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U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: REASSESSING PRIORITIES AMID CONTINUED CHALLENGES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, everybody, for being here.

The U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges is an important topic. And on the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs we look forward to addressing this, and we have invited you here because of your expertise.

And you guys know how this works with the button in front of you. Make sure your microphone is turned on. You'll have a green light. It goes yellow and red and then you'll hear the gavel.

We have votes that are going to come up between 2:30 and 3:00 o'clock and typically what we do is we take a break. We ask if you can stay to hear your input when we come back and we will reconvene as quickly as we can.

So, with that, we will go ahead and start with the opening statements. And, again, I thank you for being here.

The United States has sought a cooperative relationship with Pakistan for nearly 20 years despite incompatible goals. Over the last year, this contradiction has come to an inevitable head.

As we meet today, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is devolving. Faced with few good options in our fight to stabilize Afghanistan, the United States has spent about $33 billion on Pakistan since 2001.

For years now, U.S. expenditures for Pakistan has decreased as it becomes more and more evident that our priorities are just not in alignment.

Over the last 6 months, the administration has taken steps to sharply accelerate this trend. Though it's long overdue, the United States is finally facing the reality that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship needs to change.

Counterterrorism cooperation has been central to this relationship but the reality is that Pakistan has never shared the United States commitment to eliminate terrorist activity in South Asia.

We won't soon forget that Osama bin Laden was hiding in plain sight in Pakistan or that Dr. Afridi remains in prison for the work
that he did to help us capture Osama bin Laden. And this same attitude continues today.

Pakistan wants a government in Kabul that it can control or no government at all. That is why Pakistan continues to give a pass to extremists who seek to destabilize Afghanistan or attack India.

Many Members of Congress have argued for this dramatic recalibration of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But as we move to the next stage, it’s essential that we get it right.

No matter what, Pakistan will continue to be central to U.S. strategy in South Asia and is increasingly important to the administration’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy.

For decades, Pakistan and China have shared what they call an all-weather friendship and have drawn even closer in recent years. Pakistan has doubled down on its relationship with China as tensions with the United States have grown.

The China-Pakistan economic corridor is a central component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative offering economic benefits for Pakistan in exchange for China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea.

As many expected, this economic initiative has also begun to take on a military character. Last month, it was revealed that China will build its second overseas military facility in conjunction with a port at the Pakistani city of Gwadar. This is the second one in a short period of time with the other one being in Djibouti.

Pakistan’s internal dynamics are also challenging to the continued partnership with the United States. Religious freedom and human rights concerns are longstanding and not improving.

Now fundamentalists and extreme voices are taking on a new prominence in Pakistani politics. Further divergence between Pakistan and the United States on values and principles will make cooperation all the more difficult and widen the gaps between our strategic priorities.

If 2017 laid the groundwork for a recalibration of U.S.-Pakistan relationships, 2018 will help decide its future course. The President and Congress will need to determine how we want to shape and fund this relationship, going forward, particularly with budget season approaching.

So I look forward to hearing the panel’s thoughts today and hope their testimonies will inform a number of lingering questions as we work on the issues throughout the coming year.

Are U.S. and Pakistani goals for South Asia fundamentally compatible? What elements of military and counterterrorism cooperation must be maintained and what—and which need to be reworked?

How does Pakistan play in U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo Pacific in our larger competition with China?

And finally, what is the future of Pakistan society and government, and is Pakistan becoming less tolerant and a less suitable partner for the United States of America?

I thank the panel for joining us to share their expertise on these issues and any other member—any others that the members may wish to raise.

And with that, members present will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material for the record to length limitations in the rules and the witnesses' written statements will be entered into the hearing record.

I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for any remarks he may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]
The United States has sought a cooperative relationship with Pakistan for nearly 20 years, despite incompatible goals. Over the last year, this contradiction has come to an inevitable head. As we meet today, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is devolving. Faced with few good options in our fight to stabilize Afghanistan, the United States has spent about $33 billion on Pakistan since 2001. For years now, U.S. expenditures for Pakistan have decreased as it becomes more and more clear that our priorities are just not in alignment.

Over the last 6 months, the administration has taken steps to sharply accelerate this trend. Though it’s long overdue, the United States is finally facing the reality that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship needs to change. Counterterrorism cooperation has been central to the relationship, but the reality is that Pakistan has never shared the United States’ commitment to eliminate terrorist activity in South Asia. We won’t soon forget that Osama Bin Laden was hiding in plain sight in Pakistan, or that Dr. Afridi remains in prison. And this same attitude continues today. Pakistan wants a government in Kabul that it can control, or no government at all. This is why Pakistan continues to give a pass to extremists who seek to destabilize Afghanistan or attack India.

Many Members of Congress have argued for this dramatic recalibration of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But as we move to the next stage, it’s essential that we get it right. No matter what, Pakistan will continue to be central to U.S. strategy in South Asia, and is increasingly important to the administration’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy.

For decades, Pakistan and China have shared what they call an “all weather friendship,” and have drawn even closer in recent years. Pakistan has doubled down on its relationship with China as tensions with the United States have grown. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a central component of China’s Belt and Road initiative, offering economic benefits for Pakistan in exchange for China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea. As many expected, this economic initiative has also begun to take on a military character—last month it was revealed that China will build its second-ever overseas military facility in conjunction with a port at the Pakistani city of Gwadar.

Pakistan’s internal dynamics are also challenging to the continued partnership with the United States. Religious freedom and human rights concerns are longstanding and not improving. Now, fundamentalist and extremist voices are taking on a new prominence in Pakistani politics. Further divergence between Pakistan and the United States on values and principles will make cooperation all the more difficult, and widen the gaps between our strategic priorities.
lf2017 laid the groundwork for a recalibration of U.S.-Pakistan relations, 2018 will help decide its future course. The President and Congress will need to determine how we want to shape and fund this relationship going forward, particularly with budget season approaching. So, I look forward to hearing the panel’s thoughts today, and hope their testimonies will inform a number of lingering questions as we work on these issues throughout the coming year:

- Are U.S. and Pakistani goals for South Asia fundamentally compatible?
- What elements of military and counterterrorism cooperation must be maintained, and which need to be reworked?
- How does Pakistan play into U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, and our larger competition with China?
- And finally, what is the future of Pakistan’s society and government, and is Pakistan becoming less tolerant and a less suitable partner for the United States?

I thank the panel for joining us to share their expertise on these issues and any others that Members may wish to raise. And with that, Members present will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to length limitation in the rules, and the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the hearing record. I now turn to the Ranking Member for any remarks he may have.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing.

Pakistan is a highly consequential nuclear state. But all too often, we look at Pakistan as just a single inanimate entity.

With these hearings, we can look inside Pakistan. We have witnesses that can give us an understanding of what's going on in the country with its political, regional, and ethnic groups and the state of Pakistani democracy, such as it is.

Since 2001, the United States has provided to Pakistan $11 billion in economic aid, and $8 billion in security aid. That's $19 billion.

In addition to that, we have paid $14 billion in coalition support funds which we are told the Pakistani military has used in anti-terrorist efforts in support of our war in Afghanistan.

On the one hand, we have seen small improvements in the economic and political developments in Pakistan. We have, at least nominally, a civilian government that was elected in 2008, then with elections also in 2013, and an election scheduled for later this year.

Pakistan has a small but growing middle class, a semi-active civil society and press, and a judiciary that has at times confronted the state.

And USAID projects have helped in areas of energy, agriculture, education, and health, including helping to provide 3,000 megawatts of electric power generation to Pakistan's national grid, management practices and technologies for 300,000 farmers, repair or build 1,300 schools, and train 2,700 teachers.

Still, we have challenges. In the area of civil/military relations, the military appears to have the upper hand. It influences or controls Pakistani foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India, and also seems to play a outsized role even on domestic policy.

On issues of federalism, the Pakistani state dominates the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and the Pashtun areas, often with little regard for the citizens in those areas.

Most egregiously, even though thousands of Pakistanis have lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the past decade, Pakistani security and intelligence agencies have not been playing or often are not playing a constructive role with regard to terrorism.

Instead, they provide safe haven to terrorist groups that attack Afghanistan and India and are linked to grave human rights violations in Sindh and other parts of Pakistan.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee and the State Department's report on human rights have noted serious concerns about hundreds of cases of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearance in Pakistan, particularly in Sindh.

Among those hundreds of cases, we have with us a witness who has been directly affected. In November 2015, Sindhi leader Dr. Anwar Laghari, the brother of one of our witnesses, was brutally murdered in Pakistan.

The Pakistani Government has not been very responsive to numerous inquiries made by the State Department at the request of myself and other Members of Congress.
The reason for Dr. Laghari’s death and why his perpetrators have not been brought to justice, these are questions the Pakistani Government must still answer.

And then to compound that tragedy, on October 30th last year, Dr. Anwar Laghari’s son, Asad Laghari, was found dead in suspicious circumstances and is suspected to be a victim of poisoning.

I met Asad Laghari when he was in Washington. He was pursuing a Master’s degree here in the United States. He was preparing to help his country deal with water issues.

On August 18th last year, I wrote to the State Department about these issues with six colleagues—three Democrats and three Republicans. I have also raised these issues on the House floor.

We must focus on an end to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in Sindh and elsewhere in Pakistan. We must place a high priority on advancing genuine human rights and democracy in Pakistan, not just for the people of Pakistan who would benefit from human rights and democracy but because a democratic Pakistan that respects the rule of law will be a true ally of the United States.

As the chairman brought up, we are concerned still, of course about the compound that Osama bin Laden had. He wasn’t hiding in some nondescript apartment—a mile from the West Point of Pakistan, in a large protected compound.

But those in the ISI who must have known bin Laden was there are still at high-ranking positions in the Pakistani Government. Whereas Dr. Afridi, who helped us capture and kill Osama bin Laden, is in prison. Kind of tells you which side is in control in Pakistan.

The Trump administration has strongly condemned Pakistan for its safe havens for terrorist organizations including the Taliban. We could develop a political strategy to address Pakistan’s concerns about India and Afghanistan.

We should consider officially recognizing the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan rather than just say that it is a matter to be discussed by the countries. And with the understanding that we gain here in these hearings, I hope that we develop a more effective policy toward Pakistan that understands its internal ethnic, religious, and political dynamics.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Yoho. I’d like to thank the ranking member.
Next we will turn to Mr. Chabot of Ohio, who, incidentally, used to be the chairman of this committee.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr.—

Mr. Yoho. And I aspire to be as talented as he is. [Laughter.] Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our relationship with Pakistan continues to be marked with frustration, oftentimes a lack of cooperation, and then sometimes it seems that there is mutual agreement and engagement and things are looking positive.

I want to give a tip of the hat to the gentleman from California here, Mr. Rohrabacher, who oftentimes has positions which I don’t always agree with and other members don’t always agree with.
But in his defense of Dr. Afridi, I have to say he's been relentless. He's been committed. He's never given up and he's absolutely right.

The treatment that Dr. Afridi got, a friend of this country who actually—information which led—you'll have some folks, oh, we are not sure about this. But in everything that I've seen it led to the end of Osama bin Laden, who killed so many of our fellow citizens on that horrible day, and then to have him thrown in jail, and this is supposed to be a government that's our friend and that we give pretty substantial amounts of aid to every year.

And I've generally voted for that aid over the years because I do think that, you know, if we cut it off they are going to be even closer to China and there is going to be ramifications there and they have nuclear weapons and all the rest.

So I understand we have to—we have to get along. We need to work together. But their treatment of Dr. Afridi is outrageous. It's indefensible and it should change, and I would hope sooner rather than later.

But I want to commend my colleague from California for never giving up on that and that's in meetings, at Republican conferences, in the face of leadership and demanding why they are not doing more and why we are letting Pakistan just continue to keep this doctor in a dungeon.

It's despicable, and thank you, Dana. We appreciate it. Until you do something bad and then I'll have to disagree with you. [Laughter.]

Mr. Yoho. No, thank you for bringing that up because I have to echo that. I mean, Mr. Rohrabacher has been out there consistently, hammering that home pretty much every meeting we have and I thank you for that.

Next, we will turn to Dr. Bera from California for an opening statement.

Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking member.

Obviously, there are a lot of complicated regions in the world, whether it's the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula.

But as someone who focuses on South Asia, I would argue that this is one of the most complicated regions in the world.

You know, whether it's our mission in Afghanistan, you know, you bring in India and Pakistan and, you know, it gets complicated.

Whether it is the rise of India as a growing economy, as one that's being welcomed into the League of Nations and leaders in the world and the amount of investment, you know, what does that portend to the India—Indo-Pak relationship as the economy—India becomes a stronger nation and garners more attention.

The hope is that Pakistan takes notice of some of the economic reforms that are taking place, some of the civilian reforms and some of the anti-corruption events, and you try to find a resolution between India and Pakistan.

You know, there are areas where I think the U.S., working with other nations, you know, to address Pakistan's very concerning energy needs, their electrical grid, areas where you got to take baby steps.
But how do you create some sort of, you know, small dialogue and trust? How do we support civilian government in Pakistan? How do we create those civilian institutions that will be necessary to create stability and a democracy?

Again, none of these are easy answers. You know, what role does China play here? You know, does China and—you know, does Pakistan—as the U.S. relationship with Pakistan changes, does Pakistan run to China as a counterweight?

I would argue that’s the wrong approach because China has shown a history of really China-centric involvement.

That said, does China take a more responsible role in helping create stability as a global leader? So, again, none of these are easy answers and, you know, I think we all have to look at all of this together but from the interest of Pakistan, looking at their long-term stability, their long-term—you know, they have an educated population.

They’ve got a diaspora here in the United States that’s very interested in looking for a path forward and resolving tensions and lowering tensions between India and Pakistan and hoping to see a more democratic Pakistan.

So, again, I look forward to the witnesses and thank you for calling this hearing.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments.

And I want you guys to understand that when we have these hearings your input is so valuable. It goes into ideas that we come up with legislation to help strengthen our foreign policy that we send to the state or the administration. And so we really value you being here and we want to thank you for your time.

What I want to do is just introduce all four of you and then we will start with you, Dr. Jones, and your statement.

Dr. Seth Jones, Harold Brown chair and director Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Jeff Smith, research fellow for South Asia at the Heritage Foundation; Mr. Munawar Sufi Laghari, executive director at the Sindhi Foundation; Dr. Shah, Wick Cary assistant professor of South Asian politics in the Department of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma.

Again, thank you for being here. Dr. Jones, your opening statement.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak out of order for a second.

Mr. YOHO. Please.

Mr. CHABOT. We have got actually a whole bunch of chairs over here if the folks over there might want to sit down and——

Mr. YOHO. You know, and I appreciate you pointing that out because I also want everybody just to kind of glance around the room. See how packed this room is.

People are interested about this topic, about our relationships with Pakistan, on both sides. And so that’s why this room is so crowded and over standing.

But feel free to come across if you got a moment right now, and thank you for pointing that out.

Dr. Jones, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, PH.D., HAROLD BROWN CHAIR, DIRECTOR, TRANSLATIONAL THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for allowing us to testify on this important subject that I think all of you that have spoken so far have indicated.

I want to keep my remarks brief and focus on two issues. One is the security situation which is what I focused on, both in Pakistan and the region, and the second is just to lay out potential options for consideration.

