[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 9, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-96
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
VACANT
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York AMI BERA, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Wisconsin THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Donald Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State................... 6
Ms. Cheryl Anderson, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development.............. 16
Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, professorial lecturer in African studies,
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University..................................................... 37
Mr. Fred Bauma, representative, La Lutte pour le Changement...... 46
Ms. Severine Autesserre, Ph.D., professor of political science,
Barnard College, Columbia University........................... 53
Ms. Ida Sawyer, Central Africa director, Human Rights Watch...... 65
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Donald Yamamoto: Prepared statement................ 10
Ms. Cheryl Anderson: Prepared statement.......................... 18
Mr. Mvemba Dizolele: Prepared statement.......................... 40
Mr. Fred Bauma: Prepared statement............................... 49
Ms. Severine Autesserre, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............... 55
Ms. Ida Sawyer: Prepared statement............................... 68
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 92
Hearing minutes.................................................. 93
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations:
Material submitted for the record.............................. 94
Prepared statement by His Excellency Francois Balumuene Nkuna,
Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Congo............... 102
Written responses from the Honorable Donald Yamamoto to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Wisconsin................................................... 105
RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 o'clock
a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The hearing will come to order, and welcome. And
I think the committee is privileged to see our distinguished
chairman, Ed Royce, joining us, chairman of the full committee.
And I thank him for his leadership on Africa having once been
chairman of this subcommittee.
So great to see you, Ed, and thank you for your ongoing
leadership and for yesterday's important briefing with Nikki
Haley, our Ambassador to the United Nations, and a major
portion of that important briefing late in the afternoon was on
the Democratic Republic of Congo. So thank you, Chairman Royce.
The Democratic Republic of Congo was supposed to conduct
elections 1 year ago this month in order to achieve the
required transition of political power by December 19th.
However, after years of stalling on making preparations for
elections, the Government of the DRC failed to hold elections
last year and relied on a constitutional provision that
President Joseph Kabila could not step down until an election
was held to select a replacement.
Both Chairman Royce and I, Karen Bass, our ranking member,
and others, have had ongoing meetings with DRC officials,
including high-level people who have flown here to Washington.
And time and time again, we have admonished them, urging them
to stick to the schedule and hold these elections, and ensure
that they are free and fair.
The interpretation by President Joseph Kabila of the
Constitution is an apparent contradiction to other
constitutional provisions requiring elections to be held on
time and limiting President Kabila to two terms. The Election
Commission has just announced that elections cannot be held
until sometime in late 2018. We were told by Ambassador Nikki
Haley they are talking about December 2018, and how often have
we seen those timelines slip? And then we would be in 2019. And
I think Ambassador Haley made it very clear in yesterday's
briefing that there are an abundance of sanctions, almost like
a sort of Damocles, that would hold over the heads of those
who, again, would push to delay. And I think that is very real,
and I hope it is very compelling pressure to ensure that they
do exactly what they say they would do, because this is what
the people of the DR Congo want: They want a free and fair
election; they want to choose their next leader.
Polling has indicated that the majority of the Congolese
want Kabila's government to end and be replaced by a
transitional government until a new one can be elected. We
don't take sides, but we do want free and fair, and we want to
make sure that the people's will prevails.
Enduring conflict hotspots in Eastern DRC has seen recent
flare-ups. And I would note parenthetically, back in 2005, I
traveled to Goma, along with my good friend and chief of staff,
Greg Simpkins, and we saw, on the ground, and met many of the
people who had been raped, many of the women who had been so
horrifically sexually abused, but we also, like Africa
Compassion, an organization that did wonderful work with
helping to heal and to mitigate the damage of such abuse, saw
that there were people on the ground, indigenous Congolese who
cared so much that they were going the extra mile to make sure
that the fighting stopped and also that there would be a way
forward for those who had been abused.
In two other regions, Kasai and Tanganyika province, the
conflicts in Kasai and Tanganyika alone have caused the
displacement of nearly 2 million people since mid 2016. This is
in a country, where a war that seemed to never end, took the
lives of some 4 million people.
Now we all focused, as we should, on Darfur and the loss of
life there. The number of people that have lost their lives in
DRC historically eclipses that, which is a terrible, terrible
legacy.
The DRC has one of the highest rates of human displacement
in the world. Political unrest in urban centers, a string of
large prison breaks and violent attacks in Kinshasa, the
capital, by members of the religious sect that has declared
itself in opposition to Kabila have further contributed to the
worsening security of the conflict in Kasai, which reportedly
was first sparked in 2016 by the murder of a judicial leader by
state security forces and had become a catastrophic
humanitarian crisis, featuring severe atrocities and widespread
recruitment and abuse of children.
Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Eastern DRC, at one
time, saw violent activity by 2 million militia groups, and an
out-of-control national army resulting in the systematic rape
of about 50 women and girls per hour.
This hearing is intended to look at possible solutions to a
political stalemate that could very well lead to further
violence and upheaval in a large African country bordering on
nine neighbors. It follows a successful resolution on DRC that
I introduced that was passed by the House last year. Ranking
Member Bass and I are introducing new legislation very soon.
We understand that there is no easy solutions to the
current crisis in DRC. A negotiated transition likely could be
achieved if President Kabila were convinced that neither he nor
his family would be prosecuted for human rights violations or
corruption. However, that would reward them for abusing their
citizens and plundering the country's resources, and that is
even if members of his government were not covered.
A palace coup might take place in Kabila. This is not
unknown in the DRC. Kabila's father, Laurent, was assassinated
in office in 2001. Mobutu Seko, who the elder Kabila had
himself overthrown in elected government in 1965. He was chased
from power and fled into exile in 1997.
However, a coup would not support international efforts to
instill democratic practices in DRC, and could lead to
protracted infighting and national chaos. We want an orderly,
peaceful transition, and that's what the international
community led by the United States is asking and really
demanding.
The status quo, as detailed earlier, is already leading to
growing violence, and will not lead to a peaceable solution the
longer that transition is delayed. In fact, it is more likely
that violence could escalate and spill over into neighboring
countries, as did conflict in 1967, 1997, and 1998 to 2003.
Over the past year, we have heard many, many promises by
the Government of the DRC about when the elections will be
held. There have been several dates given to when voter
registration would be completed during this past year. The
current government timetable calls for voter registration to
extend to the point at which elections couldn't be held in the
DRC until late 2018, with inauguration early in 2019. That
would mean that Joseph Kabila could have an extra half term in
office when the Constitution precluded him from going past
December 2016.
Consequently, we will, today, hear from the State
Department on our Government's diplomatic efforts to resolve
the transition stalemate and the U.S. Agency for International
Development on our Government's programs on the ground to
promote democracy and free and fair elections.
Our second panel consists of scholars and activists who
will give us their informed insights as to how we can break
this political stalemate and prevent more bloodshed in the DRC.
Again, no solution will be easy or without cost, but
nonaction would even have a higher cost in terms of human
lives. And that we must not tolerate.
I would like to yield to my distinguished friend and
colleague.
Mr. Royce. Well, I will defer first to the ranking member.
Ms. Bass. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
Chairman.
I appreciate that. Thank you for your leadership, for
holding this hearing today. And I want to thank and welcome our
distinguished witnesses today.
You know what is so tragic is that we all know that DRC is
potentially one of the richest countries on earth. We know that
it has an abundance of deposits of copper, gold, diamonds,
cobalt, and many other minerals. We know that the Congo River
is the second largest river in the world and the most powerful
river in Africa, which means that the country has enormous
potential to generate hydroelectric power. And some scientists
say that it could provide enough power for all of sub-Saharan
electricity needs.
Now, on the other side of this, we know the stark reality
of living in DRC today. We know that it is one of the poorest
countries in the world, ranking 176 out of 187 on the latest
U.N. Human Development Index. More than half of the country
lives in extreme poverty, and we know that there are 3.8
million internally-displaced persons. And we also know that
there are parts of the DRC that are on the brink of hunger and
famine.
We shouldn't forget that in March of this year, all of the
humanitarian efforts, we had two U.N. investigators of American
and Swedish nationality and their Congolese interpreter, who
were found dead. They were there to investigate alleged large-
scale violence, and alleged human rights violations by the
Congolese army and local militia groups.
So we know with the world's most complex humanitarian
crisis, the DRC has 7.3 million people in need of humanitarian
assistance. But aid workers are finding it increasingly
difficult to address the deteriorating situation in the DRC,
and many face the risk of attacks and are unable to access
areas in most need of humanitarian assistance. So the signs
coming out of the DRC are not encouraging.
The Congolese Government and the main opposition coalition
reached a political agreement to organize a vote by the end of
2013, and Kabila committed to not run for a third term.
However, yesterday, we met, as the chairman mentioned, we met
with our U.N. Ambassador, Nikki Haley, who said that the DRC
has announced that they will hold Presidential elections in
December 2018. That seems like a ridiculously long time to
wait, considering the elections were supposed to be held long
ago. And I think, as you mentioned in your comments, that is
just a way of really extending it into another term.
But my concern is, is that even if it is genuine that there
will be elections held in December 2018, I am not convinced
that that does not mean that Kabila won't be on the ballot
until we hear definitively a public announcement that he will
not seek a third term, and will not change the Constitution.
And I believe, if I heard the Ambassador right, Mr. Chair, she
did say that he said he wouldn't change the Constitution,
correct?
Mr. Smith. That is right.
Ms. Bass. But I do not believe he has made the public
statement that he will not be on the ballot, which, obviously,
if he was on the ballot, that is a violation of the
Constitution; however, we all know that sometimes, people find
ways of saying they are not violating the Constitution, like in
Burundi, it was just a different interpretation, and the world
will not tolerate that.
I was encouraged by the Ambassador yesterday making very
strong statements that the United States will not be there in
support of the country unless we do see a commitment for a
peaceful transition. And with that, I yield to the other
chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, I want to thank
you, and I want to thank Ranking Member Karen Bass for the
focus that both of you have kept on the DRC; and for the trips
that both of you have taken to the DRC; the resolutions that
the two of you have passed; the effort to, sort of, galvanize
our attention on this tragedy, a tragedy like no other, as you
mentioned when you talked about the millions and millions who
have lost their lives there. And a lot of it is a governance
issue with respect to a lack of rule of law. And that emanates,
unfortunately, from Laurent and then to Joseph Kabila.
I also want to thank Greg Simpkins for--back in 1997, Tom
Sheehy and I, and a delegation from this committee, were in
neighboring Angola meeting with Savimbi and dos Santos, with
our Ambassador trying to broker peace there. And that night the
Government of Mobutu was overthrown.
Ms. Bass. Oh, you were there?
Mr. Royce. We were there. And Greg was our interpreter,
luckily, and we were able to take a plane into the airport in
Kinshasa. And we met with the new government, that was 1 day
new, and he was able to also communicate with Tshisekedi, who
was being pushed aside.
We didn't find out all until a little later, we were able
to track and follow Laurent Kabila, met with him in Harare in
order to discuss this issue, the rule of law, the Constitution,
the importance of elections. And we have struggled under the
Kabilas now. I think we have made three trips, I have with Mr.
Sheehy to Kinshasa, and we have met numerous times here or in
New York.
I have to give Ambassador Haley credit for, not just the
commitment she got in terms of the December 23rd election next
year, but also the benchmarks that are to be put in place, and
the announcement on the part of Joseph Kabila, that there will
be an election. Now, it falls on us and the international
community.
So this is really good news. We finally have an election
calendar. And I think we have to welcome not only the
announcement, but the sense among the people in Congo, when you
see them in civil society asserting their rights to be part of
this process, because they have felt the consequences more than
anyone.
And so, I think the State Department, the administration,
and us on the committee, we have to monitor this progress. And
if deemed insufficient, we must use every tool we have to
pressure the government in Congo. Now is the time. If we do not
address the political instability, then the violence and the
unrest across that country, which has cost over 4 million lives
so far, is only going to escalate. And as we watch people
flee--and recently we have seen another 1 million try to escape
the violence--when we see the 2 million that are displaced on
our trips there, living in camps, we know that the humanitarian
situation is dire and warrants our immediate attention, and the
world's immediate attention. And we really encourage the NGO
communities, some of who are here today, because too many
Congolese are suffering.
So we look forward to the witnesses' testimony today. And
again, Chairman Smith, I thank you for this hearing.
Mr. Smith. Chairman Royce, thank you very much again for
your long-standing, decades-long leadership. I really
appreciate it. Dan Donovan, the gentleman from Staten Islands
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And since I am not a
chairman or ranking member--and I learn so much more by
listening and speaking. I just learned how long Greg has been
here. I am going to yield my time so that Secretary Yamamoto
and Administrator Anderson can have more time to testify. Thank
you, sir.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. I would like to now
introduce our first panel, our two very distinguished public
servants and leaders, beginning with Ambassador Donald
Yamamoto, who serves as Acting Assistant Secretary in the
Bureau of African Affairs in U.S. Department of State.
He has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the
Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006, and where he was
responsible for coordinating U.S. policy toward 20 countries in
East and Central Africa.
Ambassador Yamamoto was also our Ambassador to the Republic
of Djibouti from 2000 to 2003, as well as to Ethiopia. He was
the Deputy Director of East African affairs from 1998 to 2000.
And without objection, your full resume and that of our
distinguished other witness, Cheryl Anderson, will be made part
of the record.
Ms. Anderson is working as the Acting Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau of African Affairs for USAID, the
Agency for International Development. Ms. Anderson has more
than 20 years of development experience, mostly in Africa.
Since joining USAID as a foreign service officer, she has
worked in USAID's admissions in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Uganda, Sudan, and East Africa.
Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Anderson worked as a program
manager at Health Link Worldwide, and also served as a Peace
Corps volunteer in Ghana. And she has also testified before our
subcommittee. So both of you, welcome back and we look forward
to your insights and recommendations.
The floor is yours, Ambassador Yamamoto.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD YAMAMOTO, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
I ask for the longer version to be submitted for the record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Ambassador Yamamoto. And thank you very much, Chairman
Smith, and Ranking Member Bass and Chairman Royce. Thank you
very much for this very important hearing today.
Today's hearing comes at a critical juncture for the DRC.
And the country faces two starkly different, possible
trajectories over the next 12 months, where we have
Presidential elections on December 2018 and the DRC's first
peaceful democratic transfer of power. Or alternatively, where
we see the absence of genuinely free and fair elections and a
continuation of the current political impasse, we could see the
DRC return to widespread violence and instability. Our
immediate focus is to support the stability of the DRC through
genuine free and fair elections that are credible and inclusive
and lead to a peaceful democratic transfer of power.
With the November 5th announcement of the DRC's electoral
commission by the CENI, the elections will be held in December
2018. We have an opportunity to support the Congolese people
achieve historic democratic transfer of power. However, this
will require political will on behalf of the Government of the
DRC to organize credible elections and commitment by the
oppositions to participate through the democratic process, and
continued engagement, pressure, and support from the
international community, including the United States.
Ambassador Haley's October visit to the DRC sent a very
clear powerful message to President Kabila and his government,
that further delays and an unrealistic electoral calendar will
be unacceptable.
Ambassador Haley also told opposition party leaders that
the United States does not support calls for unconstitutional
change, and stressed the need for all actors to work within the
framework of the DRC Constitution and the December 2016 Saint
Sylvestre Agreement.
