THE MILITARY POSTURE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO–ASIA–PACIFIC REGION

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

With us today is Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of United States Pacific Command [PACOM].

As Admiral Harris nears the end of his military service, I want to first thank him for that service and for the insights and perspective he has shared with us both here in Washington and as Members have traveled throughout the PACOM region.

Remarkably, 40 years of service to our Nation is not enough for Admiral Harris. Last week, the President announced his intention to nominate him as our Ambassador to Australia.

This hearing comes at an opportune time. Last week, we heard Secretary Mattis and General Selva testify on the new National Defense Strategy and on the Nuclear Posture Review. Also last week, Congress passed and the President signed into law legislation that raised the spending caps so that repair of our readiness shortfalls can begin in earnest.

Admiral Harris has had to grapple with that full range of issues. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the United States faces a near-term belligerent threat armed with nuclear weapons and also a longer term strategic competitor. In fact, four of the five key security challenges—China, Russia, North Korea, and terrorism—reside in the PACOM area of responsibility. Unfortunately, the region has also seen a tragic loss of life of American service members in naval and aircraft accidents and has felt some of the consequences of our inadequate defense budgets.

Despite North Korea’s recent charm offensive at the Olympic games, the threat posed to U.S. service members, our allies, and the American homeland has not diminished. We have an urgent need to ensure that we are ready for whatever course that situation may take.

The challenge posed by China has also not lessened. China is rapidly transforming its military, continuing to militarize artificial islands in the South China Sea, and expanding its presence
through political influence campaigns and economic coercion. According to the National Defense Strategy, quote, “China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage,” end quote.

Critical to meeting all of the challenges to the region is our relationship with our allies and also with countries with whom we share interests. The fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act includes more for training and exercises with partners, as well as establishing the Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, which in part is designed to show our allies that we stand by them with more than just words.

We all look forward to Admiral Harris’s candid assessment of these and other issues, but first let me yield to the ranking member.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join you in thanking Admiral Harris for his service to our country in the military. He has served honorably and for a long time, is doing a great job in his current job.

And, also, congratulations on your appointment as the Ambassador to Australia. At least as we discussed prior, you have experience with the confirmation process—a different committee, I understand, but it is at least good to understand what you are getting into. And I wish you the best of luck in that. And thank you for your great work in the Pacific.

Other than that, I think the chairman did a great summary of the challenges that we face out there. I would only emphasize one point, and that is the last one that he made, and that is the importance of partnerships and our allies.

There are a lot of countries in the Pacific region in play, a lot of countries that could be crucial allies to us as we try to stop China from being overly aggressive towards their neighbors and pushing other folks out. And building those alliances is critical.

And I know one of the things that really helps that is the presence of our military and, in particular, the presence of our Navy, the ability to do joint exercises, to do port calls, to build relationships with those countries. Obviously, it is about more than that, but the more friends we have in Asia, I think the better able we are going to be able to nudge China in a more positive direction.

There is no question China is going to be a major player in Asia, but is it going to be for good or is it going to be for ill? And I think that has a lot to do with how strong their neighbors are in pushing back against some of the things that China is doing that are problematic.

So I appreciate your hard work in building those relationships and look forward to hearing more about them and more about our challenges in the Pacific. And, again, I thank you very much for your service.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the ranking member.

Let me just remind members that immediately upon conclusion of this open hearing we will regroup in classified session upstairs with Admiral Harris.

Admiral, thank you again for being here. Without objection, your full written statement will be made part of the record.

And, without objection, we have a written statement from General Brooks, our commander in Korea, which will also be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of General Brooks can be found in the Appendix on page 113.]

The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members. It is an honor for me to appear again before this committee for what is likely my last posture hearing to you all.

I do regret that I am not here with my usual testimony battle buddy, General Vince Brooks from Korea, but I think you will all agree that he is where he is needed right now, on the Korean Peninsula.

There are many things to talk about since my last testimony 10 months ago, but I want to start by thanking the Congress for your actions last week. I am grateful for the bipartisan effort to raise the budget caps for fiscal year 2018 and 2019, and I am optimistic that Congress will resource the fiscal year 2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] in the coming weeks.

I and many others have regularly highlighted the negative effects that sequestration and the Budget Control Act have leveled against the military, so I would further ask the Congress to make these bipartisan measures permanent and end sequestration for good.

One of the principal problems that we face in the region is overcoming the perception that the United States is a declining power. A fully resourced defense budget leading into long-term budget stability will send a strong signal to our allies, partners, and all potential adversaries that the U.S. is fully committed to preserving a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific.

As the PACOM commander, I have the tremendous honor of leading approximately 375,000 soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, coastguardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians standing watch for the largest and most diverse geographic command. These men and women, as well as their families, fill me with pride in their hard work and devotion to duty, and I am humbled to serve alongside them.

The U.S. has an enduring national interest in the Indo-Pacific. As I stated last year, I believe America’s security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical region, which remains at a precarious crossroads where tangible opportunity meets sig-
significant challenge. Here, we face a security environment more complex and volatile than we have experienced in recent memory. Rogue regimes, like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persist in taking outlaw actions that threaten regional and even global stability. This past year has seen rapid and comprehensive improvement in the DPRK's ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities despite broad international condemnation and the imposition of additional United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes the detonation of its largest nuclear device, first-ever launches of two different intercontinental ballistic missiles, and six launches of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, all of which Pyongyang emphatically states will target the United States and Guam.

Now, while some might dispute both the reliability and quantity of the North's strategic weapons, it is indisputable that KJU [Kim Jong-un] is rapidly closing the gap between rhetoric and capability. The Republic of Korea and Japan have been living under the shadow of the DPRK's threats for years, and now that shadow looms over the American homeland.

PACOM and the entire DOD [Department of Defense] fully support the President’s maximum-pressure campaign led by the State Department. Nobody seeks or desires conflict with North Korea, but the U.S. and our allies must prepare for the full range of contingency responses.

Meanwhile, China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific to their advantage. While some view China's actions in the East and South China Seas as opportunistic, I do not. I view them as coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using their military and economic power to erode the free and open international order.

China's aggression in the South China Sea moves along unabated despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration's tribunal ruling that invalidated China's Nine-Dash Line claim, an unprecedented land reclamation, in 2016. And China is attempting to assert de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features by further militarizing its manmade bases to this very day.

China's impressive military buildup could soon challenge the United States across almost every domain. Key advancements include fielding significant improvements in missile systems, developing fifth-generation fighter aircraft capabilities, and growing the size and capability of the Chinese Navy, to include their first overseas base in the Port of Djibouti. They are also heavily investing in the next wave of military technologies, including hypersonic missiles, advanced space and cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence. If the U.S. does not keep pace, PACOM will struggle to compete with the People’s Liberation Army on future battlefields.

China’s ongoing military buildup, advancement, and modernization are core elements of their strategy to supplant the United States as the security partner of choice for countries in the Indo-Pacific, but China also holds clear global ambitions.

But don't take my word for it. Just listen to what China itself says. At the 19th Party Congress, President Xi stated he wanted China to develop a world-class military and become a global leader
in terms of composite national strength and international influence.

Ladies and gentlemen, China’s intent is crystal clear. We ignore it at our peril.

These types of aspirational goals could be appropriate for a nation of China’s stature, but judging by China’s regional behavior, I am concerned that China will now work to undermine the rules-based international order, not just in the Indo-Pacific but on a global scale, as China expands its presence in Central Asia, the Arctic, Africa, South America, and Europe. This increasingly complex environment necessitates continued dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to improve understanding and reduce risk.

For PACOM, my goal remains to convince China that its best future comes from peaceful cooperation and meaningful participation in the current free and open international order and honoring its international commitments. After all, the Chinese economic miracle could not have happened without the rules-based order under which the region has long supported. But I have also been loud and clear that we won’t allow the shared domains to be closed down unilaterally. So we will cooperate where we can but remain ready to confront where we must.

Now, Russia’s operations and engagement throughout the Indo-Pacific continue to rise, both to advance their own strategic interests and to undermine U.S. interests. China intends to impose additional costs on the U.S. whenever and wherever possible by playing the role of a spoiler, especially with respect to the DPRK.

Russia also sees economic opportunities to not only build markets for their energy exports but also to build and in some cases rebuild arms sales relationships in the region. Of particular note are Russian efforts to build presence and influence in the high north. Russia has more bases north of the Arctic Circle than all other countries combined and is building more with distinctly military capabilities.

In the PACOM region, one event dominated the counterterrorism fight in 2017, and that was the siege by ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in the Philippines and recapture by the government forces of the Philippine city of Marawi. It was both symbolic of the larger struggle against violent extremism and also an anomaly characterized by unique circumstances and opportunities.

Marawi underscores two important themes with regard to defeating ISIS in the Indo-Pacific. First, localized threats can quickly transform into international causes, and early and effective response is vital to control the fight and own the narrative. Second, counterterrorism operations are extremely challenging, and most regional forces are poorly equipped for such fights. Our engagement strategy and capacity-building efforts have remained and will continue to remain focused on enabling regional counterterrorism forces to win whatever fights they face. Through multinational collaboration, we can eliminate ISIS before it spreads further in the area.

Every day, our allies and partners join us in addressing these global challenges to defend freedom, deter war, and maintain the rules which underwrite a free and open international order. These mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships provide a durable,
asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival could match.

In the Indo-Pacific, our alliance with Australia continues to anchor peace and stability in the region, with increased collaboration in the counterterrorism, space, cyber, integrated air and missile defense, and regional capacity-building.

Our alliance with South Korea is ironclad, and our alliance with Japan has never been stronger. The attack on Marawi City served as a reminder of the value of our alliance to Philippine security and stability.

And we have reinvigorated our alliance with Thailand through continued engagement with military leadership to promote regional security and healthy civil-military relations. We have also advanced our partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and many others who are dedicated to the principles of longstanding customary international law.

While U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are real and enduring, the growing challenges to our interests are daunting and cannot be overstated. In order to deter conflict initiated by revisionist powers, rogue states, and transnational threats, we must continue to acquire and field critical capabilities. Our evolving force posture must decrease our vulnerabilities, increase our resilience, and reassure our allies and partners.

America’s resolve is strong, and it is imperative that we continue to show our commitment to this region in the years to come. I ask this committee to continue its support for these future capabilities that maintain our edge and prevent would-be challengers from gaining the upper hand. Based on your bipartisan efforts last week, I am excited about the path ahead.

Thank you for your enduring support to the PACOM team and our families who work and live in the Indo-Pacific, a region critical to America’s security. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

And I appreciate your comments about the budget agreement last week. I think we in Congress often underestimate the extent to which our action or inaction sends a message to allies, adversaries, and fence-sitters who are out there in the world. You have to deal with all three of them in your region. And I think it is important for us to be reminded that even what we may consider routine actions has consequences, reverberations out in the world.

I want to ask about what Kim Jong-un is after. The, I guess, dominant view is that he wants missiles and nuclear weapons in order to safeguard his regime—kind of the Qadhafi lesson, et cetera.

But last month there was an article written by former Ambassador James Jeffrey that really provoked my thinking, and his basic point was that is the predominant view because to think anything else is so unpleasant that we don’t let ourselves think that maybe he wants these nuclear weapons to hold U.S. cities hostage so that he can have his way and finish what his grandfather started on the peninsula. And Ambassador Jeffrey said maybe this dominant thinking reflects the historic tendencies of liberal societies to
discount existential threats simply because they are so terrible to contemplate.

I don’t know. I would just be interested, after you have studied and thought about this, do you have a view about what his intentions are, but especially about whether we can recognize what his intentions are? Or are we limiting ourselves because the alternatives are too terrible to contemplate?

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir, for the question.

I do think that there is a prevailing view that KJU is doing the things that he is doing to safeguard his regime. I don’t ascribe to that view.

I do think that he is after reunification under a single communist system. So he is after what his grandfather failed to do and his father failed to do, and he is on a path to achieve what he feels is his natural place and where North Korea's natural outcome is a unified Korean Peninsula that is subject to KJU and the communist regime there. So I think that is the long view and that is what he is after.

I think his nuclear ambitions contribute to that view. It puts him in a position to blackmail the South and other countries in the region and us. And I think that is the overarching reason why he is pursuing the nuclear capabilities that he has.

I think we are self-limiting if we view North Korea's nuclear ambitions as solely a means to safeguard his regime. I think we need to take that longer view and consider what he is really after.

I think also that the idea of not being willing to confront the reality is extant. And my job is to contemplate those things that are difficult to contemplate, to imagine the unimaginable, if you will. And I have said before that what is unimaginable to me is a nuclear strike on Honolulu or Los Angeles or New York or Washington. That is unimaginable. So if that is unimaginable, then I can, in fact, imagine all the others, and I have to do that. That is what you pay me to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you.

Adam? Excuse me. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. "Adam" works. We are all friends here.

Following up just quickly on that question, so, I mean, I think the real answer is there is no way to know. I mean, we can guess what he is trying to do. I think anyone who confidently asserts that, you know, all Kim Jong-un wants to do is to protect his regime is just as wrong as anyone who confidently asserts that, you know, he definitely wants to reunite the peninsula. I would honestly say that he probably doesn’t know and it sort of depends on the circumstances and how things play out. So we have to be prepared for both realities.

But if we were to assume, from the chairman’s question, that he is going to attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula and basically start a war with South Korea, how would that change our policy? What should we be doing differently now from what we are doing?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, sir, I think what we should be doing is what we, in fact, are doing, and that is to increase and maintain the pressure campaign plan, run by the State Department, to convince Kim Jong-un that his nuclear ambitions are flawed and that we should continue to pressurize the North to achieve a complete
verifiable and irreversible nuclear Korean Peninsula. We want to take that capability away from North Korea. That is our stated position. And I think——

Mr. SMITH. Just quick, I agree with you. And also I think it is really important that we emphasize to North Korea diplomatically and in any means possible that if they were to start a war with South Korea we would be there and they would lose and lose badly and that would be the end of the regime. So I think that is a very important part of it as well. But—well, I think that is all I will say on that.

I had a quick question on China. You mentioned that the international order has greatly benefited China, and I think you are right. They are a growing economy and all that. And yet, as you said, they are subverting it constantly, particularly in their own actions with their immediate neighbors.

What do you think China’s calculation is on that? Why do they look at a world order that has enabled them to rise and seem so determined to undermine it? And is there some way that we could persuade them that it would be better if they didn’t?

Admiral HARRIS. I think that to understand China is to look at their fundamental underlying government premise, which is based on communism. I think they use everything that the international order has given them up to this point, which has enabled them to become a very strong economic power, and they are using that power to increase their military capability.

Nothing wrong with that on the surface. Strong countries ought to have the militaries that they want and can afford. But I think it is how they are going about it and their stated ambitions for the remainder of this century that cause me to be concerned about China.

Just as I said, what President Xi said during the 19th Party Congress was an affirmation of where China has been. They have this sense of this 100 years of humiliation and all of that. And I think the fact that there is a cult of personality now growing in China surrounding Xi Jinping is an area of concern for all of us who seek democratic values in the world.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. And just an editorial comment. I mean, China’s 100 years of humiliation, they have had a pretty good few decades. Can’t they, you know, let that go?

Admiral HARRIS. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. It is like, you know, they got Hong Kong back, they got Macau back, they are the second-largest economy in the world, they are everywhere. I think, you know, that tendency towards this nationalistic drive could potentially undermine the most thing that China should be trying to do, and that is figure out how to feed 1.4 billion people.

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. SMITH. I am similarly concerned about their desire to go beyond that and be more of a dominant power instead of, you know, a strong regional player that works cooperatively with its neighbors. And I appreciate your leadership on that issue.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral Harris, thank you very much for your service. And I was grateful firsthand to visit you several times, and each time I was so impressed by your capabilities and your dedication to our country and also your dedication of promoting peace through strength.

Also, your appointment as Ambassador to Australia fulfills a prognostication by my wife, Roxanne, that President Trump is successful by surrounding himself by talented individuals. And it has been very humbling for me to have to let my wife know she was correct.

Admiral HARRIS. He is sending me away, though.

Mr. WILSON. Well, we are just really proud of your service.

And, Admiral, in dealing with near-peer adversaries, I agree we must involve a whole-of-government response. My question lies in the definition and application of what “whole of government” looks like.

Would you briefly explain the various touchpoints that you, as the PACOM commander, have as an opportunity to sit down with the diverse and relevant group of senior government officials to discuss the threats and the strategic planning to mitigate these challenges?

Admiral HARRIS. So the challenges that we face, I think, are consistent with my previous testimonies. The most imminent challenge is North Korea. China remains an existential threat. Russia is an existential threat. And China is the longest term challenge that I think we face.

And we have ISIS in the region as well, as I talked about in my opening statement. And the threat from ISIS is real in the Pacific, but as long as we continue to do the things that we are doing and build the capacity and capability of our allies and partners, I think we can keep ISIS at bay.

With regard to the whole-of-government approach, I think it is essential that we view these threats from a whole-of-government perspective. And by that, I mean that it is not enough that the State Department or the Defense Department view China as a rival. I think we need to view China, for example, as a rival across all of government. And the same for North Korea.

And I would submit that, more than just a whole-of-government, we need to have a whole-of-nation perspective on the threats that these regimes pose to the United States. I would also add that, from the Chinese perspective, I believe China has achieved that within their country. They view the United States as a rival across the whole of their nation. So they have a whole-of-nation view of the United States. And their system gives them the wherewithal to immediately have a whole-of-government view, but, more than that, they have a whole-of-nation view. And I think we are coming up to speed on the whole-of-government aspect, but we have more to go in that regard.

Mr. WILSON. It is mutually beneficial for America and China to have a good relationship, but I am concerned about the propaganda operations within the United States. And, specifically, I would like to hear your thoughts concerning the Confucius Institutes and the role they play for the Chinese Government in the United States.
Since 2005, more than 100 Confucius Institutes have opened at American colleges and universities. Last year, the number of institutes in the world rose by 40 percent. They are funded by the Chinese Government’s Ministry of Education. In 2009, the head of propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party called the institutes, quote, “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup,” end of quote.

What is your view about these institutes?
Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I would agree, sir, with the concern there. I think DNI [Director of National Intelligence] Coats addressed this yesterday in his testimony before the Senate. It is important. And I think that we need to continue to look into the effect that Confucius Institutes and other influence operations that China has in our country.

Mr. WILSON. And I am grateful, too, for your efforts in regard to soft power for the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, specifically working with India regarding ballistic missile defense. What is the status of the development with the Republic of India?
Admiral HARRIS. So I view India as one of the biggest strategic opportunities that we have. I recently traveled to India in January to speak at the Raisina Dialogue. And I think that the opportunities with India, a country that shares our democratic values, the largest democracy in the world, and a friend of the United States—it is important that we continue to work closely with India, that we continue to provide things for the Indian military, and that we continue the mil-to-mil relationship with the Indian Armed Forces.

Mr. WILSON. Again, congratulations on your appointment as Ambassador to Australia. Best wishes. Thank you.
Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. It is just the beginning of the process, but I am grateful for the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thanks for coming.
I want to just shift gears a little bit in your testimony and your discussion about our allies and partners. Without going through each ally and partner, can you characterize generally their capability and willingness to invest in their own militaries, as well as to train to get to a level of effectiveness? Sort of playing off the theme that you—one of your themes in your testimony, that we need to have capable and able partners. Can you characterize how, maybe, folks fit into boxes there?
Admiral HARRIS. Sure. I think that our allies are capable and their militaries reflect their commitment to the fact that they are allies of the United States. So they buy American equipment. We train a lot of their forces here, and we train together at sea and in the air and on land with them—the Japanese, the Koreans, the Australians of course, and on and on. So we have good, strong mil-to-mil relationships with these countries, and that is reflected in the makeup of their militaries.
But I think in the partner realm, you know—and I differentiate that with—we have five countries that are treaty allies, and then we have partners out there. When I look at the partners, when you consider Singapore and what they provide for us, not only the stuff that they purchase from us for their military but what they provide
for us, you know, they give us a platform from which to operate our ships, our staffs, our aircraft, and the like. That is very important.

India is another partner, and we are working closely with them as we seek to improve the capability of their military. So I think that is another opportunity.

Vietnam is a terrific opportunity for us. And their location is strategic. You know, we have an aircraft carrier strike group that is going into Vietnam next month, the USS Carl Vinson, which I think is exciting. It is exciting for us, it is exciting for the Navy, and it is exciting for Vietnam.

Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Great. Thanks.

Flipping back to China, I think a lot of your testimony and oral testimony has emphasized one aspect, and that is about defending against and trying to stop China from activities. But can you talk a little bit about what the U.S. can do or isn’t doing to shape activities, maybe looking at diplomatic or informational or economic elements of power?

Admiral Harris. Sure. So, when I criticize China, as I have done in the past and I just did a few moments ago, I also want to compliment China for the things that they do that are positive and for the greater good.

For example, you know, they are operating in the Horn of Africa region for counter-piracy operations. They were operating in the Mediterranean during the effort to remove chemical weapons from Syria. They have operated in humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. They helped in the search for a sailor that fell overboard a few months ago and the MH370 Malaysian airliner incident a few years ago.

So these are positive things, indicative of a growing China that is finding its way in the world.

But I think that the pressures that we bring to bear on China are, first, diplomatic. And for me, for PACOM, you know, what I have to do is ensure that we maintain credible combat power and that we demonstrate our resolve to fly, sail, or operate wherever international law allows. And by doing that, then we demonstrate to China that there is a role for order in the international system and that rules are meant to be followed and that rules benefit all. And that is the view I take.

Mr. Larsen. And on that point—and I am sorry. The crux of my question is really, are we doing enough to support that last point you made? Do you have an assessment about whether or not the United States is doing enough to live up to that role of continuing to support the rules-based international order, in sending that message?

Admiral Harris. Yeah, I think we are. I think in the military sense we are. You know, our freedom-of-navigation operations simply exist to do just what it says, to ensure the freedom of navigation. And that goes to the premise that countries ought to be able to fly, sail, or operate in international waters and airspace per the rules that we all ascribe to. So I think that in a military sense we are doing that.

We have these engagements with China, the military consultative working group, for example, which allows us——
Mr. LARSEN. I am sorry, I don't want to be rude, but I really don't want the chairman to be angry with me. So thank you very much.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you for being here, and thank you for your service to our country.

In addition to Japan and Korea, what other countries in the region do you think should and could be contributing to PACOM's regional ballistic missile defense?

Admiral HARRIS. I think that, you know, when you look at the threat vector, if you look at the threat vector from North Korea, I think South Korea and Japan are key to that. I think other countries could contribute if they want, but I don't want to speak for them. But, again, it is a function of the threat vector and their capabilities and their own budgets, whether they can afford that kind of a system.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you aware of any countries in the region that have expressed an interest in foreign military sales of BMD [ballistic missile defense] systems or potential development of BMD?

Admiral HARRIS. Not to the degree that they have gone ahead with LORs [letters of request] and LOAs [letters of authorization] and that acquisition stuff.

Mr. ROGERS. Assuming that the two Aegis Ashore sites that Japan has begun the process of procuring and developing are complete and in place, what effect will that have on your U.S. Aegis ships in the region?

Admiral HARRIS. It would relieve some of the pressure that I face and the Navy faces, the Pacific fleet faces in BMD, in ballistic—

Mr. ROGERS. And how would that manifest itself?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, because we have ships that are underway to help the Japanese defend their homeland as part of our treaty obligations and defend Americans that are living and working in——

Mr. ROGERS. I understand, but what will you be able to do that you can't do now?

Admiral HARRIS. I would be able to take that ship off-station and put it somewhere else.

Mr. ROGERS. Like where?

Admiral HARRIS. Like wherever it is needed at the moment—you know, South China Sea, in the Indian Ocean, in the Philippine Sea, wherever I might need that ship.

Right now, one of the obligations I have is a ship off of Guam for the defense of our homeland and a ship in the Sea of Japan that helps in the defense of Japan.

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent.

Are you confident that the system that you have in place today to protect Guam, Hawaii, and the mainland is adequate?

Admiral HARRIS. I believe it is adequate for the threat that we face today, but I think that much more needs to be done for the threat that we will face in 2 to 3 years.

Mr. ROGERS. For example?
Admiral HARRIS. So I have advocated for the defense-of-Hawaii radar, because I think that radar is essential for the threat that we are going to face from North Korea in 3 or 4 years.

I believe that one of our older platforms, the SBX, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar that is on that old platform, you know, that is only good when it is underway. And the defense-of-Hawaii radar would allow me to cover the gaps when that ship is not underway or in maintenance. So that is important.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am always very concerned about keeping Madeleine Bordallo happy and safe. Is there anything else we need to be doing for Guam?

Admiral HARRIS. I am all for Guam, sir. It is part of us, right? I believe that the THAAD [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense] system that is there, the fact that it is a PCS, it is a permanent station there now, is important. And I want to continue to resource that.

Mr. ROGERS. But there is nothing in addition that you think at the present we need to be doing?

Admiral HARRIS. At the present time, no, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to defer my questions to the closed session, but I do want to express my public admiration for Admiral Harris's great career.

We appreciate your Tennessee ties, and we look forward to your success as Ambassador to Australia.

And I also feel pressure from my colleague from Guam. I want to make sure she has maximum opportunity to ask her questions, so I will yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I, too, Admiral Harris, appreciate and thank you for your service to our country. Some people don't know this, but I believe the term that you have is the "Old Goat"?

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. LAMBORN. The longest-serving graduate from your time in the Naval Academy?

Admiral HARRIS. That is correct, sir. I don't know if that is a point of pride or I have just been around the longest.

Mr. LAMBORN. And, also, even though Colorado is not known for being a Navy State, you are moving there after your retirement, and so I will welcome you at that point.

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you.

Mr. LAMBORN. But, in the meantime, besides finishing out your service as PACOM commander, you are going to be in Australia as our Ambassador, and congratulations on that. Australia is such a wonderful ally and always has been, and I appreciate the opportunity you have to strengthen the ties.

What are some things that can be strengthened? I know that missile defense is a possibility or hypersonic glide vehicle research. There are some things going on. There is the Marine deployment
in Darwin. What can you tell us about U.S.-Australia ties and how important that is in the Pacific?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. Thanks for the question and for the lead-in for it. And I am honored to be given the opportunity to serve in Australia, but I don’t want to presume the goodwill of the Senate. I will await my time.

As far as Australia as an ally, they are a key ally of the United States. They have been with us in every war, or we have been with them in every war since World War I. I look to my Australian counterparts for their help and assistance. I admire their leadership in the battlefield and in the corridors of power in the world. So I appreciate the opportunity to work with them in my current role, and I am looking forward to continuing to be able to work with them in a potentially future role.

Some of the areas that are key is the force posture agreements. So this involves the Marines in Darwin. You know, right now, this year, this March, next month, we will start the next rotation of Marines there. We will increase their rotation to about 1,500 Marines, which is significant.

There is an Air Force component of the force posture agreement as well, the enhanced air cooperation piece, both at Darwin and at Tindal—Tindal Air Base in Australia. So that will help us in terms of refueling and other kinds of aircraft that we will be able to put in Australia. So I am excited by that.

In the naval business, as they finish their buildup of their three Hobart-class ships and then moving on to their next-generation antisubmarine warfare ships, there are opportunities for us to continue to work with them as they develop that capability.

