[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RAISING THE STANDARD: DHS'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY AROUND
THE GLOBE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-28
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
28-417 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
____________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
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Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Clay Higgins, Louisiana William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Ron Estes, Kansas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Witnesses
Mr. Craig Lynes, Director of Global Compliance, Office of Global
Strategies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
For the Record
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Statement of Anthony M. Reardon, National President, National
Treasury Employees Union..................................... 26
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts:
Report, Secrets In The Sky..................................... 33
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Craig
Lynes.......................................................... 45
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Todd C.
Owen........................................................... 46
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Jennifer
Grover......................................................... 47
RAISING THE STANDARD: DHS'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY AROUND
THE GLOBE
----------
Tuesday, September 26, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Higgins, Fitzpatrick,
Estes, Watson Coleman, Keating, and Thompson.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation Protective Security will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to examine global aviation
security standards at last-point-of-departure airports and to
assess the Department of Homeland Security's current security
capabilities in order to protect American aviation assets and
American citizens traveling internationally.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The recent failed plot to take down a passenger plane in
Australia is yet another stark reminder that aviation still
stands as a top target for terrorists around the world. This is
the last in a series of incidents, unfortunately, some of which
have been successful from the terrorists' standpoint.
This incident is alarming for many reasons, but perhaps
most disturbing is how the improvised explosive device came
into the hands of the suspect. According to reports, an ISIS
operative sent the parts of the IED on a cargo plane from
Turkey to the suspects in Australia. The suspects were able to
build the IED and then attempted to conceal it in their
luggage.
Fortunately, the bag was over the weight limit and unable
to be brought on the plane. If not for good luck, and stupidity
on the part of the bad guys, this plot could have been
successful.
The Australians called this one of the most sophisticated
plots that has ever been attempted on Australian soil. Exposing
not only the vulnerabilities and threats to both passenger and
cargo aircraft, this plot illuminates the importance of the
international community in securing aviation.
The international aviation system represents our modern,
globalized world. However, with interconnected transportation
systems come interconnected risks. No matter how good our
domestic airport and aircraft security is, we must continue to
raise the standard of global aviation security for foreign
countries and last-point-of-departure airports.
It is imperative that aviation security standards are
robust and that these standards are commonplace in foreign
countries, especially those with last-point-of-departure
airports to the United States.
Confidence in aviation security at home begins with the
assurance that our global partners are enforcing security
standards abroad. Today, this subcommittee holds this hearing
to better understand the scope and impact of the Department of
Homeland Security's global programs aimed at securing
international aviation, as well as recent efforts to enhance
security at overseas airports with direct flights to the United
States.
We want to hear from all of our witnesses about what we are
currently doing to improve global aviation security, as well as
what we could be doing better, and how Congress can work with
the departments to support those efforts.
I must say, I encourage you all to speak frankly and
candidly, and not just have talking points and not just have
glossy overarching language. We want to get down to the nitty
gritty. We want to know how we can do better and what the
actual vulnerabilities are.
We can't afford to ignore the potential security lessons
from the Australian incident, which was thankfully
unsuccessful. Just as a failed 2010 Yemen plot led to major
improvements to cargo screening, we must use this as a way to
assess and improve our own security and the security of our
international partners.
Additionally, ISIS' role in his plot solidifies their
sophistication, unfortunately, and their determination and
ability to threaten every corner of the globe despite losing
large parts of its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
The Department of Homeland Security's overseas mission is
now more important than ever, and it is critical that this
subcommittee understands the extent of the Department's global
reach, as well as how the U.S. Government is working with
foreign partners and aviation stakeholders to enhance security
at overseas airports.
The subcommittee supports the recent security measures that
were implemented for in-bound flights to the United States. We
look forward to hearing how these measures are improving our
security and what else is under consideration to continue to
raise the standard of global aviation security.
Additionally, we want to hear about the efforts of other
entities, such as the International Civil Aviation
Organization, in setting aviation security standards world-
wide. ICAO, as it is known for short, and other entities, are
an essential component in proliferating security best practices
and capacity building at high-risk airports around the world.
However, the sad reality is that many airports around the
globe, with inadequate security, are receiving passing grades
based on ICAO standards that I believe are outdated. Our
Department of Homeland Security must do all it can to raise
these international standards and ensure their enforcement, and
I look forward to hearing more about that.
Throughout the 114th, and 115th Congresses, this
subcommittee has worked to close security gaps at last-point-
of-departure airports. This includes my legislation signed into
law that directs TSA to perform comprehensive security risk
assessments of all LPD airports and develop a strategy to
enhance security for in-bound flights, while also authorizing
TSA to donate screening equipment to foreign airports in need
of advanced technology.
It also includes Chairman McCaul's Homeland Security
Authorization Bill, which directs the United States to work
with international partners to increase the minimum standards
for aviation security world-wide, and requires foreign airports
to provide U.S. inspectors with information about the screening
and vetting of airport workers during regular security
assessments.
These pieces of legislation highlight the challenges our
foreign partners face in passenger and cargo screening, as well
as vetting aviation workers with access to secure and sensitive
areas of airports.
These efforts in Congress, together with the actions of the
Department of Homeland Security abroad, will continue to bring
attention to last-point-of-departure airport security and show
the global aviation community that the United States is serious
about these international challenges.
Regardless of how challenging they may be, however, we must
always strive to lead in this critically important area because
raising the aviation security standard around the globe will
ultimately keep America safe.
We all know and we all acknowledge that America is the Holy
Grail for terrorism, and we must understand that by keeping
standards that are in place in America and getting those
standards internationally is critically important.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
September 26, 2017
The recent failed plot to take down a passenger plane in Australia
is a stark reminder that aviation still stands as a top target for
terrorists around the world. This incident is alarming for many
reasons, but perhaps most disturbing is how the improvised explosive
device came into the hands of the suspects. According to reports, an
ISIS operative sent the parts of the IED on a cargo plane from Turkey
to the suspects in Australia. The suspects were able to build the IED
and then attempt to conceal it in their luggage. Fortunately, the bag
was over the weight limit and unable to be brought on the plane. If not
for good luck, this plot could have been successful. The Australians
called this one of the most sophisticated plots that has ever been
attempted on Australian soil.
Exposing not only the vulnerabilities and threats to both passenger
and cargo aircraft, this plot illuminates the importance of the
international community in securing aviation. The international
aviation system represents our modern, globalized world. However, with
interconnected transportation systems comes interconnected risk. No
matter how good our domestic airport and aircraft security is, we must
continue to raise the standard of global aviation security for foreign
countries and last-point-of-departure airports. It is imperative that
aviation security standards are robust, and that these standards are
commonplace in foreign countries, especially those with LPD airports.
Confidence in aviation security at home begins with the assurance that
our global partners are enforcing security standards abroad.
Today, the subcommittee holds this hearing to better understand the
scope and impact of DHS's global programs aimed at securing
international aviation, as well as recent efforts to enhance security
at overseas airports with direct flights to the United States. We want
to hear from all of our witnesses about what we are currently doing to
improve global aviation security, as well as what we could be doing
better, and how Congress can work with the Department to support these
efforts.
We cannot afford to ignore the potential security lessons from the
Australian incident, which was thankfully unsuccessful. Just as the
failed 2010 Yemen plot led to major improvements to cargo screening, we
must use this as a way to assess and improve our own security and the
security of our international partners. Additionally, ISIS's role in
this plot solidifies their sophistication, determination, and ability
to threaten every corner of the globe--despite losing large parts of
its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
DHS's overseas mission is now more important than ever, and it is
critical that this subcommittee understands the extent of the
Department's global reach, as well as how the U.S. Government is
working with foreign partners and aviation stakeholders to enhance
security at overseas airports. The subcommittee supports the recent
security measures that were implemented for in-bound flights to the
United States. We look forward to hearing how these measures are
improving our security and what else is under consideration to continue
to raise the standard of global aviation security.
Additionally, we want to hear about the efforts of other entities,
such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, in setting
aviation security standards world-wide. ICAO and other entities are an
essential component in proliferating security best practices and
capacity building at high-risk airports around the world. However, many
airports around the globe with inadequate security are receiving
``passing grades'' based on ICAO standards. DHS must do all it can to
raise these international standards and ensure their enforcement, and I
look forward to hearing more about that.
Throughout the 114th and 115th Congresses, this subcommittee has
worked to close security gaps at LPD airports. This includes my
legislation signed into law that directs TSA to perform comprehensive
security risk assessments of all LPD airports and develop a strategy to
enhance security for in-bound flights, while also authorizing TSA to
donate screening equipment to foreign airports in need of advanced
technology. It also includes Chairman McCaul's DHS Authorization bill,
which directs the United States to work with international partners to
increase the minimum standards for aviation security world-wide, and
requires foreign airports to provide U.S. inspectors with information
about the screening and vetting of airport workers during regular
security assessments. These pieces of legislation highlight the
challenges our foreign partners face in passenger and cargo screening,
as well as vetting aviation workers with access to secure and sensitive
areas of airports.
These efforts in Congress, together with the actions of DHS abroad,
will continue to bring attention to LPD airport security and show the
global aviation community that the United States is serious about these
international challenges. Regardless of how challenging they may be,
however, we must always strive to lead in this critically important
area, because raising the aviation security standard around the globe
will ultimately keep Americans safe.
Mr. Katko. Now, I am pleased to recognize the Ranking
Member, my friend of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New
Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for her opening statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Chairman Katko, and thank
you for convening this hearing.
I appreciate the witnesses being here today as well. This
year there have been a series of thwarted terrorist plots that
underscore the diverse nature of the threat to aviation. We
know that when the Department of Homeland Security issues an
aviation security directive, the entire world reacts.
It is important that this subcommittee continues its robust
oversight of DHS's efforts to raise baseline security at
overseas airports. Over the past decade, TSA and CBP have
played central roles in these efforts.
The Obama administration expanded CBP's pre-clearance
program to help the Department of Homeland Security identify
terrorists, criminals, and other security threats prior to
boarding passenger planes.
Additionally, under President Obama's leadership, DHS
pushed out policies that improved security for U.S.-bound
flights, principally through active engagement with the
international body that oversees standards for civil aviation.
It is imperative that Congress and the Department of Homeland
Security build on the gains made under the Obama administration
to advance aviation security.
The recent aviation threat posed by large personal
electronic devices and the foiled Australia airplane attack
demonstrate that we cannot place 9/11, subsequent attacks, and
thwarted plots in the rearview mirror. We must continue to move
forward.
In moving forward, Congress has a responsibility to
prioritize agency spending. My colleagues on the other side of
the aisle, should familiarize themselves with the phrase
``opportunity cost.''
For every dollar that is diverted to erecting the
politically-motivated border wall, there are fewer resources
for doing vital, real security work, like international
engagement or on aviation security or surface transportation
security, an area of which I am particularly interested in.
As stewards of the taxpayer dollars, we have a duty to put
valuable taxpayer resources in the areas of greatest need.
Providing adequate resources is paramount to allowing TSA to
quickly respond to threats.
I hope to hear more today about where the agency's needs
are, as well as how they have adjusted to the recent threats. I
look forward to hearing from CBP about their pre-clearance
program and plans for the future.
The Obama administration planned to expand that program by
10 new foreign airports, but it is unclear whether President
Trump has a desire in growing this security program. I will be
happy to hear what you have to say about that.
I am pleased to see GAO participating in today's hearing.
GAO has been a steady source for Congress as we learn more
about security for last-point-of-departure airports. Their
contribution to today's hearing is invaluable. I look forward
to engaging with GAO about their findings, and issues for
Congress to consider.
Finally, let me say that the new Trump travel ban is deeply
troubling. Identifying--excuse me--indefinitely banning all
citizens of certain countries from applying for visas to the
United States is not only bad security policy, it is un-
American.
I am confident our Government can continue to conduct
individualized risk-based assessments on visa applicants that
ensure our Nation's security without undermining our
fundamental principles as a Nation. I hope that the courts will
closely scrutinize this most recent travel ban and urge my
colleagues to exercise our oversight authority on this issue.
With all that said, once again, I thank the witnesses for
appearing before us today. Look forward to hearing from you
today on those critically important issues. As an aside, let me
just say that having read your written testimonies that you
submitted, I am very impressed with the measure of
accountability checks and balances that are employed with the
work that you do, and I feel a certain sense of confidence
having read that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you. Thank you.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
September 26, 2017
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this hearing.
I appreciate the witnesses being here today.
This year, there have been a series of thwarted terrorist plots
that underscore the diverse nature of the threat to aviation. We know
that when the Department of Homeland Security issues an aviation
security directive, the entire world reacts. It is important that this
subcommittee continue its robust oversight of DHS's efforts to raise
baseline security at overseas airports. Over the past decade, TSA and
CBP have played central roles in these efforts.
The Obama administration expanded CBP's Preclearance Program to
help the Department of Homeland Security identify terrorists,
criminals, and other security threats prior to boarding passenger
planes. Additionally, under President Obama's leadership, DHS pushed
out policies that improved security for U.S.-bound flights, principally
through active engagement with the international body that oversees
standards for civil aviation. It is imperative that Congress and the
Department of Homeland Security build on the gains made under the Obama
administration to advance aviation security.
The recent aviation threats posed by large personal electronic
devices and the foiled Australian airplane attack demonstrate that we
cannot place 9/11, subsequent attacks, and thwarted plots in the rear
view mirror. We must continue to move forward.
In moving forward, Congress has a responsibility to prioritize
agency spending. My colleagues on the other side of the aisle should
familiarize themselves with the phrase ``opportunity cost.'' For every
dollar that is diverted to erecting the politically-motivated Border
Wall, there are fewer resources for doing vital REAL security work,
like international engagement on aviation security or surface
transportation security. As stewards of the taxpayer dollars, we have a
duty to put valuable taxpayer resources in the areas of greatest need.
Providing adequate resources is paramount to allowing TSA to quickly
respond to threats.
I hope to hear more today about where the agency's needs are as
well as how they have adjusted to the recent threats. I look forward to
hearing from CBP about their Preclearance program and plans for the
future. The Obama administration planned to expand the program by 10
new foreign airports, but it is unclear whether President Trump has any
interest in growing this security program.
Finally, I am pleased to see GAO participating in today's hearing.
GAO has been a steady source for Congress as we learn more about
security for last-point-of-departure airports. Their contribution to
today's hearing is invaluable and I look forward to engaging with GAO
about their findings and issues for Congress to consider.
With all that said, once again, I thank the witnesses for appearing
before us today, and look forward to hearing from you today on these
critically important topics.
I yield back the balance of my time Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Other Members of
the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel here to
testify here before us today on this very important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statements will appear in the record. Our first witness is Mr.
Craig Lynes. Mr. Lynes served as the director of compliance
with the Office of Global Strategies at the Transportation
Security Administration. That is his current role.
Prior to that role, Mr. Lynes, served as the director of
Global Affairs International Operations from 2014 to 2017,
where he was responsible for reducing security risks to global
transportation modes through operational support to TSA
representatives, or TSARs.
Previously, Mr. Lynes, was stationed overseas as the
attache for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Iceland based at
the U.S. embassy in London, which is pretty cool I must say. I
have a lot of family over in Ireland still.
I now recognize Mr. Lynes for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG LYNES, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL COMPLIANCE, OFFICE
OF GLOBAL STRATEGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Lynes. Thank you. Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify regarding TSA's global aviation security
mission. My name is Craig Lynes, and I serve as TSA's director
of Global Compliance.
The terrorist attacks of TWA flight 847 and the bombing of
Pan Am flight 103 were two significant events from which the
foreign airport assessment program was founded and that led me
to seek a career in international aviation security.
I began my Federal career as a civil aviation security
inspector for the FAA. I have held a number of international
positions at TSA, including as an international industry
representative, the TSA representative attache to the United
Kingdom and most recently in executive leadership positions
within TSA's international program.
It was during my overseas posting in London that I had the
opportunity to serve as the U.S. speaker at the 25th
anniversary of the Pan Am flight 103 attack in Lockerbie,
Scotland, pledging at the somber anniversary, our unrelenting
commitment to continuing the fight against terrorism,
protecting global civil aviation, and seeking to ensure that
these types of horrific events never occur again.
Yet as terrorists actively pursue multiple approaches to
compromising the global web of civil aviation, targeting both
passenger and cargo aircraft, including innovative methods for
concealing explosives, recruiting airport and airline insiders,
attacking airport public areas and hijacking aircraft, TSA has
taken significant steps to address not only these threats, but
to raise the global baseline for aviation security.
TSA has worked closely with airlines and industry on
enhanced security measures enacted in June 2017. These measures
helped to secure flights from more than 280 last-point-of-
departure airports in 105 countries around the world. These
enhanced security measures, both seen and unseen, will improve
screening and heighten security standards for airlines and
airports.
The global compliance directorate is responsible for
ensuring the effective implementation of these measures through
the world-wide deployment of our assessment teams. TSA's
international inspectors are located in six regional offices
throughout the world.
As required by law, TSA is responsible for assessing
foreign airports with direct flights to the United States and
inspecting aircraft operators with service to the United
States. During fiscal year 2016, TSA conducted 135 foreign
airport assessments and 1,880 air carrier inspections.
