[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: REASSESSING PRIORITIES AMID CONTINUED
CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-110
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Seth Jones, Ph.D., Harold Brown Chair, director, Transnational
Threats Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies 10
Mr. Jeff Smith, research fellow, South Asia, Heritage Foundation. 23
Mr. Munawar ``Sufi'' Laghari, executive director, Sindhi
Foundation..................................................... 39
Aqil Shah, Ph.D., Wick Cary assistant professor of south asian
politics, Department of International and Area Studies,
University of Oklahoma......................................... 49
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific: Prepared statement.................................... 4
Seth Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 12
Mr. Jeff Smith: Prepared statement............................... 25
Mr. Munawar ``Sufi'' Laghari: Prepared statement................. 41
Aqil Shah, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................. 51
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 72
Hearing minutes.................................................. 73
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 74
U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: REASSESSING PRIORITIES AMID CONTINUED
CHALLENGES
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, everybody, for being here.
The U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid
Continued Challenges is an important topic. And on the Asia-
Pacific Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs we look forward to
addressing this, and we have invited you here because of your
expertise.
And you guys know how this works with the button in front
of you. Make sure your microphone is turned on. You'll have a
green light. It goes yellow and red and then you'll hear the
gavel.
We have votes that are going to come up between 2:30 and
3:00 o'clock and typically what we do is we take a break. We
ask if you can stay to hear your input when we come back and we
will reconvene as quickly as we can.
So, with that, we will go ahead and start with the opening
statements. And, again, I thank you for being here.
The United States has sought a cooperative relationship
with Pakistan for nearly 20 years despite incompatible goals.
Over the last year, this contradiction has come to an
inevitable head.
As we meet today, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is
devolving. Faced with few good options in our fight to
stabilize Afghanistan, the United States has spent about $33
billion on Pakistan since 2001.
For years now, U.S. expenditures for Pakistan has decreased
as it becomes more and more evident that our priorities are
just not in alignment.
Over the last 6 months, the administration has taken steps
to sharply accelerate this trend. Though it's long overdue, the
United States is finally facing the reality that the U.S.-
Pakistan relationship needs to change.
Counterterrorism cooperation has been central to this
relationship but the reality is that Pakistan has never shared
the United States commitment to eliminate terrorist activity in
South Asia.
We won't soon forget that Osama bin Laden was hiding in
plain sight in Pakistan or that Dr. Afridi remains in prison
for the work that he did to help us capture Osama bin Laden.
And this same attitude continues today.
Pakistan wants a government in Kabul that it can control or
no government at all. That is why Pakistan continues to give a
pass to extremists who seek to destabilize Afghanistan or
attack India.
Many Members of Congress have argued for this dramatic
recalibration of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But as we move
to the next stage, it's essential that we get it right.
No matter what, Pakistan will continue to be central to
U.S. strategy in South Asia and is increasingly important to
the administration's emerging Indo-Pacific strategy.
For decades, Pakistan and China have shared what they call
an all-weather friendship and have drawn even closer in recent
years. Pakistan has doubled down on its relationship with China
as tensions with the United States have grown.
The China-Pakistan economic corridor is a central component
of China's Belt and Road Initiative offering economic benefits
for Pakistan in exchange for China's direct access to the
Arabian Sea.
As many expected, this economic initiative has also begun
to take on a military character. Last month, it was revealed
that China will build its second overseas military facility in
conjunction with a port at the Pakistani city of Gwadar. This
is the second one in a short period of time with the other one
being in Djibouti.
Pakistan's internal dynamics are also challenging to the
continued partnership with the United States. Religious freedom
and human rights concerns are longstanding and not improving.
Now fundamentalists and extreme voices are taking on a new
prominence in Pakistani politics. Further divergence between
Pakistan and the United States on values and principles will
make cooperation all the more difficult and widen the gaps
between our strategic priorities.
If 2017 laid the groundwork for a recalibration of U.S.-
Pakistan relationships, 2018 will help decide its future
course. The President and Congress will need to determine how
we want to shape and fund this relationship, going forward,
particularly with budget season approaching.
So I look forward to hearing the panel's thoughts today and
hope their testimonies will inform a number of lingering
questions as we work on the issues throughout the coming year.
Are U.S. and Pakistani goals for South Asia fundamentally
compatible? What elements of military and counterterrorism
cooperation must be maintained and what--and which need to be
reworked?
How does Pakistan play in U.S. strategic priorities in the
Indo Pacific in our larger competition with China?
And finally, what is the future of Pakistan society and
government, and is Pakistan becoming less tolerant and a less
suitable partner for the United States of America?
I thank the panel for joining us to share their expertise
on these issues and any other member--any others that the
members may wish to raise.
And with that, members present will be permitted to submit
written statements to be included in the official hearing
record.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for
5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous
material for the record to length limitations in the rules and
the witnesses' written statements will be entered into the
hearing record.
I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for any
remarks he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]
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----------
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing.
Pakistan is a highly consequential nuclear state. But all
too often, we look at Pakistan as just a single inanimate
entity.
With these hearings, we can look inside Pakistan. We have
witnesses that can give us an understanding of what's going on
in the country with its political, regional, and ethnic groups
and the state of Pakistani democracy, such as it is.
Since 2001, the United States has provided to Pakistan $11
billion in economic aid, and $8 billion in security aid. That's
$19 billion.
In addition to that, we have paid $14 billion in coalition
support funds which we are told the Pakistani military has used
in anti-terrorist efforts in support of our war in Afghanistan.
On the one hand, we have seen small improvements in the
economic and political developments in Pakistan. We have, at
least nominally, a civilian government that was elected in
2008, then with elections also in 2013, and an election
scheduled for later this year.
Pakistan has a small but growing middle class, a semi-
active civil society and press, and a judiciary that has at
times confronted the state.
And USAID projects have helped in areas of energy,
agriculture, education, and health, including helping to
provide 3,000 megawatts of electric power generation to
Pakistan's national grid, management practices and technologies
for 300,000 farmers, repair or build 1,300 schools, and train
2,700 teachers.
Still, we have challenges. In the area of civil/military
relations, the military appears to have the upper hand. It
influences or controls Pakistani foreign policy, especially
vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India, and also seems to play a
outsized role even on domestic policy.
On issues of federalism, the Pakistani state dominates the
provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and the Pashtun areas, often
with little regard for the citizens in those areas.
Most egregiously, even though thousands of Pakistanis have
lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the past decade,
Pakistani security and intelligence agencies have not been
playing or often are not playing a constructive role with
regard to terrorism.
Instead, they provide safe haven to terrorist groups that
attack Afghanistan and India and are linked to grave human
rights violations in Sindh and other parts of Pakistan.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee and the State
Department's report on human rights have noted serious concerns
about hundreds of cases of extrajudicial killings and forced
disappearance in Pakistan, particularly in Sindh.
Among those hundreds of cases, we have with us a witness
who has been directly affected. In November 2015, Sindhi leader
Dr. Anwar Laghari, the brother of one of our witnesses, was
brutally murdered in Pakistan.
The Pakistani Government has not been very responsive to
numerous inquiries made by the State Department at the request
of myself and other Members of Congress.
The reason for Dr. Laghari's death and why his perpetrators
have not been brought to justice, these are questions the
Pakistani Government must still answer.
And then to compound that tragedy, on October 30th last
year, Dr. Anwar Laghari's son, Asad Laghari, was found dead in
suspicious circumstances and is suspected to be a victim of
poisoning.
I met Asad Laghari when he was in Washington. He was
pursuing a Master's degree here in the United States. He was
preparing to help his country deal with water issues.
