[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 27, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://oversight.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
27-741 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member
Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont
Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California
Will Hurd, Texas Jimmy Gomez, California
Gary J. Palmer, Alabama
James Comer, Kentucky
Paul Mitchell, Michigan
Greg Gianforte, Montana
Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
William McKenna General Counsel
Mike Howell, Senior Counsel
Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security
Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman
Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts,
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Ranking Member
Justin Amash, Michigan Val Butler Demings, Florida
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Peter Welch, Vermont
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jody B. Hice, Georgia Jimmy Gomez, California
James Comer, Kentucky Vacancy
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 27, 2017.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. Kerry Sleeper, Assistant Director, Office of Partner
Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 8
Mr. George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 13
Ms. Raheel Raza, President, Muslims Facing Tomorrow
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Mr. Adnan Kifayat, Director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next
Foundation
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Written Statement............................................ 35
Mr. Seamus Hughes, Deputy Director, Program on Extremism, George
Washington University
Oral Statement............................................... 39
Written Statement............................................ 41
APPENDIX
Opening Statement of Chairman Ron DeSantis....................... 64
April 2017 GAO report titled, ``Countering Violent Extremism:
Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of
Federal Efforts,'' submitted for the record by Chairman
DeSantis....................................................... 70
July 26, 2017, letter from the Muslim Justice League of Boston,
submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch............... 71
July 27, 2017, letter from the Brennan Center for Justice,
submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch............... 79
DHS response to GAO report, submitted for the record by Mr. Selim 80
July 28, 2017, letter from the Anti-Defamation League, submitted
for the record by Ranking Member Lynch......................... 84
COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
----------
Thursday, July 27, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:42 p.m., in
Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Gosar, Hice,
Comer, Lynch, Welch, Demings, and DeSaulnier.
Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will
come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to
declare a recess at any time.
In the words of DHS Secretary John Kelly, the United States
is experiencing a, quote, ``unprecedented spike in homegrown
terrorism.'' Currently, the FBI has open terrorism
investigations in all 50 States. As of June 2017, the U.S.
Government has charged 128 individuals with offenses related to
the Islamic State over the last three years. Radical Islamic
extremism is the primary driver of this problem and deserves
the government's immediate attention.
In recent years, the Federal Government has sought to
combat this problem under the guise of a program called
Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE. Three cities were used to
conduct pilot programs: Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis.
Minneapolis is a particularly troublesome area, as it is a
major center of Islamic terrorist activity. The region is home
to the largest concentration of Somali refugees and has been
the epicenter for domestic radicalization.
From 2007 to 2015, over 20 Somali-Americans are known to
have left Minnesota to join the al-Shabaab terrorist
organization in Somalia. Over the last three years, Federal
prosecutors have charged 13 individuals from Minnesota for
connections to the Islamic State. Minnesota is second only to
New York, which has four times as many residents, in number of
ISIS terrorists charged. The terrorist problem in Minnesota led
former U.S. Senator Norm Coleman to warn that the State is in
danger of becoming, quote, ``the land of 10,000 terrorists.''
Now, as the chairman of this subcommittee, I visited
Minneapolis last December to meet with Federal and local law
enforcement officials and community groups who were involved in
the Countering Violent Extremism program. The area is obviously
a ground zero for recruitment.
Now, I invited Richard Thornton, the FBI's special agent in
charge of the Minneapolis Division, to testify today about the
problems our country is facing in that part of the country, but
he is not here. Instead, the Bureau has sent Assistant Director
Kerry Sleeper from headquarters with the expectation he can
speak to Thornton's specific experience and interactions in
Minneapolis. I look forward to hearing specifics about FBI's
efforts in Minneapolis so the committee can evaluate the
effectiveness of this CVE approach.
Our law enforcement and intelligence community have their
hands full with preventing radicalization and interdicting
terrorists before they commit acts in the name of their
ideology. The Department of Homeland Security leads the
government's Countering Violent Extremism efforts. CVE refers
to ``proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to
recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.''
Currently, the Department still follows the Obama-era
policies related to CVE. And guidance developed during the
Obama administration specifically limits any intelligence or
law enforcement investigative activity through CVE. By leaving
this information on the table, CVE efforts are potentially
missing opportunities to identify and disrupt terrorist plots.
Obama-era guidance also fails to properly identify the threat
of radical Islamic ideology. The nearly 4,000-word October 2016
CVE strategy does not even mention radical Islamic terrorism at
all. The Obama administration's strategy also relied heavily on
non-governmental organizations with vague and immeasurable
goals.
One week before President Trump's inauguration, former DHS
Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the grant recipients of $10
million appropriated by Congress for CVE efforts. The
selections reflect a preference for working through community-
based organizations, some with questionable programs and
immeasurable goals. For example, the Obama administration
selected for funding an organization who suggested countering
violent extremism through, quote, ``collaborative songwriting,
multimedia, and performance.'' Another suggested hiring college
students to make video games. This was not a serious attempt to
stop the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS.
After President Trump took office, DHS froze the $10
million in grants, reviewed the organizations, and announced
they were removing 11 Obama-era grant recipients but adding six
new ones. A committee review of the organizations indicates a
preference for law enforcement organizations over community-
based organizations.
Now, despite this step, some of the law enforcement
organizations designated for funding have questionable agendas.
For example, the city of Houston's application relied on so-
called community experts with vocally partisan and anti-Israel
agendas. The city of Denver submitted an application that
prioritized an agenda unrelated to CVE, suggesting working
through organizations such as Black Lives Matter.
The Committee requested the applications of all grant
recipients to determine what taxpayer dollars were funding, but
DHS has still not produced these applications. The committee
requested a briefing on the rationale for the selection of the
grant recipients, but DHS refused.
Today, the subcommittee seeks to understand what this
administration's policy is for countering violent extremism.
According to DHS, this policy is currently under review, and
DHS has declined to share any details about this process,
including when this review is supposed to be complete and which
organizations are participating. For Congress' immediate
purposes, we must determine what is driving DHS's agenda: the
assumptions of the Obama era about countering this threat or
the President's pledge to put political correctness aside and
defeat the Islamic State at home and abroad.
We will question witnesses on whether the FBI and DHS are
properly vetting organizations and individuals who participate
in the program. We will also hear from non-governmental
witnesses on the role of the private sector in CVE efforts and
the scope of violent extremism problem facing the United
States.
I thank the witnesses for their attendance and look forward
to their testimony.
Mr. DeSantis. And I now recognize the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to, in advance,
thank the witnesses for their willingness to help this
committee with its work.
I would like to thank you for holding this hearing, Mr.
Chairman, to reexamine our efforts to address violent extremism
and terrorist radicalization. I would also like to again thank
the witnesses here involved, DHS and FBI especially. I know
that there was some back and forth about getting witnesses to
come forward. I am glad that we were able to resolve that.
The recapture of the city of Mosul by Iraqi forces earlier
this month marked a significant development in the U.S.-led
global coalition effort to degrade and destroy ISIS. The loss
of Iraq's second-largest city, coupled with ongoing advances by
coalition-backed Syrian rebels in the self-declared ISIS
capital of Raqqa in eastern Syria are the most recent
indicators of the continuing loss of geographic territory by
the terrorist organization.
According to global data monitoring company IHS Market,
ISIS currently controls an estimated 14,000 square miles, an
area roughly the size of Maryland. That is a 60 percent
decrease from January of 2015. The terrorist group has also
experienced a corresponding loss in annual revenue by about 50
percent.
However, battlefield losses on the ground in Iraq and Syria
do not signify the complete degradation or destruction of ISIS,
as recently underscored by Lieutenant General Mike Nagata at
the National Counterterrorism Center. ISIS' ability to absorb
this damage and continue to direct, enable, or inspire
terrorist attacks worldwide indicate that, and I quote, ``We do
not fully appreciate the scale or strength of this
phenomenon,'' close quote.
In the midst of the coalition-backed defense in Raqqa, the
New York Times reports that top ISIS operatives have already
relocated to the town of Mayadin, Syria, about 100 miles away,
along with the recruitment, financing, propaganda, and external
operations functions necessary to facilitate and motivate
attacks here in the West.
Regrettably, we have already witnessed the devastation
caused by ISIS-inspired ideology and the influence of extremist
social media content here at home with the 2015 terrorist
attack in San Bernardino, California, that resulted in 14
deaths, and the 2016 terrorist attacks in Orlando, Florida,
that killed 49 people. The program on Extremism at the George
Washington University has identified at least 16 successful
attacks perpetrated in the United States alone since ISIS
announced the so-called caliphate in 2014. The majority of the
attackers, including Orlando shooter Omar Mateen, openly
pledged their allegiance to ISIS.
