[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-70]
THE MILITARY POSTURE AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE
INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 14, 2018
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee RO KHANNA, California
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin JIMMY PANETTA, California
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JODY B. HICE, Georgia
Jen Stewart, Staff Director
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr..................................... 53
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 51
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Prepared statement of GEN Vincent K. Brooks, Commander,
United Nations Comand; Republic of Korea and United States
Combined Forces Command; and United States Forces Korea.... 113
Letter requesting correction for the record to GEN Brooks'
prepared statement......................................... 129
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 133
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 133
.
THE MILITARY POSTURE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 14, 2018.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
With us today is Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of
United States Pacific Command [PACOM].
As Admiral Harris nears the end of his military service, I
want to first thank him for that service and for the insights
and perspective he has shared with us both here in Washington
and as Members have traveled throughout the PACOM region.
Remarkably, 40 years of service to our Nation is not enough
for Admiral Harris. Last week, the President announced his
intention to nominate him as our Ambassador to Australia.
This hearing comes at an opportune time. Last week, we
heard Secretary Mattis and General Selva testify on the new
National Defense Strategy and on the Nuclear Posture Review.
Also last week, Congress passed and the President signed into
law legislation that raised the spending caps so that repair of
our readiness shortfalls can begin in earnest.
Admiral Harris has had to grapple with that full range of
issues. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the United States
faces a near-term belligerent threat armed with nuclear weapons
and also a longer term strategic competitor. In fact, four of
the five key security challenges--China, Russia, North Korea,
and terrorism--reside in the PACOM area of responsibility.
Unfortunately, the region has also seen a tragic loss of life
of American service members in naval and aircraft accidents and
has felt some of the consequences of our inadequate defense
budgets.
Despite North Korea's recent charm offensive at the Olympic
games, the threat posed to U.S. service members, our allies,
and the American homeland has not diminished. We have an urgent
need to ensure that we are ready for whatever course that
situation may take.
The challenge posed by China has also not lessened. China
is rapidly transforming its military, continuing to militarize
artificial islands in the South China Sea, and expanding its
presence through political influence campaigns and economic
coercion. According to the National Defense Strategy, quote,
``China is leveraging military modernization, influence
operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring
countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their
advantage,'' end quote.
Critical to meeting all of the challenges to the region is
our relationship with our allies and also with countries with
whom we share interests. The fiscal year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act includes more for training and exercises with
partners, as well as establishing the Indo-Asia-Pacific
Stability Initiative, which in part is designed to show our
allies that we stand by them with more than just words.
We all look forward to Admiral Harris's candid assessment
of these and other issues, but first let me yield to the
ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in thanking Admiral Harris for his
service to our country in the military. He has served honorably
and for a long time, is doing a great job in his current job.
And, also, congratulations on your appointment as the
Ambassador to Australia. At least as we discussed prior, you
have experience with the confirmation process--a different
committee, I understand, but it is at least good to understand
what you are getting into. And I wish you the best of luck in
that. And thank you for your great work in the Pacific.
Other than that, I think the chairman did a great summary
of the challenges that we face out there. I would only
emphasize one point, and that is the last one that he made, and
that is the importance of partnerships and our allies.
There are a lot of countries in the Pacific region in play,
a lot of countries that could be crucial allies to us as we try
to stop China from being overly aggressive towards their
neighbors and pushing other folks out. And building those
alliances is critical.
And I know one of the things that really helps that is the
presence of our military and, in particular, the presence of
our Navy, the ability to do joint exercises, to do port calls,
to build relationships with those countries. Obviously, it is
about more than that, but the more friends we have in Asia, I
think the better able we are going to be able to nudge China in
a more positive direction.
There is no question China is going to be a major player in
Asia, but is it going to be for good or is it going to be for
ill? And I think that has a lot to do with how strong their
neighbors are in pushing back against some of the things that
China is doing that are problematic.
So I appreciate your hard work in building those
relationships and look forward to hearing more about them and
more about our challenges in the Pacific. And, again, I thank
you very much for your service.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member.
Let me just remind members that immediately upon conclusion
of this open hearing we will regroup in classified session
upstairs with Admiral Harris.
Admiral, thank you again for being here. Without objection,
your full written statement will be made part of the record.
And, without objection, we have a written statement from
General Brooks, our commander in Korea, which will also be made
part of the record.
[The prepared statement of General Brooks can be found in
the Appendix on page 113.]
The Chairman. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
Member Smith, and distinguished members. It is an honor for me
to appear again before this committee for what is likely my
last posture hearing to you all.
I do regret that I am not here with my usual testimony
battle buddy, General Vince Brooks from Korea, but I think you
will all agree that he is where he is needed right now, on the
Korean Peninsula.
There are many things to talk about since my last testimony
10 months ago, but I want to start by thanking the Congress for
your actions last week. I am grateful for the bipartisan effort
to raise the budget caps for fiscal year 2018 and 2019, and I
am optimistic that Congress will resource the fiscal year 2018
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] in the coming weeks.
I and many others have regularly highlighted the negative
effects that sequestration and the Budget Control Act have
leveled against the military, so I would further ask the
Congress to make these bipartisan measures permanent and end
sequestration for good.
One of the principal problems that we face in the region is
overcoming the perception that the United States is a declining
power. A fully resourced defense budget leading into long-term
budget stability will send a strong signal to our allies,
partners, and all potential adversaries that the U.S. is fully
committed to preserving a free and open order in the Indo-
Pacific.
As the PACOM commander, I have the tremendous honor of
leading approximately 375,000 soldiers, sailors, Marines,
airmen, coastguardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians
standing watch for the largest and most diverse geographic
command. These men and women, as well as their families, fill
me with pride in their hard work and devotion to duty, and I am
humbled to serve alongside them.
The U.S. has an enduring national interest in the Indo-
Pacific. As I stated last year, I believe America's security
and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical
region, which remains at a precarious crossroads where tangible
opportunity meets significant challenge. Here, we face a
security environment more complex and volatile than we have
experienced in recent memory.
Rogue regimes, like the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, persist in taking outlaw actions that threaten regional
and even global stability. This past year has seen rapid and
comprehensive improvement in the DPRK's ballistic missile and
nuclear capabilities despite broad international condemnation
and the imposition of additional United Nations Security
Council resolutions. This includes the detonation of its
largest nuclear device, first-ever launches of two different
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and six launches of an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, all of which Pyongyang
emphatically states will target the United States and Guam.
Now, while some might dispute both the reliability and
quantity of the North's strategic weapons, it is indisputable
that KJU [Kim Jong-un] is rapidly closing the gap between
rhetoric and capability. The Republic of Korea and Japan have
been living under the shadow of the DPRK's threats for years,
and now that shadow looms over the American homeland.
PACOM and the entire DOD [Department of Defense] fully
support the President's maximum-pressure campaign led by the
State Department. Nobody seeks or desires conflict with North
Korea, but the U.S. and our allies must prepare for the full
range of contingency responses.
Meanwhile, China is leveraging military modernization,
influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce
neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific to their
advantage. While some view China's actions in the East and
South China Seas as opportunistic, I do not. I view them as
coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using their military
and economic power to erode the free and open international
order.
China's aggression in the South China Sea moves along
unabated despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration's tribunal
ruling that invalidated China's Nine-Dash Line claim, an
unprecedented land reclamation, in 2016. And China is
attempting to assert de facto sovereignty over disputed
maritime features by further militarizing its manmade bases to
this very day.
China's impressive military buildup could soon challenge
the United States across almost every domain. Key advancements
include fielding significant improvements in missile systems,
developing fifth-generation fighter aircraft capabilities, and
growing the size and capability of the Chinese Navy, to include
their first overseas base in the Port of Djibouti. They are
also heavily investing in the next wave of military
technologies, including hypersonic missiles, advanced space and
cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence. If the U.S.
does not keep pace, PACOM will struggle to compete with the
People's Liberation Army on future battlefields.
China's ongoing military buildup, advancement, and
modernization are core elements of their strategy to supplant
the United States as the security partner of choice for
countries in the Indo-Pacific, but China also holds clear
global ambitions.
But don't take my word for it. Just listen to what China
itself says. At the 19th Party Congress, President Xi stated he
wanted China to develop a world-class military and become a
global leader in terms of composite national strength and
international influence.
Ladies and gentlemen, China's intent is crystal clear. We
ignore it at our peril.
These types of aspirational goals could be appropriate for
a nation of China's stature, but judging by China's regional
behavior, I am concerned that China will now work to undermine
the rules-based international order, not just in the Indo-
Pacific but on a global scale, as China expands its presence in
Central Asia, the Arctic, Africa, South America, and Europe.
This increasingly complex environment necessitates continued
dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to improve
understanding and reduce risk.
For PACOM, my goal remains to convince China that its best
future comes from peaceful cooperation and meaningful
participation in the current free and open international order
and honoring its international commitments. After all, the
Chinese economic miracle could not have happened without the
rules-based order under which the region has long supported.
But I have also been loud and clear that we won't allow the
shared domains to be closed down unilaterally. So we will
cooperate where we can but remain ready to confront where we
must.
Now, Russia's operations and engagement throughout the
Indo-Pacific continue to rise, both to advance their own
strategic interests and to undermine U.S. interests. China
intends to impose additional costs on the U.S. whenever and
wherever possible by playing the role of a spoiler, especially
with respect to the DPRK.
Russia also sees economic opportunities to not only build
markets for their energy exports but also to build and in some
cases rebuild arms sales relationships in the region. Of
particular note are Russian efforts to build presence and
influence in the high north. Russia has more bases north of the
Arctic Circle than all other countries combined and is building
more with distinctly military capabilities.
In the PACOM region, one event dominated the
counterterrorism fight in 2017, and that was the siege by ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in the Philippines and
recapture by the government forces of the Philippine city of
Marawi. It was both symbolic of the larger struggle against
violent extremism and also an anomaly characterized by unique
circumstances and opportunities.
Marawi underscores two important themes with regard to
defeating ISIS in the Indo-Pacific. First, localized threats
can quickly transform into international causes, and early and
effective response is vital to control the fight and own the
narrative. Second, counterterrorism operations are extremely
challenging, and most regional forces are poorly equipped for
such fights. Our engagement strategy and capacity-building
efforts have remained and will continue to remain focused on
enabling regional counterterrorism forces to win whatever
fights they face. Through multinational collaboration, we can
eliminate ISIS before it spreads further in the area.
Every day, our allies and partners join us in addressing
these global challenges to defend freedom, deter war, and
maintain the rules which underwrite a free and open
international order. These mutually beneficial alliances and
partnerships provide a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage
that no competitor or rival could match.
In the Indo-Pacific, our alliance with Australia continues
to anchor peace and stability in the region, with increased
collaboration in the counterterrorism, space, cyber, integrated
air and missile defense, and regional capacity-building.
Our alliance with South Korea is ironclad, and our alliance
with Japan has never been stronger. The attack on Marawi City
served as a reminder of the value of our alliance to Philippine
security and stability.
And we have reinvigorated our alliance with Thailand
through continued engagement with military leadership to
promote regional security and healthy civil-military relations.
We have also advanced our partnerships with India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and many others who are dedicated
to the principles of longstanding customary international law.
While U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are real and
enduring, the growing challenges to our interests are daunting
and cannot be overstated. In order to deter conflict initiated
by revisionist powers, rogue states, and transnational threats,
we must continue to acquire and field critical capabilities.
Our evolving force posture must decrease our vulnerabilities,
increase our resilience, and reassure our allies and partners.
America's resolve is strong, and it is imperative that we
continue to show our commitment to this region in the years to
come. I ask this committee to continue its support for these
future capabilities that maintain our edge and prevent would-be
challengers from gaining the upper hand. Based on your
bipartisan efforts last week, I am excited about the path
ahead.
Thank you for your enduring support to the PACOM team and
our families who work and live in the Indo-Pacific, a region
critical to America's security. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
And I appreciate your comments about the budget agreement
last week. I think we in Congress often underestimate the
extent to which our action or inaction sends a message to
allies, adversaries, and fence-sitters who are out there in the
world. You have to deal with all three of them in your region.
And I think it is important for us to be reminded that even
what we may consider routine actions has consequences,
reverberations out in the world.
I want to ask about what Kim Jong-un is after. The, I
guess, dominant view is that he wants missiles and nuclear
weapons in order to safeguard his regime--kind of the Qadhafi
lesson, et cetera.