On August 18th last year, I wrote to the State Department
about these issues with six colleagues--three Democrats and
three Republicans. I have also raised these issues on the House
floor.
We must focus on an end to extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances in Sindh and elsewhere in Pakistan. We
must place a high priority on advancing genuine human rights
and democracy in Pakistan, not just for the people of Pakistan
who would benefit from human rights and democracy but because a
democratic Pakistan that respects the rule of law will be a
true ally of the United States.
As the chairman brought up, we are concerned still, of
course about the compound that Osama bin Laden had. He wasn't
hiding in some nondescript apartment--a mile from the West
Point of Pakistan, in a large protected compound.
But those in the ISI who must have known bin Laden was
there are still at high-ranking positions in the Pakistani
Government. Whereas Dr. Afridi, who helped us capture and kill
Osama bin Laden, is in prison. Kind of tells you which side is
in control in Pakistan.
The Trump administration has strongly condemned Pakistan
for its safe havens for terrorist organizations including the
Taliban. We could develop a political strategy to address
Pakistan's concerns about India and Afghanistan.
We should consider officially recognizing the Durand Line
as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
rather than just say that it is a matter to be discussed by the
countries. And with the understanding that we gain here in
these hearings, I hope that we develop a more effective policy
toward Pakistan that understands its internal ethnic,
religious, and political dynamics.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
Mr. Yoho. I'd like to thank the ranking member.
Next we will turn to Mr. Chabot of Ohio, who, incidentally,
used to be the chairman of this committee.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr.----
Mr. Yoho. And I aspire to be as talented as he is.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our relationship with Pakistan continues to be marked with
frustration, oftentimes a lack of cooperation, and then
sometimes it seems that there is mutual agreement and
engagement and things are looking positive.
I want to give a tip of the hat to the gentleman from
California here, Mr. Rohrabacher, who oftentimes has positions
which I don't always agree with and other members don't always
agree with.
But in his defense of Dr. Afridi, I have to say he's been
relentless. He's been committed. He's never given up and he's
absolutely right.
The treatment that Dr. Afridi got, a friend of this country
who actually--information which led--you'll have some folks,
oh, we are not sure about this. But in everything that I've
seen it led to the end of Osama bin Laden, who killed so many
of our fellow citizens on that horrible day, and then to have
him thrown in jail, and this is supposed to be a government
that's our friend and that we give pretty substantial amounts
of aid to every year.
And I've generally voted for that aid over the years
because I do think that, you know, if we cut it off they are
going to be even closer to China and there is going to be
ramifications there and they have nuclear weapons and all the
rest.
So I understand we have to--we have to get along. We need
to work together. But their treatment of Dr. Afridi is
outrageous. It's indefensible and it should change, and I would
hope sooner rather than later.
But I want to commend my colleague from California for
never giving up on that and that's in meetings, at Republican
conferences, in the face of leadership and demanding why they
are not doing more and why we are letting Pakistan just
continue to keep this doctor in a dungeon.
It's despicable, and thank you, Dana. We appreciate it.
Until you do something bad and then I'll have to disagree with
you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Yoho. No, thank you for bringing that up because I have
to echo that. I mean, Mr. Rohrabacher has been out there
consistently, hammering that home pretty much every meeting we
have and I thank you for that.
Next, we will turn to Dr. Bera from California for an
opening statement.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking
member.
Obviously, there are a lot of complicated regions in the
world, whether it's the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula.
But as someone who focuses on South Asia, I would argue
that this is one of the most complicated regions in the world.
You know, whether it's our mission in Afghanistan, you
know, you bring in India and Pakistan and, you know, it gets
complicated.
Whether it is the rise of India as a growing economy, as
one that's being welcomed into the League of Nations and
leaders in the world and the amount of investment, you know,
what does that portend to the India--Indo-Pak relationship as
the economy--India becomes a stronger nation and garners more
attention.
The hope is that Pakistan takes notice of some of the
economic reforms that are taking place, some of the civilian
reforms and some of the anti-corruption events, and you try to
find a resolution between India and Pakistan.
You know, there are areas where I think the U.S., working
with other nations, you know, to address Pakistan's very
concerning energy needs, their electrical grid, areas where you
got to take baby steps.
But how do you create some sort of, you know, small
dialogue and trust? How do we support civilian government in
Pakistan? How do we create those civilian institutions that
will be necessary to create stability and a democracy?
Again, none of these are easy answers. You know, what role
does China play here? You know, does China and--you know, does
Pakistan--as the U.S. relationship with Pakistan changes, does
Pakistan run to China as a counterweight?
I would argue that's the wrong approach because China has
shown a history of really China-centric involvement.
That said, does China take a more responsible role in
helping create stability as a global leader? So, again, none of
these are easy answers and, you know, I think we all have to
look at all of this together but from the interest of Pakistan,
looking at their long-term stability, their long-term--you
know, they have an educated population.
They've got a diaspora here in the United States that's
very interested in looking for a path forward and resolving
tensions and lowering tensions between India and Pakistan and
hoping to see a more democratic Pakistan.
So, again, I look forward to the witnesses and thank you
for calling this hearing.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
And I want you guys to understand that when we have these
hearings your input is so valuable. It goes into ideas that we
come up with legislation to help strengthen our foreign policy
that we send to the state or the administration. And so we
really value you being here and we want to thank you for your
time.
What I want to do is just introduce all four of you and
then we will start with you, Dr. Jones, and your statement.
Dr. Seth Jones, Harold Brown chair and director
Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Mr. Jeff Smith, research fellow for
South Asia at the Heritage Foundation; Mr. Munawar Sufi
Laghari, executive director at the Sindhi Foundation; Dr. Shah,
Wick Cary assistant professor of South Asian politics in the
Department of International and Area Studies at the University
of Oklahoma.
Again, thank you for being here. Dr. Jones, your opening
statement.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak out of order for
a second.
Mr. Yoho. Please.
Mr. Chabot. We have got actually a whole bunch of chairs
over here if the folks over there might want to sit down and--
--
Mr. Yoho. You know, and I appreciate you pointing that out
because I also want everybody just to kind of glance around the
room. See how packed this room is.
People are interested about this topic, about our
relationships with Pakistan, on both sides. And so that's why
this room is so crowded and over standing.
But feel free to come across if you got a moment right now,
and thank you for pointing that out.
Dr. Jones, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, PH.D., HAROLD BROWN CHAIR, DIRECTOR,
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member
Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for
allowing us to testify on this important subject that I think
all of you that have spoken so far have indicated.
I want to keep my remarks brief and focus on two issues.
One is the security situation which is what I focused on, both
in Pakistan and the region, and the second is just to lay out
potential options for consideration.
As I look at the security situation in Pakistan, what's
interesting as we looked at the data is actually there is been
a dramatic drop in violence levels in Pakistan, especially over
the past 4 years.
Attacks have declined fairly significantly, probably in
part a function of Pakistan's counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations in the country including in the
tribal areas as well as against groups like the Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistan Taliban.
Fatality rates are actually down somewhat. Lethality rates
against groups are actually down somewhat. They are still high
in a few places, including Balochistan.
But I think what we see is some successful efforts by the
Pakistan state, in some areas quite lethal, including on human
rights issues that I think are worth bringing up. But we have
seen a decrease.
In neighboring Afghanistan, obviously, the situation is
different. We are seeing high levels of violence, Taliban
control of somewhere between 10 to 12 percent of the Afghan
population, depending on the numbers, and a pretty notable
decrease in Afghan Government control of populated areas up
through 2017, about 60 percent of the country, down from nearly
70 percent about 1\1/2\ years.
