[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE INTERIOR, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member
Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont
Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California
Will Hurd, Texas Jimmy Gomez, California
Gary J. Palmer, Alabama
James Comer, Kentucky
Paul Mitchell, Michigan
Greg Gianforte, Montana
Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
William McKenna General Counsel
Ryan Hambleton, Subcommittee Staff Director
Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment
Blake Farenthold, Texas, Chairman
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona, Vice Chair Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
Dennis Ross, Florida Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Gary J. Palmer, Alabama Jimmy Gomez, California
James Comer, Kentucky (Vacancy)
Greg Gianforte, Montana
C O N T E N T S
Page
Hearing held on September 26, 2017............................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. Anthony J. O'Donnell, Commissioner, Maryland Public Service
Commission, Chair, National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners, Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues, Waste Disposal
Oral Statement............................................... 4
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. Chuck Smith, Council Member, Aiken County, South Carolina on
behalf of Energy Communities Alliance
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Mr. David G. Victor, Chairman, San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station, Community Engagement Panel, Professor, UC San Diego
School of Global Policy & Strategy
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 19
Dr. Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union
of Concerned Scientists
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 29
Ms. Katie Tubb, Policy Analyst, Institute for Economic Freedom,
The Heritage Foundation
Oral Statement............................................... 39
Written Statement............................................ 41
APPENDIX
Statement for the record by Senator Dean Heller of Nevada,
submitted by Chairman Farenthold............................... 64
The Costs of Inaction on Nuclear Waste Management, submitted by
Mr. Palmer..................................................... 68
Questions for the record for Mr. Anthony O'Donnell, submitted by
Chairman Farenthold............................................ 71
Questions for the record for Mr. Chuck Smith, submitted by
Chairman Farenthold............................................ 74
Questions for the record for Ms. Katie Tubb, submitted by
Chairman Farenthold............................................ 78
EXAMINING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE
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Tuesday, September 26, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy and
Environment
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in
Room 2154, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Blake
Farenthold [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Farenthold, Gosar, Ross, Palmer,
Comer, Gianforte, Raskin, and Gomez.
Also Present: Representatives Issa and Clay.
Mr. Farenthold. The Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy,
and the Environment will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess at any time.
Without objection, we are going to allow Mr. Clay to sit
in, a member of the full committee, to participate in this
subcommittee. Without objection, so ordered.
Good afternoon. Today, the Subcommittee on the Interior,
Energy, and the Environment will examine America's nuclear
waste management and storage.
Over the last 40 years, the U.S. produced 76,000 metric
tons of nuclear waste. That's enough volume to cover a football
field 24 feet high. This waste is scattered around our cities
at nuclear power plants and other facilities because our
country can't get moving on a proper long-term plan for storage
and disposal.
Today, we'll explore our existing regulations for nuclear
waste management and possible opportunities for improvement.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or NWPA, of 1982 directed the
Department of Energy, aka the DOE, to develop a national
repository for the permanent disposal of nuclear waste. Way
back in 1987, the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository in
Nevada was designated as this site. The DOE submitted a
licensing application for Yucca Mountain to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in 2008. However, the Obama
administration's disapproval of the proposal and a series of
court cases significantly delayed the application's review.
Today, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has yet to approve the
license for Yucca Mountain rendering the site unusable.
To cover the cost of permanent removal, the NWPA
established a Nuclear Waste Fund to collect fees under
contractual obligation from nuclear power utilities in exchange
for removal of nuclear waste. The DOE has, in fact, collected
around $750 million annually, despite their inability to
dispose the utility's nuclear waste. The DOE now owes roughly
$29 billion in liabilities since they failed to fulfill their
contracts.
With nearly 2,000 metric tons of nuclear waste produced
each year, the need for a long-term storage solution is
becoming crucial. In my home State of Texas, there's currently
a site in Andrews County used for low-level radioactive waste.
A licensing application to upgrade the sight to an interim
nuclear repository was submitted to the NRC. But similar to
Yucca Mountain, the application faced numerous roadblocks
ultimately stalling, in their view, process.
Due to the barriers faced in establishing a national
repository, nuclear power of utilities often store nuclear
waste in reactor sites. This is costly and unsustainable over
the longterm and places significant burdens on the communities
that house them. The Federal Government has a designated site
and the resources necessary to make it operational, yet has
struggled every step of the way to get the approval required to
move forward. It's been 35 years since the passage of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and we have hardly anything to show
in that time period, despite billions of dollars spent. We have
to find a way to move past the gridlock.
I look forward to hearing ideas and suggestions from our
panel, and am hopeful the committee can create solutions to
improve the management and storage of America's nuclear waste.
At this point, I will yield 5 minutes to Mr. Raskin, the
acting ranking member, as Ms. Plaskett is detained in the U.S.
Virgin Islands for obvious reasons.
Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
important hearing. And welcome to all of our fine witnesses,
including my former colleague from the Maryland General
Assembly, Mr. O'Donnell. It's really good to see you.
And I am serving in the place of our distinguished ranking
member, my friend and former law student, Ms. Plaskett, who is
attending to her constituents in the U.S. Virgin Islands who
are struggling to recover from the devastating hurricane and
all the flood damage. They are in our thoughts, and prayers are
with her and with her constituents.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss an issue on
the minds of a lot of Americans. Nuclear waste storage is a
pressing nationwide concern that requires a nationwide
solution. There are currently over 700,000 metric tons of spent
nuclear fuel in our country, an additional 13,000 metric tons
from defense-related activities. This radioactive waste is
currently being stored at dozens of deteriorating nuclear
storage sites across America. And I believe we can all agree
that this is not a viable or safe long-term solution.
I believe we can also agree that our government owes the
American people an effective plan to address the nuclear waste
storage problem. We owe the American people a plan that allows
for nuclear waste to be stored securely in the manner that does
not poison the environment and that presents no public health
and safety concerns for local communities.
Questions about the soundness and safety of our current
storage regime and facilities are not new. In recent years,
we've seen several disturbing incidents that have brought into
question our ability to safely store this dangerous material in
communities across the land.
Internationally, the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima
plant caused by an earthquake and a tsunami is still a vivid
and serious reminder of the dangers of nuclear power and
escaped nuclear radiation. And it serves as a warning to all of
us around the world of what can happen if we don't keep safety
at the very forefront of our concerns.
So it's troubling to me that the Trump administration is
moving swiftly to advance the Yucca Mountain facility. The
President's proposed budget provides for $120 million to
restart the licensing for this controversial plan. There are
significant reasons why the repository at Yucca Mountain site
originally selected 30 years ago has not yet been built. Yucca
Mountain is seismically active and faces the possibility of
continued and increased volcanic activity. Moreover, the
facility comes with a known risk of radioactive waste leaking
into the groundwater and contaminating the drinking water of
nearby communities. Furthermore, the transportation of nuclear
waste to Yucca Mountain would take it through 44 States and the
District of Columbia, well over two-thirds of the country, nor
have we fully considered the national security risks involved
in transporting and storing this nuclear waste.
These significant concerns cannot be swept under the rug in
a mad dash to get Yucca Mountain licensed. All of these
environmental, public health, safety, transportation, and
national security questions must be thoroughly answered before
we determine that Yucca Mountain is the best site for nuclear
waste storage.
There are so many difficulties involved in using Yucca
Mountain to store nuclear waste that the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board Panel is considering approximately 300
different contingencies. It seems clear we should be
considering alternative sites to act as a permanent repository.
Looking forward whether we are discussing short- or long-term
solutions, we must continue to make the public safety a
paramount priority, and this means carefully considering
environmental implications of all the sites.
As the people of Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands desperately try to recover from record-force hurricanes
and flooding damage, we must take stock of the fact that
climate change is dramatically increasing the ferocity and the
perils of natural disasters. No plan to safely dispose of and
store nuclear waste is remotely complete if it does not take
into account changes in weather patterns. It is also imperative
that the Federal Government works with State and local
governments to develop and implement effective solutions going
forward.
