[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES AND
RESOURCES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 8, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-94
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
VACANTAs of 10/24/17 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Alice G. Wells, Acting Assistant Secretary, Acting
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bureau of
South and Central Asian Affairs , U.S. Department of State..... 9
Mr. Gregory Huger, Assistant to the Administrator, Office of
Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International
Development.................................................... 18
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Alice G. Wells: Prepared statement................. 11
Mr. Gregory Huger: Prepared statement............................ 20
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 48
Hearing minutes.................................................. 49
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 50
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and
North Africa, and written responses from:
The Honorable Alice G. Wells................................... 52
Mr. Gregory Huger.............................................. 54
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman,
a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
written responses from:
The Honorable Alice G. Wells................................... 57
Mr. Gregory Huger.............................................. 59
THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES AND
RESOURCES
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m.,
in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
North Africa) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Deutch,
Ranking Member Sherman, each for our opening statements, I will
then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses. And without objection,
the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the
record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and
questions for the record subject to the length limitation and
the rules.
I would like to remind audience members that disruption of
committee proceedings is against the law and will not be
tolerated, although wearing theme shirts while seated, seated
in the hearing room, is permissible. Holding up signs or
standing up during the proceedings is not. Any disruptions will
result in a suspension of proceedings until the Capitol Police
can restore order.
Thank you, Mr. Police Officer.
The Chair now recognizes herself for such time as she may
consume.
Finally, the third time is the charm. After running into
hurricanes from Mother Nature and an emergency tax reform
retreat the first two times that we scheduled this hearing, I
am glad that we can all finally convene this important and
timely hearing. I thank our witnesses for their patience and
their willingness to work with us and coordinate our schedules
so that we can make this hearing finally happen. So without
further ado, we will officially kick off our budget hearing for
Afghanistan and Pakistan in an effort to examine the new
strategy the President announced 2\1/2\ months ago.
What I think many of us are interested in hearing is
exactly what the details are in this strategy--how it will be
implemented, what are the benchmarks for measuring success, how
the President intends to use the resources available to
implement this new strategy. What I did hear when the strategy
was rolled out was a clear and decisive message that the United
States is resolved to win, to defeat terror, and that we will
not focus on artificial timelines for withdrawal. I think that
is the approach we should be taking reversing our previous
message to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and others that they can
simply wait us out, because we had already predetermined when
we would leave. But we haven't seen or heard how we plan on
doing this.
We do know that this comes with an undefined and open-ended
financial commitment by the United States as we saw earlier
this week when the administration sent up an amendment to the
budget request for additional resources to support 3,500 more
troops. I don't see how we can defeat these groups without the
support of Pakistan. I know the President put an emphasis on
Pakistan needing to demonstrate its commitment to civilization,
to order, to peace. But the strategy was lacking on details on
how we are going to get Pakistan to reverse course.
Pakistan needs to quit hedging its bets and get fully on
board with the U.S. and Afghanistan. But the strategy was short
on details on exactly what tools we will use and how to
convince Pakistan that its interests aligned with what we aim
to achieve in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the correct move.
Following her trip to Pakistan with Secretary Tillerson,
Ambassador Wells, welcome to you, stated that the
administration ``laid out some very specific expectations of
how Pakistan can help create the conditions that would help
bring the Taliban to the table.''
I hope to hear some of those specific expectations, not
just on bringing the Taliban to the table, but to address the
use of Pakistan territory as terror safe havens. I support the
President's determination to integrate all elements of American
power--diplomatic, military, economic, and political--to
protect our interests and achieve our objectives, particularly
when it comes to leaning on our partners and allies to share
the financial burden and to provide more troops. A safe,
secure, and stable Afghanistan, free from terror groups is in
all of our interests.
The United States should not be relied upon to bear the
full burden. Others must contribute to our mutual success. But
right now, I don't see that willingness from our partners,
especially when it comes to contributing more troops to NATO's
mission, and I think the administration hasn't quite gone into
detail on how we can get the support. I am also concerned that
the new strategy isn't as clear when it comes to our commitment
to Afghanistan's future and the U.S.-Afghan relationship.
Since the year 2002, we have made a concerted effort to
support and empower women in Afghanistan. And in recent years,
we have seen that support start to be realized. Dr. Bera and I
had the honor and privilege to host first lady Ghani, former
First Lady Bush, and members of the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council
for a meeting with our committee members and members of the
Caucus for Women's Issues last week in the Capitol.
What we heard was that the United States has helped build a
foundation for women and girls that has improved their lives.
But now, what we need is to take that to the next level, to
build on previous successes achieved in large part to the work
of the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council, help them scale up and meet
long-term challenges. Women will have an important role to play
in Afghanistan's future, and I hope to hear how our new
strategy will leverage that to achieve even greater success.
The President clearly defined winning as attacking our
enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al-Qaeda, preventing the
Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping terror
attacks against America. But what is the strategy in which to
do this? What is our plan for addressing the growing Iranian
influence in Afghanistan? We didn't hear anything in the new
strategy regarding Iran's military and financial support for
the Taliban, or of Qatar's continued support for the Taliban,
and likely other terror groups in the region.
