[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-59]
U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 3, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
27-562 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi JIMMY PANETTA, California
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Jen Stewart, Staff Director
Jennifer Bird, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff....................................................... 5
Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 60
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 65
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 67
Ms. Rosen.................................................... 68
Mr. Scott.................................................... 66
Ms. Speier................................................... 65
U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 3, 2017.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:03 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The committee welcomes the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff today for a hearing on
Afghanistan and South Asia. The Secretary had previously
indicated that he would be back to discuss the administration's
approach to this region once it was decided, and that is the
topic for today.
I understand that there are many issues facing the
Department and this committee, but in the interest of time and
focus, I want to encourage members to confine their questions
to today's subject.
United States officially launched Operation Enduring
Freedom on October 7th, 2001, just about exactly 16 years ago.
Approximately 2,400 American service members have lost
their lives in the Afghanistan conflict. Another 20,000 or so
have been wounded. As this administration formulates its
policies, the American people and Members of Congress have some
basic questions, questions such as, does American national
security still warrant our military presence in Afghanistan? Do
we have a strategy to succeed or one to avoid failure? How is
this administration's approach different from previous
approaches? And can we ever be successful in the face of Afghan
corruption and Pakistan's duplicity?
Both Secretary Mattis and General Dunford have considerable
personal experience with this conflict, and I believe that they
are as authoritative as anyone in helping provide answers to
our questions and to chart the way forward. But these
fundamental issues do need to be discussed openly for the
American people and for those who have sacrificed over the last
16 years. That is the reason we are here today.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I think the chairman raised all of the questions that
need to be raised. This is obviously a very, very difficult
part of the world. We clearly have national security interests
in how Afghanistan is governed, and Pakistan as well, going
back to 2001, when the then Afghanistan government led by the
Taliban allowed Al Qaeda to have safe haven to plot and plan
terrorist attacks against the U.S., including 9/11. Making sure
that we don't return to those days is clearly in our national
security interests.
But what is not as clear is how we do that, and what the
cost is of our current effort. Afghanistan is a very difficult
place to govern. And I think one of the things that concerns
most members of this committee and most people in the country
is we understand that it is a fragile situation. We have been
hearing that for, as the chairman mentioned, 16 years.
If we are there for another 20, I envision that whoever is
sitting in those seats at that point would be having the same
conversation, and I think that is my one big question, how do
we get to the point where we can reduce our commitment in
Afghanistan so that it is not an open-ended commitment and a
blank check?
The President said that in his remarks when he rolled out
his strategy, that it wasn't going to be open-ended, it wasn't
going to be a blank check. Absent from that was what that meant
and how we would go about achieving that very worthy goal. And
I think that is my biggest question.
And the second question to that would be while granting
that there are risks in pulling out, there are obviously risks
in staying there. So, what happens under the two different
scenarios? Because it would be great if we were able to bring
our troops home and commit our resources elsewhere. And the
longer we stay there, the less it looks like it is going to
move us towards the positive outcome that we want.
So, are we envisioning just a prolonged stalemate where we
figure we cannot leave, because if we do it will get worse? Or
do we actually think we can get to the point where we go beyond
prolonged stalemate and get to a more positive outcome, which
is simply--you know, paraphrasing one of the questions the
chairman asked. But those are the questions I think I am most
interested in.
I appreciate both of our witnesses being here, and
obviously their tremendous service to our country.
With that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 60.]
The Chairman. Again, Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, thank
you all for being here. We will turn the floor over to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Mattis. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appear before
you following the tragic event in Las Vegas. The Department of
Defense is staying closely linked with the intelligence
community, and we remain alert to law enforcement's assessment
of events.
You on this committee are keenly aware of the complex and
volatile security environment our country faces today. Russia
continues to invest in a full range of capabilities designed to
limit our ability to project power, erode U.S. influence and
undermine NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization's]
transatlantic alliance.
China is focused on limiting our ability to project power
as well, and weakening our position in the Indo-Pacific region,
even as we work to find common ground in confronting North
Korea's provocative actions.
The international community, as reflected by the two latest
unanimous Security Council sanctions resolutions, is focused on
the destabilizing threat posed by North Korea and Kim Jong-un's
relentless pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile
capabilities. The Defense Department supports fully Secretary
Tillerson's efforts to find a diplomatic solution, but remains
focused on defense of the United States and our allies, per
President Trump's orders.
In the Middle East, Iran continues to project malign
influence across the region. While we continue to make gains
against the terrorist enemy in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, in
Afghanistan we have faced a difficult 16 years. General
Nicholson, our NATO and United States field commander, with
troops from 39 nations has blunted the terrorists' offensive
moves in Afghanistan.
NATO's strengths and support of the improving Afghan
security forces and disarray among various enemy groups have
caused the Taliban to expend resources, constrain their
movements, and limit the Taliban's ability to conduct major
offensives. Beginning last month, and for the first time in
this long fight, all six Afghan military corps are engaged in
offensive operations.
During these recent months, there have been fewer civilian
casualties as a result of coalition operations, although
regrettably, Taliban high-profile attacks on civilians continue
to murder the innocent. While the Taliban still attempts to
seize district or provincial centers before the end of this
fighting season, they have generally been forced into
decentralized, small-scale ambushes and the use of improvised
explosive devices.
Importantly, the rate of Afghan National Security Force
casualties has reduced from last year.
As you know, I just returned last week from a trip to India
and Afghanistan and can report that General Nicholson and the
NATO team are holding the line. Forecasts of a significant
Taliban offensive remain unfulfilled. Violence and progress do
coexist in Afghanistan, but the uncertainty in the region and
the NATO campaign have been replaced by certainty due to the
implementation of President Trump's new South Asia strategy.
This strategy has been welcomed almost uniformly by leaders
in the South Asia region as well as the 39 countries
contributing troops to the NATO-led campaign.
We must always remember we are in Afghanistan to make
America safer and ensure that South Asia cannot be used to plot
net transnational attacks against the U.S. homeland or our
partners and allies. Our goal is a stable and secure South
Asia. A political settlement in Afghanistan is only possible if
the Taliban rejects support of or conduct of terrorism.
Based on the intelligence community analysis and my own
evaluation, I am convinced we would absent ourselves from this
region to our ultimate peril. Our new conditions-based approach
has set the stage for regional and Afghanistan national change.
Our new strategy, vigorously reviewed and approved by President
Trump is, quote ``R4+S'' unquote. Which stands for regionalize
it, realign it, reinforce it, and reconciliation, coupled with
sustaining it.
The first `R,' to regionalize it, recognizes challenges
exist beyond Afghanistan and adopts a geographic framework with
a holistic comprehensive view. India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia,
and China were considered at the outset, rather than focusing
only on Afghanistan and then introducing external variables
late in our strategic design. My visit last week to India was
in part to thank them for their continued generous development
support in Afghanistan.
We also discussed ways to expand our collaboration to
improve long-term regional stability and security. We will
firmly address Pakistan's role. NATO's demands need to be heard
and embraced in Islamabad.
The second `R,' to realign, signifies that we were shifting
our main effort to align more advisors who can provide training
and advisory support at the battalion and brigade level. The
fighting will continue to be carried out by our Afghan
partners, but our advisors will accompany tactical units to
advise and bring NATO support to bear when needed.
Make no mistake, this is combat duty for our troops, but
the Afghan forces remain in the lead for the fighting.
We have now approximately 11,000 troops in Afghanistan,
alongside 6,800 from NATO and coalition partners and 320,000
Afghan National Security Forces. From these numbers, you can
see the Afghan forces remain the main effort and we are
supporting them not supplanting or substituting our troops for
theirs.
The third `R' is reinforce, and that is seen in our
addition of over 3,000 U.S. troops arriving in the coming
months to extend NATO's advisory effort to Afghan troops that
are currently without. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and I
together toured Afghanistan last week, sending a message of the
NATO coalition's unity. He is also reaching out to our allies
to increase their troop levels.
In light of our new strategy, 15 nations have signaled that
they will increase their support. Again, certainty now having
replaced uncertainty, we are looking to our partners to provide
more troop and financial support.
The last `R' is reconcile, and that is the desired outcome
from our military operations, convincing our foes that the
coalition is committed to a conditions-based outcome, we intend
to drive fence-sitters and those who will see that we are not
quitting this fight, to reconcile with the Afghan national
government. Our goal is a stabilized Afghanistan achieved
through an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process.
War is principally a matter of will, and the international
community is now making clear that it will stand alongside the
Afghans committed to this fight. As we have shifted to a
conditions-based strategy, not time-based or troop number-
focused, ambiguity has been removed. The elements of this
strategy are a tangible demonstration of our resolve. All this
will be carried out by, with, and through our Afghan partners
and within the coalition framework ensuring this campaign is
politically, fiscally, and militarily sustainable.
Our Afghan partners, who continue to take the lead, fight
most effectively where NATO and partner advisors are alongside
them. As President Ghani said to the United Nations General
Assembly in New York, ``Afghans are determined to fight. No one
should mistake our will to defend our country.''
I am heartened and impressed by the international reception
to our strategy. I am confident we will see heightened levels
of support from our allies and partners in the months ahead. As
NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said last week in Kabul,
this is about making sure that Afghanistan does not once again
become a safe haven for international terrorists. And the best
way of doing that is to enable the Afghans to have defense
security forces which are strong enough to do that.
We are already starting to see the psychological impact of
this new strategy, both militarily in the field as well as
through President Ghani and the Afghan government's commitment
to reform.
President Ghani recognizes that fighting corruption and
accelerating institutional reform across government are
critical to success. The recently launched U.S.-Afghan Compact,
outlining more than 200 measurable benchmarks for reform,
demonstrates our shared emphasis on these goals.
Our South Asia strategy reinforces to the Taliban that the
only path to peace and political legitimacy is through a
negotiated settlement. It is time for the Taliban to be forced
to recognize they cannot kill their way to power, nor can they
provide refuge or support to transnational terrorists who
intend to do us harm.
I want to close by recognizing the need to maintain the
closest possible dialog with Congress and specifically with
this committee. This committee has long appreciated that the
defense caps mandated in the Budget Control Act [BCA] imposed
the greatest inhibitor to our defense. Without relief from the
BCA caps, our air, land, and sea fleets will continue to erode,
our path to modernization will be shortchanged, and our
technological competitive advantage lost.
I trust I will have your support for lifting the defense
spending caps as we address today's complex and increasingly
volatile national security environment.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Dunford.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to join Secretary Mattis in providing an update on
the South Asia strategy.
In recent months, our commander in Afghanistan, General
Nicholson, described the current condition in the country as a
stalemate. Secretary Mattis has testified that we are not
winning. And members of this committee have made similar
statements. This situation has developed since the NATO mission
in Afghanistan transitioned to an advisory effort.
Since 2015, we have advised and accompanied Afghan special
operations units at the tactical level, but our advisory effort
for conventional forces has generally been limited to the
Afghan army corps and institutional level. We also reduced the
aviation, artillery, and intelligence support provided to the
Afghan forces. This construct did not provide Afghan
conventional forces with the support they needed to succeed in
combat operations.
My military assessment is that we drew down our advisory
effort and combat support for the Afghan forces too far and too
fast. As a result, the Taliban expanded territorial and
population control and inflicted significant casualties on the
Afghan army and police, while we lost campaign momentum. Last
spring, Secretary Mattis directed the Department to conduct a
detailed failure analysis to identify the root causes for the
lack of progress in Afghanistan and he directed we provide
targeted solutions.
Informed by these findings, our commanders developed, and
Secretary Mattis approved, a new operational approach to break
the stalemate and bolster Afghan capabilities. The new approach
supports the President's broader strategy by expanding our
advisory efforts to the tactical level, increasing the combat
support we provide to our Afghan partners and enhancing
authorities.
We believe these adjustments will improve the ability of
the Afghans to conduct offensive operations, defend critical
terrain, and reduce Afghan casualties. The emphasis is on
providing effective support to the over 300,000 Afghans we have
trained and equipped, so they can secure their own country.
Going forward, we will support President Ghani's efforts to
reorganize the Afghan forces, which will expand special
operations units while at the same time reducing less effective
units. We will also continue to develop a capable, sustainable
Afghan air force. And finally, we will enhance and expand our
own counterterrorism operations in the region.
By next spring, this approach will have our most senior
capable and operational experienced leaders advising at the
decisive point in Afghan operations. Their efforts will be
fully enabled by the support and the authorities they need to
take the fight to the enemy--that is specifically for the
Afghans to take the fight to the enemy.
As we implement the strategy, we are also tackling
corruption, the single greatest roadblock to progress. In my
judgment, our military objectives for this new strategy are
clear and they are achievable.
The first is we defeat ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and we ensure other
terrorist groups are unable to launch attacks against the
homeland, U.S. citizens, or our allies. We are going to further
develop Afghan forces that are capable of managing the residual
violence with limited international support.
We will support President Ghani's effort to ensure that key
population and economic centers are secure, and we will provide
an enduring counterterrorism partnership with Afghanistan to
protect our shared interests in South Asia.
As Secretary Tillerson has recently outlined, this entire
effort is intended to put pressure on the Taliban and have them
understand they will not win a battlefield victory, so they
will enter an Afghan-led peace process to end the conflict.
And with that, Chairman, I am ready to take questions.
The Chairman. I appreciate it, sir.
I guess I want to--just basically have one question. A
former military commander in Afghanistan directed me to this
editorial written by former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan,
Ronald Newman. It appeared in the Washington Post on August
9th. The first paragraph says in theory, U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan has been to train an Afghan army that can fight Al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State, and then largely to
withdraw. After 16 years, it is not surprising that many people
think that strategy has failed. In fact, it hasn't really been
tried.
And then he goes through a brief history of our efforts, or
lack of efforts, of deadlines, of not meeting commitments and
so forth and concludes by saying that much of the rush to
failure has been Washington driven.
And so, I guess I would like each of you to comment on the
extent to which the lack of stability in approach, the lack of
stability in commitment, the lack of stability in funding, as
we begin the ninth consecutive year under a CR [continuing
resolution], to what extent those Washington driven aspects
have contributed to Afghanistan not being as successful so far
as we would like it to be.
Secretary Mattis. Chairman, war is primarily a matter of
willpower and what we have to demonstrate, based on where the
situation is at this time, is an implacable will that the
international community--and that means America first among all
of them, is going to stand by this effort. And that has to do
with standing by certain policies, standing by the Afghan
military, standing by budgets that give predictability so we
keep our own military strong.
It is all part of setting a cohesive framework within which
we can achieve tangible results and not face what Ranking
Member Smith rightly is concerned with, a prolonged stalemate.
When you set timelines, you are telling the enemy what you will
not do--we will not fight past a certain day. When you set
troop caps, you are saying what you won't do.
And I believe right now, the most important thing is to let
the enemy know they are not going to win, and that is because
we now have over 300,000 Afghan forces in the field that
through some very severe fighting have earned our support, as
we try to drag this toward an end of this war, toward
reconciliation.
Chairman.
General Dunford. Chairman, you and many members of the
committee have visited Afghanistan multiple times and I know in
each of the visits one of the issues that has been raised is
hedging behavior, hedging behavior by the Taliban, hedging
behavior by regional actors, in particular Pakistan.
One of the primary drivers of that hedging behavior, which
was inhibiting us in actually making progress in a campaign,
was a lack of certainty and a lack of confidence that the U.S.
commitment, the international coalition commitment would be
enduring, and particularly for probably 4 or 5 straight years,
there was always a sense, and it has been described as kind of
the Y2K effect in Afghanistan--it was always a sense that when
December came, the coalition would depart.
I think one of the most significant changes in the strategy
with conditions-based is it leverages the center of gravity,
the source of strength in Afghanistan which is the confidence
of the Afghan people and the confidence of the Afghan forces.
And on the flip side, it actually undermines the confidence
in the Taliban because they are not really trying to deal with
us or wait us out. As Secretary Mattis said, it is a clash of
wills. They now realize that the 300,000 Afghan soldiers and
police that have been built, they are going to have the support
they need to defeat the Taliban and to bring the Taliban to the
peace table.
So, I think that is probably, in my judgment, how the
hedging behavior back here in Washington, lack of clarity has
affected the campaign.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Just sort of following up on that question, I
think you--right we have had timelines. We have had troop caps.
We have also consistently exceeded those troop caps and
consistently gone beyond those timelines. So, if the Taliban
were actually paying attention, at some point, they would come
not to rely on those timelines or those troop caps.
And I guess what you have outlined is kind of what we have
all been hoping for 16 years, is if we just stay there long
enough, in great enough numbers, Afghanistan will eventually be
able to defend itself, and we won't have to be there anymore.
I think the lack of confidence in that, and I hope that
that editorial that was written is correct, comes from more
than just the lack of commitment, it is the complications of
the terrain, what does reconciliation look like? When do the
Taliban come to the table?
And like I said, what I think we are really looking for is
some confidence--let's say that we do it conditions-based and
we do all the stuff--for how long? And I am not looking for a 1
year, 2 year--you know, 2 years, 12 months exactly, but what
are the factors that give you confidence that we won't be in
the scenario that I just described? That even if we do this
more open-ended commitment that we won't be having the same
conversation 20 years from now?