As I look at the security situation in Pakistan, what’s interesting as we looked at the data is actually there is been a dramatic drop in violence levels in Pakistan, especially over the past 4 years. Attacks have declined fairly significantly, probably in part a function of Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the country including in the tribal areas as well as against groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistan Taliban.

Fatality rates are actually down somewhat. Lethality rates against groups are actually down somewhat. They are still high in a few places, including Balochistan.

But I think what we see is some successful efforts by the Pakistan state, in some areas quite lethal, including on human rights issues that I think are worth bringing up. But we have seen a decrease.

In neighboring Afghanistan, obviously, the situation is different. We are seeing high levels of violence, Taliban control of somewhere between 10 to 12 percent of the Afghan population, depending on the numbers, and a pretty notable decrease in Afghan Government control of populated areas up through 2017, about 60 percent of the country, down from nearly 70 percent about 1½ years.

So the situation in Afghanistan is still quite violent and the situation in Pakistan, while violent, appears to be—indicators appear to be lessening.

Let me talk about next steps, moving forward, and I’ll skip—the testimony talks about a whole range of issues including China-Pakistan cooperation. Let me focus on three things in the remaining time.

One is broader relations with Pakistan. As someone who works on security, I do focus a lot on the security relationship, both with Pakistan and the region.

I do think it is important to remember that there are other areas of interest with Pakistan. It’s got the sixth largest population in the world. It’s got a GDP of about $300 billion, which is on par with South Africa and Colombia. It is a reasonable country and it has got a reasonable growth rate of about 5½ percent.

So there are areas—I think you talk to American companies that deal with iron and steel, agriculture machinery, aircraft that have an interest in trade, and then we get textiles, new apparel, leather products from Pakistan as well. So there’s an economic incentive to keep a relationship and to keep a trade relationship.

There are also interests in targeting the Islamic State in Khorasan Province, which sits really on the Af-Pak border in
Nangarhar Province, and that has conducted attacks including recently in Jalalabad.

So there are areas, I would say, of some common interest. I also think there is probably worth noting that any political settlement in Afghanistan almost certainly has to involve Pakistan because of its relationship with the Afghan Taliban.

So assuming there are efforts to improve and establish some kind of a peace deal, I think Pakistan is an important partner. But let me just say in general that we have a situation, I think, with Pakistan that I still find unacceptable.

The U.S. is fighting a war in Afghanistan primarily against the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The leadership structure of both groups sits on the Pakistan side of the border.

That is leader Haibatullah Akhunzada, his chief deputy, Siraj Haqqani and Mohammad Yaqub, a range of leaders—Abdul Qayyum Fakir, Ahmadullah Nanai, Abdul Latif Mansura—all located on the Pakistan side of the border and that has not stopped.

If that does not stop, I think it’s worth considering a range of issues. I’d like to see a more transparent aggressive information campaign in the United States about who is sitting in Pakistan, roughly, where they are located, what their names are, because I think we have got a lot that we can disclose without getting into sources and methods.

I think there are a range of issues from non-NATO ally status to multilateral financial lenders that I’ll save for the question and answer period.

But I think it’s worth thinking very carefully about an escalatory latter with Pakistan if some of that does not change.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Statement Before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

"U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges"

A Testimony by:

Dr. Seth G. Jones
Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

February 6, 2018
2200 Rayburn House Office Building
Thank you, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify today at such an important hearing, “U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges.” In this testimony, I will argue that the United States needs to broaden its relationship with Islamabad beyond just security issues. But Washington also needs to be prepared for escalation if Pakistan refuses to adequately target militant groups that enjoy a sanctuary on Pakistan soil and are operating against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.

My testimony is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of the security situation in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. The second highlights the evolution of U.S.-Pakistan relations. And the third provides recommendations for U.S. policy.

Overview of the Security Situation

This section examines the security situation in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. While the U.S. relationship with Pakistan shouldn’t be viewed primarily through an Afghan lens, the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan makes it inevitable that U.S. dealings with Islamabad are, in part, tied to Afghanistan and broader regional developments. Moreover, Pakistan’s security is tied, in part, to Afghanistan’s security, since they share a border that is nearly as long as the U.S.-Mexican border.

Pakistan: Pakistan has made countless sacrifices in both blood and treasure in its struggle against militants. Thousands of Pakistan soldiers, police, intelligence professionals, and other government officials have died fighting militant groups. Tens of thousands of Pakistan civilians have died because of terrorist attacks in Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad, Karachi, and other cities. As Figure 1 highlights, violence has occurred across the country over the past two decades—though it has been most heavily concentrated in such areas as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan, as well as in cities like Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore.

1 The U.S.-Mexican border is roughly 1,954 miles, while the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is roughly 1,510 miles.
Despite these attacks, recent trends suggest that violence levels have notably declined, an indication that Pakistan security agencies have likely made progress against extremist groups. As Figure 2 shows, there was a significant decrease beginning in 2014. Pakistan has conducted a range of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations across the country, including in the FATA, against groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. In addition, fatality rates from terrorist attacks are at a near-ten-year low, and lethality rates also dropped dramatically from a 20-year high of 5.4 deaths per attack in 2015 to 1.3 deaths per attack in 2016.  

2 Source: Map by CSIS Transnational Threats (TNT) Project, data from University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database. Available at: https://transnationalthreats.csis.org/builder/369674cb-2e2a-4d30-9433-6e29f315a944/embed

3 See, for example, such Pakistan documents as the National Internal Security Policy (NISP), which was presented to parliament in May 2014, and the National Action Plan (NAP), which was presented in December 2014.

4 Data from the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database.
According to data collected and analyzed by the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, violence levels in 2017 were also relatively low. There were 249 recorded terror incidents in Pakistan, including Jammu and Kashmir. Roughly 73 of these terror attacks occurred in Baluchistan Province, accounting for 29 percent of all incidents. FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa together accounted for 40 percent of all incidents in Pakistan in 2017.

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5 Data from the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database and Pakistan’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (NACTA). The NACTA figure for 2017 includes all attacks as of September 11, 2017.

6 This research did not include military-to-military clashes, which were accounted for in the NACTA estimates.
Afghanistan. While violence levels are down in Pakistan, the security situation is more concerning in Afghanistan. There are several sets of indicators that provide a sense of the state of the Afghan war. The first are changes over time in population control, since that is a major goal of the Taliban and the Afghan government. According to U.S. Department of Defense data, there has been a slight increase in Taliban control or influence of Afghanistan’s population—from 9 percent in August 2016 to roughly 10-12 percent in October 2017. There has also been a decrease in Afghan government control—from 69 percent in August 2016 to between 60 and 64 percent in October 2017. More data available at

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1 Map and data by CSIS TNT Project. The data include the contested areas of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan. These numbers likely underestimate the total number of attacks. Map available at https://transnat.healthyterrorismcarto.com/builder/114d8b17-0001-4057-82e4-aee5803880b7/ncfbc
percent in October 2017. This leaves roughly a quarter of the Afghan population living in contested areas where neither side has significant control or influence.6

Yet the data also show that Taliban gains have been almost entirely in rural areas of the country, where it enjoys some support among conservative Afghans that have become disillusioned with the Afghan government and who support the Taliban’s religious zealotry. The Taliban controls no major urban areas. After briefly seizing the northern city of Kunduz in September 2015, the Taliban quickly lost control of it within days. In 2017, the Taliban failed to mount a sustained threat against any provincial capital and instead engaged in high-profile attacks in Kabul and other populated areas. Even in Helmand Province, where the Taliban have made advances in rural areas, local commanders have so far failed to seize and hold such cities as Lashkar Gah and Gereshk.

A second set of indicators includes changes over time in local support, since both the government and Taliban need to mobilize support to hold and expand areas. The Taliban’s ideology may be amenable to some Afghans, such as those living in conservative rural pockets of the south and east. But it is still too extreme for many Afghans who adhere to a much less conservative form of Islam that permits most modern technology, sports, elections, and some women’s rights. The Taliban and its ideology are deeply unpopular, even compared to the current government and its security forces. A nationwide poll in 2015, for example, found that 92 percent of Afghans supported the Kabul government and only 4 percent favored the Taliban.9

While the Taliban may be unpopular in many areas, several indicators suggest that Afghans are deeply unhappy with their government. Nearly two-thirds of Afghans say the country is moving in the wrong direction, compared to only one-third who believe it is moving in the right direction.10 Afghans also believe their government is corrupt, a finding that is consistent with the assessments of international organizations. Afghanistan ranks 169 out of 176 countries on

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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and over three-quarters of Afghans say that corruption is a serious problem in the country.11

These indicators suggest that the Afghan war is, at best, a draw. The Taliban has slightly increased its control of populated areas, but it lacks a strong popular support base. The Afghan government has lost some rural areas, and Afghans harbor numerous grievances against their government. But most of the population would rather live under the government of Ashraf Ghani than under Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhunzada.

U.S.-Pakistan Relations

In part because of the Afghan war, relations between Washington and Islamabad have soured over the past several months. In July 2017, President Trump remarked that “Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror.”12 On New Year’s Day in 2018, President Trump went further, tweeting that the U.S. has “foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years” with little in return, promising “No more!”13 Pakistan officials quickly returned fire. Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif said that Mr. Trump is likely “disappointed at the U.S. defeat in Afghanistan and that is the only reason he is flinging accusations at Pakistan.” Mr. Asif also warned that Pakistan wouldn’t budge. “We have already told the U.S. that we will not do more,” he said, “so Trump’s ‘no more’ does not hold any importance.”14

There is a bit of déjà vu with this escalating war of words. Since 2001, the relationship between Washington and Islamabad has largely been transactional. Washington has needed Pakistan’s help in targeting al-Qaeda and other terrorists operating on Pakistani soil, as well as moving supplies from port cities like Karachi to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan, in turn, has used the billions of dollars in U.S. aid to support its economy. The United States and Pakistan have also cooperated in border operations against militant groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban

13 Quote came from President Trump’s Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, on January 1, 2018. The full Tweet was: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit. Thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!”
Pakistan, which have conducted terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Yet Washington and Islamabad have regularly clashed over issues like the Osama bin Laden raid, U.S. intelligence collection against militant groups in Pakistan, Pakistan aid to groups like the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, and skirmishes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

What is different today is how quickly relations plummeted. The Bush and Obama administrations generally had cooperative relations with Islamabad at first, but eventually became frustrated. Trump administration officials had little patience from the beginning. Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, still provides sanctuary and aid to groups like the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network that are fighting the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. Pakistan is engaged in a balance-of-power struggle with India, which has close relations with the Afghan government. Islamabad is also skeptical that the U.S. will remain in Afghanistan for the long run and fears a spiking civil war when U.S. forces eventually depart. Consequently, Pakistan uses proxies like the Afghan Taliban as a tool of foreign policy.

Moreover, Islamabad and Beijing have established increasingly close political, security, and economic relations. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to bring valuable infrastructure and economic activity to Pakistan, including in Baluchistan Province. But recent attacks on convoys and train lines in Baluchistan have shown that China will also need to secure their infrastructure developments. China is already Pakistan’s number one supplier of armaments and defense technology.

Recommendations

The United States is right to get tough with Pakistan. But Washington still needs to work with Pakistan in areas where they share a common interest. The combination of terrorism, nuclear weapons, and great power politics in South Asia make the region a huge potential flashpoint and important for U.S. national security. Moving forward, there should be several components of a revamped U.S. strategy toward Pakistan.

1. Broader Trade and Other Relations: The first is to emphasize that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is multi-faceted and should include economic, diplomatic, and development components – not just security. Pakistan has the sixth largest population in the world at nearly 200 million, a gross domestic product of nearly $300 billion (on par with South Africa and
Colombia), and a respectable 2016 growth rate of 5.5 percent. In 2016, the U.S. exported machinery, aircraft, cotton, iron and steel, and agricultural products to Pakistan, while the U.S. imported textiles, knit apparel, and leather products from Pakistan.

There are other areas where the United States and Pakistan share common interests. One example is countering terrorist groups like the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, the regional Islamic State branch. The Islamic State has a foothold along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province, as well as cells in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Washington, Islamabad, and neighboring governments should continue to coordinate efforts to weaken and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in the region. Finally, Islamabad is building a fence along its border with Afghanistan, a move that the Trump Administration might support if it could be effectively negotiated with Kabul – including territory disputed by Afghan and Pakistani.

2. Work toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan: A second component is to work with Pakistan toward a settlement in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban is too weak to overthrow the Kabul government or even to seize and hold a major Afghan city. And the Afghan government is too weak to defeat the Taliban on the battlefield. The result is a military draw, an important prerequisite for a political settlement. Pakistan has long-term interests in a safe and stable Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban makes it an important player in peace negotiations. It was unhelpful for U.S. officials to publicly call off peace negotiations, as the U.S. president did on January 30 after a series of high-profile bombings in Afghanistan. Peace efforts need to continue, and Pakistan will be essential in reaching a political resolution in Afghanistan.

3. Be Prepared for Escalation: With the Trump Administration’s decision to keep U.S. forces in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, Washington should continue to emphasize that it is in Islamabad’s interest to work toward a peace settlement and end its sanctuary for the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The Trump Administration is already moving in this direction. The Afghan and Pakistani people have suffered far too long in violence that is supported on various
sides by the United States, European countries, India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and China. Afghanistan, in particular, is the quintessential example of the historical “great game.”

The entire leadership of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which the U.S. and its allies are fighting in Afghanistan, are located on the Pakistan side of the border. Examples include the Taliban’s leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada; his deputies, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mohammad Yaqub; and a range of senior leaders like Abdul Qayyum Zakir, Ahmadallah Nanai, Abdul Latif Mansur, and Noor Mohammad Saqib. All reside in Pakistan. While the bulk of Taliban and Haqqani foot soldiers live in Afghanistan and fight a government they consider corrupt and incompetent, the United States cannot accept a situation where Islamabad covertly supports insurgents—some of which are targeting U.S. forces. This situation is a far cry from the 1980s, where both Islamabad and Washington worked together and ran a covert campaign to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. If Pakistan continues to harbor Taliban and Haqqani leaders, and fails to support an Afghan peace process, the U.S. should consider several steps on its escalatory ladder:

- Provide more public transparency about Pakistan activities. This could include, for example, publicly disclosing the names of senior Taliban and Haqqani leaders residing in Pakistan;
- Commit to aggressively pursue U.S. enemies wherever it finds them. The United States should be prepared to target the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and other groups wherever it finds them—including in Pakistan;
- Continue to freeze or terminate most military aid to Pakistan;
- Consider suspending or terminating Pakistan’s status as a non-NATO ally. This designation is given by the U.S. government to allies that have a strategic relationship with the United States, but are not members of NATO. Non-NATO ally status offers military and financial advantages that generally are not available to non-NATO countries;
- Consider making it more difficult for Islamabad to get access to multilateral financial lenders;
- Consider placing Pakistan on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. The U.S. military and intelligence agencies have collected an abundance of information over the years about ISI ties to terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and India, from Lashkar-e-Talba (or Jamaat-ud-Dawa) to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network.

By Washington should be prepared to carefully escalate if there is not an improvement in cooperation. It also needs to develop alternative routes to bring material to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, particularly through countries like Uzbekistan situated along Afghanistan’s
northern distribution lines. Pakistan officials warn that the U.S. aid freeze is driving Islamabad toward China. But as already noted, this development is not new. Pakistan has long been developing close relations with China, including through CPEC.