In light of the continuing national security threat posed
by terrorist-related attacks, we must work on a bipartisan
basis to conduct robust oversight of Federal efforts to combat
violent extremism and maximize our ability to mitigate the
threat of radicalization based on fact.
As highlighted by the Independent Government Accounting
Office just this month in its report on ``Countering ISIS and
its effect,'' and I again quote, ``The Federal Government does
not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the
countering violent extremism effort,'' close quote. Moreover,
programs designed to counter violent extremism at the Federal
level have lacked a clear mission and objective, receiving
insecure or inadequate funding and have failed to reflect
meaningful and collaborative Muslim community engagement and
input.
In 2014, the Obama administration announced the
establishment of key pilot programs in Minneapolis, Los
Angeles, and my own city of Boston designed by the Department
of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
National Counterterrorism Center to counter violent extremism
and stop radicalization through community-based outreach and
education. The greater Boston region was selected as a pilot
area as a result of a preexisting collaboration between law
enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and local
communities, including the Muslim community. In fact, President
Obama recognized Boston as one of the 10 cities where local
elected officials, law enforcement, faith organizations, youth
groups, and others have already worked together to achieve
marked improvement in community policing.
In the New England area, local Muslim community leaders and
organizations occupy a strategic role to prevent online
radicalization and other forms of terrorist recruitment and
promote community engagement. The Islamic Center of New
England, which is in my district in the city of Quincy, has
sought to develop a faith-based curriculum for young people
that educates them on the prevalence of misinformation on the
internet and particularly social media, while reinforcing
positive Islamic values.
In addition, Imam Khalid Nasr of the Quincy Mosque has
sought to increase community outreach and interaction through
open houses designed to afford all members of the community the
opportunity to visit the mosque and meet with their Muslim
neighbors, especially during Muslim holidays.
Since the inception of the regional pilot program, the
Federal Countering Violent Extremism program has expanded to
include a grant program authorized by Congress to assist
States, localities, and nonprofit organizations in preventing
terrorist recruitment and radicalization. As announced by
Secretary of Homeland Security General John Kelly in June of
2017, the agency awarded 26 grants totaling $10 million to
organizations dedicated to securing our communities and
preventing terrorism--the list of grants, including an
approximate $485,000 to the Boston Police Foundation, a
nonprofit organization that works with the Boston Police to
implement innovative youth outreach programs. Unfortunately,
the current administration has frozen this $10 million in
funding in its fiscal year 2018 budget, proposing zeroing out
the $50 million for Countering Violent Extremism program
altogether.
Rather than weakening our effort to combat violent
extremism, we have to work together to identify what works and
what additional steps we must take to improve collaboration and
cultivate a solid relationship of mutual respect and deeper
understanding between law enforcement and local communities
based on a shared commitment, and that includes the Muslim
communities--that is based on a shared commitment to preventing
radicalization and recruitment.
To this end, I look forward to today's hearing, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
I will hold the record open for five legislative days for
any members who would like to submit a written statement.
We will now recognize our panel of witnesses.
I am pleased to welcome Mr. Kerry Sleeper, assistant
director, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Mr. George Selim, director of the Office of
Community Partnerships, Department of Homeland Security; Ms.
Raheel Raza, president of Muslims Facing Tomorrow; Mr. Adnan
Kifayat, director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next
Foundation; and Mr. Seamus Hughes, deputy director of the
Program on Extremism from the George Washington University.
Welcome to you all.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
before they testify, so if you can please rise and raise your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Thank you. Please be seated. All
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
testimony to five minutes. Your entire written statement will
be made part of the record.
And with that, Mr. Sleeper, you are up for five minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF KERRY SLEEPER
Mr. Sleeper. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking
Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
threat of homegrown violent extremism. My name is Kerry
Sleeper. I'm assistant director with the FBI in charge of our
Office of Partner Engagement.
The FBI utilizes a comprehensive violence reduction
strategy, which focuses on all pathways to violence but is not
limited to this sole focus of homegrown violent extremism. Our
violence reduction strategy is primarily composed of prevention
and intervention lines of effort.
In the area of prevention, the FBI has a long history of
engagement in outreach and education initiatives and continues
this effort as we identify and adapt to current trends and
threats. In collaboration with our State and local partners,
the FBI has historically been very successful in outreach
programs designed to reach certain communities who are at a
greater risk for radicalization. For example, FBI Minneapolis
served as a pilot program for the Bureau immediately after 9/11
when their executive management regularly hosted focus group
meetings with specific audiences such as Somali elders in order
to address their concerns and needs.
Some of our popular outreach programs that have a positive
impact on our community relationships are the Campus Liaison
Initiative, the Private Sector Liaison, the Correction
Initiative, the FBI Citizens Academy, and the Junior G Man
program. These efforts are managed by our division outreach
coordinators in conjunction with our JTTFs and local partners.
Additionally, the vision outreach coordinators assess the
needs of their individual community groups and develop specific
programming tailed to integrated community and law enforcement
goals to mitigate local risk factors for violence.
The FBI also focuses on education for different catalysts
for radicalization designed to help the public increase an
awareness of that radicalization. These public--these products
are widely disseminated to the law enforcement and community
partners for further engagement with the public and demand
continues to increase for additional products.
The FBI created a website ``Don't be a puppet; pull back
the curtain on violent extremism'' specifically designed for
the public and for use by educators and community leaders and
organizations for school-age children. Visits to this website
average nearly 7,400 visits a month.
Also, in reaching out to communities, the FBI has produced
other media-based products, including preventing violent
extremism in school, recognizing pathways to violent extremism,
campus attacks, targeted violence affecting institutions of
higher education, and workplace violence issues and response.
We have also produced and distributed documentaries A
Revolutionary Act, Redemption, and Active Shooter: Managing the
Mass Casualty Threat.
I left with the members to be distributed a copy of A
Revolutionary Act. This was a video that we created for State
and local law enforcement. It documented the murder of two Las
Vegas Metro PD officers by domestic terrorists two years ago.
The reception by the State and local law enforcement community
has been very, very strong. It's an example of the type of work
we do for the law enforcement agencies to then engage with
their communities and have discussions.
In our intervention area, the FBI is closely coordinating
with our State and local partners to best meet the needs of
their communities. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement
identified as a best practice used by police departments, the
crisis intervention teams, and their partner multidisciplinary
teams composed of community mental health and social welfare
providers.
The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement is currently
initiating closer coordination with police department crisis
intervention teams in order to develop a coordinated strategy
to identify potential individuals appropriate for intervention.
The FBI also conducted a pilot program to assess the
viability of off-ramping. The idea behind off-ramping subjects
is to take them off the path of violence before they commit a
crime. This process must be completed with the utmost attention
to detail, sensitivity to law enforcement and community
partners, and a forward-leaning approach. The FBI's pilot
program indicated the best results would be achieved by close
collaboration with our State and local law enforcement and
government partners. The FBI continues to work with these
partners to form a cohesive and beneficial plan to implement
off-ramping efforts and to better serve our communities.
In conclusion, I am pleased to be here today to talk to you
about the FBI's work with our State and local partners in
combating homegrown violent extremism. Thank you for this
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Kerry Sleeper follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Selim, you are up for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE SELIM
Mr. Selim. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking
Member Lynch, other members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today. My name is George Selim, and I
lead the Office for Community Partnerships at the Department of
Homeland Security, and I also serve as the director of the
Interagency Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, which is
tasked to manage the synchronization and integration of a
whole-of-government effort to empower local partners to prevent
violent extremism here in the United States.
I have built on my nearly 12 years of homeland security-
related work experience in the executive branch, including the
Department of Justice, most recently DHS headquarters, as well
as the National Security Council to further the Department's
and the Interagency's key priorities on fostering
relationships, promoting trust, and finding innovative ways to
expand the toolbox for both law enforcement officials and civil
leaders to prevent and intervene in the process of
radicalization.
Terrorism prevention programs complement traditional
counterterrorism investigative and prosecutorial processes.
Prevention focuses on disrupting the beliefs of violent
extremists and their will to act on those beliefs through
criminal or other violent actions. Community-driven prevention
programs are designed to mitigate recruitment and interdict
individuals radicalizing to violence earlier in the process,
and that way, thus contributing to our collective homeland
security.
Historically, my office, the Office of Community
Partnerships, has pursued a number of activities to advance the
terrorism prevention mission. We educate our communities,
working with departments and agencies to provide community
awareness briefings that demonstrably increase the
understanding of how terrorist groups recruit and radicalize
and thus incite to violence.
We have engaged with community stakeholders around the
United States to open doors to dialogue and build trust. My
office has deployed field staff to more than a dozen cities
nationwide to bolster engagement with and between governmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, not the least of
which are our State and local law enforcement partners, as well
as community and civic groups.