Because this is not Afghanistan's first time at this. As
everyone knows, people have come and gone from Afghanistan for
a very long time. And I get the feeling that as far as the
Taliban are concerned, we can come in and say we are going to
be there for 50 years, and they say fine, we will be there for
51.
So what is the confidence you have that this change can
address not just whatever shortcomings might have been in
previous administration strategies, but the reality of
Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, we--the men and women in
this world live by hope. They hope tomorrow is going to be
better. The Taliban could hope repeatedly that whether we
overstayed what timeline we gave ourselves, we had still said
we are leaving as soon as we can. What we are saying now is
there is going to be an end to the war. It is going to end
because we don't want the threat to America. We don't want the
threat to our allies. And the best way to do that, as Secretary
General Stoltenberg put it, make certain the Afghans have a
force that can deal with this internally.
Certainly, it is going to take our mentors. What
reconciliation looks like goes back some years in terms of the
conditions. But it is Afghan-led. It involves the Taliban
rejecting terrorism and supporting people who have attacked
this country. It involves them to quit killing--to stop killing
the Afghan people and live by the constitution. That is a
pretty low bar if they choose to rejoin the political process.
If they don't, we are going to make it extremely
uncomfortable for them by training, advising, assisting the
Afghan forces. And I think what we don't want is some transient
success. So we have pushed this forward in a way, in an
implacable way, because that is the surest way to end this
faster, rather than stringing it along--if that addresses your
question.
Mr. Smith. It does to some degree. And I understand that my
question is unanswerable past a certain point. We don't know,
you know, what it is going to take to really break the Taliban,
but that does put us in the position.
I guess, put it just one different way. When the President
says no blank check, no open-ended commitment, what does that
mean? Where does the check stop? Where does the commitment
stop?
Secretary Mattis. One point is, sir, that Secretary General
Stoltenberg when he was getting off the plane when we came out
of theater, said he is going back to Brussels to build more
support. In other words, we are going to have more people
aligned with us in terms of financial and troop contributions
because of our--the certainty we have replaced the uncertainty
with.
It also means that we are going to see a declining use of
American mentors as this army gets up on the step. We simply
cut back too soon. We pulled the training wheels off the bike
before it was fully ready to be balanced and move against the
Taliban. This was a concern from our intelligence agency when
we pulled all of our forces down to the level they were at. And
so we are going to have to make up for it, and we have to
inherit where it lies now.
But it is not an unending commitment. You will see a
degrading number of American forces, a declining number of
American forces, as you see an improving capability on the part
of the Afghan forces conditions-based.
Mr. Smith. Understood. And I know that Congressman Jones is
next, and he will drill down on this in much greater degree
than I did, so I will let that go. And the only other question
I have, and it is largely rhetorical, but I would nonetheless
like your response. You mentioned at the conclusion of your
remarks the budget caps that the Defense Department faces and
the CRs that have been presented to you have been one of the
factors that have made it difficult to maintain a consistency
of commitment to Afghanistan.
If we were to reduce revenue by $1.5 trillion over the
course of 10 years, would that not make it just a little bit
more difficult to provide the Department of Defense the money
that it needs to do what it needs to get done?
Secretary Mattis. Chairman, probably someone with better
financial background than myself could give a better answer. I
would just say that as I understand the process right now it is
to reduce the taxes to build the economy and the growth is
going to accrue more government revenue. But this is not an
area that I would call one of my expertise.
Mr. Smith. Fair enough--and I know that is the hope. There
is no credible economist--even conservative economists say that
that is absurd under our current scenario, that somehow if you
cut taxes dramatically for everybody you are going to magically
wind up with more money.
If the top rate was, like, 90 percent or we had a capital
gains rate of like 66 percent and we were cutting it down from
there, but cutting it from where we are at to right now, making
a commitment to our national security and reducing the revenue
by at least $1.5 trillion over 10 years is, I think,
significantly inconsistent, and that is a point that I will
return to at other hearings.
I yield back.
Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Smith. And we are
going to proceed--Chairman Thornberry has gone to the floor to
vote so that the committee can continue meeting and then soon
as he returns obviously we are going to proceed.
And at this time, we now have Mr. Jones of North Carolina.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. Secretary and
General, thank you as well.
I wrote to President Trump on July 18th asking him to
please come to Congress and ask us to have a debate on a new
AUMF [authorization for use of military force]. Now here is a
sentence from one of his tweets that I would like to read:
``Let's get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by
the Afghanis we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense.
Rebuild the United States of America.'' That is his tweet, not
mine.
In addition, that brings me to this, General Mattis, in a
Politico article in August of this year titled ``Trump
Administration Opposes Effort to Rein in War Powers,'' they
quote in this sentence as you--not quoting you, but it makes
reference to you: ``That stance appears to contradict comments
by Mattis, who has endorsed passage of a new AUMF to govern the
war against ISIS. Mattis chastised Congress at a March Senate
hearing, testifying that he has not understood why the Congress
hasn't come forward to at least debate on AUMF.'' Well, that is
the fault of our leadership under Paul Ryan, to be honest with
you. He could ask that we have a debate but he doesn't do it.
My two questions--that is one, if you will just write that
down. The other one is going to be as quick as well. The waste,
fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan--we have spent over $1
trillion. You talked about the soldiers and Marines who have
been killed--thank you for remembering and sharing the 2,300/
2,400, or Mac Thornberry did--over 20,000 wounded.
We have been paying ghost soldiers to help the Americans
over there. They don't even know who they are, but we have
spent billions and billions of dollars. DOD [Department of
Defense] paid $6 million to buy nine goats. We don't know where
the goats are, by the way, but that is DOD spending that money.
That is why the position on sequestration, I somewhat agree
with you. I didn't vote for it but in all fairness we keep
wasting the taxpayers' money. As Mr. Trump said, not only in
that one sentence, but he said it 30 times, and I have all 30
of his quotes.
The one that really of all the waste, fraud, and abuse that
have just about shocked the people of the Third District of
North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, was
the one that the U.S. Department of Defense signed a contract
with a British firm called New Century Consulting, where we
paid them $50 million to train Afghans to be intel officers.
Out of that they bought seven luxury cars. The firm in
Britain bought seven luxury cars--an Aston Martin, a Bentley,
Porsches, and four other luxury cars. Plus, they paid their
wives--talking about the executives--$400,000 each.
Go back to the AUMF and then I want to ask you this--who on
your staff is responsible for reporting to you about all this
waste, fraud, and abuse that John Sopko has done a great job of
informing Congress and the American people, and it keeps going
on and on.
It has got to stop because it is going to hurt the Nation,
which is $20 trillion in debt, and it is hurting our military.
But how can you justify--not you personally--how can we justify
spending more and more money when we can't account for the
waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan?
So, there are my two questions, and I appreciate your
answers.
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, we cannot justify wasting
any money, and I am committed to finding who is responsible
every time we find a case like this, holding them accountable
and preventing it in the future. And I need to look into this
New Century Consulting piece, and I will be getting back to you
on this in detail, because I don't believe you can waste
government money.
One of the things we are doing to make certain there are no
more ghost soldiers--and by the way President Ghani has
embraced it now because he is working on his ghost teachers--
granted, not something we are putting money into. But he has
got the same problem in his education system--because we are
biometrically enrolling every one of them. And if necessary I
will use U.S. paymasters, but we are not going to hand the
money over and hope it gets to the right places in terms of
fighting this war.
The biometrics alone will remove a lot of this problem,
because the only way to be entered is to be there. So the ghost
soldier piece will be more a matter of monitoring their
continued status than it will be having corruption introduced
at the beginning.
This comes out of the chairman's failure analysis that I
directed him to do and what do we do about the kind of things
you rightly bring up to us here today. But we are not going to
continue that.
And as far as the AUMF goes, my point is that we need the
unity of the American government and with the Congress involved
that brings the unity of the American people to this fight. And
I recognize we have to win your trust and your confidence on
this. And the fact that the Department of Defense is big
notwithstanding I intend to do that.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Jones. We now proceed to Mr.
Larsen of Washington State.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple questions. First off, with regards to the
regionalization or `R' in the new strategy--in 2004 the
administration at the time designated Pakistan as a non-NATO
ally, making Pakistan eligible for certain preferences,
especially with regards to the support of its military.
Given that one of the points that you have made and the
President has made about the administration taking a harder
line towards Pakistan regarding support of the Taliban, are you
ready now to revoke Pakistan's non-NATO ally status? If yes,
can you give us the reasons, and if not, why not?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, what we are doing right now
is we are aligning what Department of Treasury, Department of
Defense, the intelligence community, Department of State, say,
this is what we must ask Pakistan to do to change its behavior.
At the same time, we are aligning that with NATO so we have 39
other nations that will also be reinforcing this.
As you know, I just visited New Delhi about the situation
they face on their border. There are a number of ways, based on
a very recent visit by the Pakistan chief of army staff to
Kabul, about 3 days ago, that we can help Pakistan to see its
way forward to do what is in its own best interest.
We will do this in a holistic, integrated way; holistic
means whole of government and integrated with our allies and
that is across South Asia. This strategy is not exclusive. In
other words, any nation that wants to fight back against
terrorism and reduce this threat to all nations is more than
welcome.
It is not exclusive with Pakistan, it is inclusive, and
that is why we started with a regionalized strategy. As we move
this forward, we are going to have to find common ground with
Pakistan. And, as you know, the international community does
not stand for terrorism. So there are decisions Pakistan must
make. They have lost more troops than probably any other
fighting terrorists.
So on the one hand, we have the problems of havens and
other things that we have all registered. And yet, at the same
time, they have actually been fighting the terrorists. We have
got to get this aligned regionally and solve this problem. And
we have options to deliver----
Mr. Larsen. And if I could just note in 16-plus years I
have probably shared the frustrations of many on this committee
about Pakistan as well as the limited number of successes that
we have had with Pakistan.
Secretary Mattis. Right.
Mr. Larsen. Is revocation of non-NATO allies status on that
list of possibles?
Secretary Mattis. I am sure it will be.
Mr. Larsen. General Dunford, you just came back from China,
visited one border, the Chinese-North Korean border, but there
is a 90-kilometer border between China and Afghanistan. It is
not very easy to get to, but it does exist. Did you have any
discussions with China on the regionalization issue and what
role they can play--it can play?
General Dunford. Congressman, at really a minimum--that
trip was really focused on North Korea--had a few sidebar
conversations on Afghanistan. Clearly China has, you know,
there are many areas where our interests diverge. There are
some interest areas where they converge and I think
counterterrorism is one of those areas where our interests
converge, particularly in Afghanistan.
And I have certainly suggested to the Chinese interlocutors
that they could play a more productive role, particularly in
development and assisting with the counterterrorism effort on
the border.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Gentlelady from Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to go on record to thank Secretary
Mattis and General Dunford. It is good to see both of you again
today, and I will take a moment to express my appreciation to
you and the Department of Defense for providing the security to
the people of Guam from North Korea, and we do appreciate the
Department's efforts to have the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense] battery protecting the people of Guam. Thank you
very much.
My expectation is that today's hearing is one of the first
steps in drawing out what an Afghanistan strategy that the
administration puts out would look like.
Secretary Mattis, at your recent speech at the Air Force
Association conference, you stressed the importance of not only
listening to our allies, but be willing to be persuaded by
them.
So can you point out to me pieces of this strategy where
the administration and the Department of Defense have been
persuaded by our allies, or would solicit input from the
international community?
And what portions of the strategy do our allies and
partners have concerns with?
Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, right now I would just
tell you that to be willing to be persuaded, the allies were
100 percent persuaded by our approach to drive towards
reconciliation.
It has received near universal agreement. I say near
because I haven't talked to all of them. But during the--while
we were putting this strategy together, I have met three times
with various groups of allies; from the Defeat ISIS group,
because of the similarities in the counterterrorism campaign,
and with the Ministers of Defence, there in Brussels--the NATO
ministers, as well as in the Pacific when I was at the Shangri-
La Dialogue where I talked to many of my counterparts there.
They made it very clear that they believe that this enemy
had to be defeated in Afghanistan, or whether it was in Europe
or in the Pacific, we were going to see a wider spread.
So, I think this is why we have seen such--such support,
frankly, from across our allies since we have rolled it out.
From Brussels and the NATO nations to New Delhi in India,
certainly in Kabul where even the housing prices are going up,
based on the confidence--this is an objective measure we watch
very closely for what is going on there.
So we have seen the input. We have heard the input. And it
has been incorporated into what we have. And we are getting
good feedback, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I am happy to hear
that.
And gentlemen, when do you expect the new strategy to
produce positive results? What tools and process do you have in
place to assess progress toward the stated end goal?
I am aware that the strategy will not have predetermined
timelines, but I am interested in the Department of Defense's
plan to monitor progress toward the condition-based goals that
have been set.
Either one of you.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, Congresswoman, we have, in a U.S.-
Afghan Compact agreement with President Ghani's government, we
have over 200 specific benchmarks, as we attempt to quantify to
the degree we can--you can't quantify everything, but quantify
where we can, the progress we are making.
Furthermore, we have polling going on to see how we are
doing with the hearts and minds of the people.
Additionally, we have a separate--by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff we have a separate assessment that will be going on as we
look at our own benchmarks that we intend to meet; numbers of
units that are mentored, this sort of thing.
But in order to be output oriented, it is going to take a
little time. That said, I was struck by the degree of
confidence I saw, politically and militarily, in Afghanistan
among our coalition troops and among the Afghan leadership,
military and political, as a result of this strategy.
So I think the psychological impact is beginning to be
felt. The Taliban have been unsuccessful in what they have been
attempting to do, to take a provincial and district center.
They are still trying, as we speak here today. But also, they
are starting to fight among themselves due to a loss of some
key leadership. And because they are just not getting along
with each other, under the increasing pressure that the Afghan
forces are placed on. Anything else, Chairman, to add?
Ms. Bordallo. General.
General Dunford. I think we will have a pretty good sense
for the strategy next summer, as our advisory effort is
revised, and we implement the full advisory effort that is
informed by the failure analysis that we spoke about earlier.
Next summer's performance by the Afghan force will be one
indicator.
There is also a very important event taking place in
Afghanistan next year, which is the elections. You know, I
think the--we will see the Afghan's ability to perform the
security function associated with the elections as being a very
good indicator as well.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General, and I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To both of you, we are
deeply grateful for your service, and for the kind of in-depth
analysis you do on all of these issues to present to the
President.
I have a couple questions. Director Coats, the Director of
the National Intelligence, recently testified to Congress, in
which he said ``The intelligence community assesses that the
political and security situation in Afghanistan will almost
certainly deteriorate through 2018, even with a modest increase
in military assistance by the United States and its partners.''
General Dunford, you and the Secretary plan for only a
modest increase in military assistance. If the intelligence
community assesses that won't make any difference, then how can
you defend sending thousands more troops, and how can we ask
our allies to do the same?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, I think that is a fair
question, and I think what the intel community has done is
provided a snapshot in time. I don't think the intel community
has assessed several things. One is the revised organizational
construct of the Afghan forces. They are making some
significant changes.
I don't think the intel community has factored in the
change, the advisory assist effort, and the increased combat
support that U.S. and coalition forces are providing to the
Afghans. I don't think the intel community has adequately
assessed the impact of a conditions-based strategy on the
confidence of the Afghan people, the confidence of the Afghan
security forces, or the behavior of other regional actors.
So Congresswoman, I--you know, again, this is a very
difficult endeavor. The one thing I am sure of is that the
strategy will keep the American people safe by preventing Al
Qaeda and ISIS from conducting attacks on the homeland. But I
also believe it has a good prospect of allowing the Afghan
security forces to get to the point where they can secure their
country on their own.
Ms. Speier. Do you agree with me that we will have a
presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, each of
you?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, I will take that question
first. Here is what I would say. In South Asia as a whole, we
have vital national interests, and I believe those vital
national interests are enduring. And I believe we will have a
diplomatic, an economic, and some military presence in the
region for a long period of time.
I do believe that the military element of our strategy will
decrease over time to a sustainable level. What we are
attempting to do in our overall campaign against terrorism is
ensure that working by, with, and through local partners, we
get to the point where we have a politically, a militarily and
a fiscally sustainable strategy from West Africa, Southeast
Asia. In Afghanistan, I look at--in that context.
So while I do think there will be U.S. influence and U.S.
presence for some time to come, I don't think there will be a
large footprint of U.S. forces for a long period of time to
come.
Ms. Speier. So to be fair to the American people, we should
make it clear to them that we are not leaving Afghanistan.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, we should only leave a
region--again, if you look at our strategies being diplomatic,
economic, and military, if we didn't have enduring vital
national interests, and I believe we do, and so I think there
has to be some presence and some influence. Again albeit in
different form over time, but there has to be some U.S.
presence in the region in order for us to advance our interests
in the region.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments on
that?
Secretary Mattis. I would agree with the chairman. We have
a number going in now. It is going to make the Afghan military
more capable. As they prove themselves and build their own
capability as the enemy diminishes, certainly our numbers would
be coming down in a commensurate way, conditions-based as the
President said.
