    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          MORE THAN A NUCLEAR THREAT:
                      NORTH KOREA'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
                            AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                    AND THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 17, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-104

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
        Wisconsin                        ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 TED LIEU, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

                                     ------

                      Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

                         TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   AMI BERA, California
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Anthony Cordesman, Ph.D., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy,
      Center for Strategic and International Studies.................    11
    Mr. John Parachini, director, Intelligence Policy Center, RAND
      Corporation....................................................    45
    Mr. Anthony Ruggiero, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of
      Democracies....................................................    58
    The Honorable Bonnie Jenkins, founder and president, Women of
      Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation
      (former Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, Bureau of
      International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of
      State).........................................................    72

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Anthony Cordesman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.....................    13
    Mr. John Parachini: Prepared statement...........................    47
    Mr. Anthony Ruggiero: Prepared statement.........................    60
    The Honorable Bonnie Jenkins: Prepared statement.................    74

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................   100
    Hearing minutes..................................................   101
    The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
      Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................   102
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........   104

                          MORE THAN A NUCLEAR THREAT:
                      NORTH KOREA'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
                           AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2018

                         House of Representatives,

           Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and

                     Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho
    (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific)
    presiding.
        Mr. Yoho. The subcommittee will come to order. Chairman Poe
    got detained because of the weather, and I guess Texas isn't
    set up for equipment like that, deicing planes.
        Members present will be permitted to submit written
    statements to be included in the official hearing record.
    Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5
    calendar days to allow statements, questions and extraneous
    material for the record, subject to length limitations in the
    rules.
        Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman Poe for
    calling this hearing. It is such an important hearing to have
    in today's climate. And Ranking Member Keating, Ranking Member
    Sherman, and all other members of the subcommittee for
    gathering today to continue working on one of the most urgent
    security threats facing the United States.
        As we will hear from our witnesses today, the danger North
    Korea poses to the world is more than just its rogue nuclear
    program and ballistic missile brinksmanship. Pyongyang develops
    other weapons of mass destruction and backs them with
    significant conventional military capabilities.
        As his pursuit of chemical and biological weapons shows,
    Kim Jong-un commands tools of indiscriminate mass murder beyond
    nuclear weapons, and U.S. policy must be responsive to these
    threats as well.
        North Korea, one of only 6 countries that has not signed
    the Chemical Weapons Convention, is believed to have stockpiles
    of thousands of tons of chemical weapons, including sulfur,
    mustard gas, chlorine, sarin, and VX, some of the worst
    chemicals that mankind has devised. These agents could be
    delivered by a variety of North Korean weapon systems, notably
    the massed artillery deployed near the DMZ which would place
    Seoul at extreme risk.
        Experts believe North Korea would not hesitate to use such
    tactics as a way to make up the deficiency in its aging
    military and that such an attack could feasibly result in
    millions of civilian casualties in South Korea.
        Recent reports have also highlighted North Korea's
    continuing work on another longstanding WMD program, the
    production of biological weapons, including anthrax and
    smallpox. It has been known for some time that North Korea
    possesses the capability to produce anthrax for military
    purposes, and just last month, a Japanese newspaper reported
    that North Korea has begun experiments to load anthrax into
    ICBMs. Tellingly, this assertion is reiterated in the
    administration's recent national security strategy. The
    frightening truth is that we already have at least one data
    point to show that North Korea is ready and willing to use such
    horrific weapons to accomplish its goal.
        In early 2017, we all remember North Korean agents
    assassinated Kim Jong-nam, the half brother of Kim Jong-un,
    with VX nerve agent in Malaysia. This operation proved to the
    world not only that North Korea has access to chemical lethal
    weapons, but also the willingness and the expertise to
    transport and apply them in a targeted and sophisticated
    manner.
        Partly in response to this killing, the White House in
    November announced that it was redesignating North Korea as a
    state sponsor of terrorism in a large part due to Judge Poe and
    other members of this committee. An overdue step to remind the
    world that Kim's unlawful regime is an international pariah.
    But the threat remains.
        To backstop its asymmetric capabilities, North Korea also
    maintains the world's fourth largest standing army, with over 1
    million personnel, accounting for almost 5 percent of its total
    population. North Korea keeps its substantial conventional
    forces in a forward-deployed posture, keeping Korea and also
    Japan under constant threat.
        For example, even conservative estimates place hundreds of
    North Korean artillery tubes within range of Seoul, able to
    rain thousands of shells per minute down on the metropolitan
    area. These weapons could inflict enormous costs on South
    Koreans and the 230,000 Americans living in South Korea.
    Combined with chemical or biological payloads, the cost would
    be unimaginable even in the absence of nuclear weapons.
        North Korea's conventional, chemical, and biological
    weapons raise a number of questions that are too often
    overlooked in the congressional debate over our policies toward
    North Korea. North Korea's investment in these weapons may
    increase the cost of potential contingency and constrain U.S.
    strategic planning. They may give Kim Jong-un additional
    strategic options to escalate a conflict without using nuclear
    weapons and provoking regime-ending war.
        If North Korea truly wants to rejoin the international
    community in a meaningful and lasting way, the Kim regime will
    have to bring something to the negotiating table. Perhaps the
    regime's chemical, biological, and other weapons aimed solely
    at civilian populations might be a fitting place to start as we
    work toward the goal of full denuclearization.
        I look forward to working toward answers to these and other
    questions, and I thank the panel for joining us today to
    discuss this concerning topic.
        And without objection, the witnesses' written statements
    will be entered into the hearing record. And I now turn to the
    ranking member on TNT for any remarks he may have.
        Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Take it away.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
    the hearing today. One of President Obama's outgoing warnings
    to President Trump was about the threat posed by North Korea.
    And here we are.
        Today we are not talking about the nuclear threats. It is
    axiomatic, almost, the question theoretically that was posed to
    one of our first ladies once, saying, ``Other than that, Mrs.
    Lincoln, how did you enjoy the theater?'' But there are,
    indeed, other real threats posed by North Korea's non-nuclear
    weapons. As tensions rise and the rhetoric heats up about
    military options, we need to be having an honest, realistic
    conversation about the types of threats that we are facing from
    North Korea and the full range of options we must consider
    given the very real risk we face.
        Frankly, reports that the administration is considering
    quote, unquote,  deg.``a bloody nose strategy in North
    Korea'' is deeply concerning. War is not a matter of bloody
    noses. It is human lives, constant uncertainty, long-term
    challenges in our investments to achieve some amount of
    security. And we know all too well that this investment can
    easily take a generation because security is not just fighting
    the battle and then going home. It is also everything that
    comes afterwards. We know this because we are fast-approaching
    20 years of military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. That
    is because the instability produced by war is itself a threat.
        The chemical, biological, conventional and other non-
    nuclear threats posed by the North Korean regime are serious
    indeed. And it is our duty to come together in Congress to best
    ensure the safety of the American people. Whether we like it or
    not, if the President launches an attack on North Korea, we
    will need to make a decision on whether we will give him the
    authority to continue that military engagement.
        U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harris, who I had the
    opportunity to meet with when I visited the Pacific and South
    Korea roughly 1 year ago, was one of those voices we should
    listen to closely when it comes to formulating U.S. strategy in
    North Korea. So when Admiral Harris categorized diplomacy as
    the most important starting point, we should be taking a hard
    look in Congress at whether our diplomatic options truly are
    being pursued as aggressively as we can. Because protecting the
    American people does not automatically mean sending them to
    war, or worse yet, all but inviting an attack from a hostile
    regime.
        Before jumping to the military options, we need to be clear
    on what they look like and most importantly, the full range of
    diplomatic options that we have available to us.
        We need to be clear on our options because the options we
    choose will matter tremendously to our women and men in uniform
    and to their families and friends. It will matter to families
    living across the United States wondering if they might live
    within the blast radius where North Korea has the ability to
    strike here at home, and it will matter to the generations
    forced to clean up the mess left behind by what would
    inevitably be a long and complicated conflict on the Korean
    Peninsula.
        North Korea is likely not to go its way and follow
    international law on the use of chemical and biological
    weapons. It was not so long ago that another brutal regime used
    chemical weapons in the midst of a conflict. What does it mean
    to operate on a battlefield where chemical and biological
    weapons could be in play? What do the civilian casualties look
    like? Can these weapons be secured in the midst of an armed
    conflict, and if not, what types of the proliferation risks
    should we consider?
        All this, in addition to the concerns presented by North
    Korea's conventional forces. What could such a conflict breed
    in terms of the spillover effects into other countries. A
    military option should only be used when necessary and once
    there are no other effective options left on the table.
        So I am looking forward to discussing our other options
    today, our diplomatic options. And I thank the panel for being
    here to help us in that endeavor.
        Congress has already passed sanctions to deal with the
    threats from North Korea, so where is the diplomatic follow
    through? Where is our State Department? Where are our
    Ambassadors? The United States still does not have an
    Ambassador to South Korea in place. Our allies are not
    reassured by this administration's actions, and we are not even
    at the table as North and South Korea negotiate, even though
    our own security is also very much at stake.
        These are serious issues and we have very little
    information to understand and properly counter these threats.
    So we need to take stock of what we do have and what we have to
    do. We have long had strong allies and partnerships in South
    Korea, Japan and so many other countries that are similarly
    concerned by the threats posed by North Korea. When we face
    serious threats of this nature, such as nuclear threats from
    Iran, what have we done in the past? We worked closely in a
    coalition of partner nations.
        The women and men of the State Department have long been
    some of our strongest assets in representing the United States
    at the table to negotiate peace and to make it possible for
    Americans to sleep soundly at night. Under this administration,
    they have weakened our State Department and confused our
    allies. We should be concerned that once a leader, the United
    States is rapidly becoming a pariah on the international stage,
    and that does not make us safer.
        So I appreciate the witnesses being here. I hope to hear
    from you on what we could be doing, even in light of the
    challenging circumstances and alarming threats that we face.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Keating. Words well spoken, well
    meaning, and hopefully well taken as we go through this.
        Being the chair of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee, and Judge
    Poe is not here, I am going to turn to the ranking member, good
    friend, Mr. Brad Sherman from the State of California, who is
    the ranking member of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee. And it is
    important that everybody knows that the two committees have
    come together on this important topic.
        Mr. Sherman, thank you.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. And for many years our policy on
    North Korea has focused on its nuclear program. We have to make
    sure that we don't stumble into war. And I am concerned about
    the rhetoric that sounds like adolescent boys at a junior high
    school. The idea that we could bloody the nose of our adversary
    without risk to the Korean Peninsula and the world is absurd.
        In today's hearing, I look forward to hearing from our
    panel on chemical, biological and conventional weapons, but at
    least in my opening statement, I am going to also focus on the
    nuclear.
        I have cosponsored five bills, many of us have, that
    sanction and condemn North Korea. But I have also cosponsored
    the No Unconstitutional Strike Against North Korea Act, because
    we should not, by presidential fiat, be conducting military
    strikes and going to war with North Korea.
        We need a strong military to deter North Korean action, but
    we also need diplomacy. And diplomacy starts with reasonable
    objectives. I am old. I was here when North Korea had as one of
    its objectives just getting a nonaggression pact with the
    United States. We turned them down. Vice President Cheney
    imagined that we could have a righteous invasion of North
    Korea. Bad idea now. Bad idea then.
        We might very well look at the freeze-for-freeze
    initiative. We could suspend our military exercises in return
    for a verifiable freeze on North Korea's nuclear and missile
    testing and production--and I want to emphasize the word
    ``production'' because I don't think China has gone that far in
    its proposal--of both nuclear material and missiles, but also
    chemical and biological materials.
        To reduce the biological threat, we can ask North Korea to
    affirm that it will remain in the Biological Weapons
    Convention. We should encourage it in public health and
    agricultural dialogues to limit bioweapons. And as suggested by
    one of our witnesses, push a no-first-use pledge and give one
    ourselves with regard to chemical and biological weapons use.
    We need to prepare for chemical, biological, and nuclear
    weapons use in the Korean Peninsula because it may indeed
    happen.
        The idea that you can't reduce casualties from a nuclear
    strike because a nuclear strike is beyond our imagination, in
    its horror, is to say that there is no difference between
    100,000 casualties, 1 million casualties, and 5 million
    casualties. Likewise, when we look at the chemical threat from
    North Korea, we estimate it to have 2,500 to 5,000 tons of
    chemical agents. We see that the distribution, not only to our
    troops, but to relevant Korean civilians, of gas masks and more
    sophisticated countermeasures might well be the investment, not
    because it would render us invulnerable or our allies
    invulnerable to such an attack, but only because it would
    reduce casualties.
        Finally, two other points I want to make. One is, North
    Korea may soon be interested in selling its nuclear weapons or
    chemical or biological weapons. Roughly 10 years ago Israel
    destroyed a Syrian nuclear facility which seemed to have
    Iranian participation. That was all North Korean technology.