But last month there was an article written by former
Ambassador James Jeffrey that really provoked my thinking, and
his basic point was that is the predominant view because to
think anything else is so unpleasant that we don't let
ourselves think that maybe he wants these nuclear weapons to
hold U.S. cities hostage so that he can have his way and finish
what his grandfather started on the peninsula. And Ambassador
Jeffrey said maybe this dominant thinking reflects the historic
tendencies of liberal societies to discount existential threats
simply because they are so terrible to contemplate.
I don't know. I would just be interested, after you have
studied and thought about this, do you have a view about what
his intentions are, but especially about whether we can
recognize what his intentions are? Or are we limiting ourselves
because the alternatives are too terrible to contemplate?
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir, for the question.
I do think that there is a prevailing view that KJU is
doing the things that he is doing to safeguard his regime. I
don't ascribe to that view.
I do think that he is after reunification under a single
communist system. So he is after what his grandfather failed to
do and his father failed to do, and he is on a path to achieve
what he feels is his natural place and where North Korea's
natural outcome is a unified Korean Peninsula that is subject
to KJU and the communist regime there. So I think that is the
long view and that is what he is after.
I think his nuclear ambitions contribute to that view. It
puts him in a position to blackmail the South and other
countries in the region and us. And I think that is the
overarching reason why he is pursuing the nuclear capabilities
that he has.
I think we are self-limiting if we view North Korea's
nuclear ambitions as solely a means to safeguard his regime. I
think we need to take that longer view and consider what he is
really after.
I think also that the idea of not being willing to confront
the reality is extant. And my job is to contemplate those
things that are difficult to contemplate, to imagine the
unimaginable, if you will. And I have said before that what is
unimaginable to me is a nuclear strike on Honolulu or Los
Angeles or New York or Washington. That is unimaginable. So if
that is unimaginable, then I can, in fact, imagine all the
others, and I have to do that. That is what you pay me to do.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
Adam? Excuse me. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. ``Adam'' works. We are all friends here.
Following up just quickly on that question, so, I mean, I
think the real answer is there is no way to know. I mean, we
can guess what he is trying to do. I think anyone who
confidently asserts that, you know, all Kim Jong-un wants to do
is to protect his regime is just as wrong as anyone who
confidently asserts that, you know, he definitely wants to
reunite the peninsula. I would honestly say that he probably
doesn't know and it sort of depends on the circumstances and
how things play out. So we have to be prepared for both
realities.
But if we were to assume, from the chairman's question,
that he is going to attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula and
basically start a war with South Korea, how would that change
our policy? What should we be doing differently now from what
we are doing?
Admiral Harris. Well, sir, I think what we should be doing
is what we, in fact, are doing, and that is to increase and
maintain the pressure campaign plan, run by the State
Department, to convince Kim Jong-un that his nuclear ambitions
are flawed and that we should continue to pressurize the North
to achieve a complete verifiable and irreversible nuclear
Korean Peninsula. We want to take that capability away from
North Korea. That is our stated position. And I think----
Mr. Smith. Just quick, I agree with you. And also I think
it is really important that we emphasize to North Korea
diplomatically and in any means possible that if they were to
start a war with South Korea we would be there and they would
lose and lose badly and that would be the end of the regime. So
I think that is a very important part of it as well. But--well,
I think that is all I will say on that.
I had a quick question on China. You mentioned that the
international order has greatly benefited China, and I think
you are right. They are a growing economy and all that. And
yet, as you said, they are subverting it constantly,
particularly in their own actions with their immediate
neighbors.
What do you think China's calculation is on that? Why do
they look at a world order that has enabled them to rise and
seem so determined to undermine it? And is there some way that
we could persuade them that it would be better if they didn't?
Admiral Harris. I think that to understand China is to look
at their fundamental underlying government premise, which is
based on communism. I think they use everything that the
international order has given them up to this point, which has
enabled them to become a very strong economic power, and they
are using that power to increase their military capability.
Nothing wrong with that on the surface. Strong countries
ought to have the militaries that they want and can afford. But
I think it is how they are going about it and their stated
ambitions for the remainder of this century that cause me to be
concerned about China.
Just as I said, what President Xi said during the 19th
Party Congress was an affirmation of where China has been. They
have this sense of this 100 years of humiliation and all of
that. And I think the fact that there is a cult of personality
now growing in China surrounding Xi Jinping is an area of
concern for all of us who seek democratic values in the world.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. And just an editorial
comment. I mean, China's 100 years of humiliation, they have
had a pretty good few decades. Can't they, you know, let that
go?
Admiral Harris. That is right.
Mr. Smith. It is like, you know, they got Hong Kong back,
they got Macau back, they are the second-largest economy in the
world, they are everywhere. I think, you know, that tendency
towards this nationalistic drive could potentially undermine
the most thing that China should be trying to do, and that is
figure out how to feed 1.4 billion people.
Admiral Harris. Right.
Mr. Smith. I am similarly concerned about their desire to
go beyond that and be more of a dominant power instead of, you
know, a strong regional player that works cooperatively with
its neighbors. And I appreciate your leadership on that issue.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral Harris, thank you very much for your service.
And I was grateful firsthand to visit you several times, and
each time I was so impressed by your capabilities and your
dedication to our country and also your dedication of promoting
peace through strength.
Also, your appointment as Ambassador to Australia fulfills
a prognostication by my wife, Roxanne, that President Trump is
successful by surrounding himself by talented individuals. And
it has been very humbling for me to have to let my wife know
she was correct.
Admiral Harris. He is sending me away, though.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we are just really proud of your service.
And, Admiral, in dealing with near-peer adversaries, I
agree we must involve a whole-of-government response. My
question lies in the definition and application of what ``whole
of government'' looks like.
Would you briefly explain the various touchpoints that you,
as the PACOM commander, have as an opportunity to sit down with
the diverse and relevant group of senior government officials
to discuss the threats and the strategic planning to mitigate
these challenges?
Admiral Harris. So the challenges that we face, I think,
are consistent with my previous testimonies. The most imminent
challenge is North Korea. China remains an existential threat.
Russia is an existential threat. And China is the longest term
challenge that I think we face.
And we have ISIS in the region as well, as I talked about
in my opening statement. And the threat from ISIS is real in
the Pacific, but as long as we continue to do the things that
we are doing and build the capacity and capability of our
allies and partners, I think we can keep ISIS at bay.
With regard to the whole-of-government approach, I think it
is essential that we view these threats from a whole-of-
government perspective. And by that, I mean that it is not
enough that the State Department or the Defense Department view
China as a rival. I think we need to view China, for example,
as a rival across all of government. And the same for North
Korea.
And I would submit that, more than just a whole-of-
government, we need to have a whole-of-nation perspective on
the threats that these regimes pose to the United States. I
would also add that, from the Chinese perspective, I believe
China has achieved that within their country. They view the
United States as a rival across the whole of their nation. So
they have a whole-of-nation view of the United States. And
their system gives them the wherewithal to immediately have a
whole-of-government view, but, more than that, they have a
whole-of-nation view. And I think we are coming up to speed on
the whole-of-government aspect, but we have more to go in that
regard.
Mr. Wilson. It is mutually beneficial for America and China
to have a good relationship, but I am concerned about the
propaganda operations within the United States. And,
specifically, I would like to hear your thoughts concerning the
Confucius Institutes and the role they play for the Chinese
Government in the United States.
Since 2005, more than 100 Confucius Institutes have opened
at American colleges and universities. Last year, the number of
institutes in the world rose by 40 percent. They are funded by
the Chinese Government's Ministry of Education. In 2009, the
head of propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party called the
institutes, quote, ``an important part of China's overseas
propaganda setup,'' end of quote.
What is your view about these institutes?
Admiral Harris. Yeah, I would agree, sir, with the concern
there. I think DNI [Director of National Intelligence] Coats
addressed this yesterday in his testimony before the Senate. It
is important. And I think that we need to continue to look into
the effect that Confucius Institutes and other influence
operations that China has in our country.
Mr. Wilson. And I am grateful, too, for your efforts in
regard to soft power for the Indo-Asia-Pacific region,
specifically working with India regarding ballistic missile
defense. What is the status of the development with the
Republic of India?
Admiral Harris. So I view India as one of the biggest
strategic opportunities that we have. I recently traveled to
India in January to speak at the Raisina Dialogue. And I think
that the opportunities with India, a country that shares our
democratic values, the largest democracy in the world, and a
friend of the United States--it is important that we continue
to work closely with India, that we continue to provide things
for the Indian military, and that we continue the mil-to-mil
relationship with the Indian Armed Forces.
Mr. Wilson. Again, congratulations on your appointment as
Ambassador to Australia. Best wishes. Thank you.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir. It is just the beginning of
the process, but I am grateful for the opportunity.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thanks for coming.
I want to just shift gears a little bit in your testimony
and your discussion about our allies and partners. Without
going through each ally and partner, can you characterize
generally their capability and willingness to invest in their
own militaries, as well as to train to get to a level of
effectiveness? Sort of playing off the theme that you--one of
your themes in your testimony, that we need to have capable and
able partners. Can you characterize how, maybe, folks fit into
boxes there?
Admiral Harris. Sure. I think that our allies are capable
and their militaries reflect their commitment to the fact that
they are allies of the United States. So they buy American
equipment. We train a lot of their forces here, and we train
together at sea and in the air and on land with them--the
Japanese, the Koreans, the Australians of course, and on and
on. So we have good, strong mil-to-mil relationships with these
countries, and that is reflected in the makeup of their
militaries.
But I think in the partner realm, you know--and I
differentiate that with--we have five countries that are treaty
allies, and then we have partners out there. When I look at the
partners, when you consider Singapore and what they provide for
us, not only the stuff that they purchase from us for their
military but what they provide for us, you know, they give us a
platform from which to operate our ships, our staffs, our
aircraft, and the like. That is very important.
India is another partner, and we are working closely with
them as we seek to improve the capability of their military. So
I think that is another opportunity.
Vietnam is a terrific opportunity for us. And their
location is strategic. You know, we have an aircraft carrier
strike group that is going into Vietnam next month, the USS
Carl Vinson, which I think is exciting. It is exciting for us,
it is exciting for the Navy, and it is exciting for Vietnam.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Great. Thanks.
Flipping back to China, I think a lot of your testimony and
oral testimony has emphasized one aspect, and that is about
defending against and trying to stop China from activities. But
can you talk a little bit about what the U.S. can do or isn't
doing to shape activities, maybe looking at diplomatic or
informational or economic elements of power?
Admiral Harris. Sure. So, when I criticize China, as I have
done in the past and I just did a few moments ago, I also want
to compliment China for the things that they do that are
positive and for the greater good.
For example, you know, they are operating in the Horn of
Africa region for counter-piracy operations. They were
operating in the Mediterranean during the effort to remove
chemical weapons from Syria. They have operated in humanitarian
assistance and disaster response operations. They helped in the
search for a sailor that fell overboard a few months ago and
the MH370 Malaysian airliner incident a few years ago.
So these are positive things, indicative of a growing China
that is finding its way in the world.
But I think that the pressures that we bring to bear on
China are, first, diplomatic. And for me, for PACOM, you know,
what I have to do is ensure that we maintain credible combat
power and that we demonstrate our resolve to fly, sail, or
operate wherever international law allows. And by doing that,
then we demonstrate to China that there is a role for order in
the international system and that rules are meant to be
followed and that rules benefit all. And that is the view I
take.
Mr. Larsen. And on that point--and I am sorry. The crux of
my question is really, are we doing enough to support that last
point you made? Do you have an assessment about whether or not
the United States is doing enough to live up to that role of
continuing to support the rules-based international order, in
sending that message?
Admiral Harris. Yeah, I think we are. I think in the
military sense we are. You know, our freedom-of-navigation
operations simply exist to do just what it says, to ensure the
freedom of navigation. And that goes to the premise that
countries ought to be able to fly, sail, or operate in
international waters and airspace per the rules that we all
ascribe to. So I think that in a military sense we are doing
that.
We have these engagements with China, the military
consultative working group, for example, which allows us----
Mr. Larsen. I am sorry, I don't want to be rude, but I
really don't want the chairman to be angry with me. So thank
you very much.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Thanks.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for being here, and thank you for your
service to our country.
In addition to Japan and Korea, what other countries in the
region do you think should and could be contributing to PACOM's
regional ballistic missile defense?