The United Nation's recent passing of Security Council
Resolution 2309 called upon the international community to
bolster its efforts to secure international air travel.
Within ICAO, TSA continues its work to enhance
international aviation standards. Recently, TSA Administrator
Pekoske spoke at the ICAO Symposium, where he emphasized the
importance of advancing global aviation security.
These include fostering a culture of security, information
sharing, ensuring rigorous implementation of standards,
adopting innovation and technology, all with thorough oversight
programs.
To assist and promulgate the efforts of raising the
baseline, TSA has forward-deployed TSA representatives who
serve as the on-site attaches in embassies abroad. TSARs are
charged with building and maintaining strong security
partnerships around the world to advance TSA security policies
and initiatives.
Additionally, TSA international industry representatives
serve as the primary liaison to over 330 foreign and domestic
airlines. They coordinate information sharing on aviation
security requirements, security policy, and incident
management.
TSA Federal air marshals also cover numerous flights
departing from international airports. Our mission overseas is
to identify, analyze, and mitigate vulnerabilities to reduce
the risk to in-bound aviation. Our assessment and inspection
information allows us to identify vulnerabilities and develop
mitigation plans to address them.
Capacity development is one of our primary methods for
addressing vulnerabilities. Activities range from traditional
classroom training, interactive workshops, technical
assistance, mentoring and equipment loans and donations. In
fiscal year 2016, TSA conducted 47 capacity development events
world-wide.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss TSA's role in international aviation security. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Lynes and Mr. Owen
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Craig Lynes and Todd C. Owen
September 26, 2017
introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's (CBP) role in cargo and passenger security as it
pertains to commercial air service.
In response to 9/11 and the persisting threats from terrorists and
criminals who have long viewed aviation as a leading target for attack
and/or exploitation, CBP continues to adapt its security approach and
strengthen its ability to detect and mitigate diverse threats through a
multi-layered, risk-based system. As the lead Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) agency for border security, CBP works closely with our
domestic and international partners to deny terrorist exploitation of
the aviation sector and to protect the Nation from a variety of dynamic
threats, including those posed by passengers, cargo and commercial
conveyances arriving at our ports of entry (POE).
CBP utilizes a risk-based strategy and operational approach to
secure and facilitate the immense volume of international trade and
travel. In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers processed more than 390
million travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, including more than 119
million air travelers. CBP officers also processed more than 27 million
imported cargo containers at POEs in fiscal year 2016, equating to
$2.28 trillion in imports.\1\
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\1\ Air import values account for approximately 25 percent.
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CBP's security and facilitation missions are mutually supportive:
By utilizing a risk-based strategy and multi-layered security approach,
CBP can focus time and resources on those suspect shipments and
passengers that are high-risk. This approach separates known and
unknown air travelers and allows CBP to facilitate legitimate trade and
travel, which are critical to America's economic growth.
By leveraging intelligence-driven analysis, innovative
partnerships, and advanced technology, CBP secures and promotes the
movement of legitimate cargo and travelers transiting through the
aviation environment. This multi-layered approach is designed to
detect, identify, and prevent potentially dangerous or inadmissible
individuals or dangerous cargo from boarding planes bound for the
United States and is integrated into every aspect of our rigorous
travel and cargo security operations at every stage along the
international trade and travel continuum.
air cargo security
CBP's cargo security approach incorporates three layered elements
to improve supply chain integrity, promote economic viability, and
increase resilience across the entire global supply chain system.
Advance Information and Targeting
First, CBP leverages advance information about cargo, conveyances,
and persons, and tailored targeting techniques to increase domain
awareness and assess the risk of all components and factors in the
supply chain. CBP, supported by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), recently extended the Air Cargo Advance Screening
(ACAS) pilot,\2\ which began after the global counterterrorism
community discovered and disrupted a potential terrorist attack in
October 2010 that would have occurred mid-air over the continental
United States, using explosive devices concealed in cargo on-board two
aircrafts destined to the United States. This incident demonstrated the
significance of early advance information in identifying and disrupting
terrorist attempts to exploit the global supply chain. While CBP had
already been receiving some advance electronic information for air
shipments prior to arrival in the United States, this incident exposed
the need to collect certain advance information to enable CBP and TSA
to target and mitigate high-risk shipments prior to the loading of
cargo onto aircraft destined for the United States. The ACAS pilot
program requests that the in-bound carrier or other eligible party
electronically transmit specified advance cargo data (ACAS data) to CBP
for air cargo transported onboard U.S.-bound aircraft as early as
practicable, but no later than prior to loading of the cargo onto the
aircraft.
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\2\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/07/24/2017-
15441/extension-of-the-air-cargo-advance-screening-acas-pilot-program.
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This advance information requirement is a critical element of CBP's
targeting efforts at the National Targeting Center (NTC) and enhances
CBP's capability to identify high-risk cargo without hindering
legitimate trade and commerce. The NTC, established in 2001,
coordinates and supports CBP's counterterrorism activities related to
the movement of cargo in all modes of transportation--sea, truck, rail,
and air. Using the Automated Targeting System (ATS), the NTC
proactively analyzes advance cargo information before shipments depart
foreign ports. ATS incorporates the latest cargo threat intelligence
and National targeting rule-sets to generate a uniform review of cargo
shipments, and provides comprehensive data for the identification of
high-risk shipments. ATS is a critical decision-support tool for CBP
officers working at the NTC, the Advanced Targeting Units at our POEs,
and foreign ports.
Government and Private-Sector Collaboration
Second, in addition to CBP's targeting capabilities, a critical
component of CBP's effort to extend our cargo security to the point of
origin is our effective partnerships with private industry. CBP works
with the trade community through the Customs--Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, which is a public-private partnership
program wherein members of the trade community volunteer to adopt
tighter security measures throughout their international supply chains
in exchange for enhanced trade facilitation, such as expedited
processing. C-TPAT membership has rigorous security criteria, and
requires extensive vetting and on-site validation visits of domestic
and/or foreign facilities. This program has enabled CBP to leverage
private sector resources to enhance supply chain security and integrity
on a global level.
C-TPAT membership has grown from just seven companies in 2001 to
more than 11,000 companies today, accounting for more than 54 percent
(by value) of goods imported into the United States. The C-TPAT program
continues to expand and evolve as CBP works with foreign partners to
establish bi-lateral mutual recognition of respective C-TPAT-like
programs. Mutual Recognition as a concept is reflected in the World
Customs Organization's Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate
Global Trade, a strategy designed with the support of the United
States, which enables Customs Administrations to work together to
improve their capabilities to detect high-risk consignments and
expedite the movement of legitimate cargo. These arrangements create a
unified and sustainable security posture that can assist in securing
and facilitating global cargo trade while promoting end-to-end supply
chain security. CBP currently has signed Mutual Recognition
Arrangements with New Zealand, the European Union, South Korea, Japan,
Jordan, Canada, Taiwan, Israel, Mexico, Singapore, and the Dominican
Republic and is continuing to work toward similar recognition with
China, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, and India.
Advanced Detection Equipment and Technology
Finally, CBP maintains robust inspection regimes at our POEs,
including the use of non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment, canines,
and radiation detection technologies. NII technology enables CBP to
detect materials that pose potential nuclear or radiological threats,
and other materials, including illicit narcotics such as heroin,
fentanyl, cocaine, and illicit prescription drugs. Technologies
deployed to our Nation's land, sea, and air POEs include large-scale X-
ray and Gamma-ray imaging systems, as well as a variety of portable and
handheld technologies. NII technologies are force multipliers that
enable us to screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of
commercial traffic while facilitating the flow of legitimate cargo.
Canine operations are also an invaluable component of CBP's cargo
security operations. CBP canine teams work at international mail
facilities to examine millions of foreign mail shipments coming into
the United States from all parts of the world.
These interrelated elements are part of a comprehensive cargo
security strategy that enables CBP to identify and address the
potential use of containerized cargo to transport dangerous materials,
before they arrive at our Nation's border.
air passenger security
On a typical day, CBP welcomes to the United States more than
300,000 international travelers at our Nation's airports. One of the
initial layers of defense in securing international air travel is
preventing dangerous persons from obtaining visas, travel
authorizations, and boarding passes. Before boarding a flight destined
for the United States, most foreign nationals \3\ must obtain a
nonimmigrant or immigrant visa--issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate--
or, if they are eligible to travel under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
they must apply and be approved for a travel authorization through the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).
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\3\ Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa
exempt authority, such as Canada. Citizens of countries under visa
exempt authority entering the U.S. via air are subjected to CBP's
vetting and inspection processes prior to departure. In the land
environment, they are subjected to CBP processing upon arrival at a
U.S. POE.
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Pre-departure Safeguards
Through ESTA, CBP conducts enhanced vetting of VWP applicants in
advance of travel to the United States, to assess whether they are
eligible to travel under the VWP, or whether they could pose a risk to
the United States or the public at large. All ESTA applications are
screened against security and law enforcement databases, and CBP
automatically refuses authorization to individuals who are found to be
ineligible to travel to the United States under the VWP. Similarly,
current and valid ESTAs may be revoked if concerns arise through
recurrent vetting.
In response to increasing concerns regarding foreign fighters and
other terrorist threats, DHS continues to strengthen the security of
VWP including by implementing enhancements to ESTA. Recent enhancements
include a series of additional questions VWP travelers must answer on
the ESTA application, including other names and citizenships; parents'
names; contact and employment information; city of birth; travel
history in select countries. These improvements are designed to provide
an additional layer of security for the VWP and increase our ability to
distinguish between lawful applicants and individuals of concern.
Any traveler who requires a nonimmigrant visa to travel to the
United States must apply to the Department of State (DOS) under
specific visa categories depending on the purpose of their travel,
including those as visitors for business, pleasure, study, and
employment-based purposes. Prior to the issuance of a visa, the DOS
screens every visa applicant's biographic data against the DOS Consular
Lookout and Support System, and provides data to the inter-agency
community via the streamlined DOS Security Advisory Opinion (SAO)
process to alert consular officers to the existence of Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB) files or records related to potential visa
ineligibilities. DOS also checks the applicant's biometric data (i.e.,
fingerprints and facial images) against other U.S. Government databases
for records indicating potential security, criminal, and immigration
violations.
In an effort to augment visa security operations, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Visa Security Program (VSP) personnel are
co-located with CBP personnel at the NTC to conduct thorough and
collaborative analysis and in-depth investigations of high-risk visa
applicants. The VSP is focused on identifying terrorists and criminal
suspects and preventing them from exploiting the visa process, while
the NTC provides tactical targeting and analytical research in support
of preventing terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States.
Furthermore, ICE, CBP, and DOS have implemented an automated visa
application screening process that significantly expands DHS's ability
to identify serious threats to National security and public safety. The
program enables synchronized reviews of information across these
agencies and allows for a unified DHS response and recommendation
regarding a visa applicant's eligibility to receive a visa. This
process also serves as a precursor to and works in conjunction with the
current DOS SAO and Advisory Opinion (AO) programs. The collaborative
program leverages the three agencies' expertise, authorities, and
technologies to screen pre-adjudicated (approved) visa applications and
enhance the U.S. Government's anti-terrorism efforts.
Once travel is booked, CBP's NTC gathers information, assesses
risk, and conducts pre-departure vetting for all international flights
departing for the United States by commercial air. CBP leverages all
available advance passenger data \4\--including Passenger Name Record
(PNR) and Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) data, previous
crossing information, intelligence, and law enforcement information, as
well as open-source information in its counterterrorism efforts at the
NTC--to make risk-based operational decisions before a passenger boards
an aircraft, continuing until the traveler is admitted to the United
States.
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\4\ When a traveler purchases a ticket for travel to the United
States on a commercial air carrier, a PNR may be generated in the
airline's reservation system. PNR data contains information on
itinerary, co-travelers, changes to the reservation, and payment
information. CBP receives passenger data from commercial air carriers
at various intervals up to 96 hours prior to departure and concluding
at the scheduled departure time. Further, APIS regulations require that
commercial air carriers transmit all passenger and crew manifest
information before departure, prior to securing the aircraft doors. CBP
vets APIS information, which includes passenger biographic data and
travel document information, on all international flights to and from
the United States against the TSDB, criminal history information,
records of lost or stolen passports, public health records, and prior
immigration or customs violations and visa refusals.
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CBP's pre-departure vetting efforts work in concert with TSA's
Secure Flight program, which vets passengers flying to, from, over, and
within the United States against the No-Fly and Selectee portions of
the TSDB.
Overseas Enforcement Programs and Partnerships
Supported by these targeting efforts, CBP uses overseas enforcement
capabilities and partnerships to extend our zone of security. Working
in conjunction with the NTC, CBP's overseas programs--Preclearance,
Immigration Advisory and Joint Security Programs (IAP/JSP), and
Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLGs)--provide the ability to address
those risks or prevent the movement of identified threats toward the
United States at the earliest possible point.
Preclearance provides for the complete inspection, including
determination of an alien's admissibility to the United States for all
travelers before passengers ever board a U.S.-bound flight from a
foreign location at which preclearance is established. Through
preclearance, CBP is able to work with foreign law enforcement
officials and commercial carriers to prevent the boarding of
potentially high-risk travelers, leveraging law enforcement authorities
consistent with the governing agreements, as opposed to serving a
purely advisory role. Preclearance also provides unique facilitation
benefits, generally allowing precleared passengers to proceed to their
final destination without further CBP processing, as if they had
arrived on a domestic flight. It is important to note, however, that
CBP always retains the authority to conduct further inspection or
engage in enforcement action of a precleared flight upon its arrival in
the United States. CBP currently has 15 Preclearance locations in six
countries: Dublin and Shannon in Ireland; Aruba; Freeport and Nassau in
The Bahamas; Bermuda; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; and Calgary,
Toronto, Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver, and Winnipeg
in Canada.
Building upon the success of existing Preclearance operations, CBP
intends to expand the program to new locations. DHS prioritization for
expansion includes technical site visits to interested airports, during
which each airport is carefully evaluated based on the current and
future capacity to host CBP Preclearance operations and aviation
security screening meeting TSA standards, as well as an analysis of the
potential facilitation and homeland security benefits. CBP is currently
negotiating with several countries interested in establishing
Preclearance operations, and recently concluded agreements to cover
Stockholm, Sweden (signed November 4, 2016) and Punta Cana, Dominican
Republic (signed December 1, 2016).
Through IAP, CBP officers in plain clothes are posted at major
gateway airports in Western Europe, with a presence in Asia and the
Middle East including: Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London Heathrow, London
Gatwick, Manchester, Madrid, Paris, Tokyo, and Doha. Building on the
IAP concept, CBP launched the JSP, partnering with host country law
enforcement to identify high-risk travelers. JSP officers are posted in
Mexico City, Panama City, and San Salvador.
Finally, Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG) were developed to
provide coverage of non-IAP airports and support Preclearance airports.
CBP coordinates with the RCLGs to prevent terrorists and other
inadmissible aliens from boarding U.S.-bound commercial aircraft. The
RCLGs, which are located in Honolulu, Miami, and New York, are staffed
by CBP officers and utilize established relationships with the
commercial airlines to prevent passengers who may pose a security
threat, who present fraudulent documents, or those who are otherwise
inadmissible from boarding flights to the United States.
Arrival Processing
CBP's use of advance information and targeting are key elements of
CBP's multi-layered security strategy to address concerns long before
they reach the physical border of the United States. It is important to
note that upon arrival in the United States, all persons, regardless of
citizenship, are subject to inspection by CBP officers. CBP officers
review entry documents, collect biometrics,\5\ query CBP and other law
enforcement databases with both biographic and biometric information,
and interview each traveler to confirm identity, determine the purpose
and intent of their travel, and whether any further inspection is
necessary based on, among other things, National security,
admissibility, customs, or agriculture concerns.
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\5\Generally speaking, biometrics are collected from aliens
arriving at U.S. airports, except for: (i) Certain Canadian citizens
temporarily visiting the United States; (ii) children under the age of
14; (iii) persons over the age of 79; and (iv) aliens admitted on A-1,
A-2, C-3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal employees of
accredited officials), G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3,
NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6 visas; and (v) certain Taiwan officials who
hold E-1 visas or members of their immediate family who hold E-1 visas.
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During arrival processing, CBP officers remove from circulation
counterfeit, fraudulent, and altered travel documents, as well as lost
or stolen travel documents presented for use by an individual other
than the rightful holder. In fiscal year 2016, CBP intercepted 7,689
fraudulent documents. CBP's Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit maintains
a central fraudulent document repository and provides analysis,
intelligence, alerts, and training back to the field. Furthermore,
through the Carrier Liaison Program, CBP officers provide interactive
training to commercial air carrier participants to improve the air
carrier's ability to detect and disrupt improperly documented
passengers. Since the program's inception in 2005, CLP has provided
training to more than 36,341 airline industry personnel.
