarkably gruesome report outlining North Korea's ongoing
efforts to assist Syria building chemical weapons. This report
states that North Korea has been shipping supplies to the
Syrian Government, including acid-resistant tiles, valves, and
thermometers. Additionally, North Korean missile technicians
have been observed working at chemical weapons and missile
facilities in Syria.
Are you able to comment on the U.N. report? And if not,
could you describe the malign and disruptive role North Korea
currently plays in Syria and whether or not you see their role
expanding in the coming years? Additionally, what is being done
to disrupt this cooperation between the dictatorships of North
Korea and the Syrian Government?
General Votel. Congressman, I admit, I have not seen that
report, so I can't comment specifically on it. Obviously, we
are concerned about the proliferation of these type of weapons
in Syria with a country that has demonstrated the intent to use
them. So this will be an area that we will continue to pay
close attention to.
Mr. Wilson. And it is so important. I was actually
pleasantly surprised that The New York Times covered it today.
My experience with that newspaper is they frequently overlook
threats to stability in the world, but I urge your
consideration.
Also, a primary concern for the long-term stability of the
Middle East surrounds a return of defeated Islamic State
fighters who are returning home from fighting in Iraq and
Syria. An estimate from The Soufan Center and The Global
Strategy Network have tracked 5,600 fighters who have returned
to their home countries. Specifically, sadly, Turkey has 900
returning and Saudi Arabia has 760 returning.
Could you explain what threat the return of the defeated
Islamic State fighters to their home country represents to the
long-term stability in the region? And can you explain the
proposed or ongoing efforts to work with ally nations in
dealing with this flow of fighters?
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman. Well, certainly,
these fighters that are able to depart these war zones are able
to take with them experiences and tactics that could
potentially be applied to other places. Additionally, they are
radicalized so they have the ability to bring others onboard
with this. These, I think, are the principal concerns. This has
been at the forefront of our efforts from the very beginning.
As you have heard the Secretary talk about our strategy of
annihilation, in the conduct of our operations, we have always
attempted to isolate these areas and prevent the escape of
these fighters so that they are either killed or captured where
we take them on, and I think we have been successful in that.
Certainly, there are some that have gotten away.
We have, with the support of some of the authorities that
have been provided to us by Congress, we do have an effective
program to interdict foreign fighters as they attempt to depart
the area. And we are now working with the Department of State
and the Department of Justice to ensure that these hundreds
that are in the control of our partners in both Iraq and Syria
are moving into a judicial process that holds them accountable
and, ultimately, returns them to the countries from which they
came.
Mr. Wilson. And what a challenge that is. The detainees you
are speaking of, not just fighters, but their families. And
this has just got to be addressed, and I appreciate you
bringing that issue up.
Additionally, Turkey has been a valued ally, for nearly a
century, of the United States. A member of NATO, beginning with
the Korean War, they have been fighting side by side with
Americans for freedom. What is being done to continue our
important alliance?
General Votel. Thank you, and I would just echo your
comments. Turkey has been absolutely vital throughout the
entire campaign plan. They certainly have serious concerns of
PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] terrorism. Of course, this has
created some tension with some of the partners we have on the
ground.
The principal way that we are addressing this, Congressman,
is by being transparent and clear and candid with Turkey about
the things that we are doing on a day-to-day basis with our
partners. Just this morning, I had a conversation with my
counterpart in Turkey, again, sharing information back and
forth, keeping the communication channels professional and open
as we discuss this very, very difficult challenge that we are
working through.
Mr. Wilson. And with the multitude of issues you have to
face, Yemen, what is the latest on efforts to provide security
in working with Saudi Arabia?
General Votel. I would say, you know, our effort in this
setting is principally to help them defend themselves, and I
think we have made some very good progress in this area. And I
look forward, in the closed session, to sharing with you some
examples.
Mr. Wilson. We appreciate your service. Thank you.
General Votel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask you, there was a column in The Wall Street
Journal, I believe in their opinion section maybe about 4 days
ago, that talked about where they allege that there was a
Russian attack on U.S. special operation forces on the evening
of February the 7th and 8th. And I specifically wanted to ask
you what you know about that, and how can CENTCOM prioritize
U.S. counterterrorism objectives while trying to avoid any sort
of dangerous escalation with Russia?
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman. You know, I think we
have kind of characterized that as pro-regime forces. You know,
we are certainly aware of the amount of media that is out there
talking about this. But in this particular instance, this was a
very clear case of self-defense on our part. And so I, frankly,
am quite proud of the way the force responded to this: quickly
identified it, immediately got on the net to our Russian--our
channel here to talk with them about this--we were talking with
them before, during, and after this--and very effectively
brought together the right capabilities to address this self-
defense threat. And so they have continued to do that.
So, you know, I think what I would just tell you is that we
retain sufficient capability to protect ourselves at the same
time that we are pursuing our counterterrorism objectives in
Syria.
Mr. Veasey. Do you think that Russia is going to want to
try to have more influence or diminish our influence in the
region once we push ISIS out of there, or how do you see that
relationship, you know, playing out long term?
General Votel. Well, I think what I would say, Congressman,
is what we see is Russia has failed to follow through on
delivering the regime in a number of different areas. As we
look at the U.N. sanctions, cease-fire that was put in this
place, one that they helped draft and agreed to implement and
to cause the regime to comply by it, they have failed to do
that. So I think either Russia has to admit that it is not
capable or it doesn't want to play a role in ending the Syrian
conflict here. I think the role is incredibly destabilizing at
this point.
Mr. Veasey. I would also like to briefly kind of switch
here and ask you just a little bit about Afghanistan too. I
know that there have been some that have been concerned about
our deteriorating relationship with the Pakistanis, and was
wondering, how important do you think it is for us to continue
to have relationships with Pakistan, keeping routes open, so we
can adequately supply troops in the Afghanistan part of the
Middle East? And just what are some of your thoughts on that
whole relationship and, particularly, just how it lines up with
Afghanistan?
General Votel. Congressman, my view is that success in
Afghanistan and South Asia will require a strong relationship
and the cooperation of Pakistan. And since the announcement of
the South Asia strategy, this has been one of my principal
focuses here, is to help Pakistan and us together, achieve the
specific things that we require for them, we have asked them to
do in support of our strategy.
And what I would report to you and to the committee is that
I do have very frequent and routine professional communications
with my counterpart. We talk almost weekly. We meet frequently
face-to-face. And my goal is to develop this very productive
and trustful relationship that will help us move forward
together. I can't characterize the relationship as trustful at
this particular point. There is a lot of history here that has
to be overcome.
But what I will also tell you is that we are now beginning
to see positive indicators. They, through their communications,
they are reporting to us some of the actions that they are
taking on the ground. These are positive indicators that they
are moving in the right direction. It does not yet equal the
decisive action that we would like to see them take in terms of
a strategic shift, but they are positive indicators. And it
gives me hope that our approach is the right one. I have
confidence in our approach, and it gives me hope that we can
begin to restore this very important relationship.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, thank
you for your service.
You have barely mentioned Lebanon and we hardly ever talk
about Lebanon. But there are so many problems there, and in any
other part of the world, it would be front and center in the
headlines all the time. But with all the other problems in
CENTCOM, it takes a backseat.
But given that Hezbollah is a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization and that the Lebanese President has been very
public in his support of Hezbollah as a military partner with
the Lebanese Armed Forces, and given that we have, in the past
anyway, supplied high-quality American arms to the Lebanese
Armed Forces, do you think we should keep working with the
Lebanese Armed Forces and giving them high-quality American
weaponry, and are they a reliable partner?
General Votel. Congressman, I think they are a very
reliable partner. And I think the investments that we have made
over the last 10 or 11 years, very moderate investments in
terms of people and money, compared to some of the other things
we do, have really paid off. And they are helping us develop a
very professional Lebanese Armed Forces that is beginning to be
viewed as the principal security arm in Afghanistan.
And I note your comment here about it doesn't appear in the
news, but, frankly, Lebanon is a frequent stopping place for me
and for all of my commanders, and we pay a lot of attention to
this relationship. We have an outstanding ambassador there who
is a very, very engaged in the activities, and we are very
proud of what Lebanese Armed Forces are doing. They very
effectively last fall, on their own, orchestrated a pretty
effective operation against ISIS. They view us as their most
important partner, and I do think it is an investment worth
continuing.
Mr. Lamborn. But doesn't the relationship between the
cozying up to Hezbollah within Lebanon to the conventional
forces there give you pause?
General Votel. Well, I tell you, I frequently interact with
the chief of defense there. I consider him to be a very
professional military officer. You know, this is a
multiconfessional arrangement here in Pakistan that obviously
trips over into the political environment, but what I observe
in Lebanon is a military that is answerable to the leadership,
is doing a good job at staying apolitical, and is focused on
security of the country.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Shifting gears to Saudi Arabia, are we
doing enough to help them and the United Arab Emirates defend
themselves, as was discussed a little earlier, from Iranian-
supplied missiles to the Houthi rebels? Are we doing enough?
General Votel. In this setting, I would say yes, we are. We
are definitely focused on this particular threat right here,
and I look forward to sharing a few more comments with you
about this in the closed session.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. Now, in Yemen, the U.S.
military has conducted a much higher number of strikes against
terrorist targets last year than in 2016, the previous year.
What positive impact, if any, have these strikes had on AQAP
[al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula] and on ISIS in Yemen--or
excuse me, Islamic State in Yemen?
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman. It has had, I think,
a very significant impact on AQAP. Certainly, it has impacted
their ability to conduct external operations. It has gone into
the areas in which they have had sanctuary, and it has
continued to present them with multiple dilemmas that they have
to deal with. So not only are they contending with our strikes,
but they are also contending with partner operations that we
work with our Arab coalition partners on the ground and with
our Yemeni partners on the ground. And this has become very,
very effective.
