    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                         COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 27, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-37

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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                           http://oversight.house.gov

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                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

                      Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
    John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee       Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
    Darrell E. Issa, California              Ranking Minority Member
    Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
    Mark Sanford, South Carolina         Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
    Justin Amash, Michigan                   Columbia
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona               Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
    Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee          Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
    Trey Gowdy, South Carolina           Jim Cooper, Tennessee
    Blake Farenthold, Texas              Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
    Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
    Thomas Massie, Kentucky              Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
    Mark Meadows, North Carolina         Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    Ron DeSantis, Florida                Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
    Dennis A. Ross, Florida              Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Mark Walker, North Carolina          Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
    Rod Blum, Iowa                       Jamie Raskin, Maryland
    Jody B. Hice, Georgia                Peter Welch, Vermont
    Steve Russell, Oklahoma              Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
    Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Mark DeSaulnier, California
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Jimmy Gomez, California
    Gary J. Palmer, Alabama
    James Comer, Kentucky
    Paul Mitchell, Michigan
    Greg Gianforte, Montana

                         Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
                      Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
                        William McKenna General Counsel
                          Mike Howell, Senior Counsel
                             Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                       Subcommittee on National Security

                        Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman
    Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair  Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts,
    John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee           Ranking Member
    Justin Amash, Michigan               Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona               Peter Welch, Vermont
    Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Mark DeSaulnier, California
    Jody B. Hice, Georgia                Jimmy Gomez, California
    James Comer, Kentucky                Vacancy

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 27, 2017....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Kerry Sleeper, Assistant Director, Office of Partner
      Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation
        Oral Statement...............................................     5
        Written Statement............................................     8
    Mr. George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships,
      Department of Homeland Security
        Oral Statement...............................................    11
        Written Statement............................................    13
    Ms. Raheel Raza, President, Muslims Facing Tomorrow
        Oral Statement...............................................    17
        Written Statement............................................    19
    Mr. Adnan Kifayat, Director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next
      Foundation
        Oral Statement...............................................    33
        Written Statement............................................    35
    Mr. Seamus Hughes, Deputy Director, Program on Extremism, George
      Washington University
        Oral Statement...............................................    39
        Written Statement............................................    41

                                    APPENDIX

    Opening Statement of Chairman Ron DeSantis.......................    64
    April 2017 GAO report titled, ``Countering Violent Extremism:
      Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of
      Federal Efforts,'' submitted for the record by Chairman
      DeSantis.......................................................    70
    July 26, 2017, letter from the Muslim Justice League of Boston,
      submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch...............    71
    July 27, 2017, letter from the Brennan Center for Justice,
      submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch...............    79
    DHS response to GAO report, submitted for the record by Mr. Selim    80
    July 28, 2017, letter from the Anti-Defamation League, submitted
      for the record by Ranking Member Lynch.........................    84

                         COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM

                                  ----------

                            Thursday, July 27, 2017

                      House of Representatives,
                     Subcommittee on National Security,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:42 p.m., in
    Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis
    [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Gosar, Hice,
    Comer, Lynch, Welch, Demings, and DeSaulnier.
        Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will
    come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to
    declare a recess at any time.
        In the words of DHS Secretary John Kelly, the United States
    is experiencing a, quote, ``unprecedented spike in homegrown
    terrorism.'' Currently, the FBI has open terrorism
    investigations in all 50 States. As of June 2017, the U.S.
    Government has charged 128 individuals with offenses related to
    the Islamic State over the last three years. Radical Islamic
    extremism is the primary driver of this problem and deserves
    the government's immediate attention.
        In recent years, the Federal Government has sought to
    combat this problem under the guise of a program called
    Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE. Three cities were used to
    conduct pilot programs: Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis.
    Minneapolis is a particularly troublesome area, as it is a
    major center of Islamic terrorist activity. The region is home
    to the largest concentration of Somali refugees and has been
    the epicenter for domestic radicalization.
        From 2007 to 2015, over 20 Somali-Americans are known to
    have left Minnesota to join the al-Shabaab terrorist
    organization in Somalia. Over the last three years, Federal
    prosecutors have charged 13 individuals from Minnesota for
    connections to the Islamic State. Minnesota is second only to
    New York, which has four times as many residents, in number of
    ISIS terrorists charged. The terrorist problem in Minnesota led
    former U.S. Senator Norm Coleman to warn that the State is in
    danger of becoming, quote, ``the land of 10,000 terrorists.''
        Now, as the chairman of this subcommittee, I visited
    Minneapolis last December to meet with Federal and local law
    enforcement officials and community groups who were involved in
    the Countering Violent Extremism program. The area is obviously
    a ground zero for recruitment.
        Now, I invited Richard Thornton, the FBI's special agent in
    charge of the Minneapolis Division, to testify today about the
    problems our country is facing in that part of the country, but
    he is not here. Instead, the Bureau has sent Assistant Director
    Kerry Sleeper from headquarters with the expectation he can
    speak to Thornton's specific experience and interactions in
    Minneapolis. I look forward to hearing specifics about FBI's
    efforts in Minneapolis so the committee can evaluate the
    effectiveness of this CVE approach.
        Our law enforcement and intelligence community have their
    hands full with preventing radicalization and interdicting
    terrorists before they commit acts in the name of their
    ideology. The Department of Homeland Security leads the
    government's Countering Violent Extremism efforts. CVE refers
    to ``proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to
    recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.''
        Currently, the Department still follows the Obama-era
    policies related to CVE. And guidance developed during the
    Obama administration specifically limits any intelligence or
    law enforcement investigative activity through CVE. By leaving
    this information on the table, CVE efforts are potentially
    missing opportunities to identify and disrupt terrorist plots.
    Obama-era guidance also fails to properly identify the threat
    of radical Islamic ideology. The nearly 4,000-word October 2016
    CVE strategy does not even mention radical Islamic terrorism at
    all. The Obama administration's strategy also relied heavily on
    non-governmental organizations with vague and immeasurable
    goals.
        One week before President Trump's inauguration, former DHS
    Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the grant recipients of $10
    million appropriated by Congress for CVE efforts. The
    selections reflect a preference for working through community-
    based organizations, some with questionable programs and
    immeasurable goals. For example, the Obama administration
    selected for funding an organization who suggested countering
    violent extremism through, quote, ``collaborative songwriting,
    multimedia, and performance.'' Another suggested hiring college
    students to make video games. This was not a serious attempt to
    stop the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS.
        After President Trump took office, DHS froze the $10
    million in grants, reviewed the organizations, and announced
    they were removing 11 Obama-era grant recipients but adding six
    new ones. A committee review of the organizations indicates a
    preference for law enforcement organizations over community-
    based organizations.
        Now, despite this step, some of the law enforcement
    organizations designated for funding have questionable agendas.
    For example, the city of Houston's application relied on so-
    called community experts with vocally partisan and anti-Israel
    agendas. The city of Denver submitted an application that
    prioritized an agenda unrelated to CVE, suggesting working
    through organizations such as Black Lives Matter.
        The Committee requested the applications of all grant
    recipients to determine what taxpayer dollars were funding, but
    DHS has still not produced these applications. The committee
    requested a briefing on the rationale for the selection of the
    grant recipients, but DHS refused.
        Today, the subcommittee seeks to understand what this
    administration's policy is for countering violent extremism.
    According to DHS, this policy is currently under review, and
    DHS has declined to share any details about this process,
    including when this review is supposed to be complete and which
    organizations are participating. For Congress' immediate
    purposes, we must determine what is driving DHS's agenda: the
    assumptions of the Obama era about countering this threat or
    the President's pledge to put political correctness aside and
    defeat the Islamic State at home and abroad.
        We will question witnesses on whether the FBI and DHS are
    properly vetting organizations and individuals who participate
    in the program. We will also hear from non-governmental
    witnesses on the role of the private sector in CVE efforts and
    the scope of violent extremism problem facing the United
    States.
        I thank the witnesses for their attendance and look forward
    to their testimony.
        Mr. DeSantis. And I now recognize the ranking member of the
    subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to, in advance,
    thank the witnesses for their willingness to help this
    committee with its work.
        I would like to thank you for holding this hearing, Mr.
    Chairman, to reexamine our efforts to address violent extremism
    and terrorist radicalization. I would also like to again thank
    the witnesses here involved, DHS and FBI especially. I know
    that there was some back and forth about getting witnesses to
    come forward. I am glad that we were able to resolve that.
        The recapture of the city of Mosul by Iraqi forces earlier
    this month marked a significant development in the U.S.-led
    global coalition effort to degrade and destroy ISIS. The loss
    of Iraq's second-largest city, coupled with ongoing advances by
    coalition-backed Syrian rebels in the self-declared ISIS
    capital of Raqqa in eastern Syria are the most recent
    indicators of the continuing loss of geographic territory by
    the terrorist organization.
        According to global data monitoring company IHS Market,
    ISIS currently controls an estimated 14,000 square miles, an
    area roughly the size of Maryland. That is a 60 percent
    decrease from January of 2015. The terrorist group has also
    experienced a corresponding loss in annual revenue by about 50
    percent.
        However, battlefield losses on the ground in Iraq and Syria
    do not signify the complete degradation or destruction of ISIS,
    as recently underscored by Lieutenant General Mike Nagata at
    the National Counterterrorism Center. ISIS' ability to absorb
    this damage and continue to direct, enable, or inspire
    terrorist attacks worldwide indicate that, and I quote, ``We do
    not fully appreciate the scale or strength of this
    phenomenon,'' close quote.
        In the midst of the coalition-backed defense in Raqqa, the
    New York Times reports that top ISIS operatives have already
    relocated to the town of Mayadin, Syria, about 100 miles away,
    along with the recruitment, financing, propaganda, and external
    operations functions necessary to facilitate and motivate
    attacks here in the West.
        Regrettably, we have already witnessed the devastation
    caused by ISIS-inspired ideology and the influence of extremist
    social media content here at home with the 2015 terrorist
    attack in San Bernardino, California, that resulted in 14
    deaths, and the 2016 terrorist attacks in Orlando, Florida,
    that killed 49 people. The program on Extremism at the George
    Washington University has identified at least 16 successful
    attacks perpetrated in the United States alone since ISIS
    announced the so-called caliphate in 2014. The majority of the
    attackers, including Orlando shooter Omar Mateen, openly
    pledged their allegiance to ISIS.
        In light of the continuing national security threat posed
    by terrorist-related attacks, we must work on a bipartisan
    basis to conduct robust oversight of Federal efforts to combat
    violent extremism and maximize our ability to mitigate the
    threat of radicalization based on fact.
        As highlighted by the Independent Government Accounting
    Office just this month in its report on ``Countering ISIS and
    its effect,'' and I again quote, ``The Federal Government does
    not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the
    countering violent extremism effort,'' close quote. Moreover,
    programs designed to counter violent extremism at the Federal
    level have lacked a clear mission and objective, receiving
    insecure or inadequate funding and have failed to reflect
    meaningful and collaborative Muslim community engagement and
    input.
        In 2014, the Obama administration announced the
    establishment of key pilot programs in Minneapolis, Los
    Angeles, and my own city of Boston designed by the Department
    of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
    National Counterterrorism Center to counter violent extremism
    and stop radicalization through community-based outreach and
    education. The greater Boston region was selected as a pilot
    area as a result of a preexisting collaboration between law
    enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and local
    communities, including the Muslim community. In fact, President
    Obama recognized Boston as one of the 10 cities where local
    elected officials, law enforcement, faith organizations, youth
    groups, and others have already worked together to achieve
    marked improvement in community policing.
        In the New England area, local Muslim community leaders and
    organizations occupy a strategic role to prevent online
    radicalization and other forms of terrorist recruitment and
    promote community engagement. The Islamic Center of New
    England, which is in my district in the city of Quincy, has
    sought to develop a faith-based curriculum for young people
    that educates them on the prevalence of misinformation on the
    internet and particularly social media, while reinforcing
    positive Islamic values.
        In addition, Imam Khalid Nasr of the Quincy Mosque has
    sought to increase community outreach and interaction through
    open houses designed to afford all members of the community the
    opportunity to visit the mosque and meet with their Muslim
    neighbors, especially during Muslim holidays.
        Since the inception of the regional pilot program, the
    Federal Countering Violent Extremism program has expanded to
    include a grant program authorized by Congress to assist
    States, localities, and nonprofit organizations in preventing
    terrorist recruitment and radicalization. As announced by
    Secretary of Homeland Security General John Kelly in June of
    2017, the agency awarded 26 grants totaling $10 million to
    organizations dedicated to securing our communities and
    preventing terrorism--the list of grants, including an
    approximate $485,000 to the Boston Police Foundation, a
    nonprofit organization that works with the Boston Police to
    implement innovative youth outreach programs. Unfortunately,
    the current administration has frozen this $10 million in
    funding in its fiscal year 2018 budget, proposing zeroing out
    the $50 million for Countering Violent Extremism program
    altogether.
        Rather than weakening our effort to combat violent
    extremism, we have to work together to identify what works and
    what additional steps we must take to improve collaboration and
    cultivate a solid relationship of mutual respect and deeper
    understanding between law enforcement and local communities
    based on a shared commitment, and that includes the Muslim
    communities--that is based on a shared commitment to preventing
    radicalization and recruitment.
        To this end, I look forward to today's hearing, and I yield
    back the balance of my time.
        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
        I will hold the record open for five legislative days for
    any members who would like to submit a written statement.
        We will now recognize our panel of witnesses.
        I am pleased to welcome Mr. Kerry Sleeper, assistant
    director, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of
    Investigation; Mr. George Selim, director of the Office of
    Community Partnerships, Department of Homeland Security; Ms.
    Raheel Raza, president of Muslims Facing Tomorrow; Mr. Adnan
    Kifayat, director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next
    Foundation; and Mr. Seamus Hughes, deputy director of the
    Program on Extremism from the George Washington University.
        Welcome to you all.
        Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
    before they testify, so if you can please rise and raise your
    right hand.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Thank you. Please be seated. All
    witnesses answered in the affirmative.
        In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
    testimony to five minutes. Your entire written statement will
    be made part of the record.
        And with that, Mr. Sleeper, you are up for five minutes.

