[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-72]
STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 15, 2018
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee RO KHANNA, California
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin JIMMY PANETTA, California
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JODY B. HICE, Georgia
Jen Stewart, Staff Director
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Friedberg, Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International
Affairs, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School........... 2
Ratner, Ely, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.......................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Friedberg, Aaron L........................................... 40
Ratner, Ely.................................................. 53
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 38
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Dr. Friedberg paper, ``NSC 68 Plus 68''...................... 65
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 93
Mr. Wilson................................................... 93
STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 15, 2018.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today the
committee meets to receive testimony on strategic competition
with China.
Following our hearing with Admiral Harris yesterday, I
think it is a good time to hear additional perspectives,
especially with the knowledge and expertise of today's
witnesses. They are Dr. Aaron Friedberg, professor at Princeton
University, and Dr. Ely Ratner, senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations. Both are long-time experts on China, and we
thank you both for being with us today.
As the National Defense Strategy points out, long-term
strategic competition with China is a principal priority for
the Department of Defense, requiring an investment and
attention that is both increased and sustained. American
security and American economic prosperity are both at stake.
The National Defense Strategy states, quote, ``China is
leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and
predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder
the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. China continues its
economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an
all-of-nation long-term strategy,'' end quote.
Countering China's all-of-nation strategy is a real
challenge for us. In recent years, we have frequently read or
heard admonitions to integrate all elements of America's
national power--political, economic, and military--but we have
not yet really done so.
If China chooses a path of responsible participation in
world affairs, we should welcome and encourage it. But the U.S.
must also be ready, able, and willing, working with our allies
and partners, to adjust to other choices that China may make.
In his book, ``Destined for War,'' Graham Allison points to
two difficult truths, and I quote: ``First, on the current
trajectory, war between U.S. and China in the decades ahead is
not just possible, but much more likely than currently
recognized. Indeed, on the historical record, war is more
likely than not. Second, war is not inevitable. History shows
that major ruling powers can manage relations with rivals, even
those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering a
war.'' End of Dr. Allison's quote.
The bottom line is, a lot is at stake. And I look forward
to hearing the insights of our witnesses today, as we sort
through these various issues.
Let me yield to the gentlelady from California as the
acting ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just go ahead
and put Mr. Smith, ranking member's, comments in the record,
and look forward to the testimony. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. Again, I appreciate
both witnesses being here. Without objection, your full written
statements will be made part of the record. And also, without
objection, a paper that Dr. Friedberg has written for the
Office of Net Assessment on the strategy China, ``NSC 68 at
68'' I think is the title, will also be made part of the
record. And let me highly encourage members to read that, which
I have. I think it gives us some very useful options for going
forward.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
The Chairman. Again, I appreciate both of you for being
here. Dr. Friedberg, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF AARON L. FRIEDBERG, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON
SCHOOL
Dr. Friedberg. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry,
members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to be here
today. It is an honor for me.
In the time available, I would like to try to make three
main points. First, the strategy that this country has been
pursuing towards China over the past 25 years has failed.
Second, as the chairman mentioned, China is presently
following a wide-ranging, whole-of-government or whole-of-
nation strategy that aims to displace the United States as the
preponderant power in East Asia and I think ultimately the
world.
Third, meeting this challenge will require that we adopt a
new and comprehensive strategy of our own, one that more
effectively mobilizes, integrates, and applies all of the
various instruments of our national power and also those of our
partners. This is doable. And unfortunately, we have not done
it yet. I don't think we are currently doing it adequately.
Time is getting short.
Let me expand briefly on each of these points. Following
the end of the Cold War, the United States adopted a two-
pronged approach for dealing with China. On the one hand, we
sought to engage China across all fronts, diplomatic, cultural,
scientific, and above all, economic. But at the same time,
successive U.S. administrations worked to maintain a favorable
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. We strengthened
our own forward-based forces. We bolstered our traditional
alliances. And we built new quasi-alliance partnerships with
other countries, like Singapore and more recently India.
So we pursued a strategy that involved engagement on the
one hand, but also balancing. And the goals of that two-pronged
strategy were essentially to preserve stability while waiting
for engagement effectively to work its magic on China.
Engagement was supposed to encourage China's leaders to see
their interests as lying in the maintenance and strengthening
of the existing U.S.-led international order, while at the same
time accelerating liberalization of its economy and eventually
the democratization of its political system.
Since the turn of the century, and especially in the last
10 years, it is become increasingly evident that this approach
has failed to achieve its objectives. China has obviously
become far richer and stronger, but instead of loosening its
grip, the country's Communist Party regime has become even more
repressive and more militantly nationalistic. Instead of
evolving towards a truly market-based economy, as it was hoped
and expected, Beijing continues to pursue--and in certain
respects has expanded--its use of state-directed, market-
distorting, mercantilist economic policies.
And finally, China's external behavior, its attitude
towards its neighbors and towards the United States, as well,
has become assertive and even in certain respects aggressive.
China's military build-up is beginning to tilt the balance of
military power away from us and our allies and towards China,
and I would say China is now quite clearly a revisionist power.
It seeks to change important aspects of the existing order in
Asia and increasingly the wider world, as well.
And although all of these tendencies were present and have
been present for some time, they were amplified by the effects
of the financial crisis and even more by the rise to power of
Xi Jinping in 2013.
Regarding China's strategy, like their predecessors, Xi and
his colleagues are driven by a mix of insecurity and ambition.
They fear dissent, social instability, and political unrest,
and they are convinced that the United States and its
democratic allies are out to encircle their country and to
undermine their regime.
At the same time, especially since the crisis, the
financial crisis of 2008, China's leaders have concluded that
America is in decline, that their own power is on the rise, and
that the moment has come for China to reclaim its rightful
place in the world.
But even this overall long-term confidence is tinged with
uncertainty and a sense of urgency. China's rulers know that
they face serious difficulties in sustaining economic growth
and meeting the demands of an increasingly complex and rapidly
aging society. And no matter what their propaganda organs say,
they continue to have a healthy respect for the resilience and
power of the American system.
One reason that they are pressing so hard now, I think, is
that they see a window of opportunity that may not stay open
forever. They want to lock in the gains that they made and
advance towards their goals. So what are those goals?
First and foremost, to preserve the Chinese Communist
Party's monopoly on domestic political power. I think
everything they do at home and abroad is motivated by that
desire. Second, to restore China to what they see as its
rightful place as the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia,
including both its continental and maritime domains. And,
third, to become a truly global player with power, presence,
and influence on par with, and eventually superior to, that of
the United States.
As suggested at the outset, China seeks to integrate all of
the various instruments of its power in pursuit of these goals.
I have discussed this in greater detail in my written testimony
and in a longer paper that Chairman Thornberry kindly
mentioned, that I have submitted for inclusion in the record.
To sum up very briefly, I think Beijing is trying to use
its expanding military capabilities to push the United States
away from East Asia and to weaken our alliances. It is
deploying diplomatic and economic tools in tandem to try to
pull others towards China and to extend its influence in Asia
and beyond. And last but not least, under Xi Jinping, China has
become more aggressive in using information or political
warfare to try to undermine and weaken the ability and resolve
of other countries, including the United States, to resist its
efforts.
Although they have thus far met with mixed results, China's
efforts are impressive in their scope and ambition and in the
resources that they bring to bear. So how should the United
States respond? Let me just touch on a few of the main points
that I try to elaborate in the written testimony, focusing
primarily on the regional as opposed to the global dimension of
our strategy.
First, if we are going to have a strategy, we have to be
clear about what the objectives are, and the objectives that we
pursued previously I think are for the time being out of reach.
I think as a result our objectives are going to have to be
defined for the time being in largely defensive terms, to
prevent the direct physical or indirect economic and
geopolitical domination by China of Eastern Eurasia, and
especially maritime East Asia, and to preserve the openness of
the global commons, especially the waters and airspace of the
vast Indo-Pacific region that connect them to one another and
to us.
Regarding the means, to achieve these ends I don't think we
have to abandon the mixed strategy that we have been pursuing
since the end of the Cold War, but we are going to have to
adjust the blend of its elements. We and our allies will have
to intensify our joint efforts in maintaining a favorable
balance of power, even as China continues to grow strong, while
at the same time not cutting, but modulating and in certain
respects constricting our present posture of open and
essentially unconstrained engagement with China. This is what
might be called a countervailing strategy, rather than a
strategy of containment.
In the military realm, we need to counter China's efforts
to raise doubts about our ability and willingness to project
and sustain power in the Western Pacific in order to uphold our
alliances and ensure freedom of navigation, and we need to find
ways of doing this that will allow us to regain the initiative
in the long-term military competition, increasing the burdens
that China has to bear relative to those of the United States
and its allies. And obviously, this requires money, but even
more I think it demands strategic innovation.
Somewhat more concretely, we need to make progress in three
interrelated areas--countering and offsetting China's expanding
anti-access/area denial network. The previous administration
talked about and began the process of implementing a so-called
Air-Sea Battle doctrine that was withdrawn for various reasons.
It is not clear to me what the replacement for that yet is, but
I think there has to be one.
Secondly, strengthening the capability and credibility of
our extended nuclear guarantee. I think the administration's
recent Nuclear Posture Review was a step in the right direction
here.
And strengthening the ability of our friends and allies to
withstand Chinese attempts at coercion using its developing
power projection capabilities, including its capabilities for
the so-called gray zone, paramilitary capabilities.