And I would tell you that we are extending that to ISIS in
Yemen as well. That is not as well developed as al-Qaida is,
but, of course, it is ISIS. We understand their ideology. We
understand where they are going. And so we are very concerned
about them as well.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And lastly, I would like to
ask about the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson in my
district. They are sending a brigade combat team to Afghanistan
this spring. And even though we have had budget shortfalls for
the military in recent years, we have made huge steps with this
latest budget agreement to beef up military spending, which I
totally applaud and support. So I think readiness will be less
of an issue in the future, but do you feel good about the
current state of readiness with, for instance, the brigade
combat team going to Afghanistan this spring?
General Votel. Congressman, I do. I haven't had an
opportunity to visit that specific brigade, but I just had an
opportunity to visit one of the brigades that is coming in, the
Security Force Assistance Brigade. I am extraordinarily
appreciative of the efforts that are put forth by the Army, by
the Marine Corps, the Air Force, all the services here that we
depend upon in Afghanistan to give us high-quality forces.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General
Votel, for your service and for being here.
I would like to talk a little bit more about what you began
with in your opening statement and some of the comments you
have made since about U.S. military objectives in Syria. You
talked about how you are working to defeat ISIS and bring that
campaign to a responsible close. Later, you mentioned that
countering Iran is not a coalition mission in Syria. Last
month, we heard from Secretary Tillerson about how U.S.
military presence in Syria will remain for an indefinite period
of time. And he went on to list a very expansive list of
strategic objectives of the U.S. military, to include ensuring
the defeat of ISIS, to include diminishing the influence of
Iran, advancing U.N.-led political resolution, et cetera, et
cetera.
So my question is: What is the objective of our U.S. forces
in Syria? And under what legal basis is this indefinite
presence in Syria planned under?
General Votel. Thank you. So the principal reason we are in
Syria is to defeat ISIS. And that remains our sole and single
task that we are principally oriented on. Part of defeating
ISIS, though, is removing their control of the physical
caliphate, the physical terrain, as you are well aware, and
ensuring they can't resurge. So that means that after we have
removed them from their controlled terrain, we have to
consolidate our gains and we have to ensure that the right
security and stability is in place so that they cannot resurge.
So that is part of being responsible coalition members in here,
and that will take some time beyond all of this.
Our legal basis for operating in Syria was largely driven
by the collective self-defense of Iraq. But when we first went
there, ISIS, being an organization that did not adhere to
sovereign boundaries, were moving back and forth across the
area. And while we were beginning to address ISIS in Iraq, we
knew that we also had to address ISIS in Syria.
I would also point out, Congresswoman, that the Syrian
regime itself has proved unwilling and unable to address this
particular threat. While they did do some operations down in
the middle Euphrates Valley here several months ago, they have
largely departed that area, and they have taken the pressure
off of ISIS and created more problems for the coalition in
dealing with this.
So, you know, I think those are the principal----
Ms. Gabbard. So our U.S. forces are still operating under
the 2001 AUMF. Is that correct?
General Votel. We are.
Ms. Gabbard. And does countering Iran--I am just seeing
some contradiction between what the Secretary of State is
saying, that that is now going to be a part of the U.S.
military objective in Syria, and what you stated today, saying
that countering Iran is not a part of the coalition mission.
Just a follow-up to that, if it is, then how does that fall
under the 2001 AUMF that deals directly with countering al-
Qaida and its affiliates?
General Votel. I think my understanding as the Secretary of
State laid this out is he laid it out not as a U.S. military
objective, but he laid it out as a U.S. objective. So there are
certainly other ways that we can address Iran's destabilizing
activities and other than through military means.
The fact of the matter is, as I mentioned a few moments
ago, even though Iran isn't our principal focus here in this
campaign, our relationship with partners both in Iraq and in
Syria does put us in a position where we can indirectly have an
impact on the objectives that Iran is pursuing in this part of
the world. So I think I would characterize it more in that
regard than us actively doing something militarily against
Iran.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. I believe Secretary Tillerson was
quite specific in speaking about this within the justification
of a maintained U.S. military presence there.
My last quick question is about Yemen, and under what
authorization are we providing arms and direct military support
to Saudi Arabia in what is essentially a proxy war between
Saudi Arabia and Iran?
General Votel. Well, any armed sales, of course, go through
our foreign military sales and foreign military funding process
that is managed by the Department of State, and so they have
the principal oversight for that. The provision of fuel to
Saudi aircraft is provided for under the Acquisition Cross-
Servicing Agreement that we have in place with Saudi Arabia.
And so that provides us the authority to provide that support
to them.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, thanks so much for joining us today. I
wanted to begin by getting your perspective. You speak about
Navy presence in the Gulf and the Red Sea, and we think about
CENTCOM as being land-centric. But we also see, as you
specifically point out, the first overseas Navy base put in
place by the Chinese in Djibouti. We see in Port Doraleh a
single berth there reserved for the Chinese Navy. We see
President Xi Jinping, through a modernization of his military,
looking to very aggressively expand and sustain operations
around the world.
From your perspective there as CENTCOM commander in that
AOR, specifically what do you see our U.S. Navy doing to
counter this Chinese expansionism? And what do you need as far
as U.S. Navy presence there to make sure that we have what is
necessary there in relation to what we see as Chinese
aggressive expansion?
General Votel. Thanks, Congressman, I appreciate the
question. I would share--I am an Army guy saying this, I would
share that while we do think about the land territory in
CENTCOM, it very much is a maritime theater with the three
critical chokepoints that, you know, are so important to us in
this area. So I do recognize that.
I would just tell you that I think, certainly, the
resources that are being provided to me, the maritime resources
that are provided to me by the Navy and the Marine Corps, I
think are adequate to the task that we have right now. I think
the principal way that we develop resilience against these
types of, you know, great power influences in this area is
through, first of all, our presence, our constant presence, and
we do maintain a constant presence in both the Red Sea, the
Gulf of Aden, into the Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman as
well, and through our very close partnership with our partners.
We have three combined maritime task forces that are led out of
our naval headquarters in Bahrain that include a variety of
different nations.
So when I look at the nations that are on our team and I
look at the nations that are lining up with some of these
others that are entering in the area, I think our teams are
very strong. And I think this is a very key way for us to
maintain our influence and pursue our interests in the CENTCOM
maritime environment.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Last year, the U.S. Naval Office of
Intelligence pointed out some challenges there with potentially
placing the mines that would put at risk commercial vessels
there near Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Give me your perspective, not
only on what that potential threat is, because we see Houthis
operating in the area, obviously, shooting at U.S. ships. Give
me your perspective on what we are doing in minesweeping our
operations there, looking to counter that potential threat for
mines, because we know that that is a chokepoint area that is
strategically very important.
General Votel. Thank you. Well, we certainly maintain
minesweeping capabilities in the Gulf and have for a number of
years, but so do our partners. And I would just point out, you
know, some of our partners, like the Emirates and Saudi Arabia,
have some very good capability in this regard. And so one of
the things that we do is work with them to optimize their
capabilities. Again, by, with, and through getting them to use
their capabilities and using our intelligence and some of our
experience to help them be more effective at this.
And so this, I think, has been very effective in
preventing, you know, a major mine catastrophe, if you will, in
the Bab-el-Mandeb, one that we are very concerned about. Sixty
to seventy ships a day go through the Bab-el-Mandeb, not just
ours, everybody's. So this is a very real threat that we have
to pay attention to.
Mr. Wittman. Do you currently have intelligence gathering
operations to look at what is happening in Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
about the activities that are going on there, what we can do to
maybe counter that, or the things we can do to interdict it?
Because, obviously, keeping a mine from being laid is a lot
better than having to go in and sweep those particular areas,
especially from a time perspective. Give us your perspective on
what is happening there.
General Votel. Congressman, I would say in this setting, we
absolutely do, and I would look forward to sharing the details
with you in a different setting.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Votel, thank
you for being here today.
America has been engaged in Afghanistan for 16 years, and
it is difficult to determine what progress we have made. The
administration's new strategy increased its troop levels to
14,000 troops. However, unable to learn from history, we are
investing more lives and resources without clearly defined
benchmarks. I am extremely concerned about the fact that
significant information is being withheld from the Office of
Inspector General for Afghanistan's Reconstruction and,
ultimately, the American people.
According to the inspector general, quote: ``It is hard to
make a determination of how good a job we are doing, because if
the Afghan military is not fighting that well, and there are
not many of them, we can't determine fraud, waste, and abuse in
Afghanistan.''
Because they can't get basic facts from the Department, how
are you measuring progress in Afghanistan? Please describe the
end state. What does success look like to you? Currently, what
is the amount of territory under the Afghan Government's
control? And help me understand how withholding information has
made a difference in our operations in Afghanistan.
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman. I will take your
last one here. We are aware of that issue, and I think measures
are being taken to address that right now. Some of that
information is not necessarily U.S. Government information. It
is information of the Afghan Government, and so they control
the release and classification of that information. So this is
something we have to continue to work with.
Mr. Carbajal. General, if I could just interrupt you. It is
great to parlay that to the Afghan Government, but we are the
ones with resources and the lives of our military there. So we
have got to be able to get some information from them to
appease those of us that have to make decisions on what kind of
investments we need to make in the area.
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman, and I am committed
to making sure that you do have those details.
You asked also about kind of how we are looking at the
situation right now. What I would tell you is, the big idea
here with what we are trying to do in Afghanistan right now, is
drive towards reconciliation. This is different than the
approach we have had in the past. And we are trying to do that
through creating, not just military pressure with our military
activities on the ground, but we are trying to do it through
creating social pressure with things that the Afghan Government
is doing, like credible elections that they are pursuing this
year at the parliamentary level and the national level next
year. And we are doing it through creating diplomatic and
regional pressure, just as we talked about with Pakistan a few
moments ago.