The President also said that we will work with the Afghan
Government only as long as we see determination and we see
progress; that our commitment is not unlimited and our support
is not a blank check, and the American people expect to see
real reforms. I am not sure that these are both on the same
timeline, and I am not sure that we can achieve our goals
without supporting the Afghan Government. I am also greatly
concerned with what I see as a dangerous and tragic retreat
when it comes to our counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.
The President's request for fiscal year 2018 was nearly
half of our actual expenditure on these operations in 2016.
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and so many others finance their operations, in
large part, through their illicit activities, most notably
through the money they raise from drug trafficking. We cannot
just defeat these terror groups kinetically. We need to take
out their revenue streams.
Without a commitment to counter narcotics, I don't see how
we can totally defeat these groups. There are ideas in this new
strategy that many of us can fully support, but we need to hear
details on how we will achieve our objectives, and we need to
know what benchmarks the administration is going to use to
measure success.
I hope to hear some of that from our patient panel today,
and how the President's budget request will be leveraged to
achieve our goals and fulfill this new strategy.
And with that, I turn to the ranking member of our Middle
East Subcommittee, Mr. Deutch, for his opening statement.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and thanks,
Chairman Yoho, for convening this important subcommittee
hearing. Thanks, of course, to our witnesses here today from
State and USAID, whom I fear are undervalued, underfunded, and
underutilized in the current administration.
Sixteen years. For 16 years, Americans soldiers have been
sacrificing their lives in Afghanistan to secure the future of
that country and to protect our citizens at home. Too often we
forget this very simple truth, that while we sit here in
comfort, our young men and women are risking everything for us.
Just this weekend, we were sadly reminded of this when a Green
Beret, Sergeant First Class Stephen Cribben, husband, son, and
father of two, was killed in combat operations South of Kabul.
This sacrifice, though, includes not just our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and Marines, but, also, our diplomats and our
public servants bringing hope and opportunity through the
critical work in the State Department and USAID.
Yesterday, we held a hearing in this room on democracy and
governance promotion in the Middle East. We cannot secure
Afghanistan's future and an effective relationship with
Pakistan that roots out terrorism and empowers civil society
without these efforts.
We went into Afghanistan 16 years ago in order to remove
al-Qaeda, who had been provided safe haven under brutal Taliban
rule, and we have since made tremendous gains in decimating al-
Qaeda's core infrastructure and helping Afghans reclaim their
country. We have seen great strides to improve democratic
governance, promoting women's rights, better maternal and child
healthcare, and increased access to education. Under the
oppressive Taliban rule, before 2001, less than 1 million
Afghan children were in school, and almost none of them were
girls. Today, more than 9 million children are in school, and
over 40 percent of them are girls.
And USAID, which has already spent billions to promote the
governance, economic growth, and access to education, just
announced another $75 million project to print and distribute
135 million approved textbooks for grades 1 through 12 to all
public schools in Afghanistan. The Afghan people are profoundly
grateful for these efforts, and so are the members of this
committee.
In August, the Trump administration finally unveiled its
strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia aimed at maintaining
these gains and ultimately bringing the war in Afghanistan to a
close. Today, we have a critical opportunity to hear from the
administration witnesses how that strategy will be implemented
and what it means for the future of our relationships with
Afghanistan and Pakistan. I hope our witnesses can also help
explain the motivation and potential impact of this
administration's alarming 40 percent decrease in the budget
request for these two countries from last year.
In his well-scripted strategy speech, President Trump said,
``The men and women who serve our Nation in combat deserve a
plan for victory, they deserve the tools they need and the
trust have earned to fight and to win.'' I agree.
But the very next day, Secretary Tillerson seemingly
contradicted the President by saying that while we may not win
on the battlefield, neither will the Taliban. And while winning
the war in Afghanistan has always been an amorphous target, I
would have hoped for a clearer explanation from this
administration after its intensive strategy review.
What is clear to me is that we are facing a very real risk
of backsliding in Afghanistan. The last few weeks have been
particularly tough with a number of brutal attacks, including a
deadly shooting at a TV station in Kabul this weekend by an
ISIS affiliate.
U.S. defense officials have plainly described the current
fight against the resurgent Taliban as a stalemate. The most
recent SIGAR report shows that U.S.-backed Afghan Government
maintains control or influence over just 56 percent of the
country's 400 districts, and that around 10 percent of Afghan
civilians reside in areas under militant control or influence.
So where do we go from here? There are those who believe
that the only way to achieve a stable Afghanistan is through an
unending American military presence on the ground. Others
advocate for the immediate withdrawal of every last American
troop. But serious security experts, I believe, understand a
third way. The U.S. should continue supporting and
strengthening the Afghan national defense and security forces
to ensure that it can one day function independently of foreign
assistance.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The Chair notes a disturbance of
committee proceedings. The room will be in order. I formally
request that those disrupting the committee stop the
disruption. The committee will suspend while the Capitol Police
restore order.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Officer.