Admiral Harris. I think that, you know, when you look at
the threat vector, if you look at the threat vector from North
Korea, I think South Korea and Japan are key to that. I think
other countries could contribute if they want, but I don't want
to speak for them. But, again, it is a function of the threat
vector and their capabilities and their own budgets, whether
they can afford that kind of a system.
Mr. Rogers. Are you aware of any countries in the region
that have expressed an interest in foreign military sales of
BMD [ballistic missile defense] systems or potential
development of BMD?
Admiral Harris. Not to the degree that they have gone ahead
with LORs [letters of request] and LOAs [letters of
authorization] and that acquisition stuff.
Mr. Rogers. Assuming that the two Aegis Ashore sites that
Japan has begun the process of procuring and developing are
complete and in place, what effect will that have on your U.S.
Aegis ships in the region?
Admiral Harris. It would relieve some of the pressure that
I face and the Navy faces, the Pacific fleet faces in BMD, in
ballistic----
Mr. Rogers. And how would that manifest itself?
Admiral Harris. Well, because we have ships that are
underway to help the Japanese defend their homeland as part of
our treaty obligations and defend Americans that are living and
working in----
Mr. Rogers. I understand, but what will you be able to do
that you can't do now?
Admiral Harris. I would be able to take that ship off-
station and put it somewhere else.
Mr. Rogers. Like where?
Admiral Harris. Like wherever it is needed at the moment--
you know, South China Sea, in the Indian Ocean, in the
Philippine Sea, wherever I might need that ship.
Right now, one of the obligations I have is a ship off of
Guam for the defense of our homeland and a ship in the Sea of
Japan that helps in the defense of Japan.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Are you confident that the system that you have in place
today to protect Guam, Hawaii, and the mainland is adequate?
Admiral Harris. I believe it is adequate for the threat
that we face today, but I think that much more needs to be done
for the threat that we will face in 2 to 3 years.
Mr. Rogers. For example?
Admiral Harris. So I have advocated for the defense-of-
Hawaii radar, because I think that radar is essential for the
threat that we are going to face from North Korea in 3 or 4
years.
I believe that one of our older platforms, the SBX, the
Sea-Based X-Band Radar that is on that old platform, you know,
that is only good when it is underway. And the defense-of-
Hawaii radar would allow me to cover the gaps when that ship is
not underway or in maintenance. So that is important.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I am always very concerned about keeping
Madeleine Bordallo happy and safe. Is there anything else we
need to be doing for Guam?
Admiral Harris. I am all for Guam, sir. It is part of us,
right?
I believe that the THAAD [Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense] system that is there, the fact that it is a PCS, it is
a permanent station there now, is important. And I want to
continue to resource that.
Mr. Rogers. But there is nothing in addition that you think
at the present we need to be doing?
Admiral Harris. At the present time, no, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to defer my questions to the closed session, but
I do want to express my public admiration for Admiral Harris's
great career.
We appreciate your Tennessee ties, and we look forward to
your success as Ambassador to Australia.
And I also feel pressure from my colleague from Guam. I
want to make sure she has maximum opportunity to ask her
questions, so I will yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I, too, Admiral Harris, appreciate and thank you for
your service to our country. Some people don't know this, but I
believe the term that you have is the ``Old Goat''?
Admiral Harris. Right.
Mr. Lamborn. The longest-serving graduate from your time in
the Naval Academy?
Admiral Harris. That is correct, sir. I don't know if that
is a point of pride or I have just been around the longest.
Mr. Lamborn. And, also, even though Colorado is not known
for being a Navy State, you are moving there after your
retirement, and so I will welcome you at that point.
Admiral Harris. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. But, in the meantime, besides finishing out
your service as PACOM commander, you are going to be in
Australia as our Ambassador, and congratulations on that.
Australia is such a wonderful ally and always has been, and I
appreciate the opportunity you have to strengthen the ties.
What are some things that can be strengthened? I know that
missile defense is a possibility or hypersonic glide vehicle
research. There are some things going on. There is the Marine
deployment in Darwin. What can you tell us about U.S.-Australia
ties and how important that is in the Pacific?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. Thanks for the question and for the
lead-in for it. And I am honored to be given the opportunity to
serve in Australia, but I don't want to presume the goodwill of
the Senate. I will await my time.
As far as Australia as an ally, they are a key ally of the
United States. They have been with us in every war, or we have
been with them in every war since World War I. I look to my
Australian counterparts for their help and assistance. I admire
their leadership in the battlefield and in the corridors of
power in the world. So I appreciate the opportunity to work
with them in my current role, and I am looking forward to
continuing to be able to work with them in a potentially future
role.
Some of the areas that are key is the force posture
agreements. So this involves the Marines in Darwin. You know,
right now, this year, this March, next month, we will start the
next rotation of Marines there. We will increase their rotation
to about 1,500 Marines, which is significant.
There is an Air Force component of the force posture
agreement as well, the enhanced air cooperation piece, both at
Darwin and at Tindal--Tindal Air Base in Australia. So that
will help us in terms of refueling and other kinds of aircraft
that we will be able to put in Australia. So I am excited by
that.
In the naval business, as they finish their buildup of
their three Hobart-class ships and then moving on to their
next-generation antisubmarine warfare ships, there are
opportunities for us to continue to work with them as they
develop that capability.
They have bought a French submarine buy. It is a
significant buy over a number of years. And I believe that we
should help them as they develop that submarine in the years to
come, because we want to be able to continue to interoperate
with the Australian forces in every domain. And, you know, I
think that as we continue to do that, then we will improve our
own capabilities together with our Australian ally.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And I will just finish up with a
question building on what Chairman Mike Rogers asked about,
Aegis Ashore.
We really want to protect Guam; we also want to protect
Hawaii. That goes absolutely without saying. That is so
critical. What can you say about Aegis Ashore in Hawaii?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So I am not smart enough to zero in
on a system for Hawaii. What I have advocated for in the past--
and thanks to the Congress, we are going to see some of that
laid out here in the next year or two, and that is, first, the
defense-of-Hawaii radar.
And then the next step, I have also advocated for a study
through MDA, Missile Defense Agency, to determine what the best
missile defense itself for Hawaii is. There are a number of
options. Aegis Ashore is one. THAAD is another one. Perhaps a
ground-based interceptor capability for Hawaii. I think all of
those should be looked at.
I think today, from the threat that we face in Hawaii from
North Korea, Aegis Ashore and THAAD might not be the best
platforms for Hawaii, given the trajectory and the geometries
of the missiles that are launched. I am confident in our
ground-based systems today to intercept and protect Hawaii, and
those ground-based systems are in California and Alaska. But I
think in the years ahead it would do us well to at least study
the possibility of putting some kind of interceptor capability
in Hawaii.
Meanwhile, I am pleased about the defense-of-Hawaii radar--
--
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. Because I think it is
important.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank Admiral Harris for keeping an eye on
Guam ever since you have been in your present position, and of
course to wish you the best. You are going to the beautiful
country of Australia, and you will still be in the Pacific, so
we expect that your interests will remain the same.
I also want to thank my colleagues. Since I have been here
on the Armed Services Committee, they have always been very
supportive of Guam. You know, compared to States, as a
territory, we are small and many would probably say
insignificant. But to everyone now in this committee, they know
how important Guam is strategically in the Pacific area.
And I want to thank you, Admiral, for your interest over
the years.
So it should be no surprise to you that the Readiness
Subcommittee continues to be alarmed with the state of naval
readiness in the Pacific. Since you last testified before this
committee, we have seen 2 ships damaged in collisions,
resulting in the needless loss of 17 sailors.
As the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, you identified dry-
docking in Guam as a critical component of depot-level ship
repair to support the 7th Fleet during times of peace and war.
Ten months ago in front of this committee, you called for
investments to support increased resiliency via projects in
Japan, Guam, and Australia.
Then, in November, the Fleet Comprehensive Review
identified capacity issues at the ship repair facility in
Yokosuka, Japan.
Yet, just 2 weeks ago, Admiral, the Navy started again to
dismantle the only moorings capable of supporting a floating
dry dock on Guam.
So, Admiral, you are the supported commander in the
Pacific, the individual that drives requirements for what we
need to deter aggression, maintain readiness levels, and, if
necessary, win America's wars. So, as the geographic combatant
commander, do you agree that current depot-level ship repair
capability and capacity in the Pacific is insufficient to meet
both peacetime and contingency requirements with a peer
adversary?
And do you still believe that additional depot-level ship
repair capability and capacity, to include additional dry
docks, are needed to meet current and future readiness needs in
the Pacific, especially with plans to increase the size of the
Navy?
Admiral Harris. Thanks for your question, Madam
Congresswoman. And let me begin by publicly again offering
condolences for those 17 sailors that were lost on the USS
McCain and USS Fitzgerald.
I do not agree, ma'am, today that we have an insufficient
shipyard capability. I believe the capability of our shipyards
are adequate today.
But, as the Navy increases to 355 ships, I do agree that we
need to look hard at the shipyard capabilities in the Pacific,
whether they are in CONUS [continental United States] or
whether they are in Hawaii, potentially in Guam, and in
Yokosuka. And I think that 355-ship number will cause us to
take a hard look at the shipyard capability for the future.
Ms. Bordallo. So what you are saying, then, Admiral, is
that there still is hope and you are still looking at it.
Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
The second question: In the National Defense Strategy, the
Defense Department calls for investment in layered missile
defense from North Korean threats. Secretary Mattis confirmed
before this committee last week that the Department will
continue to bolster missile defense of Guam and in the Pacific
to keep pace with the ballistic missile threat.
From your perspective as the combatant commander and
considering PACOM's published number one priority of defending
the homeland and its citizens, do you feel you have adequate
ballistic missile defense capabilities to defend forward-
deployed military assets, our allies in the region, as well as
all Americans, without fail?
Admiral Harris. I do--as I have mentioned before, ma'am, I
do believe that we have that capability today in 2018. But
given where we think--without going into classified subjects,
but given where we think the North Korean capability might be,
in terms of their missiles, in 3 or 4 years or in the early
2020s, I think we must continue to improve our missile
defenses.
And that is why I am an advocate for the defense-of-Hawaii
radar system and I have advocated for a study to look at
whether we should put ground-based interceptors or something
like that in Hawaii. And I think we must continue to resource
and improve the capabilities of the THAAD system that we have
in Guam, as well as our BMD ships that are in the Pacific, most
particularly in Japan.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. I don't want the
chairman to be mad at me either, so my time is up.
The Chairman. Never.
Ms. Bordallo. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, thanks again--right here. Thanks again for
your service, and we wish you continued success in your future
endeavors.
I want to point to the National Defense Strategy, where it
talks about rapid technological advancements and the changing
character of war. And it speaks in there specifically about
hypersonics and how China now is actually prioritizing and
funding development of hypersonics.
And I want to go to what you wrote. You said, ``I am also
deeply concerned about China's heavy investments in the next
wave of military technologies, including hypersonic missiles,
advanced space and cyber capabilities, and artificial
intelligence. If the U.S. does not keep pace, USPACOM will
struggle to compete with the People's Liberation Army on future
battlefields.''
You have also said that not only should we keep up, we have
to outpace our near-peer adversaries. And specifically in what
we are seeing happening in China with now their advancements
and prioritization of hypersonics, I wanted to get your
perspective about where you see China's capabilities now, where
it may be in the future, what we need to do, and what are the
threats that we face in the Indo-Pacific with this capability
that China has. And what should we do not only to counter--and
the physics of that become very difficult--but, also, what do
we need to do in developing that capability?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So, Congressman, I think that China's
hypersonic weapons development outpaces ours now, and I think
we are falling behind.
We are hamstrung in a number of ways, one of which is some
of our treaties are self-limiting, in my opinion. There is
nothing in the INF Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Force
Treaty, that precludes development of systems, but fielding
them becomes a problem for us.
China is not subject to the INF, and their hypersonic
weapons program is an indication of that. Over 90 percent of
China's ground-based missiles would be excluded by INF if they
were now in it, and we have no missiles that can meet that
capability from the ground. So we have air-launched and sea-
launched missiles, but they are limited by those air and sea
platforms that we have talked about in the previous question.
So I think that, in terms of hypersonic weapons, that we
need to continue to pursue that in a most aggressive way in
order to ensure that we have the capabilities to both defend
against China's hypersonic weapons and to develop our own
offensive hypersonic weapons.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks.