The administration is building on the momentum provided by
Ambassador Haley's visit in the light of the CENI's recently-
announced electoral calendar to push all parties in the DRC to
advance the electoral process. There is much at risk due to the
DRC's vast size, population, and strategic location, including
nine international borders. Continued delays by the government
in holding elections has increased tensions, undermined already
weak, or in some regions of the country, nonexisting state
authority, and risked increased violence, unrest and
instability.
The administration's focus now is on ensuring that the CENI
and the government of the DRC implement the election calendar
and do not undertake any actions that further postpone the long
overdue elections. We believe there's an opportunity for
progress despite the challenges. A democratic transition of
power, which can only come through genuine free and fair
elections, is essential for the Congolese people, the African
subregion and the U.S. strategic interests across the
continent, including: Preventing wide-scale regional insecurity
and instability, which have been a precursor to multistate wars
and genocide; denying illegal armed groups, criminal networks,
and international actors and regimes, such as North Korea and
ISIS; and access to black markets to which trade and minerals
and other natural resources; preventing the region from
becoming a stateless zone that is impossible to monitor and
responding to disease outbreaks such Ebola pandemics; and
preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers and
atrocities such as the rape of women and girls as a weapon of
war.
While elections alone will not solve DRC's daunting
challenges, they are critical to the country's stability. We
are prepared to work with our international partners to ensure
that the electoral process is transparent, and conducted in
accordance with international standards.
It is important to understand this extremely complex
country. The DRC is the size of the United States east of the
Mississippi, with more than 80 million people, and almost no
basic infrastructure. All nationally elected politicians, not
just President Kabila, have now overstayed their elected terms
in office. Opposition parties and civil society are
understandably deeply distrustful of the CENI's and the
government's commitment to elections. Restrictions on freedom
of assembly as well as politically-motivated prosecution of
opposition leaders, has significantly exacerbated tensions.
Already weak and limited state authorities has become
increasingly tenuous, and even absent in many areas, and some
elements of the state security forces have committed human
rights violations and abuses and mass atrocities.
Numerous non-state armed groups also continue to operate in
the DRC. The DRC is one of the world's poorest countries,
despite having enormous natural resources and wealth.
Despite the complex environment, we know that genuinely
free and fair elections can be held in 2018, and there is no
question that the Congolese people deeply desire to choose a
new leader through elections. The African Affairs Bureau of the
State Department is working with our interagency partners to
ensure concrete steps are implemented toward elections that are
genuinely free, fair, credible, timely, and inclusive, and
result in a peaceful democratic transfer of power. We are
similarly coordinating closely with our international partners
and regional states and multilateral institutions. Key elements
of this approach include: With the announcement of the
electoral calendar of December 2018, we are coordinating
closely with our international partners to actively press the
CENI and the DRC Government, to fully implement all required
steps in the DRC's electoral process.
Second, we are actively pressing both the government and
the opposition to operate within the framework of the
Constitution and the December agreement to reject violence and
calls for unconstitutional change.
Third, we have actively pressed, both through public
statements and private diplomatic engagements, the Government
of the DRC to respect political freedom and rights and refrain
from excessive and unlawful use of force.
Next, we are coordinating our messaging and advocacy with
key partners, including our European and regional partners. And
finally, since June 2016, if we have imposed targeted sanctions
on six current and former DRC Government officials, we remain
prepared to impose additional targeted sanctions as
developments warrant.
While our immediate focus is on the electoral process, the
DRC's urgent and ongoing security and humanitarian needs also
remain important priorities. Together with our international
partners, the United States has striven to end the violence
throughout the DRC, including specifically in the Kasais and
the East. We are continuing to provide assistance in response
to the humanitarian crisis, and to ensure that those
responsible for abuses and atrocities are held accountable. We
have worked with international partners to address the
humanitarian needs of 3.8 million internally-displaced persons,
over 620,000 Congolese refugees now living outside their
country, and nearly 543,000 refugees for neighboring countries
who are inside the DRC. We will continue to engage with the DRC
Government, the U.N., and our international partners, in
finding a long-term solution to bring about peace and
stability.
In conclusion, the stability of the DRC is a key
administration objective in Africa, given the DRC's significant
economic, geopolitical and security-related importance. We need
only recall the ramifications of the last DRC war from 1998 to
2002, to understand the enormous transnational negative impact
of armed conflict and political crises in the Congo, and
through free, fair, credible, inclusive elections, leading to
of a peaceful democratic transfer of power are central to the
DRC and the region's long-term stability and development. There
remain many challenges and risks to achieve these goals, but
our engagement and commitment are unwavering. And thank you,
and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Yamamoto follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Ms. Anderson.
STATEMENT OF MS. CHERYL ANDERSON, ACTING ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Anderson. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Bass, Congressman Donovan. Thank you for inviting me to speak
today about the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is always an
honor to have an opportunity to discuss our work with
supporters of Africa. And for me, it is a pleasure to be back
testifying before this subcommittee.
USAID has maintained a long-term relationship with the DRC
and its people since the country became independent in 1960.
With its vast mineral wealth, the country has tremendous
opportunity for economic growth that could lift citizens out of
poverty, and propel the country into middle-income status.
Instead, protracted political uncertainty is fueling violence
and instability, and prevents the realization of the country's
full potential.
The reality is that the DRC is teetering on the brink of a
crisis such as it has not seen since the formal end of the
second Congo War in 2003.
Due to the political crisis and continued electoral delays,
the mandates of all elected DRC Government officials have
officially expired.
While an election alone will not solve the DRC's many
challenges, credible inclusive Presidential and legislative
elections are critical to ensuring a peaceful transition of
power, reducing the risk of widespread violence, and
strengthening the country's democratic institutions and
economic development.
We are pleased with the recent release of an electoral
calendar, but voter registration, already months behind
schedule, must be completed. Revised electoral laws have to be
passed and funding has to be appropriated by the DRC Government
to cover the cost of organizing national elections.
Finally, the Government of the DRC needs to take immediate
steps to allow civil society, journalists and citizens to
express themselves, protect the human rights of its citizens
and ensure that all political parties are afforded equitable
access to the media, and that their rights to assemble
peacefully are respected.
Alongside other U.S. Government agencies, USAID remains
committed to supporting the timely organization of peaceful,
credible, and inclusive elections, that reflect the will of the
Congolese people. We have provided approximately $37 million in
election and political processes programming since 2013. This
includes five components: Support for domestic election
observation; civil and voter education; targeted technical
assistance to the electoral commission, CENI; political party
strengthening; and electoral justice.
USAID's election observation activity is implemented by the
local Episcopal Justice and Peace Organization. This is the
leading Congolese election observation organization.
We are helping to build their capacity to train and deploy
long- and short-term domestic election observers in accordance
with international standards.
The civic and voter education program is helping more than
35 different Congolese civil society organizations to inform
citizens, and particularly women, youth and other traditionally
marginalized groups, about the electoral process, their rights
and role as voters, and the importance of peaceful
participation in the elections.
A grant to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
provides technical assistance to the Electoral Commission,
CENI, for operations, logistics, and effective use of
information technology. USAID's political party strengthening
program provides training to 10 political parties--five from
the ruling majority, and five from the opposition--to better
represent and respond to citizens' concerns, and improve the
internal management and organization of the parties.
Finally, our human rights and electoral justice activity
strengthens the capacity of national level justice actors, the
courts, and civil society organizations to conduct legal
education, provide legal services and monitor and respond to
human rights violations, including electoral disputes.
The stakes for the DRC and for its neighbors could not be
higher. Again, we are encouraged by the announcement of an
electoral calendar, but we will now need to see confidence-
building measures to ensure that this timeline is respected and
implemented, and all measures are taking for free, credible and
peaceful elections.
This includes an end to politically-motivated prosecutions,
the release of political prisoners, and respect for the right
of peaceful assembly and association, so that opposition
parties and civil society organizations may hold peaceful
public meetings without government interference or
intimidation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, members of
the subcommittee. I look forward to hearing your counsel and
responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Anderson follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much, Ms. Anderson.
To begin the questioning, I just want to make clear,
especially for the C-SPAN audience that is following. Some of
them might say, why are we can doing this? Why do we care
whether or not a President follows his own Constitution, and
whether or not he, having given commitments and being bound by
that Constitution to two terms, why are we so concerned about
it? And I think the seemingly esoteric concern about rule of
law, which is important, is eclipsed by the potential for
horrific conflict, loss of life that we are already seeing
shaping up.
We know when these elections, and when people from various
parties, or even tribes as the Nuer and the Dinka in South
Sudan, that the flare-ups are huge, large numbers are people
are slaughtered, and women are raped and horribly abused as a
result. So we are on the cusp of what could be, as you have
pointed out in your testimonies, an incredible new flare-up of
violence in a region, as you pointed out, Ms. Anderson, that is
the size of Western Europe, with 100 million people
approximately, a large country where the potential loss of life
is very real.
So my questions, first beginning with, again, the violence
in the Kasai region, the number of internally displaced
Congolese has surged to more than 3.8 million, while the number
of suffering from acute food insecurity has reached 7.7
million. The U.N. has declared a level 3 humanitarian emergency
in the DRC, putting it in on par with crises in Iraq, Syria,
and Yemen.
And I am wondering if you could speak to how we are trying
to mitigate this terrible humanitarian crisis that is festering
before our eyes. Secondly, let me ask you, if you could: With
regards to peacekeeping, I am the one who, as you might know,
who authored the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, our
landmark law that combats sex and labor trafficking, and
subsequent laws as well.
It is a passion of mine, it is a passion of this committee
to stop all trafficking, because it is modern-day slavery. As
we all know, the peacekeepers who are deployed to DR Congo
early on, particularly during Ambassador Swing's tenure in
office, had a terrible record of bribing or taking gifts from
young people, raping 13-year-olds. These are the peacekeepers
from the U.N. We held several hearings on this subcommittee;
Greg and I traveled to Goma, and met with the peacekeepers
there and have raised it at the United Nations here in
Washington and in country unceasingly.
We understand that, and I have been tracking this, that the
efforts are far better than they have ever been, but certainly
not there yet. Peacekeepers who do commit crimes against
Congolese, particularly women and girls, are not only sent back
to their home countries, but there is a heavy admonishment by
the U.N. They prosecute, put them behind bars, and to ensure
that they are never redeployed to another peacekeeping mission
ever again where they can recommit those crimes.
If you could speak, if you would, to MONUSCO, whether or
not it is practicing what we thought--Kofi Annan had called it
the ``Zero Tolerance Policy.'' I had one hearing where he said,
``Zero Tolerance Policy in DR Congo, zero compliance.'' Because
it was so ineffectively being implemented.
Notwithstanding the great efforts by Jane Holl Lute, an
American who was in a key position there, had to fight for
that, so if you could speak to that. And finally, let me ask
you about the most credible, in my opinion, and reliable and
effective interlocutors for peace reconciliation and free and
fair elections, especially in the DR Congo, is the Catholic
Church.
Karen Bass and I were in South Sudan last May, and we met
with Salva Kiir, the President, and had a very straightforward
conversation with him, not all that happy, because of the
terrible killings that are occurring there. He wouldn't even
meet with the faith-based consortium of leaders, bishops,
clergy of all kinds, who really are the key to reconciliation.
And now, we see potentially a deja vu of that in the DR Congo.
How do we support the church in its efforts and all those who
are trying to have free and fair elections, the amount of
money? Who is it going to, if you would? And as Nikki Haley
said yesterday, you know, if this road map for having this
election does not happen, we won't support the election. We are
not going to support a fraud and a sham. So if you could speak
to those three.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is a
long list of issues that we need to tackle.
First is going to MONUSCO, and the peacekeeping operation.
As you know, 63 percent of all U.N. Ops is in Africa. And what
we have been firmly committed, especially with this new U.N.
Security Secretary General, but, also, our own commitment to
human rights; and also, to your legislation, Mr. Chairman,
which has been supportive and very helpful, is that we that we
look at MONUSCO and all U.N. operations, that they have taken
this necessary and proper steps on SEA, the sexual
exploitation, and ensure that those who have committed those
violations are held accountable. We are doing it just not on
MONUSCO, but MINUSMA and all the other organizations.
The Missions Conduct and Disciplinary team in MONUSCO is
currently composed of 23 personnel with offices in Kinshasa and
four regional offices, and MONUSCO's implementing strong
preventative actions in training, et cetera, through risk
assessment, military police deterrent patrols, enforcement of
strict curfews, and out-of-bound regimes. And the SRSG, again,
has taken a very strong and tough position on the SEA.
The other issue too is, as you know, the United States and
the State Department, we train peacekeeping troops of about
over 300,000. Part of that is human rights, the protection of
human rights and the protection of SEA.
Let me go into the other areas on the violence, is that
MONUSCO's main object and goal is to protect civilians, and, of
course, we have had, from 2013, an intervention brigade, which
is used to target groups like M23, and prevent other problems
and militias from rising and creating issues. And so those are
some helpful uses.
But the other issue, too, is that we need to keep up a very
consistent, persistent observation of the gross human rights
abuses taking place in the DRC, not only just by militias and
the FARDC troops, but by all groups. And we have to hold each
person accountable.
As you may recall, Mr. Chairman, that in June at the Human
Rights Council, we supported the international experts being
sent to Kasai to look at the gross human rights atrocities.
And, of course, but not only looking at the atrocities, but
also investigating the cases, particularly the death of Sharp
and Catalan. This murder case will remain a priority for us to
look at and to investigate.
The other thing is, during Ambassador Haley's visit to the
DRC, she met with CENCO, and also the Catholic Church and other
faith-based groups. We agree in strongly supporting the
facilitation that the Catholic Church had arranged in the Saint
Sylvestre Agreement of 2016.
And as you know, faith-based groups have been a cornerstone
pillar for a lot of our operations, not just in DRC, but
throughout Ethiopia, East Africa, West, et cetera, because of
their commitment and quality of work and low overhead costs.
And let me turn to my----
Mr. Smith. And on the peacekeeping, you did touch on that
somewhat but----
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes. On the----
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Are you satisfied that they are
protecting and the duty to protect is being followed and that--
--
Ambassador Yamamoto. The issue for the peacekeeping--it is
not. And let's be very clear, it is not. But the issue is the
complexity of the DRC. By having a political impasse, it has
emboldened a lot of the militias to conduct and engage in in
very striking, gross human rights abuse. And one way to kind of
rein in some of this abuse, is to have a coherent, free, fair,
open election that are going to be executed and implemented in
2018. We have to hold those people accountable.
And let me just kind of, if I can go off one tangent on
three issues, and that is, that there are three requirements
that we are going to be focused on: That is the technical
aspects requirements, the other thing is the political
requirements, and also the human rights requirements. And so
the technical, obviously, is the electoral process, announcing
and registering voters, ensuring that they are scrubbed,
looking at the voter registration, looking at the candidates'
registrations. That is on the technical side. But on the
political side is that what we are looking at, very carefully,
is that the government, as well as the opposition, but the
government has to give, have confidence-building measures.
In other words, they cannot arrest political prisoners,
they have to have open political space. They have to allow
people to assemble and to discuss, and there has to be looking
at and curbing at and addressing the excessive use of violence
and force. So those are some of the issues, and that goes into
the human rights issues we are looking at and trying to prevent
and stop the excessive and gross human rights abuse. But let's
go on to the----
Ms. Anderson. Chairman Smith, you asked about the situation
in the Kasais and then peacekeeping and then the churches. I
would like to start with the situation in the Kasai provinces.