        North Korea will not currently sell its nuclear weapons
    because it needs a certain number of weapons to defend itself
    from us in their mind. But they will quickly in 1 year, 2
    years, 3 years, get to the point where they can afford to sell
    one or more nuclear weapons. They won't sell for a cost that a
    terrorist group can afford, but sovereign states can indeed
    produce a billion or several billion dollars, if that is the
    asking price.
        We need to work with China to make sure there are no
    nonstop flights between Iran and North Korea. I spoke to the
    President about this, President Obama about this, and he
    assured me that we were checking ships, but we have no way of
    stopping planes. China, however, can require refueling of any
    plane between those two countries.
        Second, we have to be willing to risk our trade
    relationship with China to get a level of cooperation from
    China on this issue that goes beyond the foreign policy
    decision that they have made. And if we are not willing to do
    that, then we are putting the profits of entities of Wall
    Street above the security of the American people. It is not
    something we haven't done before, but we continue to do it when
    it comes to the Korean issue.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments. Next, we will go to
    Mr. Chabot, who used to chair the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee,
    the previous chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And you are doing a
    fine job of it, maybe not as good as I did, but really good.
    No, just kidding.
        It was mentioned that we are not a part of the talks
    between South Korea and North Korea, and that is true. But I
    would argue that those talks are--it is blackmail, it is a
    fraud, it is a sham, in my view. South Korea is concerned that
    North Korea is going to screw up the Olympics for them and
    North Korea is going to get everything they can out of this, as
    they always do. We have had previous administrations, both
    Republican and Democrat, who have been suckered by the North
    Koreans time and time again.
        They promise to give up their nuclear program. We give them
    food, we give them oil. And it doesn't matter whether we are in
    six-party talks or whoever, all of the countries that deal with
    North Korea fall into line. We give them a bunch of stuff. They
    promise to behave. They don't behave.
        And now they have nuclear weapons which now can threaten us
    right here in the continental United States. They have chemical
    and biological weapons programs that they are proceeding for
    their conventional weapons programs, whether it is tanks or the
    artillery system that they have and how they can target Seoul,
    and us for that matter. It is horrendous that we have, we being
    the rest of the world, have allowed them to get to this point.
        The key to solving this whole thing, in my view, was/is
    continues to be China. China talks a good game. They act like
    they are going to do things, they are going to cooperate and
    rein in, and they get embarrassed by the regime, the North
    Korean regime on occasion, but they are not going to rein them
    in. They are helpful to them. They keep us and our allies off
    balance. And so even though they act like they are very
    disappointed, in general what North Korea does benefits China
    as much as it keeps them off guard to some degree.
        China is the key, and as long as China believes that we are
    not going to be serious with them about cutting them off
    basically, they benefit one heck of a lot more from trade and a
    relationship with us than we do from them. And until we get
    serious--previous administrations never got serious with China.
    I think there is at least the chance for this administration.
        I do believe this President, you know, went into it being
    very tough with China. And he listened to the Chinese
    leadership. And I think he has been too gullible, really, in
    believing what they are saying, and they pump him up and how
    great he is. And he listens, unfortunately. And that really is
    unfortunate, because this administration either gets tough with
    China who can lean on North Korea and get him to back down, or
    they don't.
        In which case, we have a nuclear North Korea now and one of
    these days something will happen, which the world will regret.
        So we are way past too late, but let's hope too late isn't
    here yet. And I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for those comments.
        Next we will go to Mr. Connolly from the State of Virginia.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I echo what Ben
    said. I was in Korea last year and went to the DMZ. And what
    really struck me was that the DMZ is to Seoul what Dulles
    Airport is to Washington, DC. It is virtually that close.
        Mr. Yoho. Yeah.
        Mr. Connolly. And so we need to be careful when we saber
    rattle, when we tweet, when we throw out threats, because it
    unsettles that part of the world. We have to be careful about
    how that is interpreted by the North Korean regime and how it
    can sometimes inadvertently strengthen that regime and its
    resolve to develop nuclear weapons. But most importantly, that
    there are 25 million people who live in Seoul who will be the
    first victims of a violent outbreak. The second victims will be
    in Japan.
        And so we need to be cognizant of that. That isn't to say
    don't be strong. Is it to say, however, we need to look at
    carrots as well as sticks, points of leverage to try to engage
    North Korea, even at the 11th hour, to try to get them to
    desist. And I think that ought to be the paramount goal of U.S.
    policy and the region, stay strong, but be willing to be
    engaged.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you. Next, we will go to Mr. Joe Wilson
    from South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The totalitarian
    regime in North Korea continues to threaten the United States
    and our allies by testing nuclear capabilities and intermediate
    to long range intercontinental ballistic missiles. We will not
    and should not tolerate the escalation by this rogue regime in
    North Korea.
        I am encouraged by the leadership of President Donald Trump
    and Ambassador Nikki Haley, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
    with Deputy Secretary of State, John Sullivan, for their
    commitment to demonstrating peace through strength, clearly
    expressing their commitment to keeping all options on the table
    when it comes to addressing the threat from North Korea,
    whether it be military, diplomatic or economic. We have a
    responsibility to protect families across the globe, but
    especially those of America, South Korea and Japan from this
    existential threat.
        As one of only two Members of Congress to have visited
    Pyongyang, I saw firsthand North Korea's fragile economy.
    Buildings without electricity, highways that were virtually
    empty, inflammatory propaganda posters threatening death to
    South Koreans and Americans, and an international airport that
    was scarcely used. When contrasted with the vibrant capital of
    South Korea, it is clear that the communist regime of North
    Korea is fragile. This is why I believe the sanctions on North
    Korea promoted by President Trump have been successful,
    resulting in recent talks between North and South Korea and
    North Korea agreeing to attend the Winter Olympics for the
    first time since 2006.
        I am grateful that President Trump is heeding the advice of
    military leaders, led by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, in
    taking the threat from North Korea seriously. The United States
    is fully prepared to handle this threat. And with the
    leadership of President Trump, Ambassador Nikki Haley, House
    Republicans and Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Ed Royce, we
    will be even more prepared in the future.
        I yield back my time.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for those comments. Next we will go to
    Mrs. Ann Wagner from Missouri.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both
    chairmen for hosting this important hearing today. Despite
    international pressure and a host of new sanctions, North Korea
    continues to develop nuclear weapons, but this should not be
    our only focus. We know that North Korea is not only
    miniaturizing a nuclear warhead for placement on a ballistic
    missile that can reach the continental United States, but also
    developing offensive chemical and biological weapons. These
    weapons are agents of terror, and change how we approach
    strategies to confront the North Korean regime.
        Meanwhile, our partners in the west appear blind to the
    chemical weapons attacks by enemies of freedom across our
    globe. Just this past weekend, there were reports of a chemical
    gas attack in Syria that injured civilians. The United States
    must take a clear stand against the use of chemical and
    biological weapons and find pathways to disrupt North Korea's
    weapons of development. I look forward to your testimony and
    the questions that will ensue.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I appreciate your comments. Next we
    will go to Mr. Dan Donovan from New York.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With so much focus on
    North Korea's growing nuclear weapons program, this hearing
    brings to light an alarming aspect of North Korea's arsenal
    that is ignored in the public discourse.
        North Korea has a disquieting stockpile of conventional,
    chemical, and biological weapons which could proliferate to
    terror organizations and pose a threat to our homeland. I held
    a hearing on this topic just last month as chairman of the
    Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness
    Response and Communications. So the information that we will
    gather here today will be enormously helpful for our ongoing
    Homeland Security activities.
        According to public documents and the Congressional
    Research Service, the U.S. may need to deploy up to 700,000
    troops in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
    That is several times more than the troop levels we deployed in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, the Pentagon estimates that
    20,000 civilians in South Korea alone could die each day of a
    war all before the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea.
        This is an incredibly dangerous situation, and that is why
    I am eager to learn from today's hearing. What we hear today
    will be useful to foreign policy, military preparedness and
    homeland security. It is our role as Members of Congress to
    apply this knowledge to strengthen America's defenses. And I
    thank the witnesses today for sharing their expertise with this
    panel and look forward to hearing your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments. Mr. Garrett from
    Virginia.
        Mr. Garrett. It is 2018, and we are shocked as a Nation to
    learn that slavery is still practiced in areas of the world,
    and yet, a player on the international stage and in the
    spotlight, North Korea is in the business, as it were, of
    literally selling its citizens into slavery. With this being
    the case, can we have any doubt that North Korea would engage
    and employ weapon systems that would wreak havoc upon civilian
    populations? In fact, by my understanding, the population of
    Seoul is roughly 8 million. The metro area is closer to 24
    million.
        And having spent time as a fire supporter and understanding
    the proper employment of cannon rocket and missile fires, and
    understanding history and the fact that two-thirds of all
    combat casualties inflicted by the United States military since
    the Civil War were inflicted with indirect fire, 20,000
    civilian casualties a day seems mild.
        And the question as to whether a regime that would sell its
    own people into slavery to line its thinly-lined pockets would
    use these weapons against foreign civilians seems not to be a
    question at all. But I think these very people who we seek to
    protect in the interest of humanity and human rights are the
    key, and I would look forward to hearing from you how the
    individuals who might employ these conventional weapon systems
    might be targeted so that we might see a better humanitarian
    circumstance and a safer world for all in Korea and beyond.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments. Mr. Dana Rohrabacher
    from California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I have been listening to everyone's
    comments. I had to grab a sandwich. That is all I've had all
    day. Let me just note just some reaction to some of my
    colleagues.
        With all due respect, we are talking about the worst, God-
    awful dictatorship in the world. And we are finding our time,
    however, our focus on attacking the President of the United
    States. Now, I don't care. This guy is our President. Yeah, he
    has got some eccentricities. You think you are going to make
    war any less by attacking him instead of the enemy, instead of
    this guy who has murdered his own family and murdered countless
    people to maintain power in Korea? No.
        These insults to our President, we should know when to make
    them and when not to. This is not the hearing to make those,
    especially considering the fact that what we have now is this
    very same communist dictator in South Korea talking about how
    to cooperate at least with the Olympics. Seems to me, the
    President calling him ``rocket man'' and ``I have a bigger
    button to push than he does,'' maybe had the positive impact,
    because that is what happens with gangsters. If you deal with
    them forcefully and you put them down, they will respond to
    that.
        Let me just note, the Democrat response when I first came
    here, which was a long time ago, during the Clinton
    administration, what was their response? Their response was to
    give $4 billion in order to curry favors with that dictatorship
    in North Korea. We gave them $4 billion worth of fuel. What do
    you think they used that $4 billion for? That is where they got
    the money to develop their nuclear weapon right now.
        Yeah, of course, people attacking our President even after
    the last President gave $150 billion to Iran. Oh, yeah. No, I
    am sorry. This was not the place to attack the President of the
    United States. And yes, we should be able to be critical of
    policy. But everybody knows his eccentricities and personality.
    You are not going to do any good for our country at the cause
    of peace in a situation like this, that will make sure that the
    dictatorship in North Korea knows that our President doesn't
    have support.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. Given the fact that my friend from California
    just went way over time, I would ask 30 seconds to respond?
        Mr. Yoho. I would rather wait till the end. I would like to
    get to the witnesses for the respect of them.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, the gentleman has said----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I would request that he be given the extra
    30 seconds to refute me. He always does.
        Mr. Yoho. We will do 30 seconds.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend.
        Mr. Yoho. We need to get on for the----
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend.
        Mr. Yoho [continuing]. Benefit of the witnesses.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. I find it ironic that in
    the midst of criticizing people for criticizing Mr. Trump, my
    colleague then goes on to criticize previous Presidents, all
    Democrats.
        I would simply assert that in a democracy, we get to
    criticize an administration. And thank God for that. That is a
    right not allowed in the North Korea regime. It is one still
    allowed here. And I, and my colleagues on this side of the
    aisle, intend to exercise it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for pointing that out because around
    the world we see so many people don't have that voice of
    dissension, and that is something we are blessed with in this
    country.
        Any other members seek recognition?
        Hearing none, we will go to our witnesses. Starting with
    the panel, Dr. Anthony Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair
    in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International
    Studies. He previously served in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and the State Department. And we thank you for your
    long public service to this country.
        Mr. John Parachini. He is the director of Intelligence
    Policy Center at RAND Corporation. Previously, Mr. Parachini
    served as executive director of the Washington Office of the
    Monterey Institute of International Study Center for
    Nonproliferation Studies. I look forward to hearing from you
    and all the other ones.
        Mr. Anthony Ruggiero is the senior fellow at the Foundation
    of Defense for Democracies. Prior, Mr. Ruggiero was a foreign
    policy fellow for Senator Marco Rubio, served in the Department
    of Treasury and State.
        And Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins is the founder and the
    president of the Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and
    Conflict Transformation. Ambassador Jenkins previously served
    as the Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs in the Bureau
    of International Security and Nonproliferation at the State
    Department.
        I want to thank all of you for being here, for taking your
    time to educate us. And out of these meetings come policy
    recommendations and ideas that we have seen implemented. And so
    these are very important hearings.
        And with that, you guys, I think, have been here enough to
    know how the light system works. You got green, yellow and red.
    Push your button before you speak so the microphone is on and
    Dr. Cordesman, we will start with you.
        Thank you.

     STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CORDESMAN, PH.D., ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR
      IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Mr. Cordesman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking members,
    members of the committee. We are talking about a range of
    threats which include two massive sets of conventional forces.
    Each of which is equipped to fight unconventional wars in very
    different ways and in unpredictable scenarios.
        We have biological capabilities in North Korea. I would
    caution the committee that almost all of the open-source data
    on agents, quantities, manufacturer and delivery systems are
    extremely unreliable. And that you should consult intelligence
    sources because all of what you see is, shall we say,
    inventive, in ways that are perhaps discouraging.
        But certainly, North Korea is moving to the point where it
    can get biological weapons with nuclear lethalities. It can use
    infectious biological agents. The days in which you could
    control biological agents, I think, quite frankly are over. The
    Australia controls, which once were controls, are now more of a
    shopping list in a cookbook in an international environment
    where very small and dual facilities can be rapidly converted.
        Chemical weapons lethality is perhaps much more
    questionable than many people realize, but it is also something
    you can easily manufacture and deliver. Within the other areas,
    you have precision-guided ballistic weapons, unmanned aerial
    vehicles, and cruise missiles. These can be used to destroy
    critical infrastructure, critical movement capabilities and
    communications capabilities. And in Korea, this presents very
    special problems, both because Seoul and the greater Seoul area
    is so close to the DMZ and because this is such a fragile
    country in comparison with many other countries. There also is
    cyber and that, too, presents a problem.
        I think the point that I would make that the committee
    needs to consider, casualties and direct casualties are not a
    real measure of what war can be. What we have seen in Syria,
    Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq shows that war fighting can have
    massive human consequences without using weapons of mass
    destruction.
        In the case of Syria, you have seen it move something like
    a third of the population, losing its home, its businesses,
    casualties which we can't count because of the number of people
    who have died. One of the members mentioned the population of
    Seoul. It is actually over 25 million in the greater Seoul area
    and over 10 million in the urban area. It is concentrated in
    areas near a massive set of artillery emplacements. The models
    I have seen generally only focus on two artillery.
        I have no idea where the lethality data come from. Quite
    frankly, they don't make any sense, because there are multiple
    rocket launchers with far higher volumes of fire and they can,
    at least in theory, use chemical and biological weapons. When
    you fire into a city, remember people panic. They run and they
    go outside the city. And Korea is a mountainous area with none
    of the spread and surplus facilities to absorb people we are
    used to.
        There are five other urban cities which are critical
    targets. You are talking about essentially three major
    container ports. There are four major airports. Each of those
    is absolutely critical to a country which is dependent on
    imports, which cannot provide its own fuel and generate its own
    electricity without sustained traffic. And which bears no
    resemblance to the Korea of the Korean War.
        Unconventional wars that move into these areas, disrupt the
    economy, make people panic, create refugees and IDPs, are as
    much a risk as weapons of mass destruction. Losing food, water
    and power can have the same effect. This is a country with the
    largest rocket and missile force in unconventional war that we
    know of. And if those become precision-guided systems, its
    lethality and war-fighting capability changes much as the use
    of advanced biological weapons. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cordesman follows:]

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        Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I appreciate those grave warnings. Mr.
    Parachini.

    STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PARACHINI, DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE POLICY
                        CENTER, RAND CORPORATION

        Mr. Parachini. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
    the committee holding this hearing on this topic.
        Examining chemical and biological weapons in this theater
    has not been done in an open hearing like this as much as it
    should be. Given the danger they pose, how they might be a
    catalyst to leading us to a nuclear precipice and indeed how
    wrong assessments of those capabilities may trigger the wrong
    response.
        There are some distressing parallels with the situation in
    Iraq. Old assessments get repeated about new information or
    there is no new information, there is considerable input from
    defectors, cooperating sources that are hard to validate. There
    are allied governments that face imminent threats and have
    reason to hedge against high consequence threats if
    capabilities exists and if they might be used.
        A key difference between the Iraq and North Korean case is
    that the North Koreans have demonstrated they have nuclear
    weapons and they are rapidly developing their ballistic missile
    capabilities. Another difference, though, is that we knew a lot
    about the past Iraqi capabilities, and then when we entered in
    2003, we actually didn't know that much of their current
    capabilities. With North Korea, we know little about their past
    and we have a very incomplete understanding of their current
    capabilities.
        But because most states with an industrial capability to
    produce pesticides have some capability probably to produce
    chemical weapons, we can be reasonably confident that North
    Korea has these capabilities and has tested and produced
    chemical weapons and has a stockpile. However, as Dr. Cordesman
    mentioned, the repeated assessments suggests that there is an
    arsenal of a range of agents and delivery systems. But these
    are the same numbers that get repeated over the last decade and
    a half. Means of delivery included artillery, rockets,
    missiles, aircraft and drones. But it begs the question that
    these same citations of capabilities have not been updated in
    the last decade and it makes you wonder about their currency.
        However, there is a new development, and that is the recent
    assassination of Kim Jong-nam. Other countries have used poison
    to assassinate regime enemies, but I think we can assess that
    this also could be a signal by this regime that we have nerve
    agent and we are willing to use it.
        Biological weapons capabilities in North Korea, the
    assessments range from a list of agents that might number in a
    dozen or more to a limited program within existing industrial
    infrastructure to mere research. The potential of these weapons
    is great. And so it bears paying very close attention to them,
    but, again, the evidence we have is indirect, circumstantial,
    based on third-party observations and South Korean Government
    information and some unclassified U.S. Government statements.
        I think the best we can say at this time is they have the
    industrial infrastructure for a biological weapons program.
    They probably have the know-how and they probably have done
    some basic R&D. The more disconcerting part that I think one of
    the members has mentioned is North Korea's history as a
    proliferator. It helped with the construction of a reactor in
    Syria. It shipped chemical weapons defensive gear to Syria, and
    indeed, it has helped with their missile program with some
    reported allegations that they have helped Syria configure
    ballistic missiles to carry chemical agent. They have also been
    a supplier of conventional weaponry to Hamas and Hezbollah over
    the years.
        There is no information that they have transferred
    unconventional capabilities to terrorist groups, and indeed the
    empirical record does not show that any nation state has done
    so. However, this remains an enduring danger that we have to
    pay attention to.
        So what can be done? Well, there are four things. We can
    expand the dual-use biosurveillance in Korea that would be
    useful for catching things like SARS and MERS as well as an
    intentional biological attack. We can help other states enforce
    the robust set of sanctions that are out there. Many states
    don't have the capabilities to enforce these sanctions. We can
    help them do that. We can expand defensive measures. Dr.
    Cordesman mentioned that.
        And finally, we can reinforce the taboo against chemical
    weapons and biological weapons by asking for a pledge from the
    North Koreans for no-first-use of these weapons.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Parachini follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. And I appreciate your comments. Mr. Ruggiero.

     STATEMENT OF MR. ANTHONY RUGGIERO, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION
                       FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

        Mr. Ruggiero. Thank you. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Members
    Sherman and Keating, and distinguished members of these
    subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to address you
    today on this important issue.
        Before proceeding, it is important to state plainly, North
    Korean leader Kim Jong-un's overarching long-term goal, namely
    the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under Kim family
    rule, while Pyongyang attempts to distract Washington and the
    Seoul from this hostile intention, Kim always has his eyes on
    dominating the peninsula.
        North Korea's weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear, are a
    means to an end, extorting concessions from Seoul and using
    nuclear weapons to limit Washington's ability to defend South
    Korea from North Korea's military provocations for fear of
    escalating the situation.
        Washington's goal is and should remain the denuclearization
    of the Korean Peninsula. And the good news is that the United
    States can still act to counter Pyongyang's weapons programs. A
    combination of deterrence and coercion should be used against
    North Korea. The strategy would acknowledge the limits of each
    of these options using them in combination to secure a
    denuclearization agreement or, failing that, to weaken
    Pyongyang in order to diminish the threat it poses.
        Deterrence is essential to an effective North Korea policy.
    Yet, American strength has not deterred North Korea from
    sharing its missile and WMD knowledge with other rogue states.
    Nor has it prevented Pyongyang's race to expand illegal
    programs or engage in countless other provocations.
        The premise of the Trump administration's maximum pressure
    policy is that coercion must complement deterrence to limit
    provocations and create leverage. That coercion should take the
    form of an aggressive and comprehensive sanctions campaign. The
    good news is U.S. sanctions have more than doubled since
    February 2016, but the real test of a renewed and effective
    sanctions program is whether new sanctions are targeting
    Pyongyang's overseas business network and the non-North Koreans
    that facilitate that sanctions of ASEAN.
        There is good news here, too. The Trump administration has
    sanctioned 103 persons since March 31st. Of whom 74 percent
    operate outside of North Korea and 25 percent are non-North
    Koreans who facilitate North Korea's sanctions of ASEAN, namely
    Chinese and Russian nationals. As the maximum pressure campaign
    has begun to show results, Kim Jong-un went back to a well-worn
    tactic of trying to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.
        In 2017, the only thing the United States and North Korea
    agreed on was that China's freeze-for-freeze proposal where
    Pyongyang would freeze its nuclear and missile tests in
    exchange for a freeze of U.S.-South Korea military exercises
    was a nonstarter.
        In fact, Washington clarified that military exercises were
    defensive. So there was no reason to freeze them, whereas
    Pyongyang's programs entailed violations of numerous U.N.
    Security Council resolutions.
        But with one new year's address, preying on South Korean
    President Moon Jae-in's desire for an illusion of peace during
    the Olympics, Kim changed the narrative from freeze-to-freeze
    to delay-for-nothing. For a mere promise of talks, Pyongyang
    received a delay of the aforementioned defensive military
    exercises.
        As Seoul moves into a period of negotiation with North
    Korea on its Olympics participation, Washington's policy should
    ensure that South Korean engagement in no way undermines the
    maximum pressure campaign. If there are signs that North Korea
    is only playing for time, the U.S. should urge an end to talks.
        Pyongyang and Beijing should not be allowed to violate U.N.
    and U.S. sanctions during inter-Korean talks. If at some point
    in 2018, a substantial improvement in Pyongyang's behavior
    leads to the prospect of U.S.-North Korea negotiations,
    Washington should learn from its past mistakes and insist that
    Kim Jong-un commit to denuclearize before talks begin.
        The United States must not allow Moon's desire for a deal
    and Washington's inherent need to move beyond this crisis to
    get us into another set of flawed negotiations resulting in a
    dangerous deal that locks in North Korea's weapons program.
        Thank you for inviting me to testify. And I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ruggiero follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
        Ambassador Jenkins.

        STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BONNIE JENKINS, FOUNDER AND
        PRESIDENT, WOMEN OF COLOR ADVANCING PEACE, SECURITY AND
        CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (FORMER COORDINATOR FOR THREAT
       REDUCTION PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
              NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

        Ms. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, ranking members, ladies and
    gentlemen, I want to thank you for inviting me here today to
    speak about North Korea's DPRKs threats outside those of
    nuclear weapons. It is understandable that with the exchanges
    between the U.S. and North Korea in the past few months that
    nuclear weapons are the focus of attention regarding the North
    Koreans military capabilities.
        However, one should not lose sight of the fact that there
    are other significant military threats from North Korea. Today
    you are hearing about some of these other threats. And they
    consist of North Korea's chemical weapons, intentional
    biological weapons pursuits and the overwhelming conventional
    weapons. And we have on this panel today experts on the various
    non-nuclear threats emanating from North Korea, so I will move
    on to discussing some potential diplomatic mechanisms to meet
    those threats.
        Addressing the DPRKs threat is not a challenge that
    Washington should tackle alone. North Korean involvement in
    chemical and biological weapons programs are not in line with
    the international norms against development and use of those
    weapons and should be part of a global effort to address those
    programs.
        Few countries have any contact with the DPRK, which limits
    opportunities for diplomatic exchange. Working with countries
    that do have that type of relationship, for example, Sweden,
    can be part of a planned diplomatic effort to engage North
    Korea. Of course, the key to any negotiations on North Korea's
    weapons will require North Korea to come to the table, which is
    a significant challenge.
        All of the following ideas had that caveat in mind. On
    chemical weapons, the general goal of the international
    community should be that the DPRK destroy any such weapons
    regardless of the fact that the DPRK is not a party to the CWC.
    Any discussions with the DPRK on such weapons would require the
    engagement of the organization for the prohibition of chemical
    weapons in regional states at a minimum. The DPRK should join
    the CWC as a state party and agree to destroy any potential
    weapons with verification.
        We have witnessed with the destruction of Syrian chemical
    weapons that the international community can come together to
    assist in that process. Regarding conventional weapons, the
    primary concern is the overwhelming number of such weapons
    possessed by North Korea.
        There should be a reduction in the conventional forces and
    more equality in the numbers and types of weapons with South
    Korea as a way to reduce tensions.
        In this respect, the two sides may negotiate an agreement
    similar to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty, and
    both sides can reduce their conventional weapons to an equal
    amount and types. Such an agreement would require a permanent
    and verifiable means of destruction. The CFE can provide some
    thoughts on a way forward.
        North Korea is already a party to the Biological Weapons
    Convention, and as a result, it should not be developing
    biological weapons. Any activities regarding a biological
    weapons program should stop. Since there is no verification
    regime of the BWC, a small number of the countries including
    those in the region may agree to a verification scheme. The
    Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit
    should be a part of any engagement with additional staff and
    funding for this particular purpose.
        These options lean heavy on the diplomatic effort and
    negotiations to address the North Korean military threats. Some
    rely on existing norms that reflect the agreement by a global
    community by just the possession and use of such weapons.
        South Hem conventions are initiatives that can serve as
    examples for engaging the North Koreans. However, any
    negotiation needs an element of trust amongst the parties.
    There must be some belief that the party on the other side
    wants to discuss the issues and has something to gain by doing
    so.
        If you want North Korea to come to the table, we must
    temper our threats with real possibilities for diplomacy. In
    this respect it would be extremely challenging to convince
    North Korea to relinquish the weapons it believes it needs for
    its defenses or its domestic purposes. Moving the DPRK to join
    the international community that has already moved away from
    the development and use of chemical and biological weapons, for
    example, will take time and it will need a continuous process.
        It is also essential that the international community walk
    the walk and talk the talk of actions that we want other
    countries to do, including North Korea. We also need to find a
    way to make any successful negotiation sustainable. We have
    seen in the case of negotiations with North Korea's nuclear
    program through the years that what is considered an agreement
    continually fails.
        How do we make sure that North Korea does not go back to
    business as usual? In each situation there needs to be a
    mechanism to continue discussions and help verify that the
    North Koreans are living up to their agreements. In this
    respect, the North Koreans would need to be part of existing
    implementing bodies, treaty implementing bodies. There may be
    other options that we can do with North Korea assuming we can
    move them from being an adversary to essentially being a party.
    This will all take time and a lot of real diplomacy.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. I would like to thank the panel for your expert
    testimony. I look forward to answering the questions.
        Dr. Cordesman, you pointed out the number that we know is
    exactly that. It is what we know. It is what we don't know that
    really scares us. The unknown. And I guess that is part of--I
    don't want to say terrorism, but that is part of a hand they
    play. You know, it is what you don't know.
        Are there other techniques that we can do to get other
    countries to come on board? When I look at what is going on,
    you know, I have got information in here, that is out there, in
    August, shipments of 30,000, 30,000 North Korean produced
    rocket-propelled grenades were intercepted on their way to
    Egypt. How concerned should we be about Egypt's secret
    arrangement to procure $23 million worth of weapons, number
    one, that is funding North Korea while they are an ally of
    ours. This is not a U.S. problem with what North Korea is
    doing. It is not a South Korean problem. It is a world problem.
    And if we have allies, especially ones that we are giving
    foreign aid to, to get them to the table, how do we find out
    more information and get everybody on the same page? Like we
    have to get a resolution to this peacefully and ideally.
        Do you have any thoughts on that?
        Mr. Cordesman. Mr. Chairman, I wish I had more optimistic
    conclusions, but a little over a month ago, I was in the Middle
    East at a time there was a supposed 40-country alliance of Arab
    states that was supposed to be cooperating and dealing with
    security issues. And quite frankly, I have never seen more
    hypocrisy at a given meeting than I saw there. I don't think
    you have any choice unless you are willing to embarrass allies
    and put pressure on countries, unless you can threaten, not
    simply sanctions, but actually intercepting known shipments of
    arms and weapons.
        North Korea is going to do anything it can to find ways to
    export, to obtain technology, import, to do, if it can, simply
    exchanging the techniques of producing systems with other
    countries like Iran. Locking that is something we can sometimes
    do in detail, but it requires an extremely aggressive approach.
        And, yes, there are European allies, there are Asian allies
    that will work with us, but those are not the countries North
    Korea deals with. And I simply would not be optimistic about
    the prospects.
        Mr. Yoho. Okay. And I would like to get some response on
    this. The agreement to destroy the chemical weapons in Syria
    was supposedly carried out and certified 100 percent by the
    world community. We realize that is not true. You know, there
    was still some left over. In fact, we just heard reports that
    the Assad regime may have used chemical weapons, including VX
    gas.
        Does anybody have any information on--is that true? And to
    think they came out--is there any proof that--is there any
    information out there that they could have come out from North
    Korea--anybody want to comment on that?
        Mr. Parachini.
        Mr. Parachini. So we are better off that chemical weapons
    were eliminated from Syria with the understanding that they had
    the possibility to both hide and make even after their
    stockpile was removed, because that meant fewer weapons that
    they could use against----
        Mr. Yoho. Do we know that they are making them, or are they
    getting them from North Korea?
        Mr. Parachini. So we don't know--even if there are--if they
    are getting chemicals from North Korea, they are more in the
    precursor nature, and they could be making new agents. But,
    remember, a lot of what we have seen in Syria are attacks using
    chlorine.
        Mr. Yoho. Right, but just recently they said that could
    have been laced with VX gas. I don't know how you do that or--
    --
        Mr. Parachini. So Syria--in the Syrian complex, VX has not
    appeared yet as an agent that has been used. Sarin----
        Mr. Yoho. Sarin. I am sorry.
        Mr. Parachini. Sarin has been the nerve agent that has been
    used. But look at how they have used chlorine----
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Mr. Parachini. Even after they agreed to eliminate their
    stockpile, they have used a widely available industrial
    chemical as a weapon of war.
        Mr. Yoho. And that is a terrible chemical. Just one more
    question. If North Korea is serious about earnest dialogue and
    coming to the table, would you recommend signing on to the CWC,
    the Chemical Weapons Convention?
        Mr. Parachini. So I will offer a comment and then
    Ambassador Jenkins may have some thoughts here.
        Mr. Yoho. Sure.
        Mr. Parachini. North Korea is the only member of the five-
    party talks--or the six-party talks that is not a member.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Mr. Parachini. So it stands out. So it is to our advantage
    to press them on this issue, number one. And, number two, the
    global taboo on the use of these weapons has degraded since the
    Syrians have used chemical weapons. There is an opportunity to
    bolster that norm by pushing the North Koreans.
        Mr. Yoho. I think that is a good point. Ambassador Jenkins,
    do you have a comment?
        Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I would just agree and say that I think
    it would be good to have them part of the convention because
    then they can be part of the multilateral and international
    negotiations that go on on a regular basis. There are yearly
    meetings with the OPCW. There are activities that go on, and
    one way to help make sure that they are doing what they should
    be doing is have some kind of transparency and some kind of
    engagement. So I think that would be very helpful.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
        We will go to the ranking member, Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is clear that one thing we should do is maximize our
    soft power, that we could, and sometimes things appear, from
    the administration, to be disjointed. Let me give you an
    example. We had a new President--President Moon came to power.
    And one of the strengths we have, at least when I was there
    just a year ago, was the coalition we have with Japan, South
    Korea, and the U.S. It is at unprecedented levels. The
    cohesiveness was stronger than it ever has been. However, with
    a new President--our President threatened to pull apart the
    trade agreement with South Korea during that period. Now, how
    could that possibly do anything but hinder our ability and
    cohesiveness as a coalition together, as a fundamental
    coalition? And how damaging were those comments and the timing
    of those comments? Does anyone want to address that?
        Ms. Jenkins. I guess I would start with that. I would agree
    with you in what you are saying in terms of how those comments
    were probably received. I think one of the things that we seem
    to be lacking now is a much more coordinated approach in the
    way in which the U.S. Government is really handling a lot of
    these issues. There seems to be not as much attention for force
    coming from the Department of State and engagement of the
    Department of State and engagement of the expertise in
    discussing some issues before they are actually made and the
    policies before they are actually made and told to other
    countries.
        So I think that has created a bit of confusion with some of
    our countries out there, some of our allies out there.
        I know I often get questions regarding the way in which the
    U.S. Government is perceived regarding the State Department and
    what is coming out of the White House. And I think that we
    don't have the coordinated message. That would be helpful. It
    is good to have soft and hard power, but I think you have to
    have a way in which it is coordinated and it is seen as a
    whole.
        So I think that when you have these kind of statements that
    are made in the middle of a situation where relationships are
    going very well, it does cause countries to take a step back
    and wonder what is going on.
        Mr. Keating. Do any members of the panel think that was
    helpful, the timing and the effect of that? Thank you.
        Dr. Cordesman brought up a couple of important points, I
    think, takeaways that I had myself. We are focused on the
    nuclear issue and the missile capability. But every day on the
    border, there are scuffles, and there are potential conflicts
    that can escalate at any time. In fact, our own military
    leadership there has said that they spend an inordinate amount
    of their time just trying to tamp those down because of that
    fear. That is one point.
        The other point that might come along with those lines is,
    again, an important point looking down the road, and that is
    potential refugee problems, should they occur.
        So, Dr. Cordesman, do you want to just extend your comments