I want to ask another question, too. When you look at the
challenges that you face in PACOM and looking at any of these
OPLANs [operational plans] and what you would have to execute
with that, one of the things that I think is a glaring
deficiency is the current state of our Ready Reserve Fleet in
being able to mobilize, get supplies and troops forward
deployed.
If you look at where we are--and I just had a chance to
talk to Admiral Buzby, who is the MARAD [Maritime
Administrator] Administrator--as well as look at our fleet, we
have 46 ships in the Ready Reserve fleet. Average age: 43 years
old.
I got to visit the SS Gopher State crane ship, a great
ship, and the mariners on board do a great job. But there are
two things that I think should concern us. One is the age of
that fleet and being able to mobilize quickly. Second is what
we would have to do to surge merchant mariners. It is not just
the ships, but it is the number of merchant mariners that we
need going forward.
Give me your perspective about where we are today with the
Ready Reserve Force sealift. And, you know, airlift is a
different component of that. Give me your thought about that.
And how critical a component is that in what you need in the
Pacific Command in order to meet these OPLAN requirements?
Admiral Harris. So I believe that we are deficient in
sealift to a strategic level. I think we must resource them,
resource the Military Sealift Command, both to decrease the
average age of the fleet and also to increase the size of the
merchant fleet. It is imperative at a strategic level, in my
opinion.
Nowhere is that felt more than in the Pacific. To go from
the West Coast of the United States, while all our force is
there, to lift that force to fight on the Korean Peninsula in
support of the Korean war plans is a months-long process when
you consider the time it takes to call up the fleet, mobilize
the fleet, activate the fleet, mobilize and call up the
mariners, find them, and then send them, and then load all the
stuff on them.
So I think that we are deficient in that. I agree with you
completely that sealift is a strategic shortfall in our system
today.
Mr. Wittman. Do you believe the Navy should reflect that
priority in their projection about the ships we need to build
in the future?
Admiral Harris. I do. But I think that it is more than just
the Navy. There is an airlift component to it. I think the guy
who has probably got the hardest job in the joint force is
Darren McDew, General McDew, at TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation
Command], because he is responsible for both sealift and
airlift. And I think it is bigger than just the Navy, it is
bigger than just the Air Force; it is part of the joint force.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Admiral, again for, you know, your great
service and really incredible accessibility to this committee
over the last 3 or 4 years.
Also want to, as the co-chairman of the Friends of
Australia Caucus with my colleague Mr. Gallagher from
Wisconsin, just say how--again, your appointment is really
outstanding.
This is a big year for our two countries. It is the 100
years of mateship, which we are celebrating really an alliance
that is probably as deep and strong as any country in the
world. And it is based on--and I think you know this--not just
shared interests but also shared values. And you are going to
have a zero learning curve to take on this task in, again, an
important time. So congratulations.
I would like to focus again on an issue that you have been
pretty persistent in all of your prior visits, which is to
focus on the undersea realm, where, again, you have noted that
we still have an asymmetric advantage, but that is not a static
condition.
And, again, page 25 of your testimony actually sort of
quantifies, you know, sort of where we are today and where it
is going in the future. I was wondering if maybe you could talk
about that a little bit.
Admiral Harris. Thanks.
I will start off by commenting on the 100 years of
mateship. You know, that was started with General Monash, who
was the first time an American force fought under a foreign
leader, General Monash in World War I.
On submarines and submarine warfare, undersea warfare is an
asymmetric advantage that the United States has. No country on
the Earth can touch us in our ability to operate under the sea.
But that is a perishable advantage that China and Russia are
trying desperately to close. And if we don't continue to
resource the undersea warfare capabilities that are resident in
the Navy today, both in the submarine force and in our
antisubmarine warfare forces, China and Russia will close that
gap, and then we will face a significant challenge to our
position in the world.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And, again, just to go to your testimony, again, which I
think really kind of focuses exactly on what you just said, is
roughly 230 of the world's 400 foreign submarines are in the
Indo-Pacific, of which 160 belong to China, Korea, and Russia.
Obviously, our entire attack submarine fleet is about 52, and
that is obviously not all focused in the Pacific. So, I mean,
at some point, this is math.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. And I am concerned about it. I mean,
I think it is arithmetic, really. I mean, it is at 52 now, and
in the 2020s it is going to dip down into the low to mid-40s.
And, you know, my requirements for submarines are only met
by about half now. And that is on the denominator of 52. When
that denominator goes down--I guess that would be math then.
When that denominator goes down, then the percentage of
submarines that I get will be even less.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I would like to follow up on Mr. Wittman's question
regarding sealift. Because, again, you know, the part of the
world that you are in, you know, particularly the Korean
Peninsula, you know, in terms of offshore petroleum
distribution for, you know, a situation that might arise there,
I mean, that is an example, I think, a concrete example, of
where, you know, we have got a challenge right now in terms of,
you know, what sealift resources are out there.
I was wondering if you could sort of focus on that as just,
you know, a specific example.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. I agree with you. And I think that in
that niche capability, offshore petroleum distribution, and the
way that we are going to get our fuel from places like Red Hill
in Hawaii to the fight in Korea, you know, we don't want to
have that dependent on a 46-year-old ship, for example. So we
have to invest in that, in my opinion.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, over here. Thank you so much for your
extraordinary years of dedicated service to the United States
Navy and to our country. And pending Senate confirmation,
congratulations on your nomination and hopefully confirmation
to be the United States Ambassador to Australia.
My fundamental concern is this, that historically we know
whenever there is an established power and an ascendent or a
rising power there tends to be conflict. Not always. I mean,
there are times when historically it has been managed to avoid
conflict. But often there is.
And when I look at your area of operations, particularly
in, let's say, the South China Sea, where China is that
ascendant power, and certainly they are focused on projecting
seapower, that--and when we look at the United States, during
the Reagan buildup, we had about almost 600 ships, 600 vessels.
Now we are down at--I think the number is around 280
operational vessels below that. And so the greatest worry I
have, in terms of looking at our conventional capability, is
the projection of seapower.
And what China wants to do, certainly, is, you know, area
denial, to keep us out of being able to intervene in the event
that they would act on Taiwan or in the event that they would
act on any of their territorial ambitions, let's say, in the
South China Sea, in that particular region.
And so, you know, certainly, the ships we have today are
more capable than their predecessors, but no ship can be in two
places at the same time. And so how concerned are you about our
ability to, in a sense, be a deterrent to aggression in that
region, given the rise of China and given our conventional
capability in terms of the projection of seapower?
Admiral Harris. Thanks for the question.
And I could not agree more. I believe that, in terms of
just pure numbers--right? I mean, quantity has a quality all
its own. And when you don't have the quantity and you rely
solely on quality and the other fellow has enormous quantity,
then you are at a disadvantage.
And I think that is potentially the vector that we face if
we were to continue on the course we were on. But I think we
are on a different course now, thanks to the Congress, that we
are moving toward a larger Navy.
I think power projection is inherent in the power of the
joint force. And, you know, people talk about anti-access/area
denial and the threat that our carriers face from China, and my
response to that is, if the carriers were so vulnerable, why is
China trying to build four or five of them? And so, you know, I
think that the power that is inherent in an aircraft carrier
strike group is enormous and is reflective of the power of the
Nation behind it.
I don't ascribe, in all respects, in all cases, to this
idea of the Thucydides trap, where a rising power and a
declining power are inevitably doomed to go to war. And I think
in the case of China and the United States, I would debate
anybody on who the rising power is in that equation. I think
America is on the rise, that we are the rising power.
And so, you know, I am hopeful that it won't come to a
conflict with China. But, as we all have to be, we must all be
prepared for that, if it should come to that.
Mr. Coffman. So if we look at our allies in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, most of them are stepping up to
the plate in terms of what the requirement has been stated, 2
percent of GDP [gross domestic product] for defense spending as
a minimum requirement. And, you know, that is problematic,
certainly, for us in terms of being a deterrent factor to
Russia.
What do you see in terms of our allies? Obviously, we don't
have a metric that is required, and we don't have--there are
some formal treaties, but there are associated powers that are
friendly to the United States and could be treated as allies--
--
Admiral Harris. Yeah.
Mr. Coffman [continuing]. That we don't have a formal
relationship with. But what do you see, in terms of the rise of
India--I guess I will take that for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Admiral Harris. Thanks.
Mr. Coffman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I appreciate it. We are making good progress.
We want to keep making good progress.
Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha, Admiral Harris. It is great to see you here. I would
just like to briefly thank you for your service. But,
specifically for Hawaii, you have been a great friend to the
people of Hawaii, and I think people there consider you one of
our own.
Thank you for talking about the importance of the defense-
of-Hawaii radar. For many reasons, obviously, the people of
Hawaii and this country are becoming more keenly aware of the
growing threat coming from North Korea. And I want to thank the
work that my colleague Congresswoman Hanabusa and I have done,
in conjunction with the leadership of this committee, in
continuing to move the funding forward for this radar. You
know, we cannot be solely dependent on the SBX deployment
capability for the defense of Hawaii.
I wanted to ask you about China's role in finding a
peaceful resolution to this growing threat from North Korea--
not only what more can be done to engage China in this regard,
but also if you can address the role of North Korea's other
bordering country, Russia. What role do they or should they be
playing as we seek to explore all diplomatic means possible to
resolve this threat?
Admiral Harris. Thank you. And it is always good to see
you. Pending the goodwill of the Senate, I am going to coin a
new phrase, ``gadoha.'' That will be the new thing.
Ms. Gabbard. That is right.
Admiral Harris. With regard to China and DPRK, North Korea,
I think China holds the key. And I have said before that China
is the key to a peaceful outcome on the Korean Peninsula, but
China is not the key to all outcomes. And so the onus really is
on them. If over 90 percent of North Korea's trade comes from
China, then, despite whatever China says, they have a lever
that ought to be applied.
That said, I want to be upfront and acknowledge that China
is doing a lot in the pressure campaign plan in pressuring
North Korea and in honoring the U.N. [United Nations] sanctions
against North Korea.
I think there is more to be done. I think this issue of
guest workers, these are folks that are--North Koreans that
work in other countries, and then their pay, their revenue goes
back to the regime. I think there is a lot to be done in that
regard. We think that, overall, in the world, there are
probably 80,000 of these guest workers. Many countries are now
sending those guest workers home, but even so, 60,000 of the
80,000 are in Russia and China. So Russia and China have a big
lever.
So I think there is more that could be done and there is
more that must be done in that regard. But I do want to
acknowledge that China is doing a lot in terms of joining the
pressure campaign and in enforcing the sanctions that the U.N.
has placed on them.
I think that Russia holds the role of a spoiler. They have
said that they will cover down on where the sanctions pressured
North Korea too much. And I think that that fits their role as
a spoiler. So there is much to be done in the Russian space, if
you will, with North Korea and particularly in this area of
guest workers.
Now, they have said that they are going to expel their
guest workers, the North Korean guest workers, in 2019. Now,
that is a positive, and I want to be optimistic about it. But
until they do, then it becomes problematic.
Ms. Gabbard. Briefly, in 2016, India was declared a major
defense partner. You have made it a priority throughout your
time in command to increase the security engagements with
India.
Do you feel that the implementation of this designation as
a major defense partner is being implemented appropriately? And
if so, great. If not, where are there other opportunities for
growth?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So, as I have said, I do believe that
India is our great strategic opportunity--shared values, shared
concerns, and all of that. They are the only country in the
world that is designated as a major defense partner, and we,
the United States, we need to continue to look for ways to turn
that term into reality.
I think we have a great opportunity coming up in India to
improve the capability of their defense forces. I spoke in
Raisina [Dialogue] 3 this year, and the theme of my talk was
this is the year to get things done. So we have talked about
it. We designated India in 2016. In 2017, we continued that
work. I think in 2018 this is the year to get things done.
That means we have to do things on our side as well. There
are these foundational agreements that we require countries to
adhere to. I think we need to be creative in how we insist on
that application in India and work with the Indians so that
together we can come to a place where we can realize this
``major defense partner'' moniker.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you much for being here this morning.
We hear the phrase ``whole-of-government approach'' when it
comes to the United States, and I heard recently someone refer
to the whole-of-country approach that China takes with respect
to as they address whatever their issues.
I have supply chain concerns across a wide spectrum of
issues, in particular, things that we buy from the Chinese--
telecommunications and other gear. While the companies like
Huawei and ZTE might argue that they are outside Chinese
Government control, there is no real way to prove that. There
is no real way to know what the influences are.
