    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

            EXAMINING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                     THE INTERIOR, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENT

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 26, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-39

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

                      Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
    John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee       Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
    Darrell E. Issa, California              Ranking Minority Member
    Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
    Mark Sanford, South Carolina         Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
    Justin Amash, Michigan                   Columbia
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona               Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
    Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee          Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
    Trey Gowdy, South Carolina           Jim Cooper, Tennessee
    Blake Farenthold, Texas              Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
    Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
    Thomas Massie, Kentucky              Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
    Mark Meadows, North Carolina         Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    Ron DeSantis, Florida                Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
    Dennis A. Ross, Florida              Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Mark Walker, North Carolina          Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
    Rod Blum, Iowa                       Jamie Raskin, Maryland
    Jody B. Hice, Georgia                Peter Welch, Vermont
    Steve Russell, Oklahoma              Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
    Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Mark DeSaulnier, California
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Jimmy Gomez, California
    Gary J. Palmer, Alabama
    James Comer, Kentucky
    Paul Mitchell, Michigan
    Greg Gianforte, Montana

                         Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
                      Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
                        William McKenna General Counsel
                  Ryan Hambleton,  Subcommittee Staff Director
                             Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director

                                   ------

             Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment

                       Blake Farenthold, Texas, Chairman
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona, Vice Chair   Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
    Dennis Ross, Florida                 Jamie Raskin, Maryland
    Gary J. Palmer, Alabama              Jimmy Gomez, California
    James Comer, Kentucky                (Vacancy)
    Greg Gianforte, Montana

                               C O N T E N T S

                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on September 26, 2017...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Anthony J. O'Donnell, Commissioner, Maryland Public Service
      Commission, Chair, National Association of Regulatory Utility
      Commissioners, Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues, Waste Disposal
        Oral Statement...............................................     4
        Written Statement............................................     7
    Mr. Chuck Smith, Council Member, Aiken County, South Carolina on
      behalf of Energy Communities Alliance
        Oral Statement...............................................    15
    Mr. David G. Victor, Chairman, San Onofre Nuclear Generating
      Station, Community Engagement Panel, Professor, UC San Diego
      School of Global Policy & Strategy
        Oral Statement...............................................    16
        Written Statement............................................    19
    Dr. Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union
      of Concerned Scientists
        Oral Statement...............................................    27
        Written Statement............................................    29
    Ms. Katie Tubb, Policy Analyst, Institute for Economic Freedom,
      The Heritage Foundation
        Oral Statement...............................................    39
        Written Statement............................................    41

                                    APPENDIX

    Statement for the record by Senator Dean Heller of Nevada,
      submitted by Chairman Farenthold...............................    64
    The Costs of Inaction on Nuclear Waste Management, submitted by
      Mr. Palmer.....................................................    68
    Questions for the record for Mr. Anthony O'Donnell, submitted by
      Chairman Farenthold............................................    71
    Questions for the record for Mr. Chuck Smith, submitted by
      Chairman Farenthold............................................    74
    Questions for the record for Ms. Katie Tubb, submitted by
      Chairman Farenthold............................................    78

            EXAMINING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE

                                  ----------

                          Tuesday, September 26, 2017

                      House of Representatives,
              Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy and
                                            Environment
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in
    Room 2154, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Blake
    Farenthold [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Farenthold, Gosar, Ross, Palmer,
    Comer, Gianforte, Raskin, and Gomez.
        Also Present: Representatives Issa and Clay.
        Mr. Farenthold. The Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy,
    and the Environment will come to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess at any time.
        Without objection, we are going to allow Mr. Clay to sit
    in, a member of the full committee, to participate in this
    subcommittee. Without objection, so ordered.
        Good afternoon. Today, the Subcommittee on the Interior,
    Energy, and the Environment will examine America's nuclear
    waste management and storage.
        Over the last 40 years, the U.S. produced 76,000 metric
    tons of nuclear waste. That's enough volume to cover a football
    field 24 feet high. This waste is scattered around our cities
    at nuclear power plants and other facilities because our
    country can't get moving on a proper long-term plan for storage
    and disposal.
        Today, we'll explore our existing regulations for nuclear
    waste management and possible opportunities for improvement.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or NWPA, of 1982 directed the
    Department of Energy, aka the DOE, to develop a national
    repository for the permanent disposal of nuclear waste. Way
    back in 1987, the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository in
    Nevada was designated as this site. The DOE submitted a
    licensing application for Yucca Mountain to the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission in 2008. However, the Obama
    administration's disapproval of the proposal and a series of
    court cases significantly delayed the application's review.
    Today, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has yet to approve the
    license for Yucca Mountain rendering the site unusable.
        To cover the cost of permanent removal, the NWPA
    established a Nuclear Waste Fund to collect fees under
    contractual obligation from nuclear power utilities in exchange
    for removal of nuclear waste. The DOE has, in fact, collected
    around $750 million annually, despite their inability to
    dispose the utility's nuclear waste. The DOE now owes roughly
    $29 billion in liabilities since they failed to fulfill their
    contracts.
        With nearly 2,000 metric tons of nuclear waste produced
    each year, the need for a long-term storage solution is
    becoming crucial. In my home State of Texas, there's currently
    a site in Andrews County used for low-level radioactive waste.
    A licensing application to upgrade the sight to an interim
    nuclear repository was submitted to the NRC. But similar to
    Yucca Mountain, the application faced numerous roadblocks
    ultimately stalling, in their view, process.
        Due to the barriers faced in establishing a national
    repository, nuclear power of utilities often store nuclear
    waste in reactor sites. This is costly and unsustainable over
    the longterm and places significant burdens on the communities
    that house them. The Federal Government has a designated site
    and the resources necessary to make it operational, yet has
    struggled every step of the way to get the approval required to
    move forward. It's been 35 years since the passage of the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and we have hardly anything to show
    in that time period, despite billions of dollars spent. We have
    to find a way to move past the gridlock.
        I look forward to hearing ideas and suggestions from our
    panel, and am hopeful the committee can create solutions to
    improve the management and storage of America's nuclear waste.
        At this point, I will yield 5 minutes to Mr. Raskin, the
    acting ranking member, as Ms. Plaskett is detained in the U.S.
    Virgin Islands for obvious reasons.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
    important hearing. And welcome to all of our fine witnesses,
    including my former colleague from the Maryland General
    Assembly, Mr. O'Donnell. It's really good to see you.
        And I am serving in the place of our distinguished ranking
    member, my friend and former law student, Ms. Plaskett, who is
    attending to her constituents in the U.S. Virgin Islands who
    are struggling to recover from the devastating hurricane and
    all the flood damage. They are in our thoughts, and prayers are
    with her and with her constituents.
        I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss an issue on
    the minds of a lot of Americans. Nuclear waste storage is a
    pressing nationwide concern that requires a nationwide
    solution. There are currently over 700,000 metric tons of spent
    nuclear fuel in our country, an additional 13,000 metric tons
    from defense-related activities. This radioactive waste is
    currently being stored at dozens of deteriorating nuclear
    storage sites across America. And I believe we can all agree
    that this is not a viable or safe long-term solution.
        I believe we can also agree that our government owes the
    American people an effective plan to address the nuclear waste
    storage problem. We owe the American people a plan that allows
    for nuclear waste to be stored securely in the manner that does
    not poison the environment and that presents no public health
    and safety concerns for local communities.
        Questions about the soundness and safety of our current
    storage regime and facilities are not new. In recent years,
    we've seen several disturbing incidents that have brought into
    question our ability to safely store this dangerous material in
    communities across the land.
        Internationally, the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima
    plant caused by an earthquake and a tsunami is still a vivid
    and serious reminder of the dangers of nuclear power and
    escaped nuclear radiation. And it serves as a warning to all of
    us around the world of what can happen if we don't keep safety
    at the very forefront of our concerns.
        So it's troubling to me that the Trump administration is
    moving swiftly to advance the Yucca Mountain facility. The
    President's proposed budget provides for $120 million to
    restart the licensing for this controversial plan. There are
    significant reasons why the repository at Yucca Mountain site
    originally selected 30 years ago has not yet been built. Yucca
    Mountain is seismically active and faces the possibility of
    continued and increased volcanic activity. Moreover, the
    facility comes with a known risk of radioactive waste leaking
    into the groundwater and contaminating the drinking water of
    nearby communities. Furthermore, the transportation of nuclear
    waste to Yucca Mountain would take it through 44 States and the
    District of Columbia, well over two-thirds of the country, nor
    have we fully considered the national security risks involved
    in transporting and storing this nuclear waste.
        These significant concerns cannot be swept under the rug in
    a mad dash to get Yucca Mountain licensed. All of these
    environmental, public health, safety, transportation, and
    national security questions must be thoroughly answered before
    we determine that Yucca Mountain is the best site for nuclear
    waste storage.
        There are so many difficulties involved in using Yucca
    Mountain to store nuclear waste that the Atomic Safety and
    Licensing Board Panel is considering approximately 300
    different contingencies. It seems clear we should be
    considering alternative sites to act as a permanent repository.
    Looking forward whether we are discussing short- or long-term
    solutions, we must continue to make the public safety a
    paramount priority, and this means carefully considering
    environmental implications of all the sites.
        As the people of Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
    Islands desperately try to recover from record-force hurricanes
    and flooding damage, we must take stock of the fact that
    climate change is dramatically increasing the ferocity and the
    perils of natural disasters. No plan to safely dispose of and
    store nuclear waste is remotely complete if it does not take
    into account changes in weather patterns. It is also imperative
    that the Federal Government works with State and local
    governments to develop and implement effective solutions going
    forward.
        I look forward to hearing today from people who are
    tackling these important issues.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
        Without objection, other members will have 3 legislative
    days to submit an opening statement. Additionally, without
    objection, Senator Dean Heller of Nevada has also submitted
    testimony. And without objection, we'll add that to the record
    as well.
        Mr. Farenthold. Now I'd like to introduce our witnesses.
        We have Mr. Anthony O'Donnell, commissioner of the Maryland
    Public Service Commission, and chair of the Subcommittee on
    Nuclear Issues - Waste Disposal at the National Association of
    Regulatory Utility Commissioners. We have Mr. Chuck Smith, a
    councilman in Aiken County, South Carolina, and chairman of the
    Energy Community Alliance. We have Mr. David Victor, professor
    of international relations and director of the Laboratory on
    International Law and Regulations at UC San Diego, as well as
    chairman of the Community Engagement Panel at San Onofre
    Nuclear Generating Station. We have Dr. Edwin Lyman, senior
    scientist of--at the Union of Concerned Scientists Global
    Security Program. And Ms. Katie Tubb, policy analyst at the
    Heritage Foundation, Center for International Trade and
    Economics.
        We welcome you all.
        Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn
    before their testimony.
        Would you please rise and raise your right hand.
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're
    about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth, so help you God?
        Let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the
    affirmative. And you all may be seated.
        We all have your preprovided testimony. So in order to
    allow time for discussions and questions, I'd request you limit
    your time for your verbal testimony to 5 minutes. The clock in
    front of you shows the time remaining. It will turn yellow when
    you have 30 seconds remaining and turn red when your time's up.
    If you go way over, I'll start tapping the gavel to--in case
    you missed the clock.
        So with that, we'll begin with Mr. O'Donnell. You're
    recognized for 5 minutes, sir.