They have bought a French submarine buy. It is a significant buy over a number of years. And I believe that we should help them as they develop that submarine in the years to come, because we want to be able to continue to interoperate with the Australian forces in every domain. And, you know, I think that as we continue to do that, then we will improve our own capabilities together with our Australian ally.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And I will just finish up with a question building on what Chairman Mike Rogers asked about, Aegis Ashore.

We really want to protect Guam; we also want to protect Hawaii. That goes absolutely without saying. That is so critical. What can you say about Aegis Ashore in Hawaii?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So I am not smart enough to zero in on a system for Hawaii. What I have advocated for in the past—and thanks to the Congress, we are going to see some of that laid out here in the next year or two, and that is, first, the defense-of-Hawaii radar.

And then the next step, I have also advocated for a study through MDA, Missile Defense Agency, to determine what the best missile defense itself for Hawaii is. There are a number of options. Aegis Ashore is one. THAAD is another one. Perhaps a ground-based interceptor capability for Hawaii. I think all of those should be looked at.

I think today, from the threat that we face in Hawaii from North Korea, Aegis Ashore and THAAD might not be the best platforms
for Hawaii, given the trajectory and the geometries of the missiles that are launched. I am confident in our ground-based systems today to intercept and protect Hawaii, and those ground-based systems are in California and Alaska. But I think in the years ahead it would do us well to at least study the possibility of putting some kind of interceptor capability in Hawaii.

Meanwhile, I am pleased about the defense-of-Hawaii radar——

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. Because I think it is important.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank Admiral Harris for keeping an eye on Guam ever since you have been in your present position, and of course to wish you the best. You are going to the beautiful country of Australia, and you will still be in the Pacific, so we expect that your interests will remain the same.

I also want to thank my colleagues. Since I have been here on the Armed Services Committee, they have always been very supportive of Guam. You know, compared to States, as a territory, we are small and many would probably say insignificant. But to everyone now in this committee, they know how important Guam is strategically in the Pacific area.

And I want to thank you, Admiral, for your interest over the years.

So it should be no surprise to you that the Readiness Subcommittee continues to be alarmed with the state of naval readiness in the Pacific. Since you last testified before this committee, we have seen 2 ships damaged in collisions, resulting in the needless loss of 17 sailors.

As the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, you identified dry-docking in Guam as a critical component of depot-level ship repair to support the 7th Fleet during times of peace and war.

Ten months ago in front of this committee, you called for investments to support increased resiliency via projects in Japan, Guam, and Australia.

Then, in November, the Fleet Comprehensive Review identified capacity issues at the ship repair facility in Yokosuka, Japan.

Yet, just 2 weeks ago, Admiral, the Navy started again to dismantle the only moorings capable of supporting a floating dry dock on Guam.

So, Admiral, you are the supported commander in the Pacific, the individual that drives requirements for what we need to deter aggression, maintain readiness levels, and, if necessary, win America’s wars. So, as the geographic combatant commander, do you agree that current depot-level ship repair capability and capacity in the Pacific is insufficient to meet both peacetime and contingency requirements with a peer adversary?

And do you still believe that additional depot-level ship repair capability and capacity, to include additional dry docks, are needed to meet current and future readiness needs in the Pacific, especially with plans to increase the size of the Navy?
Admiral Harris. Thanks for your question, Madam Congresswoman. And let me begin by publicly again offering condolences for those 17 sailors that were lost on the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald.

I do not agree, ma'am, today that we have an insufficient shipyard capability. I believe the capability of our shipyards are adequate today.

But, as the Navy increases to 355 ships, I do agree that we need to look hard at the shipyard capabilities in the Pacific, whether they are in CONUS [continental United States] or whether they are in Hawaii, potentially in Guam, and in Yokosuka. And I think that 355-ship number will cause us to take a hard look at the shipyard capability for the future.

Ms. Bordallo. So what you are saying, then, Admiral, is that there still is hope and you are still looking at it.

Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Bordallo. All right.

The second question: In the National Defense Strategy, the Defense Department calls for investment in layered missile defense from North Korean threats. Secretary Mattis confirmed before this committee last week that the Department will continue to bolster missile defense of Guam and in the Pacific to keep pace with the ballistic missile threat.

From your perspective as the combatant commander and considering PACOM’s published number one priority of defending the homeland and its citizens, do you feel you have adequate ballistic missile defense capabilities to defend forward-deployed military assets, our allies in the region, as well as all Americans, without fail?

Admiral Harris. I do—as I have mentioned before, ma’am, I do believe that we have that capability today in 2018. But given where we think—without going into classified subjects, but given where we think the North Korean capability might be, in terms of their missiles, in 3 or 4 years or in the early 2020s, I think we must continue to improve our missile defenses.

And that is why I am an advocate for the defense-of-Hawaii radar system and I have advocated for a study to look at whether we should put ground-based interceptors or something like that in Hawaii. And I think we must continue to resource and improve the capabilities of the THAAD system that we have in Guam, as well as our BMD ships that are in the Pacific, most particularly in Japan.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. I don’t want the chairman to be mad at me either, so my time is up.

The Chairman. Never.

Ms. Bordallo. I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Harris, thanks again—right here. Thanks again for your service, and we wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

I want to point to the National Defense Strategy, where it talks about rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war. And it speaks in there specifically about hypersonics...
and how China now is actually prioritizing and funding development of hypersonics.

And I want to go to what you wrote. You said, “I am also deeply concerned about China’s heavy investments in the next wave of military technologies, including hypersonic missiles, advanced space and cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence. If the U.S. does not keep pace, USPACOM will struggle to compete with the People’s Liberation Army on future battlefields.”

You have also said that not only should we keep up, we have to outpace our near-peer adversaries. And specifically in what we are seeing happening in China with now their advancements and prioritization of hypersonics, I wanted to get your perspective about where you see China’s capabilities now, where it may be in the future, what we need to do, and what are the threats that we face in the Indo-Pacific with this capability that China has. And what should we do not only to counter—and the physics of that become very difficult—but, also, what do we need to do in developing that capability?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So, Congressman, I think that China’s hypersonic weapons development outpaces ours now, and I think we are falling behind.

We are hamstrung in a number of ways, one of which is some of our treaties are self-limiting, in my opinion. There is nothing in the INF Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, that precludes development of systems, but fielding them becomes a problem for us.

China is not subject to the INF, and their hypersonic weapons program is an indication of that. Over 90 percent of China’s ground-based missiles would be excluded by INF if they were now in it, and we have no missiles that can meet that capability from the ground. So we have air-launched and sea-launched missiles, but they are limited by those air and sea platforms that we have talked about in the previous question.

So I think that, in terms of hypersonic weapons, that we need to continue to pursue that in a most aggressive way in order to ensure that we have the capabilities to both defend against China’s hypersonic weapons and to develop our own offensive hypersonic weapons.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thanks.

I want to ask another question, too. When you look at the challenges that you face in PACOM and looking at any of these OPLANs [operational plans] and what you would have to execute with that, one of the things that I think is a glaring deficiency is the current state of our Ready Reserve Fleet in being able to mobilize, get supplies and troops forward deployed.

If you look at where we are—and I just had a chance to talk to Admiral Buzby, who is the MARAD [Maritime Administrator] Administrator—as well as look at our fleet, we have 46 ships in the Ready Reserve fleet. Average age: 43 years old.

I got to visit the SS Gopher State crane ship, a great ship, and the mariners on board do a great job. But there are two things that I think should concern us. One is the age of that fleet and being able to mobilize quickly. Second is what we would have to do to
surge merchant mariners. It is not just the ships, but it is the number of merchant mariners that we need going forward.

Give me your perspective about where we are today with the Ready Reserve Force sealift. And, you know, airlift is a different component of that. Give me your thought about that. And how critical a component is that in what you need in the Pacific Command in order to meet these OPLAN requirements?

Admiral HARRIS. So I believe that we are deficient in sealift to a strategic level. I think we must resource them, resource the Military Sealift Command, both to decrease the average age of the fleet and also to increase the size of the merchant fleet. It is imperative at a strategic level, in my opinion.

Nowhere is that felt more than in the Pacific. To go from the West Coast of the United States, while all our force is there, to lift that force to fight on the Korean Peninsula in support of the Korean war plans is a months-long process when you consider the time it takes to call up the fleet, mobilize the fleet, activate the fleet, mobilize and call up the mariners, find them, and then send them, and then load all the stuff on them.

So I think that we are deficient in that. I agree with you completely that sealift is a strategic shortfall in our system today.

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you believe the Navy should reflect that priority in their projection about the ships we need to build in the future?

Admiral HARRIS. I do. But I think that it is more than just the Navy. There is an airlift component to it. I think the guy who has probably got the hardest job in the joint force is Darren McDew, General McDew, at TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], because he is responsible for both sealift and airlift. And I think it is bigger than just the Navy, it is bigger than just the Air Force; it is part of the joint force.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral, again for, you know, your great service and really incredible accessibility to this committee over the last 3 or 4 years.

Also want to, as the co-chairman of the Friends of Australia Caucus with my colleague Mr. Gallagher from Wisconsin, just say how—again, your appointment is really outstanding.

This is a big year for our two countries. It is the 100 years of mateship, which we are celebrating really an alliance that is probably as deep and strong as any country in the world. And it is based on—and I think you know this—not just shared interests but also shared values. And you are going to have a zero learning curve to take on this task in, again, an important time. So congratulations.

I would like to focus again on an issue that you have been pretty persistent in all of your prior visits, which is to focus on the undersea realm, where, again, you have noted that we still have an asymmetric advantage, but that is not a static condition.

And, again, page 25 of your testimony actually sort of quantifies, you know, sort of where we are today and where it is going in the
future. I was wondering if maybe you could talk about that a little bit.

Admiral Harris. Thanks.

I will start off by commenting on the 100 years of mateship. You know, that was started with General Monash, who was the first time an American force fought under a foreign leader, General Monash in World War I.

On submarines and submarine warfare, undersea warfare is an asymmetric advantage that the United States has. No country on the Earth can touch us in our ability to operate under the sea. But that is a perishable advantage that China and Russia are trying desperately to close. And if we don't continue to resource the undersea warfare capabilities that are resident in the Navy today, both in the submarine force and in our antisubmarine warfare forces, China and Russia will close that gap, and then we will face a significant challenge to our position in the world.

Mr. Courtney. Thank you.

And, again, just to go to your testimony, again, which I think really kind of focuses exactly on what you just said, is roughly 230 of the world's 400 foreign submarines are in the Indo-Pacific, of which 160 belong to China, Korea, and Russia. Obviously, our entire attack submarine fleet is about 52, and that is obviously not all focused in the Pacific. So, I mean, at some point, this is math.

Admiral Harris. Yeah. And I am concerned about it. I mean, I think it is arithmetic, really. I mean, it is at 52 now, and in the 2020s it is going to dip down into the low to mid-40s.

And, you know, my requirements for submarines are only met by about half now. And that is on the denominator of 52. When that denominator goes down—I guess that would be math then. When that denominator goes down, then the percentage of submarines that I get will be even less.

Mr. Courtney. Thank you.

I would like to follow up on Mr. Wittman's question regarding sealift. Because, again, you know, the part of the world that you are in, you know, particularly the Korean Peninsula, you know, in terms of offshore petroleum distribution for, you know, a situation that might arise there, I mean, that is an example, I think, a concrete example, of where, you know, we have got a challenge right now in terms of, you know, what sealift resources are out there.

I was wondering if you could sort of focus on that as just, you know, a specific example.

Admiral Harris. Yeah. I agree with you. And I think that in that niche capability, offshore petroleum distribution, and the way that we are going to get our fuel from places like Red Hill in Hawaii to the fight in Korea, you know, we don't want to have that dependent on a 46-year-old ship, for example. So we have to invest in that, in my opinion.

Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Harris, over here. Thank you so much for your extraordinary years of dedicated service to the United States Navy and to our country. And pending Senate confirmation, congratulations on
your nomination and hopefully confirmation to be the United States Ambassador to Australia.

My fundamental concern is this, that historically we know whenever there is an established power and an ascendent or a rising power there tends to be conflict. Not always. I mean, there are times when historically it has been managed to avoid conflict. But often there is.

And when I look at your area of operations, particularly in, let’s say, the South China Sea, where China is that ascendant power, and certainly they are focused on projecting seapower, that—and when we look at the United States, during the Reagan buildup, we had about almost 600 ships, 600 vessels. Now we are down at—I think the number is around 280 operational vessels below that. And so the greatest worry I have, in terms of looking at our conventional capability, is the projection of seapower.

And what China wants to do, certainly, is, you know, area denial, to keep us out of being able to intervene in the event that they would act on Taiwan or in the event that they would act on any of their territorial ambitions, let’s say, in the South China Sea, in that particular region.

And so, you know, certainly, the ships we have today are more capable than their predecessors, but no ship can be in two places at the same time. And so how concerned are you about our ability to, in a sense, be a deterrent to aggression in that region, given the rise of China and given our conventional capability in terms of the projection of seapower?

Admiral Harris. Thanks for the question.

And I could not agree more. I believe that, in terms of just pure numbers—right? I mean, quantity has a quality all its own. And when you don’t have the quantity and you rely solely on quality and the other fellow has enormous quantity, then you are at a disadvantage.

And I think that is potentially the vector that we face if we were to continue on the course we were on. But I think we are on a different course now, thanks to the Congress, that we are moving toward a larger Navy.

I think power projection is inherent in the power of the joint force. And, you know, people talk about anti-access/area denial and the threat that our carriers face from China, and my response to that is, if the carriers were so vulnerable, why is China trying to build four or five of them? And so, you know, I think that the power that is inherent in an aircraft carrier strike group is enormous and is reflective of the power of the Nation behind it.

I don’t ascribe, in all respects, in all cases, to this idea of the Thucydides trap, where a rising power and a declining power are inevitably doomed to go to war. And I think in the case of China and the United States, I would debate anybody on who the rising power is in that equation. I think America is on the rise, that we are the rising power.

And so, you know, I am hopeful that it won’t come to a conflict with China. But, as we all have to be, we must all be prepared for that, if it should come to that.

Mr. Coffman. So if we look at our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, most of them are stepping up to the plate in
terms of what the requirement has been stated, 2 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] for defense spending as a minimum requirement. And, you know, that is problematic, certainly, for us in terms of being a deterrent factor to Russia.

What do you see in terms of our allies? Obviously, we don’t have a metric that is required, and we don’t have—there are some formal treaties, but there are associated powers that are friendly to the United States and could be treated as allies——

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah.

Mr. COFFMAN [continuing]. That we don’t have a formal relationship with. But what do you see, in terms of the rise of India—I guess I will take that for the record, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks.

Mr. COFFMAN. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it. We are making good progress. We want to keep making good progress.

Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Aloha, Admiral Harris. It is great to see you here. I would just like to briefly thank you for your service. But, specifically for Hawaii, you have been a great friend to the people of Hawaii, and I think people there consider you one of our own.

Thank you for talking about the importance of the defense-of-Hawaii radar. For many reasons, obviously, the people of Hawaii and this country are becoming more keenly aware of the growing threat coming from North Korea. And I want to thank the work that my colleague Congresswoman Hanabusa and I have done, in conjunction with the leadership of this committee, in continuing to move the funding forward for this radar. You know, we cannot be solely dependent on the SBX deployment capability for the defense of Hawaii.

I wanted to ask you about China’s role in finding a peaceful resolution to this growing threat from North Korea—not only what more can be done to engage China in this regard, but also if you can address the role of North Korea’s other bordering country, Russia. What role do they or should they be playing as we seek to explore all diplomatic means possible to resolve this threat?

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you. And it is always good to see you. Pending the goodwill of the Senate, I am going to coin a new phrase, “gadoha.” That will be the new thing.

Ms. GABBARy. That is right.

Admiral HARRIS. With regard to China and DPRK, North Korea, I think China holds the key. And I have said before that China is the key to a peaceful outcome on the Korean Peninsula, but China is not the key to all outcomes. And so the onus really is on them. If over 90 percent of North Korea’s trade comes from China, then, despite whatever China says, they have a lever that ought to be applied.

That said, I want to be upfront and acknowledge that China is doing a lot in the pressure campaign plan in pressuring North Korea and in honoring the U.N. [United Nations] sanctions against North Korea.
I think there is more to be done. I think this issue of guest workers, these are folks that are—North Koreans that work in other countries, and then their pay, their revenue goes back to the regime. I think there is a lot to be done in that regard. We think that, overall, in the world, there are probably 80,000 of these guest workers. Many countries are now sending those guest workers home, but even so, 60,000 of the 80,000 are in Russia and China. So Russia and China have a big lever.

So I think there is more that could be done and there is more that must be done in that regard. But I do want to acknowledge that China is doing a lot in terms of joining the pressure campaign and in enforcing the sanctions that the U.N. has placed on them.

I think that Russia holds the role of a spoiler. They have said that they will cover down on where the sanctions pressured North Korea too much. And I think that that fits their role as a spoiler. So there is much to be done in the Russian space, if you will, with North Korea and particularly in this area of guest workers.

Now, they have said that they are going to expel their guest workers, the North Korean guest workers, in 2019. Now, that is a positive, and I want to be optimistic about it. But until they do, then it becomes problematic.

Ms. GABBARD. Briefly, in 2016, India was declared a major defense partner. You have made it a priority throughout your time in command to increase the security engagements with India.

Do you feel that the implementation of this designation as a major defense partner is being implemented appropriately? And if so, great. If not, where are there other opportunities for growth?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So, as I have said, I do believe that India is our great strategic opportunity—shared values, shared concerns, and all of that. They are the only country in the world that is designated as a major defense partner, and we, the United States, we need to continue to look for ways to turn that term into reality.

I think we have a great opportunity coming up in India to improve the capability of their defense forces. I spoke in Raisina [Dialogue] 3 this year, and the theme of my talk was this is the year to get things done. So we have talked about it. We designated India in 2016. In 2017, we continued that work. I think in 2018 this is the year to get things done.

That means we have to do things on our side as well. There are these foundational agreements that we require countries to adhere to. I think we need to be creative in how we insist on that application in India and work with the Indians so that together we can come to a place where we can realize this “major defense partner” moniker.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you much for being here this morning.

We hear the phrase “whole-of-government approach” when it comes to the United States, and I heard recently someone refer to the whole-of-country approach that China takes with respect to as they address whatever their issues.

I have supply chain concerns across a wide spectrum of issues, in particular, things that we buy from the Chinese—telecommuni-
cations and other gear. While the companies like Huawei and ZTE might argue that they are outside Chinese Government control, there is no real way to prove that. There is no real way to know what the influences are.

The other direction would be things that they buy, companies they buy here, you know, certain issues that we wouldn't like them to control—the CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] review process, the high-end things that we would obviously be concerned about, all the way down to buying a seed company that controls seeds that we need year in and year out for our agriculture issues.

One, do you share those concerns? And if you do, can you talk to us somewhat about what you would see as the CFIUS review process needing to be upgraded, as well as buying telecommunications and other things that would be implemented on our bases and in our gear?

Admiral Harris. Thanks for the question.

I am very concerned about Chinese direct investment in the United States and their ability to buy stuff either that are critical to our defense or buy tracts of land that are adjacent to our major training ranges and the like. So I have been involved in the CFIUS process since I was the Pacific Fleet commander. I think the process is laborious and it is discouraging.

That said, CFIUS 2.0, part of the FIRRMA [Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization] Act that is being worked in Congress now, I am completely in support of that. I think it is absolutely essential to our national defense that we move out and improve CFIUS. And the CFIUS 2.0 process I think is commendatory, and it has my support.

Mr. Conaway. So what about stuff we would buy? Are you concerned buying things, like, from Huawei or ZTE?

Admiral Harris. Sure.

Mr. Conaway. Okay.

Admiral Harris. Absolutely.

Mr. Conaway. All right.

So Mr. Coffman got you started down a little bit on power projection. Could you speak specifically about the importance of airpower projection and forward deployment of that projection, whether it is on aircraft carriers or other places where we would have our aircraft, given the new threats or what appear to be emerging threats to carriers and other things?

Admiral Harris. Yeah. So power projection, again, is the backbone of any nation's ability to maintain its defense. I think airpower is key not only because I wear wings but because of the reality of what airpower brings.

Whether that airpower is launched from the shore or from an aircraft carrier is not as important as the airpower itself, in my view. The carrier gives you the flexibility, and that has its own inherent importance, but I think things like the fifth-generation aircraft are vital.

And I think that when you look at the numbers of fourth-generation fighters that we will have at the end of the 2020s, I think we should invest also in the capability to improve those fourth-genera-
tion fighters to something—you know, I use the term fifth-gen-minus or fourth-gen-plus. You know, it is in that regard.

I think we need to continue to invest in Long-Range Strike Bomber capability. The B–21 comes to mind as a follow-on to the B–2 and the B–1. I use today, heavily, B–52s and B–1s in addition to B–2s, today, heavily, in our lightning missions in the Pacific.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, Admiral, thank you and your wife for your long service. And if you can make it through that laborious process on the other side of the building to become an ambassador, look forward to your service there.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Rosen.

Ms. ROSEN. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith.

And thank you, Admiral Harris, for your service. And congratulations on your future endeavors.

What I wanted to ask is this: Last week, Secretary Mattis was here before this committee and talked about the Nuclear Posture Review [NPR]. And it contemplates some very novel circumstances under which nuclear weapons can be used.

So, given the ever-present threat of North Korean cyber attacks and the nation’s advancing nuclear weapons programs, in what ways could the expanded scenarios in the NPR allow for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats, like a cyber threat? And how is that going to increase the likelihood of a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and North Korea?

Admiral HARRIS. It is an important question, but I am going to defer it because I am not the expert on nuclear weapons——

Ms. ROSEN. Okay.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And I don’t have any under my control. The nuclear weapons that are extant in the force are under General Hyten’s control at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. But I will be happy to take the question and try to get back to you in some coherent way.

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. I appreciate it.

Well, then I am going to move on to another question. I am really concerned about this new budget and its significant cuts to the State Department.

So we are all in agreement that combating the threat of North Korea is going to require a lot of strong cooperation with all of our allies in the region, just like we are heading off China’s attempts to become the world’s leading military and economic power. It is going to necessitate us strengthening our alliances and pursuing new partnerships. And the military play crucial and critical roles in the efforts, just like our diplomats do, and we need those resources.

So I am wondering what effects—and now you are going to be going to a new job, maybe, as the ambassador. So what effects could these significant cuts to the State Department budget have on your ability to build those partnerships?

Admiral HARRIS. So I am not an expert on the specific cuts in the State Department. But I will say in general that a strong State Department and a strong military Defense Department together
make a strong nation. A weak State Department means you are going to have to have a much stronger Defense Department. So I think the diplomacy and military capabilities and defense go hand in hand. And I don't want to see a place where—you know, Foreign Minister Talleyrand, back in the old French days, he said once to his field marshal that when my profession fails—being the foreign minister—when my profession fails, yours has to take over. I think it is much better that both professions go hand in hand to strengthen the country.

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. I look forward to building those partnerships in your new endeavor.

Thank you. I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I just want to thank you again for your service to our Nation, you and your wife. And we look forward to continued service in a different capacity.

I wanted to cover a couple of areas with China, the influence just as the One Belt, One Road Initiative, as well as the influence in Australia. And we primarily look at the One Road, One Belt Initiative from an economic standpoint, but there is a military component to it as well, and I was wondering if you could describe a little bit about that. We know that there is the new military base in Djibouti. We know that there are some access ports issues, potential bases.

But could you expound on that and then how we are changing our force posture, as well as our operational plans, accordingly?

Admiral HARRIS. So I think One Belt, One Road is, in fact, much more than just an economic engine that China is undertaking. I think it seeks to link economically the population of China with markets and resources in Europe and Africa and Central Asia. And I think that is all good. You know, anything that you put to improve the quality of life of folks through trade is a positive.

But I think also that One Belt, One Road seeks to displace the United States and our friends and allies in the region, in the Indo-Pacific region, by China. It is a concerted, strategic endeavor by China to gain a foothold and displace the United States and our allies and partners in the region.

And I think you need to only look at the bases and places where China is putting its emphasis to see the realization of this. They are in a position today to influence the shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz; in the Gulf of Aden; the Red Sea, which means the Suez Canal; and also in our hemisphere in the Panama Canal; and also, finally, in the Strait of Malacca. All those global choke points are under pressure from China's One Belt, One Road Initiative.

And I can go on and on about it, but I will stop there unless you have more specific questions.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. How are we adjusting our force posture and our operational plans as a result? Or have we?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, part of the force posture is the DPRI [Defense Program Review Initiative], the distributed movement of U.S. forces out of Japan, not all of them, of course, but some of them
out of Japan, and putting them in Australia and Guam and Hawaii and back in the United States. So that is part of it.

We are also improving our relationships with countries like Sri Lanka, which, to me, is an important relationship; obviously, with India that we talked about. Singapore is key, as I mentioned earlier, and the access that we enjoy because of our Singaporean partners, that access is strategically important to the United States, in my view.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great.

Moving on to Australia—and thank you for mentioning the bombers and the airpower and how important it is. Certainly Whiteman Air Force Base, I know the B–2 has been part of some operations there. And we have had some training with our Australian allies, both as far as large-force air exercises, integration with air control parties on the ground. And we have also sent liaison officers to visit their operations centers to give and receive briefings on joint capabilities.

So how effective do you think these efforts have been in strengthening our partnership with Australia? How can we build on these efforts moving forward?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. Again, I think that Australia is one of the keys to a rules-based international order. They are a key ally of the United States, and they have been with us, again, in every major conflict since World War I.

I think that there are many areas that we continue to work with the Australian Defense Forces, and that includes their work in Darwin, their work at Tindal Air Base, both in the Air Force and the Marine Corps.

Our navy-to-navy relationship with the Royal Australian Navy and the Army relationships are terrific. They are key partners. They have key staff officers on my staff in Hawaii at the general officer level and at the SES level, Senior Executive Service level, that play key roles in PACOM. I could not do what I do without those officers there in Hawaii.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Harris, thanks for your appearance today and—over here. Amazing how the Navy seems to be able to make a sailor seem older than they are, with the distinctions you have as the “Old Goat” and the “Gray Owl.” But I thank you for your service and your longest serving naval flight officer, which has given you that distinction as the “Gray Owl.”

We have heard a lot today about the threats to the posture and readiness under your command, but could you just sort of briefly identify, without a lengthy description, just what would be the top three—not the only three, but the top three—readiness challenges or concerns that you have for your forces under your command?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. Just briefly, sir, as you asked, my top three readiness concerns are munitions, submarines, and ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. And I will stop there, depending on more questions.

Mr. BROWN. No, I appreciate that.
I had an opportunity to visit U.S. Forces Korea and also Okinawa. And regarding munitions, you know, one of the concerns that were presented in a variety of briefings is not only what you have on hand but the storage capacity and not just the amount of capacity but the aging nature of those facilities. Can you talk a little bit about that?

Admiral HARRIS. I can.

And so, at the beginning of my time at Pacific Command, I was worried about some of those key munitions shortfalls. And now that the Army and the other services have moved munitions to the peninsula, I am beginning to worry about munitions storage capacity.

So what I tell folks, that is a nice problem to have. I mean, I am glad I have that problem, not the earlier problem. But we have to get after that one now in a serious way.

Mr. BROWN. And is that reflected in the budget?

Admiral HARRIS. It is.

Mr. BROWN. Okay.

Admiral HARRIS. And it is reflective in what South Korea has provided the United States in terms of their commitments under the alliance.