Additionally, we have engaged young people through the
internationally recognized public-private partnership titled
the Peer-to-Peer Challenging Extremism Competition, which was
featured last week in the New York Times, which its aim is to
challenge teams of students from colleges and universities both
across the United States and abroad to develop and implement
social media programs targeting the narratives and online
recruiters of violent extremism.
In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security worked with
Congress to secure a first-of-its-kind funding for the CVE
grant program, which the chairman referred to earlier, that
supports communities seeking to do more to combat the ongoing
threat of terrorism here in the homeland. Six months later, the
Department of Homeland Security released our Notice of Funding
Opportunity for this grant program. The application period
closed last September, and almost 200 applications received
were reviewed by a combination of experts to evaluate the
strengths and merits of each individual application.
After a leadership review panel reviewed the scoring
results in the five focus areas and ensured important
programmatic soundness was met such as the optimized use of
funds to avoid duplication and other similar projects. After a
deliberate process, then-Secretary Johnson made a determination
on funding options presented to him and publicly announced
grants on January 13 of 2017. My office anticipated
approximately 30 days later from the announcement to make the
formal award offers and allow time to finalize many of the
administrative tasks associated with the grants.
After the inauguration of President Trump on January 20,
the new DHS leadership asked to put a pause on the program,
reviewing the entire effort, alongside numerous other efforts
at the Department of Homeland Security. What I can tell you
today is that the review was comprehensive. New DHS leadership
imagined--examined the goals of the program, the processes, and
how the grant program would measure its own efficacy.
As a result of the review, and consistent with the
authorizes granted to the Secretary and as outlined in the
Notice of Funding, the Department considered three additional
factors among the pool of applicants, including the applicant
or proposal's level of engagement with law enforcement and the
community, the proposal's likelihood for it to be highly
effective, and the proposal's level of resource dedication or
long-term sustainability. In the end, the application of these
factors resulted in some changes in the list of intended
awardees.
Moving forward, the 26 projects funded by the Countering
Violent Extremism grant program are designed to establish a
solid foundation for prevention of terrorism in our American
communities. The grants support a full range of terrorism
prevention activities, including awareness campaigns,
engagement, trust-building, intervention efforts, and direct
opposition of terrorism narratives these days. The awards span
communities across the country and focus on all forms of
violent extremism.
In conclusion, our team recognizes that now comes the hard
part. We are working with all 26 project teams to ensure that
the awardees detail their progress towards their goals through
ongoing and rigorous monitoring. In doing so, my office will
identify promising practices and tools to keep extremists from
luring more impressionable people towards terrorism. We will
add to the dataset on existing terrorism prevention programs,
and we will share the result from these grants publicly so that
other communities and the public and you, the committee, can
learn firsthand what works and what does not in the field of
terrorism prevention. We are grateful for bipartisan support
from Congress on this program to date and look forward to
keeping you informed on our progress and ensure that it lives
up to the Congress' standards.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of George Selim follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Ms. Raza, you are up for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF RAHEEL RAZA
Ms. Raza. [Speaking foreign language.] I begin in the name
of God, most beneficial, most merciful.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to deliver this testimony.
My name is Raheel Raza. I'm a practicing Muslim, president
of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, founding member of the Muslim
Reform Movement, and advisory board member of the Clarion
Project. I've engaged in dialogue about these issues in the
U.S., at the U.N., and in the Canadian and U.K. Parliaments for
over two decades. I have four main recommendations:
1. Shift government focus and efforts to tackle the
Islamist ideology.
2. Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an entity that aids
and abets terrorism.
3. Prevent funding of U.S. educational institutions and
mosques by foreign extremist sources.
4. Invite voices of reform-minded Muslims to also be heard
in these esteemed chambers.
Firstly, there is a serious error at the heart of the
countering violent extremism policy. We must confront radicals
before they become violent. Before World War II, Nazism was an
ideology expressed in Mein Kampf. Before two million Chinese
died in the Cultural Revolution, ideas were written down in a
Little Red Book. And in 1928, another ideology appeared with
the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks a
totalitarian system of government and forced implementation of
Sharia law, the trickling effects of which we don't want to see
in the United States.
This ideology fuels ISIS and al-Qaida, subjugates women,
executes homosexuals, kills Christians, and inspires some
American Muslims to commit acts of terror. The Clarion
Project's short film By the Numbers puts numbers to these
assertions based on Pew research. Twenty-seven percent or 237
million Muslims believe nonbelievers should be executed, and 26
percent of young American Muslims believe suicide bombings
against non-Muslims can be justified. Fortunately, most Muslims
don't hold this radical ideology, but hundreds of millions do.
Some claim ideology is not a clear predictor of terrorism.
They are dead-wrong. A 2016 study traced the path of 100
violent jihadists. Fifty-one percent of them began their
journey in nonviolent Islamist movements. By the time an
extremist becomes violent, it's too late. As such, the U.S.
must defeat, humiliate, destroy, and discredit this poisonous
radical ideology of Islamism stemming from the Wahhabi Salafi
ideology, Khomeinism, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which brings
me to recommendation number two, designate the Muslim
Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism.
As I've already explained, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to
establish a worldwide Islamic State and build a new world
civilization based on Sharia law. In fact, Russia, Syria,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have
all listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
The U.S. must follow suit.
Next, number three, remove foreign extremist funding from
American campuses and mosques. Saudi Arabia is thought to have
spent $70-100 billion to disseminate their intolerant version
of Islam worldwide. Saudi Arabia gave $20 million to Georgetown
and $20 million to Harvard. A Saudi billionaire named as a
defendant in a 9/11 lawsuit donated $10 million to establish a
Center of Islamic Law and Civilization at Yale. Iran is also
complicit in funding Shia mosques, Islamic schools, and
organizations. We should not have Iran or Saudi Arabia teaching
their version of Islam to our youth.
Final recommendation number four, a seat at the table;
listen to martyred Muslims. Mohamed Elibiary helped craft the
Countering Violent Extremism, the CVE program, yet he called
for the political integration of mainstream Islamists like the
Muslim Brotherhood. Also, CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic
Relations, is a radical group which claims to speak for
American Muslims. CAIR does not speak for me or most Muslims.
CAIR was designated as a terrorist group by the United Arab
Emirates, and its L.A. director called the work of this
committee a myth.
CAIR's recommendation to the House Committee on Homeland
Security was to refuse a legitimizing platform to organizations
and individuals they deem ``Islamophobic.'' Let me clarify that
anti-Muslim bigotry is real, but that's not a permission slip
to call every dissenting voice an Islamophobe. I've raised two
sons with Muslim values while keeping them from radical views
and will do the same for my four grandchildren. Does educating
youth about the dangers of radicalization make one an
Islamophobe? Of course not. These labels keep us from critical
debate such as the one we are having now and stops the Muslim
communities from becoming pluralistic, tolerant, embracing of
democracy, freedoms, and liberties, and accepting of all paths
and people.
On behalf of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, reform-minded
Muslims, and the Clarion Project, thank you for letting our
voices be heard.
[Prepared statement of Raheel Raza follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Adnan Kifayat for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADNAN KIFAYAT
Mr. Kifayat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to
speak before you on behalf of Gen Next. My name is Adnan
Kifayat. I'm the head of global security for Gen Next Ventures.
Gen Next Foundation leverages a venture philanthropy model
to help private sector individuals use their talents,
knowledge, and resources to solve big challenges, and
countering violent extremism in the homeland is one of our core
areas of focus.
I come here before you as a private citizen, but before I
became a private citizen again, I served in government in a
number of roles at the Treasury Department, the State
Department, and the White House for both Democratic and
Republican administrations. I first became involved in
countering violent extremism work when I was at the National
Security Council under President Bush. Back then, we used to
call it the ``War of Ideas.''It is now commonly referred to as
countering violent extremism, but we must always recognize that
in the 15 years since 9/11, we have learned a great deal about
the enemy, about what the enemy uses, and how the enemy
radicalizes, recruits, and activates would-be terrorists.
When I served in government, I had always hoped and
sometimes daydreamt that there would be outside entities in the
private sector that were keeping pace with the threat that
we're finding real-world solutions to this menace. These
entities could do what government alone was not equipped to do.
They could innovate, they could keep pace with the internet,
they could use new and sophisticated technologies, and they
could take risks that sometimes government is unable to take.
Today, there are small but committed groups of people,
including Gen Next, who are finding ways to rally American
ingenuity and creativity to counter homegrown terrorism. There
are strong and powerful growing voices in the private sector
that are echoing across our country, and I urge you to listen
to those voices and the solutions that they are finding.