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                       STATEMENT OF KERRY SLEEPER

        Mr. Sleeper. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking
    Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
    the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
    threat of homegrown violent extremism. My name is Kerry
    Sleeper. I'm assistant director with the FBI in charge of our
    Office of Partner Engagement.
        The FBI utilizes a comprehensive violence reduction
    strategy, which focuses on all pathways to violence but is not
    limited to this sole focus of homegrown violent extremism. Our
    violence reduction strategy is primarily composed of prevention
    and intervention lines of effort.
        In the area of prevention, the FBI has a long history of
    engagement in outreach and education initiatives and continues
    this effort as we identify and adapt to current trends and
    threats. In collaboration with our State and local partners,
    the FBI has historically been very successful in outreach
    programs designed to reach certain communities who are at a
    greater risk for radicalization. For example, FBI Minneapolis
    served as a pilot program for the Bureau immediately after 9/11
    when their executive management regularly hosted focus group
    meetings with specific audiences such as Somali elders in order
    to address their concerns and needs.
        Some of our popular outreach programs that have a positive
    impact on our community relationships are the Campus Liaison
    Initiative, the Private Sector Liaison, the Correction
    Initiative, the FBI Citizens Academy, and the Junior G Man
    program. These efforts are managed by our division outreach
    coordinators in conjunction with our JTTFs and local partners.
        Additionally, the vision outreach coordinators assess the
    needs of their individual community groups and develop specific
    programming tailed to integrated community and law enforcement
    goals to mitigate local risk factors for violence.
        The FBI also focuses on education for different catalysts
    for radicalization designed to help the public increase an
    awareness of that radicalization. These public--these products
    are widely disseminated to the law enforcement and community
    partners for further engagement with the public and demand
    continues to increase for additional products.
        The FBI created a website ``Don't be a puppet; pull back
    the curtain on violent extremism'' specifically designed for
    the public and for use by educators and community leaders and
    organizations for school-age children. Visits to this website
    average nearly 7,400 visits a month.
        Also, in reaching out to communities, the FBI has produced
    other media-based products, including preventing violent
    extremism in school, recognizing pathways to violent extremism,
    campus attacks, targeted violence affecting institutions of
    higher education, and workplace violence issues and response.
    We have also produced and distributed documentaries A
    Revolutionary Act, Redemption, and Active Shooter: Managing the
    Mass Casualty Threat.
        I left with the members to be distributed a copy of A
    Revolutionary Act. This was a video that we created for State
    and local law enforcement. It documented the murder of two Las
    Vegas Metro PD officers by domestic terrorists two years ago.
    The reception by the State and local law enforcement community
    has been very, very strong. It's an example of the type of work
    we do for the law enforcement agencies to then engage with
    their communities and have discussions.
        In our intervention area, the FBI is closely coordinating
    with our State and local partners to best meet the needs of
    their communities. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement
    identified as a best practice used by police departments, the
    crisis intervention teams, and their partner multidisciplinary
    teams composed of community mental health and social welfare
    providers.
        The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement is currently
    initiating closer coordination with police department crisis
    intervention teams in order to develop a coordinated strategy
    to identify potential individuals appropriate for intervention.
        The FBI also conducted a pilot program to assess the
    viability of off-ramping. The idea behind off-ramping subjects
    is to take them off the path of violence before they commit a
    crime. This process must be completed with the utmost attention
    to detail, sensitivity to law enforcement and community
    partners, and a forward-leaning approach. The FBI's pilot
    program indicated the best results would be achieved by close
    collaboration with our State and local law enforcement and
    government partners. The FBI continues to work with these
    partners to form a cohesive and beneficial plan to implement
    off-ramping efforts and to better serve our communities.
        In conclusion, I am pleased to be here today to talk to you
    about the FBI's work with our State and local partners in
    combating homegrown violent extremism. Thank you for this
    opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Kerry Sleeper follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
        Mr. Selim, you are up for five minutes.