Mr. BROWN. Okay. And let me just continue. I know, perhaps, if I asked you for a lengthier list than the top three, you would have included noncombatant evacuation operations——

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. NEO. That also is a concern that I have. When I was on the peninsula, you know, in conversations with General Brooks and General Vandal, who just left, as you know, the Eighth Army after doing a remarkable job there, and also with General Cornish, 18th Wing on Okinawa, it doesn’t seem as if we really have a NEO—a good grasp of what we need to do. I mean, I think it sounds like the plans are in place, the documents are there. You would pass, sort of, like, a command inspection, check the block, yeah, you got what you need. But I don’t get the sense that, like, the rehearsals, the walk-throughs, the, you know, soup to nuts have been thought through logistically, how, as we are bringing follow-on troops onto the peninsula, we coordinate then, you know, dependents and other U.S., you know, citizens and others who we are responsible for to get them off the peninsula.

In fact, there was a comment, not by any of the three officers who I mentioned, but, you know, by a person who briefed us that, when asked about NEO, it was sort of like, “Yeah, well, we are starting to take a look at it.”

And so can you just talk a little bit about NEO——

Admiral HARRIS. Sure.

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. And what——

Admiral HARRIS. So I would say that we are much further along, Congressman, than just taking a look at it, but there is work to be done. And so U.S. Army Pacific, General Brown and his staff in Hawaii, has been charged to develop the NEO plan and then to see it through to fruition.

General Brooks and I have made NEO a key line of effort in what we are both doing, because we both know that if conflict
breaks out on the Korean Peninsula then we are going to have to get the Americans off of there.

The numbers are staggering, right? I mean, estimates say there are 200,000-plus Americans, not military, but Americans who live and work in South Korea. And then on top of that, you have a million Chinese that live and work on the Korean Peninsula, 60,000 Japanese, and on and on and on. So our friends, allies, partners, and others also have a vested interest in the evacuation of non-combatants should war break out on the peninsula.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Admiral Harris.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, you just hit on two of the issues that I want to talk with you about. One of them is ISR. Every commander that we talk with wants more ISR and more dependable ISR.

I am very concerned, especially after reading your testimony and others, that as the Department becomes more dependent on space and our adversaries—we certainly accept space as a contested environment. And your testimony says, “Our adversaries continue to develop means to deny our space-enabled capabilities . . . broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which include direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems.” You talk about their development and the ability to jam our satellite communications and PNT [position, navigation, and timing] jammers.

The Department, the Air Force has recently proposed to not recapitalize the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] platform. And I am concerned that we are becoming too dependent on space and that there will be a lack of redundancy if we get rid of the systems that we have today that work, in hopes of a system that might or might not work, and that somebody may be able to find a way to deny our ability to use that system.

Could you speak to the issues of the vulnerabilities in becoming too dependent on space and the need for redundancy in ISR platforms?

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir.

I think, as a nation, over the past several decades, we have viewed space as a peaceful place, and we have been led astray by viewing space as some kind of a fuzzy panda bear thing.

I think the Chinese, on the other hand, the Russians, and others, they have viewed space as the ultimate high ground, and they are preparing for battle in space. And we are just now coming to the realization that we are going to have to change our view of space, that it is a place of importance in terms of battlefield dominance.

So, you know, I am advocating that we change that view of space and what we need to do in order to ensure that we maintain a level of dominance in space, that we can have access to the tools that we have put up there to do the ISR and other things.

Mr. SCOTT. I hope we continue the development of space as well. I am just concerned that if we get rid of systems that we know currently work and somebody has more advancements in space than we have, then we could be left without the ISR platforms. And I
I hope that we will continue both the development of current ISR platforms as well as additional space-based platforms.

I want to mention one other thing, and then I will yield the remainder of my time. I was in Djibouti not too long ago. And as we talk about the Chinese, the one thing that surprised me the most on that trip and that sticks in my mind is a hospital ship parked in Djibouti. And not only are they actually—in the past, they have helped to make the lives of the leaders of countries better, but now they are actually trying to win the hearts and minds of the people of the country. So that seems to be a marked change.

I hope that, as we have the [USNS] Comfort and the Mercy, that as we continue to rebuild the Navy, that we will look at other ships like them as well.

Thank you for your service, and maybe I will come see you in Australia.

I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Murphy.

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here. I just wanted to add my congratulations to my colleagues’. Congratulations to you for your selection as Ambassador to Australia.

You know, based on my experience in a prior life working on OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy, Southeast Asia team, as well as out at the Pacific Command, and also as you highlighted in your response to Mrs. Hartzler’s question, Australia is an incredibly important ally. And I am so grateful that the relationship with this important ally will be in very good hands with you out there.

And so thank you for your service and your willingness to continue to serve this country.

Speaking about allies, you know, in order for us to improve stability in the Asia-Pacific AOR [area of responsibility], we really focus on promoting security cooperation activities with our allies and partners in the region. And, as you know, section 333 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA consolidated several security cooperation authorities into a new, broader, global train and equip authority.

Can you give us some detail about how PACOM is looking strategically at its security cooperation programming under this new section 333 authority?

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. I am excited about what 333 does and the fact that it consolidates many of the disparate programs that we have before. So we are getting after how to best utilize that authority now throughout the PACOM staff and our components.

I am also encouraged by the Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative and what that gives me in terms of flexibility to deal with our partners and friends in the region.

And, finally, there is the MSI, the Maritime Security Initiative, which has been in place now for 2 years, and we are in the third year now. And that is about a $500 million program, roughly. You know, it was roughly $50 million, $50 million, and then $100 million, $100 million, $100 million. So about $435 million, I guess.

And these programs are important. They are important in our ability to deal with the needs of our friends and partners in the region to improve their capacity. And I think it is important. So I am grateful for that.
I would like to see increased funding in IMET, international military education and training, for some of those countries that we have put IMET on hold. I think it is important that we resource IMET so that we can then train the leaders of these militaries in the United States, so they can see democracy in action, so they can control their military in action on a daily basis.

Mrs. Murphy. I am glad you raised IMET. I think back to our relationship with Indonesia, and there was a time where we weren’t doing IMET, and we lost almost a generation of relationships between our senior military folks and our counterparts in Indonesia. So I appreciate you raising that.

In your written testimony, you said, “National power and security depend on the ability to operate securely in and through cyberspace.” I am sure you would agree that, in order to fight and win future wars in the cyber domain, we have to elevate our cyber training, cyber preparedness, and capacity building as part of our security cooperation activities.

How, specifically, is PACOM incorporating cybersecurity and cyber training ranges into your train and equip planning for fiscal year 2019?

Admiral Harris. Quite a bit. And we have formed at PACOM the Joint Cyber Center. We have operational planning teams that are working with U.S. Cyber Command to get after the challenges that are resident in the domain.

Mrs. Murphy. Great. Well, I appreciate that response.

And, also, just as you consider planning for fiscal year 2019 train and equip, I just want to emphasize that there has been strong congressional support for establishing a persistent cyber training environment that could provide deployable cyber training capability in the future. And I would just encourage you to continue to incorporate these new cyber training capabilities into your planning.

Thank you.

Admiral Harris. Thank you.

Mrs. Murphy. I yield back.

The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Great to see you, Admiral Harris.

I wanted to focus on cyber and information warfare and information operations.

So, first, I would be interested in an update as to our engagement with South Korea in regional confidence-building measures and capacity regarding cyber capability to counter not only the North Korean threat but also the threat from China.

Admiral Harris. So I work with USFK [United States Forces Korea], General Brooks and his team, and with Admiral Rogers and his team for cyber capacity in Korea, for their ability to counter the threat from North Korea.

I think North Korea is a major cyber actor, and the work that we do, both on the peninsula and off the peninsula, that work is critical as we get after the threat from North Korea, as well as, you know, China and Russia and all that. But North Korea is a major cyber actor.
Ms. STEFANIK. And how do we work with our allies most effectively in terms of information sharing when it comes to countering North Korea’s cyber activities?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So, by sharing that information and sharing our operations. But we are limited, in many cases, by clearance issues with our allies and our partners and friends. So each one is different, each level of access is different, and we have to have that view toward maximizing the training that we can do with each one.

Ms. STEFANIK. And then shifting to information warfare. It is the same question: What, specifically, are we doing to counter Chinese and North Korean information warfare and propaganda efforts? How are we working with our allies in the Asia-Pacific? And who is the lead within the DOD on coordinating these efforts?

Admiral HARRIS. In information warfare, we work through the and with the Joint Staff, the J–39 team in the Joint Staff, and at OSD in order to have a unified view of information warfare.

I think China is using its considerable resources and the platform that is China to challenge us in the information domain. You know, an earlier question about the Confucius Institutes and things like that.

Across the United States, you know, and in other countries, you can see the impact of a strategic view of information warfare which China has. And I am not convinced today that the United States has that unified strategic view of information warfare across our whole of government.

Ms. STEFANIK. So what steps do we need to take within the DOD? Because I think before we even tackle the whole-of-government approach, I think making sure that DOD is focused on this, not just in terms of countering Chinese propaganda, North Korea propaganda, but propaganda when it comes to violent extremist groups and terrorist organizations—what steps do we need to take to ensure that DOD is focused on this, as they should be?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, one is the training internal to DOD. And one involves those authorities which Admiral Rogers needs, and then he can delegate some of those authorities to the combatant commanders. But without those authorities to do offensive cyber operations, I think we are limited.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Panetta.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral, for being here. It is quite an honor that I get to be in this position to talk to you. And I look forward to hearing about your continued service to this country. Thank you.

It was alluded to briefly earlier in one of the questions, and that was about the major incidents that occurred with our Navy ships last year. I guess there were 4 major ones in 2017, 2 of which led to the deaths of 17 soldiers—more than the deaths of our service members in Afghanistan last year as well.

If you could, just provide us with a brief summary of the findings about those events as well as the steps that need to be taken in order to prevent those types of events in the future.

Admiral HARRIS. So there were two major investigatory reviews besides the ones that focused just on the incidents themselves.
There was the comprehensive review led by Admiral Davidson, the U.S. Fleet Forces Command commander. And there was the Secretary of the Navy’s strategic review, strategic readiness review, which was directed by the Secretary of the Navy and led by Admiral Gary Roughead, the former Chief of Naval Operations.

And those reviews echoed the findings of the actual investigations of the incidents themselves, what I call inside the skin of the ship. It reflected a negligence on the parts of the crews of the ships and the commanding officers.

I think that accountability was properly applied by the Navy in this throughout the chain of command of the Navy in holding the right level of accountability for those incidents.

At the end of the day, it was about training. Tactically, it was about training and leadership and seamanship inside the skins of those ships, in my opinion.

Mr. PANETTA. Okay. Great. Thank you. Appreciate that.

In regards to the South China Sea, that was kind of the flavor of the month for a while. Everybody was focused on that. And North Korea came about, and now the focus seems to be on that. But in regards to China’s involvement there, can you elaborate on if we are continuing to focus on that and how?

Admiral HARRIS. So I think that we can walk and chew gum at the same time. You know, we can think about North Korea and the South China Sea at the same time.

I believe that, in the past couple years, I have focused on China’s reclamation activities. This past year, we have seen them consolidate those reclamation activities in—what I call they have built vertically.

So, in the South China Sea—and I will have some pictures, photographs for the closed session. But we have seen them build vertically and dramatically in the South China Sea on those seven reclaimed features that I call seven new bases in the South China Sea, to include aircraft hangars, barracks facilities, radar facilities, weapon emplacements, 10,000-foot runways—there are three of them down there—and all of that. So they now have seven new military bases in the South China Sea.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate you being here, and I appreciate the great job that PACOM is doing.

I want to follow up on a question that Mr. Conaway asked. He was talking about the long-term security challenges in our country with investments and talking about the U.S. technological advantages relative to China.

A followup that I have on that is, do you have specific concerns that real estate transactions either by Chinese state-owned enterprises or perhaps other interests under a false flag could create vulnerabilities to our bases?

Admiral HARRIS. I do, Congressman. I think that, you know, each case needs to be looked at on its own merits, but when China buys something adjacent to one of our training ranges or intelligence facilities or the like, you know, I think it bears looking into whether that purchase is for the right reasons or for nefarious reasons.
Mr. BACON. What are your thoughts on the recently introduced legislation known as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, FIRRMA, of 2017?

Admiral HARRIS. I would have mentioned that earlier if I could have remembered what that acronym stood for. I am in favor of FIRRMA, and I loosely refer to it as CFIUS 2.0. But I am in favor of it. I wrote a letter to Senator Cornyn supporting that.

Mr. BACON. And, sir, referencing Taiwan, do you think we have done an adequate job communicating our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and our support of this democracy of the neighbor, China, there, that they respect free enterprise and individual freedoms? I worry about if we are not doing it enough.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. I am satisfied with where we are, but we need to continue to stay with it, right?

I mean, so my obligations to Taiwan, unlike the other countries in the region, I am obligated by law to think about the defense of Taiwan and to help them in their legitimate defensive needs under the Taiwan Relations Act. I get it, and I take my responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act seriously. So my job is to help Taiwan improve its legitimate defensive needs in the 21st century.

Mr. BACON. Well, I appreciate you doing that. Some of our officials, I find, tone down that support, I think, out of fear of how China will perceive it. But I think that communicates weakness towards our commitment to Taiwan. And I think we need to do just the opposite, make clear that we are standing by them, folks who have embraced democracy, free enterprise, and the respect to freedom. And I think to do otherwise sends a mixed signal to China, and that is not necessarily healthy.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. I agree with you completely.

Mr. BACON. Finally, I just want to say thank you again for your service. We look forward to having a great ambassador in Australia. Thank you.

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Aloha, Admiral. And I join my colleague Congresswoman Gabbard in a great “mahalo” from the people of Hawaii, not only for your service but for your wife’s as well.

I am going to call this 56-page—I am not sure people realize that, but your statement is 56 pages. I am going to call it “The Admiral Harris Strategy on Indo-Pacific.” And I hope that your successor would follow it, if he can get through the 56 pages.

Having said that, let me—there is one thing that you start off with that also the National Defense Strategy starts off with. And I am trying to understand exactly what the premise—because I find that it is the premise of both what you are saying as well as the NDS is saying.

And that is this concept of free and open international order, which seems to be stating that, after World War II, that sort of was the rule of what governed, especially in the Indo-Pacific area, and that what is happening now is China and Russia are undercutting both of that. And you seem to say that we have to get back to the free and open international order, because that is what is really
going to promote this prosperity and the economic development, everything that we want, that our presence is there.
And there is also reference to this concept of the rules of the road, which I also believe is a function of this free and open international order.
So my question to you is twofold. One is, what is this free and open international order?
And, secondly, hidden in all of that, or maybe not so hidden in all of that, is this whole concept that, in order to be successful or to be effective, you must be able to prevent war but you must be able to win war. So one of your priorities is lethality—in other words, the ability to do the defense.
So I was wondering if you could tie all of that for me. Because I think that, in my opinion, serves as the basis of what your 56 pages is getting at.
And, by the way, omedeto for your appointment.
Admiral HARRIS. Arigato.
So I think the original concept of the rules-based international order actually predated the end of World War II. It started out in the Atlantic Charter discussions, and then it became the Atlantic Charter, then you had the United Nations, then you had NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and you had all these things. And some of the organs of the rules-based international order were the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and those enforcement mechanisms that allowed states to prosper under a set of rules where they would know what other states were—the rules they were following.
And I think no state prospered more in the decades after World War II than China. I mean, if you see where China is today, that is due, in my view, in my opinion, that is due to this rules-based international order.
And no one has advocated for China’s involvement and inclusion in that more than United States. It was United States that supported China’s entry in the World Trade Organization and on and on and on.
And now, though, we find, I think, that rules-based international order under pressure. And it is under pressure by principally China and Russia, two nations that I call revisionist powers.
So I think it behooves us to go back to the source, to go back to this rules-based international order that has done well by so many countries, including China and including the United States, and continue to advocate for the importance of that system.
I think, as far as the idea of deterrence and winning wars, you know, I am a military guy, and I think it is important that you must plan and resource to win a war while at the same time you work to prevent it. But at the end of the day, you know, the ability to wage war, I think, is important, or else then you become a paper tiger.
Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. And I think that is where some of us feel that we are schizophrenic. But we have to be able to do both. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks.
Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, join me, as well, to the growing chorus today of those thanking you for your service not just to our country but to the greatest branch of the greatest military in the world.

Everybody catch that? All right.

I wonder if you could comment a little bit on whether or not you believe the torpedo threat within the Indo-Pacific region has decreased.

Admiral HARRIS. No, it hasn't decreased at all. As China and Russia, primarily, as their submarine capability has increased, then the threat from torpedos as well as other weapons systems that are resident on those submarines increases.

And we also see an increase in capability of North Korean submarines. And that is of immediate concern, given the conditions on the peninsula now.

Mr. BANKS. Then why in the budget that was released this week do we see a drastic cut to Surface Ship Torpedo Defense [SSTD], which 5 years ago was funded at approximately $84 million and, in the budget request this year, down to $8.59 million in the request? Why would we not assume then that there has been a significant decrease in the threat?

Admiral HARRIS. Congressman, I don't know. I mean, that is a Navy part of that submission, and I just don't know.

Mr. BANKS. But you just said a moment ago the threat certainly hasn't diminished——

Admiral HARRIS. That is correct. Yeah. I do not believe the threat has diminished. In fact, I believe the threat is greater now than it has been. Why the Navy decided to cut that in its budget submission, I don't know.

Mr. BANKS. Can you comment on SSTD and the importance?

Admiral HARRIS. I don't——

Mr. BANKS. Surface Ship Torpedo Defense.

Admiral HARRIS. Right. If you are on a ship, I think it is probably one of the things you are thinking about all the time. I think it is very important.

Mr. BANKS. Okay. That is all I have. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

Admiral HARRIS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGEO. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral, I have a couple questions regarding freedom of navigation and freedom-of-navigation operations specifically dealing with the blockchain islands that China is trying to do.

Are we doing anything in addition to, you know, some of the operations we are doing right now in terms of sending our ships near the islands, are we doing anything else to basically try to test or push or even prevent the Chinese goal of the Nine-Dash Line?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. On the idea of the Nine-Dash Line itself, you know, we are talking about it in the public domain, not just me but, you know, we are all talking about the fact that the tribunal that was charged to look at the case in 2016 that was raised by the Philippines but against China, the outcome of that case ruled the Nine-Dash Line to be illegitimate.

Mr. GALLEGEO. Right.
Admiral Harris. And so we talk about it in international venues. And one of the things that I think is important to do is to continue to talk about it and get other partner nations to also talk about the illegitimacy of the Nine-Dash Line claim. And that Nine-Dash Line claim affects Malaysia——

Mr. Gallego. Right.

Admiral Harris [continuing]. The Philippines, and all the rest. What we do in the military sense is we continue to operate in the South China Sea. We continue to do freedom-of-navigation operations to demonstrate that we will fly, sail, or operate wherever international law will allow us.

And we are encouraging our friends, allies, and partners to do the same. If they are not willing to do freedom-of-navigation operations to the level that we do, that is up to them. But if they are operating in the South China Sea, that demonstrates to all the world, really, that the South China Sea is, in fact, international water space and is not China’s simply because it has “China” in its name.

Mr. Gallego. Have there been any other thoughts or plans, for example, to further push the idea of how delegitimate their claims are? For example, sending naval science teams or science teams of other flag-bearing countries to these atolls or lands. Because, ostensibly speaking, if these islands don’t belong to China, then they should not be opposed to, you know, nonmilitary entities actually, you know, doing some research there.

Admiral Harris. There has been some thought of that, but we run up against policy and international law. You know, if one of these islands, for example, is a high-tide elevation—you know, I don’t want to get too pedantic about it, but if it is a high-tide elevation, then regardless of who owns it or if anyone owns it, it has a 12-mile limit around it. And so that becomes problematic if you are going to do scientific research. And we don’t want to find ourselves in the position of asking China’s permission to do the scientific research——

Mr. Gallego. Right.

Admiral Harris [continuing]. Because then that——

Mr. Gallego. Because that legitimizes it.

Admiral Harris. That is correct.

Mr. Gallego. To back up on that, Admiral, so you are saying—I guess I am confused, because, from what I understand, the international order has so far said that these islands are not recognized as Chinese islands. In my mind, that means then we should be able or our allies should be able to bring at least nonmilitary assets to these islands, such as testing or whatever it is.

And what you are saying is they still have some level of sovereignty that is questionable within the international order?

Admiral Harris. Right. Yeah. And so now I am going to be drawn into the pedantic part of this, but——

Mr. Gallego. Right.

Admiral Harris [continuing]. If it is a high-tide elevation, that means if it sticks up above the water at high tide, then that means it has territoriality to the feature, you know, no matter who owns it. And we say that China does not own it, but it still has territoriality. So we are going to follow that 12-mile limit around it.
If it is a low-tide elevation, in other words it disappears at high tide, then it has no territoriality associated with it at all.

Mr. GALLEGO. I guess I am very confused. This is like a very chicken-or-egg thing. How can China have territoriality over these manmade islands?

Admiral HARRIS. They don’t, other than the reality is that they claim it.

Mr. GALLEGO. Right.

Admiral HARRIS. So they claim it as theirs. And so they say that the territoriality is imparted to Beijing.

Mr. GALLEGO. Right.

Admiral HARRIS. And we say for those high-tide elevations that China has no territoriality over it. But it rates its own territoriality. So we don’t give it—we give it the 12-mile limit.

If it is a low-tide elevation so that it disappears at high tide, then it has no territoriality at all, and we can go right up to it—and we do—under freedom-of-navigation operations.

Mr. GALLEGO. I just feel—and just reclaiming my time and finish up—I just feel that, you know, it is in the future interests of this country and our allies to make sure that we are constantly pushing on the Nine-Dash Line establishment, including with these atolls overseas.

Admiral HARRIS. And I agree with you. The Nine-Dash Line covers all—almost all of the South China Sea. So China claims the Nine-Dash Line and every feature in it.

Mr. GALLEGO. I see it on the map, so—yeah. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hice.

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral, as already has been said so many times, thank you for your service, and congratulations on your next assignment. It is a great honor to have you here. And, in fact, it is a great honor to virtually be sitting at the table with you here. I feel like we can shake hands.

But I want to begin with the question that Mr. Scott asked a little while ago. I didn’t really catch the answer. Do you believe we are, in your opinion, leaving ourselves more vulnerable if we forsake the JSTAR program for other platforms, ISR platforms?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, so I support the Air Force’s view on the JSTARS that it can be replaced. My requirement is the requirement for the capability, and I tend to be platform-agnostic on all of these things.

As a joint commander, you know, I state the requirement for the capability and ask the services to provide that capability. If they choose to provide it on a large-frame airplane or some other way, then that is the purview of the services, and that is the system under which you all have created for us, and I am okay with that.

So if the Air Force says the JSTARS platform is obsolete or trending toward obsolescence and they have another way to meet that capability, I am okay with that.

Mr. HICE. I think all of us would be, if that capability is tested and proven before just forsaking that which we already know works effectively. And that certainly is an area of concern.
You mentioned a while ago good news, bad news—good news that, in your opinion, the U.S. is rising in power, but the bad news that China is outpacing us right now.

Of the next-generation military technologies involved with China right now, be it hypersonic missiles or directed energy weapons, autonomous weapons or space-based, which concerns you the most?

Admiral HARRIS. Today, Congressman, I am concerned about hypersonics because of where they are in that development. You know, some of the other areas you mentioned, directed energy and space-based weapons, I think that they are not as far along as they are—analogous terms—as they are with hypersonics. I worry about hypersonics today.

Mr. HICE. Okay. With that statement, then, would you agree that that would be the area of most importance for us in terms of our keeping a technological edge? Or where would you say we need to focus?

Admiral HARRIS. I think we need to continue to focus on maintaining the technological and asymmetric edge in undersea warfare. I think that is the most important thing.

That said, you know, here comes the hypersonic threat from China, and we need to start thinking about and resourcing our defense against hypersonic weapons and our own offensive hypersonic weapons.

But I think that our advantage and the capability that is resonant in the undersea warfare domain is so significant and is so pressurized now by China’s development that we have to continue to resource that.

Mr. HICE. Do you believe we are properly resourced?

Admiral HARRIS. I do not. I mean, I have said before that I don’t have enough—just the submarine numbers alone, I don’t have what I need.

Mr. HICE. Okay. You mentioned a while ago, too, about the cyber domain. Do you believe we are adequately prepared to deal with whatever attacks or threats may come from cyber?

Admiral HARRIS. I don’t. But I will defer to Admiral Rogers and U.S. Cyber Command, and that is his job. But my sense is that we need to continue to develop that capability.

Mr. HICE. Okay. Thank you again, Admiral.

And, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And very good to see you, Admiral. And thank you so much for your service. I think everyone has certainly acknowledged that. I know that we all appreciate your great openness whenever there is a CODEL [congressional delegation] visit to PACOM, and you certainly represented that.

I also just wanted to say how pleased I am about your nomination and, I think, your strong statement earlier about our diplomatic missions need to be supported as much budgetarily as our defense missions as well. You are going to be a strong voice in that, and I appreciate it.

You know, I know that nuclear weapons are not your direct responsibility, but they do certainly have a direct impact on your area of responsibility as it exists today.
The NPR calls for modernizing and expanding our nuclear architecture through sea-based-launch cruise missiles and low-yield sea ballistic missiles, therefore lowering the threshold for employing nuclear weapons.

So I am just wondering how you weigh this nuclear modernization with the priorities that you have outlined today. Do you feel that you can address that?

Admiral Harris. I do. And I think that those elements that are in the Nuclear Posture Review are critical to PACOM because they are critical to the Nation.

I think the idea of modernizing the triad is essential. Perhaps one of the most important outcomes of the Nuclear Posture Review is acknowledgement and affirmation that we need the triad. And then the next step, of course, is to modernize it. So I think that is one of those nuances in there that is so important.

I think the small-yield submarine-launched weapons increases our capability. And it remains to be seen, I think, what the command and control of that kind of a weapon would be, and the sea-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile. So we are going to have to think about that, because we haven't had to think about that in a while. I haven't had to think about it at all.

But I think the sea-launched cruise missile, nuclear-capable, sounds like a TLAM–N [Tomahawk Land Attack Missile–Nuclear], which, you know, was extant in a lot of my career during the Cold War. We don't have that now. So the command and control of those tactical kinds of weapons, I think we are going to have to explore that. Whether that is given to the combatant commander in general or whether it is retained by Strategic Command, you know, I don't know how that is going to work.

But the fact is that I think that that increases our capability and decreases the chance of an accidental nuclear war by giving us those capabilities.

Mrs. Davis. Is it fair to say that there are risks certainly associated with this strategy as well?

Admiral Harris. I think the risk is by not adhering to the strategy.

Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Uh-huh. How might China perceive the renewed U.S.-Russian modernization?

Admiral Harris. I can almost guarantee you that they won't like it. But that is no reason not to do it. You know, if we didn't do anything that China didn't like, then we would be nowhere.

Mrs. Davis. Right.

Admiral Harris. So it seems like no matter what we do in a legitimate defensive situation—THAAD on the peninsula, for example—they are going to object to. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't go ahead and do it, because it is the right thing to do, in my view.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you.

I had one other question, Mr. Chairman, but I know we have a few people that are waiting, so I will go ahead and yield back. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you also for making what I am sure is the first reference to Sir John Monash and the
Battle of Hamel in HASC [House Armed Services Committee] history. I look forward to working with you in your new role.