Mr. Deutch is recognized to continue.
Mr. Deutch. The ANDSF must ensure that it can one day
function independently of foreign assistance and U.S.
leadership on the ground. Meanwhile, we need to create
conditions on the ground that can bring about a negotiated
political settlement where the Taliban understands that it can
never win power through its military. But any political
settlement cannot come at the expense of the human rights and
basic dignity of the Afghan people. Ultimately, for this to be
successful, the Afghan Government must become accountable for
its own future. A stable Afghanistan will require continued
patience and consistent resources from Congress. Achieving
success in Afghanistan will not be quick or easy, but we owe it
to the Americans and Afghans who have sacrificed so much get
this right.
I look forward to exploring with our witnesses how the U.S.
can, in fact, get this right, and address the ongoing
challenges in Afghanistan from Taliban insurgency, terrorism,
corruption, economic stagnation, and narco trafficking, as well
as Pakistan's role in preventing terrorist groups from
establishing safe havens.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And now I am pleased to yield 5 minutes for his opening
statement to the chair of the Asia and the Pacific
Subcommittee, Dr. Ted Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Good morning. And I thank Chairman emeritus Ros-
Lehtinen for spearheading this hearing. And it is nice to know
that you are going to looking down upon us as these hearings
continue.
Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to make up one of the
United States' most complex foreign policy and security
challenge. And sadly, in the 16 years of our conflict in
Afghanistan, the broad strokes of this situation are strikingly
unchanged. Though the previous administration attempted to
bring a symbolic close to the combat mission in Afghanistan, in
reality, America's longest war is still ongoing. American
soldiers are still fighting and dying in Afghanistan, and the
cancer of the Taliban and terrorist groups is metastasizing.
Pakistan is still seen as both a key to resolving the conflict
and shelter for our enemies.
While he is no support of unending wars in the Middle East
and South Asia, President Trump observed in his speech that the
consequence of a rapid exit and both predictable and
unacceptable. In announcing our new national strategy for the
conflict, the President laid out an important truth that should
have guided our policies all along, that despite the enormous
cost, we can't leave without resolution. Doing otherwise would
create a vacuum filled instantly by terrorist threats, not just
to the United States, but to the free world. Our new strategy
must include civilians as well as military efforts to secure a
lasting victory in Afghanistan and for the Afghanistan people,
and a sustainable relationship with Pakistan. There are many
important questions to be answered about how the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development will
work within the new strategy and contribute to its eventual
success. The administration has proposed reconsolidating the
special representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan back into
the bureau of the South and Central Asia.
I hope Ambassador Wells, the acting head of both offices,
will share her thoughts whether this will increase operational
efficiencies, and contribute to more region-wide strategic
thinking. I am particularly interested in hearing more about
whether this administration will tolerate Pakistan's aiding and
abetting of terrorist groups within its borders. Pakistan has
been one of the largest U.S. foreign assistant recipients in
the post-911 period. But despite giving tens of billions of
dollars in counterterror assistance over the years, terrorist
organizations continue to operate with impunity in Pakistan.
We have seen some promising signs that this administration
will no longer put up with Pakistan's friendliness toward
terror groups, and I hope to hear this new posture is reflected
throughout the budgetary planning. A broader question is how
reduced resources will be redirected and whether the
administration's reduced focus on nation-building, which the
President mentioned in his speech, plays into foreign
assistance budgeting for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
administration's budget for these two countries reflect
substantial cuts, even to accounts which have a strong nexus to
defense and security, including INCLE, NADR, and FMF.
So I thank the witnesses for joining two subcommittees
today to share their knowledge on these and other important
questions, and for working with us on scheduling to hear this
hearing. And I look forward to their testimony.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Yoho.
I now will recognize members for their opening statements,
starting with Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and
Chairman Yoho, and Ranking Member Deutch, and Ranking Member
Sherman, for holding this joint subcommittee hearing exploring
the President's Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thank you to
our witnesses for being here today to discuss this critical set
of issues.
For 16 years, the United States military has been deployed
to South Asia in response to the terrorist attacks of September
11. Since the beginning of military operations in October 2001,
our Nation's objectives have evolved several times creating
more and more uncertainty as to the future of Afghanistan and
America's role in that country's continuing challenges. Most
importantly, since October 2001, nearly 2400 American lives
have been lost in military operations. We owe it to the brave
men and women and their families who have made the ultimate
sacrifice to clearly define what our Nation's role is in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This includes a clear explanation of
the President's plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan, detailing
the strategy and mission, and what it will take in terms of
resources and personnels to achieve the objectives set forth in
that mission successfully.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as they
can help inform this process. And with that, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. Mr.
Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would hope that we are going to be doing
things differently to achieve a different outcome. We have been
there for 16 years. I have spent a lot of time in Afghanistan
over my life, and been involved in its policy. Madam Chairman,
we have had the wrong policy. Obviously it hasn't worked. And
unless we are--for example, we mentioned going to hold Pakistan
more accountable. Unless we are going to eliminate poppy
production, which we have not done, all of this time there--
Taliban are still making their money, hundreds and millions of
dollars off opium production. We have not stopped that. We had
the ability to do so.
There are a number of things that needed to be done. We
have written a constitution and foisted upon the people of
Afghanistan that is totally contrary to their culture. And
while it is important for us to defeat the forces of radical
Islam, including the Taliban, either we do these other things
right instead of just relying on the military, we are doing a
great disservice to the people of Afghanistan and the people of
the United States.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Dr. Bera of California.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
You know, along with the chairwoman, as she mentioned, last
week, we had the ability to meet with First Lady Ghani and
First Lady Laura Bush to discuss some of the problems that are
facing women and girls in Afghanistan but also to discuss some
of the successes. One thing I think we can be proud of as a
Nation is that investment in a generation of girls. By USAID's
own statistics, USAID has helped support 3.5 million girls in
school and has helped increase the number of female health
workers in Afghanistan. You know, in 2002, only 25 percent of
the health facilities had a female health worker. In 2015, 85
percent do. That is something we can be proud about. As a few
of my colleagues have indicated, though, as we start to change
our mission in Afghanistan, we have got to look at regional
partners. And it would be difficult for us to think about
budgets with Afghanistan and Pakistan without talking about
India as well, and India's ability to create some stability in
the region.
I look forward to the testimony and look forward to
thinking about India's role in that region.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kinzinger is recognized.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And to the
guests, thank you for being here. It is going to be a good
hearing. I just think--Michael Waltz, who is a friend of mine,
he was a Green Beret in Afghanistan, who wrote a good book. He
made the point that at the moment, the prior administration
announced a surge in Afghanistan but had an end date on it. He
said at that point, the conversation he was having with the
locals ended because they basically said, Look, we really like
Americans, we like you here, but we know you are leaving now.
And it really set our policy back quite a bit.
I think this President coming forward and saying we are not
going to be defeated in Afghanistan, people know that--I think
we all know that we won't be defeated on the battlefield. The
only time we will be defeated is with our will, if that
happens. And, look, Afghanistan is not going to be a smiley
unicorn facility if we leave. It is going to be even worse, and
we are going to see another 9/11 type attack being planned.
Unfortunately, we are finding ourselves engaged in generational
war on terror that I think will last the rest of my life. I
wish it was different, but it is the reality.
So Madam Chair, I appreciate you doing this, and I look
forward to all the great insights from our guests.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Kinzinger.
Ambassador Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank our esteemed chairman for organizing
the hearing today.
The President said in his August speech on South Asia that,
and I quote, ``We can no longer be silent about Pakistan's safe
havens for terrorist organizations.'' And he made clear that
the U.S. would fulfill its mission in Afghanistan and give
commanders the green light to target terrorist and criminal
organizations. I welcome the President's policy change on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and look forward to working with the
administration on improving the U.S. security approach in South
Asia.
However, I believe that any policy and funding upheavals
should include intentional inclusion of civil society
organizations and serious reform of the IMET program with
Pakistan to emphasize human rights and good governance.
I thank you, and I look forward to your statements, and I
thank the chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Madam Ambassador.
Does any member wish to seek recognition?
Seeing no other members seeking recognition, I am delighted
to finally introduce our witnesses. Thank you for your patience
with the rescheduling.
We are delighted to welcome Ambassador Alice Wells, the
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs and the Acting Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Prior to serving in this position,
she served as the United States Ambassador to Jordan, special
assistant to the President for Russia and Central Asia, and
Executive Assistant to Secretary of State Clinton. Thank you
for your lifelong service, and we look forward to your
testimony, Ambassador Wells.
I am also delighted to welcome Dr. Gregory Huger, who
serves as USAID's Assistant to the Administrator for the Office
of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Mr. Huger has served in
various capacities within USAID, including Pakistan's Deputy
Mission Director, Afghanistan's Senior Development Advisor in
Regional Command East, and Mission Director for Ukraine and
Egypt. Thank you for being here. We also look forward to your
testimony.
As I said, your written statement will be made a part of
the record. And please feel free to summarize.
We will begin with you, Ambassador Wells.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALICE G. WELLS, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS , U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Wells. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Chairman
Yoho, Ranking Member Deutch, Ranking Member Sherman, and
members, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
administration's strategy for South Asia.
At the top of my testimony, I want to recognize and thank
the thousands of U.S. servicemen and women, diplomats,
development specialists, intelligence professionals, and
international partners who are working every day to enhance our
collective security. I have submitted the longer written
testimony for the record. But here today, I would like to
emphasize a few points about our approach to the region.