In the diplomatic domain, we need to strengthen and extend
our network of alliance and quasi-alliance ties, even as China
tries to weaken and fragment them. Bolstering the credibility
of our military security guarantees is essential to that
effort, but there is more that can and should be done. If we
don't want others in the region to be drawn ever more closely
into a Chinese-dominated economic co-prosperity sphere, we need
to provide them with the greatest possible opportunity to
remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and investment with
us and with one another, and that is why in my view the Trans-
Pacific Partnership was a good idea, certainly from a strategic
perspective, and withdrawing from it I think sent a disturbing
signal.
One part of the line that China is pushing in Asia is that
the United States is a declining power with an increasingly
narrow view of its own interests and that its commitments are
therefore unreliable. To counter this narrative, U.S. diplomacy
should highlight the common values that link it with its major
regional allies and strategic partners, including, I think,
India and also Taiwan, as well as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and others.
Aside from commercial interests or purely geopolitical
concerns about physical security, these shared beliefs provide
an enduring foundation for cooperation. And here are two. I
think there is more that can and should be done.
As regards the economic dimension of our countervailing
strategy, I don't believe that we can any longer afford to
treat China as just another trading partner. It is not, both
because of its refusal to abandon mercantilist policy tools and
because it has clearly become a strategic rival of the United
States. And we need to adjust our approach to economic
engagement with China to take account of these realities, and
this in my view would involve, among other things, joining
forces with other advanced industrial democracies to pressure
China to modify or abandon some of its more egregious market-
distorting policies, doing more to maintain our edge in
strategically relevant technologies, including both measures to
stimulate innovation here, but also to slow the diffusion or
transfer of critical technologies to China. In my view, the
CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States]
reform bill that is working its way through Congress is a step
in the right direction here.
We have to reduce our vulnerability to possible Chinese
economic leverage and counter Chinese attempts to exert
economic leverage over other nations, including through its so-
called Belt and Road initiative, and we have to take steps to
maintain an adequate defense industrial base.
Finally, our strategy for countering China's political
warfare campaign must have both defensive and offensive
elements. And I think it is going to have to involve both
government and the private sector. Regarding the defensive side
of the equation, we need to do more to prevent hostile foreign
powers that do not share our values from exploiting the
openness of our system. So, among other things, I think the
Federal Government should invest more resources in domestic
counterintelligence targeted at this particular problem, but
private-sector organizations and institutions, too, including
think tanks and universities will have to take much of the
responsibility for countering foreign influence attempts that
are inappropriately manipulative and intrusive, even if they
are not flatly illegal. And the best defense against many of
these techniques I think is transparency.
In addition to strengthening its own defenses, the United
States should assist friendly governments seeking to harden
themselves against Chinese influence operations. I think we are
already doing that, for example, with Australia.
Finally, U.S. political warfare strategy must also include
an offensive component that seeks to convey certain messages to
our friends, to our allies, to neutral parties, and to the
extent that they can be reached, to the Chinese people, as
well. Despite its protestations of benign intent, the CCP
[Chinese Communist Party] regime is engaged in activities on a
massive scale that are aggressive, destabilizing, flout
international norms, and impose disproportionate costs on other
societies.
Notwithstanding the impressive growth of its material
power, China has numerous social, economic, and environmental
problems, and absent significant changes in the character of
its domestic political system, its continued rise, to say
nothing of its ability eventually to dominate Asia, perhaps the
world, are by no means inevitable.
Whatever its other accomplishments, the Chinese political
system is brutal, repressive and profoundly corrupt. The CCP
enriches its own members and their families even as it denies
ordinary Chinese people the right to express their opinions, to
choose their leaders, and to worship as they see fit.
Fearful of its own people, the CCP regime invests enormous
resources in monitoring and trying to control their activities.
And this is a sign of weakness and vulnerability, not of
strength. And it is a fact that we need to take into account as
we seek to recalibrate our strategy for engaging with China.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Friedberg can be found in
the Appendix on page 40.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Ratner.
STATEMENT OF ELY RATNER, MAURICE R. GREENBERG SENIOR FELLOW FOR
CHINA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Smith, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on a topic of vital importance
to the future of the United States.
Let me start my testimony with four top-line observations
on what I see as the current state of the U.S.-China
competition. Number one, the United States and China are, in
fact, now locked in a geopolitical competition that will
ultimately determine the rules, norms, and institutions that
govern international relations in the coming decades.
Number two, the United States on balance is currently
losing this competition in ways that increase the likelihood
not just of the erosion of the U.S.-led order, but also the
rise of an illiberal China-dominated Asia and beyond.
To be concrete, here is what this would mean for the United
States: weaker alliances, fewer security partners, and a
military forced to operate at greater distances; U.S. firms
without access to leading technologies and markets and
disadvantaged by unique standards, investment rules, and
trading blocks; weak international and regional institutions
unable to resist Chinese coercion; and a secular decline in
democracy and individual freedoms around the world. The net
result would be a less secure and less prosperous United States
that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.
Number three, the U.S. government has failed to approach
this competition with anything approximating its importance for
the country's future. Much of Washington remains unfocused on
the China challenge, and although the Trump administration has
sounded some of the right notes in its first National Security
Strategy and National Defense Strategy, many of its foreign and
domestic policies do not reflect a government committed to
projecting or sustaining power and leadership in Asia and the
world.
Number four, despite these trends, the United States can
still, in fact, arrest China's momentum and prevent the growth
of an illiberal order in Asia and internationally. The
foundations of American power are strong and we can preserve
our interests and turn this thing around if we muster the
necessary strategy, attention, and resources.
Turning to recommendations for U.S. policy, I should
underscore and agree with what Dr. Friedberg said at the
outset, that succeeding in strategic competition with China
will require a comprehensive whole-of-government policy across
security, economics, politics, diplomacy, information, and
ideology. These all interact with one another and actually
cannot be separated out from each other.
In my written testimony, I provide several policy
recommendations for Congress to consider. Let me use just the
balance of my time to highlight four specific issues for your
attention.
First, Congress should prioritize defense resources for the
China challenge. Our military investments and the way we use
the force should reflect the statement in the National Defense
Strategy that inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism,
is the primary concern in U.S. national security. This should
include reducing our footprint in Afghanistan and the Middle
East and shifting limited resources to the Pacific.
We also need to ensure, as is definitively not the case
today, that U.S. partners associated with the China challenge,
as compared to those in other regions, are receiving an
appropriate proportion of the U.S. defense trade and arms
transfers.
Second, it will be imperative for the United States to
avoid wars of choice, especially with North Korea. A preventive
war with North Korea would make it far more difficult, if not
impossible, for the United States to succeed in a strategic
competition with China. Put another way, a decision to attack
North Korea to deny them a nuclear capability in the absence of
an act of North Korean aggression would likely forfeit the
strategic competition with China.
Third, with respect to the economic competition, it is
absolutely essential for the United States to rejoin the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. China's coercive power and influence are
growing in the absence of U.S. economic leadership, and even a
$1 trillion U.S. defense budget would not make up the
difference if countries in the region perceive China as
economically dominant and the center of the region's economic
future.
In response, the United States can't just be playing
defense with CFIUS reform and export controls, as important as
those efforts are. We need to play offense, with a multilateral
initiative to strengthen the rules of the international trading
and investment system.
Fourth and finally, Mr. Chairman, Congress should increase
support for U.S. information operations and strategic
messaging. Ideology and information are going to be central to
this competition in ways we have not experienced since the end
of the Cold War. Congress should call upon the Broadcasting
Board of Governors in Radio Free Asia to testify on what it
would take to significantly expand their China-related content
throughout the region and beyond to provide a counterweight to
China's global propaganda operation.
Related to this, as Dr. Friedberg mentioned, the United
States should also work with like-minded partners to root out
malign Chinese Communist Party influence operations that are
shaping information and debates about China around the world.
Alternatively, failing to address this information space will
make it much more difficult to succeed in other areas of the
competition.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you both. There is a lot to
pursue there. I just want to, I guess, ask one question. And
that--and you have both talked about whole-of-government,
everything is integral, we have got to do better. But I want to
just pull out for a second the military aspect.
So if China thinks that we are in decline, that there is a
narrowing window of opportunity for them, to what extent does
that reflect their perception of our willingness to spend on
defense, our willingness to be innovative? What portion of this
perception that we are in decline is military versus other
economic, social, other aspects? Dr. Friedberg.
Dr. Friedberg. Chinese spend a lot of time making these
judgments and assessments. They devote enormous energy----
The Chairman. Would you pull that microphone right in front
of you, please?
Dr. Friedberg. I am sorry. They take very seriously this
process of trying to assess trends, long-term trends. I think
the answer to your question, my own sense is that if they look
now at the situation in the world and in the Western Pacific in
particular, they don't have any illusions about our military
superiority and the strength of our alliances and so on.
But as they look over the longer term, and in particular as
they assess those societal trends, the character of our
political discourse, our economic dynamism, and so on, I think
for those reasons they believe that these long-term trends are
running in their favor and that our resolve may weaken before
our actual capabilities weaken. So it is partly about the
military balance, but it is more about the future and these
longer-term trends.
The Chairman. Okay, so explain to me if you would just the
window of opportunity that you said they could see closing
soon.