You mentioned, I believe in an exchange with Mr. Wittman earlier, you brought up INF. And to put a finer point on it, given China’s investment in missiles that you have referenced, as well as their overall modernization, do you believe INF restrictions harm our conventional deterrence to the point that we may not be able to uphold our commitments in the Pacific into the 2020s? Or, put differently, INF, while critical in Europe, is it hamstringing us in Asia?

Admiral Harris. Thanks for the question.

I wouldn’t go as far as the beginning part of your question, but I do agree that it hamstrings me in the Pacific. Because the weapons that I have to bring to bear are outmatched by the ground-based weapons that China can bring to bear because they are not a signatory to INF.

So the way ahead, I am not the expert on that. I have highlighted the deficiencies in my capability in the Pacific because of INF. And I know that it is—at least I think it is being studied at the right levels to figure out the way ahead. But I view INF as self-limiting to the United States. And, to me, INF is not about Russia as it is about China.

Mr. Gallagher. But given your perspective as a theater commander there on the ground, I would just be curious of your thoughts, are there things we should be exploring on the committee? For example, you could imagine increasing firing rates, capacity, range of existing systems. You could initiate R&D [research and development] for noncompliant systems. Or you could develop systems with an INF-compliant boost range but a glide range that extends. And I just would love your thoughts on what we should explore in this case.

Admiral Harris. Yeah, I think that we could be creative in our approach to defining weapons. So if it has more boost than glide, then it is not an airplane, then it is probably INF-compliant, so we ought to think about it in that regard.

You know, the INF Treaty itself doesn’t limit the R&D, so we ought to start the R&D and then decide later on whether we are going to field the weapon or not. But we don’t want to start later on with the R&D, or else we have lost all that time.

Of course, the other argument is we could waste the money. And that is why it is a decision that has to be taken not only at the department level but at you-all’s level.

Mr. Gallagher. Great. I appreciate your candor, Admiral. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.

Mr. Gaetz. Admiral, thank you again for your service to the country. We look forward to your new role, your new diplomatic role in Australia.

As we look at China and Russia turning the levers that you have indicated today could help us with the North Koreans, are there any things that you see that they are not doing that we wish that they were doing?

Admiral Harris. That is a little bit open-ended, but I would like for them to do more. I think that they have the capacity to do
more. I think if 90 percent of your trade comes from China, then China then wields a powerful lever. I think their coal——

Mr. GAETZ. Is it that we want them to better enforce the posture that they have taken, or is it that we would like them to accelerate their——

Admiral HARRIS. I would like them to do both. I would like them especially to accelerate. You know, we talk oil and coal. I mean, they have a powerful lever there. Food and the guestworker program and all that revenue that goes into the regime——

Mr. GAETZ. China occasionally takes the position that, while the government does not sanction some of those activities that yield humans moving from North Korea into China for work or other assets like energy assets moving from China into North Korea or vice versa, that just as there are nongovernment actors in the United States that can do things outside of the law, there are nongovernment actors in China that can do the same.

Is that a realistic claim that they are making, or do they have sufficient command and control to enforce broader sanctions?

Admiral HARRIS. They are a communist country. I think they have sufficient command and control.

Mr. GAETZ. So that would seem to indicate that the claims that, well, some of this activity occurs beyond our gaze—you would question those claims.

Admiral HARRIS. I would question those claims.

Mr. GAETZ. When we look at success in the event of some sort of kinetic conflict, it appears clear to us—and I thank the chairman for a really provocative and insightful day yesterday on these questions—we look at the importance of what capabilities our allies bring to bear.

Could you highlight some of the important capabilities that our allies in the region would need to bring to bear in the event of a kinetic conflict?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, you know, I don't want to speak for the allies in terms of kinetic conflicts, in the sense that they are going to have to make those decisions.

But the capabilities that Japan and Japan's Self-Defense Forces, the Koreans and the Korean Armed Forces have in that theater are significant, in terms of the ROK [Republic of Korea] Army is an incredible fighting force. The Japan ballistic missile systems, their ships and their aircraft are first-rate.

And then you go and you think about Australia and all of their capabilities. You look at Singapore as a partner, and what they provide us as a platform are significant.

So these are important friends, allies, and partners that we all work hard to maintain those relationships.

Mr. GAETZ. In the event that conflict does go kinetic on the Korean Peninsula, we will likely have to launch munitions over water that will then land on land, correct?

Admiral HARRIS. Correct.

Mr. GAETZ. And, to my knowledge, the only place that the Navy or the Air Force are currently testing munitions that are launched over water and land on land is in the Gulf Test Range in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Am I right about that, or are there other places where we do that testing and evaluation?
Admiral HARRIS. We are testing strikes at Nellis, for example, Nellis Air Force Base, where we do a lot of our command and control exercises that result in——

Mr. GAETZ. But for next-gen weapons systems.
Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. I don’t know.
Mr. GAETZ. Okay. Very well.

You would agree that, then, looking beyond our current moment to a 30-, 50-year timeframe, do you believe that we would win any type of kinetic conflict with China on the airframe alone, or would we require development in our munitions capabilities?

Admiral HARRIS. We will clearly require development in our munitions capabilities. But if I am around in 30 or 40 or 50 years, I will be the grayest owl you have ever seen.

Mr. GAETZ. Well, I know that so much of your service has been dedicated to ensuring that we win well beyond the time that those of us who are here are still around.

And I would just merely make mention, Mr. Chairman, that I believe we will not win on the airframe alone. I think the munitions are going to be essential.

I agree with your assessment, Admiral. And that is why it is so important that we preserve the assets that allow us to test and develop those next-generation munitions.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentlelady from Arizona have a question for open session?
The gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes or less.
Ms. MCSALLY. Everybody else got their turn, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral Harris. Thanks so much for your years of service. You are a tremendous patriot, and we really appreciate all your sacrifice.

Having been in the military myself, you know, we spent a lot of time also focusing on information warfare and how our enemies use that against us as a domain.

I was cringing with Kim Jong-un’s sister at the Olympics and how not only she was received but also how she was treated by the, at best, naive media in the coverage of her. She is the head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and responsible, as part of this brutal regime, of the lack of human rights, the death and torture of many citizens. I mean, you know what this regime is like. And the fact that our media would play into this is just embarrassing and disgusting to me.

And I just want your thoughts. I mean, you mentioned earlier in your testimony about you think his long game is the reunification under communist rule. What are your thoughts about the antics that they just played and the impact? Because it was just embarrassing to me.

Admiral HARRIS. So, clearly, a charm offensive. And I think that it behooves us and our Korean allies not to be charmed——

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And to consider North Korea for the regime it is——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And to deal with it on the basis of fact and not charm. I believe that General Brooks is ideally posi-
tioned to do that and that he views this charm offensive through

clear eyes.

Ms. MCSALLY. But just the impact, though, on the media kind of
playing into it, and how it basically looks like they were a tool of
their information warfare and their propaganda campaign—again,
naive at best. Is that fair?

Admiral HARRIS. That is fair.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, sir.

With the $700 billion and $716 billion that we have now agreed
to last week to infuse into our military, can you share what that
means for PACOM, like, what that is going to be able to do from
a readiness and a warfighting and a capability to address the many
threats that you have to face?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. Again, I will express my gratitude for
that and the hopes that we will get the appropriation for that in
the NDAA 2018 and then the next year.

It gives us 2 years to plan. It gives us something we haven't had
for a long time. You know, the day after tomorrow, Saturday, I will
have been in command of PACOM for 1,000 days, and 433 of those
will have been under a CR [continuing resolution].

So this budget is terrific. I mean, this thing that you all have
done, this bipartisan agreement, is outstanding. It helps me and it
helps the joint force be able to plan and train and buy equipment
that we need and start new starts and all of that.

Ms. MCSALLY. Can you translate that into, like, some specific
warfighting capabilities, just for the American people to under-
stand, like, what it means for those who are responsible to be
ready to fight tonight on the Korean Peninsula, if needed, and deal-
ing with all the other stuff, China, munitions, all that stuff? How
does that really——

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. And so—well, among other things, MK–
48 torpedos, long-range antisurface missiles, training for our Air
Force and Navy fighter pilots, significant things like that that we
have had to—we have lost the opportunity over the last couple of
years, that we will be able to recapture that.

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I was a strong “yes” on that spe-
cifically because of the impact that is going to have on our troops
and those who serve with you. So thanks.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. That was a good way to
end.

Admiral, I have one request. Before you leave the military, if you
could help coach other DOD witnesses to give clear, direct answers
to questions, it would be a really good thing. And I appreciate your
directness to all the questions you have gotten today.

We will adjourn this open hearing and regather in about 5 min-
utes upstairs in classified session.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed
session.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 14, 2018
With us today is Admiral Harry Harris, the Commander of United States Pacific Command. As Admiral Harris nears the end of his military service, I want to first thank him for that service and for the insights and perspectives he has shared with us, both here in Washington and as Members have traveled in the PACOM region.

Remarkably, forty years of service to our nation is not enough for Admiral Harris. Last week, the President announced his intention to nominate him as our Ambassador to Australia.

This hearing comes at an opportune time. Last week, we heard Secretary Mattis and General Selva testify on the new National Defense Strategy and on the Nuclear Posture Review. Also last week, Congress passed and the President signed into law legislation that raised the spending caps so that repair of readiness shortfalls can begin in earnest.

Admiral Harris has had to grapple with that full range of issues. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the United States faces a near-term, belligerent threat armed with nuclear weapons and also a longer-term strategic competitor. In fact, four of the five key security challenges—China, Russia, North Korea, and terrorism—reside in the PACOM area of responsibility. Unfortunately, the region has also seen the tragic loss of life of American service members in naval and aircraft accidents and has felt some of the consequences of our inadequate defense budgets.

Despite North Korea’s recent charm offensive at the Olympic games, the threat posed to U.S. service members, our allies, and the American homeland has not diminished. We have an urgent need to ensure that we are ready for whatever course that situation may take.

The challenge posed by China has also not lessened. China is rapidly transforming its military, continuing to militarize artificial islands in the South China Sea, and expanding its presence through political influence campaigns and economic coercion. According to the National Defense Strategy, “China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.”

Critical to meeting all of the challenges in the region is our relationship with our allies and also with countries with whom we share interests. The FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act includes more for training and exercises with partners, as well as establishing the Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, which, in part, is designed to show our allies that we stand by them
with more than just words.
We all look forward to Admiral Harris’s candid assessment of these and other issues.
Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith  
House Armed Services Committee Hearing:  
February 14, 2018

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I would like to welcome Admiral Harris. His views are instrumental to our evaluation of the security situation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is vital to our national interests, and the United States must remain committed to sustaining regional security. As we guard against threats, our efforts should be aimed primarily toward easing tensions, preserving peace, and upholding the international rules-based order in the region.

Unfortunately, North Korea continues to pose a significant threat to the international community. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (the NDS Summary) assesses that “North Korea seeks to guarantee regime survival and increased leverage by seeking a mixture of nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States.” Consequently, the United States must maintain a coherent, whole-of-government approach to containing this threat and coordinate closely with its allies and partners to deter North Korea.

In doing so, we need to continue to demonstrate clearly and convincingly our resolve to respond decisively to an armed attack by North Korea. Reinforcing our regional missile defense posture and imposing targeted sanctions were positive responses. However, we must carefully avoid actions, which could be dangerously escalatory or which could aggravate the risk of a fateful miscalculation. The stakes are too high. I welcome the prospect for renewed inter-Korean talks as well as the potential for multilateral diplomatic engagements and direct communications that could reduce the risk of miscalculation. I hope that the North Korean regime recognizes the true value of constructive dialogue, that it will embrace opportunities to foster genuine good will with the rest of the world, and that it will ultimately refrain from, once again, resorting to belligerence, brinksmanship, or open provocation to further its objectives.

China must demonstrate a willingness to abide by internationally-accepted norms and to abstain from pressing its claims in the South China Sea in an aggressive manner. The NDS Summary states that “China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.” It also declares, “The most far-reaching objective of this defense
strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.” We should work to establish a stable and mutually beneficial relationship with China, encourage it to accept peaceful and equitable resolutions to the many disputed claims in the South China Sea, dissuade it from employing unilateral methods, short of open conflict, to achieve its foreign policy goals, and emphasize the importance of its cooperative participation within the international community.

The NDS Summary also accuses Russia of undermining international order. Russia has meddled in electoral processes, conducted malign influence operations, and systematically tried to disrupt alliances and partnerships to weaken democratic institutions and to promote authoritarianism. I am concerned that reports of increasing Russian activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region may be indicative of Russian willingness to exacerbate regional challenges.

These challenges among others, including threats from violent extremist organizations and illicit arms proliferation, illustrate the need for persistent U.S. engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The NDS Summary recognizes that allies and partners are essential to deterring conflict and to maintaining the international rules-based order. Therefore, the United States should continue to strengthen its relationships with its many allies and partners in the region. The more we can do to defuse tensions and to avoid conflict through our contributions to collective security, the more we can help to cultivate continued growth and prosperity in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the Admiral’s testimony.
STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS JR., U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
14 FEBRUARY 2018
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This is my third opportunity to present my posture assessment since taking command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in May 2015. During my time at USPACOM, I have had the tremendous honor of leading the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians standing watch for the largest and most diverse geographic command. These men and women, as well as their families, fill me with pride with their hard work and devotion to duty. I’m humbled to serve alongside them.

Since its inception in 1947, USPACOM and the joint military forces assigned to it have served as a shield protecting the U.S., its territories, its people, and its interests throughout the Indo-Pacific region. To accomplish this, USPACOM works hand-in-hand with the other U.S. government agencies in this region to defend our homeland and our citizens. This is USPACOM’s enduring responsibility and my #1 command priority. To enhance our efforts, USPACOM works with our allies and partners to improve stability in the region by promoting security cooperation, deterring aggression, responding to contingencies, and, when necessary, fighting to win. The path to security is based on our commitments to mutual interest and partnership, continuous military presence, and global readiness.

The U.S. has a lasting national interest in the Indo-Pacific. As I stated last year, I believe America’s security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical region, which remains at a precarious crossroad where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. Of the five principal challenges that drive U.S. defense planning and budgeting – China, Russia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and violent extremist organizations – four are found within the Indo-Pacific. To protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life, we must target threats at their source and confront them before they ever reach our borders or cause harm to our people. America cannot ignore these challenges and should not allow any nation or treacherous non-state actor to erode the rules-based security order that has yielded tremendous benefits for our nation and this region for the last seven decades.

Following the upheaval of World War II, the rules-based international order – or what the 2018 National Defense Strategy described as a free and open international order – flourished to keep
the Indo-Pacific largely peaceful, creating the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region. Ironically, the country that has benefitted the most from regional stability is China. The collective respect for, and adherence to, international law and standards have produced the longest era of peace and prosperity in modern times. This was not happenstance. This was made possible by seven decades of robust and persistent U.S. military presence and credible combat power. America’s security treaties with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand have buttressed this security order, which is consequently strengthened even further by growing partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. USPACOM recognizes the global significance of the Indo-Pacific region and that strong and independent states are the best hope for a peaceful world. Challenges are best met together; therefore, America will remain an engaged and trusted ally and partner committed to preserving the security, stability, and freedom necessary for enduring prosperity.

A free and open order encompasses a number of critical principles: the rule of law; adherence to international law and other international standards; peaceful resolution of disputes; freedom of navigation for all civilian and military vessels and aircraft; and open access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. The outcomes of these principles are enhanced security and open, legitimate trade. Sustainable security requires effective and enduring institutions, both civilian and military, that are guided by these principles. Defense, diplomatic, and development efforts are intertwined and continue to reinforce each other to promote stability to build and sustain stable democratic states.

The Indian and Pacific Oceans are the economic lifeblood that links the Indian Subcontinent, Australia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Oceania with the U.S. Oceans that were once physical and psychological barriers keeping nations apart are now maritime superhighways that bring them together. Over half the global GDP comes from the region (including the U.S.) and roughly one-third of global shipping passes through the South China Sea. A quarter of U.S. exports go to the region, and exports to China and India have more than doubled over the past decade. This diverse region drives global growth and is home to the world’s largest economies (U.S., China, and Japan) and six of the world’s fastest growing economies (Cambodia, India, Laos, Burma, Nepal, and the Philippines). Unimpeded lawful commerce, fair market economies,
and free trade promote American prosperity and security, leading to a strong economy that protects the American people, supports our way of life, and sustains American power.

The Indo-Pacific has the world’s most populous democracy (India) and the world’s largest Muslim-majority state (Indonesia), both of which we see as key U.S. partners in the region. The area is home to more than half the world’s population. Eleven of the 15 largest militaries in the world are in or adjacent to the region, as are six of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons. These regional characteristics merely reinforce the need for a strong and persistent U.S. presence in the region to preserve peace through strength. To be blunt, the stability of the Indo-Pacific matters to America. And the region needs a strong America, just as America needs a vibrant, thriving Indo-Pacific that remains both politically and economically free.

It is not just history that necessitates our continued presence in the Indo-Pacific region; it is the future as well. The U.S. must maintain credible combat power across the region in order to defend against revisionist powers that seek to subvert democracy and undermine a free and open international order. It is to our long-term benefit to remain the region’s security partner of choice by working closely with our allies and partners who share our commitment to uphold peace, economic prosperity, and security. We must not cede ground in this endeavor.

What follows is USPACOM’s strategic approach to the region, as directed by the National Defense Strategy, including my assessment of the regional security challenges, the key strategic opportunities, and the capabilities necessary to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific. I will emphasize critical needs in order to seek your support for budgetary and legislative action to improve our position and military readiness in the theater. I will detail the value of U.S. strategic force posture and forward presence, and describe how these preconditions improve the readiness of our joint force to fight tonight, while simultaneously enhancing our ability to reassure allies and partners. Finally, I will discuss how USPACOM can advance U.S. foreign policy by strengthening our existing alliances and cultivating important partnerships, thereby yielding strategic benefits that improve USPACOM’s readiness to protect and defend U.S. interests.
Overview

Regional security and stability are threatened by a range of rogue and revisionist state and non-state actors who are challenging U.S. influence and the free and open international order that has helped underwrite peace and prosperity for America and throughout the region for over 70 years. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has rapidly advanced and improved its ballistic missile capability and its nuclear weapons program. Sanctions, international condemnation, and even increased pressure from China, to date, have not yet compelled the DPRK to end their unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. And while tensions in the East China Sea between China and Japan have stabilized, China’s provocative and destabilizing actions in the South China Sea continue unabated. China’s historically unprecedented economic development has enabled an impressive military buildup that could soon challenge the U.S. across almost all domains. Key Chinese advancements include: significant improvements in missile systems; 5th generation fighter aircraft capabilities; and increased size and capability of the Chinese navy. A major initiative for that growing navy is China’s first-ever overseas base in Djibouti. I am also deeply concerned about China’s heavy investments into the next wave of military technologies, including hypersonic missiles, advanced space and cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence – if the U.S. does not keep pace, USPACOM will struggle to compete with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on future battlefields. China’s ongoing military modernization is a core element of China’s stated strategy to supplant the U.S. as the security partner of choice for countries in the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s interest and influence in the region continues to increase through national outreach and military modernization – in both its conventional forces and nuclear strike capabilities. The threat of ISIS in the Indo-Pacific changed drastically from inspiration and support to direct action as ISIS-Philippines seized control of the city of Marawi in May. The Armed Forces of the Philippines recaptured the city after a long fight and scattered what was left of ISIS-Philippines, but the incident highlights the dangerous and difficult problem transnational terrorism presents to the region. Drug trafficking, human smuggling, piracy, weapons proliferation, natural disasters – as well as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing – further challenge regional peace and prosperity.

The U.S. military remains the most powerful in the world, but our relative advantage and ability to counter these threats have declined. For USPACOM to continue to underpin U.S. diplomatic
efforts and deter future conflict against peer competitors, rogue states, and transnational threats, the joint force must maintain a clear ability to fight and win when called upon to do so.

**Strategic Approach**

The 2018 National Defense Strategy aims to Compete, Deter, and Win alongside our allies and partners. In support of these aims, USPACOM maintains a strategic approach to the region that encompasses four core elements:

1) Maintain credible combat power and work with the Services and Departments to build the right force of the future;
2) Maintain a network of like-minded allies and partners to cultivate principled security networks which reinforce the free and open international order;
3) Continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows and encourage others to do the same. Be ready to counter the coercive influence of regional competitors;
4) Counter transnational threat and challenges, including terrorism and illegal/illicit trafficking, and be ready to respond to natural disasters.

USPACOM recognizes the global significance of the Indo-Pacific and understands that challenges are best through a unified approach. Thus, USPACOM actions are guided by two unifying concepts: 1) communicate effectively and truthfully; and 2) synchronize efforts outside of USPACOM across the DoD, the interagency environment, and internationally with like-minded allies and partners. Together, fully aligned with our interagency, joint, and combined partners, USPACOM will remain prepared to meet the following key challenges.

**Key Challenges**

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK):** Last year I testified that the DPRK was our most immediate threat, and since then the level of that threat has increased significantly. The past year has seen rapid and comprehensive improvement in the DPRK’s ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities, despite broad international condemnation and the imposition of additional United Nations Security Council sanctions. This includes the first-ever launches of two different intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBM) during three separate ICBM tests and six
launches of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Pyongyang emphatically states its ICBMs are only designed to target the U.S. and its IRBMs are only designed to strike Guam. Two missile tests overflew sovereign Japanese territory, needlessly endangering Japanese citizens. Several commercial aircraft on standard flight routes also reported being close enough to see missiles in the air during tests, underscoring the DPRK’s reckless research and development programs.

The DPRK still holds the distinction of being the only nation to have tested nuclear weapons in the 21st century, and the DPRK detonated its sixth and largest nuclear device at its underground facility at Punggye-ri in September 2017. Senior DPRK officials then threatened to conduct an air burst of a nuclear warhead mated to one of its long-range ballistic missiles. Although this has not happened, Pyongyang could potentially do so to further demonstrate capability or to prove that its design and technical functions work. The international community has cautioned against doing so, and is certain to condemn such an act if it occurs, but Kim Jong Un has demonstrated over and over again his disdain for international norms, responsibilities, and prudent conduct.

The combination of successful, or mostly successful, ballistic missile tests and the most recent nuclear test have advanced the DPRK’s capabilities significantly. Following the 29 November 2017 Hwasong-15 ICBM test, Kim Jong Un declared with pride that they now have “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force.” While some in the U.S. might dispute both the reliability and quantity of the North’s strategic weapons, it is indisputable that Kim is rapidly closing the gap between rhetoric and capability. Our two close allies in Northeast Asia – the Republic of Korea and Japan – have been living under the shadow of the DPRK’s threats; now the shadow looms over the American homeland. USPACOM and the entire DoD fully support the President’s maximum pressure campaign, led by the State Department. Nobody seeks or desires conflict with the DPRK, but the U.S. and its allies must prepare for the full range of military contingencies.

Beyond the unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2321, 2356, 2371, 2375, and 2397 in 2017, countries around the world are diplomatically and financially isolating the DPRK. In response to the efforts of Secretary Tillerson and other senior administration officials, the international community has drastically reduced trade with the
DPRK, frozen assets, expelled overseas DPRK workers, and more. China’s actions are critical as China is the DPRK’s largest trading partner (approximately 92% of all trade). To Beijing’s credit, China has taken significant steps to enforce the various UNSCRs, but Beijing can and should do more. I am also concerned about Russia’s limited contributions to the pressure campaign. While Moscow voted in favor of the recent Security Council resolutions, Russia has the capability to undermine the efforts of other countries, thereby playing the role of a spoiler as the DPRK approaches a full ICBM capability. Overall, the pressure campaign does appear to be affecting Pyongyang’s calculus, but Kim Jong Un continues to channel his reduced resources to weapons programs and high profile “morale” projects that benefit only the elites, leaving the DPRK’s citizens to suffer.

The DPRK’s grossly oversized conventional forces provide the regime additional coercive options. Pyongyang’s active military force of almost 1.2 million is the fourth largest in the world, though the DPRK’s population (approximately 24.5 million) ranks as only the 52nd largest worldwide. By contrast, the 53rd most populous country, Australia, fields an active force of under 60,000. The DPRK People’s Army boasts a substantial inventory of long-range rockets, artillery, and close-range ballistic missiles aimed across the Demilitarized Zone at the Republic of Korea and U.S. forces stationed there. Many of these systems are capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. The DPRK’s well-trained, highly disciplined special operations forces are another asymmetric option for Kim Jong Un. Additionally, the DPRK is arming its navy with longer-range anti-ship missiles and is continuing to work on a submarine-launched ballistic missile capability.

I said last year that it was critical that the U.S. maintain a strong sense of resolve in order to bring Kim Jong-Un to his senses, not his knees. That is even more true today.

**China:** The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) rapid evolution into a modern, high-tech fighting force continues to be both impressive and concerning. PLA capabilities are progressing faster than any other nation in the world, benefitting from robust resourcing and prioritization. During the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping promised military development would remain a national priority, pledging to complete modernization by 2035 and to achieve “world class” status by 2049. On the current
trajectory, USPACOM assesses the PLA will likely attain these goals well ahead of the projected completion dates.

In the past year, PLA forces have become more expeditionary and more integrated. The reorganization that created geographically-focused Theater Commands is now two years old and the PLA is exhibiting a rapid maturation of processes and structures. As tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased, Chinese and regional press began highlighting exercises and preparations underway in the Northern Theater – the command responsible for Korean contingencies. Similarly, there was a variety of activities in the Western Command this past summer and fall during the standoff between Chinese and Indian forces at Doka La. While we assess the PLA will still face a number of challenges moving forward, the PLA has clearly embraced the need for increased joint interoperability.

Perhaps nowhere is the PLA making more dramatic progress than in ballistic missiles. While the PLA is rapidly expanding the number, type, and sophistication of all of its missiles, China has made the most progress in intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) technology, with IRBMs now constituting approximately 95 percent of the PLA’s overall missile force. Chinese media routinely trumpets missile developments, carefully noting their missiles do not target any specific country. However, a simple comparison of missile ranges with geography suggests where Chinese missiles would most likely be targeted – SRBMs against Taiwan and U.S. carrier strike groups operating at sea, IRBMs against U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, and ICBMs against the continental U.S. China’s pursuit of advanced hypersonic missile technologies portends even greater challenges over the next few years.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is in the midst of a massive shipbuilding program. If this program continues, China will surpass Russia as the world’s second largest Navy by 2020, when measured in terms of submarines and frigate-class ships or larger. The first Type 055 (Renhai) guided missile cruiser was launched in June 2017 – the lead unit in a class of advanced multi-warfare ships that we expect will enter operational service next year. At least four more of these ships are under construction. Six Type 052 (Luyang III) Guided Missile Destroyers are operational, with another seven being built or fitted out. Amphibious capabilities are also growing. Four of an expected six Type 071 (Yuzhou) Amphibious Transport Docks have joined
the fleet in the past decade, and the first Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock is under construction. In October 2017 China launched the lead ship in the Type 901 Fast Combat Support Ship class, the first logistics ship specifically designed to support China’s aircraft carrier(s); the second PLAN carrier is in the water at Dalian and progressing toward sea trials. New submarines under construction include five more Type 039A (Yuan) and four more Type 093 (Shang) Nuclear Attack Submarines. All of these ships boast improved communications suites and defensive systems, as well as more lethal and longer-range weapons.