For Afghanistan, it is conditions-based. The President has
made clear that our true presence will be driven by conditions
on the ground, and not arbitrary timelines or troop ceilings,
and that the ultimate goal is a political settlement that
stabilizes Afghanistan and denies sanctuary to those who
threaten us. The Taliban will come to understand that the
United States has the resolve to deny them success on the
battlefield, and their best option is a negotiated political
settlement with the Afghan Government. The Afghan leadership
has welcomed the President's recommitment and recognizes that
the strategy cannot succeed unless the Afghan government does
its part.
During the Secretary's October visit to Afghanistan,
President Ghani and CEO Dr. Abdullah briefed on the ambitious
reform goals endorsed in the Kabul compact, including measures
to fight corruption, promote the private sector, combat ghost
soldiers and police, and ensure the integrity of the electoral
process. Credible elections in 2018 and 2019 will demonstrate
to the Afghan people and the Taliban that the central
government represents the hopes and aspirations of all Afghans.
Our rock-solid commitment to Afghanistan's security provides
the time and space for Afghanistan to build its political
future.
Our strategy is also regional in nature. A sustainable
solution to the conflict in Afghanistan requires more than just
a responsible and democratic Afghan Government. It requires the
collective efforts of Afghanistan's neighbors and the
international community. To be economically healthy and
politically secure, Afghanistan must be anchored in a region
that respects territorial integrity and sovereignty, promotes
government stability, and works toward economic prosperity.
In October, we restarted the Quadrilateral Coordination
Group convening Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United
States to discuss a path toward reconciliation in Afghanistan.
We will vigorously pursue international and regional efforts to
build broad support among the region to increase pressure on
the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Pakistan, of
course, is a central part of our strategy. On the one hand, it
has suffered greatly from terrorism and has fought back against
militants' intent on undermining the Pakistani Government. We
recognize the sacrifices that Pakistan has made in its progress
against some of these terror groups. Pakistan has been a
partner with us in the past when they helped decimate al-Qaeda,
and Pakistan is cooperating with us in our efforts to disrupt
ISIS.
But we look to Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not
a safe haven for the Taliban-Haqqani network and other groups
seeking to destabilize the region. We have also called on
Pakistan to use its influence to create the conditions that
will bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.
Pakistan's support in securing the release of Caitlin
Coleman; her husband, Joshua Boyle; and their three children
from captivity showed what we can accomplish when we work in
partnership. Indeed, a Pakistani officer was injured while
pursuing the hostage takers. However, the fact that the
Coleman-Boyle family was in Pakistani territory highlights that
Pakistan still has much to do to meet its commitment to take
action against all terrorists without discrimination.
As long as terrorists continue to operate within Pakistan's
borders, they pose a threat to Pakistan's own stability as well
as to the security of American citizens and servicemembers in
the region. Pakistan has said that it is committed to the war
on terrorism and seeks a strong relationship with the United
States.
We look for tangible evidence that Pakistan is adopting an
indiscriminate posture against groups that threaten the
region's stability, including the Taliban, the Haqqani network,
Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and Jaish-e Mohammed. The Secretary conveyed
specific requests on how Pakistan could make this happen. And
he made clear that if Pakistan decides not to meet these
requests, we will adjust our strategy accordingly. Pakistan has
made important commitments to improve relations with
Afghanistan. Afghanistan reasonably asked that the Taliban
insurgents be forced to fight on Afghanistan soil without
recourse to safe haven, respite, and regeneration in
neighboring states.
Finally, our strategy prioritizes the reduction of tension
between India and Pakistan, which drives much of Pakistan's
security calculus. On his trip to the region, Secretary
Tillerson encouraged India and Pakistan to keep channels of
communication open. The region and the world looks to both
countries to safeguard against a nuclear conflict in South
Asia.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to a candid
conversation today.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wells follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wells.
Mr. Huger.
STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY HUGER, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Huger. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Yoho, Ranking
Member Deutch, my Congresswoman from my home district in St.
Louis, Congresswoman Wagner, members of the subcommittee, thank
you for inviting me here to discuss the administration's plans
for USAID assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan under the
South Asia strategy. It is an honor to appear before you with
Acting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia,
Ambassador Alice Wells, to discuss U.S. assistance that
supports our national security.
I want to begin by thanking, as the Ambassador did, the men
and women who have served in the U.S. military and our civilian
agencies and their families who served and sacrificed in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the thousands of Afghan and
Pakistani citizens who have served alongside us.
As was said, I bring to this position, which I have held
for 2 months, experience within USAID and in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, 5 years on the border, three of them based in Bagram
covering eastern Afghanistan, and two of them working FATA and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the consulate in Peshawar.
In the 2 months that I have been in this position, I have
had the opportunity to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan to
meet our staff and many of our local counterparts, many of whom
I have known for years.
When I went to Afghanistan, I was the head of the U.S.
delegation to the senior officials meeting, which was the
Afghan Government meeting with representatives of 38 countries
that support Afghanistan meeting to review progress over the
year, since commitments to support Afghanistan's development
were made in Brussels. My takeaway from that meeting was that
we do have a real partner in the national unity government.