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The U.S. decision to stay in Afghanistan should send a strong signal to Islamabad that Pakistan officials need not prepare for a post-American region, a rationale that Pakistan policymakers repeatedly used to justify their support to the Taliban and other militant groups. With a long-term U.S. commitment to the region, Washington and Islamabad can focus on building a more constructive and enduring political, economic, and security relationship. A U.S. commitment should help allay Pakistan fears that the country will again face an Afghanistan to its west in chaos or an Afghanistan dominated by its rival, India. It may also provide renewed vigor to peace talks with the Taliban, particularly if Taliban leaders increasingly recognize that they cannot win on the battlefield.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
Mr. Smith, if you would.

STATEMENT OF MR. JEFF SMITH, RESEARCH FELLOW, SOUTH ASIA, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Smith. No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border areas. That was the unfortunate inalienable truth revealed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence nearly one decade by then Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair.

Sadly, it is as true today as it was then. Military strategists are in near universal agreement on this point. Nothing offers an insurgency greater vitality than the provision of support and safe haven across an international border in a neighboring country.

It is the equivalent of counterinsurgency kryptonite. The United States has been pursuing a set of objectives in Afghanistan that, by its own admission, are likely to remain hopelessly out of reach, absent a fundamental change in Pakistan's misguided strategic calculus.

The reality is there is a glaring fundamental incongruity between American and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan.

Whereas Washington, Kabul, and most of the international community have strived to build a peaceful stable democratic Afghanistan, Pakistan's ideal objective is an Afghan Government that is pliable, submissive, and hostile to India.

Since the Afghan people, understandably bitter after over a decade of Pakistani malfeasance, are unlikely to elect such a government, Islamabad's second order of priorities is to keep the country weak, unstable, and divided.

It sees the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and their fellow travelers as the most effective means of doing so and of securing its secondary objectives and interests in Afghanistan.

In 2009, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan concluded that there was no chance that Pakistan would view any increase in aid as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these militant groups.

The following year, the U.S. increased aid to Pakistan by 50 percent, from $3 billion to $4.5 billion. That was the year 2010, which was telling in two more ways.

It was the year that U.S. aid to Pakistan reached an all-time high and the year that U.S. casualties in Afghanistan reached an all-time high.

The Trump administration tried to signal early on that business as usual was coming to an end. This is a conditions-based approach and our relationship with Pakistan will also be conditions-based, based on whether they take action, Secretary Tillerson explained last year.

As long-time Pakistan watchers predicted, the administration's warnings fell on deaf ears. No, I have not seen any change yet in Pakistan's behavior, General John Nicholson, our top military commander in Afghanistan, admitted in November.

Instead, Pakistan returned to a familiar playbook of deflection, denial, conspiracy, and outright threats. If President Trump wants
Pakistan to become a graveyard for U.S. troops, let him do so, the chairman of Pakistan's senate warned last August.

In this context, President Trump's January 1st announcement of a suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan was not only merited but long overdue. The time has come to rewrite the terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

For years, America and the international community have bemoaned the Pakistani military's interference in the country's politics. Yet, they convinced themselves that as the country's real power brokers the military was the only institution capable of resolving Pakistan's terrorism problem.

That experiment has been a failure. The military and the ISI have consistently proven to be the source of Pakistan's terrorism problem.

As a result, the most effective points of pressure on Pakistan will be those targeting the military brass, particularly their considerable interests in and access to the West.

Pakistani officials and experts regularly claim their country is prosecuting America's war. Pakistan is not receiving aid from the U.S. It is receiving compensation for military operations conducted on America's behalf.

Nation states are obligated to ensure that their territory is not being used to launch attacks on other countries. That is their sovereign responsibility, not something they are entitled to receive compensation for.

If Pakistan is incapable of or unwilling to exercise sovereignty over its territory and prevent cross-border attacks, it should not be surprised when others take action to defend themselves.

I have several other conclusions and quite a bit on the Pakistan-China relationship in my written testimony that I suspect we may get to in Q and A.

But thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges

A Belated Reckoning:
U.S.–Pakistan Relations in the Trump Era

Testimony before
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
U.S. House of Representatives

February 6, 2018

Jeff M. Smith
Research Fellow
The Heritage Foundation

My name is Jeff M. Smith and I am a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
When General David Petraeus was named commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2010 he asked his former boss, General Jack Keane (ret.), to assess accusations Pakistan was playing a “double game” in Afghanistan. A retired four-star general and former vice-chief of Army staff who had served in Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Keane returned from a fact-finding trip with a dour conclusion: “The evidence is unequivocal that the government of Pakistan and the military leadership of Pakistan aids and abets [militant] sanctuaries. We have clear evidence to that fact. That’s the reality. It’s not a question of unable or unwilling.”

“Every day out of those sanctuaries,” he added, “come forces that are killing our forces and maiming our soldiers and interfering with NATO’s effort at large. That is the absolute facts of it. Some of them are—actually receive training from Pakistan forces.”

One year earlier, then-Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair delivered his own frustrating conclusion to Congress: “No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border areas.”

The United States has been pursuing a set of objectives in Afghanistan that, by its own admission, are likely to remain hopelessly out of reach absent a fundamental change in Pakistan’s misguided strategic calculus. Military strategists are in near universal agreement on this point: nothing offers an insurgency greater vitality than the provision of support and safe haven across an international border in a neighboring country. It is the equivalent of counterinsurgency kryptonite.

Pakistan’s supporters are quick to note the U.S. and Afghan governments have made their own share of mistakes in Afghanistan. That is true. Yet, I would contend nothing has had as pernicious an impact on the war’s trajectory as Pakistan’s double game. In fact, it is debatable whether the most heroic efforts by the U.S. and Afghan governments could have produced a materially different outcome so long as Pakistan was playing for a different team.

At risk of stating the obvious, a jihadist nexus with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network at its core have for over one decade used Pakistani territory as a springboard for attacks on Afghanistan and the U.S. coalition there. By the account of every interested intelligence agency and objective analyst in the world, these groups have received varying levels of support and safe haven from the Pakistani military and its notorious spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). The latter is in the business of making distinctions between “bad terrorists” that target the Pakistani state and “good terrorists” that target Afghanistan and India.

Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani Network, which former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said “acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency,” has proven particularly destructive to U.S. interests. The group was almost certainly responsible for the December 30, 2009, bombing of a CIA agency outpost in Khost, Afghanistan, that killed seven officers—the single deadliest attack on the agency in its storied history.

The Haqqani Network was also linked to the September 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul that resulted in seven deaths and 15 injuries. Most recently, a U.S. military spokesman said he was “very confident” the Haqqani Network was behind a January 28 attack on a hotel in Kabul that killed more than 100 people, including several U.S. citizens.
This intolerable state of affairs is the product of a glaring, fundamental incongruity between American and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. Whereas Washington, Kabul, and most of the international community have strived to build a peaceful, stable, democratic Afghanistan, Pakistan’s ideal objective is an Afghan government that is pliable, submissive, and hostile to India.

Since the Afghan people, understandably bitter after over a decade of Pakistani malfeasance, are highly unlikely to elect such a government, Islamabad’s second order of priorities is to keep the country weak, unstable, and divided. It sees the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and their fellow travelers as the most effective means of doing so, and of securing its secondary objectives and interests in Afghanistan.

Two motivations drive these compulsions and Pakistan’s double game more broadly: insecurity and narrow self-interest.

Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment believe a unified and unfriendly Afghan government might be tempted to: (1) stir unrest among Pakistan’s restive Pashtun population; (2) invite a greater role for India, which Pakistan believes is determined to encircle and dismember it; and (3) challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that no Afghan government has recognized, including the Taliban government of the 1990s.

Are all these concerns illegitimate? No. They are, however, either grossly inflated or problems that are exacerbated, not mitigated, by Pakistan’s current strategy. The horrific campaign of violence facilitated by the Pakistani establishment against Afghanistan has generated tremendous hostility toward Islamabad, increasing the likelihood Afghanistan will seek closer ties to India or attempt to counter Pakistan’s double game with asymmetric tactics of its own.

Pakistan’s paranoid obsession with India has proven particularly ruinous. Its expressed concerns about Indian encirclement and charges of Indian interference in Afghanistan remain wholly unsupported by evidence. Delhi is looking East, chasing double-digit growth, solidifying partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, and contending with new challenges from China. India has moved on.

Pakistan would be well-served by doing the same. But it will not move on because the second driver of Pakistan’s double game is the narrow self-interest of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. They believe their popularity, legitimacy, and survival are dependent on keeping the Pakistani population consumed with fear and anxiety or intoxicated with anger and conspiracy. Only if Pakistan is under omnipresent threat from India, the U.S., Afghanistan, and other phantom menaces can the Pakistani military justify its generous budget and its tight grip on power.

Aid to Nowhere

In 2009 the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan concluded there was “no chance” that Pakistan would view any increase in aid “as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these [militant] groups.” The following year the U.S. increased aid to Pakistan by 50 percent, from $3 billion to $4.5 billion. Indeed, the year 2010 was telling in two ways: it was simultaneously the year U.S. aid to Pakistan reached an all-time high, and the year the U.S. casualties in Afghanistan reached their peak.
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

The greatest trick Pakistan ever pulled was convincing America it faced a dichotomous choice: tolerate and bankroll its double game or risk a fundamental rupture in bilateral relations, stirring an unstable cocktail of Islamist extremism and weapons of mass destruction. In this preposterous narrative the mere specter of U.S. pressure is threatening to the integrity of the Pakistani state, the million-man Pakistani army is powerless to protect its nuclear arsenal, and the severing of bilateral relations would prove more costly to the U.S. than to Pakistan.

This paradigm ensured the U.S. toolbox was brimming with over $30 billion in carrots but desperately lacking in sticks. Washington responded to each flagrant Pakistani provocation with lucrative aid and scholarly lectures about the unethical and counterproductive nature of its support for Islamist militants. Yet, from Pakistan’s perspective, its strategy has been anything but counterproductive.

For the past decade a formidable coalition of powers has been committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan free from Taliban rule. The lone country pursuing a weak and divided Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban has is not only besting this coalition, it is forcing them to bankroll their own defeat.

Trying to alter Islamabad’s cost-benefit calculus without imposing costs was always a fool’s errand. As former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani has argued, U.S. aid “makes hardliners in Pakistan believe they are too important to the U.S., and they can do anything they please.”

Thankfully, some in Congress began to recognize this years ago and their frustration has been reflected in a steady decline of aid over the past three years. The request for appropriations and military reimbursements to Pakistan fell from $2.6 billion in 2013, to $1.6 billion in 2015, to roughly $350 million for fiscal year 2018.

A New Sheriff

While it was not the first to do so, the Trump Administration signaled very early in its tenure that business as usual with Pakistan was coming to an end. “We’re out to change [Pakistan’s] behavior and do it very firmly,” Defense Secretary Mattis insisted last year. “This is a conditions-based approach and our relationship with Pakistan will also be conditions-based, based on whether they take action,” added Secretary Rex Tillerson.

On the ground, the Administration authorized an increase in drone strikes in Pakistan, including a strike in Kohat that represents the “deepest that American drones have penetrated into Pakistan’s airspace.” It placed Pakistan on a Special Watch List for religious freedom violations. Its December 2017 National Security Strategy insists “no partnership can survive a country’s support for militants and terrorists who target a partner’s own service members and officials.”

As longtime Pakistan watchers predicted, the Administration’s warnings fell on deaf ears. “No, I haven’t seen any change yet in [Pakistan’s] behavior,” General John Nicholson, America’s top military commander in Afghanistan, admitted in November 2017. Instead, Pakistan returned to a familiar playbook of deflection, denial, conspiracy, and outright military threats.

If President Trump “wants Pakistan to become a graveyard for U.S. troops, let him do so,” the chairman of Pakistan’s senate warned last August. After U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley
insisted Pakistan’s “game is not acceptable to this administration,” a Pakistani military spokesman explained that Haley is of Indian origin and the “current misunderstanding between Pakistan and the U.S. is created by India.”

In this context, President Trump’s January 1 announcement of a suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan was not only merited but long overdue. The time has come to rewrite the terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

**Looking Ahead**
The contours of a more effective, equitable, and, where necessary, punitive Pakistan strategy have been evident for years. Such an approach was outlined in an excellent 2017 paper, “A New U.S. Approach to Pakistan: Enforcing Aid Conditions Without Cutting Ties,” co-authored by the Hudson Institute’s Husain Haqqani and Lisa Curtis, then at The Heritage Foundation. Among their recommendations:

- Reducing U.S. aid;
- Prioritizing engagement with Pakistan’s civilian leadership;
- Working with international partners to diplomatically isolate Pakistan;
- Increasing unilateral drone strikes inside Pakistan;
- Sanctioning Pakistani military and ISI officials known to have facilitated acts of terrorism, including travel bans; and
- Consideration of designating Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism and suspending Pakistan’s non-NATO-ally status.

The Trump Administration has already begun adopting some elements of this strategy, including increasing drone strikes, reducing U.S. aid, and diplomatically isolating Pakistan. Moving forward it is important the Administration present a clear schedule of demands linked to specific timetables and a specific set of intensifying consequences should Pakistan fail to act on those demands.

**It’s the Military, Stupid**
Some influential figures in Pakistan seem to be taking the Trump administration’s threats seriously. Two days after the President’s January 1 announcement, Nawaz Sharif, who resigned as prime minister in July, implored Pakistanis to “appraise our actions,” “break this spell of self-deception,” put Pakistan’s “house in order,” and “reflect on why the world holds negative opinions about us.”

Last September Pakistan’s Foreign Minister declared: “Every Pakistani must ask whether the [militants] we nurtured during the past 30 or 40 years are still our [strategic] assets today.”

There are likely many in the Pakistani government, and many more among the Pakistani public, that find Pakistan’s double game lamentable. Unfortunately, they lack the power and authority to change Pakistan’s trajectory. That power resides exclusively with the Pakistani military and intelligence...
services, which have methodically neutered and eliminated any potential opposition or voices of dissent in Pakistan’s political class, judiciary, or civil society.

For years America and the international community have bemoaned the Pakistani military’s blatant interference in the country’s politics. Yet they convinced themselves that, as the country’s real power-brokers, the military was the only institution capable of resolving Pakistan’s terrorism problem. That experiment has been a failure. The military and ISI have consistently proven to be the source of Pakistan’s terrorism problem. As a result, the most effective points of pressure on Pakistan will be those targeting the military brass, particularly their considerable interests in, and access to, the West.

Unilateral Action
Pakistan officials and experts regularly claim their country is prosecuting America’s war. Pakistan is not receiving aid from the U.S.; it is receiving compensation for military operations conducted on America’s behalf.

Nation-states are obligated to ensure that their territory is not being used to launch attacks on other countries. That is their sovereign responsibility—not something they are entitled to receive compensation for. If Pakistan is incapable of or unwilling to exercise sovereignty over its territory and prevent cross-border attacks, it should not be surprised when others take action to defend themselves.

In its first year in office the Trump Administration authorized drone strikes further into Pakistani territory than any that had come before and increased the number of strikes inside Pakistan from the three launched in 2016 to between five and eight in 2017.