    on your perception of how really threatening those border
    issues are on a day-to-day basis? How they could escalate? And
    then, secondly, an interesting point that you did bring up in
    regards to if there is a conflict and there are refugee
    problems, that will affect China, and you know, are they
    factoring that in? Because generally China is not taking these
    issues as seriously as they should be, from our perspective,
    and that is one thing they should look at, at what happens to
    the peninsula. Doctor?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think we have--first, we need to be
    careful about the term ``border.'' We are talking about the
    DMZ, and the problem we have is it isn't just the hardened
    artillery sides near the DMZ, which go all along the DMZ. They
    are not simply near the center of Seoul. They are near an area
    with about 25 percent of the population or more of Korea just
    in the area around Seoul.
        So this is something where longer range rocket systems can
    have a major effect. And we are talking about depths of perhaps
    50 to 100 to 200 kilometers when we throw in unmanned aerial
    vehicles and cruise missiles, which are actually far better
    systems for delivering biological and chemical weapons than
    artillery is because they are slow fires and they disseminate
    in much more controllable ways.
        We also have some 25 tunnels. All of these things could
    produce a massive refugee population. And looking at Seoul and
    the greater Seoul area, there simply isn't surplus capacity,
    and it is remarkably hard for them to even move south, not in
    the numbers that exist today.
        Mr. Keating. Yeah. Thank you.
        And I yield back, but I will be following up with a written
    question, Chairman, you know, just dealing with a common thread
    of how we have to improve our intelligence in that region and
    how maybe working with the coalitions, that is something we
    should work on as well.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Keating. I appreciate your
    respecting people's time, and if we have time for a second
    round, if you are still here, we will let you do that.
        I will next go to Mr. Joe Wilson, South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I was grateful in September to lead a delegation to South
    Korea. Of course, we visited the DMZ. We were there in Seoul.
    We visited, in particular, Camp Humphreys. And it was really
    incredible for me to know the strong relationship we have with
    the Republic of Korea and their investments--the American
    people need to know the hundreds of millions of dollars which
    have been spent to build a world class facility there at Camp
    Humphreys, truly indicating the bond that we have between the
    people of the United States and the people of Korea.
        Another issue to me, and I would be really interested in
    finding out from each of you what your view is, has there been
    any collaboration on nuclear weapon or missile development with
    the rogue regime in Iran, between--cooperation between
    Pyongyang and Tehran?
        Mr. Cordesman. There is very good evidence of cooperation
    on missile development. There are questions among experts as to
    how much cooperation there is in specific areas, how much they
    are sharing, but it has been clear for years that there is an
    exchange of technology. It is also clear that some of the
    technology that is coming from Russia and from China has spread
    into both North Korea and Iran and is affecting the engines and
    capabilities for missile development there.
        I don't know of any evidence of cooperation in the
    development of nuclear weapons. There are reports of
    delegations being present from Iran at the test of North Korean
    nuclear weapons. Whether they are accurate or not, to be
    honest, one of the problems we have is a lot of media reporting
    sometimes claiming it is coming from North Korean--I am sorry--
    South Korean military sources that is very unreliable. But to
    be honest, I am not sure you would detect cooperation in
    nuclear weapons design. It is not something where you would
    have to be public or there would be easily observable signals.
        Mr. Ruggiero. I would say, on ballistic missiles, it is
    important to remember that, on the implementation day 2 years
    ago of the Iran nuclear deal, that the Obama administration
    issued sanctions against Iranians for their cooperation--or
    their missile cooperation with North Korea. It just shows you
    the sort of level that that cooperation was at.
        On the nuclear side, I think the concern here that I have
    always had is that what each side has fits really well in the
    sense that they both use very similar enrichment programs,
    enrichment centrifuges. And Iran, likely, has a desire for both
    the design and some of the testing information that North Korea
    has gotten from nuclear tests, and Iran, of course, could pay
    for that. So that is always the main concern between Iran and
    North Korea nuclear cooperation.
        Mr. Wilson. And wasn't it proven that there was a direct
    relationship of North Korea with the nuclear development in
    Syria? But, fortunately, Israel took care of that and may have
    even dispatched some North Korean scientists on the side. So
    this is such a danger, the collaboration of totalitarian
    regimes.
        Another question I have for each of you, and it is really
    frustrating to me that China has benefited so much from trade
    with South Korea, tourism, investments by South Korea in
    developing business and industry and opportunity for the people
    of China. On the other hand, DPRK, the Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea, is simply a dependency of the People's
    Republic. Why would they maintain such a dependency when they
    can see the benefits of working with the Republic of Korea?
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, I think, you know, I think the
    relationship in that region is interesting. I would also add
    that the Chinese always criticize unilateral sanctions until
    they use them. And, of course, they used them against South
    Korea, really to their own detriment I think. I think that the
    Chinese did not win in that. I think the Chinese are realizing
    that. I think the record on sanctions is mixed. The Chinese are
    willing to go after North Koreans inside of China, but they
    still remain unwilling to go after their own nationals that are
    aiding North Korea. And that is really--and Russia does that,
    and it is the same thing with Russia as well on North Korea
    sanctions. So that is really the critical area that we need to
    get the Chinese to move toward.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. My time is up.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. All right. Next, we have Mr. Gerald Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Isn't my timing
    perfect? Yeah, perfect. And I have been watching and listening
    upstairs, so thank you.
        Ambassador Jenkins, you talked about using hard power and
    soft power. I was making the same point in my opening remarks.
        Could you elaborate a little bit? I mean, what is the soft
    power available to us that could be efficacious?
        Ms. Jenkins. Well, it is interesting you use the word
    ``power'' in the situation of North Korea because we are still
    limited in what we can do in terms of soft power. But I think
    there is a lot that we have not yet explored. I think, for the
    most part, the situation with North Korea in that region has
    been very much a bilateral relationship with the U.S. working
    directly with each country, and we have worked very much
    regionally in trying to resolve the issues there.
        I think there are other options or other possibilities for
    working with more countries to try to see if there are ways in
    which we could address some of these issues. All of the things
    we are talking about today, whether it is chemical weapons or
    biological weapons particularly, are issues that are of a
    concern to the international community. They are issues that,
    as we have said already--there is international norm against
    the use of those weapons and the development of those weapons.
        So I think that there are options to try to see how
    countries can start to work together to see how they can
    address the issues with North Korea. Of course, trying to make
    sure first of what they actually have, but also trying to see
    if there is a way that countries can work together on that
    issue.
        Mr. Connolly. So one soft power would be sanctions,
    correct?
        Ms. Jenkins. Yeah.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Ruggiero, Governor John Kasich wrote a--
    Governor John Kasich wrote an op-ed piece in which he said we
    haven't used all the soft power with respect to sanctions that
    we could have. And he cited things like, you know, more indepth
    banking, ties and relationships getting really tough on that.
    He talked about insurance for Merchant Marine fleets, so that
    shipping suddenly becomes vulnerable because we are denying
    them insurance, if they are going back and forth to North Korea
    and the like.
        Do you believe we still have leverage that is meaningful
    that could persuade the North Koreans it is worth pausing, if
    not rolling back, their nuclear development program, because
    that is really the object here?
        Mr. Ruggiero. Right, I do. I think this administration has
    gone after China, whether it is firms or banks or individuals,
    seven times last year, but they are still pulling back. They
    are pulling their punches. And I think part of that is because
    they likely fear Chinese retaliation. When it comes to North
    Korea, you know, I take your question as, you know, how can you
    affect the revenue flows? And the good news here is that it
    looks like, from the examples we have more recently, a lot of
    this revenue is inside of China, so you can start to affect
    that. And then North Korea uses that for what I like to call
    three purposes, military, and obviously the security sources,
    the weapons programs, and their elites. And right now they get
    to rank those one A, B, and C. From my perspective what we have
    to do is rank them 1, 2, and 3 because all of them are key to
    Kim's survival. And we are not talking about regime change, but
    we are talking about changing the calculus here.
        Mr. Connolly. Right.
        Mr. Ruggiero. And I think, you know, going after Chinese
    banks, not cutting them off from the U.S. financial system or
    sanctioning--or freezing their assets, but using regulatory
    fines, like we did against European banks in the Iran sanctions
    context.
        Mr. Connolly. Which is a model. I mean, that worked.
        Mr. Ruggiero. Right.
        Mr. Connolly. Apparently that worked. Mr. Cordesman and Mr.
    Parachini, and I have got a limited amount of time, but what is
    your take on how much leverage we really have with respect to
    Chinese behavior? Can we really bring the Chinese to cooperate
    with us in a meaningful way? I mean, we talked about soft
    power, but for example, there are North Korean restaurants and
    businesses, that is to say, businesses and restaurants run by
    North Koreans who remit profits back to China, I mean, back to
    North Korea from China. They open--they are operating with
    impunity; it is not like it is a secret. So is there more room,
    and what is the point of leverage we have over the Chinese to
    cooperate?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think there is more room, but I think we
    need to be very careful. They will not take steps which
    threaten the existence of the regime in North Korea or its
    status as a buffer. They do not have the same strategic
    interests we do. And the cooperation can never be enough to by
    itself probably force North Korea to change.
        Mr. Yoho. Go ahead. I will let you finish up.
        Mr. Parachini. So I would add that the Chinese are very
    concerned about refugee flow from North Korea to them. And I
    have met with Chinese from right over the border, and they are
    very concerned about that. And that may be an area of
    collaboration between the United States and China, but we have
    to be very careful about how we manage that because, should
    there be a collapse of the regime, China is going to be very
    eager to move first and make sure that we and South Korea do
    not move very far north.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Next, we will go to Mr. Tom Marino from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Parachini, am I pronouncing that correctly? That is
    Italian?
        Mr. Parachini. Parachini.
        Mr. Marino. Parachini.
        Mr. Parachini. Rhymes with zucchini, which is a good
    vegetable.
        Mr. Marino. Okay. You answered my first question that I
    wanted to ask, and let's expand on that a little bit. My
    question was--it is going to be, and I believe this is so
    because I am of member of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and we
    discuss these issues--that China is very concerned about the
    North Koreans flowing into China because they do not want to
    have to take care of them. And North Korea is a buffer between
    the democracy of South Korea and the United States and China.
    Is that a fairly good assumption to make?
        Mr. Parachini. I think it is. And there is a longstanding
    relationship between China and North Korea and between China
    and Myanmar. And there is a special relationship there between
    those three countries that is hard to overcome given historical
    ties.
        Mr. Marino. Do you think at any point--and I don't believe
    this, but if anyone on the panel believes that North Korea
    would get into serious discussions with the U.S., do you think
    that is possible? Anyone?
        Mr. Parachini. So I would add, we need to think about this
    as a long-term game.
        Mr. Marino. It has been a long term game.
        Mr. Parachini. NATO was in place until the Soviet Union
    fell for a long time. And I think, unfortunately, on the Korean
    Peninsula, we are in the same type of game. So the question is
    how to make sure it doesn't come unraveled; we don't have a hot
    conflict. As we have seen, the North Korean leaders do pass on.
    So we have to hope for moderated change.
        Mr. Marino. No.
        Mr. Parachini. I don't think we should be thinking that
    they are going to negotiate and change. That leopard is not
    going to change its spots.
        Mr. Marino. No.
        Mr. Parachini. So we have got to figure out some way to
    navigate with them over a long term.
        Mr. Ruggiero. I mean, I would just say I guess I am the
    optimist here, which is kind of surprising for someone who
    supports sanctions. But the optimist here that, you know, when
    it came to Iran, we could have conversations about the nuclear