Dr. Friedberg. Two aspects of this. The Chinese doctrine or
discussion of the strategic environment and competition has
included for some time the notion that China has a 20-year
window of strategic opportunity that started in 2002. And the
idea is that Chinese strategists at that point, I think in part
because of 9/11 and their recognition that the United States
was going to be preoccupied in other places with other
problems, would have an opportunity, unharassed, to develop its
power and increasing its influence, but they have never
believed that that was going to go on forever and that the
competition would intensify.
I think a little more concretely and specially, I think
they--as I mentioned--regard the 2008 financial crisis as a
major setback for us and for our system and for the idea that
we sort of know what we are doing, our confidence and our
resources. And I think also as they look at our political
discourse today and divisions in our country and difficulty in
reaching consensus about a whole array of issues, they see
that, too, as providing an opportunity and they want to take
advantage of it.
The Chairman. Okay, Dr. Ratner, to what extent does
military play into this perception of us?
Dr. Ratner. I guess I would agree with Dr. Friedberg. I
think the Chinese still respect U.S. military power in and of
itself. I think where they have come to doubt us is in our
resolve and attention. And in the South China Sea, for
instance, I think they have been surprised at how easily they
have been able to build out their sphere of influence, in
essence pushing on an open door, and leading to so much self-
deterrence on the United States and fear of confrontation.
Mr. Chairman, I know you cited Graham Allison's book and
the Thucydides trap in terms of concerns about conflict between
rising powers. I am much more concerned that a Chinese sphere
of influence, Chinese domination will result from a permissive
environment that we create by our inattention, rather than
conflict as a result of being too confrontational.
And I would agree with Dr. Friedberg that the political and
economic components of this related to at once the global
financial crisis, but also the withdrawal of TPP [Trans-Pacific
Partnership], compounded with some of the political dysfunction
here in Washington, compounded with some of the diplomatic
actions that the Trump administration has taken to withdraw
U.S. leadership in the world, has created an opportunity that
is more for them to fill a vacuum and avoid rather than even
having to push the United States out of its leadership role.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ranking Member.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
testimony. It was very well summarized and I think a good
outline of the problem and the challenge.
What countries in the Asia region do you think are most
important for us in terms of building alliances to accomplish
what we are talking about here? And I think you outlined it
perfectly in terms of what China is trying to accomplish and
why it is bad for us and bad for the globe. But it starts with
the countries in the region, and the countries in the region
are sort of trapped to some extent between--they have got a big
powerful neighbor there. They may not like what they are doing,
but how do they navigate that?
What are the most important countries? And what should we
do to try to strengthen those alliances to maintain our friends
and power in the Asia region?
Dr. Friedberg. I think among our five traditional
alliances, our formal mutual defense treaties and alliances in
the region, the most--the big three are probably Japan,
certainly the most important in terms of resources, and I think
also commitment to cooperating with us in trying to counter the
growth of Chinese power, which they feel is very directly
threatening to their interests and even their survival.
The Republic of Korea certainly is still an important ally
and partner of the United States, although I think the views in
Korea about exactly what direction they want to go are perhaps
more in play than is the case in Japan.
Australia, which has stepped up and really is playing a
very important role I think in assisting us. It would be good
if we had more cooperation, for example, from the Philippines
in order to enable us better to counter what the Chinese are
trying to do in the South China Sea. It would be good to have
access to facilities and more active cooperation, perhaps, than
we have had.
Non-alliance countries or countries to whom we don't extend
a security guarantee are also important. Singapore has played a
major role in helping us to maintain our naval presence in the
region, and India I think in the long run, too, because of its
resources and its attitude towards the region and towards
China, and because of our ideological commonality will be a
critically important partner, although there our relationship
is really just getting going.
The issues I think differ in each case, but I think overall
it is important for us to convey the sense that we are not
going anywhere, we intend to stay in the region, to remain
strong, and to help our allies to defend themselves. I think
there are opportunities for expanded defense cooperation,
certainly with Japan.
There is something that is happening in the region I would
say not in spite of us, but aside from what we are doing, which
I think is very positive, which is that countries with whom we
have sort of bilateral relationships are also now talking to
one another and trying to cooperate more closely on strategic
issues, Japan with India, for example, or Australia with India.
Those are tendencies, too, that we should be encouraging.
But I think it would be a mistake to believe that somehow
the balance of power is going to be maintained automatically
because these countries fear China. They do. They want to
maintain their autonomy. But they look to us for leadership. I
think no one in the region believes that they can maintain a
balance without us. We need to make sure that they believe that
we will be there with them.
Dr. Ratner. Yes, my list would be similar to your specific
question about which partners. I think Australia, Japan, and
South Korea are clearly among the five, the most central to our
security network in East Asia, and finding a way to keep the
Philippine relationship survivable through this period with
President Duterte will be really important, because we have an
important historical and economic relationship with them, and
they occupy a really important piece of geography. So we ought
to keep our eye on that relationship, as well.
In terms of non-ally countries, I would echo Singapore and
India. I would add to that list Indonesia and Vietnam. I think
these are countries, Mr. Congressman--and I believe yesterday
you described them before Admiral Harris as fence-sitters. I
think that is a good description. And I think these are
countries that don't want to live in a China-dominated Asia,
but if push comes to shove, they will.
And they will--if they don't see an economic alternative
and a security alternative, I think they will hold their nose
and live within a China-dominated order. So I think there is
opportunity there. On the economic side, you know, clearly,
again, providing alternatives to a China-dominated centric
economic order is going to be really important. And if the
Trans-Pacific Partnership is not politically possible right
now, then the Trump administration needs to be coming forward
with some bold and ambitious initiatives, some of which I think
are germinating but none of which have appeared yet.
And on the security front, I would say, again, as I said in
my oral testimony, I think we need to--if you look at the
balance of the degrees to which we are building partner
capacity in Asia versus other regions, it is quite
disproportionately low. And so, for instance, the marquee
initiative of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative--or,
sorry, the major capacity-building initiative in Southeast
Asia, I think this was $450 million or $425 million over 5
years, at a time when we are spending north of $5 billion or
$10 billion in Afghanistan, does not look to me like a country
that again, according to the National Security Strategy, is
placing the China challenge at the top of its U.S. national
security interest.
Mr. Smith. Okay, thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Friedberg, I agree
with you that China appreciates the resilience and power of the
United States. I have had the opportunity to go on delegations
to China. It was really meaningful to me. My dad served in the
Flying Tigers in World War II. He developed a great affection
for the Chinese people and he hoped for the best for them.
And then on my visits there, I have been at public
presentations. I have also seen the monuments placed in
recognition of the American military which served there during
World War II, which they professed to me over and over again
saved hundreds of thousands of lives of innocent Chinese
civilians. So I have seen a positive.
But at the same time, as I believe it will be mutually
beneficial for China and America to be partners, we have a
circumstance--and this is for both of you--of Chinese
propaganda operations in the United States. And that is
specifically I would like to hear your thoughts concerning the
Confucius Institutes and the role they perform for the Chinese
government within America.
Since 2005, more than 100 Confucius Institutes have opened
at American colleges and universities. Last year, the number of
Confucius Institutes in the world rose by 40 percent. They are
funded by the Chinese Government's Ministry of Education, and
in 2009, the head of the propaganda for the Chinese Communist
Party called the Confucius Institutes, quote, ``an important
part of China's overseas propaganda set-up,'' end of quote.
Some of these universities also host research center
laboratories with the U.S. Department of Defense, where they
conduct highly sensitive research. For each of you, do you
believe the Confucius Institutes pose a threat to university-
affiliated research center laboratories which conduct highly
sensitive research on behalf of the Department of Defense?
Dr. Friedberg. Thank you. I agree the Chinese operations,
information operations, propaganda, political warfare as they
use the term, are pervasive in democratic societies, including
our own, and I think we are just starting to pay adequate
attention to this.
Confucius Institutes originally were presented as
mechanisms for encouraging Chinese language education in the
United States and for introducing students and others to
Chinese culture. They appear benign, and I suppose in some
sense, some of their activities might be, but as you mentioned,
they have this tie to the Chinese regime. They have also
allegedly in a number of instances played a role in shaping
discussion on college campuses and elsewhere of issues related
to China and suppressing the expression of some views that the
Chinese regime finds offensive.
I think one of the features of the Confucius Institutes
that has now aroused the greatest concern is that they in many
cases involved essentially secret covenants between the funders
and the host institutions, the universities, signed agreements
that were not made public. And so there has been a kind of
backlash against this, and I think on balance that is a good
thing.
There is another--there are several other sets of issues
that you mentioned about research cooperation, about the role
of Chinese students, visiting faculty at universities, and what
risks that may pose, and the director of the FBI [Federal
Bureau of Investigation] I think raised some questions about
this in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Those are obviously very sensitive questions.
I think there is a problem here. We have to be careful how
we deal with it so that we are dealing fairly with students who
come to this country and also people who may be of Chinese
ethnicity that are American citizens and should not be exposed
to prejudice or accused of things that they are not guilty of.
There is also another aspect--if I could just very briefly
touch on it--which I think may be more important than all of
this, which is the nature of the relationships between Chinese
and American businesses. Chinese investment in the United
States, the pressure that the regime has put on American and
other foreign companies to transfer advanced technology to
China in order to have access to the Chinese market, that I
think is a real and pressing area of strategic concern, as
well.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And Dr. Ratner.