So the situation in Afghanistan is still quite violent and
the situation in Pakistan, while violent, appears to be--
indicators appear to be lessening.
Let me talk about next steps, moving forward, and I'll
skip--the testimony talks about a whole range of issues
including China-Pakistan cooperation. Let me focus on three
things in the remaining time.
One is broader relations with Pakistan. As someone who
works on security, I do focus a lot on the security
relationship, both with Pakistan and the region.
I do think it is important to remember that there are other
areas of interest with Pakistan. It's got the sixth largest
population in the world. It's got a GDP of about $300 billion,
which is on par with South Africa and Colombia. It is a
reasonable country and it has got a reasonable growth rate of
about 5\1/2\ percent.
So there are areas--I think you talk to American companies
that deal with iron and steel, agriculture machinery, aircraft
that have an interest in trade, and then we get textiles, new
apparel, leather products from Pakistan as well. So there's an
economic incentive to keep a relationship and to keep a trade
relationship.
There are also interests in targeting the Islamic State in
Khorasan Province, which sits really on the Af-Pak border in
Nangarhar Province, and that has conducted attacks including
recently in Jalalabad.
So there are areas, I would say, of some common interest. I
also think there is probably worth noting that any political
settlement in Afghanistan almost certainly has to involve
Pakistan because of its relationship with the Afghan Taliban.
So assuming there are efforts to improve and establish some
kind of a peace deal, I think Pakistan is an important partner.
But let me just say in general that we have a situation, I
think, with Pakistan that I still find unacceptable.
The U.S. is fighting a war in Afghanistan primarily against
the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The leadership structure of
both groups sits on the Pakistan side of the border.
That is leader Haibatullah Akhunzada, his chief deputy,
Siraj Haqqani and Mohammad Yaqub, a range of leaders--Abdul
Qayyum Fakir, Ahmadullah Nanai, Abdul Latif Mansura--all
located on the Pakistan side of the border and that has not
stopped.
If that does not stop, I think it's worth considering a
range of issues. I'd like to see a more transparent aggressive
information campaign in the United States about who is sitting
in Pakistan, roughly, where they are located, what their names
are, because I think we have got a lot that we can disclose
without getting into sources and methods.
I think there are a range of issues from non-NATO ally
status to multilateral financial lenders that I'll save for the
question and answer period.
But I think it's worth thinking very carefully about an
escalatory latter with Pakistan if some of that does not
change.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
Mr. Smith, if you would.
STATEMENT OF MR. JEFF SMITH, RESEARCH FELLOW, SOUTH ASIA,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Smith. No improvement in Afghanistan is possible
without Pakistan taking control of its border areas. That was
the unfortunate inalienable truth revealed to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence nearly one decade by then Director of
National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair.
Sadly, it is as true today as it was then. Military
strategists are in near universal agreement on this point.
Nothing offers an insurgency greater vitality than the
provision of support and safe haven across an international
border in a neighboring country.
It is the equivalent of counterinsurgency kryptonite. The
United States has been pursuing a set of objectives in
Afghanistan that, by its own admission, are likely to remain
hopelessly out of reach, absent a fundamental change in
Pakistan's misguided strategic calculus.
The reality is there is a glaring fundamental incongruity
between American and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan.
Whereas Washington, Kabul, and most of the international
community have strived to build a peaceful stable democratic
Afghanistan, Pakistan's ideal objective is an Afghan Government
that is pliable, submissive, and hostile to India.
Since the Afghan people, understandably bitter after over a
decade of Pakistani malfeasance, are unlikely to elect such a
government, Islamabad's second order of priorities is to keep
the country weak, unstable, and divided.
It sees the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and their fellow
travelers as the most effective means of doing so and of
securing its secondary objectives and interests in Afghanistan.
In 2009, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan concluded that
there was no chance that Pakistan would view any increase in
aid as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these
militant groups.
The following year, the U.S. increased aid to Pakistan by
50 percent, from $3 billion to $4\1/2\ billion. That was the
year 2010, which was telling in two more ways.
It was the year that U.S. aid to Pakistan reached an all-
time high and the year that U.S. casualties in Afghanistan
reached an all-time high.
The Trump administration tried to signal early on that
business as usual was coming to an end. This is a conditions-
based approach and our relationship with Pakistan will also be
conditions-based, based on whether they take action, Secretary
Tillerson explained last year.
As long-time Pakistan watchers predicted, the
administration's warnings fell on deaf ears. No, I have not
seen any change yet in Pakistan's behavior, General John
Nicholson, our top military commander in Afghanistan, admitted
in November.
Instead, Pakistan returned to a familiar play book of
deflection, denial, conspiracy, and outright threats. If
President Trump wants Pakistan to become a graveyard for U.S.
troops, let him do so, the chairman of Pakistan's senate warned
last August.
In this context, President Trump's January 1st announcement
of a suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan was not only merited
but long overdue. The time has come to rewrite the terms of the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
For years, America and the international community have
bemoaned the Pakistani military's interference in the country's
politics. Yet, they convinced themselves that as the country's
real power brokers the military was the only institution
capable of resolving Pakistan's terrorism problem.
That experiment has been a failure. The military and the
ISI have consistently proven to be the source of Pakistan's
terrorism problem.
As a result, the most effective points of pressure on
Pakistan will be those targeting the military brass,
particularly their considerable interests in and access to the
West.
Pakistani officials and experts regularly claim their
country is prosecuting America's war. Pakistan is not receiving
aid from the U.S. It is receiving compensation for military
operations conducted on America's behalf.
Nation states are obligated to ensure that their territory
is not being used to launch attacks on other countries. That is
their sovereign responsibility, not something they are entitled
to receive compensation for.
If Pakistan is incapable of or unwilling to exercise
sovereignty over its territory and prevent cross-border
attacks, it should not be surprised when others take action to
defend themselves.
I have several other conclusions and quite a bit on the
Pakistan-China relationship in my written testimony that I
suspect we may get to in Q and A.
But thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. No, thank you for your intuition on that and, you
know, pointing that out because those are things that we need
to delve into.
Mr. Laghari, if you would, please.
STATEMENT OF MR. MUNAWAR ``SUFI'' LAGHARI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
SINDHI FOUNDATION
Mr. Laghari. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and
members of the committee, let me thank you all for inviting me
to this important hearing on U.S.-Pakistan relations. My focus
is mainly on Sindh Province.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is a topic of much media discussion.
But there is little media and political discussion about the
Sindhis, who comprises about 14 percent of Pakistan's
population of just over 205 million people.
Mr. Chairman, Sindhi people believed that becoming part of
Pakistan would bring an end to religious wars and the
prevalence of justice and rights. But hostility and tensions in
the region have never ended.
The United States can play a very important role in this
region, particularly to bring about the eradication of
terrorism and restoration of human rights.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is a de facto military state run by
its army, Islamic jihadi outfits, protected and promoted by the
army as assets and as important Pakistani foreign and defence
policy tools.
Militant Islam is the most powerful weapon of the Pakistani
army. Islamic religious organizations have been and will always
be their assets. They not only use these religious
organizations against India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but
also against the United States and Israel.
Mr. Chairman, Sindh can be contrasted with Pakistan's
military-dominated state. Jihad, Islam, and the army have
always been features of the Pakistani army--Pakistani state.