                          WITNESS TESTIMONIES

                   TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY J. O'DONNELL

        Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good afternoon, Chairman Farenthold and Acting Ranking
    Member Raskin and other members of the Subcommittee on the
    Interior, Energy, and Environment. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today on the lack of progress on nuclear
    waste disposal and its effect on ratepayers.
        My name is Tony O'Donnell, and I'm a commissioner on the
    Maryland Public Service Commission. I also serve as chairman of
    the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
    NARUC, Subcommittee on Nuclear Issues - Waste Disposal. Thank
    you for holding this hearing.
        State economic utility regulators are responsible for
    ensuring the safe, reliable, and affordable delivery of
    essential electric utility services in every State across this
    country. The success of the Federal nuclear waste management
    program funded by the consumers of electricity generated from
    the Nation's nuclear power plants is necessarily of keen
    interest. Both NARUC and its member commissions have dedicated
    a tremendous amount of time and resources to ensure that
    electricity consumers receive the services they have paid for.
        State regulators agree that users of electricity for
    nuclear power plants should pay for the Federal--for the
    Federal nuclear waste management and disposal program, and the
    consumers have paid generously into this fund.
        Since 1982, more than $40 billion in direct payments and
    interest have been paid into the U.S. Nuclear Waste Fund. In
    fact, the $40-plus billion the consumers have contributed to
    the fund is only part of the entire amount they have spent on
    nuclear waste.
        First, consumers have paid for the original waste storage
    of facilities through the rates. Secondly, they paid into the
    Nuclear Waste Fund, as I just mentioned. Third, consumers paid
    to rerack or consolidate used fuel pools through the rates
    because the Federal Government failed to remove the waste by
    the statutory deadline. Fourth, they had to pay for onsite,
    out-of-pool dry cask storage through rates, again due to
    Federal failure. Finally, consumers paid a fifth time, through
    taxes paid for the Judgment Fund disbursements to cover damages
    caused by the failure of the Federal nuclear waste program.
        With respect to the judgement fund, taxpayers from every
    State, even those whose utilities have no stake in nuclear-
    generated electricity, continue to fund court-awarded damages
    from the Department of Justice Judgment Fund for DOE's partial
    breach of its contracts with electric companies that required
    DOE to remove the used nuclear fuel.
        According to a September 2014 DOE audit report, $4.5
    billion in damages have already been paid as a result of the
    Federal Government inaction. DOE estimates the total liability
    for the Federal Government will be about $27 billion, subject
    to check, maybe it's $29 billion. But that estimate includes
    the unrealistic assumption that the Department can begin to
    accept used nuclear fuel by 2021. Industry estimates almost
    double that projection. Even former President Obama's Blue
    Ribbon Commission estimated that every year of delay in
    accepting used nuclear fuel will increase this liability by
    approximately $500 million. Yet for those billions, so far
    ratepayers in the country have nothing to show for it.
        The Federal Government missed its statutorily mandated
    deadline to start accepting nuclear mandate--nuclear waste in
    1998. In the 1990s and early 2000s, at least the program had
    shown progress, notwithstanding the missed deadline.
        However, since that time, efforts to block funding for a
    geological disposal of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain as well
    as the U.S. Department of Energy's unlawful refusal to support
    the project's licensing application has kept the country in the
    exact same situation we occupied 30 years ago when Congress
    decided--I reiterate, Congress decided--that Yucca Mountain
    should be the first site considered for the United States
    permanent repository.
        The United States needs and--needs and consumers have paid
    for a permanent storage solution, and nothing less. To put it
    bluntly, the States and localities have the Federal
    Government's waste, and the Federal Government has our money.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be
    part of this critical discussion.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. O'Donnell follows]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith.