This pales in comparison to the over 100 drone strikes launched in 2010. That tempo may not be warranted at this time but if Pakistan continues to refuse to take action against militant groups operating inside its borders, the U.S. must be prepared to increase the quantity and potency of drone strikes moving forward.

Human Rights and Religious Freedom
For too long the U.S. has turned a blind eye to what is by all accounts a deeply troubling human rights situation in Pakistan. Women, Christians, Shi’ites, ethnic minorities like the Baluch, the forgotten people of Gilgit-Baltistan, and Islamic sects like the Ahmadis, are regularly subjected to violence, persecution, discrimination, and state-supported repression.

Journalists critical of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services routinely “disappear.” Nearly two dozen people are on death row as a result of Pakistan’s draconian blasphemy laws and hundreds more have been convicted or killed simply for being accused of insulting the Prophet Muhammad or Islam. As Amnesty International notes, in recent years Pakistan’s security forces perpetrated human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests, torture and other ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions. Security laws and practices, and the absence of any independent mechanisms to investigate the security forces and hold them accountable, allowed government forces to commit such violations with near-total impunity… State and non-state
actors continue to harass, threaten, detain and kill human rights defenders, especially in Balochistan, FATA and Karachi.\textsuperscript{19}

Mohajirs, immigrants that migrated to Pakistan from India after the 1947 Partition, have also complained of mass-scale human rights violations at the hands of Pakistan's security forces as well as economic, political, and social injustices. Based mostly in Karachi, the Mohajirs are one of the few communities in Pakistan to publicly condemn the government's support for extremism and the Talibanization of society—and in recent years have paid a heavy price for it.

The era of excessive deference to Pakistan's sensitivities on the subject of human rights and religious freedom abuses should come to an end.

Logistics

Since the war began, America's dependence on Pakistan for its ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Afghanistan has repeatedly emerged as the United States' Achilles heel. Defenders of the status quo have met every effort to increase pressure on Pakistan with reminders that America relies on Pakistani territory to supply its war effort in Afghanistan.

That may be changing. In January a Pentagon spokesman explained: “While the U.S. favors shipping cargo via Pakistan because of cost, we have built flexibility and redundancy into our overall system of air, sea, and ground routes to transport cargo into and out of Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{20} However, the U.S. military continues to rely on Pakistan’s GLOCs to handle a considerable proportion of supplies bound for Afghanistan.

The Trump administration should make every effort to reduce its dependence on Pakistan’s GLOCs, including opening discussions with Russia and Central Asian countries on the revival of the Northern Distribution Network, as well as pursuing alternative options. There are early signs the Administration has begun such discussions and should be supported by Congress.

Afghanistan has already begun doing so. A recent report suggests “Afghanistan has shifted 80% of its cargo traffic from Pakistan’s Karachi seaport to Iran’s Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports.”\textsuperscript{21} Last year India began operating a new air supply corridor to Afghanistan and has been active in building new road and rail links to Afghanistan’s western border through Iran.

The China Factor

Any further deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan relations is likely to incentivize Pakistan to draw even closer to its “all-weather friend,” China. Whether Beijing wants the relationship to be any closer, and what opportunities and challenges that may present to the U.S., is a matter of open debate.

Experts have long argued that China’s considerable political and economic influence in Pakistan, as well as its relative popularity among the Pakistani elite and public, make it a potentially effective partner in persuading Pakistan to abandon its support for Islamist militants and advance a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.
To date, however, Beijing has proven extremely averse to coordinating approaches with the U.S. on Pakistan. Chinese officials often recoil at attempts to discuss Pakistan policy at even the most basic level. Could that change in the years ahead?

On one hand, the already robust China-Pakistan relationship is positioned for considerable expansion under the banner of the over $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing has particularly ambitious plans for the Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Reports suggest Chinese firms are planning a $500 million housing project there that could one day accommodate a half million Chinese citizens across 10 million square feet. China and Pakistan are co-producing the $500 million JF-17 fighter aircraft and in 2015 China announced its largest-ever defense deal, the sale of eight Yuan-class submarines to Pakistan at a cost of roughly $5 billion. Recent reports suggest China is now considering a full-fledged military base in Pakistan, with rumors of Chinese interest in an offshore naval base at Gwadar and/or a refurbished air and naval base at Jiwani, 60 kilometers west of Gwadar.

How close is too close? Despite these developments, there are cracks emerging in the China-Pakistan relationship in two separate arenas: (1) concerns over China’s expanding economic footprint in Pakistan, and (2) differences over terrorism and the war in Afghanistan.

Pakistan surprised observers earlier this year when it announced it was rejecting a $14 billion proposed Chinese investment in the Diamer-Basha dam project. The conditions attached to the investment, which would have seen China assume ownership of the project, were “not doable and against our interests,” declared the chairman of Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority. Similarly, Pakistan recently rejected a demand that the Chinese currency, the yuan, be used in the Gwadar Free Trade Zone.

Last November China announced it was suspending funding for three road projects under the CPEC banner. The same month, Pakistan’s senate was informed that 91 percent of the revenues generated by the Gwadar port would go to China for the next 40 years. Pakistani banks, another report noted, have only been involved in financing 10 percent of CPEC projects.

Pakistan is now expected to repay China $90 billion for CPEC investments over the next three decades. Christopher Balding finds it “mathematically impossible for Sri Lanka and Pakistan to repay big yuan-denominated loans when they’re running trade deficits with China.” Notably, since the two countries signed a currency swap agreement in 2011, Pakistan’s trade deficit with China has tripled, reaching more than $12 billion in 2017.

Terrorism. For years, China outsourced its foreign policy in Afghanistan to Pakistan. Its chief priority: that Afghanistan did not become a safe haven for Uighur militants that have opposed Chinese rule in its western province of Xinjiang. Since 2012, however, there have been signs of growing divergence on Afghanistan.

China’s ambitious plans to build westward connectivity networks via its Belt and Road Initiative has given it a greater stake in stability in Afghanistan. Some in Beijing appear increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in Afghan peace talks and Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. As Andrew Small notes:
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

China strongly encouraged Pakistan to forge a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban, rather than backing its militant protégés. Chinese interests, from Xinjiang to the new Silk Road schemes, increasingly rely on broad stability in the region, rather than just a defense of narrow security and commercial goals, and it has finally started to bring its influence in Pakistan to bear in trying to achieve them. In one manifestation of this frustration, China no longer relies on Pakistan to serve as its principal interlocutor with Afghanistan. In September 2012, a trip to Kabul by Public Security Chief Zhou Yongkang marked the first visit to Afghanistan by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in decades. The following year Beijing and Kabul signed a terrorist extradition treaty and agreed to intensify cooperation against transnational security threats. Beginning in 2013 Afghanistan’s intelligence services began sharing detailed dossiers with Beijing on Uighur militants operating in the region, “laying out evidence tracing the militants back to Islamist training camps inside Pakistan.” Meanwhile, Chinese economic aid to Afghanistan surged from less than $9 million per year between 2001 and 2013 to $80 million in 2014 and $240 million from 2016 through 2019. When Ashraf Ghani was elected Afghanistan’s president in 2014 he chose China for his first visit abroad, finding Beijing more willing to discuss sensitive security issues than ever before. During the trip, Premier Li Keqiang called on Afghanistan’s neighbors to respect its “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, [and] not interfere with its internal affairs.” Recent reports suggest China is in talks with Kabul over the construction of a military base in Afghanistan. The army camp will reportedly “be built in Afghanistan’s remote and mountainous Wakhan Corridor, where witnesses have reported seeing Chinese and Afghan troops on joint patrols.”

An opening? Defenders of the status quo in Pakistan have long warned that U.S. attempts to pressure Islamabad risked pushing it into the arms of Beijing. A deterioration of U.S.-Pakistan ties may well lead Islamabad to seek even deeper ties with, and solicit more aid from, Beijing. However, it is important to recognize the China-Pakistan relationship is already—indeed, exactly—as close as China wants it to be. To date, China has reaped all the strategic benefits of its patronage toward Pakistan while allowing the U.S. to assume all the costs and responsibilities. Ultimately, most experts and officials in Beijing do not want to see a rupture in U.S.-Pakistan relations. They recognize that it could add new stress to their own relationship with Pakistan and further aggravate existing tensions.

China’s support for Pakistan is already a controversial subject both internally and internationally. In a 2014 Pew Survey Pakistan only 30% of the Chinese public viewed Pakistan favorably, the exact same favorability rating accorded to Chinese-rival India and far less than the 50% who viewed the U.S. favorably. China’s shielding of Pakistani-based terrorists from sanctions at the United Nations has already cost it dearly in its relationship with India while generating tension with its broader counterterrorism policies and priorities.
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

The Trump administration must recognize the complexity of the triangular dynamic between the China, Pakistan, and the U.S. and prepare to spend greater political capital—wielding both positive and negative incentives—to encourage more cooperation with Beijing on the Pakistan challenge, much as it has attempted to do with North Korea. The stakes with Pakistan are arguably no less significant and there is arguably a greater alignment of U.S. and Chinese interests in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The U.S. should be under no illusions that a Pakistan strategy bearing more sticks will serve as a panacea for the myriad problems afflicting bilateral relations. Nor will it result in a swift or dramatic improvement in the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. In fact, the Trump administration must be prepared for at least a short-term deterioration on both fronts.

Attacks in Afghanistan may increase as cooperation with Pakistan becomes even more challenging. American diplomats and journalists operating in Pakistan may be subject to increased harassment. Notably, Radio Mashaal, the Pashto-language service of Radio Free Europe, had its branch in Pakistan abruptly closed on January 19, accused by the Interior Ministry of working on behalf of “hostile foreign intelligence agencies.”

To date, however, Pakistan has avoided having to make a choice between a lucrative relationship with the U.S. and an addiction to Islamist militancy as an instrument of foreign policy. The Trump administration should muster all elements of American power to present and clarify that choice to Pakistan. One road leads to prosperity, peace, and modernity. The other to an escalating cycle of recrimination, hostility, and retribution. The choice is Pakistan’s but it must be forced to choose.

Biography

Jeff M. Smith is a research fellow in Heritage’s Asian Studies Center, focusing on South Asia. He formerly served as director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council. Smith is the author of “Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century,” (Lexington Books, 2014), author and editor of the forthcoming “Asia’s Quest for Balance: China’s Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific,” (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018). Smith has contributed to multiple books on Asian Security issues, testified as an expert witness before multiple congressional committees, served in an advisory role for several presidential campaigns, and regularly briefs officials in the executive and legislative branches on matters of Asian security.

His writing on Asian security issues has appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, USA Today, War on the Rocks, the Harvard International Review, Jane’s Intelligence Review, the National Interest, and The Diplomat, among others. In recent years his expert commentary has been featured by The Economist, The New York Times, FOX News, The Washington Times, Reuters, NPR, and the BBC, among others.
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The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1.0% of its 2016 income. The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the national accounting firm of RSM US, LLP.

7 As an aside, 2010 was the same year the ISI was accused of “outing” the CIA station chief in Islamabad, forcing his departure. His successor, Mark Kelton, “began preaching ‘Moscow Rules’... meaning that the ISI should be treated as a determined foe rather than a problematic partner.” Pakistan’s spy chief began referring to his as “the cadaver” and two months after the raid on the bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, Kelton fell abruptly, mysteriously, and violently ill, forcing his departure from Islamabad.


Mr. Yoho. No, thank you for your intuition on that and, you know, pointing that out because those are things that we need to delve into.

Mr. Laghari, if you would, please.

STATEMENT OF MR. MUNAWAR “SUFI” LAGHARI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SINDHI FOUNDATION

Mr. Laghari. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the committee, let me thank you all for inviting me to this important hearing on U.S.-Pakistan relations. My focus is mainly on Sindh Province.

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is a topic of much media discussion. But there is little media and political discussion about the Sindhis, who comprises about 14 percent of Pakistan’s population of just over 205 million people.

Mr. Chairman, Sindhi people believed that becoming part of Pakistan would bring an end to religious wars and the prevalence of justice and rights. But hostility and tensions in the region have never ended.

The United States can play a very important role in this region, particularly to bring about the eradication of terrorism and restoration of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is a de facto military state run by its army, Islamic jihadi outfits, protected and promoted by the army as assets and as important Pakistani foreign and defence policy tools.

Militant Islam is the most powerful weapon of the Pakistani army. Islamic religious organizations have been and will always be their assets. They not only use these religious organizations against India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but also against the United States and Israel.

Mr. Chairman, Sindh can be contrasted with Pakistan’s military-dominated state. Jihad, Islam, and the army have always been features of the Pakistani army—Pakistani state.

Sindh’s identity has always been peace, progress, coexistence, culture, and democracy. Sindh has always been at the forefront of anti-military dictator struggles against military dictators in Pakistan. Sindh played a leading role in the 1983 movement for the restoration of democracy.

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan’s official language, Urdu, is the mother tongue of the Indian Muslim migrants. It is currently spoken by only 8 percent of the total population. The state of Pakistan imposed Urdu as a tool of cultural repression upon the rest of the population—Sindhis, Baloch, Pashtuns, Punjabis, Saraikis, and other native languages.

This was one of the reasons for the separation of Bangladesh in 1971. Injustice done to the indigenous languages has eroded the cultural identity of Sindh, replaced by the violence and extremism.

The state has captured the interest of Punjabis and Muhajirs. Punjab has always been superior. Muhajirs have always been privileged. Meanwhile, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Baloch have always suffered.
Mr. Chairman, as long as you don’t understand these ground realities, you will not be able to align American interests and relations with those of Pakistan. Hundreds of Sindhis nationalists are missing in Sindh and thousands of Baloch nationalists are missing in Balochistan. Their enforced disappearances are part of the so-called “strategic depth” policy of Pakistan’s army and ISI because these activists are against the multi-billion-dollar CPEC. Young Sindhi, Hindu women are being forcefully converted to Islam and made sex slaves of Islamic extremists in Sindh.

Mr. Chairman, it is high time that the United States reconsider the nature of their relationship with Pakistan, their military, and the ISI. The U.S. should also better its relationship with the pluralistic people of Sindh.

I have many recommendations, which are already in my full testimony but I want to mention one recommendation. I want to read it here.

The Pakistani military and ISI should be held accountable for fraud and abuse of U.S. resources, equipment, and money, which they use to hunt down anti-jihadi, Sindhi and Baloch dissidents instead of going against the jihadi and terrorist groups including the Hafiz Saeed and Haqqani Network.

Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Laghari follows:]
Testimony of Mr. Munawar “Sufi” Laghari
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Asia and the Pacific,
United States House of Representatives,
Hearing on “U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued
Challenges”
February 6, 2018

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the Committee

Let me thank you all for inviting me to this important hearing on US-Pakistan relations.

Pakistan is a topic of much media discussion, but the media does not discuss the realities I will inform you about today. There is little media and political discussion about Sindhis, who comprise about 14% of Pakistan’s population of just over 205 million people.

The Sindhi people are peaceful, pro-democracy, secular, and believers of mystic Sufism (mysticism).

When Pakistan became independent, the Sindhi people believed that becoming part of Pakistan would bring about regional peace, end to religious wars, end to resentfulness, and prevalence of justice and rights. But hostility and tensions in the region have never ended; religious extremism and differences have increased; Pakistan fought three wars with India; and it has been involved in many regional conflicts that have resulted in increased terrorism.