First of all, the widespread violence and human rights
violations that we have seen there are totally unacceptable.
This is against innocent civilians. We know that the violence
has been subsiding, but that should not take our attention away
from the fact that this is a very serious security and human
rights and humanitarian situation in the Kasais with people
starting to come back. We also have to make sure that we don't
lose sight of the fact that people need to be accountable for
the abuses that we have seen.
So the United States, along with our bilateral and
multilateral partners, has been responding through efforts to
end the violence and hold people responsible for the heinous
acts. But also on the humanitarian side, we have been
responding. We have scaled up our funding. It has been hard to
operate, it had been previously hard to even get in there. As
you mentioned, it can be very treacherous for humanitarian
workers, but we did scale up a response for health and food
security, as well as protection of children who are affected by
the violence. And we airlifted 300 metric tons of blankets and
cooking kits and other kinds of humanitarian supplies into the
area in Kasai, Kasai-Central, Kasai-Oriental, and two other
provinces there.
In the whole country, this is just one part of the country,
so there are different numbers out there. The ones that I have
are that we have as many as 3.9 million internally-displaced
people in DRC. And that is the most, that is the highest number
for all of sub-Saharan Africa, and 600,000 refugees who have
now left the DRC.
In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. Government has provided a
total of $190 million in humanitarian assistance across the
country, and of that, $128 million is from USAID. And we also
remain committed to providing humanitarian assistance to people
who are in need, with, working with the U.N. and with our NGO
partners.
I won't really speak on peacekeeping, except to say that in
the area of gender-based violence, I think you are aware that
USAID has been very engaged since 2002 in preventing and
responding to gender-based violence. And on the Catholic Church
and churches and faith-based organizations, definitely, these
groups play such a critical role in the country in keeping
peace and helping to ensure that people hold their government
accountable, that they are involved in the election process,
and also in providing services across the country to people.
We have repeatedly endorsed the Catholic Church's December
31st agreement, and we continue to urge respect for that
agreement. And I did mention earlier that we are working with
the Episcopal Justice and Peace Organization on domestic
election observation efforts.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Without objection, we are going to
put the December 31st agreement into the record so all can see.
Thank you for your testimony.
I now yield to Ranking Member Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just a few questions. I
wanted to get some specifics. Because when you are talking
about--both of our witnesses--when you are talking about
holding people accountable, I wanted to know how we do that?
Ambassador Yamamoto, you were referring to, I think you
talked about political, technical--you were talking about the
confidence-building measures. And you said technical, political
and human rights, is that what you were saying? So I wanted to
know, you know, how we specifically go about that? I mean, I
hear from people all the time of folks being arrested, and I
don't know what our role in that is, or when we see the
violence taking place, especially government-initiated
violence.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Let me give kind of one introductory
remark and then go into the discussion.
So since coming in as the Acting Assistant Secretary, I
made a concerted effort to talk to all our partners and
colleagues dealing with the DRC. And the issue is that we find
it extremely unacceptable that the elections in the DRC has
taken so long. And the instability that has given rise to
militias and other groups because they have been emboldened by
the lack of political uncertainty.
We talked to the African Union, the FARDC and the European
colleagues, the donors, and the issue comes in is that by
holding Kabila and the opposition accountable, but mostly in
this case, President Kabila, that he doesn't have political
space, to maneuver, to escape, to delay, but that he has held
focus, that you will have elections.
The other issue too, is I know we discussed with the
opposition one of the areas was that they wanted to look at the
transitional government. We said no, under the Constitution and
under the Saint Sylvestre Agreement that Kabila will be there
until the new President is elected. That means we will hold
Kabila responsible and accountable to instituting, implementing
the agreements, and according to the Constitution, the process
for election of the President.
Ms. Bass. Yeah, I just wonder what we specifically do. I
mean, I understand we talked to AU, we talked to FARDC but, you
know, what measures do we specifically take?
Is there something we would hold back? What do we do?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think on a broader scope by having
the Africans and the Europeans committed and focused, that, you
know, puts on President Kabila the onus that he has political
stake, he has to implement, he has to be committed to doing
this, and that there is no alternative or no ability to delay
that process.
Ms. Bass. Well, yes, although he has delayed it.
So you mentioned also that there were sanctions that were
prepared, and I was wondering what kind of sanctions. And then,
you know, that we are looking at legislation, and I wanted to
know what your thoughts were about that?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Everything has to be on the table. And
as you know, we did implement targeted sanctions, OFAC
sanctions on six specific individuals. And sanctions are on the
table.
Ms. Bass. And so if we target the specific individuals,
what are we sanctioning them for? They can't come to the United
States?
Ambassador Yamamoto. And their assets, they----
Ms. Bass. Do they have assets here?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Assets not only here, but in other
countries. By doing it on the banking institutions, that helps
restrict their operations. It is something similar that we have
done in other countries and to other individuals. So that's on
the OFAC side. The other issue, too, is we can look at limiting
their ability to come to the United States, through visa
processes. We can also look through, with the United Nations
and on U.N. sanctions, and also build on that through sanctions
from the European Union as well.
So it has to be a very concerted effort----
Ms. Bass. When we do sanctions like that on the
individuals, because I know that some of these folks--I don't
know specifically about the group you are talking about, but
some of them have children here----
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes.
Ms. Bass [continuing]. Going to our universities.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes.
Ms. Bass. Do our sanctions ever refer to that?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Sanction is only on the specific
individual.
Ms. Bass. It is not like on a family, per se?
Ambassador Yamamoto. For instance, I mean, hypothetical, if
an individual is thinking, because they have gotten ill-gotten
assets, let's say the Kleptocracy Act, then that obviously
would affect the family members, because they can't access the
banking institutions and to get money out, because those are
ill-gotten assets.
Ms. Bass. Do we ever say their families can't come here?
Ambassador Yamamoto. It depends on if they have been
targeted.
Ms. Bass. Yeah, I understood on the financial part, but I
was just--because I know that one of the strategies that is
used is that their relatives are not in the countries. When all
of the strife is happening, their individual families are
protected.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes, and you raised a very good point,
Congresswoman Bass, and that is something that we are
discussing separately, but the issue comes in is family
members--in one country where family members are living outside
of the country benefiting from ill-gotten assets.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Those people as well----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ambassador Yamamoto [continuing]. Cannot access, not only
the banking facilities, but also any of the benefits from those
assets so they, too, will be under those sanctions.
Ms. Bass. Because one thing that we do is that we allow
folks to come here and buy real estate and all sorts of things.
They are living well.
Ambassador Yamamoto. And, again, the way we do the targeted
sanction, it has to be very negotiated, it has to be looked at.
We can't go into who we are considering for sanctions, but just
it is generally that everything is on the table for discussion,
and the breadth and the depth of those sanctions.
Ms. Bass. Now, on our end, do we have an Ambassador?
Ambassador Yamamoto. We have not had one since December of
last year.
Ms. Bass. And is there one in the pipeline that just hasn't
been confirmed?
Ambassador Yamamoto. There is one but I defer to the White
House personnel system. And----
Ms. Bass. I understand that you defer for the specifics,
but do you know if the person is waiting Senate confirmation?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I am not at liberty to say; it is,
again----
Ms. Bass. It is a secret?
Ambassador Yamamoto [continuing]. This would be for the
White House personnel.
Ms. Bass. Okay. You said that we are really looking at the
case of the two murders.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes.
Ms. Bass. And so I wanted to know what that meant? What are
we doing?
Ambassador Yamamoto. We have an American citizen----
Ms. Bass. One was an American.
Ambassador Yamamoto. American. But that doesn't matter
because both of them were part, they are investigating the mass
atrocities that have taken place.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Their work is important to us. As part
of the process, we are coordinating looking at investigations,
pushing the United Nations, pushing operations, pushing the
DRC.
Ms. Bass. Are they doing--Who is doing the investigation,
by the way? Is the DRC doing it, or is it an international
investigation or----
Ambassador Yamamoto. We have said everyone is going to be
participating in the investigation, because this is a priority
for the United States to look at who were involved in the
murders, and to hold those people accountable.
One thing is that we supported the U.N. Secretary General's
recent employment of Robert Petit of Canada to head a team that
will assist in the national investigation into the deaths of
Mr. Sharp and Ms. Catalan. And then, we are looking at other
means and methods to help those investigations.
Ms. Bass. Also on our end, I know that we were talking
about the peacekeeping troops, but we pushed for a rather deep
reduction in the troop levels.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Right.
Ms. Bass. So how does that work? Because I think you were
saying--was that you, Ms. Anderson? Were you talking about the
real need for troops but yet we propose cutting them back?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Right. So Ambassador Haley, in her
trip to the DRC, one of the issues was focusing on peacekeeping
missions that are fit for purpose, and I think that was the key
word, fit for purpose. And so if we look at MONUSCO, it is
probably one of the largest and longest serving peacekeeping
operations for the United Nations. And so the issue comes in,
how do you make those more efficient, effective, targeted?
On the one hand, yes, I know that Ambassador Haley had
raised the issue of the Burundi refugee being killed by the
FARDC troops, how did MONUSCO respond or not respond? How about
the intervention battalion, Tanzania's troops, et cetera, it is
not enough to target and to go after all of the problems that
are in----
Ms. Bass. I was just referencing, didn't we ask for a
reduction?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes.
Ms. Bass. But yet, we said more were needed, so I didn't
understand why we asked for a reduction?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Okay. So I think right now currently,
it is to assess the effectiveness of MONUSCO, looking at, do we
have the right mission set and that it is fit for purpose,
according to what Ambassador Haley----
Ms. Bass. I see. So there might be fewer, but you are
saying it might be more specific.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Specific and targeted.
Ms. Bass. And you were mentioning--and I believe this was
Ms. Anderson--was mentioning the electoral assistance that we
have provided over the years. You gave quite a span of years.
And I was just wondering what we are doing now, specifically
how much, and what does it mean that we provide electoral
assistance?
Ms. Anderson. I mentioned that we have been providing
assistance since 2013 in preparation for this, this election
that is coming up. So it is not just the 1 day of the election,
but it is a process. And so, our $37 million in funding is for
those five components that I mentioned. And a lot of it has
been in process because we had been working on things like
voter and civic education, so that the people know what to
expect, how to get involved in elections, working with
political parties.
Ms. Bass. So just to understand kind of specifically,
because I certainly----
Ms. Anderson. Sure.
Ms. Bass [continuing]. Understand it in the abstract. But
specifically, do we fund a U.S. NGO or DRC NGO that goes in
villages and sits down and talks to people? Is that an example?
And given that voter registration is really behind, are we
doing anything, and if we are, specifically, if you can give an
example of a project that we fund and what they do?
Ms. Anderson. Sure. That is really important now because we
have to keep adjusting. Now we have a date, so that that means
that we can put a number of things into motion toward the date
of the election. But I can talk about, for example, the civic
and voter education component of our program.
This is--we have invested $19 million in this program. It
is implemented by Counterpart International, and they work with
38----
Ms. Bass. Is that a U.S. company?
Ms. Anderson. Yes. It is working with 38 different
Congolese civil society organizations. That is how we are
helping to build a local capacity so that those organizations,
now, they inform the citizens. They work with the citizens to
talk about the electoral process, what are your rights as a
voter, what is your role as a voter, what do you need to do to
get involved. And they also have a specific component on
peaceful participation.
Ms. Bass. Is it a consulting firm?
Ms. Anderson. Counterpart International is a--I think it is
a--I may have to get back to you. It may be a not-for-profit
organization.
We have the four other components. I would like to mention
the component on elections observation, and that is one of our
few direct awards to a DRC-based organization with----
Ms. Bass. Is it NDI and IRI or that comes out of another--
on our part?
Ms. Anderson. We have--NDI is involved in the component of
our assistance that we call political party training.
Ms. Bass. And then you fund DRC group to do the
observation?
Ms. Anderson. Right. So they coordinate a number of
Congolese groups to do the observation. And this is the
Episcopal justice and peace organization in DRC.
Ms. Bass. So given that now we know the election is
December of next year, is more money needed? Or because these
elections have been stalled, have you been holding onto the
dollars in anticipation that one day we get a date?
Ms. Anderson. Yes. We are hustling now to have a look at
what we have, but we had extended our awards into 2018 and
2019. And at this point, I think we may have to make some
adjustments to get us through that period through the period of
the elections. But for the most part, we had done extensions to
the programs to allow us to continue into 2018, potentially
2019.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Anderson. It is a long process, so it is not just the
election.
Ms. Bass. Especially when you don't know----
Ms. Anderson. Yes. And then we hope that they stick to the
date too. We have to hold them to that.
Mr. Smith. You know, as you realize unmet need, if you
could advise our subcommittee--I know you'll be advising
hopefully the Appropriations Committee as well--so that we can
try to meet that need.
I yield to my good friend and colleague, Dan Donovan.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just have one question for both of you. Maybe, Mr.
Secretary, you can speak about the election process, and maybe,
Ms. Anderson, you can talk about our humanitarian efforts. We
are a passionate Nation, particularly when it comes to both
democracies and humanitarian efforts. We are also a very
compassionate Nation. How do we see our role, the United
States' role in the government of other countries? There is a
lot of talk about other countries' influence on our election
process here in the United States. Now we are talking about
maybe United States involvement in the elections in another
country.
I was just wondering how do we define our role or what do
we see as proper, and for the humanitarian efforts, in a
country I am not sure that they are cooperative with USAID's
efforts to help people, but we as a Nation reach out to those
folks in the rest of the globe who are suffering, and sometimes
their countries or their government might not appreciate our
efforts and may see what we are trying to do in humanitarian
environment as trying to influence their people in other ways.
I was just wondering if you can just give me some background on
that.
Ambassador Yamamoto. So our role in the political process,
we don't take winners, losers, and we are not addressing or
advocating for any candidate. What we are doing is that these
are agreements, the Constitution of the DRC and the Saint-
Sylvestre agreement of 2016 negotiated by the Catholic church,
which both the government and the opposition signed. What we
are doing is holding both parties accountable and committed to
what they had signed.
And for 4 years I led peace talks and negotiations in the
Congo, and everywhere I went, the United States stands as a
symbol that we are going to work for what the people of Congo
want, and they demand an election, a credible, free, fair, open
election. And in that context, we are going to support the
people of the Congo to say, yes, we are going to--we are behind
you, we are going to hold the government and the opposition
accountable to do these electoral processes in 2018.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Secretary, do we do that as a Nation? Are
we doing that as a group as the United Nations? How do we do
that? Does the United States stand alone in doing that or our
partners at the U.N. assist in that as well?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes. We do that in the context of
negotiations with the donor community, the United Nations, but
also the African unions and also local communities within the
Congo and also the various groups.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Secretary, Ms. Anderson, can you speak
about our humanitarian efforts?
Ms. Anderson. Yes. We always do our best to respond to
humanitarian crises wherever they are. In the DRC, we have a
very challenging environment. We work closely with the U.N.,
with other bilateral and multilateral development partners,
with international and local NGOs. We always have to coordinate
our efforts. We always encourage the government--we need their
cooperation, and we always encourage them to do increasingly
more to respond to humanitarian crises. This is a tough one in
the DRC, and I can say that we--we are a major donor in
humanitarian assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, and that
includes the DRC. So many of the other players look to us to
play a leading role.
