    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 115-69]

            SENIOR LEADER MISCONDUCT: PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                FEBRUARY 7, 2018

                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    28-972		          WASHINGTON : 2019

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                        MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      JACKIE SPEIER, California
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio, Vice Chair   ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma              NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    DON BACON, Nebraska                  RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona              CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
    RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana         JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
                     Dan Sennott, Professional Staff Member
                    Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member
                             Danielle Steitz, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Coffman, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Military Personnel.............................     1
    Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel.....................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Fine, Glenn A., Principal Deputy Inspector General, U.S.
      Department of Defense..........................................     4
    Harris, Lt Gen Stayce D., USAF, Inspector General of the Air
      Force, United States Air Force.................................     8
    McConville, GEN James C., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
      United States Army.............................................    34
    Moran, ADM William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
      United States Navy.............................................    35
    Ottignon, BGen David A., USMC, Inspector General of the Marine
      Corps, United States Marine Corps..............................     9
    Quantock, LTG David E., USA, Inspector General of the Army,
      United States Army.............................................     6
    Shelanski, VADM Herman, USN, Naval Inspector General, United
      States Navy....................................................     7
    Walters, Gen Glenn M., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine
      Corps, United States Marine Corps..............................    36
    Wilson, Gen Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
      Force, United States Air Force.................................    36

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Coffman, Hon. Mike...........................................    57
        Fine, Glenn A................................................    59
        Harris, Lt Gen Stayce D......................................    97
        McConville, GEN James C......................................   107
        Moran, ADM William F.........................................   113
        Ottignon, BGen David A.......................................   103
        Quantock, LTG David E........................................    87
        Shelanski, VADM Herman.......................................    92
        Walters, Gen Glenn M.........................................   125
        Wilson, Gen Stephen W........................................   118

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Chart displayed by Ms. Speier................................   133

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Ms. McSally..................................................   140
        Ms. Speier...................................................   137

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Speier...................................................   145
        Ms. Tsongas..................................................   148

            SENIOR LEADER MISCONDUCT: PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                            Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
                           Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 7, 2018.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Coffman
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE COFFMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

        Mr. Coffman. This subcommittee hearing is called to order.
        I want to welcome everyone to this morning's Military
    Personnel Subcommittee hearing. The purpose of today's hearing
    is to receive testimony from the Department of Defense and the
    services regarding efforts they have taken to investigate and
    hold senior leaders accountable for misconduct and to
    understand what programs and policies are in place to prevent
    misconduct.
        Our military enjoys the highest confidence rating by far of
    any institution in American society. This well-deserved
    reputation has been earned through the service and sacrifice of
    millions of brave men and women. One by-product of this
    reputation is that the military and its leaders are held to a
    much higher standard than almost any other institution, and I
    know that you wouldn't have it any other way.
        Consequently, the misconduct of a few can greatly impact
    the military's hard-earned reputation. When the misconduct
    involves flag or general officers, the negative effects are
    even greater. These incidents of senior leader misconduct, even
    though relatively rare, not only hurt the victims involved, but
    can have a lasting impact on the readiness of the unit in which
    the senior leader has served.
        While one incident of senior leader misconduct is too many,
    it is important to acknowledge that the vast majority of senior
    leaders serve with distinction. It is also important to
    acknowledge that some of the acts of misconduct that the
    military investigates and punishes would not be investigated,
    much less punished, in the civilian world. Nonetheless,
    military leadership must continue to ensure that all senior
    leaders uphold the highest standards of ethical conduct, and
    when senior leaders fall short, they must be held appropriately
    accountable.
        We will hear from two panels today. The first panel
    consists of the Department of Defense and services' inspectors
    general. They will discuss the reporting and investigation of
    senior leader misconduct, in addition to the types of cases
    they investigate.
        For the second panel, we are honored to have the Vice
    Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with the
    Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. They will discuss
    what happens to those IG [inspector general] investigations, if
    they are substantiated, how they hold individuals accountable,
    and they will provide an overview of their prevention programs.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
    ethics and mentorship programs in place to prevent misconduct.
    I am also interested to hear how the services investigate
    misconduct allegations and hold wrongdoers accountable.
    Additionally, I would like to know what trends had developed
    with regard to the types of issues that are being reported and
    investigated. Finally, I look forward to hearing what
    additional actions can be taken to further reduce incidents of
    senior leader misconduct.
        I would like to make two other administrative points.
    First, it is important to note that the Department of Defense's
    common definition of senior official includes an officer in the
    grade of O-7 and above, including officers who have been
    selected for promotion to O-7, or civilian member of the Senior
    Executive Service. For the purposes of today's hearing and
    consistent with the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, the
    witnesses have been asked to focus on misconduct by senior
    military officers in the rank of O-7 select and above.
        I would also like to remind the members that the witnesses
    today may not be able to answer certain questions regarding
    specific cases if the answer would compromise an ongoing
    investigation or would give rise to an accusation that the
    military has prejudged the outcome of a pending investigation.
        Before I introduce our first panel, let me offer the
    ranking member, Ms. Speier, an opportunity to make her opening
    remarks.
        Ms. Speier.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Coffman can be found in the
    Appendix on page 57.]

        STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
     CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today and for your service to
    our country. You know, one of the core tenets of the armed
    services and of our country is that no one is above the law.
    From the most recent recruit to the most senior officer, all
    service members are subject to the same UCMJ [Uniform Code of
    Military Justice] laws and the same ethical code of conduct.
    But there is a phrase in the military that goes like this,
    ``Different spanks for different ranks.'' And as Don
    Christensen, the former general counsel for the Air Force said,
    and I quote, ``An everyday troop is court-martialed for what a
    general officer is given a slap on the wrist.''
        So it is with great sorrow and anger that I have read
    countless reports of misconduct among senior leaders, including
    general officers and admirals. This is borne out by the data.
    Buried on page 66 of an 85-page DOD [Department of Defense]
    Inspector General [IG] report on, quote, ``Top DOD Management
    Challenges,'' unquote, is a finding of a 13 percent increase in
    complaints alleging misconduct by senior officials from fiscal
    year 2015 to fiscal year 2017, from 710 to 803. An increase in
    substantiated rate increase from 26 percent to 37 percent. The
    most common allegations involved personal misconduct including
    improper relationships, improper personnel actions, misuse of
    governmental resources, and travel violations.
        In my time on this committee, I have heard over and over
    the importance of the chain of command and how it leads to
    better justice outcomes, but many senior leaders who should be
    the essential core of the chain of command are not being held
    to the same standard as the rank and file. This corrupts
    fairness, justice, and morale.
        To illustrate the severity of this problem, I want to
    highlight five cases of senior leader misconduct from just the
    last few years. As you will see, these senior leaders committed
    serious crimes and rule violations, yet received only light
    administrative, not judicial, punishment. Most got no public
    scrutiny until journalists inquired about their cases.
        Army Major General John Custer had an inappropriate
    relationship with a woman, had his staff buy her sexy clothes,
    and lied to investigators about it. Lucky for him, General
    Martin Dempsey, then Custer's commander, removed, and I am
    underscoring this, removed the substantiated account of an
    inappropriate relationship from Custer's record. How do you do
    that? So the review board could only consider lesser charges.
    Custer retired at a rank and kept his pension. So he retired at
    rank and kept his pension. The public only knows about this
    incident because a whistleblower told USA Today.
        Second, Air Force General Arthur Lichte was alleged to have
    coerced sex from a subordinate in 2007 and 2009. His victim
    believes she had to reciprocate the general's advances due to
    his rank and position. Lichte was reprimanded and demoted to
    major general, but not for command rape but for a, quote,
    ``inappropriate sexual relationship.''
        Army Major General Ralph Baker assaulted a woman at an off-
    base event. For this he received a letter of reprimand and
    retired as a brigadier general. The public learned about this 9
    months after it happened following a FOIA [Freedom of
    Information Act] request.
        Army Major General David Haight's exploits earned him the
    nickname ``swinging general.'' He had an 11-year affair and
    regularly swapped sexual partners, which made him a foreign
    intelligence threat and target. As punishment, Haight was
    reprimanded and retired as a lieutenant colonel.
        But make no mistake, not all misconduct is sexual. At West
    Point, the man in charge of teaching future leaders ethics,
    Superintendent Lieutenant General David Huntoon, Jr., made his
    staff work at private charity dinners, give free driving
    lessons, and feed a friend's cat. Huntoon received a reprimand
    and retired at rank. The IG report was kept secret for more
    than a year and only released via FOIA as Huntoon neared
    retirement.
        Colleagues, these are just 5 stories out of an estimated
    500 since 2013. They don't even include criminal misconduct of
    the type we have seen in the Fat Leonard case in which 330 Navy
    personnel, including 60 current and retired admirals, are under
    investigation for accepting bribes and gifts. And these aren't
    just ordinary bribes and gifts. Some of them included an
    $18,000 dinner or a $50,000 stay in a swank hotel. Sometimes
    these bribes and gifts were exchanged for revealing classified
    information. But I picked them because they are illustrative of
    a deep and systematic problem in the armed services.
        Leaders set the standard, and when that leadership is
    toxic, it drips down to all levels of the military. Based on
    the DOD Inspector General's own data, it is clear that the
    current system of deterrence is not working. In today's
    hearing, I want to hear from all our panelists about what they
    are doing to exert sufficient oversight. In the case of the
    inspector general, how are they working to increase
    accountability and transparency? In the case of the vice
    chiefs, what are they doing to combat criminal behavior and
    corruption?
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from
    our witnesses.
        Mr. Coffman. I thank the ranking member.
        We will give each witness the opportunity to present his or
    her testimony and each member an opportunity to question the
    witnesses for 5 minutes. We would also respectfully remind the
    witnesses to summarize, to the greatest extent possible, the
    high points of your written testimony in 5 minutes or less.
    Your written comments and statements will be made part of the
    hearing record.
        Let me welcome our first panel. Mr. Glenn A. Fine,
    Principal Deputy Inspector General, United States Department of
    Defense; Lieutenant General David E. Quantock, Inspector
    General of the United States Army; Vice Admiral Herman
    Shelanski, Naval Inspector General; Lieutenant General Stayce
    D. Harris, Inspector General of the Air Force; Brigadier
    General David A. Ottignon, Inspector General of the Marine
    Corps.
        With that, Mr. Fine, you are recognized for your opening
    statement.

    STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL,
                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Fine. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about
    the work of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector
    General regarding senior official misconduct, prevention, and
    accountability. In my written statement, I describe how the DOD
    OIG [Office of Inspector General] investigates allegations of
    senior official misconduct and oversees military service IG
    investigations of these allegations. In addition, I provide
    statistics and trends on the number of misconduct complaints,
    the types of misconduct, the number of investigations, the
    timeliness of investigations, and substantiation rates for both
    the DOD OIG and the service IG investigations. I also provide
    additional statistics for a particular type of misconduct:
    allegations of retaliation and reprisal by senior officials
    against whistleblowers. In my oral testimony, I would like to
    highlight a few key points from that statement.
        First, I believe it is important to recognize that the vast
    majority of senior officials in the DOD perform their
    challenging jobs with dedication and integrity. My experience,
    both as the IG of the Justice Department overseeing the DOJ
    [Department of Justice] and the FBI [Federal Bureau of
    Investigation] for 11 years and from my experience for over 2
    years performing the duties of the DOD Inspector General, is
    that only a very small percentage of these senior officials
    fail to uphold the high ideals and ethics required of their
    critical positions. However, some do commit misconduct. When
    they do, they need to be held accountable. The DOD OIG and the
    service IGs, therefore, seek to investigate allegations of
    misconduct in a thorough, fair, professional, and timely way.
        Second, the data I present in my written statement show
    that there was a significant increase in the number of
    complaints alleging misconduct by senior DOD officials from
    fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, and since then the number
    of these complaints has been steady. During the same period,
    the number of allegations warranting investigation by the DOD
    OIG or service and component IGs has decreased.
        Overall, the number of senior official cases with any
    findings of substantiated misconduct rose between fiscal year
    2008 and 2012 from 40 to 85, but has declined since then to 49
    in fiscal year 2017. However, I want to make clear our
    recognition that any misconduct by a senior official is
    unacceptable.
        Third, while the types of substantiated allegations against
    senior officials involve a broad range of misconduct, the
    allegations primarily fell within five main categories, which I
    describe in my written statement. Within these categories,
    there are several areas of particular concern. For example,
    there are a number of substantiated allegations against senior
    officials engaged in inappropriate relationships, and these
    cases have received substantial public attention.
        Fourth, the DOD OIG also has a criminal investigative arm,
    the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, DCIS, to handle
    investigations of criminal allegations. Currently, the biggest
    case DCIS is handling involves Glenn Defense Marine Asia [GDMA]
    and its owner, Leonard Francis, widely known as the Fat Leonard
    case. GDMA provided husbanding services to U.S. Navy ships in
    the Pacific, such as refueling and resupply. Francis
    orchestrated a scheme to defraud the U.S. Navy of tens of
    millions of dollars by routinely overbilling for goods and
    services. Francis accomplished this criminal conduct by
    systematically grooming and bribing Active Duty military and
    civilian employees of the U.S. Navy with things of value, such
    as dinners, gifts, hotel expenses, money, and the services of
    prostitutes.
        To date, Francis and 17 former Navy and DOD officials,
    including a rear admiral and an SES [Senior Executive Service]
    member, have pled guilty to criminal conduct. In addition, in
    2017, nine senior officials previously assigned to the Navy's
    7th Fleet were indicted for conspiracy, bribery, and false
    statements. That case is ongoing.
        Finally, my written statement discusses measures the DOD
    OIG has implemented to further improve investigations of
    misconduct. For example, to standardize investigations across
    the DOD and to speed the review process, we are working to
    implement a standardized case management database among the DOD
    OIG and military service IGs.
        To ensure compliance with laws and regulations and to share
    best practices among the service IGs, we have begun conducting
    quality assessment reviews of the service IGs similar to peer
    reviews. To promote fairness, the DOD OIG provides subjects an
    opportunity to comment on the accuracy of our substantiated
    findings through the tentative conclusions letter process prior
    to completion of our final report.
        To promote transparency, the DOD OIG considers proactive
    public release of our completed substantiated reports,
    particularly those with findings of substantiated misconduct
    involving high-level officials. To help address timeliness, we
    have also reallocated resources within the DOD OIG to increase
    the number of investigators working on misconduct and
    whistleblower cases. However, handling the increasing number
    and complexity of complaints requires resources, not only for
    the DOD OIG, but also for the service and component IGs. It is
    critical to adequately resource the DOD OIG, as well as the
    service and component IGs, particularly when the DOD continues
    to grow.
        In conclusion, the DOD OIG and the service IGs have a
    challenging but critically important mission to investigate
    allegations of misconduct thoroughly, fairly, professionally,
    and timely, and we will continue to seek to fulfill that
    important responsibility.
        That concludes my statement, and I would be glad to answer
    any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fine can be found in the
    Appendix on page 59.]
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Fine.
        General Quantock.

     STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID E. QUANTOCK, USA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
                      THE ARMY, UNITED STATES ARMY

        General Quantock. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
    guests of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify on senior leader misconduct. On behalf of the Secretary
    of the Army, the Honorable Dr. Mark Esper, and our chief of
    staff, General Mark Milley, thank you for your support of our
    soldiers, Army civilians, families, and veterans.
        The Army holds its senior leaders to the highest standards.
    The trust and confidence of the American people, which is
    intrinsic to who we are as an Army, is rooted in our character
    and our credibility. We do acknowledge problems exist, and we
    take senior misconduct very seriously. Over the past decade,
    the Army Inspector General agency substantiated allegations
    against only 3 percent of the general officer population per
    year. While recent headlines on Army senior misconduct give the
    appearance of widespread misbehavior, the truth is most
    transgressions are technical violations committed by a very
    small minority.
        The most common substantiated allegations involving general
    officers are misuse of government resources, failure to follow
    regulations, and failure to take action. Substantiated
    allegations for inappropriate relationships or sexual
    misconduct over the past decade involved less than 1 percent of
    general officers. This small fraction of senior leaders does
    not represent the honorable service and character of the entire
    general officer core.
        Whistleblower reprisal remains the number one allegation.
    The substantiation rate for whistleblower reprisal cases is 4
    percent. A significant factor in the low 4 percent
    substantiation rate is the misuse of the whistleblower reprisal
    process. This typically occurs when a soldier or civilian is
    held accountable by a senior official for misconduct or poor
    performance, following a protected communication. The resulting
    claim of reprisal creates challenges for senior commanders who
    hold people accountable and then are faced with an inspector
    general whistleblower reprisal investigation. And in the last 3
    years, whistleblower reprisal has basically had a sixfold
    increase and has been--is out of control, in my view.
        The vast majority of the 685 general officers serving are
    doing the right thing every single day. The positive trend over
    the past 5 years has been a 51 percent reduction in the number
    of general officer substantiated cases from 32 in 2013 to 15
    last year. This includes a decrease in substantiated
    allegations for official travel violations, inappropriate
    political activities, non-Federal entities involvement,
    conflicts of interest, and improper endorsements.
        In closing, the overwhelming majority of Army general
    officers abide by the letter and spirit of our laws and
    regulations, and utilize sound judgment in the stewardship of
    taxpayer resources. Those who do not are held accountable.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for your
    continued support of our soldiers, our civilians, families, and
    veterans. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Quantock can be found in
    the Appendix on page 87.]
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Quantock, for your
    testimony.
        Vice Admiral Shelanski, you are now recognized.

       STATEMENT OF VADM HERMAN SHELANSKI, USN, NAVAL INSPECTOR
                      GENERAL, UNITED STATES NAVY

        Admiral Shelanski. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier,
    and Military Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you very
    much for having us here today to discuss senior leader
    misconduct and the opportunity to explain our senior leader
    investigative process.
        In the Navy, we take pride in living up to our core values
    of honor, courage, and commitment. We expect the highest
    ethical and moral behaviors of our senior leaders. Therefore,
    we take any allegations of misconduct very seriously, and where
    appropriate, investigate, and when substantiated, hold our
    people accountable when they do not meet our high standards.
        To be clear, there must be a violation of rule, regulation,
    or law. There is a process in place with many offices that
    handle this range of violations. Our primary role as the IG is
    to conduct administrative investigations, not criminal or UCMJ
    cases.
        When we receive complaints on flag officers from our
    hotline, Congress, or by referral from the DOD, we will open
    investigation on credible allegations of misconduct against
    one- and two-star admirals.
        The investigation process is fair, deliberate, and
    thorough. Our investigators are highly trained and experienced
    professionals who rigidly adhere to the Council of Inspectors
    General on Integrity and Efficiency standards. We constantly
    strive through process improvements to produce ever more timely
    reports without sacrificing professional due diligence. Our
    investigators receive lots of oversight, from our division
    directors to legal review to a DOD review and their ultimate
    approval.
        At the end of our investigation, all reports go to the CNO
    [Chief of Naval Operations] and the Secretary of the Navy. If
    any allegation is substantiated, we submit a request to the
    Office of the VCNO [Vice Chief of Naval Operations] that
    appropriate corrective action be taken and documented.
    Corrective action can range from verbal counseling to formal
    disciplinary action under UCMJ. We receive a copy of the
    documented corrective action recorded in our database and
    provide a copy to the DOD IG. This adverse information will
    remain in the officer's record for the entirety of their
    career.
        In the last 5 years, we have seen a steady decrease in the
    number of overall flag officer complaints and also a decrease
    in the number of cases substantiated. The most common
    categories of substantiated offenses we have seen is misuse of
    government vehicles and drivers for personal use, improper use
    of official travel, improper gift acceptance, and prohibited
    personnel practices.
        In conclusion, I believe that our investigative process is
    a necessary and effective tool to address questionable ethical
    behaviors by our senior leaders. Thank you for your continued
    support for our sailors, Marines, Navy families, and veterans.
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Shelanski can be found
    in the Appendix on page 92.]
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Vice Admiral Shelanski.
        Lieutenant General Harris, you are now recognized.