Furthermore, CBP Tactical Terrorism Response Teams (TTRT) of CBP
officers who are specially trained in counterterrorism response are
deployed at the 46 largest POEs--including 22 POEs added in calendar
year 2017 to conduct advanced interview training. TTRT officers are
responsible for the examination of travelers identified within the TSDB
as well as other travelers, their associates, or co-travelers who
arrive at POE and are suspected of having a nexus to terrorist
activity. TTRT officers work closely with NTC analysts to exploit
information derived from targeting and inspection to mitigate any
possible threat. During fiscal year 2017, through September 2017, more
than 1,400 individuals were denied entry to the United States as a
result of TTRT efforts and information discovered during the secondary
inspection at POEs.
conclusion
CBP will continue to work with our Federal and international
partners--as well as commercial carriers and the trade community--to
ensure the security and facilitation of the immense volume of
international air travelers and cargo. We will continue to collaborate
to strengthen on-going efforts to secure the aviation sector against
terrorists and other threats, and promote safe and efficient
international travel and trade to the United States.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Lynes. Every time I hear someone
mention Pan Am 103 I think of one of my best friends for the
last 20 years who lost his sister on that flight from Oswego
State. I also think of the 35 students from Syracuse University
who died on that flight and that were in my district.
There is a big monument up on the university where I went
to law school commemorating that terrible day, and it is what
drives me and drives all of us, I think, to make sure something
like that never happens again.
But we must face reality that that is always a possibility
and that is always a goal of the bad guys, so we have to be
ever vigilant in what we do here on our committee to make sure
that we are doing everything we can to hold people's feet to
the fire in the international community.
We appreciate you being here today, and we thank you for
your testimony, Mr. Lynes.
Our second witness is Mr. Todd Owen. Mr. Owen became the
assistant commissioner of the office of field operations in
February. He currently oversees over 29,000 employees including
more than 24,00 CBP officers and CBP agricultural specialists.
Previously, Mr. Owen served as the director of field
operations for the Los Angeles field office, where he had
responsibility and oversight for all CBP operations in the
greater Los Angeles area.
Prior to arriving in Los Angeles, Mr. Owen served as
executive director of Cargo and Conveyance Security in
Washington, DC, and as a director of the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, also known as--I can't even
pronounce it--C-TPAT.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Owen for his opening
statement, and I must admit that is one of the more interesting
acronyms I have seen in Washington, so welcome.
Now before you start, Mr. Thompson is here. He is the
Ranking Minority Member on the Homeland Security Committee, and
when we get done with your testimony, if you would like, Mr.
Thompson, we would be happy to allow you to make a statement.
Mr. Thompson. OK.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Please go ahead, Mr. Owen.
STATEMENT OF TODD C. OWEN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Owen. OK. Good morning, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member
Watson Coleman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's role in cargo and passenger
security as it pertains to the international aviation sector.
As the unified border security agency of the United States, CBP
is charged with securing our borders and preventing the
introduction of terrorists and terrorist weapons into our
country.
In response to 9/11 and the persisting threats from
terrorists who have long viewed aviation as the leading target
for attack, CBP continues to adapt our multi-layered security
approach and strengthen our ability to detect risk and mitigate
diverse aviation threats, those posed by passengers, cargo,
commercial conveyances arriving at our ports of entry.
This multi-layered approach is integrated into every aspect
of our rigorous travel and cargo security operations at every
stage along the international trade and travel continuums.
Each day over 1 million international travelers cross our
borders, approximately 300,000 in the air environment.
Additionally, over 1 million international air cargo packages
enter our country every day. As international travel continues
to grow, and with the increase in e-commerce, these volumes are
sure to climb.
In the travel environment, CBP leverages advanced data,
enhanced targeting systems, multiple pre-departure safeguards,
international programs and partnerships, all part of our
strategy to secure air travel by pushing our borders outward
through the early identification of and response to potential
threats.
CBP's travel security approach starts well before the
traveler boards a plane. Before traveling to the United States
most foreign nationals must obtain a nonimmigrant or immigrant
visa issued by the U.S. embassy or consulate.
Or if they are eligible for travel under the visa waiver
program, they must apply and be approved for travel
authorization through the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization or ESTA.
From the moment they apply for a visa, or complete their
ESTA, CBP's national targeting center begins to assess the risk
of the applicant against law enforcement, intelligence and
National security databases. This vetting performed by CBP is
continuous and occurs through arrival into the United States
ports of entry.
Then, once travel is booked and before the flight departs,
CBP then uses airline reservation data, airline passenger
manifests, previous border inspection information, intelligence
and law enforcement information to identify travelers of
National security concern or who are likely inadmissible into
the United States.
CBP is then able to address potential concerns through a
suite of international enforcement and liaison programs, such
as pre-clearance, the Immigration Advisory Program, the joint
security program and through our regional carrier liaison
groups.
These partnerships provide CBP the ability to address
identified risk or prevent the boarding of individuals who pose
a threat to the country or are inadmissible into the United
States.
It is important to note that upon arrival into the United
States, all persons, regardless of citizenship, are subject to
inspection by CBP officers. CBP officers review entry
documents, collect biometrics, query CBP and other law
enforcement databases and interview each traveler before
deciding if the traveler is admissible into the United States.
Likewise, in the air cargo environment, CBP leverages
advanced information about the cargo, conveyances, and persons
involved in a shipment to identify those shipments which may
potentially pose a risk to homeland and aviation security.
As part of our Air Cargo Advanced Screening pilot program,
or ACAS, CBP receives advanced information on shipments prior
to loading onto the aircraft bound for the United States.
Air cargo shipments warranting additional scrutiny may be
examined at the last point of departure through coordination
with our TSA and international partners. The ACAS program was
launched by CBP and TSA in October 2010 in response to the
foiled Yemen printer cartridge bomb plot.
To date, the ACAS pilot program has 53 voluntary
participants from the air cargo community and covers 83 percent
of the air cargo shipments headed to the United States. Lessons
learned from the program have allowed CBP to effectively
target, identify, and mitigate risk in the air cargo
environment, while minimizing impact on trade operations.
In conclusion, CBP will continue to work with our Federal
and international partners, as well as commercial carriers in
the trade community, to strengthen our on-going efforts to
secure the aviation sector against terrorists and other
threats, and promotes safe and efficient international travel
and trade to the United States.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Owen. We appreciate you taking
the time to be here today and provide your testimony.
Our third witness is well-known to us. That is Ms. Jennifer
Grover. Ms. Grover is the director of Government Accountability
Office's Homeland Security and Justice Team, leading a
portfolio of work on transportation security.
In this position she oversees GAO's reviews of the TSA and
Coast Guard programs and operations. She joined GAO in 1991 and
regularly testifies before Congressional committees as an
expert witness. She earned a Master's degree in public policy
administration from the University of Wisconsin--Madison, and a
Bachelor's degree in political science from the University of
Illinois of Urbana--Champaign.
I now recognize Ms. Grover for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER GROVER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Grover. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Katko,
Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, other
Members of the subcommittee and the staff. Thanks for the
opportunity to testify today on last-point-of-departure
airports.
My main message is that TSA has a strong program in place
to assess security and address deficiencies at foreign
airports, but could improve its data management to better
understand the effectiveness of different approaches that they
use to enhance foreign airport security, as well as the overall
state of LPD security.
Through its assessments, TSA evaluates the security
measures that are in place at the roughly 300 airports across
the world that fly directly to the United States.
Over the past years TSA has significantly improved its
foreign airport assessment program by adding more consistent
and targeted assessments, risk-based operations, more
systematic vulnerability scores and new approaches for data
analysis.
When TSA inspectors do identify a deficiency, they have a
broad set of tools that they can use to help foreign officials
address the problem, including on-the-spot counseling, training
for airport staff, technical consult, and providing equipment.
Importantly, TSA can also require the air carriers
operating from that airport to implement security procedures to
help fill any gaps in airport security measures.
Figuring out how to best address a deficiency is
complicated because each airport is unique in its laws,
customs, the equipment, and the knowledge about how best to use
it. So what works at one airport may not always work well at
another airport that has the same type of problem.
Therefore TSA needs good data on the root causes behind
each deficiency, what corrective actions were recommended, what
capacity-building steps were taken and the outcome to
understand how to most effectively deploy its resources.
We found that TSA does have a data management system to
track these factors, but agency officials are not using it
consistently and the data fields are not specific enough. For
example, our review of the 2016 data showed that 70 percent of
the data on root causes and corrective actions was blank.
If TSA officials were to complete the databases required
and if the data collected was more specific, the agency could
analyze the relative success of different types of approaches
and would also have better visibility on the state of security
at LPD airports world-wide. In our forthcoming report we will
recommend that TSA make these changes.
One note of caution before I conclude. Although TSA has a
strong program for assessing foreign airports, that does not
necessarily ensure strong security across all LPD airports.
Some airports still struggle to fully implement all aspects of
the ICAO standards. Our analysis of 5 years' worth of TSA data
from 2012 to 2016 showed regional variation in LPD airport
compliance with the ICAO standards.
TSA considers the results to be sensitive so I can't
address them here, but I can say that airports in certain
regions are more likely to fall short of the standards and that
some of the ICAO standards tend to be more challenging to
implement than others.
Given the on-going vulnerabilities that remain at some LPD
airports, TSA should pursue improved data management to better
monitor the relative effectiveness of the wide variety of
different approaches that they have available to them, as well
as the aviation security environment as a whole. This concludes
my statement. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Grover
September 26, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss our work
examining the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) foreign
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. We are
conducting this work in response to a provision in the Aviation
Security Act of 2016.\1\
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\1\ See Pub. L. No. 114-190, tit. III, Sec. 3202(b), 130 Stat.
615, 652 (2016). The Aviation Security Act was enacted on July 15, 2016
as title III of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016.
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Civil aviation, including U.S.-bound flights, remains a target of
coordinated terrorist activity. The threat has become more diverse as
adversaries develop new tactics to attack the aviation system. With
approximately 300 airports in foreign countries offering last-point-of-
departure flights to the United States, TSA's efforts to evaluate the
security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the United
States--and mitigating any identified security risks--are of vital
importance in ensuring the security of the aviation system.
This statement is based on a draft report, the sensitive version of
which is currently with TSA for comment.\2\ This testimony discusses
key preliminary findings from that report on: (1) The steps TSA has
taken to enhance foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections since 2011 and (2) the steps TSA takes to address any
deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and air
carrier inspections. In addition to these objectives, our forthcoming
sensitive report will describe the results of TSA's foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections. We also plan to issue a public
version of that report.
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\2\ We shared the information in this statement with TSA for a
sensitivity review and to obtain its views. TSA officials provided us
with technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate, and
determined that the statement contains no sensitive information.
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To address these objectives, we reviewed TSA documents, including
its 2016 Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard Operating
Procedures (FAAP SOP). In addition, we interviewed senior TSA
officials, inspectors, and country and industry liaisons located at TSA
headquarters and in the field. We also interviewed other stakeholders,
such as officials with the Department of State (State) and the European
Commission (EC) to discuss efforts these organizations have in place to
enhance international aviation security and their experiences
coordinating with TSA. We accompanied a team of TSA inspectors during
an air carrier inspection at an airport in Europe and we spoke with
airport officials and representatives from two air carriers at a
separate European airport. We based our site selection on several
factors, including the air carrier locations TSA had plans to inspect
during the course of our audit work and host Government willingness to
allow us to accompany TSA. Finally, we compared TSA's efforts to
leverage information for capacity development to the FAAP SOP and
criteria for obtaining and processing information in Federal internal
control standards.\3\
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\3\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO-14-704G (Washington, DC: September 2014).
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The work upon which this statement is based is being conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
Enacted shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA and
gave the agency responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation, including the Nation's civil aviation system.\4\
Consistent with ATSA and in accordance with existing statutory
requirements, TSA is to assess the effectiveness of security measures
at foreign airports: (1) Served by a U.S. air carrier, (2) from which a
foreign air carrier serves the United States, (3) that pose a high risk
of introducing danger to international air travel, and (4) that are
otherwise deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security.\5\
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\4\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001); 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 114. For purposes of this statement, U.S.-flagged air carriers are
air carrier operations regulated in accordance with 49 C.F.R. part 1544
and are referred to as ``U.S. air carriers'' or ``domestic air
carriers,'' and foreign-flagged air carriers are air carrier operations
regulated in accordance with 49 C.F.R. part 1546 and are referred to as
``foreign air carriers.''
\5\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44907. Prior to the establishment of DHS in
March 2003, authority for conducting foreign airport assessments
resided with the Secretary of Transportation and was carried out by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). TSA assumed responsibility for
conducting the assessments following the enactment of ATSA (enacted
Nov. 19, 2001). In March 2003, TSA transferred from the Department of
Transportation to DHS in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of
2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 403(2), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178
(2002).
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TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign
airports using select aviation security standards and recommended
practices adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a United Nations organization representing 191 member
countries.\6\ In addition, TSA is to conduct inspections of U.S. air
carriers and foreign air carriers servicing the United States from
foreign airports in order to ensure that they meet applicable security
requirements, including those set forth in an air carrier's TSA-
approved security program.\7\
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\6\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44907(a)(2)(C). ICAO has a primary objective
to provide for the safe, orderly, and efficient development of
international civil aviation.
\7\ In general, domestic and foreign air carriers that operate to,
from, or within the United States must establish and maintain security
programs approved by TSA in accordance with requirements set forth in
regulation at 49 C.F.R. parts 1544 (domestic air carriers) and 1546
(foreign air carriers). See 49 U.S.C Sec. Sec. 44903(c), 44906; 49
C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 1544.3, 1544.101-1544.105, 1546.3, 1546.101-1546.105.
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In 2007, we recommended that TSA take steps to improve oversight of
its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs.\8\
In 2011, we reported on TSA's efforts to assess the security at foreign
airports and made several recommendations to enhance program efficiency
and effectiveness, among other things.\9\ Specifically, we recommended
that TSA: (1) Develop a mechanism for trend analysis, (2) establish
criteria and guidance to help decision makers with vulnerability
ratings, and (3) consider the feasibility of conducting more targeted
foreign airport assessments and compiling best practices. DHS concurred
with the three recommendations and has since taken several actions to
address them all, including developing a mechanism to compile and
analyze best practices.
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\8\ GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These
Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-729 (Washington, DC: May 11, 2007).
\9\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance its
Foreign Airport Assessments, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen the
Program, GAO-12-163 (Washington, DC: October 21, 2011).
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since 2011, tsa has taken various steps to strengthen its foreign
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs
Our preliminary analysis showed that, since 2011, TSA has taken
various steps to strengthen its foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs. For instance, TSA has taken steps to:
Better target program resources based on risk.--For example,
based on a recommendation in our 2011 report, TSA has taken
actions to conduct more targeted foreign airport assessments.
Specifically, TSA developed the Pre-Visit Questionnaire, which
foreign airport officials fill out prior to TSA's visit. This
information enables each TSA foreign airport assessment team to
tailor the on-site assessment at each airport and focus TSA's
assessment efforts on specific areas of concern. TSA also
implemented more focused airport assessments, known as targeted
risk assessments, in locations where risk is high or there are
other factors that require a more focused evaluation of the
site's security posture.
Strengthen foreign airport access and the comprehensiveness
of its airport and air carrier evaluations.--For instance,
according to TSA officials, the agency has used several tactics
to resolve access issues and overcome delays with scheduling
foreign airport visits at certain locations, including
deploying the same inspectors over multiple assessments to
build rapport with foreign airport officials. Furthermore,
since our 2011 review, TSA has begun primarily assessing
airports in Europe through joint assessments with the EC.\10\
TSA officials we met with indicated that TSA's strong
relationship with the EC has afforded the agency excellent
access to foreign airports in Europe and a better understanding
of vulnerabilities at these locations, which has resulted in
more comprehensive assessments.
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\10\ The EC is the executive body of the European Union and is
responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions,
upholding the Union's treaties, and the general day-to-day running of
the Union.
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Create operational efficiencies.--For instance, TSA
developed the Global Risk Analysis and Decision Support System
(GRADS) to streamline the assessment report writing process and
strengthen the agency's data analysis capabilities of its
foreign airport assessment results. According to TSA officials,
GRADS has provided agency personnel with a number of benefits,
including the ability to run standardized reports, extract and
analyze key data, and manage airport operational information,
such as data on security screening equipment.
tsa addresses security deficiencies through various capacity
development efforts, but data management challenges exist
TSA Assistance to Foreign Airports and Air Carriers
Our preliminary analysis showed that TSA assists foreign airports
in addressing identified security deficiencies in various ways. For
instance, inspectors transfer knowledge on how to mitigate identified
airport security deficiencies to foreign airport officials. According
to TSA officials, inspectors typically offer on-the-spot counseling
during airport assessments when they discover deficiencies, usually of
an infrequent, less serious, or technical nature, that can be addressed
immediately. To address deeper problems with staff security knowledge
or to strengthen staff knowledge in an evolving threat environment, TSA
may provide training, such as traditional classroom courses or
interactive workshops, to foreign airport staff. TSA also assists
foreign governments in securing technical assistance and consultation
provided by TSA and other U.S. and foreign government agencies to help
improve security at foreign airports, particularly after security
incidents or at airports in developing countries.