The idea here is that creating pressure on all of those
three axes are going to create enough pressure on the Taliban
that they come to the table. What is different this time as we
approach this is that we are taking a conditions-based approach
that is focused on reconciliation as its end state. It is a
regional focus here, and we are engaging the partners in the
region, not just Pakistan, but the Central Asian states as well
who are key to this.
And we have changed the way that we are working with the
Afghan forces. So we previously had advised down to a very low
level with their Afghan special operations forces. We are now,
with the additional enablers and additional advisers that the
Department has approved for us, are taking that capability and
extending it out to their conventional forces. We are building
out the Afghan Air Force. We are doubling the size of their
Afghan special operations capability. So there are a variety of
different aspects to this approach. This will give us the
ability to measure the progress.
You asked about how much of the population is controlled by
the Afghan Government. Today, the figure is 64 percent. Twelve
percent of the population is in areas that are controlled by
the Taliban, and the balance of that are in contested areas.
Our focus, the focus of our military operations is on
increasing and expanding population control by the Government
of Afghanistan. And what we are going to do this season is we
are going to--our intention is to break the stalemate, grab the
initiative, begin to expand population control this year and
next year, and then ensure that we create an environment here
that allows for credible elections to take place, one of the
most important things that the Afghan people need to see from
their government.
Mr. Carbajal. We are running out of time. What about
information, the sharing of information with the inspector
general?
General Votel. As I mentioned, Congressman, we will do our
very best to ensure that you have the information that you need
to make the decisions that are necessary.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you so much.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for
being here.
I want to talk with you a little bit about ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the CENTCOM
area. And I know you have got a lot of partners in that area,
but what percentage of the ISR does the United States provide?
General Votel. I am not sure I can tell you what the
percentage overall is. I mean, it is very clear that the
majority of the ISR in the region is being provided by the
United States.
Mr. Scott. What about the DOD's capacity to meet the demand
for ISR? Do you have enough ISR currently?
General Votel. Well, I think, Congressman, I don't think
you are going to find any commander that is going to say that
he has enough ISR. We right now, today, have the largest
concentration of MQ-9s down in Kandahar Airfield designed to
support General Nicholson and his forces, and I know that is
adequate for what he needs right now. But given his own
druthers, I am sure he would want more. And so we would want
more in all these areas.
Mr. Scott. I understand that the Army in some ways and
commanders are agnostic as to the different platforms that ISR
may come from, but I assume that when it comes to providing
additional ISR, the commanders would not be agnostic to the
timeline to get new ISR to the field. Would that be a fair
statement?
General Votel. That is right. I think the faster we can
continue to provide those capabilities, the better.
Mr. Scott. So one of my concerns, and I certainly have a
tremendous amount of respect for the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of the Air Force as well, but as they have
changed the strategy to more of a China or Russia strategy,
they are canceling the procurement or have proposed to cancel
the procurement of items that are not capable of flying against
the Russians or the Chinese or in a direct conflict with the
Russians and the Chinese.
One of these platforms is the new JSTARS [Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], the recapitalization
of the JSTARS, which we have spent hundreds of millions to
develop and are now currently ready to purchase. And they have
proposed to cancel the procurement of the JSTARS because they
have said that they are going to use a system that has not been
developed yet, which, obviously, changes the timeline on when
we can deliver that system to you.
I guess my question is: Do the systems that you use in
Central Command have to be survivable, if you will, in a
conflict that would be as high end as that between the Russians
and the Chinese, a direct conflict?
General Votel. Well, they don't necessarily need to be. I
mean, the environment is different in parts of CENTCOM than it
might be in other parts of the world. So, you know, some of the
requirements that I have, the environment that we operate in,
are probably different than what Admiral Harris and others, and
General Scaparrotti, you know, deal with, and PACOM [U.S.
Pacific Command] and EUCOM [U.S. European Command],
respectively, here.
Mr. Scott. I would appreciate any advocacy you could have.
I agree with you 100 percent, and I am not opposed to the DOD
developing the system that they want for the fight against the
Russians and the Chinese. But even in developing that system,
we don't want to use that system unless we have to because we
don't want the Russians and the Chinese to be able to gather
the intel that they are going to gather from it every time we
fly it.
So we certainly continue to be concerned about, as we shift
in strategy to China and Russia, abandoning platforms that work
in the other parts of the world which are very serious fights
that we are in and that you are commanding right now.
I am down to about a minute, but just briefly, if you
would, again, I have been on the border of Syria and Israel.
The military objectives in Syria, can you just outline for us
what they are again very briefly?
General Votel. Well, specifically, it is to ensure--
principally, it is to ensure an enduring defeat of ISIS is what
the principal objective is of our military campaign right now
in Syria. You know, certainly we are concerned about the
weapons of mass destruction, in terms of some of their chemical
capabilities. As you have seen in the past, we are obviously
very concerned about making sure we can provide the
humanitarian aid, the stability that goes along with getting
people back into their homes. We are concerned about making
sure that we protect allies that are on the flanks of Syria--
Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey--that all feel the impacts of that.
And, of course, we are very keen to ensure that there is a
political resolution to all of this. Of course, that is beyond
my military----
Mr. Scott. General, my time has expired, but it is a tough
situation. I am glad that we have a leader like you over there
and thank you for your service.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
And, General Votel, thank you for your leadership and for
appearing before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss
the readiness, the posture, and the activities within CENTCOM.
So thank you.
I want to bring your attention back to Iran and its
activities in Syria, perhaps covering some ground that has been
covered and hopefully clarifying at least one point that you
made. Iran is playing a very large role in Syria, providing
senior advisers to the Assad regime, delivering weapons, cash,
recruiting, and encouraging foreign fighters.
Last month, Iran launched a drone that entered Israeli
airspace. There was a series of events resulting in the downing
of an F-16. The situation is clearly escalating and at greater
risk.
You mentioned, in response to Ms. Cheney's question, that
we can impede Tehran. Can you just identify what those
strategic and/or operational impediments are that we are
putting in Tehran's way, and can you evaluate the effectiveness
of them?
General Votel. Well, I think some--as I mentioned, I think
one of the things that we can do is we can build strong and
resilient partnerships with our partners, whether it is the
Iraqis on their side of the border or whether it is, you know,
kind of the Syrian Democratic Forces. At this point, that is
our partner on the ground.
You know, in many regards, these partners share the same
concerns we do with this, that they don't want their countries,
they don't want their areas exploited by others for purposes of
creating instability in this area.
So the relationships that we develop with them, Iraqi
forces, you know, particularly their border control forces, I
think help aid and prevent the movement of these types of
activities and equipment back and forth across their borders. I
think the Iraqis are as concerned about that as we would be and
as most countries would be.
And, certainly, I think in Syria, although I do acknowledge
our partners on the ground are a very indigenous partner, they
do control very important areas along the border between Iraq
and Syria. And so they can as well, through their own
operations, make it difficult for Iran to pursue their
activities through these particular areas. And so that is why I
kind of describe it much more in an indirect way as----
Mr. Brown. If I may, General, so that sounds a little bit
aspirational and I appreciate that. Can you evaluate the
effectiveness of what you just described?
General Votel. Well, I think we are working on how we
actually do that. I mean, most of these networks are very
resilient. They are very savvy in terms of how they are doing
things. So this is something that we are looking at now, how we
measure the effectiveness of it.
I mean, we are only in this case largely talking about
ground routes. Certainly, Iran has the ability to use air
routes as well to basically go over or around all of that. They
have the ability to use maritime routes. They have the ability
to go through Africa to get to these areas as well.
So, you know, we have to look at this holistically as we
try to address this.
Mr. Brown. So let me ask one other question, perhaps the
last in the time I have remaining. I understand that Israel is
in the EUCOM AOR. You know, conflict in that region doesn't
necessarily respect the area of operations of our different
commands. Can you talk about in the event, regardless of the
likelihood, of a conflict between Iran and Israel, regardless
of how it is provoked, can you just comment on what our
readiness--in this setting, perhaps it is best for the
classified setting--our readiness and posture to come to the
aid of Israel?
General Votel. Again, I think that is probably a question
that is best suited for General Scaparrotti, but what I would
tell you----
Mr. Brown. For readiness and posture? That wouldn't involve
CENTCOM?
General Votel. Right. Given that it is in his area and he
has the principal responsibility for that relationship.
What I would tell you is this, is that, you know, the
CENTCOM area, not just on the Israeli border, but certainly on
the border of Egypt with Libya, on the border of Pakistan with
India, to the north of the Central Asian states with Russia, it
is a tough neighborhood. And so it is imperative for the
combatant commanders to be very well-nested across all of these
areas.
And I think, under the leadership of our chairman and with
the National Defense Strategy that the Secretary has put in
place, that we are improving significantly our ability to
operate in cooperation with each other and in many cases very,
very seamlessly.
So it is not unusual for General Scaparrotti and I to have
a lot of coordination and talking across our common areas of
concern, just like it is not uncommon for General Waldhauser in
AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] and I to talk or Admiral Harris
and I to talk about the things on his side.
So this is an area where we have really got to continue to
pay attention to, and I think we are doing a much, much better
job of this.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, good to see you again. I have three
important questions. I will be as fast as I can. The first is
about this attack on U.S. forces in Syria, media reports
alleging it is by Russian mercenaries.
Can you comment at all if we have confirmation that, in
fact, those were Russian mercenaries, number one? How many do
you think were killed? And do we have any confirmation that
that was approved or ordered by the Kremlin or Putin? And what
do you think their objective might have been?
General Votel. Congresswoman, I am not sure I can report
anything different than you have seen in the media and in the
press on this right now, in terms of numbers and attribution of
who this is. What I can tell you is that, throughout this
entire event, we were in communications on our communication
channel with the Russians before, during, after. And what they
told us is these were not their forces and not their military
forces.
So, you know, I think that kind of speaks for itself here
in terms of what they are. And then, of course, we have seen
all the media that has come out after this. So, to me, it
highlights, again, the unwillingness, inability of the regime
and pro-regime forces to take seriously the ISIS threat,
particularly if there is apparent contracted forces in the area
attempting to do this.