                       STATEMENT OF GEORGE SELIM

        Mr. Selim. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking
    Member Lynch, other members of the committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to be here today. My name is George Selim, and I
    lead the Office for Community Partnerships at the Department of
    Homeland Security, and I also serve as the director of the
    Interagency Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, which is
    tasked to manage the synchronization and integration of a
    whole-of-government effort to empower local partners to prevent
    violent extremism here in the United States.
        I have built on my nearly 12 years of homeland security-
    related work experience in the executive branch, including the
    Department of Justice, most recently DHS headquarters, as well
    as the National Security Council to further the Department's
    and the Interagency's key priorities on fostering
    relationships, promoting trust, and finding innovative ways to
    expand the toolbox for both law enforcement officials and civil
    leaders to prevent and intervene in the process of
    radicalization.
        Terrorism prevention programs complement traditional
    counterterrorism investigative and prosecutorial processes.
    Prevention focuses on disrupting the beliefs of violent
    extremists and their will to act on those beliefs through
    criminal or other violent actions. Community-driven prevention
    programs are designed to mitigate recruitment and interdict
    individuals radicalizing to violence earlier in the process,
    and that way, thus contributing to our collective homeland
    security.
        Historically, my office, the Office of Community
    Partnerships, has pursued a number of activities to advance the
    terrorism prevention mission. We educate our communities,
    working with departments and agencies to provide community
    awareness briefings that demonstrably increase the
    understanding of how terrorist groups recruit and radicalize
    and thus incite to violence.
        We have engaged with community stakeholders around the
    United States to open doors to dialogue and build trust. My
    office has deployed field staff to more than a dozen cities
    nationwide to bolster engagement with and between governmental
    organizations, nongovernmental organizations, not the least of
    which are our State and local law enforcement partners, as well
    as community and civic groups.
        Additionally, we have engaged young people through the
    internationally recognized public-private partnership titled
    the Peer-to-Peer Challenging Extremism Competition, which was
    featured last week in the New York Times, which its aim is to
    challenge teams of students from colleges and universities both
    across the United States and abroad to develop and implement
    social media programs targeting the narratives and online
    recruiters of violent extremism.
        In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security worked with
    Congress to secure a first-of-its-kind funding for the CVE
    grant program, which the chairman referred to earlier, that
    supports communities seeking to do more to combat the ongoing
    threat of terrorism here in the homeland. Six months later, the
    Department of Homeland Security released our Notice of Funding
    Opportunity for this grant program. The application period
    closed last September, and almost 200 applications received
    were reviewed by a combination of experts to evaluate the
    strengths and merits of each individual application.
        After a leadership review panel reviewed the scoring
    results in the five focus areas and ensured important
    programmatic soundness was met such as the optimized use of
    funds to avoid duplication and other similar projects. After a
    deliberate process, then-Secretary Johnson made a determination
    on funding options presented to him and publicly announced
    grants on January 13 of 2017. My office anticipated
    approximately 30 days later from the announcement to make the
    formal award offers and allow time to finalize many of the
    administrative tasks associated with the grants.
        After the inauguration of President Trump on January 20,
    the new DHS leadership asked to put a pause on the program,
    reviewing the entire effort, alongside numerous other efforts
    at the Department of Homeland Security. What I can tell you
    today is that the review was comprehensive. New DHS leadership
    imagined--examined the goals of the program, the processes, and
    how the grant program would measure its own efficacy.
        As a result of the review, and consistent with the
    authorizes granted to the Secretary and as outlined in the
    Notice of Funding, the Department considered three additional
    factors among the pool of applicants, including the applicant
    or proposal's level of engagement with law enforcement and the
    community, the proposal's likelihood for it to be highly
    effective, and the proposal's level of resource dedication or
    long-term sustainability. In the end, the application of these
    factors resulted in some changes in the list of intended
    awardees.
        Moving forward, the 26 projects funded by the Countering
    Violent Extremism grant program are designed to establish a
    solid foundation for prevention of terrorism in our American
    communities. The grants support a full range of terrorism
    prevention activities, including awareness campaigns,
    engagement, trust-building, intervention efforts, and direct
    opposition of terrorism narratives these days. The awards span
    communities across the country and focus on all forms of
    violent extremism.
        In conclusion, our team recognizes that now comes the hard
    part. We are working with all 26 project teams to ensure that
    the awardees detail their progress towards their goals through
    ongoing and rigorous monitoring. In doing so, my office will
    identify promising practices and tools to keep extremists from
    luring more impressionable people towards terrorism. We will
    add to the dataset on existing terrorism prevention programs,
    and we will share the result from these grants publicly so that
    other communities and the public and you, the committee, can
    learn firsthand what works and what does not in the field of
    terrorism prevention. We are grateful for bipartisan support
    from Congress on this program to date and look forward to
    keeping you informed on our progress and ensure that it lives
    up to the Congress' standards.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [Prepared statement of George Selim follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
        Ms. Raza, you are up for five minutes.

                        STATEMENT OF RAHEEL RAZA

        Ms. Raza. [Speaking foreign language.] I begin in the name
    of God, most beneficial, most merciful.
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank
    you for the opportunity to deliver this testimony.
        My name is Raheel Raza. I'm a practicing Muslim, president
    of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, founding member of the Muslim
    Reform Movement, and advisory board member of the Clarion
    Project. I've engaged in dialogue about these issues in the
    U.S., at the U.N., and in the Canadian and U.K. Parliaments for
    over two decades. I have four main recommendations:
        1. Shift government focus and efforts to tackle the
    Islamist ideology.
        2. Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an entity that aids
    and abets terrorism.
        3. Prevent funding of U.S. educational institutions and
    mosques by foreign extremist sources.
        4. Invite voices of reform-minded Muslims to also be heard
    in these esteemed chambers.
        Firstly, there is a serious error at the heart of the
    countering violent extremism policy. We must confront radicals
    before they become violent. Before World War II, Nazism was an
    ideology expressed in Mein Kampf. Before two million Chinese
    died in the Cultural Revolution, ideas were written down in a
    Little Red Book. And in 1928, another ideology appeared with
    the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks a
    totalitarian system of government and forced implementation of
    Sharia law, the trickling effects of which we don't want to see
    in the United States.
        This ideology fuels ISIS and al-Qaida, subjugates women,
    executes homosexuals, kills Christians, and inspires some
    American Muslims to commit acts of terror. The Clarion
    Project's short film By the Numbers puts numbers to these
    assertions based on Pew research. Twenty-seven percent or 237
    million Muslims believe nonbelievers should be executed, and 26
    percent of young American Muslims believe suicide bombings
    against non-Muslims can be justified. Fortunately, most Muslims
    don't hold this radical ideology, but hundreds of millions do.
        Some claim ideology is not a clear predictor of terrorism.
    They are dead-wrong. A 2016 study traced the path of 100
    violent jihadists. Fifty-one percent of them began their
    journey in nonviolent Islamist movements. By the time an
    extremist becomes violent, it's too late. As such, the U.S.
    must defeat, humiliate, destroy, and discredit this poisonous
    radical ideology of Islamism stemming from the Wahhabi Salafi
    ideology, Khomeinism, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which brings
    me to recommendation number two, designate the Muslim
    Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism.
        As I've already explained, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to
    establish a worldwide Islamic State and build a new world
    civilization based on Sharia law. In fact, Russia, Syria,
    Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have
    all listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
    The U.S. must follow suit.
        Next, number three, remove foreign extremist funding from
    American campuses and mosques. Saudi Arabia is thought to have
    spent $70-100 billion to disseminate their intolerant version
    of Islam worldwide. Saudi Arabia gave $20 million to Georgetown
    and $20 million to Harvard. A Saudi billionaire named as a
    defendant in a 9/11 lawsuit donated $10 million to establish a
    Center of Islamic Law and Civilization at Yale. Iran is also
    complicit in funding Shia mosques, Islamic schools, and
    organizations. We should not have Iran or Saudi Arabia teaching
    their version of Islam to our youth.
        Final recommendation number four, a seat at the table;
    listen to martyred Muslims. Mohamed Elibiary helped craft the
    Countering Violent Extremism, the CVE program, yet he called
    for the political integration of mainstream Islamists like the
    Muslim Brotherhood. Also, CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic
    Relations, is a radical group which claims to speak for
    American Muslims. CAIR does not speak for me or most Muslims.
    CAIR was designated as a terrorist group by the United Arab
    Emirates, and its L.A. director called the work of this
    committee a myth.
        CAIR's recommendation to the House Committee on Homeland
    Security was to refuse a legitimizing platform to organizations
    and individuals they deem ``Islamophobic.'' Let me clarify that
    anti-Muslim bigotry is real, but that's not a permission slip
    to call every dissenting voice an Islamophobe. I've raised two
    sons with Muslim values while keeping them from radical views
    and will do the same for my four grandchildren. Does educating
    youth about the dangers of radicalization make one an
    Islamophobe? Of course not. These labels keep us from critical
    debate such as the one we are having now and stops the Muslim
    communities from becoming pluralistic, tolerant, embracing of
    democracy, freedoms, and liberties, and accepting of all paths
    and people.
        On behalf of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, reform-minded
    Muslims, and the Clarion Project, thank you for letting our
    voices be heard.
        [Prepared statement of Raheel Raza follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
        I now recognize Mr. Adnan Kifayat for five minutes.