TSA also takes steps, such as on-the-spot counseling, to help air
carriers address security deficiencies identified during air carrier
inspections. According to TSA, since carriers have TSA-approved
security programs, additional training may not be necessary to correct
small issues. Rather, officials said that counseling air carrier staff
on the proper procedures and follow up observations of them practicing
the procedures may suffice. In addition, TSA assigns liaisons to
counsel air carriers and provide clarification regarding TSA security
requirements when necessary.
Leveraging Information and Enhancing Data Management
Our preliminary analysis indicated that, since our 2011 report, TSA
has taken a number of steps to strengthen its analytical processes and
better understand the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs. Specifically, TSA now conducts regional
strategy meetings in which officials examine trend data for airport
assessments and air carrier inspections, identify common areas of non-
compliance, and develop capacity building approaches customized to one
of four regions: Africa-Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Western
Hemisphere. TSA also produces regional risk reports, which are meant to
provide TSA personnel operating within each of the four regions with an
understanding of known vulnerabilities in the region in order to inform
mitigation planning efforts.
While TSA has taken steps to leverage the results of foreign
airport assessments and air carrier inspections to monitor system-wide
vulnerabilities and inform capacity development, our preliminary
analysis showed that TSA lacks key information for decision making. For
instance, TSA's database for tracking the resolution status of
identified foreign airport deficiencies has gaps and its system for
categorization does not result in sufficient specificity of information
related to security deficiencies' root causes and corrective actions.
Root causes represent the underlying reason why an airport is not
meeting security standards and, according to TSA documentation, fall
into three general categories: Lack of knowledge, lack of
infrastructure, and lack of will. Corrective actions are efforts to
mitigate security deficiencies and might include training and other
capacity-building efforts. According to TSA, a thorough understanding
of the underlying reasons for each deficiency is critical to selecting
the appropriate mitigation activities. However, we found that 70
percent of fiscal year 2016 records in TSA's database exhibited empty
fields pertaining to root cause or recommended corrective action. TSA
officials indicated that the agency began requiring staff to record
root cause and corrective action information in 2015 and that
institutionalizing this requirement to facilitate consistent data entry
will take time. Having complete data on root causes and corrective
actions would help TSA systematically monitor airport performance in
addressing deficiencies and leverage information for decision making
regarding capacity development.
We also found that the same database has limitations related to the
categorization of root causes and corrective actions. TSA procedures
indicate that root causes may relate to three broad categories, as
explained earlier, and 12 subcategories: Aviation security
infrastructure, communication, cultural factors, human factors,
management systems, physical infrastructure, procedures, quality
control, resources, supervision, technology, and training. However, the
database does not include a field to categorize root causes according
to these subcategories or other more specific areas. As a result, it
does not capture more granular information that would better explain
the specific root cause of an identified security issue. Moreover,
information on recommended corrective actions is stored entirely in
narrative fields and, therefore, is difficult to analyze without manual
intervention.
TSA staff stated that they recognize that the classification of
data currently contained in the database could be improved, but that
they have not had an opportunity to address the issues because they
have been focused on developing the newest release of GRADS. TSA staff
also indicated that they are exploring opportunities to better classify
data in future releases of GRADS. However, according to TSA procedures,
a thorough understanding of the underlying reasons for each deficiency
is critical to properly selecting the appropriate mitigation
activities. By classifying information on root causes and corrective
actions with additional specificity, TSA would be better positioned to
assure that corrective actions accurately address the specific,
underlying reasons for security vulnerabilities. Our draft report
includes two recommendations to TSA to strengthen data management.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much, Ms. Grover. Before I
recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions, I want to
recognize my friend from Mississippi, the Ranking Minority
Member Mr. Thompson for 5 minutes of opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
interested in getting to the questions, and I will just submit
my written testimony for the record.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 26, 2017
Thank you to the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding today's
hearing.
I also thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee.
Earlier this month, we commemorated the anniversary of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, 16 years after the
attacks, terrorist threats to transportation systems both abroad and at
home remain.
Last month, we saw the threat to cargo security when Australians
connected to ISIS were arrested in connection with attempting to place
an explosive on an international flight. Less than 2 weeks ago, we saw
the threat to rail and public transportation systems when a bomb
partially detonated on the London Underground.
We know that terrorist networks often encourage attacks overseas to
be mirrored in the United States, and just this summer, Inspire
magazine called for attacks against U.S. rail systems. Persistent
threats to transportation systems make clear that we must remain
vigilant and build on the significant transportation security
improvements made by the Obama administration.
I look forward to hearing testimony from GAO and TSA about the
progress made over the last decade to improve foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections and their recommendations for
further enhancements.
I also look forward to hearing from CBP about the future of its
Preclearance program. The Obama administration recognized the security
benefit of having our CBP officers overseas to screen U.S.-bound
passengers and expanded the program for the first time in decades. I
hope to hear about the status of negotiations initiated under the prior
administration to expand the program.
Additionally, I have real questions about whether President Trump--
with his preoccupation with banning travelers from Muslim-majority
countries and building a Border Wall--will continue efforts to expand
Preclearance and implement other meaningful aviation security measures.
I also have serious questions about the newest misguided travel ban
announced this week and its potential detrimental effects to our
Nation's security and our American values.
In closing, I want to recognize the front-line officers working
every day to keep the American people safe. Their hard work and
dedication allows our security systems to operate effectively and we
thank them for their service to our country.
Once again, thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questions. Ms. Grover, I want to start with you, a couple of
quick questions I have for you. You mentioned--well, one
really. You mentioned they can prove data management, but
something you said later in your testimony really kind of
concerned me, and that was that some airports struggle to
comply with ICAO standards.
As you know and the whole panel knows, ICAO standards are
the bare minimum by which airports must operate. If LPD
airports are not complying or struggling to comply with even
the bare minimum standards of international travel, that is
quite concerning to me, to say the least.
So I know we can't get into which airports and which
standards they are struggling to comply with in an opening
setting, but I definitely want to be able to follow up with you
in a secure setting either through a briefing or through
written statements for the committee to have.
But I want to take a step back for a second about the ICAO
standards overall. Based on your years of experience and what
you have seen, do you have concerns about some of the
requirements of ICAO standards not being sufficient, No. 1? No.
2, do you have any concerns about, any suggestions about how we
can make those standards better?
One of the things I am concerned about is what you said. If
we have these standards and people are struggling to meet them,
why are they still having LPD airports flying into the United
States?
Ms. Grover. Yes, sir, I appreciate the question. So the
ICAO standards are very broad and they encompass essentially
all aspects of airport operations. So in that aspect they are
quite comprehensive, and I agree they do provide a baseline set
of standards and they are non-prescriptive. So there are lots
of different ways that airports across the world in theory
could meet the standards.
So this really gets at the heart of what we are talking
about today is the TSA inspectors, when they are out doing
their assessment every single time, they have to make a
judgment about what they see in place at that airport to say is
this situation adequate to ensure security?
What they do is at the end of each assessment they
essentially rate the airport on a 1 to 5 scale, depending on
their assessment of the vulnerabilities. So is everything in
good shape or are there vulnerabilities that are coming to the
fore?
Mr. Katko. Now, is that assessment, that 1 to 5 scale, is
that based on the ICAO standards or is it just based like on
other standards as well?
Ms. Grover. It is based on the ICAO standards. It is based
on the inspector's assessment of how well the airport is doing
at implementing the ICAO standards. They have several tools
that they can use that TSA has developed over time to make sure
that those judgments are consistent and that they look at
everything that is important.
So, you know, TSA also has several tools they can use to
work with airports, and the air carriers are really the
fallback measure. So it is important to note that even if there
are vulnerabilities at an airport, that doesn't necessarily
mean the flight departing that airport is not secure because
the air carriers can fill in as a backstop.
Mr. Katko. OK. That still is troubling to me because of
course airlines want to make sure their flights are safe, but
there is a business aspect, a business incentive that is quite
strong to make sure they do that. But still I am not quite sure
I understand the depth or gravity of the situation with respect
to airports or not being able to keep up with the ICAO
standards, so we will have to talk about that in a secure
setting.
But more importantly do you think it is time for more
prescriptive measures for ICAO, given the repeated attempts in
some successful, some not successful, airports especially in
the Middle East?
I mean, look what we have had. We have had the Daallo
Airlines, the Metrojet. We have Egypt Air, and we had the
attempt in Australia. That is all over the last 2 years. So I
am interested in that.
Ms. Grover. Sir, I would defer to DHS on that. At the end
of the day it is the responsibility of the DHS Secretary to
determine whether or not the measures in place at any airport
are sufficient. The Secretary always had the option of saying
that flights cannot come to the United States from a specific
airport.
As far as strengthening ICAO standards, I mean, I do think
it would be valuable to follow up with TSA. They have all of
the data on the specific vulnerability scores and the risk
assessments. So they have a good understanding of the
vulnerabilities across the world, as well as the threats.
But given that there are airports that are currently not
meeting the ICAO standards regularly that are in place now, I
am not sure that raising them across the board would
necessarily help lift up those airports. TSA has a number of
tools that they are using to try to work with airports to
enhance their efforts to meet the current ICAO standards.
Mr. Katko. I understand that, but for example, the laptop
ban seemed to snap some of those airports into order, and I
really applaud the Homeland Security and TSA for having the
guts to do that because it worked. It sounds like they got
their act together.
But I don't think we should be in a situation, and we will
ask the others as well, of just simply saying, well, since they
can't meet the ICAO standards as they are now so there is no
sense raising them. That is not what we should do.
We don't want another Pan Am Flight 103. We don't want
another attempt like the Australian Airlines. Lord knows, based
on the secure briefings we have all had, that the
vulnerabilities are getting more and more difficult to detect.
So I think we need to have a more robust discussion in a secure
setting on that.
But Mr. Owen, I would like to hear from you about my
question about ICAO standards, whether you think that they are
sufficient, whether they need to be tweaked, whether they need
to be revamped?
Mr. Owen. Well, really with the ICAO standards that really
is under the purview of TSA. Where CBP comes involved is at
those last-point-of-departure airports where we have a physical
presence, i.e., the pre-clearance locations.
We do have 15 pre-clearance locations around the world, and
as part of that agreement with pre-clearance, those airports
adopt higher security standards, not only on the screening side
as administered by TSA, but as well as things such as vetting
the airport employees who have access to the Federal inspection
site to the aircraft.
At those 15 pre-departure airports, individuals with
access, we have their biographic and biometric information,
which we run through all of our targeting screening. So in many
ways I see pre-clearance as the gold standard in our
counterterrorism efforts overseas at last points of departure.
Again, we are at 15 locations. Ranking Member, we are
expanding. We have two new agreements in place, and we are
negotiating with another 10 countries. So we will continue to
advance that program under the last administration as well as
under the current administration.
Mr. Katko. So what can we do? I agree with Mrs. Watson
Coleman, as well. I think pre-clearance is critically
important. So what can we do in Congress to help you expand
that program and incentivize all those countries to get on-
board? Because that may be a way to basically say if you are
not--I am sorry, LPD, if you are not on-board you are not doing
your job, we can't take the risk.
Mr. Owen. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Katko. What can we do to help you with that?
Mr. Owen. Absolutely. With the pre-clearance, again, the
countries come to us in a voluntary nature. So anything we can
do to encourage additional countries to want to partner with us
through the pre-clearance model is definitely the step forward.
We need to make sure in each of the pre-clearance
agreements that we do sign that our officers have the full
authorities to conduct the performance of their duties as they
would in a U.S. airport. So we cannot have reduced standards
for our officers overseas. They must have the same standards as
we do here in the United States.
Mr. Katko. All right. That is excellent.
Mr. Lynes, anything you want to add before I turn it over
to Mrs. Watson Coleman and Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Lynes. Yes, thank you. As you know, the ICAO standards
are outcome-focused. As Ms. Grover pointed out, our TSA
assessment and inspection teams they are looking at actually at
the implementation effectiveness of those standards.
For example, controlling, one of the standards would be all
contracting States shall ensure and control access to a
critical restricted area of an airport. Our inspection teams
are looking at how well that is being performed. We do that by
first reviewing the National programs, what is set out by the
State. Then that is at the macro level.
Then we will get back into looking at the actual airport
implementation, how well that airport is meeting those
standards. They could be, such as having a fence with three
strands of barbed wire.
If we find a hole in the fence we are looking at, OK, what
are they doing beyond that to control that, whether they have
guards, patrols? So we are ensuring how well they are actually
meeting that National standard during our assessments and
inspections.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson
for 5 minutes of questions. I will note Mr. Thompson that I
went over a little bit, and the Chair will exercise a lot of
flexibility since we don't have a lot of Members here today.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Grover, you talked a little bit about the lack of the
analyzing data. Can you expound a little bit on that?
Ms. Grover. Yes, sir. So at the micro level, TSA has good
information about what is going on at each airport. One of the
things that TSA has done really well in the past few years is
developed regional data analysis groups.
So they have their staff get together and they talk all
about what are the threats and vulnerabilities for a specific
set of groups in a region and talk about each airport. So at
that level, they are really doing a fine job at keeping track
of what is going on.
But at a world-wide level, the database that they have set
up to track the root causes behind the vulnerabilities that
they find, the deficiencies, and the record of the corrective
actions that they have recommended, it is just the data is not
being entered as it should.
So----
Mr. Thompson. So excuse me. Is that from an operational
standpoint that somebody is just not doing it?
Ms. Grover. That is right. Somebody is just not doing it.
It is a relatively new requirement, and I think it just hasn't
become routine practice. But it is important to make sure that
TSA has the information at an enterprise level to understand
the different root causes behind the problems, what they are
putting in place at the airports to try to fix it so that they
can get a sense of what works and what doesn't.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Lynes, have you been made aware of this?
Mr. Lynes. Yes. Yes, I have, sir, and let me reassure the
subcommittee that TSA is taking immediate action whenever we
identify a vulnerability. We do have the documentation about
those vulnerabilities, and we do concur with the GAO's
recommendations. We have been working quite closely to shore up
those recommendations.
Mr. Thompson. OK. So it is not a matter of you not having
the resources to do it. You just need to have the--well, I
guess you have the will, but we just need to carry it forward?
Mr. Lynes. As Ms. Grover points out, it is a relatively new
requirement in our system. Independent of GAO's review of our
program, we have been working at revisions to our system to
create a new tool to track the life cycle of those
vulnerabilities so that we can identify the root cause of that
vulnerability and what mitigation efforts we can apply to
address that vulnerability.
Mr. Thompson. So have you formally submitted this, Ms.
Grover, to TSA?
Ms. Grover. Yes, sir, and they have formally concurred with
our recommendation and stated that they intend to take action.
Mr. Thompson. OK. Thank you. I guess the other question
talks about the pre-clearance model and whether or not Mr.
Owen, you have all of the resources to expand pre-clearance to
other airports?
Mr. Owen. Yes. Part of the requirement with the new pre-
clearance model that we adapted after we went operational in
Abu Dhabi, is that the partner countries that sign on for pre-
clearance do so under a cost recovery basis. So they bear much
of the cost to establish the facility, to have our officers
present so the resources are coming from those other countries
that want to have us there.
Mr. Thompson. So are we now saying if you can pay for it,
we will pre-clear you? Or are we doing it based on number of
passengers, or?
Mr. Owen. It is based on risk and the negotiations that we
have place pre-clearance in places like Abu Dhabi where we
believe there is a strategic importance to be there.
So that is really was what driving that. Clearly there is a
facilitation benefit as well that the airlines very much
appreciate, but whenever we have an opportunity to address that
potential risk at a last-point-of-departure airport before that
individual gets put on a plane to come here, that is the model
we need to embrace more of.
Mr. Thompson. Right. But if I said where the next two
airports the highest enplanement airports in the world coming
to the United States, what would your answer be?
Mr. Owen. I am sorry. The question?
Mr. Thompson. In other words, the pre-clearance we are
giving to the next two airports----
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Is this based on the ability of
those countries or those airports to pay the cost? Or is it
based on the number of passengers who are coming through the
airport en route to the United States?
Mr. Owen. It is pretty much a combination of both. I mean,
they have to incur the cost to have our officers there to have
the facility there. The cost only makes sense when there is a
large enough throughput to really have that return on
investment. So a very small airport would probably not embrace
pre-clearance, but a larger airport where that return on
investment is financially possibly would be more likely to
embrace pre-clearance.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chair----
Mr. Owen. Again, our decision to go out is based on where
we see a strategic value from a risk assessment standpoint.
Mr. Thompson. When we first put this in place one of the
problems is, Mr. Chairman, we went to airports who could pay
rather than airports with the largest volume of passengers
coming to the United States. So that kind of skewed the risk
model.
I am trying to see how we get it back and saying if we have
5,000 people coming from this airport and 1,000 coming from
another, why are we doing the 1,000-passenger airport rather
than the 5,000?
Mr. Owen. Right. You really have to look at all the
different variables as to what is behind this. Pre-clearance
started in the early 1950's and was primarily a facilitation
program with the airports out of Canada.
The Abu Dhabi model, which we adopted 3 years ago, was
really the new standard for how we treat pre-clearance.
Identify high-risk locations where we feel our presence adds
value, work cooperatively with the host country to make sure
all of our requirements are met, as we have seen in Abu Dhabi.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be instructive
for the committee if we got the list of pre-clearance airports
tied to how many passengers from those airports are coming and
how they rank in terms of airports that we work with.