Dr. Ratner. Yes, I would only add that I think transparency
is the answer here. I think to the degree that, you know,
universities should be responsible and held accountable to both
making public the amount of money that they are receiving from
the Chinese Government, as well as what the specifics of those
arrangements are, and to the extent that those deals are made
public, I think the record of the last several months and years
has been that they get corrected, again, sort of through
transparency.
And I would just add, I think the university issue is an
important area, but I would agree with Dr. Friedberg that I
think we do need a broader conversation about the role of the
private sector in this discussion, as well as the role of the
U.S. media and self-censorship, as well as the entertainment
industry in the United States. So this isn't just a problem in
universities.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for
joining with us today. I don't know if you happened to see the
testimony yesterday, but Admiral Harris told the committee that
he thinks North Korea's Kim Jong-un seeks to reunify the Korean
Peninsula under his control, thinking about his grandfather,
his father, and their failure to do that.
So he is really--suggesting that he is on a path to achieve
a united Korean Peninsula that is subject to Kim and the
Communist regime. I wondered if you agree with that position or
whether you think Kim Jong-un is motivated only by regime
survival. What do you think China believes that his intentions
are?
Dr. Friedberg. Based on what I know about North Korea--and
that was an issue that I worked on when I was in the government
in the George W. Bush administration--I agree with Admiral
Harris. I think that has been the goal of the North Korean
regime going back to its founding. Kim Jong-un is not different
in that regard, although he has capabilities that his father
and grandfather sought, but had not yet acquired, and that
makes him a greater threat.
So, yes, I don't think he is intending just to survive. I
think in his dreams he imagines being the great unifier of
Korea. I do not think that that is plausible. I think we have
to make sure that we deter any effort to achieve that through
the use of coercion or force, but we have to be aware that
those, in fact, are the objectives of the regime. It may appear
crazy to us, but I don't think it is to Kim Jong-un or to the
people around him.
I think the Chinese assessment of North Korea is in flux.
There is no love lost between the Chinese regime and the
present North Korean regime. I think they are worried and
annoyed at the things that he has done to provoke the United
States, in part because they fear that is going to strengthen
our defense position and our alliances there; but I think,
unfortunately, the record shows that the Chinese regime is
simply not willing to apply the kind of pressure that they
could conceivably to North Korea to reach what we would regard
as a satisfactory resolution of this standoff.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. Dr. Ratner.
Dr. Ratner. Yes, I am going to slightly disagree here. I
think my answer to the question of what are Kim Jong-un's
intensions is we don't know. And I think I would be a little
cautious about--I mean, I think people have instincts and
guesses. I would be cautious about anyone stating with
certainty.
I spent the last 2 years of the Obama administration in the
White House seeing and reading all sorts of U.S. intelligence.
I didn't come to that conclusion. And I think we ought to be
cautious about doing so.
I also think his intentions may change, and that is
something we should keep an eye on. As capabilities grow,
intentions grow, as well, so it is not impossible. But I think
what we have seen so far suggests to me that a policy of
deterrence and containment is the appropriate approach right
now, given what would be the terrible costs of preventive war.
Mrs. Davis. And China's view of his intentions? The same?
Dr. Ratner. I don't know about China's views of his
intentions. I think China is looking out for its own interests,
which is stability, and they are going to do whatever they can
to prevent conflict on the peninsula. And I think that is what
we have seen so far; so they are engaging in a constant
balancing act between applying enough pressure to keep the
Trump administration at bay without so much pressure as to
potentially destabilize the regime. So I think they have tried
to stay in that box so far.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I wanted to just--one other
question. I mean, we all talk about the difference between our
open system and obviously their closed system in that sense. So
they have some cultural vulnerabilities, as well.
How can we better leverage some of those weaknesses in
strategic competition with them? And I am thinking about,
obviously, the violation of human rights, freedom of
expression, adherence to the rule of law. How do we leverage
that? And what kind of job are we doing?
Dr. Friedberg. I think that is a crucial question and an
extremely difficult one to answer, especially as China has
gotten richer and more powerful. But overall, it seems to me
that it is a mistake for us to back away from talking about
these issues, raising these issues, raising them in a general
way in public, raising them with our Chinese counterparts.
I think we have become more and more wary about doing that
as China has grown richer and stronger. And that is a mistake.
Now, to believe that we can directly or even indirectly have a
major influence on the course of the evolution of this vast
society and complex political system is an illusion. It is one
that I think underpinned our strategy for a long time.
I guess I would say just generally, we have to continue to
believe in the things that we believe in, and not seem to have
doubts about the values on which our system is based.
I guess one last thing. We talk sometimes about American
values, but in fact our system is founded on what we believe to
be universal values. It is not our system. It is our belief in
the sanctity of the individual and all that follows from that.
And we have to make sure that people understand that we do
believe in those things.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
our witnesses for joining us.
Dr. Friedberg, I would like to go to you first. In your
testimony, you point to China's operations in the South China
Sea. You talk specifically about what they have done in
expansion areas there. We know some of those islands are as big
as Washington, DC.
We also know that they have unveiled a new dredging, reef-
building, island-building ship called the Tiankun. And it can
dredge up to 211 cubic feet of material every hour. That is
two-and-a-half Olympic-sized swimming pools. Pretty amazing. We
think with that they can build up to nine additional islands,
fortify--or nine new islands, fortify existing islands, which
really to me reinforces their intent to dominate--not just have
a presence, but to dominate the South China Sea area, to push
others out.
And I want to go to your testimony where you say the true
significance of these islands in the South China Sea may lie
not in whatever role they might play in future conflict, but in
the seemingly inability or unwillingness of the United States
to prevent them from being built. I think that is a great
point.
Give me your perspective about what we clearly see from
China and their efforts to expand and fortify this island
chain. What does that mean to the United States? And what can
we do currently to dissuade them or to stop that current
effort?
Dr. Friedberg. Thank you very much. Yes, China is I think
trying now vigorously to assert longstanding claims to control
virtually all of the water surface features, resources of the
South China Sea. And they are doing it through the use of a
variety of means, including this creation of artificial
islands.
In my view, as I mentioned in the testimony, as you quoted,
the significance of this in part was to demonstrate that they
could do it and we were not willing to stop them. And I think
they kept on going because we did not have a very strong
response.
I do not think we can undo this. And probably we are not
going to be able to significantly slow or prevent them from
continuing with it. But what does it mean in the longer run?
They are going to create these positions. These will enable
them better to project and to maintain military power and a
presence across this entire region.
The significance of these fortified islands in a conflict
with the United States or a big power is probably not great.
They are very vulnerable. They could be easily destroyed in the
opening stages of a conflict. Their significance in a possible
confrontation with only the local powers, however, would be
great.
As far as what we can do about it, I think probably there
are layers to the answer. One is, we have to make sure that we
are able to maintain ourselves a more or less continuous
presence in that region. We both mentioned the value of the
Philippines and access to the Philippines for this purpose.
In the long run, we have to develop and help our allies to
acquire capabilities that could be used to neutralize some of
the capabilities that the Chinese are developing in the region.
But part of what we need to do is symbolic, but nonetheless
important for being so.
We need to deny the existence or not accept the reality of
any attempt by the Chinese to impose zones of exclusion in the
air or on the sea that exceed what they are entitled to under
international law. So we need to demonstrate, and our friends
and allies, too, our willingness to sail and fly wherever
international law permits.
We have done that in a rather sporadic way. I think we have
called great attention to what we intended to do, and then we
have not necessarily followed through. But there are a lot of
other countries that share our concern. The British just sent a
British Royal Navy vessel to sail through these waters. The
French have expressed some interest in doing it. The regional
countries, as well. We should be working with our partners to
make sure that on any given day there are ships and aircraft
passing through this zone, regardless of what the Chinese say.
Mr. Wittman. Very good, thanks. Dr. Ratner, I want to go to
your testimony where you talked about the efforts of China to
reduce U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region and to exclude
in certain areas, push us out. Give me your perspective on the
things that China is doing now to exacerbate that even more, to
make us stand off even further distances.
With the development of hypersonics, you know, they are
developing the DF-17, which has an extended range out to 2,300
kilometers. Give us your perspective on what they are doing
there and the continued effort to push us out, to exclude us in
those areas, and hold at risk our assets in that region and
where they are with the advancement of this very troubling
technology.
Dr. Ratner. I think that is right, Mr. Congressman, and it
is really a whole suite of military capabilities that they have
been developing that have made it increasingly risky for us to
project power into the Western Pacific. And I think that is a
real problem, politically, as well. They are driving divisions
between us and our allies, undermining our partnerships with
other countries, and economically, as well, through the Belt
and Road initiative.
So I would look at this very comprehensively. I think the
military piece is important, but it is one of a much larger
puzzle.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank the witnesses, as well. Wanted to reiterate the point
that both of them made, that the TPP agreement is in the United
States best interests. And it sounds like both witnesses
strongly supported bringing that agreement to fruition.
When Dr. Friedberg opened his statement, he said
unequivocally that U.S. policy toward China had failed. That
sounds like you were too polite to say that we are now in the
post-Kissinger era. Was Dr. Kissinger naive perhaps?
Dr. Friedberg. Dr. Kissinger is many things, but naive is
not one of those things.
Mr. Cooper. Well, wrong then.