President Ghani was very articulate in his praise of the
South Asia strategy. That was shared by his team as well as the
representatives from the other countries attending the meeting.
His focus was on shifting from donor assistance to private
investment as a long-term solution for Afghanistan and, in that
context, addressing corruption and the other impediments to the
functioning of a market economy in Afghanistan, including, of
course, security. He also, together with his wife, First Lady,
emphasized the importance of the empowerment of women. And one-
third of the conference was spent on that subject.
My takeaway from my visit of last week to Pakistan,
including visits to Islamabad, Peshawar, and Karachi was the
strong support for the mainstreaming of FATA in a way that is
not yet clearly articulated but which seems to be a priority
for political parties, military, and the citizens more broadly.
And I was very pleased to see the strong support in civil
society for the effort to give resilience to communities to
resist extremism, particularly among the youth.
Now, in Afghanistan, and we will talk more about this, I am
sure, we are focused on three points: Helping sustain the gains
in health, education, and women's empowerment; helping build
stronger bonds between the government and the citizens through
service delivery, credible elections, and reduced corruption;
and through supporting increased private sector investment,
particularly in the market areas of the larger urban areas, to
create opportunity for the people and revenue for the
government.
In Pakistan, we are focused on three main points: First,
normalizing the border area, stabilizing the border area, and
that includes mainstreaming FATA in whatever way the Pakistanis
decide to do it and reincorporating those people who have
returned; the second is supporting communities to become
resilient to violent extremism; the third is to support private
sector investment to create opportunities for the youth bulge.
Thank you for having me here. I am delighted to be here and
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huger follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to both of you for
your patience and for being here.
Ambassador Wells, it was reported last week that there is a
proposal on the table to have the Office of the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the White House.
The report also confirmed that the actual office had been
dissolved at State with the duties and functions fully
integrated into the SCA Bureau.
Do you have any update on that decision? That would seem to
many of us that State is no longer a key player when it comes
to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ambassador Wells. I am not aware of a measure to move SRAP
to the White House. But within the State Department, we have
completed a reintegration, a combination of the South and
Central Asian Bureau with the Afghanistan and Pakistan offices.
And this has been an initiative that the State Department has
sought since 2016. It reflects very much this administration's
view that the answer to Afghanistan is a regional one that we
have to look beyond the stovepipe of AFPAK and understand how
the region as a whole is going to contribute to the
stabilizing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Well, please keep us updated
on any moves that way. Thank you very much.
Dr. Bera and I were happy to host First Lady Ghani, First
Lady Bush, and many members of the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council
last week. And they expressed gratitude for the assistance from
the United States, particularly with the investment that we
have made together in women's programs. But they suggested that
we begin thinking about more long-term planning rather than
implementing short-term programs. USAID has its Promote Program
that recognizes the important role that women will have in
Afghanistan's future. With Promote now about halfway through
its 5-year mandate, are we starting to plan for the next
iteration using what we have learned to help inform the next
stage when Promote ends for more long-term programming, Mr.
Huger?
Mr. Huger. Yes, we are.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Poppy cultivation. A lot of us have discussed it. Up again
last year. Eradication down drastically. Afghanistan produces
about 75 percent of the world's opium. And not only does this
cause a serious health crisis, but it also provides a great
deal of funding for terrorists and incentivizes corruption and
crime, yet the budget request for Afghanistan for the
international narcotics control and law enforcement counter-
narcotics effort was nearly cut in half to about $44 million,
from the nearly $80 million in fiscal year 2016 actuals. How
can we justify this great reduction in the request for the
international narcotics control and law enforcement counter-
narcotics program, while we know that production is up, and we
know that terror groups fund their activities from drug
trafficking?
Ambassador Wells. There is a relationship between drug
production and security. And right now, the overwhelming
majority of hectares of opium grown is under Taliban control or
in contested areas. And so critical to our efforts to counter
narcotics are going to be steps to resolve the essential
conflict with the Taliban.
The reason you have seen a decline in funding under INL for
counter narcotics is because over the years, we have managed to
build a capacity within the government of Afghanistan. We have
stood up under the ministry of interior, a counter-narcotics
police force. There are two specialized units that are also
working in close coordination in training with the DEA. And so
we want to see a shift, because we are not there for permanent
nation-building. This is about building the Afghanistan
capacity.
I think in terms of strategy right now, the idea is not to
go after the lowest person on the food chain, the farmer, but
to go after the processing centers and the facilities that are
the next level up, because it is critical to disrupt Taliban
financing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I have another
question about infrastructure projects, but we have Nikki Haley
coming in at noon, so I will yield back the balance of my time
and turn to Mr. Deutch, the ranking member.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Since 2001, the United States has provided over $100
billion in economic and security assistance to Afghanistan. Can
you comment on what you believe are the most important outcomes
of this aid in the areas of economic development, gender
equality, human rights education, health democracy, the rule of
law. What are the most important security accomplishments from
this aid? What have we gotten for $100 billion? Both of you.