                       STATEMENT OF ADNAN KIFAYAT

        Mr. Kifayat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
    members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to
    speak before you on behalf of Gen Next. My name is Adnan
    Kifayat. I'm the head of global security for Gen Next Ventures.
        Gen Next Foundation leverages a venture philanthropy model
    to help private sector individuals use their talents,
    knowledge, and resources to solve big challenges, and
    countering violent extremism in the homeland is one of our core
    areas of focus.
        I come here before you as a private citizen, but before I
    became a private citizen again, I served in government in a
    number of roles at the Treasury Department, the State
    Department, and the White House for both Democratic and
    Republican administrations. I first became involved in
    countering violent extremism work when I was at the National
    Security Council under President Bush. Back then, we used to
    call it the ``War of Ideas.''It is now commonly referred to as
    countering violent extremism, but we must always recognize that
    in the 15 years since 9/11, we have learned a great deal about
    the enemy, about what the enemy uses, and how the enemy
    radicalizes, recruits, and activates would-be terrorists.
        When I served in government, I had always hoped and
    sometimes daydreamt that there would be outside entities in the
    private sector that were keeping pace with the threat that
    we're finding real-world solutions to this menace. These
    entities could do what government alone was not equipped to do.
    They could innovate, they could keep pace with the internet,
    they could use new and sophisticated technologies, and they
    could take risks that sometimes government is unable to take.
        Today, there are small but committed groups of people,
    including Gen Next, who are finding ways to rally American
    ingenuity and creativity to counter homegrown terrorism. There
    are strong and powerful growing voices in the private sector
    that are echoing across our country, and I urge you to listen
    to those voices and the solutions that they are finding.
        Five years ago, Gen Next Foundation, Google Ideas, and the
    Institute for Strategic Dialogue launched the first-ever global
    network of former extremists called the Against Violent
    Extremism network. AVE, which now numbers 470 members, uses the
    voices of former extremists both online and offline to dissuade
    youth all over the world from being radicalized and recruited
    by groups like ISIS and al-Qaida. Almost 1,000 online
    interventions have taken place and hundreds of
    deradicalizations through person-to-person engagement have
    occurred.
        Since our initial investment, multinational corporations,
    international institutions, and foundations have all helped
    scale AVE's footprint because it works. Last year, Gen Next
    helped launch the first-even online effort to redirect at-risk
    youth searching for in that terrorist groups like ISIS and al-
    Qaida put out there towards content that is nonviolent and non-
    extremist. By using marketing and advertising techniques, our
    partnership with Google Jigsaw, and experts at Moonshot CVE,
    known as the Redirect Method, is leveling the playing field
    online and challenging the narrative of the terrorists.
        There are many other examples of the private sector
    organizing, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted those in the written
    testimony for additional study. Last year, I co-chaired the
    Department of Homeland Security's Advisory Subcommittee report
    on countering violent extremism, which had strong bipartisan
    support. It detailed a national blueprint for partnering with
    city leaders, mayors, local leaders, as well as the private
    sector.
        In today's complex maze of networks, we can't just pay lip
    service to partnering with people outside of Washington. We
    have to find concrete ways to do so. Some of these efforts will
    require resources like money, talent, and access to technology
    or just convening. While Gen Next Foundation serves as a
    convener and incubator of new solutions in the private sector,
    this space is by no means saturated. As an example, the
    government has done with the defense and intelligence
    communities through organizations like the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and In-Q-Tel to bridge the
    divide between public and private sectors, provide risk
    capital, eliminate some unnecessary and slow processes, develop
    key performance indicators and measurements that work, and
    potentially reduce some of the fierce politicization of this
    issue so that we can get to finding solutions.
        We know today that to be lured by Islamist or jihadist
    ideologist, one can be rich or poor, boy or girl, religiously
    observant or not. The threat is varied, and we have to find
    varied solutions to this threat.
        The examples I've shared with you, AVE and Redirect are
    just two examples. We must work together and welcome innovation
    and risk-taking in the private sector if we are to truly find
    solutions to counter homegrown extremism that leads to
    terrorism.
        Mr. Chairman and ranking member and members of the
    subcommittee, today, we must fight the War of Ideas radically
    different than we did 15 years ago. There are solutions out
    there today, and there are solutions waiting to be found. Thank
    you very much.
        [Prepared statement of Adnan Kifayat follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
        Mr. Hughes, you are recognized for five minutes.