     STATEMENT OF LT GEN STAYCE D. HARRIS, USAF, INSPECTOR GENERAL
               OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

        General Harris. Okay. Thank you.
        Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to
    testify before you today.
        And as the Air Force Inspector General, I am responsible to
    independently and continuously inspect, assess, investigate,
    and report to the Secretary of the Air Force on the readiness,
    economy, efficiency, and discipline of our force. And with the
    Air Force core values of integrity first, service before self,
    and excellence in all we do, I take special pride in helping
    ensure our airmen live up to those values.
        Misconduct by Air Force senior officers erodes the trust in
    our service, the trust of our airmen, and the trust of our
    country. And your Air Force is committed to the development of
    ethical airmen leaders, and we are equally determined to ensure
    accountability when standards are violated. And part of my
    responsibility includes resolution of complaints against Air
    Force general officers, officers selected for promotion to
    brigadier general, and retired general officers.
        The top three categories of violations we have seen in the
    past 5 years may be generally categorized as ethics violations,
    improper handling of personnel matters, and unprofessional
    relationships, in that order. And every complaint against a
    senior officer is diligently acted upon.
        Our cases are investigated by an independent team of
    investigating officers, augmented by embedded attorneys from
    the Office of the Air Force Judge Advocate General. And Air
    Force senior officer investigations are independent, thorough,
    impartial, objective, and we are careful to meet all legal
    requirements. This important work of ensuring accountability in
    our most senior leaders promotes the discipline, efficiency,
    and economy of our force.
        Our process in conducting senior officer investigations
    includes multiple layers of internal review, with every
    investigation receiving a separate and independent legal review
    signed by the director of administrative law for the Air Force.
    And upon completion of each investigation, the Department of
    Defense Office of the Inspector General provides an oversight
    review, as was mentioned. Investigations with substantiated
    allegations are referred to the appropriate command authority
    to determine what disciplinary action is warranted.
        And, finally, my deputy and I use a variety of venues and
    products to promote education and awareness across our senior
    officer population. It is important to me that we not only
    investigate complaints against our senior officers, but that we
    also work to reduce the incidence of misconduct by these high-
    ranking leaders.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, members of the
    subcommittee, I very much appreciate the committee's continuing
    support of our Air Force and your interest in our efforts to
    prevent misconduct by our senior officers. I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Harris can be found in
    the Appendix on page 97.]
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Lieutenant General Harris.
        Brigadier General Ottignon, you are now recognized.

    STATEMENT OF BGEN DAVID A. OTTIGNON, USMC, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
              THE MARINE CORPS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