Mr. Huger. If I could begin answering from the USAID
perspective. As you said in your introductory comments, the
progress in education, particularly of girls, has been very
important. Very difficult, but very important. And that is
something that we will continue.
The effort that Chairman Ros-Lehtinen mentioned in the
Promote Program, which is focused on 85,000 women, who have at
least a high school education, to help them play important
roles in business, in civil society, and in government, has
gotten off to a very good start. The infrastructure efforts
that we have made, challenging as they have been, have produced
a road transportation network that meets minimum requirements
of the country, if maintained.
We have made contributions to the production, distribution
of electric power, and we have helped Afghanistan make
significant gains in health. Where, though, there is a long way
to go, health care is available to a very large number of
Afghans when it was not before.
These and many other concrete accomplishments are the
result of our work in Afghanistan. It is definitely a work in
progress. It is definitely facing opposition, but it is
definitely worth continuing to achieve the outcomes envisioned
in the South Asia strategy.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
Ambassador Wells, I am going to go a slightly different
direction in my remaining time.
I think it is safe to say that the members on this dais all
agree that there is no purely military solution to the war and,
therefore, reconciliation of some sort is also going to be
needed. The President said, Perhaps it will be possible to have
a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Can you tell us what that political settlement
would look like from the administration's perspective? And what
would the key impediments to the Taliban seeking to participate
in the reconciliation process be? And is there any way for the
Taliban to be a part of this that wouldn't jeopardize Afghani
human rights?
Ambassador Wells. The administration has always said not
preconditions to negotiations, but end conditions. And the end
conditions have been a cessation of violence, a cessation of
ties to terrorist networks, and respect for the Constitution,
including the provisions for women and minorities. And that
continues to be the case.
You know, this is going to be--there is necessarily going
to have to be an Afghan-Afghan conversation. President Trump
was very clear that we are not there to micromanage how Afghans
decide among themselves to live and to regulate their political
life. And so, I think this has been a remarkably open approach
by successive administrations, including the Trump
administration. The impediments are, you know, foremost, the
unwillingness to date of the Taliban to enter into negations
with the Government of Afghanistan, whether privately or
publicly. And so the challenge right now--the question is not
whether we are prepared to support, you know, an Afghan-led and
owned peace process. We are. And we have said that. And
Secretary Tillerson has been quite explicit, that there is a
role and a place at the table for moderate Taliban. And we look
for them to join this process.
You know, the task right now is how do we get the Taliban
to the negotiating table? And there are two parts to that.
There has to be increased military pressure. For the last 4
years, they were waiting for us to leave. You know, not
unreasonably, given that that was the policy of the prior
administration. But, second, there has to be political pressure
and coordinated international pressure on the Taliban. And that
includes ensuring that the Taliban political commission in Doha
is doing its essential function, which is facilitating, you
know, peace negotiations.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
Dr. Yoho is recognized.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ambassador Wells, earlier this week, the President issued a
budget amendment with respect to the DOD budget. It called for
additional funding for troops. He made it clear that he will
not talk about troop levels, but that we will ask our NATO
allies and global partners to increase their troop levels to
support us. Does NATO have the level troops it has deemed
necessary for the Afghan mission?
Ambassador Wells. Our NATO partners have been interested in
working with us to ensure the success of this South Asia
strategy.
Mr. Yoho. I am sure they are interested, but have they
increased the level of commitment since the change of
leadership in our country?
Ambassador Wells. We are confident that we are going to get
increased levels of support from our NATO partners.
Mr. Yoho. As of yet, you have not seen that?
Ambassador Wells. No. The process is ongoing, and we are
confident that we are going to see that increased support.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. You have answered my second question, too,
then.
Is the current request for $1.13 billion for Afghanistan
and Pakistan enough to implement this new strategy that we
have?
Ambassador Wells. Yes. We believe that the $780 million,
approximately, for Afghanistan, is an appropriate sum that
represents about an 18 percent reduction from our previous
request, but continues to build out in the essential three
areas that Mr. Huger identified as being the pillars of our
approach.
Mr. Yoho. And the normalizing and stabilizing border areas,
resilient communities, and the private sector investments, you
both agree that is where we need to focus on?
Ambassador Wells. Yes. From the State Department's
perspective, very much so. And from the President's speech, the
idea that this is not a blank check, that we need to help
Afghanistan shift from a donor economy to a private sector
fueled economy.
Mr. Yoho. I am glad to hear you say it is not a blank
check. You know, I have got in front of me--and, Mr. Huger, I
am going to come to you.
Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign
assistance in post-9/11 period. Congress appropriated more than
$33 billion in assistance from 2002 to 2016, including $10.5
billion in economic development, humanitarian aid. In addition,
there was an extra $14 billion in CSF funding which is the
Coalition Support Fund.
When I look at that kind of an investment, you know, I
always wonder what kind of return on an investment did we get?
And so, I think one of the things that we can do is look at
approval ratings. And it is interesting to me, with that kind
of money that the American taxpayers have allowed to be spent
by the people in government; in 2015, 22 percent people that
were polled in Pakistan viewed the United States positively.