And I would just conclude by saying that, once again, this
is a very challenging environment, and it is very difficult for
us to kind of get ahead of this situation, as well as to decide
what to do because it is a dangerous environment for our
humanitarian work.
Mr. Donovan. And when you say we are a great donor, is that
just in financial resources? Is it in human resources? What is
our actual presence there?
Ms. Anderson. We have--we have personnel on the ground who
work on humanitarian assistance, and we work with local and
other international organizations, especially the United
Nations, to deliver humanitarian assistance in the form of food
assistance, emergency health assistance, other types of relief
supplies. And also one thing we work on is the protection of
citizens, especially children in dangerous situations.
Mr. Donovan. And my last question, do you find resistance
in the DRC from the efforts that you have just described?
Ms. Anderson. I would say that one of the biggest
challenges is a question of the will of the government to move
forward on its commitments. In the December 31 agreement and
also their--the fact that we have such a dangerous environment
that with violence and human rights violations makes it very
hard for us to do our humanitarian work.
Mr. Donovan. I thank you both.
Mr. Smith. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Garrett.
Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening this important meeting. It is interesting as a
freshman member of this committee to sort of do the learning
curve on Africa in particular, and certain trends have emerged
in my observations.
But first, let me thank our panelists, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Yamamoto's service goes all the way back to oversight of the
tragic events in Tiananmen Square, and Ms. Anderson served, and
I will thank you for your service in the Peace Corps, putting a
good face on America for the remainder of the world and I think
an investment that a lot of my colleagues undervalue as it
relates to return on investment (ROI) and the opinion of
America that people across the world who might otherwise only
get that opinion from mass media have, and that is so
important, so thank you for that.
I don't want anybody to break out in laughter when I ask
this question, but as we work toward hopefully free, fair, and
transparent elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, what
can we say we are doing to ensure that the Chinese influence
over the electoral process doesn't tilt the scales in the
direction that would be to the benefit of the Chinese? And that
is an open question.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman.
You know, we have looked at the--in our coordination with the
international community--and we do hold annual discussions with
the Chinese specifically on what they are doing in Africa. And
we are trying to steer not only China, but all these countries
to play a helpful, supportive role. The other area too that we
have concerns is, of course, the exploitation of resources in
eastern Congo.
Mr. Garrett. That was my next question.
Ambassador Yamamoto. That is the area that we have been
working on very long and hard, is that the people of the Congo
need to benefit from the resources. There has to be a rational
process in whereby you develop these resources. And one of the
things is that, you know, looking at your question, is that we
do discuss the Chinese on a whole spectrum and aspect. And not
just China; it is all the other countries that are involved,
positively and negatively, in the DRC.
Mr. Garrett. Ms. Anderson, if you want to, and if you don't
want to, then I will keep going.
Ms. Anderson. I guess I would just say, if you are
referring to the elections and our involvement related to the
Chinese, we are focusing on local capacity, and we are working
so that the Congolese can be prepared to participate in their
election and hold their own government accountable so that they
can start to be able to find their own future. And that is the
role that we are playing in the elections, and it is quite
different from the Chinese.
Mr. Garrett. Right. And so that is something that is
noteworthy here as we as Americans recognize that perhaps
American, dare I say, overreach globally has manifested itself
in ways that we didn't anticipate, that there are certain types
of aid that are greatly appreciated and others that are taken
because they are aid, but that come with a backlash, if you
will. There is a vacuum, I think, inherently created, and the
Chinese are all too happy to fill it. Pardon me, I am going to
do soliloquy for a second here.
I have not spent a ton of time on the ground in Africa, but
I did speak to a ranking member of a North African country
wherein the entire presidential palace that I would say
probably rivals the Cannon House Office Building in square
footage was built by China. They built a palace. And when you
get off the airport, and you served in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia,
which is a dynamic country where if we get it right, great
things will happen, and if we don't, tragic things will happen,
you almost feel like you are in a Chinese annex. And the
Chinese record of exploitation of individuals is apparent even
from 2007 in the DRC as it relates to exploitation of child
labor, as it relates to the monopolization of the mineral
deposits in DRC in particular, which if properly levied, should
make the DRC one of the most prosperous nations on the planet.
The Chinese efforts are historically and demonstrably toward
ensuring a Chinese access to things like tungsten and tantalum
and coltan and cobalt that have manufacturing applications in
anything from lithium-ion batteries to jet engine components.
And I get it, except what we are trying to do is empower
the people in the DRC to be the leaders to the people in the
DRC, and without a combative tone, and understanding that there
is a global economic struggle afoot and the Chinese are
extraordinarily strong competitors therein, how do we ensure
the power in Congo goes to the Congolese, that our monies that
are spent aren't converted by way of Chinese exploitation of
stability that we helped create to enrich the Chinese at the
expense, literally, of the poorest and weakest people in places
like the DRC? I am asking for suggestions because I don't know
the answer. Understanding that we don't want to take a
combative stance, but my primary function on this committee is
to the extent that it is relevant and possible for the United
States to create a better circumstance for human rights to do
so. How do we do that without empowering the Chinese to
continue exploitative practices?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think that is a very difficult
question and a very complex situation. The issue is that we
talk--it is not just the Chinese, but it is a lot of countries,
outside countries, it is a lot of regional states as well that
is exploiting those resources. And of course, our effort is to
make sure that we monitor, we hold people accountable, and we
look at how these resources are being distributed, and find
mechanisms and ways that the people of the Congo can benefit
from those resources.
In our annual discussions--since your question is on
China--that we do have--we are coming up to another annual
discussions with China to see where they can play a helpful
role. In the past, they have done an engineering battalion in
south--in Sudan. They have done road construction to AID and
U.S. projects. So looking and seeing where we can have areas of
commonality and then areas where we do not is how do we make
sure that it is beneficial to the people in Africa.
Ms. Bass. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Garrett. Yes, absolutely. My colleague from California,
Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
You know what, one of the things I wanted to say in terms
of China's involvement, I really want to see more involvement
from our companies, you know. And one of the areas that I am
really interested in is promoting our companies in the U.S. to
get involved in infrastructure. China is famous for building
roads in Africa, and it is a real mixed bag in terms of--what
did you say?
Mr. Smith. Not so good roads.
Ms. Bass. Exactly. Not so good roads. But, you know, we
certainly know the quality of our companies. And so I would
really like to work with you in the future in ways that we can
establish partnerships to promote U.S. business involvement,
because I am distressed by the Chinese involvement as well, but
I think one answer to it is to step up ours.
Mr. Garrett. I think--I would thank the Congresswoman and
sort of pile on there. We have spoken just a couple of times,
and I would think originally with regard to oppressed
minorities in Africa, and I look forward to working with the
Congresswoman. It strikes me that the Chinese infrastructure
created in Africa almost always heads from the natural resource
to the ports. Go figure. But it is, at some level, a national
security situation for our Nation as it relates to rare Earth
minerals, et cetera. And, again, there is a role for this
country to play in perpetuating basic human dignities and
freedoms and expectations. We could spend another entire
hearing on alleged abuses by U.N. peacekeeping forces.
Mr. Smith. And we have. Four of them. So it is a real
problem.
Mr. Garrett. Well, it is tragic, right? To paraphrase
President Reagan, I am from the U.N., and I am here to help,
and it gets worse. And so that doesn't mean we should throw up
our hands and stop trying. But when we have people of your
caliber with your experience, you know, again, within the
appropriate role and purview of the U.S. Federal Government, we
need to care about human beings across the world. And a
prominent foreign leader said to me, look, if the Chinese will
help us and there are strings attached, it is still help. And
if we withdraw and create a vacuum, somebody is going to fill
it.
But the challenge here is how we are good stewards, work
within the appropriate realm of what is federally allowable in
this country, and then don't subsidize bad outcomes. And that
is what frustrates me. And in no way, shape, or form am I in an
adversarial tone from you two fine people. It is that I want to
hear--we have these hearings, we talk, it feels good, but what
are the answers?
And so I think Congresswoman Bass and I are on the same
page there, but there are opportunities to be had. If a
corporate entity wants to make money, that is fine, but if they
help people while they are doing it, it is even better. And so
how do we do that? How do we invest? How do we ensure that our
investments aren't undergirding those who are our geopolitical
rivals, economically and potentially militarily? And how do we
do so without victimizing people who have a 200-year history of
being victimized by outsiders?
Ms. Bass. Here, here.
Mr. Smith. Before we go to our next panel, just very
briefly, I would point out that my good friend, on one trip to
Kinshasa, I will never forget, I had dinner with--so did Greg--
with a member of Parliament who also has a farm, and he said, I
can grow anything. I really loved his attitude, and he showed
me his farm. He can grow anything. I can't get it to market.
There is no roads. There is no bridges. There are very few. And
the Chinese have come in and in a quid pro quo in a fleecing of
DR Congo, which they have done elsewhere in Africa, they have
gotten minerals, wood, all kinds of commodities at unbelievably
discounted prices for those roads and bridges.
We have the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It precludes, it
holds accountable those who engage in bribery and other corrupt
practices. China has no such law. So we know that corruption is
a very serious issue here, and the Congolese are not getting
anywhere near what they should be getting for what they give to
China in exchange for those roads and bridges. So we need to do
much more on trying to ensure that our friends and allies who
are truly democracies with something like the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act sell, but especially the United States.
I do have one final question of many, but I will just
finish with this.
Mr. Garrett. Mr. Chairman, if I can interrupt. I apologize.
And thank you for yielding.
The first thing we can do is tell the world that the
Chinese are exploiting people.
Mr. Smith. Exactly.
Mr. Garrett. And again, I don't have a problem with Chinese
corporate entities, I don't have a problem with them building
the roads, but they are--"fleecing'' is a great word.
Mr. Smith. It is. And I say to my friend, we have had
several hearings on that kind of corruption and that, really,
exploitation of African resources on their way to Ghana. There
are many, many countries. And unfortunately, it doesn't get
covered by the press. We hold these hearings. We put in
resolutions. We get bills passed. And it is not even on page
15. So that is very discouraging, but we have got to do it
anyway because we have got to do what is right. But I thank my
friend for raising that.
My question would be, the U.N. 2017 humanitarian plan is
now running for this year at about 42 percent. My question is,
are the U.N. needs assessment accurate? Do we believe that we
have confidence that they have a real handle on what is needed
to be done to mitigate disease, death, mortality from things
like hunger and illnesses? And secondly, what does a near 60
percent underfunding of the U.N. for the DRC mission mean to
women and children in vulnerable populations?
Ms. Anderson. Mr. Chairman, we always have some involvement
when the U.N. is doing their assessments because we are very
engaged with them on a day-to-day basis. By the same token, we
look at the assessments with a critical eye, based on our
knowledge of the situation on the ground. And the reality is
that often the requirements are much higher than what we all
together can meet. So it means that we always have to
prioritize. And that is what we are constantly doing, is
prioritizing and looking at what we can provide, what is the
highest priority that is really going to make the most
difference.
The United States will always be there for people in need.
Our resources are not unlimited, so it is very important for us
to prioritize, and that is why it is important for us to have a
good assessment of what the situation is on the ground.
Mr. Smith. I thank you. I would just point out that I have
chaired hearings in the past, a number of them, about the mass
exodus of people from the Middle East. And once they got to
refugee camps, usually in the auspices of the UNHCR,
particularly those with longer stays found more gross
underfunding, including the World Food Program, which massively
cut their allocation, but it was order of magnitude about 40
percent of what the U.N. assessment was for those, and that is
why they uprooted and left and flocked into Europe and
elsewhere because they saw no future. There was no education
opportunities and certainly there wasn't enough food, clothing,
and shelter to meet their very legitimate needs.
So, you know, for the international community to go cheap
on refugees and IDPs is a very bad bargain first and foremost
for the victims, but secondly, because they are going to move
somewhere else. They have to because they care for their
families. And I thank you again for your great leadership and
for your testimony today.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Just one quick comment. So we agree
with you, Mr. Chairman, it is excellent. I want to make one
comment on what Congresswoman Bass had said, and the point is
that I don't like to play defense, I like to play offense. And
one of the offensive issues is, is that we need to get more
American companies. And how do we encourage American companies,
and the area, of course, is risk insurance and financing and
other support. And our Embassies are supporting 100 percent,
and we are looking at means and mechanism. So we are going to
continue to do that, Madam Congressman.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. I would like to now welcome our second panel
beginning first with Mvemba Dizolele, who is a writer and
foreign policy analyst and independent journalist, and a
veteran of the United States Marine Corps. Mr. Dizolele was a
grantee of the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and covered
the 2006 historic elections in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. With the Pulitzer Center he produced ``Congo's Bloody
Coltan,'' a documentary report on the relationship between the
Congo conflict and the scramble for mineral resources. He
served as an election monitor with the Carter Center in Congo
in 2006 and again in 2011. He was also embedded with the U.N.
peacekeepers and Congo's District South Kivu province as a
reporter. He has testified before various subcommittees in both
chambers. And again, we welcome him here today.
We will then hear from Mr. Fred Bauma, who is with an
organization known in English as the Struggle for Change. This
nonviolent, nonpartisan civil society movement was founded in
June 2012 in Goma, the capital of North Kivu in DRC. The
movement campaigns for social justice and accountability in the
DRC and encourages Congolese citizens to push for the promotion
and respect for human rights. Mr. Bauma was arrested in March
2015 but was later released. He currently resides in the United
States.
We will then hear from Severine Autesserre, who is a
professor of political science, specializing in international
relations and African studies at Columbia University. She works
on civil wars, peacekeeping, peace building, and humanitarian
aid. Professor Autesserre's latest research project has landed
successful international contributions to local embodiment
peace building. Her earlier research progress focused on
violence and international intervention in the eastern part of
the Democratic Republic of Congo, where she has traveled
regularly since 2001. Her field work and analysis culminated in
``The Trouble with Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of
International Peacebuilding'' published by Cambridge University
Press in 2010.
And then we will hear from Ida Sawyer, who is the Central
Africa director for Human Rights Watch. She has been based in
Congo since January 2008, first in Goma since 2011, and in the
capital of Kinshasa. In August 2016, Congolese authorities
barred Ms. Sawyer from continuing her work in the country
following a series of human rights publications by Human Rights
Watch on political repression. She is now based in Brussels
where she oversees Human Rights Watch's work in Congo, Rwanda,
and Burundi. Ms. Sawyer has conducted research across Congo and
in areas of Northern Congo and in neighboring countries
afflicted by the Lord's Resistance Army, and her research has
been integral to numerous human rights reports and has informed
the world about what has been going on.
If I could, Mr. Dizolele, if you could begin.
STATEMENT OF MR. MVEMBA DIZOLELE, PROFESSORIAL LECTURER IN
AFRICAN STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before
you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, and the distinguished
members. The views I express today are mine and mine alone.
With your permission, sir, I would like to submit my remarks
for the record.
Over the years, I have proudly provided my analysis of
developments in Congo to several subcommittees in both chambers
of this august Congress. Today, however, I beg for your
indulgence. I do not wish to speak as an academic, journalist,
analyst, or fellow. I want to speak as a human being talking to
other human beings. I would love to speak plainly, no academic
speak, no diplomatic jargon. In other words, what I want to say
is that Kabila must go.
The responsibility for the suffering of the Congolese
people rests with one man, Joseph Kabila, which he shares with
a small and shrinking cadre of associates and family members.
Over the last 16 years, this group has captured the state with
total impunity at the expense of the people.