Five years ago, Gen Next Foundation, Google Ideas, and the
Institute for Strategic Dialogue launched the first-ever global
network of former extremists called the Against Violent
Extremism network. AVE, which now numbers 470 members, uses the
voices of former extremists both online and offline to dissuade
youth all over the world from being radicalized and recruited
by groups like ISIS and al-Qaida. Almost 1,000 online
interventions have taken place and hundreds of
deradicalizations through person-to-person engagement have
occurred.
Since our initial investment, multinational corporations,
international institutions, and foundations have all helped
scale AVE's footprint because it works. Last year, Gen Next
helped launch the first-even online effort to redirect at-risk
youth searching for in that terrorist groups like ISIS and al-
Qaida put out there towards content that is nonviolent and non-
extremist. By using marketing and advertising techniques, our
partnership with Google Jigsaw, and experts at Moonshot CVE,
known as the Redirect Method, is leveling the playing field
online and challenging the narrative of the terrorists.
There are many other examples of the private sector
organizing, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted those in the written
testimony for additional study. Last year, I co-chaired the
Department of Homeland Security's Advisory Subcommittee report
on countering violent extremism, which had strong bipartisan
support. It detailed a national blueprint for partnering with
city leaders, mayors, local leaders, as well as the private
sector.
In today's complex maze of networks, we can't just pay lip
service to partnering with people outside of Washington. We
have to find concrete ways to do so. Some of these efforts will
require resources like money, talent, and access to technology
or just convening. While Gen Next Foundation serves as a
convener and incubator of new solutions in the private sector,
this space is by no means saturated. As an example, the
government has done with the defense and intelligence
communities through organizations like the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and In-Q-Tel to bridge the
divide between public and private sectors, provide risk
capital, eliminate some unnecessary and slow processes, develop
key performance indicators and measurements that work, and
potentially reduce some of the fierce politicization of this
issue so that we can get to finding solutions.
We know today that to be lured by Islamist or jihadist
ideologist, one can be rich or poor, boy or girl, religiously
observant or not. The threat is varied, and we have to find
varied solutions to this threat.
The examples I've shared with you, AVE and Redirect are
just two examples. We must work together and welcome innovation
and risk-taking in the private sector if we are to truly find
solutions to counter homegrown extremism that leads to
terrorism.
Mr. Chairman and ranking member and members of the
subcommittee, today, we must fight the War of Ideas radically
different than we did 15 years ago. There are solutions out
there today, and there are solutions waiting to be found. Thank
you very much.
[Prepared statement of Adnan Kifayat follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Hughes, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF SEAMUS HUGHES
Mr. Hughes. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members
of the committee, it is a privilege to be invited to speak here
on the threat of homegrown terrorism and efforts to prevent it.
As the chairman noted, homegrown terrorism inspired by
groups like ISIS has been a persistent threat in the U.S. The
FBI has reported some thousand active investigations in all 50
States. Since March 2014, 120 individuals have been charged
with terrorism-related activities in connection to ISIS. A near
majority were accused of attempting to travel or successfully
traveling to the so-called caliphate. Nearly 30 percent were
accused of domestic plotting.
These individuals represent a very diverse group. Their
backgrounds vary. There's not a typical profile of an ISIS
recruit. They're old, they're young, they're rich, they're
poor. It runs the spectrum.
A careful review of the cases points to a mobilization of
individuals and not necessarily a widespread community-level
phenomenon. It is homegrown terroism in the truest form of the
word. They are born and raised here. The vast majority are U.S.
citizens or legal permanent residents.
While considerably smaller than other Western countries,
ISIS mobilization in the United States is unprecedented. The
backbone of the response has been through traditional
counterterrorism approaches. However, they must be augmented
with other non-law enforcement efforts. As such, the U.S. must
develop a more robust, transparent, and effective domestic
prevention program.
The U.S.'s domestic Countering Violent Extremism or CVE
program efforts can best be understood in a series of fits and
starts. In 2011, the U.S. Government released their first
domestic CVE strategy. It was broken up in three parts: first,
enhanced engagement with communities; second, build expertise
with State and local officials; and three, counter extremist
propaganda. The strategy was explicit in acknowledging that no
new resources would be devoted to the issue. Local officials,
particularly U.S. Attorneys' Offices, were directed to use
existing funding. The Federal Government provided guidance
where needed. This new approach was introduced to hesitant
local officials and community partners, which struggled to
understand the intricacies of radicalization and recruitment.
As a result of a lack of an explicit definition of CVE and
direction for CVE, it became a catchall phrase for programming
from broad-based engagement on non-terrorism-related
programming to more direct one-on-one intervention of
radicalized individuals. Lacking dedicated funding and a
focused resource, government officials struggled to complete
the strategy's goals and objectives.
It is with that backdrop that the previous administration
refocused their efforts on three pilot cities. Minneapolis
focused largely on societal-level issues or what they saw as
societal-level issues, Boston on individualized intervention
programs, and Los Angeles primarily on community engagement.
Following the completion of the pilot program, the U.S.
Government created a CVE Task Force. This interagency group,
with a rotating leadership from DHS and DOJ, would be comprised
of detailees from various different agencies, a hub of CVE
activity.
There are a few challenges to quickly note. Radicalization
is not a linear process. Humans by their very nature are
complex. We float in and out of our extreme. There's not a
step-by-step guide for why individuals join terrorist
organizations, while others with similar experiences do not.
Conversely, the radicalization disengagement does not adhere to
a straight-line path. Developing CVE programs must not fall in
a trap of one-size-fits-all.
The administration's proposed budget significantly curtails
CVE funding. While the continuation of DHS grants or more
focused continuation of DHS grants is a step in the right
direction, the ability to scale up these projects without an
influx of new grant funding is doubtful. Moreover, the proposed
budget cuts to reduce the number of employees at DHS and other
agencies that serve the CVE task force may limit our innovation
in the future.
CVE efforts in the previous administration and the current
one has largely focused on one form of extremism. The previous
administration, while not explicit in its public messaging but
clearly in its implementation, focused nearly entirely on
countering ISIS-inspired terrorism. By nearly all outward
accounts, the current administration also indicates this
singular focus. Of course, there should be a prioritization of
resources, but CVE programs would do well to concentrate not
only on the threat posed by individuals like Omar Mateen but
also those by the Dylann Roofs of the world.
Domestic CVE is in a tenuous state. Decisions by government
and community partners in the coming months will determine
whether CVE is truly a viable option. CVE is a delicate tool,
if properly implemented, can help sway young men and women away
from radicalization and violence. And families that I met with
in Minneapolis, in Boston, individuals who have dealt with
loved ones who've joined terrorist organizations and are
grappling with these questions, we haven't provided them any
form of support from the Federal Government or local effort. We
need to step up and provide this. And by the way, it's also an
important goal to help adjust resources for the Federal
Government so the FBI can focus on more immediate threats,
while communities and non-governmental partners can focus on
other things.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
[Prepared statement of Seamus Hughes follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Well, thanks for the witnesses. The chair now
recognizes himself for five minutes.
Mr. Selim, we have looked at some of these pilot programs,
specifically Minnesota. How do you at the Department evaluate
the effectiveness of the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis?
Mr. Selim. Chairman DeSantis, thanks for the question, and
again, thanks for having us here today.
I think there have been a number of ways that we can assess
the pilot program in Minneapolis. Overall, I would assess that
it has been successful in a number of different categories.
It's validated the assumptions that at the local level
solutions to CVE programs need to be constructed.
Second, it's validated that working by, with, and through
State and local law enforcement, municipal officials, and
councilmembers and individuals that hold some type of position,
having them act as some type of facilitator or convener is a
positive step forward and brings communities closer together.
And three, a number of both governmental and
nongovernmental organizations have validated that they want to
participate in these efforts, that they would like to
participate in programming related to preventing and
intervening in the process of radicalization but lack the
resources to do so. And in the volume of applications that we
received for the grant program, we've seen an overwhelming
response from the Twin Cities area, and fortunately, we've been
able to act on a number of those very strong applications and
make some awards in that place.
Mr. DeSantis. I would note for the record, and I ask
unanimous consent to submit a GAO report. GAO disagrees with
that. They say there is no cohesive process for measuring
outcomes. So, I ask unanimous consent that this be added to the
record.
Mr. DeSantis. So, let me ask you this. There was a major
trial in Minnesota, I think 13 guys for material support to
ISIS, and the U.S. Attorney's Office did a good job, FBI, but
is that a success of CVE or is that a failure of CVE when
something like that happens?
Mr. Selim. I think that's serve--that's not CVE. A
counterterrorism investigation and arrest and a prosecution --
--
Mr. DeSantis. So, then, basically, that would mean that the
CVE community-based programs were obviously not successful at
steering those individuals away from a violent ideology,
correct?