                        TESTIMONY OF CHUCK SMITH

        Mr. Smith. Chairman Farenthold and members of----
        Mr. Farenthold. Could you turn your microphone on, please,
    sir?
        Mr. Smith. Thank you for inviting me to testify today
    ensuring that the perspective of the local communities that
    host the government's defense nuclear waste facilities is
    represented. I am Chuck Smith, council member of Aiken County,
    South Carolina, board member of the SRS Community Reuse
    Organization, and chairman of Energy Communities Alliance.
        Our communities have long played a key role supporting the
    Nation's national security efforts. Indulge me, please. I have
    two canisters of high-level waste from different locations.
    Scientists will tell you that both are radiologically the same
    material, yet it costs $10 billion to manage this material and
    $100 billion to manage this material. Why? Because DOE
    regulations make no sense.
        I'd like to discuss defense high-level waste in an
    alternative path forward that can potentially reduce current
    cost estimates for addressing nuclear waste by upwards of $40
    billion.
        DOE produced defense nuclear waste through its reprocessing
    programs carried out as a part of the Manhattan Project and
    during the Cold War. DOE has 332 underground tanks used to
    process and store liquid high-level waste. The large tanks sit
    at three locations: Hanford, Washington; the Idaho National
    Laboratory; and in my State, Savannah River Site.
        The defense high-level waste is ultimately destined for
    disposal at Yucca Mountain. ECA has long supported moving
    forward with the Yucca Mountain licensing process. A high-level
    waste repository is and remains essential. ECA also supports
    consolidated interim storage, but it must exist alongside a
    permanent solution and not instead of it.
        As the ``kick the can down the road approach'' continues, I
    must remind you that our communities are already de facto
    interim storage sites. In addition, DOE and nuclear power
    producers are already incurring large costs paid for by
    taxpayers in your communities. GAO reported this year that
    DOE's environmental liability has doubled from a low of $176
    billion in 1997 to an estimate of $372 billion in 2016. DOE has
    paid $6.1 billion in damages. That breaks down to 800 million
    annually, about $2.5 million per day. The cost of inaction is
    high.
        So what can we do? ECA believes one option is clarifying
    the way nuclear waste is classified. Our country's radioactive
    waste clarification system currently relies primarily on point
    of origin rather than consumption or the specific hazards posed
    by its disposal. This approach does not make sense. Some
    defense high-level waste could technically qualify as
    transuranic waste, if based on its radioactive content. Only
    the U.S. classifies this nuclear waste this way.
        Just this month, ECA released a white paper outlining five
    near-term actions we believe can help DOE cut years of
    operation: reduce the size and duration of storage facilities
    needed before a high-level waste repository is available,
    accelerate waste tank retrieval and closures, and, as I
    mentioned earlier, realize savings of more than 40 billion.
        Our first two recommendations reflect a two-pronged
    approach. First, DOE should revise its order 435.1 to clarify
    that waste will be managed and disposed of according to
    characteristics rather than origin. DOE already has the
    authority to do this under the Atomic Energy Act. Congress
    should eventually provide statutory clarification to codify any
    clarification and reduce the chances it will shift over time
    along with politics and new administrations. However, any
    legislative language should support DOE's efforts and not get
    ahead of them. My community has started to develop its own
    legislative language, but we need to ensure that resources are
    available for local and State representatives around each
    impacted site to engage with their constituents, State
    policymakers, and congressional delegations to provide
    education and build support.
        Our next two recommendations deal with WIPP. DOE must begin
    working with the State of New Mexico on a permanent
    modification--on a permanent modification for WIPP to allow
    some of the tank waste currently classified as high-level waste
    to go to WIPP if it meets waste-acceptance criteria. This could
    allow 2,300 canisters of waste at Savannah River that are
    already destined to safely go to WIPP rather than sit onsite
    waiting for a high-level repository to be operational. Congress
    and DOE should provide full funding for WIPP so the full range
    of disposal capabilities can be resumed and capacity ultimately
    increased.
        And finally, DOE should begin to work on pilot projects and
    policy options to better understand alternative approaches.
    This includes considering how best to utilize private
    facilities such as WCS in Texas. Again, I caution it is
    imperative that DOE enter into discussions as early as possible
    with host communities and States to ensure there's a full
    understanding of the risk and benefits of any proposal.
    Impacted stakeholders must have the resources and opportunities
    necessary to participate in planning and provide feedback into
    policymaking process.
        For many communities, trust in DOE has eroded over time,
    and transparency is paramount to our community's ability to
    support DOE decisions. Clarifying waste definition is a large
    departure from current policy, but current policy has not
    served us well. There are safe options, and the Federal
    Government must seriously consider them.
        In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
    you today. I did bring copies of our report. ECA calls on you
    to support our communities and the country to move forward
    using science-based, not politically science-based, decision.
    We need to stop spending millions of taxpayers' dollars or
    fines rather than progress. It just makes sense.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, sir.
        Mr. Victor, you're up for 5 minutes.

                      TESTIMONY OF DAVID G. VICTOR

        Mr. Victor. Thank you very much, Chairman Farenthold,
    Acting Ranking Member Raskin, Representative Gomez, members of
    the subcommittee. My name is David Victor. I'm a professor at
    UC San Diego. I'm also a chairman of the Community Engagement
    Panel at San Onofre. This is a panel set up by Southern
    California Edison, the operator of the facility, to help
    steward the process of decommissioning of the San Onofre site,
    which is the largest commercial reactor site to be
    decommissioned to date.
        I've submitted in advance my written testimony. I want to
    just focus on three remarks in the 5 minutes that I have here
    today, remarks based on what I'm hearing from the communities
    on the front lines around these plants.
        The first comment is that the problem is now well-known.
    The Nation needs a solution. We do not have a solution to the
    long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. But the situation
    today is radically different from what it was 10 years ago, and
    it's going to get worse quickly.
        Today, there are 17 reactors at 14 sites on 11 States that
    are in the various stages of decommissioning, including the San
    Onofre plant. In the future, there will be more reactors in a
    similar situation.
        At these sites, the visibility and the problems associated
    with the lack of a solution to the spent nuclear fuel problem
    are much more visible because they're an operating site,
    there's always fuel onsite, and the reactor core and pools
    onsite at cask storage. And a decommissioned site situation is
    totally different. And the deal that the communities expect is
    that when the plants are removed and the benefits from that
    plant are removed, that the spent fuel will be removed as well.
    And that deal is not being fulfilled.
        The second of the three comments I'd like to make concerns
    Yucca Mountain. I understand that a lot of the politics around
    this issue in Washington are focused on Yucca Mountain. What
    I'm hearing from people on the front lines is very different.
    There's attention to Yucca Mountain, but there's much more
    attention to consolidated interim storage, or monitorable and
    retrievable storage, such as the sites mentioned in west Texas,
    another site in eastern New Mexico near the WIPP facility, and
    perhaps other sites in the future.
        Over the last 3 years, our panel has spent a lot of time on
    this issue. And what we have learned is that it's important to
    view consolidated interim storage as a complement to Yucca
    Mountain. I understand that politically they can be
    complements, but the role of these interim facilities and
    helping get spent fuel out of these communities quickly is
    vital, because even with a restart of Yucca Mountain, there are
    going to be many delays. It's going to take a long time. And
    interim storage is a much more rapid response option.
        In my testimony, I cite some of the work that's been done
    on the economics. Interim storage, in addition to help save
    money when developed in tandem with Yucca Mountain or other
    permanent storage facilities, it also gives us more options as
    a country, so that if one option doesn't work or if there are
    political troubles, the entire country is not held up by those
    difficulties as we have seen in the debate over the last few
    decades.
        We have spent more time on this issue around the San Onofre
    communities than any other topic that our panel looks at. And
    the number one ask from those communities is to help accelerate
    an overall strategy that involves permanent repositories as
    well as consolidated interim storage.
        The third and last comment I'd like to make concerns all
    the progress that has been made in Washington and, to some
    degree, in the arms of the Federal Government around the
    possibilities of restarting Yucca and around making
    consolidated storage a reality. It's really striking how much
    has happened in the last few years and how much in particular
    this body has done on the legislative front. Maybe not quite as
    much progress over in the Senate yet, but we can hope.
        I think the bill that's working its way through here is a
    big step forward, but it's a first step and additional work is
    needed. And I'd like to highlight two areas where we have
    learned about additional work that will be essential.
        One of those areas concerns the order with which spent fuel
    is removed from sites and sent to an interim storage facility
    or a permanent repository. Current procedures are ambiguous
    about this but seem to envision a scenario where the oldest
    fuel will be taken first from lots of different sites around
    the country. What we hear from not just our communities, but
    other communities around decommissioned nuclear sites is they
    would like those fuels to be moved first, because in
    decommissioned sites, there is especially no logic for
    continued onsite presence of spent nuclear fuel.
        And the other topic that needs more work is transportation.
    And current appropriations have some money needed for
    developing the railcar systems to move spent fuel. More work is
    needed on that front so we can develop a fleet of railcars, so
    that when real options appear, there are ways to get the fuel
    out of sites like San Onofre to permanent facilities.
        I thank you very much for your interest and attention to
    these issues. We in the communities around plants such as San
    Onofre are living this on a daily basis, and we are encouraged
    by the potential progress on solutions. Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Victor follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Victor.
        Dr. Lyman, you've got your 5 minutes, sir.