A series of reports, including those from the Carter
Center, the Panama Papers, the Lumumba Papers, the Paradise
Papers, Bloomberg News, and the Congo Research Group have
documented and exposed the wide extent to which DRC's natural
and financial resources, estimated in billions of dollars, have
been diverted to benefit this small group.
The Kabila regime has been characterized by three things:
Looting, plunder, and deadly violence. We have tolerated this
for too long. It is time for a new leadership. Again, Kabila
must go.
Kabila's biography is a Cinderella story with a bloody
twist. Kabila, having grown outside Congo, showed up in Congo
for the first time at the age of 26 during the war that
eventually vanquished the late President Mobutu Sese Seko. When
his father took over a year later, he made his son a two-star
general and appointed him chief of staff of the armed forces,
the ground forces, that is. Four years later, after his father
was assassinated, the younger Kabila became President.
The Congolese disapproved. Most of the Congolese at least
disapproved of the father-to-son succession, but the
international community fully embraced him with total
diplomatic, financial, and political support.
Donors initiated a number of projects to help Kabila end
the war that he inherited from his father. This initiative
included Sun City Accord, the Transition, the Constitutional
Referendum, and the 2006 election. On the security front, the
world raised the largest peacekeeping force--or peacekeeping
mission to help Kabila buy time and build an army. The World
Bank remitted the debt at the tune of about $13 billion, again,
to help him start a new economy. And then the World Bank also
wrote a new mining code, but eventually Kabila will misuse that
mining code to trade his power for financial and political
gains.
So we were really determined, the world that is, to make
Kabila a success, and nothing could derail what he had started.
We then arrested his main opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, to get
him out of the way so that Kabila will succeed. Unfortunately,
Kabila did not succeed. He himself set out to undermine the
political gain and the democratic gain of the country. Despite
the legitimacy that he had achieved, he wanted to change the
constitution, eventually leading the country in 2011 in highly
contested and botched elections.
So despite this goodwill, Kabila has not succeeded. Since
then the country has gone from crisis to crisis to crisis. When
we confront Kabila and his associates about the abysmal record,
they typically blame everyone and everything, from the weather,
the political position, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, the youth, the
United States, and the militias. Everybody except themselves.
Nobody ever takes responsibility for actions in DRC, and the
government definitely never fires anyone, and nobody ever
resigns.
So even by the standards of Central Africa's dysfunctional
states, the Kinshasa regime stands alone in its mediocrity.
Unlike his peers in the region, Kabila has no political base
and is so unpopular that he cannot face his fellow citizens and
explain why he should stay in power. Every time he has made an
attempt to stay longer, he has faced stiff resistance from the
population, so his government has decided to simply not fund
and organize the elections. His action has only emboldened the
Congolese to demand that he leaves office.
So I believe that we should not be, as the government seems
to propose today, blissfully naive about the decision that we
will be holding the election next year by December. The record
stands for itself. It has been 16 years. I don't have to go
further into this. But I just want to say that, internally,
Kabila has no good options. He has tried everything: Subvert
the Constitution, kill protestors, jail everyone. The
international community has helped him. He has failed. The only
option that he has is to rely on military force and bloody
repression. We have already seen too much of that.
So at this point, in fact, the Congolese see him as an
illegal, illegitimate, and unconstitutional President, which he
is. They are already referring to him as the former President.
So should we.
Outside DRC, Kabila and his associates are spending lots of
money to launder his image and fend off the pressure. They have
hired Mer Security and Communication Systems, an Israeli firm,
to represent their interests in Washington, DC, for nearly $6
million. This is in a country where civil servants, nurses and
doctors are on strike because they are not being paid, nurses
and doctors, yet the government is spending over $6 million in
lobbying efforts.
A year after Kabila's mandate expired, we tried to give him
another year. That is way, way too long that anybody practical
should accept. It is unacceptable. Kabila must go. The longer
he stays in office, the greater the risk for violence and
instability.
My recommendation is that this body and the Government of
the United States should impose sanctions on Kabila and his
family and his inner circle, who have been imposing sanctions
on people who are totally irrelevant: Generals, ministers of
information. That is not going to work. Kabila is the obstacle.
He should be held accountable.
We have spoken to Kabila for a long time at the highest
level of this Government of the United States. President Obama,
Secretary Kerry, Secretary Clinton, Senator Russ Feingold, Tom
Perriello, they have all engaged Kabila in the nicest of ways
that most dictators would have wished for, and he is not
adjusted.
We should impose sanctions on Corneille Nangaa, the head of
the Independent National Electoral Commission. His delaying
tactics fuel the tensions and pose even a greater risk for
stability. Many of you have met Corneille Nangaa. He is really
convinced in his own bubble that what he is saying makes sense,
but all of us know that what he says most of the time is
incoherent and nonsensical.
In fact, Corneille Nangaa has retained a lobby firm, Reset
Public Asset, LLC, to represent him in Washington, DC, for a
monthly fee of $30,500, to represent him ahead of an electoral
commission. The Madison Group, LLC, represents the Independent
National Election Commission for a fee of $25,000. This is a
red flag.
The message here is that the Electoral Commission and its
President care more about what the U.S. Government thinks or
does, while showing utter contempt for the Congolese opinion.
While they almost never meet the Congolese opposition to update
them on the electoral process, they are spending millions of
taxpayer dollars both in the U.S. and in Congo on frequent
travels and on expensive lobbying efforts in Washington, DC.
This again is unacceptable. Corneille Nangaa should be held
accountable. He should be put on the sanction list.
The U.S. Congress, this august body, has been holding
hearings for DRC for years to little effect on the ground. I
feel that we are all accomplices, and unless we act, these
hearings will remain but abstract academic discussions. Your
committee, your subcommittee has been considering legislation
on DRC for 6 months. Now is the time to show resolve and roll
out that legislation forcefully and more strong--much more
stronger.
I think I will stop here and wait for Q&A. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]
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----------
Mr. Garrett [presiding]. Thank you. I was reading your bio,
and I think that you probably speak more languages than the
rest of the room combined, which is unusual for a Marine. I was
an Army guy. So thank you.
Without objection, the full remarks of all witnesses will
be entered into the record without request, but I thank you for
that. And we have votes coming up relatively quickly, but I
want to get everyone's testimony in if we can, so I would ask
you all to continue.
And, Mr. Bauma, we would welcome your comments.
STATEMENT OF MR. FRED BAUMA, REPRESENTATIVE, LA LUTTE POUR LE
CHANGEMENT
Mr. Bauma. Thank you, Mr. Garrett.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to speak about my country,
the DRC. I hope to share some insights that you will find
valuable.
On Monday, October 30, Jotham Kasigwa, Justave Kambale,
Jean Louis Kikandi, and Remy Mulwana, and Obedi Mumbere, all
under 20 years old of age, were shot by Congolese National
Police and the military police while demonstrating peacefully
in Goma. Those demonstrations were called by the Civil Society
Coalition, including the Struggle for Change (LUCHA).
The aim of these demonstrations was to call President
Kabila to resign as a consequence of his failure to organize
the elections, and to respect the timelines in our
Constitution. It should concern the United States that this
violent crackdown on peaceful protestors took place so
blatantly within the week after Ambassador Nikki Haley visited
the DRC.
Violent repressions of demonstrators calling for timely
free and fair elections have escalated as Kabila's willing to
show contempt of the constitutionally mandated term limit has
become increasingly obvious. I have personally experienced this
repression when I spend over 17 months in jail for exercising
my basic constitutional rights. But my story, unfortunately, is
not unique.
Since September 2016, almost 150 peaceful demonstrators
have been killed, while hundreds more have been arrested or
kidnapped by security forces, and many of them remain in jail.
Government officials, including mayors and heads of police in
some cities, has been recruiting gangs ironically called
antigang or some other name like Bana Mura. Those groups are
deployed to arrest and sometimes arbitrarily arrest civil
society activists and members of the opposition.
These groups have been responsible for severe human rights
violations in many places in DRC, and work tightly with the
national police and the Congolese intelligence service. At the
same time, journalists are harassed and media outlets are shut
down. According to a new report by Journalistes en Danger, an
independent watchdog, the Congolese Government and the security
forces are responsible for over 83 percent of attacks against
the media over the last years.
Even while facing repression, Congolese people are
repeatedly demonstrating with the same message: The need for a
peaceful transition by the end of this year as stipulated by
the CENCO agreement. As Mvemba said, Kabila must go.
The political repression is an only small part of the
overall human rights and humanitarian crisis effective--that
affect millions of Congolese people. Over 4.5 million of
internationally displaced persons, including 1.5 million in
Kasai region alone wherein international agencies have
documented more than 30,000 refugees to Angola, 80 mass graves,
and over 5,000 civilians killed, and hundreds of schools
destroyed. In the east of Congo, the regions of Beni, Bukavu,
Uvira, Tanganyika, and Ituri have been the theatre of the surge
in massacres and intercommunal violence.
This grim situation is tightly linked to the political
crisis originated by Kabila's unwillingness to organize
elections and his attempt to overstay his power in violation of
both Constitution and the CENCO-sponsored agreement. This
agreement granted the government one additional year to
organize the elections and create conditions for a peaceful
transition of power. The political uncertainty is causing
trouble that potentially may undermine the peace and security
in, not only DRC, but also the region.
While poverty and misery are increasing significantly and
the country is collapsing--and the economy of the country is
collapsing, President Kabila, his family, and his inner circle
are known to have built a rich empire through illicit means.
According to reports of different organizations, including the
Congo Research Group, Enough Project, Global Witness, the
Carter Center, and more recently the Paradise Papers, Joseph
Kabila, his family, and both his civilian and military
entourage are involved in massive looting of natural resources,
corruption, money laundering, potentially implicating terrorist
groups. These activities include some individuals and companies
linked to U.S. citizens and the U.S. financial system that the
U.S. Treasury could target.
By refusing to respect the Constitution, by choosing to
oppress and dismantle the opposition of political parties
instead of implementing in good faith the CENCO agreement,
Joseph Kabila has undermined the trust and the credibility
necessary for any dialogue. Fool play on the part of President
Kabila is so blatant that it will be a total waste of time to
push yet for another round of negotiations between Kabila and
his opposition.
The routine of endless and now useless dialogues can no
longer be considered as the only path to sustainable solution
on the Congo crisis. Further, this government has demonstrated
again and again that the electoral calendars are a delay
tactic, an empty promise used to divert attention for the fact
that the government has no intention to organize the election
that will remove Kabila from power. This delay tactic is the
best way to ensure that the election will not be held and that
if and when they are, they will be rushed in the manner that
they will neither be free or fair.
This is a dangerous path for Congo and one that I hope the
U.S. also wants to avoid. The only sustainable solution lies in
the immediate resignation of Kabila from the office and his
replacement by a respected civilian or team that will organize
the election.
We the people of DRC are not seeking for pity or charity
from the U.S. We are seeking your support in our efforts to
prevent DRC for falling once again under a dictatorship. We are
prepared to oppose by all peaceful means to a President who has
violated rule of law as defined by our Constitution.
There are steps that the U.S. Government can take to push
for election and democratic transition with a peaceful transfer
of power: The U.S. should impose direct targeted sanctions
against Kabila and his inner circle responsible for human
rights violations, money laundering, corruption, and sabotage
of the political and electoral process.
The U.S. should require the U.N. and the MONUSCO to stop
any kind of support to the Congolese security service,
including the Congolese army and the police, who are the main
perpetrators of human rights violations. Any unconditional
support by MONUSCO to the army or the police is akin to support
institutions responsible for massive atrocities and human
rights violations. Instead, the U.S. Government should work
with the U.N. Security Council to make MONUSCO's mandate more
effective and precise, allowing it to protect civilians from
any form of danger, including the one from the government
officials.
The U.S. should state without any ambiguity that they will
not back any electoral process that will not end in free and
fair elections, organized by a truly independent commission,
with a credible voter register, and in an environment where all
participants are free to organize and conduct campaigns and
rallies, and have access to media, including public media,
where civil society has a voice where media and judiciary are
free and independent. None of these criteria are met by the
Congolese Government, neither by the current CENI.
Finally, the U.S. and international partners, particularly
African union, should push Kabila to resign, to allow the
return to the Constitution, and honor the CENCO deal, and
vacate the office by the end of this year. Any contact with
Kabila should aim to effecting his resignation so to allow the
return to constitutional order.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope that this
committee and the U.S. citizens understand our hunger for
peace, for democracy, for liberty, for dignity, and for
happiness. I hope that you understand, as did the U.S.
Founders, that whenever any form of government becomes
destructive to its end, as it is dictated in DRC, it is not
only the most sacred right of the people to abolish it, it is
our indispensable duty. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bauma follows:]
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Mr. Smith [presiding]. Mr. Bauma, thank you so very much.
We do have a vote on the floor, recorded vote on H.R. 2201,
the Micro Offering Safe Harbor Act. We will take a very, very
brief recess, subject to the call of the chair, and then we
will reconvene our hearing. And I apologize for the delay.
[Recess.]
Mr. Smith. The hearing will resume.
Ms. Bass will be returning very shortly for the hearing.
Let me ask Dr. Autesserre if she could provide her
testimony. And is that the right pronunciation, Doctor?
Ms. Autesserre. Almost, yes. Thank you so much.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you. Put on your microphone, please.
STATEMENT OF MS. SEVERINE AUTESSERRE, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Ms. Autesserre. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Bass, members of the subcommittee, for organizing this
hearing and for inviting me. My name is Severine Autesserre. I
am an author and researcher and a professor of political
science at Barnard College, Columbia University.
Over the past 2 years, activists, journalists, diplomats,
and politicians have focused mostly on the political crisis
around general elections and on the struggle for power in
Kinshasa. We are so preoccupied with the upcoming elections
that we are diverting our attention away from the many other
issues that are causing violence in Congo, and we are wasting
the opportunity to tackle these other issues.
Based on 18 years of research on peacebuilding, including
several years living and working in Congo, I believe, and I
will show you in my statement, that there is a better way to
help resolve the Congolese conflict. Congress should revise its
approach to the Congolese crisis by recognizing that there are
many other causes of violence beyond the electoral political
issue and by acknowledging that democracy and peace do not
always go together.
The two most important measures Congress can take are to
increase the United States' support to local and bottom-up
peacebuilding and to put local actors in the driver's seat.
The delay in holding elections is only one among the many
issues that fuel the ongoing violence in Congo. And
importantly, local conflicts at the village or district level
also fuel extensive violence.
So to be clear, yes, national and international leaders
regularly manipulate local armed groups, including for
electoral purposes. But at the same time, local combatants use
national and regional tensions as a way to pursue their own
specific, local goals. For instance, in North and South Kivu,
villagers regularly ally with national leaders and with foreign
militias to get control over neighboring land. As a result,
Congo needs bottom-up peacebuilding in addition to the current
top-down approach. And the words ``in addition to'' are very
important. I am not saying that we should replace the current
Kinshasa-centered, election-focused strategies with local
peacebuilding measures. Instead, what I am saying is that we
should add local peacebuilding to the set of options that we
currently use to resolve the Congolese conflict. This means
increasing the United States' support--financial support,
logistic support, and technical support--to local
peacebuilding.
We should also recognize that democracy and peace do not
always go together. In fact, the push toward rapid elections
has fueled violence in many other war and postwar environments.