        General Ottignon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coffman. And how do you say it?
        General Ottignon. It is pronounced Ottignon.
        Mr. Coffman. Ottignon. I was close.
        General Ottignon. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay.
        General Ottignon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Speier, distinguished members of the House Armed Services
    Committee on Military Personnel. Thank you for the opportunity
    to testify today about this important topic.
        My office provides the Secretary of the Navy and the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps an impartial and [credible]
    means to investigate or inquire into allegations of senior
    official misconduct, impropriety, or violation of law. I
    oversee a group of 25 dedicated professionals committed to
    upholding the laws that govern the service.
        In the past 10 years, 15 Marine Corps generals were
    substantiated by a thorough investigation process led by an
    inspector general. Most of these cases were violations of
    administrative processes and standards of conduct regulations.
    None of them were criminal in nature.
        I have complete confidence in the investigatory process and
    due diligence taken with each and every allegation brought
    forward. Every general officer investigation is reviewed for
    legal sufficiency and requires Department of Defense Inspector
    General oversight.
        The seriousness of which the Marine Corps approaches
    character, leadership, and ethics is apparent in the demanding
    standards that we expect all our leaders to uphold.
        In the last year, my office has traveled around the globe
    conducting training with commanding generals across the Corps
    and conducting thorough inspections to ensure that the
    application of our standards are consistent with our
    foundational core values of honor, courage, and commitment.
        On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant
    of the Marine Corps, we thank Congress and this subcommittee
    for the opportunity to discuss such an important issue with you
    this morning and your continued support for our United States
    Marine Corps and its families. I look forward to the
    opportunity to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Ottignon can be found in
    the Appendix on page 103.]
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Brigadier General Ottignon, for
    your testimony.
        We are going to limit to 5 minutes each member, but we will
    do a second round, if necessary, for the first panel.
        Some of you mentioned during your testimony that there is a
    wide scope of misconduct that you investigate. Could you please
    give some additional examples of the types of cases you
    investigate, and if you see any misconduct trends emerging? Why
    don't we start with you, Lieutenant General Quantock.
        General Quantock. Yes, sir. I am just looking at the last--
    last year, we had 15 substantiations. The range of the kind of
    work that we do is late NCOERs [noncommissioned officer
    evaluation reporting]. We had one particular general officer
    that basically lied on his PT [physical training] test, height
    and weight type stuff. One that inappropriately approved a
    flyover, so misuse of government resources. The dignity and
    respect, how they treated subordinates, what they were
    substantiated for. Improperly using an IG investigation for
    adverse action at the junior levels was substantiated.
        So those are--misuse of subordinate times, subordinate--we
    have made a huge effort in trying to get after certain cases
    where general officers make technical type of mistakes with
    subordinates primarily.
        You know, we all have staffs, and a lot of times our staffs
    try to do good things for us, and they try to make our life a
    little bit nicer. We have beat the hell out of that the last
    couple years. We have got an exportable training package. When
    I sit down with a general officer that are going into command,
    we encourage them to sit down. It is about 75, 80 pages of
    PowerPoint slides, basically vignettes of what has got general
    officers in trouble. Again, a lot of technical violations from
    use of travel, getting rental cars, all those kind of things
    that sets folks up for trouble.
        Mr. Coffman. What is dignity and respect?
        General Quantock. Dignity and respect is publicly
    humiliating somebody. That is the genesis of dignity and
    respect. So--but that exportable training package I think is
    one of the leading reasons why in 2013 we had 32 general
    officers out of 685, I might add, down to 15 that we have in
    this last year. A lot of the technical violations have been
    weeded out. So we continue to work this piece hard, not to
    mention all of the efforts of the senior leadership to get out
    there and make their vision well known.
        Mr. Coffman. Next.
        Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. So for us, over the last 3
    years, a decrease trendwise in substantiated cases, so 10 in
    2015, 4 in 2016. It looks like one will be substantiated for
    2017. We are finishing that case up now.
        You know, in general, most of the cases are about gifts
    acceptance and solicitation. So these are the technical--I am
    going out to lunch, and I accepted a gift of lunch from a
    contractor that was more than the acceptable limit. It is also
    in terms of endorsing non-Federal entities, so there are
    certain charities that were not supposed--unless they are
    federally recognized. In our official capacity, we are not
    allowed to endorse them, so one of our flag officers was seen
    to endorse it inappropriately, but, of course, mistakenly did
    not know that at the time. Also, some pay and benefits, so, for
    instance, leave statements, so inappropriate documentation of
    leave. And so those are very technical violations in general,
    so nothing in the order of larger, you know, more--so--and
    specific, no sexual harassment or any of those type of trends,
    sir.
        Mr. Coffman. General Harris.
        General Harris. Thank you. The greatest majority of our
    violations have been ethics violations, as has been mentioned
    by my peers. Misuse of a subordinate's time, misuse of a
    government vehicle, unauthorized gifts, postgovernment
    employment. But what is most important is that how we
    proactively, within the IG enterprise, within the inspector
    general enterprise, go out and educate our personnel, from the
    most junior to the most senior, on the different pitfalls and
    opportunities to lead the right example and to let them know
    what to look out for, and even--there is complaints sometimes
    that people don't think that would be an issue, giving out a
    challenge coin to a contractor would be a violation, but we
    continually educate our personnel on what the pitfalls are and
    what they should do to correct them.
        Mr. Coffman. Where in the career track do you begin that
    education?
        General Harris. From the very beginning.
        Mr. Coffman. From the very beginning?
        General Harris. Yes, sir.
        General Ottignon. Sir, in the last 3 years, we have had
    four substantiations. All of those were administrative in
    nature, violations of Marine Corps order for fitness report
    evaluations, for physical fitness evaluations. One was regards
    to training. So our trend lines are, as I previously mentioned,
    all administrative in nature.
        Mr. Fine. Mr. Chairman, if I can add.
        Mr. Coffman. Sure.
        Mr. Fine. Since we have oversight over all the service IGs,
    we have accumulated all the data on the types of misconduct,
    and which we described on page 10 of my testimony. It generally
    fell into five categories. First one, misconduct or ethical
    violations, such as improper accepting services from a
    subordinate, sexual relationships with subordinates, requiring
    subordinates to perform personal services for them, misusing
    your official position.
        The second one is improper personnel matters, which also
    involves unwelcome physical contact with subordinates and
    improper hiring.
        Third is misuse of government resources, such as using
    vehicles to commute improperly or misuse of government
    aircraft.
        And the fourth is travel violations, traveling for purely
    personal reasons.
        And the fifth is other, for such things as improper
    procurement, steering contracts.
        On page 11, I talk and we discuss the trend lines, and the
    trend lines are generally down, but they are still significant
    in these categories. And of particular interest, I think to the
    committee, is the inappropriate relationship category. On page
    12, we talk about how many there are across the services, and
    there has been a steady number of them. There were 10 in 2013
    substantiated findings, and in the subsequent years----
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Fine, I am afraid I am out of time. I am
    going to have to----
        Ranking Member Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to put a chart up, if we could, that shows
    each of the services. And this is for you to start, Mr. Fine.
    So in the Air Force, the total closed cases were 54; 54 were
    dismissed, zero were investigated in the Air Force. In the
    Army, 101; 101 dismissed, zero investigated. Defense agency,
    111; 110 dismissed, 1 was investigated. Thirty-six in the Navy;
    36 dismissed, zero investigated.
        Are you basically saying that none of these cases even
    deserved to be investigated?
        [The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
    133.]
        Mr. Fine. So that chart, Representative Speier, I think is
    from our semiannual report for a 6-month period.
        Ms. Speier. It is one half of the year.
        Mr. Fine. Yes, one half of the year in 2017. What we have
    is, in my testimony is a chart describing the number of cases
    involving senior official misconduct overall for the last 10
    years, and there is a substantial number investigated. The
    chart that was up there has to do with, I think, three-star and
    four-stars, which are the highest level ones. And so this chart
    has to do with senior official cases, including two-stars, one-
    stars, O-7 promotables, SES employees, et cetera.
        We do look at all these cases seriously. We do intake. We
    determine whether it warrants an investigation, and these are
    the ones that did warrant investigation against the high-level
    officials who was investigated against. But as you can see from
    my chart on page 8, there is a significant number of ones that
    are investigated and are substantiated.
        Ms. Speier. But I am totally confused then. It says that
    zero of these, out of 312 cases, 311 of them were dismissed.
    Only one was investigated. Are we basically--are you basically
    telling us that all of these cases were bogus?
        Mr. Fine. No. And what this chart also does--it is probably
    a confusing chart. The top part is the DOD OIG receiving those
    cases. Many of them are referred down to the service or agency
    and are investigated and closed by them. So if there is 54, for
    example, that we get, we--these are the numbers we investigate,
    and we refer them down to the Air Force, the Army, the Marine
    Corps, and the Navy, and they investigate them and have
    investigated many of them.
        Ms. Speier. Well, it is still not making any sense to me.
        Mr. Fine. Okay.
        Ms. Speier. So there is 54 that you receive from the Air
    Force. Why do you use the term ``dismissed'' if you were then
    forwarding them to the Air Force IG?
        Mr. Fine. So we receive far more than those, and we refer
    many of them, 12 of them to the Air Force, for example, and of
    the others we do not--we do intake and determine they don't
    require an investigation. But there are a number of them that
    do require investigation, as indicated by the chart below, the
    numbers below.
        Ms. Speier. Well, the numbers below are the ones that are
    investigated by the service IGs.
        Mr. Fine. Right.
        Ms. Speier. You are not investigate--it looks like you are
    not investigating any, by this chart. I don't want to take a
    lot of time on this. I think this chart needs to be reviewed,
    and I would like for you to come to my office. And I don't know
    if Mr. Coffman would be inclined to hear more about this, but
    this is deeply troubling to me.
        All right. In one of the cases that I mentioned, there was
    a recommendation by the IG of holding someone accountable for
    substantiated claims, and then it went to the--in this case,
    General Dempsey, who just struck one of the substantiated
    claims. How often does that happen?
        Mr. Fine. We have a chart on page 14 that it happens
    sometimes. Of the allegations, of 427 allegations of
    substantiated misconduct, over I think it is a 5-year period,
    29 of them were declined to take action, and about 80 of them
    are still pending. So in a small percentage of allegations they
    are--the service has declined to take action.
        Ms. Speier. So you are saying--did you not present your
    document to us until yesterday?
        Mr. Fine. We provided it, yes.
        Ms. Speier. So I still don't have a copy of it,
    unfortunately. Can you just go over that for me?
        Mr. Fine. Certainly. On page 12, we discuss corrective
    actions by rank of senior official, and this is over from
    fiscal year 2013 to 2017, and we describe the actual discipline
    corrective action that was taken, ranging from a letter of
    counseling to suspension to removed from assignment. Of those,
    the top line is declined to take action. In 29 of the 427
    substantiated allegations, the service declined to take action.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Would you please provide for me, in
    those 29 cases where they declined to take action, the
    specifics. Because I find it unjustified to have inspector
    generals go through the process of determining, through
    investigation, conduct that is inappropriate, have that be
    presented to the chiefs, and then have them just strike it as
    if it doesn't exist, as it happened in the Custer case. I mean,
    that is fraudulent, as far as I am concerned.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
    being here today.
        I want to take a couple of questions for the four service
    reps, give you a chance to think about, so I will go to Mr.
    Fine and ask him a couple while you are stewing on a couple of
    these questions. But I take--I find most commanders try their
    best to do the right job on these things, but they are
    imperfect. Some of them have made bad decisions, just as some
    judges have, just as some district attorneys have. We are
    imperfect, but I think we strive to be the very best we can and
    try to get as close as perfect as we can.
        So the first question I am going to come back to you all on
    will be if we take commanders out of the discipline and
    accountability process, what would be the impact on the mission
    or the impact on morale and unit integrity from your opinion?
        Secondly, how would you address the ranking member's point
    that there are different spanks for different ranks? So I want
    to come back to you all on that, give you a chance to think
    about it.
        Mr. Fine, my data shows we have 23--or 2,327 senior
    leaders. 963 of those are general officers. Roughly, if you
    could just give an average, what would you say, how many
    allegations are made a year against those 2,327 senior leaders?
        Mr. Fine. About 800. In our testimony, we discuss how many
    have been made over the last 10 years. In 2008, there was 395.
        Mr. Bacon. So 395 out of 2,327?
        Mr. Fine. In 2008. Now in 2017, there is 803.
        Mr. Bacon. Eight hundred?
        Mr. Fine. Yeah.
        Mr. Bacon. That seems like a lot for 2,327 senior leaders.
        Mr. Fine. Those are the allegations, correct.
        Mr. Bacon. Okay. Out of those allegations, how many
    substantiated, just to put it on record here?
        Mr. Fine. Eighty-three.
        Mr. Bacon. So 83. And what would that come out as a
    percentage? I guess it is 34 percent I think you had of the
    allegations that were substantiated?
        Mr. Fine. Well, of the cases that we actually investigate,
    30 percent of them are substantiated.
        Mr. Bacon. About 30 percent are substantiated. And they
    range from overdue reports to the more serious?
        Mr. Fine. Correct.
        Mr. Bacon. So many of these are things that would nowhere
    would be considered criminal in the private sector.
        Mr. Fine. Most of these are--very few, a very small
    percentage are criminal.
        Mr. Bacon. If you just give me your thoughts, how many
    would you say senior leaders have done something criminal,
    sexual assault, for example, out of this last year's data? One
    or two, three or four?
        Mr. Fine. Very few have done criminal misconduct, except I
    will mention the GDMA case, the Francis case, which is a----
        Mr. Bacon. Right. Which is criminal, got it.
        Mr. Fine. Which is criminal.
        Mr. Bacon. So we are talking less than a handful out of
    this 2,300-plus senior officers have done something criminal?
        Mr. Fine. Yes.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
        One other thing, one of the things that concerned me as a
    five-time commander is the length of time it takes to
    investigate. When you have people under investigation for 2
    years and then exonerated and their career is over, it seems to
    me that we have to do something better there. I mean, just as a
    person--I have never been investigated, thankfully, in five
    commands, so I have been blessed, thanking the Almighty, but I
    know some people have been under for 2 years and then they are
    exonerated, you are like, man. Is there anything we can do
    better there?
        Mr. Fine. I think there is. We do strive for timeliness. We
    recognize that when you are under investigation, your promotion
    is held up, sometimes you can't retire, you can't be moved, and
    it is difficult to be under the microscope, and many of them,
    most of them are cleared in the end. So we do strive for
    timeliness.
        With the number of investigations, the number of
    complaints, the resources, we also want to be thorough and
    accurate, so it is a balance there. On some of them we can
    handle quickly, some of them take longer. Having said that, all
    of the IGs, we and the service IGs, are moving to try and
    increase our timeliness without sacrificing quality, accuracy,
    and thoroughness.
        Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you.
        Now I will go to our service reps. And I will go to the
    first question, if we take commanders out of the process here,
    what do you think the impact is on your service?
        General Quantock. Sir, it would be absolutely devastating.
    I have commanded from company all the way up through three
    times as a two-star commander. Absolutely devastating if you
    take--you know, we are not Walmart. We send soldiers to do very
    dangerous things. I lost 13 soldiers as a brigade commander,
    over 200 Purple Hearts. I tell them to go out there and protect
    terrain, to escort convoys. They put their lives on the line.
    So some folks, you know, may have problems with some of the
    orders that I give. But we have to give them.
        So it would be devastating. So to be able to have control
    over the carrot and the stick, for another word that you could
    use, carrot and the stick, you have got to have a lot of
    carrots, but you also have got to have the stick to hold people
    accountable and to uphold the high values that we have in the
    Army that are not due for--that are not really applicable to
    Uniform Code of Military Justice.
        It would be absolutely devastating. And we are, right now,
    the greatest service the world has ever seen, and we would
    become a third-world country, a third-world army if we were to
    remove commanders from the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
        Mr. Bacon. General Quantock, thank you. I will come back on
    the different spanks.
        General Quantock. Okay.
        Mr. Bacon. Admiral Shelanski.
        Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. I will agree with General
    Quantock. Certainly, it is about good order and discipline. And
    in terms of being--having the UCMJ capability at the commander
    level is essential for that good order and discipline and the
    morale of the crew, because they expect also fairness and
    justice throughout their command, and they hold each other
    accountable. And when one of their shipmates is not doing the
    right thing, they want them to be held accountable, and that
    has got to be done quickly and efficiently.
        Mr. Bacon. I saw that in the Air Force. We had a commander
    downgrade a court-martial, and he was held accountable for it.
        With that, Chairman, I will come back for my second round
    to finish these two rounds of questions for the service reps.
        So, General Harris, I will come back to you later on my
    second round with that. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. Ms. Tsongas, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, I think we would all agree that the military is a
    rightly honored institution. We would not be the country we are
    without it. But as we have heard and is so true, it is not
    perfect and those serving are not perfect, so it is important
    that there is a process in place to look at senior leader
    misconduct.
        So as we engage in the oversight of this process, and I am
    grateful for this hearing, I think we have to be reassured that
    the process is not biased in favor of those senior leaders
    being investigated. So I have to say at the outset, it really
    concerns me that in each service it is a general officer who
    functions as an inspector general. It just seems to me that
    there is an inherent conflict there and possibly an inherent
    tilt in the process in favor of the general officer.
        I don't necessarily want you all to comment on it, but I
    think it is something that we all have to take into account.
    But given that that is the fact, I am curious, who provides
    oversight of all your work and makes sure that there is no
    inherent bias, that it is being performed correctly to meet--to
    be sure that we are truly identifying misconduct and holding
    general officers responsible? So I would like to start with
    you, Mr. Fine.
        Mr. Fine. So we as the DOD OIG do provide oversight over
    the service IGs. We review their reports to make sure that they
    are thorough and complete and have done all that they should do
    to track the leads, to investigate, to interview the
    appropriate people. So we do that level of oversight.
        We also have begun doing what we call quality assurance
    reviews, similar to a peer review, to look at their processes,
    their procedures in a systematic way to make sure they are
    following the rules and regulations and they are adhering to
    quality standards and are doing the right thing. So we provide
    that oversight.
        One of the questions that is often asked is, well, who
    oversees us. We are overseen by other IGs. The CIGIE [Council
    of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency] has a
    peer review process, and we are also regularly overseen by the
    GAO [Government Accountability Office]. So there is oversight
    over us, and we provide oversight over them, and that is a good
    thing.
        Ms. Tsongas. Do you have the ability to refer a case back
    if you think it hasn't been appropriately investigated?
        Mr. Fine. Yes, we do, and we do that.
        Ms. Tsongas. And how often have you had to do that?
        Mr. Fine. I don't have the exact numbers, but there are
    occasions when we do do that. We review the report. And there
    are times where we think they have not fully investigated or if
    they reached a conclusion that is not supported by the
    evidence, we refer it back to them for additional work.
        Ms. Tsongas. I don't know if each of you would like to
    comment how you do your job in a way that you feel is
    fairminded, given that you represent and come out of the
    service you are overseeing.
        General Quantock. Yes. Yes, Congresswoman. I would just say
    a couple of things. Number one is, in my last job I was a CID
    [U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command] commander, so when I
    left that job, I had three friends, and after this job I have
    no friends. So the fact that, you know, this is not a highly
    sought after--well, maybe some for the--highly sought after job
    because we make hard calls with the DOD IG oversight. It is a
    very fair process.
        Just about the investigators that do a majority of my cases
    are civilians, so they--and many of them have extensive years
    of experience. One of my investigators has got 18 years.
    Another has got 10 years of these kinds of cases. So it is very
    well.
        And not only that, we have many levels of legal review of
    these cases to ensure we are doing due process both for the
    complainant and for the subject. Once an investigation is done,
    legal review. After that, it goes to my lawyer. He does the
    legal review. After that, it goes to the Office of General
    Counsel for their legal review. After I have had three legal
    reviews and I have read the case and I understand the case and
    I agree with the findings, I sign the case.
        Ms. Tsongas. Are the findings conclusive or can you reject
    the findings?
        General Quantock. I have never rejected the findings that
    have been brought to me. So after all of the scrutiny that goes
    on with these things, I can almost exclusively say I don't
    think I have overturned one case that has been brought to me. I
    sign it, and it goes to DOD OIG for their oversight review. So
    it is a very fair and thorough process.
        Ms. Tsongas. So there is only somebody higher up in the
    chain that could reject the findings or would likely reject the
    findings?
        General Quantock. After we get done with a case, it gets
    adjudicated for cases, and that is what happens. Once it comes
    down as substantiated, we are just calling balls and strikes.
    We are saying did they violate a regulation, yes or no. If the
    answer is yes, that the substantiation holds, even if it is for
    small technical violations, then it goes--after the DOD IG
    review, it goes over to the lawyer side of the Army, the TJAG
    [The Judge Advocate General of the United States Army]. The
    TJAG basically puts the case together and brings it to the
    adjudicator, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. And the Vice
    Chief of Staff, under advice of counsel, holds the person
    accountable, according to due process and according to the
    facts of the case and what he has been substantiated for.
        Ms. Tsongas. Well, I appreciate--we don't have time to hear
    from everybody, but still I do think it is deeply concerning
    that you are generals in the service you are overseeing, and I
    do think a civilian oversight perhaps would at least eliminate
    the appearance----
        General Quantock. Congresswoman, we have a lot of civilian
    oversight, but our Army is made up of soldiers, okay? The vast
    majority of our Army is soldiers, and I believe, having been a
    commander a number of times, I also can look at the case and
    also understand, you know--because, again, we are representing
    the Army. I am the Army Inspector General. And I think from our
    soldier's perspective, at least the vast majority who are
    soldiers and know the fact that the person calling the shots at
    the IG has been a former commander themselves, from the time I
    was a captain all the way up to my last position, I think it is
    important that that person is a soldier, a sailor, or an
    airman, Marine.
        Ms. Tsongas. We can agree to disagree. Thank you. My time
    is up.
        General Quantock. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. Dr. Abraham, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just a statement first. As a Congressman, certainly, I
    think as the general public we want to know that the process is
    intact. And what I am hearing from the panel is that the
    process is good and that it is accountable and, more
    importantly, it is responsible for the actions that are found.
    Certainly, as a physician, I am judged by my peers on the
    physician side, so, you know, I think it is--you have got to
    have peer review, and I certainly don't think there is any
    conflict there that--from being reviewed by your peers.
        When I have asked for private conversations with several of
    the vice chiefs behind you, I have gotten them and there have
    been very forthcoming answers to direct questions, so I
    appreciate the openness that you are affording me.
        So, again, just a statement that I like the process. I
    think the process is good, and what I am hearing is that the
    process is working, because we are seeing a decrease, not only
    in the severity of the accusations, but in the total number
    too.
        And I am going yield the rest of my time back to General
    Bacon so he can continue his dialogue.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        What would be the impact of taking the commanders out of
    this discipline process? General Harris, what would be your
    perspective from the Air Force?
        General Harris. Sir, I agree with my peers. It would be
    absolutely devastating, and it would, you know, erode the good
    discipline and order of our force.
        And then as far as disparity in punishments, our data that
    I have reviewed doesn't support that. We hold our officers
    actually to a higher standard of accountability. And there is
    actually two other articles of the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice, 133, which is conduct unbecoming, and 134, which is
    fraternization, which holds us accountable.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        General Ottignon.
        General Ottignon. Sir, I agree with my peers as well. I
    think removing the commander from the process would have grave
    implications to the good order and discipline of the
    organization, a fighting organization. And I agree also that
    the data doesn't show that. I think we hold our senior leaders
    more accountable in the Marine Corps.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        Going back to General Quantock and Admiral Shelanski on the
    different spanks for different ranks, any feedback on that?
        General Quantock. Yes, Congressman. I would tell you, if I
    had to look at all the cases that I have looked at in my last
    job as a CID commander and, of course, now as the IG, it is
    about 6\1/2\ years, I would tell you it is huge, hugely swayed
    on the part of a general officer being crushed, okay, for a
    substantiation. And how is that? Well, what is the most
    egregious--usually the most egregious kind of offenses that we
    have general officers? Inappropriate relationships.
        Now, I have adjudicated sergeant first classes, junior
    soldiers for inappropriate relationships. They would get a
    letter of reprimand. Same thing that we would give a general
    officer, a letter of reprimand. However, on the general officer
    side, they are done. And the sergeant first class isn't going
    to get promoted either, but he isn't going to go backwards.
    That general officer is done, okay, and a lot of times he will
    retire at a grade a lot less. So he is effectively being fined,
    in case for retirement, hundreds of thousands if not millions
    of years when you have a major general go back to the rank of
    lieutenant colonel.
        Now, we can discount the fact that that soldier has been in
    combat multiple times, and that is what we would like to do
    sometimes by saying, well, we should just take his retirement
    away, but what we have done is separated him from his family
    multiple times, sometimes years at a time, and then we say the
    person doesn't deserve anything? Again, a lot of times we
    forget about that none of us at this table came in the Army as
    generals. I spent 27 years coming up the chain just like
    everybody else, and I have been 11 years as a general officer.
    I can tell you we crush general officers, and should they be
    crushed for these kind of offenses? Absolutely. They know since
    the time they were second lieutenant what is right and what is
    wrong. And when they do it, they expect the consequences, and
    we should hold them accountable.
        Mr. Bacon. I know I felt that way as a general officer in
    the Air Force. Thank you.
        Admiral Shelanski.
        Admiral Shelanski. So I agree. And one particular case that
    we would have that I could give you as an example. So a flag
    officer viewing pornography on a government computer on a ship.
    That type of work, should it have happened with an enlisted
    sailor, that enlisted sailor would probably be brought to mast,
    probably reduced in rate, withheld pending further, you know, 6
    months, and then taken their rights away to utilize that
    computer. And then once that 6 months was up, they would be
    back in their job continuing as a sailor onboard the ship.
        Flag officer, removed from his position, his command, and
    retired as an O-6. Much harsher and much more deeply pressing
    for his career.
        Mr. Bacon. One question I will just leave for anybody's--if
    they want to, you know, answer the question, does anyone here
    think it would be better to bring a judge from the outside to
    adjudicate these or does anyone here think a district attorney
    outside of the military would do this better?
        General Quantock. Only if you want to make the system much,
    much longer and hold people in suspended animation forever.
    That is the problem when you go to a purely jurisprudence
    system. We all have advice and advice from SJAs [Staff Judge
    Advocates]; we are not legally minded, but I get advice as a
    commander from many different individuals. So I think that
    would be a huge mistake.
        Also, what I have been trying this 38 years that I have
    been in the Army, I have been trying to find the perfect
    profession. So as I look around all of the professions out
    there, I haven't found one. We are not either, but we try real
    hard to be that, and we hold people accountable, even for minor
    discretions or minor violations of Army regulations.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
        And I thank Dr. Abraham for yielding to me, and back to the
    chairman.
        Mr. Coffman. Dr. Wenstrup, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much. Thank you all for being
    here to approach a very difficult topic for everyone involved.
    I will say, and especially with what you just said, General,
    you know, they say, ``To whom much is given, much is
    expected,'' although I wouldn't say rank is given; it is often
    earned, but the expectation is much greater. And I think that
    is a fair assessment. You do expect more from your officers and
    especially your general officers as you go up in rank. So I
    appreciate that feedback.
        Mr. Fine, you mentioned earlier about gathering data from
    the IGs. So what do you see down the road with this? Is it
    going to set maybe a tone for what type of punishment is
    appropriate or what legal actions we need to take? What do you
    expect to gain from that as that comes together?
        Mr. Fine. Well, we regularly gather that data and have, and
    I think it is important to report that for transparency to see
    what is going on, even by service and by rank and by offense.
    So we will continue to do that. It provides transparency on the
    process, which is a good thing. I will mention one thing that
    we intend to do is also to look at this issue about the
    disparities, and we have--we are going to open a review and
    evaluation to see if there are disparities that jump out.
        Now, sometimes the disparities are because the cases are
    different, and that is very hard to analyze. But I think, in
    some ways, it is important to look at the overall statistics,
    the numbers, and see if there are anomalies that jump out
    either by rank, by service, by gender, by race, by all sorts of
    stratifications, and we intend to do that. I think that is a
    useful exercise.
        Dr. Wenstrup. So you are really looking for, I guess, best
    practices, if you will, when it comes to setting guidelines. I
    mean, every case is different, and so you don't want to say
    this is the mandatory sentence for this, you know, because you
    want to take the case in its entirety. But are you expecting to
    have guidelines from this?
        Mr. Fine. No, I don't think we are going to have
    guidelines. That is up to the services to implement corrective
    action. But it is important to see what is happening and to
    analyze that and to evaluate that. In terms of guidelines, I do
    think there ought to be standardization and guidelines for how
    we conduct the investigations----
        Dr. Wenstrup. Okay.
        Mr. Fine [continuing]. And to make sure that it is
    relatively standard throughout the DOD so that if you are
    subject to an investigation in the Air Force, you are not going
    to be treated differently than if you are in the Navy. I think
    that is helpful, that is important, so that there are
    standardized, timely investigations, and we intend to look at
    that as well.
        Dr. Wenstrup. So are you far enough along at this point
    where you would maybe be making suggestions or just pointing
    out the differences or----
        Mr. Fine. In terms of the standardization?
        Dr. Wenstrup. Yes.
        Mr. Fine. Yeah. I think there are some suggestions that we
    have made and we will continue to make. One, there ought to be
    a standardized case management system, a database, and we all
    use it so that we track it and record it in similar ways and we
    share information in a similar way. I think we ought to sort of
    consider formats, formats of reports to be standardized; that
    will speed things up as well.
        I think we also ought to consider--there may be some
    disagreement here--but sort of a tentative conclusion process
    to give the subject an opportunity to comment on the report to
    show if it is inaccurate or not. We do that. On the other hand,
    that does lengthen the timeline a little bit because it gives
    them time, and sometimes, as a result, you are required to do
    more work, and that is the tradeoff. But I think that is a fair
    process, and it gives them fairness and due process and
    ultimately will make the decision on what is the ultimate
    finding.
        So I think those are the kinds of things that could be
    useful to standardize. And I have had discussions with the
    service IGs as well on that. We will continue to pursue that.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much.
        And I want to thank you all for engaging with us on this
    very difficult and important issue. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Kelly, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. This
    is an important hearing.
        I want to go back kind of on the line that General Bacon
    had, or Congressman Bacon. Members of the service, especially
    senior level leaders, whether they be command sergeant majors
    or general officers, would you agree that they are more hard on
    people for disgracing their uniform and their rank and their
    awards than a civilian would be, because many times do you
    think civilians are in awe of the things that you do and,
    therefore, kind of give you a pass because of your service, and
    a sitting other general who has done the same service is less
    likely to be in awe of your career and the things you have
    done? Would you agree with that?
        General Quantock. Well, sir, I would just say that I don't
    know if ``awe'' is the word. I think respected. My father was a