                        TESTIMONY OF EDWIN LYMAN

        Mr. Lyman. Thank you, Chairman Farenthold and Acting
    Ranking Member Raskin and the other distinguished members of
    the subcommittee. On behalf of the Union of Concerned
    Scientists, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
    testify here today.
        And before I begin, I would just like to extend our
    sympathies and best wishes for a swift and full recovery to the
    people of Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and all the other
    areas that have been so deeply affected by Harvey, Irma, and
    Maria.
        UCS has more than half a million supporters united by a
    central belief we need sound scientific analysis to create a
    healthy, safe, and sustainable future. We are neither pro nor
    anti nuclear power, but we have served as a nuclear power
    safety and security watchdog for nearly 50 years. In this
    regard, it is critically important that spent fuel be managed
    safely and protected from terrorist attack until it can be
    buried in a geological repository. But a sustainable nuclear
    waste disposal strategy must have broad public acceptance at
    local, State, and national levels.
        The witnesses today were asked to focus on the needs and
    challenges of communities currently holding nuclear waste.
    While we do agree these communities must have a major stake in
    the process, a sound nuclear waste policy should also reflect
    national priorities and look to protect future generations as
    well as ours. The problems that actions may appear to benefit
    some communities in the short term can penalize others and may
    even be harmful to the long-term interests of the U.S. as a
    whole.
        To be clear, in our view, spent nuclear fuel can be stored
    safely and securely at reactors and dry cask facilities for
    many decades, provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
    or NRC, conducts rigorous oversight, which has not been the
    case to date in all respects.
        Nevertheless, risk acceptance varies from one community to
    another, and it is understandable why some representatives
    would support legislation to facilitate moving spent fuel in
    their districts out as soon as possible. This is why Congress
    needs to come together to develop a new and science-based
    national nuclear waste management policy in order to allocate
    risks and benefits as fairly as possible.
        This policy should include a process to establish and
    maintain political momentum for development of repositories; a
    process for repository site selection that is consent-based,
    fair, and technically sound; requirements that spent fuel be
    managed safely and securely at reactor sites until a repository
    becomes available; and requirements for safe and secure
    shipment of spent fuel from reactor sites to repository.
    Current laws and regulations do not adequately address any of
    these issues.
        Unfortunately, the one game in town right now, which is
    H.R. 3053, has a number of flaws and avoids many of these
    questions, or exacerbates them. We expressed our concerns about
    it in the draft version earlier this year in testimony. And now
    if there's a version that's been reported out, it's a little
    improved. In some respects it's even worse.
        So I'd like to focus on the linkage between siting
    monitored retrievable storage facilities and a geologic
    repository. The current version of H.R. 3053 weakens that
    linkage; in fact, would allow DOE to immediately contract with
    a private company to spend public funds on developing a
    monitored retrievable storage facility up until the step of
    actually operating it. So they could pay to site, do all the
    reviews, and build a facility, but they can't move fuel there
    until NRC makes a decision whether or not to authorize
    construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain.
        Now, we can see what the problems with this are. Even with
    that latter condition, we think this would undermine the
    geologic repository program, because of the way we read the
    bill, even if the NRC were to deny a construction authorization
    for Yucca Mountain, DOE would be allowed to keep building MRS
    facilities indefinitely, each one capped at 10,000 tons, but
    could build as many as they wanted. So there would be no
    impetus for actually going forward with the geological
    repository. And that, we think, would be a bad outcome
    primarily because of the security concern of leaving spent fuel
    aboveground indefinitely.
        Over time, spent fuel in aboveground storage is not only a
    risk--poses a risk for sabotage but eventually will become a
    risk for nuclear terrorism because of the plutonium contained
    in the spent fuel. That spent fuel becomes more vulnerable over
    time because of the decay of the radioactive barrier that
    protects it. So we do believe there need to be mechanisms to
    not provide an escape valve that would allow DOE to abandon a
    search for geologic repositories.
        In the meantime, work does need to be done on increasing
    safety and security of spent fuel at reactor sites. That would
    include expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry
    casks and also upgrading the security requirements for dry
    cask, because they are also vulnerable.
        And finally, transportation is the weakest link in the
    chain. We agree with the other speakers that this must get more
    attention than it has in the past to facilitate safe and secure
    transport of spent fuel in that final management system.
        So the U.S. can afford to allow the NRC to take its time
    reviewing Yucca Mountain because there is a window of safety.
    But there is no urgent need to rush forward to a less-than-
    optimal approach. And so Congress should take the time to get
    it right.
        Thank you, and I apologize for exceeding my time.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Farenthold. Oh, that's all right. No, you didn't go too
    badly. We had somebody this morning use 5 extra minutes.
        Ms. Tubb, you're up. And please don't use 5 extra minutes.

