[House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE INTERIOR, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 26, 2017 __________ Serial No. 115-39 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://oversight.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 27-759 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California Will Hurd, Texas Jimmy Gomez, California Gary J. Palmer, Alabama James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Greg Gianforte, Montana Sheria Clarke, Staff Director Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director William McKenna General Counsel Ryan Hambleton, Subcommittee Staff Director Kiley Bidelman, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment Blake Farenthold, Texas, Chairman Paul A. Gosar, Arizona, Vice Chair Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis Ross, Florida Jamie Raskin, Maryland Gary J. Palmer, Alabama Jimmy Gomez, California James Comer, Kentucky (Vacancy) Greg Gianforte, Montana C O N T E N T S Page Hearing held on September 26, 2017............................... 1 WITNESSES Mr. Anthony J. O'Donnell, Commissioner, Maryland Public Service Commission, Chair, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues, Waste Disposal Oral Statement............................................... 4 Written Statement............................................ 7 Mr. Chuck Smith, Council Member, Aiken County, South Carolina on behalf of Energy Communities Alliance Oral Statement............................................... 15 Mr. David G. Victor, Chairman, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Community Engagement Panel, Professor, UC San Diego School of Global Policy & Strategy Oral Statement............................................... 16 Written Statement............................................ 19 Dr. Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists Oral Statement............................................... 27 Written Statement............................................ 29 Ms. Katie Tubb, Policy Analyst, Institute for Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation Oral Statement............................................... 39 Written Statement............................................ 41 APPENDIX Statement for the record by Senator Dean Heller of Nevada, submitted by Chairman Farenthold............................... 64 The Costs of Inaction on Nuclear Waste Management, submitted by Mr. Palmer..................................................... 68 Questions for the record for Mr. Anthony O'Donnell, submitted by Chairman Farenthold............................................ 71 Questions for the record for Mr. Chuck Smith, submitted by Chairman Farenthold............................................ 74 Questions for the record for Ms. Katie Tubb, submitted by Chairman Farenthold............................................ 78 EXAMINING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE ---------- Tuesday, September 26, 2017 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy and Environment Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in Room 2154, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Blake Farenthold [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Farenthold, Gosar, Ross, Palmer, Comer, Gianforte, Raskin, and Gomez. Also Present: Representatives Issa and Clay. Mr. Farenthold. The Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and the Environment will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. Without objection, we are going to allow Mr. Clay to sit in, a member of the full committee, to participate in this subcommittee. Without objection, so ordered. Good afternoon. Today, the Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and the Environment will examine America's nuclear waste management and storage. Over the last 40 years, the U.S. produced 76,000 metric tons of nuclear waste. That's enough volume to cover a football field 24 feet high. This waste is scattered around our cities at nuclear power plants and other facilities because our country can't get moving on a proper long-term plan for storage and disposal. Today, we'll explore our existing regulations for nuclear waste management and possible opportunities for improvement. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or NWPA, of 1982 directed the Department of Energy, aka the DOE, to develop a national repository for the permanent disposal of nuclear waste. Way back in 1987, the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada was designated as this site. The DOE submitted a licensing application for Yucca Mountain to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2008. However, the Obama administration's disapproval of the proposal and a series of court cases significantly delayed the application's review. Today, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has yet to approve the license for Yucca Mountain rendering the site unusable. To cover the cost of permanent removal, the NWPA established a Nuclear Waste Fund to collect fees under contractual obligation from nuclear power utilities in exchange for removal of nuclear waste. The DOE has, in fact, collected around $750 million annually, despite their inability to dispose the utility's nuclear waste. The DOE now owes roughly $29 billion in liabilities since they failed to fulfill their contracts. With nearly 2,000 metric tons of nuclear waste produced each year, the need for a long-term storage solution is becoming crucial. In my home State of Texas, there's currently a site in Andrews County used for low-level radioactive waste. A licensing application to upgrade the sight to an interim nuclear repository was submitted to the NRC. But similar to Yucca Mountain, the application faced numerous roadblocks ultimately stalling, in their view, process. Due to the barriers faced in establishing a national repository, nuclear power of utilities often store nuclear waste in reactor sites. This is costly and unsustainable over the longterm and places significant burdens on the communities that house them. The Federal Government has a designated site and the resources necessary to make it operational, yet has struggled every step of the way to get the approval required to move forward. It's been 35 years since the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and we have hardly anything to show in that time period, despite billions of dollars spent. We have to find a way to move past the gridlock. I look forward to hearing ideas and suggestions from our panel, and am hopeful the committee can create solutions to improve the management and storage of America's nuclear waste. At this point, I will yield 5 minutes to Mr. Raskin, the acting ranking member, as Ms. Plaskett is detained in the U.S. Virgin Islands for obvious reasons. Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. And welcome to all of our fine witnesses, including my former colleague from the Maryland General Assembly, Mr. O'Donnell. It's really good to see you. And I am serving in the place of our distinguished ranking member, my friend and former law student, Ms. Plaskett, who is attending to her constituents in the U.S. Virgin Islands who are struggling to recover from the devastating hurricane and all the flood damage. They are in our thoughts, and prayers are with her and with her constituents. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss an issue on the minds of a lot of Americans. Nuclear waste storage is a pressing nationwide concern that requires a nationwide solution. There are currently over 700,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in our country, an additional 13,000 metric tons from defense-related activities. This radioactive waste is currently being stored at dozens of deteriorating nuclear storage sites across America. And I believe we can all agree that this is not a viable or safe long-term solution. I believe we can also agree that our government owes the American people an effective plan to address the nuclear waste storage problem. We owe the American people a plan that allows for nuclear waste to be stored securely in the manner that does not poison the environment and that presents no public health and safety concerns for local communities. Questions about the soundness and safety of our current storage regime and facilities are not new. In recent years, we've seen several disturbing incidents that have brought into question our ability to safely store this dangerous material in communities across the land. Internationally, the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima plant caused by an earthquake and a tsunami is still a vivid and serious reminder of the dangers of nuclear power and escaped nuclear radiation. And it serves as a warning to all of us around the world of what can happen if we don't keep safety at the very forefront of our concerns. So it's troubling to me that the Trump administration is moving swiftly to advance the Yucca Mountain facility. The President's proposed budget provides for $120 million to restart the licensing for this controversial plan. There are significant reasons why the repository at Yucca Mountain site originally selected 30 years ago has not yet been built. Yucca Mountain is seismically active and faces the possibility of continued and increased volcanic activity. Moreover, the facility comes with a known risk of radioactive waste leaking into the groundwater and contaminating the drinking water of nearby communities. Furthermore, the transportation of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain would take it through 44 States and the District of Columbia, well over two-thirds of the country, nor have we fully considered the national security risks involved in transporting and storing this nuclear waste. These significant concerns cannot be swept under the rug in a mad dash to get Yucca Mountain licensed. All of these environmental, public health, safety, transportation, and national security questions must be thoroughly answered before we determine that Yucca Mountain is the best site for nuclear waste storage. There are so many difficulties involved in using Yucca Mountain to store nuclear waste that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel is considering approximately 300 different contingencies. It seems clear we should be considering alternative sites to act as a permanent repository. Looking forward whether we are discussing short- or long-term solutions, we must continue to make the public safety a paramount priority, and this means carefully considering environmental implications of all the sites. As the people of Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands desperately try to recover from record-force hurricanes and flooding damage, we must take stock of the fact that climate change is dramatically increasing the ferocity and the perils of natural disasters. No plan to safely dispose of and store nuclear waste is remotely complete if it does not take into account changes in weather patterns. It is also imperative that the Federal Government works with State and local governments to develop and implement effective solutions going forward. I look forward to hearing today from people who are tackling these important issues. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. Without objection, other members will have 3 legislative days to submit an opening statement. Additionally, without objection, Senator Dean Heller of Nevada has also submitted testimony. And without objection, we'll add that to the record as well. Mr. Farenthold. Now I'd like to introduce our witnesses. We have Mr. Anthony O'Donnell, commissioner of the Maryland Public Service Commission, and chair of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues - Waste Disposal at the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. We have Mr. Chuck Smith, a councilman in Aiken County, South Carolina, and chairman of the Energy Community Alliance. We have Mr. David Victor, professor of international relations and director of the Laboratory on International Law and Regulations at UC San Diego, as well as chairman of the Community Engagement Panel at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. We have Dr. Edwin Lyman, senior scientist of--at the Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program. And Ms. Katie Tubb, policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, Center for International Trade and Economics. We welcome you all. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before their testimony. Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. And you all may be seated. We all have your preprovided testimony. So in order to allow time for discussions and questions, I'd request you limit your time for your verbal testimony to 5 minutes. The clock in front of you shows the time remaining. It will turn yellow when you have 30 seconds remaining and turn red when your time's up. If you go way over, I'll start tapping the gavel to--in case you missed the clock. So with that, we'll begin with Mr. O'Donnell. You're recognized for 5 minutes, sir. WITNESS TESTIMONIES TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY J. O'DONNELL Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Chairman Farenthold and Acting Ranking Member Raskin and other members of the Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the lack of progress on nuclear waste disposal and its effect on ratepayers. My name is Tony O'Donnell, and I'm a commissioner on the Maryland Public Service Commission. I also serve as chairman of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, NARUC, Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues - Waste Disposal. Thank you for holding this hearing. State economic utility regulators are responsible for ensuring the safe, reliable, and affordable delivery of essential electric utility services in every State across this country. The success of the Federal nuclear waste management program funded by the consumers of electricity generated from the Nation's nuclear power plants is necessarily of keen interest. Both NARUC and its member commissions have dedicated a tremendous amount of time and resources to ensure that electricity consumers receive the services they have paid for. State regulators agree that users of electricity for nuclear power plants should pay for the Federal--for the Federal nuclear waste management and disposal program, and the consumers have paid generously into this fund. Since 1982, more than $40 billion in direct payments and interest have been paid into the U.S. Nuclear Waste Fund. In fact, the $40-plus billion the consumers have contributed to the fund is only part of the entire amount they have spent on nuclear waste. First, consumers have paid for the original waste storage of facilities through the rates. Secondly, they paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund, as I just mentioned. Third, consumers paid to rerack or consolidate used fuel pools through the rates because the Federal Government failed to remove the waste by the statutory deadline. Fourth, they had to pay for onsite, out-of-pool dry cask storage through rates, again due to Federal failure. Finally, consumers paid a fifth time, through taxes paid for the Judgment Fund disbursements to cover damages caused by the failure of the Federal nuclear waste program. With respect to the judgement fund, taxpayers from every State, even those whose utilities have no stake in nuclear- generated electricity, continue to fund court-awarded damages from the Department of Justice Judgment Fund for DOE's partial breach of its contracts with electric companies that required DOE to remove the used nuclear fuel. According to a September 2014 DOE audit report, $4.5 billion in damages have already been paid as a result of the Federal Government inaction. DOE estimates the total liability for the Federal Government will be about $27 billion, subject to check, maybe it's $29 billion. But that estimate includes the unrealistic assumption that the Department can begin to accept used nuclear fuel by 2021. Industry estimates almost double that projection. Even former President Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission estimated that every year of delay in accepting used nuclear fuel will increase this liability by approximately $500 million. Yet for those billions, so far ratepayers in the country have nothing to show for it. The Federal Government missed its statutorily mandated deadline to start accepting nuclear mandate--nuclear waste in 1998. In the 1990s and early 2000s, at least the program had shown progress, notwithstanding the missed deadline. However, since that time, efforts to block funding for a geological disposal of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain as well as the U.S. Department of Energy's unlawful refusal to support the project's licensing application has kept the country in the exact same situation we occupied 30 years ago when Congress decided--I reiterate, Congress decided--that Yucca Mountain should be the first site considered for the United States permanent repository. The United States needs and--needs and consumers have paid for a permanent storage solution, and nothing less. To put it bluntly, the States and localities have the Federal Government's waste, and the Federal Government has our money. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be part of this critical discussion. [Prepared statement of Mr. O'Donnell follows] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith. TESTIMONY OF CHUCK SMITH Mr. Smith. Chairman Farenthold and members of---- Mr. Farenthold. Could you turn your microphone on, please, sir? Mr. Smith. Thank you for inviting me to testify today ensuring that the perspective of the local communities that host the government's defense nuclear waste facilities is represented. I am Chuck Smith, council member of Aiken County, South Carolina, board member of the SRS Community Reuse Organization, and chairman of Energy Communities Alliance. Our communities have long played a key role supporting the Nation's national security efforts. Indulge me, please. I have two canisters of high-level waste from different locations. Scientists will tell you that both are radiologically the same material, yet it costs $10 billion to manage this material and $100 billion to manage this material. Why? Because DOE regulations make no sense. I'd like to discuss defense high-level waste in an alternative path forward that can potentially reduce current cost estimates for addressing nuclear waste by upwards of $40 billion. DOE produced defense nuclear waste through its reprocessing programs carried out as a part of the Manhattan Project and during the Cold War. DOE has 332 underground tanks used to process and store liquid high-level waste. The large tanks sit at three locations: Hanford, Washington; the Idaho National Laboratory; and in my State, Savannah River Site. The defense high-level waste is ultimately destined for disposal at Yucca Mountain. ECA has long supported moving forward with the Yucca Mountain licensing process. A high-level waste repository is and remains essential. ECA also supports consolidated interim storage, but it must exist alongside a permanent solution and not instead of it. As the ``kick the can down the road approach'' continues, I must remind you that our communities are already de facto interim storage sites. In addition, DOE and nuclear power producers are already incurring large costs paid for by taxpayers in your communities. GAO reported this year that DOE's environmental liability has doubled from a low of $176 billion in 1997 to an estimate of $372 billion in 2016. DOE has paid $6.1 billion in damages. That breaks down to 800 million annually, about $2.5 million per day. The cost of inaction is high. So what can we do? ECA believes one option is clarifying the way nuclear waste is classified. Our country's radioactive waste clarification system currently relies primarily on point of origin rather than consumption or the specific hazards posed by its disposal. This approach does not make sense. Some defense high-level waste could technically qualify as