                       STATEMENT OF SEAMUS HUGHES

        Mr. Hughes. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members
    of the committee, it is a privilege to be invited to speak here
    on the threat of homegrown terrorism and efforts to prevent it.
        As the chairman noted, homegrown terrorism inspired by
    groups like ISIS has been a persistent threat in the U.S. The
    FBI has reported some thousand active investigations in all 50
    States. Since March 2014, 120 individuals have been charged
    with terrorism-related activities in connection to ISIS. A near
    majority were accused of attempting to travel or successfully
    traveling to the so-called caliphate. Nearly 30 percent were
    accused of domestic plotting.
        These individuals represent a very diverse group. Their
    backgrounds vary. There's not a typical profile of an ISIS
    recruit. They're old, they're young, they're rich, they're
    poor. It runs the spectrum.
        A careful review of the cases points to a mobilization of
    individuals and not necessarily a widespread community-level
    phenomenon. It is homegrown terroism in the truest form of the
    word. They are born and raised here. The vast majority are U.S.
    citizens or legal permanent residents.
        While considerably smaller than other Western countries,
    ISIS mobilization in the United States is unprecedented. The
    backbone of the response has been through traditional
    counterterrorism approaches. However, they must be augmented
    with other non-law enforcement efforts. As such, the U.S. must
    develop a more robust, transparent, and effective domestic
    prevention program.
        The U.S.'s domestic Countering Violent Extremism or CVE
    program efforts can best be understood in a series of fits and
    starts. In 2011, the U.S. Government released their first
    domestic CVE strategy. It was broken up in three parts: first,
    enhanced engagement with communities; second, build expertise
    with State and local officials; and three, counter extremist
    propaganda. The strategy was explicit in acknowledging that no
    new resources would be devoted to the issue. Local officials,
    particularly U.S. Attorneys' Offices, were directed to use
    existing funding. The Federal Government provided guidance
    where needed. This new approach was introduced to hesitant
    local officials and community partners, which struggled to
    understand the intricacies of radicalization and recruitment.
        As a result of a lack of an explicit definition of CVE and
    direction for CVE, it became a catchall phrase for programming
    from broad-based engagement on non-terrorism-related
    programming to more direct one-on-one intervention of
    radicalized individuals. Lacking dedicated funding and a
    focused resource, government officials struggled to complete
    the strategy's goals and objectives.
        It is with that backdrop that the previous administration
    refocused their efforts on three pilot cities. Minneapolis
    focused largely on societal-level issues or what they saw as
    societal-level issues, Boston on individualized intervention
    programs, and Los Angeles primarily on community engagement.
        Following the completion of the pilot program, the U.S.
    Government created a CVE Task Force. This interagency group,
    with a rotating leadership from DHS and DOJ, would be comprised
    of detailees from various different agencies, a hub of CVE
    activity.
        There are a few challenges to quickly note. Radicalization
    is not a linear process. Humans by their very nature are
    complex. We float in and out of our extreme. There's not a
    step-by-step guide for why individuals join terrorist
    organizations, while others with similar experiences do not.
    Conversely, the radicalization disengagement does not adhere to
    a straight-line path. Developing CVE programs must not fall in
    a trap of one-size-fits-all.
        The administration's proposed budget significantly curtails
    CVE funding. While the continuation of DHS grants or more
    focused continuation of DHS grants is a step in the right
    direction, the ability to scale up these projects without an
    influx of new grant funding is doubtful. Moreover, the proposed
    budget cuts to reduce the number of employees at DHS and other
    agencies that serve the CVE task force may limit our innovation
    in the future.
        CVE efforts in the previous administration and the current
    one has largely focused on one form of extremism. The previous
    administration, while not explicit in its public messaging but
    clearly in its implementation, focused nearly entirely on
    countering ISIS-inspired terrorism. By nearly all outward
    accounts, the current administration also indicates this
    singular focus. Of course, there should be a prioritization of
    resources, but CVE programs would do well to concentrate not
    only on the threat posed by individuals like Omar Mateen but
    also those by the Dylann Roofs of the world.
        Domestic CVE is in a tenuous state. Decisions by government
    and community partners in the coming months will determine
    whether CVE is truly a viable option. CVE is a delicate tool,
    if properly implemented, can help sway young men and women away
    from radicalization and violence. And families that I met with
    in Minneapolis, in Boston, individuals who have dealt with
    loved ones who've joined terrorist organizations and are
    grappling with these questions, we haven't provided them any
    form of support from the Federal Government or local effort. We
    need to step up and provide this. And by the way, it's also an
    important goal to help adjust resources for the Federal
    Government so the FBI can focus on more immediate threats,
    while communities and non-governmental partners can focus on
    other things.
        Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Seamus Hughes follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. Well, thanks for the witnesses. The chair now
    recognizes himself for five minutes.
        Mr. Selim, we have looked at some of these pilot programs,
    specifically Minnesota. How do you at the Department evaluate
    the effectiveness of the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis?
        Mr. Selim. Chairman DeSantis, thanks for the question, and
    again, thanks for having us here today.
        I think there have been a number of ways that we can assess
    the pilot program in Minneapolis. Overall, I would assess that
    it has been successful in a number of different categories.
    It's validated the assumptions that at the local level
    solutions to CVE programs need to be constructed.
        Second, it's validated that working by, with, and through
    State and local law enforcement, municipal officials, and
    councilmembers and individuals that hold some type of position,
    having them act as some type of facilitator or convener is a
    positive step forward and brings communities closer together.
        And three, a number of both governmental and
    nongovernmental organizations have validated that they want to
    participate in these efforts, that they would like to
    participate in programming related to preventing and
    intervening in the process of radicalization but lack the
    resources to do so. And in the volume of applications that we
    received for the grant program, we've seen an overwhelming
    response from the Twin Cities area, and fortunately, we've been
    able to act on a number of those very strong applications and
    make some awards in that place.
        Mr. DeSantis. I would note for the record, and I ask
    unanimous consent to submit a GAO report. GAO disagrees with
    that. They say there is no cohesive process for measuring
    outcomes. So, I ask unanimous consent that this be added to the
    record.
        Mr. DeSantis. So, let me ask you this. There was a major
    trial in Minnesota, I think 13 guys for material support to
    ISIS, and the U.S. Attorney's Office did a good job, FBI, but
    is that a success of CVE or is that a failure of CVE when
    something like that happens?
        Mr. Selim. I think that's serve--that's not CVE. A
    counterterrorism investigation and arrest and a prosecution --
    --
        Mr. DeSantis. So, then, basically, that would mean that the
    CVE community-based programs were obviously not successful at
    steering those individuals away from a violent ideology,
    correct?
        Mr. Selim. I would say that the CVE-related programs and
    the small amount that are being implemented across the country
    are just one facet of the broader counterterrorism approach.
    So, to the extent that a CVE program in one city can help bring
    in a tip, can help contribute to an intervention for an
    individual, that's a positive contribution, but it's not a
    catchall. It's just one piece in our broader homeland security
    strategy.
        Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask Mr. Sleeper in terms of the
    Minnesota--we were able to meet with the folks at the FBI down
    there on the ground. I will ask you. The effectiveness of the
    community-based programs, has that been a gamechanger? It
    seemed to me when we were there, there were still significant
    threats that they were monitoring.
        Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I spoke with SAC
    Thornton last evening prior to coming here. The challenge
    remains. The SAC would indicate that communication has improved
    between government authorities and the community, but it's
    still not what it should be in order to ensure an effective
    exchange of information to prevent individuals from either
    harming other people or harming themselves by traveling
    overseas. This is going to be a long-term commitment to
    ensuring that the community develops enough confidence to be
    able to keep the information flow going.
        Mr. DeSantis. One of the things that was a little
    surprising is the community there, the Somalis, is primarily a
    refugee community, but yet they are--particularly some of the
    problem people would travel back and forth. And so if they are
    coming as refugees, then why are they just going back and
    forth? It was a little odd to me that that would be something
    that would be okay. You would think if you are fleeing an area,
    you wouldn't want to just keep going back, but that seemed to
    be--I mean, I know a lot of these guys who were convicted, they
    were going back. They had government money they were using. I
    mean, it was really, really dispiriting to see.
        Mr. Sleeper. There are some examples, sir, of individuals
    that have traveled back, yes, sir, and returned.
        Mr. DeSantis. All right. The use of funds, let me ask Mr.
    Selim. I mean, we looked at some of these grants. For example,
    there was $160,000 to a group called Music in Common whose task
    was ``empowering diverse cultures and faiths to discover common
    ground through collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and
    performance.'' So, in terms of effectiveness, collaborative
    songwriting, is that an effective approach to warding off
    terrorism?
        Mr. Selim. Mr. Chairman, what I could say about that
    application in particular is that was not one of the ones that
    was awarded in June of 2017. I think you're referring to one of
    the earlier ----
        Mr. DeSantis. Right.
        Mr. Selim.--awards from January of 2017. What I can say
    conclusively--and I think I would echo some of the comments
    that Mr. Hughes made earlier--is radicalization is not a linear
    process. There are multiple ways that individuals in the United
    States and across the globe have been radicalized, and thus,
    the solution sets to preventing and intervening in the process
    of radicalization are equally diverse and multidisciplinary.
        Mr. DeSantis. I think that that is true, but I just--is
    this a good use of tax funds for this particular group? Was
    there any measurable success as a result of awarding this
    grant? Are there other groups which I would say are more fuzzy
    in terms of their approach--has there been documented success
    from there? Because we looked for it. It was hard for us to
    find it, and it is a concern.
        Mr. Selim. I understand your concern, Mr. Chairman. Here's
    the best way I can try to answer that.
        Mr. DeSantis. But, I guess--I mean, the fact that this
    group got dropped is probably an indication that it had not
    been having a lot of success, correct?
        Mr. Selim. Part of the reason that group and a number of
    others were dropped is because of the additional factors that
    Secretary Kelly and DHS leadership infused into the grant
    program and to--sorry.
        Mr. DeSantis. No, finish your thought.
        Mr. Selim. And to address your point on measurement and
    evaluation, looking at each and--each individual grant--grantee
    and program that we will be funding, overall, I guess I would
    summarize we're looking at readiness overall, and we're looking
    at readiness of preventing radicalization here in a couple
    different facets. The first is in this grant program are we
    raising awareness on the threat of radicalization and
    recruitment? Are we creating willingness within communities to
    engage with State, local, and municipal law enforcement? And
    third, are we demonstrating an increased level of capabilities
    for State, local, and nongovernmental actors to do something if
    radicalization and recruitment is detected?
        Overall, what this grant program is trying to do is up our
    readiness game and factors that we need to work on moving
    forward.
        Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask Ms. Raza. When you see something
    like the collaborative songwriting, you have been very clear