The advances shown in the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are less focused on new aircraft – though there are several noteworthy developments. Air and air-defense progress has been most evident in the increasing sophistication of operational training. When Chinese bombers began flying simulated strike profiles in the Philippine Sea, Sea of Japan, and South China Sea a few years ago, the exercises were very basic events. Now we see fighter escorts and supporting packages of other specialized aircraft, including aerial refuelers. Major training events are increasingly incorporating professional opposing forces, evaluators, and instrumentation to better challenge and assess capabilities. The J20 multi-role fighter program is progressing from development and prototypes into operational use. The J31 program appears to be advancing less quickly, but the two programs suggest a near-term capability for China to field 5th generation fighters within the next few years. At least two new heavy-lift transports (Y-20) are the leading edge of a fleet that will help the PLA overcome a long-standing inability to move troops and equipment anywhere in China or across the world. New and/or upgraded bombers, electronic warfare, command and control, and anti-submarine aircraft all expand PLA abilities to conduct a wide range of operations.

PLA ground forces are still in the midst of a force-wide reorganization as the PLA Army (PLAA) moves from divisions to combined arms brigades as its basic combat formation. These more flexible, integrated formations will give the PLAA the ability to respond more precisely to a wider variety of contingencies. Forces are training in unfamiliar locations, under challenging environmental conditions, and with increased realism in an attempt to gain proficiency across a range of circumstances. The expansion of the PLAN-Marines continues as well, as the force has grown from two brigades to possibly eight, with two brigades each allocated to most of the
Theater Commands. A contingent of PLAN-Marines continues to garrison the PLA’s first overseas base in Djibouti, having arrived late last summer.

Following its establishment at the close of 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) has quickly matured to better manage and employ the PLA’s impressive array of cyber, space, and other specialized capabilities. The PLASSF consolidates and employs specialized capabilities that could degrade or deny other countries the use of space, the electromagnetic spectrum, communications systems, and data networks. This joint organization reflects the PLA’s emphasis on winning “system versus system” conflicts.

To operationalize these new and expanded capabilities, Chinese forces – especially the PLAN – are operating in more locations, more often, leading to greater degrees of proficiency. The PLAN’s counter-piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden is now in its ninth year, and has provided invaluable experience to many of the PLAN’s surface ships and crews. Chinese submarines have deployed to the Indian Ocean seven times in the past four years, and Chinese ships have conducted dozens of port visits across Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This does not mean the PLAN has become a global navy, but its presence and influence are expanding. Much of this activity is linked to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, which is meant to increase China’s global influence through a China-centered trading network. The majority of this activity was expected, and is consistent with the actions of a rising power, but some activities and China’s lack of openness about its plans are reasons for concern. When the base in Djibouti opened last year, the base was touted as a logistics outpost; yet within the base’s first few months of operation, PLAN-Marines held several live fire drills involving armored combat vehicles and artillery. This suggests the base also functions as a forward deployed location for expeditionary capabilities, rather than as simply a logistics hub.

Recent efforts to introduce clarifying legislation – in the form of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA, aka “CFIUS 2.0”) – seek to improve the national security focus of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and will help focus the lens on activities conducted by the Chinese. The economic stimulus of Chinese investment in the U.S. and across the Indo-Pacific region, including real estate transactions in the vicinity of military installations, threatens to undermine our national security objectives and those of our
allies and partners. I am fully supportive of these efforts, and believe we must view Chinese investment holistically to best understand Beijing’s overall intent.

**Territorial Disputes and Maritime Claims:** Overlapping and competing territorial and maritime claims remain a source of friction in the region. I am most concerned about China’s ongoing actions in the South China Sea. In 2017, China took significant steps to further militarize its bases on disputed features.

**South China Sea:** The U.S. takes no position on competing sovereignty claims to naturally formed islands in the South China Sea, but we do strongly call on all countries to ensure their claims and activities are consistent with international law. Specific to maritime claims and activities, countries should adhere to the law of the sea as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The most significant territorial disputes in the South China Sea include: 1) the Paracel Islands, between China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; 2) Scarborough Reef, between China, Taiwan, and the Philippines; and 3) the Spratly Islands, where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines each claim sovereignty over some or all of the land features. It is the last one that has drawn much of the attention in recent years. On September 25, 2015, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in a Rose Garden ceremony that China did not intend to militarize its outposts on the Spratly Islands. The plain fact is that China has built a number of clear military facilities and capabilities on all of their seven outposts, and China continues to build more.

It is important to note that there are no military aircraft, air defense missile launchers, or anti-ship missile systems currently deployed to any of China’s Spratly Island outposts. The only weapons present now are short-range defensive systems appropriate for close defense of the outposts. However, China has built a massive infrastructure specifically – and solely – to support advanced military capabilities that can deploy to the bases on short notice. The U.S. should assume Beijing plans to use these facilities for their clearly intended purposes at some point in the future. The Chinese also built the same sets of structures on each of its three largest outposts in the Spratly Islands (at Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef), including:
• 10,000 foot runways capable of launching and recovering all military aircraft
• Fighter aircraft hangars
• Large aircraft hangars, capable of supporting larger aircraft such as bombers, AWACS, and transports
• Protected air defense launcher sheds
• Protected anti-ship missile launcher sheds
• Water and fuel storage tanks farms
• Ammunition storage facilities
• Barracks, communications systems, deep water pier facilities, military radars

These bases appear to be forward military outposts, built for the military, garrisoned by military forces, and designed to project Chinese military power and capability across the breadth of China’s disputed South China Sea claims. China’s explanation that Beijing was “forced” to deploy these capabilities in “response” to an “increased” U.S. presence – especially Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) – is disingenuous. The U.S. Navy has been navigating and operating in the South China Sea, and has been peacefully exercising freedom of navigation operations all over the world, for decades. On the other hand, China only recently began island reclamation earlier this decade. The overall design and execution of the projects strongly suggests a master plan was in place from the start. In July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal under the Law of the Sea Convention issued its ruling in favor of the Philippines’ South China Sea claims. Even though the Arbitral Tribunal is binding on both China and the Philippines, China has yet to abide by the ruling. The Philippines, preoccupied with the counter-terrorism fight on Mindanao and desirous of stable relations with China, has not pressed the issue since China is “allowing” Filipino fishermen some access to Scarborough.

Across the South China Sea, China’s air force, navy, coast guard, and maritime militia all maintain a robust presence. Routine patrols and exercises ensure Chinese forces are in and around all the features, not just the ones they occupy. China routinely challenges the presence of non-Chinese forces, including other claimant nations and especially the U.S., often overstating its authority and insisting foreign forces either stay away or obtain Chinese permission to operate.
Since 1979, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation program has peacefully challenged excessive maritime claims by coastal states all around the world, including those of our friends and allies. This program consists of diplomatic communications and operational assertions, which are not provocative and are not a threat to any country. These operations are conducted globally to maintain open seas and skies, which underpins economic prosperity for the U.S. and all countries.

**East China Sea:** Tensions between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands have largely stabilized since last year, but there is no long-term resolution in sight. With substantive military and coast guard assets in the area from both countries, the situation could easily lead to miscommunication, miscalculation, and escalation. China persistently challenges Japan’s administration over the islands by sailing Coast Guard ships near the Senkaku Islands and protesting Japanese reconnaissance flights. Chinese exercises prominently feature military actions focused on the Senkaku Islands, including exercises training for a possible future physical occupation of the islands and establishment of a maritime blockade to isolate the disputed areas. Clearly describing Beijing’s intent to the U.S. and Japan, Chinese media prominently features stories that highlight those specific capabilities and actions. America’s policy is clear and has not wavered: the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and, as such, are covered by Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The United States opposes any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.

**Russia:** Russian operations and engagement throughout the Indo-Pacific continue to rise, both to advance their own strategic interests and to undermine U.S. interests. Russia intends to impose additional costs on the U.S. whenever and wherever possible by playing the role of a spoiler, especially with respect to the DPRK. Additionally, Moscow seeks to alleviate some of the effects of sanctions imposed following their aggression in Ukraine by diplomatically wooing select states in Asia. Russia also sees economic opportunities to not only build markets for energy exports, but also to build – or in some cases rebuild – arms sales relationships in the region.
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are modernizing and routinely practice nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland. The Russian Pacific Fleet’s two Borey (Dolgorukiy-class) nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) have been integrated into operations since their arrival in 2015 and 2016, augmenting older Delta III SSBNs and substantially bolstering Russia’s modern nuclear strike capabilities. Tu-95 Bear bombers fly off the coasts of Canada, Alaska, and occasionally the northwest part of the continental U.S. in profiles designed to train their crews and assess U.S. and Canadian responses. Additionally Russia uses its long-range aviation forces for strategic messaging on other issues, for example, flying around Japan or off the Korean Peninsula. Most recently, a pair of Tu-95s deployed to eastern Indonesia, passing by Guam during their transits each way. Land-based nuclear missile forces similarly exercise and test-fire missiles oriented toward North America.

Russian naval modernization is making their Pacific Fleet more capable and more lethal. The fleet is expected to receive as many as 10 new ships in 2018, including several combatants. The first Steregushchy-class guided missile corvette was commissioned in January 2017 with two more expected to arrive this year. This ship class is equipped with the advanced Kalibre missile system, a multi-functional weapons array that can fire a variety of long-range anti-ship and land attack missiles. The first of six modernized Project 636.3 (Kilo) nuclear attack submarines is scheduled to arrive in late 2018 (though it could slip into 2019), with all six in the fleet by 2021. The Russian Pacific Fleet’s five Project 949A (Oscar II) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines are being upgraded to incorporate the Kalibre system as well. This will make these submarines, whose wartime missions include attacking aircraft carriers and other priority land and sea targets, much more lethal.

Ground and air modernization efforts continue as well, including state-of-the-art Bastion coastal defense cruise missiles, S-400 strategic air defense missiles, and new/upgraded helicopters and fighters. In 2017, Russian troops and warships held several combined training events with China and hosted India for their first tri-service bilateral exercise.

Of particular note are Russian efforts to build presence and influence in the high north. Russia has more bases north of the Arctic Circle than all other countries combined, and is building more with distinctly military capabilities.
ISIS/Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): One event dominated the counter-terrorism fight in the USPACOM AOR in 2017: the siege by ISIS in the Philippines (ISIS-P) and recapture by government forces of the Philippine city of Marawi. The crisis began in May 2017, following a failed operation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to capture the leader of an ISIS-pledged group. A range of extremist actors, motivated by ideology, financial reward, clan ties, adventure, or other reasons descended upon Marawi, where they found a historically marginalized, predominantly Muslim population. ISIS-P became a focus for global ISIS media publications and statements, many of which encouraged additional supporters to flock to Marawi. A few tried, not many made it. USPACOM—with Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) in the lead—provided counter-terrorism support and assistance to the AFP, enabling the Philippine Security Forces to disrupt ISIS-P activities in the southern Philippines. After a protracted fight, the AFP recaptured the city and killed or drove out what was left of ISIS-P. According to the AFP, 962 ISIS-P, 165 AFP, and 47 civilians were killed during the siege and recapture.

Marawi underscores several important themes with regard to defeating ISIS in the Indo-Pacific. First, localized threats can quickly transform into international causes. Prior to Marawi, few, if any, ISIS leaders or media coordinators had ever heard of the location or key actors involved. Within weeks, Marawi was the cover story on ISIS’ flagship media product. An early and effective response is vital to control the fight and own the narrative. Second, despite such media attention and calls for support, few extremists from within the region responded, and even fewer came from outside the AOR. This underscores our assessments that most issues in the Indo-Pacific are “local” and the desire and ability to join someone else’s fight are limited. Third, counter-terrorism operations are extremely challenging, and most regional forces are poorly equipped for such fights. Our engagement strategy and capacity-building efforts have remained—and will continue to remain—focused on enabling regional counter-terrorism (CT) forces to win whatever fights they face.

USPACOM remains concerned about the potential for ISIS ideology to inspire terrorism in the Indo-Pacific, but cautiously notes that the number of successful attacks dropped significantly during the past year. The decline could be the result of an increased CT focus by governments.
across the region, as well as more effective efforts by host nation intelligence and security services – Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh are among the places where authorities have successfully disrupted plots. The decline might also be due to the diminished stature of ISIS and its ideology following losses in Iraq and Syria. However, the region is still fertile for radicals and extremists looking to affiliate with the ISIS brand.

Multinational partnerships represent the best method of countering VEOs across the region. USPACOM is engaging Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand to degrade and defeat ISIS and other VEO threats. Many Indo-Pacific countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore have joined the coalition dedicated to ISIS’ complete destruction. Through multinational collaboration, like-minded nations can eliminate ISIS before it spreads further in the USPACOM area of responsibility.

Countering violent extremism in the Indo-Pacific requires close collaboration with U.S. government interagency partners, such as the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USAID, and the other agencies from the U.S. intelligence community. Through an interagency network reinforced by liaison officers embedded in USPACOM headquarters and Special Operations Command (SOCOM), we are able to leverage tools from across our government to fight terrorism and counter violent extremism.

**Transnational Crime:**

From finished opioids to industrial chemicals that support production of other illegal drugs, the Indo-Pacific is a key player the global supply chain for the illegal drug market. Transnational criminal organizations, operating across borders and across the globe, are responsible for the vast majority of the illicit activities that spill drugs and related violence into American communities. Characteristics of these threat organizations continue to evolve. They use technology as an enabler to further disperse and decentralize their organizations, thereby making effective targeting of these threats more challenging. The opportunistic nature of drug trafficking organizations enables them to stay ahead of law enforcement.
At the same time countries in the Indo-Pacific are wrestling with growing internal drug consumption challenges. In the Philippines, the scourge of drug use has had multiple destabilizing effects, at the family-level, community-level, and the national level, as President Duterte’s efforts to address the problems have created relationship challenges with the U.S. and others. Amphetamine Type Stimulant (ATS) use continues to grow throughout East and Southeast Asia, while heroin demand remains steady. Consistently high prices for cocaine in Australia and New Zealand support a small but extremely lucrative trade for Western Hemisphere drug traffickers.

Across the Pacific Island Nations, expanding ATS usage, concurrent with expanding crime and corruption, aptly demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between drugs and these corrosive effects. U.S. territories such as Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI) face these same challenges.

Many of the drug trafficking challenges on America’s southwest border start with the precursor chemicals that are sold through licit commerce, predominantly from China, and to a lesser extent, India. Criminal entities with ties to Mexican and South American drug cartels use these licit chemicals to produce methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin.

Another drug, fentanyl-laced heroin, has been responsible for a spike in U.S. overdose deaths. Fentanyl, and its numerous analogs, originate almost exclusively from China. To combat these threats, the U.S. Government works closely with the government of the People’s Republic of China in a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on Law Enforcement Cooperation led by the Department of Justice.

**Cyber:** The importance of cyberspace is growing rapidly as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and networked. National power and security depend on the ability to operate securely in and through cyberspace. The two most capable cyber actors worldwide are Russia and China. Both of these countries have incorporated cyber into their joint warfighting doctrine and routinely exercise these capabilities alongside more traditional elements as a force multiplier. In fact, China values cyber so highly it created the Strategic Support Force to integrate and synchronize cyber operations. Meanwhile, a provocative DPRK continues to
employ cyber operations against its adversaries. Last May, the DPRK deployed the WannaCry ransomware attack, affecting over 300,000 computers in 150 countries. As regional interaction becomes increasingly dependent on cyber activity, these threats to cyberspace will become more concerning.

**Proliferation:** The Indo-Pacific has the busiest air and maritime ports in the world. Technological advances have outpaced many countries’ ability to effectively manage export controls to counter the proliferation of component technology. Trade includes dual-use technology, such as commercial items controlled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control regimes, including manufactured or re-exported materials from other countries with limited export control enforcement. USPACOM’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) community supports Special Operations Command (SOCOM) global counter-proliferation strategy by addressing regional concerns through key leader engagements, combined and joint exercises, and international security exchanges focused on counter-proliferation activities. Since 2014, an enduring Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) is held annually between PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) states in the USPACOM AOR. The U.S., New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Japan, and Republic of Korea rotate hosting the PSI exercises. This year, Japan is hosting the PSI APER followed by the Republic of Korea next year.

**Natural Disasters:** The Indo-Pacific region continues to remain the most disaster-prone region in the world. About 75 percent of the Earth’s volcanoes and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the “Ring of Fire” surrounding the Pacific Basin. According to a 2015 UN report, disasters over the last ten years took the lives of a half a million people in the region, with over 1.5 billion people affected, and damages greater than 500 billion dollars.

While disaster response is not a primary focus for USPACOM, a key element of USPACOM’s Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) is building capacity with allies and partners to improve their resiliency and capability to conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). HA/DR cooperation is also an effective means to deepen and strengthen relationships. USPACOM’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management (CFE-DM) serves as a regional authority on best practices for HA/DR and helps prepare regional governments for HA/DR events. Our service
components are prepositioning HA/DR stocks to facilitate timely response and to build access in
the region. When possible, U.S. military forces assist with their unique capabilities in the areas
of air and sealift, infrastructure restoration, and emergency medical support. As just two
examples, in 2016, USS SAMPSON (DDG 102) and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance
Aircraft assisted New Zealand in its response to an earthquake on its South Island; and in 2017,
USS Lake Erie (CG 70) supported Sri Lanka during flooding from a tropical cyclone and the
rainy season.

Workforce Challenges for Military Realignments in the Pacific: I appreciate Congress’
efforts in the FY18 NDAA to provide much-needed relief for DoD on the problem of
construction worker shortages in Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands
(CNMI). By extending the authority to grant H2B visas from 2018 to 2023 for military
construction (MILCON) projects, Congress will help alleviate labor shortages in these areas that
would otherwise drive cost increases and delays in key MILCON projects that support the
realignment of U.S. forces in the region. However, the same labor shortages that threaten
MILCON also threaten much needed civilian construction for these communities. Unless
directly supporting a MILCON project, civilian construction efforts will not receive the same
relief from H2B Visas. In addition to slowing the economic growth of Guam and CNMI, the
insufficient number of workers is causing friction between the military and civilian communities.
The local communities perceive that the U.S. has favored military construction at the expense of
civilian construction.

Budget Uncertainty: Fiscal uncertainty breeds a significant risk to USPACOM’s strategic
priorities. The Budget Control Act and yearly continuing resolutions (CR) interrupt
USPACOM’s ability to work with the Services, Unified Commands, and Sub-Unified
Commands to effectively plan for the long-term mission. According to the Government
Accountability Office’s (GAO) September 2017 report, “Budget Uncertainty and Disruptions
Affect Timing of Agency Spending,” we have had approximately 101 CR extensions between
1999 and 2017. This year added five more CR extensions. Under these conditions of perpetual
uncertainty, we cannot efficiently and effectively plan and prepare our forces to meet today’s
challenges. This is no truer than in the Indo-Pacific.
Five years ago, sequestration cut almost every defense program equally. As a result, readiness and operational capability have suffered. While the recent tragedies in the Western Pacific involving surface combatants assigned to USPACOM were the direct result of gross negligence by the ships’ crews, multiple reports cited additional contributing factors. Both the Secretary of the Navy’s Strategic Readiness Review and U.S. Fleet Forces Command’s Comprehensive Review identified the “imbalance” in surface combatant capacity and operational requirements. In fact, the Comprehensive Review noted that, “Under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and extended Continuing Resolutions, the ability to supply forces to the full demand is – and will remain – limited.” Additionally, the Strategic Readiness Review stated that, “the lean fiscal environment, worsened by the BCA, coupled with a high operational demand for forces and reduced fleet levels, challenged the Navy even more, placing a heavy strain on the service. Coincidentally, as the BCA further constrained the fleet, it became clear that China was emerging as a peer Navy competitor.”

The lean fiscal environment, coupled with a high operational demand for forces and reduced fleet levels, challenged the Navy even more and placed a heavy strain on the service. As the 2011 BCA further constrained the fleet, it became clear that China was emerging as a peer Navy competitor. China’s adoption of advanced technology, its increasingly dispersed operations, and its doctrinal writings make clear that it aspires to a more robust regional capacity and global reach. Our peer competitors like China and Russia are quickly closing the technological gap. I need weapons systems of increased lethality that go faster and further, are networked, are more survivable, and affordable. If USPACOM has to fight tonight, I don’t want it to be a fair fight. If it’s a knife fight, I want to bring a gun. If it’s a gun fight, I want to bring in the artillery, and the artillery of all of our allies. I have said during my last two appearances before this Committee, that sequestration could reduce us to wielding a butter knife in this fight. This is unacceptable. We must not let that happen. In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific, we must build a more lethal force by investing in critical capabilities and harnessing innovation. We must develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities. The force posture must also reassure our allies and partners and encourage them to be full and cooperative partners in their own defense and the defense of the free and open international order.
Overall, I am grateful to Congress for the recent agreement on the DoD-budget caps for the next two years. The positive actions you took last week will help the DoD and USPACOM address many of the issues above, and I’m optimistic that the DoD is approaching an era of fiscal certainty. Over the long-term, fiscal certainty will allow us to build and train a force that is best postured to overcome the external challenges that we face in the Indo-Pacific.

**Critical Capabilities**

The most technological, high-end military challenges America faces in the region continue to grow. While forward presence, alliances, and partnerships address these challenges, USPACOM requires our most technologically advanced warfighting capabilities to fully meet them. The critical capabilities in this section demand our attention and treasure. We must preserve our asymmetric advantages in undersea and anti-submarine warfare, and we must strengthen our abilities to counter strategies designed to limit our freedom of action.

China has developed and fielded capability and capacity to challenge our regional maritime dominance. I need increased lethality, specifically ships and aircraft equipped with faster and more survivable weapons systems. Longer range offensive weapons on every platform are an imperative. We must also network this force and take advantage of man-machine teaming to improve our responsiveness.

Pacing the threats we face in the region is not an option in my playbook. We must work hard and invest the money to outpace the competition by developing and deploying the latest technology to USPACOM. Examples include: Navy Integrated Fires and the AEGIS Flight III destroyer and its new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR); rotational deployment of Air Force and Marine Corps 5th generation fighters; and new systems capable of defending our vulnerable bases from the full spectrum of current and emerging threats (e.g., hypersonic missiles and armed unmanned aerial systems). These tools are essential in today’s complex operating environment.

** Munitions, Fuels, and Logistics Networks:** Critical munitions shortfalls continue to be my top warfighting concern. Shortages in our munition inventories pose a significant threat to our
combat readiness and exacerbate the effects of the peer competitors who continue to modernize their weapon systems and expand their inventories. It is critical that we retain our capability to operate in contested environments, which requires dedicated investment in the industrial base and the development of new concepts and technologies. Additionally, we must continue to expand Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty-compliant theater strike capabilities to effectively counter adversary Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities and force preservation tactics.

My priorities include multi-domain kinetic/lethal strike capabilities, including hypersonic, long-range strike, air-to-air missile, long-range precision fires, maritime strike, and integrated air and missile defense. Additional requirements include the command and control (C2) and integration of long-range, high-speed, lethal, survivable, and precision munitions capabilities in ships, submarines, patrol craft, land-based formations, bombers, and fighters. With respect to ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions that allow us to defeat an aggressor from greater range, we are pursuing capabilities similar to Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER). In the air-to-air realm, I continue to seek advancements in munitions that will provide us an advantage in a denied environment, such as the AIM-120D and AIM-9X air superiority missiles. We must continue to modernize and improve our torpedo and naval mine capabilities to maintain our undersea advantage. I appreciate Congress’ efforts to address LRASM, JASSM, air-to-air missiles, and undersea warfare capabilities in the FY18 NDAA. Continued improvements in the capability and capacity of ballistic/cruise missile defense interceptors will further enhance homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In support of the Korean Peninsula, the new policy on cluster munitions, signed 30 November 2017, helps to alleviate the capability gap created by the previous policy. However, I support efforts to acquire a replacement for cluster munitions – we need an area effects munition now.

As new inventory becomes available, storage capacity will become critical. As an example, we are beginning to see the storage capacity limitations play out as Services reposition munitions on the Korean Peninsula. Admittedly, this is a nice problem to have. Beyond the capacity challenges posed, our current, legacy storage locations are inadequate to store specific types of modernized munitions and meet the requirements of FY21 Department of Defense Explosive
Safety Standards. We are currently operating on waivers in many areas and assuming risk to meet mission requirements.

Fuel is the lifeline of operations, and without resilient resupply capability, our operational effectiveness is severely degraded. Crucial to our ability to operate in increasingly contested and austere locations is the velocity of fuels support from source of supply to the point of use. Strategic positioning is a key pillar of our logistics posture. Ensuring we have the right fuel, in the right amount, at the right location, at the right time, is vital to USPACOM's ability to project power throughout the Indo-Pacific under combat conditions. USPACOM is closely integrated with the Defense Logistics Agency and the Services, and I am encouraged by the progress being made. In fiscal year 2018, investments are planned to increase fuels supply/operations infrastructure, storage, and resiliency in Guam, Japan, and Australia. I remain committed to building the capacity of our prepositioned war reserve stocks of fuel, including resiliency of the facilities, infrastructure, and distribution capabilities on which these stocks depend.

USPACOM's ability to project power is underpinned by strong airlift capabilities. Unfortunately, budget instability and ongoing continuing resolutions have driven inflexibility into these critical areas while the global strategic environment requires increased flexibility. In today's global competition for airlift, increased demand and limited resources hinder the joint force's ability to promptly achieve operational objectives. In war, this shortfall will result in greater loss of life, increased risk to USPACOM forces, and increased risk to our nation's credibility with partners and allies.

Strategic sealift assets play a significant role in PACOM's success. Whether during a contingency or during peacetime, the ability to deliver forces and sustain them with timely equipment, critical logistics, and service support is essential. Our adversaries continue to strengthen their capabilities, while many of our assets and platforms are approaching the end of their service life, resulting in shortfalls which reduce our ability to maintain sea supremacy. In order to adequately support current operations and prepare for future warfighter requirements, it is crucial that we increase investment in strategic sealift assets.
As the Indo-Pacific region becomes more connected to other regions and more influential, we must be prepared to anticipate the need for key enablers that will ensure our influence in the region remains strong. Preparedness is underwritten by logistics and sustainment capability, capacity, resiliency, and agility. Our logistics capability is one of the U.S. military’s key asymmetric advantages around the world. Unfortunately, due to budgetary pressures and decades of global engagement, our logistics systems and infrastructure are struggling to support the full range of military operations in the Indo-Pacific region. No one aspect of our logistics system is broken; but when examined as a “system of systems,” executed by logistics, engineers, and medical experts, the overall logistics enterprise has become more vulnerable, or brittle, because the system has fewer redundancies. More specifically, risk against each key functional area in our logistics system has risen over the last decade. The slow erosion of our logistics system has been manifested in manpower cuts to key areas like maintenance manning or the consolidation of our engineers in the Pacific. Each service has made difficult choices—balancing modernization with recapitalization and sustainment. Smaller munitions inventories mean the overall logistics enterprise must make up for that limitation by better, faster distribution processes to get the right munition to the right place at the right time to support operations. Additionally, the Services have consolidated and centralized important wartime materiel to better set the globe or have consolidated and reduced logistics staffs. Those changes have exacerbated the challenges associated with PACOM’s “tyranny of distance.” The time consumed by logistically supporting operations from greater distances reduces my decision space in a very dynamic and fast paced crisis or contingency.