Sindh's identity has always been peace, progress,
coexistence, culture, and democracy. Sindh has always been at
the forefront of pro-democracy struggles against military
dictators in Pakistan. Sindh played a leading role in the 1983
movement for the restoration of democracy.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistan's official language, Urdu, is the
mother tongue of the Indian Muslim migrants. It is currently
spoken by only 8 percent of the total population. The state of
Pakistan imposed Urdu as a tool of cultural repression upon the
rest of the population--Sindhis, Baloch, Pashtuns, Punjabis,
Saraikis, and other native languages.
This was one of the reasons for the separation of
Bangladesh in 1971. Injustice done to the indigenous languages
has eroded the cultural identity of Sindh, replaced by the
violence and extremism.
The state has captured the interest of Punjabis and
Muhajirs. Punjab has always been superior. Muhajirs have always
been privileged. Meanwhile, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Baloch have
always suffered.
Mr. Chairman, as long as you don't understand these ground
realities, you will not be able to align American interests and
relations with those of Pakistan.
Hundreds of Sindhis nationalists are missing in Sindh and
thousands of Baloch nationalists are missing in Balochistan.
Their enforced disappearances are part of the so-called
``strategic depth'' policy of Pakistan's army and ISI because
these activists are against the multi-billion-dollar CPEC.
Young Sindhi, Hindu women are being forcefully converted to
Islam and made sex slaves of Islamic extremists in Sindh.
Mr. Chairman, it is high time that the United States
reconsider the nature of their relationship with Pakistan,
their military, and the ISI. The U.S. should also better its
relationship with the pluralistic people of Sindh.
I have many recommendations, which are already in my full
testimony but I want to mention one recommendation. I want to
read it here.
The Pakistani military and ISI should be held accountable
for fraud and abuse of U.S. resources, equipment, and money,
which they use to hunt down anti-jihadi, Sindhi and Baloch
dissidents instead of going against the jihadi and terrorist
groups including the Hafiz Saeed and Haqqani Network.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Laghari follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I appreciate your input.
Dr. Shah.
STATEMENT OF AQIL SHAH, PH.D., WICK CARY ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA
STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
Mr. Shah. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding
this very timely hearing on Pakistan and inviting me to
testify.
In my testimony, I am going to focus on two key issues--
challenges to democratization in Pakistan and the repression of
human rights and civil society by security services.
Pakistan's fragile democracy is facing a serious threat
from the military once again. The military in Pakistan has
repeatedly intervened to arrest the development of democracy in
the country, ruling it directly for almost half the country's
existence and maintaining a firm grip on national security
policy and politics for the rest of the time.
As Pakistan nears a crucial parliamentary election later
this year, the military's intelligence arm, the Inter-Services
Intelligence, is reportedly trying to engineer an outcome that
will undercut the electoral prospects of the ruling Pakistan
Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, with the
ultimate aim of creating a divided and hung Parliament.
Mr. Sharif was ousted from office in July 2017 when the
country's Supreme Court disqualified him from holding public
office in a corruption inquiry linked to the Panama Papers.
But the probe that became the basis of the court's decision
was led by military intelligence officials and marred by
serious accusations of partiality amid reports of witness
intimidation and illegal wiretapping of the witnesses' phones.
But dishonesty is not the reason for Mr. Sharif's or other
Pakistani politicians' predicament. Instead, it is their
attempt to wrest authority from the military in matters of
national security and foreign policy.
Mr. Sharif has already been deposed twice in the past--in
1993 by a military-backed Presidential decree and in 1999 by
General Musharraf's coup--mainly for seeking reconciliation
with India and for asserting the civilian supremacy over the
military.
After resuming office for the third time in 2013, he ran
afoul of the military once again for making peace overtures to
India, for calling for an end to undue interference in
Afghanistan, and his insistence that the ISI stop using a
jihadi terrorist group like the Lashkar-e-Taiba as proxies to
promote perceived national security goals which he believes has
eroded Pakistan's internal coherence and international
credibility.
But rather than acting against these violent extremists,
the military has now sought to convert them into political
parties. The aim is to shield these groups from international
sanctions and to balance and counter politicians like Sharif
and others.
If parliamentary elections take place as planned in mid-
2018, it will be Pakistan's second transition from one elected
government which has completed its term to another--a milestone
in a country where all previous transitions to democracy were
aborted by military coups or intervention.
Pakistan achieved its first one in 2013. A second
transition is more crucial because it would show that the
country's political leaders and parties are unconditionally
committed to democracy even when they lose elections and signal
to the military that Pakistanis have the right to
democratically change their leaders.
Elections, obviously, do not equal democracy. But regular
elections can help solidify democracy by habituating
politically significant groups such as political parties, the
military, and civil society to the fact that democratic
procedures and norms are the only game in town.
The experience of other military-dominated parties in Latin
America and Asia shows that the certainty of the electoral
process can empower democratically-elected leaders to
successfully roll back the institutional prerogatives of the
military.
Besides, violent extremists are less likely to find easy
refuge in a democratic Pakistan. The stronger that Pakistan's
democratic institutions become, the less room the Pakistan
military and its ISI will have to use jihadi proxies both for
domestic and foreign adventures.
Coming to the repression of human rights, the human rights
situation in Pakistan is, obviously, dismal. The Pakistan
military's continued institutional power and entrenched
assumptions of impunity mean that human rights are likely to
continue to deteriorate in the coming year.
Particularly alarming is the issue of enforced
disappearances of Baloch and Sindhi dissidents, social workers,
peace activists, and journalists.
There are official mechanisms that can address these human
rights violations including the National Commission for Human
Rights and the Official Commission of Inquiry on forced
disappearances.
But their authority is limited by constraints both
budgetary and the fact that they are unable to prosecute
military officers.
For too long the United States has focused narrowly on
security in Pakistan, which has invariably meant a military-
centric relationship at the expense of civilian democratic
governance.
I would recommend that Congress ensure that U.S. election
monitors such as NDI and IRI coordinate their efforts with
international observers for the next elections to closely
assess and monitor the electoral process. Congress should also
review the composition of aid to Pakistan and, lastly, the U.S.
should work with its allies to urge Pakistan to strengthen the
Commission on Forced Disappearance, the National Human Rights
Commission, and to urgently ratify the International Convention
for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shah follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank everybody for being on time with your
statements and your passion. I appreciate that.
This is something, as you guys have all pointed out, that
we have seen.
Dr. Jones, I believe you were talking about how the attacks
are down in Pakistan, are they down because the attacks in
Afghanistan are going up? Are they just shifting?
And then, Mr. Smith, I think it was you talking about the
foreign aid--that we have had areas or times where we have had
a lot of foreign aid going into Pakistan, we have had times
where there was none going into Pakistan, and then we had
moderate amounts. But yet, the situation hasn't changed.
So it kind of makes me think foreign aid is not the answer
to this to get people to come to the table, and we have seen
the response of Pakistan.
How should Congress interpret Pakistan's move to double
down on its relationship with China as tensions with the United
States rise?
We will go with you, Mr. Smith, first.
Mr. Smith. It's a great question and, you know, I think
China has often been looked at as one of the few potentially
effective avenues or mechanisms to effect in real change in
Pakistan because they do have a great deal of influence. They
do give a great deal of money, like the U.S. But unlike the
U.S., they are popular in Pakistan among the elite and the
public.
But what I think often gets lost in that discussion is
that, and Andrew Small, I think, put it best when he said the
Pakistan-China relationship is exactly as close as China wants
it to be.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Smith. I don't know that Beijing is eager to see a
fundamental rupture in U.S.-Pakistan relations and for it to
assume responsibility as the sole patron of Pakistan and their
commitments and responsibilities that come with that.