The other direction would be things that they buy,
companies they buy here, you know, certain issues that we
wouldn't like them to control--the CFIUS [Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States] review process, the high-end
things that we would obviously be concerned about, all the way
down to buying a seed company that controls seeds that we need
year in and year out for our agriculture issues.
One, do you share those concerns? And if you do, can you
talk to us somewhat about what you would see as the CFIUS
review process needing to be upgraded, as well as buying
telecommunications and other things that would be implemented
on our bases and in our gear?
Admiral Harris. Thanks for the question.
I am very concerned about Chinese direct investment in the
United States and their ability to buy stuff either that are
critical to our defense or buy tracts of land that are adjacent
to our major training ranges and the like. So I have been
involved in the CFIUS process since I was the Pacific Fleet
commander. I think the process is laborious and it is
discouraging.
That said, CFIUS 2.0, part of the FIRRMA [Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization] Act that is being worked
in Congress now, I am completely in support of that. I think it
is absolutely essential to our national defense that we move
out and improve CFIUS. And the CFIUS 2.0 process I think is
commendatory, and it has my support.
Mr. Conaway. So what about stuff we would buy? Are you
concerned buying things, like, from Huawei or ZTE?
Admiral Harris. Sure.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Admiral Harris. Absolutely.
Mr. Conaway. All right.
So Mr. Coffman got you started down a little bit on power
projection. Could you speak specifically about the importance
of airpower projection and forward deployment of that
projection, whether it is on aircraft carriers or other places
where we would have our aircraft, given the new threats or what
appear to be emerging threats to carriers and other things?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So power projection, again, is the
backbone of any nation's ability to maintain its defense. I
think airpower is key not only because I wear wings but because
of the reality of what airpower brings.
Whether that airpower is launched from the shore or from an
aircraft carrier is not as important as the airpower itself, in
my view. The carrier gives you the flexibility, and that has
its own inherent importance, but I think things like the fifth-
generation aircraft are vital.
And I think that when you look at the numbers of fourth-
generation fighters that we will have at the end of the 2020s,
I think we should invest also in the capability to improve
those fourth-generation fighters to something--you know, I use
the term fifth-gen-minus or fourth-gen-plus. You know, it is in
that regard.
I think we need to continue to invest in Long-Range Strike
Bomber capability. The B-21 comes to mind as a follow-on to the
B-2 and the B-1. I use today, heavily, B-52s and B-1s in
addition to B-2s, today, heavily, in our lightning missions in
the Pacific.
Mr. Conaway. Well, Admiral, thank you and your wife for
your long service. And if you can make it through that
laborious process on the other side of the building to become
an ambassador, look forward to your service there.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Rosen.
Ms. Rosen. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Smith.
And thank you, Admiral Harris, for your service. And
congratulations on your future endeavors.
What I wanted to ask is this: Last week, Secretary Mattis
was here before this committee and talked about the Nuclear
Posture Review [NPR]. And it contemplates some very novel
circumstances under which nuclear weapons can be used.
So, given the ever-present threat of North Korean cyber
attacks and the nation's advancing nuclear weapons programs, in
what ways could the expanded scenarios in the NPR allow for the
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats, like a
cyber threat? And how is that going to increase the likelihood
of a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and North Korea?
Admiral Harris. It is an important question, but I am going
to defer it because I am not the expert on nuclear weapons----
Ms. Rosen. Okay.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. And I don't have any under my
control. The nuclear weapons that are extant in the force are
under General Hyten's control at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
Command]. But I will be happy to take the question and try to
get back to you in some coherent way.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Well, then I am going to move on to another question. I am
really concerned about this new budget and its significant cuts
to the State Department.
So we are all in agreement that combating the threat of
North Korea is going to require a lot of strong cooperation
with all of our allies in the region, just like we are heading
off China's attempts to become the world's leading military and
economic power. It is going to necessitate us strengthening our
alliances and pursuing new partnerships. And the military play
crucial and critical roles in the efforts, just like our
diplomats do, and we need those resources.
So I am wondering what effects--and now you are going to be
going to a new job, maybe, as the ambassador. So what effects
could these significant cuts to the State Department budget
have on your ability to build those partnerships?
Admiral Harris. So I am not an expert on the specific cuts
in the State Department. But I will say in general that a
strong State Department and a strong military Defense
Department together make a strong nation. A weak State
Department means you are going to have to have a much stronger
Defense Department.
So I think the diplomacy and military capabilities and
defense go hand in hand. And I don't want to see a place
where--you know, Foreign Minister Talleyrand, back in the old
French days, he said once to his field marshal that when my
profession fails--being the foreign minister--when my
profession fails, yours has to take over. I think it is much
better that both professions go hand in hand to strengthen the
country.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to building those
partnerships in your new endeavor.
Thank you. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I just want to thank you again for your
service to our Nation, you and your wife. And we look forward
to continued service in a different capacity.
I wanted to cover a couple of areas with China, the
influence just as the One Belt, One Road Initiative, as well as
the influence in Australia. And we primarily look at the One
Road, One Belt Initiative from an economic standpoint, but
there is a military component to it as well, and I was
wondering if you could describe a little bit about that. We
know that there is the new military base in Djibouti. We know
that there are some access ports issues, potential bases.
But could you expound on that and then how we are changing
our force posture, as well as our operational plans,
accordingly?
Admiral Harris. So I think One Belt, One Road is, in fact,
much more than just an economic engine that China is
undertaking. I think it seeks to link economically the
population of China with markets and resources in Europe and
Africa and Central Asia. And I think that is all good. You
know, anything that you put to improve the quality of life of
folks through trade is a positive.
But I think also that One Belt, One Road seeks to displace
the United States and our friends and allies in the region, in
the Indo-Pacific region, by China. It is a concerted, strategic
endeavor by China to gain a foothold and displace the United
States and our allies and partners in the region.
And I think you need to only look at the bases and places
where China is putting its emphasis to see the realization of
this. They are in a position today to influence the shipping
routes in the Strait of Hormuz; in the Gulf of Aden; the Red
Sea, which means the Suez Canal; and also in our hemisphere in
the Panama Canal; and also, finally, in the Strait of Malacca.
All those global choke points are under pressure from China's
One Belt, One Road Initiative.
And I can go on and on about it, but I will stop there
unless you have more specific questions.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. How are we adjusting our force posture
and our operational plans as a result? Or have we?
Admiral Harris. Well, part of the force posture is the DPRI
[Defense Program Review Initiative], the distributed movement
of U.S. forces out of Japan, not all of them, of course, but
some of them out of Japan, and putting them in Australia and
Guam and Hawaii and back in the United States. So that is part
of it.
We are also improving our relationships with countries like
Sri Lanka, which, to me, is an important relationship;
obviously, with India that we talked about. Singapore is key,
as I mentioned earlier, and the access that we enjoy because of
our Singaporean partners, that access is strategically
important to the United States, in my view.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great.
Moving on to Australia--and thank you for mentioning the
bombers and the airpower and how important it is. Certainly
Whiteman Air Force Base, I know the B-2 has been part of some
operations there. And we have had some training with our
Australian allies, both as far as large-force air exercises,
integration with air control parties on the ground. And we have
also sent liaison officers to visit their operations centers to
give and receive briefings on joint capabilities.
So how effective do you think these efforts have been in
strengthening our partnership with Australia? How can we build
on these efforts moving forward?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. Again, I think that Australia is one
of the keys to a rules-based international order. They are a
key ally of the United States, and they have been with us,
again, in every major conflict since World War I.
I think that there are many areas that we continue to work
with the Australian Defense Forces, and that includes their
work in Darwin, their work at Tindal Air Base, both in the Air
Force and the Marine Corps.
Our navy-to-navy relationship with the Royal Australian
Navy and the Army relationships are terrific. They are key
partners. They have key staff officers on my staff in Hawaii at
the general officer level and at the SES level, Senior
Executive Service level, that play key roles in PACOM. I could
not do what I do without those officers there in Hawaii.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, thanks for your appearance today and--over
here. Amazing how the Navy seems to be able to make a sailor
seem older than they are, with the distinctions you have as the
``Old Goat'' and the ``Gray Owl.'' But I thank you for your
service and your longest serving naval flight officer, which
has given you that distinction as the ``Gray Owl.''
We have heard a lot today about the threats to the posture
and readiness under your command, but could you just sort of
briefly identify, without a lengthy description, just what
would be the top three--not the only three, but the top three--
readiness challenges or concerns that you have for your forces
under your command?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. Just briefly, sir, as you asked, my
top three readiness concerns are munitions, submarines, and
ISR--intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. And
I will stop there, depending on more questions.
Mr. Brown. No, I appreciate that.
I had an opportunity to visit U.S. Forces Korea and also
Okinawa. And regarding munitions, you know, one of the concerns
that were presented in a variety of briefings is not only what
you have on hand but the storage capacity and not just the
amount of capacity but the aging nature of those facilities.
Can you talk a little bit about that?
Admiral Harris. I can.
And so, at the beginning of my time at Pacific Command, I
was worried about some of those key munitions shortfalls. And
now that the Army and the other services have moved munitions
to the peninsula, I am beginning to worry about munitions
storage capacity.
So what I tell folks, that is a nice problem to have. I
mean, I am glad I have that problem, not the earlier problem.
But we have to get after that one now in a serious way.
Mr. Brown. And is that reflected in the budget?
Admiral Harris. It is.
Mr. Brown. Okay.
Admiral Harris. And it is reflective in what South Korea
has provided the United States in terms of their commitments
under the alliance.
Mr. Brown. Okay. And let me just continue. I know, perhaps,
if I asked you for a lengthier list than the top three, you
would have included noncombatant evacuation operations----
Admiral Harris. Right.
Mr. Brown [continuing]. NEO. That also is a concern that I
have. When I was on the peninsula, you know, in conversations
with General Brooks and General Vandal, who just left, as you
know, the Eighth Army after doing a remarkable job there, and
also with General Cornish, 18th Wing on Okinawa, it doesn't
seem as if we really have a NEO--a good grasp of what we need
to do.
I mean, I think it sounds like the plans are in place, the
documents are there. You would pass, sort of, like, a command
inspection, check the block, yeah, you got what you need. But I
don't get the sense that, like, the rehearsals, the walk-
throughs, the, you know, soup to nuts have been thought through
logistically, how, as we are bringing follow-on troops onto the
peninsula, we coordinate then, you know, dependents and other
U.S., you know, citizens and others who we are responsible for
to get them off the peninsula.
In fact, there was a comment, not by any of the three
officers who I mentioned, but, you know, by a person who
briefed us that, when asked about NEO, it was sort of like,
``Yeah, well, we are starting to take a look at it.''
And so can you just talk a little bit about NEO----
Admiral Harris. Sure.
Mr. Brown [continuing]. And what----
Admiral Harris. So I would say that we are much further
along, Congressman, than just taking a look at it, but there is
work to be done. And so U.S. Army Pacific, General Brown and
his staff in Hawaii, has been charged to develop the NEO plan
and then to see it through to fruition.
General Brooks and I have made NEO a key line of effort in
what we are both doing, because we both know that if conflict
breaks out on the Korean Peninsula then we are going to have to
get the Americans off of there.
The numbers are staggering, right? I mean, estimates say
there are 200,000-plus Americans, not military, but Americans
who live and work in South Korea. And then on top of that, you
have a million Chinese that live and work on the Korean
Peninsula, 60,000 Japanese, and on and on and on. So our
friends, allies, partners, and others also have a vested
interest in the evacuation of noncombatants should war break
out on the peninsula.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Admiral Harris.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, you just hit on two of the issues that I want to
talk with you about. One of them is ISR. Every commander that
we talk with wants more ISR and more dependable ISR.
I am very concerned, especially after reading your
testimony and others, that as the Department becomes more
dependent on space and our adversaries--we certainly accept
space as a contested environment. And your testimony says,
``Our adversaries continue to develop means to deny our space-
enabled capabilities . . . broad and robust array of counter-
space capabilities, which include direct-ascent anti-satellite
missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems.'' You talk about
their development and the ability to jam our satellite
communications and PNT [position, navigation, and timing]
jammers.
The Department, the Air Force has recently proposed to not
recapitalize the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System] platform. And I am concerned that we are becoming too
dependent on space and that there will be a lack of redundancy
if we get rid of the systems that we have today that work, in
hopes of a system that might or might not work, and that
somebody may be able to find a way to deny our ability to use
that system.