I look forward to hearing today from people who are
tackling these important issues.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
Without objection, other members will have 3 legislative
days to submit an opening statement. Additionally, without
objection, Senator Dean Heller of Nevada has also submitted
testimony. And without objection, we'll add that to the record
as well.
Mr. Farenthold. Now I'd like to introduce our witnesses.
We have Mr. Anthony O'Donnell, commissioner of the Maryland
Public Service Commission, and chair of the Subcommittee on
Nuclear Issues - Waste Disposal at the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners. We have Mr. Chuck Smith, a
councilman in Aiken County, South Carolina, and chairman of the
Energy Community Alliance. We have Mr. David Victor, professor
of international relations and director of the Laboratory on
International Law and Regulations at UC San Diego, as well as
chairman of the Community Engagement Panel at San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station. We have Dr. Edwin Lyman, senior
scientist of--at the Union of Concerned Scientists Global
Security Program. And Ms. Katie Tubb, policy analyst at the
Heritage Foundation, Center for International Trade and
Economics.
We welcome you all.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn
before their testimony.
Would you please rise and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're
about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the
affirmative. And you all may be seated.
We all have your preprovided testimony. So in order to
allow time for discussions and questions, I'd request you limit
your time for your verbal testimony to 5 minutes. The clock in
front of you shows the time remaining. It will turn yellow when
you have 30 seconds remaining and turn red when your time's up.
If you go way over, I'll start tapping the gavel to--in case
you missed the clock.
So with that, we'll begin with Mr. O'Donnell. You're
recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
WITNESS TESTIMONIES
TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY J. O'DONNELL
Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Chairman Farenthold and Acting Ranking
Member Raskin and other members of the Subcommittee on the
Interior, Energy, and Environment. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the lack of progress on nuclear
waste disposal and its effect on ratepayers.
My name is Tony O'Donnell, and I'm a commissioner on the
Maryland Public Service Commission. I also serve as chairman of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
NARUC, Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues - Waste Disposal. Thank
you for holding this hearing.
State economic utility regulators are responsible for
ensuring the safe, reliable, and affordable delivery of
essential electric utility services in every State across this
country. The success of the Federal nuclear waste management
program funded by the consumers of electricity generated from
the Nation's nuclear power plants is necessarily of keen
interest. Both NARUC and its member commissions have dedicated
a tremendous amount of time and resources to ensure that
electricity consumers receive the services they have paid for.
State regulators agree that users of electricity for
nuclear power plants should pay for the Federal--for the
Federal nuclear waste management and disposal program, and the
consumers have paid generously into this fund.
Since 1982, more than $40 billion in direct payments and
interest have been paid into the U.S. Nuclear Waste Fund. In
fact, the $40-plus billion the consumers have contributed to
the fund is only part of the entire amount they have spent on
nuclear waste.
First, consumers have paid for the original waste storage
of facilities through the rates. Secondly, they paid into the
Nuclear Waste Fund, as I just mentioned. Third, consumers paid
to rerack or consolidate used fuel pools through the rates
because the Federal Government failed to remove the waste by
the statutory deadline. Fourth, they had to pay for onsite,
out-of-pool dry cask storage through rates, again due to
Federal failure. Finally, consumers paid a fifth time, through
taxes paid for the Judgment Fund disbursements to cover damages
caused by the failure of the Federal nuclear waste program.
With respect to the judgement fund, taxpayers from every
State, even those whose utilities have no stake in nuclear-
generated electricity, continue to fund court-awarded damages
from the Department of Justice Judgment Fund for DOE's partial
breach of its contracts with electric companies that required
DOE to remove the used nuclear fuel.
According to a September 2014 DOE audit report, $4.5
billion in damages have already been paid as a result of the
Federal Government inaction. DOE estimates the total liability
for the Federal Government will be about $27 billion, subject
to check, maybe it's $29 billion. But that estimate includes
the unrealistic assumption that the Department can begin to
accept used nuclear fuel by 2021. Industry estimates almost
double that projection. Even former President Obama's Blue
Ribbon Commission estimated that every year of delay in
accepting used nuclear fuel will increase this liability by
approximately $500 million. Yet for those billions, so far
ratepayers in the country have nothing to show for it.
The Federal Government missed its statutorily mandated
deadline to start accepting nuclear mandate--nuclear waste in
1998. In the 1990s and early 2000s, at least the program had
shown progress, notwithstanding the missed deadline.
However, since that time, efforts to block funding for a
geological disposal of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain as well
as the U.S. Department of Energy's unlawful refusal to support
the project's licensing application has kept the country in the
exact same situation we occupied 30 years ago when Congress
decided--I reiterate, Congress decided--that Yucca Mountain
should be the first site considered for the United States
permanent repository.
The United States needs and--needs and consumers have paid
for a permanent storage solution, and nothing less. To put it
bluntly, the States and localities have the Federal
Government's waste, and the Federal Government has our money.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be
part of this critical discussion.
[Prepared statement of Mr. O'Donnell follows]
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Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
TESTIMONY OF CHUCK SMITH
Mr. Smith. Chairman Farenthold and members of----
Mr. Farenthold. Could you turn your microphone on, please,
sir?
Mr. Smith. Thank you for inviting me to testify today
ensuring that the perspective of the local communities that
host the government's defense nuclear waste facilities is
represented. I am Chuck Smith, council member of Aiken County,
South Carolina, board member of the SRS Community Reuse
Organization, and chairman of Energy Communities Alliance.
Our communities have long played a key role supporting the
Nation's national security efforts. Indulge me, please. I have
two canisters of high-level waste from different locations.
Scientists will tell you that both are radiologically the same
material, yet it costs $10 billion to manage this material and
$100 billion to manage this material. Why? Because DOE
regulations make no sense.
I'd like to discuss defense high-level waste in an
alternative path forward that can potentially reduce current
cost estimates for addressing nuclear waste by upwards of $40
billion.
DOE produced defense nuclear waste through its reprocessing
programs carried out as a part of the Manhattan Project and
during the Cold War. DOE has 332 underground tanks used to
process and store liquid high-level waste. The large tanks sit
at three locations: Hanford, Washington; the Idaho National
Laboratory; and in my State, Savannah River Site.
The defense high-level waste is ultimately destined for
disposal at Yucca Mountain. ECA has long supported moving
forward with the Yucca Mountain licensing process. A high-level
waste repository is and remains essential. ECA also supports
consolidated interim storage, but it must exist alongside a
permanent solution and not instead of it.
As the ``kick the can down the road approach'' continues, I
must remind you that our communities are already de facto
interim storage sites. In addition, DOE and nuclear power
producers are already incurring large costs paid for by
taxpayers in your communities. GAO reported this year that
DOE's environmental liability has doubled from a low of $176
billion in 1997 to an estimate of $372 billion in 2016. DOE has
paid $6.1 billion in damages. That breaks down to 800 million
annually, about $2.5 million per day. The cost of inaction is
high.
So what can we do? ECA believes one option is clarifying
the way nuclear waste is classified. Our country's radioactive
waste clarification system currently relies primarily on point
of origin rather than consumption or the specific hazards posed
by its disposal. This approach does not make sense. Some
defense high-level waste could technically qualify as
transuranic waste, if based on its radioactive content. Only
the U.S. classifies this nuclear waste this way.
Just this month, ECA released a white paper outlining five
near-term actions we believe can help DOE cut years of
operation: reduce the size and duration of storage facilities
needed before a high-level waste repository is available,
accelerate waste tank retrieval and closures, and, as I
mentioned earlier, realize savings of more than 40 billion.