The United States can play a very important role in this region, particularly to bring about the eradication of terrorism and restoration of human rights.

The Pakistani State and its Links to Terrorist Groups
While American taxpayers help Pakistan, and Pakistan’s authorities have at times informed their American counterparts about killing a few terrorists in Wana and Waziristan, Pakistan’s security agencies also shelter the Taliban; Pakistan makes money from heroin and hashish trade through the Taliban; and more than two million students are going to madrasahs (religious seminaries) where they could be radicalized. These students get free food, education, and accommodation. They could be a threat to the whole world if they take control of nuclear weapons. None
of this could be done without the help of the military. Cases against them should be pursued in international courts.

Militant Islam is the most powerful weapon of the Pakistani Army. Islamic religious organizations have been, and will always be, their assets. They not only use these religious organizations against India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but also against the United States and the whole world. They have created hatred against United States, India, and Israel.

There are many extremist religious organizations in Pakistan, but two types are the most influential: Fundamentalist Parties and Jihadi Organizations. Both are linked to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).

**A Focus on Sindh**

Sindh can be contrasted with Pakistan’s military-dominated state. Jihad, Islam, and the Army have always been features of the Pakistani state. Sindh’s identity has always been peace, tolerance, coexistence, culture, and democracy.

Sindh has always been at the forefront of pro-democracy struggles against military dictators in Pakistan. Sindh played a leading role in the 1983 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, while a harsh military crackdown led to thousands of Sindhis facing brutal torture, imprisonment, and death.

Sindhis have always had Sufi and tolerant tendencies, but Islam is forcibly imposed on them.

The percent of Urdu-speaking people has increased from four to eight percent, and this erodes Sindh’s identity. We are losing our culture and language. Urdu has been imposed on us as a tool, and as long as you don’t understand these ground realities, you will not be able to align American interests and relations with those of Pakistan.

Pakistan is a de-facto military state run by its army with total disregard to the country’s civilian institutions. Islamic Jihadi outfits are protected and promoted by the army as assets and as an important Pakistani foreign and defense policy tool.

The mullahs and military have been the dominant force in Pakistan for a long time, and the state has catered to the interests of Punjabis and Mohajirs. Punjab has always been superior; Mohajirs have always been privileged. Meanwhile, Pashtoons, Sindhis and Baloch have always suffered.
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES OF SINDHI POLITICAL DISSIDENTS and NATIONALISTS

Hundreds of political dissidents and Sindhi nationalist activists are missing in Sindh. They are kept incommunicado for months and even years as their whereabouts are not known to their families, friends, and party colleagues. No one is sure if they are currently dead or alive. They include political activists, writers, teachers, and publishers.

Their enforced disappearance is part of the so-called “strategic depth” policy of Pakistan’s army and ISI because these dissidents and nationalist activists are against the multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being built by China via Pakistan. Sindhis and Baloch are opposing CPEC tooth and nail. So writing or speaking against the CPEC Project is considered high treason or blasphemy in the eyes of Pakistani authorities, the military, and the ISI. One of the very few credible news magazines in the country, Pakistan’s monthly ‘Herald,’ mentions that “The intelligence agencies treat [the critics of CPEC] as their enemies,” (quoting a Sindhi nationalist G.M. Bhagat who was a former missing person himself). “Those who even whisper against CPEC are either kidnapped or killed.”

Hidayatullah Lohar is a headmaster for an elementary school in Nasirabad, in the Larkana division of Sindh. On April 17, 2017, while teaching a class, he was whisked away by armed ISI agents in an unmarked car in front of his students and colleagues. Since then, he has been missing, and his daughter Sassui, who is a computer science graduate, is running a campaign for his and other missing persons’ release. She and her brother regularly receive death threats.

Nangar Chana (also known as Faiz Rasool) has translated twenty one books on world literature and history into the Sindhi language. He was taken away by the intelligence agency’s men from the same town in August 2017. Nobody knows if he is dead or alive and no one knows his whereabouts.

Sandhiya is a young girl who has recently graduated with a degree in civil engineering from Karachi’s NED University of Engineering and Technology and has won a gold medal with distinction. She was sad along with her family on the day of her graduation because her father Inam Abbasi, who was the publisher of anti-jihadi books, was kidnapped by the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies. He is still missing.
There are more than one hundred missing Sindhi political dissidents and nationalist activists. A culture of impunity prevails from the government towards their abducting agencies. Fear is established among people of Sindh as well as judges and lawyers who do not dare take their cases, except with few exceptions. So it is very difficult for people to talk against these enforced disappearances. However, I have been able to obtain a list of 54 missing persons (list is submitted hereto).

Several victims of enforced disappearances were killed through torture. Their dead bodies were punctured with drill machines, burnt with cigarettes, and were finally discarded in desolate places with pieces of papers marking their names. Some had papers with “Jeay Sindh” (“long live Sindh”) recovered from their pockets.

The names of others who were forcibly kidnapped and killed are Raja Dhar BhamBro, 26 year old Sarwech Pirzado, and Muzafar Bhutto. There are Sindhi nationalist activists and leaders who were killed on the spot or burnt alive in their cars. For example, wheelchair-bound Sindhi nationalist leader Muneer Choliani was stopped while he was riding a car with his family members, taken out of the car, and shot to death. Qurban Serai, Maqsood Qureshi, and their colleagues were burnt to death in their cars in separate incidents. Sindhi Nationalist leader Bashir Khan Qureshi was also killed.

RISE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM & PATRONAGE OF HAFIZ SAEED AND DAESH [also known as ISIS]:
It is interesting to note that Hafiz Saeed and his party goons roam freely and hold public rallies in Sindh, especially in the Thar area bordering India. They have a huge network in Sindh. They recruit Sindhi youths for jihad in Kashmir. Daesh is infesting universities in Sindh and recruiting young women for war in Syria and Iraq or even as sex companions to the terrorists of Daesh. Twenty young girls are missing from their homes in Sindh and have joined the ranks of jihadis of Daesh abroad. One example is young girl, Norain Laghari, who was arrested from Lahore while plotting suicide attacks. Norain was kept under military patronage and pardoned. While Sindhi nationalists are harassed, hunted, kidnapped, abducted, tortured, and killed because they are resisting and opposing jihadi terrorists groups being nurtured by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies; especially ISI in Sindh.

Secondly, the jihadi groups I mentioned are committed to destroying the pluralistic fabric of Sindhi society as they send suicide bombers to destroy Sufi shrines. Last
year, they attempted to destroy the shrine of the great saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar at Sehwan, killing 60 men, women, and children.

Hindu temples and Sufi shrines are their prime targets as well the Sindhi Hindu community.

The Pakistani army and intelligence agencies have never treated Sindhi Hindus as equal to Muslim citizens. “We want to convert their women to Islam, kill their men, and recruit Sindhi Muslim youths to fight against India,” Hafiz Saeed delivered in his infamous sermon in Thar.

In Mithi, the district headquarters of Tharparkar, Hafiz Saeed has illegally occupied, and allotted the land of a local girls college to construct a Madressah. Recently, and in the same town, two Hindu youths were gunned down but their killers have not yet been arrested.

**HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER TARGETED**

The Pakistani military has now started targeting human rights defenders who call out human rights violations in Sindh. They took away Punhal Sario, the chairperson of Voice for Missing Persons of Sindh. I am thankful on the behalf of the Sindhi people to Congressmen Brad Sharman, Adam Schiff, and their staff for their efforts to release Mr. Sario. He was released apparently on the condition that he not open his mouth. Otherwise, they know how to silence him.

As you are aware, they have also tried to silence me but to no avail. Over two years ago, the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies assassinated my only brother, Dr. Anwar Laghari, a law abiding, non-violent, political activist and social worker, after I wrote a letter to President Obama while former Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif was visiting White House. This past October, my young nephew, Asad Laghari, who was one of few water experts in the country, was found “dead under mysterious conditions” as stated by police. His murder mystery is an open secret as he was murdered by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, believed to be in Sindh, because I was organizing a news conference and working with members of Congress on the release of Mr. Punhal Sario. No investigation was conducted, and no arrests were made in the murders of my brother and nephew.
FORCED CONVERSIONS OF YOUNG HINDU GIRLS TO ISLAM

Young Hindu women are being forcibly converted to Islam and made sex slaves for Islamic extremists with the help of local extremists, the so-called spiritual leaders of certain shrines and Mullahs in Sindh. Hindu women and girls, some as young as 12 and 13, are kidnapped and forcibly converted to Islam and married despite legislation against child marriages in Sindh. Judges are either silent or biased. Parental refusal to marry their 12 or 13 year old daughters is ruled as blasphemy. As a result of social stigma and disgrace, the parents of girl victims have no other option but to migrate to other countries, preferably to India. Thus, Hindu communities in Sindh are reducing in number due to these forced marriages of their young girls. To be a Hindu parent of a young girl means to write off your daughter into forced conversion and forced marriage. It is a preplanned, national conspiracy that pro-jihadis call “purify the land of the pure of the Hindus”.

So-called pro-Islamist jihadi spiritual leaders and mullahs, who are instrumental in forced conversions of young Hindu girls, are backed by the Pakistani military and the ISI. Some of those spiritual leaders are responsible for distributing money to the families of jihadis killed in Kashmir and Afghanistan and others are known to be linked with dictators such as the late Gaddafi in Libya and Assad in Syria.

So again, conditions in Sindh are very difficult for religious minorities, Sindhi political dissidents, and nationalist activists, and Sindh has seen an influx of terrorists and jihadists who have opened around 50,000 madressahs along both banks of the Indus River and near national highways that connect traffic to Afghanistan. A few years ago, a caravan of trucks carrying logistics for US and NATO forces was attacked and burnt down in Shikarpur by the madressah’s young goons and pro-Taliban JUI (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam) mullahs. Thousands of young Sindhi recruits are the strength of the jihadi organizations.

It is high time that the United States recognizes the alarming situation and human rights violations in Sindh, and reconsiders the nature of their relationship with Pakistan, their military, and the ISI. The US should also better its relationship with the pluralistic people of Sindh.

US AID TO SINDH

Honorable members of Congress, people of Sindh are delighted with recent steps to stop military aid to Pakistan. At the same time, the Sindhi people are happy to see US aid of several billion dollars over the past decade for health, education, women’s empowerment, and women’s health. An allocation of 19 million dollars is worth spending for three universities and for child education in Sindh.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. There is critical need to enhance non-military and humanitarian aid in fields of education, health, women’s empowerment, child protection, human rights, and democracy.

2. There will never be a better time to permanently cut all military aid to the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies in order to permanently end enforced disappearances of anti-jihadi, pluralistic, Sindhi political dissidents, nationalist activists, writers, poets, publishers, journalists, civil society members, teachers, and translators.

3. The Pakistani military and ISI should be held accountable for fraud and abuse of U.S. resources, equipment, and money which they used to hunt down anti-jihadi Sindhi and Baloch dissidents instead of going against the jihadis and terrorist groups including the Hafiz Saeed and Haqqani network.

4. Declare the Pakistani Army and intelligence agencies as rogue forces that promote and protect inhuman and anti-US jihadi forces. They have become a threat to the peace and security of South Asia and the civilized world.

5. The children of the Pakistani military elite often come to the US to study. Their fees and expenses are paid with laundered money. Family members of the military elite should be sanctioned, and the sources of their funding should be aggressively investigated.

6. Tolerance toward modern western values should be another test for receiving visas. One indicator of such tolerance could be competence in local languages other than Urdu, such as Sindhi and Balochi. Neglect of local, tolerant cultural traditions in Pakistan is typically seen upon the adoption of the dominant Urdu language.

7. Restrict exchange programs that allow Pakistani scholars to gain access to and insights into US thinking. Since 9/11, Pakistan has gained significant sophistication in dealing with the US, while US has not benefitted in a similar way. These exchanges are not serving US interests.

8. Restrict visas for Pakistani scholars whose primary qualification is their criticism of Pakistani policy. These visas are not serving any useful US
interest and are simply offering a convenient career path for some in Pakistan.

9. Help empower Sindhis to assert their tolerant culture and identity. Recall that coastal Sindh and Balochistan are what allow otherwise landlocked Punjab to have global influence. The Sindhis and the Baloch do not share the aggressive, expansionist aspirations of Punjab. Their subjugation by the Punjab, wholly against the principles surrounding Pakistan's founding, give the Punjabi-dominated military access to a vast amount of resources, markets, and international waters. History shows that empowering Sindh and Balochistan would prevent their territory from being used to create chaos around the world.

10. Ask the Administration to raise its voice against human rights violations in Pakistan, especially of Sindhi and Baloch people, in appropriate international forums, including U.N. bodies.

11. Ask CRS to report on corruption in Pakistan in general and especially in Sindh. This committee should also ask the US Ambassador in Islamabad and the Consulate in Karachi to meet the families of victims of enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings.

12. Ask the State Department to raise issues of Human Rights violations, especially enforced disappearances in Sindh, as a critical issue in bilateral relations with Pakistan.

Thank you.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I appreciate your input.

Dr. Shah.

STATEMENT OF AQIL SHAH, PH.D., WICK CARY ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

Mr. Shah. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding this very timely hearing on Pakistan and inviting me to testify.

In my testimony, I am going to focus on two key issues—challenges to democratization in Pakistan and the repression of human rights and civil society by security services.

Pakistan’s fragile democracy is facing a serious threat from the military once again. The military in Pakistan has repeatedly intervened to arrest the development of democracy in the country, ruling it directly for almost half the country’s existence and maintaining a firm grip on national security policy and politics for the rest of the time.

As Pakistan nears a crucial parliamentary election later this year, the military’s intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence, is reportedly trying to engineer an outcome that will undercut the electoral prospects of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, with the ultimate aim of creating a divided and hung Parliament.

Mr. Sharif was ousted from office in July 2017 when the country’s Supreme Court disqualified him from holding public office in a corruption inquiry linked to the Panama Papers.

But the probe that became the basis of the court’s decision was led by military intelligence officials and marred by serious accusations of partiality amid reports of witness intimidation and illegal wiretapping of the witnesses’ phones.

But dishonesty is not the reason for Mr. Sharif’s or other Pakistani politicians’ predicament. Instead, it is their attempt to wrest authority from the military in matters of national security and foreign policy.

Mr. Sharif has already been deposed twice in the past—in 1993 by a military-backed Presidential decree and in 1999 by General Musharraf’s coup—mainly for seeking reconciliation with India and for asserting the civilian supremacy over the military.

After resuming office for the third time in 2013, he ran afoul of the military once again for making peace overtures to India, for calling for an end to undue interference in Afghanistan, and his insistence that the ISI stop using a jihadi terrorist group like the Lashkar-e-Taiba as proxies to promote perceived national security goals which he believes has eroded Pakistan’s internal coherence and international credibility.

But rather than acting against these violent extremists, the military has now sought to convert them into political parties. The aim is to shield these groups from international sanctions and to balance and counter politicians like Sharif and others.

If parliamentary elections take place as planned in mid-2018, it will be Pakistan’s second transition from one elected government which has completed its term to another—a milestone in a country
where all previous transitions to democracy were aborted by military coups or intervention.