Could you speak to the issues of the vulnerabilities in
becoming too dependent on space and the need for redundancy in
ISR platforms?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, sir.
I think, as a nation, over the past several decades, we
have viewed space as a peaceful place, and we have been led
astray by viewing space as some kind of a fuzzy panda bear
thing.
I think the Chinese, on the other hand, the Russians, and
others, they have viewed space as the ultimate high ground, and
they are preparing for battle in space. And we are just now
coming to the realization that we are going to have to change
our view of space, that it is a place of importance in terms of
battlefield dominance.
So, you know, I am advocating that we change that view of
space and what we need to do in order to ensure that we
maintain a level of dominance in space, that we can have access
to the tools that we have put up there to do the ISR and other
things.
Mr. Scott. I hope we continue the development of space as
well. I am just concerned that if we get rid of systems that we
know currently work and somebody has more advancements in space
than we have, then we could be left without the ISR platforms.
And I hope that we will continue both the development of
current ISR platforms as well as additional space-based
platforms.
I want to mention one other thing, and then I will yield
the remainder of my time. I was in Djibouti not too long ago.
And as we talk about the Chinese, the one thing that surprised
me the most on that trip and that sticks in my mind is a
hospital ship parked in Djibouti. And not only are they
actually--in the past, they have helped to make the lives of
the leaders of countries better, but now they are actually
trying to win the hearts and minds of the people of the
country. So that seems to be a marked change.
I hope that, as we have the [USNS] Comfort and the Mercy,
that as we continue to rebuild the Navy, that we will look at
other ships like them as well.
Thank you for your service, and maybe I will come see you
in Australia.
I yield.
The Chairman. Mrs. Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here. I
just wanted to add my congratulations to my colleagues'.
Congratulations to you for your selection as Ambassador to
Australia.
You know, based on my experience in a prior life working on
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy, Southeast Asia
team, as well as out at the Pacific Command, and also as you
highlighted in your response to Mrs. Hartzler's question,
Australia is an incredibly important ally. And I am so grateful
that the relationship with this important ally will be in very
good hands with you out there.
And so thank you for your service and your willingness to
continue to serve this country.
Speaking about allies, you know, in order for us to improve
stability in the Asia-Pacific AOR [area of responsibility], we
really focus on promoting security cooperation activities with
our allies and partners in the region. And, as you know,
section 333 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA consolidated several
security cooperation authorities into a new, broader, global
train and equip authority.
Can you give us some detail about how PACOM is looking
strategically at its security cooperation programming under
this new section 333 authority?
Admiral Harris. Sure. I am excited about what 333 does and
the fact that it consolidates many of the disparate programs
that we have before. So we are getting after how to best
utilize that authority now throughout the PACOM staff and our
components.
I am also encouraged by the Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability
Initiative and what that gives me in terms of flexibility to
deal with our partners and friends in the region.
And, finally, there is the MSI, the Maritime Security
Initiative, which has been in place now for 2 years, and we are
in the third year now. And that is about a $500 million
program, roughly. You know, it was roughly $50 million, $50
million, and then $100 million, $100 million, $100 million. So
about $435 million, I guess.
And these programs are important. They are important in our
ability to deal with the needs of our friends and partners in
the region to improve their capacity. And I think it is
important. So I am grateful for that.
I would like to see increased funding in IMET,
international military education and training, for some of
those countries that we have put IMET on hold. I think it is
important that we resource IMET so that we can then train the
leaders of these militaries in the United States, so they can
see democracy in action, so they can control their military in
action on a daily basis.
Mrs. Murphy. I am glad you raised IMET. I think back to our
relationship with Indonesia, and there was a time where we
weren't doing IMET, and we lost almost a generation of
relationships between our senior military folks and our
counterparts in Indonesia. So I appreciate you raising that.
In your written testimony, you said, ``National power and
security depend on the ability to operate securely in and
through cyberspace.'' I am sure you would agree that, in order
to fight and win future wars in the cyber domain, we have to
elevate our cyber training, cyber preparedness, and capacity
building as part of our security cooperation activities.
How, specifically, is PACOM incorporating cybersecurity and
cyber training ranges into your train and equip planning for
fiscal year 2019?
Admiral Harris. Quite a bit. And we have formed at PACOM
the Joint Cyber Center. We have operational planning teams that
are working with U.S. Cyber Command to get after the challenges
that are resident in the domain.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Well, I appreciate that response.
And, also, just as you consider planning for fiscal year
2019 train and equip, I just want to emphasize that there has
been strong congressional support for establishing a persistent
cyber training environment that could provide deployable cyber
training capability in the future. And I would just encourage
you to continue to incorporate these new cyber training
capabilities into your planning.
Thank you.
Admiral Harris. Thank you.
Mrs. Murphy. I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Great to see you, Admiral Harris.
I wanted to focus on cyber and information warfare and
information operations.
So, first, I would be interested in an update as to our
engagement with South Korea in regional confidence-building
measures and capacity regarding cyber capability to counter not
only the North Korean threat but also the threat from China.
Admiral Harris. So I work with USFK [United States Forces
Korea], General Brooks and his team, and with Admiral Rogers
and his team for cyber capacity in Korea, for their ability to
counter the threat from North Korea.
I think North Korea is a major cyber actor, and the work
that we do, both on the peninsula and off the peninsula, that
work is critical as we get after the threat from North Korea,
as well as, you know, China and Russia and all that. But North
Korea is a major cyber actor.
Ms. Stefanik. And how do we work with our allies most
effectively in terms of information sharing when it comes to
countering North Korea's cyber activities?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So, by sharing that information and
sharing our operations. But we are limited, in many cases, by
clearance issues with our allies and our partners and friends.
So each one is different, each level of access is different,
and we have to have that view toward maximizing the training
that we can do with each one.
Ms. Stefanik. And then shifting to information warfare. It
is the same question: What, specifically, are we doing to
counter Chinese and North Korean information warfare and
propaganda efforts? How are we working with our allies in the
Asia-Pacific? And who is the lead within the DOD on
coordinating these efforts?
Admiral Harris. In information warfare, we work through the
and with the Joint Staff, the J-39 team in the Joint Staff, and
at OSD in order to have a unified view of information warfare.
I think China is using its considerable resources and the
platform that is China to challenge us in the information
domain. You know, an earlier question about the Confucius
Institutes and things like that.
Across the United States, you know, and in other countries,
you can see the impact of a strategic view of information
warfare which China has. And I am not convinced today that the
United States has that unified strategic view of information
warfare across our whole of government.
Ms. Stefanik. So what steps do we need to take within the
DOD? Because I think before we even tackle the whole-of-
government approach, I think making sure that DOD is focused on
this, not just in terms of countering Chinese propaganda, North
Korea propaganda, but propaganda when it comes to violent
extremist groups and terrorist organizations--what steps do we
need to take to ensure that DOD is focused on this, as they
should be?
Admiral Harris. Well, one is the training internal to DOD.
And one involves those authorities which Admiral Rogers needs,
and then he can delegate some of those authorities to the
combatant commanders. But without those authorities to do
offensive cyber operations, I think we are limited.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for being here. It is quite an honor
that I get to be in this position to talk to you. And I look
forward to hearing about your continued service to this
country. Thank you.
It was alluded to briefly earlier in one of the questions,
and that was about the major incidents that occurred with our
Navy ships last year. I guess there were 4 major ones in 2017,
2 of which led to the deaths of 17 soldiers--more than the
deaths of our service members in Afghanistan last year as well.
If you could, just provide us with a brief summary of the
findings about those events as well as the steps that need to
be taken in order to prevent those types of events in the
future.
Admiral Harris. So there were two major investigatory
reviews besides the ones that focused just on the incidents
themselves. There was the comprehensive review led by Admiral
Davidson, the U.S. Fleet Forces Command commander. And there
was the Secretary of the Navy's strategic review, strategic
readiness review, which was directed by the Secretary of the
Navy and led by Admiral Gary Roughead, the former Chief of
Naval Operations.
And those reviews echoed the findings of the actual
investigations of the incidents themselves, what I call inside
the skin of the ship. It reflected a negligence on the parts of
the crews of the ships and the commanding officers.
I think that accountability was properly applied by the
Navy in this throughout the chain of command of the Navy in
holding the right level of accountability for those incidents.
At the end of the day, it was about training. Tactically,
it was about training and leadership and seamanship inside the
skins of those ships, in my opinion.
Mr. Panetta. Okay. Great. Thank you. Appreciate that.
In regards to the South China Sea, that was kind of the
flavor of the month for a while. Everybody was focused on that.
And North Korea came about, and now the focus seems to be on
that. But in regards to China's involvement there, can you
elaborate on if we are continuing to focus on that and how?
Admiral Harris. So I think that we can walk and chew gum at
the same time. You know, we can think about North Korea and the
South China Sea at the same time.
I believe that, in the past couple years, I have focused on
China's reclamation activities. This past year, we have seen
them consolidate those reclamation activities in--what I call
they have built vertically.
So, in the South China Sea--and I will have some pictures,
photographs for the closed session. But we have seen them build
vertically and dramatically in the South China Sea on those
seven reclaimed features that I call seven new bases in the
South China Sea, to include aircraft hangars, barracks
facilities, radar facilities, weapon emplacements, 10,000-foot
runways--there are three of them down there--and all of that.
So they now have seven new military bases in the South China
Sea.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate you being here,
and I appreciate the great job that PACOM is doing.
I want to follow up on a question that Mr. Conaway asked.
He was talking about the long-term security challenges in our
country with investments and talking about the U.S.
technological advantages relative to China.
A followup that I have on that is, do you have specific
concerns that real estate transactions either by Chinese state-
owned enterprises or perhaps other interests under a false flag
could create vulnerabilities to our bases?
Admiral Harris. I do, Congressman. I think that, you know,
each case needs to be looked at on its own merits, but when
China buys something adjacent to one of our training ranges or
intelligence facilities or the like, you know, I think it bears
looking into whether that purchase is for the right reasons or
for nefarious reasons.
Mr. Bacon. What are your thoughts on the recently
introduced legislation known as the Foreign Investment Risk
Review Modernization Act, FIRRMA, of 2017?
Admiral Harris. I would have mentioned that earlier if I
could have remembered what that acronym stood for. I am in
favor of FIRRMA, and I loosely refer to it as CFIUS 2.0. But I
am in favor of it. I wrote a letter to Senator Cornyn
supporting that.
Mr. Bacon. And, sir, referencing Taiwan, do you think we
have done an adequate job communicating our commitment to the
defense of Taiwan and our support of this democracy of the
neighbor, China, there, that they respect free enterprise and
individual freedoms? I worry about if we are not doing it
enough.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. I am satisfied with where we are, but
we need to continue to stay with it, right?
I mean, so my obligations to Taiwan, unlike the other
countries in the region, I am obligated by law to think about
the defense of Taiwan and to help them in their legitimate
defensive needs under the Taiwan Relations Act. I get it, and I
take my responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act
seriously. So my job is to help Taiwan improve its legitimate
defensive needs in the 21st century.
Mr. Bacon. Well, I appreciate you doing that. Some of our
officials, I find, tone down that support, I think, out of fear
of how China will perceive it. But I think that communicates
weakness towards our commitment to Taiwan. And I think we need
to do just the opposite, make clear that we are standing by
them, folks who have embraced democracy, free enterprise, and
the respect to freedom. And I think to do otherwise sends a
mixed signal to China, and that is not necessarily healthy.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. I agree with you completely.
Mr. Bacon. Finally, I just want to say thank you again for
your service. We look forward to having a great ambassador in
Australia. Thank you.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir, very much.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha, Admiral. And I join my colleague Congresswoman
Gabbard in a great ``mahalo'' from the people of Hawaii, not
only for your service but for your wife's as well.
I am going to call this 56-page--I am not sure people
realize that, but your statement is 56 pages. I am going to
call it ``The Admiral Harris Strategy on Indo-Pacific.'' And I
hope that your successor would follow it, if he can get through
the 56 pages.
Having said that, let me--there is one thing that you start
off with that also the National Defense Strategy starts off
with. And I am trying to understand exactly what the premise--
because I find that it is the premise of both what you are
saying as well as the NDS is saying.