    about going after the ideology. I mean, is that the approach
    you think would be successful or are you arguing for more of a
    direct acknowledgement of what the threat is?
        Ms. Raza. Thank you for having me here, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you for that question. Yes, I would say that the time has
    come to definitely have a more direct approach. With due
    respect to the songwriting project, I mean, ``fluff stuff'' and
    interfaith dialogue really hasn't led to much deradicalization
    and hasn't led to countering violent extremism. There need to
    be specific policies put into place that tackle the ideology,
    as I have mentioned in both my oral and written testimony.
        Mr. DeSantis. So in terms of the ideology, I notice the
    government manuals recently, they will not mention radical
    Islam or they don't use anything associated with the word
    Islam, but then when I look at people in the Middle East who
    are fighting this like General President el-Sisi of Egypt, I
    mean, he gave a speech in front of all those Islamic clerics,
    and he said, look, he is like, you know, I am a devout Muslim
    but we can't use the faith to be at war with other people. So,
    he seemed to view it as really a debate within Islam, and he
    wanted the nonviolent--which I think is the majority for sure--
    to really carry the day, whereas I think the government view
    has been to just say this has nothing to do with Islam; all
    violent extremism is the same. It just seems like Sisi is
    confronting the ideological a little more directly. It seems
    like some of the government manuals, you know, they kind of
    dance around the core ideological point. Is that a fair
    description of the difference?
        Ms. Raza. Yes, it is, and thank you for bringing that up
    because this point has come up more than once that the word
    Islam is--radical ideology should not be used. As a practicing
    Muslim, let me point out that to separate Islamist ideology
    from the spiritual message of Islam is a very pro-Islamic thing
    to do. It's not about political correctness. There are people
    here in the West who are afraid to use the word Islamist
    ideology because they think that it is anti-Muslim. It is
    actually very pro-Muslim because it makes the ordinary masses
    of people understand the difference between the faith of Islam
    and an ideology, which is political in nature and which is evil
    in its agenda. And in order to fight that ideology, we have to
    name it. We have a mandate in our organization where we say you
    have to use the three E's, expose the problem, educate the
    masses, and then erase the problem.
        Mr. DeSantis. So, you mentioned designating the Brotherhood
    as a terrorist-supporting organization. If the U.S. Government
    did that and that preventing money from flowing to some of the
    domestic groups, do you think that that would help neuter some
    of the economic fuel for the extremist ideology?
        Ms. Raza. Yes, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as an
    organization that aids and abets terrorism definitely would be
    a step in the right direction, especially when other Muslim
    countries have already done this. And the--they fuel and feed
    the radical ideology that eventually leads to terrorism.
        Mr. DeSantis. For Adnan Kifayat, the good thing about the
    private sector what you are trying to do is you are not really
    burdened by some of the bureaucratic scriptures and you guys
    can kind of see things and react. So, you mention some of these
    online interventions that have been successful, so can you
    describe, what does that entail and how some of those have
    worked?
        Mr. Kifayat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, so some of our
    online work right now is focused on really understanding the
    narratives and the content that groups like ISIS, al-Qaida,
    others put out there and the kinds of messages that they use to
    basically get people to go down those pathways. And what we're
    learning is geography, so where those searches are taking
    place, where that content is being consumed, potentially
    deploying some off-ramping, as has been talked about, some off-
    ramping programs, hotlines in those geographies.
        Two, we've learned about--more about the complexity of the
    messaging, so it's everything from religious argument, as has
    been noted a number of times, to things like seeking adventure,
    things like protecting one's culture, protecting one's
    community. And understanding what those message points are is
    very helpful to us as we create content and repurpose content
    to push back against those messages.
        We've also learned, Mr. Chairman, that terrorists are not--
    they don't start off by viewing beheading videos or the
    bloodiest or the most gruesome of the content. They actually
    start off by consuming what might appear to be mild content but
    has tinges of hate, tinges of hate, intolerance, and so forth.
    And so nipping it in the bud has been one lesson that we've
    learned.
        Mr. DeSantis. Great. I am over my time.
        I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just for a threshold matter, I have a couple of documents
    that I would like to submit with unanimous consent. I have a
    letter here from the Muslim Justice League of Boston, and I
    have a letter as well from the Brennan Center for Justice
    addressed to you and I.
        Mr. DeSantis. And you would ask unanimous consent that they
    ----
        Mr. Lynch. I do.
        Mr. DeSantis.--be entered into the record. Without
    objection.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lynch. One of the difficulties here that I know my
    colleagues are struggling with is really identifying the
    metrics for success. So, we have got these--we are expending
    these resources, and we are trying to--it is difficult, I have
    to admit, to measure or count an attack that doesn't occur,
    right? If we are putting people out there and trying to reduce
    radicalization, you know, the strongest evidence is a lack of
    attacks, and that is, you know, that's a proven negative.
        But, Director Sleeper and Mr. Hughes, you have been out
    there, sort of law enforcement capacity, and we have talked
    about or heard a lot about trust today from a number of
    witnesses. There seems to be almost an organic friction between
    law enforcement coming in and investigating and a faith a
    mosque--any faith or a church for that matter in which
    constituents are coming there to practice their religion
    confidentially, and there is that trust between the imam and
    the Oma, just as there are, you know, in my faith there is a
    relationship, a confidential relationship between the priest
    and Catholics.
        So, I am struggling with how do we balance in a way--
    balance our need to intervene here and at the same time do it
    in a respectful way that doesn't isolate some of these mosques?
    Because I have heard in various parts of my community, in the
    Muslim community that those who accept money, CVE money, are
    tainted. There is almost a collaborator label among some that
    say, oh, that mosque is accepting CVE money. They are
    cooperating with the FBI or with the Boston Police, and so for
    some, they get a black mark and are seen as less worthy. And
    others that refuse to take the CVE seek to take on this role of
    legitimacy in the Muslim community. How do we deal with that,
    Mr. Hughes?
        Mr. Hughes. I spent a lot of time, about 3-1/2 years,
    working for the National Counterterrorism Center on this exact
    issue and a lot of time actually in your district.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes.
        Mr. Hughes. And so my biggest takeaway from kind of
    traveling around the country and meeting with Muslim American
    community leaders throughout the country was you just got to be
    honest and talk about it in human stories. So instead of 128
    people have been arrested for terrorism charges, it's my name
    is Seamus Hughes, I'm a father, and I'm worried about these
    kids. And I tell the story of a young man from Minneapolis who
    disappears on election day and doesn't--and his mother's
    worried about him, goes to Somalia, realizes it's his bill of
    goods and is killed there for his doubts. And at some point in
    his radicalization he was reachable. My name is Seamus Hughes
    and I want to save that young kid because I never want to sit
    in a room like I used to in a basement of an apartment building
    talking to mothers of--grieving sons.
        And so if you frame the issue in terms of human aspect, I
    think you'd get a lot farther than you would. And I think you
    also need to have a bright line between counterterrorism
    operations and CVE efforts.
        So, my engagement with community partners I didn't share my
    notes with the local FBI office because I needed to let--build
    levels of trust, and that doesn't happen overnight. So, going
    to Boston every couple weeks, talking to folks, knowing who
    their kids are, where they play soccer, things like that, those
    things matter in order to actually build this level of trust.
    It's not just a one-and-done thing.
        Mr. Lynch. That is great.
        Director Sleeper?
        Mr. Sleeper. Thank you for the question, sir. I have been a
    police officer for four decades, the first three decades in
    State and local law enforcement. Outreach to communities is the
    cornerstone of law enforcement. It's the essence of how local
    government communicates with its citizens in order to prevent
    violence in the communities, all violence. It's an effort to
    prevent violence from happening, to encourage dialogue between
    families, community groups, religious organizations, and to
    open up dialogue so that if someone see something, if they're
    concerned about a friend or a family member that may be going
    in the wrong direction, that that's communicated and that
    violence is prevented. That's really what this program is about
    is preventing violence. The FBI looks at it from a very broad
    perspective of looking at all potential avenues of extremism
    and violence that may be dealt with in a community.
        We're very cognizant that all cities and communities are
    different, and it's the citizens of the community that are best
    to identify the level of engagement, the type of engagement,
    and allow them to dictate back to the law enforcement community
    what they need and what they would like in order to exchange
    and open up that dialogue, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you. So, it just so happens that Mr.
    Russell and I have spent a fair amount of time in refugee camps
    on the Syrian border, Syria and Turkey, Syria and Lebanon,
    Syria and Amman, Jordan, and on one of my visits we actually
    had an opportunity to bring in six of these so-called moderate
    rebel groups, the leaders of these groups. They came up out of
    Aleppo and met with us. And one of my conversations I asked
    each one of them as they came in separately, I said, how do you
    communicate? And they are all on WhatsApp, okay? So, not
    surprisingly, a lot of the radical content that we are seeing
    on our end here in the United States is also coming through
    WhatsApp. And I don't want to single them out. There are a few
    others.
        But one of the folks that I deal with on this issue, who is
    Dr. Nabeel Khudairi, he is the former chairperson of the
    Islamic Council of New England, he had a great quote. He said,
    ``If we are going to do battle against extremists, we have to
    bring something in the same genre of the social media to
    balance a young person's opinion of what to do.'' So, what are
    we doing in terms of--and now, I am talking about the social
    media aspect of it that is oftentimes the point of contact
    between efforts of others to radicalize our sons and daughters
    here at home? What is the counterpoint that we are using to
    sort of push back on that? And has anything that you have been
    doing so far been successful, Mr. Sleeper or Mr. Hughes, I
    guess? Or Mr. Selim actually, yes.
        Mr. Sleeper. There's a number of areas, sir, that are being
    pursued. Some of those fall into the true counterterrorism
    effort in the sense of identifying and eliminating individuals
    that are responsible for creating and sending those messages.
    There's significant work that's being done with the private
    sector, and there's been significant success with the private
    sector recognizing that their applications are being leveraged
    by people, so there are successes there. And I know George is
    working a number of initiatives at a different level.
        Mr. Selim. Seamus, do you want to ----
        Mr. Hughes. Yes, if you don't mind. I interviewed an
    American ISIS supporter who spent about four months in ISIS
    last month, and he was using WhatsApp to communicate with other
    friends when he crossed the border. So, absolutely, the online
    environment does matter for these folks, and in many ways, it's
    a logistical support and a level of connectivity they wouldn't
    normally have.
        Mr. Lynch. Just to be clear, it is the level of encryption
    there that ----
        Mr. Hughes. It's ----
        Mr. Lynch.--allows that, right?
        Mr. Hughes. It's the debate that the FBI would talk about,
    the ----
        Mr. Lynch. And it is owned by Facebook, right?
        Mr. Hughes. I believe so, yes.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes.
        Mr. Hughes. So, in terms of what we're doing domestically,
    not a whole lot. So, we have a few programs. We have peer-to-