Mr. Selim. I would say that the CVE-related programs and
the small amount that are being implemented across the country
are just one facet of the broader counterterrorism approach.
So, to the extent that a CVE program in one city can help bring
in a tip, can help contribute to an intervention for an
individual, that's a positive contribution, but it's not a
catchall. It's just one piece in our broader homeland security
strategy.
Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask Mr. Sleeper in terms of the
Minnesota--we were able to meet with the folks at the FBI down
there on the ground. I will ask you. The effectiveness of the
community-based programs, has that been a gamechanger? It
seemed to me when we were there, there were still significant
threats that they were monitoring.
Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I spoke with SAC
Thornton last evening prior to coming here. The challenge
remains. The SAC would indicate that communication has improved
between government authorities and the community, but it's
still not what it should be in order to ensure an effective
exchange of information to prevent individuals from either
harming other people or harming themselves by traveling
overseas. This is going to be a long-term commitment to
ensuring that the community develops enough confidence to be
able to keep the information flow going.
Mr. DeSantis. One of the things that was a little
surprising is the community there, the Somalis, is primarily a
refugee community, but yet they are--particularly some of the
problem people would travel back and forth. And so if they are
coming as refugees, then why are they just going back and
forth? It was a little odd to me that that would be something
that would be okay. You would think if you are fleeing an area,
you wouldn't want to just keep going back, but that seemed to
be--I mean, I know a lot of these guys who were convicted, they
were going back. They had government money they were using. I
mean, it was really, really dispiriting to see.
Mr. Sleeper. There are some examples, sir, of individuals
that have traveled back, yes, sir, and returned.
Mr. DeSantis. All right. The use of funds, let me ask Mr.
Selim. I mean, we looked at some of these grants. For example,
there was $160,000 to a group called Music in Common whose task
was ``empowering diverse cultures and faiths to discover common
ground through collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and
performance.'' So, in terms of effectiveness, collaborative
songwriting, is that an effective approach to warding off
terrorism?
Mr. Selim. Mr. Chairman, what I could say about that
application in particular is that was not one of the ones that
was awarded in June of 2017. I think you're referring to one of
the earlier ----
Mr. DeSantis. Right.
Mr. Selim.--awards from January of 2017. What I can say
conclusively--and I think I would echo some of the comments
that Mr. Hughes made earlier--is radicalization is not a linear
process. There are multiple ways that individuals in the United
States and across the globe have been radicalized, and thus,
the solution sets to preventing and intervening in the process
of radicalization are equally diverse and multidisciplinary.
Mr. DeSantis. I think that that is true, but I just--is
this a good use of tax funds for this particular group? Was
there any measurable success as a result of awarding this
grant? Are there other groups which I would say are more fuzzy
in terms of their approach--has there been documented success
from there? Because we looked for it. It was hard for us to
find it, and it is a concern.
Mr. Selim. I understand your concern, Mr. Chairman. Here's
the best way I can try to answer that.
Mr. DeSantis. But, I guess--I mean, the fact that this
group got dropped is probably an indication that it had not
been having a lot of success, correct?
Mr. Selim. Part of the reason that group and a number of
others were dropped is because of the additional factors that
Secretary Kelly and DHS leadership infused into the grant
program and to--sorry.
Mr. DeSantis. No, finish your thought.
Mr. Selim. And to address your point on measurement and
evaluation, looking at each and--each individual grant--grantee
and program that we will be funding, overall, I guess I would
summarize we're looking at readiness overall, and we're looking
at readiness of preventing radicalization here in a couple
different facets. The first is in this grant program are we
raising awareness on the threat of radicalization and
recruitment? Are we creating willingness within communities to
engage with State, local, and municipal law enforcement? And
third, are we demonstrating an increased level of capabilities
for State, local, and nongovernmental actors to do something if
radicalization and recruitment is detected?
Overall, what this grant program is trying to do is up our
readiness game and factors that we need to work on moving
forward.
Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask Ms. Raza. When you see something
like the collaborative songwriting, you have been very clear
about going after the ideology. I mean, is that the approach
you think would be successful or are you arguing for more of a
direct acknowledgement of what the threat is?
Ms. Raza. Thank you for having me here, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for that question. Yes, I would say that the time has
come to definitely have a more direct approach. With due
respect to the songwriting project, I mean, ``fluff stuff'' and
interfaith dialogue really hasn't led to much deradicalization
and hasn't led to countering violent extremism. There need to
be specific policies put into place that tackle the ideology,
as I have mentioned in both my oral and written testimony.
Mr. DeSantis. So in terms of the ideology, I notice the
government manuals recently, they will not mention radical
Islam or they don't use anything associated with the word
Islam, but then when I look at people in the Middle East who
are fighting this like General President el-Sisi of Egypt, I
mean, he gave a speech in front of all those Islamic clerics,
and he said, look, he is like, you know, I am a devout Muslim
but we can't use the faith to be at war with other people. So,
he seemed to view it as really a debate within Islam, and he
wanted the nonviolent--which I think is the majority for sure--
to really carry the day, whereas I think the government view
has been to just say this has nothing to do with Islam; all
violent extremism is the same. It just seems like Sisi is
confronting the ideological a little more directly. It seems
like some of the government manuals, you know, they kind of
dance around the core ideological point. Is that a fair
description of the difference?
Ms. Raza. Yes, it is, and thank you for bringing that up
because this point has come up more than once that the word
Islam is--radical ideology should not be used. As a practicing
Muslim, let me point out that to separate Islamist ideology
from the spiritual message of Islam is a very pro-Islamic thing
to do. It's not about political correctness. There are people
here in the West who are afraid to use the word Islamist
ideology because they think that it is anti-Muslim. It is
actually very pro-Muslim because it makes the ordinary masses
of people understand the difference between the faith of Islam
and an ideology, which is political in nature and which is evil
in its agenda. And in order to fight that ideology, we have to
name it. We have a mandate in our organization where we say you
have to use the three E's, expose the problem, educate the
masses, and then erase the problem.
Mr. DeSantis. So, you mentioned designating the Brotherhood
as a terrorist-supporting organization. If the U.S. Government
did that and that preventing money from flowing to some of the
domestic groups, do you think that that would help neuter some
of the economic fuel for the extremist ideology?
Ms. Raza. Yes, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as an
organization that aids and abets terrorism definitely would be
a step in the right direction, especially when other Muslim
countries have already done this. And the--they fuel and feed
the radical ideology that eventually leads to terrorism.
Mr. DeSantis. For Adnan Kifayat, the good thing about the
private sector what you are trying to do is you are not really
burdened by some of the bureaucratic scriptures and you guys
can kind of see things and react. So, you mention some of these
online interventions that have been successful, so can you
describe, what does that entail and how some of those have
worked?
Mr. Kifayat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, so some of our
online work right now is focused on really understanding the
narratives and the content that groups like ISIS, al-Qaida,
others put out there and the kinds of messages that they use to
basically get people to go down those pathways. And what we're
learning is geography, so where those searches are taking
place, where that content is being consumed, potentially
deploying some off-ramping, as has been talked about, some off-
ramping programs, hotlines in those geographies.
Two, we've learned about--more about the complexity of the
messaging, so it's everything from religious argument, as has
been noted a number of times, to things like seeking adventure,
things like protecting one's culture, protecting one's
community. And understanding what those message points are is
very helpful to us as we create content and repurpose content
to push back against those messages.
We've also learned, Mr. Chairman, that terrorists are not--
they don't start off by viewing beheading videos or the
bloodiest or the most gruesome of the content. They actually
start off by consuming what might appear to be mild content but
has tinges of hate, tinges of hate, intolerance, and so forth.
And so nipping it in the bud has been one lesson that we've
learned.
Mr. DeSantis. Great. I am over my time.
I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just for a threshold matter, I have a couple of documents
that I would like to submit with unanimous consent. I have a
letter here from the Muslim Justice League of Boston, and I
have a letter as well from the Brennan Center for Justice
addressed to you and I.
Mr. DeSantis. And you would ask unanimous consent that they
----
Mr. Lynch. I do.
Mr. DeSantis.--be entered into the record. Without
objection.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. One of the difficulties here that I know my
colleagues are struggling with is really identifying the
metrics for success. So, we have got these--we are expending
these resources, and we are trying to--it is difficult, I have
to admit, to measure or count an attack that doesn't occur,
right? If we are putting people out there and trying to reduce
radicalization, you know, the strongest evidence is a lack of
attacks, and that is, you know, that's a proven negative.