And that is this concept of free and open international
order, which seems to be stating that, after World War II, that
sort of was the rule of what governed, especially in the Indo-
Pacific area, and that what is happening now is China and
Russia are undercutting both of that. And you seem to say that
we have to get back to the free and open international order,
because that is what is really going to promote this prosperity
and the economic development, everything that we want, that our
presence is there.
And there is also reference to this concept of the rules of
the road, which I also believe is a function of this free and
open international order.
So my question to you is twofold. One is, what is this free
and open international order?
And, secondly, hidden in all of that, or maybe not so
hidden in all of that, is this whole concept that, in order to
be successful or to be effective, you must be able to prevent
war but you must be able to win war. So one of your priorities
is lethality--in other words, the ability to do the defense.
So I was wondering if you could tie all of that for me.
Because I think that, in my opinion, serves as the basis of
what your 56 pages is getting at.
And, by the way, omedeto for your appointment.
Admiral Harris. Arigato.
So I think the original concept of the rules-based
international order actually predated the end of World War II.
It started out in the Atlantic Charter discussions, and then it
became the Atlantic Charter, then you had the United Nations,
then you had NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and you
had all these things. And some of the organs of the rules-based
international order were the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund, and those enforcement mechanisms that allowed states to
prosper under a set of rules where they would know what other
states were--the rules they were following.
And I think no state prospered more in the decades after
World War II than China. I mean, if you see where China is
today, that is due, in my view, in my opinion, that is due to
this rules-based international order.
And no one has advocated for China's involvement and
inclusion in that more than United States. It was United States
that supported China's entry in the World Trade Organization
and on and on and on.
And now, though, we find, I think, that rules-based
international order under pressure. And it is under pressure by
principally China and Russia, two nations that I call
revisionist powers.
So I think its behooves us to go back to the source, to go
back to this rules-based international order that has done well
by so many countries, including China and including the United
States, and continue to advocate for the importance of that
system.
I think, as far as the idea of deterrence and winning wars,
you know, I am a military guy, and I think it is important that
you must plan and resource to win a war while at the same time
you work to prevent it. But at the end of the day, you know,
the ability to wage war, I think, is important, or else then
you become a paper tiger.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And I think that is where some of
us feel that we are schizophrenic. But we have to be able to do
both. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, join me, as well, to the growing chorus today
of those thanking you for your service not just to our country
but to the greatest branch of the greatest military in the
world.
Everybody catch that? All right.
I wonder if you could comment a little bit on whether or
not you believe the torpedo threat within the Indo-Pacific
region has decreased.
Admiral Harris. No, it hasn't decreased at all. As China
and Russia, primarily, as their submarine capability has
increased, then the threat from torpedos as well as other
weapons systems that are resident on those submarines
increases.
And we also see an increase in capability of North Korean
submarines. And that is of immediate concern, given the
conditions on the peninsula now.
Mr. Banks. Then why in the budget that was released this
week do we see a drastic cut to Surface Ship Torpedo Defense
[SSTD], which 5 years ago was funded at approximately $84
million and, in the budget request this year, down to $8.59
million in the request? Why would we not assume then that there
has been a significant decrease in the threat?
Admiral Harris. Congressman, I don't know. I mean, that is
a Navy part of that submission, and I just don't know.
Mr. Banks. But you just said a moment ago the threat
certainly hasn't diminished----
Admiral Harris. That is correct. Yeah. I do not believe the
threat has diminished. In fact, I believe the threat is greater
now than it has been. Why the Navy decided to cut that in its
budget submission, I don't know.
Mr. Banks. Can you comment on SSTD and the importance?
Admiral Harris. I don't----
Mr. Banks. Surface Ship Torpedo Defense.
Admiral Harris. Right. If you are on a ship, I think it is
probably one of the things you are thinking about all the time.
I think it is very important.
Mr. Banks. Okay. That is all I have. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Admiral Harris. All right.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral, I have a couple questions regarding freedom of
navigation and freedom-of-navigation operations specifically
dealing with the blockchain islands that China is trying to do.
Are we doing anything in addition to, you know, some of the
operations we are doing right now in terms of sending our ships
near the islands, are we doing anything else to basically try
to test or push or even prevent the Chinese goal of the Nine-
Dash Line?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. On the idea of the Nine-Dash Line
itself, you know, we are talking about it in the public domain,
not just me but, you know, we are all talking about the fact
that the tribunal that was charged to look at the case in 2016
that was raised by the Philippines but against China, the
outcome of that case ruled the Nine-Dash Line to be
illegitimate.
Mr. Gallego. Right.
Admiral Harris. And so we talk about it in international
venues. And one of the things that I think is important to do
is to continue to talk about it and get other partner nations
to also talk about the illegitimacy of the Nine-Dash Line
claim.
And that Nine-Dash Line claim affects Malaysia----
Mr. Gallego. Right.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. The Philippines, and all the
rest.
What we do in the military sense is we continue to operate
in the South China Sea. We continue to do freedom-of-navigation
operations to demonstrate that we will fly, sail, or operate
wherever international law will allow us.
And we are encouraging our friends, allies, and partners to
do the same. If they are not willing to do freedom-of-
navigation operations to the level that we do, that is up to
them. But if they are operating in the South China Sea, that
demonstrates to all the world, really, that the South China Sea
is, in fact, international water space and is not China's
simply because it has ``China'' in its name.
Mr. Gallego. Have there been any other thoughts or plans,
for example, to further push the idea of how delegitimate their
claims are? For example, sending naval science teams or science
teams of other flag-bearing countries to these atolls or lands.
Because, ostensibly speaking, if these islands don't belong to
China, then they should not be opposed to, you know,
nonmilitary entities actually, you know, doing some research
there.
Admiral Harris. There has been some thought of that, but we
run up against policy and international law. You know, if one
of these islands, for example, is a high-tide elevation--you
know, I don't want to get too pedantic about it, but if it is a
high-tide elevation, then regardless of who owns it or if
anyone owns it, it has a 12-mile limit around it. And so that
becomes problematic if you are going to do scientific research.
And we don't want to find ourselves in the position of asking
China's permission to do the scientific research----
Mr. Gallego. Right.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. Because then that----
Mr. Gallego. Because that legitimizes it.
Admiral Harris. That is correct.
Mr. Gallego. To back up on that, Admiral, so you are
saying--I guess I am confused, because, from what I understand,
the international order has so far said that these islands are
not recognized as Chinese islands. In my mind, that means then
we should be able or our allies should be able to bring at
least nonmilitary assets to these islands, such as testing or
whatever it is.
And what you are saying is they still have some level of
sovereignty that is questionable within the international
order?
Admiral Harris. Right. Yeah. And so now I am going to be
drawn into the pedantic part of this, but----
Mr. Gallego. Right.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. If it is a high-tide
elevation, that means if it sticks up above the water at high
tide, then that means it has territoriality to the feature, you
know, no matter who owns it. And we say that China does not own
it, but it still has territoriality. So we are going to follow
that 12-mile limit around it.
If it is a low-tide elevation, in other words it disappears
at high tide, then it has no territoriality associated with it
at all.
Mr. Gallego. I guess I am very confused. This is like a
very chicken-or-egg thing. How can China have territoriality
over these manmade islands?
Admiral Harris. They don't, other than the reality is that
they claim it.
Mr. Gallego. Right.
Admiral Harris. So they claim it as theirs. And so they say
that the territoriality is imparted to Beijing.
Mr. Gallego. Right.
Admiral Harris. And we say for those high-tide elevations
that China has no territoriality over it. But it rates its own
territoriality. So we don't give it--we give it the 12-mile
limit.
If it is a low-tide elevation so that it disappears at high
tide, then it has no territoriality at all, and we can go right
up to it--and we do--under freedom-of-navigation operations.
Mr. Gallego. I just feel--and just reclaiming my time and
finish up--I just feel that, you know, it is in the future
interests of this country and our allies to make sure that we
are constantly pushing on the Nine-Dash Line establishment,
including with these atolls overseas.
Admiral Harris. And I agree with you. The Nine-Dash Line
covers all--almost all of the South China Sea. So China claims
the Nine-Dash Line and every feature in it.
Mr. Gallego. I see it on the map, so--yeah. Thank you,
Admiral.
The Chairman. Mr. Hice.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, as already has been said so many times, thank
you for your service, and congratulations on your next
assignment. It is a great honor to have you here. And, in fact,
it is a great honor to virtually be sitting at the table with
you here. I feel like we can shake hands.
But I want to begin with the question that Mr. Scott asked
a little while ago. I didn't really catch the answer. Do you
believe we are, in your opinion, leaving ourselves more
vulnerable if we forsake the JSTAR program for other platforms,
ISR platforms?
Admiral Harris. Yeah, so I support the Air Force's view on
the JSTARS that it can be replaced. My requirement is the
requirement for the capability, and I tend to be platform-
agnostic on all of these things.
As a joint commander, you know, I state the requirement for
the capability and ask the services to provide that capability.
If they choose to provide it on a large-frame airplane or some
other way, then that is the purview of the services, and that
is the system under which you all have created for us, and I am
okay with that.
So if the Air Force says the JSTARS platform is obsolete or
trending toward obsolescence and they have another way to meet
that capability, I am okay with that.
Mr. Hice. I think all of us would be, if that capability is
tested and proven before just forsaking that which we already
know works effectively. And that certainly is an area of
concern.
You mentioned a while ago good news, bad news--good news
that, in your opinion, the U.S. is rising in power, but the bad
news that China is outpacing us right now.
Of the next-generation military technologies involved with
China right now, be it hypersonic missiles or directed energy
weapons, autonomous weapons or space-based, which concerns you
the most?
Admiral Harris. Today, Congressman, I am concerned about
hypersonics because of where they are in that development. You
know, some of the other areas you mentioned, directed energy
and space-based weapons, I think that they are not as far along
as they are--analogous terms--as they are with hypersonics. I
worry about hypersonics today.
Mr. Hice. Okay. With that statement, then, would you agree
that that would be the area of most importance for us in terms
of our keeping a technological edge? Or where would you say we
need to focus?
Admiral Harris. I think we need to continue to focus on
maintaining the technological and asymmetric edge in undersea
warfare. I think that is the most important thing.
That said, you know, here comes the hypersonic threat from
China, and we need to start thinking about and resourcing our
defense against hypersonic weapons and our own offensive
hypersonic weapons.
But I think that our advantage and the capability that is
resonant in the undersea warfare domain is so significant and
is so pressurized now by China's development that we have to
continue to resource that.
Mr. Hice. Do you believe we are properly resourced?
Admiral Harris. I do not. I mean, I have said before that I
don't have enough--just the submarine numbers alone, I don't
have what I need.
Mr. Hice. Okay. You mentioned a while ago, too, about the
cyber domain. Do you believe we are adequately prepared to deal
with whatever attacks or threats may come from cyber?
Admiral Harris. I don't. But I will defer to Admiral Rogers
and U.S. Cyber Command, and that is his job. But my sense is
that we need to continue to develop that capability.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Thank you again, Admiral.
And, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And very good to see you, Admiral. And thank you so much
for your service. I think everyone has certainly acknowledged
that. I know that we all appreciate your great openness
whenever there is a CODEL [congressional delegation] visit to
PACOM, and you certainly represented that.
I also just wanted to say how pleased I am about your
nomination and, I think, your strong statement earlier about
our diplomatic missions need to be supported as much
budgetarily as our defense missions as well. You are going to
be a strong voice in that, and I appreciate it.
You know, I know that nuclear weapons are not your direct
responsibility, but they do certainly have a direct impact on
your area of responsibility as it exists today.
The NPR calls for modernizing and expanding our nuclear
architecture through sea-based-launch cruise missiles and low-
yield sea ballistic missiles, therefore lowering the threshold
for employing nuclear weapons.
So I am just wondering how you weigh this nuclear
modernization with the priorities that you have outlined today.
Do you feel that you can address that?
Admiral Harris. I do. And I think that those elements that
are in the Nuclear Posture Review are critical to PACOM because
they are critical to the Nation.
I think the idea of modernizing the triad is essential.
Perhaps one of the most important outcomes of the Nuclear
Posture Review is acknowledgement and affirmation that we need
the triad. And then the next step, of course, is to modernize
it. So I think that is one of those nuances in there that is so
important.
I think the small-yield submarine-launched weapons
increases our capability. And it remains to be seen, I think,
what the command and control of that kind of a weapon would be,
and the sea-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile. So we are
going to have to think about that, because we haven't had to
think about that in a while. I haven't had to think about it at
all.