Taken collectively, the complex problem of getting the right stuff to the right place at the right time in a contested environment is a vexing problem made worse by the slow erosion of capability, capacity, and agility. That reality requires that we make faster, more accurate logistics decisions to support operations. The Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative (IAPSI) is the single most important initiative that can reverse a dangerous trend toward an inevitably brittle Joint Logistics Enterprise in the Pacific, and I’m thankful for Congress’ efforts to fund IAPSI. Our logistics systems, infrastructure, key supplies, and processes are in need of replenishment with new equipment, better infrastructure, additional trained professionals, and innovative logistics concepts to better prepare USPACOM for peer-level competition and large scale crises.
Air Superiority: For the last several decades the U.S. has enjoyed unmatched air superiority. The preponderance of aircraft ensuring this permissive air-domain has been 4th generation fighters and air-battle-management platforms, which have benefitted from a technology gap over any potential rival. Our potential adversaries, however, are rapidly closing this gap as both Russia and China have fielded their own versions of 5th generation fighters which threaten our ability to gain air superiority at a time and place of our choosing. In order to deter and defeat potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region, we must have the capability to quickly gain and maintain air superiority long enough to complete critical missions. The U.S. is now beginning to field 5th generation platforms in the Pacific; however, our legacy 4th generation platforms will be in our inventory for years to come, and we must be prepared to address future threats. While we continue to invest in 5th generation platforms, we must also find innovative ways to make our 4th generation aircraft and air-battle-management platforms more capable.

Undersea Warfare: USPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage in undersea warfare capability including our attack submarines, their munitions, and other anti-submarine warfare systems like the P-8 Poseidon and ship-borne systems. Roughly 230 of the world’s 400 foreign submarines are in the Indo-Pacific, of which approximately 160 belong to China, DPRK, and Russia. Potential adversary submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels, requiring an increase of U.S. activity to maintain undersea superiority. This growth of regional submarine fleets, and increasing demand from other Combatant Commands for SSNs, will challenge the Joint Force to address our SSN requirements in the decade ahead. The SSN imbalance will only be aggravated as the global U.S. Navy SSN inventory drops and submarines are retired faster than replacements are constructed. China is improving the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines, building quieter, high-end diesel and nuclear powered submarines, and has placed in service four nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). An armed Jin-class SSBN will give China an important strategic capability that must be countered. Russia is modernizing its existing fleet of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and producing their next generation Severodvinsk Yasen-class SSGNs. Russia has also homeported their newest Dolgoruky-class SSBN in the Pacific, significantly enhancing its strategic capability. Current counter undersea capabilities include the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), including the Surface Towed Array Sensor Systems (SURTASS). While these platforms have operated since the early 1980s, these systems, along with the new
autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicle technologies, play a key role in theater operations and must be resourced appropriately to ensure they remain relevant and capable. Maintaining pace with submarine activity growth is necessary and I support the Secretary of the Navy’s 2016 “Force Structure Assessment” which calls for a 355-ship navy, including 66 attack submarines.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR):** The challenge of gathering credible, deep, and penetrating intelligence cannot be overstated. The Indo-Pacific presents a dynamic security environment requiring persistent and intrusive ISR to provide indications, warning, and situational awareness across a vast geographic area. Our treaty allies rely on U.S. ISR capabilities to support mutual defense treaties. ISR is required to prevent strategic surprise, buy decision space for national leadership, accurately assess the security environment, and defeat adversaries, if necessary. The rapid modernization of our peer competitors requires additional advancements in how our intelligence is collected and processed, including the associated risks. Our ISR capabilities must be suited to our unique operating environment.

**Space and Cyberspace:** USPACOM relies heavily on space-based assets for satellite communications (SATCOM), Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), Missile Warning, and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities to support missions across the range of military operations. USPACOM’s region spans over half the globe and space-based assets are high-demand, low-density resources. As the electromagnetic spectrum grows increasingly congested and contested, our adversaries continue to develop means to deny our space-enabled capabilities. China continues to pursue a broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which include direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, cyber-attack and exploitation capabilities, directed energy weapons, and ground-based satellite and PNT jammers. DPRK continues to develop and employ SATCOM and PNT jammers, while also continuing their development and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles despite UNSCR 1718 prohibiting such activities.

USPACOM faces constant threats in the cyber domain from both state and non-state actors, such as China, DPRK, Russia, and criminal actors. The U.S. must ensure it has a robust and capable cyber force, as well as the equipment necessary to maintain command and control of our forces.
USPACOM requires an agile and defensible mission command network infrastructure to enable interoperability with our allies and mission partners to fully leverage our combined capacity. In addition, offensive cyber capabilities provide additional tools to use as part of tailored options that bolster multi-domain effects, but these capabilities must grow faster. As we work across the interagency environment to develop whole-of-government solutions, we require a workforce that strikes the right balance between cyber forces assigned in the theater, working directly for USPACOM and its subordinates, and forces assigned to USCYBERCOM and other U.S. government agencies at the national level.

**Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD):** USPACOM faces unique Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) challenges despite efforts to forward station additional IAMD sensors and weapons capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to protect our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are part of our homeland and must be defended. Hawaii is currently protected from DPRK intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by the Ground-Based-Midcourse Defense System. This system includes Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California; ground-, sea-, and space-based sensors; and redundant command, control and communications systems. For the defense of Hawaii, the Homeland Defense Radar - Hawaii (HDRH) siting process is near complete. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to compete and award a Pacific Radar contract in FY18 and deliver an initial capability by FY23. The new radar will provide an enhanced ballistic missile sensing and discrimination capability in the Pacific, and will increase the capability of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System to defend the state of Hawaii. This radar is being built to stay ahead of potential future threats. DPRK’s 3 September 2017 nuclear test, its KN-22 “Hwasong-15” ICBM test launch on 28 November 2017, and DPRK’s continuing research and development of submarine launch ballistic missile technology, demonstrates the DPRK’s desire for greater technical performance and capability. Also, China and Russia continue to develop and operationally field advanced counter-intervention technologies which include fielding and testing of highly maneuverable re-entry vehicle/warhead (i.e., hypersonic weapons) capabilities that challenge U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical freedom of movement and maneuver. China and Russia also present other notable challenges in the form of cruise missiles and small-unmanned aircraft systems (s-UAS) which fly different trajectories, making them hard to detect, acquire, track, and intercept.
due to unpredictable low-flight profiles and high-potential use of countermeasures. I support MDA’s intent to formally study the efficacy of putting an interceptor capability in Hawaii.

USPACOM’s IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible, and sustainable ballistic missile defense presence by forward deploying the latest advancements in missile defense technologies to the Indo-Pacific. Through their forward and persistent presence, these active missile defense capabilities help mitigate the risk to missile threats that USPACOM faces in the AOR. USPACOM continues to work with the Department of Defense (DOD), our academic institutions and industry to improve or deploy systems capable of countering the missile threat challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

USPACOM maintains an active Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery on Guam to protect our fellow citizens and strategic military capabilities from the threat of DPRK intermediate-range ballistic missiles (KN-17 and MUSUDAN). USPACOM also employs additional radars across the theater to support homeland defense and testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Additionally, USPACOM is supporting MDA’s siting-study to identify a home for the new Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii.

USPACOM and USFK, with the support from the MDA and the DoD, deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the Korean peninsula in 2017 that is fully operational. The U.S. Navy is moving forward with the port shift of the USS MILIUS from San Diego to Yokosuka, Japan this spring. This port shift provides the U.S. Seventh Fleet with improved capability to support the U.S.-Japan alliance. USPACOM will continue working with Japan, the ROK, and Australia to improve our level of staff coordination and information sharing with the goal of creating a fully-integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture that addresses the increasing cruise missile threat.

USPACOM continues to support MDA and the Services to develop and test emerging missile and counter-small UAS defense capabilities through modeling and simulation, as well as live-fire testing conducted at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, the Ronald Reagan Test Center at Kwajalein Island, Point Mugu, and other testing ranges located on the continental U.S. and Alaska. These tests encompass a number of developmental flight tests including: Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB Threat Upgrades; Distributed Ground Tests to assess the performance of the Ballistic Missile Defense System; two Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) missiles against a complex medium-range ballistic missile target; and SM-3 Block IIA allowing longer flight times and engagements of more complex threats higher in the exo-atmosphere. USPACOM will continue to support future flight tests to help improve the Ballistic Missile Defense System performance against more complex threats. Going forward, USPACOM supports all efforts that improve the capability and capacity of ballistic missile, cruise missile, and UAS defense technologies to further enhance Homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional locations from aggressive action. The development of a credible and effective defense against advanced and future missile and UAS threats remains vital to our operational plans and critical to the continued defense of the U.S.

**Innovation:** USPACOM increasingly relies on innovation to address USPACOM’s capability gaps and maintain our military advantage. This includes testing and integrating new technologies, developing new capabilities, and exploring new concepts of operation and employment. This multi-pronged approach to innovation is paying dividends, and my innovators are getting these capabilities into the hands of the warfighters quickly in order to enhance our ability to fight tonight. Advances in man/machine teaming, artificial intelligence, machine-learning, hypersonic technology, autonomy, and command and control will enable the Joint Force to maintain a velocity of precision operations our adversaries simply cannot match. USPACOM’s ability to conduct operationally realistic exercises where we can rigorously test our innovative ideas makes me confident we will continue to identify, test, evaluate, and integrate the best technology our industry offers.

Capitalizing on the vast open spaces of the Pacific, USPACOM runs the most complex field exercises in the world. For example, the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is a premier location to focus on joint air and electronic warfare exercises, while the Pacific Missile Range Facility and ranges near Guam provide excellent opportunities to test naval and missile innovations. USPACOM forces conducted over 50 more warfighting experiments in 2017 than any year before. I believe we can take this construct to the next level by combining innovation across multiple areas: operational planning, cutting-edge technologies, modeling and simulation, and execution of multi-Combatant Command exercises.
Our innovation successes would not be possible without strong partnerships. USPACOM benefits from our continued relationships with organizations across the DoD, including the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental, Service laboratories and innovation offices, national laboratories, university-affiliated research centers, and industry. USPACOM has also significantly increased its interaction with U.S. Special Operations Command, and we continue to work closely with the OSD Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to develop and field game-changing technologies for the Indo-Pacific.

**Fires...Achieving Multi-Domain Battle (MDB):** Multi-domain battle is the ultimate joint concept that allows commanders to achieve cross-domain effects while mitigating significant advancements in our adversaries’ ability to out-range and out-gun some of our most advanced platforms and systems.

We have made significant progress in the past 12 months. This year, the Army and the Marine Corps “signed out” Version 1.0 of this warfighting concept in a document titled *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Concept, Multi-Domain Battle: The Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century*. This concept describes how U.S. and partner forces organize and employ capabilities to project and apply power across domains, environments, and functions over time and physical space to contest adversaries in relative “peace” and, when required, defeat them in “war.” The concept of MDB seeks a common and interoperable capability development effort to provide Joint Force Commanders complementary and resilient forces to prosecute campaigns and further the evolution of combined arms for the 21st century.

In execution, MDB broadens the options for Joint Force Commanders and poses a corresponding dilemma for our adversaries. Version 1.0 of this concept formally transitions emergent concepts and ideas to experimentation. The complementary capabilities described in this concept provide an initial set of ideas to test with regard to employment and capability requirements, while supplementary capabilities required for combined arms and maneuver serve as a starting point for common capability development efforts between the Army, Marine Corps and their joint partners. Our joint forces will revise this concept to Version 2.0, refining ideas and corresponding solution set by incorporating the results of experimentation, as well as other Service and Joint perspectives.
I recently asked the USPACOM component commands to test MDB operational concepts as part of our Joint Exercise Program, to include demonstrations in one of our major capstone events – the Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC ’18). Implementing a “crawl-walk-run” methodology, we will move from discrete events across domains to the fusion of joint capabilities across domains in a sensor to shooter agnostic environment that is both contested and integrated across the combined force. In keeping with the MDB concept vision – we will progress from experimentation to validation of concepts, culminating in a validation and demonstration of the Army’s new Multi-Domain Task Force during the RIMPAC ’20 exercise.

We will capitalize on the existing MDB capabilities resident in much of our force, but in order to maintain our competitive edge, we must continue our rapid pursuit of new technologies and approaches. One of the biggest capability gaps in terms of joint effects is the lack of complete connectivity and integration between the Services’ operational and tactical ISR, target acquisition, and fire control systems – such as the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the Army’s Advanced Tactical Field Artillery Target Data Systems, Army’s THAAD and Patriot Systems, and the USMC’s C2 systems. Together with the Services, USPACOM is working to solve these problems with the Joint Staff and OSD.

**Strategic Force Posture in the Indo-Pacific**

The Joint Force is forward-stationed throughout the Indo-Pacific region to deter conflict or to defeat adversaries should deterrence fail. The tyranny of distance, mobilization timelines for reserve component enablers, and strategic lift constraints hinder the ability to generate force flow early in a crisis. While USPACOM remains focused on fielding credible combat power, gaining access to new locations, upgrading existing operating locations, and encouraging whole-of-government approaches to deter and confront regional adversaries are all critical to preserving our positional advantage in the region. As challenges in the Indo-Pacific region continue to evolve, the importance of infrastructure recapitalization and the fielding of advanced capabilities have increased.
Global Force Management (GFM): Credible combat power offers the greatest potential for meeting the Indo-Pacific region’s complex security issues and enables our ability to prevail in combat. The DoD continues to strongly support USPACOM GFM priorities through the assignment of critical platforms and capabilities in Alaska and on the West Coast. USPACOM continues to prioritize forward stationing and deployment of 5th generation aircraft in the Indo-Pacific, to include the first Marine Corps F-35B Joint Strike Fighters to Japan in January 2017 and the first Air Force F-35A squadron to the Republic of Korea in November 2017. In addition, U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific is further evidenced by the deployment of our newest and most advanced aviation platforms such as the P-8 Poseidon, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MV-22 Osprey, EA-18G Growler, E-2D Hawkeye, and C-130J Super Hercules.

The long-range capabilities of U.S. bombers are well suited for the Indo-Pacific region due to the vast distances and unique challenges. This mission enables Joint Force readiness and commitment to extended deterrence, offer assurances to our allies and partners, and strengthen regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

In addition to the Pacific Pathways deployments and posture commitments, the Army is assessing existing U.S. inventories to prioritize requirements for focused readiness, critical munitions, sustainment stocks, mobility shortfalls, chemical defense, and facility operations within the region.

The culmination of joint and combined force operations with our Service components and our partner nations in the Indo-Pacific region in 2017 was the three-carrier strike force exercise in the Western Pacific. USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Nimitz (CVN 68), and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) strike groups conducted coordinated operations in international waters to demonstrate the Navy’s unique capability to operate multiple carrier strike groups as a coordinated strike force effort.

Force Posture Initiatives: USPACOM’s ability to execute national tasking and meet national objectives is reflected in military construction investments that support increased resiliency for the Joint Force via projects in Japan, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Australia. The vast distances associated with the Indo-Pacific, coupled with the
short timelines to respond to crises, require investment in infrastructure to properly preposition capabilities and capacity throughout the region. Military construction supports critical capabilities to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Republic of Korea), Cyber Mission Force teams (Hawaii), Special Operations Forces (Japan), increased critical munitions storage capacity in Washington State, and quality of life investments for the Joint Force and their families in Guam, Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Host country support at 23 established operating locations in the Indo-Pacific region remains robust overall. The U.S. military receives approximately $37 billion in new construction at a cost of less than $7 billion to the U.S. taxpayer in the Indo-Pacific region. The Government of Japan committed resources in 2013 that continue to assist in the strategic realignment of U.S. Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam and other locations as a part of the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI). Additionally, the Government of Japan is supporting the airfield expansion work underway at the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan and the Futenma Replacement Facility. The Republic of Korea continues to support the work on the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan Relocation Plan, which are estimated to be finished within the next four years. Outside of the above initiatives, Japan and the Republic of Korea continue to provide other funding and support, which play a critical role in sustaining U.S. presence in the region.

USPACOM continues to execute five major force posture initiatives: (1) U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) / USMC Distributed Laydown; (2) U.S. Forces Korea Realignment; (3) Resiliency; (4) Agile Logistics; and (5) Agile Communications.

Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI)/USMC Distributed Laydown: DPRI is a vital part of the larger U.S. military Integrated Global Basing and Presence Strategy. A major goal of DPRI is to create an environment that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable to better support the enduring presence of U.S. forces in Japan. USPACOM maintains significant focus and effort on these initiatives. DPRI is one of the largest construction efforts since the end of the Cold War. Much work by both the U.S and Japan remain, but progress is being made towards realigning some U.S. Marines from Okinawa to
Guam and build-up of facilities at other locations such as Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Japan. Military construction investments in the FY18 NDAA include projects for DPRI in Guam and Iwakuni. Another critical cooperative effort, the Futemma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab/Henoko will enable the U.S. to fulfill its security obligations to Japan while also enabling the return of MCAS Futenma to Okinawa. In the past year, top leaders from the U.S. and Japan have reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to construct the FRF. This solution maintains our presence at MCAS Futenma until the FRF is completed.

USFK Realignment: The consolidation of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea via the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) continues to progress as planned. Posture priorities remain the relocation of thousands of U.S. personnel to bases south of Seoul and setting conditions to support United Nations Command and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. The U.S. is committed to maintain the current level of U.S. military personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea through the next five years, at which point the Joint Force will become strategically flexible and exercise freedom of action throughout the AOR.

Resiliency: The Joint Force remains ready to fight tonight across all domains in the Indo-Pacific. USPACOM ensures sustained power projection capabilities exist forward in theater, and generates resiliency through the dispersal of our capabilities and the decisive aggregation of effects. USPACOM resiliency efforts include investment in more robust infrastructure in ally and partner countries and the hardening of critical facilities. USPACOM also works to disperse critical enablers, including communication nodes, fuel repositories, medical readiness centers, and logistic support equipment.

Agile Logistics: Combat operations in a contested environment require U.S. forces to disperse across multiple locations, both inside and outside the enemy’s operational reach. We can no longer rely on the past strategy of consolidating in large, central locations that position combat capabilities close to the fight to maximize efficiency and time on target. To survive, our warfighters must move quickly in and out of enemy fire, placing a greater burden on the units that support them. Logistics plans can no longer construct central basing stockpiles of critical sustainment materiel without fear of attack. USPACOM must disaggregate those stockpiles, anticipate demand, and adapt to the speed of operational maneuver. Supported by other
Combatant Commands and strategic partners, USPACOM is working to develop an agile, resilient logistics network, to include sophisticated logistics decision support tools.

**Agile Communications:** USPACOM must work with mission partners in order to further national objectives throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Five of seven U.S. Mutual Defense Treaties exist in the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR), which translates to five alliances of national militaries that must operate together as a unified force on a daily basis and through all phases of planned operations. Similarly, USPACOM does not have formal agreements for exchanging information with many of the nation states or organizations within the USPACOM AOR, giving rise to the need for dynamic information technology capabilities to support the full spectrum of military operations. Agility with coalition information sharing environments that allow for the rapid addition or removal of mission partners must be available on short notice to adequately respond to natural disasters and contingencies in order to synchronize efforts, achieve synergistic results and to ensure forces do not interact with each other in a negative manner. As a result, we are not fully postured with the latest technology to interoperate with multiple partner combinations over all the phases of military operations. Furthermore, we will not have the communication capacity and sharable encryption capability to support the most modern warfighting platforms and associated weapon systems as they are built and deployed.

**Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability (IAPSI) Initiative:** I’m grateful for the inclusion of IAPSI in the FY18 NDAA. IAPSI supports a number of the force posture initiatives addressed in this section, including enhanced resiliency and increased logistical agility. Overall, IAPSI helps USPACOM fully leverage the capabilities of our allies and partners, while also signaling our persistent commitment to the region.

**Readiness:** USPACOM is a “fight tonight” theater with short response timelines across vast spaces. Threats as discussed earlier require U.S. military forces in the region maintain a high level of readiness to respond rapidly to crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which place a premium on forward-stationed, ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations’ militaries and follow-on forces to respond to operational contingencies. Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date Line increase decision space and decrease response times, bolster the
confidence of allies and partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential adversaries.

The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces is an asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. Over the past two decades of war, the U.S. has prioritized the readiness of deploying forces at the expense of follow-on-forces and critical investments necessary to outpace emerging threats. As a result of high operational demands, delayed maintenance caused by sequestration and ongoing Continuing Resolutions (CR), and training pipeline shortfalls, a shortage of ready surge forces limit USPACOM’s responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. These challenges grow each year as our forces continue to deploy at unprecedented rates. We are overstressing the force as the Services are unable to establish conditions to reset their force elements with the current fiscal instability.

Past budget uncertainty degraded USPACOM’s ability to plan and program, leading to sub-optimal utilization of resources. Fiscal uncertainty forces the Department to accept risk in long-term engagement opportunities with detrimental strategic consequences to U.S. relations and prestige. Services must be able to develop and execute long-term programs for modernization while meeting current readiness needs. Constrained budgets over the last few years forced choices within the Services that have limited procurement and fielding of 5th generation fighter aircraft (F-35) in sufficient quantities and modernization of 4th generation aircraft (F-15, F-16, F/A-18) essential to prevent capability gaps and to maintain pace with potential adversary advancements. Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the continental U.S. was established during World War II and during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure requires investment to extend its service life but the Services struggle to maintain infrastructure sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts at appropriate levels. Similarly, the shadow of budget uncertainty has exacerbated the industrial base’s inability to meet and respond to increasing requirements to replace expenditures and field new systems and technologies. If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will experience reduced warfighting capabilities and increased challenges in pacing maturing adversary threats.
Allies and Partners

U.S. national power depends on more than a robust economy and military strength: we need allies and partners. Our network of alliances and partnerships, established over the past 70-plus years, has contributed to the free and open order that we enjoy today. These countries do not follow U.S. lead on all issues, but allies and partners provide a foundation for like-minded nations to draw upon when dealing with major issues or crises. Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand have all been long-standing allies, but Congress’ designation of India as a “Major Defense Partner” in 2016 provides USPACOM the opportunity to forge a new relationship with the world’s largest democracy. A robust network of allies and partners creates an environment of cooperation to work together on shared challenges.

USPACOM is directly connected to regional leaders. I am in frequent communication with my regional counterparts and appreciate the ability to reach out at any time to share perspectives. USPACOM maintains a close link with allies and partners through staff exchange and liaison officers, in addition to a series of formal bilateral mechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. security treaty and are guided by USPACOM’s principal bilateral event with Australia, the Military Representatives Meeting, which leads up to the Australia-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Meeting with SecDef/SecState and their Australian counterparts. Similarly, the annual Joint Senior Leader Seminar guides USPACOM’s military-to-military relationship with Japan. The Military Committee and Security Consultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanisms that guide the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Each year USPACOM and the Armed Forces of the Philippines co-host the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board to deal with 21st-century challenges. USPACOM conducts annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to address security concerns and reinforce U.S. commitment to democratic principles. USPACOM also conducts annual formal bilateral activities with non-alliance partners throughout the region, including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Our multilateral cooperation is further enhanced by numerous Flag and General Officer (FOGO) exchange officers that work for the U.S. at USPACOM. These foreign officers from our “Five Eye” (FVEY) partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) serve under my
Command as fully integrated members of the USPACOM team. Our operations and intelligence watch centers are FVEY environments and FOGOs are embedded within USPACOM and our service components

**Bilateral and Multinational “Partnerships with a Purpose”**: The future lies in multilateral security mechanisms. USPACOM is broadening key bilateral relationships into multilateral “partnerships with a purpose” that will more effectively address shared security concerns. For example, the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea multilateral coordination in response to the DPRK’s provocative behavior, while challenging, is improving. The ROK and Japan each recognize that provocative actions by the DPRK will not be isolated to the peninsula and greater coordination and cooperation are required. Historical tensions between the nations remain, but cooperation and collaboration are slowly improving. The November 2016 signing of the Japan-Republic of Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is a major accomplishment in improving bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo; the GSOMIA lays an essential foundation for expanding cooperation and enables the U.S. to work more closely with both allies. Recognizing the benefits of this bilateral agreement, in November 2017, the Republic of Korea and Japan renewed GSOMIA for another year. I look forward to increasing the frequency and complexity of multilateral information sharing while simultaneously enhancing multilateral security cooperation.

To encourage multilateral cooperation, USPACOM hosts the Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHODs) annually. The CHODs conference location normally rotates between Hawaii and a regional partner. In 2017, 30 countries attended the CHODs conference in Victoria, Canada. USPACOM also participates in Australia-Japan-U.S. multilateral defense dialogues, including the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF).

The multilateral relationship between the U.S., Japan, and India is growing stronger as well. All three countries share democratic values, interests in protecting sea-lanes of commerce, and respect for international law. On the security front, all three countries participate in India’s increasingly complex annual Malabar military exercise as well as the multinational Rim of the Pacific exercise.
In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines formed a multilateral relationship aimed at countering violent extremists through coordinated maritime and air patrols. Additional Southeast Asia nations, such as Brunei and Singapore, and other Indo-Pacific regional nations, such as the U.S., Japan, and Australia are all supporting the multilateral initiative through various support missions.

**Allies**

**Australia:** The U.S.-Australia alliance anchors peace and stability in the region. Australia plays a leading role in regional security, capacity-building efforts and addressing disaster response. Australia is a key contributor to global security and a significant contributor to counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria and the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With the implementation of force posture initiatives, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin successfully completed its sixth deployment while maintaining a presence of 1,250 U.S. Marines. The seventh deployment begins in April 2018 and will consist of approximately 1,500 U.S. Marines with future growth informed by capability requirements and budget resource availability. The 2018 deployment will include ten MV-22 Osprey aircraft, providing a more robust capability. The deployment of USAF F-22s to Australia for integration with Royal Australian Air Force E/A-18G, F/A-18F, and/or E-7A as part of the Enhanced Air Cooperation force posture initiative will build upon the initial activities that occurred in 2017 by increasing the complexity of mutual tactics, techniques, and procedures. The U.S. and Australia are increasing collaboration in counter-terrorism, space, cyber, integrated air missile defense, and regional capacity building. Australia is procuring high-tech U.S. platforms that will further increase interoperability. These include the F-35A Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, EA-18G Growler, Global Hawk UAVs, and MH-60R helicopters. To enhance interoperability, the Australian Government provides a General Officer to USPACOM and a General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific on a full-time basis. Australia has also set a goal of reaching 2% of its GDP on defense spending over the next decade.

**France:** As a NATO ally, France has significant equities in the Indo-Pacific, and I welcome France’s growing involvement in the region. The French territories in Polynesia and New Caledonia make France the sixth largest nation on the planet by area, which translates into an
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) of over 166,000 square miles. The French navy maintains a professional military force in both territories, focused primarily on maritime security. But, France aims to become more involved across the Indo-Pacific writ large. Not only is France providing submarines to Australia and India, France is currently operating a combatant frigate (FF VENDEMIARE) in the East and South China Seas with U.S. Pacific Fleet. France also maintains a contingent of forces on New Caledonia and remains active in support or regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. During my recent visit to New Caledonia, the French military Commander indicated a strong desire to increase their training interaction with USPACOM forces, and we are developing opportunities for increased interaction. Overall, I am very excited about France’s increased willingness to stand by the U.S. as we confront revisionist state and non-state actors across the region.

Japan: The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Operational cooperation and collaboration between USPACOM and the Japan Joint Staff continue to increase. Japan's Peace and Security Legislation authorizing limited collective self-defense operations and the revised 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation have significantly increased Japan’s ability to contribute to regional stability more broadly. Japan continues to support USPACOM activities to maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and remains concerned about Chinese activities in the East China Sea. We are strengthening our alliance with Japan, including through reviewing our roles, missions and capabilities, to ensure seamless alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations amid an increasingly challenging regional security environment. Japan is procuring high-tech U.S. platforms that will increase interoperability such as the F-35B, E-2D Hawkeye, Global Hawk UAS, and MV-22 Osprey; it has also announced its intentions to procure AEGIS Ashore.