So, of course, President Kabila should go, and of course
Congolese people deserve elections and democracy. But in the
short term, there may be a choice to make between the two goals
of democracy and peace. And foreign activists and diplomats and
foreign politicians should not be the ones to make this choice.
Ordinary Congolese people should.
And this leads to my last point. Local people have far more
relevant knowledge, skills, capacity, contacts, and means to
resolve their own predicaments than we usually believe, and
more than provincial, national, or international actors will
ever have. When you look at things that have actually worked in
Congo, you see that certain local, ordinary citizens have
managed to create islands of peace--literal islands of peace--
in the Kivus. Others have decreased tensions in Ituri, and yet
others, like Fred Bauma sitting next to me, have created a wide
democratic movement at the grassroots.
The usual international approach is to ignore these kinds
of local initiatives. Instead, we should support, fund, and
protect these local initiatives so that we reinforce them. And
I published a book on how to do that. The book is called
``Peaceland.'' To summarize it in just one sentence, we need to
build on local expertise, and we need to involve in the design
and planning of international efforts not only the elite based
in Kinshasa, but also local leaders, intended beneficiaries,
and ordinary citizens.
So to wrap up, we can help Congo establish sustainable
peace and functioning democracy, but to do that we have to look
beyond elections and also support the other peacebuilding
priorities. We also have to build much more on the expertise
and capacity of Congolese people--ordinary Congolese people--
and support bottom-up peacebuilding much more extensively.
Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Autesserre follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony.
Ms. Sawyer?
STATEMENT OF MS. IDA SAWYER, CENTRAL AFRICA DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Sawyer. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify. I
appreciate your ongoing and bipartisan interest in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
As you know, President Kabila's constitutionally mandated
two-term limit ended in December 2016. Yet he has used one
contrivance after another to delay elections, while plunging
the country into a web of security, humanitarian, political,
and economic crises that have had devastating consequences for
the Congolese people and risk destabilizing the volatile
subregion.
During U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley's recent
visit to Congo, she pressed Kabila to hold elections before the
end of 2018. Clearly in response, Congo's Electoral Commission,
the CENI, published a new calendar setting December 23, 2018,
as the date for Presidential elections. The silver lining here
is that the CENI's response shows the considerable influence
the U.S. Government continues to have in Kinshasa. Haley's
visit and strong messaging signaled renewed high level U.S.
engagement on Congo. It showed Congolese Government officials
that, not only does Congress continue to be seized by the
political crisis in Congo, but that the Trump administration is
also watching very closely.
Yet at the same time, the message that elections only need
to be held before the end of 2018 was seen by many Congolese as
giving a free pass for Kabila to continue his delaying tactics
and stay in power another year, despite his lack of
constitutional legitimacy. Congolese officials have blatantly
disregarded previous election calendars, while Kabila and his
ruling coalition have largely ignored the main terms of the New
Year's Eve agreement signed last year.
Kabila should be stepping down by the end of this year. By
unilaterally extending the timeframe, the U.S. runs the risk of
losing credibility among key actors in Congo. Yet if the U.S.
is willing and able to use its influence now to ensure fair
elections that reflect the will of the Congolese people, it
could rebuild any lost legitimacy. The question now is how far
will the U.S. go?
Senior U.S. officials delivered messages similar to those
of Ambassador Haley as the end of Kabila's two-term limit
approached in 2016. When that deadline passed, U.S. officials
pressed Kabila to organize elections by the end of 2017. Since
then, Kabila instead entrenched his hold on power through
corruption and repression. Congolese Government and security
force officers went so far as to implement a deliberate
strategy of chaos through orchestrated violence, especially in
the southern Kasai region, where up to 5,000 people have been
killed since August 2016. Nearly 90 mass graves are scattered
across the region, 600 schools have been attacked or destroyed,
and 1.4 million people displaced from their homes, including
30,000 who fled to neighboring Angola.
In March, two U.N. investigators, Michael J. Sharp, an
American from Kansas, and Zaida Catalan, a Swedish and Chilean
citizen, were killed while investigating violence in the
region. Human Rights Watch investigations suggest government
responsibility for the double murder.
Predictably, government and CENI officials have cited the
violence in the Kasais as one of the main excuses for why
elections could not be held this year. Kabila's refusal to
relinquish the presidency can partly be explained by the
considerable fortune he and his family have amassed during his
tenure and the millions of dollars in mining revenue that have
gone missing. Such corruption has helped leave the government
bereft of funds to meet the basic needs of an impoverished
population. Hundreds of government employees went on strike in
recent months, including hospital workers who hadn't been paid
since 2016. This comes amid a national cholera epidemic and
impending famine threatening millions of Congolese.
Meanwhile, brutal repression has continued unabated, as
Fred described. Security forces shot dead more than 170 people
during protests in 2015 and 2016. Earlier this year, security
forces killed 90 people in a crackdown against a political
religious sect. During a protest in Goma just on October 30,
security forces killed five people, including an 11-year-old
boy. Hundreds of opposition leaders, activists, and journalists
have been jailed. In July, unidentified armed men shot and
nearly killed a judge, who refused to hand down a ruling
against an opposition leader.
These actions are very much at the heart of how Kabila and
his coterie seek to overcome the political crisis, by using all
available institutional authorities to squash, silence, and
flat out eliminate any opposition to his efforts to hold on to
power.
More protests are planned in the coming days and weeks.
Citizens movements, human rights activists, and opposition
leaders have denounced the new electoral calendar as a fantasy
and shameful maneuver by Kabila to stay in power indefinitely.
They have urged the Congolese people to mobilize. They have
proposed a citizens' transition, without Kabila, led by
individuals who could not be candidates to allow for the
organization of credible elections. There is a real risk of
increased violence in the coming months.
As things now stand, the U.S., including Congress, cannot
afford to take its eyes off Congo. There is too much at stake.
First, Congress should hold the executive branch to account and
make sure the administration is not being fooled by empty
promises. Kabila has given no clear signals that he intends to
leave power, while the repression, violence, and corruption
have become so pervasive across institutions and security
forces that it is nearly impossible to imagine credible,
peaceful elections being organized with Kabila still President.
While there is no easy path forward, a short citizens'
transition without Kabila is probably the best way to ensure
good elections. To get there, the U.S. should work closely with
regional and international partners to press Kabila to step
down, and share concerns about Kabila's physical security after
he leaves office are addressed and actively support
consultations to determine the management of a post-Kabila
transition.
We also urge Congress and the U.S. administration to
support the following: Expand targeted sanctions on Kabila's
family members and close financial associates, including those
involved in serious corruption to quash peaceful dissent or
otherwise maintain Kabila's rule. Previous sanctions against
senior security force and government officials have had an
impact and appear to have helped change behavior and affect the
calculus of some top officials. Yet additional sanctions are
needed to show Kabila himself that there are real consequences
for the ongoing violence and election delays.
Publicly denounce the repression. Call for the immediate
release of all political prisoners and for all politically
motivated charges against opposition leaders and activists to
be dropped.
And three, continue support in this challenging environment
for the U.N. peacekeeping mission.
We also hope you will continue to press for an independent
investigation into the murders of the U.N. experts Sharp and
Catalan and to help ensure that those most responsible are held
to account. Efforts to date are far from adequate. A failure to
do so would send the message that those responsible for such a
heinous crime can escape justice, risking future lives, not
only in Congo, but across the world where U.S. and the U.N.
have deployed experts.
The U.S. has important influence in Congo and can help
prevent more bloodshed, but time is running out. Strong,
courageous positions and actions are needed to demonstrate that
the U.S. is on the side of the Congolese people and their
aspiration for a democratic, rights-respecting, and accountable
government.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sawyer follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Ms. Sawyer, thank you very much as well.
Let me just ask a few opening questions about the
imposition of sanctions now is something that you clearly have
indicated. And, of course, in his testimony as well,
Dr.Dizolele made a very strong appeal. As a matter of fact, the
first recommendation is to impose sanctions on Joseph Kabila,
his family, and his inner circle.
I know that the administration is very, very serious about
this course. They hope it doesn't come to it, but my sense, and
gleaning from your testimony, it should be done now.
By way of background, I am the author of the Belarus
Democracy Act. I remember, on this panel--I have been on this
panel since the early 1980s--when we voted on sanctions against
South Africa, which I supported, and strongly supported,
because apartheid is an abomination. Thankfully, it is in a
dust heap of history but there was always concern about the
impact it would have on unintended victims who then would get
hurt by those broad-based sanctions.
When I did the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, which became
the template for the Magnitsky Act, the whole idea was to
single out the bad actors, starting often with the President,
in that case it was Lukashenko, the President of that country,
and his henchmen and people who were benefiting. And we put
visa bans on them, and we also said, you can't do business
here.
And I was the House sponsor of the Magnitsky Act here, and
it became an amendment, became law, and is a very useful tool.
And I am glad that we have it, but the tool needs to be
utilized. So the big question is not that if it will be done,
and we have legislation I am going to be introducing, joined by
my good friend Karen Bass, that really admonishes the
administration to do just that. Delay is denial. Unless we see
very significant progress that this is really going to happen,
it is going to happen--hopefully it would have happened sooner.
I think December 28 is unconscionably long, to wait more than a
year. So I just want to ask all of you right up front if
there's any downside to doing it right now.
For example, Nikki Haley has said, and she told us
yesterday, and it was said, we would not provide funding for
the election if there were problems, if it was delayed again.
And that perhaps could unwittingly, incentivize Kabila to say,
``Okay, I am out of here. I am going to stay President for
life.'' Of course, the wrath of sanctions from not just the
U.S., but the EU and others would then come tumbling down upon
him, at least that would be the hope.
So I just want to make sure that we fully understand the
possible consequences. I think sanctions are needed. If you
don't use them, it becomes something in the toolbox that
dictators and people who want to be Presidents for life turn
around and say, no worry here, there is not going to be a
sanction now or into the future.
So I think they need to be used very prudently and very
effectively. And again, as you said, Professor Dizolele, you
want it now. So if you go speak to the positive and the
negative on that, and you have done a little bit in your
testimony, and I appreciate it, but I think it would be good to
get it very clear, should these be done today?
Yes, Professor.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two things really. I
think now is the time of imposing the sanctions. In fact, they
are long overdue. I mean, sanctions should have been in place,
or the threat of sanctions should have been in place in 2016,
in January, because all the signs had been there.
We are talking here about targeted sanction to one specific
group of people. We are not saying that the entire country of
DRC should be on the embargo from the U.S. This has worked in
the past. President Mobutu, in his last days, faced similar
situations.
So back then, the U.S. led the charge, along with the
Europeans, sanctions were imposed on him. Mobutu had been a
strategic partner of this country, had received the Legion of
Merit, one of the highest honors the U.S. can bestow on a
military officer. But when the time came to let go, we did let
go. We put sanctions on him, on his assets, on his children,
children who were studying overseas, one of his sons was
studying in Canada. Canada followed suit, denied him visa. He
could not go back to study. It was very effective in that way.
His associates faced the same situation.
Today, if we are blissfully naive to accept that Kabila
will hold elections in December of next year, then we have not
learned anything over the last 16 years, and the joke is on us.
By that I mean Kabila only understands the language of force.
His people have said so so many times. They have said that we
came through force. If you want us to leave, we will only leave
through force.
One force is sanction. Again, it is just to target
specifically them. The children go to school here. They have
come to your offices with their expensive suits and expensive
bags to tell you why they should stay, and most of the time
that is not founded in any logic. So I think we should not be
catering to them.
In fact, one thing I want to say, the idea that if they do
not act a certain way, the international community will not
engage, that is music to their ears, because that is exactly
what they--that is the perfect scenario. Nobody gets involve.
Let me play the field the way I want.
So we should avoid, actually, aligning ourselves behind
that position. It is a very weak position from Kabila's
perspective.
Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Bauma. I would like to add something to what Mr.
Dizolele is saying. I think the problem of DRC is not only--the
group Kabila and all the autocratic system around him is not
only seeking the power for the sake of power. I think it is the
way for them to get rich, to get access to resources, and to
use them in different ways.
And I think the other thing is that the same resources are
finally used to oppress people. And the recent research shows
that, for example, with Blanco, that they had paid, I think,
$750 millions of dollars deg. to the system, which
could have been enough to organize election, even if the
election is very expensive.
So I think, as Mvemba said, that sanctions should be
applied and should be applied now. And those sanctions--the
fact is that the inner circle of Kabila is made of people who
are all businessmen. They are officials, the civilian people,
his family, all of them have very deep link in mineral
resources or any kind of business.
So I think the efficient way is not only to target them in
the way of banning travels or something like that, but be able
to touch their resources where they can really feel it. And if
they can stay in power but without protecting their financial
assets, I think the interest of staying in power will lose its
essence.
So I think it is important to target them now, but more
important to target them where it is really valued, where it is
important to touch, not only general target.
Ms. Autesserre. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I am going to
add two points. The first one is that if sanctions are used,
they should really be used as part of a much broader
legislative program.
Sanctions may help. It is not 100 percent sure, but it may
help, but clearly it won't be enough. So it should really go
with support for peacebuilding, for human rights, and for
basically what Honorable Yamamoto was saying: The human rights
and the political side of the organization of elections.
The other thing, the other point is that sanctions should
not only be linked to the electoral issue or to the fact of
whether or not those in power are going to leave power, but
also to the broader problems, meaning that they should be
linked to the respect for human rights and to an end of human
rights violations and to an end to violence as well. This is
really important.
Ms. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I fully agree that
targeted sanctions should be applied now. We should not wait
any longer. The fact that a calendar was announced does not
mean that we are necessarily having elections, and we have seen
the repression, the violence, the massive human rights
violations continue unabated with complete accountability. So a
strong signal should be sent. And targeted sanctions is a very
clear tool that you have available to send that signal.
We have also seen how the targeted sanctions, which have
already been applied, have had an impact. They have rattled the
political class, the senior security force officers. These are
individuals who travel regularly to Europe, to the United
States. They do their shopping abroad, their medical
appointments abroad. Many of them have homes overseas. Their
children study in the U.S. or Europe. They have bank accounts
in U.S. dollars. They are personally very affected by these
targeted sanctions. And many of them, since the sanctions
started, you know, they are coming to us, to others, asking
what can they do to avoid being on the list, or if they have
already been targeted, how they can get off the list.
So it has an impact, but so far, Kabila's inner circle, his
close family members, his financial associates, they haven't
been affected. So I think now is the time to go further up and
show Kabila himself that the consequences are real. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. I would just remind, and for
the record, point out that the President has this authority. It
is very clear and it is compelling. We reiterated in the bill
that we are going to be reducing very shortly, that the
President in his Executive Order 13413, as amended by Executive
Order 13671, shall impose the sanctions described in section C
within 60 days of the date of enactment of this Act against any
high-level individuals responsible for undermining democratic
processes and institutions in the DRC and the entities they own
or control, including senior DRC Government officials, their
international commercial facilitators with offshore companies,
and complicit family members and associates. It shall also
impose sanctions described in our bill, which we have yet to
introduce, we have a draft now we are working on, describes in
subsection D, and it goes on from there.
But we are going to be looking for bold and demonstrative
actions. I mean, talk is cheap, particularly here in
Washington, and we have got to make sure it is backed up by
something that is more significant, like a sanction. And I can
tell you--because I was just in Minsk for a parliamentary
assembly of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, I am the co-chair
of the Helsinki Commission--Lukashenko has released the
political prisoners over the years, and there may be just one
left. Maybe two, we are not sure. But the point is, sanctions
work, but they have to be applied.