Its support for Pakistan has already cost it in its
relationship with India. It has cost it in the international
community in some regards and it cost a great deal financially
in some regards.
And I think another thing often lost is that the Chinese
public views Pakistan just about as favorably as they view
India, which is a historic rival of China, and far less
favorably than they view the U.S.
So there is popular opinion in China to a degree that
influences elite opinion as well, even if it's not a democracy.
So I think in some ways a rupture in U.S.-Pakistan
relationships that pushes Pakistan further toward China could
actually expose some tensions in that relationship and may make
China a more willing cooperator or collaborator.
Mr. Yoho. And you brought up a good point. They've got such
an influence that they can, and I think what they will find out
in Pakistan and other countries with this One Belt One Road,
it's a one-way street that heads toward China for China's
benefit.
Although they can do great things with that, I think it's
something that we should point out. The Gwadar Port shows that
there is a close link to the Chinese military ambitions.
You know, I remember sitting with the Chinese Ambassador
talking about the Spratly Islands. He said it was strictly for
peaceful navigational purposes. We know that's not true and we
have seen that repeated over and over again.
Let me see. This will be for Dr. Shah. Is the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship at the point of no return and do you believe that
it's still accurate to call Pakistan an ally, given its history
of the two-faced dealings on the war on terror?
Mr. Shah. That's a tough question.
So Pakistan, as you are all aware, has kind of been, as
some people call it, a friend and an enemy, or a frenemy. So it
has, you know, willingly cracked down on terrorists and
militants that attacked the Pakistani state while keeping,
protecting, and sponsoring other groups like the Haqqani
Network that hurt Indian and Afghanistan.
U.S.-Pakistan relations have seen a kind of rise and fall
throughout history. But I would imagine that it's not a
breaking point yet that the U.S. could still do things that
might turn the kind of direction of the Pakistani state around,
especially as I emphasized by promoting democracy, which has
been missing from U.S. assistance to Pakistan for quite some
time.
There was a short period that the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
Enhanced Partnership Act that was emphasized for 5 years.
But I think the real key is to have a long-term commitment,
an unconditional commitment to democratization in Pakistan and
to build relationships with civilian leaders and civil society.
Mr. Yoho. I hope we can come back to that question there.
And I want to go to Dr. Jones. What would be the
implications of stripping Pakistan of its status as a major
non-NATO ally, which it acquired in 2004, thus ending its
preferential access to American weapons and technologies?
Mr. Jones. Well, look, I think if that--the step of
suspending or even terminating Pakistan status as a non-NATO
ally was part of a series of escalatory steps and that went
further, if it made no difference, Pakistan is not on the U.S.
State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. But we
know.
I was in the U.S. Government. I mean, there is a lot of
evidence to suggest that they do support Lashkar-e-Taiba, the
Taliban, the Haqqani Network.
So my answer to you is I don't know that it would have an
immediate step of revoking it. I think it would; Pakistan could
get that assistance potentially elsewhere, including from the
Chinese.
But if it's part of a process that is politically isolating
Pakistan, I don't think that would be in their interest, over
the long run.
Mr. Yoho. I agree with you, and thank you.
We will next turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Two thousand years ago, the greatest imperial
power was Rome and all roads led to Rome. Today, all roads and
belts lead to Beijing.
In most places the country has an army. In Pakistan's case,
the army has a country.
I am concerned with the efforts of elites in Islamabad to
compel the use of the Urdu language nationwide. They tried that
on what was then called East Pakistan. It is no longer referred
to as East Pakistan.
Last year, seven Members of Congress signed a letter
condemning human rights violations in Sindh, especially
regarding forced disappearances, missing persons, and religious
extremist attacks on minorities.
Mr. Laghari, what can the U.S. do to help improve human
rights in Sindh?
Mr. Laghari. I think one great effort is already done for
the first time ever after the British. The U.S. Consulate of
Karachi Web site in Sindhi, credit goes to this committee or
Congressman Brad Sherman and Adam Schiff and Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher, who signed those letters.
I think that they still need authorization from the
Appropriations Committee about the Voice of America program in
Sindhi.
That is needed because there is no voice for the Sindhi
peoples and I really highly recommend it and this committee can
try to ask the State Department or the Voice of America that we
start a Sindhi program in Voice of America.
Mr. Sherman. I would point out that we have reduced our
cost of foreign aid to Pakistan by many hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars a year.
In my work on this, I have seen a need for maybe $1\1/2\
million to communicate with 30 million-plus Sindhi speakers.
Should we also have a Baloch radio service as well? I'll ask
Mr. Laghari and also Mr.--Dr. Shah.
Mr. Shah. I mean, I don't think it'll hurt to have such
programming. But the problem in Balochistan is, obviously,
deeply rooted in the Pakistani state's repression of legitimate
Baloch demands for autonomy and a share of the resources.
This is a province that now produces I think, if I am not
wrong, about 36 percent of Pakistan's natural gas. But it
receives a tiny--a pittance in revenues from Islamabad.
And the military systematically abuses human rights in
Balochistan. Baloch dissidents have been kidnapped, tortured,
and then dumped on the roadside, and in some cases their bodies
had engraved on them ``Pakistan zindabad'' or, you know, ``long
live Pakistan.''
So Baloch alienation, you know, is growing and this is a
middle class insurgency, by the way. The doctors, engineers,
and professionals have taken up arms against the Pakistani
state.
And so, first of all, I think there is a need to outrightly
condemn human rights violations in Balochistan, the rest of
Pakistan, and to pressure Pakistan to at least respect its
obligations to the international community in terms of
following--in terms of adhering to the norm of human rights
protection.
Mr. Sherman. The Punjabi represent about 53 percent of the
country. Do they represent a disproportionate percentage of the
army, the ISI, and especially the officer corps?
Mr. Shah. Historically, that has been the case. The army
does not release the ethnic composition of its officer corps.
But estimates have ranged from 70 to 80 percent Punjabis
and then Pashtuns form about 15 percent, and the last 5 percent
would be some Sindhi and Baloch and Muhajirs, I believe.
Mr. Sherman. I'll go down the row. Does anyone here think
that over 10 percent of the officer corps is made up of persons
other than Pashtun and Punjabi?
Dr. Shah, you said----
Mr. Shah. No.
Mr. Sherman. No? For the record, Mr. Laghari says no. Mr.
Smith? Dr. Jones?
So you have certain ethnic groups controlling the army and
then the army controls the country, and then you sometimes call
it a democracy.
I believe my time has expired.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
We will next go to Mr. Rohrabacher from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
President Trump has sent a message, a long overdue message,
to the clique that rules the day in Pakistan, and now, today,
the United States Congress, from this committee, is sending the
same message.
The clique that is ruling in Pakistan, this clique of
Punjabis, rule with an iron fist. They are terrorists to their
own people and they are corrupt.
They are not a legitimate government and should not be
treated as a legitimate government but instead, a pariah that
is not in the interests of its own people and certainly not in
the interests of the United States.
We have, over the years, given to them every benefit of the
doubt we could. When I arrived here three decades ago, many
people believed I was Pakistan's best friend on the Hill.
I was. We were deeply involved in Afghanistan and I spent a
lot of time and effort on that particular issue. But over the
years it has become very clear to me that Pakistan is the root
of the problem in Afghanistan.
The ISI and the Pakistani Government, which are synonymous
in so many ways, have been at fault for keeping this conflict
going and going and going.
So we are talking about thousands and thousands of lives
lost. We mentioned Dr. Afridi today. Dr. Afridi is symbolic of
all of this.