Ms. Speier. So what does a diplomatic solution there look
like? How do we bring the parties together? And what would that
look like?
Secretary Mattis. First, we have to remove from the Taliban
a sense that they don't have to negotiate this, and how they
can achieve what they want through violence. Once they get that
through their head, then we are going to peel off some of them.
And you already see this happening where there is an
atomization of the Taliban going on because they have lost some
key leaders. And the ones who have stepped up, frankly, have
not been as good.
It has made in some way the reconciliation--political
reconciliation a little harder because some of the people we
are dealing with may not represent this new fragmented Taliban.
But eventually the weakening of the Taliban should put us in a
position where some of them say, ``That is it; I am not going
to keep this up.'' Others of them say, ``We are willing to
negotiate.''
What does the negotiation look like? They stop killing
people and stop supporting the terrorists who attacked this
town and New York City. And at that point, if they are willing
to live by the constitution, President Ghani has made clear
that they can come back in. You have already seen parts of it
actually come over, you know, come over to Ghani's side.
So it is starting and it is not tidy, but it is ongoing
now. And that is what you will see continue to move forward as
we block them militarily from having a chance for victory on
the battlefield.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, it looks like it is going to be
maybe another 5 minutes or so before other members come back. I
could pepper you with questions, but maybe I won't. You have
had--you have been testifying a lot today.
So what I think we will do is invite our witnesses to the
anteroom and the committee will stand in recess for
approximately 5 to 6 minutes.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. We
appreciate you all's patience with our voting schedule. Chair
recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary Mattis
and General Dunford, I want to thank you on behalf of our
military service members, military families, veterans. There is
such a reassurance with your service and so greatly appreciated
your dedication and your persistence on behalf of victory as we
are proceeding in the global war on terrorism.
As the grateful dad of an Afghanistan veteran, one of the
primary concerns that I would like each of you to address is
the--are the rules of engagement in Afghanistan. During the
previous administration, I introduced a resolution calling for
a revision to the existing rules of engagement under Operation
Resolute Support in Afghanistan in an effort to succeed in the
complex environment combatant commander's face. What is the
status of the new rules of engagement for U.S. military efforts
in Afghanistan?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the old rules included both rules--
under rules of engagement and operating principles, included a
requirement for proximity of the enemy to be engaged by our air
forces. President Trump has told me that I have the authority
to change that. So I have removed proximity, and that in itself
opens the enemy, wherever they are found, to the NATO air
support, under the NATO OPLAN [operations plan]. So the first
thing is, we have unleashed that. At the same time, we have had
a reduction in the number of deaths by innocent people as a
result of coalition operations, not Taliban.
And my point is, we will always take every humanly possible
step to protect the innocent, but the rules themselves permit
the engaged forces to bring air support and artillery support
in. Furthermore, by extending the who--which units are being
advised it means that many Afghan army units that never had
advisors and had a very convoluted way to get at that air
support--it wasn't a rule of engagement problem, but it was
organizational problem; that has been removed as well. If that
addresses your concerns.
Mr. Wilson. It does and I truly appreciate the complex
situation of organizational end rules and you addressing it,
and again, it is reassuring as a parent. And then Mr. Secretary
we all want to succeed in Afghanistan and you clearly
illuminated, or identified the situation and that is that we
need to eliminate safe havens for terrorists abroad to defend
American families at home.
At the same time, I support your efforts for more troops,
but we have increased deployments meaning fewer ready units at
home for unforeseen contingencies. Sadly, we have also had the
recent extended loss of two destroyers, the Fitzgerald and
McCain and the necessary support for devastating hurricanes.
The strain on the military is ever-increasing. What can we in
Congress do to help you face the multiple threats that are
facing our country?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman Wilson, I think the most
important thing is that we get budget predictability and
certainty because without that we cannot take the--adjust our
forces and get predictability into our budgets that permits us
to gain the best bang for the buck, to put it bluntly. We are
going into the ninth year with a continuing resolution.
As you know, I cannot make new starts under that. Even if
the cyber domain or the space domain require that we do new
things we have not had to do before to maintain our competitive
edge. So the most important thing, I believe, is to make
certain that the Congress act together to relieve us of the
Budget Control Act cap, the defense caps, and we get
predictability in our funding.
Mr. Wilson. And I am really grateful for the leadership of
Speaker Paul Ryan and Chairman Diane Black. We are trying to
address that. And additionally, Mr. Secretary, as the former
co-chair of the India Caucus, I appreciate your visit last week
to New Delhi. Under the new strategy, how will our defense
relationship with India change, and keeping that in mind, how
can we balance our cooperation with India as we have a
situation where Pakistan has a level of resentment?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the question you are bringing up is
exactly why I was in New Delhi last week where Prime Minister
Modi and their national security advisor, the minister of
defense, welcomed me. I would tell you that India is on the
move. The economy is picking up.
But most importantly in my portfolio, we now have a
strategic convergence of two natural partners, the two largest
democracies in the world. And India has been generous over many
years with Afghanistan. They have been the victim of terrorism,
so I don't need to go there and talk about the terrorist threat
with them.
We have many areas where we are natural partners with one
another. And we are deepening and broadening the military-to-
military relationship with them. But it is not an exclusive--it
is not an exclusive strategy, exclusive of anyone. Any nation
that wants to be part of this--the counterterror effort and
this stability effort in South Asia, can sign up.
Pakistan need not think this is exclusive of them. It is
open to any nation that wants to move against terrorism and
remove this threat to all civilized nations.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, thank you for being
here. Thank you for your service to our country.
In President Trump's August 21st speech, the President
stated that he had lifted restrictions placed on our
warfighters and the expanded targeting authorities. And I know
you understand that this is obviously--it is critical that
Congress be kept apprised of the operational outcome as a
result of these changes so that we can continue to conduct the
appropriate level of oversight.
Can you more clearly define for me what are these
restrictions that have been lifted? And which authorities have
been extended? And which results have you seen--what results
have you seen since these changes were made thus far?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the NATO OPLAN had certain--had
certain objectives in mind. It is organized to bring the Afghan
army into a stronger position. And in some cases we were not
giving that army the high ground. In other words, having fought
in the mountains, it is a very uncomfortable feeling when the
enemy is above you.
We did not give the young Afghan boys the sense that they
had the high ground when they were fighting against this enemy,
that the NATO air support could have given them. Today, I can
bring that air support to them. We have got to reorganize our
advisors because those units with NATO and American advisors
win, and those without them often do not win. So we are going
to spread the number of units with advisors. We are going to
bring that air support to bear.
And specifically, we are no longer bound by the need for
proximity to our forces. In other words, wherever we find the
enemy, we can put the pressure from the air support on them. It
used to be we had to basically be in contact with that enemy.
At the same time, we do not want this to be misinterpreted into
a laissez-faire use of fire support when we are fighting wars
where the enemy intentionally hides among innocents.
It is still very much aligned with our effort to do
everything humanly possible to prevent the death or injury of
innocent people, women and children, villages, this sort of
thing.
Mr. Langevin. Are there other restrictions that we should
know about that you can identify now?
Secretary Mattis. The other restrictions usually are
basically in now being able to bring this fire support to bear
where we could not before, whether it be proximity or we were
not with those units. Remember, we were only advising under the
old--under what I inherited, down to the corps level. We are
now going down to the brigade level and the next level down,
the kandak, or what you and I call the battalion level. These
are the forces that actually move against the enemy.
You will notice the commando forces and special forces who
consistently win against the Taliban also have--they also have
NATO and U.S. advisors with them. Our failure analysis made
very clear why we had the problem with the other forces. We are
going to solve that.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Secretary Mattis, while the Afghan
government is certainly determined to maintain security and
stability, it is obvious that they are also contending with the
clash of cultures in the region necessitating a coalition of
our partner nations to address regional security challenges.
So I understand that you were just in India or you spoke
about that with Congressman Wilson, where they pledged $3
billion for development projects to train Afghan officers as
well as additional naval cooperation.
So how will this expanded engagement enhance security in
the region?
How do you intend to leverage relationships like this to
develop a more effective coalition strategy that will inject a
level of legitimacy and confidence between the Afghan
government, its people, and its regional partners?
And, similarly, something that caught my attention in the
President's speech with respect to Pakistan, how do you intend
to persuade Pakistan to take more action to eliminate
cooperation, support, and refuge for the Taliban in the Haqqani
network?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I am--let me take the second
question first. On Pakistan, what you are going to see is 39
nations all in the NATO campaign working together to lay out
what it is we need Pakistan to do as well as in the U.S.
Government--Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of State, the
intelligence community, Defense Department, and we lay out what
it is we need Pakistan to do and then we are going to use a
whole-of-government international effort to align the,
basically, the benefits and the penalties if those things are
not done.
Pakistan, again, has lost more troops in this fight against
terrorists than nearly any country out there. And yet at the
same time, as you know, there has been some parsing out where
some terrorists have been allowed safe havens. We are out to
change that behavior and do it very firmly.
Based on a visit 3 days ago by the chief of army staff of
Pakistan to Kabul, we actually have, for the first time, a
sense of some optimism out of the Afghan government. So I am
from--I am in a show-me stage right now, but we intend to work
through international partners diplomatically, economically,
and work together to make the change that actually impacts in
best interest.
As far as gaining confidence there with the Afghan people
and their military and how do we make this work, I am going to
ask the chairman to say a few words on this, but the bottom
line is, sir, that if you look at what we call a loya jirga,
which is the largest political assemblage under their culture,
it is overwhelming how much of the population wants the NATO
alliance to stick with them.
And so, when you add to that the countries like India which
are trying to provide more generous--they have been very
generous, but even more development support, there are ways to
build the confidence of a people that have been tormented ever
since the Soviet invasion by violence.
Chairman, if you have something.
General Dunford. Congressman, the one thing we always said
was that the most important thing that we were delivering to
the Afghan people was some hope for the future, and a
conditions-based approach gives them that.
In recent polling, about 80 percent of the people reject
the Taliban. About 70 percent plus have confidence in the
Afghan security forces, and roughly those same numbers as
Secretary Mattis alluded to, roughly those same numbers welcome
a coalition presence.
So, I think that the commitment that the international
community, because this isn't just a strategy about the United
States, there are 39 other nations, and NATO has the same
approach, a conditions-based approach. I think that is having a
profound effect on the psychology of the Afghan people. Which
again, we always felt was a source of strength in the campaign.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you both.
The Chairman. Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you
for your very solid and extraordinary leadership. I think the
Nation is very fortunate that you have accepted these
assignments. A lot of my questions have already been asked and
answered, but I want to go back just to what a couple of my
colleagues have said previously about Pakistan.
So, I know that they are demonstrating, at least
rhetorically, the right approach and willing--expressing the
willingness to help, but we have seen this before. And we have
been disappointed and sometimes they do a little bit and make
it sound like it is a lot.
What--in this, I recognize we are also in an open setting,
what can you tell us about if we find that this is a false
start again that we can do to pressure them to more cooperate?
Because I think it is pretty obvious without them we have a
much more difficult time in Afghanistan.
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the reason we did a regional
approach in the beginning was so we didn't try to start with
Afghanistan, put together a great plan and say, well now we
have got to add in these kind of variables. We started with
India to Iran. We looked up into Central Asia and down into
Pakistan and came at Afghanistan as a geographically
centralized problem, but informed by the others.
I think that there is an increasingly level of discontent
in the world with any country that supports terrorism for any
reason. I mean, it has taken a while for some countries to come
onboard or you look at what Secretary Tillerson has put
together in terms of the Defeat ISIS Coalition, 69 countries
right now plus the Arab League, European Union, NATO, INTERPOL
[International Criminal Police Organization].
When you think of that number of countries it is clear that
what ISIS has done has created its own antibodies. And by doing
that, there is more of a concern about the spread of terrorism.
So as we work this problem with Pakistan, as Pakistan has moved
actually against the border areas here in the last 6 months,
losing a lot of troops and pushing against some of the border
passes to give access into Afghanistan, I think that we are in
a position now where we can be more compelling. But, this is
going to be one step at a time. We are going to remain,
basically, focused on this effort.
We are not going to back off and it will start with
assistant secretaries coming out of Washington and the national
security staff members going into Pakistan soon followed by the
Secretary of State. I will go in and we have Secretary General
Stoltenberg's very clear support for this in his advocacy as
the Secretary General of NATO.
So we are going to continue to build this up in an
international way with a whole of U.S. Government argument for
the Pakistanis to work in their own best interest and ours.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for being here.
At the outset I just want to, sort of, endorse Mr. Jones's
comments that, I too, feel that we as a full body of Congress
should have the opportunity to debate an authorization for use
of military force. It has been too many years, I feel. I have
been here 10 years and we have been having these hearings over
and over and over again, and we have many new Members of
Congress as well.
So, with the new administration a new effort, not
necessarily is different, but nevertheless, a new effort I
feel, we need the chance to debate this and recommit or not to
what you are doing.
But I also wanted to just address, again, the regional
approach that you are taking--and we have had some conversation
about Pakistan but there has also been reporting that Russia is
engaged in finding ways to support the Taliban; Iran as well.
And I would just like your thoughts on how that is complicating
your efforts there.
Secretary Mattis. Well, any effort to support a violent
group--a terrorist group like the Taliban, until they renounce
terrorism, support for them is not in Russia's best interest,
not in Iran's best interest. Certainly not in Afghanistan
people's best interest and it is contrary to the NATO campaign
and the international agreements under the U.N. [United
Nations] that put us there in the first place, that authorized
us to be there.
So, I think that this is very difficult to discern why they
would do something that is not in their best interest. I am not
ready to say precisely what it is. I want to see more evidence
about how deep the support is.
It is just hard to believe--Iran has had their diplomats
killed by Taliban. Russia certainly has had enough problems
coming out of terrorism in South-Central Asia, so this doesn't
make sense, but then the world doesn't always make sense. We
will figure it out and we will illuminate it where it is
necessary in order to try to get a change in behavior.
Ms. Tsongas. And yet, you have seen some evidence of it
without really wanting to go--without fully having a sense of
to what level it goes.
Secretary Mattis. We have seen some, ma'am. It is--I need
more definition on what is coming out of Russia--I can't figure
it out. It doesn't make sense. But we are looking at it very
carefully.
Out of Iran it has always been a low level of intermittent
support for Taliban; mostly financial, some weapons. It is Iran
doing what it usually does, in terms of trying to create chaos.
Ms. Tsongas. General Dunford, would you like to comment?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, what we have seen, just to
be clear, because you have talked about support. I think we
have clear indications of communications. I think with regard
to the Iranians there is no question that there is a degree of
support, as well as communications. With the Russians, I don't
think we have specificity on support to the Taliban.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. That was my only question. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, it is good to see you again and thank you
for being here.
I too, like the other members, want to thank you for your
work since you have been Secretary. You have been very diligent
in ensuring that this committee is informed working directly
with the members of the committee, but even beyond that you
have with the classified briefings that you have held for the
whole House, made certain that other Members hear your message.
That helps us because what we learn in this committee, in
these hearings, we take out to other Members but you are taking
your message directly which has included repealing
sequestration, the effects of CRs, and I want to appreciate
that you have done that because it is making a big difference.
So, I want to thank you for being here today also. And I
want to ask you a question concerning the drug trade in
Afghanistan. According to a 2016 survey concerning opium
cultivation and production in Afghanistan, the cultivation in
Afghanistan in 2016 increased by 10 percent. All regions,
except the southern region, experienced an increase in opium
poppy cultivation last year.
Additionally, aside from a drop between 2014 and 2015, the
data shows a steady growth in opium poppy cultivation between
1994 and 2016.
If you look at the historical levels from 2001 to where we
are today it has roughly doubled. So, we have seen that it was
less than half before 2001. I know that that is unacceptable. I
am certain you believe it is unacceptable, and it has a direct
impact on counterterrorism, as you know, because it includes
funding. Counternarcotics efforts lessen the funds that are
available to terrorists. It also breeds corruption in both the
Afghan government and in the Afghan military.
And we know how to address this. We address the crops, we
address distribution, we address labs, we address funding--
basically the infrastructure for the narcotic trade.
So, in looking at your new additional strategy in South
Asia, how do you see this strategy including an effort to
affect the opiate narcotic trade?
Secretary Mattis. It is a great question. Both the counter-
finance aspects of the strategy and the counter-corruption are
linked directly to the counternarcotics campaign. We will--we
watched as we drew down too fast, too early. We watched the
Taliban surge. As the Taliban surged, we watched the poppy
surge right along with it. There is no surprise here--the
intelligence community had warned us about this, so it is
exactly what we were told would happen.
As we look at this we are going to go after the
counternarcotics refineries, the transportation nodes, the
bazaars as they call them, where they are bartered. And the
reason is that is where the Taliban actually accrues their
taxation cash off of the trade. It is not from the little guy
down there who is farming this hearty crop of poppies.
And so, we are going to look at where does it help the
Taliban and fight it from that direction rather than going
pretty much in a big way just after the farmers themselves. So,
there is a way to cut this thing and reduce it by targeting the
right locations and the right nodes in the drug trade that will
also undercut the Taliban's fundraising.