                        TESTIMONY OF KATIE TUBB

        Ms. Tubb. My name is Katie Tubb, and I'm a policy analyst
    for energy and environment issues at the Heritage Foundation.
    And the views I express today are my own. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you today and for your interest
    in examining nuclear waste management issues.
        Rather than a problem, I believe nuclear waste management
    is an opportunity for growth and innovation in the nuclear
    industry, if we can get policy right. As requested, I hope to
    briefly cover how we got to the current dysfunction, the
    consequences of stalled action, particularly to taxpayers, and
    where we are on the issue today.
        According to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as
    amended, the Department of Energy entered into contracts with
    commercial nuclear power companies to collect and store nuclear
    waste at a long-term repository at Yucca Mountain. It was
    required to begin collecting waste by 1998.
        In 2008, the DOE applied for a license with the NRC to
    build a facility at Yucca Mountain. But shortly thereafter, and
    lacking any technical or scientific justification, the Obama
    administration unilaterally walked away from the Yucca Mountain
    license and declared it not a workable solution.
        Following a series of court cases, the NRC was ordered to
    review the Yucca Mountain application until funds were
    exhausted, and the DOE was required to stop collection of the
    nuclear waste fee. These pivotal court decisions, in essence,
    bring matters back to where they were in 2008.
        Stalled action has had costs, and a voice too often left
    out is that of the taxpayer. Because the DOE has failed to
    collect nuclear waste as contractually obligated, it has been
    found in partial breach of its contracts with nuclear power
    companies. Over $6 billion in settlements have been paid to
    nuclear utilities from the Treasury Department's Judgment Fund.
    And put simply, this means the DOE budget takes no hit for its
    negligence. The nuclear industry is made whole through the
    Judgment Fund. Taxpayers cover the bill.
        The DOE projects liability to be $24.7 billion, based on
    DOE's 2016 December financial report. But this is misleading
    because it assumes construction of a pilot interim facility in
    2021 based on the Obama administration's original plan. The
    nuclear industry estimates liability of upwards of $50 billion.
        Another expense to taxpayers is a result of how the Nuclear
    Waste Fund is accounted for in Federal budgets. As mentioned,
    the DOE stopped collecting the nuclear waste fee in May 2014 as
    the courts directed. However, CBO continues to assume the
    Federal Government is collecting $385 million simply because
    the DOE could continue--or reinstate the fee. OMB has also used
    this budget tool. In other words, the Nuclear Waste Fund has
    been used to disguise the cost of budgeting choices,
    perpetuating the myth that Congress is fully paying for new
    spending.
        The current and future nuclear industry faces considerable
    uncertainty after the past decade of political mismanagement.
    Despite a new administration willing to follow the law,
    Congress has not appropriated for the Nuclear Waste Fund since
    2010. American is at a crossroads where Congress has the
    opportunity to set nuclear waste management on track. There
    have been notable legislative efforts; however, none have
    addressed the underlying issues with the current system.
        First, responsibility for nuclear waste management ought to
    belong with nuclear power operators as an aspect of commercial
    nuclear power generation in the same way that other industries
    such as healthcare, mining, manufacturing, farming all take
    care of their own waste streams.
        If waste management were a dynamic part of the utility's
    bottom line, the nuclear industry would naturally be interested
    not only in efficient nuclear waste disposal, but also cost-
    effective predisposal decisions such as interim storage
    options, fuel types, and reactor technologies.
        When nuclear power companies are responsible for waste
    management, regulatory agencies can been seen exactly as that:
    Disinterested regulatory agencies interested in protecting
    health and safety. As both regulatory and repository operator,
    the government appears to have a bias, whether that's real or
    just perceived.
        Further, a potential host community can then be a truly
    equal partner in negotiations with the industry, rather than an
    inferior party submitting to the Federal Government in a David-
    Goliath battle to locate a repository.
        Secondly, nuclear waste policy reforms should replace the
    previous flat nuclear waste fee with accurate pricing. Prices
    are critical to any functional and efficient marketplace and
    provide suppliers and customers with data to determine the
    attractiveness of a product and service. Prices also give
    potential competitors the information they need to introduce
    new alternatives.
        Nuclear waste management is not an inherent government
    activity. It is primarily a business activity related to
    commercial production of electricity. Reform must work off of
    these two principles of industry responsibility and market
    prices. It also must recognize that a long-term geologic
    repository is needed and that in order to progress with the
    Yucca Mountain, the State of Nevada must have more say in the
    matter.
        I think a possible way forward is to treat existing waste
    under the political realities of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
    and to approach new ways under a market-based policy. At the
    very least, Congress needs to provide enough funding for the
    DOE and NRC to complete the license review of Yucca Mountain.
    Finishing the review merely brings all the information together
    for Congress, Nevada, and the industry to make prudent
    decisions about the next steps.
        Thank you for giving me 38 extra seconds.
        [Prepared statement of Ms. Tubb follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Farenthold. You are very welcome.
        We'll now proceed with questions. Since I will be staying
    through the whole hearing, I'll reserve my questions to bat
    cleanup. So we'll start first with the gentleman from Kentucky.
        Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It's my understanding that taxpayers across the country
    have already paid over $6 billion in damages because the
    Federal Government has failed to honor its commitment to remove
    spent fuel from nuclear reactors around the country.
    Additionally, it's estimated that the final tab that taxpayers
    are responsible for could rise to $30 billion.
        What immediate actions can be taken by this Congress to get
    a feasible used fuel program operating so that the taxpayer
    liability can be limited and hopefully eliminated going
    forward? It's up to anybody.
        Mr. O'Donnell. I'll take an open crack at it, Congressman.
    I appreciate the question.
        I think the first thing, from a regulatory standpoint and a
    State regulator, is there's been an application made to the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And the first thing this
    Congress can do is to fund that application going forward,
    either through the Department of Energy reasserting itself as
    the applicant, which it hasn't been doing. So they'll need some
    money to do that. The President's submittal contains money. So
    we need to get that funding stream going, as well as the NRC
    needs to be fully complemented and ready to take this
    application back up.
        As a State regulator, if we get an application, Mr.
    Chairman, for somebody who wants to do something under our
    purview, we can't just suspend that in contravening our own
    law. We have to run that to ground, and we have to get an
    answer to that application. And so one way or another, we need
    that answer. That's where the scientific-based solutions will
    occur. And I think that's what this Congress can do
    immediately, is get some funding going and get these programs
    stood back up so that we can continue down the path of getting
    the NRC doing the scientific evaluation of the application.
        Mr. Comer. Okay.
        Mr. Victor?
        Mr. Victor. I'd agree with what Mr. O'Donnell said. But let
    me add the vital importance of interim storage. I recognize
    Representative Issa, he and the congressional delegation in
    California spent a lot of time with us around this.
        We can begin the process of restarting Yucca Mountain in a
    permanent repository. And I understand the imperative of that.
    But there's also a very large cost savings that comes from not
    storing spent fuel at lots of sites all around the country, but
    at a smaller number of sites. And so for people who are
    concerned about the cost of all this, in addition to a variety
    of other objectives here, interim storage is a vital role to
    play here, as does a smart--Dr. Lyman pointed to a smart
    transportation program so that we can efficiently, once we have
    places to send it, and ideally as many places as possible so we
    have competition, an efficient transportation system so that--
    which is really a DOE responsibility in the end as well as
    State and local planning--an efficient transportation system so
    that we can move as many of these shipments to those facilities
    as possible.
        One last comment here briefly, which is we get regular
    updates on the status of all the canisters at San Onofre. And
    what's striking to me is that there are dozens of canisters
    that are already ready to ship. And in the next few years,
    there will be dozens more. And so we and many other sites are
    ready to go as soon as there's a place to send it.
        Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you.
        Mr. O'Donnell, it's great to have you here today in your
    role as chairman of the National Association of Regulatory
    Utility Commissioner's, subcommittee on nuclear waste disposal.
    I was made aware that you previously worked at the Calvert
    Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant just down the road in Calvert
    County, Maryland. So you are very familiar with the issues
    we're here to address today.
        It's my understanding that electricity ratepayers, who are
    also constituents of ours, have paid billions of dollars to
    their electricity bills to have nuclear waste removed from the
    reactors around the country. However, as we all know too well,
    they've got nothing in return.
        On behalf of the ratepayers around the country, can you
    speak to how--exactly how much money they have paid into the
    nuclear waste fund?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Congressman, the estimates that I've been
    given are the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund payments and the
    interest that has accumulated over time on those payments into
    the corpus is $40 billion. So it's a lot of money.
        I can tell you, in my home State of Maryland, the
    estimate--and we have State-by-State estimates. The ratepayers
    in Maryland alone have paid $800 million into this fund. And
    that's a very, very significant payment for a small State like
    Maryland with 5 or 6 million citizens. So every State has this
    problem, every State has paid a lot of money, and all of our
    constituents deserve some action for that payment.
        Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
        Mr. Raskin indicates he's going to stick with me and bat
    cleanup. So I will now recognize the gentleman from California,
    Mr. Gomez.
        Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Acting Ranking Member
    Raskin.
        We all know nuclear waste is a serious health hazard. It
    threatens the health and safety of Americans from 329
    congressional districts across 44 States and the District of
    Columbia. But we haven't come up with an effective plan for
    what to do with this waste for decades.
        As it stands right now, most of our nuclear waste is stored
    at facilities ill-equipped to do the job. Nowhere is this truer