If you have a group of gangsters who have taken someone
like a doctor and put him in prison, in a dungeon, because he
helped discover and helped disclose the murderers of 3,000
Americans, well, what does that indicate to you about the
people who put him in that dungeon?
It is time for us to side with the people who are repressed
by this, what I say, clique that rules--the regime that rule
Pakistan. We need to side with the Baloch, who have their young
men and women grabbed, murdered, and then dumped on their front
lawn.
We have got a group in Karachi, the MQM movement, that's
basically a group of people that wanted to live with enterprise
and have a zone where they could deal with the world in a
commercial way and they are finding their people murdered.
They are finding their lives repressed by a small group of
Punjabis who are--basically, many of them don't even pay taxes
in their country.
We have spent $33 billion for Pakistan since 9/11--$33
billion--and they, with $33 billion, could not even get
themselves--couldn't get themselves to help us destroy the
poppy crops--the opium that is grown on the Pakistan-Afghan
border.
Now, this has been a travesty. Our policy has been a
travesty of cowardice or ignorance, on the part of the United
States, that we are supporting such a regime. And I would hope
that instead that we send a message to the Sindhis, to the
Baloch, to the MQM and others in Pakistan--and there are small
minorities of other faiths that are there that are being
murdered all the time. Christians have been murdered in
Pakistan at will and there's never anybody arrested for it.
So with this thought, Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to ask
the panel--I got 1 minute left so it's going to have to be yes
or no--do you think the United States should drop its, how do
you say, official relationship with Pakistan and begin dealing
with those elements in Pakistan that believe in democracy and
represent the people of their country--the Baloch, the Sindhis,
the MQM, et cetera?
Yes or no? You have 30 seconds. Go ahead.
Mr. Jones. I mean, I think the U.S. should--would work at
those levels, work with the--need to talk to the government but
needs to also talk with the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I agree, because I don't believe that
those people have power in Pakistan or the government. In the
United States we believe government derives its just powers
from the consent of the governed and that's not what you have
in Pakistan. You have people who are being terrorized by that
clique.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I would second the comments of my honorable
colleague.
Mr. Laghari. I agree with you, except it's difficult
because they are so involved in terrorism and tortures in the
Sindh Province. But I have no problem with the Muhajirs, the
common Muhajirs, the identities, the main issues, this is my
stand--and I think the United States also must play very
importantly in the relationship.
We don't want to see another Taliban or the Rohingya type
in Karachi or those things. This is my concern. And thanks, I
agree with you. So we have to cut off the official
relationship.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We see the Taliban emerging in Karachi.
You can guess who's really behind it. One last----
Mr. Shah. I wanted to add to your concerns. Pashtuns in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas have also been subjected to
systematic human rights violations.
As we speak, thousands of Pashtuns gathered in the capital
of Islamabad seeking justice for a young man who was killed
extrajudicially, partly because his name sounds--his name is
the same as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Mehsud.
And so in Karachi these human rights violations have been
carried out by the security services against Pashtuns as well.
I don't think we should sever our relationship with
Pakistan but I think there is a need to seriously think about
shifting our focus to dealing with and building our
partnerships with civilian and political leaders, civil
society, the media, professional associations, other NGOs like
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
Mr. Yoho. We'll come back to that. We need to move on.
Next, we will go to Mr. Suozzi from New York.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to get a little bit of more information from each of
you.
So I have three areas that I want to explore. One is you
talk about, you know, we should continue to try and work with
the government.
But there is a big difference in the government between the
military and the civilian government. So I wanted you just to
expand a little bit between the difference between the civilian
and the military government.
Number two is, you know, we want to do a lot--want to see
them do a lot better job of policing their borders between
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Now, we have been having a hard time with our borders in
the United States of America and there is a very long border in
Pakistan as well. What can be done--what should the Pakistan
Government be doing more effectively to secure their long
border with Afghanistan.
And I'll ask you, Dr. Jones, first and then I am going to
ask another question afterwards if I still have more time.
Mr. Jones. Sure. On the civilian and military, I think the
U.S. has traditionally had a much closer relationship with the
civilian side in general.
Problems with the military have particularly been the ISI,
the Inter-Services Intelligence director, which has----
Mr. Suozzi. The U.S. has always had a very close
relationship with the military as well.
Mr. Jones. Well, with some parts of the military. But I
think when it comes to military intelligence that's where the
biggest source of friction have been on support to groups
operating in Afghanistan, Haqqani's Taliban itself.
That's been a breaking point, I think, and continues to be
a source of significant friction.
Mr. Suozzi. So think of other relationships that were built
during the war in Afghanistan with the Russians and, you know,
Pakistan supporting the mujahideen and the relationships that
were built. Those relationships still exist. How do they undo
those relationships and get rid of the people that we are
having a hard time with?
Mr. Jones. Well, look, there is a strategic rationale for
why Pakistan continues to support these groups. They are
pursuing Pakistan's foreign policy interests in Afghanistan as
they are in India with Lashkar-e-Taiba.
There could be a strategic rationale to change that kind of
support. It is undermining U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It is
undermining Afghan interests. It's undermining regional
interests. That's a strategic decision I think that goes well
beyond any kind of historical ties.
Mr. Suozzi. And what about the practical questions related
to securing the border? What would you like to see happen more
that's not happening?
Mr. Jones. I'd like to see Pakistan conduct intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance to Taliban Haqqani members
crossing the border.
They have the capability to do that. They haven't done it.
They are also trying to build a wall right now. You know, it
may be worth looking closely at, but it has to be on a
conjunction with Afghanistan.
Mr. Suozzi. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I think in some ways it gets to the question of
what is the military's cost-benefit calculation, and to date
they have not borne significant costs for their policy of using
Islamist militant as an extension of foreign policy.
They have gotten benefits from that strategy but they
haven't borne costs.
Mr. Suozzi. Do we think that's a policy that is promoted
more by the military than by the civilian government?
Mr. Smith. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Suozzi. And then how about securing the border? Do you
want to add anything to that?
Mr. Smith. I have nothing to add. But I am sure U.S.
military commanders have a lot of suggestions for how Pakistan
could better secure that border.
Mr. Suozzi. Mr. Laghari?
Mr. Laghari. I think--even if you keep the relationship
with civilians but the control is with the Pakistani military
and even in the military, the ISI is in control of the
military. So it's very difficult to control this ISI.
Mr. Suozzi. Is there a big tension between the civilian and
the military government in Pakistan?
Mr. Laghari. In the last 70 years, if you see any one
single election, fair election happen in Pakistan, that time in
1970 and Pakistan breakup.
There is no fair--after even it is controlled by the
Pakistani interests--if you can control through the ISI then
you can maybe say that we can build a good relationship with
the Pakistani military or ISI.
Mr. Suozzi. Dr. Shah.
Mr. Shah. Let me clarify that the ISI is actually part of
the military's chain of command. It's not a rogue agency. Its
head is a three-star general who goes back to the regular
military.
And, you know, in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relations, I
mean, there hasn't been a Pakistani dictator that the United
States hasn't been in love with and the relationship has been
completely military-centric.
That's my one point, and there are deep tensions between
the civilians and the military.
On the border, I think there is a question also of
willingness. It's not just a matter of capabilities. Does
Pakistan really want to achieve those objectives that you
identify to stop and prevent the Haqqani Network.
I think it's the opposite. They actually facilitate their
insertion into Afghanistan.
Mr. Suozzi. Who are two or three people--do I have a few
more seconds, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Yoho. Yes.
Mr. Suozzi. Who are two or three people that you think are
the best people for--if a Congressperson was to go visit
Pakistan, who are the two or three best civilian people that
you think we should talk to?