I think, you know, that is the politics of it, but one of
the challenges we have is if we put reimbursement for
participation above numbers of passengers from a particular
area----
Mr. Katko. Right.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Some of us think we are creating
a bigger problem because those who can pay----
Mr. Katko. Right.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Get pre-clearance and those who
can't participate by paying and might have two, three time more
people coming. I understand the risk.
Mr. Katko. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. But I think that is something that from a
policy standpoint we can look at, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Katko. Yes, Mr. Thompson, I think that is an excellent
point. I would ask Mr. Owen to endeavor to get those statistics
to us within 10 days, and then I think we should meet and talk
about it.
Mr. Thompson. OK.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman for 5 minutes
of questioning.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
I seek unanimous consent to submit testimony for the record
from the National Treasury Employees Union for today's hearing.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Anthony M. Reardon, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union
September 26, 2017
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit
this statement on Customs and Border Protection (CBP) staffing issues
that affect aviation security around the globe on behalf of the 25,000
CBP officers, agriculture specialists, and trade enforcement personnel
stationed at 328 land, sea, and air ports of entry across the United
States and at preclearance stations currently in Ireland, the
Caribbean, Canada, and United Arab Emirates airports represented by the
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).
As of June 2017, CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) has 22,810
CBP officers on-board at the ports of entry--1,404 short of its fiscal
year 2017 on-boarding target of 24,214. The fiscal year 2018 House
appropriations bill includes funding to filling the current vacancies
to meet the fiscal year 2017 target of 24,214, but provides no new
funding to address the current CBP officer staffing shortage of at
least 2,107 additional CBP officers as stipulated by CBP's own fiscal
year 2017 Workload Staff Model and to fund an additional 631 CBP
agriculture specialists as stipulated by CBP's own fiscal year 2017
Agriculture Resource Allocation Model (see appendix.)
cbp preclearance program
The U.S. currently has 15 airport preclearance locations in six
countries: Aruba; Freeport and Nassau; the Bahamas; Bermuda; Calgary,
Toronto, Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver, and Winnipeg,
Canada; Dublin and Shannon, Ireland; and Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates. More than 600 CBP law enforcement officers are stationed at
15 locations around the world checking travel documents, passports,
visas, and making sure travelers abide by strict customs and
agriculture importation rules. Passengers departing these airports are
treated the same as domestic travelers, and do not have to go through
customs when they arrive in the United States.
Airports with preclearance programs accounted for about 18 million
travelers in 2016-15 percent of all commercial air travellers to the
United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated
that it would like to see this increased to 33 percent of foreign
passengers annually by 2024. The effort is designed to extend the
United States' border security to foreign airports as part of new
initiatives to reduce the risk of potential terrorists entering the
country.
The preclearance operations in the United Arab Emirates and the
foreign airports to be chosen for new preclearance operations are
responsible for most of the program's costs, including a significant
portion of CBP officers and agriculture specialists' salaries and
benefits, as well as the construction and maintenance of the space
dedicated to the preclearance operation inside the airport.
In May 2015, the United States identified airports in 9 countries
as possible participants in the program--Punta Cana, Tokyo, Stockholm,
London, Manchester, Istanbul, Oslo, Madrid, Amsterdam, and Brussels.
Agreements with CBP were reached late last year for new facilities at
Stockholm Arlanda Airport in Sweden and Punta Cana International
Airport in the Dominican Republic. CBP is expected to reach final
agreements with a few of the other foreign airports that were named in
its 2015 expansion round. Preclearance operations in these airports may
begin as early as 2019.
In November 2016, DHS selected 11 additional foreign airports,
located in 9 countries, for possible Preclearance expansion. The new
airports selected to potentially take part are El Dorado International
Airport in Bogota; Ministro Pistarini International Airport in Buenos
Aires; Scotland's Edinburgh Airport; Keflavik International Airport in
Iceland; Mexico City International Airport; Italy's Milan-Malpensa
Airport; Kansai International Airport in Osaka; Rio de Janeiro-Galeao
International Airport; Rome's Leonardo da Vinci-Fiurnicino Airport; Sao
Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport in Brazil; and Princess Juliana
International Airport in St. Maarten. More than 10 million travelers
fly to the United States from these airports annually.
NTEU recognizes the security benefits of preclearance including
preventing high-risk travelers from boarding aircraft bound for the
United States and reduced wait times for passenger processing at the
busiest U.S. international airports. Nonetheless, NTEU has serious
concerns about the impact of preclearance expansion on the already
critical staffing shortages at the Nation's ports of entry.
cbp at the ports of entry staffing shortage
There is an existing vacancy rate of nearly 1,400 funded CBP
officers at the ports and, according to CBP's analytic workload
staffing model, an additional 2,100 CBP officers need to be funded and
hired in order to meet 2017 staffing needs--translating into a total
CBP officer staffing shortage of 3,500 today.
The economic cost of this shortage is also staggering. For every 33
additional CBP officers hired, the United States can potentially gain
over 1,000 private-sector jobs. If Congress fully staffed the ports
with the needed 3,500 additional CBP officers, 106,000 private-sector
jobs could be created. Understaffed ports lead to long delays in travel
and cargo lanes and also create a significant hardship for front-line
employees. Both involuntary overtime and involuntary work assignments
far from home disrupt CBP officers' family life and destroy morale.
Notably, on-going CBP staffing shortages directly contribute to CBP's
perennial low ranking in Federal employee workforce satisfaction
surveys.
In addition to CBP's trade and travel security, processing and
facilitation mission, CBP employees at the ports of entry are the
second-largest source of revenue collection for the U.S. Government. In
2016, CBP processed more than $2.2 trillion in imports and collected
more than $44 billion in duties, taxes, and other fees.
As you know, the President's January Executive Order calls for
hiring 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents (BPAs) and 10,000 new
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, but does not ask for
one additional CBP officer new hire, despite the fact that CBP officers
at the ports of entry in 2016 encountered over 274,000 undocumented
immigrants and seized over 600,000 pounds of illegal drugs, and over
$62 million in illicit currency, while processing over 390 million
travelers and $2.2 trillion in imports through the ports.
As preclearance operations come on board, NTEU asks how can CBP OFO
staff these new locations when it has a current staffing shortage of
3,500 CBP officer and 631 agriculture specialist positions?
The 1,400 existing vacancies at U.S. ports of entry must be filled
first and 2,100 new CBP officer staffing positions needs to be funded
by Congress. CBP officers should not be diverted to new preclearance
operations before the existing staffing shortage at the U.S. ports of
entry is resolved.
Congress should reevaluate CBP's funding priorities as it finalizes
its fiscal year 2018 appropriations bills. Unlike other DHS components
operating between the ports of entry and at ICE, both of which received
significant increases in personnel funding in the fiscal year 2018
appropriation bill recently approved by the House, CBP at the ports of
entry has established and documented Workload Staffing Models that
justify the need to hire 3,500 CBP officers and 631 agriculture
specialists today. Because of the on-going staffing shortages at the
nations' ports, CBP officers at some ports work up to 16 hours a day
and since 2015, CBP OFO has had to divert several hundred CBP officers
from already short-staffed ports to the critically short-staffed land
ports at San Ysidro and Tucson for 90-day stints.
Even though the salaries of CBP personnel at the new preclearance
ports will be primarily funded by the foreign countries hosting the new
preclearance facilities, there are no excess CBP employees today that
can be reassigned to preclearance ports without exacerbating the
staffing shortages at domestic ports of entry.
Delays at the U.S. ports of entry result in real losses to the U.S.
economy. Understaffed ports lead to long delays in travel and cargo
lanes, hurting businesses and consumers, and also create a significant
hardship for front-line employees. NTEU agrees that expanding CBP
inspection facilities at preclearance locations adds another level of
security to the homeland, but until Congress acknowledges and addresses
the current critical CBP staffing shortages at the ports of entry,
preclearance expansion will only exacerbate current deficiencies at
domestic air, sea, and land ports.
If Congress is serious about improving aviation security around the
globe, there is an opportunity to address the justified and documented
need to fund additional CBP staffing at the ports in the Omnibus bill
that will be considered later this year. On behalf of the men and women
represented by NTEU at the Nation's ports of entry, I urge you to
authorize and fund CBP officers and agriculture specialists at least to
the levels that BPAs and ICE agents are funded in the recently-approved
fiscal year 2018 House appropriations bill.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement to the
committee.
APPENDIX.--CBP RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION STRATEGY
cbpo staffing requirements through fiscal year 2017: 28,414
gap: 2107 \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Incorporates legislative proposal fee increases in staff gap
calculation.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
cbp agricultural specialist staffing requirements through fiscal year
2017: 3,048
gap: 631
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Grover. thank you so much for your testimony. It
actually is good news that it is your assessment, it is GAO's
assessment that TSA is moving forward in doing the kinds of
things that you have recommended over the course of time.
Then the minor issue, not minor minor, but the issue that
you are really concerned about now is that they establish what
they are finding and what they are going to do to respond to
their findings. Is that right?
Ms. Grover. Yes, ma'am. TSA has made significant
improvements in this program over many years, and----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. That is great to hear because so then
with TSA not getting beaten up so badly I hope that you will
find that you will have higher morale and people will recognize
that the job that you all are doing is appreciated by everybody
at every level. One of the concerns that we have always had
with TSA is that perhaps the morale was impacted by lack of
movement out of certain positions, type of job that you get to
do.
What I am wondering is do you all have an upward mobility
program where you take people within your agency that you see
have certain promise and give them training so that they can
move up through the agency and do some of these other what seem
to be really pretty exciting jobs on the international air
level, on the regional levels and things of that nature?
Mr. Lynes. Yes. I think I am a really good example of that
over my 20-year career. We do have mid-level and senior-level
development programs. I would be more than happy to take that
back as I am not in the H.R. department. But I would be more
than happy to take that back and give the committee some
additional details about our programs within TSA.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Abu Dhabi was an airport that had pre-
clearance.
Mr. Lynes. Yes, yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. But it also at some point became an
airport where you had the restrictions on the personal
electronic devices. Is that not true? Tell me how did that
happen?
Mr. Lynes. Well, the security directives that were issued
in March 2017 by then Secretary Kelly were to counter a very
specific threat. Then later in June 2017, the then, again,
then-Secretary Kelly was evaluating the threat and directed TSA
to issue global security directives and emergency amendments.
It was after our TSA assessment and inspection teams were
able to review those locations that they were able to meet
those enhanced standards and since the restrictions were
removed.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. The restrictions on all the airports
was removed.
Mr. Lynes. From the 10 locations that were specified----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. From the 10----
Mr. Lynes [continuing]. In the March directives. That is
correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. So this restriction doesn't exist
anywhere at any of the airports now, or does it?
Mr. Lynes. That is correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. You all have been very active and
you have done a lot of, I guess, going back monitoring, making
sure that things that you think were agreed upon are being done
and ensuring that the security standards are being upheld. Is
that placing any kind of a--is that sustainable in terms of the
resources that you have?
I know that you went to a couple of hundred airports. You
are going to go again to recheck. Do you have the resources to
sustain that kind of oversight and monitoring?
Mr. Lynes. Yes, we do. We do have a risk methodology for
visiting airports, and our inspection teams follow that risk
methodology in the way that they go and visit these locations.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So you have the manpower resources,
the ability to hire? You have got a sufficient staff?
Mr. Lynes. Yes. We believe that we are adequately resourced
to perform our duties.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Mr. Owen, a couple of months ago there
were these incidences that were found at the Newark airport
involving hazing, actually assaulting of some of the newer or
low-level employees by supervisors. As a result of that I
believe that three of your employees were actually arrested and
about five of them were put on suspension or administrative
leave?
Mr. Owen. Right. Once the initiation of the investigation
several officers were placed on administrative duties where
their law enforcement authorities were suspended and with the
conclusion of the--or the on-going investigation by the Office
of the Inspector General, we have now had three officers that
have been arrested and indicted for those actions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Are you all looking into seeing if
there are any other airports that have similar situations?
Mr. Owen. Yes, we are. I would just tell you that we are
all appalled by the behavior of those employees, and we would--
fully cooperated with the I.G. throughout the investigation. I
personally made management changes in Newark to address what I
felt had been allowed to continue unaddressed. So we have taken
this very seriously throughout the agency.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So are you looking at other airports?
Are you--OK.
Mr. Owen. Yes, we are. We have not found any indication
that there has been similar misconduct at any other of our
ports of entry.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Owen. Have you engaged
in any kind of employee development, employee training to
ensure that your supervisors know their responsibilities, their
accountabilities and what is improper behavior that will not be
tolerated?
Mr. Owen. Yes, we have.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Yes. Yes. We talked about the
expanding of the pre-clearance programs to two or ten or what
other airports. You said that there are two other airports
that----
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. We have engaged in that?
Mr. Owen. We have two additional----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Can you tell us who they are?
Mr. Owen. Yes, we have two signed agreements to move
forward. So one is in Punta Cana and one is in Stockholm,
Sweden. So those agreements have been signed. We are basically
just waiting for the host country to address the infrastructure
issues and any of their legal authority matters that they need
to address.
Outside of those two signed agreements we are in
negotiations at various stages with another 10 countries for
further expansion throughout the world.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So my last question at this moment,
because I am just a little bit over as well?
Mr. Katko. That is fine.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. The most recent travel ban----
Mr. Owen. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. That has been released by the
administration, do you anticipate--first of all, we don't
completely understand the criteria that was used, and I don't
think either one of you has the capacity to respond to why
these particular countries were under this ban and what this
ban really means. But what do you see the sort of pressure it
is going to place on your resources?
Mr. Owen. Well, I could speak to the, you know, expected
impact at the ports of entry. We will not see what we saw with
the first travel ban. This is a more measured approach. There
is a time period before it becomes effective.
Anyone who currently has a valid travel document from those
eight countries is still allowed to travel. This does not
pertain to legal permanent residents.
Many of the areas that were so problematic in the first
travel ban are not within this. So while I can't speak to the
formulation of the policy, I can speak to the impact it will
have at the ports of entry. This will be very smooth and you
will not see any problems like you saw back in January, late
January.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. What is the implementation date, the
beginning? I know it is phasing in.
Mr. Owen. It is there is phasing in for some of the
countries----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Effective?
Mr. Owen [continuing]. It is immediate. For some it goes
through October 18.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Mr. Owen. So based on different countries and the different
categories there is a more phasing in.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Does this require a different
training?
Mr. Owen. No, because in order to travel to the United
States you need a valid travel document.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Mr. Owen. Anyone who has a valid travel document it will be
admissible outside of other concerns that have nothing to do
with the travel ban, our normal performance of the duties. So
if someone from those eight countries has a valid travel
document today they would still be allowed to travel. As a
result the impact at our ports of entry will be very, very
minimal.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. The impression I got was that there
would be people who may not be permitted to come into this
country today or in the beginning of this travel ban, but that
that could change. So is someone training people on what that
criteria would be, those changes would be?
Mr. Owen. Once again, within CBP it is quite simple. They
need a valid travel document, a visa. If they have the visa----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So you are at the end of it.
Mr. Owen. We are at the end of it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You are at the end of that food chain.
Mr. Owen. State Department is at the front of it, yes,
ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Thank you. That is something I
think we need to explore with DHS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Owen, Mr. Lynes, and Ms. Grover.
Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was concerned with
a recent Boston Globe investigative report entitled ``Secrets
in the Sky.'' It went back to something we still haven't
corrected. It seems that there are gaps, serious gaps between
our agencies.
This deals with the FAA procedure of licensing pilots and
other related activities. You know, in the course of that, the
FAA came back and said they are not the police officers of the
sky, leaving the job to groups like Transportation Security
Administration, Homeland Security, and the FBI.
Indeed, TSA monitors all the time. In fact, they reference
this 28 million airmen, you know, with threat assessments that
they have monitored in a course.
However, that is only as good as the material you have to
look at. There is a huge gap that exists here where people have
got their pilot's license using dead people's names, where
there was someone who was sentenced to life imprisonment and
released on compassionate grounds because he had cancer with
the Lockerbie bombing threats. He still had some valid
credentials in the air.
So my question is this. I think Congress has tried from the
FAA standpoint to get them to move and correct some of these
things, which doesn't seem to be really working.
My concern is can TSA or Homeland Security have more
oversight? What would you suggest to close this gap, to give
you more ability to look at the materials you get in from the
FAA? Because this gap is a serious one and presents a real
safety issue.
With all the other things we are doing, this persists and
it was one of the concerns dating back to the 9/11 Commission
that hasn't been addressed. So what I am asking you is from
Homeland Security, from TSA's standpoint and having GAO look at
these kind of issues, as well as the inspector general, we have
to somehow--we can't let this gap exist between the FAA and
TSA.
So from your perspective what changes could we make as a
Congress to give you more ability to have oversight over the
original material that you are dealing with? I mean, looking at
the numbers, 43,000 pilots received their license and they
didn't provide permanent address, according to an audit just a
few years ago. Eight thousand people found the Social Security
numbers on file belonged to dead people.
So you are only as good as the information you get to
review. What could you recommend we do to give you more
oversight authority to make sure that that material you are
getting from the FAA is, you know, is valuable, is accurate and
doesn't present a security risk?