Dr. Friedberg. No, I think we made a bet. We had a strategy
that was based on a certain set of assumptions that were not
entirely unreasonable, that through engaging China we could
encourage favorable trends that would lead ultimately to its
transformation.
Thinking back to when we really decided particularly on the
economic front to pursue that element of our strategy, it is in
the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the early
1990s. I think there was a belief that authoritarian regimes
were on the way out and that there would be change quickly in
China. This is also in the wake of Tiananmen, so it didn't seem
like it was so far-fetched.
The problem is that we became addicted economically and I
think in a sense psychologically, as well, to the idea that
simply continuing what we were doing would achieve these
desirable strategic effects. It was economically beneficial to
some sectors in our economy, although clearly not to others.
And it appeared to be the reasonable thing to do. It wasn't
obvious what the alternative was.
So it is difficult for me looking back to fault people for
making those choices. I guess the problem was and remains our
unwillingness to acknowledge the accumulating evidence of the
reality of what has been happening in China and our difficulty,
which continues down to the present, of--in wrestling with the
question of how we now want to, as I said, modulate, and in
certain respects constrict our engagement.
We are having great difficulty with that. We seem to be in
a world where we think it is one thing or the other. We are
either completely open or somehow completely closed. And nobody
wants to be completely closed. And I think that is one of the
greatest challenges we face. Reform of our system for
overseeing foreign direct investment is part of this, but there
are a broader set of questions about the character of our
trade, about technology transfer, investment by American firms
in China, that we have really just started to deal with.
And we haven't made a lot of progress on that. And it is
going to be difficult. There are a lot of interests, a lot of
people who don't want any of that to change.
Mr. Cooper. Dr. Ratner.
Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congressman, I have an article just out
this week in Foreign Affairs magazine with the former Assistant
Secretary of State Kurt Campbell that makes this precise
argument that the assumptions that undergirded our strategy
since the end of the Cold War simply haven't panned out across
how our combination of balancing and engagement would lead to
China's evolution of economic opening, political opening, some
degree of willingness to live within the U.S.-led security
order in Asia, and then how China would behave in terms of
integrating into the international liberal order.
So I think what we are seeing today in terms of the
National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy, I
think we would have seen a version of this under a President
Hillary Clinton, as well. So I don't think this is exclusive to
President Trump or a Republican administration. I think we are
at a moment of reckoning in our U.S.-China strategy, and I
think we are wrestling now with, okay, we see the cognitive
dissonance between what our expectations were and what the
reality is, and what do we do next and how do we gear up for
this competition?
And again, I would just say I think the--I support the
Trump administration strategy documents, yet it would be good
to see them filling out in the other components of U.S. policy
to gear up for that competition.
Mr. Cooper. My time is running out. Any thoughts on the
future of Hong Kong or Taiwan?
Dr. Friedberg. I think the question of the future of Hong
Kong has effectively been answered. The Beijing regime is
increasing its grip on Hong Kong and suppressing efforts to
maintain autonomy, although they haven't completed that yet.
The question of the future of Taiwan remains very much
open. It is clear that the Beijing regime wants eventually to
bring Taiwan under its control, and for the most part the
people of Taiwan resist that. That is not a change. I think the
problem is that the balance of power is shifting, and China's
capabilities for forcibly imposing such a resolution to this
longstanding standoff are growing, and that is a problem that
we are going to have to face.
The Chairman. Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Dr. Ratner, I would be interested
in your thoughts on the South China Sea. You said in your
testimony that you think China was surprised at how quickly
they were able to do it and the little resistance we got. What
do you think we should have done? And/or most importantly, what
do you think we should do now?
Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Congresswoman. I have written
extensively on this issue. I think given where we are now, we
can Monday morning quarterback about what we should have done 5
years ago. I think where we are now, I think we need to
transition from a policy that was predicated on trying to
restrain China through international law and dialogue to a
policy predicated on militarizing the South China Sea on our
own terms.
And that means in terms of the U.S. military, but also in
terms of how we are going about building partner capacity among
the other claimants and to what end, in terms of helping them
build their own anti-access/area denial capabilities, turning
China's military strategy on its head, and giving these
countries counter-intervention capabilities.
I will say, though, that that strategy won't work unless
the United States is viewed as a leader on economics and
diplomacy, as well, because countries are going to be and
already are increasingly reluctant to stick their necks out if
they think that the future of the Asian economy is going to be
with China and they will be punished or left out of opportunity
for partnering with the United States or resisting China.
So I think there has to be an economic component to this.
An informational component, as well. There is a very specific
recommendation in my written testimony encouraging Congress to
include a provision in the 2019 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] to require the State Department to produce a
public report, quarterly report on Chinese activities in the
South China Sea. I think we need to be putting this information
and the images we have on the front pages of regional
newspapers. We are not doing that, and it is making it easier
for regional governments to turn the other cheek, to turn a
blind eye to this.
Mrs. Hartzler. That builds on one of my questions. I think
you have answered it. Does the United States have a strategic
communications strategy to counter China? And what would an
effective one look like? So anything you want to expound on
that?
Dr. Ratner. I think currently we are not focused on this
area, and we absolutely will have to be, given the billions of
dollars that China invests in shaping the narrative on the
South China Sea. But the rest of the region, as well.
But as it relates to the South China Sea, they have been
very effective selling a story of calm and only outside
disturbance and influence, and that has led to ASEAN
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] and other regional
institutions being willing to back off this issue. So we should
be very focused on the information side of this.
Mrs. Hartzler. And not just on South China Sea. My question
is broader. I don't think most Americans know all of the whole-
of-country plan that they have, and One Belt, One Road, and
everything else. But last year, the South China Morning Post
published an article describing efforts by China to exploit and
gain access to U.S. nuclear weapons research by luring
scientists back to China through financial incentives, appeals
to patriotism, and the promise of better jobs.
So in an annual report to Congress, the Department of
Defense noted that China is actively pursuing an intensive
campaign to gain access to U.S. technology by using Chinese
nationals such as students or researchers who are studying at
U.S. universities and working in U.S. labs. What can Congress
do to help the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy mitigate this very serious threat to our national
security?
Dr. Friedberg. There is a--I mean, there are activities
that have to do with classified information and projects which
presumably are protected or should be protected from
participation by people who don't have appropriate clearances
and aren't supposed to have access. That is a job that we
should be doing.
I think, in fact, historically there are some examples
where we seem to have failed and the Chinese in one way or
another have gained access to information that has allowed them
to move forward more quickly in developing their nuclear
capabilities and others. So there is a counterintelligence
issue.
I think the more difficult problem lies in areas of so-
called dual-use technology or emerging technologies that are
being developed initially for commercial reasons, but which
clearly have enormous potential for development of military
systems, things like artificial intelligence, robotics, big
data analytics, and so on. That seems to me to be the most
difficult problem.
And that is also something that has--in my understanding,
at least, has not been adequately covered by the mechanisms
that we have for reviewing proposed investments by Chinese
firms or firms that are linked by one step or two steps to
China. And we have to scrutinize those and probably regulate
them more carefully than we have in the past. If it is possible
for venture capital firms to come and buy up start-ups that are
doing work that may have enormous strategic significance, that
is a problem for our security.
There will be objections to that, because it also involves
commerce and openness. We don't want to shut ourselves off. But
I think we have to start by looking at what is actually going
on.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Friedberg, the
interesting thing about one of the publications that you
attached is the concept of the NSC 68, which seems to be the
genesis of the Cold War philosophy. And though you seem to have
different points as to why it may not be as applicable, people
do find an analogy to what is going on with China with what
happened back then.
I guess my interest is more along the lines of, one of the
confusions that I think people have is, what exactly is the
Trump administration's position on isolationism? Which was, as
you know, the genesis of the beginning of the whole Cold War
discussion. You know, are we going to actively pursue in the
Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific region? Or are we going to simply
just react, which seems to be kind of the mode that we are in?
I believe if you heard Admiral Harris' testimony yesterday,
one of the things that he keeps warning about is the fact that
we created--the United States created a period of calm and sort
of stability within Asia-Pacific and the beneficiary was China,
not us. It was China. As a matter of fact, the whole concept of
the pivot to Asia-Pacific was because the perception is we
pivoted away and we concentrated on the Middle East instead.
And in the meantime, China grew, because there was no one
there to keep China in check. So I would like to get a better
sense of what you meant or why you even put in NSC 68. It seems
to be there to prompt the discussion, and I am concerned about
the isolationism issue.
Dr. Friedberg. Thank you very much. Yes, I used the
reference to NSC 68 for exactly the reason that you indicate.
This is--the situations are not entirely comparable. In fact,
they differ in many ways. But it seems to me we are probably in
a period that resembles the one that we were in back in the
late 1940s and maybe down to 1950, where we are not certain
exactly what the character of our relationship is going to be
with this new emerging power, but there is increasing concern
about it, and where we have not yet reached national consensus
on how we are going to respond and what our strategy is going
to be.
Now, the analogy breaks down, because I think the situation
is different and the strategy has to be different. But it seems
to me, as I said before, we have to find a position that is
somewhere in between true containment, Cold War attempts to cut
off trade and technology and so on--that is not going to
happen--something between that and doing what we are doing now,
which is not adequately defending our interests.
As far as----
Ms. Hanabusa. If I may just interrupt you there. But, see,
Dr. Friedberg, the reason why it seems to be so analogous is
that what our emphasis seems to be, especially with the release
of the new NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], we seem to be going
back to the triad and the whole issue of our dominance or our
position militarily in the region seems to be shifting to
nuclear.