    peer program which the U.S. Government and Facebook have
    stepped up in form and encouraged the university students to
    create counter-messaging. But I think there's a few low-hanging
    policy questions I think we can solve pretty quickly. One is
    community partners like the one you mentioned, giving them some
    level of a legal understanding of what's right and left
    latitudes online, so they're not crossing against material
    support to terrorism clauses if they're engaging with a would-
    be jihadist, right, so letting them know what the latitudes
    are.
        The second one is informing them of how ISIS and other
    groups use the online environment. So, it's not Twitter
    anymore. It's largely concentrated on Telegram. And what do
    those channels look like and how do you get involved and what
    are the messages that are there? We're not doing enough of that
    type of work.
        And the last part, and I think Adnan would have a point to
    raise on this is, you know, the Federal Government's not really
    going to step up in this spot. It's uncomfortable there. It
    raises a whole host of kind of legal issues and the ability for
    the Federal Government to move and shift in the online space is
    very little, right? So, this is where foundations like Gen Next
    can step up. Other foundations, family foundations and things
    like that can say, okay, community partner in Boston who has a
    great idea, you need X amount of money. It's a small amount of
    funding. Let's try this out, and if it works, let's take it to
    L.A. or let's take it to Seattle and get the Federal Government
    out of this process and help kind of do that connective tissue.
        Mr. Lynch. Mr. Selim, Mr. Kifayat?
        Mr. Selim. Yes, thank you, Ranking Member Lynch, and please
    feel free to jump in on this. I guess I would only amplify and
    add one or two points from what my colleagues mentioned. In the
    past number of years that I've been working on this issue, I've
    seen a fair bit of progress from industry, from the technology
    companies, from the social media companies, from the internet
    service providers in this space. Next week, in northern
    California for the first time ever, a number of these companies
    are convening a forum to talk about this issue with Federal,
    State, and local officials. Facebook, Google, Twitter, and a
    whole host of others are convening officials. I think the
    public-private aspect of this that Mr. Hughes alluded to
    earlier is critical to two parts of the question that you
    asked. One is the content and the encryption--how do you remove
    it or take it down--but then there's another important part of
    that issue, which is how do you amplify other non-extremist
    content? How do you amplify the voices of individuals that are
    in refugee camps, American Muslims or other civic leaders in
    the United States to help drown out those voices that are
    online that are trying to recruit and radicalize? And I think a
    stronger partnership with industry on these issues can help
    address both those issues, and I think we need to do it sooner
    rather than later.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. Mr. Kifayat and Ms. Raza, if you have
    anything to add.
        Mr. Kifayat. Just to amplify one point, sir, the--there are
    huge conversations taking--huge tectonic plates of young--
    Americans having conversations about culture and identity and
    what civilization means and talked about what religion means,
    and the problem we've seen online, social media, is that there
    is an ample amount of really bad information out there that
    tells you how to act and what adventure means and what a call
    to action means and what living in a community of nonbelievers
    means. And what we have been doing in our partnerships with the
    technology sector is to, as--to pick along what George said, is
    to drown those out, right, to relegate those to make them
    impotent online. And so we're putting out narratives that
    counter those concepts, counter those ideas at the nip so when
    they begin. And that, I think is where the future is if we are
    to save the internet and save the online space, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Ms. Raza?
        Ms. Raza. Thank you so much for having us here.
        The question of social media is extremely important, and
    our organization has been approached to create an alternate
    narrative. And with regards to the conversation that you had
    brought up before as well, NGOs, nongovernment organizations,
    need to be part of this movement and to create an alternate
    narrative on the internet, on social media so that it can drown
    out, as Mr. Kifayat said, the extremist voices.
        And one of the measures that we have looked upon, which has
    been very successful in terms of community relationships, and
    you had mentioned your concern, along with Mr. Russell, is to
    empower the Muslim communities themselves to take
    responsibility to bring about some of the change so it doesn't
    seem that it's just law enforcement or CVE or someone else who
    is telling them to.
        And the best example of that I can give you is what
    happened last week at a mosque in Davis, California, where the
    imam Ammar Shahin who is at the Islamic Center of Davis called
    for Muslims to fight the Jews and annihilate them. This was
    following the troubles at Temple Mount. And it was the Muslim
    communities that actually took upon this challenge and started
    an online petition to actually have him fired and hire another
    imam. And this is something new and different, which is what we
    need to focus on is while we want to counter violent extremism
    through government, we also want to do it from within the
    communities themselves.
        Mr. Lynch. That is great. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
    extreme courtesy. I appreciate that. I yield back.
        Mr. Russell. [Presiding] And I thank the gentleman, the
    ranking member.
        We have certainly seen firsthand a lot of these issues as
    we have tried to address them. I am going to yield myself some
    time for questions here.
        I think that there is really a responsibility in messaging
    that goes just beyond the Islamic communities. I think it goes
    even nationwide with our media. For example, when you see a
    story reported about ISIS, the B-roll in the background is, you
    know, these people sneaking around with tennis shoes and AK's
    riding on tanks, you know, looking like they are some heroic
    figure rather than the barbarians that have committed
    atrocities that have not been seen since the Dark Ages. I think
    we bear some responsibility when our own media will not engage
    in the betrayal. If all you show is this positive, glorious
    image, then that can be extended through social media, and then
    we see a lot of those issues there.
        It is just a false characterization also of our military
    targeting where somehow the military, which our military is the
    most accurate and the most human-rights-conscious. When we have
    to unsheathe the sword, we try to make sure that it is accurate
    to the point of enormous expenditures to have our weaponry to
    be accurate so that we don't cause undue suffering. And yet the
    opponents, you know, don't abide by any of these rules, and
    then our media will somehow attack our country, our soldiers,
    our warriors instead of those that are sawing people's heads
    off, setting them on fire in cages causing untold human
    suffering, displacing hundreds of thousands and millions of
    people, leveling cities. Other than that, they are all pretty
    nice guys.
        What is interesting is that we have large Muslim
    communities in this country, and a lot of them have lived quite
    peacefully for decades. And, you know, I think of, you know,
    little Baghdad in San Diego. You know, not only do they
    contribute to the economy, not only have we seen very little
    radicalization from these areas--you know, I think of my own
    hometown in Oklahoma City. We have got folks that have come
    from both an Arab, Sunni Arab, Persian Shia background due to
    different things that have happened in the '50s, '60s, '70s,
    '80s, '90s, you know, 2000s, live quite peacefully in the
    community with very little radicalization.
        And then we get to other areas where we have just an
    outrageous proportionate level of radicalization. For example,
    Minnesota has produced 26 percent of young foreign fighters
    recruited in the United States, and more terrorist suspects
    charged in connection with ISIS than any other State besides
    New York, and when you compare the population of Minnesota and
    New York, well, my goodness, you know, you--and so I guess my
    question to you, Mr. Sleeper, would be why is Minnesota such a
    significant center of terrorist activity and recruitment?
        Mr. Sleeper. It's difficult for us to articulate the reason
    why that's happening, sir. Obviously, there's a large Somali
    population, 100,000-plus, in that ----
        Mr. Russell. There is a large Somali population in D.C. --
    --
        Mr. Sleeper. Geographic ----
        Mr. Russell.--but we don't see a recruitment from that. I
    mean, there has got to be a reason. I mean, one thing I learned
    as a warrior, you know, fighting--I have lived in these
    cultures. I have gone to weddings, wakes, you know, done the
    land grab and the bulls, everything and have made great
    friends. But when you have enemies that percolate in an area,
    there is a reason. And so, you know, let's see if we can get
    some ideas to this. Mr. Hughes, you are raising your hand. I
    will come back to you, Mr. Sleeper.
        Mr. Hughes. Sure. Looking at the Minneapolis cases, I think
    we talked a lot about the online environment, this idea of
    online radicalization, online recruitment. Minneapolis is much
    more of a peer-to-peer recruitment. So, the reason why you had
    a number of guys try to join ISIS later is because their
    brother joined al-Shabaab a few years before that or their
    roommate before that. And there was--and there's a connectivity
    there that I don't think we fully understood. So, Abdi Nur goes
    over to Syria and then FaceTimes with his buddies back in
    Minneapolis and says it's time to join the so-called caliphate.
    So, that human interaction actually matters quite a bit. It's
    the reason why Minneapolis had a higher number with a very--
    with a large Somali population and Lewiston, Maine, or San
    Diego doesn't. That peer-to-peer network does matter.
        Mr. Russell. And, Mr. Sleeper, what would be the profile of
    these terrorist suspects or recruits that are coming out of
    Minnesota, you know, to speak to what Mr. Hughes is--what would
    that profile look like?
        Mr. Sleeper. There really is no profile. We spent a
    tremendous amount of time, research, and analysis looking into
    individuals that are becoming radicalized so that we can get
    ahead of the curve, behaviors, indicators ----
        Mr. Russell. But, see, we got to do better than that. And
    look, you know, when I was thrust in combat environments, you
    know, one of the first things I said is three questions: What
    does the enemy look like? How can he hurt us? And how can we
    hurt him? Now, we have the most incredible, phenomenal
    intelligence services in the United States. We have millions of
    Muslim Americans that are willing to help and serve their
    country. How do I know? Because I served with quite a few of
    them. So just to say, well, we can't identify what they look
    like, we can't make a profile, you really think that is true? I
    mean, you represent the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I
    mean, boy, if that is true--because if we can't identify the
    problem, we can never solve it.
        Mr. Sleeper. It is difficult to identify any commonality --
    --
        Mr. Russell. Life's tough, but it is tough if we don't
    identify the problem. I mean, so, help me out here. What ----
        Mr. Sleeper. So, if you look at the number of
    investigations we have open right now, several hundred
    investigations in this country right now, I'd say the FBI is
    very effective at identifying individuals that articulate a
    desire and we determine there's predicated information that
    they're prepared to act on it.
        Mr. Russell. And to your point ----
        Mr. Sleeper. Prior to that, it's a very difficult process
    to do in consideration with First Amendment rights, freedom of
    speech.
        Mr. Russell. Sure. And to your point on the good job that
    the FBI does, I don't want you to think I'm picking on you; I
    have great respect for the Bureau. And ISIS self-turned air
    traffic controller just caught two weeks ago, charged, indicted
    in Honolulu, I mean, imagine the destruction and damage he
    could have done if our Bureau had not been Johnny-on-the-spot.
    And so, you know, we do appreciate the work that our military
    and the Bureau does every day.
        But I refuse to accept that we can't identify a profile.
    Anyone else want to take on what that might--Mr. Selim?
        Mr. Selim. Sir, if I may just add one note to this. Part of
    the group of folks who work for me is there are a group of
    folks dedicated to working with the latest and greatest, both
    analytical and social science community on this. Going back to
    your earlier question on why--in Minneapolis, why is the spike
    so high, what a number of studies and what a lot of research
    has shown is that individuals who come to this country that
    have a higher exposure to violence from wherever they came from
    may possess a higher propensity to radicalization and
    recruitment.