Pakistan achieved its first one in 2013. A second transition is more crucial because it would show that the country’s political leaders and parties are unconditionally committed to democracy even when they lose elections and signal to the military that Pakistanis have the right to democratically change their leaders.

Elections, obviously, do not equal democracy. But regular elections can help solidify democracy by habituating politically significant groups such as political parties, the military, and civil society to the fact that democratic procedures and norms are the only game in town.

The experience of other military-dominated parties in Latin America and Asia shows that the certainty of the electoral process can empower democratically-elected leaders to successfully roll back the institutional prerogatives of the military.

Besides, violent extremists are less likely to find easy refuge in a democratic Pakistan. The stronger that Pakistan’s democratic institutions become, the less room the Pakistan military and its ISI will have to use jihadi proxies both for domestic and foreign adventures.

Coming to the repression of human rights, the human rights situation in Pakistan is, obviously, dismal. The Pakistan military’s continued institutional power and entrenched assumptions of impunity mean that human rights are likely to continue to deteriorate in the coming year.

Particularly alarming is the issue of enforced disappearances of Baloch and Sindhi dissidents, social workers, peace activists, and journalists.

There are official mechanisms that can address these human rights violations including the National Commission for Human Rights and the Official Commission of Inquiry on forced disappearances.

But their authority is limited by constraints both budgetary and the fact that they are unable to prosecute military officers.

For too long the United States has focused narrowly on security in Pakistan, which has invariably meant a military-centric relationship at the expense of civilian democratic governance.

I would recommend that Congress ensure that U.S. election monitors such as NDI and IRI coordinate their efforts with international observers for the next elections to closely assess and monitor the electoral process. Congress should also review the composition of aid to Pakistan and, lastly, the U.S. should work with its allies to urge Pakistan to strengthen the Commission on Forced Disappearance, the National Human Rights Commission, and to urgently ratify the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shah follows:]
Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Shennan, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding this timely hearing on Pakistan and for inviting me to testify.

Pakistan’s nascent democracy is facing a serious threat from the military, which has repeatedly intervened to arrest the development of democracy in the country, ruling it directly for almost half the country’s existence and maintaining a firm grip on national security policy and politics for the rest of the time. As Pakistan nears parliamentary elections later this year, the military’s intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), is reportedly trying to engineer an outcome that would undercut the electoral prospects of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif [Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)] with the ultimate aim of creating a hung parliament. Sharif was ousted from office in July 2017 when the country’s Supreme Court disqualified him from holding public office, in a corruption inquiry linked to the Panama Papers, not on the basis of proof but a technicality, with the judgement resting on an insidious constitutional requirement of “honesty,” inserted by a previous military dictator and used to oust dissenting members of parliament. The probe that became the basis for the court’s decision was, moreover, led by military intelligence officials and marred by serious accusations of partiality amid reports of witness intimidation, and illegal wiretapping of the witnesses’ phones.1

Military Manipulations

Dishonesty is not the reason for Mr. Sharif’s predicament. Instead, it is his attempts to wrest authority from the military in matters of national security and foreign policy. He has already been deposed twice in the past—in 1993 by a military-backed presidential decree and in 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf’s coup—for seeking reconciliation with India and for asserting civilian supremacy over the military.2

military once again for making peace overtures to India, calling for an end to undue Pakistani interference in Afghanistan, and his insistence that the Inter-Services Intelligence stop using jihadi terrorist groups, like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), as proxies to promote perceived national security goals, which has eroded Pakistan’s international credibility.  

Rather than acting against these violent extremists, the military has also sought to “mainstream” them by recasting them as political parties. The aim is to shield these groups from international sanctions, and to balance politicians like Sharif.  

Barred two weeks after Sharif was ousted, the LeT front organization, Jamaatud Dawa, reinvented itself as a political party to compete against Sharif’s wife in the bye-election held to fill the seat vacated by him. Another violent extremist group, the Tehrik-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), inspired by the police guard Mumtaz Qadri who murdered Punjab governor Salman Taseer over his criticism of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws in 2011, also fielded a candidate in the contest. While they did not win the contest, the two parties secured 11% of the vote by cutting into the conservative vote bank in Sharif’s home town. Emboldened by their performance, other jihadi groups too have vowed to establish their own political parties. The military’s attempts to undermine the PML-N government were also clearly visible in the role it played in the TLP’s three week long anti-government “sit-in” that blocked the main highway into the capital Islamabad to force the resignation of the law minister accused of committing blasphemy. The military refused to come to the aid of the PML-N government against the protestors and the protests ended only after the government was forced to accept their demands in an agreement brokered by the military.  

The military’s anti-democratic policies are part of a long-standing pattern. Every time democracy starts to find a footing in Pakistan or a democratically elected leader challenges the military’s domination, it either directly or indirectly tries to subvert the democratic process, for instance, by deploying political proxies such as the Taliban-sympathizing opposition leader, Imran Khan, and the Islamic cleric, Tahirul Qadri, a dual Pakistani-Canadian national, to stage protests in order to destabilise the civilian government. The military also uses intimidation and blackmail to undermine the government. It reportedly engineered a no-confidence vote by PML-N dissidents against Sharif’s Balochistan chief minister Sanaullah Zehri who was forced to resign from his post and replaced by a pro-military leader, weeks before crucial Senate elections in which the

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PML-N was assured of a majority, which would have strengthened its ability to expand civilian space after the general elections.6

If parliamentary elections take place as planned in mid-2018, it would be Pakistan's second transition from one elected government, which had completed its term to another, a milestone in a country where all previous transitions to democracy were aborted by military coups or interventions. Pakistan achieved its first one in 2013, when former Prime minister Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), now represented by her widower, left office and handed over power to the PML-N, which carried enormous symbolic significance. But a second transition is crucial because it would show that the country's political leaders and parties are unconditionally committed to democracy even when they lose elections, and signal to the military that Pakistanis have the right to democratically change their leaders.7

Elections do not equal democracy. But regular elections can help solidify democracy by habituating politically significant groups, such as political parties, the military, and civil society, to the fact that democratic procedures and norms are the "only game in town." The experience of other military dominated polities in Latin America and Asia shows that the certainty of electoral competition can empower democratically elected leaders to successfully roll back the institutional prerogatives of the military.9 As the democratic process gains traction over time, the institutional costs to the military of subverting democracy will inevitably outweigh its benefits.

Violent extremists are also less likely to find easy refuge in a democratic Pakistan. The stronger Pakistan's democratic institutions become, the less room the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies, including ISI, will have to use jihadi proxies both for domestic and foreign adventures. Pakistan's people have always aspired to democratic government, and it is obviously for them to determine who governs them. But it is in the interest of both Pakistan and the United States that the election results accurately reflect the preferences of Pakistani voters.

Repression of Human Rights

The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is usually associated with improvements in the protection of human rights, and democratizing states are more likely than other types of regimes to make commitments to international human rights treaties and institutions because of the incentive to demonstrate their democratic intentions to international audiences, including the

But the Pakistani military’s continued institutional power and entrenched presumptions of impunity mean that human rights are likely to continue to deteriorate in the coming years.

Pakistani intelligence services have long been accused of “disappearing” Baloch and Sindhi dissidents and suspected anti-military militants. But in recent years, they have broadened their crackdown down to include social media and other political activists, rights defenders, and reporters. In 2016 alone, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that 728 people were forcibly “disappeared,” the highest number in six years. Pakistan’s official Commission on Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances reported nearly 300 cases of enforced disappearances from August to October 2017, the highest since its creation in 2011.

In January 2017, suspected intelligence agents abducted and tortured at least four activists who had mocked the military’s political role on social media for three weeks. In December of last year, Raza Khan, an activist working for peace between Pakistan and India, went missing in the city of Lahore after attending a meeting that strongly condemned the TLP sit-in. Even a judge of the Islamabad High Court who was holding hearings on the protests admitted that he might go missing or be killed for questioning the military's enabling role in the standoff between protestors and the government. On January 10, the investigative journalist and well-known critic of the military, Talha Siddiqi, barely escaped a kidnapping attempt in Islamabad.

The military has also committed flagrant violations of human rights against Baloch nationalists who have been fighting an insurgency against the Pakistani state since 2006. The insurgency was sparked by the military’s brutal killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a respected Baloch political leader, but is more deeply rooted in Baloch grievances over the lack of provincial autonomy and the denial of their fair share in the distribution of resources (such as the low share of revenue the province receives from the federal government for natural gas that is produced in Baluchistan). According to human rights organizations, thousands of Baloch nationalists have been missing, while hundreds have been abducted, tortured, killed and their bodies dumped by the roadside.
Despite civil society protests against these crimes, exposure in the media, and appeals for action from human rights organizations,16 “state agencies” (a euphemism for the ISI) continue to operate without facing any consequences.

There are official mechanisms that can address human rights violations, including enforced disappearances. The government established a National Commission for Human Rights in 2012 for the protection and promotion of human rights. However, its functioning has been marred by institutional problems such as lack of autonomy, shortage of trained personnel, budgetary constraints, a limited mandate over the armed forces, and the fact that it has no authority to investigate intelligence agencies. The official Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, established in 2011, has the authority to fix responsibility and file police reports against those involved in the disappearance of an individual. But it has not brought anyone to justice for these crimes.

U.S. Policy Options for Supporting Democratization and Human Rights in Pakistan

Last week, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson firmly expressed the U.S. commitment to what he called the three pillars of diplomatic engagement: economic growth, security, and democratic governance. For too long, the United States has focused narrowly on security in Pakistan which has invariably meant a military-centric relationship at the expense of civilian democratic governance and economic development. For instance, the U.S. has provided over $33 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan since 2002, of which almost $23 billion were security-related. Pakistan is unlikely to become a stable or secure state committed to fighting terrorism and to end its support for jihadi proxies such as the LeT or denying Afghan terror groups like the Haqqani Network sanctuaries on its soil as long as the military retains its undue power over national politics and policies in Pakistan.

The options outlined below can help Congress achieve the important goals of supporting democratic governance and protecting human rights in Pakistan:

Democratic Progress:

1. Congress should actively support and publicly demand a free and fair vote in Pakistan in which all political parties and leaders have a level playing field, and strongly condemn any attempts by the intelligence or security services to undermine the democratic process, which will send a strong signal that the U.S. is firmly committed to the continuation of the democratic process in Pakistan.


2. More specifically, Congress should ensure that U.S. election monitors, such as the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republic Institute, coordinate their efforts with other international observers, to closely assess and monitor the electoral process before, during and after the election.

3. Congress should review the composition of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, which has historically been heavily tilted towards security assistance. U.S. aid should instead prioritize the strengthening of democratic institutions such as political parties, the parliament and the Election Commission, and building partnerships with civil society organizations, the media, and universities.

4. Beyond democratic procedures, the U.S. should take a long view and invest in the future of Pakistan, for instance, by working with its European and other allies to help Pakistan reform its education system and provide economic opportunities to Pakistanis through enhanced trade ties.

5. Pakistan’s moderate, centrist political parties, including the PML-N and the PPP, and civil society want the country to become a modern, democratic state at peace with its neighbors. In the short run, it is important that the U.S. help them succeed by supporting the crucial upcoming electoral transition. But Congress should also clearly articulate a long-term, unconditional commitment to democracy in Pakistan. Ultimately, a strong, stable and prosperous democracy in Pakistan would be the international community’s most natural partner in fighting terrorism.

Human Rights

1. Congress should unequivocally condemn human rights violations in Pakistan, and call for the immediate release of those believed to be in the illegal captivity of Pakistani intelligence services.

2. Congress should strongly urge Pakistani authorities publicly and privately to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of those responsible.

3. Congress should hold frequent hearings on human rights violations in Pakistan to keep up the pressure on the state agencies that perpetrate these crimes. Congressional hearings may not readily alter their behavior, but regularly bringing rights abuses into the spotlight can certainly impact their cost-benefits calculations and act as a deterrent, while at the same time, assuring activists and journalists in Pakistan that the U.S. is firmly standing by them rather than displaying silent complicity in the violation of their human rights.

4. The U.S. should work with its allies to urge Pakistan to strengthen the Commission on Enforced Disappearances, and the National Human Rights Commission, and to urgently ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for your attention and consideration.
Mr. YOHO. Thank everybody for being on time with your statements and your passion. I appreciate that.

This is something, as you guys have all pointed out, that we have seen.

Dr. Jones, I believe you were talking about how the attacks are down in Pakistan, are they down because the attacks in Afghanistan are going up? Are they just shifting?

And then, Mr. Smith, I think it was you talking about the foreign aid—that we have had areas or times where we have had a lot of foreign aid going into Pakistan, we have had times where there was none going into Pakistan, and then we had moderate amounts. But yet, the situation hasn’t changed.

So it kind of makes me think foreign aid is not the answer to this to get people to come to the table, and we have seen the response of Pakistan.

How should Congress interpret Pakistan’s move to double down on its relationship with China as tensions with the United States rise?

We will go with you, Mr. Smith, first.

Mr. SMITH. It’s a great question and, you know, I think China has often been looked at as one of the few potentially effective avenues or mechanisms to effect in real change in Pakistan because they do have a great deal of influence. They do give a great deal of money, like the U.S. But unlike the U.S., they are popular in Pakistan among the elite and the public.

But what I think often gets lost in that discussion is that, and Andrew Small, I think, put it best when he said the Pakistan-China relationship is exactly as close as China wants it to be.

Mr. YOHO. Right.

Mr. SMITH. I don’t know that Beijing is eager to see a fundamental rupture in U.S.-Pakistan relations and for it to assume responsibility as the sole patron of Pakistan and their commitments and responsibilities that come with that.

Its support for Pakistan has already cost it in its relationship with India. It has cost it in the international community in some regards and it cost a great deal financially in some regards.

And I think another thing often lost is that the Chinese public views Pakistan just about as favorably as they view India, which is a historic rival of China, and far less favorably than they view the U.S.

So there is popular opinion in China to a degree that influences elite opinion as well, even if it’s not a democracy.

So I think in some ways a rupture in U.S.-Pakistan relationships that pushes Pakistan further toward China could actually expose some tensions in that relationship and may make China a more willing cooperator or collaborator.

Mr. YOHO. And you brought up a good point. They’ve got such an influence that they can, and I think what they will find out in Pakistan and other countries with this One Belt One Road, it’s a one-way street that heads toward China for China’s benefit.

Although they can do great things with that, I think it’s something that we should point out. The Gwadar Port shows that there is a close link to the Chinese military ambitions.
You know, I remember sitting with the Chinese Ambassador talking about the Spratly Islands. He said it was strictly for peaceful navigational purposes. We know that’s not true and we have seen that repeated over and over again.

Let me see. This will be for Dr. Shah. Is the U.S.-Pakistan relationship at the point of no return and do you believe that it’s still accurate to call Pakistan an ally, given its history of the two-faced dealings on the war on terror?

Mr. Shah. That’s a tough question.

So Pakistan, as you are all aware, has kind of been, as some people call it, a friend and an enemy, or a frenemy. So it has, you know, willingly cracked down on terrorists and militants that attacked the Pakistani state while keeping, protecting, and sponsoring other groups like the Haqqani Network that hurt Indian and Afghanistan.

U.S.-Pakistan relations have seen a kind of rise and fall throughout history. But I would imagine that it’s not a breaking point yet that the U.S. could still do things that might turn the kind of direction of the Pakistani state around, especially as I emphasized by promoting democracy, which has been missing from U.S. assistance to Pakistan for quite some time.