And as a result of that, that is where I believe that the
analogy also comes into play, if you would like to continue.
Dr. Friedberg. On the nuclear issue, that is part of the
equation. We have to, I think, do things to make sure that not
only China, but Russia, too--Chinese and Russian leaders don't
believe that they could use nuclear weapons in some limited way
and we would not have an adequate response, and I think that is
part of what the Nuclear Posture Review is getting at.
But I think the other levels of our capability, including
in particular our conventional capability, are extremely
important here and in fact probably in some ways more
important. I mentioned the anti-access/area denial problem. We
had a question about this. This is something that we have
recognized now for over a decade, but we have not really I
think fully and adequately addressed it.
I mentioned Air-Sea Battle. It had its problems, but it was
a public and comprehensible response to a real problem. And I
think whatever we are doing in secret in our war plans and our
weapons development, at some point we have to be able to tell a
story to our allies, to our own people, to China, about what
our military strategy is going to be and why we think it is
going to work. We did that in the Cold War. We had so-called
flexible response.
Ms. Hanabusa. So, Doctor, you agree that we are not being
very clear as to where we are standing on all of this and what
our position is in the Indo-Pacific area?
Dr. Friedberg. We are not being clear enough. I think we
are starting to get greater clarity, but we are not close to
where we need to be.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask about
China's systemic strategy of intellectual property theft,
particularly at college campuses. You have each spoken to the
value of transparency in that system. And I was wondering what
tools might be available where research is being conducted at a
college campus. You typically are in search of investment. You
see what might be a thinly veiled Chinese business, but really
it enjoys the support of the Chinese Government up here. And
then the technology is then commercialized back in China.
What would be some of the forward-leaning strategies you
would suggest for our higher education partners so that they
don't fall into that trap?
Dr. Friedberg. Well, I think the place to start, as you
suggested, is with transparency. And part of the problem is
that universities, but also think tanks and other institutions
of that sort, are dealing with counterparts who have links, in
fact, to the Chinese party and the Chinese state which are not
immediately obvious.
So China has set up a number of foundations which are--
appear to be analogs to American not-for-profit foundations
that fund research and do other things in the United States and
elsewhere. But if you look carefully at how they are
structured, who the members of their boards are, there are
obvious links to the party and they are part of what is called
the so-called united front effort that China engages in.
So I would say--start with transparency. And the trustees
of universities, for example, as well as faculty have to be
aware if university administrators are signing agreements with
entities that have these kinds of links. And in some cases, I
think at least there will be an inclination not to engage in
them.
There may also be legal questions. And I don't claim to be
an expert on those or what our options would be there. But I
think there are some things we probably just don't want to
allow, connections between entities in China that are directly
linked, for example, to the PLA [People's Liberation Army].
In Australia, PLA-linked research institutions have set up
cooperative arrangements with Australian universities, and the
Australian government is now re-examining those and probably is
going to implement laws that forbid them. I don't know that we
have had that degree of penetration. But if we did, it would be
something that ought to be regulated.
But we need to start by shedding light on what the nature
of these connections actually is.
Dr. Ratner. The only thing I would add would be, there is
obviously a role here for the universities to get together
themselves and in association groups and come up with standards
of behavior or shared norms around how they are going to be
accepting Chinese money. Because there is a little bit of a
hang together or hang separately component to this kind of
competition over funds, and if there were standards of
transparency or otherwise and everyone was operating at the
same level, that would create a fair playing field and not lead
to some of these more secret, private, malicious agreements.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here. I appreciate your time, your efforts, as well
as your expertise on this topic.
I am not sure which one of you mentioned, but you talked
about that our allies need to feel like the United States is
not going anywhere. My question to you is based on your
expertise, do our allies--what do our allies feel about the
United States and the future of our involvement in that area?
You have probably been there. You have read a lot more than I
have. And so I pose to you that question, but I also want to
ask, what is the propaganda efforts that are aiding any sort of
sentiment about the United States future intention there,
China's propaganda efforts? And is there anything that we are
doing to counter those efforts, as well?
Dr. Friedberg. Thank you. Of course, Asia is a big place.
Each one of these countries is a big country.
Mr. Panetta. Understood.
Dr. Friedberg. So there is a range of views. If you look at
some of the public opinion polls, there are expressions of
uncertainty. If you talk to people privately, depending on
where you are, I think there is a deep concern about where we
are headed, maybe not in the short run--and there might have
been immediately after our election, given some of the things
that President Trump had said as a candidate about our allies
and uncertainty about what he was going to do and some relief
that none of the worst things actually happened. There was no
tearing up of alliances and so on.
But there is a sense of uncertainty and concern--and I
think also now an uncertainty about the functioning of our
political system. If it is possible for an administration to
come in which appears at least to be wanting to head off in a
totally different direction, even if it doesn't this time
around, could it happen the next time or the time after that?
I think there has been a degree of confidence in our
presence and our commitment over the last 60, 70 years which is
not as strong as it once was. And it has partly to do with us,
but it also has to do with China. And you mentioned their
propaganda efforts. Those are considerable and ongoing.
Sometimes they are subtle. Sometimes they are not so subtle.
Chinese counterparts in their contacts with Australian
diplomats or South Koreans or academics will say, do you really
want to be tied so closely to the United States? We are here.
We are not going anywhere. The Americans are increasingly
unreliable. It could be dangerous for you. You could get drawn
into a conflict with us. You really should reconsider.
But maybe even more important than that, because they have
done that for some time, is the fact that they now have these
economic resources that they can bring to bear as an inducement
to encourage closer cooperation and as a tool that they can use
to try to punish other countries, including advanced industrial
countries allied to the United States, for not doing things
that China wants. And we have seen that in the case of South
Korea. The Chinese imposed what were in effect economic
sanctions, although they didn't say that, on Korea for agreeing
to allow us to base part of our anti-missile defense system on
their territory. And they inflicted real pain on South Korea.
They backed off after a while, but I think the message was
clear.
Mr. Panetta. Mr. Ratner, I think one your four points,
number four was strategic messaging. And I guess this kind of
ties into that question. Do we need to do more of that to
counter this propaganda?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, we absolutely do. And I think, again, the
broader narrative in the region right now is one of Chinese
ascension and American decline. And until we arrest that, how
much steel we float out in the Pacific is going to make no
difference.
And so I would put that right up there with the pillar now
at this point of economics and politics and diplomacy and
military. There is an informational, ideological component to
this that we had stopped thinking about for 20 years that is
going to be front and center to this competition. Our U.S.
officials in their public engagements need to be talking more
about the virtues of democracy and open markets, as well as
related to an earlier comment highlighting some of the
weaknesses of the Chinese system.
Because one of the things that we have seen over the last
year or so, particularly over the last 6 months, is Xi Jinping
and the Chinese government propaganda machine being very
affirmative in their own alternative model of governance in the
world. And that is something we do not want, because it is
going to produce more economic and political liberalism in a
way that is going to undermine United States interests and
United States values.
So we need public officials talking about that. And we need
Congress to devote more resources to the institutions that we
have, like the Broadcasting Board of Governors, that can do
strategic messaging and information operations around the
world.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And appreciate you both
being here today. I had to step out for another committee
hearing, so if I have duplicated a question, I apologize.
My first question is, do you think we are being clear with
our messaging on our commitment to Taiwan? Or is there any
ambiguity in China's mind, in your opinion, that we stand by
our allies, the Taiwanese?
Dr. Friedberg. I guess I would say on the one hand, no. I
think the Chinese realize that we continue to regard Taiwan as
an entity to whom we have a lasting commitment. We have the
Taiwan Relations Act. We have a legal and now ideological
commitment to Taiwan.
I don't think there is reason for them to doubt that for
the moment. They may at the beginning of this administration
have been concerned that perhaps we were going to go further in
the other direction and do things that previously we had not to
recognize or acknowledge Taiwan's autonomy. And that has not
really happened, either.
The question is what they think about the long run and what
they think about our commitment in the long term. And they are
trying very hard to use all of the instruments of their power,
as I said, to push us away, to make it seem that intervention,
military intervention on the behalf of Taiwan would be a
disaster for us, to deter us from doing that. At the same time,
they have been developing economic ties with Taiwan and binding
the island even more closely to the mainland, and they engage
in political warfare in Taiwan, as well. In some ways, Taiwan
is a microcosm of what they are now doing, I think regionally
and globally, bringing to bear all of these instruments.
I guess I would say, the last thing, the concern is might
the Chinese leaders at some point reach the conclusion that
they could or had to act to resolve this issue once and for
all? This has been on the back burner for the last several
years because the Taiwanese Government was one that the Chinese
thought they could work with. It is changed in the last couple
of years because of the Taiwanese elections.
Some people think Xi Jinping regards this, the solution of
this problem as his ultimate legacy. I do not think that he is
going to do anything immediate or rash, but I am concerned
about how this is going to play out over the next couple of
years.
Dr. Ratner. I would just say--I think that they are--I
would agree fundamentally our position remains fairly strong
there, but I do think there are two aspects to President
Trump's approach to Asia policy to date that are of concern, as
it relates specifically to Taiwan.
One is an overly narrow focus on North Korea and trade at
the expense of other issues in the region. And I would put
Taiwan in the same category as South China Sea in that regard.