Ms. McSally. So do you believe they were not Russian
mercenaries, and do we have any intelligence to corroborate or
confirm or deny that?
General Votel. None that I would discuss in this particular
setting.
Ms. McSally. Could we maybe discuss in the follow-on
setting?
General Votel. I would be happy to talk with you.
Ms. McSally. But do you personally believe that they were
not Russian mercenaries at this point, or can you not even say
that?
General Votel. We have characterized them as pro-regime
forces at this point.
Ms. McSally. Okay. I look forward to following up in a
classified setting.
The second topic is A-10 Warthog was back in Afghanistan
kicking butt in January. Can you comment on the types of
missions that they are doing? And I know it is a little
specific, but as part of the shift in strategy, it seems like
we are now going after more of the sources of revenue perhaps
overall in attacking the, you know, poppy industry and the
drugmaking facilities. And how is the A-10 doing over there?
General Votel. A-10s are doing great. They were in action
within 24 hours of being on the ground here. And I have had an
opportunity to visit the squadron and meet the squadron
commander, and very, very proud of what they are doing. And
they are doing the things that we would expect the A-10s to do.
Part of our concept and why we are pushing adviser teams
down to a lower level is so that we can bring capabilities like
the A-10 to bear very effectively in support of the Afghan
National Defense Forces. And so that is what we expect they are
doing.
You are correct: One of the things that has been successful
and we have tried to carry over from our defeat-ISIS campaign
is going after the revenue generation and, in this case, the
narcotrafficking that fuels the Taliban. And so this is a key
focus for General Nicholson and our forces at this point.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I do want to note if the last
administration got their way, all the A-10s would be in the
boneyard by now. And as I told this President, you are going to
have to pry them out of my cold dead hands, because it is such
a critical warfighting capability. And I appreciate this
committee and leadership working to keep that asset so we can
be doing missions like this.
The last topic is I am really concerned about the buildup
on Israel's northern border, so southern Syria, of Iranian-
backed militias and forces, Quds Force commanding that, and the
increased aggression we are seeing from there, as the Assad
regime seems to be shoring up controlling that area, and the
potential for escalation of a crisis with Israel.
Again, I know that's EUCOM's AOR, but Syria is yours. So
can you speak to what you are seeing in the trends in the Golan
area and whether there is a threat there?
General Votel. I think we share the same concerns that you
have just highlighted right here. And, you know, what this is--
you know, very effectively in this southwestern corner of
Syria, we have been able to diplomatically begin to address
that. And so working with the special Presidential envoy, Mr.
McGurk, and others, we are continuing to keep focus on that.
Again, Russia is a party to this and they have
responsibilities to ensure that, you know, the detractable
partners that may be in this area are under control. And so
they have to take responsibility for this and be held
accountable, not just the Iranians but the others that are down
there that are much more akin to the violent extremists down
there. So I think we have to continue to address that in this
particular aspect.
Ms. McSally. Can you share any of the trends that you are
seeing, increase in military capability we have seen, again,
with the escalation over the last few weeks, and any concerns
you have about that escalating into a full-blown crisis with
Israel?
General Votel. Well, I think what I am concerned about is
in these places down in the southwest and particularly up in
places like Idlib, these are becoming collection zones for a
lot of unsavory organizations right here, and eventually, they
are going to have to be dealt with. And so I am concerned that,
left unaddressed, that they will become bigger problems.
In terms of trends and stuff like this, I can't tell you in
the southwest, particularly in this setting, that we have seen
anything specific here in terms of this, but obviously there
are some concerns. But what we have seen in places like Idlib
and others is where these groups that have come together do
potentially pose long-term challenges for security of the
region, above and beyond Syria.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I am over my time, but I look
forward to discussing further in the closed session. Thanks.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, great to see you again. Thank you for your great
service to the Nation. It is a pleasure to have you back before
the committee once again.
I would like to continue on the Iran topic as well and do a
deeper dive on this topic. So Iran supports numerous proxies:
Hezbollah in Israel, Lebanon, and Syria; the Houthis in Yemen;
and militias in Iraq. Iran is using its militias and insurgents
abroad to upset the existing order and sow chaos, obviously. In
addition to proxies, Iran uses other asymmetric means, like
cyber operations and information warfare, to expand its
influence in the region.
So can you explain how you have seen Iran utilize these
techniques during your tenure as CENTCOM commander to create a
land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, and if you think
they have been effective in increasing their influence through
this strategy?
General Votel. Thanks. Thanks, Congressman. Some of this
discussion probably I think is best set for a closed session
here, but, you know, I think, you know, what Iran attempts to
do is by creating proxy organizations that can go out there and
do their bidding, that can operate in areas in which they have
interests. I think they are attempting to do that. And I do
think we see some instances of that as we look at some of the
undisciplined Shia militia organizations that are here that are
much more beholden to Iran than they are to, say, the
Government of Iraq. This is very concerning to us, and I think
this gives us indications that they are acting not on behalf of
the government they say they are representing but on behalf of
another party.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Good. I look forward to following up on
that question too once we are in the closed session.
So the war in Syria has left hundreds of thousands dead,
millions either internally displaced or seeking asylum as
refugees. But as the fight against ISIL transitions to
consolidating gains and building stability, it seems as if some
of the groups that have formed partnerships of convenience may
now turn their attention towards fighting each other instead.
So how do you see these various elements aligning
themselves in Syria, and do you worry about a potential
shifting regional balance of power, and do you feel the Syrian
Kurds might feel slighted by recent events and align more
closely with Iran to ward off threats?
General Votel. Yes. So, first off, Congressman, what I
would say is, with the partners that we operate, the Syrian
Democratic Forces, we have not necessarily seen infighting
among themselves here in terms of that. I mean, it is a large
organization, roughly half Kurd/half Arab, and with some others
thrown in there, Yazidis and others, Turkmen, that are involved
in this group. But, frankly, they, in my estimation, have
continued to be pretty coherent in terms of how they are doing
this.
I guess the way I would describe it is that, as we are
completing the defeat of ISIS, I think what we are now
beginning to see is the reemergence of many of the underlying
issues that have always been in place in Syria. And as we have
converging forces in the area, we are now seeing diverging
interests.
And I think we see this down in the middle Euphrates Valley
between the focus of the coalition and our partners on the
ground and what the pro-regime element is focused on. They are
less concerned about rooting out ISIS than they are about going
in and addressing some of the opposition elements to the
regime.
So I think what we--I think what we have to be mindful of
is that, as the caliphate goes away and as the threat of ISIS
is removed, we will begin to see more of a return to the
underlying challenges that really gave birth to many of these--
to this problem and other problems in the country. And those
are ultimately going to have to be addressed through some type
of Geneva process that brings the parties together to, you
know, establish some kind of process and arrangement that
allows Syria to be the country that it should be.
Mr. Langevin. It seems that we are at that tipping point
right now where the State Department has to play a stronger
role in working with the powers that have interests there and
try to bring about a political solution. So I hope we are going
to be pursuing that on dual tracks.
I see my time is about to run out, so I will hold my
questions for the closed session, but, again, thank you for
your service, General, and I will yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Russell.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Votel, for your testimony today.
A couple of areas that I have not heard discussed. Could
you give us your thoughts on Turkish operations in Afrin and
its partnering with al-Qaida affiliates, its attacks on U.S.-
backed forces, and how that will impact the by, with, and
through strategy to make a stable border security force?
General Votel. Congressman, I think some of that will
probably be reserved for the closed session here. But, you
know, I think we have acknowledged that Turkey has some
concerns, has some significant concerns along their border with
longstanding PKK interests. Our concern, of course, is that
this activity in Afrin is detracting from our efforts against
ISIS.
Mr. Russell. And then kind of a broader scope on that. What
actions do you think are needed to prevent this mixture of
Erdogan-Putin counter-efforts to secure the hard-fought gains
against ISIS?
General Votel. Well, I think as I mentioned in my opening
statement, as I have said a couple times here, I really view
Russia as being at the heart of many of these issues here.
And I am being very serious when I say they play the role
of both arsonist and fireman, fueling tensions and then trying
to resolve them in their favor and manipulating all the parties
they can to try to achieve their objectives--their objectives--
and not necessarily the broader objectives of the international
community here.
So I think there certainly has to be more accountability
and pressure put on Russia to do what they said they were going
to do.
Mr. Russell. Do you think that that pressure could come
from the other instruments of national power from the United
States on our NATO ally in Turkey?
General Votel. I think they can come from a variety of
different sources, Congressman.
Mr. Russell. And then I guess can you speak also to the
need to interdict the ISIS/al-Qaida migration into sub-Saharan
Africa, AQ Maghreb, Boko Haram, others, see a lot of that now,
that as they have been pushed out of one area, that they may
drift over to the other, and how that would cooperate between
the combatant commands.
General Votel. Well, certainly, we are very cognizant of
what AFRICOM is dealing with with their partners on the ground
in Sahel and the Maghreb here and very, very concerned about
that. I think one of the principal things that we can do is
continue to share information back and forth.
Frankly, we are not seeing mass migration of these
fighters. I won't tell you that they are probably not getting
out with refugees and others that are doing that. That probably
is occurring. But certainly, this is a concern long term.
And so I think one of the things that we are attempting to
do is, particularly now that we have so many foreign fighters
that have been captured and are in some level of detention with
our partners here, is try to get the international community
engaged in taking responsibility for their people and bringing
them to some level of justice. There is a lot that can be
learned from these foreign fighters, and we have to make sure
that we have exploited that and learned as much as we can so we
can prevent it, but we also need to make sure that they are put
back into the judicial process so they can be dealt with by
their countries from which they came.
Mr. Russell. Then I guess the last question I have would
be, could you give your assessment of Egyptian and Saudi
combined efforts on Yemen and the status of Yemen?