    Vietnam vet. I will tell you the way they were treated back in
    those days was incredibly poor. But I will tell you, there is a
    lot of respect among us, but, yeah, of course, the people that
    understand the culture--culture is a big deal in the military,
    and it has evolved over time. I have seen huge changes for the
    good since 1980 until the present day, and we continue to
    change that culture for the good. But to make a complete
    statement that civilians--I mean----
        Mr. Kelly. Not necessarily in awe, but they tend to give
    you the benefit of the doubt when maybe a peer or someone of
    the same or a higher rank would not want their uniform
    disgraced.
        General Quantock. I would absolutely agree. The
    professionalism of our noncommissioned officer corps is second
    to none. And I have sat on many promotion boards with them, and
    they get down to the standard of a particular individual, get
    down to the----
        Mr. Kelly. Let me rephrase. Would you as a general officer
    in your job cut someone a break, another general officer,
    because they are a general officer? Or would you be harder on
    them because they disgraced the rank that you worked so hard to
    earn?
        General Harris. Harder.
        Admiral Shelanski. Harder. Absolutely. Absolutely.
        Mr. Kelly. And I want to go back just a second, General
    Quantock. I think we have actually been in the same places a
    couple of times. I looked at your bio, and I was at Taji in
    2009 and 2010, and I think you were overall, and of course, we
    had a facility there.
        I want to ask you, Lieutenant General Ed Cardon recently
    commented to the AP [Associated Press] that the Army is
    reviewing ways to improve the senior officer corps through
    pilot initiatives. And can you please expand on one or more of
    these initiatives and explain how they reinforce ethical
    behavior in general officers?
        General Quantock. I will just tell you: It is a holistic
    study by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the vice will have
    much more on this than I do. But, really, it is a study on
    basically the health of our general officer corps. Particularly
    with the last 15, 16 years, we have run this general officer
    corps into the ground. Not to mention our soldiers, our
    sailors, our airmen, and our Marines. We have run this force
    into the ground.
        Many of us have been away from home years at a time. So--
    but what--we never take a day off. When I am on leave, I am
    attached to my BlackBerry and on my phone. My wife and I have
    these discussions many times. Okay. I am never disconnected
    from the Army. I lose leave every single year. Even though we
    make sure that our subordinates take their 30 days of leave, we
    never take--we basically--we put it over weekends; we don't
    take any leave.
        So the health of the force really requires us to give those
    general officers a little bit of reprieve. So, from making them
    take their leave----
        Mr. Kelly. Let me move on to the next question. I want just
    a little more answers on things. In my experience in the
    military of people going forward for GO [general officer]
    boards or general officers or senior level leaders in the
    military, it has been my experience, my personal experience,
    that I have seen far more people punished and prevented an IG
    complaint to hold up a guy who the promotion board goes past
    his MRD [mandatory removal date], and so he never makes general
    officer, or he doesn't make O-6, or they don't make O-7 or O-8.
        Has your experience been that far more senior leaders are
    punished by being held or flagged for negative transactions by
    an IG complaint that is not substantiated as to those who get
    away with doing something wrong and never get punished?
        General Quantock. Yes, sir. And that is the elephant in the
    room. That is the whistleblower reprisal issue. When we talk
    about numbers, whistleblower reprisal has skyrocketed because
    of the misuse and misapplication of whistleblower reprisal
    against senior officials. It is off the charts. I have been
    investigated twice for whistleblower----
        Mr. Kelly. Let me just real quick--and you guys understand.
    Junior members know--or junior members of the military know if
    they have a commander they don't like for some reason, that if
    they file an IG complaint at the right time, it can end his
    career, even though they have done nothing wrong and nothing to
    substantiate it. Is that correct?
        Admiral Shelanski. That is correct. So we, you know, we can
    see a rise in complaints right around the time that the list
    comes out.
        Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Ms. Rosen, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Russell, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
    for being here.
        I guess, Mr. Chairman, I don't understand why Members of
    Congress want to trash the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It
    is the one glue that holds our military together. We can
    critique it. We can oversee it. We can hold it accountable.
    But, God forbid, if people in the political environment ever
    trash the Uniform Code of Military Justice and get rid of it--
    you think we have screwed up the military good now, put it in
    the hands, with no UCMJ, and put it out there where we have
    people with no understanding of the institution that create,
    Lord knows what, good order and discipline, decisions,
    battlefield decisions that commanders have to make, that would
    all be eroded and gone. And we would feel good about it, and
    then we would hold our hearings and pound fists on tables and
    point bony fingers talking about what went wrong as honorable
    people sit here before us and holding them to account.
        And, yes, Mr. Chairman, I am on my high horse.
        How many of these offenses, General Quantock, were
    discovered outside of the military?
        General Quantock. Sir, I can think of one where actually it
    was the press--it was an individual that decided to go to the
    press----
        Mr. Russell. So only one out of all of the hundreds or even
    thousands of accusations, they were all discovered by the
    institutions.
        General Quantock. Yes, sir. Some were anonymous complaints.
        Mr. Russell. Now, where I come from, that is the hallmark
    of professionalism. You don't see that at IBM, and God knows we
    don't see that here in Congress. So I guess the question would
    be, why is it we think that it is a broken system? Yes, we have
    problems. Yes, we see oversight that Congress has to be
    responsible of, and we have civilian control of the military,
    and that is the great Republic that we all serve.
        But it is somewhat a little bit offensive to suggest that
    the institution is unprofessional or somehow broken because it
    discovers its own problems. In the business community, people
    would love to have those problems. Congress, gosh, we would
    love to have our own accountability where we discover the
    problems before the American public does.
        In terms of generals overseeing the military, wow, gosh,
    that is kind of like Members of Congress overseeing government.
    How could that be? The military has a better rate of
    accountability than society as a whole, certainly better than
    Congress, and perhaps even better than Hollywood, when it comes
    to offenses and things like this that we see.
        So I guess my question would be, what would be the damage
    that we see as we continue to inflate the problem, not saying
    ignore the problem--we have to take these things seriously, we
    have to hold them to account, we are doing that, we see that--
    but when it becomes inflated--and as was mentioned by my
    colleague from Mississippi, IG complaints come up, and then,
    you know, here come the investigations. And I have known many
    great warriors who were held from senior level command, were
    later exonerated after a 2-year period. They would have been
    able to keep men and women alive in battle and do great service
    to our Republic, but they never got the opportunity because,
    because, because.
        Could you speak to some of the other problems in your
    capacity as inspector general that, when someone is exonerated,
    do they ever get their life back? Are they ever restored, or
    does the ship just pass them by?
        General Quantock. Sir, both happens. Sometimes the ship--it
    is based on timing. But sometimes the ship sails because
    investigations take long. I will tell you, just the other day--
    a couple months ago, I had a division commander that just came
    back from Afghanistan, and I won't talk about his name. But he
    comes in my office, he said: Sir, I am getting ready to resign.
    I have had it. I have absolutely had it.
        A disgruntled employee, a week before his change in
    command, knowing the effect of it, throws an allegation out
    there. Now, what happens is, of course, we spin up an
    investigation. He is flagged, no award at the end of a division
    command, despite his sacrifices to himself and his family. The
    FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command] commander was coming down
    there to pin an award on that guy, but that is off, but he
    still was going to a pin an award on the spouse. The spouse
    told her husband, said: I don't want the damn award. Okay.
        So the families also were impacted on this because they
    also sacrifice. So one day we are going to wake up, if we keep
    this, we are going to wake up one day and realize, who the heck
    wants to serve? Because we put people through hell. We put
    families through hell. We put the soldiers through hell. We
    work them like dogs. We deploy them into combat. We bring them
    back, and here is your thanks. You are leaving without award.
    There is this cloud over your head, possibly lost your
    reputation. And then eventually he probably would get--he will
    get exonerated, and then he will be--because I have looked at
    the case, and there is nothing there.
        This is the whistleblower reprisal. I have been
    investigated twice for whistleblower reprisal when I came here
    because I held somebody accountable because they beat up a CID
    agent, beat up his weapon, pulled his weapon on his neighbor.
    And because he sent a protected communication to Congress about
    wanting to deploy and his unit said no, I got held up to 6
    months. Or I downgraded an award from an MSM [Meritorious
    Service Medal] to an ARCOM [Army Commendation Medal]. I am on
    the awards board. I had no idea about the protected
    communication. Another 4 months. We do this to the general
    officer corps, not to mention to the entire Army all the time.
    The reason why the numbers are so high from DOD IG about the
    rise in complaints is because the misapplication of
    whistleblower reprisal.
        The law is good. It talks about gross waste of funds. It
    talks about intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury to
    the members of the Armed Forces. It talks about grievous
    things, not downgrading an award. That is the problem we have.
    We have hijacked the system, and there is a cloud over the
    general officer corps because, right now, we are getting
    hammered.
        Mr. Russell. I thank the chairman.
        And the only parting comment I will say is that people are
    dragged into the IG to serve in IG capacities. They pick them
    from some of the best performing folks that are out there. They
    go kicking and screaming. They don't want those assignments.
    They call all of the favors in to try to avoid them, and they
    still have to go. And so my hats are off to all of those that
    serve in our inspectors general departments within our
    military.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Ms. Speier, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Speier. I feel compelled to speak because we have an
    obligation as Members of Congress to do oversight. When 400
    service members are implicated in the Fat Leonard scandal, when
    over 60 admirals are potentially implicated, we have an
    obligation to look at the process. So I take great umbrage,
    frankly, that it is suggested somehow that we don't have a role
    here.
        The Uniform Code of Military Justice is not on trial here.
    We live by the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the
    military. I mean, there are elements of it that I am not
    particularly excited about, but for the most part, it is a--
    frankly, a victim-centered code. We have made some changes over
    the years, but what we are really looking at is a couple of
    things, from my perspective.
        Why is Congress oftentimes the last to know? We have
    oversight responsibility. You should come to us when you have
    got an issue with a senior officer and let us know so we are
    not reading about it in the newspaper. When you have a scandal
    like the Fat Leonard case in the Navy, it is incumbent on us to
    look at that case in particular and see, why is it no
    bystander, no bystander felt that they could come forward?
        And to Lieutenant General Quantock, whistleblower
    protection, I would argue, is not enough protection, and that
    is why people don't come forward because they fear that there
    will be reprisals. There were too many people that were engaged
    in conduct unbecoming of officers in that case, and no one
    called them out.
        Now, let me now ask a question. I would like from each of
    you to know what your backlog is, quickly, if you could.
        Mr. Fine. We have a significant number of open
    investigations, and we report them and----
        Ms. Speier. Do you have a number?
        Mr. Fine. I can get you the exact number.
        Ms. Speier. I just want to get numbers at this point to see
    whether or not we have got staffing issues.
        Mr. Fine. We do have staffing issues. The complexity, the
    number of cases that have risen, the number of cases that we
    have to do, and we take them seriously. We take each of them
    seriously. And you can only do more with less for so long, and
    it does affect the timeliness of the investigations and how
    long people are hung up.
        So I do believe that it is important to adequately resource
    IGs, both us and the service IGs. They are not the first people
    that they think of when they are growing the military. But you
    need to grow----
        Ms. Speier. Okay. I have got limited amount of time. How
    many additional staff do you think you need?
        Mr. Fine. We could use 100 more additional staff. We have
    1,600 employees. That is not that much. I think we could use a
    significant number more.
        Ms. Speier. All right.
        Mr. Fine. I can give you more statistics and sort of basis,
    but we need significant resources, as do they.
        Ms. Speier. All right.
        Lieutenant General.
        General Quantock. Yes, Congressman, we have 50 open senior
    official cases going on right now. I have 20 investigators. I
    could easily double that. The average case is about over 400
    days. Whistleblower reprisal, a separate division, I have
    another 20 people doing that. I have 345 open cases. Average
    length of a case is 391 days.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. Thank you.
        Vice Admiral.
        Admiral Shelanski. Yes, ma'am. We have over 200 cases that
    are open at this time, and we are just now finishing up and
    getting up to our 2016 cases. So there is some lag time because
    of the numbers of investigators. But I would have to give you a
    specific number later, if that is okay.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
        Lieutenant General.
        General Harris. Congresswoman, we welcome the opportunity
    to partner with you on assessing our needs for plussing up our
    forces. I would like to take that question for the record and
    understand that our average investigation takes 187 days.
        Ms. Speier. So yours take about half the time as the Army.
    Is that right? Sounds like?
        General Quantock. It sounds like it.
        Ms. Speier. I think we should probably look at that. Why is
    it one service can do it----
        General Quantock. One service is much bigger than the other
    service. The amount of service members does have an impact; but
    I am not sure, I would have to look at the numbers.
        Ms. Speier. Yeah, I think we should look at the numbers.
        Brigadier General.
        General Ottignon. Ma'am, I have 11 open cases on general
    officers. I have 26 whistleblower reprisal cases open. I have
    300 total cases--just over 300 cases open. I average 233 days
    for a senior official investigation. And the remaining
    investigations are upwards of 300 days.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. I think we need to be sensitive to the
    time it takes for these cases. We need to up, I think, the
    service to the person who is charged and to those who are
    actually providing the work among your--those who are employed.
    At another point in time, I would like to know, in terms of
    your investigators, how many of your investigators are
    civilians? So I will take that for the record, if each of you
    could provide that to me, as compared to those who are in the
    military. Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Abraham, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Dr. Abraham. Just to follow up. Again, the process is good.
    In my opinion, it is working, simply because of the results
    that you all have had to this point. Moving forward, General
    Harris, you mentioned it a little bit in one of your answers.
    Since this is an open hearing, let's let the general public
    know, what are the services doing proactively from that second
    lieutenant up to that four-star to help prevent this from
    occurring over and over again?
        General Harris. Thank you, Congressman, for the opportunity
    to respond to this. So, proactively, two areas, prevention and
    training. So, first, training. So, from the youngest airman,
    whether you are an officer or enlisted, through every course of
    leadership that you go through, you have an ethics training,
    whether it be squadron officer school or airman leadership
    school, all the way up to the senior leader officer course,
    which general officers attend.
        Proactively, in the inspector general system, of course, we
    have our inspection process. And so not only are we assessing
    the readiness of our force, but we are assessing the culture of
    that force also and providing that feedback to the commander.
        Reactively, of course, the IG investigates fair,
    accurately, and thoroughly, any investigations, any complaints
    that we have to ensure that we are offering due process in
    upholding the standards of our service.
        Dr. Abraham. Other members? General.
        General Ottignon. Just briefly, sir. I would suggest that
    it begins at the beginning of boot camp. It begins at the
    beginning of officer candidate school. It is reinforced through
    every service school as they continue in their career, both
    enlisted and for officers. It becomes much more acute as the
    general officer, upon selection, annual requirements that we
    meet each year, as well as my office providing additional
    training each year in the field. So it is often, and it is more
    focused on the ethics piece throughout that year.
        Dr. Abraham. Admiral.
        Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. Like the generals just said,
    from the beginning. So midshipmen, whether in ROTC [Reserve
    Officer Training Corps], at the Naval Academy, or officer
    candidate school, get their first taste of ethical training.
    That goes up all through their career. It is mandatory when
    they reach O-5 command that they go up to the Navy War College
    where they go through the Navy leadership and ethics class. And
    then, onward from there, as a flag officer, when they first
    become a flag, they have ethics training.
        I personally go to many of these classes. In fact, I either
    virtually or in person to talk about cases and where fellow
    commanders and flag officers before them have crossed the line.
        Dr. Abraham. General Quantock.
        General Quantock. Yes, sir. It is similar across all the
    services. The additional thing is that we put a lot of focus on
    the general officer education. Many different levels, that
    every time you make a step, you get an ethics brief, every
    year, you are getting an ethics brief.
        I would also say that we also have to really get after it
    at the battalion and brigade level, lieutenant colonel and
    colonel level. At our pre-command course, you know, we have
    extended it to 2 weeks. So they get SJAs, and of course, they
    get me for an hour and a half because--and I have not missed
    one in my 3\1/2\ years as the IG and 6\1/2\ years when you talk
    about my CID time, because prevention is really the key.
        If we can prevent people from walking into mistakes, that
    is the key. And 99\2/3\ percent of our soldiers out there want
    to do the right thing, but sometimes they walk into it. So our
    goal is to prevent that from happening.
        Dr. Abraham. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coffman. I recognize myself. So one of the concerns is
    the length of time that it takes to go through this process.
    One element of that is certainly the resources in terms of the
    number of personnel we are throwing at it. But is there
    anything we can do procedurally to change the process to hasten
    it, to get, you know, it is just--it is unfair to a lot of
    parties to just tie this thing up for so long.
        Mr. Fine, do you have any recommendations?
        Mr. Fine. I do think a uniform process could help speed
    things up, standardized databases, standardized formats, so
    that we know what we are doing and we can do that more quickly.
    I do think there ought to be sort of an assessment at the front
    end in the intake level whether there is sufficient indicia of
    credibility that it warrants an investigation. And then, if
    there is indication as the investigation is going along that
    there is a fundamental deficiency in the allegation, that it is
    not substantiated, we can close it in a reasonably timely way.
        Mr. Coffman. Sure.
        Mr. Fine. So I think those are things that can be done. And
    I do think resources, as I mentioned, is significant.
        Mr. Coffman. Any other comments on this?
        General Quantock. Yes, sir. And the point that I would
    make, if I haven't mentioned reprisal, I would like to mention
    reprisal again. Forty percent of my senior official cases are
    caught up in reprisal because they basically have held somebody
    accountable. So some better guidance to DOD on how they
    basically interpret reprisal law so that just the significant
    ones fall under that and not everything. Downgrading an award,
    you know, hold somebody accountable because they beat somebody
    up and pulled a weapon on them. Somebody had--a doc who was on
    cocaine. Reprisal.
        I mean, it goes on and on and on, the amount of cases,
    because all I have to do is have a protected communication
    followed by any kind of unfavorable personnel action, we are
    off to the races on a whistleblower reprisal case. And, again,
    average time is 391 days.
        If we get some help, some guidance on that piece--I mean,
    again, it is good law. It is there for very good reasons. But
    if we could get some help in that particular area, that would
    help on the resource piece as well.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay.
        Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. We have initiated a couple of
    prototypes about intake analysis, and it has been very
    profitable in terms of timesaving. So we continue to look at
    process improvement.
        But part of the issue besides that is IT [information
    technology]. And I think, you know, as we continue to have to
    scan documents and manually input things into the computer
    system, it is a huge waste of time.
        The effort by DOD to make one type of system that we all
    can manage electronically eventually will save us a large
    amount of time and effort that right now is taken up with just
    antiquated systems that just eat up a lot of time.
        General Harris. Our timeliness factors are really based on
    the complexity of the allegation that we are investigating, the
    volume of complaints, and then the availability of witnesses,
    takes great time. But last year, we ran a process improvement
    event, which got us down to the 187 days, and of course, we are
    still looking to get it down even further.
        General Ottignon. I would say that the Marine Corps is very
    supportive of that law. I mean, that statute, we have great
    confidence in it. Any changes that we have made over the
    previous years obviously has a trickle-down effect to us
    through the Department in procedure and policy. Statute of
    limitations would be a perfect example of review of how 1
    year's worth of time, as the general has alluded to in
    examples, that is a pretty wide aperture that can provide us
    the complexity of a case that makes that timing go out for
    several hundred days to complete.
        Mr. Coffman. Well, certainly what we want to have is a
    system that we--apparently we do not have right now--where we
    can expeditious--more expeditiously discipline officers in
    substantiated cases, but not hurt their careers and not hurt
    the military as a whole on cases that are not substantiated but
    drag out forever. So we--there is really a need, I think, to
    figure out how we can move this system along faster.
        Ms. McSally, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I really appreciate it. I do want to follow up on that.
    While we do need a process to hold people accountable when they
    have had wrongdoing and we need to make sure that there are no
    dirtbags in senior leadership positions, I know way too many
    examples of very good people who are caught up in this process,
    whose names are maligned, who don't have a chance to defend
    themselves until the investigation is nearly complete. They
    don't even know what charges are brought against them. In the
    court of public opinion, they are already guilty. They are not
    exonerated publicly at all. So they end up--them and their
    families are held in shame for long periods of time, only to
    kind of disappear at the end of a long distinguished career.
        This process--I mean, I hear and I know of way too many
    examples of this. So, when we are talking about these processes
    of sorting out the frivolous complaints, commanders have to
    make tough decisions. Sometimes they have to clean up
    organizations. Sometimes people don't like that. Sometimes
    people have to, you know, be held accountable below them, and
    we have got to be able to protect legitimate whistleblowers
    while also protecting due process for the accused.
        And, again, I have way too many examples that bring concern
    to me about this process, both at the service level and at the
    DOD IG level. So a couple of quick questions. We also I think
    have a culture, by the way, if any of them ask for a lawyer,
    they must be guilty. But then we have investigators that are
    acting like prosecutors, and they are not getting the legal
    advice that they need in order to not be trapped. So I think
    that is a cultural issue, not necessarily a process issue.
        So how long--if an investigation goes on and somebody is
    exonerated, how long does that investigation stay on file? And
    are they kept on file in order to confirm whether that person
    is confirmable to a higher rank or a new job? Can anybody
    answer that?
        Mr. Fine. I can answer to the extent that we accumulate the
    derogatory information, including substantiated findings, and
    are required to provide that to both to Department and the
    Senate when someone is up for promotion. We do it if there is a
    substantiated case. If it is not substantiated, that is not
    derogatory and----
        Ms. McSally. So unsubstantiated cases are kept on file for
    how long?
        Mr. Fine. We keep the files. I mean, we don't get rid of
    the files.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Fine. But in terms of--it doesn't go into their
    personnel file.
        Ms. McSally. Are we saying that there is no process by
    which they are checking confirmability of any general officers
    with unsubstantiated cases?
        Mr. Fine. When we have a records check process and we do
    that records check and if it is not substantiated, it does not
    come up as a positive on that records check.
        Ms. McSally. So it basically says nothing?
        Mr. Fine. Right. We provide, you know, negative information
    to the Department----
        Ms. McSally. All right. What about the process of an
    individual who is accused not knowing necessarily what they are
    accused of until the investigation--in great detail, again, we
    have heard recently of this happening--until the investigation
    is wrapped up. And then they have to defend themselves after a
    whole package of stuff has been put together, and now they are
    having to, like, go through--down all these rabbit holes to
    figure out how to defend themselves, instead of being upfront
    right upfront. And this is an example from the Air Force.
        General Harris.
        General Harris. We defend our process, which we believe is
    fair and accurate and thorough, and so we take the time to get
    the information from our witnesses and the complainant in order
    to gather all that together, and then, at the end, then we do
    absolutely interview the subject so that they do have their
    time to speak.
        Ms. McSally. Do you see a concern that maybe an accused
    needs to know upfront what they are accused of so they can in
    parallel be preparing themselves to defend themselves because
    sometimes these rabbit holes go deep, and then you are having
    to unwind it if you are just handed this package at the end of
    the whole thing?
        General Quantock. Ma'am, I would just say, you have to be
    very careful because if you start making allegations that you
    just--you can set this individual up for reprisal. We do a lot
    of--DOD IG does it. We do it. We do a credibility assessment.
    In fact, there is a lot of heavy investigative load on the
    front end as we try to see if--if this allegation is in fact
    credible.
        Credible determination is a big piece. Again, we work with
    our DOD IG brethren up here to make sure that we agree, okay.
    So then we will launch an investigation. But we want to get
    some facts together. Because we also don't want to set this
    general officer up, ``Hey, you are under investigation for
    this.'' Well, if that person happens to be under command and it
    may be unsubstantiated, then any time he deals with the person
    who is making the complaint could set this person up for
    reprisal. So we are very careful in that respect.
        Ms. McSally. I hear you, but do you understand the concern
    that I am conveying, that you guys may go through a very
    lengthy process, and then somebody is just handed the----
        General Quantock. But once we determine there is credible--
    a credible allegation, that person is basically, ``Hey, here is
    what you are being accused of,'' and we read him rights.
        Admiral Shelanski. And that is the same with us. We have a
    script that, once it is determined to be credible and we are
    going to investigate, there is a script that we read, and you
    are--the complaint is as follows; the following rule and
    regulation has been violated. We tell them to not interview or
    talk to anybody. So there is a whole script to make sure that
    they understand exactly what is----
        Ms. McSally. I hear what you are saying. Again, the vast
    majority of these cases are unsubstantiated and frivolous
    allegations. I am talking about the individual who has served
    their country well, who is now being held up for retirement,
    who is now being moved with their family and wondering what
    their future is, and has already been tried in the court of
    public opinion. And in the end, it is unsubstantiated. But them
    holding on, wondering what their fate is for long periods of
    time, not getting an ability to defend themselves until it is
    all over. It may make you feel better that it is
    unsubstantiated at the end, but the process that they went
    through is not a positive one. And that is one I think that
    really we need to shine a greater light on in order to protect
    those that are accused who in the end are innocent.
        Is there any sort of way that they can be publicly
    exonerated? I know I missed the first round, but I got--Okay.
    All right. Thank you. I will wind up and come back again----
        Mr. Coffman. Without objection----
        Ms. McSally. If you don't mind. I won't be long.
        Is there a way for them to be publicly exonerated for
    something that they didn't commit when this is all over, to at
    least clear people's names?
        Mr. Fine. One thing we do is we consider our reports for
    proactive release. If they are substantiated and involve a
    high-level official, we do not wait for a FOIA request years
    later, but we release it. At the same time, if it has already
    received public attention, if somebody is out there as having
    been accused of something, we will consider that for proactive
    release as well, just so that the result of that investigation
    can be----
        Ms. McSally. Well, there is a difference between being in
    the media and having an entire unit and everybody that has ever
    served with somebody hearing all the rumors and innuendoes and
    what is going on as far as the investigation goes.
        So is there not a way that we can--when somebody is
    cleared, that you can, regardless of whether it has been in the
    public eye, say, ``This person is exonerated,'' or if they
    request that? Maybe some people don't want that, but----
        General Quantock. Well, I think, as long as the person
    agrees, they can go to the public affairs officer and have
    the--say, ``Hey, it was not substantiated.'' But a lot of
    folks, people don't realize what is going on unless they have
    been substantiated. Here is, at least in my view, I have seen
    this for 6\1/2\ years. How these things get into the press and
    how they get in there--I mean, I am not big into public release
    and public shaming; that is just not what I am into.
        However, what I believe in is that, every 6 months, we have
    two folks that FOIA, ``Give me all the substantiations for all
    general officers,'' and we do. We give them a spreadsheet;
    ``Here is all the substantiations for all general officers.''
    And then they pick the salacious ones, and then that makes the
    next headline, the next newspaper. That is how this works. So
    they all get out there. All the salacious ones get out there.
        Ms. McSally. Yeah, I am talking about the unsubstantiated
    ones.
        General Quantock. I know exactly what you are talking
    about. I am just saying that most people, if they are not
    substantiated, don't want it out there because they are under
    investigation, because most people don't know.
        Ms. McSally. I hear you.
        Can you talk about the process of what investigations are
    done by the services and which investigations are done by the
    DOD IG, really briefly? I see in your testimony it says
    normally three- and four-stars are at DOD IG level or something
    that is of such a high level of attention.
        But is there other determinations on that? And if the
    services actually close an investigation and unsubstantiate it,
    do we have cases where the DOD IG decides to open it up again
    or take it on after the fact?
        Mr. Fine. So, on the front end, we do the three-star and
    four-star, the SES employees, Presidential appointees,
    intelligence-type investigations. And if there is a conflict or
    some reason why the service IG shouldn't do it or can't do it,
    we will do those as well. Otherwise, they do the investigation.
    When it is completed, they provide it to us for oversight. If
    we think it is thorough and has done all the investigative work
    that needs to be done, we approve it. If we don't, we can send
    it back to them for additional work.
        Ms. McSally. So is there ever cases where you then take on
    an investigation yourself after they have closed it?
        Mr. Fine. There has been occasion, yeah.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Fine. Yeah, for good reason. Very rarely.
        Ms. McSally. Okay.
        Mr. Fine. For additional information or for some specific
    reason, but it has happened.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks, I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to make something really clear from my
    perspective. I think we do have a problem with different spanks
    for different ranks. As I understand it, there have been 70,000
    court-martials in the Air Force, for instance, and not 1
    general officer has ever been court-martialed.
        When some of my colleagues were talking about the UCMJ and
    how if--what the UCMJ does is provide for accountability where
    there wouldn't be--where this isn't criminal conduct. There are
    cases that have just been brought to my attention. For
    instance, Lieutenant General Ron Lewis, who misused government
    credit cards at two strip clubs, falsely claimed his credit
    cards had been stolen, fraudulently stole over a thousand
    dollars from a credit card company, violated an order by going
    to a restricted area, and had an inappropriate relationship, he
    didn't get prosecuted under the UCMJ. He didn't have a court-
    martial. A junior enlisted would get prosecuted for that
    offense.
        General Kip Ward, misuse of government resources for his
    personal gain, and his family was ordered to pay back $82,000.
    That is theft. And under normal circumstances, that would be
    subject to a court-martial. So, as we look at this issue, I
    think one of the things that I would like to see, Mr. Chairman,
    is that we take the time to make sure that everyone is being
    treated fairly in the military.
        I would really appreciate having from each of the services
    the number of court-martials, how many for enlisted, how many
    for officers, so we can just take a look at that as well.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        And let me also point out to you that yesterday we passed a
    very strong sexual harassment bill in the House. There have
    been a number of Members who have resigned or are retiring as a
    result of sexual harassment, not sexual assault, here. And I
    think that, as we look at the military, we are going to expect
    the same level of responsibility for conduct that we are now
    expecting of Members of Congress.
        I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. We will now take a brief recess in order to
    set the witness table for the second panel. We will take a 5-
    minute recess.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Coffman. I wish now to welcome our esteemed second
    panel. We would like to respectfully remind the second panel to
    summarize, to the greatest extent possible, the high points of
    your written testimony in 5 minutes or less. Your written
    comments and statements will be made part of the record.
        Our second panel consists of General James C. McConville,
    Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Bill Moran, Vice Chief
    of Naval Operations; General Stephen W. Wilson, Vice Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force; General Glenn M. Walters, Assistant
    Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        With that, General McConville, you may now make your
    opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES C. McCONVILLE, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
                    OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES ARMY