But, Director Sleeper and Mr. Hughes, you have been out
there, sort of law enforcement capacity, and we have talked
about or heard a lot about trust today from a number of
witnesses. There seems to be almost an organic friction between
law enforcement coming in and investigating and a faith a
mosque--any faith or a church for that matter in which
constituents are coming there to practice their religion
confidentially, and there is that trust between the imam and
the Oma, just as there are, you know, in my faith there is a
relationship, a confidential relationship between the priest
and Catholics.
So, I am struggling with how do we balance in a way--
balance our need to intervene here and at the same time do it
in a respectful way that doesn't isolate some of these mosques?
Because I have heard in various parts of my community, in the
Muslim community that those who accept money, CVE money, are
tainted. There is almost a collaborator label among some that
say, oh, that mosque is accepting CVE money. They are
cooperating with the FBI or with the Boston Police, and so for
some, they get a black mark and are seen as less worthy. And
others that refuse to take the CVE seek to take on this role of
legitimacy in the Muslim community. How do we deal with that,
Mr. Hughes?
Mr. Hughes. I spent a lot of time, about 3-1/2 years,
working for the National Counterterrorism Center on this exact
issue and a lot of time actually in your district.
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Hughes. And so my biggest takeaway from kind of
traveling around the country and meeting with Muslim American
community leaders throughout the country was you just got to be
honest and talk about it in human stories. So instead of 128
people have been arrested for terrorism charges, it's my name
is Seamus Hughes, I'm a father, and I'm worried about these
kids. And I tell the story of a young man from Minneapolis who
disappears on election day and doesn't--and his mother's
worried about him, goes to Somalia, realizes it's his bill of
goods and is killed there for his doubts. And at some point in
his radicalization he was reachable. My name is Seamus Hughes
and I want to save that young kid because I never want to sit
in a room like I used to in a basement of an apartment building
talking to mothers of--grieving sons.
And so if you frame the issue in terms of human aspect, I
think you'd get a lot farther than you would. And I think you
also need to have a bright line between counterterrorism
operations and CVE efforts.
So, my engagement with community partners I didn't share my
notes with the local FBI office because I needed to let--build
levels of trust, and that doesn't happen overnight. So, going
to Boston every couple weeks, talking to folks, knowing who
their kids are, where they play soccer, things like that, those
things matter in order to actually build this level of trust.
It's not just a one-and-done thing.
Mr. Lynch. That is great.
Director Sleeper?
Mr. Sleeper. Thank you for the question, sir. I have been a
police officer for four decades, the first three decades in
State and local law enforcement. Outreach to communities is the
cornerstone of law enforcement. It's the essence of how local
government communicates with its citizens in order to prevent
violence in the communities, all violence. It's an effort to
prevent violence from happening, to encourage dialogue between
families, community groups, religious organizations, and to
open up dialogue so that if someone see something, if they're
concerned about a friend or a family member that may be going
in the wrong direction, that that's communicated and that
violence is prevented. That's really what this program is about
is preventing violence. The FBI looks at it from a very broad
perspective of looking at all potential avenues of extremism
and violence that may be dealt with in a community.
We're very cognizant that all cities and communities are
different, and it's the citizens of the community that are best
to identify the level of engagement, the type of engagement,
and allow them to dictate back to the law enforcement community
what they need and what they would like in order to exchange
and open up that dialogue, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. So, it just so happens that Mr.
Russell and I have spent a fair amount of time in refugee camps
on the Syrian border, Syria and Turkey, Syria and Lebanon,
Syria and Amman, Jordan, and on one of my visits we actually
had an opportunity to bring in six of these so-called moderate
rebel groups, the leaders of these groups. They came up out of
Aleppo and met with us. And one of my conversations I asked
each one of them as they came in separately, I said, how do you
communicate? And they are all on WhatsApp, okay? So, not
surprisingly, a lot of the radical content that we are seeing
on our end here in the United States is also coming through
WhatsApp. And I don't want to single them out. There are a few
others.
But one of the folks that I deal with on this issue, who is
Dr. Nabeel Khudairi, he is the former chairperson of the
Islamic Council of New England, he had a great quote. He said,
``If we are going to do battle against extremists, we have to
bring something in the same genre of the social media to
balance a young person's opinion of what to do.'' So, what are
we doing in terms of--and now, I am talking about the social
media aspect of it that is oftentimes the point of contact
between efforts of others to radicalize our sons and daughters
here at home? What is the counterpoint that we are using to
sort of push back on that? And has anything that you have been
doing so far been successful, Mr. Sleeper or Mr. Hughes, I
guess? Or Mr. Selim actually, yes.
Mr. Sleeper. There's a number of areas, sir, that are being
pursued. Some of those fall into the true counterterrorism
effort in the sense of identifying and eliminating individuals
that are responsible for creating and sending those messages.
There's significant work that's being done with the private
sector, and there's been significant success with the private
sector recognizing that their applications are being leveraged
by people, so there are successes there. And I know George is
working a number of initiatives at a different level.
Mr. Selim. Seamus, do you want to ----
Mr. Hughes. Yes, if you don't mind. I interviewed an
American ISIS supporter who spent about four months in ISIS
last month, and he was using WhatsApp to communicate with other
friends when he crossed the border. So, absolutely, the online
environment does matter for these folks, and in many ways, it's
a logistical support and a level of connectivity they wouldn't
normally have.
Mr. Lynch. Just to be clear, it is the level of encryption
there that ----
Mr. Hughes. It's ----
Mr. Lynch.--allows that, right?
Mr. Hughes. It's the debate that the FBI would talk about,
the ----
Mr. Lynch. And it is owned by Facebook, right?
Mr. Hughes. I believe so, yes.
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Mr. Hughes. So, in terms of what we're doing domestically,
not a whole lot. So, we have a few programs. We have peer-to-
peer program which the U.S. Government and Facebook have
stepped up in form and encouraged the university students to
create counter-messaging. But I think there's a few low-hanging
policy questions I think we can solve pretty quickly. One is
community partners like the one you mentioned, giving them some
level of a legal understanding of what's right and left
latitudes online, so they're not crossing against material
support to terrorism clauses if they're engaging with a would-
be jihadist, right, so letting them know what the latitudes
are.
The second one is informing them of how ISIS and other
groups use the online environment. So, it's not Twitter
anymore. It's largely concentrated on Telegram. And what do
those channels look like and how do you get involved and what
are the messages that are there? We're not doing enough of that
type of work.
And the last part, and I think Adnan would have a point to
raise on this is, you know, the Federal Government's not really
going to step up in this spot. It's uncomfortable there. It
raises a whole host of kind of legal issues and the ability for
the Federal Government to move and shift in the online space is
very little, right? So, this is where foundations like Gen Next
can step up. Other foundations, family foundations and things
like that can say, okay, community partner in Boston who has a
great idea, you need X amount of money. It's a small amount of
funding. Let's try this out, and if it works, let's take it to
L.A. or let's take it to Seattle and get the Federal Government
out of this process and help kind of do that connective tissue.
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Selim, Mr. Kifayat?
Mr. Selim. Yes, thank you, Ranking Member Lynch, and please
feel free to jump in on this. I guess I would only amplify and
add one or two points from what my colleagues mentioned. In the
past number of years that I've been working on this issue, I've
seen a fair bit of progress from industry, from the technology
companies, from the social media companies, from the internet
service providers in this space. Next week, in northern
California for the first time ever, a number of these companies
are convening a forum to talk about this issue with Federal,
State, and local officials. Facebook, Google, Twitter, and a
whole host of others are convening officials. I think the
public-private aspect of this that Mr. Hughes alluded to
earlier is critical to two parts of the question that you
asked. One is the content and the encryption--how do you remove
it or take it down--but then there's another important part of
that issue, which is how do you amplify other non-extremist
content? How do you amplify the voices of individuals that are
in refugee camps, American Muslims or other civic leaders in
the United States to help drown out those voices that are
online that are trying to recruit and radicalize? And I think a
stronger partnership with industry on these issues can help
address both those issues, and I think we need to do it sooner
rather than later.
Mr. Lynch. Right. Mr. Kifayat and Ms. Raza, if you have
anything to add.
Mr. Kifayat. Just to amplify one point, sir, the--there are
huge conversations taking--huge tectonic plates of young--
Americans having conversations about culture and identity and
what civilization means and talked about what religion means,
and the problem we've seen online, social media, is that there
is an ample amount of really bad information out there that
tells you how to act and what adventure means and what a call
to action means and what living in a community of nonbelievers
means. And what we have been doing in our partnerships with the
technology sector is to, as--to pick along what George said, is
to drown those out, right, to relegate those to make them
impotent online. And so we're putting out narratives that
counter those concepts, counter those ideas at the nip so when
they begin. And that, I think is where the future is if we are
to save the internet and save the online space, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Ms. Raza?
Ms. Raza. Thank you so much for having us here.