transuranic waste, if based on its radioactive content. Only the U.S. classifies this nuclear waste this way. Just this month, ECA released a white paper outlining five near-term actions we believe can help DOE cut years of operation: reduce the size and duration of storage facilities needed before a high-level waste repository is available, accelerate waste tank retrieval and closures, and, as I mentioned earlier, realize savings of more than 40 billion. Our first two recommendations reflect a two-pronged approach. First, DOE should revise its order 435.1 to clarify that waste will be managed and disposed of according to characteristics rather than origin. DOE already has the authority to do this under the Atomic Energy Act. Congress should eventually provide statutory clarification to codify any clarification and reduce the chances it will shift over time along with politics and new administrations. However, any legislative language should support DOE's efforts and not get ahead of them. My community has started to develop its own legislative language, but we need to ensure that resources are available for local and State representatives around each impacted site to engage with their constituents, State policymakers, and congressional delegations to provide education and build support. Our next two recommendations deal with WIPP. DOE must begin working with the State of New Mexico on a permanent modification--on a permanent modification for WIPP to allow some of the tank waste currently classified as high-level waste to go to WIPP if it meets waste-acceptance criteria. This could allow 2,300 canisters of waste at Savannah River that are already destined to safely go to WIPP rather than sit onsite waiting for a high-level repository to be operational. Congress and DOE should provide full funding for WIPP so the full range of disposal capabilities can be resumed and capacity ultimately increased. And finally, DOE should begin to work on pilot projects and policy options to better understand alternative approaches. This includes considering how best to utilize private facilities such as WCS in Texas. Again, I caution it is imperative that DOE enter into discussions as early as possible with host communities and States to ensure there's a full understanding of the risk and benefits of any proposal. Impacted stakeholders must have the resources and opportunities necessary to participate in planning and provide feedback into policymaking process. For many communities, trust in DOE has eroded over time, and transparency is paramount to our community's ability to support DOE decisions. Clarifying waste definition is a large departure from current policy, but current policy has not served us well. There are safe options, and the Federal Government must seriously consider them. In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I did bring copies of our report. ECA calls on you to support our communities and the country to move forward using science-based, not politically science-based, decision. We need to stop spending millions of taxpayers' dollars or fines rather than progress. It just makes sense. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Victor, you're up for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF DAVID G. VICTOR Mr. Victor. Thank you very much, Chairman Farenthold, Acting Ranking Member Raskin, Representative Gomez, members of the subcommittee. My name is David Victor. I'm a professor at UC San Diego. I'm also a chairman of the Community Engagement Panel at San Onofre. This is a panel set up by Southern California Edison, the operator of the facility, to help steward the process of decommissioning of the San Onofre site, which is the largest commercial reactor site to be decommissioned to date. I've submitted in advance my written testimony. I want to just focus on three remarks in the 5 minutes that I have here today, remarks based on what I'm hearing from the communities on the front lines around these plants. The first comment is that the problem is now well-known. The Nation needs a solution. We do not have a solution to the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. But the situation today is radically different from what it was 10 years ago, and it's going to get worse quickly. Today, there are 17 reactors at 14 sites on 11 States that are in the various stages of decommissioning, including the San Onofre plant. In the future, there will be more reactors in a similar situation. At these sites, the visibility and the problems associated with the lack of a solution to the spent nuclear fuel problem are much more visible because they're an operating site, there's always fuel onsite, and the reactor core and pools onsite at cask storage. And a decommissioned site situation is totally different. And the deal that the communities expect is that when the plants are removed and the benefits from that plant are removed, that the spent fuel will be removed as well. And that deal is not being fulfilled. The second of the three comments I'd like to make concerns Yucca Mountain. I understand that a lot of the politics around this issue in Washington are focused on Yucca Mountain. What I'm hearing from people on the front lines is very different. There's attention to Yucca Mountain, but there's much more attention to consolidated interim storage, or monitorable and retrievable storage, such as the sites mentioned in west Texas, another site in eastern New Mexico near the WIPP facility, and perhaps other sites in the future. Over the last 3 years, our panel has spent a lot of time on this issue. And what we have learned is that it's important to view consolidated interim storage as a complement to Yucca Mountain. I understand that politically they can be complements, but the role of these interim facilities and helping get spent fuel out of these communities quickly is vital, because even with a restart of Yucca Mountain, there are going to be many delays. It's going to take a long time. And interim storage is a much more rapid response option. In my testimony, I cite some of the work that's been done on the economics. Interim storage, in addition to help save money when developed in tandem with Yucca Mountain or other permanent storage facilities, it also gives us more options as a country, so that if one option doesn't work or if there are political troubles, the entire country is not held up by those difficulties as we have seen in the debate over the last few decades. We have spent more time on this issue around the San Onofre communities than any other topic that our panel looks at. And the number one ask from those communities is to help accelerate an overall strategy that involves permanent repositories as well as consolidated interim storage. The third and last comment I'd like to make concerns all the progress that has been made in Washington and, to some degree, in the arms of the Federal Government around the possibilities of restarting Yucca and around making consolidated storage a reality. It's really striking how much has happened in the last few years and how much in particular this body has done on the legislative front. Maybe not quite as much progress over in the Senate yet, but we can hope. I think the bill that's working its way through here is a big step forward, but it's a first step and additional work is needed. And I'd like to highlight two areas where we have learned about additional work that will be essential. One of those areas concerns the order with which spent fuel is removed from sites and sent to an interim storage facility or a permanent repository. Current procedures are ambiguous about this but seem to envision a scenario where the oldest fuel will be taken first from lots of different sites around the country. What we hear from not just our communities, but other communities around decommissioned nuclear sites is they would like those fuels to be moved first, because in decommissioned sites, there is especially no logic for continued onsite presence of spent nuclear fuel. And the other topic that needs more work is transportation. And current appropriations have some money needed for developing the railcar systems to move spent fuel. More work is needed on that front so we can develop a fleet of railcars, so that when real options appear, there are ways to get the fuel out of sites like San Onofre to permanent facilities. I thank you very much for your interest and attention to these issues. We in the communities around plants such as San Onofre are living this on a daily basis, and we are encouraged by the potential progress on solutions. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Victor follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Victor. Dr. Lyman, you've got your 5 minutes, sir. TESTIMONY OF EDWIN LYMAN Mr. Lyman. Thank you, Chairman Farenthold and Acting Ranking Member Raskin and the other distinguished members of the subcommittee. On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. And before I begin, I would just like to extend our sympathies and best wishes for a swift and full recovery to the people of Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and all the other areas that have been so deeply affected by Harvey, Irma, and Maria. UCS has more than half a million supporters united by a central belief we need sound scientific analysis to create a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. We are neither pro nor anti nuclear power, but we have served as a nuclear power safety and security watchdog for nearly 50 years. In this regard, it is critically important that spent fuel be managed safely and protected from terrorist attack until it can be buried in a geological repository. But a sustainable nuclear waste disposal strategy must have broad public acceptance at local, State, and national levels. The witnesses today were asked to focus on the needs and challenges of communities currently holding nuclear waste. While we do agree these communities must have a major stake in the process, a sound nuclear waste policy should also reflect national priorities and look to protect future generations