        General McConville. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Speier, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, good morning. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        The United States military is one of the most trusted
    institutions in the country, and we value that bond of trust,
    and we recognize that every single day we need to wake up and
    earn that trust. While senior misconduct in the Army is down 51
    percent, we know that one act of misconduct breaks that trust
    of the America people.
        Senior misconduct in the United States Army has no place.
    Our senior officers are developed through decades of formal and
    informal training on ethics, Army values, leadership, and
    character. And we provide additional training for those leaders
    who have been selected to serve as general officers. The vast
    majority of our senior officers uphold our demanding moral and
    ethical standards just as we, their soldiers, and the American
    people expect them to.
        We are not a perfect institution, but we strive to be one.
    Senior officers who fail to meet the Army standards are held
    accountable. I, along with the other Army leaders, am committed
    to upholding the standards of our profession and ensuring all
    our senior officers do the same.
        I appreciate your time and attention this morning, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General McConville can be found
    in the Appendix on page 107.]

      STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
                     OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY

        Admiral Moran. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, thank
    you for the opportunity to be here to speak to the subcommittee
    members, the American public, but most importantly this
    morning, to talk to our sailors.
        The foundation of our joint forces--this is going to sound
    like a broken record and just demonstrates how much we believe
    in the values of our institution. The foundation of the joint
    force is trust. When senior leaders fail, trust at the
    institution level is put at risk, which can have a profound
    impact on every aspect of developing and employing this force.
        So we all take this topic extremely seriously. And while we
    all seem to be trending in the right direction, as Jim just
    articulated, every single one of these matters. At the end of
    the day, we are an institution comprised of human beings who
    are indeed fallible. So, to get after this, we have taken
    deliberate steps to train and develop our enlisted and officer
    corps throughout their careers, to preclude moral and ethical
    failures. And when they do fail, we address them in ways to
    preserve the larger trust in the institution.
        Being transparent and accountable is part of this effort.
    Our goal is, by the time senior leaders are produced, they have
    a solid foundation formed through years of experience where the
    principles of ethical behavior and moral decision making and
    proper professional conduct are not only taught but reinforced
    and tested.
        As you have heard from our inspector general, we not only
    routinely track the data, we look for trends. When we see
    evidence, we explore and derive lessons learned to be better
    leaders. And while we have ethical guidelines and even rules to
    limit the consequences of poor decision making, the rules alone
    are not what you and the American public expect from us. You
    expect us to live up to higher standards of professional
    behavior.
        Transparency along these lines is central to our efforts to
    strengthen trust within our ranks, within the institution, with
    the American public, and I believe it strengthens our
    relationship with Congress.
        So thank you for the opportunity to be transparent today,
    to speak candidly and directly about this critical topic,
    because it is the foundation of our profession. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Moran can be found in
    the Appendix on page 113.]

     STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
               OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

        General Wilson. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    inviting me to testify before you today. On behalf of our
    Secretary of the Air Force and our chief of staff and the
    670,000 total force airmen around the globe, it is an honor to
    be here. It is honor to be here with my vice chiefs.
        Late last summer, on the eve of our 70th birthday as a
    Nation--a service, I had the privilege to stand a few miles
    from here on the turf of the Nationals Ballpark. Forty-six of
    America's sons and daughters were in front of me, the backdrop
    of the Capitol behind them. They were about to enter the United
    States Air Force.
        In that moment, I thought about what we owe those patriotic
    volunteers in return for their selfless service and their
    selflessness. The word that came to mind was trust. I think all
    of us, all of us vice chiefs, view maintaining trust and
    confidence with the American people and with our force as the
    essential element of our past and future mission success. It is
    for that reason that we employ a deliberate and career-long
    continuum of learning, not only in operations and leadership,
    but in law and ethical standards for all airmen and certainly
    for our senior officers.
        Despite those efforts, at times, senior officers do break
    bonds of trust by faltering in judgment and/or character. And
    in those instances, we leverage a robust system of
    investigation and accountability. Complaints are investigated
    by independent teams of professionals. Disposition is done with
    objectivity, steeped in process and law.
        I know I can speak for my fellow chiefs here: Even one case
    of senior officer misconduct is too many. Our goal is for all
    airmen to do what is right at all times, regardless of the
    circumstances, and no matter the rank or the position. If they
    fall short of that goal, we will hold them accountable for
    their actions.
        Thank you for your continued leadership and your
    partnership as we seek to achieve that goal and, by extension,
    maintain the trust of all airmen and the American people. I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in
    the Appendix on page 118.]

     STATEMENT OF GEN GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
            OF THE MARINE CORPS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