General Votel. With respect to the status of Yemen, I
think, obviously, Yemen is very destabilized at this particular
point. Not only do they have a civil war going on, they have
kind of a proxy war playing out here between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, with Iran introducing advanced technology into there.
We see the enabled Houthis trying to challenge navigation in
the Bab-el-Mandeb, and, of course, they have a counterterrorism
problem that we are very focused on.
So, you know, I think, from the counterterrorism
standpoint, I think we are making very good progress in this
particular area. I don't see significant changes in the civil
conflict that is taking place, that is largely being
orchestrated by the Arab coalitions on the ground there. They
certainly need to put some more effort into that. We are paying
attention to the efforts by our diplomats and others here to
try to address this politically. There had been--there has been
some opportunities in the past that have not come to fruition
yet, and I think we still have to continue on in this area.
But I think Yemen is an area that we should all be
concerned about, because we are seeing all kinds of problems in
that particular area and, on top of it, huge humanitarian
issues. The people are suffering greatly.
Mr. Russell. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Rosen.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I want to thank the general for being
here today and thank the ranking member and the chairman for
this important hearing.
I would like to speak a little bit about sanctions on Iran
and Russia, and what is your opinion and how would implementing
sanctions or what level of sanctions, if any, do you think
would influence activities in the Middle East, specifically
Russia and Iran?
General Votel. Well, Congresswoman, we don't really manage
those within the Department of Defense and certainly not within
CENTCOM. I do know that the Secretary has recently provided
some information to Senator Corker and others with regards to
CAATSA [Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act]
and some of the other things regarding sanctions out here, and
I think those kind of represent his interest.
You know, I think sanctions are a very important part of
this. In most of these threats--and I think as I tried to
mention in my opening comments, this is a team sport. And so we
can do things militarily, but we also need the other
instruments of our national power, whether it is diplomatic,
whether it is economic, whether it is informational, to really
kick in on these things. And when we are able to bring all of
those together, to include things like sanctions, I think we
often have the best effects.
And so, you know, I think there are certainly some very
good areas where sanctions will make a difference. We do have
to look at the impact of those on some of our partners, and we
have to be mindful of that. I do think granting waiver
authority to the Secretary of State with regard to some of
these things is a good approach and gives us the flexibility
that we need in these regards, but, you know, I look at it as a
key part of the whole-of-government approach.
Ms. Rosen. So you feel you are getting enough support in
this regard?
General Votel. I do. And I certainly know this is a
continuing area of topic in other parts of the government.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you.
I also want to switch over and talk about Syria a little
bit. And so where does the communication stand after Russian-
aligned troops, of course, attacked our partner forces in Syria
in early February? So how are things going there? And our
strategy of deconfliction with Russian mechanisms, has that
been helpful?
General Votel. Congresswoman, there has been no change in
the communication channel that we have had. Our deconfliction
channel remains a very professional military discussion. It was
before, and it has been since. And so it remains an effective
way to deconflict our forces and make sure our airmen stay safe
and our people on the ground are safe.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Just to follow up briefly on something Mr.
Russell said, what do we say to our NATO allies in Ankara
regarding our support for Kurdish elements in Syria, the YPG,
and other elements? What message do we communicate to them?
General Votel. The message that I have conveyed is that our
Kurdish partners, part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a
multiethnic force that consists in equal measures and actually
in greater measures of Arabs than Kurds, has been the most
effective force on the ground in Syria against ISIS. And we
need them to finish this fight. So I think that is the first
thing and really one of the principal things we have to
acknowledge to them. I think we also have to acknowledge their
concerns about this. And so our attempts to try to be as
transparent and clear in terms of what we are doing and our way
forward I think are things we have to continue to emphasize to
them.
Mr. Gallagher. Do they simply make no distinction between
the PKK and the elements that we support on the ground in
Syria?
General Votel. Well, they don't draw that distinction. And,
of course, that is the tension.
Mr. Gallagher. To follow up on something Ms. Cheney said
earlier, or that you said in response to her question, that it
is not part of the coalition effort to counter Iran in Syria,
how would you characterize our strategy in Syria vis-a-vis
Iran? What are we trying to do to Iran in Syria?
General Votel. Well, I think our broad U.S. Government
objective here is to limit Iran's influence in Syria, because,
as we have seen, they are attempting to arm and motivate
fighters that could pose threats to our other vital partners
here. And so, you know, I think as a government, we have
interest in trying to limit their influence and activities in
this part of the region.
Mr. Gallagher. I don't want to spend my remaining time on a
semantic debate, but I just would say if their influence is
gaining in Syria and we need to limit that, I sort of think
that necessarily involves us countering their gains in Syria.
So perhaps some clarity, or let me rather say, what is our
strategy? How would you characterize our strategy vis-a-vis
Iran throughout the rest of the region?
General Votel. I would characterize our strategy as deter,
assure, and compete. We have to have capabilities in place to
deter Iran's use of ballistic missile capability against our
partners, and we have to ensure that we can deter their ability
to race to a nuclear weapons capability.
We have to always assure our partners in the region. As I
think I have said several times here, our partnerships, when
you line up our coalition versus their coalition, ours is much
more capable. And so continuing to develop those relationships
is really very important and assuring our partners that we are
going to be there with them.
And then we have to compete with them not just militarily
but with our other instruments of power, in the areas that we
can. And this is pushing back, rolling back on their influence,
pushing back on their narrative where we can, and then, in the
areas where we must, preventing them from moving their weapons
and other things around the theater that pose threats to our
partners.
Mr. Gallagher. But does that rollback, that competition
sort of reach a limit in Syria? Is there some reason we are
being less aggressive there? You sort of mentioned Iraq as an
area where we are competing more effectively with them.
General Votel. I think my point is only that, as we form
the coalition, the defeat-ISIS coalition, that, you know, has
both a military and a political component to it, that one of
the objectives that has not been assigned to us is countering
Iran. It has specifically been focused on the ISIS mission. So
I think that is what I am trying to emphasize.
Mr. Gallagher. And then, in Iraq, do you think we are
actively or effectively competing with them? And I am thinking
specifically of, you know, one of the biggest phenomena in the
last year has been the rise of the PMF [Popular Mobilization
Forces] and, you know, some of these groups may be able to be
incorporated in the ISF [Iraqi security forces], but others are
terrorists, you know, taking orders from the IRGC [Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps].
General Votel. Well, I think, you know, certainly
addressing the PMF is something that the Prime Minister will
have to do, and in many regards, he has done that. But, again,
I think one of the best things we can do on the ground in Syria
is being a really good and valued partner to the Iraqi security
forces, and I think the assistance that the United States and
the coalition did I think demonstrated that.
And in my engagements with the security force leaders that
I talk to on a regular basis, I think they deeply value that,
and they appreciate it, and they look forward to maintaining
that relationship in the future.
Mr. Gallagher. I have run out of time. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Suozzi.
Mr. Suozzi. General, I want to thank you so much for your
service and the great work of everyone under your command
throughout the regions that are under your command.
My particular concerns are about Afghanistan that I briefly
discussed with you before the hearing began. And the special
inspector general's report on Afghan reconstruction reports
that we are not making progress as far as population centers
and how much we control. In fact, we lost a little bit of
ground from the last report.
And I support what the military is doing. I supported the
effort to increase the number of troops recently. And I think
that you have a very clear strategy as far as the five points
of help the Afghan Army, helping the Afghan special forces to
increase their size and effectiveness; increase the
collaboration between the Afghan Air Force and the Army; as
well as replace their platforms with American equipment as
opposed to Russian equipment; help the police; and put more
pressure on Pakistan. It is a clear five-point strategy that
makes tremendous sense, and you are doing a very effective job
of clearing and holding area.
The problem is the backfilling. And in your prepared
testimony, you talked about how Kabul's uncertain political
situation remains the greatest risk of stability. And you went
on to say that ``the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan continues to suffer from a professional
governmental capacity deficit, competing interests, and
corruption.'' And my concern is that your colleagues on the
civilian side do not have a clear plan the way that the
military has. So I want to ask you, who do you see as being
your clearest partners with General Nicholson on the civilian
side in this effort, and what do you perceive their strategy to
be? If you could put it in a succinct way, because I don't see
them putting out a clear succinct plan on the civilian side. So
you are clearing and holding, but when it comes to rebuilding
and transitioning, they are not laying out a clear plan. So I
just want to ask you to comment on that, please, General.
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman.
I think that the principal partner that we would look to on
the U.S. side certainly is the Ambassador and the country team.
And, you know, I do think we have a very outstanding Ambassador
on the ground. I think he is very engaged in this. And I think
we are beginning to address many of these things that you have
talked about.
As I mentioned to you, in many regards the military
missions in many of these countries really are the easy part of
addressing the situation. And the more difficult part is the
political resolution that has to take place afterwards, because
this is when you have to address the deep underlying issues
that, you know, oftentimes gave way to the conflict that we
just resolved.
As I think I mentioned to you beforehand, you know,
tomorrow in Kabul, President Ghani and, you know, certainly
with the support of our Embassy, will be hosting the Kabul
Process conference that will address both reconciliation and
counterterrorism and will be an opportunity with 25 nations
brought in to help do that.
There are efforts underway with our Department of State
interlocutors to help devise ways to move forward with
reconciliation. It is extraordinarily complex. The Taliban is
not a singular contiguous group to deal with. It is broken. It
is fractured. And so not only do we have to look at
reconciliation, we have to look at things like reintegration as
well.
So, you know, the task in front of our diplomats to solve
this I think is an extraordinarily complex one as they move
forward. And I do think this certainly is a challenge here, but
I do think that they are moving forward in ways to begin to
address this effectively here as we apply military, social, and
diplomatic pressure to bring the Taliban to the table.