    deal, but I think even critics and supporters of the deal agree
    that sanctions brought them to the table.
        Mr. Marino. Yeah, but nobody was there protecting Iran per
    se. Iran--the sanctions--the economic sanctions were doing well
    until we gave them $150 billion.
        Mr. Ruggiero. Right.
        Mr. Marino. Aside from that, I don't think anyone else
    would have been coming to Iran's aid concerning sanctions.
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, I mean, I would say--I also worked on
    Iran's sanctions when I was in the government, and I remember
    conversations about we couldn't go after their oil revenue, and
    of course, that is what happened. So I think we are talking
    about the Iran sanctions model with North Korea. North Korea--
    and, frankly, China--has never really faced what the Treasury
    Department could do with North Korea sanctions, you know, back
    to the prior question.
        So I think it is, from my perspective, too, we also have to
    have a conversation of what would those negotiations look like,
    because my main concern is that those who support diplomacy
    fall back to the--well, we could get a freeze, and then we
    could go through extended negotiations, and North Korea will
    eventually denuclearize. I think you have to flip that on its
    head and insist that North Korea be committed to denuclearize
    upfront, not denuclearize, but be committed to do that upfront.
        Mr. Marino. Okay. Doctor.
        Mr. Cordesman. I think the committee should ask where North
    Korea will be in 5 to 10 years in its nuclear programs, its
    precision strike programs, and its biological capabilities. You
    mentioned a long-term game, in each case, they can edge around
    an awful lot of negotiating constraints and agreements. And
    instead of just looking at what you can do that might work, I
    think you need to take a harder look at what will happen with
    the existing way that North Korea is proliferating and
    developing its weapons and technology.
        Mr. Marino. I happen to agree with you. I think that is the
    first issue that we should tackle in any situation like this.
        Ambassador, did you have anything--comment?
        Ms. Jenkins. No, I would just--just thinking that we heard
    a little bit about some of the uncertainties about what North
    Korea really does have in terms of chemical and biological. I
    think it is a good time to think about what we can do now to
    try to get ahead of what we may or may not know about what they
    have. If in fact they are not at the point of having a
    biological weapon, for example, what can we do to try to work
    through that problem and that situation now?
        Mr. Marino. Quickly, in 2 seconds, do any of you believe
    that China will take out the ruling family in North Korea?
        Let the record reflect that no one responded to that they
    think they will take out the ruling family.
        I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your questions.
        Next, we will go to ranking member of the Asia and the
    Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Brad Sherman from California.
        Mr. Sherman. Public sources have estimated that North Korea
    has between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical agents. Does
    anyone on the panel think that a different number has more
    credibility?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think that number does not have
    credibility----
        Mr. Sherman. Because it is too low, it is too high, or you
    just have----
        Mr. Cordesman. Because it is simply a set of round numbers
    that somebody thought up at a point of time some years back.
        Mr. Sherman. Does anybody on the panel have any different
    estimate?
        Mr. Cordesman. Would you like 12?
        Mr. Sherman. Any guesstimate that it is an estimate rather
    than--okay.
        If China were to end all banking and all trade, except food
    and medicine, that is to say, exporting food and medicine to
    North Korea, how big of an effect would that have on the
    regime?
        Mr. Ruggiero.
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, I mean, the issue here is that they
    seem to be willing to do that for North Koreans, but if they
    are not willing to do that for their own nationals, aiding
    North Korea's sanctions evasion, then it will not have the
    impact----
        Mr. Sherman. I am saying that if China used all of its
    devices to make sure that there wasn't a single dollar's worth
    of goods exported from North Korea to China, no coal, no
    whatever, no labor services, and actually enforced it, what
    effect would that have on the North Korean regime?
        Mr. Ruggiero. I think it would have a substantial impact. I
    mean, the point I made earlier is that some of these examples
    we are seeing is a ledger system between China and North Korea
    where the money resides in China. And so what you are going to
    have is North Korea not have the ability to even go to another
    country for those items that they need.
        Mr. Sherman. Should we be more strong in our statements to
    Poland and others that have accepted North Korean workers, to
    use a euphemism?
        Mr. Parachini.
        Mr. Parachini. So I think getting China to change on this
    is going to be an enduring challenge, but----
        Mr. Sherman. It is not an enduring challenge. You just put
    a 50-percent tariff on all their exports to the United States,
    and you will get their attention. But the enduring challenge is
    summoning the political will to do that in a system in which
    there--obviously, that would have an effect, but if you
    threaten to do it, they would concede. The reason we haven't
    threatened to do it is because of the tremendous power of
    corporations that--on issues of national security. But, please
    continue.
        Mr. Parachini. I think there are costs and benefits of that
    type of economic pressure.
        Mr. Sherman. There are only benefits if China blinks.
        Mr. Parachini. But I think there is the opportunity to help
    other countries enforce the sanction network that is out there
    that can be--and Poland----
        Mr. Sherman. Trim around the edges, yes. But Poland
    continues to have North Korean workers and insists upon doing
    that for another year and says that is a local rather than a
    national decision. Whether that is a violation of section 5 of
    the NATO agreement in spirit, I don't know; probably,
    technically, it is a violation of section 5 de jure.
        We have sanctioned one small bank, Bank of Dandong. We
    haven't sanctioned any of the major Chinese banks because the
    economic powers in this country say we shouldn't do it. Last
    September, Chairman Royce identified several Chinese banks,
    including the China Merchants Bank and a state-owned bank, the
    Agricultural Bank of China, as doing sanctionable business with
    North Korea. Chairman Yoho and I wrote to the Treasury
    Department deriding several Chinese banks, including the
    Industrial Commercial Bank of China, the largest bank in the
    world, and the Bank of Communications, one of the largest banks
    in the world. The executive branch has failed to pull the
    trigger.
        How--the question is, why have we put preserving the $500
    billion or $400 billion trade deficit with China and all the
    profits that generates above our national security? How do we
    get the administration to get serious with the big banks? Does
    someone have a--yes.
        Mr. Ruggiero. Right. I mean, I would say, you know, there
    was a narrative that North Korean financial activity was going
    through small Chinese banks and that these medium and large
    banks were just a conduit. But FinCEN, an element of the
    Treasury Department, put out an advisory last year, and said
    some of these accounts are actually at major Chinese financial
    institutions. So how do you do it? You do it with the
    regulatory fines. You know, I would also piggyback on the
    answer----
        Mr. Sherman. You can do it, but how do you summon the
    political will to do it?
        Mr. Ruggiero. That is the thing. I mean, these are
    mandatory sanctions passed by Congress, the same as with----
        Mr. Sherman. Nothing is illegal if 50 major businesses all
    decide it is the right policy. And just because we pass laws
    doesn't mean that the executive branch will follow them.
        Mr. Ruggiero. Right. I think this is stuck in a narrative--
    not this narrative--but a narrative about whether to do it
    between doing nothing and freezing their access to New York
    when there is this interim--what we talked about in terms of
    Iran sanctions, using fines.
        Mr. Sherman. I don't think--if you only do the level of
    economic effect that we had with Iran, this is a much more
    closed society, and a regime that cares even less about its own
    people. I think you are going to have to have much tougher
    sanctions if you are going to get even a freeze of their
    nuclear program, let alone the unrealistic goals that we at
    least claim that we are trying to achieve.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank for your comments. That is why tomorrow we
    are going to do the special order on China to draw out some
    these things, these inequities that they are doing, so that the
    American people know this and Members of Congress.
        Next, we will go to Adam Kinzinger from Illinois.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your
    leadership on this issue.
        Thank you all for being here for this very important
    subject. I think back, and I don't know if it is a good
    comparison--I think it is--to Neville Chamberlain coming back
    from his negotiations with Chancellor Hitler in a very
    difficult time, frankly, in Europe, understanding that they
    just came out of a major war, chewed up a generation with this
    prospect of another. They were understandably excited to talk
    about peace in our time. But I think, looking back at that
    moment, it is not Neville Chamberlain that we celebrated as the
    hero of that era. It is a guy like Churchill, who saw the
    gathering storm clouds. My hope is this does not turn into a
    kinetic exercise between the United States and North Korea.
    There is no doubt we would win, but nobody wants to go there.
        But I think what is important to note in all of this is
    that this is a real threat. In 1994, I think it was around then
    when President Clinton was actually looking at options to bomb
    North Korea because of this. Jimmy Carter pops up in Pyongyang
    and says he has an agreement, and we are all excited. We take a
    nice sigh of relief, and we fixed the problem. And here we are
    today in 2018 looking down the barrel, frankly, of a gun.
        And I actually give the President a lot of props for having
    really brought this to the forefront. I know it makes people
    nervous. North Korea should make people nervous. This is a
    regime that is dead set on destabilizing our allies in the
    region, all in the goal of maintaining power. But I think it
    is--we are going to have some very tough decisions to make
    here.
        I think if we go to a posture of saying we are going to
    just simply accept a nuclear North Korea, which is what some
    people, frankly, have advocated for, especially in the prior
    administration, and said we just need to build interceptors
    that can exceed their ability to launch nuclear weapons, I
    think that spells, in effect, the end of the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty for the world. How are you ever going to
    confront Iran's nuclear ambitions if we just allowed North
    Korea? What is going to happen to every other rogue regime that
    decides they want nuclear weapons? We don't have the moral
    ability to confront them in this, simply because we didn't with
    North Korea.
        So I think we have to take this extremely seriously. I
    think people that say the military option is absolutely off the
    table are doing very major damage to our diplomatic effort. As
    we all understand instruments of power, the diplomatic
    instrument of power against an adversary does not work without
    the military instrument of power there to back it up.
    Otherwise, we can do all the sanctions we want, but if they
    don't think there is a stick, the carrot has no effect.
        Let me ask Mr. Parachini, I hope I said your name right.
    Given this threat, I think we are all clear-eyed to the fact
    that North Korea has the potential to sell WMDs to the highest
    bidder. That could be a rogue regime like Syria--obviously,
    Assad has shown his desire to kill his own people--or even a
    terrorist group like al-Qaeda or ISIS. And it is no secret that
    North Korea provided assistance to Syria in building their
    nuclear reactor, which was destroyed in 2007. Given the
    situation in Syria now, I can't fathom how much worse it would
    be if Syria was a nuclear weapons state. Just because we
    haven't heard much about North Korea proliferation of other
    countries doesn't mean they still aren't interested in it. Can
    you speak to the level of interaction and potential WMD
    assistance that the Kim regime currently provides or is willing
    to provide to rogue regimes and non-state actors? What is their
    moral driver to prevent them from doing it, if in fact that is
    the answer? And which countries or groups seeking WMD
    assistance from North Korea should concern us the most?
        Mr. Parachini. Congressman, I think there has been a
    special relationship between North Korea and Syria for quite
    some time, which I think in part explains that relationship.
    Since the fall of the Soviet Union, which provided a lot of
    financing for Syrian purchases of conventional weapons and
    other capabilities, Iran has stepped in to kind of be that bank
    account. And the close relationship between Iran, Syria, and
    North Korea I think does explain some of the Assad regime's
    weapons purchases over the last decade and, indeed, some of the
    collaboration on either its missile program, the reactor that
    you referred to that was destroyed, as well as chemical
    defenses.
        On non-state actors, there again, North Korea is in the
    trenches with Iran and Syria. That is, they see themselves as
    aligned to support Hamas and Hezbollah, but there is not
    evidence that they have actually transferred unconventional
    capabilities to non-state actors. Conventional weapons, yes.
    Assistance and guidance on tunneling, yes. But in terms of
    jumping the taboo that is on about states not transferring
    that, we have not seen that yet.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Do you have a fear that it could happen
    potentially?
        Mr. Parachini. There is always that possibility. Given the
    power of these weapons, states are very reluctant to let them
    get out of control in that way. We feared that with Saddam