There was a short period that the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Enhanced Partnership Act that was emphasized for 5 years.

But I think the real key is to have a long-term commitment, an unconditional commitment to democratization in Pakistan and to build relationships with civilian leaders and civil society.

Mr. Yoho. I hope we can come back to that question there.

And I want to go to Dr. Jones. What would be the implications of stripping Pakistan of its status as a major non-NATO ally, which it acquired in 2004, thus ending its preferential access to American weapons and technologies?

Mr. Jones. Well, look, I think if that—the step of suspending or even terminating Pakistan status as a non-NATO ally was part of a series of escalatory steps and that went further, if it made no difference, Pakistan is not on the U.S. State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. But we know.

I was in the U.S. Government. I mean, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that they do support Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network.

So my answer to you is I don’t know that it would have an immediate step of revoking it. I think it would; Pakistan could get that assistance potentially elsewhere, including from the Chinese.

But if it’s part of a process that is politically isolating Pakistan, I don’t think that would be in their interest, over the long run.

Mr. Yoho. I agree with you, and thank you.

We will next turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Sherman. Two thousand years ago, the greatest imperial power was Rome and all roads led to Rome. Today, all roads and belts lead to Beijing.

In most places the country has an army. In Pakistan’s case, the army has a country.

I am concerned with the efforts of elites in Islamabad to compel the use of the Urdu language nationwide. They tried that on what
was then called East Pakistan. It is no longer referred to as East Pakistan.

Last year, seven Members of Congress signed a letter condemning human rights violations in Sindh, especially regarding forced disappearances, missing persons, and religious extremist attacks on minorities.

Mr. Laghari, what can the U.S. do to help improve human rights in Sindh?

Mr. LAGHARI. I think one great effort is already done for the first time ever after the British. The U.S. Consulate of Karachi Web site in Sindh, credit goes to this committee or Congressman Brad Sherman and Adam Schiff and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who signed those letters.

I think that they still need authorization from the Appropriations Committee about the Voice of America program in Sindhi.

That is needed because there is no voice for the Sindhi peoples and I really highly recommend it and this committee can try to ask the State Department or the Voice of America that we start a Sindhi program in Voice of America.

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that we have reduced our cost of foreign aid to Pakistan by many hundreds of millions or billions of dollars a year.

In my work on this, I have seen a need for maybe $1 1⁄2 million to communicate with 30 million-plus Sindhi speakers. Should we also have a Baloch radio service as well? I’ll ask Mr. Laghari and also Mr.—Dr. Shah.

Mr. SHAH. I mean, I don’t think it’ll hurt to have such programming. But the problem in Balochistan is, obviously, deeply rooted in the Pakistani state’s repression of legitimate Baloch demands for autonomy and a share of the resources.

This is a province that now produces I think, if I am not wrong, about 36 percent of Pakistan’s natural gas. But it receives a tiny—
a pittance in revenues from Islamabad.

And the military systematically abuses human rights in Balochistan. Baloch dissidents have been kidnapped, tortured, and then dumped on the roadside, and in some cases their bodies had engraved on them “Pakistan zindabad” or, you know, “long live Pakistan.”

So Baloch alienation, you know, is growing and this is a middle class insurgency, by the way. The doctors, engineers, and professionals have taken up arms against the Pakistani state.

And so, first of all, I think there is a need to outrightly condemn human rights violations in Balochistan, the rest of Pakistan, and to pressure Pakistan to at least respect its obligations to the international community in terms of following—in terms of adhering to the norm of human rights protection.

Mr. SHERMAN. The Punjabi represent about 53 percent of the country. Do they represent a disproportionate percentage of the army, the ISI, and especially the officer corps?

Mr. SHAH. Historically, that has been the case. The army does not release the ethnic composition of its officer corps.

But estimates have ranged from 70 to 80 percent Punjabis and then Pashtuns form about 15 percent, and the last 5 percent would be some Sindhi and Baloch and Muhajirs, I believe.
Mr. Sherman. I'll go down the row. Does anyone here think that over 10 percent of the officer corps is made up of persons other than Pashtun and Punjabi?

Dr. Shah, you said——

Mr. Shah. No.

Mr. Sherman. No? For the record, Mr. Laghari says no. Mr. Smith? Dr. Jones?

So you have certain ethnic groups controlling the army and then the army controls the country, and then you sometimes call it a democracy.

I believe my time has expired.

Mr. Yoho. Thank you.

We will next go to Mr. Rohrabacher from California.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

President Trump has sent a message, a long overdue message, to the clique that rules the day in Pakistan, and now, today, the United States Congress, from this committee, is sending the same message.

The clique that is ruling in Pakistan, this clique of Punjabis, rule with an iron fist. They are terrorists to their own people and they are corrupt.

They are not a legitimate government and should not be treated as a legitimate government but instead, a pariah that is not in the interests of its own people and certainly not in the interests of the United States.

We have, over the years, given to them every benefit of the doubt we could. When I arrived here three decades ago, many people believed I was Pakistan's best friend on the Hill.

I was. We were deeply involved in Afghanistan and I spent a lot of time and effort on that particular issue. But over the years it has become very clear to me that Pakistan is the root of the problem in Afghanistan.

The ISI and the Pakistani Government, which are synonymous in so many ways, have been at fault for keeping this conflict going and going and going.

So we are talking about thousands and thousands of lives lost. We mentioned Dr. Afridi today. Dr. Afridi is symbolic of all of this.

If you have a group of gangsters who have taken someone like a doctor and put him in prison, in a dungeon, because he helped discover and helped disclose the murderers of 3,000 Americans, well, what does that indicate to you about the people who put him in that dungeon?

It is time for us to side with the people who are repressed by this, what I say, clique that rules—the regime that rule Pakistan. We need to side with the Baloch, who have their young men and women grabbed, murdered, and then dumped on their front lawn.

We have got a group in Karachi, the MQM movement, that's basically a group of people that wanted to live with enterprise and have a zone where they could deal with the world in a commercial way and they are finding their people murdered.

They are finding their lives repressed by a small group of Punjabis who are—basically, many of them don't even pay taxes in their country.
We have spent $33 billion for Pakistan since 9/11—$33 billion—and they, with $33 billion, could not even get themselves—couldn't get themselves to help us destroy the poppy crops—the opium that is grown on the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Now, this has been a travesty. Our policy has been a travesty of cowardice or ignorance, on the part of the United States, that we are supporting such a regime. And I would hope that instead that we send a message to the Sindhis, to the Baloch, to the MQM and others in Pakistan—and there are small minorities of other faiths that are there that are being murdered all the time. Christians have been murdered in Pakistan at will and there's never anybody arrested for it.

So with this thought, Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to ask the panel—I got 1 minute left so it's going to have to be yes or no—do you think the United States should drop its, how do you say, official relationship with Pakistan and begin dealing with those elements in Pakistan that believe in democracy and represent the people of their country—the Baloch, the Sindhis, the MQM, et cetera?

Yes or no? You have 30 seconds. Go ahead.

Mr. JONES. I mean, I think the U.S. should—would work at those levels, work with the—need to talk to the government but needs to also talk with the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I agree, because I don't believe that those people have power in Pakistan or the government. In the United States we believe government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed and that's not what you have in Pakistan. You have people who are being terrorized by that clique.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I would second the comments of my honorable colleague.

Mr. LAGHARI. I agree with you, except it's difficult because they are so involved in terrorism and tortures in the Sindh Province. But I have no problem with the Muhajirs, the common Muhajirs, the identities, the main issues, this is my stand—and I think the United States also must play very importantly in the relationship.

We don't want to see another Taliban or the Rohingya type in Karachi or those things. This is my concern. And thanks, I agree with you. So we have to cut off the official relationship.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We see the Taliban emerging in Karachi. You can guess who's really behind it. One last——

Mr. SHAH. I wanted to add to your concerns. Pashtuns in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have also been subjected to systematic human rights violations.

As we speak, thousands of Pashtuns gathered in the capital of Islamabad seeking justice for a young man who was killed extrajudicially, partly because his name sounds—his name is the same as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Mehsud.

And so in Karachi these human rights violations have been carried out by the security services against Pashtuns as well.

I don't think we should sever our relationship with Pakistan but I think there is a need to seriously think about shifting our focus to dealing with and building our partnerships with civilian and political leaders, civil society, the media, professional associations, other NGOs like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
Mr. YOHO. We’ll come back to that. We need to move on.

Next, we will go to Mr. Suozzi from New York.

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to get a little bit of more information from each of you. So I have three areas that I want to explore. One is you talk about, you know, we should continue to try and work with the government.

But there is a big difference in the government between the military and the civilian government. So I wanted you just to expand a little bit between the difference between the civilian and the military government.

Number two is, you know, we want to do a lot—want to see them do a lot better job of policing their borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Now, we have been having a hard time with our borders in the United States of America and there is a very long border in Pakistan as well. What can be done—what should the Pakistan Government be doing more effectively to secure their long border with Afghanistan.

And I’ll ask you, Dr. Jones, first and then I am going to ask another question afterwards if I still have more time.

Mr. SUOZZI. So think of other relationships that were built during the war in Afghanistan with the Russians and, you know, Pakistan supporting the mujahideen and the relationships that were built. Those relationships still exist. How do they undo those relationships and get rid of the people that we are having a hard time with?

Mr. JONES. Well, look, there is a strategic rationale for why Pakistan continues to support these groups. They are pursuing Pakistan’s foreign policy interests in Afghanistan as they are in India with Lashkar-e-Taiba.

There could be a strategic rationale to change that kind of support. It is undermining U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It is undermining Afghan interests. It’s undermining regional interests. That’s a strategic decision I think that goes well beyond any kind of historical ties.

Mr. SUOZZI. And what about the practical questions related to securing the border? What would you like to see happen more that’s not happening?
Mr. JONES. I'd like to see Pakistan conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to Taliban Haqqani members crossing the border.

They have the capability to do that. They haven't done it. They are also trying to build a wall right now. You know, it may be worth looking closely at, but it has to be on a conjunction with Afghanistan.

Mr. SUOZZI. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I think in some ways it gets to the question of what is the military's cost-benefit calculation, and to date they have not borne significant costs for their policy of using Islamist militant as an extension of foreign policy.

They have gotten benefits from that strategy but they haven't borne costs.

Mr. SUOZZI. Do we think that's a policy that is promoted more by the military than by the civilian government?

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Mr. SUOZZI. And then how about securing the border? Do you want to add anything to that?

Mr. SMITH. I have nothing to add. But I am sure U.S. military commanders have a lot of suggestions for how Pakistan could better secure that border.

Mr. SUOZZI. Mr. Laghari?

Mr. LAGHARI. I think—even if you keep the relationship with civilians but the control is with the Pakistani military and even in the military, the ISI is in control of the military. So it's very difficult to control this ISI.

Mr. SUOZZI. Is there a big tension between the civilian and the military government in Pakistan?

Mr. LAGHARI. In the last 70 years, if you see any one single election, fair election happen in Pakistan, that time in 1970 and Pakistan breakup.

There is no fair—after even it is controlled by the Pakistani interests—if you can control through the ISI then you can maybe say that we can build a good relationship with the Pakistani military or ISI.

Mr. SUOZZI. Dr. Shah.

Mr. SHAH. Let me clarify that the ISI is actually part of the military's chain of command. It's not a rogue agency. Its head is a three-star general who goes back to the regular military.

And, you know, in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relations, I mean, there hasn't been a Pakistani dictator that the United States hasn't been in love with and the relationship has been completely military-centric.

That's my one point, and there are deep tensions between the civilians and the military.

On the border, I think there is a question also of willingness. It's not just a matter of capabilities. Does Pakistan really want to achieve those objectives that you identify to stop and prevent the Haqqani Network.

I think it's the opposite. They actually facilitate their insertion into Afghanistan.

Mr. SUOZZI. Who are two or three people—do I have a few more seconds, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. YOHO. Yes.
Mr. SUOZZI. Who are two or three people that you think are the best people for—if a Congressperson was to go visit Pakistan, who are the two or three best civilian people that you think we should talk to?
Go ahead, Dr. Shah.
Mr. SHAH. I would suggest not focusing on individuals but institutions to build relations with the Pakistani National Assembly, their politicians who—in both the Pakistan Muslim League and Pakistan People’s Party or former Prime Minister, late Benazir Bhutto, who understand the urgency of ridding Pakistan of extremism who want to have a peaceful relationship with India, want to end interference in Afghanistan.
So I think it’s a matter of building ties with institutions more than individuals.
Mr. SUOZZI. Do you want to add anything, Dr. Jones or Mr. Smith or Mr. Laghari?
Mr. JONES. No, strongly agree institutions and strongly agree with organizations like the Senate.
Mr. LAGHARI. I also agree about the judiciary, too.
Mr. SUOZZI. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. YOHO. Thank you.
We will next go to Ms. Wagner from Missouri.
Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this hearing and I appreciate your continued attention to our—what I’ll call changing relationship with Pakistan.
Mr. Smith, you recently wrote that you foresaw stronger Indo-U.S. and Sino-Pakistan ties as the balance of power in Asia shifts.
We can already see that China is investing staggering amounts of money—over $50 billion—in Pakistan and has been especially active in the port town of Gwadar.
What kind of game is China playing with Gwadar? Is it an attempt to isolate India or is China laying the groundwork for long-term competition with the United States?
Mr. SMITH. I think China has both commercial and military interests in the port of Gwadar. You know, going back a decade, a lot of Indian strategists were concerned about and publically complaining about the possibility China would build a string of pearls—port facilities and logistics facilities—along the Indian Ocean rim and those concerns were sort of downplayed at the time.
But I think they may have just come a decade too early because what we have seen in recent years is that China does have plans for military facilities and installations.
Ms. WAGNER. I should say so. President Trump has advocated for a 350-ship navy. Given that China seems to have designated Gwadar a future PLA naval base, are we doing enough to prepare for China’s creep westward?
Mr. SMITH. Well, one of the things we should be doing and we are doing—I would commend the Trump administration on this—is strengthening our partnership with India across all the services political, civilian, military—that in some ways we see India as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and that partnership has made really dramatic progress over the past 10 years.
And I think we have a unique situation with Prime Minister Modi in India and this Trump administration very bullish on the India relationship, to move that forward. That, more than anything—a strong U.S.-India partnership, will secure our interests in the Indian Ocean.

Ms. Wagner. I have several more questions.

Last fall, Pakistan refused to capitulate to China’s demand that it accept Chinese currency within the Gwadar free zone.

Dr. Shah, do you see Beijing’s funding conditions for the China-Pakistan economic corridor becoming a wedge issue that inhibits cooperation between the two countries?

Mr. Shah. There have been reports of rising tensions. Pakistan also refused Bhasha Dam. I think the Chinese helped in that because the conditions were too stringent.

Pakistan’s ministry for shipping told the Senate that 90 percent of the revenue from Gwadar will go to China. So I think Pakistani officials are beginning to realize that this is really not about Pakistan’s economic development per se but it’s about Chinese commercial economic interests.

And so there is tension also amongst the smaller provinces because they feel like, again, this project has been hijacked by the Punjab and left them out of the loop. So there is domestic tension but there is also frictions with China on certain issues including the currency issue.