But I think the sea-launched cruise missile, nuclear-
capable, sounds like a TLAM-N [Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-
Nuclear], which, you know, was extant in a lot of my career
during the Cold War. We don't have that now. So the command and
control of those tactical kinds of weapons, I think we are
going to have to explore that. Whether that is given to the
combatant commander in general or whether it is retained by
Strategic Command, you know, I don't know how that is going to
work.
But the fact is that I think that that increases our
capability and decreases the chance of an accidental nuclear
war by giving us those capabilities.
Mrs. Davis. Is it fair to say that there are risks
certainly associated with this strategy as well?
Admiral Harris. I think the risk is by not adhering to the
strategy.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Uh-huh. How might China perceive the
renewed U.S.-Russian modernization?
Admiral Harris. I can almost guarantee you that they won't
like it. But that is no reason not to do it. You know, if we
didn't do anything that China didn't like, then we would be
nowhere.
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Admiral Harris. So it seems like no matter what we do in a
legitimate defensive situation--THAAD on the peninsula, for
example--they are going to object to. But that doesn't mean
that we shouldn't go ahead and do it, because it is the right
thing to do, in my view.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
I had one other question, Mr. Chairman, but I know we have
a few people that are waiting, so I will go ahead and yield
back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you also for
making what I am sure is the first reference to Sir John Monash
and the Battle of Hamel in HASC [House Armed Services
Committee] history. I look forward to working with you in your
new role.
You mentioned, I believe in an exchange with Mr. Wittman
earlier, you brought up INF. And to put a finer point on it,
given China's investment in missiles that you have referenced,
as well as their overall modernization, do you believe INF
restrictions harm our conventional deterrence to the point that
we may not be able to uphold our commitments in the Pacific
into the 2020s? Or, put differently, INF, while critical in
Europe, is it hamstringing us in Asia?
Admiral Harris. Thanks for the question.
I wouldn't go as far as the beginning part of your
question, but I do agree that it hamstrings me in the Pacific.
Because the weapons that I have to bring to bear are outmatched
by the ground-based weapons that China can bring to bear
because they are not a signatory to INF.
So the way ahead, I am not the expert on that. I have
highlighted the deficiencies in my capability in the Pacific
because of INF. And I know that it is--at least I think it is
being studied at the right levels to figure out the way ahead.
But I view INF as self-limiting to the United States. And, to
me, INF is not about Russia as it is about China.
Mr. Gallagher. But given your perspective as a theater
commander there on the ground, I would just be curious of your
thoughts, are there things we should be exploring on the
committee? For example, you could imagine increasing firing
rates, capacity, range of existing systems. You could initiate
R&D [research and development] for noncompliant systems. Or you
could develop systems with an INF-compliant boost range but a
glide range that extends. And I just would love your thoughts
on what we should explore in this case.
Admiral Harris. Yeah, I think that we could be creative in
our approach to defining weapons. So if it has more boost than
glide, then it is not an airplane, then it is probably INF-
compliant, so we ought to think about it in that regard.
You know, the INF Treaty itself doesn't limit the R&D, so
we ought to start the R&D and then decide later on whether we
are going to field the weapon or not. But we don't want to
start later on with the R&D, or else we have lost all that
time.
Of course, the other argument is we could waste the money.
And that is why it is a decision that has to be taken not only
at the department level but at you-all's level.
Mr. Gallagher. Great. I appreciate your candor, Admiral.
That is all I have.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Admiral, thank you again for your service to the
country. We look forward to your new role, your new diplomatic
role in Australia.
As we look at China and Russia turning the levers that you
have indicated today could help us with the North Koreans, are
there any things that you see that they are not doing that we
wish that they were doing?
Admiral Harris. That is a little bit open-ended, but I
would like for them to do more. I think that they have the
capacity to do more. I think if 90 percent of your trade comes
from China, then China then wields a powerful lever. I think
their coal----
Mr. Gaetz. Is it that we want them to better enforce the
posture that they have taken, or is it that we would like them
to accelerate their----
Admiral Harris. I would like them to do both. I would like
them especially to accelerate. You know, we talk oil and coal.
I mean, they have a powerful lever there. Food and the
guestworker program and all that revenue that goes into the
regime----
Mr. Gaetz. China occasionally takes the position that,
while the government does not sanction some of those activities
that yield humans moving from North Korea into China for work
or other assets like energy assets moving from China into North
Korea or vice versa, that just as there are nongovernment
actors in the United States that can do things outside of the
law, there are nongovernment actors in China that can do the
same.
Is that a realistic claim that they are making, or do they
have sufficient command and control to enforce broader
sanctions?
Admiral Harris. They are a communist country. I think they
have sufficient command and control.
Mr. Gaetz. So that would seem to indicate that the claims
that, well, some of this activity occurs beyond our gaze--you
would question those claims.
Admiral Harris. I would question those claims.
Mr. Gaetz. When we look at success in the event of some
sort of kinetic conflict, it appears clear to us--and I thank
the chairman for a really provocative and insightful day
yesterday on these questions--we look at the importance of what
capabilities our allies bring to bear.
Could you highlight some of the important capabilities that
our allies in the region would need to bring to bear in the
event of a kinetic conflict?
Admiral Harris. Well, you know, I don't want to speak for
the allies in terms of kinetic conflicts, in the sense that
they are going to have to make those decisions.
But the capabilities that Japan and Japan's Self-Defense
Forces, the Koreans and the Korean Armed Forces have in that
theater are significant, in terms of the ROK [Republic of
Korea] Army is an incredible fighting force. The Japan
ballistic missile systems, their ships and their aircraft are
first-rate.
And then you go and you think about Australia and all of
their capabilities. You look at Singapore as a partner, and
what they provide us as a platform are significant.
So these are important friends, allies, and partners that
we all work hard to maintain those relationships.
Mr. Gaetz. In the event that conflict does go kinetic on
the Korean Peninsula, we will likely have to launch munitions
over water that will then land on land, correct?
Admiral Harris. Correct.
Mr. Gaetz. And, to my knowledge, the only place that the
Navy or the Air Force are currently testing munitions that are
launched over water and land on land is in the Gulf Test Range
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Am I right about that, or are
there other places where we do that testing and evaluation?
Admiral Harris. We are testing strikes at Nellis, for
example, Nellis Air Force Base, where we do a lot of our
command and control exercises that result in----
Mr. Gaetz. But for next-gen weapons systems.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. I don't know.
Mr. Gaetz. Okay. Very well.
You would agree that, then, looking beyond our current
moment to a 30-, 50-year timeframe, do you believe that we
would win any type of kinetic conflict with China on the
airframe alone, or would we require development in our
munitions capabilities?
Admiral Harris. We will clearly require development in our
munitions capabilities. But if I am around in 30 or 40 or 50
years, I will be the grayest owl you have ever seen.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, I know that so much of your service has
been dedicated to ensuring that we win well beyond the time
that those of us who are here are still around.
And I would just merely make mention, Mr. Chairman, that I
believe we will not win on the airframe alone. I think the
munitions are going to be essential.
I agree with your assessment, Admiral. And that is why it
is so important that we preserve the assets that allow us to
test and develop those next-generation munitions.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Does the gentlelady from Arizona have a
question for open session?
The gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes or less.
Ms. McSally. Everybody else got their turn, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Harris. Thanks so much for your years of
service. You are a tremendous patriot, and we really appreciate
all your sacrifice.
Having been in the military myself, you know, we spent a
lot of time also focusing on information warfare and how our
enemies use that against us as a domain.
I was cringing with Kim Jong-un's sister at the Olympics
and how not only she was received but also how she was treated
by the, at best, naive media in the coverage of her. She is the
head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and
responsible, as part of this brutal regime, of the lack of
human rights, the death and torture of many citizens. I mean,
you know what this regime is like. And the fact that our media
would play into this is just embarrassing and disgusting to me.
And I just want your thoughts. I mean, you mentioned
earlier in your testimony about you think his long game is the
reunification under communist rule. What are your thoughts
about the antics that they just played and the impact? Because
it was just embarrassing to me.
Admiral Harris. So, clearly, a charm offensive. And I think
that it behooves us and our Korean allies not to be charmed----
Ms. McSally. Yeah.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. And to consider North Korea
for the regime it is----
Ms. McSally. Right.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. And to deal with it on the
basis of fact and not charm. I believe that General Brooks is
ideally positioned to do that and that he views this charm
offensive through clear eyes.
Ms. McSally. But just the impact, though, on the media kind
of playing into it, and how it basically looks like they were a
tool of their information warfare and their propaganda
campaign--again, naive at best. Is that fair?
Admiral Harris. That is fair.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, sir.
With the $700 billion and $716 billion that we have now
agreed to last week to infuse into our military, can you share
what that means for PACOM, like, what that is going to be able
to do from a readiness and a warfighting and a capability to
address the many threats that you have to face?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. Again, I will express my gratitude
for that and the hopes that we will get the appropriation for
that in the NDAA 2018 and then the next year.
It gives us 2 years to plan. It gives us something we
haven't had for a long time. You know, the day after tomorrow,
Saturday, I will have been in command of PACOM for 1,000 days,
and 433 of those will have been under a CR [continuing
resolution].
So this budget is terrific. I mean, this thing that you all
have done, this bipartisan agreement, is outstanding. It helps
me and it helps the joint force be able to plan and train and
buy equipment that we need and start new starts and all of
that.
Ms. McSally. Can you translate that into, like, some
specific warfighting capabilities, just for the American people
to understand, like, what it means for those who are
responsible to be ready to fight tonight on the Korean
Peninsula, if needed, and dealing with all the other stuff,
China, munitions, all that stuff? How does that really----
Admiral Harris. Yeah. And so--well, among other things, MK-
48 torpedos, long-range antisurface missiles, training for our
Air Force and Navy fighter pilots, significant things like that
that we have had to--we have lost the opportunity over the last
couple of years, that we will be able to recapture that.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I was a strong ``yes'' on that
specifically because of the impact that is going to have on our
troops and those who serve with you. So thanks.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. That was a good way
to end.
Admiral, I have one request. Before you leave the military,
if you could help coach other DOD witnesses to give clear,
direct answers to questions, it would be a really good thing.
And I appreciate your directness to all the questions you have
gotten today.
We will adjourn this open hearing and regather in about 5
minutes upstairs in classified session.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 14, 2018
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 14, 2018
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 14, 2018
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 14, 2018
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. Please describe the impact Counter America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) would have for U.S. ties in
the Indo-Pacific region, specifically with India, Indonesia, and
Vietnam. Please provide specific examples of PACOM efforts to
strengthen relations with the affected countries and the potential
implications CAATSA would have on those efforts.
Admiral Harris. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. At this time, the United States and our allies rely
heavily on China in the rare-earths market. What national security
concerns do you have regarding China's dominance of the rare-earths
market? In your opinion, should the U.S. focus more on building up our
own production and refinement base to ensure independence from China?
How can we work with our allies to secure independence from China in
this regard?
Admiral Harris. Rare earth minerals are neither rare nor hard to
mine. These elements are used in high-end electronics and
manufacturing. As the demand grows for faster and more advanced
electronics, and for advanced process technologies (e.g., as high-end
lasers, high-speed processors, catalysts, solid oxide fuel cells,
batteries, etc.), the demand for rare earth minerals such as Yttrium,
Erbium, and Neodynium will continue to grow. Similarly, as demand
grows, so will supply and innovations to more efficiently mine and
produce rare earth minerals.
Although China exports around 90 percent of rare earth minerals
globally, they do not have a monopoly. What they do have is a poorly-
governed, environmentally-damaged countryside full of illegal mines and
toxic waste. And while China has dominated the rare earth minerals
market since the mid-1990s, rare earth minerals are not unique to
China. Rare earth minerals are currently mined in Australia, Canada,
Greenland, India, Brazil, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and many other
countries that we consider partners, allies, and reliable trade
partners. Like many aspects of their economy, China currently has too
much capacity in rare earths production and sells it at the lowest
prices. Even China's mines are running at a loss and forced to contend
with illegal mining and smuggling. The Chinese government plans to
limit production by 2020, which will likely spur production elsewhere
in the world, including the U.S.
While the U.S. is currently not mining rare earth minerals, our
allies and partners are, and we could if we wanted to when the price is
right. When global prices in the rare earths market go up, I would
expect production elsewhere in the world to go up, including the U.S.
[all]