    Hussein, and in the end, it proved not to be the case. Is there
    a zero possibility? No. There is some possibility, but I think
    it is very low.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Since my time is up, I will just
    say this without asking it. I think it is important that we
    look at utilizing the potential of boost phase intercept as
    well. I know this is something that has been discussed. It is
    inexpensive. Boost phase is the slowest launch phase of an
    ICBM, and I think it is imperative on the administration to
    also explore the idea of boost phase intercept as well.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your hospitality
    and thank you for being here, and I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. I appreciate your line of questioning. That has
    brought up some great points.
        Next, we will go to Ms. Dina Titus of Nevada.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, ranking
    members, for holding this hearing today. With all due respect
    to my colleagues across the aisle, I think we do have to be
    concerned about the President's conflicting messages. One
    minute he is talking and bragging about having a bigger button
    than North Korea, and the next minute he is trying to take
    credit for bringing North Korea and South Korea together to
    talk about the Olympics. We just don't know what is coming out
    of the White House.
        He just now, a little while ago, gave an interview to
    Reuters in respect to the preemptive strike or the preemptive
    attack on North Korea, and this was his quote: ``We are playing
    a very, very hard game of poker, and you don't want to reveal
    your hand.''
        Well, this isn't a game. And I am from Nevada. We know
    something about playing poker. There is also a tell when you
    play poker, and his tell is some of this braggadocio that he is
    always talking about when he is going to back down or not.
        I think most of the questions and the attention has been on
    the nuclear threat, but I am glad that we are talking about the
    non-nuclear threat as well. This is especially important in
    light of the Vancouver meeting and the false ballistic missile
    warning that kind of terrorized Hawaii just recently.
        So let me ask you, Ambassador Jenkins, during your time at
    the State Department when you were the Coordinator for Threat
    Reduction Programs, what were your office's greatest assets?
    What were you able to do to prevent some of the terrorism that
    we are talking about that is non-nuclear? And would you go on
    to say and tell us, now that that position is vacant--even
    though North Korea is such a big threat, they haven't bothered
    to fill that position--how are we going to address this?
        Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for your question. The work that I
    was doing at the Department of State was really focusing on how
    to prevent WMD terrorism, and I worked closely with colleagues
    who were working on the nuclear issues. But my portfolio really
    did cover CBRN, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
    Issues. And most of the focus was on working amongst countries
    on how to deal with this issue. Putting funds into all types of
    programs that would prevent WMD terrorism, whether it was
    nuclear security, whether it was biological security, whether
    it was border security issues, whether it was security culture
    issues with the scientists. So we really worked hard on those
    issues.
        The thing that is important is that the type of programs
    that I worked on, you would have to be working with a country
    that is open to those type of activities. So the type of
    activities that I was working on would not be useful for, let's
    say, for North Korea right now because they are not a country
    that would be open to those kind of things. It is something
    that would happen later.
        But we were able to do quite a bit to reduce the chances of
    WMD terrorism around the world because it is a global issue. It
    is a global problem, and we have quite a few countries that are
    working on it.
        Ms. Titus. I think you also mentioned the cyber threat that
    North Korea poses. Maybe you could address that. I think there
    was a bulletin from DHS in June 2017 that North Korea was
    targeting the U.S., targeting media, aerospace, financial. We
    don't know the level of sophistication. Do you think there is
    any possibility they could, like the Russians, target
    elections?
        Ms. Jenkins. Well, I am not an expert in cyber, so I can't
    really say with any authority whether they could do it or not,
    but apparently North Korea does have some capabilities when it
    comes to cyber. So whether they could actually do what we are
    finding out the Russians have done, I am not sure, but they
    obviously are in the process of trying to strengthen their
    cyber capabilities.
        Ms. Titus. Can anybody else address that?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think that to have anything as broad as a
    major election would be beyond their current capabilities. But
    they have used cyber, at least in one case, to attack part of
    the power grid, or tried to, in South Korea. They have
    conducted offensive cyber operations, and their capabilities
    are improving. But whether they would take on anything as broad
    as the U.S., I think that certainly is beyond their current
    capabilities.
        Mr. Ruggiero. I mean, I would just say that we shouldn't
    underestimate North Korea's cyber capabilities. It was only 4
    years ago that they attacked Sony Pictures. And I think it is
    also easy to forget that when certain theaters said they were
    going to show the movie anyway, then North Korea threatened a
    9/11 style attack against the United States.
        So North Korea has advanced its cyber capabilities. Now,
    whether they would want to impact an election, I think is more
    of a--that is not what they are going for. I think they are
    going for the ability to use cyber in a pre- and wartime
    environment. And you look at some of their activities in South
    Korea, and that is clear, but also to steal money to blunt the
    sanctions impact.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your questions.
        Next, we will go to Mrs. Ann Wagner from Missouri.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you all for being witnesses today. I appreciate
    your testimony.
        Mr. Cordesman, I really appreciated your thorough review of
    North Korea's weapon activities. It was very useful to the
    committee. Do you know to what extent U.S. bases in Northeast
    Asia have security measures in place to combat infectious or
    lethal agents?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think you would have to get a briefing on
    detection at a different level because it is really, more than
    anything else now, the ability to characterize an attack that
    becomes the most critical issue. Your other problem is that
    when it comes down to what is the attack, there are so many
    different agents and so many different ways you can attack,
    that there are at least some agents which, in an island
    context, an infectious agent or so on, where it would be
    extremely difficult for anyone to conduct a defensive measure
    other than treatment. And in that case, detecting the way in
    which the weapon was developed would be critical, because if it
    is altered to have a slow gestation period, which is now
    possible, it becomes a very difficult problem. I am sure this
    issue is one that is being examined as part of a broader
    effort, but I think you are touching on some very sensitive
    issues.
        Mrs. Wagner. Mr. Ruggiero, I appreciated your summary of
    how President Trump's diplomatic pressure has caused other
    countries to end relationships with North Korea. Are there
    countries partnering with North Korea that stand out to you as
    needing special attention from the administration?
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, beyond China and Russia, and, you know,
    it was mentioned earlier, Poland, there are certainly still
    countries in Africa I am concerned about. Even though Singapore
    has said that it will cut off its trade relationship with North
    Korea, I am still concerned about the actual implementation of
    that. Malaysia has been an issue in the past. I think the
    question here is whether the administration is willing to use
    sanctions authorities to go after companies in friendly
    countries to show an impact. I think if they did that perhaps
    once or twice, that it could have an exponential impact.
        Mrs. Wagner. I agree. Ambassador Jenkins, can you speak
    about the outcomes of yesterday's U.S./Canada meeting in
    Vancouver on North Korea's illicit transfer of materials and
    equipment?
        Ms. Jenkins. The one thing that I was able to pick up, but
    I need to get more information, is that there was an agreement
    by Canada to provide some funding to the U.S. to help with
    sanctions against North Korea. There was a pledge of $325
    million--$3.25 million to help the U.S. with the sanctions, to
    help other countries with strengthening sanctions.
        So I don't think there was a lot of--I don't know how much
    success there was in terms of bringing North Korea to the
    table, which is one of the things they wanted to do and,
    obviously, there is--thinking that by continuing the pressure
    on North Korea, that will bring them to the table and this is
    another way to try to do that. But there was a lot of
    discussion on the sanctions and how to enforce the sanctions.
        Mrs. Wagner. Great. Thank you. It seems that U.S. policy
    prioritizes the challenge of the nuclear threat over the
    challenge of the chemical and biological weapons threat. Mr.
    Parachini, do you believe the U.S. Government should work to
    change its what I will call cost-benefit analysis and better
    prioritize the chemical and biological threats? And how do you
    think we begin to do that, sir?
        Mr. Parachini. So I think a focus on the nuclear threat is
    appropriate. It is a demonstrated capability that they have now
    also demonstrated a ballistic missile capability. So it is
    generally--it is in a category in and of itself where their
    chemical and biological weapons capabilities are at different
    thresholds. We don't have a good sense of what those thresholds
    may be. They are a greater threat, I think, in both South Korea
    and the Asian theater than they are to the homeland, but I
    think that naturally leads you to prioritize nuclear first.
        Their chemical capabilities are probably more robust based
    on what we know and based on the ease of producing those types
    of weapons. And their biological weapons are probably least
    available for use, and we know less about them, so I think I
    would prioritize those less. I would say if there are ways to
    do dual-use things for detection and addressing any infectious
    diseases, that is desirable to deal with I think the least
    probable of these threats.
        Mrs. Wagner. Great. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Next, we will go to Ms. Tulsi Gabbard from the State of
    Hawaii.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, at this point, I think no one more viscerally
    appreciates the seriousness of the threat that we face at this
    moment than the people of Hawaii who just went through a
    terrifying experience on Saturday morning, receiving this alert
    on their cell phone that a ballistic missile was incoming, take
    shelter immediately, this is not a drill. Now, obviously, we
    know now this turned out to be colossal error on the part of
    the State officials responsible for this. But it really served
    as a wake-up call to the country and to the people in
    Washington about the imminent nature of the threat that we face
    and the need for urgent and effective action to ultimately
    remove this threat from our country.
        So, Mr. Ruggiero, you were talking about sanctions and
    through a lot of the different questions, I think you gave
    responses coming at different angles. It is clear, though, that
    none of the sanctions that have been put in place over the last
    few decades against North Korea have proven effective, which is
    why we are sitting in this position, nor are they anywhere
    near--nor have they reached anywhere near the effectiveness of
    the sanctions in Iran that caused the nuclear deal to occur.
        Can you label maybe the top most effective changes to
    current sanctions that would actually prove this sanctions
    regime to be effective to create this leverage?
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, I can give you three. We talked about
    the China financial, so we don't have to go into much detail
    about that. We talked about the fines, and that would be
    useful. I would say the other benefit of the Vancouver meeting
    is something that I testified before this committee last year
    about, which is the public nature of a like-minded group. And
    we had that on Iran, and it looks like we now have that with
    Vancouver. And I think that one of the things in the statement
    was that they are going to meet more often, so that is the
    second thing. And the third, which is related to that, is
    shipping. You know, our research indicates that there are at
    least double, if not triple, of the number of North Korean
    linked vessels that can be and really should be sanctioned. And
    then also we have already seen the South Korean stop two--or
    excuse me--freeze or impound two vessels with regard to ship-
    to-ship transfers. That is an area that is going to need more
    work, and I think a lot of people don't want to interdict
    vessels, but we need to remember the value of just doing
    training exercises with regard to interdicting vessels as well.
    Doing those in a more public way to increase the costs for some
    of these vessels that may not know they are involved with North
    Korea.
        Ms. Gabbard. Anyone else? With regard to--there has been
    some conversation, especially lately, about the possibility of
    a, quote/unquote, deg. ``preventative or preemptive
    strike,'' and I am wondering what actual defense treaties are
    in place between China and North Korea, and Russia and North
    Korea, respectively, and what you believe their responses would
    be from the spectrum of a surgical strike that some are
    advocating for all the way to an overwhelming military strike
    coming from the United States? How would China and Russia react
    to that?
        Mr. Cordesman. There is no automatic treaty relationship
    between China and North Korea, but there is a broad security
    relationship and treaty or agreement. I think that when you
    talk about how China would react, any kind of bolt from the
    blue, just preemptive attack without a cause, would almost
    force China to react, at least diplomatically, and take a very