Our first two recommendations reflect a two-pronged
approach. First, DOE should revise its order 435.1 to clarify
that waste will be managed and disposed of according to
characteristics rather than origin. DOE already has the
authority to do this under the Atomic Energy Act. Congress
should eventually provide statutory clarification to codify any
clarification and reduce the chances it will shift over time
along with politics and new administrations. However, any
legislative language should support DOE's efforts and not get
ahead of them. My community has started to develop its own
legislative language, but we need to ensure that resources are
available for local and State representatives around each
impacted site to engage with their constituents, State
policymakers, and congressional delegations to provide
education and build support.
Our next two recommendations deal with WIPP. DOE must begin
working with the State of New Mexico on a permanent
modification--on a permanent modification for WIPP to allow
some of the tank waste currently classified as high-level waste
to go to WIPP if it meets waste-acceptance criteria. This could
allow 2,300 canisters of waste at Savannah River that are
already destined to safely go to WIPP rather than sit onsite
waiting for a high-level repository to be operational. Congress
and DOE should provide full funding for WIPP so the full range
of disposal capabilities can be resumed and capacity ultimately
increased.
And finally, DOE should begin to work on pilot projects and
policy options to better understand alternative approaches.
This includes considering how best to utilize private
facilities such as WCS in Texas. Again, I caution it is
imperative that DOE enter into discussions as early as possible
with host communities and States to ensure there's a full
understanding of the risk and benefits of any proposal.
Impacted stakeholders must have the resources and opportunities
necessary to participate in planning and provide feedback into
policymaking process.
For many communities, trust in DOE has eroded over time,
and transparency is paramount to our community's ability to
support DOE decisions. Clarifying waste definition is a large
departure from current policy, but current policy has not
served us well. There are safe options, and the Federal
Government must seriously consider them.
In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today. I did bring copies of our report. ECA calls on you
to support our communities and the country to move forward
using science-based, not politically science-based, decision.
We need to stop spending millions of taxpayers' dollars or
fines rather than progress. It just makes sense.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Victor, you're up for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID G. VICTOR
Mr. Victor. Thank you very much, Chairman Farenthold,
Acting Ranking Member Raskin, Representative Gomez, members of
the subcommittee. My name is David Victor. I'm a professor at
UC San Diego. I'm also a chairman of the Community Engagement
Panel at San Onofre. This is a panel set up by Southern
California Edison, the operator of the facility, to help
steward the process of decommissioning of the San Onofre site,
which is the largest commercial reactor site to be
decommissioned to date.
I've submitted in advance my written testimony. I want to
just focus on three remarks in the 5 minutes that I have here
today, remarks based on what I'm hearing from the communities
on the front lines around these plants.
The first comment is that the problem is now well-known.
The Nation needs a solution. We do not have a solution to the
long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. But the situation
today is radically different from what it was 10 years ago, and
it's going to get worse quickly.
Today, there are 17 reactors at 14 sites on 11 States that
are in the various stages of decommissioning, including the San
Onofre plant. In the future, there will be more reactors in a
similar situation.
At these sites, the visibility and the problems associated
with the lack of a solution to the spent nuclear fuel problem
are much more visible because they're an operating site,
there's always fuel onsite, and the reactor core and pools
onsite at cask storage. And a decommissioned site situation is
totally different. And the deal that the communities expect is
that when the plants are removed and the benefits from that
plant are removed, that the spent fuel will be removed as well.
And that deal is not being fulfilled.
The second of the three comments I'd like to make concerns
Yucca Mountain. I understand that a lot of the politics around
this issue in Washington are focused on Yucca Mountain. What
I'm hearing from people on the front lines is very different.
There's attention to Yucca Mountain, but there's much more
attention to consolidated interim storage, or monitorable and
retrievable storage, such as the sites mentioned in west Texas,
another site in eastern New Mexico near the WIPP facility, and
perhaps other sites in the future.
Over the last 3 years, our panel has spent a lot of time on
this issue. And what we have learned is that it's important to
view consolidated interim storage as a complement to Yucca
Mountain. I understand that politically they can be
complements, but the role of these interim facilities and
helping get spent fuel out of these communities quickly is
vital, because even with a restart of Yucca Mountain, there are
going to be many delays. It's going to take a long time. And
interim storage is a much more rapid response option.
In my testimony, I cite some of the work that's been done
on the economics. Interim storage, in addition to help save
money when developed in tandem with Yucca Mountain or other
permanent storage facilities, it also gives us more options as
a country, so that if one option doesn't work or if there are
political troubles, the entire country is not held up by those
difficulties as we have seen in the debate over the last few
decades.
We have spent more time on this issue around the San Onofre
communities than any other topic that our panel looks at. And
the number one ask from those communities is to help accelerate
an overall strategy that involves permanent repositories as
well as consolidated interim storage.
The third and last comment I'd like to make concerns all
the progress that has been made in Washington and, to some
degree, in the arms of the Federal Government around the
possibilities of restarting Yucca and around making
consolidated storage a reality. It's really striking how much
has happened in the last few years and how much in particular
this body has done on the legislative front. Maybe not quite as
much progress over in the Senate yet, but we can hope.
I think the bill that's working its way through here is a
big step forward, but it's a first step and additional work is
needed. And I'd like to highlight two areas where we have
learned about additional work that will be essential.
One of those areas concerns the order with which spent fuel
is removed from sites and sent to an interim storage facility
or a permanent repository. Current procedures are ambiguous
about this but seem to envision a scenario where the oldest
fuel will be taken first from lots of different sites around
the country. What we hear from not just our communities, but
other communities around decommissioned nuclear sites is they
would like those fuels to be moved first, because in
decommissioned sites, there is especially no logic for
continued onsite presence of spent nuclear fuel.
And the other topic that needs more work is transportation.
And current appropriations have some money needed for
developing the railcar systems to move spent fuel. More work is
needed on that front so we can develop a fleet of railcars, so
that when real options appear, there are ways to get the fuel
out of sites like San Onofre to permanent facilities.
I thank you very much for your interest and attention to
these issues. We in the communities around plants such as San
Onofre are living this on a daily basis, and we are encouraged
by the potential progress on solutions. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Victor follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Victor.
Dr. Lyman, you've got your 5 minutes, sir.
TESTIMONY OF EDWIN LYMAN
Mr. Lyman. Thank you, Chairman Farenthold and Acting
Ranking Member Raskin and the other distinguished members of
the subcommittee. On behalf of the Union of Concerned
Scientists, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify here today.
And before I begin, I would just like to extend our
sympathies and best wishes for a swift and full recovery to the
people of Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and all the other
areas that have been so deeply affected by Harvey, Irma, and
Maria.
UCS has more than half a million supporters united by a
central belief we need sound scientific analysis to create a
healthy, safe, and sustainable future. We are neither pro nor
anti nuclear power, but we have served as a nuclear power
safety and security watchdog for nearly 50 years. In this
regard, it is critically important that spent fuel be managed
safely and protected from terrorist attack until it can be
buried in a geological repository. But a sustainable nuclear
waste disposal strategy must have broad public acceptance at
local, State, and national levels.
The witnesses today were asked to focus on the needs and
challenges of communities currently holding nuclear waste.
While we do agree these communities must have a major stake in
the process, a sound nuclear waste policy should also reflect
national priorities and look to protect future generations as
well as ours. The problems that actions may appear to benefit
some communities in the short term can penalize others and may
even be harmful to the long-term interests of the U.S. as a
whole.
To be clear, in our view, spent nuclear fuel can be stored
safely and securely at reactors and dry cask facilities for
many decades, provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
or NRC, conducts rigorous oversight, which has not been the
case to date in all respects.
Nevertheless, risk acceptance varies from one community to
another, and it is understandable why some representatives
would support legislation to facilitate moving spent fuel in
their districts out as soon as possible. This is why Congress
needs to come together to develop a new and science-based
national nuclear waste management policy in order to allocate
risks and benefits as fairly as possible.