    than at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in southern
    California where 3.5 million pounds of nuclear waste sit atop
    of a fault line next to the Pacific Ocean. Our inability to
    find an effective repository for our nuclear waste is a
    shortcoming that we can no longer ignore. Waiting for a nuclear
    waste crisis is a recipe for disaster, and I'm glad that this
    subcommittee is here today to explore this issue further.
        I believe that safety needs to be the top priority in
    selecting a permanent site for our nuclear waste. This might
    sound obvious to some, but our plan in southern California for
    the better part of the last 50 years has been to store nuclear
    waste in an area known for earthquakes, and that's just not
    very smart.
        As someone who grew up in southern California, in
    Riverside, and actually would go surfing in the San Onofre
    State--or tried to go surfing in the San Onofre State beach,
    I'm well aware that most people are just concerned about the
    safety of the facilities and what to do with the nuclear fuel
    once the facilities are no longer generating electricity.
        So this question would--goes to Dr. Lyman. Can you briefly
    describe some of the safety hazards involved with the storage
    of nuclear waste for the shortterm and the longterm?
        Mr. Lyman. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for your question.
    At reactor sites, spent nuclear fuel is stored in two main
    ways. One, in the water-filled pools where it's put immediately
    after discharge from the reactor, and also in what are called
    dry storage casks, which are smaller structures which house a
    smaller amount of spent fuel and do not require water or--for
    cooling. And typically, spent fuel can be moved from the pools
    to the dry casks after a period of about 5 years once the decay
    heat is decreased so that can be done safely.
        So both of those pose problems but in different ways. So
    the spent fuel pools are overcrowded in this country. The
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission allows them to densely pack the
    fuel. And as a result, those pools are vulnerable in the event
    of an earthquake or a terrorist attack that could cause the
    water to drain out rapidly, leading to a large-scale fire in
    the pool and a large release of radioactive material.
    Colleagues of mine have done calculations that showed an event
    like that in the United States could affect millions of people
    hundreds of miles away from the reactor for a very long time.
        So the first thing that needs to be done is a policy to
    reduce the--store the density of spent fuel in the pools. And
    that can be done onsite by increasing the amount of dry cask
    storage at reactors.
        Now, dry cask storage is safer because--for a number of
    reasons, but it's not completely invulnerable. And there are a
    number of ways where the NRC could take action to increase the
    safety and security, especially at sites that are more
    vulnerable than others, let's say on the San Onofre. But it's a
    more manageable problem. And so I do believe that there is some
    time, if those issues are addressed, to store spent fuel and
    dry cask safely at reactors until a better national solution is
    come up with. Thank you.
        Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Lyman.
        This is a question for Dr. Victor. Is it fair to say that
    one of the major concerns of members of the San Onofre
    community have about this nuclear waste remaining onsite is
    safety? And what are some of the concerns of the--what are some
    of the specific concerns about keeping it there?
        Mr. Victor. Thank you very much, Representative Gomez. I'd
    agree with what Dr. Lyman said here. We--there's a range of
    views about the concerns on the onsite storage of spent nuclear
    fuel. There are some people, a minority, and I think not well
    informed, that think the dry cask systems are not safe. I think
    all the evidence points to exactly what Dr. Lyman said.
        For the longterm, what people are concerned about is two
    things. One is they're concerned about making sure that there's
    a long-term program for monitoring and--the canisters and their
    integrity. And as long as we're stuck with it there, we want to
    make sure it's being monitored, there are programs in place to
    detect any faults and so on. We've had, at our most recent
    meeting, extensive briefings about this. There's been a lot of
    work in this area. I am encouraged that there's been a lot of
    progress in that area.
        The other concern that people have is less tangible, but I
    think maybe even more important, which is that people are
    seeing the rest of the site being dismantled, and they don't
    understand why it is that the spent fuel is stuck there. And
    they're really angry about that. Because the deal that was made
    was we paid the Federal Government to remove it, and it's not
    being removed. And that's a--that's a palpable anger and
    sentiment in the community.
        Mr. Gomez. Mr. Victor, Mr. Lyman, thank you for your
    testimony. I'm out of time, so I yield back.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Gomez.
        I see Mr. Issa from California has arrived. Without
    objection--Mr. Issa is a member of the full committee--will be
    authorized to participate in this subcommittee hearing. Without
    objection, so ordered.
        Up next is a gentleman from--Mr. Palmer.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to go back to some questions that Mr. Comer brought
    up about the amount of money that is being spent. I have a
    document here on the cost of an actual nuclear waste
    management--I'd like to have entered into the official record,
    if I may, Mr. Chairman--that shows that since 2009, the Federal
    Government's liabilities have escalated from $12 billion to
    over $30 billion.
        Mr. Farenthold. Without objection.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Tubb, the Federal Government has spent more than $6
    billion on settlements to utilities for the failure to collect
    nuclear waste, and this amount grows every year. Additionally,
    the DOE estimates that future liabilities will exceed $25
    billion.
        What would it cost to make Yucca Mountain operational so
    that the taxpayers are not continuing to be on the hook for
    these settlements?
        Ms. Tubb. The DOE last gave a lifetime--life cycle cost
    estimate in 2008. In 2017 numbers, I think that estimates up to
    $97 billion over 125 years.
        Mr. Palmer. I'd like to point out, as we're operating in a
    deficit, that's money we have to borrow.
        Can you give us some idea of the way that CBO treats money
    that was paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund?
        Ms. Tubb. Sure. CBO, unfortunately, doesn't do Congress
    many favors with the Nuclear Waste Fund. Money comes in as
    mandatory receipts. And so the fund offsets mandatory spending.
    It goes out as discretionary appropriations, and so the Nuclear
    Waste Fund has to compete with other congressional priorities.
    And so each of these baskets of money is treated under
    different budgeting rules. It makes it very difficult to either
    reform the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is the principal mechanism
    for moving forward with Yucca Mountain or any other plan, and
    it also makes it very difficult to actually spend money for
    Yucca Mountain or any other plan.
        I would also add that when DOE spends money to reduce that
    taxpayer liability, CBO does not recognize that taxpayer
    savings. And so, again, when DOE spends money, it can't offset
    that in savings to taxpayer liability.
        Mr. Palmer. So basically, what we're doing is spending the
    fees that have been collected on other projects.
        Ms. Tubb. Correct. So the Nuclear Waste Fund is funded by
    ratepayers and utilities. There's no taxpayer contribution to
    the Nuclear Waste Fund, and yet the Nuclear Waste Fund has to
    compete with taxpayer priorities based on these budget rules.
        Mr. Palmer. So to make the taxpayer whole in respect to the
    Nuclear Waste Fund, Congress, at some point, will have to
    appropriate money to make it up, or does the tax--does that--do
    we just leave that money off the table?
        Ms. Tubb. The only way the taxpayer is liable is for paying
    the Department of Energy's legal fees. So as far as providing
    for the nuclear waste management services, that's all on
    ratepayers and utilities, as it should be, and as according to
    the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Taxpayers are on the hook for
    DOE's delinquency and being found in courts.
        Mr. Palmer. Let me change directions a little bit here and
    continue with you. The Department of Energy's license
    application for Yucca Mountain has languished at the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission since 2008. What are the barriers that
    are holding this up?
        Ms. Tubb. Principally, it's politics. It's no secret that
    the Obama administration was not supportive of Yucca Mountain.
    And a lot of it has to do with former Senator Harry Reid. I
    would also say that, you know, there are scientific technical
    contentions, many of which are offered up by the State of
    Nevada. And as mentioned, I think we need to move forward with
    those and air those, you know, as the law requires. And if
    there are problems with Yucca Mountain, that needs to be known.
    And that's part of completing the Yucca Mountain licensing
    process.
        Mr. Palmer. Just less than a half a minute left.
        How long would it take for Yucca to become operational if
    the license were approved?
        Ms. Tubb. Not being an engineer, I don't have a good answer
    on that, so I'll have to pass.
        Mr. Palmer. All right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
        I've just been informed that votes will be scheduled around
    3:15. We're going to see how far we can get and then determine
    what we're going to do at that time.
        I'll now recognize Mr. Clay for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Raskin
    and other members, for extending me the opportunity to join you
    this afternoon on a matter of great urgency to our Nation and
    also to the region that I represent in St. Louis: The safe
    disposal of nuclear waste.
        And some might wonder why I am cosponsoring this bill to
    finally establish a national nuclear waste repository at Yucca
    Mountain, and the answer is simple: The U.S. Government created
    a nuclear waste problem 75 years ago, and we have a
    responsibility to finally clean it up. And that long story
    began in my congressional district.
        In 1942, the water department secretly contracted with
    Mallinckrodt Chemical in St. Louis to enrich yellowcake uranium
    from the Belgian Congo to fuel the Manhattan Project. That
    enriched uranium was used to fuel our Nation's first atomic
    bombs created in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in the Met program,
    which existed from 1942 to 1945 was essential to winning World
    War II. But the nuclear waste that was generated from the
    manufacturing of those original atomic bomb and others that
    would follow forged a curse of radioactive contamination that
    is still inflicting pain and suffering across this country. And
    the waste from our Nation's nuclear power plants has compounded
    this problem.
        In Missouri, several failed attempts to clean up the
    original nuclear waste caused dangerous radioactive
    contamination at sites in downtown St. Louis; at Lambert St.
    Louis International Airport; at Latty Avenue in North St. Louis
    County; at Coldwater Creek, which is a tributary that flows
    into the Mississippi River. And finally, in 1973, approximately
    50,000 tons of that same nuclear waste was illegally dumped at
    West Lake Landfill in Bridgeton, Missouri, and mixed with other
    debris. That nuclear waste includes radioactive uranium,
    radioactive thorium, radioactive barium sulfate, and other
    toxic contaminates.
        Unbelievably, that radioactive toxic mess dumped illegally
    at West Lake 44 years ago is held in an unlined limestone