Mr. Lynes. Yes, thank you. We do work quite well with the
intelligence community on information that we receive and while
I am aware of the security threat assessment process that is
being performed by the TSA, it is not my area of expertise. I
would be more than happy to take that question back to get
additional information regarding the security threat
assessments that we do perform of FAA certificate holders.
Mr. Keating. Yes. My question is not with TSA's ability to
do that. You are only able to do that well given the
information that you have to review. So anything you could
suggest as a follow-up to this hearing where we could look at
changes where TSA has a greater ability to review that FAA
procedures, because they are letting, it is so decentralized
they let airports do it.
It is a real black hole in our security system. It is
something I think TSA and Homeland should have more ability to
have oversight over. So I would appreciate that. That is a real
concern of mine. It should be a concern of all of ours. It
hasn't been corrected since the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission.
It is still with reports just like this, which I will share
with the committee----
Mr. Katko. Do you want to enter it into the record?
Mr. Keating. Yes.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Report Submitted For the Record by Honorable William R. Keating
SECRETS IN THE SKY
By Kelly Carr, Jaimi Dowdell and Jenn Abelson, Spotlight Fellows and
Globe Staff
The FAA was warned in 2009 that people with terrorist ties
were licensed to fly and repair aircraft. Eight
years later, it is, incredibly, still the case.
BORNHOLM, DENMARK.--Just two minutes after the private jet was
cleared for landing, the pilot realized his error and declared an
emergency. He had miscalculated the fuel needs for the one-hour journey
from Germany, and now his engines were flaming out.
The Learjet plummeted toward the ground that day in September 2012,
then carved its way through a field, coming to rest amid cornstalks and
mud, the passenger on-board seriously hurt. First responders found the
pilot, an Iranian with a criminal record, unconscious in the cockpit.
Nearby, investigators discovered a US pilot certificate with a name
that wasn't his.
Nader Ali Sabouri Haghighi's own pilot certificate, it turned out,
had been revoked years earlier for providing false information, but the
Federal Aviation Administration conveniently mailed him a new one.
Haghighi had called the FAA hotline claiming to be a professional pilot
named Daniel George who had lost his license. He then recited George's
license number and other personal details that he'd obtained from their
business dealings. Without asking further questions, the FAA agent sent
Haghighi a license with George's name on it.
It ought to have been difficult for the black-haired, brown-eyed
Iranian to use a pilot's license belonging to a fair-skinned, gray-
haired American nearly 20 years his senior, except for one factor: FAA
pilot licenses do not include photographs of the pilot. Haghighi was
able to pull off his ruse for nearly four years until Danish police
found the license in the rubble of the crash.
Almost a decade after Haghighi's brazen identify theft, the FAA
still does not include pilot photos on its licenses, and the agency
does not fully vet pilot information before issuing them credentials.
Last year, a leading congressional overseer of the FAA, then-
Representative John Mica, called US pilot licenses ``a joke'' and said
that a day pass to Disney World in his native Florida contains more
sophisticated security measures.
FAA officials defend their licensing practices, noting that pilots
are also required to carry a government-issued ID such as a driver's
license to prove their identity. The pilot certificate, they say, is
more an indicator of the pilot's level of training than a security
tool, and commercial airports and airlines generally issue their own
IDs for access to tarmacs, planes, and other secure areas.
But the flawed airman licenses are part of a troubling pattern of
lax oversight of more than 1 million FAA-approved airmen--including
pilots, mechanics, flight attendants, and other aviation personnel--
that has made the agency vulnerable to fraud, and the public vulnerable
to those who mean to do harm, a Spotlight Team review has found.
After the 9/11 attacks, Congress called on the FAA to overhaul its
licensing for more than 600,000 US-certified pilots. But the FAA's
changes so far have been modest, such as making licenses with higher-
quality materials to reduce forgeries. Today, FAA security procedures
remain geared more toward the convenience of pilots than the needs of a
nation engaged in a ``war on terror,'' often failing to challenge
airmen's claims on their applications and seemingly unaware of
deceptions.
Haghighi, for example, continued to finagle help from the FAA even
after he went to jail in Denmark for flying without a valid license and
endangering his passenger. After his release, the FAA issued him a
medical certificate that helped him land a job at an airline in
Indonesia in 2014. All he had to do was change one letter in the
spelling of Sabouri and alter his birth year. An official at another
federal agency eventually tipped off the FAA to Haghighi's duplicity.
Or take the case of Richard Hoagland. Beginning in 1994, he
purchased homes, registered a plane, obtained a pilot license, and even
got married under the name Terry Symansky, according to court records.
The ruse wasn't discovered until Symansky's nephew was doing family
research on Ancestry.com and found that his late uncle was listed as
alive. The FAA never caught on that the real Terry Symansky had been
dead since 1991, issuing Hoagland a new private pilot certificate in
Symansky's name as recently as 2010. Hoagland is now serving a two-year
sentence in federal prison for identity theft.
FAA procedures also make it easy for pilots to hide damaging
information, by simply not reporting it. That's because the agency
relies on them to self-report felony convictions and other crimes that
could lead to license revocation. Among the licensed pilots currently
listed in the airman registry are Carlos Licona and Paul Grebenc,
United Airlines pilots who were sentenced to jail in Scotland earlier
this year for attempting to fly a commercial airliner with alcohol in
their blood. Under FAA rules, an alcohol-related offense, especially
related to flying can be grounds for license revocation or suspension,
though the FAA decides on a case-by-case basis.
But as of Sept. 1, Grebenc and Licona were still listed in the
FAA's active airman registry. Agency records showed that as of January,
four months after the men were arrested, there were no reported
incidents or enforcement actions related to the pilots.
FAA officials stress that they are not the police officers of the
skies, leaving that job to an alphabet soup of agencies including the
Transportation Security Administration, Homeland Security, and the FBI.
The FAA merely issues the airman certificates and keeps the database
that helps these investigators do their work. And, while FAA officials
admit they don't routinely investigate information that pilots,
mechanics, and others list on license applications, the TSA says it
continuously reviews the FAA database against the Terrorist Screening
Database, additional terrorism-related information, and other
government watch lists. Since 2010, the TSA has completed 28 million
airman threat assessments.
But it is hardly a fail-safe system. Outside reviewers have
repeatedly found that the FAA's Airman Registry is riddled with errors
and gaps, making it difficult for law enforcement officials to rely on.
More than 43,000 pilots received licenses even though they did not
provide the FAA with a permanent address, according to a 2013 audit by
the Department of Transportation inspector general. Two years earlier,
the Department of Homeland Security inspector general found that 8,000
of the Social Security numbers on file belonged to dead people, in part
because the FAA doesn't purge its files of dated information. Another
15,000 didn't match the airmen's personal information on file.
When asked whether the FAA vets the information on airman
certificate applications, officials did not answer directly. The FAA
issued a statement reading, ``Pilots are expected to provide accurate
and complete information on all FAA forms.''
Agency officials also said that, when pilots apply for medical
certificates--a crucial document needed to fly--they conduct a one-time
check against the national drivers' database for drug- or alcohol-
related convictions.
The lack of accurate information can have serious consequences.
Last October, when a student pilot from Jordan intentionally crashed a
twin-engine plane near a major defense contractor in East Hartford,
Conn., law enforcement officials initially feared terrorism and
converged on the Illinois address he had given the FAA. But the
student, Feras M. Freitekh, had listed the address of a family friend,
a place where he had never lived, so law enforcement descended or a
house nearly 900 miles from his actual home.
Most worrisome, even with on-going TSA vetting, people with
suspected or proven ties to terrorism still keep active airman
certificates.
FAA-approved offenders
Mark Schiffer couldn't believe what he was finding.
Schiffer, the chief scientist for a company that helps banks detect
fraud, was simply testing an algorithm to check names against publicly
available watch lists that included suspected terrorists and other bad
actors. In April 2009, he was using data from the FAA Airman Registry
for his test because the list was large and readily available.
But he kept turning up terrorists.
There was Fawzi Mustapha Assi, who was on the FBI's most-wanted
list for five years before being convicted of providing material
support to Hezbollah in 2008. Though imprisoned, he had an active
pilot's license, which never expires. His release was expected in a few
years.
Also on the list was Myron Tereshchuk, an FAA-certified mechanic
and student pilot, who was convicted in federal court in 2005 for
possession of biological agents or toxins that could be used as
weapons. Tereshchuk was also in prison, but he, too, was expected to be
released in a few years.
And there was Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, who was sentenced
to life in prison for his role in the bombing of Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland. Scottish authorities released him in 2009 on
compassionate grounds after he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. He
still had a valid aircraft dispatcher certificate from the FAA.
``Holy cow,'' Schiffer said to himself.
In all, Schiffer and his company, Safe Banking Systems of New York,
confirmed eight matches between FAA-approved airmen and various watch
lists.
``The results were as unexpected as they are chilling,'' Safe
Banking Systems said in a June 2009 report distributed to nearly 40
lawmakers and top government officials, including the FAA administrator
and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
But no one responded until a New York Times reporter asked the
Transportation Security Administration about the certified airmen with
terror ties listed in the Safe Banking Systems report. The following
day, in June 2009, the TSA advised the FAA to revoke airman certificate
for six of the eight names that SBS gave to the reporter.
The Department of Homeland Security's inspector general, in an 18-
month investigation released in July 2011, found that the TSA's ability
to screen airmen for national security threat is hampered by the
quality of information the FAA provides. The TSA could not properly vet
thousands of airmen because of missing or inaccurate data within the
FAA's registry, according to the report. From 2007 to 2010, the TSA
recommended the revocation of 27 licenses, but the number would likely
have been larger had all of the information been complete.
The inspector general also found that the TSA doesn't screen for
broader criminal activity, allowing airmen who ``have outstanding
warrants or are known fugitives'' to escape detection. The IG said that
one U.S.-approved pilot was actually a ``drug kingpin'' serving 20
years in a foreign prison.
Since then, the TSA and FAA have stepped up their screening for
national security threats, reviewing the FAA database four times a year
to ensure accuracy.
The Spotlight Team wanted to check whether the heightened scrutiny
has improved the FAA's record in preventing bad actors from having
pilot's licenses. At the request of the Globe, Safe Banking Systems
tested the public part of the airman registry and again found problems.
Running the same name-matching program in January 2017, SBS found
five active airmen on watch lists with possible ties to terrorism or
international crime, including Tairod Nathan Webster Pugh, a former Air
Force mechanic who bought a one-way ticket to Turkey in 2015. His
packed bags included flash drives with maps, a letter to his wife about
jihad, and his Federal Aviation Administration airman certificate,
according to court records. When he was arrested, Pugh was headed to
Syria to offer himself as an aircraft mechanic.
In May, Pugh was sentenced to 35 years in prison for attempting to
provide material support to the Islamic State, though he is appealing.
On Aug. 1, Pugh's name still appeared on the FAA's list of active
airmen. But Pugh was removed by Sept. 1, days after the Globe requested
his records. FAA officials now say that Pugh's license was actually
revoked in 2015, though on Friday, they could not explain why his name
continued to be on the active list for another two years.
In addition, SBS turned up a long-time American Airlines mechanic
who attempted to broker a deal that would have moved seven Airbus A300s
to Iran, which the United States has identified as a state sponsor of
terrorism; a Florida businessman who was planning on illegally shipping
navigation systems used for steering planes, ships, and missiles to
Turkey; and an Irish pilot sanctioned by the U.S. Office of Foreign
Assets Control for his connections to a company and plane that were
also sanctioned. The mechanic and Florida businessman both have been
released from prison, while the Irish pilot has not been charged with a
crime.
In August, when the Globe requested information about the airmen
identified by SBS, FAA records contained no indication that any of the
five had faced FAA enforcement action.
``Have things really changed? Does the government know who they are
dealing with?'' said David Schiffer, Safe Banking Systems' chief
executive officer (and Mark Schiffer's father). ``The fact that some
are licensed while still incarcerated is unbelievable. We certainly
view this as a very serious threat to national security.''
A history of deceit
Long before the crash in Denmark, Nader Haghighi had spent years
duping the FAA. When his name came across the desk of federal
investigator Robert Mancuso in late 2008, Haghighi had already racked
up a significant criminal record for stealing a plane, had had his
pilot's license revoked, and had even been deported from the United
States in 2006, according to federal investigative reports and court
records. And the FAA was receiving two new calls per month about
Haghighi's scams.
Mancuso, a special agent for the U.S. Department of Transportation
Inspector General's Computer Crimes Unit, began investigating a report
that Haghighi had tried to illegally obtain a pilot's license on-line
using Daniel George's name. Mancuso quickly discovered that George was
just one more victim of a con man who used at least a dozen aliases and
falsely claimed to have a degree from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and a job at Lockheed Martin.
But Haghighi made a mistake when he initially tried to get George's
license. He had collected George's personal information when he hired
the professional pilot to fly a plane for him. But when Haghighi
entered the stolen information on-line to get a copy of George's
license, Haghighi neglected to change the e-mail address on the
account, so George received notification about the new license and
contacted the FAA. The agency intercepted the certificate before it was
sent out.
And Mancuso thought that was the end of it, though he kept
investigating Haghighi.
Then, when Haghighi crashed with George's license in his possession
a few years later, Mancuso made a stunning discovery: Haghighi had
found yet another way to get a license. He called the FAA directly,
posing as George and complaining that he had never received the
certificate he had requested weeks earlier. The FAA, without further
investigation, mailed out new copy to Haghighi's post office box in
Texas, something an FAA employee told Mancuso was ``not uncommon for
our office to do, based on a phone call from the airman.''
``I was shocked,'' said Mancuso, who traveled to Denmark to testify
against Haghighi. ``I assumed that some type of fraud alert would be
placed on Mr. George's record to prohibit this from happening,
especially when it was sent to the same bad address.''
The FAA said pilots today can no longer request duplicate
certificates by telephone, but they can get them on-line or by mail.
During his trial in Denmark, Haghighi tried yet another scam,
insisting that his real name wasn't Haghighi or George but the one on
another passport recovered from the crashed plane. But the judge didn't
believe him and sentenced Haghighi to 10 months in prison for
endangering passengers, including children, flying without a valid
license or a required co-pilot on multiple occasions.
Even then, Haghighi was not through tricking the FAA. A year after
his release from prison, in February 2014, he contacted the agency to
secure another medical certificate, which is needed for pilots to fly.
On his application, he changed his name from ``Sabouri'' to
``Saboori'' and his birth year from 1972 to 1973. According to a U.S.
Department of Transportation investigative report, Haghighi lied
repeatedly on the form, claiming that he had not visited a medical
professional in three years, even though emergency responders had found
him unconscious inside a crashed plane just two years earlier.
His word was good enough for the FAA, which gave Haghighi a new
certificate that he promptly used to land a job with Susi Air, an
Indonesian airline.
Flying again
Haghighi is an extreme example, but his case is by no means
isolated. At least one other pilot on the FAA registry, Re Tabib, won
his license back after he went to prison for attempting to smuggle
aircraft parts to Iran and was formally declared a security threat by
the TSA.
In 2006, federal officers seized thousands of aircraft parts, some
packed in suitcases, and ``shopping lists'' from the California home of
Tabib, an Iranian-born FAA certified pilot. He was arrested on charges
of attempting to illegally export parts for F-14 Tomcat jets to Iran.
Tabib, a veteran airman who at one time piloted private flights for
the designer Gianni Versace pleaded guilty and served time in federal
prison from July 2007 until January 2009. Yet, according to court
records, the FAA issued him an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, the
highest-level license for pilots, just three months after his release,
allowing him to fly large jets.
Unlike other pilots with a criminal record, Tabib made no attempt
to hide his past, alerting the agency about his felony conviction on an
application form that calls on candidates to disclose any previous
arrests or convictions. But the FAA--which can suspend flying
privileges for anyone with an ATP license it judges not of ``good moral
character''--did not revoke or suspend his license.
As of August, FAA records revealed no incidents or enforcement
records connected to Tabib. The agency declined to comment further on
Tabib's case but said it examines possible violations of the ``good
moral character'' standard on a case-by-case basis. The agency said
that a criminal conviction is not automatic grounds for action against
an ATP license.
In June 2009, just months after Tabib received his new certificates
from the FAA, Safe Banking Systems, the New York fraud detection
company, matched Tabib's name to public watch lists and passed it along
with others to The New York Times.
The TSA responded to the story by advising the FAA to revoke
Tabib's certificate. Tabib's airman certificates gave him ``insider
access'' that, combined with his connections to Iran, could render him
a security threat, according to a 2010 decision by an administrative
law judge.
Tabib fought the decision for years and finally reached a
settlement with the TSA in 2012. His attorney, Robert Schultz, said the
law permitting the TSA to revoke airman licenses is unconstitutional
because it treats airmen as presumed guilty without proper due process.
``Mr. Tabib was a professional pilot who was denied the right to
earn a living for years based on mere suspicion,'' Schultz said,
referring to the TSA threat assessment. Last year, the FAA issued him
new commercial pilot and flight instructor certificates.