This policy should include a process to establish and
maintain political momentum for development of repositories; a
process for repository site selection that is consent-based,
fair, and technically sound; requirements that spent fuel be
managed safely and securely at reactor sites until a repository
becomes available; and requirements for safe and secure
shipment of spent fuel from reactor sites to repository.
Current laws and regulations do not adequately address any of
these issues.
Unfortunately, the one game in town right now, which is
H.R. 3053, has a number of flaws and avoids many of these
questions, or exacerbates them. We expressed our concerns about
it in the draft version earlier this year in testimony. And now
if there's a version that's been reported out, it's a little
improved. In some respects it's even worse.
So I'd like to focus on the linkage between siting
monitored retrievable storage facilities and a geologic
repository. The current version of H.R. 3053 weakens that
linkage; in fact, would allow DOE to immediately contract with
a private company to spend public funds on developing a
monitored retrievable storage facility up until the step of
actually operating it. So they could pay to site, do all the
reviews, and build a facility, but they can't move fuel there
until NRC makes a decision whether or not to authorize
construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain.
Now, we can see what the problems with this are. Even with
that latter condition, we think this would undermine the
geologic repository program, because of the way we read the
bill, even if the NRC were to deny a construction authorization
for Yucca Mountain, DOE would be allowed to keep building MRS
facilities indefinitely, each one capped at 10,000 tons, but
could build as many as they wanted. So there would be no
impetus for actually going forward with the geological
repository. And that, we think, would be a bad outcome
primarily because of the security concern of leaving spent fuel
aboveground indefinitely.
Over time, spent fuel in aboveground storage is not only a
risk--poses a risk for sabotage but eventually will become a
risk for nuclear terrorism because of the plutonium contained
in the spent fuel. That spent fuel becomes more vulnerable over
time because of the decay of the radioactive barrier that
protects it. So we do believe there need to be mechanisms to
not provide an escape valve that would allow DOE to abandon a
search for geologic repositories.
In the meantime, work does need to be done on increasing
safety and security of spent fuel at reactor sites. That would
include expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry
casks and also upgrading the security requirements for dry
cask, because they are also vulnerable.
And finally, transportation is the weakest link in the
chain. We agree with the other speakers that this must get more
attention than it has in the past to facilitate safe and secure
transport of spent fuel in that final management system.
So the U.S. can afford to allow the NRC to take its time
reviewing Yucca Mountain because there is a window of safety.
But there is no urgent need to rush forward to a less-than-
optimal approach. And so Congress should take the time to get
it right.
Thank you, and I apologize for exceeding my time.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Farenthold. Oh, that's all right. No, you didn't go too
badly. We had somebody this morning use 5 extra minutes.
Ms. Tubb, you're up. And please don't use 5 extra minutes.
TESTIMONY OF KATIE TUBB
Ms. Tubb. My name is Katie Tubb, and I'm a policy analyst
for energy and environment issues at the Heritage Foundation.
And the views I express today are my own. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today and for your interest
in examining nuclear waste management issues.
Rather than a problem, I believe nuclear waste management
is an opportunity for growth and innovation in the nuclear
industry, if we can get policy right. As requested, I hope to
briefly cover how we got to the current dysfunction, the
consequences of stalled action, particularly to taxpayers, and
where we are on the issue today.
According to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as
amended, the Department of Energy entered into contracts with
commercial nuclear power companies to collect and store nuclear
waste at a long-term repository at Yucca Mountain. It was
required to begin collecting waste by 1998.
In 2008, the DOE applied for a license with the NRC to
build a facility at Yucca Mountain. But shortly thereafter, and
lacking any technical or scientific justification, the Obama
administration unilaterally walked away from the Yucca Mountain
license and declared it not a workable solution.
Following a series of court cases, the NRC was ordered to
review the Yucca Mountain application until funds were
exhausted, and the DOE was required to stop collection of the
nuclear waste fee. These pivotal court decisions, in essence,
bring matters back to where they were in 2008.
Stalled action has had costs, and a voice too often left
out is that of the taxpayer. Because the DOE has failed to
collect nuclear waste as contractually obligated, it has been
found in partial breach of its contracts with nuclear power
companies. Over $6 billion in settlements have been paid to
nuclear utilities from the Treasury Department's Judgment Fund.
And put simply, this means the DOE budget takes no hit for its
negligence. The nuclear industry is made whole through the
Judgment Fund. Taxpayers cover the bill.
The DOE projects liability to be $24.7 billion, based on
DOE's 2016 December financial report. But this is misleading
because it assumes construction of a pilot interim facility in
2021 based on the Obama administration's original plan. The
nuclear industry estimates liability of upwards of $50 billion.
Another expense to taxpayers is a result of how the Nuclear
Waste Fund is accounted for in Federal budgets. As mentioned,
the DOE stopped collecting the nuclear waste fee in May 2014 as
the courts directed. However, CBO continues to assume the
Federal Government is collecting $385 million simply because
the DOE could continue--or reinstate the fee. OMB has also used
this budget tool. In other words, the Nuclear Waste Fund has
been used to disguise the cost of budgeting choices,
perpetuating the myth that Congress is fully paying for new
spending.
The current and future nuclear industry faces considerable
uncertainty after the past decade of political mismanagement.
Despite a new administration willing to follow the law,
Congress has not appropriated for the Nuclear Waste Fund since
2010. American is at a crossroads where Congress has the
opportunity to set nuclear waste management on track. There
have been notable legislative efforts; however, none have
addressed the underlying issues with the current system.
First, responsibility for nuclear waste management ought to
belong with nuclear power operators as an aspect of commercial
nuclear power generation in the same way that other industries
such as healthcare, mining, manufacturing, farming all take
care of their own waste streams.
If waste management were a dynamic part of the utility's
bottom line, the nuclear industry would naturally be interested
not only in efficient nuclear waste disposal, but also cost-
effective predisposal decisions such as interim storage
options, fuel types, and reactor technologies.
When nuclear power companies are responsible for waste
management, regulatory agencies can been seen exactly as that:
Disinterested regulatory agencies interested in protecting
health and safety. As both regulatory and repository operator,
the government appears to have a bias, whether that's real or
just perceived.
Further, a potential host community can then be a truly
equal partner in negotiations with the industry, rather than an
inferior party submitting to the Federal Government in a David-
Goliath battle to locate a repository.
Secondly, nuclear waste policy reforms should replace the
previous flat nuclear waste fee with accurate pricing. Prices
are critical to any functional and efficient marketplace and
provide suppliers and customers with data to determine the
attractiveness of a product and service. Prices also give
potential competitors the information they need to introduce
new alternatives.
Nuclear waste management is not an inherent government
activity. It is primarily a business activity related to
commercial production of electricity. Reform must work off of
these two principles of industry responsibility and market
prices. It also must recognize that a long-term geologic
repository is needed and that in order to progress with the
Yucca Mountain, the State of Nevada must have more say in the
matter.
I think a possible way forward is to treat existing waste
under the political realities of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
and to approach new ways under a market-based policy. At the
very least, Congress needs to provide enough funding for the
DOE and NRC to complete the license review of Yucca Mountain.
Finishing the review merely brings all the information together
for Congress, Nevada, and the industry to make prudent
decisions about the next steps.
Thank you for giving me 38 extra seconds.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Tubb follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Farenthold. You are very welcome.
We'll now proceed with questions. Since I will be staying
through the whole hearing, I'll reserve my questions to bat
cleanup. So we'll start first with the gentleman from Kentucky.
Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's my understanding that taxpayers across the country
have already paid over $6 billion in damages because the
Federal Government has failed to honor its commitment to remove
spent fuel from nuclear reactors around the country.
Additionally, it's estimated that the final tab that taxpayers
are responsible for could rise to $30 billion.
What immediate actions can be taken by this Congress to get
a feasible used fuel program operating so that the taxpayer
liability can be limited and hopefully eliminated going
forward? It's up to anybody.