And then the other is just the degree to which President Trump
has suggested at times a transactional nature of the U.S.-China
relationship, where if you help with us on North Korea, maybe
we will not come down on you so hard on trade. He even said
publicly at times that his direct engagement with President
Tsai Ing-wen would be either consulted upon with Beijing or
determinative of the broader mood within the U.S.-China
relationship.
So I think both of those are things that we should steer
away from and we need a broader policy that is comprehensive
and based on our interests and values and neither narrow nor
transactional.
One solution to this for the Trump administration would be
to think about very specifically how it thinks about
integrating Taiwan into its Indo-Pacific strategy. So I think
talking about Taiwan, the Taiwanese, and Tsai Ing-wen have
talked about wanting to be a part of this, and seeing--and I
think there is a lot of questions for countries outside the
quad, specifically the India, Japan, Australia, United States
arrangement--how do countries fit into this? And I think
fitting in Taiwan in a very explicit way would be a useful way
to buttress U.S. commitment.
Mr. Bacon. One other question here. Dealing with North
Korea, would you say China's--how would you rate them from 1 to
10, let's just say, on their economic pressure on North Korea?
Are they like at a five? Or can they do a lot more economically
or clamping down on financial or trade? I would love to have
your thoughts. Would reintroduction of nuclear weapons by the
United States into that area, would that be helpful as a
leverage point? Thank you.
Dr. Friedberg. It is a very good question. And now I am
trying to do the math and figure out how I should give you an
answer to that. It is definitely not 10. It is not zero. I
think it fluctuates between two and four. They crank it up a
little bit when they need to signal us that they are being
helpful, but they undercut it at the same time by engaging in
trade, allowing Chinese entities to operate on Chinese--rather,
North Korean entities to operate on Chinese soil. There is a
lot more that they could do to cut off the financial flows and
to impose economic pain on North Korea if they wanted to do it.
Nuclear weapons, I don't think the South Koreans want us to
put nuclear weapons back on the peninsula. I don't think we
need to do it for military reasons, but especially if we fail
in our efforts to denuclearize the north, the nuclear deterrent
is going to be once again an increasingly important part of our
posture there. And that is I think why some elements of what is
suggested in the Nuclear Posture Review make a lot of sense.
Mr. Bacon. Chair, I think I am out of time. I yield.
The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Friedberg, you
talked earlier about how when the Chinese were upset about
certain American presence in South Korea that they imposed what
was essentially some form of sanctions. I was wondering, you
know, if you go back to when Jimmy Carter said that he was
going to pull out of the peninsula, and back then China was not
the power that they are today, and the Chinese and the
Russians, you know, asked for the American presence--for us to
stay there, obviously, a lot of things have changed since the
1970s. China is much more powerful now.
But what would be their ultimate plan for the peninsula, if
the United States were not there? I mean, to me, it seems like
having us there right now while they are trying to ascend in
military power around the world is somewhat convenient for
them. I mean, what would they do with an armed North Korea, if
the United States were not there?
Mr. Friedberg. I think their objective, the Chinese
objective in the long run, if they could get it, would be a
perhaps unified Korean Peninsula under the control of a regime
that was friendly and favorably disposed towards Beijing----
Mr. Veasey. Even with nukes?
Dr. Friedberg. They would I think prefer that that country
not have nuclear weapons, but that it be neutral, effectively,
that it terminate its alliance with the United States, that the
U.S. military presence in Korea would be withdrawn. I think
they feel like that would be a situation that they could work
with. The economic ties that they now have to South Korea are
so extensive, that gives them potential leverage.
They would like to see the peninsula neutralized. I do not
think they would want to see it under the control of the north
with nuclear weapons. I think that would be a nightmarish
problem for them. Would they be satisfied with a democratic
unified Korea with a government that was neutral and had pulled
away from the United States? I think they probably would,
provided that it was dependent on China, and acquiescent to
China's wishes.
Mr. Veasey. I also wanted to ask both of you to answer this
one. When you start thinking about the long-term goals for the
Chinese, of course, you know after World War II, we basically
went to allies and said, you know, you can--in a post-World War
II world, you can have a democracy and good governance and we
sort of spread these Western ideas to other countries. And that
standard has held pretty standard--or held pretty solid since
World War II.
My question to you is, what do the Chinese--like, if
America was to go into a decline and we were not to have the
presence that we have in the Pacific right now, like what would
the Chinese offer these countries that have already bought into
our philosophy of how you govern and how you lead around the
world? Or would they just be okay with them doing their own
thing? Would they not seek to impose their footprint in the way
they govern in these areas around the Pacific?
Dr. Friedberg. I think the--what the Chinese would like to
do is to create not initially a global order, but a regional
order that they would dominate with themselves at the center
economically, politically, strategically, and that would be
made up of countries that were favorably disposed to them,
detached from the United States. Some portion of those
countries, particularly along the so-called Belt and Road and
especially on continental Eurasia, would have authoritarian
regimes with which the Chinese are quite comfortable.
They would adhere to Chinese standards regarding movements
of people. They would probably be part of a kind of
authoritarian intranet that would be cut off from the rest of
the world or regulated in its access. I think they have an
emerging vision of a Eurasian system that is dominated by
themselves and which is essentially an authoritarian subsystem
within a larger global order.
You mentioned the end of the Second World War. We created a
liberal order which consisted of democratic countries in Europe
and Asia and North America. At the end of the Cold War, we
tried to expand that system, hoping by bringing in countries
like Russia and China, we could encourage them to transform.
They have not done it. And now they are sort of lodged in our
system and doing things to weaken and destabilize it. And that
to me is the big problem that we have to deal with.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Hice.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just go a little
bit further on that train of thought, then. And, Dr. Ratner, I
will begin with you. I mean, looking at China's--not only their
military flexing of the arm, but also the economic side of
things, how are they using their economic strength to coerce
other countries and governments to accept their own will, be it
political or security-wise or what have you?
Dr. Ratner. That is a good question, Congressman, and it
has been absolutely central to their broader foreign policy and
security strategy to use their economic power to shape decision
making around politics and diplomacy and security decisions.
And I think that is the reason why, again, these perceptions of
inevitability of Chinese economic dominance is so important.
And they have been using a variety of inducements related to
loans and assistance related to their Belt and Road strategy
and have also been using a variety of penalties. And we have
seen that with South Korea, as Dr. Friedberg mentioned.
We have seen it really throughout a number of countries in
the region where Beijing will close off particular trading
commodities or whatnot in response to their displeasure with an
action by a government, whether it is cutting off salmon
because of the Nobel Peace Prize that they didn't like from
Europe.
So they have been using that quite proactively. And this is
something that has been--is increasingly studied and I think
people are understanding how to get a better understanding of
this. And there are a variety of ways in which we can support
these countries defend themselves against this kind of
coercion.
One, as I mentioned earlier, would be to build up higher
standard trade investment rules to which these countries would
find an alternative to Chinese economic coercion and economic
power. And the other is, we can provide some of these countries
with capacity to be able to evaluate some of these deals. So
the Chinese often come with these debt-laden, high interest
loans, where countries end up in debt traps and end up having
to forfeit, for instance, critical infrastructure back to
Beijing to pay back their loans. Those are things we can get
out on the front end and help these countries make sure that
the kinds of deals they are getting into with China are
economically viable.
Mr. Hice. Okay, well, another issue with that--and I
appreciate the answer--all right, we have got laws that we
abide by, for example. There is countries out there committing
human violations, and that impacts our trade with those
countries, and we have certain laws that we abide by. Does
China have similar laws? Or it appears to me that they don't.
So we hold back on trade, and they just move in. So how do
we counter that aspect of it, as well? And I will just leave
both of you--I would like to hear from both of you on that.
Dr. Ratner. I will just quickly and then turn it over to
Dr. Friedberg. But I think there were elements, for instance,
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that included standards around
labor standards, environmental standards, the rights of women,
the rights of children. And the purpose of that is to prevent
this race to the bottom which will occur in the absence of the
United States putting forward its liberal values in the world.
So I think that that is a real concern, and there are
increasing cognizance around corporate social responsibility
among Chinese firms.
But still certainly they don't have the environmental and
social considerations and legal framework that we do.
Dr. Friedberg. Yes, I agree with everything that Dr. Ratner
has said. Just I guess a couple quick points. One of the things
that is changed here has to do with, of course, the growth of
the Chinese economy. Two things in particular. The size of the
market and the fact that it is now so important that by
threatening to cut off access to it, China really has
considerable leverage that it can exert for political reasons,
stopping buying salmon from Norway. It is a big deal for
Norway, and it was a real punishment. They can use it for
economic purposes to extract technology and so on.
And the other thing, of course, now is that they are an
exporter of capital and they are making investments around the
world. And one of the things that they are doing--one of the
things they offer which they say is competitive with what is
being offered by the West or better, is to simply ignore these
issues of governance, human rights standards, and so on.
That is part of the package that they offer. They are
essentially saying to others in the developing world, you can
have a system like ours, which is sort of market-oriented or -
driven growth, with authoritarian politics and we will help you
do it.
Mr. Hice. Yes, and that seems like it could be problematic
in the future. I appreciate your answers and appreciate you
guys being here. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Just building off that last comment, I think the
great power struggle that has been described as re-emerging is
100 percent accurate. And it is China and Russia at the same
time. And the struggle really is more ideological than I think
people have acknowledged, that both China and Russia envision
authoritarian kleptocracy, basically, is their approach to
economics and politics.