This time, Tabib's name was kept out of the FAA database of active
airmen that the public can download to review the full list of pilots
and mechanics. As a result, his name did not appear this year when Safe
Banking Systems checked for airmen who had been on terror watch lists.
More than 350,000 airmen were excluded from the public database at
their request.
Recent social media posts show Tabib in front of a King Air C90
turboprop aircraft. A photo from this spring shows him wearing an
aviation headset in the cockpit of a plane at the Azadi airport in
Iran. His Facebook page says he's now a flight instructor and pilot at
John Wayne Airport in Orange County, Calif. Tabib is flying again.
Con air
Mario Jose Donadi-Gafaro, a U.S.-licensed pilot, died along with
six others in a horrific plane crash in Venezuela in 2008 when his
plane plummeted into a bustling neighborhood a few minutes after
takeoff. He never made a distress call, and questions still remain nine
years late about the cause of the accident.
But another mystery is how Donadi-Gafaro, a pilot who also
moonlighted as a drug trafficker, kept a U.S. pilot's license as long
as he did.
Donadi-Gafaro's criminal career began at least a decade before the
crash. His initial U.S. felony drug conviction in 1999 for importing
cocaine into Miami International Airport should, under FAA rules, have
immediately triggered agency scrutiny of his license.
But even after the pilot was convicted a second time--this time in
Venezuela--in 2006 for attempting to transport cocaine on an aircraft,
the FAA did not revoke Donadi-Gafaro's license instead, the agency gave
him a promotion. He applied for and was issued his Air Transport
Pilot's License, the gold standard of U.S. airmen ratings, on July 23,
2007. Almost a decade after the crash in Venezuela that killed him, the
FAA still listed Donadi-Gafaro as an ``active'' pilot, including him in
its database as recently as March 2016.
The agency finally deactivated his license in 2016 after the Globe
began asking questions about it. The FAA declined to comment on whether
Donadi-Gafaro had reported his conviction, saying that information is
protected under the Privacy Act.
``We don't know who they are''
A frustrated John Mica held up a plastic card as he addressed a
2016 hearing of his House subcommittee on the topic of ``securing our
skies.'' The card, borrowed from then-Representative Tammy Duckworth, a
pilot, was an example of a modern FAA certificate.
``An airline pilot has access to the controls, flying the plane,''
said Mica, but a U.S. pilot's license lacks basic security features and
includes only a decorative picture. ``The only photo on this license
are the Wright brothers, Orville and Wilbur. Orville and Wilbur, I blew
it up here. OK?''
To make his point, the congressman held up an entry pass for Disney
World. The card, decorated with Minnie Mouse, has a magnetic strip that
is capable of linking identities to fingerprints. This allows Disney to
track when cardholders enter or leave the park. The FAA license is
primitive by comparison.
``This is Minnie Mouse,'' said Mica, referring to the Disney pass.
Then, nodding to Duckworth certificate in his other hand, he added,
``and this is Mickey Mouse.''
Congress long ago called on the FAA to implement significant
changes. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
mandated not only pictures of pilots, but also that pilot licenses
include biometric capabilities such as fingerprints or iris scans.
``Fifteen years later, we see a system that has not complied with
the laws that we have passed multiple times,'' said Mica. ``We have
pilots that are flying planes. We don't know who they are.''
The FAA said that it has made some improvements. In 2003, the
agency switched from paper licenses to new ``security-enhanced airman
certificates,'' the FAA said. The plastic documents include an FAA seal
and, according to the FAA, are resistant to tampering, alteration, and
counterfeiting.
But lawmakers have repeatedly challenged the agency on why the FAA
has not followed congressional mandates regarding the licenses. Mica,
in particular, voiced his concern publicly about the licenses in
letters and hearings in 2010, 2011, 2013, and most recently, last year.
In 2017, the former congressman says he's still concerned about the
lack of progress and failure to have a ``credible'' document.
``We tried to get them to comply, but they never did fully
comply,'' Mica said. ``Any credit card in your wallet has better
capability.''
Many pilots and flight instructors opposed the photo IDs, some
complaining that it could add to the cost of licensing without
improving national security. In written comments to the FAA, pilots
said the photo on the license was unnecessary because they are already
required to carry other photo IDs--and because airport officials never
ask to see pilot certificates anyway.
``Many of our members describe this effort as `security theater,'
putting a photograph on a document that authorities never ask for,''
said Doug Stewart, chairman of the Society of Aviation and Flight
Educators, in a 2011 letter.
``What is most critical in the issuance of an FAA pilot certificate
from a security standpoint is the accurate establishment of the pilot's
identity, background descriptors, and qualifications,'' wrote Robb
Powers, chairman of the national security committee at the Air Line
Pilots Association, International. ``Presently, FAA does not verify the
identity of the person requesting a pilot certificate other than
through visual inspection of the individual's driver's license or
passport.''
As of last month, the agency said it, along with the Department of
Transportation, is ``still evaluating options for including a photo,''
a project expected to cost about $1 billion.
While the FAA has pondered additional security requirements for
more than a decade, special interest groups have worked to quietly
relax regulation for pilots. In a victory for advocates of general
aviation, Congress eased the medical requirements for pilots seeking a
basic license, requiring only a visit to the family doctor and
participation in an on-line course provided by th Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association. And the FAA reauthorization bill now in the Senate
includes an amendment to roll back some commercial pilot training
requirements enacted after a 2009 regional airline crash that killed 50
and was blamed on pilot error.
``What a nightmare''
Early into his new job, officials at Susi Air in Indonesia grew
suspicious of Nader Haghighi an discovered that his passport number
belonged to someone else. They alerted the United States.
Robert Mancuso, the Department of Transportation investigator who
tracked Haghighi for years as the con man fooled authorities while
using many aliases, including Nader Schruder, learned about the latest
escapade and sent an e-mail to FAA officials.
``Hello all! It's my yearly e-mail regarding Mr. Nader Schruder. He
seems to have popped back up in Indonesia with his revoked FAA
certificate . . . Can you also run a search for any pilots with the
name `Nader Ali Saboori' to make sure he doesn't have another
certificate.''
The FAA responded the next day: ``I do show a record for SABOORI;
Nader Ali with a First Class Medical certificate issued 2/27/14 . . .
It's probably the same airman.''
Haghighi soon after found himself without a job. He left Indonesia
and was detained during a stopover in Panama after U.S. authorities put
out an alert. In November 2014, Haghighi pleaded guilty in U.S.
District Court in Houston to four counts of identity theft.
George, the man whose identity Haghighi stole, wrote a letter to
the judge detailing the personal toll--hundreds of thousands of dollars
in lost revenue from potential pilot position and thousands of hours
spent trying to figure out where Haghighi would turn up next.
``What a nightmare this man has been to me personally and
professionally,'' George wrote.
After Haghighi was released from federal prison in October 2016, he
was deported to his native Iran--ending roughly 15 years of deception.
``It's sad it went on this long. He was putting the public's life
in danger,'' said Mancuso, now a special agent at another federal
office of the inspector general.
Haghighi, in Facebook messages to a Globe reporter, expressed no
remorse for his behavior and described the FAA in bluntly critical
terms: ``know the right person, pay the right amount in a right way and
then the sky turns green.''
The Globe could find no evidence that Haghighi has a U.S. pilot's
license today, but a Facebook photo update in March suggests he hasn't
given up hope: He was smiling from the cockpit of a plane with his hand
inches away from the controls.
Q: How could the man on the bottom steal--and use--the pilot's license
of the man on the top?
A: U.S. pilot's licenses don't include photos of the pilots, a big
advantage for an experienced con man like Nader Ali Sabouri Haghighi.
This investigation was made possible through the Spotlight
Investigative Journalism Fellowship, funded by Participant Media, Open
Road Films, and FirstLook Media. The fellowship provides journalists
the opportunity to pursue their own in-depth investigation with the
help of the Globe Spotlight Team. Jaimi Dowdell can be reached at
[email protected]. Kelly Carr can be reached at
[email protected]. JennAbels01 can be reached
[email protected]. For more information about the Spotlight
fellowship, go to www.spotlightfellowship.com. Globe staff members
Jonathan Saltzman, Lisa Tuite, and Todd Wallack also contributed to
this report.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. So I will do that. I will look
forward to suggestions. I know it is difficult for some of the
agencies to come forth with suggestions over the boundaries,
but I honestly think given the time period and the results it
would seem FAA isn't just isn't gonna do this. So we have to, I
think particularly this committee have to give TSA more
authority and oversight to review this serious issue. So thank
you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask
unanimous consent for Congresswoman Jackson Lee to be allowed
to sit at the dais and to ask questions at today's hearing?
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Watson Coleman, you are recognized for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Jackson Lee.
Mr. Katko. Ms. Jackson Lee, you are recognized for 5
minutes of questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, let me thank you for the
courtesy of the Chairman and the Ranking Member and also the
courtesy of extending to me the opportunity to be with you this
morning. Forgive me for being delayed at another meeting, but I
thought this was very important for several reasons, and I have
a number of questions.
But my first question is have you all made an assessment of
the conditions as relates to security at the airport in Puerto
Rico, San Juan in particular? Not sure whether we have
discussed that already, but the conditions are of a level of
humanitarian crisis.
I understand there may be a thousand people or more at the
airport. Have you sent additional personnel? What is the level
of security at that airport?
Then can I ask you on a just a side issue, we have had a
briefing from a number of our Members of Puerto Rican descent,
and it is imperative that you convey back to Secretary Duke,
Chief of Staff Kelly, that there is a humanitarian crisis and
there is need for immediate action even today.
I want to put on record there should be some kind of
military czar. Obviously you are civilians established and as
well the C-130's can probably land on the airport delivering
food and medicine, which is what is their desperate need.
So you might comment as well as you will convey that aspect
of it but the question would be have you assessed since we are
talking about aviation security, global whether you have had an
assessment or there is an assessment going on, on the
conditions at the airport in Puerto Rico because of the
vulnerabilities that are there?
I will let you answer that. I am looking--I will let you
answer that and let me follow up with another question.
Mr. Lynes. Yes, thank you. Puerto Rico does have a TSA
Federal security director because it is what we consider a
domestic airport. It falls outside of my remit. I am not sure
of the exact details of the current status.
TSA has stood up its Critical Incident Management Group,
which is monitoring the situation to provide any needed
assistance from the TSA assets. So I am sorry. I would have to
take that back and get some further information for you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So would you be willing to take it back as
well as my addendum regarding the immediate crisis that needs
to be responded to? Obviously, Homeland Security is the
supervising agency that can collaborate with the U.S.
Department of Defense. Would you convey that back please?
Mr. Lynes. I would, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Sir, from the CBP, conditions there that
you are working with?
Mr. Owen. Yes, we have officers on the ground that have
been working for full employee accountability to make sure our
employees have come through the storm. We have done an initial
assessment on the Federal inspection site at the San Juan
airport. The area that we work in is in where we process the
international.
There has been some damage there, but it is not as
significant--saw much greater damage in St. Thomas and St.
Croix as a result of the earlier storm. So we do have officers
on the ground that are working toward that mission. But for the
larger point we will take that back to the Department, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Great. Ms. Grover, unless you want to
answer. I don't know whether you----
Ms. Grover. Nothing to add, thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Let me additionally thank the
TSA and CBP for their service to the Nation. I usually always
start with that and the excellent work that you all are doing.
Particularly to the Transportation Security Administration, it
is important to convey because I remember the very thorny start
that you had because we were so unused to it. Please let the
men and women there know, because they are the first
encountering, how much I appreciate their service.
So my last question has to do with the enhanced ban, which
I think takes a lot of resources. I am not sure how effective
the ban is adding these additional nations. What are you
crafting? Are you going in to get a different matrix dealing
with these expanded numbers? Are you needing expanded
resources? Will you be using additional intelligence?
The last point, do you feel that you are at a high level of
accountability on aviation security throughout the Nation's
domestic airports?
Mr. Katko. If I may interject for just one moment? This was
covered thoroughly, so if you would do it in a summary fashion,
that would be helpful. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Owen. Yes, ma'am. In terms of the new travel ban, CBP
is involved with the implementation at the airport. So we were
not involved with the formulation. I can't speak to that. But
what I can speak to is that it will be a very smooth
implementation. Those that have valid travel documents will
continue to be allowed for travel.
There is a graduation, a graduated roll-out for certain
countries as part of this. Really the emphasis becomes at time
of application for a visa and that falls within the State
Department.
But at the U.S. airports it will be a very smooth
implementation. If there is valid travel document they will be
allowed to come into the country. We will not see the issues
that we saw back in late January.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Anything with TSA?
Mr. Lynes. No. From the perspective of--you asked about the
ban. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security statement
on the travel ban.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Anything Ms. Grover?
Ms. Grover. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Before we conclude I just want to ask a question of both
Mr. Lynes and Ms. Grover for information that both Mrs. Watson
Coleman and myself would like to have quickly, and that is as
the subcommittee continues its oversight and due diligence in
assessing the National aviation threats, especially at LPD
airports, it is very helpful for us to see which specific
airports are of concern.
Now, we touched on some of those today. I understand the
sensitivity of this information. That is why we didn't get into
it in an open setting. That is why I am requesting that TSA
provide to the committee in writing a ranking of the 10 worst
LPD airports in terms of security and the reasoning for the
poor ranking.
I also asked Ms. Grover to provide information that she has
regarding those airports that are either not meeting ICAO
standards or are having troubles meeting those ICAO standards
and provide as much detail as you can on those. I ask that both
of you produce that information to us within 5 business days.
Is that doable?
Ms. Grover. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Lynes.
Mr. Lynes. Yes, Congressman, I do believe that we have
provided some of those details from the FAA Extension Safety
and Security Act of 2016. Our agency was required to produce a
report. If you have not already received that, I will make sure
that you get that.
Mr. Katko. But it is not just a report I want. We
specifically asked about the 10 worst LPD airports in terms of
security and the reasoning for the poor ranking, as well as
those that are struggling to meet the ICAO standards. All
right?
Mr. Lynes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. I would like to thank all
of the witnesses for their testimony today. It was extremely
helpful as always. We are all on the same page here.
That is one thing I love about this subcommittee and this
Homeland Security as a whole. It is about as bipartisan as you
can get because keeping this country safe is about as
bipartisan an issue as you can have. That is why it is very
rewarding to work on this committee.
Members of the committee may have additional questions for
witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will be
open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Craig Lynes
Question 1a. In your testimony, you mentioned that TSA ``invite[s]
select foreign Government aviation security personnel to participate in
some of our own training programs such as FAMs training.'' How does TSA
choose which countries to invite for training programs?
Question 1b. How does TSA vet individuals participating in the
training?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) offers a
number of training opportunities to its foreign counterparts which meet
the requirements under the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Annex 17. This includes train-the-trainer programs such as those
to assist in the development of sustainable in-flight security officer
programs. In this specific reference, countries selected to participate
must have a current air marshal program with a concept of operations
comparable to the TSA's Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) and
available funding to pay the participants' travel costs if training is
conducted domestically, or TSA's cost if it is to occur overseas.
Question 2. On September 24, President Trump announced his revised
travel order which indefinitely bans entry for nationals from eight
countries, including Venezuela, which is home to three last-point-of-
departure airports. The White House stated that Venezuela was included
because the Venezuelan government is ``uncooperative in verifying
whether its citizens pose National security or public-safety threats''
and does not share ``terrorism-related information adequately.'' Given
these concerns, what is the Trump administration's rationale for
continuing to allow direct flights to the United States from Venezuela?
Answer. As noted in Proclamation 9645 of September 24, 2017,
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists and Other Public Safety
Threats, the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined that
Venezuela has been uncooperative in verifying whether its citizens pose
National security or public-safety threats. In addition, the Venezuelan
government has failed to share public-safety and terrorism-related
information adequately, and has been assessed to be not fully compliant
with regard to the acceptance of its nationals who are subject to final
orders of removal from the United States. The entry restrictions and
additional vetting requirements established by the President are
necessary to prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom
the U.S. Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks
they pose to the United States; elicit improved identity-management and
information-sharing protocols and practices; and advance U.S. foreign
policy, National security, and counterterrorism objectives.
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, DHS has reasonable confidence
in our ability to verify Venezuelan nationals' identity, which
contributes to our aviation security efforts. In addition to
information provided directly by foreign partners, the U.S. Government
has an array of data sources at its disposal to assist with vetting and
screening of Venezuelan nationals regardless of whether they arrive in
the United States on direct flights from Venezuela. Therefore, we have
determined that direct flights from Venezuela to the United States can
continue. As articulated in the Proclamation, the restrictions imposed
on Venezuela focus on government officials of specified agencies who
are responsible for the identified inadequacies rather than the
Venezuelan general public.
Question 3a. What steps can TSA take when it finds that a foreign
airport or air carrier is not meeting security standards?
If a last-point-of-departure airport fails an assessment and
neither the airport or host government can absorb the cost associated
with correcting the cause of failure, what happens to the airport?
Question 3b. Is the air carrier responsible for the costs?
Answer. When the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
determines that a foreign airport or air carrier is not meeting
security standards, TSA will work with the appropriate authorities in
the host country to address and properly mitigate any identified
security deficiencies through training, instruction, or capacity
development where resources and political partnership will allow.