        General Walters. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier,
    and distinguished members of the House Armed Services
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here
    today and report to you on this very important issue, the moral
    and ethical conduct of our Marine general officers.
        We know that our Nation's citizens expect the very best
    from their Marines. They expect operational excellence. They
    trust that their Marines are women and men of the highest
    character, both on the battlefield and in every aspect of their
    lives. We Marines expect the same from ourselves. We readily
    accept this responsibility.
        Our core values of honor, courage, and commitment guide our
    moral and ethical conduct of every Marine. All Marines are
    custodians of these core values. Our senior leaders set the
    example for every Marine to emulate. They understand this
    responsibility, and they spend their lives upholding these
    values. They understand that winning our Nation's battles
    requires a foundation of character within every Marine, and it
    starts with them.
        Marines learn these sacred values early and often. We
    believe that through our continuum of training throughout an
    officer's career and oversight and education provided by our
    inspection programs, we build ethical decision makers. At every
    level of officer training and education, we continually and
    consistently emphasize ethical leadership as the foundation of
    leading Marines.
        Over the last 10 years, the Marines have averaged one and a
    half cases per year of substantiated general officer
    misconduct. In nearly half of these cases, the mistakes have
    been administrative in nature. While we take pride in the moral
    conduct of our generals, we acknowledge that there is always
    room to improve. Like every improving and learning
    organization, we remain proactive to evolving our education and
    training and programs to ensure the disciplined moral conduct
    of every Marine, especially our general officers.
        On behalf of our Commandant, General Robert Neller, we
    thank the Congress and this subcommittee for the opportunity to
    discuss this important issue. We appreciate your continued
    support to ensure the joint force remains the very best
    military our Nation requires and expects. And I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Walters can be found in
    the Appendix on page 125.]
        Mr. Coffman. Let me ask this question, and I would
    appreciate an answer from the Army, Navy, then the Air Force,
    and then the Marine Corps. Many of us are familiar with the
    consequences of a court-martial, a conviction. But less
    familiar with some of the other administrative and nonjudicial
    actions that can be taken against service members.
        Could you explain the other options available to you when
    disposing of senior leader misconduct cases and the
    consequences thereof?
        General McConville.
        General McConville. Yes, sir, I could. You know, what is at
    our disposal if we don't go to a court-martial is we could do a
    memorandum of concern, a memorandum of reprimand, but what
    really hurts an officer is a general officer memorandum of
    reprimand that we put in their official file. And that goes in
    their official file. It basically ends their career as they go
    forward. And as they go to retire, that is seen by the board
    that adjudicates what rank they will retire at. So, basically,
    you could lose one, two, three stars, depending on what rank
    you retire at, which is hundreds of thousands of dollars, for
    some type of misconduct at that level.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. I was going to mention the
    retirement grade determination process that all of us go
    through, for any flag officer, senior leader, who has had a
    substantiated allegation, that what we term becomes adverse
    information to their record. We must do a board, and we all do
    that, we carry out that process. A retirement grade
    determination for one- and two-stars is ultimately signed off
    by senior leaders in the Navy. All of our services with the
    Secretary level. And for a three- or four-star retirement,
    grade determination must be approved by the Secretary of
    Defense.
        Mr. Coffman. Let me fully understand this. So that--you
    give some sort of a letter of admonition or whatever that is
    there. So it is a career killer. So that person is not going to
    get promoted. They may be able to finish out their tour of duty
    or--at some level, I suppose, be able to finish their career.
    So then they go to retirement, and then they are reviewed by a
    board to determine whether or not they are going to be reduced
    in rank in retirement? Am I clear on that?
        Admiral Moran. If it's adverse information, yes, sir. I
    would add--I won't speak for the rest of the services here--but
    for the Navy, if a senior officer is found with substantiated
    allegations that are serious, they are not asked--they will not
    stay for the rest of their tour. They are often relieved of
    their command, relieved of their duties, and asked to retire,
    and then we go through the retirement grade determination.
        Mr. Coffman. So somebody that you were going to allow to
    finish their--it was a letter of admonition. It is a career
    killer, but you are going to let them finish their tour of
    duty.
        Admiral Moran. Not necessarily. If it is serious enough for
    a letter of admonition, they are not going to continue.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay.
        General Wilson.
        General Wilson. We have the same process. Ours would be
    letter of reprimand, or an Article 15 type of instance, and the
    same things apply. We would determine whether or not they
    should still serve in that job. In most cases, for a senior
    officer, if they have an Article 15 or letter of reprimand,
    then are going to be removed from that job immediately, and
    they will go through an officer grade determination to follow.
        Mr. Coffman. So, effectively, if somebody got a letter of
    admonition, forced to retire, reduced in rank in that
    retirement, it is literally the equivalent of a fine of
    hundreds of thousands of dollars, am I correct?
        General Wilson. That is correct.
        Mr. Coffman. General Walters.
        General Walters. Sir, we follow the same process. The one
    example I could give you, albeit is 10 years old, we had a
    selected two-star. He had a substantiated finding on him. He
    was retired as an O-6.
        Mr. Coffman. Wow.
        General Walters. So he didn't get a second star. He retired
    as an O-6. I actually did the calculation last night, and if
    you compare his O-6 retirement to an O-8 retirement, what he
    really lost in compensation over a 30-year retirement is $1.9
    million.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay.
        Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you all for your presentations, for your
    conversations yesterday.
        I guess this question could be asked of you as well. Could
    you inform us by letter of how many court-martials there have
    been of general officers? The chairman just talked about, you
    know, the potential loss of rank and loss of hundreds of
    thousands of dollars over one's lifetime in retirement,
    although they still keep their retirement.
        I am more interested in the value of a security clearance
    because that is worth a lot of money--a whole lot more money
    than $200,000, frankly. And in some cases, these cases that
    have come before us where they have lied and done things that
    would question their moral turpitude, drunkenness, under normal
    circumstances, someone could in fact lose their security
    clearance. But I wonder how many do lose their security
    clearance.
        Does anyone have any thoughts on that? And if you don't, if
    you could also provide that to us for the record. Of these
    cases that--we have seen so much prominence, and we can provide
    them to you if you don't know them off the top of your head--I
    would be curious to know how many actually lose their security
    clearance because that is more valuable, I think, than many
    other things.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 138.]
        Ms. Speier. Admiral, you talked about transparency in your
    opening remarks, and I think that that is really important from
    the congressional oversight perspective. The DOD IG does
    disclose substantiated cases, but to my knowledge, there isn't
    any means by which each of your services would disclose to
    Congress, for instance, substantiated cases. Could each of you
    inform us as to whether or not you would be supportive of that?
        General McConville. As far as the Army, if this committee
    wants those cases, absolutely.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, ma'am.
        General Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
        General Walters. No problem, ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
        Admiral, the Fat Leonard case has come up a number of
    times, and it is probably the most egregious case in the
    history, certainly of the Navy, if not the military in general.
    Because so many people were involved and so many people
    corrupted by this individual, I am stunned that there weren't
    any bystanders that spoke up.
        First question, how did it actually--there were a number of
    cases that were investigated by NCIS [Naval Criminal
    Investigative Service] because there was bid rigging or
    overcharging for fuel or the like that he was engaged in, but
    many of those cases were dismissed. Have you done kind of a
    postmortem on that to look at where the holes were within the
    chain of command in terms of identifying the issues and
    addressing them?
        Admiral Moran. Ma'am, I hope you will respect this comment.
    It is an ongoing Federal investigation by the Department of
    Justice and the U.S. Attorney. I am very uncomfortable
    answering questions that could prejudice the case in any way,
    and so answering some of that--what you just asked--could
    potentially cause us problems. And when it is done, and we are
    hopefully getting to the very end of this now, when it is done
    and all the files are turned over to us, we will do that. And
    there is a process in place to make sure that we evaluate every
    single case that comes to the Navy. Whether they are handled by
    the Department of Justice or not, they come to us for final
    resolution, and we cannot talk publicly about that until the
    Department of Justice is complete with their investigation.
        Ms. Speier. No, I appreciate that. And I am not asking you
    to do that, but from a policy standpoint, are there any new
    policies that you recognize would be helpful in preventing
    cases like this from, you know, exploding into scandals that
    are of proportions that it is hard to even comprehend?
        Admiral Moran. Most of the issues revolve around the
    contracting for services in overseas ports, so we have taken a
    very strong turn on the process by which we do that. We put
    layers of oversight into how those contracts are issued and who
    is issuing them. And that sort of training in our supply corps
    and in our general support corps has been very strong over the
    last 5 years, and we think that largely has helped us drive
    down the number of misconduct cases that have resulted outside
    the scope of the GDMA case.
        Ms. Speier. One last question. Bystanders, do you think
    bystanders have a duty to report? Question for each of you.
        General McConville. Absolutely.
        Admiral Moran. In every single case. We talk a lot about
    this in sexual harassment training, sexual assault, but all
    what we would call behaviors that are destructive in nature.
    Oftentimes, it can be quelled by a bystander, and we try to
    teach that value to everyone.
        General Wilson. Completely agree.
        General Walters. Yes, ma'am, we teach, see something, say
    something.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
        I appreciate all of you being here and your leadership. I
    would like to just go back to a question I asked from the
    previous panel about the different spanks for different ranks.
    Do you think we are holding people equally accountable, in your
    view, whether it is a midlevel, senior NCO [noncommissioned
    officer] to a senior officer? Thank you.
        General McConville. I do. My previous--I was commanding
    general of the 101st Airborne Division for 3 years, had general
    court-martial authority, handled a lot of the cases at the
    lower level, and now as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for
    the last 7\1/2\ months. I believe we hold everyone
    appropriately accountable, and when we look at senior officers,
    we expect a higher standard from them, and when they don't meet
    the standards, we hold them accountable.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        Admiral Moran.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. Both Jim and I served as prior
    ``1s,'' which are personnel commands, and in every disciplinary
    case, every single one that reaches the level of where we are
    trying to determine if someone should be retired early or
    retired without pay or so on and so forth or released from
    Active Duty, we see every one of those packages, and as vice
    chiefs we see them again.
        And so I think we get to see, across the board, a pretty
    balanced view of senior and junior cases. And I think we all
    also believe that if we do not do this in a fair way, we are
    going to be held accountable by our sailors, soldiers, airmen,
    and Marines, so I think we are very conscious of doing this in
    a correct way.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Wilson.
        General Wilson. Congressman Bacon, I completely agree with
    my counterparts here that we hold all of our airmen to one
    standard. And I would also add, though, that we hold our senior
    officers to an exceptionally high standard, that we know that
    we will be judged by that. And so in my time as the vice chief,
    I have seen that we are not going to walk by any problem, that
    we are going to hold any senior officer who does any misconduct
    accountable for that. We are going to investigate it, then hold
    them accountable.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        General Walters.
        General Walters. Yes, sir. I agree with all my counterparts
    here. I will just add one thing, is to remember that our senior
    officers, one shot and you are adjudicated, one shot and you
    are down, perhaps, whereas on some of the junior ranks, we try
    to give them a second chance. Not--it is not a zero defect
    mentality. I would say it is almost a zero defect mentality the
    higher up you go.
        Mr. Bacon. I know I appreciated second chances when I was
    18 and 19.
        General Walters. Yes, sir. Me too.
        Mr. Bacon. I want to just sort of pose a rough hypothetical
    and whoever wants to speak up on it. I think part of the issue
    is if you have someone who has served honorably for 30 years,
    say they are a one- or two-star at that point, and you are 31
    and 32 as a three-star, maybe involved in an unprofessional
    relationship or whatever it may be, and then you have to
    determine at retirement, do you go back to the two-star or one-
    star, versus someone, say, at the 8-year point and they do
    something similar, how hard is that, from your perspective, to
    determine is going back rank to the 30-year point or should it
    even be more serious, depending on the crime or action taken?
    How hard is that when you are making these determinations, I
    guess?
        Because my point being is sometimes you go back to the last
    rank honorably served, but yet if it is a junior enlisted or
    something that maybe they suffer a career-ending decision
    there. So I just--I would just be curious for your insights.
        General Walters. Perhaps I could illuminate a little bit,
    sir. The grade determination is a process that is in place for
    all of us, but the reminder is if--I don't care if it is a
    junior Marine or a senior Marine, if the action is criminal,
    then there is no rank involved. I can name that one in the last
    5 years where it was a senior officer, an O-6, and he is zero.
        Mr. Bacon. And he would retire with no rank?
        General Walters. He gets no retirement, he is in jail, and
    he is zero. He has got no rank at all.
        Mr. Bacon. Any other comments?
        General McConville. I will follow along with the comments.
    I agree. It is a difference. We have had two court-martials,
    and one I won't talk about right now, but that have been
    adjudicated over the last 10 years, and both officers were of
    criminal-type nature, and we will court-martial them if they
    warrant that. But when it looks at--you know, we weigh every
    single case on its merits. We look at what the soldier or the
    officer has done over the many years, and we weigh all that,
    and we put it together, and we try to do the right thing when
    it comes to making a decision on their future.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Ms. McSally, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow up on my previous line of questioning. How
    long are unsubstantiated reports kept in each of your services?
    Do you know?
        Admiral Moran. Maybe I will start. Are we talking just
    senior officers, ma'am?
        Ms. McSally. Yes.
        Admiral Moran. Yeah. So we have other terms when we talk
    about investigations where they are substantiations and then
    there are unsubstantiated but reportable information.
    Reportable meaning that it wasn't adverse, but it is still
    required by the Senate for confirmation. So it is a little bit
    different from----
        Ms. McSally. Okay. And what is an example of something that
    is unsubstantiated but reportable?
        Admiral Moran. Well, let's say they were--someone was
    accused of something. Boy, so many of these are fresh in my
    mind from a topic I am not at liberty to talk about. But if it
    was you were alleged to have gone to a dinner with a contractor
    and accepted that dinner, and it was unsubstantiated that it
    was accepted by you but it was alleged to be that you had--you
    did attend a dinner with a contractor, that can be reportable,
    but not----
        Ms. McSally. So there are people that are going through an
    entire investigative process, they are cleared, but yet in a
    nomination, even though they are cleared, it is reportable to
    the Senate for confirmation?
        Admiral Moran. The Senate is----
        Ms. McSally. The allegation?
        Admiral Moran. The Senate is entitled to any information on
    an officer being considered for promotion to the rank of O-7
    and above.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. That was kind of my line of questioning
    in the last session, but it seemed like all the panelists said
    that unsubstantiated claims are never taken into account for
    jobs or rank. And so now I am hearing that they are,
    unsubstantiated claims are taken into account.
        Admiral Moran. They have to be accounted for. That doesn't
    mean that will prevent them from being promoted. It just means
    we have to----
        Ms. McSally. So within the services--I don't know if each
    of you can answer--is there anywhere informally or formally in
    your process of considering someone for a new job or rank where
    you actually look at unsubstantiated investigations as part of
    that process?
        General McConville. Well, one of the things that we look at
    is titling. When we look at vetting an officer, we look at all
    the databases that come up to see where that--and I will give
    you an example. And, you know, this did not hold up the
    officer, but the officer was titled because his dog got loose
    in the neighborhoods. The MPs [military police] came by. They
    titled him for having a loose dog in the neighborhood, and he
    was, you know--actually, he was, you know, substantiated for
    having the dog loose in the neighborhood. So----
        Ms. McSally. I am talking about where people are cleared
    and are they somehow in any informal or formal process, are
    people looking at the files of their cleared allegations and
    cleared investigation as to whether they are going to offer
    them for a new job or promotion? Do you see what I am trying to
    get to the core of here?
        General Wilson. We don't do that.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Thanks, General Wilson.
        General Walters.
        General Walters. No, I mean, we are required to report all
    the information in a confirmation to the Senate.
        Ms. McSally. So all information includes unsubstantiated
    claims?
        General Walters. You have to report whether they were
    investigated in some cases, and these are the rules that are
    set. We don't have a big stack of all the--in my office of all
    the unsubstantiated. I don't have any of those. That is really
    the legal review, and they know what parameters that the Senate
    requires that goes in with a confirmation package. I sign off
    on those. And it is usually a paragraph at the bottom that says
    something along the lines of we looked at OGD-278, we have
    looked at this, and no substantiations, but there was an entry
    in here, and that is all it will be. And then it will be up to
    the Senate to say tell me more, if they are interested.
        Admiral Moran. Congresswoman, you will remember a
    nonpunitive letter in your days where that is between the
    commander and the individual, not to be for anyone else.
        Ms. McSally. Yes.
        Admiral Moran. That is required--a nonpunitive letter for a
    flag officer or a nominee for flag is required by the Senate to
    be reported.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. But are you saying it is the current
    law, like we have in the law, like that if--I am talking about
    IG investigations that are closed and somebody has been
    exonerated, that still the--even though they are innocent, just
    because they were accused, that has to be reported to the
    Senate?
        Admiral Moran. No, ma'am, that is not what I am saying. I
    am saying that if something was issued to an officer that is up
    for promotion to flag, unlike for the rest of the service,
    anyone else with a nonpunitive, that is no one else's business.
    Those are still required to be brought forward.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. So it still goes back to my question is,
    is there anywhere in the process within the services that--I
    know we have heard from General Wilson--that unsubstantiated
    investigations are looked at formally or informally by the
    services whether you are considering somebody for a new job or
    promotion?
        Admiral Moran. In a promotion boards, if it is not adverse
    information, it is not examined during the promotion board.
        Ms. McSally. I am not talking about a promotion board. I am
    talking about as you all sit around talking about who is going
    to be put into this next job or considered for the next star--
    --
        General Walters. Generally speaking, is we are looking at a
    slate is I guess what you are talking about, is we do a slate.
    We do slates continuing through the year because things change
    and demand signals on people change. I can't remember anybody--
    well, it is only two of us, the Commandant and I, saying, well,
    there is an unsubstantiated claim. That never comes up.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. I am over my time.
        General Walters. Substantiated, sure.
        Ms. McSally. I don't know if you guys get what I am trying
    to get at, but accused doesn't mean guilty, and I just want to
    make sure that that is being taken into consideration.
        Mr. Coffman. Dr. Wenstrup, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I have a question, something that
    I think I am seeing a rise in, and it is not at the same level
    of some of the cases we have been talking about today. But you
    have, not general officers, but officers that have the
    responsibility of making sure that their troops are doing the
    things they are supposed to do. And I have become aware of a
    couple cases where the lower ranking person, either officer or
    enlisted, wants to resist that, and all the leader is doing is
    saying, listen, you have got to be in line, you have got to get
    your job done. Then they go, the person not doing their job, go
    and accuse some kind of bias, that this leader has some kind of
    bias. And what I am seeing is these leaders, then, they are now
    the accused of something just because they were trying to make
    sure someone did their job. They make this claim that some kind
    of bias, and now that leader is tied up in knots distracted
    from doing the job they are supposed to do every day because
    they have to defend themselves, and we are losing good people,
    because they get to the point where it is like I want out. I
    don't need this harassment when all I am trying to do is do
    what is right. And you are all shaking your heads like I am
    familiar with this type of antics taking place.
        How do we--I am not saying that there can't be leaders that
    are out of line. Don't get me wrong. But how do we defend the
    people that are getting tied up in knots and kept from doing
    their job in leadership because somebody who is not doing their
    job decides they are going to take that route? And are you
    seeing a rise in this type of----
        General McConville. Well, I think I can speak for our
    service is very concerned about those type issues. We want
    commanders not to be looking over their shoulders when they are
    making decisions. On the other hand, we want to make sure that,
    you know, our soldiers have access, you know, if they see
    something wrong, to come forward, and it really becomes trying
    to find that sweet spot in between. And we have to watch that
    as we go forward. And you heard IG talk about that kind of
    concern about how maybe some people are taking advantage, and
    we just have to watch that, and we have to come back.
        And there are things we can do when we look at some of the
    cases. Some of them may be triage upfront. We take a look at
    it. We--you know, and there is risk in that because the best
    thing to do is do a 4- or 500-day investigation, you will be
    absolutely sure that you have no issues probably at the end.
        On the other hand, you may hold up someone at retirement or
    something like that, and I am not sure that is fair either. So
    we are trying to find the best way to make this fair for both
    involved.
        Dr. Wenstrup. I would like to see some focus on speeding up
    that process, because I am seeing some good people get dragged
    through the mud for absolutely no good reason whatsoever just
    because you told someone they need to get their OER [officer
    evaluation report] done. I mean, that is a little bit
    ridiculous, and then they start saying you are picking on me.
    So, obviously, I am speaking from a real experience, and I
    would love to hear from more of you.
        General Walters. Sir, I think what we are talking--we have
    a process, and we want whistleblowers to have the option to
    come forward and tell us when wrong things are being done. But
    that process right now, the reprisal process is broad ranging.
    We have a thing called request mast. Administrative errors, any
    young Marine can go all the way up the chain of command to get
    whatever he believes or she believes is an error corrected. But
    what I think we are seeing a trend instead of using that
    request mast is they have got to go talk to the commander, then
    the commander's commander, and up the chain. Instead of doing
    that, they just pick up the phone and make a complaint on a
    hotline for an administrative error. They didn't get the award
    they think, they did not think their fitness report was
    accurate, or they did not get the leave they wanted, or they
    got declined on leave.
        So these are administrative in nature, and we have the
    request mast process to adjudicate those and accommodate those
    and allows leaders to fix things when they are broken. As soon
    as they pick up the phone for those kinds of issues, it goes
    into a different process, which as you pointed out, can take
    too long.
        Dr. Wenstrup. By the way, it is not me involved with one of
    those. I was an outside observer.
        Go ahead.
        General Wilson. I really think we are a little bit out of
    balance on the whistleblower reprisal piece. About 96 percent
    of the cases are not substantiated, so it would tell you that
    we are spending a lot of time and yet it is not in balance. And
    to your point, that has a chilling effect, not only on the
    commanders, but on the force when they can't--when you were
    trying to execute good order and discipline and you feel this
    cloud above you.
        And we completely agree that if somebody is going to be
    investigated, it should be done in a timely manner. If they are
    found guilty, then let's move on with that. If not, they should
    be also on the innocent side remove that quickly. It is taking
    way too long.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
        Admiral Moran. I agree. Timeliness is the issue here, to
    your point, sir. And when we can get better at that, I think it
    will help resolve a lot of this. But we are spending the same
    amount of time on very few cases that are ultimately
    substantiated.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Russell, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you
    for being here today.
        I guess a lot of the statistics that we see amalgamated
    together include military misconduct, what would be clearly
    viewed as potential misconduct, but may not be translatable in
    the civilian world. But it also includes a wide array of tools
    that are used to address that misconduct, and all of that gets
    rolled up into this statistical analysis.
        And so I guess my question would be, what percent of the
    cases that we see--and some of the statistics I have looked at
    it is like, okay, so maybe 10 percent of the cases warrant
    further investigation, so 90 percent kind of thrown out. Of the
    10 percent that are there, roughly 30 percent of those end up
    being substantiated. And those are rough figures but, you know,
    seems to be some consistency there. So we are still talking
    small percentages. But even among that portion, not all of
    those are for like the big headline cases that we see. A lot of
    them could be, you know, you moved a boat with your household
    goods when you shouldn't have or something.
        Would you speak to that? What percent of the cases would
    never translate into offenses in civilian employment?
        Admiral Moran. Well, I will start, I guess. It is really
    hard to say. Since I graduated from high school, I have had a
    uniform on, so I don't really know. I will try to get that
    answer for you and put it in writing, but I wish I could tell
    you. All I know is the standards we have----
        Mr. Russell. Well, I mean, there are some things, just like
    with a sailor, I mean, you know, he is swabbing the deck or a
    soldier buffing the floors or whatever over something that
    would never--they would never have anything entered in any
    record or file, there would never be any offense. And I know
    that also can apply to general officers on certain standards of
    conduct that the military expects and demands certainly of our
    senior leaders, but yet if they were in the corporate world,
    this would not be anything that would translate, and yet that
    is still part of the statistical body. And that is what I am
    trying to get at, whoever would like to address that.
        General McConville. You know, we have had things from
    officer evaluation reports being late because the commander was
    waiting on a discipline issue before he actually wrote the OER.
    So, technically, he was substantiated for late OER because he
    was just waiting for this thing to resolve. Of course, you
    know, it didn't ruin his career, but he did go through a
    process which delayed him, and it runs all the way to an
    inappropriate relationship.
        And even on the civilian side, if you had an inappropriate
    relationship, inappropriate consensual relationship, we hold
    people very accountable for those type things. If you went to a
    gentleman's club, you know, on the civilian, but we hold people
    very accountable for those type things, and I think we should
    have a high standard in the military.
        Mr. Russell. General Wilson.
        General Wilson. Over the last 5 years, we have had 77
    cases. As we looked at that, about 60 percent of them I am
    going to call an error in judgment in administrative
    procedures. About 25 percent of those involve personnel
    matters, and those that involve some type of sexual harassment
    or inappropriate relationship was under 15 percent.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you.
        General Walters.
        General Walters. Sir, I am looking at--so in the last 10
    years, we have had 15 in our general officers. I was looking at
    them, most of them are admin. They wouldn't be taken--held
    accountable out in the government. I had one TAD [temporary
    additional duty] where he got extra money on his TD [temporary
    duty] claim. I guess that is theft, and that could be
    chargeable out in the civilian world. We took care of it. I
    think it was 10 bucks. And we made him cut a check, and then we
    reprimanded him.
        Mr. Russell. And I appreciate that.
        And, Mr. Chairman, that is part of what I am just trying to
    establish is that a lot of the statistics, you know, are rolled
    into where it looks like a greater problem of misconduct.
        And then my final question for Admiral Moran would be, we
    have heard mentioned in both panels today the Fat Leonard case
    and some things like that, but when a case comes up like that
    that has translated over to the Justice Department, is the
    military limited in how it can even comment or even defend or
    maybe portray the other side of the story while it is in the
    Justice Department and outside of the Department of Defense?
        Admiral Moran. Yes, sir, we absolutely are. So I look
    forward to the day when I can come back to this committee and
    testify about what we have learned from that and about the
    things we have put in place to address it. And that is much
    where I was going with Congresswoman McSally's question. I am
    very focused on that right now, and it is hard to talk about
    it.
        And some of those cases where they go through a justice
    review and end up in a Navy review and are ultimately
    unsubstantiated after years of investigation are really tough
    to account for, but Congress now expects us, Senate expects us
    to address that, even though they were unsubstantiated, just so
    they know we have looked thoroughly at it. That was my point.
        Mr. Russell. And I think that is important to note, Mr.
    Chairman, because many times what might be the appearance of
    that they are trying to hide or harbor information, the reality
    is when it translates from Department of Defense over to
    Department of Justice, they are prohibited from providing
    perhaps very illuminating or alternative views, but yet they
    can't, and so I think that is very important to establish in
    the hearing today.
        And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. Ranking Member Speier.
        Ms. Speier. In conversations with one of you, I guess it
    was over someone being reprimanded for endorsement, it came up
    that general officers could have outside employment. And then
    we checked the UCMJ and found out there is no prohibition for
    general officers to have outside employment, which I think is
    pretty stunning. Would you approve of us passing an amendment
    that would prohibit outside employment?
        General McConville. I certainly would. I don't know what
    general officer has time to have outside employment. I would
    like to know who the person was.
        Ms. Speier. That is what I was saying.
        Admiral Moran. Yes, I want his job.
        General McConville. If he is in the Army, I will get a new
    job for him.
        Admiral Moran. Ma'am, we will go back and look at the
    statutes, but I want to believe that we are prohibited from
    outside employment. We are not prohibited from serving on
    certain organizations that are for the benefit of the military
    services or volunteer organizations as a board member or a
    contributor to that. But generally speaking, we have been
    prohibited for as long as I can remember.
        General Wilson. I agree with my colleagues.
        Ms. Speier. All right.
        General Walters. No, ma'am, I only experienced it once. I
    was invited to be a member of a board for a heroes flight, and
    my counsel said you can't. And it was gratis, so--I didn't have
    the time anyway.
        Ms. Speier. General Wilson, I am going to ask you just to
    write me a memo on this, but to have 70,000 court-martials in
    the Air Force and never once a court-martial of an officer
    suggests that maybe there is something to that, so I would just
    like you to write me a memo to give me some of your thoughts on
    that.
        The UCMJ also has a statute of limitations that in many
    cases is less than it would be in the civilian world. For
    instance, for bribery, UCMJ has a 5-year statute of
    limitations. In the general society, it can be 7 to 10 years.
    Would you look at the statute of limitations for, you know,
    various forms of conduct in the military and give us your
    recommendations as to which ones should be increased.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 139.]
        Ms. Speier. And then, finally, General Walters, this was in
    the paper today, in case you haven't seen it.
        General Walters. Is that USA Today, ma'am?
        Ms. Speier. Yes. It is ``Marine Corps brushed off sex
    charges.'' And what is stunning about this particular case is
    that you have two women who have been sexually harassed by the
    same person, and nothing happened. And when the one survivor of
    the sexual harassment went to her superior, they said no one
    will believe you. And if you have heard anything from the
    Members of Congress over the last few months is we believe the
    women. So I hope that this becomes an anomaly as we continue to
    evolve in terms of the issue of sexual harassment. I think we
    have a huge problem. We have a huge problem in our academies,
    and I think we have a huge problem in our services. That isn't
    even getting to the issue of sexual assault. That is the issue
    of sexual harassment, and I think we have got to do something
    dramatic to shift the culture.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Ms. McSally, you are now recognized.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you.
        So as we have talked about in both panels, we have got
    probably an issue with reprisal whistleblower maybe being
    overly utilized and legitimate cases obviously need to be
    addressed and people need to be held accountable, but the
    system is being bogged down with a lot of other cases. And in
    some cases, as we all know, people, maybe it is their
    situational awareness is low and their perception of reality is
    such that they are reporting what they believe to be wrongdoing
    that you all unsubstantiate. But in some cases somebody may be
    fraudulently claiming wrongdoing of someone above them and you
    will investigate that.
        Again, assuming the person has been exonerated, has there
    ever been examples of going back and the accused, you know,
    being looked at for false claims or fraudulent claims or lying
    to investigators or anything like that in those cases?
        No examples of that at all?
        General Wilson. I am not aware of any.
        Ms. McSally. Is there a process even to take a look at
    that, that somewhere along the line----
        General Walters. I will put that under the heading of you
    don't want to put anything out there that will preclude someone
    from coming forward in the future. Good one.
        Ms. McSally. Totally agree. However, if somebody has
    brought together a false allegation----
        General Walters. If they truly believed in their
    allegation, although it proved to be false, I still don't
    think--and it turned out not to be true, I don't think there
    is----
        Ms. McSally. My bet would be that would be the vast
    majority of cases, but there may be a rare case within the
    process that you need to take a look at whether, you know--
    their own conduct is the issue. Is there any sort of process
    there to even take a look at that, whether somebody lied or has
    a fraudulent claim or anything like that? Everybody deserves
    due process.
        Admiral Moran. I am told there is a process, but can we get
    back to you with a written response to that to give you more
    detail behind it?
        Ms. McSally. Sure. Great.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 140.]
        Ms. McSally. And I don't know if you all can answer this
    versus the IGs on the first panel, but what sort of training do
    the investigators go through? And is there any sort of review
    to ensure that they don't take a prosecutorial mindset of, you
    know, rewarding getting some kills versus fact finding and just
    sort of oversight of the investigator selection and processes?
        Admiral Moran. I think that is another one we can get back
    to you on, Congresswoman, but there have been perceptions of
    that in the past, and I know that I have personally had
    discussions with the gent sitting behind me in our IG chair,
    and when we see that, he normally addresses it in his command,
    and I trust that he will take appropriate action if there is
    any evidence of that.
        Ms. McSally. Any other comments on that?
        General McConville. No, I agree. I think it is, you know,
    same thing with our IG. That is why we have a lot of checks and
    balances in the system, both in the legal side and the command
    side. At least from where we sit, it is not arbitrary; it is
    how these decisions are made, and that is why they take some
    time because they are reviewed at every single level to make
    sure we don't have things like that happening.
        Ms. McSally. Anyone else?
        General Wilson. I just think all the IGs would say that
    they spend a lot of time on making sure their investigators are
    trained right and trained appropriately. There are probably
    cases where that has happened, overzealous investigators,
    before, but I know all of us are emphasizing with our IGs the
    importance of the training in doing it right.
        Ms. McSally. General Walters.
        General Walters. Always have to be on the lookout for that,
    ma'am.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks.
        Would you all support--I mentioned on the first panel, if
    someone who is exonerated wanted there to be a public statement
    made that they were exonerated, would you support a process
    that you all did that, not them, but you all did that?
        General McConville. I would be glad to do it.
        Admiral Moran. Same.
        General Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. McSally. Is that something----
        General Walters. No problem.
        Ms. McSally [continuing]. We have to do or is that
    something you could do within your own procedures, to allow
    that option if they want you to make a statement that they have
    been cleared?
        General Walters. Let's look at the procedures, ma'am. And
    my sense is, much like the IGs told you, that once it is over,
    most members who are exonerated just want it to be done. They
    don't want to bring it up again.
        Ms. McSally. But if somebody would want it to be publicly--
    --
        General Walters. I don't see why we would not accommodate
    that.
        Ms. McSally. Can you all get back to me as to whether that
    is internal or whether that is something we need to do? Great.
    Thanks.
        I yield back.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 141.]
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Russell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just one comment on the outside employment. Unless
    something has changed, officers in all the services are
    prohibited from doing outside employment. The exception
    probably back to the time we have been wearing tricorn hats was
    they could write for publication and they could, if you had
    some particular person whose wartime memoirs or experiences
    were needing to be captured or published, you know, I think of
    people like General Marshall and others people wanted to know,
    and they were allowed to publish their memoirs or do things of
    that nature. I am not sure that, Mr. Chairman, a bill would be
    needed. I think all of that is currently in place, and then we
    also don't want to put prohibitions on our Guard and Reserve
    flag officers. My goodness, they wouldn't be able to eat and
    feed their families. If any of you care to comment on it, that
    is fine.
        But, General Walters, you did not have a chance to reply
    to, you know, we are accustomed in Congress to often getting
    headlines that we don't deserve or that maybe we do, but would
    you care to comment on the headline that was presented earlier?
        General Walters. No, sir. I mean, it was brought to our
    attention on Monday night. I know the reporter asked for some
    information. We couldn't turn the FOIA information, the
    redacted PII [personally identifiable information] fast enough
    for him before he published. We have our lawyers looking into
    it, and they are actually with the complainant right now
    working out the mitigation plan. So we are looking deep into
    it. I don't know all the facts yet, but I will find all the
    facts.
        Ms. Speier. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Russell. Of course.
        Ms. Speier. This is a case that dates back to 2013 and
    2017?
        General Walters. Yes, ma'am. I think 2013 was in the
    actions--what I was briefed in last night, 2013 were the
    actions. The complaint came in and I think--I believe, I don't
    know, but I believe that mitigation was put in place, but the
    mitigation broke down, and now we have to go look at mitigation
    again.
        Ms. Speier. Well, there was a second--there was second
    woman who then came forward, so there is----
        General Walters. Right. And that one never reported, but
    now she has, so we have to look at it.
        One of the problems is getting people to report and having
    trust in the system. And we have seen the increase of
    reporting, and we have established, through the task force, I
    will take this opportunity to offer a full brief on all we have
    done since last year.
        Ms. Speier. I don't want to take the gentleman's time.
        Mr. Russell. And reclaiming the time, and I thank the
    gentlelady.
        And it is important we establish those trust and that we do
    those things. And I think, Mr. Chairman, you know, with your
    leadership, we have seen from our service academy
    superintendents and commandants that have come and provided us
    testimony that many times there is a very good process. And
    when, you know, mention was made on some of that, that there
    being a big problem, I would disagree. I think our hearings
    here have substantiated that, while there are issues that
    certainly must swiftly be dealt with, when compared to
    collegiate America, my goodness, you know, colleges would love
    to have the problems that our academies have in terms of
    virtually nil in statistics. That doesn't mean that things that
    happen there, they have to be swiftly dealt with to the fullest
    extent of the uniform code and also law and criminal cases, but
    I think that those hearings have been very, very helpful.
        And thank you for your response, General Walters, on that.
    And being a true conservative, I will even give back some time,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coffman. I wish to thank all the witnesses for their
    testimony this morning. Senior leader misconduct is an
    extraordinarily important issue, and I want to thank the
    witnesses for their candor.
        There being no further business, the subcommittee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                February 7, 2018

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                February 7, 2018

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                       DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                February 7, 2018

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                February 7, 2018

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                 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Mr. Fine. There are 76 civilian investigators and 1 military who
    conduct senior official and whistleblower reprisal investigations at
    the DOD OIG. Of the 76 civilian investigators, 63 have prior military
    experience.   [See page 27.]
        General Quantock. We are authorized 20 investigators for senior
    officials, 9 are Civilian and 11 are Military. This is investigators
    only, it does not include those in leadership positions or those who
    conduct complaint intake analysis.   [See page 27.]
        Admiral Shelanski. All of the NAVINSGEN investigators are civilian.
      [See page 27.]
        General Harris. The Air Force senior official investigations office
    has 3 civilian investigators (GS-15s) and 8 military investigators
    (colonels).   [See page 27.]
        General Ottignon. GMC rates 3 civilian senior official
    investigators, currently 2 are assigned. Hiring actions are underway
    for 2 additional civilian investigators.   [See page 27.]
        General Quantock. In FY17, the Army tried 531 courts-martial. Of
    that number, 36 accused personnel were officers and 495 were enlisted
    Soldiers.   [See page 34.]
        Admiral Shelanski. See attached chart for Navy Courts-Martial
    summary.   [See page 34.]