And to some degree, that is just so they could protect
their own regimes. I think in both cases it is gone beyond that
to a philosophy that they want to see those types of
governments throughout the world, and that is who they want to
do business with.
Now, China in particular, like you said, they will do
business with whoever and part of their message is, we do not
care what you do. We are not going to be like the United
States. We are not going to be quibbling over the fact that you
are, you know, executing people randomly or doing things like
that. Run your government however you want to run it. We just
want to do business.
What really worries me in this great power thing is that
thus far our response and the dialogue at least in the Trump
administration has been all about the military side of it, that
has been--you know, here is what China is building, here is
what Russia is building, here is how we have to confront it.
And while certainly if you want to draw an analogy to the
great power struggle we had with the Soviet Union, military
might is a component part of that. Vastly more important in my
view is winning the ideological war, which, Dr. Ratner, you
talked about as one of your key points. We have abandoned the
playing field. The State Department is being cut by 30 percent.
I think legislatively we set up a fund for them to have sort of
an information campaign. They are just not spending the money
and they have not appointed anyone to run it.
We--like you said, if we are going to convince Indonesia
and Vietnam and Thailand and, heck, even the countries in
Africa, where China is doing business, that we have a better
model, we have got to actively engage in that. We have got to
actively engage in information warfare. Russia is eating our
lunch on it. I think that is by and large understood by
everybody except the President, of course.
But China, I think, is a lot more aggressive and successful
in this area than we have acknowledged. And it is really not
that difficult. If this is something we care about as a
country, we can develop the message that says here is why our
model is better than what Russia and China are offering.
And one minor little piece, the chairman and I dove into
something called Smith-Mundt a few years back, and still have
the bruises to prove it, but we did the right thing, because
part of the problem is now the way an information warfare
campaign is conducted is primarily on the internet. And there
are limitations on what the U.S. Government can put out there
that is consumed by U.S. people. And you really can't put
anything out there on the internet without it at some point
being consumed by U.S. people.
I think we need to get away from that and be able to full
scale launch an information campaign that says democracy,
freedom, and capitalism are better than authoritarianism and
kleptocracy. Be with us, because we are taking you to a better
place. We are not doing that. That is not either of your
faults. I just wanted to make that observation.
And to the extent you have any influence with people within
the administration, we got to deliver the message that we have
got to start fighting the information war or, you know, a $2
trillion military isn't going to help us advance our interests
in this great power struggle that is emerging. And if you want
to comment on that, you are welcome to.
Dr. Friedberg. Thank you, Congressman Smith. I agree
completely with what you have said, and in particular the point
you made at the very beginning. To talk about this as great
power competition and to ignore the fact that it has this
ideological component is fundamentally misleading. I think it
misunderstands or encourages people to underestimate the
antagonism that both Russia and China and their leaderships
feel towards us, the threat that they feel from our system, and
the vigor with which they are trying to oppose it.
It is an ideological struggle. It has not been until
recently the case that either of these seem to be actively
trying to spread their own version of government and ideology,
although China is now in that game more actively. They have
been more defensive; now they are taking the offensive.
The only thing I would add--and, again, I agree with what
you have said about the importance of the information piece of
this--that ultimately--and it may be a little bit of a cliche--
but ultimately it is what we do that is going to be more
important than what we say.
Mr. Smith. Show, don't tell, right?
Dr. Friedberg. Yes, we can say all we want. Our system is
better. What the Chinese are now saying is, look at these guys.
They are a mess. They messed up the global economy in 2008.
They are having trouble getting their economy growing at 2
percent, and we are growing at 7 percent. And look at their
political system, it is also a mess.
Mr. Smith. Show, don't tell also is important that 2
percent of $19 trillion is--well, I don't know if it is more
than 5 percent of $11 trillion, but it is a bit misleading. We
are starting from a higher number there. But I take your point.
But we also in that have to figure out what the appropriate
metrics are. I mean, it is like any debate, any argument. You
know, you have got facts that make you look good and facts that
make you look bad, and your job is to make the decision-maker
look at the ones that you want them to look at in the way that
you want them to look at them.
So, yes, show, do not tell, is part of it. But you also
have to make the argument. I mean, gone are the days where, you
know, people could campaign for an elective office without
actually campaigning, just say here is who I am, here is my
resume, look at what I have done, it will all be good. No, it
is a constant argument out there in the world.
And again, we got to go vote. But we are not engaged at the
moment in that argument. And I think we need to get engaged.
Thank you both. Outstanding testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank you both, too. I completely agree
with the last conversation. The only thing I would add is,
people will listen a lot more carefully to what you have to say
if you have a strong military presence there. So these things
are mutually reinforcing. And we need to hit on all cylinders.
And I agree with both of you that we have not been.
This was very helpful. Thank you both for being here. The
hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 15, 2018
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 15, 2018
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 15, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 15, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Since 2005, more than 100 Confucius Institutes have
opened at American colleges and universities. Last year the number of
Confucius Institutes in the world rose by almost 40 percent. They are
funded by the Chinese Government's Ministry of Education and in 2009
the head of the propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party called the
Confucius Institutes ``an important part of China's overseas propaganda
set-up.'' Some of these universities even house research center
laboratories with the Department of Defense where they conduct highly
sensitive research.
Do you believe that the Confucius Institutes pose a threat to
university-affiliated research center laboratories which conduct highly
sensitive research on behalf of the Department of Defense?
Dr. Friedberg. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. In dealing with near-peer adversaries I agree that it
must involve a whole-of-government response. My question lies in the
definition and application of what whole-of-government looks like.
Do you believe that there are sufficient touchpoints for a diverse
and relevant group of senior government officials to convene and
discuss a specific regional threat like China?
What more do you think is needed to holistically counter the China
problem-set?
Dr. Friedberg. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. It is my opinion that one of the best forms of soft
power in the Asia-Pacific region is partnership building capacity.
Could you please explain the ongoing and future efforts to engage
India as a strategic partner in the ballistic missile defense mission
to provide stability in the Asia-Pacific region?
Do you believe that more needs to be done?
Dr. Friedberg. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. Since 2005, more than 100 Confucius Institutes have
opened at American colleges and universities. Last year the number of
Confucius Institutes in the world rose by almost 40 percent. They are
funded by the Chinese Government's Ministry of Education and in 2009
the head of the propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party called the
Confucius Institutes ``an important part of China's overseas propaganda
set-up.'' Some of these universities even house research center
laboratories with the Department of Defense where they conduct highly
sensitive research.
Do you believe that the Confucius Institutes pose a threat to
university-affiliated research center laboratories which conduct highly
sensitive research on behalf of the Department of Defense?
Dr. Ratner. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. In dealing with near-peer adversaries I agree that it
must involve a whole-of-government response. My question lies in the
definition and application of what whole-of-government looks like.
Do you believe that there are sufficient touchpoints for a diverse
and relevant group of senior government officials to convene and
discuss a specific regional threat like China?
What more do you think is needed to holistically counter the China
problem-set?
Dr. Ratner. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. It is my opinion that one of the best forms of soft
power in the Asia-Pacific region is partnership building capacity.
Could you please explain the ongoing and future efforts to engage
India as a strategic partner in the ballistic missile defense mission
to provide stability in the Asia-Pacific region?
Do you believe that more needs to be done?
Dr. Ratner. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. To what degree is China using foreign investment to
infiltrate U.S. national security assets including companies that
supply equipment to DOD, compromising base security in the U.S., and
undermining our national security objectives? It was also recently
reported that the U.S. Army discontinued use of drones manufactured by
a Chinese company due to security concerns. In your opinion, to what
extent does China attempt to infiltrate our defense industry supply
chain with equipment that has the potential to spy on our military?
What should the U.S. do to counter China's destabilization of our
supply chain for defense equipment?
Dr. Friedberg. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Coffman. Dr. Friedberg, in your testimony you state the
importance of maintaining an adequate industrial base. At this time,
the United States and our allies rely heavily on China in the rare-
earths market. What national security concerns do you have regarding
China's dominance of the rare-earths market? In your opinion, should
the U.S. focus more on building up our own production and refinement
base to ensure independence from China? Do you believe that the U.S.
and our allies should work together to develop a degree of independence
from China's rare-earths production and refinement capabilities?
Dr. Friedberg. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Ratner, it is well-known that China is investing
in United States companies at an unprecedented rate in the pursuit of
gaining access to new technologies. How does China's foreign direct
investment negatively impact the national security of the United
States?
Dr. Ratner. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Ratner, in your testimony you state the importance
of updating the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS). I am a
cosponsor of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of
2017 that would update CFIUS. Can you please detail how China is
exploiting the current system, and what updating CFIUS will do to
improve our national security?
Dr. Ratner. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Coffman. To what degree is China using foreign investment to
infiltrate U.S. national security assets including companies that
supply equipment to DOD, compromising base security in the U.S., and
undermining our national security objectives? It was also recently
reported that the U.S. Army discontinued use of drones manufactured by
a Chinese company due to security concerns. In your opinion, to what
extent does China attempt to infiltrate our defense industry supply
chain with equipment that has the potential to spy on our military?
What should the U.S. do to counter China's destabilization of our
supply chain for defense equipment?
Dr. Ratner. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
[all]