        Mr. Russell. But, gosh, do you think that is true when you
    look at like what happened with Beirut? We have had a lot of
    people come from Lebanon, and we have not seen this problem. We
    have had civil wars and destruction of all kinds of things
    before where we see a migration of population and we don't see
    radicalization. So, do you get my point?
        Mr. Selim. I do. I think it's just--it's one of the factors
    that we've seen particularly differentiating in the Twin Cities
    with some of the Somali community attacks that we've seen in
    Ohio and other places. It's one of the factors, in addition to
    a whole host of others.
        Mr. Russell. Okay. Thank you. And I am consuming some time
    here, and I have some very patient colleagues I have great
    respect for. And I will come back on some other things, but I
    want now to recognize Ms. Demings from Florida.
        Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and believe
    me, this topic, this conversation deserves all of the time
    necessary because it is a very important issue. I want to thank
    our witnesses for being here, thank our ranking member as well,
    Mr. Lynch.
        The FBI has confirmed that there are active ISIS-related
    investigations in all 50 States. To date, 26 States and the
    District of Columbia have had at least one charge with offenses
    related to the Islamic State within their borders.
        So, Mr. Selim, I would like to start with you. What is the
    Trump administration's justification for proposing that the CVE
    grant funds be eliminated? And what would the impact be if
    those funds are eliminated?
        Mr. Selim. Ma'am, thank you for that question. I can answer
    it a few different ways. The first is that the program that we
    recently announced, these awards that we announced in June,
    this is a--that award was not a one-year award. That award was
    a two-year award. So, that $10 million in awards that we've
    administered will last for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year
    2019, and we're about to start that period of performance and
    that cycle now.
        So, I'm aware that the presidential budget request did not
    reflect the CVE grant program in fiscal year 2018. However,
    there's--it's not that there's zero dollars being spent in '18;
    it's that this is a two-year period of performance in which I'm
    very confident, as the director of the office and the program
    manager here, that we'll be able to demonstrate a high degree
    of excellence on these 26 awardees. And hopefully, by fiscal
    year 2019, we'll be able to have the best practices and lessons
    learned to be able to make the case to the Congress for more
    funds in this area.
        Mrs. Demings. Do you agree--and I would also like to hear
    from Director Sleeper as well on this. Do you agree with the
    GAO that the Federal Government does not have a cohesive
    strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort? And
    we will start with you, Mr. Selim?
        Mr. Selim. So, I am aware of the GAO response on that
    issue, and there is a DHS response to the GAO report, which, if
    the committee allows, I'd be happy to submit that for the
    record as well.
        Mr. Selim. I do not agree with that view that there is no
    measurement and evaluation of any of the programs.
        Specifically on the CVE grant program, we have robust
    measurement put in place for all 26 of the grantees, both
    qualitative and quantitative. To give you an example of some of
    the qualitative measure that we're looking at, in the CVE grant
    program, there are five focus areas overall. So one of the
    questions that the committee and you may be wondering is how do
    you measure the ability to do training on countering violent
    extremism or radicalization and recruitment? And we're really
    looking at a number of different factors. When we're looking at
    training the space, we're looking at both the number and type
    of people being trained. Are they State and local law
    enforcement professionals, are they civic leaders, are they
    spiritual leaders, and so on?
        And we're also conducting pre- and post-survey assessments
    on the level of knowledge acquisition. Historically, in any law
    enforcement or military training, the nature and scope of the
    training, the level of knowledge acquisition that's attained,
    so we're taking into consideration a very broad swath of data
    that we'll be collecting, and we'll use that to implement and
    hone our own training in the Federal Government moving forward.
        Mrs. Demings. Director Sleeper?
        Mr. Sleeper. This is an incredibly complicated issue. We're
    not the only country dealing with it. Virtually every Western
    country is currently wrestling with this. We can always be
    better, coordinate more effectively. We need to if we expect to
    meet the challenges facing us.
        Mrs. Demings. And I have to agree with our chairman's
    statement earlier that we do have to do better. This is an
    ever-critical issue. Do you agree that the evaluation process
    that is in place is adequate?
        Mr. Sleeper. I have not actually reviewed the report,
    ma'am.
        Mrs. Demings. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Russell. Very efficient on your time. I thank the
    gentlelady.
        And I would like to recognize the gentleman from Vermont,
    Mr. Welch.
        Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to acknowledge the presence of Kerry Sleeper,
    who served, Mr. Chairman, as our commissioner of public safety
    in Vermont, and we are pretty proud of him.
        And I want to ask you, Director, in your new job one of the
    things you did so well in Vermont was walk this tightrope that
    I think folks in law enforcement have to walk between being
    all-in, very aggressive, very vigilant to protect our safety on
    the one hand and also create positive relationships with the
    community, whose support you need in order to effectively do
    your job. And I would think that in this mission that all of
    you now are engaged in of countering violent extremism, that
    community support continues to be important, but the threat
    probably that you are all dealing with is even greater than
    what you have faced on a day-to-day basis when you were the
    commission of public safety.
        Congress tends, I think, to focus understandably on the
    potential violence that we want to give you the tools to
    control, but, as you did in your job in Vermont, you also
    displayed some ability to see the importance of maintaining
    that community support that is intentioned sometimes with
    aggressive actions that have to be taken to contain violence.
    And I wonder if you could just speak a little bit about that
    and how the FBI managed that.
        Mr. Sleeper. I believe the FBI does an outstanding job,
    sir, at reaching out to communities, particularly communities
    at risk. The communities most at risk are those that need the
    most outreach and communication. We see all across our country
    right now a number of cities that are struggling with
    relationships between their police departments and their
    communities, and violence is resulting as a consequence of
    that.
        This specific threat that we're discussing today requires
    that the FBI and the communities engage in dialogue with very
    specific segments of those communities, and the threat requires
    that there be open, trusted dialogue. The members of those
    communities recognize the first most fundamental role of the
    FBI is to protect the citizens of this country and to uphold
    the law. There's no doubt about that. That's the tough part.
    The fair part is that we engage in dialogue with those
    communities so they understand why we need to enforce those
    laws, why we need to protect those communities.
        And if we think particularly of the Somali community
    members who are leaving Minneapolis, they're going to fight in
    a far-distant war. The vast majority of them are going to come
    home in a body bag. So what we're trying to do is protect those
    people, communicate. And as most of the Americans that have
    traveled to fight for ISIS, they will eventually end up in a
    body bag, so we're trying to communicate to their friends and
    families that there's consequences to this type of behavior.
    That's the type of dialogue and communication that we want to
    have with those communities so they understand clearly our role
    and the likely consequences of their actions.
        Mr. Welch. When we have that kind of trust, does it also
    lead to you being able to get actionable information?
        Mr. Sleeper. It is, and again, we are seeing in the
    communities where we engage the communities do respond and
    recognize--we have been thanked by parents of children who we
    caught before they traveled for saving their children's lives,
    and that's the message and the dialogue that we want to put out
    there that we're about not only protecting the communities and
    the citizens but the individuals themselves that are making
    decisions regarding travel. But there is no doubt we are here
    to investigate and to uphold ----
        Mr. Welch. Right.
        Mr. Sleeper.--the safety of the citizens of the United
    States first and foremost.
        Mr. Welch. Yes. Well, I really appreciate that.
        Mr. Chairman, you probably--in your own work serving our
    country probably had similar tension between the need to use
    force in appropriate circumstances but try to get the trust of
    the folks in the country where you were serving, a hard job.
        Well, I thank you. Thank you, Director.
        Mr. Russell. And I thank the gentleman, and I would agree
    with those comments and associate with Mr. Sleeper's earlier
    comments that community type of interaction is essential. One
    of the things that made it even harder is when you are not even
    from the country, you don't have the language, you are
    automatically hated, you are occupying the territory, and you
    are trying to earn trust. But guess what? It can be done, even
    those tall-order things. And we are not facing that. Although
    maybe in reverse as they come back we see some of those factors
    play in.
        And I would like us, before we close, a couple of
    additional questions if I may to Mr. Sleeper. You had made
    mention that there is a number of open investigations earlier
    in your comments. About how many is that?
        Mr. Sleeper. We've publicly acknowledged in several
    environments that there's over 1,000 open investigations across
    the country right now. I can't be specific, but there's over
    1,000.
        Mr. Russell. Okay. Thank you for that. And how many
    individuals approximately have left the United States to fight
    for ISIS or other associated terror groups like al-Shabaab, et
    cetera?
        Mr. Sleeper. I don't have that number readily available,
    but we can ensure that you're provided with that.
        Mr. Russell. Sure. And if we have to provide it in a secure
    setting, you know, we can also arrange that. And can you get
    with us so that we can nail that down?
        Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you for that, sir.
        And then to Mr. Selim, you know, this morphing grants and,
    you know, we are going to add this many, we are going to
    subtract this many, and all of that, can we get full, complete
    without redaction examples of what those grants are and their
    parameters? Is that possible to provide to the committee?
        Mr. Selim. Mr. Chairman, I believe so. Currently, just to
    give you an accurate sense of where it is, I believe in a full
    and high degree of transparency with this and any other of our
    overseers, the stack of paper that we're looking at that's
    currently underneath review with our general counsel and so on
    is over 500 pages. And we're looking to make sure that there's
    no PII and whatnot, and that's the type of redaction. In
    addition to supplying that information on the grant
    applications to this committee, we want to make as much of that
    as publicly available and transparent as possible ----
        Mr. Russell. Sure.
        Mr. Selim.--so I'm committed ----
        Mr. Russell. Personal ----
        Mr. Selim.--to doing so. I need to circle back with our
    counsel and just ensure what the parameters of delivering that
    to the committee are.
        Mr. Russell. Yes, personal identifiers, Socials, like that,
    I don't think--let me check with my legal counsel. I don't
    think that that is an issue, but we don't want, you know, oh,
    you know, here are the two sentences on page 1, so ----
        Mr. Selim. No, I can assure you we're not looking to reduce
    any of the substance but just the appropriate things for
    scoring and so on.
        Mr. Russell. Okay. And I appreciate that. And then I thank
    the committee today not only for the broad bipartisan concern
    and interest but, you know, for the excellent witnesses on both
    sides. And I want to thank the ranking member for his tireless
    work on national security. You know, not only have we developed
    a friendship; we have traveled large portions of the globe
    together.
        And I also want to thank all of you today that have come
    before us. And I know it wasn't a convenience to, oh, sure, you
    know, let me--but I really appreciate the work that you do and
    the unique perspective that you provide, and I hope that we can
    work with you more in the future.
        And with that, I would like to thank all of our witnesses
    that are before us today.
        If there is no further business, without objection, the
    subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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