Republic of Korea (ROK): The U.S.-ROK alliance is ironclad, and our commitment to the Republic of Korea is unwavering. We continue to work with our close friend and ally, as it moves toward obtaining the capabilities required under the Conditions-Based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COT-P). In response to the evolving threat posed by the DPRK, the U.S. in coordination with the Republic of Korea, deployed a THAAD system to improve alliance missile defense posture. The Republic of Korea is also procuring high-tech
U.S. platforms that will further increase interoperability to include the F-35B, P-8 Poseidon, AH-64 Apache, and Global Hawk UAS.

The resumption of inter-Korean dialogue in January and the North’s decision to participate in this month’s PyeongChang Olympic Games are encouraging developments, but any future talks with the DPRK must be focused on achieving a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the alliance will maintain a high military readiness posture and will continue to provide support for the diplomatic pressure campaign through credible combat deterrence.

**The Philippines:** The U.S.-Philippine alliance has demonstrated resilience through President Rodrigo Duterte’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy. The tenor of our bilateral relationship has improved over the past year, due in part to the relationship-reset in President Duterte’s personal interactions with President Trump. Through frank and frequent dialogue with Philippine leadership, we continue to maintain a robust defense relationship comprised of 261 activities for calendar year 2018, slowly expanding parameters of military-to-military cooperation. In particular, we have obtained Philippine commitment to resuming live fire exercises and close air support training. The attack on Marawi City in Mindanao by ISIS-P posed a significant challenge to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and served as a reminder of the value of our alliance to Philippine security and stability. U.S. support, primarily in the form of providing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), tactical advice, and the use of our Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) to assist in the timely delivery of weapons and ammunition, proved crucial in the AFP’s defeat of ISIS-P in Marawi. Our quick response to addressing AFP needs helped to bolster the bilateral relationship. Our military cooperation supports a broader whole-of-government approach to countering terrorism and building resiliency and capacity in Mindanao, as well as continuing to work together to modernize the AFP. While the government of the Philippines refocused attention on internal security to address short-term security and political challenges in Mindanao, we must not lose sight of the long-term objectives of building a territorial defense capability and creating a modern and self-sufficient AFP. Strategic patience has helped recalibrate the alliance relationship. I am convinced that the relationship pendulum will continue to swing in a positive direction and will continue to stabilize the region as it has for over 60 years.
Thailand: Our deep and longstanding military-to-military ties with Thailand go back to our 1950 Agreement Respecting Military Assistance between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Thailand. Despite recent challenges, we remain close allies and important security partners. Our alliance is back on track at senior levels, capping off a year of re-engagement that included multiple 4-star visits, Secretary Mattis’ visit to Bangkok for the Royal Cremation, and POTUS’ hosting the Prime Minister at the White House. These discussions aimed to “Reinvigorate the Alliance,” and we have communicated that strengthening the alliance is a shared responsibility. Overall mil-to-mil engagements are also on a positive trajectory. Thailand facilitates world-class training opportunities for U.S. personnel across all services, and co-hosts Exercise COBRA GOLD with us, Asia’s largest multinational military exercise. Thailand provides logistical nodes essential to our forces operating throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are currently restricted, but a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) relationship continues. Thailand has publicly committed to hold national elections in November 2018, and our continued engagement with military leadership remains the best way for the U.S. to promote regional security and healthy civil-military relations in Thailand.

United Kingdom: I’m excited about the trend of UK involvement in the Indo-Pacific. As a key NATO ally, the UK continues to support U.S. logistics and ISR operations across multiple Combatant Commands from the Indian Ocean territory of Diego Garcia. The UK is also looking to become more involved in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. The HMS SUTHERLAND, a Type 23 Frigate, is currently conducting combined maritime operations with U.S. Pacific Fleet in Southeast Asia, and I expect this type of interaction will increase in the years to come.

Partners

India: The U.S.-India strategic partnership continues to advance at a historic pace and has the potential to be the most consequential bilateral relationship of the 21st century. The U.S. and India maintain a broad-based strategic partnership that is underpinned by shared democratic values, interests, and strong people-to-people ties, and I expect 2018 to be a significant and
eventful year in U.S.-India relations. The U.S. and India are natural partners on a range of political, economic, and security issues. With a mutual desire for global stability and support for the rules-based international order, the U.S. and India have an increasing convergence of interests, including maritime security and domain awareness, counter-piracy, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and coordinated responses to natural disasters and transnational terrorism. India will be among the U.S.’s most significant partners in the years to come due to its growing influence and expanding military. As a new generation of political leaders emerge, India has shown that it is more open to strengthening security ties with the U.S. and adjusting its historic policy of non-alignment to address common strategic interests. The U.S. seeks an enduring, regular, routine, and institutionalized strategic partnership with India. USPACOM identifies a security relationship with India as a major command line-of-effort. Over the past year, U.S. and Indian militaries participated together in three major exercises, executed more than 50 other military exchanges, and operationalized the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). Defense sales are at an all-time high with India operating U.S.-sourced airframes, such as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s, and CH-47s, and M777 howitzers. USPACOM will sustain the momentum of the strategic relationship generated by the POTUS-Prime Minister-level and the emerging 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue through strengthening our military-to-military relationship and working toward additional enabling agreements to enhance interoperability. At the moment, India is considering a number of U.S. systems for purchase, all of which USPACOM fully supports: the F-16 for India’s large single-engine, multi-role fighter acquisition program; the F/A-18E for India’s multi-engine, carried-based fighter purchase; a reorder of 12-15 P-8Is; a potential purchase of SeaGuardian UAS; MH-60R multi-role sea-based helicopter; and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

**Indonesia:** Indonesia plays an essential role as the maritime fulcrum of Southeast Asia. We maintain a robust defense relationship comprising over 200 annual activities as part of our Strategic Partnership. USPACOM continues to partner with Indonesia, particularly in maritime security. Indonesia desires to play a larger role in international economic and security issues. Their goal to provide 4,000 deployable peacekeeping troops by 2019 is another important area where we can engage. Indonesia continues to build and exercise in strategic maritime border areas to bolster its defense capabilities, and has concerns with Chinese activities in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands. The money spent on professional military education and technical training in
Indonesia has borne fruit in terms of Foreign Military Sales of excess defense article F-16s and new AH-64 Apaches. The Government of Indonesia is also considering the F-16 for the recapitalization of the Indonesian Air Force’s aging fleet of fighter aircraft, most of which are of Russian origin.

**Malaysia:** Our close security ties with Malaysia are based on our Comprehensive Partnership. Malaysia’s regional leadership role, technologically advanced industry, sizeable economy, and capable military make it an important partner in securing peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. Over the past year, Malaysia has implemented air and maritime patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas in accordance with a multilateral arrangement with the Philippines and Indonesia due to increased security concerns in East Malaysia. We have worked closely with Malaysia as co-chairs of ASEAN’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) working group. Malaysia also has an on-going dispute with China with respect to the Luconia Shoals, which China also claims. Malaysia has demonstrated the capacity and resolve to contribute to regional security, and we continue to support Malaysia’s emerging security requirements. Malaysia recently selected MD-530 attack helicopter, and the U.S. is also providing Malaysia with secure communications equipment to increase interoperability in maritime security and counter-terrorism missions.

**Mongolia:** Mongolia endures as a small, yet strong, partner in Northeast Asia and continues to demonstrate staunch support for U.S. regional and global policy objectives – especially those linked to the Global Peace Operations Initiative and security operations in Afghanistan. The government engages with the U.S. and other countries as part of their “Third Neighbor” policy. Mongolia also markets itself as a model for emerging democratic countries such as Burma, Nepal, and Timor Leste. My deputy visited Mongolia last summer and spoke at the Exercise KHAAN QUEST 2017 closing ceremony, reaffirming that USPACOM’s goals are to assist the Mongolian Armed Forces through their defense reform priorities. These priorities include: development of professional military education for officers and non-commissioned officers; developing a professional NCO corps; and developing an Air Force and ready reserve force. The Mongolians punch above their weight and we should continue to support them where we can.
**New Zealand:** The U.S.-New Zealand partnership remains on solid footing and continues to evolve. New Zealand is increasing its leading role in regional security and capacity-building efforts while addressing disaster response in the South Pacific and Antarctica. New Zealand is a key contributor to global security and a significant contributor to counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. is thankful for the New Zealand Defense Force’s gracious offer of the Royal New Zealand Navy ship Te’ Kaha to replace the USS Fitzgerald after she was involved in an unfortunate mishap in summer 2017 during the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group deployment. We commend New Zealand’s commitment to planned defense capability improvements identified in their 2016 Defense White Paper. These improvements acknowledge the threats posed by the rise of China’s strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific, an escalation of military spending across Southeast Asia, and increasing challenges to the rules-based international system. Military-to-Military relations and defense engagements with New Zealand remain strong. New Zealand is procuring the P-8 Poseidon – continuing the strong legacy of interoperability among Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft with the U.S.

**Singapore:** Singapore remains a steadfast partner in Southeast Asia with a strong commitment to promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. We owe Singapore our sincere gratitude for its assistance in the aftermath of the USS John McCain accident and timely aviation support to Hurricane Harvey relief efforts this year. Singapore leaders believe the U.S. plays an indispensable role in bolstering the region’s economic and security frameworks. Though not a formal treaty ally, Singapore provides us invaluable access to the strategically located entrance of the Malacca Straits and South China Sea. Singapore also hosts Littoral Combat Ships, rotational Maritime Patrol Aircraft, and Seventh Fleet’s Logistics Force headquarters, while maintaining training detachments in the United States for Singapore Air Force F-15SGs, F-16C/Ds, CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apache helicopters, and the Singapore Army’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. We conduct dozens of high level and increasingly complex military exercises with Singapore each year to increase our interoperability. Furthermore, Singapore officers regularly attend U.S. professional military education at all levels, developing relationships that span careers. The combination of a shared outlook on regional security and prosperity, strong support for U.S. presence, and a deep and broad defense relationship enables the U.S. to promote our interests abroad and focus on shared regional challenges. Overall, we remain their defense partner of choice despite intense Chinese pandering of economic influence.
USPACOM was excited to support Singapore’s request for an F-22 and an F-35B static display at the 2018 Singapore Air Show in February – a great opportunity as the Government of Singapore considers a purchase of F-35B in the future.

**Sri Lanka:** The trajectory of U.S.-Sri Lanka relations continues to ascend, with Sri Lanka emerging as a significant strategic partner in the Indian Ocean region. Despite recent political turmoil, President Sirisena, elected in January 2015, remains committed to reforms and addressing Sri Lanka’s human rights issues. Over the last year he continued Sri Lanka’s path toward reconciliation and democracy following its multi-decade civil war. I believe it is in America’s interest to continue to increase military collaboration and cooperation with Sri Lankan forces. Accordingly, USPACOM expanded bilateral defense ties, military leadership discussions, rule of law training, increased naval engagement, and focused security cooperation efforts on defense institution building in areas such as demobilizing, peacekeeping, and military professionalism. In October 2017, the USS Nimitz became the first U.S. aircraft carrier to visit Sri Lanka in over thirty years. This visit, along with granting Sri Lanka an excess U.S. Coast Guard cutter, underscores the deepening relationship between the U.S. and Sri Lanka.

**Vietnam:** Vietnam is currently our boldest regional partner in standing up to China’s provocative behavior in the South China Sea. A series of high-level bilateral visits in 2017 helped deepen our partnership, including visits to the U.S. by Prime Minister Phuc in May and Defense Minister Lich in August, as well as President Trump’s travel to Vietnam in November and Secretary Mattis’ visit in January. In March 2018, the USS Carl Vinson will make an historic port visit to Da Nang, Vietnam – an indication of the significant progress in the bilateral security relationship. Last year, we transferred a 378 foot former U.S. Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter to the Vietnam Coast Guard. Over the next few years, we expect to continue to assist the Vietnamese to build their capacity for maritime domain awareness. In addition, we signed the Cooperative Humanitarian and Medical Storage Initiative (CHAMSI) Memorandum of Understanding in May 2017. When implemented, CHAMSI will allow USPACOM to store humanitarian assistance and disaster relief equipment in Vietnam increasing our mutual ability to train for, and respond to, natural disasters in Vietnam.
Other Key Actors

**Oceania:** Maintaining strategic relationships in Oceania is becoming ever more important to U.S. national security. The provisions included in the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are important mechanisms that guide the relationships, including U.S. obligations for their defense. In return, these agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or deny access to another nation’s military forces, which allows the U.S. to maintain a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. I am grateful to Congress for fully authorizing the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement in the FY18 NDAA and would ask that Congress appropriate all required funds. The implementation of this legislation will have a significant impact on our defense relationship with Palau, and will provide a measurable advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific. Continued U.S. commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner with other Pacific island countries enhances American influence and sends a strong message of reassurance throughout the region.

**ASEAN:** ASEAN turned 50 last year and the U.S. commemorated its 40th year of U.S.-ASEAN dialogue relations. The U.S. and ASEAN share the common principles of a rules-based order, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The ten ASEAN member states, under the chairmanship of the Philippines last year and Singapore this year, continue to seek ways to improve multilateral security engagements and advance stability in the Indo-Pacific. During this past year, the U.S. strengthened its commitment to ASEAN with engagements at the Secretary of Defense and Presidential levels where we reached agreement on whole-of-government approaches to shared challenges in areas of maritime security and maritime domain awareness. USPACOM is committed to strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Over the course of the last year, USPACOM participated in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements, and practical multilateral cooperation related to the spectrum of shared transnational challenges. The U.S. is postured to support Singapore’s Chairmanship priorities for 2018 in the areas of Counterterrorism (CT), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN), and Confidence Building Measures. Malaysia and the U.S. co-chair the...
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief over the next two years. A key objective will be to support ASEAN’s effort to operationalize the ASEAN Military Ready Group to multilaterally respond to natural disasters. USPACOM’s approach is to promote multilateral partnerships of sub-regional ASEAN nations to strengthen a rules-based international order. This includes USPACOM support to the Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines multilateral Cooperation Arrangements and the Cambodia-Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam Gulf of Thailand Initiative. USPACOM looks forward to supporting the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus that Singapore will host in October.

**Burma (Myanmar):** Our engagement with Burma’s military is extremely limited and is expected to remain so considering the ongoing crisis and human rights violations by the military in the Rakhine State. The primary goal of our engagement is to encourage a professional military that operates under democratic standards of civilian control, transparency, and accountability, while also complying with international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable. We underscore these points in all of our limited engagements. In addition to the humanitarian rights violations, I am also concerned about Chinese involvement in the country. Beijing is attempting to move into Burma while other countries are taking a step back, and Chinese support comes with no strings attached.

**China:** While the United States has an economic relationship with China, in my opinion, our two nations are in clear competition for influence and control of the Indo-Pacific. As the President commented in his recent State of the Union Address, China is now our “rival,” and I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment. For the last few years, I have advocated for dealing with China realistically – as it is, and not as we would wish it would be. In other words, our relationship with China should be based on candor and clear-eyed pragmatism instead of yearning and misty-eyed optimism. Some view China’s actions in the East and South China Seas as opportunistic. I do not. I view Chinese actions as coordinated, methodical, and strategic. Beijing is using its military and economic power to coerce its neighbors and erode the free and open international order. As I have previously stated, I believe the Chinese are building up combat power and positional advantage in an attempt to assert de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features and spaces in the South China Sea, where they have fundamentally altered the physical and political landscape by creating and militarizing man-made bases. While the U.S.
has no claims in the South China Sea – and it is our policy not to take positions on sovereignty over the disputed land features – the U.S. resolutely opposes the use of coercion, intimidation, threats, or force to advance claims. These differences should be resolved peacefully and consistent with international law.

This increasingly competitive environment necessitates continued mil-to-mil dialogue between the U.S. and China to improve understanding and reduce risk. USPACOM remains committed to a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China, so while we rightfully call out China for its aggressive behavior in some areas, we should also seek its support for shared security goals, such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We will continue to cooperate with China where we have shared interests, such as military medicine and disaster response.

USPACOM conducted numerous bilateral and multilateral engagements with China last year, and co-led the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) plenary and working group focused on operational safety. Encounters between our forces at sea and in the air are generally safe, but the MMCA provides a forum for continuous dialogue to identify and address safety issues when they arise.

For USPACOM, my goal remains to convince China that its best future comes from peaceful cooperation and meaningful participation in the current free and open international order. China has the potential to emerge as a net security provider for the region, but to do so, Beijing must honor its international commitments. After all, the Chinese economic miracle could not have happened without the stability that emerged from the rules-based order – an order that Beijing now seeks to undermine. But I’ve also been loud and clear that we will not allow the shared domains to be closed down unilaterally, so we’ll cooperate where we can but remain ready to confront where we must.

Taiwan: Taiwan’s open economy and its prosperous, free, and democratic society reflect the shared values between Taiwan and the U.S. In accordance with our One China Policy, based on the three United States-China Joint Communiques, the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Yet, we maintain a substantive and robust relationship with the people of Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. In line with this policy, USPACOM will continue supporting Taiwan’s efforts to develop a credible, resilient, and cost-effective deterrent
Continued, regular arms sales and training for Taiwan’s military are an important part of that policy and help ensure the preservation of democratic institutions. As the military spending and capability of the PRC grow every year, the ability of Taiwan to defend itself decreases. We must continue to help Taiwan defend itself and demonstrate U.S. resolve that any attempt by China to force reunification on the people of Taiwan is unacceptable. USPACOM has supported extensive security cooperation activities with Taiwan in air and missile defense, maritime security, logistic support and joint operations and training. Recent sales of anti-ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, logistics helicopters, surveillance radar, Perry-class Frigates, and amphibious assault vehicle (AAV-7), and electronic warfare systems continue to improve their self-defense capabilities.

**Activities, Direct Reporting Units, and Mission Partners**

**Interagency:** USPACOM collaborates with a broad group of interagency partners that bring diplomatic, economic, reconstruction and stabilization, intelligence, law enforcement, health, national security, and scientific expertise to the discussion. This allows us to address key national security issues through a whole-of-government approach, synchronizing all instruments of power. Our interagency partners help USPACOM maintain relationships with key allies and partners in this region. Our interagency collaboration has yielded success in supporting the DPRK pressure campaign; supporting humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of natural and man-made disasters; countering transnational threats, including transnational crime; preparing for potential pandemics; and, in supporting traditional military-military engagements and in non-traditional security cooperation. Our emerging and complex problems will increasingly require whole-of-government solutions, and USPACOM stands ready to support interagency-led efforts where we are needed.

**Global Engagement Center (GEC):** The GEC is a key USPACOM partner in facilitating interagency collaboration and coordination of efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation in the Indo-Pacific. While we work to address the propaganda that terrorist organizations use to recruit new followers, we must also address the serious threat that foreign state-sponsored disinformation poses to U.S. national security. To address these threats in the information environment, it is more critical than ever that the U.S. government has a
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to informational power. In support of this effort, USPACOM has embedded a GEC officer within the Command and is actively prioritizing information related capabilities in its planning, operations, and activities.

Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM’s Security Cooperation approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing partner capability gaps, and building partner capacity. To effect change in these endeavors USPACOM is working to fully employ the consolidated Security Cooperation authorities in the FY17 NDAA. The Section 333 Global Train and Equip authority, introduced in the 2017 NDAA, consolidates older train and equip authorities such as 2282 and 1004, leading to significant benefits, such as a global approach to planning and greater visibility across lines of effort. We see great promise in advancing partners’ readiness and capabilities. USPACOM continues to follow a Theater Security Cooperation planning process that identifies partners’ priorities, to which the various authorities can be applied in concert. Additionally, the State Department is involved in the joint planning and development of Section 333 programs, and the Secretary of State must concur on any Section 333 program prior to Congressional notification. USPACOM greatly appreciates the State Department’s foreign policy review of our global train and equip programs.

USPACOM is also focused on improving partner-nation maritime domain awareness, which directly contributes to increased maritime security across the region. The FY16 NDAA Section 1263 “Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)” is effectively enhancing maritime domain awareness and improving the maritime capacities and capabilities of partners and allies in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the Philippines, Australia, and the U.S. continue to discuss regional maritime security best practices through partnership workshops. These workshops facilitate whole-of-government discussions on maritime challenges that support creation of a regional maritime domain awareness network to share information between Southeast Asian partners. We need to go beyond maritime domain awareness and use an initiative like IAPSI to improve our partners’ and allies’ multi-domain awareness and increase their domain denial capability so that they can better protect their territory and enforce their maritime rights.

USPACOM is also grateful for the State Department’s long-standing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. FMF enables
USPACOM to meet regional challenges to include border security issues, disaster response, counterterrorism and maritime security, and IMET offers long-term relationship building and sustainment.

**Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI):** Countries of the Indo-Pacific provide 31% of the world’s uniformed peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide, and of these peacekeepers, 20% come from the 12 GPOI partners in the Indo-Pacific. These 12 countries support 13 of the 15 UN peacekeeping missions, as well as three political missions. GPOI builds the capability and capacity of our partners to deploy ready forces and is centered on providing high-quality, action-oriented, challenging scenario-based training so that peacekeepers are better prepared to implement UN Security Council Resolutions of protecting vulnerable civilians, halting conflict-related sexual violence, working to put a stop to the use of children soldiers, addressing misconduct, and trying to bring long-term peace and security to conflict torn regions. In 2018, USPACOM and Bangladesh will cohost a multinational peacekeeping exercise called SHANTI DOOT, which focuses on preparing personnel for deployment to UN peacekeeping missions. We expect participation in this exercise from 32 nations who recognize the value of working with other peacekeeping nations in a very demanding training environment. Many of our partners are meeting program goals, with six of twelve partners achieving a self-sustained indigenous training capability while the others continue to make progress toward this milestone. We continue to emphasize a “train-the-trainer” approach enabling standardization and interoperability to work within United Nations guidelines. USPACOM will continue improving partner military peacekeeping skills and operational readiness, as well as provide limited training facility refurbishment. This program not only supports our efforts to improve UN peacekeeping, it is also helping to strengthen interoperability with U.S. forces and builds the trust required to improve interoperability in other relevant areas.

**Joint Exercise Program:** USPACOM’s Joint Exercise Program is vital for improving the operational and warfighting readiness of assigned Pacific Theater and partner nation forces, ensuring joint force readiness for crises and contingency operations while providing a visible and tangible deterrent to aggression. This important program is essential for advancing Combatant Commander Campaign Plan objectives including strengthening regional alliances and partnerships and deepening interoperability through combined training. Combatant Commander
Exercise Engagement Training Transformation (CE2T2) program funding enables our Joint Exercise Program, helping to enhance the readiness of our assigned forward deployed forces.

**Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W):** The drug trade in the Indo-Pacific threatens regional stability as drug trafficking organizations continue to utilize new supply chains and develop troubling partnerships across the globe. As USPACOM’s Executive Agent for counter-narcotics activities in the AOR, JIATF-W combats drug trafficking in the region by disrupting flows of drugs and precursor chemicals that transit the region, and by hardening the theater against the expansion of transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-W continues to build partner capacity to counter illicit trafficking of narcotics in the coastal areas of Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka; and the border regions of Bangladesh and Thailand. In order to develop cooperative solutions and procedures to address the transnational criminal threats in the region, bilateral and multilateral cooperative engagements are also a focus in building the capacity of our partner nations.

The global nature of illicit trafficking means that problems that exist in this area of the world may have their start on the other side of the globe, or vice versa. For example, some of the problems we are dealing with on the Southwest border of the U.S. with drug trafficking start with the precursor chemicals that are being sold through licit commerce, predominantly from China; and to a lesser extent, India. Criminal entities with ties to Mexican and South American drug cartels use these licit chemicals to produce methamphetamines, cocaine, and heroin. Another drug, fentanyl-laced heroin, has been responsible for a spike in U.S. overdose deaths. Fentanyl and its numerous analogs originate almost exclusively from China. To combat these threats, the U.S. Government works closely with the government of the People’s Republic of China in a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on Law Enforcement Cooperation led by the Department of Justice. JIATF-W collaborates with U.S. Government interagency partners to support the JLG. To date, China has agreed to list over 100 precursor chemicals on their controlled substance list. JIATF-W works with U.S. Government partners to facilitate information sharing and interagency efforts to disrupt the opioid scourge that is so quickly claiming over 100 U.S. lives every day.

In fiscal year 2017, JIATF-W identified and tracked chemical flows resulting in the disruption of roughly 116,000 kilograms of methamphetamine precursor chemicals. JIATF-W also continues
to work closely with U.S. and partner-nation agencies throughout the South Pacific, to include the French Armed Forces in Polynesia, as well as both Australian and New Zealand law enforcement, military, and intelligence services. With these partners, JIATF-W assists in the disruption of the lucrative drug trade in the region. In 2017, JIATF-W’s efforts contributed to the interdiction of 16.6 metric tons of methamphetamine precursor chemicals, nine small vessels carrying cocaine or methamphetamine, the seizure of approximately 6.5 metric tons of cocaine, and 1.5 metric tons of methamphetamines, resulting in the removal of over 1.5 billion dollars in revenue from the trafficking organizations.

**Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM):**
CFE-DM increases the capacity of U.S. and partner nation military forces to respond effectively to disasters and humanitarian emergencies, as well as enhances regional civil-military coordination through its education and training programs, regional civil-military engagements, and applied research and information sharing programs. The Center trains approximately 8,000 military and civilian personnel annually, including through bilateral and multilateral exercises focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. CFE-DM also trains deployable U.S. forces and foreign audiences. Regional partnerships with key civilian international humanitarian community and military responders enhance cooperation on regional disaster response and preparedness, increase civil-military collaboration, and encourage a robust collection of best practices for future relief efforts.

**The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS):** While DKI APCSS is no longer a Direct Reporting Unit to USPACOM, I have formally designated it as a “Mission Partner” to underscore its importance to the USPACOM mission set. DKI APCSS builds and sustains key regional partnerships, improves partner nation capacity, and enhances cooperation on regional security challenges. The Center’s courses, workshops, dialogues, and alumni engagements directly support OSD-Policy and USPACOM priorities and are integrated into USPACOM’s Theater Campaign Order. Focus areas include: rule-of-law based governance emphasizing civilian oversight of militaries, defense institution building, maritime security, and enhancing regional security architecture; collaborative approaches to maritime security, domain awareness, and counterterrorism; and improved capability and cooperation in HADR. DKI APCSS has major competitive advantages in its location, credibility, convening power, and
alumni network. APCSS has now graduated 12,000 students – many now serve in key leadership positions in nations throughout the Indo-Pacific. Those advantages, and the Center’s focus on substantive and sustainable outcomes, have broadly improved security sector governance. Specifically, this organization is leading the DoD in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Women, Peace, and Security) and the U.S. National Action Plan to achieve greater inclusion of women in the security sector.

**Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC):** USPACOM continually benefits from the expertise and responsiveness the U.S. Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) JECC provides to Combatant Commanders world-wide. JECC recently demonstrated the ability to respond effectively to time sensitive, real-world operational requirements of USPACOM and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), specifically with surge support of dynamic targeting and contingency planning efforts related to DPRK provocations. JECC’s deployable support teams remain critical to USPACOM’s ability to establish joint force headquarters rapidly, fulfill Global Response Force (GRF) responsibilities, and bridge joint operational requirements by providing mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages. JECC supports real-world contingencies, operational plans, and exercises, to include USPACOM’s high-end PACIFIC SENTRY series.

**Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs):** USPACOM continues to view LSAs as critical Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) enablers, with 16 logistics agreements in the region. We continue to actively work with eligible but as yet uncommitted partners to conclude as many of these agreements as possible, and I personally stress their importance in my engagements with partner country leadership. The logistics agreement with Japan was especially useful during the Kumamoto earthquake disaster in 2016, and the logistics agreement with the Philippines was absolutely crucial in our support to the Marawi counter-terrorism operations last year. I often share these success stories with our partners and ensure they understand that the ability of U.S. forces to provide support during a crisis or disaster is limited without an LSA in place.

**Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS):** PASOLS is an annual forum that brings together senior logisticians from 30 countries in the Indo-Pacific. The goal is to strengthen regional cooperation, improve interoperability, and develop partner capacity to
cooperatively address regional challenges. The Republic of Korea hosted PASOLS 46 in September 2017. PASOLS is our most important annual logistics engagement event.

**Conclusion**

U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are real and enduring, while the growing challenges to our interests are daunting and cannot be overstated. In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific, America must continue to invest in critical capabilities, build a force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities and increases our resiliency, and reassure our allies and partners. Simultaneously, we must also encourage our allies and partners to be full and cooperative partners in their own defense and the defense of the free and open international order. America’s resolve is strong, and it is imperative we continue to show our resolve and commitment to the region in the years to come. I ask this committee to continue support for future capabilities that maintain our edge and prevent would-be challengers from gaining the upper hand.

Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific – a region critical to America’s future.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 14, 2018
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL VINCENT K. BROOKS
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND;
AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
IN SUPPORT OF COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

February 14, 2018
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1. Introduction

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for your continued support to our efforts. For nearly two years, I have had the distinct honor to command the men and women of the United Nations Command (UNC), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the United States Forces Korea (USFK). These extraordinary Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians remain forward-deployed, devoted to deterrence, and postured to defend the Republic of Korea and its citizens every day. I could not be prouder of their efforts.

We could not accomplish our mission in the Republic of Korea without the steadfast Congressional support we receive each year. We are dedicated to maintaining strong relationships with our counterparts on Capitol Hill and are grateful for the opportunity to host Congressional delegations to visit our facilities, discuss our challenges, and meet with senior officials to engage on various issues to strengthen our posture and defend our allies. Your unwavering dedication to the Command enables us to foster the cohesion in Northeast Asia necessary for the Alliance to act as the guarantor of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Your staunch commitment to the maximum pressure campaign and the full and robust implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) is vital to the international efforts to apply the maximum amount of diplomatic and economic pressure to further isolate the Kim regime.

These diplomatic and economic efforts rest on the foundation of a credible, ready military capability. Our effort to maintain a high state of military readiness is coupled with developing and strengthening relationships within the U.S.-ROK Alliance, regionally with our allies and partners, and globally with UNC Sending States to ensure that we have a structure of relationships tailor-made to adaptively respond to the myriad of potential security challenges in the region. I am confident that our combined and unified team is prepared to address the complex and dynamic challenges we may potentially face. The Alliance – although increasingly tested by North Korea’s military advancements – remains ironclad.
2. Activities across the three Commands

The three commands – UNC, CFC, and USFK – made improvements in numerous areas in the past year which significantly increased our readiness to fulfill the unique missions of each command. UNC is the home for international commitments to the Korean Peninsula. CFC is the heart of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. USFK is living proof of America’s enduring commitment to the defense of South Korea. Together the three Commands provide the collective capabilities necessary to enhance the security of South Korea and its citizens.

Throughout the past year, UNC harnessed efforts to increase its vitality and relevance as the home for international commitments to the Korean Peninsula. While steadfastly maintaining the Armistice, we actively sought to expand our engagements with the 17 United Nations Command Sending States and our like-minded international partners. We continued to identify and enhance intelligence sharing, interoperability and unified training and planning opportunities. UNC Sending States provided liaison officers to augment the 2017 UNC Military Armistice Commission (MAC) Secretariat mission including advise and assist visits, inspections and investigations, observations, Armistice education, and DMZ access control. Over the last two years, UNC Sending States have shared their perspectives and robustly supported exercises on the Peninsula by contributing a total of 755 service members.

Efforts are advancing for the development of Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) for UNC Sending States. We are also striving to establish greater end-to-end awareness with UNC-Rear Headquarters in Japan. Corollary efforts are being made to discuss the critical role of bases in and agreements with Japan. During 2017, UNC-Rear hosted a significant increase in multilateral engagements, including port calls, aircraft visits, and visits from UNC Sending States and other international partners. These notable activities serve to reinforce UNC’s organic, multinational framework for international peace and security on the Peninsula.

CFC is the heart of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and its primary warfighting command. Over the past year, CFC strived for an increase in naval, aerial, and special operations exercises, which highlighted the strength and readiness of the combined force. These bilateral efforts demonstrated that we stand ready to defend against all adversaries and support diplomatic,
economic, and informational efforts of our two Governments. CFC increased its interactions with multilateral partners through its robust exercise program. The Command also refined its Operations Plans (OPLAN); made significant advances in ballistic missile defense (BMD); closed early warning gaps; and advanced theater command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) capabilities. CFC continues to make progress in countering-weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), cyber, and joint information environment efforts.

As living proof of America’s commitment to the defense of the ROK, USFK also made advances in readiness and capabilities. Based upon the Alliance decision this past year, the Command successfully deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) BMD system to South Korea. This advanced system is the most effective BMD platform in the world and an important capability that – when paired with existing systems like Patriot – reinforces the BMD architecture defending millions of ROK citizens, much of South Korea’s critical infrastructure, as well as U.S. forces and assets in the ROK. USFK also increased several critical munition stockpiles essential for the defense of South Korea. This major effort was accomplished with the tireless assistance of our Service partners. The Command continued to receive and integrate rotational brigades, which participated in numerous combined exercises with their ROK counterparts. Last year the Command also relocated the U.S. Eighth Army from Yongsan Garrison, within the capital city of Seoul, to Camp Humphreys, approximately 50 miles to the south and well outside the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA). This is a milestone in USFK’s efforts to return Yongsan Garrison to the ROK Government and a move that reflects the enduring nature of our commitment.

The Command also continued to emphasize a robust and challenging exercise program that serves as a cornerstone of our readiness. We participated in bilateral exercises ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and KEY RESOLVE, the two largest command post exercises supported by the Department of Defense (DoD). Eighth Army executed two NEO exercises, FOCUSED PASSAGE and COURAGEOUS CHANNEL, which pushed NEO readiness to a new level and integrated our plans and actions with U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Transportation Command. U.S. Special Operations Command, Korea (SOCKOR) executed nine joint combined exercise training events that focused on working with their ROK Special Operations
counterparts. In November, the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz, and USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike groups conducted a tri-carrier strike force exercise in U.S. Seventh Fleet’s area of operation, the first of its kind in ten years. In truly combined and joint fashion, CFC conducted two maritime counter-special operations forces (MCSOF) exercises where combined Army, Air Force, and Navy aviation assets operated under the tactical control of ROK Aegis ships and U.S. Navy strike groups to rehearse preventing infiltration along South Korea’s maritime flanks. The U.S. Seventh Air Force-hosted VIGILANT ACE exercise brought state-of-the-art capabilities to the Peninsula by incorporating F-22s and F-35s into our combined air operations for the first time. In a show of close cooperation between U.S. and ROK military forces, we conducted numerous multilateral shows of force utilizing B-1 bombers and our newest 5th Generation aircraft, as well as combined live fire exercises utilizing the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the ROK Hyunmoo-II Missile.

We also cooperated with our ROK ally through other formal and informal frameworks. In October 2017, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff hosted the annual Military Committee Meeting (MCM) and Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of Defense. The Foreign Affairs and Defense agencies of both countries also approved a framework for the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), which will work to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence posture against DPRK nuclear and missile threats. The second EDSCG meeting convened this past January, with increased emphasis on Alliance coordination of defense activities and strategic communications. Informal processes were also continuously at play through the conduct of our bilateral command post exercises and the recurrent engagements between members of our Command and various ROK officials.

3. Strategic environment

a. North Korea. North Korea remains a significant threat to security and stability in Northeast Asia and beyond. The past year was marked by continued North Korean provocations, threats, and actions that have raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula and across the globe. The Kim Jong Un Regime continues to hold security and stability in the Indo-Pacific at risk with its conventional arms, further development of WMD and other asymmetric capabilities capable of
posing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Their strategy is aimed at fracturing consensus among the key regional actors by carefully orchestrating the timing and methods of their provocative actions and messaging.

In 2017 alone, North Korea launched three ballistic ICBMs and conducted its sixth nuclear test along with sixteen other missile launch events totaling nearly two dozen ballistic missiles (two of which overflew Japan). North Korea’s missiles threaten not only South Korea, but an increasing number of its allies. Pyongyang overtly threatens the safety of citizens in Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, specifically calling out Guam, and South Korea. In addition, the Kim regime deployed a chemical agent in Malaysia to assassinate Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam in the sovereign territory of another nation. While the sum of these unlawful activities and developments may have extended the reach of North Korea’s threats, the international community has confronted the Kim Jong Un regime in months past with unprecedented diplomatic and economic pressure.

Though the expanding range of North Korea’s ballistic missiles is concerning, a serious, credible threat to 25 million ROK citizens and approximately 150,000 U.S. citizens living in the GSMA is also posed from its long range artillery. Nearly 250,000 U.S. citizens live in South Korea, with approximately 150,000 Americans in the GSMA. North Korea has deployed at least three artillery systems capable of ranging targets in the GSMA with virtually no warning. Conservative predictions of a likely attack scenario anticipate an initial artillery barrage focused on military targets, which would result in significant casualties, while a larger attack targeting civilians would yield several thousand casualties with the potential to affect millions of South Korean citizens, not to mention hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens and third country nationals within the first 24 hours. The North also possesses the world’s largest special operations force, the fourth largest standing army, and a long-standing chemical weapons program with the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood and choking agents. Moreover, North Korea could employ chemical weapons agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles. Considering its known research efforts, physical infrastructure, and weapons industry, the North also has a potential capability for biological warfare.
Kim Jong Un’s regime continues to expand its offensive cyber capabilities. In May 2017, ransomware attributed to North Korea attacked computer systems worldwide. This came on the heels of cyber operations that allowed the country to steal more than $80 million from international financial systems in 2016. According to reports, North Korea has more than 6,000 hackers, whose improving capabilities provide the regime a financial pipeline to support its weapons programs and a means to collect sensitive information from other parties and disrupt infrastructure in other countries.

While North Korea continued its pattern of destabilizing activities, cooperation and consensus among concerned partners and the greater international community increased. Just this last year, the United Nations Security Council championed efforts to further isolate the North, unanimously adopting Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2345, 2356, 2371, 2375, and 2397 to denounce its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile tests, condemn its persistent defiance of the will of the international community and violations of international law, and further sanction the Kim regime. The full, and strict implementation of UN sanctions, will bring about greater pressure on North Korea.

The year came to an end with a 73-day hiatus from North Korean provocations, interrupted by the 28 November ballistic missile launch that achieved the highest apogee yet. In the time since that event to the submission of this report, we have experienced another hiatus from provocations. The steady application of focused pressure may be having an effect given the recent signs of rapprochement between North and South Korea. Both sides are cooperating at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics hosted by South Korea and have pursued cultural exchanges in conjunction with athletic engagements. In addition, they agreed to conduct military engagement around the re-established border hotline and explore other senior official meetings in order to improve relationships between the countries and ease tensions on the Korea Peninsula. We continue to observe and closely coordinate with our ROK partners during these recent developments.
b. Republic of Korea. Strong Alliance military cooperation persisted through South Korea’s political transition in 2017, as South Korea continued to demonstrate commitment to increase its primary military role of conventional deterrence by developing and procuring modern, interoperable capabilities. The ROK Government continues to increase spending on defense (currently 2.7 percent of GDP), and ROK President Moon Jae-in committed to further raising ROK defense spending by 0.1 percent of GDP each year through 2022. As a comparison, ROK defense spending as a proportion of GDP is higher than all NATO members save the United States. The ROK also contributes significant funds to the U.S. military presence in South Korea. In 2017, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided approximately $830 million in support of USFK activities that would have otherwise been paid by the U.S. Treasury, and the ROK Government recently approved a one percent increase to the SMA for 2018. South Korea is also funding 92 percent of the total costs for the expansion, construction and relocation effort into U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in the city of Pyeongtaek. In addition to the strong fiscal support from the ROK Government, the South Korean public is strongly in favor of the Alliance, demonstrated by a high U.S. favorability rating that today ranges between 75 and 85 percent.

Seoul is also investing heavily in defense modernization. The United States and South Korea currently manage over 650 Foreign Military Sale cases, valued at over $26 billion. Our Korean ally has committed to acquire a number of military capabilities critical to our Alliance, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense, air superiority, precision guided munitions, and maritime security. Some examples of recent acquisitions include Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft, Patriot PAC-3 upgrades, Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T), Harpoon missile, Aegis KDX-III destroyers, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, upgrades of KF-16s, and F-35A Joint Strike Fighters. These capabilities and commitments are designed to greatly enhance the warfighting readiness of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and bring about many of the conditions required for successful transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea. Additionally, South Korea recently begun BMD modernization. Once completed, ROK Patriot BMD forces will have greater effectiveness against theater ballistic missiles. In concert with these advances in ROK defense modernization, we are striving for ever-greater transparency within the Alliance regarding these maturing
capabilities to ensure there is a common understanding of all of the tools that will be available to the CFC in wartime.

Beyond the Korean Peninsula, South Korea contributes to international security through peacekeeping operations, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, regional security cooperation initiatives, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Seoul has also taken important steps to increase its cooperation with Japan by bolstering multilateral cooperation, particularly in the areas of information-sharing and ballistic missile defense.

c. China. China remains a pivotal player with unique global reach and is one of the region’s most influential actors. While it once held a reputation for being as close to North Korea as “lips and teeth,” Beijing has expressed frustration with the North’s repeated provocations, and supported multilateral sanctions against the regime. However, China also retaliated economically against Seoul in protest of its deployment of the THAAD BMD system on the Peninsula. One of the most impacted sectors was ROK tourism, with losses estimated to exceed $6.5 billion. During President Xi and President Moon’s summit in Beijing in December, the deployment of THAAD to the Peninsula and China’s pressure on the South continued to linger as an issue between the two nations. China and South Korea pledged to improve bilateral relations and bolster cooperation.

The United States is looking closely at how China approaches its relations with North Korea, especially regarding implementation of recent UNSCRs. There are open source reports of recent Chinese efforts to uphold sanctions which indicate China’s trade with the North has fallen since strengthened international sanctions came into effect in September 2017 and January 2018. Such a drop in trade may be attributable to decreases in North Korean exports of coal, iron ore, lead ore, and seafood to China.

d. Russia. Russia remains opposed to North Korea’s persistent provocations and has implemented more stringent sanctions against Pyongyang. However, as it observes international cooperation, it also adopts the opportunist role in the Indo-Pacific that it takes elsewhere in the world. Recent signaling indicates that Moscow may continue to grow its role on the Korean
Peninsula. In July 2017, Russia joined China in endorsing a “freeze for freeze” initiative that calls for North Korea to refrain from missile and nuclear testing and the U.S. and South Korea to halt large-scale bilateral military exercises. In December 2017, Russia also expressed a willingness to mediate talks between the United States and North Korea.

e. Japan. In light of North Korean provocations, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sought to bolster his country’s defensive posture and allow Japan to play a larger role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Along these lines, Tokyo is pursuing its largest-ever defense budget for FY 2018, with funds earmarked for introducing the U.S. military’s Aegis Ashore land-based missile interceptor system to protect against North Korean missiles. Tokyo also sought to advance substantive cooperation with Seoul in areas where they have complementary interests. Japan’s recent attendance at the Vancouver Foreign Ministers Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Prime Minister Abe’s appearance at the Winter Olympics in South Korea are positive signals between South Korea and Japan.

4. Looking to the future

a. Innovation. USFK endeavors to become a hub for burgeoning technologies, innovative thinking, and the application of fresh strategic capabilities. With the addition of ROK and UNC partner capabilities, we seek innovative approaches to solve our challenges in this highly dynamic environment. I have directed the creation of a small team – my Emerging Capabilities and Innovative Effects Division – to connect and apply the innovation that is emerging from across the DoD to the Alliance’s opportunities and challenges on the Korean Peninsula.

Initial efforts are centered on the integrated defense of the GSMA. The ability to destroy North Korean artillery and ballistic missiles at their firing positions, coupled with the ability to intercept and protect the South Korean capital from these threats, are options we seek to continually develop and employ with our ROK partners. We also look to develop a robust chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive integrated early warning system with our ROK counterparts in order to provide immediate detection and public warning while informing decision making at the highest levels of the two Governments. When examining many of the military challenges we face, there are opportunities for path-changing innovation. Through
this work, USFK established unique partnerships with defense, government, industry, and academic organizations in the United States, South Korea and UNC Sending States. Recent Command engagements with Defense Digital Service (DDS), Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Lincoln Laboratory have enabled the Command to begin to sharpen its focus and spur innovation with our partners.

b. Increase multilateral cooperation. Nations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond are increasingly concerned about the North Korean threat, and many have demonstrated their willingness to work with South Korea, Japan, the United States, and like-minded partners to implement UNSCRs that impose sanctions on the Kim regime. Our efforts extend to integrating UNC Sending States and FVEY partners into combined exercises and planning efforts in the Korean theater of operations. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the Department of State for their sponsorship of the January 2018 Vancouver Foreign Ministers Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula. We look forward to any secondary opportunities that may arise from this important international gathering.

By reinforcing our multilateral efforts, we will work toward a coherent, collective response to our common security challenges and find ways to enhance interoperability and improve our collective defense capabilities. It is paramount that we continue to improve ballistic missile defenses, facilitate the sharing of information, and conduct exercises to maintain a common operational framework. We will bolster maritime interdiction operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response exercises, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

c. Improve readiness. USFK’s efforts to improve readiness on the Peninsula are a two-pronged approach aimed at ensuring we conduct robust combined and joint exercise cycles and continue whole scale integration efforts throughout each subordinate component command. We will execute the two major theater-level command post exercises and one theater-level field training exercise each year. These exercises are essential to strengthen the Alliance, deter North Korean aggression, ensure the UNC’s ability to maintain the Armistice, improve force readiness
and interoperability, and integrate UNC Sending State (multinational) forces and capabilities into theater defense operations. Maintaining and further developing these exercises in the future also provides the ability to execute certification requirements for the transfer of wartime OPCON, while concurrently assessing our combined warfighting readiness.

We are also making great progress toward becoming more combined at the component level. Cooperation between the Commander, Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) and the Commander of the ROK Fleet (CRF) hit an inflection point in February 2017 with the collocation of their headquarters (HQ) on the ROK Fleet base in Busan. This has dramatically increased cooperation, interoperability, and warfighting synchronization and effectiveness. Current initiatives are underway at U.S. Seventh Air Force to streamline the integration of combined component-level HQ staffs to operate together on a routine basis. U.S. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) is becoming more combined with their ROK counterparts through a recent increase in engagements with ROK Special Operations Forces and a planned feasibility assessment for the future collocation of the SOCKOR HQ with ROK Special Warfare Command.

d. Yongsan Relocation Plan. Our commitment to the timely completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) remains one of my top priorities. USFK unit relocation and the closing and relocating of camps continue to progress favorably. Through the consolidation of U.S. forces and positioning troops closer to air and sea installations south of Seoul, the relocation program enhances U.S.-ROK Alliance readiness, and improves USFK’s capacity to respond to future defense initiatives. 2017 saw the relocation of the U.S. Eighth Army Headquarters to U.S. Army Garrison - Humphreys. Relocation of most remaining units to this Garrison – USFK, UNC, U.S. Marine Forces Korea and the 2nd Infantry Division Headquarters – is slated for completion in 2018. We continue to cooperate closely with the ROK government to enable seamless progress of the remaining USFK base relocations, and to consult closely on camp return issues through the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP).

e. Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP). The Alliance has made significant progress in setting the conditions for the future combined command. The command will continue to operate under the bilateral guidance of the Presidents of the United States and South Korea or their delegates. After this transition, a U.S. general officer will change roles to serve as the
Deputy Commander of the future combined command and remain as commander of the UNC and USFK. U.S. forces will continue to operate under U.S. national authorities. The Alliance is prepared to accelerate OPCON transition as South Korea continues to develop and acquire the critical capabilities required for the Alliance’s wartime success. The OPCON transition process must proceed in a way that strengthens deterrence against North Korea and enhances our combined capabilities.

The ROK Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense pledged in October 2017 to make joint efforts to implement the commitment by President Trump and President Moon in June 2017 to enable the expeditious conditions-based transfer of wartime OPCON. The Minister of Defense emphasized South Korea’s commitment to complete the preparations necessary to exercise OPCON in accordance with the signed COTP. The draft organization of the future combined command was discussed, and the Ministers decided to continue to refine the concept through combined exercises and certifications. They also committed to develop Alliance guiding principles for the further enhancement of combined defense posture post-OPCON transition. The two sides decided to reexamine the implementation plan for OPCON transition, such as the Alliance capability acquisition plan; Terms of Reference – Relationship (TOR-R) and Operation Plan; and combined exercises and certification plan. They also agreed to jointly review and update COTP by the 2018 SCM.

5. Critical Capabilities

a. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). CFC and USFK will seek multidiscipline, persistent ISR capability and associated exploitation support to extend the warning time available to the Commander. Deep-look ISR and moving target indicators provide the ability to continuously track indications and warnings (I&W) targets over longer durations. As North Korea grows its threat to the homelands of the U.S. and our Allies, it is essential to have the fullest possible picture of activities in all domains above the Military Demarcation Line.

b. Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). It is important that we strive for C4I interoperability with our Korean ally, in areas including tactical communications and blue-force situational awareness and seek system survivability and
robustness to enable modernized information sharing. Policies, agreements, and technologies must lean toward enabling bi-national and multi-national information sharing. We rely on military and commercial satellite capacity for mission command to provide assured communications and situational awareness down to the individual Soldier. Advanced C4I capabilities that are compatible with the available frequency spectrum in Korea, able to penetrate underground facilities and capable of transmitting high bandwidth imagery and data via satellite are essential to our mission set.

c. Ballistic missile defense (BMD). We have made significant strides in BMD capability this year with commitment to thicken the layers of missile defense through THAAD and Patriot system modernization. Increasing interoperability with ROK systems is a key part of improving Alliance missile defense, including program upgrades to the ROK Patriot system and procurement of PAC-3 interceptors. As North Korea continues to improve its missile forces, the ROK-U.S. Alliance must also continue to expand its BMD capabilities.

d. Countering-WMD (CWMD). North Korea continually demonstrates its commitment to developing its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, it is imperative that we work diligently to close any gaps in our CWMD capabilities that would put ROK-US forces and civilian safety and our objectives at risk. We must ensure we have sufficient integrated early warning, protection, decontamination capabilities, and medical counter measures and that our systems provide a shared picture of the combined operational environment.

e. Critical munitions. Thanks in large part to our U.S. military Service partners, we made significant progress during the past year to increase our stocks of select munitions that are critical to the early phases of conflict. However, there is still work to be done. Together with our ROK counterparts, we continue to identify ways to close these capability gaps through various procurement channels. The long-term U.S. solution is for the Services to develop munitions requirements, fund, and procure munitions identified through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) and Munitions Requirements Process (MRP) to supply munitions that are not available from other sources.
6. Closing

Through the difficult challenges of the past year, UNC, CFC, and USFK have steadfastly defended U.S. security interests on the Korean Peninsula, and sought to maintain stability in Northeast Asia. The U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula and the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance are critical to deterring future aggression, and posturing for potential conflict. As Commander, I can report that over the past year the Command improved readiness; pursued innovative solutions to our challenges; and filled capability shortfalls that lessen North Korea’s ability to hold the United States and South Korea at risk. By making thoughtful resource decisions, developing Alliance initiatives, and reinforcing relationships with our allies and partners, we will continue to shape our environment to advance security and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Thanks to the Committee for your support, and for the opportunity to communicate my assessment of our current posture. I am honored to lead American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, our government Civilians, and their counterparts from the Republic of Korea.
SUBJECT: Correction for the Record ICO 2018 USFK Testimony Statement to the House Armed Services Committee

The Honorable Mac Thornberry
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please accept this request for a correction for the record to page 7, paragraph b of the Statement of General Vincent K. Brooks, Commander, United Nations Command, Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea in support of Commander, United States Forces Pacific Command testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, dated February 14, 2018. The original version of the Statement says that “In 2017, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided approximately $830 million in support of USFK activities that would have otherwise been paid by the U.S. Treasury, and the ROK Government recently approved a 1.9 percent increase to the SMA for 2018.” The corrected version should read “In 2017, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided approximately $830 million in support of USFK activities that would have otherwise been paid by the U.S. Treasury, and the ROK Government recently approved a one percent increase to the SMA for 2018.”

Correcting the official record in this case is of importance to ensure that the Command is accurately stating the financial obligation that the Republic of Korea has agreed to under the SMA.

The point of contact for this letter is Colonel Jay Holtermann,______

Very Respectfully,

Vincent K. Brooks
General, U.S. Army
Commander

cc:
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 14, 2018
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Mr. Thornberry. Please describe the impact Counter America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) would have for U.S. ties in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Please provide specific examples of PACOM efforts to strengthen relations with the affected countries and the potential implications CAATSA would have on those efforts.

Admiral Harris. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. Coffman. At this time, the United States and our allies rely heavily on China in the rare-earths market. What national security concerns do you have regarding China’s dominance of the rare-earths market? In your opinion, should the U.S. focus more on building up our own production and refinement base to ensure independence from China in this regard?

Admiral Harris. Rare earth minerals are neither rare nor hard to mine. These elements are used in high-end electronics and manufacturing. As the demand grows for faster and more advanced electronics and manufacturing, as the demand grows for faster and more advanced electronics and manufacturing, and for advanced process technologies (e.g., as high-end lasers, high-speed processors, catalysts, solid oxide fuel cells, batteries, etc.), the demand for rare earth minerals such as Yttrium, Erbium, and Neodymium will continue to grow. Similarly, as demand grows, so will supply and innovations to more efficiently mine and produce rare earth minerals.

Although China exports around 90 percent of rare earth minerals globally, they do not have a monopoly. What they do have is a poorly-governed, environmentally-damaged countryside full of illegal mines and toxic waste. And while China has dominated the rare earth minerals market since the mid-1990s, rare earth minerals are not unique to China. Rare earth minerals are currently mined in Australia, Canada, Greenland, India, Brazil, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and many other countries that we consider partners, allies, and reliable trade partners. Like many aspects of their economy, China currently has too much capacity in rare earths production and sells it at the lowest prices. Even China’s mines are running at a loss and forced to contend with illegal mining and smuggling. The Chinese government plans to limit production by 2020, which will likely spur production elsewhere in the world, including the U.S.

While the U.S. is currently not mining rare earth minerals, our allies and partners are, and we could if we wanted to when the price is right. When global prices in the rare earths market go up, I would expect production elsewhere in the world to go up, including the U.S.

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