Ms. Wagner. I’ve got several more questions to whomever can best answer. Would you recommend that Congress spell out specific conditions on our funding to Pakistan in the upcoming appropriations process? Mr. Laghari.

Mr. Laghari. I think especially about the human rights situations. They should put the condition on that one. And the Sindhi and Baloch disappearance issues is very critical.

Ms. Wagner. Sir, as you well know, the systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by the Pakistani military, I mean, I am interested in reforming our IMET military education program to better train participating officers from Pakistan and around the world on human rights.

What steps does the Pakistani military need to do to respect the fundamental rights?

Mr. Laghari. I haven’t seen any delegation from the U.S., even the Karachi Consulate or the Islamabad Ambassador. They have to meet at least the disappeared person’s families or the extrajudicial victim’s families.

That will go to the message to the Pakistani Army that the U.S. is really concerned about the human rights situation and whatever equipments and training the U.S. is giving to the Pakistani military or the police and the law enforcement agencies.

Ms. Wagner. I appreciate it. I’d be interested in all of your perspectives on this. But let me just get this last question in.

Just 2 days ago, the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide attack that killed 11 soldiers in the Swat Valley.

Dr. Jones, a few years back, you wrote that Pakistan had used proxy warfare to try to inspire regime change in Afghanistan. Is it still doing so and do you think the U.S.’s new positioning could encourage Pakistani counterterrorism efforts?
Mr. JONES. I think Pakistan does continue to use proxy organizations, particularly in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan has shown a willingness to conduct counterterrorism operations against groups that threaten the state—groups like the Pakistan Taliban—but not against groups that they use as tools.

So they differentiate between terrorist groups. I think the challenge for the U.S. is to try to get them to stop supporting groups undermining U.S. interests.

Ms. WAGNER. Here, here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for letting me go over. I yield back.

Mr. YOHO. Absolutely, and I appreciate your input and I thought those were great questions.

You know, what we have seen is—and I think it was Mr. Laghari, you brought up one of the shortfalls of our foreign policy and most grave is us not understanding the local cultures, tribe mentality, or the power structures that we don't have here and we have seen this repeated in Afghanistan.

We have seen it repeated all over the Middle East, and you would think, you know, one of the things that would bring us all together would be to have a common goal in stomping out radicalism in any shape and form—that we'd all come together and we could agree on that and then move beyond that and focus on economies and trade and cultural exchanges.

But I don't see that happening and what we have around the world is people have hijacked religions or bastardized them.

We have seen what the radicals have taken with Islam. But we have also seen them do that with democracies, and both of them have gotten a bad name.

You know, we heard in other meetings that democracy is a failing structure and China is promoting that. Yet, what we see around the world in so many countries is not a true democracy, you know, where the people are empowered.

What we see in so many countries is the government is still in power but they want to call it a democracy and when it doesn't work they blame democracy instead of their small thinking and they don't empower their people.

And what I've seen is people—governments are afraid to empower people that haven't formed a government like ours from the bottom up, and we are just so blessed in this country that we have empowered our people and we give people the right to have the control of the government. And it's just such a foreign concept to so many countries.

Moving forward, I didn't have a question with that. That was more just a statement, in case we ran out of time.

But what I want to ask all four of you, if you will, is what are your thoughts about Pakistan, you know, knowing Dr. A. Q. Khan and the work he's done and the laxity of what's going on in there and not knowing who the power structure is—we know it's in the hands of the military. But we see one of the groups growing as one of extremists as a candidate.

What are your thoughts about the nuclear arsenal being passed off to the wrong hands and what can the U.S. do about it?

We will—go ahead. We will start with you, Mr. Laghari.
Mr. LAGHARI. Yes. This is a very interesting question for me. I think if you look at it, we are talking about Iran and North Korea. But who gave the nuclear—all those things from Pakistan?

Mr. YOHO. Exactly.

Mr. LAGHARI. And this is not—I don’t think that just A.Q. Khan definitely is involved but also the Pakistani military and ISI. Without their permission they can’t even transfer their things from the airport or anything—their taking the bags and those things.

And one more threat I think would be if that nuclear arsenal is controlled by the Taliban or by the extremists or the Islamic fundamentalist groups, then it will be very, very dangerous and horrible for the whole world.

And instead of that, if you look at when these nuclear tests in 1998 that happened, even the chief minister from the Balochistan, the Pakistani Government haven’t asked from them that we are doing this one.

So imagine that democracy or how they are treating the people in Sindh or Balochistan or a similar province. My suggestion, focus on the common people’s educations and human rights. But nuclear things is a very, very dangerous thing. If it is not controlled——

Mr. YOHO. Right. Let me ask, does anybody else want to weigh in on that?

Mr. SMITH. Brief remark. This has, obviously, been a sort of omnipresent concern for a long time. Our military and intelligence folks here seem to think that the Pakistanis have reasonable confidence in the processes and procedures to control the nuclear weapons.

But were the country ever to descend into chaos, you know, all bets are off. One thing I would note is that China continues to supply Pakistan with nuclear reactors, what many believe is in contravention of its commitments to the Nuclear Supplier Group, which it joined in 2004 and it continues to block India’s bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, insisting that Pakistan should be given a chance, too.

And of course, Pakistan’s record on nonproliferation suggests that it should not be given consideration.

Mr. YOHO. Yes. Go ahead, Dr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Just briefly, I mean, my understanding, even during my time in the U.S. Department of Defense, is that Pakistan had reasonable oversight over its nuclear capabilities.

However, look, if the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deteriorates, as it may, I think it had to be made very clear to Islamabad that the proliferation of material—nuclear material or dual-use technology that gets out of Pakistan will be dealt with harshly.

Mr. YOHO. Harshly.

Mr. JONES. Harshly. And that needs to be made, I think, clear, publicly.

Mr. YOHO. Unfortunately, that is one of those weapons that we wish we could uninvent but we can’t. We are here and we have got to deal with it and we have to have the safeguards in place.

If you guys will bear with us, we are going to go to Mr. Sherman now for another round.

Mr. SHERMAN. Are the major political parties in Pakistan dedicated enough to democracy to work together for democracy? Or are
any one of the major parties willing to team up with the military if they can just get a piece of power?

I’ll ask Dr. Shah.

Mr. Shah. Well, I think that the Pakistan Muslim League, which is the ruling party—the Pakistan People’s Party which was, until recently, the other major party—I think are sufficiently committed to the process of democracy and have come to the consensus that a military intervention would be unacceptable. So at times——

Mr. Sherman. So either one of them would prefer the other one be in power than that the military be in power and they could be kind of junior partners to the military?

Mr. Shah. Absolutely. I think those two parties are committed to that. But there is a third force in politics now where the cricketer Imran Khan, who, you know, empathizes with the Taliban and—he has been teaming up with the military to undermine elected governments and every time, you know, the military and civilian frictions rise, he starts questioning the very legitimacy of the democratic process, the elections being unfair.

So yes, the major parties are committed but there are problems with his party called the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or Pakistan Movement for Justice.

Mr. Sherman. But not so much justice as—is he motivated by Muslim extremism or is it just a cozy relationship he has with the military?

Mr. Shah. I don’t think he’s driven by Islamic extremism but he’s expressed views in the past that are troubling. For instance, he’s said that the Taliban are justified in carrying out jihad in Afghanistan.

So, you know, but——

Mr. Sherman. I might add that if somebody said that in the United States we’d call it Muslim extremism.

Mr. LAGHARI. There is—the democracy in Pakistan is very unique. If you see recently, just currently, their chief minister in Balochistan he received only 450 votes and only one seat and he became chief minister—450 votes. This is very rare.

And the second thing, not many religious parties in the parliament—not many religious means the Jamaat-e-Islami or those organizations.

But two other factors are very impactful in democracy. One is corruption. Now it is the Pakistani former President Asif Zardari. He collect lots of money through corruption. And also Nawaz Sharif. I also suggest they be researched on the corruption in Pakistan——

Mr. Sherman. The choice between an undemocratic military and the two leading political factions involved seem to be involved in corruption.

I’ll be meeting at 4:45, and any member of the committee is welcome to join me, with Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. So I’ll ask Mr. Smith and Dr. Jones what should I know about this gentleman and what questions should I ask.

Mr. Smith. There actually is an interesting story about——

Mr. Sherman. I mean, here his mother is killed. His father was in jail.
Mr. SMITH. Yeah.

Mr. SHERMAN. Gee, and sometimes I think being a politician in the United States is tough. Go on.

Mr. SMITH. Well, back in 2008, President Zardari issued an order that would have brought the ISI—shifted control of the ISI from the prime minister's office, where it ostensibly resides today, to the interior ministry, which many interpreted as an attempt by the civilian government—a rare attempt by the civilian government maybe to exert some authority over the ISI.

Within 24 hours, he received a letter from the military essentially telling him absolutely not—rescind your order today, and he did. He did.

There have, since then, as far as I know, been no attempts by the civilian governments or the political parties to unite in an attempt to present a united front against the military. That simply has not happened.

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Yes. I mean, I think it’s worth asking and trying to get the pulse of this year’s elections. I mean, they are coming up. Is his assessment likely to be we are going to see competitive, free, and fair elections? What are going to be the obstacles?

I mean, he’s had a long—that family has had a long historical—both has been victorious and also felt the brunt of the Pakistan political system. So I would ask about the elections this year.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Laghari, Dr. Shah, anything to add?

Mr. SHAH. He has made the right statements recently both in favor of the democratic process, minority rights, and as well as—I forget now. Sorry, my mind has blanked out. I apologize.

So he’s made the right noises about democracy, human rights, minority rights, freedom of the press, which has historically been the Pakistan People Party’s kind of trend to support human rights because it used to be quite left of the center but is now a centrist moderate force.

I would ask him about the performance of the Sindh government because there are serious concerns about the—the PPP is in power in Sindh but there are serious concerns about poor governance and corruption.

So I would—I would probably raise that, too.

Mr. LAGHARI. I want to add two things. One is the government in Sindh is PPP and there is no single statement from the—neither from Bilawal Bhutto nor from the chief minister about the disappearances.

And the water issue is very serious. The poison kind of in the whole Sindh, and even from the judiciary they are asking but there is no progress about that one.

Mr. SHERMAN. Gotcha.Disappearances and water. And I might add I’ve been working to try to get broadcasting into Pakistan 24 hours in all the major languages and I’ve been told, oh, it’s so expensive—it could cost over a $1½ million.

Not per language, not per year—you know, per year per language—and that’s—I think that’s rounding error on the foreign aid and military aid. So something we can certainly afford to do, and I have a feeling I’d rather have a good relationship with the Pakistani people than with the folks that have put Dr. Afridi in jail.
And with that, I yield back.

Mr. YOHO. No, those are some good points and ideally, that’s what we’d like to accomplish is have a vibrant democracy over there in the form that fits their country best to empower their people the best so it brings stability around the region, around the world.

And I just know that what we are doing we have got to change to continue down this path. We are not getting the results that we are looking for and, you know, it just leads to destabilization around the region if not the world.

And so our recommendations will come out of this meeting. Hopefully, you’ll be able to see them, and we just want to let you know how much we appreciate the panelists—the witnesses, you guys being here with your input.

We value it very much. We value your time, and so thank you.

And with that, this meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov):

DATE: Tuesday, February 6, 2018
TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges

WITNESSES:

Seth Jones, Ph.D.
Harold Brown Chair
Director, Transnational Threats Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Jeff Smith
Research Fellow
South Asia
Heritage Foundation

Mr. Munawar "Sufi" Laghari
Executive Director
Sindri Foundation

Aqil Shah, Ph.D.
Vick Cary Assistant Professor of South Asian Politics
Department of International and Area Studies
University of Oklahoma

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-3114 at least five business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ___Asia and the Pacific____ HEARING

Day_ Tuesday  Date_February 6, 2018_ Room 2200

Starting Time  2:00 pm  Ending Time  3:26 pm

Recesses

Presiding Member(s)
Rep. Ted Yoho

Check all of the following that apply:
Open Session ☑  Executive (closed) Session ☐  Electronically Recorded (tape) ☐
Television ☐  Stenographic Record ☑

TITLE OF HEARING:
U.S. Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)
Rep. Thomas Suozzi

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☑ No ☐
(If “no”, please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)
Connell - SFR

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE 3:26 pm
TIME ADJOURNED 3:26 pm

Subcommittee Staff Associate
Statement for the Record
Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia

The U.S. faces immense difficulties in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan that are inextricably linked to our interests in regional stability in South Asia. To realize the advantages of U.S.-Pakistan relations, the United States must set guideposts for our long-term goals—both incentives and punitive measures that clearly communicate that the U.S. will not make great sacrifices for narrow shared interests. However, such nuanced diplomacy is lost on a Trump Administration that ignores the value of foreign assistance and resorts to kinetic options over diplomatic engagement at every turn.

In early January, Trump suspended all security assistance to Pakistan, which affects approximately $2.15 billion in total, pending a reassessment later this year, but did not outline any steps Pakistan should take to release the funds. Following the suspension, Kabul has experienced a string of terrorist attacks that have killed more than 130 people, including multiple Americans. The Taliban and the Islamic State have each claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, and Afghan officials have also cast blame on the Haqqani Network, whose leadership is suspected to reside in Pakistan. Pakistan’s military has long been suspected of half-hearted prosecution of, if not outright collusion with, insurgent groups. But for the Trump Administration’s move to be effective, it needs to enumerate clear metrics for cooperation against what should be shared enemies.

Last August, President Trump announced his administration’s new South Asia strategy, including a “renewed focus” on Pakistan, which contained lofty rhetoric but little substance. His plan purports to end “nation-building,” and instead focuses on eliminating the terrorist threat in the region. But he failed to recognize that it is our aid and reconstruction efforts that will eliminate terrorists’ sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not a permanent U.S. military presence.

Promoting cooperation with Pakistan is an essential component to a broader strategy. Afghanistan shares a 1,600 mile border with Pakistan, and it is in the mountainous border regions of both countries that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have taken refuge. In his speech, the President pressured Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens within its borders. Then last week, the White House said that “President Trump’s conditions-based South Asia Strategy provides commanders with the authority and resources needed to deny terrorists the safe haven they seek in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Directing battlefield commanders to operate in Pakistan is a far cry from pressuring Pakistan’s government to crack down on terrorist networks inside the country.

Despite Pakistan’s transition from military rule to an electoral democracy, basic human rights and democratic freedoms continue to elude many Pakistanis. According to the State Department’s 2016 Human Rights Report for Pakistan, “the most serious human rights problems were extrajudicial and targeted killings; disappearances; torture; lack of rule of law…gender inequality, violence against gender and sexual minorities; and sectarian violence.” Rampant persecution and violence continues against religious minorities, including Christians, Sufis, Hindus, and Ahmadi Muslims. And
Pakistan’s Interior Ministry recently closed the Pashto-language service Radio Mashaal, which Congress created as an alternative to the Islamic extremist radio stations in the border regions by Afghanistan. Such free and open news sources are a rare and critical tool to counter extremist propaganda in the region, and the Trump Administration should offer vehement support for them.

The Trump Administration’s degradation of U.S. diplomatic and development efforts and lack of a clear South Asia strategy raise serious questions about the preservation of U.S. national security interests in Pakistan. I hope our witnesses can clearly articulate the guideposts that would incentivize a more productive alliance with Pakistan.