Mr. Turner. General, we have dealt with this issue a lot
and there have been times where we have had some success. In
looking at this issue the committee is very aware of the fact
that there are impediments as to how we are structured. Are
there things interagency, interdepartment, funding issues that
we need to address to ensure that the Secretary's new strategy
is implemented? What do you see as your impediments?
General Dunford. Are you talking now more broadly,
Congressman, or just with regard to the drug problem?
Mr. Turner. You get the assignment, but you don't have all
the authorities. Where are areas where there is difficulty for
you in trying to achieve, through the DOD structure, a
reduction in narcotic production? And how can we help you?
General Dunford. I think having the right numbers of drug
enforcement agents to advise the Afghan forces--they have got a
major crimes task force there. And so, law enforcement
officials that can help advise and grow the capacity of the
Afghans to both arrest, protect evidence, and prosecute has
been something that has showed good value in the past and also
making sure the justice system continues to mature as well.
Mr. Turner. Sorry, my mic was off. Secretary Mattis,
anything you would like to add to that on the tools that you
would need? I do know that you have difficulty--interagency,
interdepartment, and structurally in trying to achieve these
goals.
Secretary Mattis. You know, sir, because it touches the
Taliban and the counter-finance effort, is something that we
are very much invested in and integrated. I don't sense that I
have any missing authorities here, but if I find them, I will
come up and see you and tell you what I need. I have made a
note of it, I need to look at it. So far, I have not heard
that, but I haven't asked a specific question. I need to do so
before I answer you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, you said a couple of times during this
hearing that war is a matter of will and that the Taliban have
to understand that there is an implacable will on our side to
continue this fight and to see it through until we achieve our
goals. Convince me that our will is more implacable than theirs
going forward.
Secretary Mattis. Well, of course, I am not alone in this
fight, sir. I have just come out and seen our troops in the
field, including the troops of other countries. I have no doubt
we have the troops with the willingness to endure danger and
discomfort in defense of this country, and this town, and New
York City that were attacked by terrorists operating out of
this very area that we are fighting in.
But I think you bring up a good point and it goes back to
something mentioned earlier about AUMF. I think there has got
to be--the U.S. Congress has got to embrace this as our fight.
We are all in this and we--I am eager to hear any criticisms of
strategy, changes in the operation, open the door, have you go
in, look at it. To me, if what you go in and see or what our
inspector finds there isn't something you admire, then I need
to change it.
But one thing, I have dealt with this kind of enemy since
1979. I do not patronize them. When they say girls don't go to
school, you are not going to talk them out of it. They didn't
rationally arrive at that point and we are going to have to
confront this the way free--generations of Americans have
confronted other threats. Whether it be militarism, fascism, or
communism, we are going have to confront it for our time.
Mr. O'Rourke. Let me ask you a follow-up question that--you
talked about some of our goals. The primary one, I think, being
that Afghanistan never again be used to plan or carry out
attacks against the United States of America. We want those
stakeholders, like the Taliban, to work within the national
government and the political process.
You also said that the Taliban have to understand they
cannot kill their way to power. I think you would also agree,
we probably cannot kill our way towards these goals and
conditions. So, therefore, what is going to have to happen for
the Taliban to accept our conditions, short of us killing all
of them?
Secretary Mattis. Well, I think Congressman, it has got to
be they recognize they are not going to gain power at the point
of a gun and that the Afghan security forces are capable of
defeating them.
General Dunford. Congressman, if I could just add in there,
and we talk about will, I think the Secretary just touched on
something that is important. It is not the Taliban will just
against U.S. and coalition will. It is the Taliban will against
the Afghans and the Afghan forces in particular. In the last
year, the Afghan forces had 16,000 soldiers killed and they
stayed in the fight. They have proved incredibly resilient.
Sure, they have had battlefield shortfalls and we know what
they are and our failure analysis indentified those, and the
plan that we have proposed is designed specifically to address
where there are tactical gaps in their capability, down at the
small unit level, and particularly, the ability to deliver
fires.
But I think at the end of the day, this is a clash of
wills. It is a clash of wills between the Afghan people and
some small portion of the Afghan people that actually want to
resort to violence to advance their political objectives. And I
think with support to the Afghan forces and the Afghan people,
I am confident that their will will actually endure longer than
Taliban will.
Mr. O'Rourke. But with all due respect, General, it is not
just the Afghan government and a small minority; it is the
Afghan government, a trillion dollars in U.S. taxpayer support,
tens of thousands of U.S. service members, NATO allies, the
support monetarily and militarily from those countries as well,
and we are in our 16th year with no end in sight.
And I am having a very hard time understanding and being
able to explain to my constituents what the game-changer is
that I am hearing today that will make this different going
forward. And I mean no disrespect----
General Dunford. No, no.
Mr. O'Rourke. But I am just not hearing it. I think this
war has suffered from a lack of oversight and a lack of
questions asked, and so I am asking you this question.
General Dunford. Sure, I think it is a fair question. I
think it is a fair question to debate why this is different and
why we should stay after 16 years.
I will certainly tell you from a military perspective why I
recommended we stay was, we looked carefully at the 20 groups
that are international terrorist groups, 20 of the 90 we
recognize around the world, and the consequences of not keeping
pressure on them. So that was number one.
In terms of what is different, people talk about 16 years--
for 14 years of those 16 years, we were in the lead and we were
in the fight. Over the past 2 years, it has been the Afghan
forces that were in the lead and in the fight. They didn't have
adequate force capabilities to be able to deal with the
Taliban.
This doesn't address 16 years of us being in the fight;
this addresses 2 years of the Taliban fighting legitimate
Afghan security forces. And this plan is designed to fill the
capability gaps that have been identified as a result of the 2
years of casualties and setbacks that they have suffered.
I think that is really important, is that this is designed
to be fiscally, militarily, and politically sustainable over
time. It will require a U.S. presence increase in the short
term, but in the long term this is about leveraging the 300,000
Afghan forces that we have grown over the course of 16 years,
but just inadequately supported here for over the last 2.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for what you
do to protect our country and our allies.
I believe the President is to be commended when he in his
recent speech talked about Pakistan and how Pakistan needs to
be more consistent in its promoting stability in the region.
And, Secretary Mattis, you addressed that very strongly in your
comments earlier.
And I would just like to follow up on that a little bit.
What can we do if Pakistan does not follow through and be a
better promoter of promoting stability?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we have an enormously powerful
number of options there. Right now I would like to think we
will be successful, but you have--you asked a very good
question, because we don't want a transient or temporary
change, but and then, you know, they--things go back the bad
way.
But I think that right now with the growing consensus
against terrorism, they will find themselves diplomatically
isolated. They will find themselves economically in increasing
trouble, as countries that are damaged by this terrorism coming
out of there say enough is enough and take steps.
There is an awful lot of advantage to Pakistan of coming
online with the international community, and I think that we
have to stay focused there, but the penalties are just as
significant as the advantages if they choose to go a different
direction.
But for right now, we need to try one more time to make
this strategy work with them, by, with, and through the
Pakistanis. And if our best efforts fail, President Trump is
prepared to take whatever steps are necessary.
Mr. Lamborn. And, for either one of you, how will or how
should our defense relationship with India change?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I was in India last week and was
very well received by Prime Minister Modi, by his minister of
defence, his national security advisor. We have a strategic
convergence right now between the two--the world's two biggest
democracies, and this is probably a once in a generation
opportunity to with shared interests to deepen and to broaden
our defense relationship, but also our economic relationship, I
think our political relationship can be tightened together.
They are a force for stability in South Asia. They are a
force for stability in the Indo-Pacific region. They are a
nation coming into their own, economically, as a great nation,
as they have steady growth rates going on right now.
And I think there is an opportunity here that we have not
experienced in decades to tie us together in terms of a
broadened level of cooperation and a natural alignment with
each other's interest.
Mr. Lamborn. As a follow-on to that, do you have anything
that you are ready today to announce or designate specifically,
that we will be doing that we haven't done in that past with
India?
Secretary Mattis. There are a number of things in motion
right now, sir, and decisions, I think, will be coming very
soon. We are both working to turn these big words into
pragmatic realities and because I see both sides working
together on it I am optimistic. It is not like we have to go
over there and convince them that terrorism is a threat.
They have felt what has happened there. We have not had to
convince them that we don't have nefarious designs on the Indo-
Pacific area. We are two democracies that we can work together
on this. There are some things we are doing in terms of their
support in Afghanistan.
Development funding, they have been very generous for many
years and they have achieved a degree of affection from the
Afghan people as a result. They intend to continue this effort
and broaden it. Furthermore, they are providing training for
Afghan military officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] at
their schools.
They are willing to do rehabilitation of Soviet-era
equipment until we are able to replace it with American. That
will take years in order to do it properly and all. So, they
need to maintain what they have now. Helicopters, for example.
Furthermore, they have been providing and will continue to
provide training for Afghani army doctors and medics in the
field, so that the army is able to take casualties and better
sustain themselves; that sort of thing.
So that it is really a very holistic approach that India's
taking. You will notice I left off boots on the ground because
of the complexity that that would bring to Pakistan. We are
trying to make this an inclusive strategy and we don't want
them to get a sense that they are vulnerable to any Indian Army
people from their western flank. That is not necessary.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, I wanted to specifically ask you about
the State Department and the USAID [U.S. Agency for
International Development] programs in Afghanistan now.
And how do funding cuts to the department as proposed by
the administration affect the overall mission there? I know
that you in the past that you have been very outspoken about
the importance of diplomacy and other programs in support of
the mission.
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, right now what we are trying
to do is get a lot more development aid from the international
community. This is separate and distinct from what we are doing
to lower the demand on the American taxpayer where we are
paying an awful lot of the military piece of this.
We are also trying to raise money, by the way, from our
allies to carry more of the commitment on the military side.
But I am not--I am not certain what the cuts are as far as
AID's budget for Afghanistan. I can get back to you. I will go
to State Department, to USAID and determine that, and come back
to you with an informed answer, sir.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Well, thank you very much.
I also wanted to ask you about Special Inspector General
John Sopko. He said in March that with a new administration and
a new Congress that it is a good idea, an opportune time to
reevaluate our efforts in Afghanistan and find out what is
working and what is not.
Now, one smart first step would be to do what SIGAR
[Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction]
recommended years ago, which is for each of the three major
agencies in the reconstruction effort--State, USAID, and DOD--
``to rack and stack their top- and worse-performing projects so
they know where to invest further and where to cut those
losses.'' That was his quote.
And I didn't know if you agreed with that proposal? And if
so, has it been implemented yet in any way in crafting a South
Asia strategy?
Secretary Mattis. I do agree with what he said about what
is working and what is not. We have done a failure analysis
that has tracked--that has delved into this issue. Right now,
before I have the chairman talk with his background as a NATO
commander there in Afghanistan, I will just tell you that when
I heard that the budget was being reduced for AID, Secretary
Tillerson and I sat down together the next day.
We spoke about how we would align DOD and DOS [Department
of State] at the high level to determine what were priorities,
without any violation of our funding lines; make certain we
were talking to each other; that we aligned our foreign policy
effort, DOD reinforcing State Department, with a very strong
partnership to make sure we are getting--we probably should
have been doing this anyway--but make certain what we are doing
was collaborative with one another in any part of the world we
were both operating in.
But let me pass this over to the chairman. He has got some
information on Afghanistan.
General Dunford. Congressman, I think to your broader
question which is did the SIGAR's report inform our strategy
moving forward. The SIGAR actually partnered with us. When
Secretary Mattis directed us to do a failure analysis, to go
back and look at what has worked and what hasn't worked in
Afghanistan, one of the key partners--we brought in a number of
outside agencies--one of the key partners we brought in, and I
had Mr. Sopko in my office, and then he had representatives on
our team.
So when we did the failure analysis, it was very much
involved--very much informed by the work that the SIGAR had
done over the past few years, not only with regard to projects,
as you have talked about, but they have done some good work on
resource transparency and accountability. They did some good
work on what worked and what didn't work in our advisory
effort. They did some good work on what worked and didn't work
in terms of collaboration between State Department and the
Department of Defense.
And so I think that I feel confident in saying that SIGAR's
work as well as some of the other literature that is out there
that talks about what has worked and what hasn't worked in
Afghanistan is very much a part of the recommendations that we
made to Secretary Mattis and the President.
Mr. Veasey. And General, or Chairman also on that one, the
July SIGAR report indicates a 21 percent increase in security
incidents from last quarter of March to May 2017, and a 2
percent increase from the same period last year. What does this
uptick in the security incidents tell us about the security
situation overall? And how are we shaping our strategy going
forward in light of these particular figures?
If you can answer that quickly. Time has----
General Dunford. Sure--sure, Congressman. I would just tell
you that I don't think any of us are satisfied with where
security in Afghanistan has been in 2016 and 2017, although so
far 2017 is slightly better than 2016. And the reason why we
believe those incidents have occurred is the Afghan forces
haven't had the wherewithal to accomplish their mission.
So we have focused on those areas where they have fallen
short of the mark, specifically the ability to deliver aviation
support and provide advisors at the right level in their
formations.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis and Chairman Dunford, thanks again for
joining us today. Thanks so much for your service.
Secretary Mattis, I wanted to refer to the U.S. defense
strategy on the war in Afghanistan. The President noted in his
August 21st address that India continues to be a very important
strategic and economic partner. And I certainly agree with
that. I had the opportunity days after to visit with the
foreign secretary in India, the defense secretary, chief of
naval operations.
I know that you just returned from the region there,
speaking with President Modi and others, and that your effort
and your direction there in dealing with India is going to be
steady engagement, which I think is spot-on. And I am all in
favor of making sure we do joint naval exercises, that we
continue expanded defense trade.
But in relation to what is happening in the region, I am
more concerned about a stable Afghanistan and securing the
hard-fought gains that we have had there. And I know that you
noted that in reference to terrorist safe havens there in the
region, that as global leaders India and the United States
resolve to work together to eradicate this scourge.
And I am fully in agreement with that, but I want to get
your perspective. What do you think that India can do
specifically to help root out or to help reduce terrorist safe
havens in that region? You talked about their engagement in
putting dollars into Afghanistan, but what can they do in a
broader sense in helping with the terrorist safe havens that
are happening throughout the region?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, India has an outsized role
to play because of its size, I think because it is as raucous a
democracy as we are, frankly. It gives people hope that their
voices can be heard, that economic opportunity can be passed
broadly in a society, not to a corrupt few. And I think their
example alone is important. It is why we are looking at this
strategic convergence as an opportunity for steady engagement,
so we have to do pragmatic things together.
I think in this regard, if there is any way for Pakistan
and India to open their border to trade at great economic
advantage to both of those countries, it would be a big help
across the region. Because stability can follow economics as
much as stability enables economics. And so I would hope that
we will eventually see that happen. I believe India wants that
to happen, but it is very hard to do that if your concern is
that you open the border to one thing and you get something
else.
So there has got to be some trust-building between those
two nations. But I think that would probably be--in South Asia,
one of the key enablers to getting trade going back and forth
across all those borders--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Chairman Dunford, I wanted to follow up along the same
lines of terrorist safe havens, and you talked about the new
Afghanistan strategy calls for expanding authority for U.S.
forces to target terrorists and the criminal networks that
operate in Afghanistan. And the President said that he agreed
and said that we ought to have a policy to make sure that there
is nowhere to hide and no place that is beyond the reach of
American might and American arms.
I wanted to get you to elaborate a little more. I know you
talked some about this--about what you see the expanded
authority specifically needing to be, and what it means in a
combat sense. And give us maybe some examples there about what
is not happening now, but what could happen under expanded
authority in how the train, advise, and assist role happens now
versus what it would be in the future.
And have you seen any positive changes that are resulting
from this transition through this change? And will there be any
more changes that you think will be implemented, or will be
necessary to be implemented?
General Dunford. Congressman, let me start with the TAA
[train, advise, and assist] changes, because I think this is
one of the more significant ones. We were providing advisors
only with Afghan conventional forces only at the corps level.
That is the general officer level, largest formation. Those are
not the organizations that are actually in the fight everyday.
So two levels down below is where the decisive action is
taking place, and we didn't have any advisors there. And so
even though we had some aviation capabilities, some
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capability, it
wasn't being delivered to those Afghan units that were actually
most relevant in the fight. So--because we didn't have the
authority to put advisors down to that level.
So one of the more significant changes in authorities is
the level at which we advise and assist. And that has and will
make it--make us more effective.
Also, just broadly speaking, without going into rules of
engagement in an unclassified venue, there are no individuals,
there are no groups that threaten the Afghan government,
threaten U.S. forces, threaten our mission, or threaten the
coalition that General Nicholson does not have the authority to
prosecute.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
This question is for Secretary Mattis. In your opinion is
Iran compliant with the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action]?
Secretary Mattis. I believe that they fundamentally are.
There have been certainly some areas where they were not
temporarily in that regard. But overall, our intelligence
community believes that they have been compliant. And the IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] also says so.