Go ahead, Dr. Shah.
Mr. Shah. I would suggest not focusing on individuals but
institutions to build relations with the Pakistani National
Assembly, their politicians who--in both the Pakistan Muslim
League and Pakistan People's Party or former Prime Minister,
late Benazir Bhutto, who understand the urgency of ridding
Pakistan of extremism who want to have a peaceful relationship
with India, want to end interference in Afghanistan.
So I think it's a matter of building ties with institutions
more than individuals.
Mr. Suozzi. Do you want to add anything, Dr. Jones or Mr.
Smith or Mr. Laghari?
Mr. Jones. No, strongly agree institutions and strongly
agree with organizations like the Senate.
Mr. Laghari. I also agree about the judiciary, too.
Mr. Suozzi. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
We will next go to Ms. Wagner from Missouri.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this
hearing and I appreciate your continued attention to our--what
I'll call changing relationship with Pakistan.
Mr. Smith, you recently wrote that you foresaw stronger
Indo-U.S. and Sino-Pakistan ties as the balance of power in
Asia shifts.
We can already see that China is investing staggering
amounts of money--over $50 billion--in Pakistan and has been
especially active in the port town of Gwadar.
What kind of game is China playing with Gwadar? Is it an
attempt to isolate India or is China laying the groundwork for
long-term competition with the United States?
Mr. Smith. I think China has both commercial and military
interests in the port of Gwadar. You know, going back a decade,
a lot of Indian strategists were concerned about and publically
complaining about the possibility China would build a string of
pearls--port facilities and logistics facilities--along the
Indian Ocean rim and those concerns were sort of downplayed at
the time.
But I think they may have just come a decade too early
because what we have seen in recent years is that China does
have plans for military facilities and installations.
Ms. Wagner. I should say so. President Trump has advocated
for a 350-ship navy. Given that China seems to have designated
Gwadar a future PLA naval base, are we doing enough to prepare
for China's creep westward?
Mr. Smith. Well, one of the things we should be doing and
we are doing--I would commend the Trump administration on
this--is strengthening our partnership with India across all
the services political, civilian, military--that in some ways
we see India as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean
and that partnership has made really dramatic progress over the
past 10 years.
And I think we have a unique situation with Prime Minister
Modi in India and this Trump administration very bullish on the
India relationship, to move that forward. That, more than
anything--a strong U.S.-India partnership, will secure our
interests in the Indian Ocean.
Ms. Wagner. I have several more questions.
Last fall, Pakistan refused to capitulate to China's demand
that it accept Chinese currency within the Gwadar free zone.
Dr. Shah, do you see Beijing's funding conditions for the
China-Pakistan economic corridor becoming a wedge issue that
inhibits cooperation between the two countries?
Mr. Shah. There have been reports of rising tensions.
Pakistan also refused Bhasha Dam. I think the Chinese helped in
that because the conditions were too stringent.
Pakistan's ministry for shipping told the Senate that 90
percent of the revenue from Gwadar will go to China. So I think
Pakistani officials are beginning to realize that this is
really not about Pakistan's economic development per se but
it's about Chinese commercial economic interests.
And so there is tension also amongst the smaller provinces
because they feel like, again, this project has been hijacked
by the Punjab and left them out of the loop. So there is
domestic tension but there is also frictions with China on
certain issues including the currency issue.
Ms. Wagner. I've got several more questions to whomever can
best answer. Would you recommend that Congress spell out
specific conditions on our funding to Pakistan in the upcoming
appropriations process? Mr. Laghari.
Mr. Laghari. I think especially about the human rights
situations. They should put the condition on that one. And the
Sindhi and Baloch disappearance issues is very critical.
Ms. Wagner. Sir, as you well know, the systematic human
rights abuses perpetuated by the Pakistani military, I mean, I
am interested in reforming our IMET military education program
to better train participating officers from Pakistan and around
the world on human rights.
What steps does the Pakistani military need to do to
respect the fundamental rights?
Mr. Laghari. I haven't seen any delegation from the U.S.,
even the Karachi Consulate or the Islamabad Ambassador. They
have to meet at least the disappeared person's families or the
extrajudicial victim's families.
That will go to the message to the Pakistani Army that the
U.S. is really concerned about the human rights situation and
whatever equipments and training the U.S. is giving to the
Pakistani military or the police and the law enforcement
agencies.
Ms. Wagner. I appreciate it. I'd be interested in all of
your perspectives on this. But let me just get this last
question in.
Just 2 days ago, the Pakistani Taliban claimed
responsibility for a suicide attack that killed 11 soldiers in
the Swat Valley.
Dr. Jones, a few years back, you wrote that Pakistan had
used proxy warfare to try to inspire regime change in
Afghanistan. Is it still doing so and do you think the U.S.'s
new positioning could encourage Pakistani counterterrorism
efforts?
Mr. Jones. I think Pakistan does continue to use proxy
organizations, particularly in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan
has shown a willingness to conduct counterterrorism operations
against groups that threaten the state--groups like the
Pakistan Taliban--but not against groups that they use as
tools.
So they differentiate between terrorist groups. I think the
challenge for the U.S. is to try to get them to stop supporting
groups undermining U.S. interests.
Ms. Wagner. Here, here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for letting me go over. I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Absolutely, and I appreciate your input and I
thought those were great questions.
You know, what we have seen is--and I think it was Mr.
Laghari, you brought up one of the shortfalls of our foreign
policy and most grave is us not understanding the local
cultures, tribe mentality, or the power structures that we
don't have here and we have seen this repeated in Afghanistan.
We have seen it repeated all over the Middle East, and you
would think, you know, one of the things that would bring us
all together would be to have a common goal in stomping out
radicalism in any shape and form--that we'd all come together
and we could agree on that and then move beyond that and focus
on economies and trade and cultural exchanges.
But I don't see that happening and what we have around the
world is people have hijacked religions or bastardized them.
We have seen what the radicals have taken with Islam. But
we have also seen them do that with democracies, and both of
them have gotten a bad name.
You know, we heard in other meetings that democracy is a
failing structure and China is promoting that. Yet, what we see
around the world in so many countries is not a true democracy,
you know, where the people are empowered.
What we see in so many countries is the government is still
in power but they want to call it a democracy and when it
doesn't work they blame democracy instead of their small
thinking and they don't empower their people.
And what I've seen is people--governments are afraid to
empower people that haven't formed a government like ours from
the bottom up, and we are just so blessed in this country that
we have empowered our people and we give people the right to
have the control of the government. And it's just such a
foreign concept to so many countries.
Moving forward, I didn't have a question with that. That
was more just of a statement, in case we ran out of time.
But what I want to ask all four of you, if you will, is
what are your thoughts about Pakistan, you know, knowing Dr. A.
Q. Khan and the work he's done and the laxity of what's going
on in there and not knowing who the power structure is--we know
it's in the hands of the military. But we see one of the groups
growing as one of extremists as a candidate.
What are your thoughts about the nuclear arsenal being
passed off to the wrong hands and what can the U.S. do about
it?
We will--go ahead. We will start with you, Mr. Laghari.
Mr. Laghari. Yes. This is a very interesting question for
me. I think if you look at it, we are talking about Iran and
North Korea. But who gave the nuclear--all those things from
Pakistan?
Mr. Yoho. Exactly.
Mr. Laghari. And this is not--I don't think that just A.Q.
Khan definitely is involved but also the Pakistani military and
ISI. Without their permission they can't even transfer their
things from the airport or anything--their taking the bags and
those things.