Mr. Suozzi. So, General, in your testimony, you also--thank
you very much for that, by the way. In your testimony, you
talked about how Pakistan is starting to share more information
and collaborate more than they had historically. What is your
prognosis with Pakistan? What do you see happening in real time
other than the sharing of information, and what can we hope to
expect as far as progress regarding the governing of the
ungoverned areas?
General Votel. Well, you know, I would say that, first off,
I think it is important to recognize that Pakistan has
actually--you know, Pakistan as a country has suffered greatly
from terrorism, perhaps as much as anybody in the region and
maybe as much as anybody around the world. And they have taken
a number of measures to address terrorism within their borders,
and that has contributed over the years to, you know, some
increased security in the area, and we have to recognize that
upfront.
So our approach I think is to continue to be engaged with
them. We want to have a candid discussion. I think I do. We
want to have frequent communication. We want to build trust in
this relationship. The history of the United States and
Pakistan, there is a very long history here. We do share many
interests, and they share many things in common with us
culturally, militarily, politically, in terms of what we are
doing, but we have to continue to work with them to move them
in directions that cause them to make strategic changes in
their approach. And that is really what we are aimed at. I
don't know that we can put a time limit on that, but, as I
mentioned to you, we are seeing some positive indicators, and
we have to ensure that we don't overlook these as we move
forward and we continue to build on these, and this is what my
objective is with my counterparts.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your service and for being here.
There is no place in the world where Iranian-backed proxy
forces are a stabilizing feature of the terrain, is there?
General Votel. Not that I would--I would not characterize
it that way, Congressman.
Mr. Gaetz. So, in July of 2015, we have the birth of the
JCPOA. From that point in time until today, would we say that
Iran has made the same investment in their proxy forces, a
reduced investment in their proxy forces, or an enhanced
investment in their proxy forces?
General Votel. I think I would characterize it as an
enhanced investment in their proxies and partners.
Mr. Gaetz. So, since the JCPOA, we have got Iran putting
more money behind proxy forces that are destabilizing in
literally 100 percent of the circumstances in which they exist.
In August of 2017, the Iranian Parliament votes to increase
their military spending.
Are there particular capabilities that we think may emerge
from that, particular tactics that Iran is investing in as they
use more of the cash that they now have access to to be a
destabilizing hegemon?
General Votel. Well, Congressman, I mean, as I mentioned
earlier, I think, as we look at the Iranian threat, I think
what we have seen is not only an increase quantitatively but,
in some cases, an increase qualitatively in some of the
capabilities that they have developed.
They are using the opportunity of things like Yemen to--you
know, like we go out to China Lake to test our weapon systems.
They go to Yemen to test their weapon systems. So they are
taking advantage of these opportunities to improve their
capabilities around the world. So I definitely am concerned
about this.
Mr. Gaetz. You also test some great weapon systems off my
district in northwest Florida we are very proud of. My district
is also home to the 7th Special Forces Group. They do a great
deal of work in the CENTCOM AOR, and frequently they return
home and then deploy to SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] AOR to
find themselves fighting a very similarly flavored enemy in
radical Islamic extremists funded in many circumstances by Iran
through their terror proxies.
Are there areas within CENTCOM's AOR where there are
training activities, where recruits are being brought in from
other parts of the world, particularly the Western Hemisphere,
and then essentially redeployed after receiving training in the
CENTCOM AOR?
General Votel. I am not sure I can answer that in this
particular setting here. I am sure that there probably are.
Mr. Gaetz. Okay. We may chat about that a little later
today then. Are there particular capabilities in the
development of Iran's terror proxies that we find them
particularly investing in, whether that is drone technology,
whether that is guerilla capability, the development of
explosives?
General Votel. I think all of the above. I think these are
all tactics that we have seen in the past. You know, certainly
we are concerned about the increasing use of missiles, of all
short-range, medium-range missiles, and that type of stuff is
very concerning. Their use of UASes [unmanned aerial systems]
is a particular concerning emerging threat for us here that we
are concerned about.
But I think one, you know, of the other things is that, you
know, I think as we look at what Iran did in--what it took Iran
to do, took 20 years for Iran to do in Lebanon with the
Lebanese Hezbollah, they are attempting to do in about 5 years
with the Houthis in Yemen. This is very concerning to us.
So I think they are accelerating their pace in their
ability to do this, and this is something we have to be very
concerned about.
Mr. Gaetz. I completely agree. And I would add to the list
activities in the Western Hemisphere where that very same game
plan that we have seen Iran run in Syria, then on the Arabian
Peninsula, and now in our own backyard would continue that
troubling trend line with an increased boost in volume and in
quality.
As we look at the particular missile systems that you
mentioned and the areas where they may be used, I look
particularly to our ally Israel as a point of vulnerability. Do
we see the--or in what capacity do we see the Iranians
hardening their positions in southern Syria, and what feedback
have we gotten at the mil-to-mil level from our ally Israel
about their discomfort with that?
General Votel. In this setting, I would just say I think we
have seen and we have seen in public media releases here, you
know, Israel has struck at some of these locations here that
they have posed a threat to them.
So, you know, I think in this setting, I think I would
leave it at that, that there certainly are some concerns there.
Mr. Gaetz. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to our next setting.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
We recently heard from Admiral Harris that munitions have
been a great concern for him in PACOM. CENTCOM has obviously
been using a lot of munitions in the counter-ISIL fight. So
please describe for me the state of our current munitions in
CENTCOM, and are you getting what you currently need?
General Votel. Congressman, we are. And I would be happy to
take it for the record and give you some more detail on this.
But what we did in CENTCOM here over the last--with the support
of the Department, was put in controlled supply rates for our
key munitions here, and we have been managing that for some
time. Certainly, the success we have had in Iraq and Syria has
resulted in a lowered use of that, which has allowed us to
cross-level within the theater to Afghanistan to address our
issues.
I won't comment on the broader Department-wide challenge
with this, but I think we are being well supported right now in
CENTCOM.
Mr. Gallego. Good. So, to follow up a little on that then,
from where you stand, are the other combatant commands,
especially EUCOM, are they keeping their stocks at the
appropriate levels they need, anticipating the kind of
adversaries----
General Votel. Congressman, I think that is probably a
better question for them. I can't comment on their stockage.
Mr. Gallego. Switching gears then, would you call Qatar a
dependable partner?
General Votel. I think Qatar has been a dependable partner
to us. Certainly, we have our--my forward headquarters is
located in Qatar. We have our air operations center there. I
think they have been good partners to us in the past.
Mr. Gallego. Is the discord between our GCC [Gulf
Cooperation Council]--other partners outside of Qatar and
especially between the Saudi and Qatar in regards to the bloc,
has that affected any of our operations in CENTCOM?
General Votel. It has not had a significant impact on our
military activities. And we have made this very clear from the
beginning that we would not allow that, and I think we have
largely been successful in mitigating most of that.
Mr. Gallego. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, thank you for being here today.
Can we go back to Afghanistan for a moment, and could you
comment more specifically on how tenuous is our 39-member-
nation coalition? Is it continuing to weaken, or do you have
more of an optimistic outlook on where our coalition is heading
forward?
General Votel. I think our coalition remains very, very
strong in Afghanistan. You know, one of the things that
underpins, you know, the President's roadmap for the Afghan
National Defense [and] Security Forces was the commitment made
by the NATO nations and the partner nations at the Brussels
conference and in Warsaw to make sure that the support would be
continued. And so we have seen the partner nations continue to
sustain and in many cases increase their contributions to the
effort.
Mr. Banks. Just to repeat, so we are seeing in some places
an increase. Can you mention which nations are increasing their
commitment?
General Votel. I think the U.K. is an example. They have
increased some of their recent contributions.
Mr. Banks. Okay, thank you. A moment ago, you said, in
addressing Mr. Suozzi's comments, that Pakistan has paid a
significant price. ``Has suffered greatly'' was your quote.
In your testimony, though, you, quote, say: ``The Taliban
and Haqqani leadership and fighters continue to find sanctuary
in Pakistan,'' end quote. And then, on the next page, you talk
about our discontinuing of IMET/FMF [International Military
Education and Training/Foreign Military Financing] support to
Pakistan.
Could you dig a little bit deeper into that? I mean, what
is working to bring Pakistan back to the table to thwart the
Taliban and other like-minded groups in providing them
sanctuary in Pakistan?
General Votel. Well, you know, I think certainly the
pressure that our government put on Pakistan as we brought out
the strategy I think contributed to that. I think what is also
working right now is the approach that we have in place with
them. I think we have tried to be very clear in terms of the
things that we need Pakistan to do for us.
And what I have endeavored to do, not always in a public
way but in a private way, is develop a relationship that allows
us to provide feedback both ways. There are things, frankly,
that Pakistan has asked of us as well. So this is a two-way
street here. And so it is my responsibility, I think, to make
sure that we have feedback loops in place that go back and
forth between the things that we are doing to try to support
each other and moving forward in that regard.
And so, you know, I would be happy to talk a little bit
more about this perhaps in a closed session here, but that is
really what this is about. It is about building a bridge back,
building the trust that has to underpin this relationship that
has been missing from it for a long time.
Mr. Banks. Has there been a plan to recontinue FMF and IMET
support to Pakistan?
General Votel. I don't think we have addressed that at this
particular point.
Mr. Banks. So we remain in a posture of discontinuing that
support? Pakistan has obviously----
General Votel. That is the current posture, and I would
imagine hopefully in the future we will have an opportunity to
reconsider.
Mr. Banks. Has that been beneficial?
General Votel. Again, I think it has created some of the
pressure on this. In many regards, you know, Pakistan isn't
necessarily looking for our equipment in all these cases. They
are looking for our understanding and respect, in terms of what
they have accomplished here. So, again, this is really about
relationship building, and that is principally my focus here
with my counterpart.
Mr. Banks. Pakistan continues to provide a very important
and strategic logistical route for our efforts into
Afghanistan. Have you seen those logistical routes continue to
operate fully as they have----
General Votel. I have. I have.