Mr. Gallego. Just a follow-up question to answer, General
Mattis. Would you--will you be recommending to President Trump
that we continue working--are working through the JCPOA to
contain Iran's nuclear capability?
Secretary Mattis. We are working that right now. There
are--if you look--we have two different issues. One is the
JCPOA and one is what Congress has passed, and those two are
distinct but integral with each other. As you look at what the
Congress has laid out at a somewhat different definition of
what is in our best interest, and therein lies, I think, the
need for us to look at these distinct but integral issues the
way the President has directed.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. If there is going
to be any change in the status of our participation in JCPOA
especially when--if it involves the interpretation of what we,
in Congress, pass in terms of sanctions against Iran outside
the JCPOA, will you come back and inform and talk to us?
Because I believe many of us voted for Iran sanctions outside
of the JCPOA with the understanding that they were not going to
be linked.
Secretary Mattis. Well, I think that this would probably be
most appropriate by the Secretary of State, and I would follow
him up here. I think that our diplomacy and the President and
the Secretary of State, I think have the lead on that. But once
a decision is made and I will be in on the decision, I will
give input of course. I will be--always willing to come up and
talk in hearing or in private.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, Mr. Chairman. When we look
back on the history of the Vietnam War in, I think in August of
1969, President Nixon orders a Vietnamization program in sort
of a phased withdraw as the army of South Vietnam gains
capability.
And then they couldn't--he couldn't, in 1972, bring the
North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. So he did, I think
it was Operation Linebacker II, which was a massive bombing
campaign, late 1972 of North Vietnam. He brought them to the
table, negotiated peace agreement that extricated the United
States from the war in Vietnam.
If I look at Afghanistan today, I think that there actually
is a better end state because I think that the Taliban come
from the Pashtun ethnic group. And I think that there are areas
in Afghanistan where the--particularly in rural Pashtun areas
where they prefer the Taliban to the government of Kabul.
But like the North Vietnamese, the Taliban don't feel that
they have--they feel like they are making gains. And so there
is no need to come to the negotiating table. And so I
understand this new strategy is designed to increase pressure
to bring them to the negotiating table. At least that would be
a by-product of it.
So--but I don't--so what I see is the change of the rules
of engagement, when you talk about air support, which is vital.
But--and we are plussing up with 3,000 troops. Is that going to
bring the Taliban to the negotiating table?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, in the past we have not had 300--
over 300,000 troops who are for all of their challenges have
stood in the field and kept the Taliban from doing what they
intended to do, even today, which is take the provincial and
district centers.
So we now have the advantage of that experience--more
experienced force. But we have got to get the advisors down to
a level where they bring NATO air support, NATO intel support,
and NATO artillery--and broadened artillery support to them. So
you know, time will tell, Congressman.
But I think too, again, this strategy is four R's,
regionalize it first. Make certain we are dealing with the safe
havens and the broader issues, get more support. It is to
realign our forces along these lines so they get down to the
tactical level. It is to reinforce them with enough that they
can get down to that level and make a difference. And then it
is reconciliation.
But there is also an S. It is 4Rs plus S. Sustain this
effort. Because if we are willing to sustain the effort--I
still remember being up here on Capitol Hill, sitting behind
Dr. Perry when he testified that it was never going to end the
fighting, the killing, on the Dalmatian coast of Bosnia,
Kosovo.
The international community stuck with that effort. And how
many times have we read in the newspaper about the murder of
innocent people in Kosovo and Bosnia. Do we still have a couple
hundred troops there as part of the international effort? Yes,
we do.
But the international community, if it sticks with this, if
it sustains this, I am confident can throw the enemy on the
back foot and give the Afghan people a chance to pull it
together.
Mr. Coffman. General Dunford or Secretary Mattis, if I
understand right, the significant change in the rules of
engagement in the prior administration, that--I guess, that
unless, in terms of the Taliban, you said that, I think,
Secretary Mattis, you referenced contact, being in contact with
the Taliban. But unless the Taliban showed harmful intent to
U.S. forces, we didn't engage them. And I think that was
modified towards the end of the last administration.
If there were--if a provincial capital were falling, then,
in fact, they could be engaged. And so, if I understand a
fundamental change in the rules of engagement, it is that if--
that the--clearly the Taliban are an existential threat to the
Afghan government that we are there to support. And if in fact,
Afghan security forces in and of themselves are in contact with
the Taliban, then we will provide close air support when
reasonable. Is that a correct interpretation of the current
rules of engagement?
Secretary Mattis. Not complete--yes, at one time, sir, we
could not help the Afghan forces unless they were in extremis.
And I was not here then, and I don't know why it happened. And
then eventually that was rescinded, but they still had to be in
proximity. They basically had to be in contact.
Today, wherever we find them, the terrorists, anyone who is
trying to throw the NATO plan off, trying to attack the Afghan
people, the Afghan government, then we can go after them.
Mr. Coffman. To remove the Taliban?
Secretary Mattis. Always with the caveat that we want to
make every effort to not kill women and children, and innocent
people. Chairman, if you want to comment on that?
General Dunford. Congressman, just to, I mean, I think just
to reinforce the point, there are two things that have changed.
We in the past were only providing advice, you know, again at
that senior level and then, Afghan special operations forces.
So the only aviation support that we could provide was when we
had actually advisors that could--that actually could control
that air support.
So the large number of Afghan conventional forces, the
preponderance of those 300,000 forces we have spoken about,
they could not receive close air support because we didn't have
advisors. That is the big difference.
And then, the other thing that has changed is that now,
again, any individual or any group that threatens the Afghan
government, our mission, coalition forces, or U.S. forces,
obviously, can be engaged.
And the conditions aren't specific to, as Secretary Mattis
has alluded to, a specific engagement at a specific time. So if
they are at an assembly area, they are in a training camp and
we know that they are an enemy and they are going to threaten
the Afghan government, our mission, or our people, General
Nicholson has the wherewithal, the flexibility to make that
decision. It is his level, is where the authority is. And that
is a fundamental difference.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, thank you so much for your continued service
to the country. We have a lot of renewed confidence with you in
your positions. But confidence is really my key question here.
And it comes back to a question we have heard a few times,
and we heard from Senator McCain on the other side of the Hill,
which is, how really will this be different? We have talked
about some of the details. But as we have discussed on this
committee before, at the end of the day, there has to be a
political solution.
The Afghan army, 300,000, however many--it doesn't mean
much if Afghan politics fall apart. Afghan politics have fallen
apart several times. How is the political effort different,
this time around?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, having just returned, I
noticed sitting across the table from me in my meetings were
new commanders and new ministers of interior and defense,
proven people. People that the NATO officers said, we have
fought with these guys, it is great to have them in place.
When you go down to the corps level commanders, these are
all proven young officers who have grown up in this fight. They
are not holdovers, not kept around from past wars. There is
also an effort underway right now to remove many of the
officers who are over the hill and replace them, give the young
officers an opportunity to come up to levels they have
demonstrated they can handle this fight.
That can only reflect a political reality because of the
nature of that society right now. As you know, it is a society
that has been shaken apart since the time of the Soviet
invasion. It is also a group that now recognizes they basically
have one last shot at this.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Secretary, you have detailed, and the
chairman as well, how bringing our advisors down to a lower
level will help on the military front. It sounds like the same
thing is needed on the political front. How confident--and I
see a lot of nodding heads. How confident are you that our
State Department can do that?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, it is not only our State
Department. The NATO Special Civilian Representative--SCR there
and his deputy and the other diplomats in the town of our
framework--NATO Framework Nations, but also for example India,
they are all working along these lines.
Mr. Moulton. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But how
confident are you that our State Department can provide that
support?
Secretary Mattis. I am confident we get varsity people out
there. Ambassador Bass is coming out of Turkey, this----
Mr. Moulton. A lot of positions are unfilled right now. We
just eliminated the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Is that helping, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mattis. It--that has no effect on the intent that
you are trying to highlight here. That is where the Ambassador
and his staff, that is who does the yeoman--the heavy lifting
of that kind of job. We also have other military--U.S. military
officers in their ministries to build bridges across to each--
the various ministry. We try to get the political concentration
of effort--unity of effort that we need.
Mr. Moulton. So, Mr. Secretary, are we actually pushing
advisors farther down in the same way that we were doing on the
military side of things?
Secretary Mattis. I am confident we will be. We currently
are doing that with NATO officers inside the ministry of
interior, ministry of defense, and the intel agencies. As far
as the other ones go, I believe--let me ask the chairman. He
has been there as the commander on the ground in the past. But
I will tell you that I have seen a new level of collaboration
between Chief Executive Abdullah and President Ghani than I
have seen in the past.
Mr. Moulton. The bar is pretty low, but I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman.
General Dunford. Congressman, I mean, I think it is a fair
question. And in--as part of the strategy, the State Department
is tasked with coming up with a more robust approach. I would
reemphasize one point and then talk about one that is
aspirational. When we knew moving forward we were going to have
a new strategy, we needed strong leadership in Kabul.
Ambassador Bass actually was carefully hand-selected. He is
coming out of Turkey. He has been there for 3 years. He has got
an incredible background experience in Afghanistan.
And many of us--many of us spoke to him and encouraged him
to accept this service, which is really what he has done. He
has accepted this service in Kabul for 3 years. So it starts at
the top, and I think we have the right diplomat that is going
over to Kabul.
With regard to your other question, has the advisory effort
on the political level been pushed down to where it needs to
be? Not yet. And that has to be done in order for us to be
successful and I know that is what Secretary Tillerson's intent
is.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen.
We are so glad that you are at the helm at this important
time in our Nation's history, and in the life of Afghanistan.
I am so encouraged by a lot of the changes that you are
instigating. I think it makes so much sense to have the
strategy be condition-based, not just time-based or number-
based.
And I have also been encouraged by what you shared earlier
about making sure that every dollar that goes there is invested
wisely.
Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee held a hearing
recently dealing with the allegation that the Afghanistans
bought and perhaps wasted $28 million dealing with their
camouflage they chose for their uniforms.
And I was so encouraged at your memo, Mr. Secretary,
afterwards, you know, directing that we bring to light the
wasteful practices and make sure that everything is looked at
and there is no waste.
So I am going to ask the question about another area, and
that deals with just the assessment of the Afghan security
forces. General Dunford, you had mentioned, and of course we
talked about 300,000 troops there now and a lot of changes are
taking place.
When I was in Afghanistan in 2011, I was struck by what I
learned there about the difference in perceptions and the
expectations of our military when we first went over there at
the level of their education, level of their abilities, and we
thought we were going to begin training at this point, but the
reality was we had to go back here because of even the literacy
rate was such that we had to start teaching them basic literacy
before we could get them to this point and move forward.
And you said we are going to expand the air force as far as
close air support. Could you just give a general assessment of
where you think they are in their capabilities? Where is their
literacy rate now? Where are the shortfalls in their
capabilities? Where are they in building the air force and the
close air support that we feel like they need?
General Dunford. Sure, Congresswoman. Let me start at the
air force. So when you were there in 2011, I think they had a
couple of small helicopters, MD-530s. They had some residual
Mi-17s and they had a total of five Mi-3s. On any given day
they might have been able to get one in the air.
Today, they've fielded 20 fixed-wing A-29 aircraft. They
have fielded, I think on the order of about 20 MD-530s, which
is small attack helicopters, with the plan to increase more.
And we are in the process of transitioning from Mi-17s to UH-
60s.
The first four UH-60s were delivered this month. The first
two attack versions of the UH-60 will be delivered in January.
And then between now and the next 7 years we will completely
transition to a UH-60 model helicopter, which combined with the
fixed-wing aircraft, the A-29 as well as the MD-530.
And then there is one other aircraft that is a smaller,
light aircraft that conducts reconnaissance called the C-208.
So they have got a pretty robust air force that is growing
right now. The most promising area of the air force has been
the special mission wing, which supports their special
operations.
And I can tell you from personal experience that the
profiles that those pilots are flying are as sophisticated as
the profiles that we typically fly on a routine basis. You
know, and again, that is the result of many, many years of
training. And this is the cream of the crop, there is no doubt.
But there is some room for promise in the Afghan air force.
I think it is important, when you talk about lessons
learned in 2011, in having an accurate assessment of Afghan
capability, one of the things that the Secretary has directed
is that our advisors are going to be the most mature, most
competent, most experienced individuals we have.
And so what you will see are people that have actually been
over there before and going back again on a repeated basis. So
I would expect the advisors that will go in in 2018 will be
people who have had experience in Afghanistan in the past. And
so we will be starting from a known point in terms of their
appreciation of culture, strengths and weaknesses, and so
forth, and be better advisors.
One area that I think is significantly different in 2011 is
leadership. And you know, in 2011 we were still dealing with
the residual of a Soviet-informed army, that type of
leadership.
This summer alone, as a result of President Ghani's
decisions, the average age of the corps commanders was reduced
10 years between last spring and right now. He replaced five of
the six corps commanders.
And so we really are now dealing with a group of
individuals that have been trained, organized, and equipped and
influenced by U.S. and coalition forces for over a decade.
The young lieutenants and captains that you met in 2011,
those are now the kandak commanders and the brigade commanders.
And so, that is something that takes a long time. We say it
takes 25 years to grow a division commander. It takes a long
time. But the investment that we have made, bringing the
Afghans to our schools and training them over years, now are
starting to result in leaders being in the right place.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is very encouraging. Thank you. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis,
General Dunford, thank you for being here.
Secretary Mattis, you talked about the new strategy, the
R4+S. Is that strategy that you also buy into? Right. Is that
something you support? The R4+S?
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely.
Ms. Hanabusa. So can you tell me--I understood your
description of what regionalizing is, but can you tell me what
reconciliation means?
Secretary Mattis. I can, Representative. What it means is
that the Taliban decide to stop killing their fellow countrymen
and women and sit down, as some of the small groups have, and
start working with the Afghan government. They have got
grievances, then bring them up through the normal processes
that countries have to resolve grievances, but no need for
violence, no need to support transnational terrorists.
Ms. Hanabusa. So is this sort of linear? In other words, do
we have to go through each of the Rs to get to the S, which is
the sustained?
Secretary Mattis. No--no, it is not. It is a great
question. We are going to fight and talk at the same time.
Already some groups have broken with the Taliban.
Furthermore, because the Taliban has lost some key
leadership, there is internal fighting going on now, which
distracts them from working against the Afghan government and
against our NATO forces, our Afghan forces.
So this is not going to happen in a sequential, linear way.
There will be--some of them will peel off early. Some will
fight to the rugged end. But the bottom line is we will fight
and talk at the same time.
Ms. Hanabusa. So is realign talking about the others, not
just--you are not talking about our troops. When you talk about
realign, you are talking about realigning, like the other
terrorist organizations or other groups?
Secretary Mattis. No, ma'am. We are talking on the
realignment--realigning our forces to the main effort of
bringing NATO support to the Afghan forces that have not had
advisors before, and ensuring that the Afghan forces are made
more capable to provide for their own defense.
Ms. Hanabusa. So the reinforce component of R-3, I think
you said, is that the United States to reinforce by having more
troops?
Secretary Mattis. We will bring in more troops to extend
the advisors to the other units that the chairman was saying
are not right now getting advisors. But it is also Secretary
Stoltenberg and myself going to other NATO and partner
nations--NATO being the nations there in Europe; partners being
ones like Georgia, Australia--and have them pick up more of the
advisory duty, align more of their troops to advisor duty as
well.
Ms. Hanabusa. So though we may not have more boots on the
ground, so to speak, we do anticipate having more of our
advisors or NATO advisors in Afghanistan in the future.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, ma'am. There will be more boots on
the ground. I mean, we are reinforcing. It is not to take over
the fighting. It is not to supplant or substitute for the
Afghan soldiers. It is to make certain that units that never
had immediate access to NATO air support, intelligence support,
this sort of thing, will now have it, making them more
effective at fighting. But we are not taking over the fighting.
We are enabling them.
Ms. Hanabusa. So, in your testimony, Mr. Secretary, you
spoke a lot about the Taliban and how the--the basically lack
of a better description, how the Taliban was such--doing
everything so bad and it was an evil entity. Yet in the
testimony of the general, he talks about defeating ISIS and Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, and to ensure other terrorist groups are
unable to launch attacks.
And then he ends with something I think you are talking
about when you talk about reconciliation. And that Secretary
Tillerson has recently outlined this entire effort is intended
to put pressure on the Taliban and have them understand that
they will not win in the battlefield victory, so they will
enter an Afghan-led peace process to end the conflict.
Is that the ultimate goal, that we will do away with ISIS
and we will do away with Al Qaeda, but the Taliban is viewed
almost like our future partner or the partner in peace in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Mattis. As you know, ma'am, the Taliban embraced
Al Qaeda, supported them, and refused to break with them even
after they attacked New York City and Washington, DC. So we go
after the Taliban as providing the structure, so to speak, that
other transnational groups have in fact used to conduct
international attacks. I mean, you know what Al Qaeda has done.
You know what ISIS has done; Haqqani in the area.
But the bottom line is we are going to go after Al Qaeda.
We are going to go after ISIS. And if the Taliban wants to
break with them and stop killing people and rejoin the
political process, then we see reconciliation as the way we
will end this war.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for
being here today.