        [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        General Harris. The chart below shows the number of court-
    martials--breaking out enlisted and officer--for the last five years.
    [See page 34.]

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Enlisted           Officer             Total
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2013             709                32                 741
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2014             525                31                 556
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015             509                38                 547
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016             469                24                 493
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2017             464                24                 488
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        General Ottignon. Disposition of corrective actions (court-
    martials) records are maintained by the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant.   [See page 34.]
    Second panel
        General McConville. Since 1999, the Army has preferred courts-
    martial charges against four general officers. Three courts-martial
    were tried to completion, the fourth is ongoing. The security clearance
    status for these officers is as listed:
        James Grazioplene: Does not have an active security clearance.
    Jeffrey Sinclair: Does not have an active security clearance.
        David R. Hale: Does not have an active security clearance.
        Roger Duff: Does not have an active security clearance.
        Over the last 5 years, the Army substantiated misconduct in 113
    investigations involving 121 general officers (GOs). Total number of
    substantiated allegations was 174. Of the 121 GOs substantiated for
    misconduct between FY13 and FY17:
        1--was prosecuted at a General Court-Martial and 1 is the defendant
    in an ongoing General Court-Martial.
        2--received Article 15s.
        32--received Memorandums of Reprimand from the Vice Chief of Staff
    of the Army (VCSA) or another commander.
        35--received Memorandums of Concern from the VCSA or equivalent
    written counseling from another commander or the Deputy Judge Advocate
    General (DJAG).
        34--received Verbal Counseling from the VCSA, another commander, or
    DJAG.
        1--retired GO had a master's degree previously awarded by the Army
    War College revoked.
        5--cases were not referred for Army disciplinary action because
    they involved minor technical infractions investigated after the
    officer retired or reflected misconduct in a civilian employment
    capacity for a Reserve officer and were referred to the proper channel
    for resolution. In 5 cases, the VCSA directed no action after reviewing
    the investigative file and receiving legal advice.
        5--cases are still pending disposition.   [See page 39.]
        Admiral Moran. In a review of court-martial records going back as
    far as 2007, the Navy has no record of a court-martial of any flag
    officer. In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted a flag
    officer in federal court for misconduct committed while on active duty,
    and in 2017 the DOJ indicted a retired flag officer for offenses
    allegedly committed while on active duty. In these cases, DOJ
    involvement precluded the Navy from court-martialing these officers.
        In the past five years, there have been 24 substantiated misconduct
    investigations against flag officers. Of these cases, 11 were a result
    of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia investigation. The accountability
    actions taken against the flag officers included relief of command,
    administrative counseling, Secretarial letters of censure, and non-
    judicial punishment. Two officers investigated for allegations of
    misconduct related to GDMA had their local access to classified
    material suspended. Of note, a Commander's decision whether to suspend
    local access to classified materials for a service member under their
    command is not part of the accountability process. Rather, this is a
    separate determination as to whether the adverse or derogatory
    information affects the standards used for clearance eligibility.
        General Wilson. A search of the Air Force's current database, which
    goes back through 1997, reveals no courts-martial involving a general
    officer and no clearances revoked.   [See page 39.]
        In the past 5 years, Air Force Inspector General Investigations
    substantiated 77 military senior officials' allegations. Command action
    in those cases included: Article 15--1 Letter of Reprimand--21 Letter
    of Admonishment--11 Letter of Counselling--24 Alternative Disposition
    (verbal counselling or no action)--14 ``Other''--3 Pending--3   [See
    page 39.]
        General Walters. There have been no general officers court-
    martialed in the Marine Corps in the last five years.
        There have been nine* misconduct allegations substantiated against
    general officers, and one against an SES in the last five years. [*
    This number does not include 2017 contempt finding in Military
    Commissions case].
        In each case, the senior official was counseled and/or received a
    non-punitive letter of caution (NPLOC). One officer who had been
    selected for major general was eventually removed from the promotion
    list after allegations were substantiated against him and his selection
    was reviewed by a Promotion Review Board (PRB). The PRB determined
    that, in light of the substantiated allegations, the officer was no
    longer qualified for promotion.
        The Marine Corps reviews on-going and completed misconduct
    investigations prior to forwarding a general officer's nomination and
    when determining an appropriate retirement grade recommendation.
        No general officer has had their security clearance revoked.   [See
    page 39.]
        General McConville. Due to recent updates, we do not recommend any
    changes at this point. The Military Justice Review Group (MJRG)
    recently studied this issue as part of a ``comprehensive and holistic
    review'' that examined all punitive articles and recommended extending
    the statute of limitations (SOL) for a child abuse offense from 5 to 10
    years, extending the SOL for fraudulent enlistment to 5 years or the
    length of the enlistment, and creating a new extension of the SOL when
    DNA evidence implicates an accused for certain offenses. Congress
    adopted these recommendations in NDAA FY17. Based on the recency and
    completeness of the MJRG review, the accompanying appellate issues each
    change generates, and the potential for due process violations, we are
    not requesting any changes at this time.   [See page 48.]
        Admiral Moran. This issue was recently considered by the Military
    Justice Review Group (MJRG). In December 2015, the MJRG reviewed the
    question of whether the statutes of limitation in the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice (UCMJ) should be modified and the group's
    recommendations were incorporated into the Military Justice Act of 2016
    (MJA16).
        The 2015 review and study of statute of limitations by the MJRG,
    including a comparison with federal law, found that the statute of
    limitations provisions under the UCMJ are largely in step with federal
    counterparts for common law crimes. The three recommended substantive
    changes that were included into MJA16 as changes to the statutes of
    limitations established in Article 43, UCMJ are as follows: 1) Child
    Abuse. Article 43(b)(2)(a) extends the statute of limitations
    applicable to child abuse offenses from the current five years or the
    life of the child, whichever is longer, to ten years or the life of the
    child, whichever is longer, thereby aligning with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3283
    (in 2006, Congress raised the limitations period in the Title 18
    provision from five years to ten years).
        2) Fraudulent Enlistment. Article 43(h) extends the statute of
    limitations for Article 83 (fraudulent enlistment) cases from five
    years to (1) the length of the enlistment, in the case of enlisted
    members; (2) the length of the appointment, in the case of officers; or
    (3) five years, whichever is longer.
        3) Cases Involving DNA Evidence. Article 43(i) extends the statute
    of limitations until a period of time following the implication of an
    identified person by DNA testing that is equal to the otherwise
    applicable limitations period, thereby aligning with 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 3297. Pursuant to Article 43, murder; rape and sexual assault;
    rape and sexual assault of a child; absence without leave or missing
    movement in time of war; and any other offense punishable by death may
    be tried and punished at any time without limitation.
        The statute of limitations for all other offenses is five years;
    however, Article 43(d)-(g) provide several additional exceptions to the
    statutes of limitations described above. These exceptions provide added
    authority and flexibility for prosecuting offenses in a number of
    circumstances unique to the military justice system including for
    offenses committed in a time of war; when an accused is absent from
    territory in which the United States has the authority to apprehend
    him, or is in the custody of civil authorities or enemy forces; and
    when prosecution is considered to be detrimental to the prosecution of
    war or inimical to the national security.   [See page 48.]
        General Wilson. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a
    five-year statute of limitations for most crimes. Congress has also
    provided for an increased statute of limitations for some of the most
    serious crimes to include murder, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of a
    child. While statutes of limitations vary by state and federal civilian
    jurisdictions, the current statute of limitations provision in the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for adequate time to
    prosecute instances of misconduct within the military.
        Any change to the statute of limitations must consider the purposes
    of such limitations. A statute of limitations ensures criminal
    allegations are resolved in a timely fashion, ensures the availability
    of evidence for both the prosecution and defense, and enables a fair
    process. Given the purposes of statute of limitations provisions, the
    adequacy of such provisions within the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice, and the availability of administrative actions, we do not
    recommend any modification to the statute of limitations at this time.
    [See page 48.]
        General Walters. The Marine Corps is part of the Joint Service
    Committee (JSC) on Military Justice. The JSC process continuously
    evaluates whether changes to the UCMJ are warranted. The JSC was also
    part of the recent Military Justice Review Group's comprehensive
    revision of the Manual for Court-Martial which resulted in Military
    Justice Act of 2016. The MJA of 2016 included some revisions to the
    length of the statutes of limitations under Art. 43, Uniform Code of
    Military Justice. There are no additional recommended changes at this
    time.   [See page 48.]
                                     ______

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY
        General McConville. We take sworn and recorded testimony. Each
    complainant, witness and subject are advised that they are required to
    provide truthful testimony. If it is determined that an individual
    provided a false official statement during an IG investigation, then
    the matter could be referred to the appropriate command/organization
    for resolution. It could also be documented as a substantiated finding
    in the IG database. However, it is rare for us to find that an
    individual provided false statements during an IG investigation.   [See
    page 49.]
        Admiral Moran. Yes. If the claim is false, the complainant's
    veracity in filing the complaint could be reviewed and addressed by
    appropriate authorities at their discretion. ``Appropriate
    authorities'' is a direct reference to the complainant's chain of
    command. A commander or supervisor could/would be the appropriate
    authority to address an allegation of misconduct on the part of a
    service member or civilian (e.g., knowingly filing a false IG
    complaint).   [See page 49.]
        General Wilson. Should a report submitted to any investigative
    agency uncover misconduct, whether by the subject of the investigation
    or by the person making the report, the Air Force maintains avenues to
    appropriately respond to any misconduct. This might include criminal
    prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, if the evidence
    supports such action.
        Integrity is one of the Air Force's core values and any lapse in
    integrity, to include fabricating allegations of wrongdoing to utilize
    the investigative process in a malicious manner, is taken seriously by
    all levels of command. This would include knowingly making false
    official statements or false claims to an investigator.   [See page
    49.]
        General Walters. When a service member, in the process of making a
    claim of reprisal or some other allegations, is suspected of making a
    false official statement, which is a criminal offense under Article 107
    UCMJ, the command or military law enforcement will investigate the
    matter in order to provide the cognizant commander relevant information
    to decide on how the alleged misconduct will be addressed.   [See page
    49.]
        General McConville. All Army Inspectors General undergo a highly
    structured, fully accredited training program based on the adult
    learning model. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the
    American Council on Education are the accrediting authorities for both
    the Army IG Basic and Advanced Courses. Specifically for
    investigations, the Basic Course provides 28.5 hours of hands-on,
    scenario-driven instruction, and the Advanced Course provides 7 hours
    of advanced critical-thinking and writing instruction. In a learner-
    centric environment that leverages state-of-the-art, interactive
    simulation and other technologies, students learn both policy and
    doctrinal aspects of IG investigations through a combination of large-
    and small-group instruction facilitated by hands-on practical exercises
    based upon actual cases. The instructors then assess student knowledge
    and application skills through a combination of knowledge-based tests
    and application-based graded homework exercises. IG investigators
    continue to enhance their skills and techniques through their local IG
    office provided training and external training opportunities, such as
    the Department of Defense IG Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
    course.
        In addition to the above training, all investigators assigned to
    conduct senior official investigations participate in a week-long
    Investigator Development Program. This training focuses specifically on
    those processes and procedures unique to senior official
    investigations. It consists of 9 training blocks, each taught by an
    experienced senior official investigator. Also, all new investigators
    are assigned a civilian mentor who works with his/her mentee until the
    new investigator has demonstrated proficiency in all tasks regarding
    senior official investigations. Our extensive review process, which
    includes peer reviews, multiple legal reviews, and several leadership
    reviews, ensures that all investigations are thorough, accurate, and
    unbiased, and that the conclusions are supported by a preponderance of
    credible evidence.   [See page 49.]
        Admiral Moran. Investigators go through Basic and Advanced Hotline
    training and Military Whistle Blower Reprisal Courses. The tenet that
    ``we serve as impartial fact-finders for the directing authority, and
    are in no position to pass judgment or execute punishment,'' is
    reinforced through the training, during practical exercises of
    interviewing and report writing. Instructors, mentors, and leaders
    evaluate these techniques throughout the courses and also provide
    checks and balances, as an ongoing measure, from the Naval Inspector
    General Headquarters, through quality assurance checks and oversight of
    inquiries and reports of investigation that are within the purview of
    the Naval Inspector General.   [See page 49.]
        General Wilson. Air Force senior official investigating officers
    come from a variety of backgrounds. Nearly all are graduated senior-
    level (colonel) commanders with 20+ year careers in the Air Force or
    other military service. These investigating officers are chosen
    selectively for their past performance, judgement, and maturity. The
    training they receive includes interview training, investigating
    writing training, courses presented by the Office of the Inspector
    General, Department of Defense, and an extensive internal ``block
    training'' process. Central to the training is the Council for
    Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ``Quality Standards for
    Investigations.'' These standards and associated training explicitly
    focus on ensuring investigations are independent, fair, thorough,
    accurate, objective, impartial, ethical, unbiased, and accomplished
    with due professional care. All Air Force senior official cases are
    investigated using a ``team concept'' with an Investigating Officer and
    an imbedded attorney advisor assigned to each investigation from start
    to finish. The investigations are overseen by the Director of Senior
    Official Inquiries. And, each investigation receives a separate and
    fully independent legal review by the Director of Administrative Law
    for the Air Force upon its completion. Our sole focus and desired
    outcome is an independent, fair, accurate, thorough, and objective
    investigation without regard for the specific finding on any individual
    allegation.   [See page 49.]
        General Walters. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
      [See page 49.]
        General McConville. In accordance with our procedures, we try to
    maintain the confidentiality of IG investigations to the maximum extent
    possible. Each individual who provides information or testimony in
    support of an IG investigation is told to not discuss the matters with
    anyone other than the IG. Additionally, most of our investigations are
    not ``sensitive'' or ``newsworthy'' and only involve a few personnel.
    In the typical case, we do not see the need for a public exoneration.
    In the rare instances when a senior official investigation becomes
    widely known and has adversely impacted the organization, as well as
    the credibility of the senior official, we would certainly support a
    formal statement issued via public affairs channels that enables the
    Army to publicly acknowledge that the senior official was cleared of
    any wrongdoing.   [See page 50.]
        Admiral Moran. No. NAVIG does not support publically acknowledging
    cases that are not substantiated. This protects the subject from
    unwanted and unwarranted attention that may cause a negative perception
    about them based on false allegations and may be damaging to their
    career.   [See page 50.]
        General Wilson. The result of any investigation is always available
    for official purposes internally within the Air Force and is generally
    releasable to the subject of that investigation subject to legal
    requirements. However, the Air Force currently does not provide a
    public statement when any Airman, to include a senior leader, is
    exonerated of an allegation. Such statements are generally not
    permitted under the Privacy Act. However, if the subject of the
    investigation permits the Air Force to release information that SAF/IG
    did not substantiate an allegation against him/her, they could sign a
    Privacy Act release authorizing the AF to release such information.
    [See page 50.]
        General Walters. When a servicemember is no longer the subject of
    an investigation, and will be the subject of no criminal or
    administrative action, it may be because that person has been
    exonerated or it has been determined that there is simply not
    sufficient evidence to proceed. In either case, there is no formal
    process for publically and specifically addressing the fact that a
    servicemember is no longer a suspect of criminal misconduct during or
    following an investigation. Rather, the commander has the prerogative
    to address the matter directly with the accused or through their
    counsel.   [See page 50.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                February 7, 2018

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
    the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
    need?
        Mr. Fine.  Whistleblower Reprisal Case Backlog

        The largest backlog exists in whistleblower reprisal cases. As of
    March 6, 2018, there were 279 open whistleblower reprisal cases at the
    DOD OIG. The 279 open cases are composed of 78 investigations, 122
    intakes, 50 Alternative Dispute Resolution cases, and 29 cases from the
    Military Services and the DOD Component IGs that the OIG is providing
    oversight review. Of the 78 investigations, 75 (96%) are over 180 days
    old and 67 (86%) are over 1 year old.
        From FY 2013 to FY 2017, the number of reprisal complaints received
    by the DOD OIG increased from 1,059 to 1,808 (71%) and the number of
    intakes dismissed increased from 495 to 892 (140%). Because DOD OIG
    investigators had to respond to the dramatic increase in incoming
    complaints, they closed fewer investigations (decrease from 47 to 37).
        Included in the increase in caseload is a significant increase in
    the number of cases where sexual assault victims have alleged that
    reprisal actions were taken against them. As of March 6, 2018, the DOD
    OIG had 84 open sexual assault related reprisal cases. The 84 open
    cases are composed of 30 investigations and 54 intakes.
        The DOD OIG has implemented several initiatives to attempt to
    address the large increase in workloads.
        [bullet]  In FY 2013, we deployed the Defense-Case Activity
    Tracking System (D-CATS) enabling a paperless environment for data and
    documentation and the seamless transmittal of cases within the DOD OIG.
        [bullet]  In FY 2014, we created the Oversight Branch with
    investigators dedicated to performing oversight reviews of reprisal
    cases referred to the Military Service and DOD Component IGs.
        [bullet]  In FY 2016, we streamlined the oversight process,
    eliminating a backlog of over 200 cases, and improving the time to
    complete oversight reviews from 70 days to 10 days.
        [bullet]  In FY 2016, we initiated reviews of the investigative
    operations of the Military Service IGs to identify areas for improved
    efficiency and to share best practices.
        [bullet]  In FY 2017, we established an Alternative Dispute
    Resolution (ADR) capacity, with a team a personnel who have completed
    108 ADR cases and 18 settlements.

    Resources Needed
        At the start of FY 2018, I reallocated 21 FTEs from other DOD OIG
    components to the Administrative Investigations (AI) Whistleblower
    Reprisal Directorate (WRI) and DOD Hotline in an attempt to improve the
    timeliness of the intakes and investigations conducted by the DOD OIG.
    The DOD OIG has been aggressively recruiting and onboarding staff to
    fill those FTEs, with 11 of 21 (52%) onboard.
        However, more resources are needed. First, we need an increase of
    21 FTES for the DOD OIG end strength in order to backfill the 21 FTEs
    in the other DOD OIG components from whom I reallocated resources to
    the whistleblower reprisal and Hotline units. This is necessary to
    prevent the other DOD OIG components from suffering due to personnel
    loss, in execution of their important missions.
        Second, we need 10 FTEs to perform the process reviews of the
    Military Service IGs. In FY 2016 and FY 2017, the DOD OIG conducted
    process reviews of the Naval IG and the Air Force IG. We recently
    initiated a review of the Army IG. These reviews, which are similar to
    Federal IG peer reviews, are in-depth systemic assessments of
    investigative operations. They require a team of 10 full time
    investigators from 6-8 months to complete. We intend to conduct reviews
    of each Military Service IG at least once every 3 years.