as well as ours. The problems that actions may appear to benefit some communities in the short term can penalize others and may even be harmful to the long-term interests of the U.S. as a whole. To be clear, in our view, spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely and securely at reactors and dry cask facilities for many decades, provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, conducts rigorous oversight, which has not been the case to date in all respects. Nevertheless, risk acceptance varies from one community to another, and it is understandable why some representatives would support legislation to facilitate moving spent fuel in their districts out as soon as possible. This is why Congress needs to come together to develop a new and science-based national nuclear waste management policy in order to allocate risks and benefits as fairly as possible. This policy should include a process to establish and maintain political momentum for development of repositories; a process for repository site selection that is consent-based, fair, and technically sound; requirements that spent fuel be managed safely and securely at reactor sites until a repository becomes available; and requirements for safe and secure shipment of spent fuel from reactor sites to repository. Current laws and regulations do not adequately address any of these issues. Unfortunately, the one game in town right now, which is H.R. 3053, has a number of flaws and avoids many of these questions, or exacerbates them. We expressed our concerns about it in the draft version earlier this year in testimony. And now if there's a version that's been reported out, it's a little improved. In some respects it's even worse. So I'd like to focus on the linkage between siting monitored retrievable storage facilities and a geologic repository. The current version of H.R. 3053 weakens that linkage; in fact, would allow DOE to immediately contract with a private company to spend public funds on developing a monitored retrievable storage facility up until the step of actually operating it. So they could pay to site, do all the reviews, and build a facility, but they can't move fuel there until NRC makes a decision whether or not to authorize construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain. Now, we can see what the problems with this are. Even with that latter condition, we think this would undermine the geologic repository program, because of the way we read the bill, even if the NRC were to deny a construction authorization for Yucca Mountain, DOE would be allowed to keep building MRS facilities indefinitely, each one capped at 10,000 tons, but could build as many as they wanted. So there would be no impetus for actually going forward with the geological repository. And that, we think, would be a bad outcome primarily because of the security concern of leaving spent fuel aboveground indefinitely. Over time, spent fuel in aboveground storage is not only a risk--poses a risk for sabotage but eventually will become a risk for nuclear terrorism because of the plutonium contained in the spent fuel. That spent fuel becomes more vulnerable over time because of the decay of the radioactive barrier that protects it. So we do believe there need to be mechanisms to not provide an escape valve that would allow DOE to abandon a search for geologic repositories. In the meantime, work does need to be done on increasing safety and security of spent fuel at reactor sites. That would include expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks and also upgrading the security requirements for dry cask, because they are also vulnerable. And finally, transportation is the weakest link in the chain. We agree with the other speakers that this must get more attention than it has in the past to facilitate safe and secure transport of spent fuel in that final management system. So the U.S. can afford to allow the NRC to take its time reviewing Yucca Mountain because there is a window of safety. But there is no urgent need to rush forward to a less-than- optimal approach. And so Congress should take the time to get it right. Thank you, and I apologize for exceeding my time. [Prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Oh, that's all right. No, you didn't go too badly. We had somebody this morning use 5 extra minutes. Ms. Tubb, you're up. And please don't use 5 extra minutes. TESTIMONY OF KATIE TUBB Ms. Tubb. My name is Katie Tubb, and I'm a policy analyst for energy and environment issues at the Heritage Foundation. And the views I express today are my own. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for your interest in examining nuclear waste management issues. Rather than a problem, I believe nuclear waste management is an opportunity for growth and innovation in the nuclear industry, if we can get policy right. As requested, I hope to briefly cover how we got to the current dysfunction, the consequences of stalled action, particularly to taxpayers, and where we are on the issue today. According to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, the Department of Energy entered into contracts with commercial nuclear power companies to collect and store nuclear waste at a long-term repository at Yucca Mountain. It was required to begin collecting waste by 1998. In 2008, the DOE applied for a license with the NRC to build a facility at Yucca Mountain. But shortly thereafter, and lacking any technical or scientific justification, the Obama administration unilaterally walked away from the Yucca Mountain license and declared it not a workable solution. Following a series of court cases, the NRC was ordered to review the Yucca Mountain application until funds were exhausted, and the DOE was required to stop collection of the nuclear waste fee. These pivotal court decisions, in essence, bring matters back to where they were in 2008. Stalled action has had costs, and a voice too often left out is that of the taxpayer. Because the DOE has failed to collect nuclear waste as contractually obligated, it has been found in partial breach of its contracts with nuclear power companies. Over $6 billion in settlements have been paid to nuclear utilities from the Treasury Department's Judgment Fund. And put simply, this means the DOE budget takes no hit for its negligence. The nuclear industry is made whole through the Judgment Fund. Taxpayers cover the bill. The DOE projects liability to be $24.7 billion, based on DOE's 2016 December financial report. But this is misleading because it assumes construction of a pilot interim facility in 2021 based on the Obama administration's original plan. The nuclear industry estimates liability of upwards of $50 billion. Another expense to taxpayers is a result of how the Nuclear Waste Fund is accounted for in Federal budgets. As mentioned, the DOE stopped collecting the nuclear waste fee in May 2014 as the courts directed. However, CBO continues to assume the Federal Government is collecting $385 million simply because the DOE could continue--or reinstate the fee. OMB has also used this budget tool. In other words, the Nuclear Waste Fund has been used to disguise the cost of budgeting choices, perpetuating the myth that Congress is fully paying for new spending. The current and future nuclear industry faces considerable uncertainty after the past decade of political mismanagement. Despite a new administration willing to follow the law, Congress has not appropriated for the Nuclear Waste Fund since 2010. American is at a crossroads where Congress has the opportunity to set nuclear waste management on track. There have been notable legislative efforts; however, none have addressed the underlying issues with the current system. First, responsibility for nuclear waste management ought to belong with nuclear power operators as an aspect of commercial nuclear power generation in the same way that other industries such as healthcare, mining, manufacturing, farming all take care of their own waste streams. If waste management were a dynamic part of the utility's bottom line, the nuclear industry would naturally be interested not only in efficient nuclear waste disposal, but also cost- effective predisposal decisions such as interim storage options, fuel types, and reactor technologies. When nuclear power companies are responsible for waste management, regulatory agencies can been seen exactly as that: Disinterested regulatory agencies interested in protecting health and safety. As both regulatory and repository operator, the government appears to have a bias, whether that's real or just perceived. Further, a potential host community can then be a truly equal partner in negotiations with the industry, rather than an inferior party submitting to the Federal Government in a David- Goliath battle to locate a repository. Secondly, nuclear waste policy reforms should replace the previous flat nuclear waste fee with accurate pricing. Prices are critical to any functional and efficient marketplace and provide suppliers and customers with data to determine the attractiveness of a product and service. Prices also give potential competitors the information they need to introduce new alternatives. Nuclear waste management is not an inherent government activity. It is primarily a business activity related to commercial production of electricity. Reform must work off of these two principles of industry responsibility and market prices. It also must recognize that a long-term geologic repository is needed and that in order to progress with the Yucca Mountain, the State of Nevada must have more say in the matter. I think a possible way forward is to treat existing waste under the political realities of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and to approach new ways under a market-based policy. At the very least, Congress needs to provide enough funding for the DOE and NRC to complete the license review of Yucca Mountain. Finishing the review merely brings all the information together for Congress, Nevada, and the industry to make prudent decisions about the next steps. Thank you for giving me 38 extra seconds. [Prepared statement of Ms. Tubb follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. You are very welcome. We'll now proceed with questions. Since I will be staying through the whole hearing, I'll reserve my questions to bat cleanup. So we'll start first with the gentleman from Kentucky. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's my understanding that taxpayers across the country have already paid over $6 billion in damages because the Federal Government has failed to honor its commitment to remove spent fuel from nuclear reactors around the country. Additionally, it's estimated that the final tab that taxpayers are responsible for could rise to $30 billion. What immediate actions can be taken by this Congress to get a feasible used fuel program operating so that the taxpayer liability can be limited and hopefully eliminated going forward? It's up to anybody. Mr. O'Donnell. I'll take an open crack at it, Congressman. I appreciate the question. I think the first thing, from a regulatory standpoint and a State regulator, is there's been an application made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And the first thing this Congress can do is to fund that application going forward, either through the Department of Energy reasserting itself as the applicant, which it hasn't been doing. So they'll need some money to do that. The President's submittal contains money. So we need to get that funding stream going, as well as the NRC needs to be fully complemented and ready to take this application back up. As a State regulator, if we get an application, Mr. Chairman, for somebody who wants to do something under our purview, we can't just suspend that in contravening our own law. We have to run that to ground, and we have to get an answer to that application. And so one way or another, we need that answer. That's where the scientific-based solutions will occur. And I think that's what this Congress can do immediately, is get some funding going and get these programs stood back up so that we can continue down the path of getting the NRC doing the scientific evaluation of the application. Mr. Comer. Okay. Mr. Victor? Mr. Victor. I'd agree with what Mr. O'Donnell said. But let me add the vital importance of interim storage. I recognize Representative Issa, he and the congressional delegation in California spent a lot of time with us around this. We can begin the process of restarting Yucca Mountain in a permanent repository. And I understand the imperative of that. But there's also a very large cost savings that comes from not storing spent fuel at lots of sites all around the country, but at a smaller number of sites. And so for people who are concerned about the cost of all this, in addition to a variety of other objectives here, interim storage is a vital role to play here, as does a smart--Dr. Lyman pointed to a smart transportation program so that we can efficiently, once we have places to send it, and ideally as many places as possible so we have competition, an efficient transportation system so that-- which is really a DOE responsibility in the end as well as State and local planning--an efficient transportation system so that we can move as many of these shipments to those facilities as possible. One last comment here briefly, which is we get regular updates on the status of all the canisters at San Onofre. And what's striking to me is that there are dozens of canisters that are already ready to ship. And in the next few years, there will be dozens more. And so we and many other sites are ready to go as soon as there's a place to send it. Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you. Mr. O'Donnell, it's great to have you here today in your role as chairman of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioner's, subcommittee on nuclear waste disposal. I was made aware that you previously worked at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant just down the road in Calvert County, Maryland. So you are very familiar with the issues we're here to address today. It's my understanding that electricity ratepayers, who are also constituents of ours, have paid billions of dollars to their electricity bills to have nuclear waste removed from the reactors around the country. However, as we all know too well, they've got nothing in return. On behalf of the ratepayers around the country, can you speak to how--exactly how much money they have paid into the nuclear waste fund? Mr. O'Donnell. Congressman, the estimates that I've been given are the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund payments and the interest that has accumulated over time on those payments into the corpus is $40 billion. So it's a lot of money. I can tell you, in my home State of Maryland, the estimate--and we have State-by-State estimates. The ratepayers in Maryland alone have paid $800 million into this fund. And that's a very, very significant payment for a small State like Maryland with 5 or 6 million citizens. So every State has this problem, every State has paid a lot of money, and all of our constituents deserve some action for that payment. Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. Mr. Raskin indicates he's going to stick with me and bat cleanup. So I will now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Gomez. Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Acting Ranking Member Raskin. We all know nuclear waste is a serious health hazard. It threatens the health and safety of Americans from 329 congressional districts across 44 States and the District of Columbia. But we haven't come up with an effective plan for what to do with this waste for decades. As it stands right now, most of our nuclear waste is stored at facilities ill-equipped to do the job. Nowhere is this truer than at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in southern California where 3.5 million pounds of nuclear waste sit atop of a fault line next to the Pacific Ocean. Our inability to find an effective repository for our nuclear waste is a shortcoming that we can no longer ignore. Waiting for a nuclear waste crisis is a recipe for disaster, and I'm glad that this subcommittee is here today to explore this issue further. I believe that safety needs to be the top priority in selecting a permanent site for our nuclear waste. This might sound obvious to some, but our plan in southern California for the better part of the last 50 years has been to store nuclear waste in an area known for earthquakes, and that's just not very smart. As someone who grew up in southern California, in Riverside, and actually would go surfing in the San Onofre State--or tried to go surfing in the San Onofre State beach, I'm well aware that most people are just concerned about the safety of the facilities and what to do with the nuclear fuel once the facilities are no longer generating electricity. So this question would--goes to Dr. Lyman. Can you briefly describe some of the safety hazards involved with the storage of nuclear waste for the shortterm and the longterm? Mr. Lyman. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for your question. At reactor sites, spent nuclear fuel is stored in two main ways. One, in the water-filled pools where it's put immediately after discharge from the reactor, and also in what are called dry storage casks, which are smaller structures which house a smaller amount of spent fuel and do not require water or--for cooling. And typically, spent fuel can be moved from the pools to the dry casks after a period of about 5 years once the decay heat is decreased so that can be done safely. So both of those pose problems but in different ways. So the spent fuel pools are overcrowded in this country. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission allows them to densely pack the fuel. And as a result, those pools are vulnerable in the event of an earthquake or a terrorist attack that could cause the water to drain out rapidly, leading to a large-scale fire in the pool and a large release of radioactive material. Colleagues of mine have done calculations that showed an event like that in the United States could affect millions of people hundreds of miles away from the reactor for a very long time. So the first thing that needs to be done is a policy to reduce the--store the density of spent fuel in the pools. And that can be done onsite by increasing the amount of dry cask storage at reactors. Now, dry cask storage is safer because--for a number of reasons, but it's not completely invulnerable. And there are a number of ways where the NRC could take action to increase the safety and security, especially at sites that are more vulnerable than others, let's say on the San Onofre. But it's a more manageable problem. And so I do believe that there is some time, if those issues are addressed, to store spent fuel and dry cask safely at reactors until a better national solution is come up with. Thank you. Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Lyman. This is a question for Dr. Victor. Is it fair to say that one of the major concerns of members of the San Onofre community have about this nuclear waste remaining onsite is safety? And what are some of the concerns of the--what are some of the specific concerns about keeping it there? Mr. Victor. Thank you very much, Representative Gomez. I'd agree with what Dr. Lyman said here. We--there's a range of views about the concerns on the onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel. There are some people, a minority, and I think not well informed, that think the dry cask systems are not safe. I think all the evidence points to exactly what Dr. Lyman said. For the longterm, what people are concerned about is two things. One is they're concerned about making sure that there's a long-term program for monitoring and--the canisters and their integrity. And as long as we're stuck with it there, we want to make sure it's being monitored, there are programs in place to detect any faults and so on. We've had, at our most recent meeting, extensive briefings about this. There's been a lot of work in this area. I am encouraged that there's been a lot of progress in that area. The other concern that people have is less tangible, but I think maybe even more important, which is that people are seeing the rest of the site being dismantled, and they don't understand why it is that the spent fuel is stuck there. And they're really angry about that. Because the deal that was made was we paid the Federal Government to remove it, and it's not being removed. And that's a--that's a palpable anger and sentiment in the community. Mr. Gomez. Mr. Victor, Mr. Lyman, thank you for your testimony. I'm out of time, so I yield back. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Gomez. I see Mr. Issa from California has arrived. Without objection--Mr. Issa is a member of the full committee--will be authorized to participate in this subcommittee hearing. Without objection, so ordered. Up next is a gentleman from--Mr. Palmer. Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to some questions that Mr. Comer brought up about the amount of money that is being spent. I have a document here on the cost of an actual nuclear waste management--I'd like to have entered into the official record, if I may, Mr. Chairman--that shows that since 2009, the Federal Government's liabilities have escalated from $12 billion to over $30 billion. Mr. Farenthold. Without objection. Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Tubb, the Federal Government has spent more than $6 billion on settlements to utilities for the failure to collect nuclear waste, and this amount grows every year. Additionally, the DOE estimates that future liabilities will exceed $25 billion. What would it cost to make Yucca Mountain operational so that the taxpayers are not continuing to be on the hook for these settlements? Ms. Tubb. The DOE last gave a lifetime--life cycle cost estimate in 2008. In 2017 numbers, I think that estimates up to $97 billion over 125 years. Mr. Palmer. I'd like to point out, as we're operating in a deficit, that's money we have to borrow. Can you give us some idea of the way that CBO treats money that was paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund? Ms. Tubb. Sure. CBO, unfortunately, doesn't do Congress many favors with the Nuclear Waste Fund. Money comes in as mandatory receipts. And so the fund offsets mandatory spending. It goes out as discretionary appropriations, and so the Nuclear Waste Fund has to compete with other congressional priorities. And so each of these baskets of money is treated under different budgeting rules. It makes it very difficult to either reform the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is the principal mechanism for moving forward with Yucca Mountain or any other plan, and it also makes it very difficult to actually spend money for Yucca Mountain or any other plan. I would also add that when DOE spends money to reduce that taxpayer liability, CBO does not recognize that taxpayer savings. And so, again, when DOE spends money, it can't offset that in savings to taxpayer liability. Mr. Palmer. So basically, what we're doing is spending the fees that have been collected on other projects. Ms. Tubb. Correct. So the Nuclear Waste Fund is funded by ratepayers and utilities. There's no taxpayer contribution to the Nuclear Waste Fund, and yet the Nuclear Waste Fund has to compete with taxpayer priorities based on these budget rules. Mr. Palmer. So to make the taxpayer whole in respect to the Nuclear Waste Fund, Congress, at some point, will have to appropriate money to make it up, or does the tax--does that--do we just leave that money off the table? Ms. Tubb. The only way the taxpayer is liable is for paying the Department of Energy's legal fees. So as far as providing for the nuclear waste management services, that's all on ratepayers and utilities, as it should be, and as according to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Taxpayers are on the hook for DOE's delinquency and being found in courts. Mr. Palmer. Let me change directions a little bit here and continue with you. The Department of Energy's license application for Yucca Mountain has languished at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 2008. What are the barriers that are holding this up? Ms. Tubb. Principally, it's politics. It's no secret that the Obama administration was not supportive of Yucca Mountain. And a lot of it has to do with former Senator Harry Reid. I would also say that, you know, there are scientific technical contentions, many of which are offered up by the State of Nevada. And as mentioned, I think we need to move forward with those and air those, you know, as the law requires. And if there are problems with Yucca Mountain, that needs to be known. And that's part of completing the Yucca Mountain licensing process. Mr. Palmer. Just less than a half a minute left. How long would it take for Yucca to become operational if the license were approved? Ms. Tubb. Not being an engineer, I don't have a good answer on that, so I'll have to pass. Mr. Palmer. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. I've just been informed that votes will be scheduled around 3:15. We're going to see how far we can get and then determine what we're going to do at that time. I'll now recognize Mr. Clay for 5 minutes. Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Raskin and other members, for extending me the opportunity to join you this afternoon on a matter of great urgency to our Nation and also to the region that I represent in St. Louis: The safe disposal of nuclear waste. And some might wonder why I am cosponsoring this bill to finally establish a national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, and the answer is simple: The U.S. Government created a nuclear waste problem 75 years ago, and we have a responsibility to finally clean it up. And that long story began in my congressional district. In 1942, the water department secretly contracted with Mallinckrodt Chemical in St. Louis to enrich yellowcake uranium from the Belgian Congo to fuel the Manhattan Project. That enriched uranium was used to fuel our Nation's first atomic bombs created in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in the Met program, which existed from 1942 to 1945 was essential to winning World War II. But the nuclear waste that was generated from the manufacturing of those original atomic bomb and others that would follow forged a curse of radioactive contamination that is still inflicting pain and suffering across this country. And the waste from our Nation's nuclear power plants has compounded this problem. In Missouri, several failed attempts to clean up the original nuclear waste caused dangerous radioactive contamination at sites in downtown St. Louis; at Lambert St. Louis International Airport; at Latty Avenue in North St. Louis County; at Coldwater Creek, which is a tributary that flows into the Mississippi River. And finally, in 1973, approximately 50,000 tons of that same nuclear waste was illegally dumped at West Lake Landfill in Bridgeton, Missouri, and mixed with other debris. That nuclear waste includes radioactive uranium, radioactive thorium, radioactive barium sulfate, and other toxic contaminates. Unbelievably, that radioactive toxic mess dumped illegally at West Lake 44 years ago is held in an unlined limestone landfill near the Missouri River, near a major hospital, near Lambert St. Louis Airport, near schools and interstate highways. And most troubling of all is the appalling fact that 1,000 of my constituents live less than 1 mile away from this illegal nuclear waste dump. And it would be almost impossible to find a dumber, more dangerous, more completely irresponsible place to dump nuclear waste than West Lake Landfill. And if you think this potential environmental disaster couldn't get any worse, you're wrong. For the last 5 years, we have also been dealing with a creeping underground landfill fire at the adjacent Bridgeton sanitary landfill, which is owned by Republic Services and is under the supervision of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. And that underground fire is less than 1,000 feet away from the buried nuclear waste. My friends, the U.S. Government created this radioactive mess, and we have a clear and unavoidable responsibility to finally clean it up. That is what opening up the Yucca Mountain registry--repository is all about. So let me say this to all of you. When the U.S. Government creates a problem, when we put citizens at risk, when we disrupt their lives, when we destroy the peace and property values of their neighborhoods, and when we allow the health of innocent citizens to be harmed because of our own inaction, we must make it right. And I was the first Member to ask that all of the waste be removed, and I will continue to do that. And I see my time is up. But, Mr. Chairman, I mean, I would support this bill because I think that the waste needs to be removed and put into a safe place, and it's the government's responsibility. I yield back. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, very much. I will now recognize the vice chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar. Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing today. Nuclear energy is one of the most reliable and stable energy sources in the world, and we should continue to look to advance further development in the secure storage of used materials. Nuclear power and the subsequent waste that comes from spent nuclear fuel is an issue which in my district I am very familiar. The Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Maricopa County is the largest nuclear generation facility in the United States. Palo Verde provides 35 percent of the total energy in Arizona, employs over 2,000 full-time workers, and has roughly a $1.8 billion economic impact on the State. And while I could speak to volumes of the benefits of nuclear power and plants across the U.S., the facts remain that temporary storage onsite of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radio waste from such power plants is a costly and hazardous practice. Mr. O'Donnell, first to you. I want you to be very concise. Can you give us a breakdown of the incurred cost to the consumer since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act? Mr. O'Donnell. I am a recovering elected official from Maryland, so I will try to be as concise as possible, Congressman. So the five times the consumers have paid just for waste storage: The original construction. And then, after original construction, the Nuclear Waste Fund. And then, after the Nuclear Waste Fund, because we didn't meet our statutory deadlines of reracking of the spent fuels that were already paid for, number one. So those first three things. And then, also, we have paid into the Judgment Fund. And I am missing one. But there are five impacts. And the fund itself is $40 billion. And the untold billions of liability that the consumers have, just it is mind boggling. Mr. Gosar. So, Mr. Smith, can you describe for us what you believe is the best solution for the long-term storage of existing spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste currently stored at nuclear facilities around the country. Mr. Smith. So I represent mostly defense waste. But finishing the licensing process of Yucca Mountain will give us a final determination on whether that facility can hold the high-level waste and the commercial material that we have. And if it doesn't, then we have got to find other alternatives, which is what we are discussing today. And that is, you know, the classification of high-level waste and changing that so that we can reroute some of this waste to other locations around the country. Mr. Gosar. So we have looked at other areas, have we not, Mr. Smith? Mr. Smith. We have. We are working with the Department of Energy right now to open up opportunities at WIPP for other materials that could be classified as transuranic waste as opposed to high-level waste, and that is one of the things that we are dealing with at this point. Mr. Gosar. We looked at a space in Texas, did we not, that was deemed geologically unsafe? Is that true? Mr. Smith. I'm not sure about the geological---- Mr. Gosar. The salt domes? Mr. Smith. I'm not sure about the geological status of that, but they're continuing to look at waste control specialists for storing additional wastes at their community. Mr. Gosar. Are you aware--where are these other sites? Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. Mr. Gosar. Okay. So, Ms. Tubb, what would you suggest to legislators as the best way forward to ensure the success of a long-term nuclear waste depository? What would be the steps, and how would you facilitate those? In what order? Ms. Tubb. I think the first step is completing Yucca Mountain licensing process. Getting an up or down decision on that brings a lot of valuable information to the table. Assuming the NRC approves Yucca Mountain, I think we need to engage the State of Nevada. You could consider a situation where DOE essentially contracts with the State of Nevada, giving Nevada a lot of control over that situation for existing waste. I think we need to look and reimagine how we treat future waste. As I talked about, creating market incentives and giving the nuclear waste industry--I am sorry--the nuclear industry a say in how they manage nuclear waste. So a system for existing waste, a system for future waste. Mr. Gosar. Would you agree with that, Mr. Victor? Mr. Victor. Yes. I think the Yucca process should restart. We don't know what the outcome of that is going to be. And so I think it's really important that we not continue to put all of our eggs in one basket. That's why we're so keen on interim storage as well. Mr. Gosar. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. We will now recognize Mr. Raskin. Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Dr. Lyman, let me start with you. What do you think are the specific dynamics and consequences of climate change today that should be informing our short-term and long-term approaches to dealing with the nuclear waste storage problem? Mr. Lyman. Yes. Thank you, Congressman Raskin. UCS is very concerned about the threat of climate change in a number of different ways. With regard to nuclear power, obviously, the estimates that the NRC has made in the past for the vulnerability of nuclear reactor sites and waste sites to natural phenomenon, including flooding, has to be revisited. And that is true both for operating reactors, and for the waste stored there and also for any new waste storage facilities. Unfortunately, the process for updating information on climate and the ability to look forward and to be anticipatory instead of reactive are problems that the NRC has had. So there needs to be a greater realization of the uncertainty that is created by the potential for increased hazards at nuclear reactors and at waste facilities. And that needs to be incorporated into the planning. When you're talking about nuclear waste, which has a potential hazardous lifetime of millions of years, obviously, there is only so much you can do. But certainly you do need to address those uncertainties and ensure that you have enough safety margin to accommodate a potentially significant increase in hazard at those sites. Mr. Raskin. Great. And similar question for Dr. Victor. The country is reeling now from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and Jose, and people are still recovering from Katrina and Sandy. The San Onofre nuclear power station is located on the California coast. Are you concerned that natural disasters like tsunamis or earthquakes could threaten the safety of nuclear waste that's stored at that facility? Mr. Victor. So, broadly, yes. The disaster matters. So there has been a lot of analysis of the different kinds of disasters. As a general rule, the tsunami risk there happens to be lower. The earthquake risk is high. And that's why the system at San Onofre is engineered to withstand a much higher seismic event, earthquake, than typical dry cask facilities. And I think, over the long term, sea level rise is a really significant--and storm surge--is a really significant concern. I think everybody has agreed that they want to move it out of-- the safest place for the San Onofre site is in dry cask. And the safest, best long-term solution is out of San Onofre, end of story. Mr. Raskin. Thank you. But I have had several conversations with my colleague, Congresswoman Titus from Nevada, who is very interested in this question of consent. And, Dr. Lyman, let me come back to you. In considering long-term alternative solutions to the Yucca Mountain possibility, do you believe that we should seek to get approval from the local communities and State government wherever a site may be located? Mr. Lyman. Yes, I think, generally speaking, the concept of consent-based siting is a good one. Unfortunately, it's hard to fully understand how to implement that. And so there certainly needs to be greater recognition of State and local concerns. However, that also has to be, as I said, in the context of a national solution. So we can do more. I don't know what the answer is at this point. But certainly there has to be a different process than the one that led to the selection of Yucca Mountain where the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and its amendments were rigged, essentially, for the rest of the country to gang up on Yucca Mountain. So the flaws of that process have to be examined and---- Mr. Raskin. But the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Nuclear Future, in 2012, did recommend placing consent-based siting at the center of successful planning in going to the future. Dr. Victor, back to you. Do you think that we are going to be able to successfully resolve this problem if we don't use this principle of local consent? Mr. Victor. I think the principle of local consent is vitally important, you know, with the caveats that Dr. Lyman laid out. We need to have a national strategy. We need to set this up so that any particular interest can't hold up the entire process. To me, what's most interesting is we have had in west Texas and in eastern New Mexico--especially in eastern New Mexico--a tremendous amount of progress on this front. We've had representatives from the eastern New Mexico site come visit our community engagement panel. There's informed consent about opening that site up, and people are ready. Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Raskin. We will now recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Gianforte. Mr. Gianforte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the panel today for your testimony. This is an important issue, and I appreciate your input. Ms. Tubb, I had a question for you. What's been the practical effect of the last administration's closing the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management? And how has that impeded the efforts to move forward with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the will of Congress? Ms. Tubb. Well, we certainly lost a lot of time. As I said, we're basically back to where we were in 2008 when the Department of Energy first submitted its application. It's going to take a lot of effort to bring back the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. I think that's very doable, having talked with people who were originally involved in the license, that people are passionate about this project and want to see it move forward. So it's definitely doable. It will just take time and money to bring those resources and those people back together. Mr. Gianforte. And as that office was closed, can you be more explicit about what it actually impeded? What did it shut down? What has the impact of that been? Ms. Tubb. Well, I mean, a lot of people have moved on and been replaced within the Department of Energy. That's a lot of institutional knowledge around this specific project that's very unique that has since been spread across the country, spread within DOE. Some of them have even retired. And I think a lot of that can be brought back. But that takes effort. Mr. Gianforte. Yeah. Okay. And then do we know what the previous administration did with the funds that were allocated for this office? Did that get returned to the Treasury, or did it go someplace else? Ms. Tubb. So a lot of it just did not get spent. Department of Energy has now roughly $20 million left from the Nuclear Waste Fund that was appropriated from Congress. The Obama administration just chose not to use that money both in DOE and NRC, and that's what some of those court cases were about. With OCRWM, a lot of those institutional functions were spread within the Office of Nuclear Energy or just atrophied. Mr. Gianforte. Okay. Great. And I have no further questions. I yield back the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. I now recognize the former chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa. Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for including me here today. As Mr. Victor said, I represented and have represented San Onofre for 16-3/4 years. During most of those years, they produced between 1100 and 2200 megawatts every day, 24 hours a day depending upon whether one or two of the reactors were online. And, of course, more than half the time, two reactors were online. With an ill-fated non-nuclear portion of the plant, that being the steam generators, arriving defective, it was prematurely shut down. So one thing, Mr. Victor, if you'll describe briefly the situation that we deal with because all of the spent rods had to be removed, brand new ones, from two reactors, unexpectedly and then put into water storage. Mr. Victor. Very briefly, essentially, the entire fuel load that has ever been in those two reactors, plus unit one originally, is still onsite, with a couple of exceptions. Mr. Issa. Right. But some are in dry cask. Mr. Victor. And some are in dry cask. They are currently building a facility to take the rest of the fuel that's in the pools and remove it. That process is on track, and as far as I can tell will be done by the end of 2019, at which point nearly all--not all, but nearly all--those canisters will be ready to ship if there is a place to ship them. Mr. Issa. So, with the early demise with the plans to build an above-ground--and I call it above ground, but it's slightly below ground--a holding area a few hundred feet from Interstate 5, a few hundred feet from San Onofre surfing area, the Trestles, and on earthquake fault, we will have 30 years of three reactors worth of spent rod sitting in dry cask from more or less--and I will use 2020, if you don't mind--for 10,000 years if we don't find a solution. Is that correct? Mr. Victor. That's correct. Mr. Issa. And in your estimation, with your expertise and your involvement in this--and I'll go to the others also--is there any question in your mind that anywhere, anywhere on Earth that is dry, not near populated centers, not near earthquake faults, even if above ground, would be safer than that location in a 10,000-year calculation? Mr. Victor. Anywhere, that's a strong standard. I mean, the middle of this room is probably not a good idea. Mr. Issa. Well, let me take, for example, one that I personally witnessed. We did underground testing at Area 51, the nuclear test center in Nevada, not Yucca but another place. Anyone can Google Earth and see mounds left over from those underground tests. That location, is it or is it not safer than on an earthquake fault in a populated area on the edge of the ocean? Mr. Victor. Absolutely. And there's an extraordinary number of sites that would be dramatically safer and better for the communities than where it is now. Mr. Issa. So, as we look at places in which there are little or no population for as much as a hundred miles in this country, areas that are dry, that have no apparent aquifers, including Area 51--and I will also say Yucca, but I use Area 51 because it already has underground nuclear materials, we have a large amount of places that are better--maybe not perfect, but better. So my question to each of you is, with the current science we have, even Yucca mountain and all proposed, currently proposed, interim storage sites, in your opinion, aren't every one of them safer than on the edge of the ocean, whether in Humboldt Bay, Diablo Canyon, or San Onofre, where we have a total of five reactors? Three are offline; two more will go offline. And I'll start with Ms. Tubb. Ms. Tubb. It certainly sounds like that to me. I am not a nuclear engineer, but I would say likely. Mr. Issa. Doctor? Mr. Lyman. Yes. Well, not---- Mr. Issa. We're not looking for perfect. I'm just asking the question of better. Mr. Lyman. Yeah. I realize that. It's just--on the record, of course, there are aquifers at the Yucca Mountain site. In fact, when I went to the---- Mr. Issa. Is the water as close as it is at San Onofre? Mr. Lyman. No. But it's not completely dry. And so it's a subtle--you know, there are issues. And, of course, there are short-term places where, if you could move all the fuel right away, then there would be a lower risk. But you do have to then take into account the transportation risk as well. So, you know, you really need to look at an integrated program, and that's the complication. Mr. Issa. Okay. Well, and I'm not trying to cut you off, but for everybody there, when I look at a current location that's starting in--let's call it January of 2020, we would be able to move, by sea, if we chose, without ever going through a populated area, all of those dry casks somewhere else. From the moment it gets on to a barge, in my estimation, it is safer than where it is. Is there anyone that disagrees that there aren't a number of places inherently safer, starting in 2020, and it would be reckless to leave them in the least safe place that one could describe, on an earthquake fault, in a populated area, between an interstate and the ocean? Mr. Victor? Mr. Victor. No. I completely agree. There are a lot of places that would be a lot smarter. And, to me, what's striking is I can understand why people are concerned about permanent repositories and making sure that the science is done properly there. And that takes time. But these interim facilities are now getting geared up, and I think that's a crucial part of this. Mr. Issa. Mr. Smith? Mr. Smith. So the Santa Ana River site sits on a geological fault, and we store thousands of canisters and waste tanks with single capability in terms of insulation. Mr. Issa. Single wall, the earlier---- Mr. Smith. Single-wall insulation. And we're now double- stacking canisters. And while we do what I consider a very safe job, as time moves on, you know, that's going to become much more problematic to my community. So I certainly think a geological repository--and if you have ever been to Yucca Mountain, it certainly seems to be the best fit for that material. Mr. Issa. Mr. O'Donnell. Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you, Congressman Issa. I will say this. I've been to Yucca Mountain. I've looked at the national laboratory experiments. I've witnessed it with my own eyes, and I can tell you that every part of my nuclear-trained background and mind tells me that, if you can't do it there, you're going to have a hard time finding any place to have a deep geological repository in this country. You have to be able to do it there, and I think we have proven that by the national laboratories. Additionally, we need to make sure that we don't allow interim solutions--and I'm certainly open to interim storage, not onsite but consolidated. But we have to make sure that that doesn't become the new bottleneck simply kicked down the road for the next generation to solve, because, sir, I have to tell you, I honestly believe that we have a moral imperative to solve this problem and solve it now. And that begins with both short-term solutions and long-term solutions, permanent solutions, and a repository. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, if I can close briefly with a short statement. In my district, just a few miles from San Onofre, for 40 years, we stored a rather controversial gas and detergent mixture that was used during the Vietnam war. And that was brought in by regular trucks, and it was shipped in and out. As the years went by, what we discovered was it was a hundred million dollar massive effort to eliminate what was basically gasoline. But, unfortunately, over time, environmental determinations can change. I fear that if we do not find interim storage that give us, you know, consolidated areas, that what the taxpayers will find--and this is probably the premier committee of taxpayers--is that that estimate, which only goes out 95 billion for 125 years of a 10,000-year cycle, will prove the following: The fund will be evaporated. Taxpayers will pay hundreds of billions of dollars if we do not act and act now in a responsible way. I know for an absolute certainty the taxpayers are already on the hook at this point for tens of billions of dollars over the next century. But this is a 10,000-year problem in need of a low-cost, safe solution. And I really want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this hearing. It's a great first step. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. And as we're in the middle of a vote and running out of time, though I do have some questions, I'm just going to simply state this is a problem that definitely needs to be solved sooner not later. I'd like to find a long-term solution because I do think there are potential risks in moving the stuff twice. But moving it twice is certainly better than leaving it in. As we learned even in the district that I represent, a nuclear power plant in the path of a hurricane, though thank the Lord it performed admirably with zero safety concerns, that may not always be the case. So, again, I wish we had time for questions, but I don't want to hold you all for 45 minutes just to ask you 5 minutes of questions. So I'm going to thank the panel for participating, thank Mr. Raskin for filling in for Ms. Plaskett, and ask that we all do keep Ms. Plaskett and her constituents and all those affected by these disasters in our prayers. And, with that, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]