General Dunford, you mentioned the A-29 mission. I am proud
to tell you that that is Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta,
Georgia, in my district. We are happy to have that mission
there. I hope you will continue to expand it. I know that that
mission is being utilized for other countries as well as
Afghanistan, so thank you for your support of that and
mentioning it.
You have talked briefly about this with General Coffman and
Wittman and some others, but on page 3 of your testimony, you
talk about the decisive point in moving--or the new approach
that will have our most senior, capable, and operationally
experienced leaders advising at the decisive point in Afghan
operations.
Can you speak to--can you give any specific examples of
where that has--that has made the difference?
General Dunford. Absolutely, Congressman. When we went
through the failure analysis, the one thing that we identified
was Afghan units that had coalition or U.S. advisors almost
invariably were successful. So we have had--we call it
persistent embedded, meaning they live and eat and they fight
with the Afghan forces in support while they are fighting. And
that is what the case was with special operations forces. So
that has worked very well.
We have not had a commensurate effort with Afghan
conventional forces. So when we talk about the decisive point,
we are talking about continuing to make sure that at the lowest
tactical level, this battalion-like organization of about 1,000
in the conventional forces, we actually have persistent
embedded advisors that are--that is advisors that are there
when they are actually in the fight.
And it has worked with special operations. It has worked in
our previous experience before we drew down the force before
2014, when we had a fairly robust advisory effort with Afghan
forces. And I was in Afghanistan during that period of time.
They were successful.
Again, why were they successful? We facilitated delivery of
aviation support. That was number one. And we continue to help
them develop their tactics, techniques, and procedures, and
ability to plan, and help them mature their logistics.
All of which takes time. And so they are--they are more
improved than they were in 2014, but I think they still need
advisors at that level when they are in the fight. So I think
we do have a pretty--a pretty good body of evidence that
indicates this will make a difference.
Mr. Scott. If I may before I yield the remainder of my
time, I know that one of the--one of the ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms that we used in
that area--moving target indicators, the JSTARS [Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]. Up to and until a few
weeks ago, I would say I was proud to support the Air Force in
the recapitalization of that program. I continue to believe
that we need to recapitalize that program.
I have concerns about the Air Force's commitment to that
mission at this stage. I look forward to working with both of
you to make sure that we maintain the capabilities that the
JSTARS platform gives us. And I hope that--I hope that the two
of you can support the continued recapitalization of that
program.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remainder of
my time.
Gentlemen, I have a tremendous amount of respect for both
of you. Thanks for your service.
The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, more than 24,000 U.S.
troops have been lost; more than 20,000 wounded, all with the
price tag of over $800 billion. I know both of you are all too
familiar with these numbers.
After 16 years, you are asking the American people to
endure more, more loss of life, more money, and without an
expiration date. And for what?
Secretary Mattis, I believe in the strength and the
capability of our military. I believe we have the most powerful
military in the world today. However, I do not know if we have
the will to fight this war to the end. Because I don't think
there will ever be an end to this fight against terror.
This is not a war that can only be fought with troops. We
are fighting against not one, but a number of worldwide
networks. The American people are tired, our troops are tired,
and our allies are tired. I believe the American people deserve
to know why additional troops are being sent back to
Afghanistan.
Secretary Mattis, you have to understand, I have to be able
to go back to my district and explain to my constituents why
they are sending their sons and daughters to Afghanistan once
again.
Secretary Mattis, would you say we know who our enemy is?
Reading over the ``lessons learned report'' by the inspector
general report for Afghanistan reconstruction, it doesn't seem
we knew ourselves or the enemy. For example, we were wasting
precious taxpayer money imposing advanced technology to an
illiterate and uneducated population without the appropriate
training, expecting them to be prepared to fight.
According to--in the same report, the U.S. underappreciated
key strategic-level threats, including the will and ability of
the Taliban to continue to fight, sustained popular support for
the Taliban in Afghanistan, insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan,
eroding Afghan government legitimacy, and corruption in the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.
Essentially, we didn't know our enemy. Have you considered
the strategic-level threats this time around? And if so what
are they?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I believe the strategic-
level threats are the ones we experienced most directly on 9/
11. Problems in these kinds of areas do not stay in those
areas. They--in a globalized world they come out.
So, the question I always ask myself before I walk into the
President's office, if I am going to recommend that we deploy
American troops where they can be killed is, does this
contribution, does this commitment of our forces--contributing
our forces to this fight contribute sufficiently to the well-
being of the American people? We could lose people as a result.
It has got to pass that standard.
I think we do know very well who this enemy is. He is an
enemy that doesn't wear a uniform. He hides behind women and
children. I recognize the difficulty of taking the country
further into this war.
I first landed in Afghanistan in November 16 years ago, so
I recognize the challenges you bring up about keeping the
American people motivated and understanding of what this fight
is all about. I believe it is necessary to defend what we
believe in and to protect the freedoms we have so the next
generation can enjoy them.
I don't believe we can ignore this. I think if we leave
this region, we leave it at our peril, and I think we have a
lot of people--even with all the confusion about our strategy
over the last several years when we kept talking about, we are
leaving, we are leaving, 39 nations out of 50 still stuck with
us, I think hoping against hope we would come up with what they
are now encouraged by, which is this strategy.
So we are not alone in this would be one of the first
messages I would bring to your constituents, Congressman. With
all respect to your constituents, they need to know we are not
alone in this fight.
Is it tough? Was the society of the Afghan people
completely shaken apart, torn apart by the Soviet invasion? Did
that open the door for then what happened here in terms of the
society I think you aptly described? Yes. But we deal with the
ball where it lies right now, sir. We can't wish it away.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, I had recent occasion to visit with some
of my constituents who have been serving in this theater when
they returned home at Walter Reed, and I promised them that I
would share with you their complete confidence in the President
and their complete confidence in your leadership of the
Department of Defense.
They were injured in a green-on-blue circumstance in which
they were attempting to give training, advice, and assistance
to the Afghan forces. Can you speak to any new strategy that we
have--any new tactics that we have to ensure that folks who are
there rendering assistance on how to perform the mission don't
then put themselves in an unnecessarily vulnerable situation?
Secretary Mattis. This is probably one of the most
difficult aspects of this war. We all recognize that treachery
has been part of warfare since the beginning of time, but this
aspect is especially difficult for us to understand or to
embrace, and it certainly undercuts the sense of commitment, if
this is what is going to happen.
So, let's get down to what are we doing about it. There is
a very invasive counterintelligence program in which we vet the
people that we are going to be training. Numerous people have
been dismissed from the service--from the Afghan service
because of it. We also maintain a guardian program where you
have guards on our people who are giving classes in the event
the counterintelligence program, like all of them, can't be
perfect--we assume that.
We also have a very strong support element there in the
Afghan government. They recognize that nothing is more
corrosive to the support of the American and the democratic
people from Europe and other democracies that are part of our
39 nations than this sort of treachery.
So, it has got our attention. The Taliban continue to try
to infiltrate their way into the Afghan units, and we have been
relatively successful at stopping them.
But, chairman, if there is anything I have not answered,
you go ahead, please.
General Dunford. Congressman the only thing I would say we
had a very high incidence of these in 2012 and 2013. In fact,
at a point where I think it is fair to say it threatened the
campaign.
And the measures that Secretary Mattis outlined were
measures that have now matured over time--the
counterintelligence effort, the training of our people to
detect changes in behavior of the people that they are training
with.
But the thing I believe is the most significant that I
would just reemphasize, as Secretary Mattis highlighted, is the
Afghan leadership owns this problem and they recognize that.
They know that our ability to continue to provide the kind of
training and support they need is based on them making sure
that we--our people are secure. So, while we provide our own--
what the Secretary describes as guardian angels, we also rely
on the Afghan forces to create an environment within which we
can get our mission done.
In my judgment, the Afghan leaders jumped in and the reason
why we do have some incidents--and one is significant in the
young folks that you have visited up at Walter Reed are
suffering the consequences of that, but we have driven the
level of these types of incidents down to a very low level. And
we should recognize it for what it is--it is an enemy tactic
designed to erode our will, and we have got to deal with it as
such.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you. And I absolutely appreciate the
extent to which we have highlighted this as a priority with the
Afghan government, because that is where we will likely get the
intelligence that we need to minimize this risk.
Another area of feedback we have gotten frequently is that
the deployment cycles that people are on can create
circumstances where someone goes and has a great relationship
with a tribal leader, a partner, but then they are out, a new
person is in. And that this confidence that you have spoken of
throughout your testimony today can be eroded by some of those
cycles.
Are there--is there any tactical change to that going
forward in this new strategy?
Secretary Mattis. We are trying--Congressman, we are trying
to bring troops back on repeat tours. Now, that is--but that is
more of a corporate memory than a personal relationship. And we
recognize this challenge. At the same time, we need to keep our
troops fresh. It is very wearing, as you know, to be in a
combat zone where you keep your guard up all the time.
And somehow we have to sustain this, and we have a military
that has got a pretty wide portfolio right now in terms of
threats around the world. So we are trying to maintain a more
veteran approach going back in. We are trying to do the kind of
things that mean we are putting people into areas that they
understand inherently, even if they don't know that specific
village.
In some cases, we are able to get that kind of return
actually to the same area again, but that is going to be very
challenging as we go forward. So it is more how do we train our
forces for it and how do we do the counterintelligence piece
that allows for us to be dealing with people who want to work
with us.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your--making yourselves available
to the House Armed Services Committee. Several weeks ago,
President Trump outlined in very sketchy format a three-pronged
strategy to Afghanistan. And I would like to ask you about two
of those. One is the time-based to condition-based approach,
and the other is to appoint advisors down to brigade level.
So starting with the first, and this is a preparatory
question. Does the condition-based approach envision or
contemplate--and I am not asking for a time; I am asking for
does it contemplate a state where we withdraw all U.S. forces?
Secretary Mattis. No, it does not. It implies bringing
people, the number of people we have there down based on the
standing-up of more capability and the maturing of the Afghan
forces. There could be American advisors there 10 years from
now, maybe a handful compared to today.
Mr. Brown. Okay--follow-up. So while the military goal, as
I understand it, is to provide that time and space for the
Afghan government, the Afghan army to establish itself so it
can provide for its own security, what are the nonmilitary
efforts to address the corruption and poor leadership, the
eroding security, the economic stagnation, the minimal foreign
investment, and the soaring unemployment--all of which
contribute to a climate in which the Taliban and other
extremist groups can recruit and then conduct their activities?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, the corruption is, to our
way of thinking, a strategic vulnerability that has to be
addressed. President Ghani has got--has signed with us a
compact of what we are going to do about it. It has to do with
control of money. It has to do with who they put into position.
There is accountability. They just put a three-star general in
jail, to show you that this is going to the very top. It is not
like it is only the little guy who is being scooped up.
There is an accountability there that is going to shift the
opportunity for this into a penalty box, not an opportunity. We
are going to change that.
I think on the eroding security, the offensive actions by
the enemy have now been pretty much blunted. They are down to
isolated ambushes and IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. Some
of the IEDs are large, high-profile IEDs. But they have been
unable to sustain the kind of offensives they had last year
where they were able to move in large groups. They get in large
groups now, they understand our rules have changed and we are
going to take them out.
So they have had to fragment and disaggregate more, which
means they can't take over the district and provincial centers
that our press was full of stories how they were proclaiming
what they were going to do this year. They have been unable.
They have been unfulfilled what they said they were going to
do.
It is not that they are not dangerous. I mean, it is not
that we are not going to have to increase the security there
for the Afghan people. We will.
As far as investment goes, you will see India, for example,
picking up a larger bit of investment. We are going to other
nations about the development investments to try to get them to
do more. And so far we have had some success in this. We will
see it actually go into action probably by sometime late this
winter, start seeing it.
But we are addressing each of these efforts that you have
laid out with benchmarks so that we as much as possible can
quantify the progress. We may not be able to quantify
everything about it. Some of it is subjective, but we are
trying to quantify what we are doing in each case so that we do
not have an assumption that things are going to turn out well.
We are going to have to make it turn out well.
Mr. Brown. If I could just use the rest of my time to make
this statement. I visited with Ambassador Llorens. And while he
has got the largest embassy in the world, they are camped out
in Kabul. You have asked for 4,000-plus more soldiers. They are
going to go to the brigade level. You are already stretched too
thin with advisors. You are going to go two levels down. You
will be stretched that much further.
He is not going to get the force protection that he needs.
And while I understand the President's concern about nation-
building or trying to build Western-style institutions, nobody
can help reestablish civil institutions and a regional economy
better than the United States. Our military is the best in
training foreign militaries, and it is our State Department,
our USAID that does diplomacy and development better than any
other nation.
So I would like--I had hoped that we could see more U.S.
involvement in that nonmilitary effort.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you both for being here. Thank you for your
leadership. Our country is blessed to have you.
General Dunford, you commanded forces in Afghanistan in
2014. How has your thinking evolved since then, seen from your
new perspective?
General Dunford. You know, to be honest with you,
Congressman, to some extent we are going back to the future
here a little bit. When we did the evaluation in 2013 and 2014
about what would be need in a post-2014 environment, we
identified the advisory effort that would be necessary for the
Afghans to be successful. We talked about the capability gaps,
to include the aviation gap we have talked about here today;
the logistics sustainability that wasn't yet in place; the
intelligence capabilities they would need.
And then we made a decision to lift off and provide support
at the corps level and the institutional level. So, we are now
having a conversation that is not dissimilar from the
conversation we had in 2000, 2013, and 2014 which was, to be
successful, we need to have advisors, the right kind of
advisors, at the right place, and we had to have sufficient
aviation capability until the Afghan air force came online.
So, I am not sure my thinking has changed significantly so
much, Congressman, as we actually now--and it is rare that we
do--but we actually now have an opportunity to do something
today, that--is the right thing.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. You may have touched on this, but
with the votes, walking in and out, let me just clarify a
point. It is often read that we think the Taliban have nominal
control of roughly 40 percent of Afghanistan. Is that about an
accurate number?
General Dunford. I think what General Nicholson talks
about, Congressman, is the government clearly in control of
somewhere between 60 and 70 percent, 10 percent is
approximately contested. So I think it is a bit less than--than
what you described. But I think that is probably less important
than the populated areas----
Mr. Bacon. Right.
General Dunford. And focus on that. And I think in that
regard, the government is probably closer to 70 percent. And
what the goal is for President Ghani is to get to at least 80
percent of the key populated areas in 4 years, which I believe
is attainable.
Mr. Bacon. That is better than what I was reading, so that
is good--good to hear. Secretary Mattis, what would be your
assessment if we pulled out of Afghanistan, as some want us to
do. What do you think would happen within, say 2 years?
Secretary Mattis. If we pulled out completely?
Mr. Bacon. Yes, Sir.
Secretary Mattis. Well, I think we would benefit the
Taliban greatly. And the Taliban have shown that they will
permit transnational terrorists. So ergo, basically what we saw
on 9/11, I think we could anticipate happening again.
Mr. Bacon. Absolutely. The Taliban were allied with Al
Qaeda. Would you say they are still allied with Al Qaeda? I
know the Taliban had been allied with Al Qaeda, or the--the
close ties. I think it is fair to say they still have those
close ties.
Secretary Mattis. Oh, absolutely. We have encouraged them
to break those ties. Our argument, when we went in, was with Al
Qaeda. We encouraged them then to break with Al Qaeda. We
didn't--they were not a transnational terrorist group, the
Taliban themselves. But they would refuse to do so. And so,
they chose to fight.
Mr. Bacon. One last question. I think our emphasis seems to
be on counterinsurgency, also training the Afghan forces. What
would you say is the percentage of investment or effort that is
being put on nation-building versus the counterinsurgency and
training aspects?
Secretary Mattis. Well, sir, if nation-building is writ
large, certainly having security forces, and intelligence
forces, and police forces help. They set the conditions for a
nation to find its footing. They set the conditions for
families to raise children, to have--to bring in--to go to
farms, to go to jobs, you know, bring jobs in. So in that
regard, we are setting the conditions for the Afghans to build
a nation.
In that regard, there is what is called the donor nations.
And those--everything, they have met several times over the
years. They raised money for Afghanistan and countries like
Japan and Afghanistan, so many more--United Kingdom, bring the
money in for targeted efforts, whether it be to build a road or
in order to get products to market before they spoil, that sort
of thing. We are setting the conditions----
Mr. Bacon. Right.
Secretary Mattis [continuing]. For that sort of thing with
the military campaign, the security campaign we are putting
together here.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you very much. And before I yield, I
just say I share your assessment. If we pulled out, we would be
back in 2 or 3 years, having to take out the Taliban and Al
Qaeda and it would be a worse fight. So I applaud the
President's strategy, your strategy to win this and to keep
Taliban and Al Qaeda out of power. So thank you.
Secretary Mattis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you for being here. I
appreciate that. I appreciate your opportunity--the opportunity
to address you, and hear from you, and obviously appreciate
your candor on these issues.
General Dunford, you mentioned counterterrorism in the
region, in what you are doing. I was wondering, how much of
this is being responded to with special operations forces?