If the assessment of the last-point-of-departure airport results in
significant findings which indicate that a condition exists that
threatens the safety and security of aviation transportation to or from
that airport, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, may determine if further Secretarial action is
warranted. Secretarial action may include: 90-day action to give the
host country time to improve security measures; public notification;
imposition of operating authority conditions; or suspension of service
for applicable air carriers operating to/from that location.
In locations where resources do not facilitate the ability of the
host country to absorb the cost of improving security measures, it may
be incumbent upon air carriers operating from that location to absorb
costs associated with meeting TSA-issued security directives and
emergency amendments, in accordance with the requirements of the air
carrier's approved security program.
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Todd C. Owen
Question 1. With a CBP officer vacancy of 1,335 funded positions
and, according to CBP's own CBP Officer Workload Staffing Model
documenting a need to fund and hire an additional 2,100 CBP officers,
how will CBP be able to staff these two new preclearance locations that
CBP has recently signed agreements with Punta Cana and Stockholm and
the up to 10 additional preclearance locations by 2024?
Answer. Preclearance locations hire experienced journeyman officers
for its overseas locations, which allows for a more expedient and
flexible hiring process than that of onboarding a new officer. Thus,
preclearance will be able to staff any new locations--including Punta
Cana and Stockholm--within agreed-upon time lines for operations
following entry into force of the agreements.
Staffing the front line with well-qualified individuals of the
highest integrity and capability remains a top mission support priority
for CBP. CBP will maintain the hiring surge that has been in effect
since fiscal year 2014. In the last 2 years, CBP has made significant
improvements, including the implementation of an expedited hiring
process, to reduce the average time-to-hire from 469 days in January
2016 to fewer than 300 days. As of April 2017, CBP is applying this
expedited process to all applicants and we expect it to continue to
significantly decrease the new hire process.
Question 2. Will CBP be diverting CBP officers from already
extremely short-staffed U.S. ports of entry to staff new preclearance
ports?
Answer. Preclearance does hire its journeyman officers from our
U.S. ports of entry, as well as from Field Operations program offices.
However, precleared flights from these foreign airports land at U.S.
domestic terminals, decreasing workload requirements at U.S. domestic
air ports of entry. Furthermore, a portion of the operational cost to
post CBP officers at these future locations will be covered by the host
nation airport operator as well as through routine user fee
collections, allowing CBP to hire at its domestic U.S. ports of entry
in order to backfill a portion of new Preclearance assignments.
Question 3a. Earlier this summer, we learned of deeply troubling
allegations of misconduct by CBP Officers at Newark Liberty
International Airport. We were told that 11 CBP employees at this
airport, including three supervisors, were placed on administrative
duty and that their firearms, badges, and access to sensitive databases
were suspended meanwhile DHS' Office of the Inspector General
investigated the allegations. In September, we were notified that three
of these accused CBP officers were arrested on charges of forcibly
assaulting and intimidating fellow officers. Can you please tell us
when CBP's headquarters first learned of these allegations at Newark
and its response?
Answer. CBP Headquarters became aware of the alleged misconduct in
Newark on or about January 23, 2017, when the allegations were reported
via email to CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). In
accordance with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy, the
information was immediately forwarded to the DHS Office of Inspector
General (OIG), which opened an investigation.
Question 3b. Does CBP have any recent or new information about any
similar allegations of misconduct among its employees at other ports of
entry?
Answer. Review of the CBP OPR Joint Intake Case Management Systems
did not identify any additional allegations involving ritualistic
hazing by one or more CBP employees as alleged in this case.
Question 3c. What specific steps has CBP taken to determine whether
similar improper conduct has occurred at other locations?
Answer. CBP takes all misconduct allegations seriously. As such,
CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) has a program manager assigned to
CBP Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) who also reviews the
Joint Intake Case Management System daily. This program manager also
serves as a liaison to OPR and Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
for OFO.
Question 3d. What specific actions are under way to prevent this
type of egregious misconduct from happening in the future?
Answer. Immediately after the alleged misconduct became known to
OFO, mandatory musters geared toward both managers and employees were
conducted to reiterate the standards of conduct and table of offenses
for unprofessional and disruptive behavior. OFO also maintains a robust
professionalism program at each Field Office. There are approximately
169 full-time Professionalism Service Managers (PSMs) Nation-wide. OFO
Headquarters conducts routine conference calls with all PSMs to discuss
topics of concern and best practices on how to avoid and address
unprofessional and disruptive behavior.
Question 4a. The Obama administration identified, based on risk, 21
expansion priority locations around the world for the Preclearance
security program. Two locations, Sweden and the Dominican Republic, are
in the agreement phase of negotiations but, no new agreements have been
executed. Since January, have there been any meetings or discussions
with the other 19 selected locations? Are any agreements in the
pipeline?
Answer. CBP continues to engage in discussions and take part in
negotiations with the other prioritized locations for the establishment
of preclearance. Ultimately, before preclearance operations may begin
at any location, an agreement between the United States and the host
government which will permit air transport preclearance in the host
country must be signed and entered into force. Overall, CBP intends to
match the speed at which host countries and airports are willing to
move forward with negotiations and airport designs. Currently, CBP is
engaged in varying levels of discussion with a number of the
prioritized locations and our expectation is that more agreements will
be signed in the near future.
Question 4b. Does DHS plan to solicit additional expressions of
interest from foreign countries in the upcoming fiscal year? If not,
why not?
Answer. CBP remains committed to furthering our discussions and
engagement with the already selected prioritized countries from the
previous open seasons for the establishment of preclearance. CBP is
willing to discuss preclearance with any additional interested
locations, however, at this time another open season has not yet been
established.
Question 5a. In previous years, Congress was briefed on the
deployment of CBP Preclearance to the United Arab Emirates, and we were
told by the Department that the plan was for the program to be deployed
first to Abu Dhabi and then soon after to Dubai. As you know, the
latter has a greater volume of travelers, more travelers of possible
concern, and is served by U.S. air carriers. Is Dubai on the
administration's current priority list?
Answer. Although Dubai remains a priority location for CBP in the
establishment of preclearance, there are no U.S. air carries that fly
direct to Dubai. Currently Dubai is in the midst of a large airport
construction project for Al Maktoum International Airport. CBP will
continue to engage with the airport authorities.
Question 5b. Does DHS still plan to establish Preclearance in
Dubai?
Answer. Establishing preclearance in Dubai will require CBP to
enter into either a new agreement or amendments to the current
agreement with the host country. CBP continues to pursue preclearance
in Dubai, once Dubai meets the U.S. legal prerequisites for a
preclearance location.
Questions From Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for Jennifer Grover
Question 1. How are TSA's inspection authorities different for air
carriers and foreign airports and what implications does that have for
TSA's ability to impact aviation security?
Answer. Although TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct
foreign airport assessments at intervals it considers necessary, it may
not perform an assessment of security measures at a foreign airport
without permission from the host government. TSA also does not have
authority to impose or otherwise enforce security requirements at
foreign airports and, therefore, seeks to address security deficiencies
it identifies through capacity building, such as training of foreign
airport staff and on-site consultation, and working with U.S. and
foreign-flagged air carriers (i.e., air carriers) to implement security
measures, among other things. In contrast to the airport assessments,
TSA is authorized under U.S. law to place security requirements on air
carriers that service the United States and may take enforcement
actions if TSA determines through its air carrier inspection program
that carriers have failed to comply with the requirements.\1\ For
example, in June 2017, DHS announced new security requirements,
including heightened screening of personal electronic devices, for air
carriers operating last-point-of-departure flights to the United States
from foreign airports.\2\ Although we did not conduct work to
specifically answer whether differences in TSA's inspection authorities
have implications for TSA's ability to impact aviation security, we did
find that while TSA does not have authority to impose requirements or
compel action by host-government officials at foreign airports should a
deficiency be identified, TSA has exercised its regulatory authority
over both U.S. and foreign-flagged air carriers to mitigate identified
deficiencies or threats.
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\1\ See 49 U.S.C. 44903(c), 44906. See also 49 C.F.R. pts. 1544
and 1546 (imposing requirements on U.S. and foreign-flagged air
carriers, respectively).
\2\ See Security Directive 1544-17-01A, International Aviation
Security (July 13, 2017); Emergency Amendment 1544-17-01A,
International Aviation Security (July 13, 2017); and Emergency
Amendment 1546-17-02A, International Aviation Security (July 13, 2017).
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Question 2. What is the most important change that TSA has made in
its foreign airport assessment program since GAO's last review?
Answer. Since 2011, TSA has taken various steps to strengthen its
foreign airport assessment program, including better targeting program
resources based on risk, resolving airport access issues, making
evaluations more comprehensive, and creating operational efficiencies.
Some of the important changes that TSA has made in these areas include:
Better target program resources based on risk.--In 2013, TSA
established a working group to evaluate ways to better integrate risk
management in the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs. This working group developed a risk framework, which,
according to TSA documentation, provides a systematic approach for
analyzing risk at international airports, supports Office of Global
Strategies (OGS) decision making, and informs efforts to mitigate
security deficiencies. In 2015, OGS created the Analysis and Risk
Mitigation (ARM) Directorate, which formalized the risk mitigation
responsibilities of the working group and serves as the data analysis
and evaluation arm of OGS. OGS officials stated that ARM helps the
program focus its resources based on risk. For example, ARM analyzes
and prioritizes activities, such as training, that are designed to
mitigate security vulnerabilities at foreign airports.
Resolve airport access issues.--Since our 2011 review, TSA has
faced delays in scheduling some foreign airport assessments and
obstacles in obtaining full access to airport operations at certain
locations. According to TSA officials, TSA has used several tactics to
resolve access issues, including deploying the same inspectors over
multiple assessments to build rapport with foreign airport officials.
For example, in one country in the Western Hemisphere region, TSA's
access to airport operations was initially limited by the host
government. However, over time, TSA used a small pool of inspectors who
officials said were able to build trust with the host government and
gain better access, including the ability to conduct interviews of
airport officials and take photographs of the security environment.
Additionally, in 2011, we reported on TSA's challenges in obtaining
access to airports in Venezuela. Specifically, we reported that TSA had
not been able to assess airports in Venezuela or conduct TSA compliance
inspections for air carriers, including U.S. carriers, flying from
Venezuela to the United States since 2006. According to TSA officials,
in 2014, TSA regained access in Venezuela after establishing dialogue
with the new government in place and emphasizing the benefits of the
evaluation process.
Make evaluations more comprehensive.--In 2012, TSA developed job
aids that provide inspectors with a set of detailed areas to assess for
each foreign airport assessment standard. For example, a job aid for
passenger and cabin baggage screening includes several prompts related
to screening roles and responsibilities, the resolution process if a
suspicious item is detected, and alternative procedures if screening
equipment is not working as intended. According to TSA officials, these
actions have led to more comprehensive evaluations and a better
understanding of foreign airport vulnerabilities.
Create operational efficiencies.--In 2012, TSA developed the Global
Risk Analysis and Decision Support System (GRADS) to streamline the
assessment report writing process and strengthen TSA's data analysis
capabilities of its foreign airport assessment results. According to
TSA officials, GRADS has provided TSA personnel with a number of
benefits, including the ability to run standardized reports, extract
and analyze key data, and manage airport operational information, such
as data on security screening equipment. According to TSA
documentation, prior to 2012, the agency captured the results of its
foreign airport assessments in narrative form that often amounted to
more than 80 pages, hampering the ability to perform data analysis.
Question 3. How well is TSA doing at monitoring the results of its
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections?
Answer. TSA has taken a number of steps to strengthen its
analytical processes and better understand the impact of the foreign
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. For example,
since fiscal year 2012, TSA has held strategy meetings to address
aviation security threats and vulnerabilities within each of TSA's four
regions: Africa-Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Western
Hemisphere. During these meetings, TSA officials examine trend data for
both airport assessments and air carrier inspections, including
vulnerability ratings over a multi-year period, identify common areas
of non-compliance, and develop capacity-building approaches customized
to each region. Additionally, in 2016, TSA began producing regional
risk reports to provide TSA personnel operating within one of the four
regions with an understanding of known vulnerabilities and their
associated risk in order to inform mitigation-planning efforts. These
reports include such information as key risks at each location and
region-wide trends on vulnerabilities. While TSA has taken steps to
leverage the results of foreign airport assessments and air carrier
inspections to monitor system-wide vulnerabilities and inform capacity
development, TSA lacks key information for decision making. For
instance, we found that the Open Standards and Recommended Practices
Findings Tool (OSFT)--a database for tracking the resolution status of
identified foreign airport deficiencies--has gaps and its system for
categorization does not result in sufficient specificity of information
related to security deficiencies' root causes and corrective actions.
For example, we found that around two-thirds of fiscal year 2016
records in the OSFT exhibited empty fields pertaining to root cause or
recommended corrective action. We also found that the OSFT has
limitations related to the categorization of root causes and corrective
actions. TSA procedures indicate that root causes may relate to three
broad categories (lack of knowledge, lack of infrastructure, and lack
of will) and 12 subcategories: Aviation security infrastructure,
communication, cultural factors, human factors, management systems,
physical infrastructure, procedures, quality control, resources,
supervision, technology, and training. However, the OSFT does not
include a field to categorize root causes according to these
subcategories or other more specific areas. As a result, it does not
capture more granular information that would better explain the
specific root cause of an identified security issue.
Question 4. What are examples of the specific types of capacity
development that TSA offers to foreign airports?
Answer. TSA assists foreign airports in addressing identified
security deficiencies in a variety of ways. TSA inspectors work to
transfer knowledge on how to mitigate identified airport security
deficiencies to foreign airport officials and provide TSA program
officials with suggestions for capacity development that could be
effective in addressing these deficiencies. Specifically, TSA capacity
development assistance to foreign airports includes on-the-spot
counseling, training, technical assistance and consultation, and
provision of security equipment.
Inspectors counsel foreign airport staff on-the-spot.--According to
TSA officials, inspectors typically offer counseling during airport
assessments when they discover deficiencies, usually of an infrequent,
less serious, or technical nature, that can be addressed immediately.
For example, during a 2013 assessment of an airport in the Europe
region, inspectors observed a total of 53 employees within the
restricted area, of which one was not displaying his badge. Airport
officials immediately requested that the individual display his badge
and informed the TSA inspection team that they will remind all staff to
properly display their airport media while in the restricted area. For
the remainder of the airport visit, no badge display issues were noted.
In another example, during an assessment in the Western Hemisphere
region, inspectors observed persons entering a restricted area without
undergoing screening. The inspectors counseled the airport's security
officials on the importance of adhering to the airport's security
program, and observed the airport officials take immediate action by
implementing escort and screening procedures.
TSA provides security training.--TSA may provide training to
foreign airport staff to address deeper problems with staff security
knowledge or to strengthen staff knowledge in an evolving threat
environment. Training may take several forms, including traditional
classroom courses or interactive workshops, and can range in length
from 1 or 2 days to more than 1 week. Course topics include risk
management, screening operations, and airport security, with a broad
variety of sub-topics, such as insider risk, cargo security, and
inspection techniques. According to TSA, new courses are in development
to meet the changing security landscape. New course topics include
landside security, behavioral awareness, and the effective use of
canines.
TSA arranges for technical assistance and consultation.--TSA
assists foreign governments in securing technical assistance and
consultation provided by TSA and other U.S. and foreign government
agencies to help improve security at foreign airports, particularly
after security incidents or at airports in developing countries. For
example, after the 2016 terrorist attack on Brussels Airport, TSA was
invited by airport officials to provide on-site consultation during the
reconstitution of the airport facilities. In another example, TSA
provided a country in the Africa-Middle East region with on-site
technical assistance for configuring and testing explosives detection
equipment at baggage screening checkpoints. In addition, the Department
of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program augments TSA's resources
in building the aviation security capacity of foreign governments. For
instance, the Department of State provides recipient nations with
courses focused on airport security management, quality control, and
fraudulent document recognition as well as multi-day passenger and
cargo security consultations. In addition, with regard to capacity
development TSA collaborates with other countries. Partners may promote
common aviation security goals to other countries when political
considerations preclude TSA from doing so, or combine resources with
TSA for joint efforts. For example, in one collaboration, a country in
the Asia-Pacific region provided resources and facilities, while TSA
provided staff so that neighboring countries could attend aviation
security training.
TSA loans and donates security equipment.--TSA may loan or donate
security equipment such as explosives detection devices and metal
detection hand wands to lower-income countries. Since fiscal year 2012,
TSA has loaned X-ray screening equipment and explosives detection
devices to five countries. TSA may also provide staff at foreign
airports with demonstrations for using equipment that has been loaned
or donated by TSA, as well as equipment otherwise acquired by host
governments. For instance, in 2016 TSA provided operator training and
maintenance assistance to a country in the Africa-Middle East region
that had procured passenger body scanners.
Question 5. Given the strides that TSA made under the Obama
administration on addressing GAO's key findings at last-point-of-
departure airports, do you think that TSA has the resources to keep up
the level of compliance activities while executing new security
directives?
Answer. We did not conduct the work necessary to evaluate whether
TSA has sufficient resources to keep up the level of compliance
activities while executing new security directives.