So let me ask a question, Ms. Sawyer, maybe start with you.
I asked the previous panel, obviously the two distinguished
witnesses from the administration, and spoke to the issue of
the 3.8 million, and there may be other estimates but ballpark,
of internally displaced people, which is a catastrophic event
anywhere in the world, the DR Congo especially, but certainly
3.8 million displaced. They are refugees within their own
borders, and that is a terrible, terrible situation.
The acute food insecurity has reached 7.7 million. Again,
there may be higher estimates for that. But that means hunger,
famine, low birthweight babies, stunting, and a whole host of
other deleterious effects on the most vulnerable: Women and
children.
You pointed out in your testimony, Ms. Sawyer, that in the
Kasai region, 5,000 people have been killed since August 2016.
And you point out the impact that has had in your testimony on
schools. Six hundred schools have been attacked or destroyed,
as you testified. One-point-four million displaced from their
homes in this area, including 33,000 who fled to neighboring
Angola, so they are obviously refugees.
You make a very, very important point. Predictably,
government officials have cited the violence in the Kasai as
one of the main excuses for why elections were not held in
2017. Seemingly, and maybe you could speak to this,
incentivizing the use of violence to impose martial law, which
means killing people in the streets. And so maybe you can speak
to that. And that is a perverse outcome. Rather than getting to
the election, it is in the government's interest to do these
kinds of things and others.
Maybe you might want to speak to that.
Ms. Sawyer. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we at Human
Rights Watch, we have interviewed numerous security force
officers in Congo, who have told us about a deliberate strategy
of chaos. So effectively, orchestrating violence, either by
security forces or government-backed militias, instigating
local level conflicts to create more violence, and then with
these horrific humanitarian consequences that we saw in the
Kasais, and then later that is used as an excuse: We can't
organize elections. We can't do voter registrations in the
Kasais because we are dealing with this terrorist threat from
this militia group in this area.
We see also in the east, there is a lot of government
manipulation of armed groups there. In Kinshasa and Kongo
Central province in south western Congo, reports of
manipulation of the Bundu dia Kongo political-religious sect
possibly to create new violence, repression, another excuse to
delay elections. So it is--as you said, it is very perverse,
and it is just another sign that there is no--we have not seen
any signs of a real intention by the part of Kabila to organize
elections and step down.
Mr. Smith. Would the other panelists want to speak to, as
you coined it, the deliberate strategy of chaos fomented by the
government?
Yes, Professor.
Mr. Dizolele. Yes. Mr. Chairman, in fact, this is one of my
greatest fears in terms of delaying till 2018, because what is
happening in Kasai is obviously part of this larger strategy of
chaos. If we were to wait until 2018, I am willing to bet on my
honor that we will see more flashpoint and zones of conflict in
the next 3 months. That might even be longer. We don't know
where they are going to pop up, but they are most likely to
happen.
Going from crisis to crisis is one of the favorite pastimes
of the Kabila regime. In fact, a good friend of mine who used
to work in the system likes to say, ``The boss is a specialist
in rotten situations.'' In other words, they like these kind of
situations. So waiting until 2018 poses a serious risk for
this. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Bauma. I think in term of violence as a strategy,
people like to focus on Kasai because, of course, over this
year, Kasai was the main region where there was a lot of
violence. But I think now there are other regions where
violence is, once again, used as a strategy. So I feel like the
focus on Kasai has at least made the government official feel
like it is becoming a lot of pressure on them.
And now we see that in Benin, for example, the violence
restart again after almost 1 year of stability. We see that in
Uvira in South Kivu, without the help of MONUSCO, Uvira would
have been under the control of some armed group. Some of them
have worked with the governments in the past. We see that in
Tanganyika or in Ituri, the same thing has started and started
again.
So I think the strategy of violence works very well in DRC.
And I would not be astonished to see that, in January or in
February or in April, that another region, another Kasai is
created somewhere, maybe in Bakongo or in Equateur, and be used
as a reason to postpone the election once again.
And I have to say that there will always be a reason that
seems to be a good reason to postpone the elections. Last year
it was, we had an agreement, now we will have election at the
end of the year, everybody is okay. Today is, we have a
calendar, we can have election next year. Next year, we will
have some other reason. And the U.S. and other countries will
say, ``Well, we can support election for 2019.'' And unless we
understand that this, all these are tactics for delayed
election, we will never have election.
We have to understand what Kabila and his government want,
really, and they will never organize the election that will end
up removing him from power. They may organize violence and
other kinds of humanitarian crisis, but not election.
Ms. Autesserre. To emphasize something that Mr. Bauma said,
I think that it is really important to keep in mind that, yes,
you have manipulation of violence, an instigation of violence
linked to the electoral issues, but a lot of the violence is
also unrelated to electoral issues. You have regional tensions
between Rwanda, Congo, Burundi, et cetera. You also have local
conflicts over land, over traditional power of who is going to
be the highest-ranked individual, family, ethnic group in a
specific area. And this sometimes relates to the electoral
issue and sometimes it doesn't.
So when we are thinking about ending the humanitarian
crisis that you described, and ending the violence, we have to
focus, yes, on the electoral issue, but also on all of these
other issues at the same time.
Mr. Smith. Please, Dr.Autesserre, you talked about the
biggest takeaway from your own book, which I think was, to
bottom-line it so well, I think is very helpful to the
subcommittee, to build on local expertise. I think there is an
underestimation, and I think you really have eloquently spoken
to that, that local expertise is excluded by design or by just
inability to appreciate what is available.
Is USAID tapping into that local expertise? And secondly--
and all of you might want to speak to this as well--the role of
the faith community, the Catholic Church, not just in
elections, but also in reconciliation and, of course, the
provision of humanitarian aid, which is an important. Faith-
based entities do provide, very efficaciously, food, clothing,
and shelter, and medicines. I mean, I have been in countries
all over the world. The secular groups do it great, but so do
the faith-based, and they often really get an army of
volunteers mobilized, which is one of their assets.
But if you could speak to that. And while you are answering
it, the role of the church in the elections--which you might
recall I asked of the earlier panel--in making sure that
violence gets tamped down, hopefully eliminated, while they
move toward a credible free and fair election.
Doctor?
Ms. Autesserre. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith. I think
regarding USAID, they are doing better than they were doing 10
or 15 years ago, in terms of tapping into local capacity. But
it is still clearly not enough. The way USAID works is still:
We are here in DC, and we know what is best for people we are
trying to help. So we know what is best for people in Congo and
other parts of the world, and therefore we design programs here
in DC.
And then when we involve Congolese people, it is going to
be only at the stage of implementation. So people who are on
the ground in Congo will only have to do things that have been
decided----
Mr. Smith. On that point, is that because indigenous NGOs
don't have the capacity to write those proposals or the NGO
community in general not including the locals in a way that
makes them full partners?
Ms. Autesserre. I don't think so.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Ms. Autesserre. I think it is mostly because it is not only
USAID, it is most nongovernmental, international organizations.
I think that outsiders----
Mr. Smith. So it is a systemic problem throughout the whole
humanitarian response.
Ms. Autesserre. Exactly. Exactly. We think that outsiders
know better and we think that outsiders have the answers. And
the way to help is to build on outsiders' knowledge. What I am
saying is that there is--I mean, look at who is sitting next to
me--there is local capacity. There are people who have the
knowledge, the expertise, and who could help design the
international programs. It is just that the standard operating
procedure is not to ask them. And it is to decide things by
ourselves here in national capitals and then go in the country
and implement them on the ground.
As to the role of the church, it is very difficult, I
think, to talk about the Catholic Church in general in Congo,
because to me, I have seen members of the Catholic Church,
including bishops, that are high-ranking members actually fuel
violence, have discourses that fuel violence, that are full of
hatred against a specific community. I have seen that in Goma,
I have seen that in Bakavu, I have seen that in one-on-one
meetings with these people. And I have also met priests who are
in a village in the middle of nowhere and who are the main
reason why you have peace in that village or why you have some
response to the humanitarian needs in that village.
So we have to be very careful, I think, not to think about
the Catholic Church as a whole, you know, an entity, but really
to think whether specific individuals within the Catholic
Church are the kind of individuals who we want to support or
whether they are the kind of people we should actually be
staying clear of.
Mr. Smith. Well, on that point, it is my experience that
the church plays a very decisive peacemaking role. If you have
names of people who are doing something contrary to that, I
would ask that you provide that to the committee.
I remember going back to the very old days of El Salvador
when there was civil war with the Duarte government and the
FMLN. I traveled down there frequently. And it was Catholic
Church that was doing the human rights work and humanitarian
work in a way that provided a bridge to two disparate groups
that had nothing in common. That is a very serious charge, if
that is true.
We work with a number of bishops and others throughout all
of Africa, who, in my experience--and Greg and I do meet with
them every time we travel, and with pastors that they do
provide--in essence, not just Catholic, it is also the other
wonderful faiths that are out there, Muslim and Christian
alike, who are playing very positive roles. So any names you
have, please provide that for us.
Would others like--oh, I am sorry. Yes.
Mr. Dizolele. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to
nuance a couple points.
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Mr. Dizolele. The Congolese want a change. They want a
couple things. One is to respect the rule of law. They did go
to a referendum in 2005 to have this Constitution. So they are
not idealists to believe that once President Kabila leaves,
everything will become a paradise on earth. But what they are
really interested in is to respect the sacrifices of the people
who fought for this change so that the President steps down,
let another Congolese, man or woman, emerge and take it to the
next level.
All the problems that Dr.Autesserre has mentioned are part
of an extension of the failed regime that is leading the
country. So the hope is that as a new regime, a new leadership
comes in, some of those key issues of provision of services,
including security and health and education and others, will be
addressed with the new leadership. So that is what people are
fighting for.
In that case, then, the election becomes very critical. In
other words, we will never get there, even to start, if we are
always going around and around. We wasted 16 years since the--I
mean, the generation, the kids who were born when Mobuto fled
are now at university, you know. Fred was 10 years old when
Mobuto fled--7. Okay. So the young man here was 7 years old
when Mobuto fled, and now he is speaking for his country and we
are still talking about the same thing.
So this is the time that is very decisive to cut that
golden knot. And that is the importance of having this
transition become a reality as soon as possible. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Smith. If you would like to add.
Mr. Bauma. I would like to add to what Severine said at the
beginning about the local capacities and the peacebuilding. And
one thing is that I think the way some expert or some ex-pats
come with their solution and the way they understand, for
example, peace or stability, is like the minimum level of it
that Congolese people cannot accept.
You know, like when, for example, the U.N. talk about
peace, is like if we can live in the city where we will not
have some trouble within a week, it is good enough. And for
people who have lived in a conflict, in the violence for very
long period, there is some low standard of peace that we will
not accept anymore. And we are not looking for something
minimal. We are looking for something that may be sustainable.
And I think Congolese people have even said we have some
solutions to our own problems. And I think it may be, the best
way may be to work on the solution that Congolese people are
suggesting to their own problem. And instead of bringing some
imported solution, which works in offices in DC, in USAID, or
other NGOs, and where local actors will just have the role to
implement them in circumstances or things like that.
I think there is so many groups, small groups, maybe less
known, who have very creative ways to address conflict, to
mobilize communities, to organize communities in their region
that needs attention for USAID and other U.S. best groups. And
it is important to listen to them, to understand how they do,
and to support them, instead of coming and give them what they
should have done while they are the one who knows what they
want.
And what Mvemba said about election is, that is true. There
is so many crises in DRC, but I think with time, and this is
also related on what I say, that minimal peace that we will not
accept anymore. The fact of saying, well, we have to make sure
there is a kind of stable country and then sort of small
problem and small problem, but the root cause is--seems to be
related on the problem of leadership in the country. And I
think the election is just one way to do it, but it is the
first way to do it. And I think in terms of long-term process,
the civic education, the process of creating another kind of
citizenship, citizen, is the main point.
I think the election should be understand that the point
where we start to bring, to build a different country, a
different system. And what for us, LUCHA, for example, we
believe is that we will make all possible to have peaceful
transition, but we are sure that the process will take so long,
the process of having the democracy and the country as we would
like to see it, will take so long. And we continue to work on
it and to make sure even the next President, we will be able to
hold him accountable, and the next one. And we will oppose to
any other President who will do the same thing as Kabila.
So the election is not like a panacea for us, but it is a
key point. It is something which has to happen in order to
allow us to see the future as we would like to see.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask with regards to U.N. issues. Your
assessment of the U.N. peacekeeping deployment, MONUSCO, are
their rules of engagement robust enough? Is the number of
personnel deployed adequate or is there a need for more?
Ambassador Haley made a very important point yesterday on
how important it is that women be much more included in those
deployments, particularly since sexual violence is so rampant.
And on the zero tolerance policy for trafficking, again, I have
had four congressional hearings alone on DR Congo. And previous
terrible exploitation by peacekeepers of young children and
women. We went there, we argued with them, went to Goma, as I
said before, and right now, we are thinking of putting together
another trip to go back to DR Congo hopefully by the end of
this year, if not early next year, on a myriad of issues,
starting with the elections.
So your thoughts on those three things. And then second, if
you don't mind jotting this down for your answer, I mentioned
earlier about the assessment done by the U.N. for how much
humanitarian aid is needed. There were about 42 percent for
2017, which is paltry compared to the need.
I did ask the administration witnesses if they have
confidence in those assessments, and my sense is that they do.
They may be a little bit highball or lowball, who knows, but it
is order of magnitude, correct? What does that kind of 60
percent underfunding for at-risk people do to those vulnerable
people? I mean, in terms of food, security and the like.
And finally, last Congress, I was the House sponsor of the
Global Food Security Act, which was signed into law, and that
legislation was largely drafted by Piero Tozzi sitting to my
right, our general counsel; and Greg Simpkins, was an important
focus on really making sure that the food insecurity systemic
problem globally, especially in Africa, is addressed
aggressively. It also put an emphasis on the first 1,000 days,
from conception to the second birthday.
Now, DR Congo has signed up to the U.N. program for the
first 1,000 days, which is, in my opinion, the most
transformative program ever, ever put together. If you ensure
that from the moment of conception to that second birthday,
both mother and child have food and supplementation, it
mitigates maternal mortality and morbidity, as well as child
mortality and morbidity. Stunting goes away, if it is properly
applied, and things like neonatal deaths and the like, which is
rampant throughout Africa, are lessened as well.
Of particular point for me, on one area, I have written
three laws on combatting the issue of autism in America,
including the original, but also the most recent Autism Cares
Act of 2012. One of the biggest takeaways from the NIH-funded
projects, the peer-reviewed studies found, that when a woman
gets folic acid in the first month of her pregnancy, the
incidence of autism drops by 40 percent. That is absolutely
radically revolutionary in terms of every woman of childbearing
age should have folic acid to lessen this growing developmental
disability pandemic that has consumed the world.
In America, one out of every 68 individuals around the
spectrum for autism in the world. It is very similar, as far as
we can tell, although the studies have not been as robust, but
we think there are at least 70 million people in the world
around the spectrum for autism. And in Africa, according to the
World Health Organization, we are talking about ``tens of
millions.''