Obviously right now, we have about--from what I have read,
about 8,000 in the world. And what I am hearing over and over
is that the forces are stretched too thin.
Is that true and is that affecting our ability to deal with
counterterrorism in Afghanistan? And are we still using the
element of--the strategy that I saw, there in 2007 and 2008,
where we were finding, fixing, finishing, and exploiting, is
that still being utilized?
General Dunford. Congressman, the last part of your
question is, yes. That methodology is still the same
methodology that we use to go after the enemy from a CT
[counterterrorism] perspective. And I would say we have
sufficient special operations forces to do the mission today.
But the issue you raise is a concern, that we are running
them too hard and in some cases, maybe, are there missions that
they are performing that could be done by other forces. And the
Secretary, about 4 or 5 months ago, right after he came into
office, asked us to make sure that as we were doing Global
Force Management, meaning every day looking at the requirements
of the combatant commanders, number one, we made sure that only
if something required special operations forces, would they go
to that force. And then, we looked to backfill certain
assignments that were being filled by special operations forces
with other capabilities. And for example, this advisory effort,
the vast majority of the advisors that will be going in is a
result of the plan that has been approved by the Secretary--our
conventional forces, the Army and the Marine Corps will provide
conventional forces to be able to provide that advisory effort.
Because we are sensitive to the fact that special
operations forces are critical, not only to the
counterterrorism fight but also to the Russia, China, Iran,
North Korea fight as well. And getting the balance right, not
only from a day-to-day engagement perspective, but making sure
that they can train against the full range of missions that
special operations require is something that we are very
sensitive to, Congressman.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. When--back in 2007, 2008 we were--
well the FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were, to
me, seemed kind of like the Wild West. And I remember the town
of Wanna, in I think it was South Waziristan, kind of reminded
me of the town of Tombstone. Is it still like that and can we
be assured that Pakistan is going to be able to patrol and
control those areas when it comes to breeding grounds for
terrorists?
Secretary Mattis. As you know, Congressman, the Federally
Administered Tribal Area, the North-West Frontier has a long
history of discontent--would be a polite way of describing it.
But I would also say that since the partition, it is called the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas for a reason. In other
words, it is not a state.
And you understand that it has been an area that has been
very hard for Pakistan to maintain the same kind of control as
it has down in the settled areas, for example. But that said,
they have been running some very strong operations up there.
They have lost, as you know, many of their own troops in this
fight.
And they have just completed one set of operations that
moved against the border on several lines of effort. And those
obviously had some of the effect of pushing people over into
Afghanistan--enemy over there.
So 3 days ago, the chief of army staff from Pakistan flew
into Kabul, and this is the first time I have heard of a visit
actually creating some degree of optimism. And so we will see.
There is reason for us to say there is a new day here. But it
is too early for me to come in front of this committee and
pronounce that with confidence.
I will fly in to Islamabad soon, after the Secretary of
State is done, so as the lead for our foreign policy, I will
fly in, and we will continue to try to work with them cross-
border operations against what can only be described as our
common enemy. And we will see if we can make this work this
time.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you. Mr. Chairman,
I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis,
General Dunford, thank you for being here.
As an Afghanistan war veteran myself, I represent tens of
thousands of Americans who have served there that want to know
that our service and sacrifice meant something.
And that is why, Secretary Mattis, I applaud your work and
the change of course in Afghanistan. That is why your change in
strategy recently brought me great hope and optimism that we
will turn the tide and fight the war to win it, rather than
fight 14 separate 1-year wars that have resulted in what we see
today.
I want to focus first, for a moment, on the specific
mission of CSTC-A [Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan], and the over $70 billion that we have spent in
ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] funding. And I know we
have talked already about the wasted money on uniforms, but
every week a different story piles up in a stack of stories
that you can find by googling waste in Afghanistan.
From the headlines that I brought with me today, 43 percent
of America's military weapons unaccounted for, Afghan forces
lost $700 million in U.S. ammo, U.S. unsure if Afghan intel
service even works despite half a billion dollars in aid, $28
million wasted on Afghan uniforms, wasted money on payroll,
wasted money on construction. You get the point. The list goes
on and on. And these aren't stories from 10 years ago; these
are stories from the last couple of years.
So my first question is what--I know you have already
talked about the general--the lessons learned. But what are we
putting in place within the structure of CSTC-A? What type of
process are we creating to raise the level of accountability on
this investment that we are making in the Afghan National
Police and the Afghan military?
General Dunford. Congressman, that is a great question.
About 2012, maybe it was even as early as 2011, in order to
develop Afghan capacity, we started to move money to a, what we
called on budget, meaning we gave the money to the Afghans for
them to manage. At one point, I think we had well over 70
percent of the money that we were giving to the Afghan forces
that was on budget.
We have actually walked that back. Now less than 25 percent
of the money is actually administered by the Afghan government;
75 percent is administered through us. And for that 25 percent,
we have put in some rigorous conditionality--you talk about the
lessons learned--rigorous conditionality to make sure that we
have transparency.
And President Ghani, unlike his predecessor, has allowed us
to get into the ministries where the money is being
administered, check the books, be able to do an audit just as
we would for, you know, on our own accounts. And I am confident
in telling you this, that the $4 billion-plus that we provide
to the Afghan security forces every year, our commander will
have in CSTC-A, as his executive organization, will have
visibility.
And I expect to be able to come back up to you and talk to
you about the transparency and accountability that we have over
those resources.
So we have learned some lessons, but I think one of the
more significant ones is that we are now delivering capability
and equipment, and they are not--they weren't quite ready for--
to execute the entire budget and have the kind of same
standards that you suggest----
Mr. Banks. Thank you, General. As a follow-up to that, how
do we know, today more than ever, after supplying 14 years of
weapons and ammunition, vehicles, uniforms, that we are giving
the Afghans what they need and not what they want?
General Dunford. Well, I think that is a constant process
of refinement. But here is what I want to tell you--is the
glimmers of hope. You know, we bought Stryker vehicles--those
are being employed right now, and they actually have provided a
competitive advantage to the Afghan forces over over their
counterparts.
The aviation enterprise, actually, is a success story, and
I think you--I don't know if you have been back recently, but I
would hope, when you go back, you can see the Afghan air force
in particular. So we delivered an A-29--it is an aircraft that
is relatively simple to learn, simple to fly. As one of the
Congressmen mentioned--that we bring the pilots back to Moody
Air Force Base--they are going back, and they are being able to
sustain that effort.
So I believe, right now, that the lessons learned over the
last few years have highlighted for us what equipment works,
what equipment doesn't work. And to be honest with you, we do
need to improve the accountability of equipment, the
maintenance procedures, and so forth. That is an area that the
advisory effort is designed to address, as well.
Mr. Banks. I have 30 seconds left. I wish I had 30 minutes.
But when we talk about rule of law in Afghanistan, it seems
to me that one of the greatest inhibitors to rule of law is
Vice President Dostum. What are we doing to prevent him from
continuing to wreak havoc on the security--or on the rule of
law situation in Afghanistan, as he returns to country and
returns to his position?
Secretary Mattis. I think the most important thing is we
are reinforcing the positive elements in the country, and not
leaving them to deal with these kinds of issues that Dostum
represents on their own.
This is--we are looking at bringing in gendarmerie kind of
police trainers--not from the U.S., but from those countries
that maintain gendarmes, so that the police themselves are more
capable of carrying out the rule of law.
It--you have got to have the right kind of police force.
Then you need to have the right kind of courts. And again,
there is nothing easy about it because of what happened to that
society, what it has been through. But I think that the right
thing to do is to reinforce the positive side and keep working
against those who are disruptive.
And right now, we obviously are trying to work by, with,
and through the Afghan government on it. But we register loud
and clear the concern that that is, in terms of trying to get
the rule of law, reduce the corruption, and get this country on
the right track so we can draw down what we are doing and leave
them more on their own.
Mr. Banks. Thank you. Yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Suozzi.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, thank you so much, again,
for your service. You inspire tremendous confidence.
I traveled to Afghanistan in April of this year, and at the
time, General Nicholson was making his request or--and
logically supporting his idea that we should increase the
number of troops by 3,000. And I publicly supported that effort
with the understanding, though, that those troops would be used
for force protection and to replace private contractors.
Are the troops being used for those purposes, or are they
being used to implement this strategy of moving down lower into
the brigades?
Secretary Mattis. Both, Congressman, both. Obviously, some
will be in force protection of those advisors that are out
there. And certainly, we are going to make certain that, where
we can bring in an Army unit coherent, rather than breaking it
up and bringing in high-paid contractors--that was forced by
the troop cap, and I am not condemning anyone who did it in the
past, but it is not the way we want to go.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
So the problem of ungoverned areas--there is a problem on
the Afghani side in Nangarhar province and other places where
the troops would not take offensive action, as they more or
less wait at checkpoints, and the Afghan army would do that.
And there is a problem on the Pakistani side. I met with
the Pakistani ambassador about 4 months ago, and they said that
they were starting to do more efforts in their ungoverned
areas. You have affirmed that today.
And you said earlier in your testimony that all six corps
are currently in offensive actions. Does that mean that they
are now moving beyond their checkpoints and that they are
moving out into these ungoverned areas?
Secretary Mattis. It does. But let me be very specific--it
means that in each of the corps areas they have offensives
under way; that doesn't mean everyone is doing that. In some
cases, they are simply holding their own, holding the district
centers, but there are offensive actions in each area--in each
corps area right now.
Mr. Suozzi. Are we encouraging them to move into the
ungoverned areas on their side of the border?
Secretary Mattis. Principally we are encouraging them to
hold and protect the populated areas, but at the same time--I
was just in Nangarhar last Thursday, and they certainly have
offensive actions underway in Nangarhar. And as you know, that
is right along the border there.
Mr. Suozzi. And another major initiative was to get our Air
Force to train their air force how to coordinate better with
their military--with their army and their air force to
coordinate better with each other. Is that happening? I will
ask General Dunford.
General Dunford. Congressman, it absolutely is. You know,
we have talked a lot today about the advisors at the brigade
and the kandak level. We have an equally robust effort with the
Afghan air force, where our very best and brightest airmen are
over there training with them as well.
And the key is--you just hit on really, I think one of the
key points we wanted to make today--is that the ability of the
Afghan ground forces to integrate the Afghan air force is a key
link.
And because we haven't had advisors down there at the level
where that kind of coordination takes place, they haven't
matured as fast as we want. One of the primary outcomes that we
expect from our changed advisory posture is the Afghans being
more effective in the ability to what we call integrate
combined arms; that is, the artillery and air support they need
to be successful in their maneuver.
Mr. Suozzi. One thing--this is a separate question--I think
that most Americans don't appreciate the difference between
these transnational terrorists that operate out of Afghanistan
that we are trying to constantly disrupt and the Taliban and
how that is a completely different type of terrorist
organization that is more focused on regional impact. Have the
rules of engagement changed for the Taliban as part of this
change in rules of engagement? Or have they only changed for
the multinational terrorist organizations?
General Dunford. Congressman, when we--the authority that
has been passed down to the commander by the President is that
any individual or any group that threatens the Afghan
government, threatens our mission, threatens U.S. forces. or
threatens the coalition can be engaged. So, it is based on
their behavior and what they are doing as opposed to what group
they are a part of.
Mr. Suozzi. So, our special forces will seek out members of
the Taliban if we believe they are engaged in terrorist
activities?
General Dunford. Our special operations forces will seek
out groups or individuals that are actually threatening the
mission or our people.
Mr. Suozzi. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We have now gone through all of the members who were here
at the gavel, and we have already held the Secretary and the
chairman longer than we had intended.
So, what I want to do to wind up is see if the remaining
members have one 15-second question that we have not addressed
yet--and I want to get them all out together and then give the
Secretary and the chairman a chance to wind this up.
Ms. Cheney, did you have something that we have not yet
touched on?
You do? Okay, 15 seconds.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
both of you for being here, and thanks for allowing us to
conduct our oversight obligations, but mostly thank you for
reminding us that we have our own constitutional obligation,
and that is to support, raise, maintain our Armed Forces.
And as often as you can this notion of the BCA, the extent
to which the BCA is damaging us, we are in a position where I
am completely dismayed as a new Member of Congress, at the
extent to which there is agreement about the damage of the BCA
and then people walk away and don't do anything about it.
And as we come up again to December 8th it is going to be
crucial that we take this on. I can assure you both this is
something we take seriously. We cannot fulfill our
constitutional obligations with the BCA in place, and I want to
thank you for raising it; thank you very much for being here
today.
That is it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It was great. It was a little more than 15
seconds, but it was good.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And really quickly, my question was partly how do we avoid
empowering the factions that grow up out of the voids that are
often created as the government begins to, you know, take hold?
And are we at a point that we cannot use quantity as much
as a metric but quality? And I am thinking about some of the
work that has been done not just in the Afghan military but
also among the women who are being trained for the Afghan
police and for other jobs? Because they seem to have more
capability than they are allowed to utilize. That takes
security, but I am wondering where we are going with that.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard, did you have----
Ms. Gabbard. Briefly, so much of what has been discussed
today and the justification for our continued open-ended
presence in Afghanistan centers around preventing it from being
a safe haven for terrorists who launch attacks against us.
The issue is that there is a long list of countries around
the world who fall under this category of being a physical safe
haven. What to speak of the phenomena of the internet now
making it so that a physical safe haven is not even required
for a terrorist to plan and launch an attack on us or on our
interests or allies.
So, my question is a big one, and maybe you can follow up
with me--but how do you justify the expenditure, the open-ended
presence, this forever war in Afghanistan given the global
threat that we are facing both physically and electronically?
Thank you.
The Chairman. Mrs. Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Just very quickly, in President Trump's speech
in August he stated that one of the core pillars of his
salvation strategy is to take a more aggressive approach
towards managing our relationship with Pakistan. Specifically,
he said, ``We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions
of dollars. At the same time they are housing the very
terrorists that we are fighting, but that will have to change,
and that will change immediately.''
I think it is fair to say that our relationship with
Pakistan is complicated, and I think it is important that we
understand what Pakistan is doing and what they are not doing
as it relates to our relationship. And that is why I am
planning on introducing some legislation that would get the
intel community to account for that. It was an idea that was
proposed in the 2009 Af-Pak policy review.
But my question for you today is what tools does DOD
currently have at its disposal to calibrate our security
relationship with Pakistan and compel them to act in a way that
is helpful rather than harmful to the United States?
The Chairman. And Mr. Khanna.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Very briefly--I don't know if you had a chance to see the
Saudi ambassador's op-ed in the New York Times this morning. It
would be the definition of propaganda and fake news. If we are
going to be involved in Yemen against Al Qaeda, that makes
complete sense, but could you assure the committee and the
American people that we will not aid in any way the Saudi
Arabia--Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthis and in its
gross human rights violations?
The Chairman. Thank you all for agreeing to do that.
Secretary Mattis. Well, let me, Chairman, take a first stab
at this and then bring the chairman in wherever he believes I
missed something or has more. As far as the buildup of factions
in Afghanistan as we get rid of terrorists in certain areas, so
long as those factions become ones that are part of the
political process, we will not get choosy about which ideas can
come forward. That is for the Afghan people to sort out.
But I think, too, that we have seen enough progress in some
parts of Afghanistan and the younger people are different based
upon the education that is now reaching boys and girls, which
is a big change. And I think that we will see the Afghan people
choosing better which factions--hopefully political factions,
they can support.
On quality versus quantity, we are also carrying that theme
forward. In that regard, if a unit is--cannot fight well, if we
find there are too many ghost soldiers, there is no requirement
for that unit to be maintained on the rolls. Take the good
soldiers who are in it, transfer them to an effective leader,
an effective unit, and go with quality not quantity.
About the women who are serving and they continue to go
through the training, obviously there is a cultural aspect to
their service. That is a reality everywhere in the world. Every
nation has its own culture. But at the same time, we would not
be having even the discussion about women serving or reducing
the number of Afghan units to only the quality ones if we were
meeting here 10 years ago. So it is somewhat a challenge for
us, but it is a good challenge to have as we go forward here.
On the havens and the concern there, the reason we shifted
to a ``by, with, and through'' global approach to terrorism is
exactly what you bring up. We could eventually pour our troops
into so many ungoverned spaces, so many havens that we wouldn't
have enough troops to go around.
So the way we invest our troops is, and I can show this to
you in private--it is classified for obvious reasons. I can
show you what it is we do for every troop invested, how many
coalition troops do we have in North Africa with us, how many
African troops do we have. If you go to Somalia, I can tell you
what is going on there. If we go to the Korean Peninsula, I can
show you what 28,000 or whatever it is U.S. troops bring in
terms of the 3 million-man South Korean army.
So what we are looking at as we look broadly across the
world, how do we deal with the geographic havens in a way that
we do things by, with, and through others.
Now on--you make a very good point about the virtual
havens, about the internet and this sort of thing. Different
problem set, needs a different response. And in that one, I
think education is one of the most bulwarks against this taking
over young people's hopes and dreams, and turning them into
what we have seen in various places.