And one more threat I think would be if that nuclear
arsenal is controlled by the Taliban or by the extremists or
the Islamic fundamentalist groups, then it will be very, very
dangerous and horrible for the whole world.
And instead of that, if you look at when these nuclear
tests in 1998 that happened, even the chief minister from the
Balochistan, the Pakistani Government haven't asked from them
that we are doing this one.
So imagine that democracy or how they are treating the
people in Sindh or Balochistan or a similar province. My
suggestion, focus on the common people's educations and human
rights. But nuclear things is a very, very dangerous thing. If
it is not controlled----
Mr. Yoho. Right. Let me ask, does anybody else want to
weigh in on that?
Mr. Smith. Brief remark. This has, obviously, been a sort
of omnipresent concern for a long time. Our military and
intelligence folks here seem to think that the Pakistanis have
reasonable confidence in the processes and procedures to
control the nuclear weapons.
But were the country ever to descend into chaos, you know,
all bets are off. One thing I would note is that China
continues to supply Pakistan with nuclear reactors, what many
believe is in contravention of its commitments to the Nuclear
Supplier Group, which it joined in 2004 and it continues to
block India's bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
insisting that Pakistan should be given a chance, too.
And of course, Pakistan's record on nonproliferation
suggests that it should not be given consideration.
Mr. Yoho. Yes. Go ahead, Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Just briefly, I mean, my understanding, even
during my time in the U.S. Department of Defense, is that
Pakistan had reasonable oversight over its nuclear
capabilities.
However, look, if the U.S.-Pakistan relationship
deteriorates, as it may, I think it had to be made very clear
to Islamabad that the proliferation of material--nuclear
material or dual-use technology that gets out of Pakistan will
be dealt with harshly.
Mr. Yoho. Harshly.
Mr. Jones. Harshly. And that needs to be made, I think,
clear, publicly.
Mr. Yoho. Unfortunately, that is one of those weapons that
we wish we could uninvent but we can't. We are here and we have
got to deal with it and we have to have the safeguards in
place.
If you guys will bear with us, we are going to go to Mr.
Sherman now for another round.
Mr. Sherman. Are the major political parties in Pakistan
dedicated enough to democracy to work together for democracy?
Or are any one of the major parties willing to team up with the
military if they can just get a piece of power?
I'll ask Dr. Shah.
Mr. Shah. Well, I think that the Pakistan Muslim League,
which is the ruling party--the Pakistan People's Party which
was, until recently, the other major party--I think are
sufficiently committed to the process of democracy and have
come to the consensus that a military intervention would be
unacceptable. So at times----
Mr. Sherman. So either one of them would prefer the other
one be in power than that the military be in power and they
could be kind of junior partners to the military?
Mr. Shah. Absolutely. I think those two parties are
committed to that. But there is a third force in politics now
where the cricketer Imran Khan, who, you know, empathizes with
the Taliban and--he has been teaming up with the military to
undermine elected governments and every time, you know, the
military and civilian frictions rise, he starts questioning the
very legitimacy of the democratic process, the elections being
unfair.
So yes, the major parties are committed but there are
problems with his party called the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or
Pakistan Movement for Justice.
Mr. Sherman. But not so much justice as--is he motivated by
Muslim extremism or is it just a cozy relationship he has with
the military?
Mr. Shah. I don't think he's driven by Islamic extremism
but he's expressed views in the past that are troubling. For
instance, he's said that the Taliban are justified in carrying
out jihad in Afghanistan.
So, you know, but----
Mr. Sherman. I might add that if somebody said that in the
United States we'd call it Muslim extremism.
But let me go to Mr. Laghari.
Mr. Laghari. There is--the democracy in Pakistan is very
unique. If you see recently, just currently, their chief
minister in Balochistan he received only 450 votes and only one
seat and he became chief minister--450 votes. This is very
rare.
And the second thing, not many religious parties in the
parliament--not many religious means the Jamaat-e-Islami or
those organizations.
But two other factors are very impactable in democracy. One
is corruption. Now it is the Pakistani former President Asif
Zardari. He collect lots of money through corruption. And also
Nawaz Sharif. I also suggest they be researched on the
corruption in Pakistan----
Mr. Sherman. The choice between an undemocratic military
and the two leading political factions involved seem to be
involved in corruption.
I'll be meeting at 4:45, and any member of the committee is
welcome to join me, with Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. So I'll ask
Mr. Smith and Dr. Jones what should I know about this gentleman
and what questions should I ask.
Mr. Smith. There actually is an interesting story about----
Mr. Sherman. I mean, here his mother is killed. His father
was in jail.
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
Mr. Sherman. Gee, and sometimes I think being a politician
in the United States is tough. Go on.
Mr. Smith. Well, back in 2008, President Zardari issued an
order that would have brought the ISI--shifted control of the
ISI from the prime minister's office, where it ostensibly
resides today, to the interior ministry, which many interpreted
as an attempt by the civilian government--a rare attempt by the
civilian government maybe to exert some authority over the ISI.
Within 24 hours, he received a letter from the military
essentially telling him absolutely not--rescind your order
today, and he did. He did.
There have, since then, as far as I know, been no attempts
by the civilian governments or the political parties to unite
in an attempt to present a united front against the military.
That simply has not happened.
Mr. Sherman. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Yes. I mean, I think it's worth asking and
trying to get the pulse of this year's elections. I mean, they
are coming up. Is his assessment likely to be we are going to
see competitive, free, and fair elections? What are going to be
the obstacles?
I mean, he's had a long--that family has had a long
historical--both has been victorious and also felt the brunt of
the Pakistan political system. So I would ask about the
elections this year.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Laghari, Dr. Shah, anything to add?
Mr. Shah. He has made the right statements recently both in
favor of the democratic process, minority rights, and as well
as--I forget now. Sorry, my mind has blanked out. I apologize.
So he's made the right noises about democracy, human
rights, minority rights, freedom of the press, which has
historically been the Pakistan People Party's kind of trend to
support human rights because it used to be quite left of the
center but is now a centrist moderate force.
I would ask him about the performance of the Sindh
government because there are serious concerns about the--the
PPP is in power in Sindh but there are serious concerns about
poor governance and corruption.
So I would--I would probably raise that, too.
Mr. Laghari. I want to add two things. One is the
government in Sindh is PPP and there is no single statement
from the--neither from Bilawal Bhutto nor from the chief
minister about the disappearances.
And the water issue is very serious. The poison kind of in
the whole Sindh, and even from the judiciary they are asking
but there is no progress about that one.
Mr. Sherman. Gotcha. Disappearances and water. And I might
add I've been working to try to get broadcasting into Pakistan
24 hours in all the major languages and I've been told, oh,
it's so expensive--it could cost over a $1\1/2\ million.
Not per language, not per year--you know, per year per
language--and that's--I think that's rounding error on the
foreign aid and military aid. So something we can certainly
afford to do, and I have a feeling I'd rather have a good
relationship with the Pakistani people than with the folks that
have put Dr. Afridi in jail.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. No, those are some good points and ideally,
that's what we'd like to accomplish is have a vibrant democracy
over there in the form that fits their country best to empower
their people the best so it brings stability around the region,
around the world.
And I just know that what we are doing we have got to
change to continue down this path. We are not getting the
results that we are looking for and, you know, it just leads to
destabilization around the region if not the world.
And so our recommendations will come out of this meeting.
Hopefully, you'll be able to see them, and we just want to let
you know how much we appreciate the panelists--the witnesses,
you guys being here with your input.
We value it very much. We value your time, and so thank
you.
And with that, this meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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