    landfill near the Missouri River, near a major hospital, near
    Lambert St. Louis Airport, near schools and interstate
    highways. And most troubling of all is the appalling fact that
    1,000 of my constituents live less than 1 mile away from this
    illegal nuclear waste dump. And it would be almost impossible
    to find a dumber, more dangerous, more completely irresponsible
    place to dump nuclear waste than West Lake Landfill. And if you
    think this potential environmental disaster couldn't get any
    worse, you're wrong.
        For the last 5 years, we have also been dealing with a
    creeping underground landfill fire at the adjacent Bridgeton
    sanitary landfill, which is owned by Republic Services and is
    under the supervision of the Missouri Department of Natural
    Resources. And that underground fire is less than 1,000 feet
    away from the buried nuclear waste.
        My friends, the U.S. Government created this radioactive
    mess, and we have a clear and unavoidable responsibility to
    finally clean it up. That is what opening up the Yucca Mountain
    registry--repository is all about.
        So let me say this to all of you. When the U.S. Government
    creates a problem, when we put citizens at risk, when we
    disrupt their lives, when we destroy the peace and property
    values of their neighborhoods, and when we allow the health of
    innocent citizens to be harmed because of our own inaction, we
    must make it right. And I was the first Member to ask that all
    of the waste be removed, and I will continue to do that.
        And I see my time is up. But, Mr. Chairman, I mean, I would
    support this bill because I think that the waste needs to be
    removed and put into a safe place, and it's the government's
    responsibility.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, very much.
        I will now recognize the vice chairman of the subcommittee,
    the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar.
        Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing today.
        Nuclear energy is one of the most reliable and stable
    energy sources in the world, and we should continue to look to
    advance further development in the secure storage of used
    materials. Nuclear power and the subsequent waste that comes
    from spent nuclear fuel is an issue which in my district I am
    very familiar. The Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Maricopa
    County is the largest nuclear generation facility in the United
    States. Palo Verde provides 35 percent of the total energy in
    Arizona, employs over 2,000 full-time workers, and has roughly
    a $1.8 billion economic impact on the State. And while I could
    speak to volumes of the benefits of nuclear power and plants
    across the U.S., the facts remain that temporary storage onsite
    of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radio waste from such
    power plants is a costly and hazardous practice.
        Mr. O'Donnell, first to you. I want you to be very concise.
    Can you give us a breakdown of the incurred cost to the
    consumer since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act?
        Mr. O'Donnell. I am a recovering elected official from
    Maryland, so I will try to be as concise as possible,
    Congressman.
        So the five times the consumers have paid just for waste
    storage: The original construction. And then, after original
    construction, the Nuclear Waste Fund. And then, after the
    Nuclear Waste Fund, because we didn't meet our statutory
    deadlines of reracking of the spent fuels that were already
    paid for, number one. So those first three things. And then,
    also, we have paid into the Judgment Fund. And I am missing
    one. But there are five impacts.
        And the fund itself is $40 billion. And the untold billions
    of liability that the consumers have, just it is mind boggling.
        Mr. Gosar. So, Mr. Smith, can you describe for us what you
    believe is the best solution for the long-term storage of
    existing spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste currently
    stored at nuclear facilities around the country.
        Mr. Smith. So I represent mostly defense waste. But
    finishing the licensing process of Yucca Mountain will give us
    a final determination on whether that facility can hold the
    high-level waste and the commercial material that we have. And
    if it doesn't, then we have got to find other alternatives,
    which is what we are discussing today. And that is, you know,
    the classification of high-level waste and changing that so
    that we can reroute some of this waste to other locations
    around the country.
        Mr. Gosar. So we have looked at other areas, have we not,
    Mr. Smith?
        Mr. Smith. We have. We are working with the Department of
    Energy right now to open up opportunities at WIPP for other
    materials that could be classified as transuranic waste as
    opposed to high-level waste, and that is one of the things that
    we are dealing with at this point.
        Mr. Gosar. We looked at a space in Texas, did we not, that
    was deemed geologically unsafe? Is that true?
        Mr. Smith. I'm not sure about the geological----
        Mr. Gosar. The salt domes?
        Mr. Smith. I'm not sure about the geological status of
    that, but they're continuing to look at waste control
    specialists for storing additional wastes at their community.
        Mr. Gosar. Are you aware--where are these other sites?
        Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Gosar. Okay. So, Ms. Tubb, what would you suggest to
    legislators as the best way forward to ensure the success of a
    long-term nuclear waste depository? What would be the steps,
    and how would you facilitate those? In what order?
        Ms. Tubb. I think the first step is completing Yucca
    Mountain licensing process. Getting an up or down decision on
    that brings a lot of valuable information to the table.
        Assuming the NRC approves Yucca Mountain, I think we need
    to engage the State of Nevada. You could consider a situation
    where DOE essentially contracts with the State of Nevada,
    giving Nevada a lot of control over that situation for existing
    waste. I think we need to look and reimagine how we treat
    future waste. As I talked about, creating market incentives and
    giving the nuclear waste industry--I am sorry--the nuclear
    industry a say in how they manage nuclear waste. So a system
    for existing waste, a system for future waste.
        Mr. Gosar. Would you agree with that, Mr. Victor?
        Mr. Victor. Yes. I think the Yucca process should restart.
    We don't know what the outcome of that is going to be. And so I
    think it's really important that we not continue to put all of
    our eggs in one basket. That's why we're so keen on interim
    storage as well.
        Mr. Gosar. Thank you.
        I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
        We will now recognize Mr. Raskin.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Dr. Lyman, let me start with you. What do you think are the
    specific dynamics and consequences of climate change today that
    should be informing our short-term and long-term approaches to
    dealing with the nuclear waste storage problem?
        Mr. Lyman. Yes. Thank you, Congressman Raskin.
        UCS is very concerned about the threat of climate change in
    a number of different ways. With regard to nuclear power,
    obviously, the estimates that the NRC has made in the past for
    the vulnerability of nuclear reactor sites and waste sites to
    natural phenomenon, including flooding, has to be revisited.
    And that is true both for operating reactors, and for the waste
    stored there and also for any new waste storage facilities.
        Unfortunately, the process for updating information on
    climate and the ability to look forward and to be anticipatory
    instead of reactive are problems that the NRC has had. So there
    needs to be a greater realization of the uncertainty that is
    created by the potential for increased hazards at nuclear
    reactors and at waste facilities. And that needs to be
    incorporated into the planning. When you're talking about
    nuclear waste, which has a potential hazardous lifetime of
    millions of years, obviously, there is only so much you can do.
    But certainly you do need to address those uncertainties and
    ensure that you have enough safety margin to accommodate a
    potentially significant increase in hazard at those sites.
        Mr. Raskin. Great.
        And similar question for Dr. Victor. The country is reeling
    now from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and Jose, and people are
    still recovering from Katrina and Sandy. The San Onofre nuclear
    power station is located on the California coast. Are you
    concerned that natural disasters like tsunamis or earthquakes
    could threaten the safety of nuclear waste that's stored at
    that facility?
        Mr. Victor. So, broadly, yes. The disaster matters. So
    there has been a lot of analysis of the different kinds of
    disasters. As a general rule, the tsunami risk there happens to
    be lower. The earthquake risk is high. And that's why the
    system at San Onofre is engineered to withstand a much higher
    seismic event, earthquake, than typical dry cask facilities.
    And I think, over the long term, sea level rise is a really
    significant--and storm surge--is a really significant concern.
    I think everybody has agreed that they want to move it out of--
    the safest place for the San Onofre site is in dry cask. And
    the safest, best long-term solution is out of San Onofre, end
    of story.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you. But I have had several conversations
    with my colleague, Congresswoman Titus from Nevada, who is very
    interested in this question of consent.
        And, Dr. Lyman, let me come back to you. In considering
    long-term alternative solutions to the Yucca Mountain
    possibility, do you believe that we should seek to get approval
    from the local communities and State government wherever a site
    may be located?
        Mr. Lyman. Yes, I think, generally speaking, the concept of
    consent-based siting is a good one. Unfortunately, it's hard to
    fully understand how to implement that.
        And so there certainly needs to be greater recognition of
    State and local concerns. However, that also has to be, as I
    said, in the context of a national solution. So we can do more.
    I don't know what the answer is at this point. But certainly
    there has to be a different process than the one that led to
    the selection of Yucca Mountain where the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act and its amendments were rigged, essentially, for the rest
    of the country to gang up on Yucca Mountain. So the flaws of
    that process have to be examined and----
        Mr. Raskin. But the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Nuclear
    Future, in 2012, did recommend placing consent-based siting at
    the center of successful planning in going to the future.
        Dr. Victor, back to you. Do you think that we are going to
    be able to successfully resolve this problem if we don't use
    this principle of local consent?
        Mr. Victor. I think the principle of local consent is
    vitally important, you know, with the caveats that Dr. Lyman
    laid out. We need to have a national strategy. We need to set
    this up so that any particular interest can't hold up the
    entire process.
        To me, what's most interesting is we have had in west Texas
    and in eastern New Mexico--especially in eastern New Mexico--a
    tremendous amount of progress on this front. We've had
    representatives from the eastern New Mexico site come visit our
    community engagement panel. There's informed consent about
    opening that site up, and people are ready.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Raskin.
        We will now recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr.
    Gianforte.
        Mr. Gianforte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for the panel today for your testimony. This
    is an important issue, and I appreciate your input.
        Ms. Tubb, I had a question for you. What's been the
    practical effect of the last administration's closing the
    Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management? And how has
    that impeded the efforts to move forward with the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act and the will of Congress?
        Ms. Tubb. Well, we certainly lost a lot of time. As I said,
    we're basically back to where we were in 2008 when the
    Department of Energy first submitted its application. It's
    going to take a lot of effort to bring back the Office of
    Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. I think that's very
    doable, having talked with people who were originally involved
    in the license, that people are passionate about this project
    and want to see it move forward. So it's definitely doable. It
    will just take time and money to bring those resources and
    those people back together.
        Mr. Gianforte. And as that office was closed, can you be
    more explicit about what it actually impeded? What did it shut
    down? What has the impact of that been?
        Ms. Tubb. Well, I mean, a lot of people have moved on and
    been replaced within the Department of Energy. That's a lot of
    institutional knowledge around this specific project that's
    very unique that has since been spread across the country,
    spread within DOE. Some of them have even retired. And I think
    a lot of that can be brought back. But that takes effort.
        Mr. Gianforte. Yeah. Okay. And then do we know what the
    previous administration did with the funds that were allocated
    for this office? Did that get returned to the Treasury, or did
    it go someplace else?
        Ms. Tubb. So a lot of it just did not get spent. Department
    of Energy has now roughly $20 million left from the Nuclear
    Waste Fund that was appropriated from Congress. The Obama
    administration just chose not to use that money both in DOE and
    NRC, and that's what some of those court cases were about.
        With OCRWM, a lot of those institutional functions were
    spread within the Office of Nuclear Energy or just atrophied.
        Mr. Gianforte. Okay. Great. And I have no further
    questions.
        I yield back the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
        I now recognize the former chairman of the full committee,
    the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for including
    me here today.
        As Mr. Victor said, I represented and have represented San
    Onofre for 16-3/4 years. During most of those years, they
    produced between 1100 and 2200 megawatts every day, 24 hours a
    day depending upon whether one or two of the reactors were
    online. And, of course, more than half the time, two reactors
    were online.
        With an ill-fated non-nuclear portion of the plant, that
    being the steam generators, arriving defective, it was
    prematurely shut down. So one thing, Mr. Victor, if you'll
    describe briefly the situation that we deal with because all of
    the spent rods had to be removed, brand new ones, from two
    reactors, unexpectedly and then put into water storage.
        Mr. Victor. Very briefly, essentially, the entire fuel load
    that has ever been in those two reactors, plus unit one
    originally, is still onsite, with a couple of exceptions.
        Mr. Issa. Right. But some are in dry cask.
        Mr. Victor. And some are in dry cask. They are currently
    building a facility to take the rest of the fuel that's in the
    pools and remove it. That process is on track, and as far as I
    can tell will be done by the end of 2019, at which point nearly
    all--not all, but nearly all--those canisters will be ready to
    ship if there is a place to ship them.
        Mr. Issa. So, with the early demise with the plans to build
    an above-ground--and I call it above ground, but it's slightly
    below ground--a holding area a few hundred feet from Interstate
    5, a few hundred feet from San Onofre surfing area, the
    Trestles, and on earthquake fault, we will have 30 years of
    three reactors worth of spent rod sitting in dry cask from more
    or less--and I will use 2020, if you don't mind--for 10,000
    years if we don't find a solution. Is that correct?
        Mr. Victor. That's correct.
        Mr. Issa. And in your estimation, with your expertise and
    your involvement in this--and I'll go to the others also--is
    there any question in your mind that anywhere, anywhere on
    Earth that is dry, not near populated centers, not near
    earthquake faults, even if above ground, would be safer than
    that location in a 10,000-year calculation?
        Mr. Victor. Anywhere, that's a strong standard. I mean, the
    middle of this room is probably not a good idea.
        Mr. Issa. Well, let me take, for example, one that I
    personally witnessed. We did underground testing at Area 51,
    the nuclear test center in Nevada, not Yucca but another place.
    Anyone can Google Earth and see mounds left over from those
    underground tests. That location, is it or is it not safer than
    on an earthquake fault in a populated area on the edge of the
    ocean?
        Mr. Victor. Absolutely. And there's an extraordinary number
    of sites that would be dramatically safer and better for the
    communities than where it is now.
        Mr. Issa. So, as we look at places in which there are
    little or no population for as much as a hundred miles in this
    country, areas that are dry, that have no apparent aquifers,
    including Area 51--and I will also say Yucca, but I use Area 51
    because it already has underground nuclear materials, we have a
    large amount of places that are better--maybe not perfect, but
    better. So my question to each of you is, with the current
    science we have, even Yucca mountain and all proposed,
    currently proposed, interim storage sites, in your opinion,
    aren't every one of them safer than on the edge of the ocean,
    whether in Humboldt Bay, Diablo Canyon, or San Onofre, where we
    have a total of five reactors? Three are offline; two more will
    go offline.
        And I'll start with Ms. Tubb.
        Ms. Tubb. It certainly sounds like that to me. I am not a
    nuclear engineer, but I would say likely.
        Mr. Issa. Doctor?
        Mr. Lyman. Yes. Well, not----
        Mr. Issa. We're not looking for perfect. I'm just asking
    the question of better.
        Mr. Lyman. Yeah. I realize that. It's just--on the record,
    of course, there are aquifers at the Yucca Mountain site. In
    fact, when I went to the----
        Mr. Issa. Is the water as close as it is at San Onofre?
        Mr. Lyman. No. But it's not completely dry. And so it's a
    subtle--you know, there are issues. And, of course, there are
    short-term places where, if you could move all the fuel right
    away, then there would be a lower risk. But you do have to then
    take into account the transportation risk as well. So, you
    know, you really need to look at an integrated program, and
    that's the complication.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. Well, and I'm not trying to cut you off,
    but for everybody there, when I look at a current location
    that's starting in--let's call it January of 2020, we would be
    able to move, by sea, if we chose, without ever going through a
    populated area, all of those dry casks somewhere else. From the
    moment it gets on to a barge, in my estimation, it is safer
    than where it is. Is there anyone that disagrees that there
    aren't a number of places inherently safer, starting in 2020,
    and it would be reckless to leave them in the least safe place
    that one could describe, on an earthquake fault, in a populated
    area, between an interstate and the ocean?
        Mr. Victor?
        Mr. Victor. No. I completely agree. There are a lot of
    places that would be a lot smarter. And, to me, what's striking
    is I can understand why people are concerned about permanent
    repositories and making sure that the science is done properly
    there. And that takes time. But these interim facilities are
    now getting geared up, and I think that's a crucial part of
    this.
        Mr. Issa. Mr. Smith?
        Mr. Smith. So the Santa Ana River site sits on a geological
    fault, and we store thousands of canisters and waste tanks with
    single capability in terms of insulation.
        Mr. Issa. Single wall, the earlier----
        Mr. Smith. Single-wall insulation. And we're now double-
    stacking canisters. And while we do what I consider a very safe
    job, as time moves on, you know, that's going to become much
    more problematic to my community. So I certainly think a
    geological repository--and if you have ever been to Yucca
    Mountain, it certainly seems to be the best fit for that
    material.
        Mr. Issa. Mr. O'Donnell.
        Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you, Congressman Issa. I will say
    this. I've been to Yucca Mountain. I've looked at the national
    laboratory experiments. I've witnessed it with my own eyes, and
    I can tell you that every part of my nuclear-trained background
    and mind tells me that, if you can't do it there, you're going
    to have a hard time finding any place to have a deep geological
    repository in this country. You have to be able to do it there,
    and I think we have proven that by the national laboratories.
        Additionally, we need to make sure that we don't allow
    interim solutions--and I'm certainly open to interim storage,
    not onsite but consolidated. But we have to make sure that that
    doesn't become the new bottleneck simply kicked down the road
    for the next generation to solve, because, sir, I have to tell
    you, I honestly believe that we have a moral imperative to
    solve this problem and solve it now. And that begins with both
    short-term solutions and long-term solutions, permanent
    solutions, and a repository.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, if I can close briefly with a short
    statement. In my district, just a few miles from San Onofre,
    for 40 years, we stored a rather controversial gas and
    detergent mixture that was used during the Vietnam war. And
    that was brought in by regular trucks, and it was shipped in
    and out. As the years went by, what we discovered was it was a
    hundred million dollar massive effort to eliminate what was
    basically gasoline. But, unfortunately, over time,
    environmental determinations can change. I fear that if we do
    not find interim storage that give us, you know, consolidated
    areas, that what the taxpayers will find--and this is probably
    the premier committee of taxpayers--is that that estimate,
    which only goes out 95 billion for 125 years of a 10,000-year
    cycle, will prove the following: The fund will be evaporated.
    Taxpayers will pay hundreds of billions of dollars if we do not
    act and act now in a responsible way. I know for an absolute
    certainty the taxpayers are already on the hook at this point
    for tens of billions of dollars over the next century. But this
    is a 10,000-year problem in need of a low-cost, safe solution.
        And I really want to thank you and the ranking member for
    holding this hearing. It's a great first step.
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
        And as we're in the middle of a vote and running out of
    time, though I do have some questions, I'm just going to simply
    state this is a problem that definitely needs to be solved
    sooner not later. I'd like to find a long-term solution because
    I do think there are potential risks in moving the stuff twice.
    But moving it twice is certainly better than leaving it in. As
    we learned even in the district that I represent, a nuclear
    power plant in the path of a hurricane, though thank the Lord
    it performed admirably with zero safety concerns, that may not
    always be the case. So, again, I wish we had time for
    questions, but I don't want to hold you all for 45 minutes just
    to ask you 5 minutes of questions.
        So I'm going to thank the panel for participating, thank
    Mr. Raskin for filling in for Ms. Plaskett, and ask that we all
    do keep Ms. Plaskett and her constituents and all those
    affected by these disasters in our prayers.
        And, with that, without objection, the committee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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