I would just tell you that exchange programs, USAID efforts
to keep libraries open, virtual libraries open, as we promote
ourselves and take our own side in this fight. But I think it
has got to be addressed differently and perhaps that is not
where the military should have the lead. That is addressed
separately.
On the Pakistan relations and what tools do we have, we
have diplomatic tools, diplomatic isolation by more and more
nations that are growing--excuse me, joining together with
Secretary Tillerson's Defeat ISIS campaign.
That, ma'am, is 69 different nations joined together to
fight ISIS from all around the world, plus Arab League, NATO,
European Union, and INTERPOL so that we can trace these foreign
fighters as they try to go home or try to move across
boundaries, this sort of thing.
All of this shows an increasing alliance against terrorism,
and any nation that would then support it or be seen to
providing havens would be running afoul of basically the most
powerful economically and diplomatic, militarily powerful
nation in the world. We also have economic tools from loan
guarantees and working with other countries on what access
people have with certain banking tools and this sort of thing.
As far as Yemen goes, we are engaged in antiterrorism
campaigns only right now and where we work with the others, it
is to reduce civilian causalities and it is to try to drive
this or draw this into the U.N.-brokered peace negotiation to
end the civil war there between the Houthis and the U.N.-
recognized and Saudi-supported Hadi government.
Miss anything?
General Dunford. Mr. Secretary, I think you gave a very
comprehensive answer to each of those questions.
Secretary Mattis. We are all tired.
The Chairman. Let me--Mr. Secretary, let me just add one
thing back to Ms. Cheney's point and it is really how we
started, talking about stability. Stability of commitment and
stability of funding--in addition to stability, adequacy is
also necessary for funding. Many of us were very pleased to see
the President at the U.N. endorse the level of funding that has
already passed the House authorization, the House
appropriation, and the Senate authorization bill.
Working together, I think it is essential that we get that
across the finish line so that whether you are the Taliban or
the Russians or the Chinese or whoever, you know that we are
going to stand up and defend ourselves with adequate resources
to do so. That is a key part of our mission as well as working
with you, so I appreciate that.
Thank you all for being here. I think this was very
helpful. The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 3, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 3, 2017
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 3, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I am encouraged that in his August 21st speech, the
President seemed to arrive at the same conclusion many of us had
previously reached--that, quote, ``the consequences of a rapid exit are
both predictable and unacceptable,'' end quote--however, we are still
light on details as to what makes this new strategy in Afghanistan and
Asia so new, and we have seen nothing on paper. So what are the metrics
you intend to use to define success or failure in Afghanistan moving
forward, and what conditions will need to be met before considering a
withdrawal of troops? Will this alter any rules of engagement in order
to meet these metrics more swiftly?
Secretary Mattis. The new South Asia Strategy is different than
past approaches to Afghanistan in several important ways. One important
difference is that the Department is not tied to arbitrary timelines
for withdrawals. Our presence in Afghanistan is based on conditions on
the ground. Another important difference is that we have a willing and
increasingly capable partner in Afghanistan that is leading this fight.
Our overarching goals in Afghanistan, which we expect Afghanistan to
work towards to maintain our support--the conditions we will be
measuring against--are as follows: terrorist groups cannot exploit
sanctuaries in Afghanistan to plan and stage attacks against the U.S.
homeland, U.S. citizens, or our allies and partners overseas; the
Afghan government counters corruption and is viewed as a legitimate
government by its citizens; the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF) continue to professionalize and reduce corruption; the
ANDSF secures more of the Afghan population and territory; regional
actors support a stable Afghanistan; and the Afghan and Pakistani
governments work together to secure the border. We seek a comprehensive
political settlement that includes relevant parties, including the
Taliban. We will adjust our personnel numbers as needed to help realize
these goals. The Department is developing a framework to assess the
effectiveness of the new strategy. This framework will help us
understand progress and communicate to a number of audiences. The
Department takes its responsibility to the U.S. public and Congress
very seriously, and when possible to measure progress in tangible,
quantifiable terms, we will do so. It is important to note, however,
that many aspects of the strategy, including political stability,
reconciliation, and our relationship with regional countries will be
very difficult, if not impossible, to measure in real time. We will
endeavor to provide you with the most accurate information. Regarding
rules of engagement, I have already approved expanded authorities that
allow for more tactical-level support to the ANDSF. The new authorities
also remove certain restrictions that made it difficult for our
military personnel to engage the enemy. Expanded authorities and more
flexible U.S. advisory efforts will help the ANDSF increase pressure on
militants and drive them towards a durable political settlement.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. This question is not related to Afghanistan, but I want
to take this opportunity with both of you here to ask you to please
respond for the record. And, given that I have yet to receive any
answers to my questions for the record from when you were both here in
June, I ask that you be prompt with your response.
On Sunday, the Washington Post reported on the case of Air Force
Colonel Ronald Jobo, who sexually harassed and assaulted a female
civilian subordinate. Colonel Jobo repeatedly said he wanted to have
sex with her, tracked her movements and sent her recordings of him
masturbating in the shower. Twice, he trapped her in the office,
grabbed her arms and forcibly tried to kiss her. There is documentation
to substantiate all of these charges, including texts, videos, and a
photo of the bruises Jobo left on the woman's arm. Colonel Jobo
admitted to all of this.
However, Lieutenant General John Thompson, the senior officer in
Jobo's chain of command, decided against charging Jobo with abusive
sexual contact, or any crime at all. Instead, General Thompson imposed
nonjudicial punishment, allowing Jobo to retire at the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel, and will continue to collect a military pension for
the rest of his life. The Air Force tried to keep all this secret until
the case was leaked to the media.
I want to know how a decision was made that non-judicial punishment
was an appropriate remedy for such a clear-cut case of sexual
harassment and physical assault.
Secretary Mattis. I share your concern that appropriate justice is
applied to cases of sexual harassment. The Secretary of the Air Force
has ordered a review of this case and she will provide you an update
upon completion.
Ms. Speier. This question is not related to Afghanistan, but I want
to take this opportunity with both of you here to ask you to please
respond for the record. And, given that I have yet to receive any
answers to my questions for the record from when you were both here in
June, I ask that you be prompt with your response.
On Sunday, the Washington Post reported on the case of Air Force
Colonel Ronald Jobo, who sexually harassed and assaulted a female
civilian subordinate. Colonel Jobo repeatedly said he wanted to have
sex with her, tracked her movements and sent her recordings of him
masturbating in the shower. Twice, he trapped her in the office,
grabbed her arms and forcibly tried to kiss her. There is documentation
to substantiate all of these charges, including texts, videos, and a
photo of the bruises Jobo left on the woman's arm. Colonel Jobo
admitted to all of this.
However, Lieutenant General John Thompson, the senior officer in
Jobo's chain of command, decided against charging Jobo with abusive
sexual contact, or any crime at all. Instead, General Thompson imposed
nonjudicial punishment, allowing Jobo to retire at the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel, and will continue to collect a military pension for
the rest of his life. The Air Force tried to keep all this secret until
the case was leaked to the media.
I want to know how a decision was made that non-judicial punishment
was an appropriate remedy for such a clear-cut case of sexual
harassment and physical assault.
General Dunford. The Joint Force is steadfast in its commitment to
properly investigate and address all reports of sexual harassment and
other misconduct--regardless of the rank or status of the offender or
victim. Commanders have the legal and moral duty to hold their Service
members accountable for their actions. With the advice of their staff
judge advocates, commanders determine how to most appropriately address
misconduct by considering the relevant circumstances and unique facts
of each case. Detailed information on this case may be obtained from
the Air Force as the Services are best positioned to provide specifics
concerning their members' misconduct and the procedures and decisions
associated with addressing such misconduct.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. The USAF briefed Congress earlier this summer indicating
the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Recap
program was on schedule for award and funded.
Now, within 6 months of that briefing, the USAF is now saying the
program does not support future warfighting needs and new alternative
approaches to the mission need to be studied? I do not understand how
the USAF has conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) and multiple
studies since 2009 that validated the program approach and now at the
11th hour, plan to do another study to yet again evaluate alternatives.
Please explain the logic of this action.
Secretary Mattis. The Air Force continually assesses the evolving
threat environments our adversaries present, and the risks these
increasingly complex environments pose to current and future Programs
of Record. These environments threaten our ability to provide
battlespace awareness required in the highly contested operational
environments of 2030 and beyond in the manner which we have in the
past. To ensure the Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
Recapitalization program is a prudent way forward, the Air Force is
reviewing alternative approaches for providing Ground Moving Target
Indicator and Battle Management Command and Control that could be more
effective in highly contested environments. The source selection for an
Engineering and Manufacturing Development for a follow-on contract to
JSTARS is ongoing. If it is determined that JSTARS Recapitalization is
the best way forward, source selection, which began in March 2017, is
projected to be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 2018.
Mr. Scott. The USAF has been telling Congress that JSTARS Recap is
a priority with validated Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
requirements with less than 5% of airborne Ground Moving Target
Indicator (GMTI) mission requirements from the COCOMS being fulfilled
and yet, the USAF is now floating the idea of cancelling the Recap
program? I would like to understand the logic behind this decision, why
it is happening at this point in this program, and how using the
alternative assets General Holmes, the commander of Air Combat Command
(ACC), alluded to in his statements will satisfy COCOM needs and
increase meeting the validated JROC requirements.
Secretary Mattis and General Dunford. Concerns about the value of
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Recapitalization in a
changing threat environment have motivated the Air Force to reassess
its investment priorities. The Combatant Commands and Joint Staff are
reviewing potential capabilities and alternatives under consideration
by the Air Force.
Mr. Scott. For the last 5 years, the USAF has asked us to support
this critical national mission area and we have done just that, but now
they are saying it is no longer needed due to the new threat? Please
explain to us how other assets support the USAF 2030 roadmap if the
JSTARS Recap weapon system is not survivable in that environment? Is it
your view that the United States will need to replace every weapon
system in the USAF inventory, to include Compass Call cross-deck and E-
2 Hawkeye aircraft, because of this new threat over the next 10 years?
If yes, what is the DOD strategy to execute this?
Secretary Mattis and General Dunford. The unique capabilities and
roles of any individual system mean that any decisions about Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Recapitalization would not
necessarily be applicable to other platforms. Our potential
adversaries' intent to deny our access to their battlespace requires us
to carefully study the right mix of capabilities for command and
control of our forces in the future.
Mr. Scott. The USAF has discussed using an alternative mix of
manned and unmanned assets to perform the E-8C mission in lieu of
pursuing JSTARS Recap. Do the COCOMS or the Joint Staff concur with
this assessment and strategy?
General Dunford. The Combatant Commands and Joint Staff will assess
the ability of alternative architectures to meet joint requirements as
these alternatives mature.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. Chairman Dunford indicated in his answer to
Congressman Moulton's question as to whether State Department political
engagements with Afghan governmental and tribal leaders are being
``pushed down to lower levels'' commensurate with our military advise
and assist mission--he replied ``not yet.'' What aspects of the Joint
effort can be better resourced to leverage collaboration between DOD
and State Department efforts on ensuring Afghan governmental
institutions are able to govern, provide citizen security, and
eliminate corruption?
Secretary Mattis. The President's South Asia Strategy is a whole-
of-government effort. The Department of Defense, Department of State,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
other departments and agencies must be appropriately authorized and
resourced to implement the new strategy. U.S. implementation efforts
include: supporting Afghan government efforts to promote economic
development, health, and education; combatting corruption and the
narcotics trade; and strengthening the Afghan government's capacity to
deliver public services. I defer to the Department of State and USAID
on their specific resource requirements and their approach to support
grass roots political engagements. Resolute Support and the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul are working closely with each other and with the
Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in a process known as the
``Kabul Compact.'' The Compact, completed in August 2017, establishes a
series of benchmarks to monitor and measure Afghan progress in four
main areas: governance, economic development, the peace process, and
security. We have made it clear to the Afghans that they must weed out
corrupt officials from the military and government, and President Ghani
has recently launched very promising anti-corruption reforms. We have
also begun a new phase of the fight against the Taliban by going after
their narcotics trade, which directly funds their insurgency.
Mr. Moulton. In response to a question from Congressman Moulton,
Secretary Mattis stated that the administration's elimination of the
Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/
RAP) has ``not impacted'' regional political engagement--yet this
office was specifically designed to better coordinate whole-of-
government efforts. What office or high-level official is charged with
executing the regional political strategy the Trump White House and
Secretary Mattis have outlined? How can the State Department and
Defense Departments be best resourced and positioned to advance this
regional political dialogue?
Secretary Mattis. There is no single office or official in charge
of implementing the South Asia Strategy. The strategy flows from the
White House down to all relevant stakeholders, and we endeavor at every
level to make sure our whole of government efforts are synchronized.
With the dissolution of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan (SRAP) office, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asian Affairs assumed the SRAP's function, and the departments
work together to implement the South Asia Strategy. I cannot speak to
resourcing the State Department, but I have previously noted that it is
imperative that Congress pass a budget and not rely on continuing
resolutions. It is difficult for any Department or Secretary to carry
out our shared mission without proper and predictable funding.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
Ms. Rosen. Secretary Mattis, what is the status of reconciliation
efforts with the Taliban and how does that status affect the security
environment in Afghanistan and the Afghan unity government?
Secretary Mattis. Reconciliation is a State Department-led effort
the Defense Department supports. The security environment in
Afghanistan is improving as we continue to train, advise, and assist
the Ministries of Defense and Interior. As the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) get stronger and more capable, the Taliban
will realize they cannot wait us out, and they cannot escape the
pressure of the ANDSF. The ultimate goal of our military efforts is to
force the Taliban to recognize it cannot win on the battlefield, and
must turn instead towards a negotiated political settlement with the
Afghan government. We remain committed to maintain the unity of the
government of Afghanistan as we drive towards an ultimate peace
settlement.
Ms. Rosen. Secretary Mattis, what specific demands will the United
States make of Pakistan? Why do we expect Pakistan to change behavior
now, after 16 years of conflict in Afghanistan?
Secretary Mattis. The United States desires a pragmatic partnership
with Pakistan that serves our mutual interests; however, Pakistan must
change its behavior. The Department considers a variety of tools,
including diplomatic and economic means, to expand our cooperation
where our interests converge and to advance our interests in areas of
divergence. Our approach to Pakistan is designed to demonstrate to
Pakistan where its interests converge with the interests of the
international community.
Ms. Rosen. Secretary Mattis, our new strategy in Afghanistan will
no longer include nation building. Will the U.S. continue to provide
diplomatic and foreign aid support to help bring about a political
solution to the conflict, in order to facilitate conditions that would
allow for a responsible U.S. military withdrawal to be possible?
Secretary Mattis. The United States is in Afghanistan to make the
U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our allies and partners safer, not to
nation build. As the President stated in his August 21 address, a
fundamental pillar of the new South Asia Strategy is the integration of
all instruments of U.S. power--diplomatic, economic, and military--
toward a successful outcome. Therefore, the strategy does include the
use of diplomacy in support of a political settlement and foreign aid
to facilitate economic growth and decrease Afghanistan's reliance on
donor assistance. I defer to the State Department and U.S. Agency for
International Development for details on these efforts. The Defense
Department is responsible for training, advising, and assisting the
Afghan forces, as well as for a small amount of counterterrorism
missions, all designed to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table
with the Afghan government.
Ms. Rosen. General Dunford, a recent SIGAR publication on U.S.
efforts to train the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
painted a bleak picture of our ability to build a sustainable and
capable force. Are you confident that the United States is making
progress toward building a capable force in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. I'm confident our efforts will drive progress
building Afghan capacity to provide security in their country. We
continue to see improvement in many areas of the Afghan forces, notably
the Afghan Special Security Forces and the Afghan Air Force. Our
previous efforts helped build the foundation to enhance Afghan
capability to provide security for their country. The new South Asia
Strategy accelerates those efforts, aligns them with President Ghani's
Roadmap, and ensures synergy with our broader regional objectives. We
will support President Ghani's doubling of the Afghan Special Security
Forces, aligning our efforts with this expansion and providing robust
tactical level advising to their forces, exploiting the unique
capability Special Forces bring to the fight. We will also support
President Ghani's efforts to expand and modernize the Afghan Air Force.
A sustainable Afghan Air Force that can integrate with Afghan National
Army ground operations is a critical component of Afghan stabilization
efforts and our long-term strategy. It will take time to fully mature
this capability, but our efforts with the Afghan Air Force are already
contributing on the battlefield, to include increased special mission
wing support to counter-narcotics and counterterrorism missions as part
of the summer 2017 campaign. Morale remains high and Afghan Air Force
attrition is consistently less than 1 percent of the force. By the end
of 2020, their fleet will consist of over 200 aircraft. In parallel,
Afghan maintenance capability continues to mature, and this year they
were able to maintain their Mi-17s and C-208s with limited to no
coalition or contract logistics support. The SIGAR report noted
introduction of the A-29 aircraft and associated pilot training as an
example where the United States had succeeded. We're expecting similar
success with the introduction of the UH-60 Blackhawk, the first of
which arrived in September and are already being used to train Afghan
aircrews in Afghanistan.
[all]