Mr. O'Donnell. I'll take an open crack at it, Congressman.
I appreciate the question.
I think the first thing, from a regulatory standpoint and a
State regulator, is there's been an application made to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And the first thing this
Congress can do is to fund that application going forward,
either through the Department of Energy reasserting itself as
the applicant, which it hasn't been doing. So they'll need some
money to do that. The President's submittal contains money. So
we need to get that funding stream going, as well as the NRC
needs to be fully complemented and ready to take this
application back up.
As a State regulator, if we get an application, Mr.
Chairman, for somebody who wants to do something under our
purview, we can't just suspend that in contravening our own
law. We have to run that to ground, and we have to get an
answer to that application. And so one way or another, we need
that answer. That's where the scientific-based solutions will
occur. And I think that's what this Congress can do
immediately, is get some funding going and get these programs
stood back up so that we can continue down the path of getting
the NRC doing the scientific evaluation of the application.
Mr. Comer. Okay.
Mr. Victor?
Mr. Victor. I'd agree with what Mr. O'Donnell said. But let
me add the vital importance of interim storage. I recognize
Representative Issa, he and the congressional delegation in
California spent a lot of time with us around this.
We can begin the process of restarting Yucca Mountain in a
permanent repository. And I understand the imperative of that.
But there's also a very large cost savings that comes from not
storing spent fuel at lots of sites all around the country, but
at a smaller number of sites. And so for people who are
concerned about the cost of all this, in addition to a variety
of other objectives here, interim storage is a vital role to
play here, as does a smart--Dr. Lyman pointed to a smart
transportation program so that we can efficiently, once we have
places to send it, and ideally as many places as possible so we
have competition, an efficient transportation system so that--
which is really a DOE responsibility in the end as well as
State and local planning--an efficient transportation system so
that we can move as many of these shipments to those facilities
as possible.
One last comment here briefly, which is we get regular
updates on the status of all the canisters at San Onofre. And
what's striking to me is that there are dozens of canisters
that are already ready to ship. And in the next few years,
there will be dozens more. And so we and many other sites are
ready to go as soon as there's a place to send it.
Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. O'Donnell, it's great to have you here today in your
role as chairman of the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioner's, subcommittee on nuclear waste disposal.
I was made aware that you previously worked at the Calvert
Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant just down the road in Calvert
County, Maryland. So you are very familiar with the issues
we're here to address today.
It's my understanding that electricity ratepayers, who are
also constituents of ours, have paid billions of dollars to
their electricity bills to have nuclear waste removed from the
reactors around the country. However, as we all know too well,
they've got nothing in return.
On behalf of the ratepayers around the country, can you
speak to how--exactly how much money they have paid into the
nuclear waste fund?
Mr. O'Donnell. Congressman, the estimates that I've been
given are the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund payments and the
interest that has accumulated over time on those payments into
the corpus is $40 billion. So it's a lot of money.
I can tell you, in my home State of Maryland, the
estimate--and we have State-by-State estimates. The ratepayers
in Maryland alone have paid $800 million into this fund. And
that's a very, very significant payment for a small State like
Maryland with 5 or 6 million citizens. So every State has this
problem, every State has paid a lot of money, and all of our
constituents deserve some action for that payment.
Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
Mr. Raskin indicates he's going to stick with me and bat
cleanup. So I will now recognize the gentleman from California,
Mr. Gomez.
Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Acting Ranking Member
Raskin.
We all know nuclear waste is a serious health hazard. It
threatens the health and safety of Americans from 329
congressional districts across 44 States and the District of
Columbia. But we haven't come up with an effective plan for
what to do with this waste for decades.
As it stands right now, most of our nuclear waste is stored
at facilities ill-equipped to do the job. Nowhere is this truer
than at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in southern
California where 3.5 million pounds of nuclear waste sit atop
of a fault line next to the Pacific Ocean. Our inability to
find an effective repository for our nuclear waste is a
shortcoming that we can no longer ignore. Waiting for a nuclear
waste crisis is a recipe for disaster, and I'm glad that this
subcommittee is here today to explore this issue further.
I believe that safety needs to be the top priority in
selecting a permanent site for our nuclear waste. This might
sound obvious to some, but our plan in southern California for
the better part of the last 50 years has been to store nuclear
waste in an area known for earthquakes, and that's just not
very smart.
As someone who grew up in southern California, in
Riverside, and actually would go surfing in the San Onofre
State--or tried to go surfing in the San Onofre State beach,
I'm well aware that most people are just concerned about the
safety of the facilities and what to do with the nuclear fuel
once the facilities are no longer generating electricity.
So this question would--goes to Dr. Lyman. Can you briefly
describe some of the safety hazards involved with the storage
of nuclear waste for the shortterm and the longterm?
Mr. Lyman. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for your question.
At reactor sites, spent nuclear fuel is stored in two main
ways. One, in the water-filled pools where it's put immediately
after discharge from the reactor, and also in what are called
dry storage casks, which are smaller structures which house a
smaller amount of spent fuel and do not require water or--for
cooling. And typically, spent fuel can be moved from the pools
to the dry casks after a period of about 5 years once the decay
heat is decreased so that can be done safely.
So both of those pose problems but in different ways. So
the spent fuel pools are overcrowded in this country. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission allows them to densely pack the
fuel. And as a result, those pools are vulnerable in the event
of an earthquake or a terrorist attack that could cause the
water to drain out rapidly, leading to a large-scale fire in
the pool and a large release of radioactive material.
Colleagues of mine have done calculations that showed an event
like that in the United States could affect millions of people
hundreds of miles away from the reactor for a very long time.
So the first thing that needs to be done is a policy to
reduce the--store the density of spent fuel in the pools. And
that can be done onsite by increasing the amount of dry cask
storage at reactors.
Now, dry cask storage is safer because--for a number of
reasons, but it's not completely invulnerable. And there are a
number of ways where the NRC could take action to increase the
safety and security, especially at sites that are more
vulnerable than others, let's say on the San Onofre. But it's a
more manageable problem. And so I do believe that there is some
time, if those issues are addressed, to store spent fuel and
dry cask safely at reactors until a better national solution is
come up with. Thank you.
Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Lyman.
This is a question for Dr. Victor. Is it fair to say that
one of the major concerns of members of the San Onofre
community have about this nuclear waste remaining onsite is
safety? And what are some of the concerns of the--what are some
of the specific concerns about keeping it there?
Mr. Victor. Thank you very much, Representative Gomez. I'd
agree with what Dr. Lyman said here. We--there's a range of
views about the concerns on the onsite storage of spent nuclear
fuel. There are some people, a minority, and I think not well
informed, that think the dry cask systems are not safe. I think
all the evidence points to exactly what Dr. Lyman said.
For the longterm, what people are concerned about is two
things. One is they're concerned about making sure that there's
a long-term program for monitoring and--the canisters and their
integrity. And as long as we're stuck with it there, we want to
make sure it's being monitored, there are programs in place to
detect any faults and so on. We've had, at our most recent
meeting, extensive briefings about this. There's been a lot of
work in this area. I am encouraged that there's been a lot of
progress in that area.
The other concern that people have is less tangible, but I
think maybe even more important, which is that people are
seeing the rest of the site being dismantled, and they don't
understand why it is that the spent fuel is stuck there. And
they're really angry about that. Because the deal that was made
was we paid the Federal Government to remove it, and it's not
being removed. And that's a--that's a palpable anger and
sentiment in the community.
Mr. Gomez. Mr. Victor, Mr. Lyman, thank you for your
testimony. I'm out of time, so I yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Gomez.
I see Mr. Issa from California has arrived. Without
objection--Mr. Issa is a member of the full committee--will be
authorized to participate in this subcommittee hearing. Without
objection, so ordered.