    strong political stand. I doubt very much if it would lead to
    immediate military action, but it would be extremely hard to
    predict. I think----
        Ms. Gabbard. Would you agree that North Korea would respond
    with military action in that instance?
        Mr. Cordesman. I think that certainly it would respond with
    some kind of military action, but whether that action would be
    something that would offset the impact of a really well-
    targeted preventative strike, a lot would depend on how well we
    can actually target preventively and locate and destroy their
    nuclear capabilities, and how many other things we would do to
    restrict their retaliatory capability. There is a very wide
    range between simply trying to strike their nuclear weapons and
    what could be a major conflict.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
        Mr. Parachini. I might add that it is very dangerous to
    think about decapitation because you don't know whether or not
    this is a regime that has the dead-hand doctrine; that is, when
    the leadership goes out, some other parts of the military know
    that it is time for them to go in. And indeed that was a Soviet
    doctrine. It is a reasonable worry that North Korea may have a
    similar one. So any type of decapitation attempt, successful or
    not, might launch something that we really would not like to
    have occur.
        Ms. Gabbard. Yeah. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. I thank you for your questioning.
        Next, we will go to Mr. Tom Garrett from Virginia.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to start with Ambassador Jenkins, Mr. Chairman,
    because I don't know if you are aware but Ambassador Jenkins
    went to our Nation's premiere flagship public university, the
    University of Virginia, for one of her degrees, so I know she
    is going to have a good answer here.
        To your knowledge, Ambassador Jenkins, is there any other
    nation on the face of the planet circa 2018 that literally
    sells workers to do work in foreign countries and then has
    their salaries remitted to the government of that nation?
        Ms. Jenkins. I am taking my time with this one just to
    think. I don't think so.
        Mr. Garrett. I don't either. And I just--I point that out,
    not because it is directly on point, but because I think it is
    relevant for those who are trying to understand the nature of
    this regime. In my opening statement, Mr. Chair, I tried to
    illustrate that any regime that would sell its very own people
    into slavery might be willing to utilize weapons of any
    variety, be they conventional, nuclear, biological or chemical
    against not only foreigners, but their own citizens. And I also
    think it is worthy of note that the history in the region
    indicates hostilities inherent over intergenerational periods
    between not just the north and the south but also the Japanese
    and the Koreans, the Chinese and the Koreans, et cetera, and I
    think most Americans fail to understand that.
        Moving somewhat, Dr. Cordesman, dual-purpose improved
    conventional munitions, submunitions, bomblets, do we know
    whether or not the North Korean regime employs artillery,
    canon, rocket, or missile systems that might employ
    submunitions? I mean, I know the answer, but----
        Mr. Cordesman. I have not heard that they have extensive
    stocks of advanced submunitions, but I think that from some of
    the literature I have seen from Jane's and others, there are
    indications they have at least some capabilities in these
    areas.
        Mr. Garrett. And unclassified documentation indicates that
    a launcher loader worth of dual-purpose improved conventional
    munitions on the proper mathematical firing solutions would be
    able to essentially impact every single unprotected target in a
    single square kilometer. So, again, these references to 20,000
    dead in 1 day, I would submit, rhetorically, are probably low,
    particularly when you consider populations not hardened,
    densely compacted in civilian areas.
        Now, does the United States employ Dual-Purpose Improved
    Conventional Munitions by doctrine?
        Mr. Cordesman. We have a range of advanced artillery
    rounds, yes.
        Mr. Garrett. But did we not remove ourselves voluntarily
    from the----
        Mr. Cordesman. Yes.
        Mr. Garrett. And that would have been circa 2015?
        Mr. Cordesman. Right.
        Mr. Garrett. And so also we have made reference to, and you
    made reference to hardened artillery emplacements, essentially,
    in theory, these artillery emplacements might roll out from
    underneath a protective overhead cover, et cetera, fire and
    then move back in. Does that accurately characterize some of
    our understanding in the North Korean indirect fire capability?
        Mr. Cordesman. They vary sharply according to the terrain.
    Some do that. Some can fire and do fire from fixed positions.
        Mr. Garrett. And so we voluntarily stop using scatterable
    submunitions that might counter these in a counter battery
    scenario. How about area-denial munitions, RAMS and ADAMS,
    artillery-fired area-denial munitions? Do we have those in our
    capability? And do we have those in our inventory in the United
    States?
        Mr. Cordesman. I know we have them in our capability and
    had them in our capability. Quite frankly, I do not know the
    inventories involved.
        Mr. Garrett. In fact, we voluntarily removed ourselves from
    the realm of nations that would employ scatterable area-denial
    munitions. Have the North Koreans done this?
        Mr. Cordesman. No.
        Mr. Garrett. And so might these withdrawals of the United
    States from the arena of cutting-edge weaponry put us at a
    competitive disadvantage with the regime that hasn't honored
    the same commitments that we have made?
        Mr. Cordesman. If I may make two points. First, we have
    basically gone to using the equivalent of Earth penetrators
    rather than submunitions because of the blast doors on the
    hearts. That is a very restricted capability, but it requires
    you to penetrate a much more serious barrier than the artillery
    rounds we then had.
        Mr. Garrett. So, specifically, in a case of a hardened
    target, the Earth penetrator might be a preferred method.
    However, if you are trying to deny a roll-in roll-out artillery
    system, the scatterable mines might be something that would
    work best.
        Let me continue, because I have about 20 seconds remaining.
    It strikes me that the people who entered this country into
    these agreements probably never did comprehensive fire-risk
    planning for offensive or defensive operations. And it strikes
    me, and I apologize again, with all due respect, sir, and I
    have an immense amount for yourself and other members of this
    panel, that we endanger the very lives of the young women and
    men who have signed on a dotted line to potentially sacrifice
    everything that they have or ever will have for the freedom of
    this Nation and defense of the innocent people, not only of
    South Korea, but the world.
        And so I take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and I will
    conclude shortly, to submit that we might relook some of the
    treaties into which we entered and some of the actions we
    unilaterally engaged in in light of the very real circumstances
    in which we find ourselves 24 years post a North Korean nuclear
    deal that was to, in the words of the President who shouted
    from the mountaintops of success, ``rid the Korean Peninsula of
    a nuclear threat.''
        It is indeed existential to the young men and women in our
    uniforms and to the people, not only of the region, but of the
    world. Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Well spoken. I appreciate your words.
        Next, Ms. Norma Torres from California.
        Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    hearing.
        Mr. Ruggiero--I hoped I pronounced your name correctly--
    last year, I introduced H.R. 3261, the North Korea Follow the
    Money Act. It is a simple bipartisan bill that requires a
    national intelligence estimate on North Korea's revenue
    sources.
        How much do we know about how North Korea is funding its
    chemical weapons programs?
        Mr. Ruggiero. I would just say that a lot of our
    understanding of North Korea's finances is very anecdotal
    partially because North Korea does not report its own trade
    statistics, partially because some trade statistics that are
    reported as North Korea are actually South Korea, and then also
    because the Chinese report what they want to report.
        And to perhaps the question of, you know, whether having an
    assessment of that type, of the budget and the usefulness of
    that, I would say, you know, sanctions are now being used more
    and more often, especially when it comes to North Korea. And I
    think it would be valuable, at least internally within the U.S.
    Government, to have a common understanding of where North Korea
    is now and what are the levers that can be used to affect
    different revenue streams.
        Mrs. Torres. Specifically, if we want to be very specific
    and target certain people versus an entire country, correct?
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, the issue here, there has always been
    this narrative of leadership assets overseas. That is certainly
    something that I know that the government has focused on
    before. And as I noted earlier, the North Koreans' use their
    revenue really in three ways, military, weapons, and for the
    elites. And I think if we had an understanding of what the
    budget is like, but it will always be imprecise, but a way to
    target the sanctions to go in certain areas and to not harm the
    people, I think is the first order there.
        Mrs. Torres. Absolutely. That is why I think it is critical
    for us to, at the very least, Mr. Chairman, try to get a
    hearing on this bill, once again, H.R. 3261.
        I am also very concerned about an incident that occurred
    June 2017, a cyber attack that shut down our Nation's ports.
    The Port of Los Angeles was impacted. That is a concern to me
    because the livelihood of my constituents is dependent on the
    activities at the ports.
        Do you think that North Korea has the capability to carry
    out cyber attacks against our ports and other critical
    infrastructure?
        Mr. Ruggiero. Well, I would say that if they don't have the
    capability now, they are going to certainly work toward getting
    it. I think what we see in South Korea over the last 5 to 6
    years where North Korea used cyber to attack U.S. Forces,
    Korea, and our South Korean counterparts in a wide approach,
    and then learned from that and was more specific. In other
    words, going after 20 Web sites the first time, and then the
    second time, going after only 2.
        So I think that is part of it. The wartime environment,
    using it in a wartime environment, but then using it--what we
    like to call cyber-enabled economic warfare, to try and harm
    the United States as these sanctions increase. And then the
    third way is to make money to blunt the impact of those
    sanctions.
        Mrs. Torres. Go ahead, Ms. Jenkins.
        Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I would just add that I think the more
    effective the international community is in terms of sanctions,
    in terms of interdiction, illicit trafficking of materials and
    equipment, the more likely North Korea will rely on cyber to
    raise the funds that they need to do what they need to do. And
    in doing that, they will develop a capability to use it for
    other things.
        So there is a connection between the effectiveness of
    activities to prevent them from doing what they are doing and
    to prevent them from raising the money that they want to raise
    and their use of this other tool to raise that money.
        Mrs. Torres. So either stealing from us, directly from us,
    or shutting down our commerce.
        What can we do to protect ourselves? Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cordesman. I think that really is a key question. An
    awful lot of the problem we face is the failure basically to
    provide basic defenses, reduce cyber vulnerability, set
    standards that do not allow ease of attack. When countries like
    North Korea can attack a critical infrastructure function, the
    question is, why is it vulnerable in the first place?
        Mrs. Torres. Thank you. I ran out of time.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. I appreciate your participation and your
    questions. And the panel, I thank you for your endurance, your
    information that you have given us.
        What I see is the continuing evolution of the North Korean
    saga, going from the Korean War to where we are at today. And
    we have seen past administrations, both Republican and
    Democrats use the carrot and stick. And at each point, the
    Koreans got stronger as far as their development.
        I have a hard time believing they did this on their own. I
    feel there was a lot of help, whether it was from Pakistan in
    the beginning, to Russia, to China, to other actors. And they
    are used as a proxy state in a lot of these ventures, but now
    they are at a point where they are today. And I think you just
    brought up a point about defensive mechanisms. And I look at
    the THAAD system South Korea put in that was so warranted at
    the time, but I saw China retaliate against South Korea. South
    Korea was doing that just for their protection. And I think
    they were very warranted to bring in the other ones. And again,
    at the dismay and dissatisfaction of China. But I think it is
    very important.
        And I think we, as a Nation, should make sure that that
    offer stands on the table as something that South Korea can use
    to make sure that they have the defensive mechanisms. But this
    is, of course, up to the South Koreans. And we are at a
    different point now with the talks that are going on between
    the two Koreas. We can just hope that with the efforts of the
    world community coming together, putting pressure on all
    partners that are trading with North Korea, that this will come
    to a peaceful resolution.
        I can't thank you enough for being here. Do you have any
    further comments you want to say or you feel pretty confident
    with what has gone on?
        Hearing no other comments, I want to thank the witnesses. I
    want to thank the members, and I want to thank Judge Poe for
    calling this important meeting jointly together with the Asia-
    Pacific Subcommittee. In his absence, I would like to end it
    with, ``and that is the way it is.''
        This meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittees were
    adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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