So obviously, a country of approximately 100 million people
will have huge numbers of autistic children, suffering parents,
no early intervention, and all the other processes that helps
to help those children. Folic acid, first 1,000 days, are just
a few of a number of initiatives that could make all the
difference in the world in the life of a child and of a mother.
And again, maternal mortality, which I take a backseat to no
one in trying to stop it every time we can, obviously we all
know one of the greatest answers for that is to have a venue
where the woman gets skilled birth attendance and access to
safe blood, which is another issue.
My own daughter-in-law, when she had one of our grandsons,
had a very serious problem with hemorrhaging in a Princeton
hospital, and I had to go to other hospitals to get enough
blood at her blood type. Those situations have become
catastrophic in a twinkling of an eye and a snap of a finger.
So safe blood and all of that is part of what our response
should be.
And I like what you said, Mr. Bauma, that the problems
preceding the election will continue after the election,
obviously. This is not a panacea. So I think your point is very
well taken here. But, again, the U.N. responses, I hope you
jotted down some of those things, so we can get a comprehensive
answer. We have to know, is the U.N. getting it right? Are we
doing what we can do on all of these various issues?
Okay. Start from right to left.
Ms. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would start by
saying that U.N. peacekeepers in Congo do absolutely critical
work protecting civilians. And their presence across the
country has saved countless lives, and we can't imagine how
much worse it would be if MONUSCO was not present and if the
peacekeepers weren't there to respond to threats, protect
civilians, help displaced people, help people go to the market
safely. So their presence is absolutely critical, and there is
nothing happening on the ground now to indicate that we should
start cutting back MONUSCO or that their presence is no
longer----
Mr. Smith. Again, my suggestion wouldn't be to cut back. It
would be to make right----
Ms. Sawyer. Right.
Mr. Smith. And, again, on the rules of engagement, while
you are answering.
Ms. Sawyer. Yes. I just wanted to start by saying that they
are critical, but that said, I think they could do much more to
make their presence more effective.
The rules of engagement, their mandate is very strong but
it is often not--not the same across the board, how that is
implemented. And different contributing countries will
interpret their rules of engagement in a different way. And
some are willing to be more robust than others to protect
civilians and how they interpret their mandate.
And I think we have a difficult contradiction within the
peacekeeping mandate in that they are there to protect
civilians, but also support the Congolese Government and
security forces. And they are often conducting joint military
operations with these forces or supporting them on their
military operations against armed groups. But this is the most
abusive force in the country that they are supporting, so that
is often a contradiction.
There is a strong human rights due diligence policy where
U.N. peacekeepers are not supposed to be providing any support
to Congolese army, officers, or soldiers who have serious human
rights records. They should cut support if these abuses are
taking place. But that is not applied as well across the board
as it could be, so I think more can be done there.
And regarding the political situation, the political
crisis, I think much more could be done by MONUSCO peacekeepers
to protect peaceful protesters and to deploy robustly alongside
protests, alongside protestors. And that could be an important
deterrent to Congolese security forces who have a tendency to
fire on these peaceful protestors.
In terms of the zero tolerance policy for trafficking and
sexual exploitation and abuse, I think we have seen some
improvements in recent years in trying to address these issues
more quickly and more effectively, but there, again, much more
can be done. And a lot of that is also with the--at the host,
the troop contributing countries. So back home, these troops
need to be held accountable and there often isn't followup. And
the U.N. can do their investigation in Congo, but back in the
capital from where these troops come from, there often isn't
enough followup to ensure that they are actually held
accountable in a court of law. So more could be done there.
On the humanitarian aid and what the underfunding means for
vulnerable people, the consequences are huge. You have hundreds
of thousands of people displaced from their homes. That means
that they are often not going to school. Children are out of
school. They don't have the healthcare they need. They often
don't have access to the food that they need. And that has all
of the medical consequences. But then also, it is a generation
of kids who aren't getting an education, that makes them more
vulnerable to being recruited into armed groups. And then you
just see the cycles of violence and impunity and abuse
continue. So it is critical that these humanitarian needs are
addressed, and they are enormous.
I think I will leave the other questions to other----
Mr. Smith. If you could, just one final question. On the
U.N. civilian personnel, you mentioned the peacekeepers with
zero tolerance. What is your sense on the U.N. civilian
personnel sexually exploiting others?
Ms. Sawyer. I would first just like to say that among the
civilian personnel, that the human rights office is doing
absolutely critical work in Congo, the U.N. Human Rights team,
as part of the MONUSCO mission, and they are a strong office
deployed across the country. And they are documenting abuses,
publicly denouncing the abuses, meeting with authorities,
pressing for change. And it is really, I would say, a model in
Congo, from one of the best U.N. Human Rights teams that are
deployed around the world, and that's something that should
continue.
On their political offices, I think they could be doing
more in terms of their good offices to press the government to
abide by their commitments, to put more pressure on the
authorities, but that role is critical and could be enhanced.
For sexual exploitation and abuse by civilian peacekeepers,
I don't have specific information on that, but I don't have
information about particular concerns either.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Doctor Autesserre?
Ms. Autesserre. Thank you so much. I am going to second
what Ida Sawyer said regarding the presence of United Nations
peacekeepers, which is absolutely essential. In many villages
in eastern Congo, the United Nations peacekeepers are the only
people who are protecting the population from horrific human
rights abuses by all kinds of armed groups. And so it is
really, really important to keep them on site.
Now, regarding whether the way they are working currently
works, I think that there are two ways that they should revise
the overall approach. The idea is not to get rid of the
peacekeeping mission, but to make it more effective, as I
understand that you want to do.
The first thing is that, currently, they use what I call
the top-down approach, meaning that they are trying to resolve
the conflict and to build peace by working with the government,
working with the elite in Kinshasa, working on high-level state
reconstruction, and all of these very abstract things, which is
important, but they are not focusing enough on supporting local
bottom-up initiatives, the kind of initiatives that Fred Bauma
mentioned, and that I mentioned as well. So I think that they
should do much more to support local peacebuilding initiatives.
And again, not arriving and saying, we are going to go in a
village and we are going to resolve conflicts in that village,
because they have no legitimacy and no expertise to do that,
but really support the local actors who know how to resolve
their own problems. So that is the first thing, supporting
local, bottom-up peacebuilding.
The second one is, again, to put local actors in the
driver's seat. Because the way the United Nations peacekeeping
mission works is like what we were talking about with USAID.
They decide at the U.N. headquarters in New York, in Geneva,
sometimes in Kinshasa, they decide how they are going to
resolve the Congolese conflict. And then the decision trickles
down, trickles down, and by the time it reaches Congolese
people, the Congolese people are just implementing strategies
that have been decided elsewhere. And the decision doesn't even
include a lot of people who have extensive country knowledge.
People who have been involved in Congolese efforts for 15, 20
years, there are very, very, very few in decision-making power.
So we end up with strategies that are very well-meaning, but
that don't really address the problems on the ground.
So that is why I think that we should really revise this
way of working and build much more on the expertise not only of
local people, but also of people who know something about Congo
and who already are within the United Nations' system--but
because of the way human resources work at the U.N., they end
up working in Timor-Leste or in Sudan or in another part of the
world. So really building more on local capacity and on country
expertise.
On your question regarding the consequences of underfunding
humanitarian aid, I have a couple of statistics in my written
statement that I think really illustrate what that means. So it
is a United Nations statistic. It says that 77 percent of
Congolese citizens live on less than $2 per day, less than $2
per day. The life expectancy is less than 60 years. More than
42 percent of children under the age of 5 suffer from
malnutrition. And less than 25 percent of Congolese people go
further than primary school in their studies.
So it really means that if there is a way to increase the
funding to the humanitarian support in Congo and to the
development support, that would be absolutely essential, but at
the same time, we should keep in mind that humanitarian aid
means addressing the consequences of the problems, and
especially the consequences of the violence. So we should also
prioritize peacebuilding so that we finally address the causes
of this enormous humanitarian crisis.
Mr. Dizolele. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I agree with a lot
of what has been said, the performance of the Human Rights
office, their presence being critical, but I also have a lot of
issues.
I think we need to reduce the U.N. mandate in scope and
time. This is part of the entire problem we have. The
expectations and priorities are now perverted. The entire
social contract is perverted. People expect things of the U.N.
as opposed of their own government. They expect the security to
be delivered by foreign troops that are just trying to survive
themselves.
And this underscores the failure of the Kabila regime; the
U.S. has poured in billions of dollars literally to support
Congo. And if we continue to think of the U.N. as part of the
salvation, then we are in deep trouble. We are going on 20
years of U.N. presence in Congo, and there is no military
rising anywhere on the Congolese side.
Mr. Smith. Can I just ask you on that point, if you don't
mind the interruption?
Mr. Dizolele. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. Again, as those U.N. figures would suggest, 42
percent of the kids underage suffer malnutrition, people are
living on $2 a day, 77 percent. Many of us would always like to
see aid as a bridge to the point of self-sufficiency. But the
concern among many of us, certainly me, is pulling vulnerable
people off life support.
Your point is very well taken. This is what the government
ought to be all about, and Kabila has failed miserably. But
that said, how do you, in the interim--almost like an ambulance
coming to the rescue, an EMT making sure that you get to the
point of surviving--get to the point of hopefully flourishing.
Your point is well taken.
Mr. Dizolele. Yes.
Mr. Smith. I respect it, but I would be concerned that
there needs to be this bridge of humanitarian assistance.
Mr. Dizolele. Yes. So I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the
human rights branch of the U.N. should be fully funded and be
made stronger because of the condition we are in, specialized
unit of the U.N., UNICEF, the food program. Those are not
MONUSCO programs. Those are specialized U.N. missions that are
playing tremendous role in Congo, and they need more support.
But that is different from looking at the U.N. as MONUSCO.
So I think the nuances are very important, because if we are
talking about security, it is one thing in terms of armed
security and others. If we are talking about human securities,
security place, this is what you are referring to, people on
life support and others, we need to buttress that.
So our challenge is how do we buttress those programs,
whether it is the integration of women who have been raped, the
support they need, the followup, with the entire notion of
having 17,000 troops that are serving as an extension of a
failed system that is in Kinshasa, which, by the way, received
as much as it can get to build its own military to support it.
That is undermining the entire emergence of the Congolese
state. So something that we need to--we should not conflate
U.N. presence with MONUSCO, because that has become a problem
as well.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Bauma. Yeah. I think Mvemba made a very good point. I
mean, the difference between the MONUSCO and the other U.N.
agencies, which are doing a good job, like OCHA or UNICEF.
I would like to focus a little bit on MONUSCO. And I also
think that in MONUSCO, the Human Rights bureau of MONUSCO
should receive a lot of fund to allow it to work properly,
because I think they are doing really amazing job. But the rest
of MONUSCO, although I have to recognize that the situation may
have been worse if they weren't there, but there are many
things that has to be questioned on how MONUSCO works.
And I think there is a lot of--for example, there is a lot
of entities in MONUSCO that, in my opinion, are not effective
at all. Like, we have--and if you have the opportunity to
travel in Congo, and if you came in Goma or in Beni, it will be
important to have a position of people on how they see the
MONUSCO and how they evaluate it. In some places in the region
of Beni, there was a lot of killings, not far from the MONUSCO
camp. And in many circumstances, the MONUSCO, after a certain
time, they can't go out. I don't know if it is their internal
policy of MONUSCO, but they--although they have equipment, they
have guns and they have all means to protect civilians, I don't
know if it is the problem of the mandate, but I think they are
ineffective. And especially some units, the Indian, the
Pakistani, or the Nepalese unit, which are ineffective.
I think it is very important, if MONUSCO is to be
maintained, to rethink how it is composed, what kind of troop
it is composed, and what kind of specific mandate they have. We
can't accept to have 20,000 troops that will not react, and
when people are killed or when people are beaten by the police,
they are just there observing, taking note. I think this is not
how we understand civilian protection. I think if someone has
to be saved, a life has to be saved, is at the time--if the
life of someone has to be saved, they have to react
immediately, not write a report in order to protect the life of
other people when they can protect life of people in the
present time.
I remember in 2013, I think, when Goma was about to fall in
the M23, there was a lot of MONUSCO troops that said, well, we
can assure you that Goma will not fall. And I was in Goma at
that time. And I remember how they start changing how they were
saying, and say, ``Well, the primary responsibility of
protecting the civilian is from the government.'' Which is a
little bit funny because, if MONUSCO is in DRC, it means that
somehow the government wasn't able to play its role, because if
the government was effective, we could not need MONUSCO.
So I think the way MONUSCO is funded, what kind of troop
MONUSCO--what kind of troop in MONUSCO have to be rethink. And
some countries should be courageous enough to send their troop
in the MONUSCO. Because I think also the problem is that some
countries which have maybe more effective troops don't send
them in a country like DRC. Maybe they have another priority,
Iraq or some country like that. And the consequence is that we
have a force which is ineffective.
The other thing with MONUSCO, I think their relation with
Congolese security forces, and I mentioned this in my
testimony, I think that kind of support should be stopped,
because it is unbelievable to say the police using the fuel of
MONUSCO coming and arrest peaceful demonstration or beat
peaceful demonstration with money, with resources given by
MONUSCO. And I pointed this out many times with MONUSCO
officials in DRC, and I think it is time to stop that kind of
cooperation with MONUSCO and the Congolese security forces,
unless we want to agree openly that we are supporting human
right violations and mass atrocities via MONUSCO.
Mr. Smith. I thank you for that insight and for your
opinion.
I would just note for the record and I think, you know, we
speak so often of all of you are very well versed on what
MONUSCO is, but for those who may not, MONUSCO is a U.N.
organization civilization mission in the DRC. It is the world's
largest U.N. peacekeeping operation with about 17,900 uniform
personnel as of August 31. And when you look at the size and
the number of people living in the DR Congo, I mean, that is a
little more than a division of military capacity.
That is why I asked about whether or not there are
sufficient numbers of deployed people are there to meet the
need, and since we are dealing with an escalating crisis, it is
not diminishing. Like you, I am very fearful that it is going
to get far worse, and staging a growing peacekeeping deployment
can't be done overnight. It does take time.
So I would note for the record too that the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2348, which was done in 2017, tasks MONUSCO
with two strategic priorities: One, protection of civilians;
and two, support to the implementation of the December 31,
2016, agreement and the electoral process.
Before we conclude, is there anything else any of our
distinguished witnesses would like to add? Yes.
Mr. Dizolele. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
want to thank your committee, your subcommittee, for your
support and continuous interest in DRC.
I think we have traveled a long way. We have traveled deep
into darkness and misery in terms of DRC. I think we have one
more opportunity to end this misery for the people of DRC. The
people of DRC have suffered enough. They have committed
themselves to sacrifice themselves. We have seen this through
various protests, various processes. If you tell DRC people
tomorrow we are going to have a dialogue for peace, they will
come, but they have also run out of strategic patience, to use
a phrase that is fashionable these days. And we don't know; if
we do not act, we might see a coup d'etat. We might see people
take up weapons. So we should not lull ourselves into things
will be exactly the way we are thinking. It is very serious,
and I think there is a cadre of people who are standing as an
obstacle to this.
And again I reiterate: Kabila must go. We need to consider
serious diplo sanctions on his family and his associates.
Corneille Nangaa is standing in the way of having an election.
We are not children. They shouldn't be playing with us. They
shouldn't be playing with you. The future of the country is at
stake. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. And in those words, the hearing is
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
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The previous document is not reprinted here in its entirety but may be
found at: http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
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