Up next is a gentleman from--Mr. Palmer.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to some questions that Mr. Comer brought
up about the amount of money that is being spent. I have a
document here on the cost of an actual nuclear waste
management--I'd like to have entered into the official record,
if I may, Mr. Chairman--that shows that since 2009, the Federal
Government's liabilities have escalated from $12 billion to
over $30 billion.
Mr. Farenthold. Without objection.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Tubb, the Federal Government has spent more than $6
billion on settlements to utilities for the failure to collect
nuclear waste, and this amount grows every year. Additionally,
the DOE estimates that future liabilities will exceed $25
billion.
What would it cost to make Yucca Mountain operational so
that the taxpayers are not continuing to be on the hook for
these settlements?
Ms. Tubb. The DOE last gave a lifetime--life cycle cost
estimate in 2008. In 2017 numbers, I think that estimates up to
$97 billion over 125 years.
Mr. Palmer. I'd like to point out, as we're operating in a
deficit, that's money we have to borrow.
Can you give us some idea of the way that CBO treats money
that was paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund?
Ms. Tubb. Sure. CBO, unfortunately, doesn't do Congress
many favors with the Nuclear Waste Fund. Money comes in as
mandatory receipts. And so the fund offsets mandatory spending.
It goes out as discretionary appropriations, and so the Nuclear
Waste Fund has to compete with other congressional priorities.
And so each of these baskets of money is treated under
different budgeting rules. It makes it very difficult to either
reform the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is the principal mechanism
for moving forward with Yucca Mountain or any other plan, and
it also makes it very difficult to actually spend money for
Yucca Mountain or any other plan.
I would also add that when DOE spends money to reduce that
taxpayer liability, CBO does not recognize that taxpayer
savings. And so, again, when DOE spends money, it can't offset
that in savings to taxpayer liability.
Mr. Palmer. So basically, what we're doing is spending the
fees that have been collected on other projects.
Ms. Tubb. Correct. So the Nuclear Waste Fund is funded by
ratepayers and utilities. There's no taxpayer contribution to
the Nuclear Waste Fund, and yet the Nuclear Waste Fund has to
compete with taxpayer priorities based on these budget rules.
Mr. Palmer. So to make the taxpayer whole in respect to the
Nuclear Waste Fund, Congress, at some point, will have to
appropriate money to make it up, or does the tax--does that--do
we just leave that money off the table?
Ms. Tubb. The only way the taxpayer is liable is for paying
the Department of Energy's legal fees. So as far as providing
for the nuclear waste management services, that's all on
ratepayers and utilities, as it should be, and as according to
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Taxpayers are on the hook for
DOE's delinquency and being found in courts.
Mr. Palmer. Let me change directions a little bit here and
continue with you. The Department of Energy's license
application for Yucca Mountain has languished at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission since 2008. What are the barriers that
are holding this up?
Ms. Tubb. Principally, it's politics. It's no secret that
the Obama administration was not supportive of Yucca Mountain.
And a lot of it has to do with former Senator Harry Reid. I
would also say that, you know, there are scientific technical
contentions, many of which are offered up by the State of
Nevada. And as mentioned, I think we need to move forward with
those and air those, you know, as the law requires. And if
there are problems with Yucca Mountain, that needs to be known.
And that's part of completing the Yucca Mountain licensing
process.
Mr. Palmer. Just less than a half a minute left.
How long would it take for Yucca to become operational if
the license were approved?
Ms. Tubb. Not being an engineer, I don't have a good answer
on that, so I'll have to pass.
Mr. Palmer. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
I've just been informed that votes will be scheduled around
3:15. We're going to see how far we can get and then determine
what we're going to do at that time.
I'll now recognize Mr. Clay for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Raskin
and other members, for extending me the opportunity to join you
this afternoon on a matter of great urgency to our Nation and
also to the region that I represent in St. Louis: The safe
disposal of nuclear waste.
And some might wonder why I am cosponsoring this bill to
finally establish a national nuclear waste repository at Yucca
Mountain, and the answer is simple: The U.S. Government created
a nuclear waste problem 75 years ago, and we have a
responsibility to finally clean it up. And that long story
began in my congressional district.
In 1942, the water department secretly contracted with
Mallinckrodt Chemical in St. Louis to enrich yellowcake uranium
from the Belgian Congo to fuel the Manhattan Project. That
enriched uranium was used to fuel our Nation's first atomic
bombs created in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in the Met program,
which existed from 1942 to 1945 was essential to winning World
War II. But the nuclear waste that was generated from the
manufacturing of those original atomic bomb and others that
would follow forged a curse of radioactive contamination that
is still inflicting pain and suffering across this country. And
the waste from our Nation's nuclear power plants has compounded
this problem.
In Missouri, several failed attempts to clean up the
original nuclear waste caused dangerous radioactive
contamination at sites in downtown St. Louis; at Lambert St.
Louis International Airport; at Latty Avenue in North St. Louis
County; at Coldwater Creek, which is a tributary that flows
into the Mississippi River. And finally, in 1973, approximately
50,000 tons of that same nuclear waste was illegally dumped at
West Lake Landfill in Bridgeton, Missouri, and mixed with other
debris. That nuclear waste includes radioactive uranium,
radioactive thorium, radioactive barium sulfate, and other
toxic contaminates.
Unbelievably, that radioactive toxic mess dumped illegally
at West Lake 44 years ago is held in an unlined limestone
landfill near the Missouri River, near a major hospital, near
Lambert St. Louis Airport, near schools and interstate
highways. And most troubling of all is the appalling fact that
1,000 of my constituents live less than 1 mile away from this
illegal nuclear waste dump. And it would be almost impossible
to find a dumber, more dangerous, more completely irresponsible
place to dump nuclear waste than West Lake Landfill. And if you
think this potential environmental disaster couldn't get any
worse, you're wrong.
For the last 5 years, we have also been dealing with a
creeping underground landfill fire at the adjacent Bridgeton
sanitary landfill, which is owned by Republic Services and is
under the supervision of the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources. And that underground fire is less than 1,000 feet
away from the buried nuclear waste.
My friends, the U.S. Government created this radioactive
mess, and we have a clear and unavoidable responsibility to
finally clean it up. That is what opening up the Yucca Mountain
registry--repository is all about.
So let me say this to all of you. When the U.S. Government
creates a problem, when we put citizens at risk, when we
disrupt their lives, when we destroy the peace and property
values of their neighborhoods, and when we allow the health of
innocent citizens to be harmed because of our own inaction, we
must make it right. And I was the first Member to ask that all
of the waste be removed, and I will continue to do that.
And I see my time is up. But, Mr. Chairman, I mean, I would
support this bill because I think that the waste needs to be
removed and put into a safe place, and it's the government's
responsibility.
I yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, very much.
I will now recognize the vice chairman of the subcommittee,
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing today.
Nuclear energy is one of the most reliable and stable
energy sources in the world, and we should continue to look to
advance further development in the secure storage of used
materials. Nuclear power and the subsequent waste that comes
from spent nuclear fuel is an issue which in my district I am
very familiar. The Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Maricopa
County is the largest nuclear generation facility in the United
States. Palo Verde provides 35 percent of the total energy in
Arizona, employs over 2,000 full-time workers, and has roughly
a $1.8 billion economic impact on the State. And while I could
speak to volumes of the benefits of nuclear power and plants
across the U.S., the facts remain that temporary storage onsite
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radio waste from such
power plants is a costly and hazardous practice.
Mr. O'Donnell, first to you. I want you to be very concise.
Can you give us a breakdown of the incurred cost to the
consumer since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act?
Mr. O'Donnell. I am a recovering elected official from
Maryland, so I will try to be as concise as possible,
Congressman.
So the five times the consumers have paid just for waste
storage: The original construction. And then, after original
construction, the Nuclear Waste Fund. And then, after the
Nuclear Waste Fund, because we didn't meet our statutory
deadlines of reracking of the spent fuels that were already
paid for, number one. So those first three things. And then,
also, we have paid into the Judgment Fund. And I am missing
one. But there are five impacts.