The question of social media is extremely important, and
our organization has been approached to create an alternate
narrative. And with regards to the conversation that you had
brought up before as well, NGOs, nongovernment organizations,
need to be part of this movement and to create an alternate
narrative on the internet, on social media so that it can drown
out, as Mr. Kifayat said, the extremist voices.
And one of the measures that we have looked upon, which has
been very successful in terms of community relationships, and
you had mentioned your concern, along with Mr. Russell, is to
empower the Muslim communities themselves to take
responsibility to bring about some of the change so it doesn't
seem that it's just law enforcement or CVE or someone else who
is telling them to.
And the best example of that I can give you is what
happened last week at a mosque in Davis, California, where the
imam Ammar Shahin who is at the Islamic Center of Davis called
for Muslims to fight the Jews and annihilate them. This was
following the troubles at Temple Mount. And it was the Muslim
communities that actually took upon this challenge and started
an online petition to actually have him fired and hire another
imam. And this is something new and different, which is what we
need to focus on is while we want to counter violent extremism
through government, we also want to do it from within the
communities themselves.
Mr. Lynch. That is great. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
extreme courtesy. I appreciate that. I yield back.
Mr. Russell. [Presiding] And I thank the gentleman, the
ranking member.
We have certainly seen firsthand a lot of these issues as
we have tried to address them. I am going to yield myself some
time for questions here.
I think that there is really a responsibility in messaging
that goes just beyond the Islamic communities. I think it goes
even nationwide with our media. For example, when you see a
story reported about ISIS, the B-roll in the background is, you
know, these people sneaking around with tennis shoes and AK's
riding on tanks, you know, looking like they are some heroic
figure rather than the barbarians that have committed
atrocities that have not been seen since the Dark Ages. I think
we bear some responsibility when our own media will not engage
in the betrayal. If all you show is this positive, glorious
image, then that can be extended through social media, and then
we see a lot of those issues there.
It is just a false characterization also of our military
targeting where somehow the military, which our military is the
most accurate and the most human-rights-conscious. When we have
to unsheathe the sword, we try to make sure that it is accurate
to the point of enormous expenditures to have our weaponry to
be accurate so that we don't cause undue suffering. And yet the
opponents, you know, don't abide by any of these rules, and
then our media will somehow attack our country, our soldiers,
our warriors instead of those that are sawing people's heads
off, setting them on fire in cages causing untold human
suffering, displacing hundreds of thousands and millions of
people, leveling cities. Other than that, they are all pretty
nice guys.
What is interesting is that we have large Muslim
communities in this country, and a lot of them have lived quite
peacefully for decades. And, you know, I think of, you know,
little Baghdad in San Diego. You know, not only do they
contribute to the economy, not only have we seen very little
radicalization from these areas--you know, I think of my own
hometown in Oklahoma City. We have got folks that have come
from both an Arab, Sunni Arab, Persian Shia background due to
different things that have happened in the '50s, '60s, '70s,
'80s, '90s, you know, 2000s, live quite peacefully in the
community with very little radicalization.
And then we get to other areas where we have just an
outrageous proportionate level of radicalization. For example,
Minnesota has produced 26 percent of young foreign fighters
recruited in the United States, and more terrorist suspects
charged in connection with ISIS than any other State besides
New York, and when you compare the population of Minnesota and
New York, well, my goodness, you know, you--and so I guess my
question to you, Mr. Sleeper, would be why is Minnesota such a
significant center of terrorist activity and recruitment?
Mr. Sleeper. It's difficult for us to articulate the reason
why that's happening, sir. Obviously, there's a large Somali
population, 100,000-plus, in that ----
Mr. Russell. There is a large Somali population in D.C. --
--
Mr. Sleeper. Geographic ----
Mr. Russell.--but we don't see a recruitment from that. I
mean, there has got to be a reason. I mean, one thing I learned
as a warrior, you know, fighting--I have lived in these
cultures. I have gone to weddings, wakes, you know, done the
land grab and the bulls, everything and have made great
friends. But when you have enemies that percolate in an area,
there is a reason. And so, you know, let's see if we can get
some ideas to this. Mr. Hughes, you are raising your hand. I
will come back to you, Mr. Sleeper.
Mr. Hughes. Sure. Looking at the Minneapolis cases, I think
we talked a lot about the online environment, this idea of
online radicalization, online recruitment. Minneapolis is much
more of a peer-to-peer recruitment. So, the reason why you had
a number of guys try to join ISIS later is because their
brother joined al-Shabaab a few years before that or their
roommate before that. And there was--and there's a connectivity
there that I don't think we fully understood. So, Abdi Nur goes
over to Syria and then FaceTimes with his buddies back in
Minneapolis and says it's time to join the so-called caliphate.
So, that human interaction actually matters quite a bit. It's
the reason why Minneapolis had a higher number with a very--
with a large Somali population and Lewiston, Maine, or San
Diego doesn't. That peer-to-peer network does matter.
Mr. Russell. And, Mr. Sleeper, what would be the profile of
these terrorist suspects or recruits that are coming out of
Minnesota, you know, to speak to what Mr. Hughes is--what would
that profile look like?
Mr. Sleeper. There really is no profile. We spent a
tremendous amount of time, research, and analysis looking into
individuals that are becoming radicalized so that we can get
ahead of the curve, behaviors, indicators ----
Mr. Russell. But, see, we got to do better than that. And
look, you know, when I was thrust in combat environments, you
know, one of the first things I said is three questions: What
does the enemy look like? How can he hurt us? And how can we
hurt him? Now, we have the most incredible, phenomenal
intelligence services in the United States. We have millions of
Muslim Americans that are willing to help and serve their
country. How do I know? Because I served with quite a few of
them. So just to say, well, we can't identify what they look
like, we can't make a profile, you really think that is true? I
mean, you represent the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I
mean, boy, if that is true--because if we can't identify the
problem, we can never solve it.
Mr. Sleeper. It is difficult to identify any commonality --
--
Mr. Russell. Life's tough, but it is tough if we don't
identify the problem. I mean, so, help me out here. What ----
Mr. Sleeper. So, if you look at the number of
investigations we have open right now, several hundred
investigations in this country right now, I'd say the FBI is
very effective at identifying individuals that articulate a
desire and we determine there's predicated information that
they're prepared to act on it.
Mr. Russell. And to your point ----
Mr. Sleeper. Prior to that, it's a very difficult process
to do in consideration with First Amendment rights, freedom of
speech.
Mr. Russell. Sure. And to your point on the good job that
the FBI does, I don't want you to think I'm picking on you; I
have great respect for the Bureau. And ISIS self-turned air
traffic controller just caught two weeks ago, charged, indicted
in Honolulu, I mean, imagine the destruction and damage he
could have done if our Bureau had not been Johnny-on-the-spot.
And so, you know, we do appreciate the work that our military
and the Bureau does every day.
But I refuse to accept that we can't identify a profile.
Anyone else want to take on what that might--Mr. Selim?
Mr. Selim. Sir, if I may just add one note to this. Part of
the group of folks who work for me is there are a group of
folks dedicated to working with the latest and greatest, both
analytical and social science community on this. Going back to
your earlier question on why--in Minneapolis, why is the spike
so high, what a number of studies and what a lot of research
has shown is that individuals who come to this country that
have a higher exposure to violence from wherever they came from
may possess a higher propensity to radicalization and
recruitment.
Mr. Russell. But, gosh, do you think that is true when you
look at like what happened with Beirut? We have had a lot of
people come from Lebanon, and we have not seen this problem. We
have had civil wars and destruction of all kinds of things
before where we see a migration of population and we don't see
radicalization. So, do you get my point?
Mr. Selim. I do. I think it's just--it's one of the factors
that we've seen particularly differentiating in the Twin Cities
with some of the Somali community attacks that we've seen in
Ohio and other places. It's one of the factors, in addition to
a whole host of others.
Mr. Russell. Okay. Thank you. And I am consuming some time
here, and I have some very patient colleagues I have great
respect for. And I will come back on some other things, but I
want now to recognize Ms. Demings from Florida.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and believe
me, this topic, this conversation deserves all of the time
necessary because it is a very important issue. I want to thank
our witnesses for being here, thank our ranking member as well,
Mr. Lynch.
The FBI has confirmed that there are active ISIS-related
investigations in all 50 States. To date, 26 States and the
District of Columbia have had at least one charge with offenses
related to the Islamic State within their borders.
So, Mr. Selim, I would like to start with you. What is the
Trump administration's justification for proposing that the CVE
grant funds be eliminated? And what would the impact be if
those funds are eliminated?