Mr. Banks [continuing]. For the past decade plus?
General Votel. Ground lines communication, airlines
communications, absolutely vital to us, and they have continued
to sustain that.
Mr. Banks. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
General Votel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, could you tell us how many U.S. forces we have in
Afghanistan right now? How many service members are deployed
there as of this moment?
General Votel. We generally don't talk numbers in public
here, Congressman. I would be happy to----
Mr. O'Rourke. What can you say that we can say in a public
setting? There is lots of reporting on this. What is a ballpark
you could talk about?
General Votel. We are at the level that the Department of
Defense has approved for us in this area, and we will maintain
that going forward.
Mr. O'Rourke. Is that public information, the level that
the Department of Defense has?
General Votel. I think that the Office of Secretary of
Defense has put some numbers out. I don't recall what their
most recent one is, but I would be happy to follow up on that
with you.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. And so I would like to ask you, how
many U.S. service members are in Syria or operating in Syria? I
am expecting to get a similar answer. Are you able to tell me?
General Votel. Right. I think, you know, that the
Department of Defense I think has basically said around 1,700
have been there, but, again, I would offer the same response to
you in this.
Mr. O'Rourke. And in answer to Ms. Gabbard's question about
what our purpose is, you responded that the sole and single
task is to defeat ISIS. Is that, in fact, the reason for our
military presence?
General Votel. That is the reason for our military
presence.
Mr. O'Rourke. And with the defeat of ISIS, will we no
longer have a military presence in Syria?
General Votel. Well, when we have completed our--when we
have completed our mission here in Syria. It involves not only
kicking ISIS out of the areas in which they occupy, but it also
includes the consolidation and the consolidation of gains and
the stability that allows us to move forward with a political
resolution to this.
So that has been defined for us by our leadership here, and
so that is how we are gauging our military support. That is
part of the mission.
Mr. O'Rourke. The first part of your answer is clear to me.
If there are no longer ISIS combatants on the battlefield, if
we no longer have a threat from them, I think that is probably
something we can measure.
The second part sounds a little mushy. Could you define
that in terms that I and my constituents can understand so we
will know when we have won and when service members can come
back from Syria?
General Votel. Right. So what we will continue to do is
support our partners on the ground, to ensure that we can
consolidate our gains, we can stabilize the area, we can ensure
that international organizations, humanitarian aid
organizations can come back, and people can get into their
homes. And this is about creating the security environment that
allows that and provides the time for our diplomats to pursue
the solution that we are seeking through the United Nations in
Syria.
Mr. O'Rourke. So, even after ISIS is gone, there is an
indefinite military commitment from the United States of
America, from the description you just gave me. What is the
legal justification to be there after ISIS is no longer there?
General Votel. Well, the fact is ISIS is still there, and
that is what we are dealing with right now.
Mr. O'Rourke. But the question I asked you is: After ISIS
is defeated and you have accomplished the task, what is the
legal justification for U.S. service members to be deployed in
Syria?
General Votel. Well, the principal thing will be to ensure
that ISIS does not reemerge in this particular area. Even
though they have been eliminated from controlling terrain does
not mean that ISIS is not present in this area. I think we have
been very clear on that. So we have to ensure that ISIS isn't
given the opportunity to resurge here.
With regard to your question on the legal authority of
this, again, I would cite that, you know, the principal legal
authority here was self-defense of Iraq in terms of this, and
the unwillingness and inability of the Syrian regime to address
this particular threat that posed a threat to, not just the
country of Syria and Iraq, but really to a much broader group
of countries around the world.
Mr. O'Rourke. My understanding is that the administration
has used the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force,
whose justification is premised on the attacks of 9/11 and
stopping those who attacked this country from being able to do
so again.
And I think the logical conclusion of your answer to my
question about our presence after ISIS is defeated is that the
U.S. military can be in every country that there was ever an
ISIS presence just so that there will not be an ISIS presence
going forward, and I think that is a recipe for disaster. We
will not have successful oversight or accountability or
prosecution of that war, because we cannot define its goals or
the strategy.
I yield back.
The Chairman. General, what happened when we left Iraq
completely in 2009 after we had supposedly defeated al-Qaida in
Iraq?
General Votel. Well, Chairman, we saw the rise of ISIS, and
we saw the inability of the Iraqi security forces to
effectively address it as it was growing.
The Chairman. Mr. Hice.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, according to the Worldwide Threat Assessment, the
most recent one, Director Coats and the intelligence community
assessed that Iran's support for the popular mobilization
committee and Shia militants remain the primary threat to U.S.
personnel in Iraq. Do you agree with that assessment?
General Votel. Congressman, I do think they certainly could
pose a threat to our forces on the ground. This is something we
are very vigilant for and are paying very, very close attention
to. We have not seen that threat manifest itself at this
particular point, but it is certainly something that we are
very cognizant of.
Mr. Hice. How is CENTCOM working with the Iraqi Government
and other regional partners to try to address this?
General Votel. Well, you know, certainly the Iraqi
Government has a law in place that addresses paramilitary
forces. And what we are doing as part of our broader security
sector reform support that we provide to the Government of Iraq
is encouraging them to take the steps to bring those forces to
the right size and to ensure they have the right leadership and
they are beholden to the Government of Iraq. So the principal
way that we will do this is through our advice and, where
necessary, our assistance to the Government of Iraq.
Mr. Hice. Okay. I would like to follow up a little bit on
Mr. Gallagher's questions a little while ago and just kind of
an overall perspective. What is CENTCOM's role in trying to
curb Iranian influence, particularly in Iraq, but in the entire
region?
General Votel. Well, you know, I think one of the principal
roles that we have, as I mentioned, is assuring our partners
and building partnerships around the region and helping our
partners be resilient against this particular threat and making
sure that they have the wherewithal to protect themselves. So
certainly developing partnerships and assuring our partners is
a key piece of this.
Another key piece of this is making sure that we have the
right military capabilities in place to deter Iran from taking
action, particularly with their growing and increasingly
capable missile capability that they are developing. So we have
a deterrence role.
And then, finally, I think we have a competition role. We
have to challenge them for some of the things that they are
doing. And we certainly can do that militarily, but we can also
do that with our other instruments of national power that we
have available for us.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Thank you. And that actually raises some
questions that I think would probably be more appropriate in
our next session.
But, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. General Votel, thank you for your leadership,
and I appreciate and thank the men and women who serve in the
United States Central Command. I was a four-time deployed
veteran of the command and proud of that.
I would like to drill a little bit more into the Iranian
influence in Syria itself and that specific problem set. Iran
has propped up Assad, I think maybe more so than Russia, but
the two together have clearly been working together. They got
advisers. They have sent fighters to Syria. They encourage
Hezbollah to be supportive. Shia militants from other countries
have been sent there. They have sent weapons, cash, petroleum.
They have recently launched a drone, it appears. I think it was
an Iranian drone versus a Syrian drone.
So what I am hearing from you--and please correct me if I
am wrong, if my characterization is not right--that we do have
a grander strategy that focuses on Iran in your AOR, but in
Syria itself, we really don't have a strategy that limits
Iran's influence in Syria. Is that a true characterization?
General Votel. I am not sure I would necessarily
characterize it that way. There are things that are appropriate
for the military to do, and that is the angle that I talk
about, but there are certainly other parts of our government
and other capabilities that we have within our national
resources that can address Iran's malign activities, whether
they are in Syria or in other places.
Mr. Bacon. But you would agree it would be unacceptable for
Iran to have a long-term presence in western Syria?
General Votel. It would be unacceptable if that presence
resulted in threats to our other partners or in further
destabilization of the region.
Mr. Bacon. Would you say it is acceptable or unacceptable
for Iran to build a land bridge from Iran, through Iraq, Syria,
to the borders of Israel?
General Votel. I would say it is unacceptable if the
purpose of that land bridge is to move lethal technologies and
advanced capabilities in the hands of other fighters who may
use those to attack their neighbors.
Mr. Bacon. What would you say was the purpose of Iran
launching that drone into Israel? Was that, indeed, Iran, or
could it have been Syrian?
General Votel. You know, I am not sure. I think that is
probably a better question for the Iranians here, in terms of
that.
Mr. Bacon. There seems to be a recent decline in Iranian
harassment of our ships in the Persian Gulf and in the straits.
Is that true, and why do you think that may be?
General Votel. It is true. We have seen a decrease in some
of the interactions that we have seen. I think this is
principally because of some of the strong rhetoric or the
strong--the discussion we have had about the lack of
professionalism of Iranian maritime forces and how they operate
in this region. I think that has got their attention.
I also do think they are perhaps concerned about our
stronger position on some of Iran's activities beyond just
their nuclear weapons program here, and so they are paying
attention to that.
I would tell you, Mr. Congressman, that one of the things
we are concerned about is their increasing use of UAVs
[ummanned aerial vehicles]. So, while we may see decreases with
some of their activities in this area, I am equally concerned
about their increasing use of UAVs that could pose a threat to
our maritime activities in the region.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Are we actively interdicting
shipments to the Hezbollah in Lebanon from Iran?
General Votel. I think that is probably beyond the
discussion in this room.
Mr. Bacon. Going back to a previous question on Joint
STARS, we are being asked by the Air Force to determine should
we recapitalize the Joint STARS with a new airframe or let that
go away and go to some new capabilities. And we are getting
conflicting advice and counsel on that.
I would love to have your perspective. Do you need more
Joint STAR capabilities or less, or do you have thoughts for us
at the HASC [House Armed Services Committee]?
General Votel. You know, as a combatant commander, you
know, I am very dependent upon the services to provide us the
right capabilities. And they always do, and we are very, very
satisfied with that. So I am less concerned about which
platform it is on and more concerned with the capability that
is coming our way.
Certainly, the Joint STARS provides not only ground
movement targeting indicator capability that is very important
in my theater and other theaters, but it also provides, you
know, battlespace management command and control that comes
along with. These are key capabilities.