    Senior Official Cases

        As of March 6, 2018, there were 35 open senior official cases at
    the DOD OIG. The 35 open DOD OIG cases were composed of 12
    investigations, 13 intakes, and 10 cases from the Military Services and
    the DOD Component IGs where the OIG is providing oversight review. Of
    the 12 open DOD OIG investigations, 4 (33%) were over 180 days old and
    1 (8%) was over 1 year old.
        From FY 2013 to FY 2017, the number of senior official complaints
    the DOD OIG received increased from 703 to 803 (14%). At the same time,
    the average number of days the DOD OIG took to complete senior official
    investigations increased from 267 days in FY 2013 to 472 days in FY
    2017.
        There are two primary reasons for the DOD OIG taking more time to
    complete investigations in the past several years. First, is the
    increasing complexity of the cases that occurred while the number of
    investigators assigned to conduct investigations remained the same. The
    complexity of investigations is measured by the number of allegations
    and issues addressed, the number of witnesses interviewed, the number
    of documents collected, and the number of pages in the final report.
        Second, the DOD OIG investigation into allegations involving
    intelligence reporting at U.S. CENTCOM was one of the largest
    investigations ever to be conducted by the DOD OIG. The investigation
    team addressed 25 allegations, conducted 150 interviews, collected 15
    terabytes of data representing over 17 million classified documents,
    and produced two reports of 190 (unclassified) and 542 pages
    (classified). This case was conducted by 30 personnel and took 18
    months to complete.
        While the U.S. CENTCOM was an unusually complex case, there have
    been an increasing number of other more complex cases and special
    reviews that the office has completed in FY 2016 and FY 2017 at the
    request of the Secretary of Defense.

    Resources Needed
        We believe we need an additional 12 investigators for the ISO
    Directorate to conduct senior official investigations and special
    reviews. This would provide us the investigative capability to more
    expeditiously handle the increasing number of more complex
    investigations and special reviews.
        Finally, the resources outlined above are only for our
    Administrative Investigations component. The DOD OIG also needs
    additional resources to conduct audits, evaluations, and criminal
    investigations; which I can discuss further if requested.
        Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
    of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
    the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
        Mr. Fine. Yes, from our perspective, it appears that the DOD has
    appropriate systems in place to record and review adverse information.
    For career actions requiring Senate confirmation, the checks of
    investigative records for adverse and reportable information is
    required by DOD Instruction (DODI) 1320.04, ``Military Officer Actions
    Requiring Presidential, Secretary of Defense, or Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness Approval or Senate Confirmation.''
        However, we are concerned about a recent policy change regarding
    procedures for investigating issues or allegations presented to Army
    IGs and for closing cases in the Army Inspector General Action Request
    System (IGARS) database. A new Army policy directs that Army IGs will
    not close out issues or allegations in IGARS as ``substantiated'' or
    ``not substantiated'' when those cases were received by IGs and
    referred to commands for investigation. Instead, Army IGs are now
    instructed to record the form of action taken by the command (i.e.,
    commander's inquiry, AR 15-6) and close the case as ``Assistance.'' The
    policy also covers complaints referred to an IG by the DOD Hotline.
    This new policy is contrary to the DOD Hotline policy that requires
    findings be stated as ``substantiated or not substantiated only,'' and
    is inconsistent with DODI 1320.04 which requires DOD to inform the
    President and Senate of adverse or reportable information. In addition,
    we are concerned by the characterization of certain adverse information
    in the Army IGARS by referring to them as ``assistance'' cases because
    it may impact the DOD's ability to provide accurate information to the
    President and the Senate about substantiated cases. We have raised our
    concerns with the Army and the Department as to how this change will
    affect the Army's and the Department's ability to document and review
    patterns of adverse behavior.
        Ms. Speier. Provide number of senior leader misconduct cases that
    allegations were substantiated, with action recommended and the Service
    did not take action. What was the substantiated allegation in each
    case? What was the rationale for not acting?
        Mr. Fine. From FY 2013 to FY 2017, there were 24 cases
    substantiated by the DOD OIG and the Military Service and DOD Component
    IGs where Military Service or DOD Senior Management Officials declined
    to take action.
        The rationale provided by the Services or the DOD for not taking
    action included that they disagreed with the investigation conclusions,
    they considered the subject's otherwise exemplary career, or that the
    subject was no longer in the Military or Federal Service.
        Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
    the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
    need?
        General Quantock. Our current investigations backlog is
    approximately 10 cases. We base this backlog against our goal of
    completing 60% of our senior official investigations in less than 180
    days. The 180 day metric is based on historical case processing
    timelines. Over the last 5 years, the average case processing time for
    senior official investigations was 246 days, with a median of 192 days.
    Note: We start our case processing timeline based on the date we
    received the complaint, which is different than some of the other
    services. In order to meet our case processing timeline goals for
    senior official investigations, we estimate that we need approximately
    2-3 additional investigators. An updated manpower analysis is currently
    in progress.
        Ms. Speier. When was LTG Quantock first made aware of complaints
    and/or allegations against Mr. Joseph F. Guzowski related to treating
    Army IG employees with dignity and respect? What actions did he take
    upon being made aware of those complaints and/or allegations? On what
    dates has LTG Quantock discussed these complaints and the resulting CID
    and DOD IG investigations with Mr. Guzwoski? What was the content of
    those conversations? What comments has LTG Quantock made to Mr.
    Guzowski about the nature of allegations and/or complaints, the
    investigations, or their disposition?
        General Quantock. LTG Quantock learned of each allegation
    separately. Regarding the 2012 allegation that Mr. Guzowski gave an
    unwanted kiss to an IG employee, LTG Quantock was made aware in August
    2015. Regarding the December 2016 inappropriate touching allegation,
    LTG Quantock was made aware in early January 2017. Upon learning of
    each allegation, LTG Quantock took immediate action. Once informed in
    August 2015 of the 2012 allegation, LTG Quantock immediately notified
    the Senior Official Investigations Division, which referred the matter
    to the appropriate agency to address the complaint--the Department of
    Defense Inspector General (DOD IG). LTG Quantock also immediately
    referred the 2016 allegation to the Senior Official Investigations
    Division, which then notified the Criminal Investigations Division
    (CID) and the DOD IG. CID investigated and determined there was no
    probable cause to believe Mr. Guzowski committed the offense of sexual
    battery. DOD IG pursued its own investigation. LTG Quantock discussed
    the DOD IG investigation findings with Mr. Guzowski only after the
    release of DOD IG's final report. At that time, LTG Quantock informed
    Mr. Guzowski that he would be temporarily detailed to the Office of the
    Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, pending review and appropriate
    action regarding the substantiated findings.
        Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
    of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
    the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
        General Quantock. The primary purpose of an investigation is to
    determine if there is a senior official impropriety. In the course of
    an investigation, we obtain evidence that is relevant to the
    allegations under investigation. Based on the nature of the allegation,
    we may identify instances of impropriety that occurred in prior years
    during the course of the investigation. This evidence of past
    impropriety would be documented in the DAIG report of investigation,
    and could be used by a board to inform/support its grade determination
    decision. Over the years, there have been a few cases where our
    investigations identified misconduct that occurred several years prior.
    In those instances, the senior official was ultimately reduced in grade
    based on this information.
        Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
    the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
    need?
        Admiral Shelanski. Currently the Naval Inspector General has a
    backlog of 73 Reprisal Investigations, 60 Hotline Investigations and 4
    Senior Official Investigations that do not meet DODIG's completion
    timeline. An average Reprisal case takes 136 days, a Hotline case takes
    79 and a Senior Official case takes 215.
        Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
    of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
    the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
        Admiral Shelanski. This question requires trend analysis, a process
    for which we are not currently resourced. NAVINSGEN's role in a
    retirement grade decision for a Flag Officer is to query our data base
    to see if there has been any misconduct reported or documented against
    the Flag Officer. These record queries are also done for Flag Officer
    promotions.
        Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
    the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
    need?
        General Harris. Air Force senior official investigations currently
    has 16 open investigations and 12 complaints in intake. In CY 2017 the
    average case duration for an Air Force senior official investigation
    was 187 days. We are currently assessing our requirements to improve
    timeliness through additional efficiencies and manpower, if necessary.
        Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
    of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
    the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
        General Harris. Air Force Inspector General senior official
    investigations address specific complaints that include credible
    evidence of a violation of law, instruction, regulation, or policy.
    However, we also consider each complaint in its broader context and
    review whether there have been any previous instances of misconduct or
    trends over an officer's career. Previous performance or misconduct
    issues would be included in the officer's record and reflected in that
    record as an officer meets a promotion board. Any substantiated
    allegations of a violation by an officer, past or present, are included
    in the officer's record meeting a promotion board in a Senior Officer
    Unfavorable Information File (SOUIF). As such, senior official
    investigations themselves provide one piece of information that may
    assist in decision making. Any individual investigation's results must
    be combined with an officer's official record to get a comprehensive
    picture of the officer's career, performance, and potential.
        Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
    the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
    need?
        General Ottignon. Currently, the Inspector General of the Marine
    Corps (IGMC) has:
        1. Open cases:
          a. Senior Official Investigation 8
          b. Senior Official (Preliminary Inquiry) 3
          c. Whistleblower Reprisal 25
          d. Hotline Investigations 292
          e. Total IGMC Cases open 328 as of 12 March 2018
        2. The average days it takes to receive, analyze, investigate and
    close investigations (Averages)
          a. 2014 186 days
          b. 2015 220 days
          c. 2016 280 days
          d. 2017 330 days as of 12 March 2018
        3. The IGMC office has conducted an internal look at requirements
    to be in compliance with the Department standards. At the minimum, the
    IGMC office requires an additional investigator (GS-14), an additional
    supervisor (GS-15) for senior official investigations and 4 paralegal
    administrative clerks (GS-9).
        Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
    of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
    the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
        General Ottignon. Yes. The statutory board process for promotions
    adheres to a process in which a member's complete record is reviewed
    and weighed. Adverse material is considered during this process to
    include IG investigation reports of misconduct that may have occurred.
    Moreover, the Marine Corps conducts reviews every 90 days to ensure
    nominees or selected members for promotion have not since had
    misconduct
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
        Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
    your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
    experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
    fully staffed?
        Mr. Fine. There are 77 investigators at the DOD OIG Administrative
    Investigations office, which conducts senior official and whistleblower
    reprisal investigations (76 civilians and 1 active duty military). The
    investigators possess an average of 14 years of investigative, audit,
    or legal experience.
        As noted above, we believe we need an additional 43 FTEs to conduct
    senior official and whistleblower reprisal investigations and reviews
    of investigative operations of the Military Service IGs. The DOD OIG
    also needs additional resources to conduct audits, evaluations, and
    criminal investigations; which I can discuss further if requested.
        Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
    your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
    experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
    fully staffed?
        General Quantock. Our current authorizations for investigators who
    conduct senior official investigations are as follows: Military--11
    (COL-LTC) Civilian--9 (GS14) We do not have any contractors who serve
    as investigators. Note that this does not include those in leadership
    positions, nor does it include those who conduct complaint intake
    analysis. Our civilian investigators have extensive investigative
    experience. Typically, a new civilian hire has at least 3-5 years of
    investigative experience. Currently, the average investigative
    experience for our assigned civilians is approximately 10 years. Our
    military investigators initially have little investigative experience.
    However, each investigator receives extensive training in order to
    become a qualified investigator of senior officials. In order to reduce
    current case backlog to meet our established goals, we will need
    approximately 2-3 additional investigators. An updated manpower
    analysis is currently in progress.
        Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
    your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
    experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
    fully staffed?
        Admiral Shelanski. At NAVINSGEN Headquarters, we currently have
    four senior official investigators, four Hotline investigators, five
    Reprisal investigators, one Congressional investigator, and two
    supervisors, who also conduct investigations in addition to their
    supervisory role. The investigators are all civilian GS employees.
    Almost all have prior investigative experience, ranging from prior
    military service to a former police officer investigator. To be fully
    staffed, under current staffing levels, we would require a total of 16
    additional investigators at NAVIG HQ and 24 additional investigators
    throughout the enterprise.
        Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
    your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
    experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
    fully staffed?
        General Harris. The Air Force senior official investigations office
    has three civilian investigators and eight military colonel
    investigators, and zero contractors. Air Force senior official
    investigating officers come from a variety of backgrounds. These
    investigating officers are chosen selectively for their past
    performance, judgement, and maturity. Nearly all are graduated senior-
    level (colonel) commanders with 20+ year careers in the Air Force or
    other military service. The training they receive includes interview
    training, investigating writing training, courses presented by the
    Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, and an
    extensive internal ``block training'' process. Central to the training
    is the Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
    ``Quality Standards for Investigations.'' These standards and
    associated training explicitly focus on ensuring investigations are
    independent, fair, thorough, accurate, objective, impartial, ethical,
    unbiased, and accomplished with due professional care. All Air Force
    senior official cases are investigated using a ``team concept'' with an
    Investigating Officer and an imbedded attorney advisor assigned to each
    investigation from start to finish. The investigations are overseen by
    the Director of Senior Official Inquiries. And, each investigation
    receives a separate and fully independent legal review by the Director
    of Administrative Law for the Air Force upon its completion. Our sole
    focus and desired outcome is an independent, fair, accurate, thorough,
    and objective investigation without regard for a specific finding on
    any individual allegation. The Air Force senior official investigating
    office is currently fully staffed, although we are currently exploring
    options to improve timeliness through efficiencies and additional
    manpower.
        Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
    your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
    experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
    fully staffed?
        General Ottignon. IGMC investigative branch has structure for 3
    civilian investigators (GS-14). Currently there are 2 civilian
    investigators serving. Hiring actions are underway for the vacancy.
    Navy IG recently shifted an additional civilian investigator to IGMC
    for a total of 4 civilian investors. Hiring actions are underway for
    this vacancy as well. Civilian investigators have an average of 3 years
    prior IG investigations experience.
        There are no military investigators assigned to IGMC investigations
    branch.

    Second panel

        Ms. Tsongas. For which felonies should the statute of limitations
    be increased?
        General McConville. Due to recent updates, we do not recommend any
    changes at this point. The Military Justice Review Group (MJRG)
    recently studied this issue as part of a ``comprehensive and holistic
    review'' that examined all punitive articles and recommended extending
    the statute of limitations (SOL) for a child abuse offense from 5 to 10
    years, extending the SOL for fraudulent enlistment to 5 years or the
    length of the enlistment, and creating a new extension of the SOL when
    DNA evidence implicates an accused for certain offenses. Congress
    adopted these recommendations in NDAA FY17. Based on the recent and
    comprehensive MJRG review, the accompanying appellate issues each
    change generates, and the potential for due process violations, we
    would not recommend any changes at this time.
        Ms. Tsongas. Which general officers have requested outside
    employment in the past five years? Which of these cases were approved
    and which were denied?
        General McConville. Under the Joint Ethics Regulation, active duty
    general officers, like all service members, must receive prior written
    approval before engaging in a business activity or compensated outside
    employment with a prohibited source. The approval authority may
    disapprove outside employment if he/she determines that it will create
    a conflict of interest with the officer's official duties, detract from
    readiness, or pose a security risk. The decision to approve or deny
    requests for outside employment submitted by active duty general
    officers is made at the local level. The Army does not centrally track
    this information. However, we are reviewing the need and feasibility of
    a system that would provide Headquarters Department of the Army
    visibility over active duty general officers engaged in outside
    employment.
        Ms. Tsongas. For which felonies should the statute of limitations
    be increased?
        Admiral Moran. This issue was recently considered by the Military
    Justice Review Group (MJRG). In December 2015, the MJRG reviewed the
    question of whether the statutes of limitation in the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice (UCMJ) should be modified and the group's
    recommendations were incorporated into the Military Justice Act of 2016
    (MJA16).
        The 2015 review and study of statute of limitations by the MJRG,
    including a comparison with federal law, found that the statute of
    limitations provisions under the UCMJ are largely in step with federal
    counterparts for common law crimes. The three recommended substantive
    changes that were included into MJA16 as changes to the statutes of
    limitations established in Article 43, UCMJ are as follows:
        1)  Child Abuse. Article 43(b)(2)(a) extends the statute of
    limitations applicable to child abuse offenses from the current five
    years or the life of the child, whichever is longer, to ten years or
    the life of the child, whichever is longer, thereby aligning with 18
    U.S.C. Sec. 3283 (in 2006, Congress raised the limitations period in
    the Title 18 provision from five years to ten years).
        2)  Fraudulent Enlistment. Article 43(h) extends the statute of
    limitations for Article 83 (fraudulent enlistment) cases from five
    years to (1) the length of the enlistment, in the case of enlisted
    members; (2) the length of the appointment, in the case of officers; or
    (3) five years, whichever is longer.
        3)  Cases Involving DNA Evidence. Article 43(i) extends the statute
    of limitations until a period of time following the implication of an
    identified person by DNA testing that is equal to the otherwise
    applicable limitations period, thereby aligning with 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 3297. Pursuant to Article 43, murder; rape and sexual assault;
    rape and sexual assault of a child; absence without leave or missing
    movement in time of war; and any other offense punishable by death may
    be tried and punished at any time without limitation.
        The statute of limitations for all other offenses is five years;
    however, Article 43(d)-(g) provide several additional exceptions to the
    statutes of limitations described above. These exceptions provide added
    authority and flexibility for prosecuting offenses in a number of
    circumstances unique to the military justice system including for
    offenses committed in a time of war; when an accused is absent from
    territory in which the United States has the authority to apprehend
    him, or is in the custody of civil authorities or enemy forces; and
    when prosecution is considered to be detrimental to the prosecution of
    war or inimical to the national security.
        Ms. Tsongas. Which general officers have requested outside
    employment in the past five years? Which of these cases were approved
    and which were denied?
        Admiral Moran. The following retired Navy flag officers requested,
    and were approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel under delegated
    authority, to accept compensated civilian employment from a foreign
    government. The Chief of Naval Personnel has not rejected any request
    in the past five years. Since law requires approval of both the
    Secretaries of Defense and State, the Department of State would need to
    confirm which officer's requests were ultimately approved.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Year              Name of Person            Foreign Government Approved To Receive Payment for Employment
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2014           Landay, William                United Kingdom
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Bowman, Frank                  Saudi Arabia, Egypt
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Creevy, Lawrence               Canada
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    201            Eccles, Thomas                 Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Gaini, Anthony                 United Kingdom
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Hall, Thomas                   Iceland
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Harnitchek, Mark               Afghanistan
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Johnson, Stephen               Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2015           Sullivan, Paul                 Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016           Eccles, Thomas                 Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016           Gale, David                    Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016           Hilarides, William             Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016           Locklear, Samuel               Taiwan
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016           Sullivan, Paul                 Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2016           Donald, Kirkland               Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2017           Eccles, Thomas                 Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2017           Hilarides, William             Italy
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2017           Johnson, Stephen               Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2018           Branch, Ted                    Australia and Canada
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2018           Donald, Kirkland               Australia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        \1\ RADM David Gale was approved to work for the Government of
    Australia in August 2016 while still on active duty and his approved
    retirement date was October 1, 2016.

        Ms. Tsongas. For which felonies should the statute of limitations
    be increased?
        General Wilson. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a
    five-year statute of limitations for most crimes. Congress has also
    provided for an increased statute of limitations for some of the most
    serious crimes to include murder, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of a
    child. While statutes of limitations vary by state and federal civilian
    jurisdictions, the current statute of limitations provision in the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for adequate time to
    prosecute instances of misconduct within the military.
        Any change to the statute of limitations must consider the purposes
    of such limitations. A statute of limitations ensures criminal
    allegations are resolved in a timely fashion, ensures the availability
    of evidence for both the prosecution and defense, and enables a fair
    process. Given the purposes of statute of limitations provisions, the
    adequacy of such provisions within the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice, and the availability of administrative actions, we do not
    recommend any modification to the statute of limitations at this time.
        Ms. Tsongas. Which general officers have requested outside
    employment in the past five years? Which of these cases were approved
    and which were denied?
        General Wilson. Air Force records available indicate that the
    following general officers requested, and were approved, for outside
    employment while on terminal leave:
        Gen Larry Spencer--President, Air Force Association--approved
        Lt Gen Robert Otto--Member, Oak Ridge National Lab Global Security
    Directorate's Strategic Advisory Group--approved
        Maj Gen James Martin, Jr.--Partner (non-equity), Kearney and
    Company--approved
        Maj Gen Scott Vander Hamm--Director of Strategic Initiatives,
    Innovative Defense technologies--approved

                                      [all]