Mr. Selim. Ma'am, thank you for that question. I can answer
it a few different ways. The first is that the program that we
recently announced, these awards that we announced in June,
this is a--that award was not a one-year award. That award was
a two-year award. So, that $10 million in awards that we've
administered will last for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year
2019, and we're about to start that period of performance and
that cycle now.
So, I'm aware that the presidential budget request did not
reflect the CVE grant program in fiscal year 2018. However,
there's--it's not that there's zero dollars being spent in '18;
it's that this is a two-year period of performance in which I'm
very confident, as the director of the office and the program
manager here, that we'll be able to demonstrate a high degree
of excellence on these 26 awardees. And hopefully, by fiscal
year 2019, we'll be able to have the best practices and lessons
learned to be able to make the case to the Congress for more
funds in this area.
Mrs. Demings. Do you agree--and I would also like to hear
from Director Sleeper as well on this. Do you agree with the
GAO that the Federal Government does not have a cohesive
strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort? And
we will start with you, Mr. Selim?
Mr. Selim. So, I am aware of the GAO response on that
issue, and there is a DHS response to the GAO report, which, if
the committee allows, I'd be happy to submit that for the
record as well.
Mr. Selim. I do not agree with that view that there is no
measurement and evaluation of any of the programs.
Specifically on the CVE grant program, we have robust
measurement put in place for all 26 of the grantees, both
qualitative and quantitative. To give you an example of some of
the qualitative measure that we're looking at, in the CVE grant
program, there are five focus areas overall. So one of the
questions that the committee and you may be wondering is how do
you measure the ability to do training on countering violent
extremism or radicalization and recruitment? And we're really
looking at a number of different factors. When we're looking at
training the space, we're looking at both the number and type
of people being trained. Are they State and local law
enforcement professionals, are they civic leaders, are they
spiritual leaders, and so on?
And we're also conducting pre- and post-survey assessments
on the level of knowledge acquisition. Historically, in any law
enforcement or military training, the nature and scope of the
training, the level of knowledge acquisition that's attained,
so we're taking into consideration a very broad swath of data
that we'll be collecting, and we'll use that to implement and
hone our own training in the Federal Government moving forward.
Mrs. Demings. Director Sleeper?
Mr. Sleeper. This is an incredibly complicated issue. We're
not the only country dealing with it. Virtually every Western
country is currently wrestling with this. We can always be
better, coordinate more effectively. We need to if we expect to
meet the challenges facing us.
Mrs. Demings. And I have to agree with our chairman's
statement earlier that we do have to do better. This is an
ever-critical issue. Do you agree that the evaluation process
that is in place is adequate?
Mr. Sleeper. I have not actually reviewed the report,
ma'am.
Mrs. Demings. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Russell. Very efficient on your time. I thank the
gentlelady.
And I would like to recognize the gentleman from Vermont,
Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to acknowledge the presence of Kerry Sleeper,
who served, Mr. Chairman, as our commissioner of public safety
in Vermont, and we are pretty proud of him.
And I want to ask you, Director, in your new job one of the
things you did so well in Vermont was walk this tightrope that
I think folks in law enforcement have to walk between being
all-in, very aggressive, very vigilant to protect our safety on
the one hand and also create positive relationships with the
community, whose support you need in order to effectively do
your job. And I would think that in this mission that all of
you now are engaged in of countering violent extremism, that
community support continues to be important, but the threat
probably that you are all dealing with is even greater than
what you have faced on a day-to-day basis when you were the
commission of public safety.
Congress tends, I think, to focus understandably on the
potential violence that we want to give you the tools to
control, but, as you did in your job in Vermont, you also
displayed some ability to see the importance of maintaining
that community support that is intentioned sometimes with
aggressive actions that have to be taken to contain violence.
And I wonder if you could just speak a little bit about that
and how the FBI managed that.
Mr. Sleeper. I believe the FBI does an outstanding job,
sir, at reaching out to communities, particularly communities
at risk. The communities most at risk are those that need the
most outreach and communication. We see all across our country
right now a number of cities that are struggling with
relationships between their police departments and their
communities, and violence is resulting as a consequence of
that.
This specific threat that we're discussing today requires
that the FBI and the communities engage in dialogue with very
specific segments of those communities, and the threat requires
that there be open, trusted dialogue. The members of those
communities recognize the first most fundamental role of the
FBI is to protect the citizens of this country and to uphold
the law. There's no doubt about that. That's the tough part.
The fair part is that we engage in dialogue with those
communities so they understand why we need to enforce those
laws, why we need to protect those communities.
And if we think particularly of the Somali community
members who are leaving Minneapolis, they're going to fight in
a far-distant war. The vast majority of them are going to come
home in a body bag. So what we're trying to do is protect those
people, communicate. And as most of the Americans that have
traveled to fight for ISIS, they will eventually end up in a
body bag, so we're trying to communicate to their friends and
families that there's consequences to this type of behavior.
That's the type of dialogue and communication that we want to
have with those communities so they understand clearly our role
and the likely consequences of their actions.
Mr. Welch. When we have that kind of trust, does it also
lead to you being able to get actionable information?
Mr. Sleeper. It is, and again, we are seeing in the
communities where we engage the communities do respond and
recognize--we have been thanked by parents of children who we
caught before they traveled for saving their children's lives,
and that's the message and the dialogue that we want to put out
there that we're about not only protecting the communities and
the citizens but the individuals themselves that are making
decisions regarding travel. But there is no doubt we are here
to investigate and to uphold ----
Mr. Welch. Right.
Mr. Sleeper.--the safety of the citizens of the United
States first and foremost.
Mr. Welch. Yes. Well, I really appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, you probably--in your own work serving our
country probably had similar tension between the need to use
force in appropriate circumstances but try to get the trust of
the folks in the country where you were serving, a hard job.
Well, I thank you. Thank you, Director.
Mr. Russell. And I thank the gentleman, and I would agree
with those comments and associate with Mr. Sleeper's earlier
comments that community type of interaction is essential. One
of the things that made it even harder is when you are not even
from the country, you don't have the language, you are
automatically hated, you are occupying the territory, and you
are trying to earn trust. But guess what? It can be done, even
those tall-order things. And we are not facing that. Although
maybe in reverse as they come back we see some of those factors
play in.
And I would like us, before we close, a couple of
additional questions if I may to Mr. Sleeper. You had made
mention that there is a number of open investigations earlier
in your comments. About how many is that?
Mr. Sleeper. We've publicly acknowledged in several
environments that there's over 1,000 open investigations across
the country right now. I can't be specific, but there's over
1,000.
Mr. Russell. Okay. Thank you for that. And how many
individuals approximately have left the United States to fight
for ISIS or other associated terror groups like al-Shabaab, et
cetera?
Mr. Sleeper. I don't have that number readily available,
but we can ensure that you're provided with that.
Mr. Russell. Sure. And if we have to provide it in a secure
setting, you know, we can also arrange that. And can you get
with us so that we can nail that down?
Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Russell. Thank you for that, sir.
And then to Mr. Selim, you know, this morphing grants and,
you know, we are going to add this many, we are going to
subtract this many, and all of that, can we get full, complete
without redaction examples of what those grants are and their
parameters? Is that possible to provide to the committee?
Mr. Selim. Mr. Chairman, I believe so. Currently, just to
give you an accurate sense of where it is, I believe in a full
and high degree of transparency with this and any other of our
overseers, the stack of paper that we're looking at that's
currently underneath review with our general counsel and so on
is over 500 pages. And we're looking to make sure that there's
no PII and whatnot, and that's the type of redaction. In
addition to supplying that information on the grant
applications to this committee, we want to make as much of that
as publicly available and transparent as possible ----
Mr. Russell. Sure.
Mr. Selim.--so I'm committed ----
Mr. Russell. Personal ----
Mr. Selim.--to doing so. I need to circle back with our
counsel and just ensure what the parameters of delivering that
to the committee are.
Mr. Russell. Yes, personal identifiers, Socials, like that,
I don't think--let me check with my legal counsel. I don't
think that that is an issue, but we don't want, you know, oh,
you know, here are the two sentences on page 1, so ----
Mr. Selim. No, I can assure you we're not looking to reduce
any of the substance but just the appropriate things for
scoring and so on.
Mr. Russell. Okay. And I appreciate that. And then I thank
the committee today not only for the broad bipartisan concern
and interest but, you know, for the excellent witnesses on both
sides. And I want to thank the ranking member for his tireless
work on national security. You know, not only have we developed
a friendship; we have traveled large portions of the globe
together.
And I also want to thank all of you today that have come
before us. And I know it wasn't a convenience to, oh, sure, you
know, let me--but I really appreciate the work that you do and
the unique perspective that you provide, and I hope that we can
work with you more in the future.
And with that, I would like to thank all of our witnesses
that are before us today.
If there is no further business, without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]