What I am trying to achieve with our use of ISR is layered
ISR. I want to be able to draw all these capabilities into an
ISR scheme that meets our requirements in this particular
theater.
Mr. Bacon. Well, again, thank you for being here today and
answering our questions. We are grateful to you.
I yield back.
General Votel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for
being here. If you stick around long enough, you get to ask a
question, whether you are good or not, if you are there.
I guess the first question is, we have been working on
getting some kinds of UAVs, whether they are Predators or they
are whatevers, to our allies in the Middle East, whether it is
Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, UAE [United Arab Emirates], and we
have been stopped. We have even offered them the ability to use
U.S. contractors to do it so that they can prosecute their own
targets, and we can use them instead of using our own.
So the question is: Can we tolerate a reality where,
because of self-imposed constraints, we can't sell our allies
our UAV technology, but the Chinese can--and you have already
spoken to that point--but when it comes to technology, I think
we are missing a big advantage there. Could you comment on
that?
General Votel. I think it is--you know, as you are alluding
to here, I think the opportunity for us to improve our
interoperability through common systems, whether it is ISR or
other systems we have out here, I think these are always
opportunities that we have to pursue wherever we can.
Mr. Hunter. Do you support us sharing our UAV technology
with our allies?
General Votel. I certainly think it deserves serious
consideration.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you. The second question is: In terms of
Iran and a ratline that goes from Iran through Syria down to
Israel, I have got big poster boards with Soleimani with his
arm around every single Iraqi corps commander and militia guy.
They are all buddies. Soleimani is now handpicking the guys
that we are equipping and training, but that is the fight that
we are in right now.
So the question is--and you have already spoken to this--
but specifically, do you think it is going to be possible to
extract Iran out of Syria and Iraq if there is an end to what
is happening in Syria? Because they are dug in deeply now.
General Votel. Yeah. I think there certainly is an
opportunity in Iraq through our strong relationships that we
are developing here, and I think that, you know, one of the
things that I have observed about Iraq over the last year has
been their outreach to other partners across the region,
whether it is Jordan, whether it is Saudi Arabia, whether it is
Kuwait, whether it is Turkey, the other key Sunni nations in
the area. And so they are very much emerging as, you know,
trying to be much more involved in the region, which I think is
a very positive thing. And I think it connotes the fact that
Iraq is for Iraqis. And while they live in a difficult
neighborhood with difficult neighbors and they have to deal
with that, that they are principally concerned with Iraq.
Mr. Hunter. Well, let's bring it back right now because,
right now, we are playing the enemy of our enemy is our friend.
That is what we are playing right now. If the Iranians are the
major power players with weapons and our training and our gear
right now with their handpicked militia guys, the Iraqis can
reach out all they want to, but the power is with the Iranians
in Iraq and Syria right now.
Is that not where the power lies, in your opinion, the
actual power, and I am talking power by force?
General Votel. Well, I think there certainly is influence
here, there is no doubt about that. But, again, I do see within
the Iraqi leadership a very strong sense of independence and a
desire to protect Iraq. And so I think these are things that we
have to continue to build on.
Mr. Hunter. So let me just lay it out then one last time.
You are confident that in the next 10 years we are not going to
see an Iranian-controlled ratline where the Iranians can go
from Tehran through Syria down to Israel on a high-speed road
with M1 Abrams tanks that we have trained them on. You do not
see that happening?
General Votel. Congressman, I wouldn't speculate in that
particular regard. What I would tell you is, I think our best
opportunity to prevent something like that is to stay engaged
and to----
Mr. Hunter. I wouldn't disagree with you on that.
General Votel [continuing]. And to continue to be the
valuable partner that we had been for them, and to continue to
professionalize their forces and their capabilities so that
they are beholden to themselves and not beholden to others to
do things for them, and they don't allow their terrain to be
exploited in the manner that you highlighted.
Mr. Hunter. As you have seen, General, as we train and
equip and try to pick sides, we are not always right on who we
end up helping. And that has turned around to, you know, bite
us a few times. And I really hope that, right now, with the
Iranians we are not doing that in a much bigger way than we
have messed up in the past. So thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. General, I want to follow on two questions
that I don't think you have been asked directly. You started
the hearing talking about considerable success in the fight to
eliminate ISIS from controlling any territory. Is there or will
there be a reduction in U.S. people and U.S. capabilities from
Iraq, especially due to that success?
General Votel. Well, as part of our alignment process there
already has been. And, you know, the success we have had has
given us the ability to move some of these critical resources,
whether it is ISR or fighter aircraft or some of our
engineering capability or medical capability that we required
on the ground and we have been able to reposition that within
the theater, Afghanistan in particular, to make sure that
General Nicholson has what he needs to be successful. So we
already have seen that.
And, of course, as the situation continues to mature, we
will continue to make smart decisions on this. We don't want to
keep one more soldier, one more piece of equipment there than
is needed to support the mission. And that is what we are
pursuing, but we are trying to do it as smartly as we can.
The Chairman. Yeah. Because we also don't want to repeat
the mistakes of the past and leave completely.
The other thing, at one point, the assessment we got was
the most capable terrorist enemy we faced was AQAP, especially
in their bombmaking and so forth. You have talked a little bit
about al-Qaida and ISIS in Yemen. Is there still a terrorist
threat that emanates from Yemen?
General Votel. There is, Chairman, and I think--first of
all, I think our efforts over the last year have been very
effective at addressing many of the concerns that we had with
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. And I think we have
addressed their leadership, their media capability, their
external operations capability, certainly some of their
explosive capability that has been inherent in this
organization.
But I think with al-Qaida, I think it is important to
always understand what their long-term objectives are. And they
are a very patient and savvy organization, and I think we
always have to be concerned about al-Qaida. And so it is
absolutely vital to not take the pressure off now but to keep
the pressure on them and make sure that we complete this effort
against them.
The Chairman. While it is a complex situation, you talked
about the humanitarian, the Houthis, and all that is going on,
I just think it is important not to lose sight of the fact that
there continues to be a terrorist threat that emanates from
there.
I think that we are good for now. Thank you for being here.
We will adjourn this open session, and within about 5
minutes, reconvene upstairs. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 27, 2018
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 27, 2018
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 27, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. There has been some question to how many service
members are currently serving in Afghanistan. Can you give me a current
number?
Does that include temporary, or rotational, forces?
Do you have a sense of the number of civilian contractors? Who
keeps track of that?
How are contractors part of the by, with and thru strategy? What is
their focus? How many contract personnel are there in Afghanistan?
Do you anticipate needing more service members? If so, how many?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE
Mr. O'Rourke. There has been some question to how many service
members are currently serving in Afghanistan. Can you give me a current
number? Does that include temporary, or rotational, forces? Do you have
a sense of the number of civilian contractors? Who keeps track of that?
How are contractors part of the by, with and thru strategy? What is
their focus? How many contract personnel are there in Afghanistan? Do
you anticipate needing more service members? If so, how many?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK
Mr. Cook. After recently visiting the UAE, Saudi and Egypt, I was
left with a deep concern about the loyalties and interactions of Qatar.
While Qatar is an ally in some respects, their deteriorating
relationship with our other allies in the region, and their alleged
support for the Muslim Brotherhood and relationship with Iran are
troubling. How does General Votel and CENTCOM see our future
relationship with Qatar playing out? Is there a back-up plan to move
our base and forces from Qatar if the relationship deteriorates any
further? Does he think the Qatari government is making efforts to
improve the relationship with CENTCOM and the U.S.?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. As best you can in this open forum, can you provide
an overview of how you are approaching cyber operations to support your
ongoing efforts across CENTCOM? And how specifically is U.S. CYBER
COMMAND supporting your efforts?
a) In terms of adversarial cyber capabilities, are you more
concerned with State-sponsored activities such as those exhibited by
Iran, or non-state actors such as AQ and ISIS? Any concern about
Russian cyber activities within your AOR?
b) We have heard a great deal about the need to speed up decision-
making for cyber warfare and cyber operations. What has been your
experience in making decisions to support cyber operations; would you
agree with these assessments that we need to perhaps speed up the
decision-making process, including those within the interagency?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Stefanik. This question deals with countering adversarial
propaganda and disinformation efforts: What do you think is your most
effective tool as a combatant commander to counter adversarial
disinformation efforts including those posed by ISIS, Russia, and Iran?
a) How do you work with the State Department? Does the Global
Engagement Center support your operations? Are we doing enough? What
else remains?
b) The BBC recently conducted an open-source analysis that showed
that ISIS media is showing signs of a recovery after a sharp decline.
Does analysis match your experiences? Can you discuss recent trends in
ISIS media and propaganda?
c) What role does DOD play here as compared to the State
Department?
d) Do you have all of the authorities you need?
General Votel. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
Ms. Stefanik. This question deals with the changing dynamics on the
ground in Syria. More and more, our forces are engaging Russian and
Syrian regime proxies, as most recently seen in the aggressive fighting
in Der az-Zur (Dare-a-Zur). The defeat of ISIS now reveals the
fingerprints of the larger geopolitical fight we are engaged in,
putting at risk current authorities, frameworks, and partnerships. And,
not to mention, the considerable risk to our forces on the ground in an
already clouded and fractured battlefield.
a) What is your long-term view of U.S. presence and investments in
the region?
b) What enduring counterterrorism capabilities do we need to be
considering given the remaining threats on the ground ?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Stefanik. The recent incident of overseas fitness trackers that
telegraphed the positions and data of our servicemen and women overseas
reminds us that the Internet-of-Things continues to change the game.
a) Can you talk about how this is impacting your approach to force
protection. What did we learn from this recent incident and what
changes have been made?
b) In a broader sense, and as a combatant commander, are you
concerned about the proliferation of more than 50 billion connected
sensors and devices? How does this impact your intelligence frameworks
and collection, for example?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
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