And the fund itself is $40 billion. And the untold billions
of liability that the consumers have, just it is mind boggling.
Mr. Gosar. So, Mr. Smith, can you describe for us what you
believe is the best solution for the long-term storage of
existing spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste currently
stored at nuclear facilities around the country.
Mr. Smith. So I represent mostly defense waste. But
finishing the licensing process of Yucca Mountain will give us
a final determination on whether that facility can hold the
high-level waste and the commercial material that we have. And
if it doesn't, then we have got to find other alternatives,
which is what we are discussing today. And that is, you know,
the classification of high-level waste and changing that so
that we can reroute some of this waste to other locations
around the country.
Mr. Gosar. So we have looked at other areas, have we not,
Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. We have. We are working with the Department of
Energy right now to open up opportunities at WIPP for other
materials that could be classified as transuranic waste as
opposed to high-level waste, and that is one of the things that
we are dealing with at this point.
Mr. Gosar. We looked at a space in Texas, did we not, that
was deemed geologically unsafe? Is that true?
Mr. Smith. I'm not sure about the geological----
Mr. Gosar. The salt domes?
Mr. Smith. I'm not sure about the geological status of
that, but they're continuing to look at waste control
specialists for storing additional wastes at their community.
Mr. Gosar. Are you aware--where are these other sites?
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. So, Ms. Tubb, what would you suggest to
legislators as the best way forward to ensure the success of a
long-term nuclear waste depository? What would be the steps,
and how would you facilitate those? In what order?
Ms. Tubb. I think the first step is completing Yucca
Mountain licensing process. Getting an up or down decision on
that brings a lot of valuable information to the table.
Assuming the NRC approves Yucca Mountain, I think we need
to engage the State of Nevada. You could consider a situation
where DOE essentially contracts with the State of Nevada,
giving Nevada a lot of control over that situation for existing
waste. I think we need to look and reimagine how we treat
future waste. As I talked about, creating market incentives and
giving the nuclear waste industry--I am sorry--the nuclear
industry a say in how they manage nuclear waste. So a system
for existing waste, a system for future waste.
Mr. Gosar. Would you agree with that, Mr. Victor?
Mr. Victor. Yes. I think the Yucca process should restart.
We don't know what the outcome of that is going to be. And so I
think it's really important that we not continue to put all of
our eggs in one basket. That's why we're so keen on interim
storage as well.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize Mr. Raskin.
Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Dr. Lyman, let me start with you. What do you think are the
specific dynamics and consequences of climate change today that
should be informing our short-term and long-term approaches to
dealing with the nuclear waste storage problem?
Mr. Lyman. Yes. Thank you, Congressman Raskin.
UCS is very concerned about the threat of climate change in
a number of different ways. With regard to nuclear power,
obviously, the estimates that the NRC has made in the past for
the vulnerability of nuclear reactor sites and waste sites to
natural phenomenon, including flooding, has to be revisited.
And that is true both for operating reactors, and for the waste
stored there and also for any new waste storage facilities.
Unfortunately, the process for updating information on
climate and the ability to look forward and to be anticipatory
instead of reactive are problems that the NRC has had. So there
needs to be a greater realization of the uncertainty that is
created by the potential for increased hazards at nuclear
reactors and at waste facilities. And that needs to be
incorporated into the planning. When you're talking about
nuclear waste, which has a potential hazardous lifetime of
millions of years, obviously, there is only so much you can do.
But certainly you do need to address those uncertainties and
ensure that you have enough safety margin to accommodate a
potentially significant increase in hazard at those sites.
Mr. Raskin. Great.
And similar question for Dr. Victor. The country is reeling
now from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and Jose, and people are
still recovering from Katrina and Sandy. The San Onofre nuclear
power station is located on the California coast. Are you
concerned that natural disasters like tsunamis or earthquakes
could threaten the safety of nuclear waste that's stored at
that facility?
Mr. Victor. So, broadly, yes. The disaster matters. So
there has been a lot of analysis of the different kinds of
disasters. As a general rule, the tsunami risk there happens to
be lower. The earthquake risk is high. And that's why the
system at San Onofre is engineered to withstand a much higher
seismic event, earthquake, than typical dry cask facilities.
And I think, over the long term, sea level rise is a really
significant--and storm surge--is a really significant concern.
I think everybody has agreed that they want to move it out of--
the safest place for the San Onofre site is in dry cask. And
the safest, best long-term solution is out of San Onofre, end
of story.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you. But I have had several conversations
with my colleague, Congresswoman Titus from Nevada, who is very
interested in this question of consent.
And, Dr. Lyman, let me come back to you. In considering
long-term alternative solutions to the Yucca Mountain
possibility, do you believe that we should seek to get approval
from the local communities and State government wherever a site
may be located?
Mr. Lyman. Yes, I think, generally speaking, the concept of
consent-based siting is a good one. Unfortunately, it's hard to
fully understand how to implement that.
And so there certainly needs to be greater recognition of
State and local concerns. However, that also has to be, as I
said, in the context of a national solution. So we can do more.
I don't know what the answer is at this point. But certainly
there has to be a different process than the one that led to
the selection of Yucca Mountain where the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act and its amendments were rigged, essentially, for the rest
of the country to gang up on Yucca Mountain. So the flaws of
that process have to be examined and----
Mr. Raskin. But the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Nuclear
Future, in 2012, did recommend placing consent-based siting at
the center of successful planning in going to the future.
Dr. Victor, back to you. Do you think that we are going to
be able to successfully resolve this problem if we don't use
this principle of local consent?
Mr. Victor. I think the principle of local consent is
vitally important, you know, with the caveats that Dr. Lyman
laid out. We need to have a national strategy. We need to set
this up so that any particular interest can't hold up the
entire process.
To me, what's most interesting is we have had in west Texas
and in eastern New Mexico--especially in eastern New Mexico--a
tremendous amount of progress on this front. We've had
representatives from the eastern New Mexico site come visit our
community engagement panel. There's informed consent about
opening that site up, and people are ready.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Raskin.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr.
Gianforte.
Mr. Gianforte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for the panel today for your testimony. This
is an important issue, and I appreciate your input.
Ms. Tubb, I had a question for you. What's been the
practical effect of the last administration's closing the
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management? And how has
that impeded the efforts to move forward with the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act and the will of Congress?
Ms. Tubb. Well, we certainly lost a lot of time. As I said,
we're basically back to where we were in 2008 when the
Department of Energy first submitted its application. It's
going to take a lot of effort to bring back the Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. I think that's very
doable, having talked with people who were originally involved
in the license, that people are passionate about this project
and want to see it move forward. So it's definitely doable. It
will just take time and money to bring those resources and
those people back together.
Mr. Gianforte. And as that office was closed, can you be
more explicit about what it actually impeded? What did it shut
down? What has the impact of that been?
Ms. Tubb. Well, I mean, a lot of people have moved on and
been replaced within the Department of Energy. That's a lot of
institutional knowledge around this specific project that's
very unique that has since been spread across the country,
spread within DOE. Some of them have even retired. And I think
a lot of that can be brought back. But that takes effort.
Mr. Gianforte. Yeah. Okay. And then do we know what the
previous administration did with the funds that were allocated
for this office? Did that get returned to the Treasury, or did
it go someplace else?
Ms. Tubb. So a lot of it just did not get spent. Department
of Energy has now roughly $20 million left from the Nuclear
Waste Fund that was appropriated from Congress. The Obama
administration just chose not to use that money both in DOE and
NRC, and that's what some of those court cases were about.
With OCRWM, a lot of those institutional functions were
spread within the Office of Nuclear Energy or just atrophied.
Mr. Gianforte. Okay. Great. And I have no further
questions.
I yield back the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
I now recognize the former chairman of the full committee,
the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for including
me here today.
As Mr. Victor said, I represented and have represented San
Onofre for 16-3/4 years. During most of those years, they
produced between 1100 and 2200 megawatts every day, 24 hours a
day depending upon whether one or two of the reactors were
online. And, of course, more than half the time, two reactors
were online.
With an ill-fated non-nuclear portion of the plant, that
being the steam generators, arriving defective, it was
prematurely shut down. So one thing, Mr. Victor, if you'll
describe briefly the situation that we deal with because all of
the spent rods had to be removed, brand new ones, from two
reactors, unexpectedly and then put into water storage.
Mr. Victor. Very briefly, essentially, the entire fuel load
that has ever been in those two reactors, plus unit one
originally, is still onsite, with a couple of exceptions.
Mr. Issa. Right. But some are in dry cask.
Mr. Victor. And some are in dry cask. They are currently
building a facility to take the rest of the fuel that's in the
pools and remove it. That process is on track, and as far as I
can tell will be done by the end of 2019, at which point nearly
all--not all, but nearly all--those canisters will be ready to
ship if there is a place to ship them.
Mr. Issa. So, with the early demise with the plans to build
an above-ground--and I call it above ground, but it's slightly
below ground--a holding area a few hundred feet from Interstate
5, a few hundred feet from San Onofre surfing area, the
Trestles, and on earthquake fault, we will have 30 years of
three reactors worth of spent rod sitting in dry cask from more
or less--and I will use 2020, if you don't mind--for 10,000
years if we don't find a solution. Is that correct?
Mr. Victor. That's correct.
Mr. Issa. And in your estimation, with your expertise and
your involvement in this--and I'll go to the others also--is
there any question in your mind that anywhere, anywhere on
Earth that is dry, not near populated centers, not near
earthquake faults, even if above ground, would be safer than
that location in a 10,000-year calculation?
Mr. Victor. Anywhere, that's a strong standard. I mean, the
middle of this room is probably not a good idea.
Mr. Issa. Well, let me take, for example, one that I
personally witnessed. We did underground testing at Area 51,
the nuclear test center in Nevada, not Yucca but another place.
Anyone can Google Earth and see mounds left over from those
underground tests. That location, is it or is it not safer than
on an earthquake fault in a populated area on the edge of the
ocean?
Mr. Victor. Absolutely. And there's an extraordinary number
of sites that would be dramatically safer and better for the
communities than where it is now.
Mr. Issa. So, as we look at places in which there are
little or no population for as much as a hundred miles in this
country, areas that are dry, that have no apparent aquifers,
including Area 51--and I will also say Yucca, but I use Area 51
because it already has underground nuclear materials, we have a
large amount of places that are better--maybe not perfect, but
better. So my question to each of you is, with the current
science we have, even Yucca mountain and all proposed,
currently proposed, interim storage sites, in your opinion,
aren't every one of them safer than on the edge of the ocean,
whether in Humboldt Bay, Diablo Canyon, or San Onofre, where we
have a total of five reactors? Three are offline; two more will
go offline.
And I'll start with Ms. Tubb.
Ms. Tubb. It certainly sounds like that to me. I am not a
nuclear engineer, but I would say likely.
Mr. Issa. Doctor?
Mr. Lyman. Yes. Well, not----
Mr. Issa. We're not looking for perfect. I'm just asking
the question of better.
Mr. Lyman. Yeah. I realize that. It's just--on the record,
of course, there are aquifers at the Yucca Mountain site. In
fact, when I went to the----
Mr. Issa. Is the water as close as it is at San Onofre?
Mr. Lyman. No. But it's not completely dry. And so it's a
subtle--you know, there are issues. And, of course, there are
short-term places where, if you could move all the fuel right
away, then there would be a lower risk. But you do have to then
take into account the transportation risk as well. So, you
know, you really need to look at an integrated program, and
that's the complication.
Mr. Issa. Okay. Well, and I'm not trying to cut you off,
but for everybody there, when I look at a current location
that's starting in--let's call it January of 2020, we would be
able to move, by sea, if we chose, without ever going through a
populated area, all of those dry casks somewhere else. From the
moment it gets on to a barge, in my estimation, it is safer
than where it is. Is there anyone that disagrees that there
aren't a number of places inherently safer, starting in 2020,
and it would be reckless to leave them in the least safe place
that one could describe, on an earthquake fault, in a populated
area, between an interstate and the ocean?
Mr. Victor?
Mr. Victor. No. I completely agree. There are a lot of
places that would be a lot smarter. And, to me, what's striking
is I can understand why people are concerned about permanent
repositories and making sure that the science is done properly
there. And that takes time. But these interim facilities are
now getting geared up, and I think that's a crucial part of
this.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. So the Santa Ana River site sits on a geological
fault, and we store thousands of canisters and waste tanks with
single capability in terms of insulation.
Mr. Issa. Single wall, the earlier----
Mr. Smith. Single-wall insulation. And we're now double-
stacking canisters. And while we do what I consider a very safe
job, as time moves on, you know, that's going to become much
more problematic to my community. So I certainly think a
geological repository--and if you have ever been to Yucca
Mountain, it certainly seems to be the best fit for that
material.
Mr. Issa. Mr. O'Donnell.
Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you, Congressman Issa. I will say
this. I've been to Yucca Mountain. I've looked at the national
laboratory experiments. I've witnessed it with my own eyes, and
I can tell you that every part of my nuclear-trained background
and mind tells me that, if you can't do it there, you're going
to have a hard time finding any place to have a deep geological
repository in this country. You have to be able to do it there,
and I think we have proven that by the national laboratories.
Additionally, we need to make sure that we don't allow
interim solutions--and I'm certainly open to interim storage,
not onsite but consolidated. But we have to make sure that that
doesn't become the new bottleneck simply kicked down the road
for the next generation to solve, because, sir, I have to tell
you, I honestly believe that we have a moral imperative to
solve this problem and solve it now. And that begins with both
short-term solutions and long-term solutions, permanent
solutions, and a repository.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, if I can close briefly with a short
statement. In my district, just a few miles from San Onofre,
for 40 years, we stored a rather controversial gas and
detergent mixture that was used during the Vietnam war. And
that was brought in by regular trucks, and it was shipped in
and out. As the years went by, what we discovered was it was a
hundred million dollar massive effort to eliminate what was
basically gasoline. But, unfortunately, over time,
environmental determinations can change. I fear that if we do
not find interim storage that give us, you know, consolidated
areas, that what the taxpayers will find--and this is probably
the premier committee of taxpayers--is that that estimate,
which only goes out 95 billion for 125 years of a 10,000-year
cycle, will prove the following: The fund will be evaporated.
Taxpayers will pay hundreds of billions of dollars if we do not
act and act now in a responsible way. I know for an absolute
certainty the taxpayers are already on the hook at this point
for tens of billions of dollars over the next century. But this
is a 10,000-year problem in need of a low-cost, safe solution.
And I really want to thank you and the ranking member for
holding this hearing. It's a great first step.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
And as we're in the middle of a vote and running out of
time, though I do have some questions, I'm just going to simply
state this is a problem that definitely needs to be solved
sooner not later. I'd like to find a long-term solution because
I do think there are potential risks in moving the stuff twice.
But moving it twice is certainly better than leaving it in. As
we learned even in the district that I represent, a nuclear
power plant in the path of a hurricane, though thank the Lord
it performed admirably with zero safety concerns, that may not
always be the case. So, again, I wish we had time for
questions, but I don't want to hold you all for 45 minutes just
to ask you 5 minutes of questions.
So I'm going to thank the panel for participating, thank
Mr. Raskin for filling in for Ms. Plaskett, and ask that we all
do keep Ms. Plaskett and her constituents and all those
affected by these disasters in our prayers.
And, with that, without objection, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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