Twenty-two percent. And I guess we should be excited about
that, because that is up from 14 percent in 2014. That is about
where Congress is. That is according to the Pew Research.
However, the thing I find interesting is 78 percent of the
Pakistanis polled view China favorably with only 3 percent
responding unfavorably. You said you have been in that region
for 5 to 6 years. What are we doing to change our tactics to
get a better response for the money that the American taxpayers
are spending?
Mr. Huger. Thank you, Congressman Yoho, for the question,
it is a very important----
Mr. Yoho. I am going to report this back to Lauren.
Mr. Huger. Yes, indeed.
The focus of our strategy is in the national security
interest of the United States and, going forward, to identify
things that are also in the national security interest of
Pakistan. It is not a popularity contest at a popular level
where, from one month to the next, the polling would show what
percentage of people love or hate us. It is about our national
security, which is tangentially related to the popularity, but
not directly.
So our focus on helping secure the border, helping
Pakistan, as it seems to want to do now, to find a way to
mainstream that ungoverned space called FATA into the province
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or in whatever way they want to do it,
is absolutely transformational from a historic perspective.
Making that a success, and with it, helping to reabsorb or
reintegrate 1.6 million people who were displaced by conflict
from FATA and are now coming back, 85 percent are back, the
rest will be returning, those are things that would make a
different Pakistan. That is good for Pakistan. That is good for
us. That is good for the region. So it is not a popularity
contest. It is about national security of the United States and
the countries where we are working.
Mr. Yoho. I appreciate you. Ambassador Wells.
Ambassador Wells. If I could just add, you know, these
polls capture something, and oftentimes it is a response to a
policy issue that Pakistanis disagree with. But if you ask
Pakistanis, where do you want to study? Where would you like to
work? Where would you like to get medical care? I mean, the
pull of America and the West is quite strong. And I think as
we, you know, continue our engagement with Pakistan, it is
really about how does Pakistan want to be a member of this
international community and the expectations not only we hold,
but our international partners hold in asking Pakistan to take
these specific steps to combat terrorism.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
And we are so pleased that our subcommittees have been
joined by the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Eliot
Engel of New York. And I am very pleased to yield whatever time
he may consume to him right now.
Thank you, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I
want thank you, and I want to thank Mr. Yoho and also Mr.
Sherman, Mr. Deutch, for letting me participate today in making
a statement.
I wanted to ask Ambassador Wells a few questions. And,
Ambassador, thank you for your service and for your time this
morning.
I want to talk about Afghanistan, because we are 16 years
into the war there. After all that time, this conflict
obviously remains our most important foreign policy priorities,
and there is an enormous amount at stake, obviously, for our
country, for Afghanistan, for the region. In August, President
Trump announced his South Asia strategy at Fort Myer, Virginia.
He told the world that we will win and that we will defeat them
and defeat them handily. It was a lot of tough talk, but it
really left me with more questions than answers, because we
don't know the details, we don't know how this plan will bring
the conflict to an end. And I want to just talk about that.
You know, I voted for all the AUMFs back in 2001, 2002. And
I am really very much chagrined that we are still operating on
that. We should have this Congress attack foreign policy and do
what is right, rather than relying on a Congress when I was
here, but I would venture to say 80 to 90 percent of the
members still here were not here back then. So I have some
questions.
Madam Ambassador, is the administration's position that the
war in Afghanistan will come to an end by military victory won
on the battlefield?
Ambassador Wells. No. Victory is a sustainable political
settlement that results in a stable Afghanistan whose territory
is not used to threaten the United States and our partners.
Sir, I had the opportunity to accompany the Secretary on
his trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. And there I was
able to see, you know, the impact of the strategy in each of
those countries. For Afghanistan, it is a recommitment to that
country, the knowledge that we are prepared to stay with them
as they have to undertake what are very difficult and necessary
reforms. It is telling the Pakistanis that we are not leaving,
it is not 1989, that you need to count on our presence. And
instead of hedging, you know, identify how to mediate the
legitimate interests that you have in Afghanistan at a
negotiating table. And in India, it is recognizing the role,
positive role, that India can play in Afghanistan's economic
stabilization.
And so, I found across, you know, the region, the strategy
was extraordinarily resonant. And I do believe that after 4
years of counting us out, we have changed the dynamic, and we
have changed the conversation, and we are going to see progress
as a result.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Let me ask you this: Has the
administration provided American troops in Afghanistan
additional authorities beyond the train, advise, and equip
mission essentially putting them back into more of a combat
role?
Ambassador Wells. The mission is still a train, advise, and
equip. I think both Secretary Mattis and the President have
made mention to authorities being provided that will allow for
more aggressive targeting. That is not really my area of
expertise, so I do defer to my defense colleagues. But the
number of troops, the commitment of our troops, and the ability
of our troops to, you know, actively and aggressively assist
the Afghan forces will make a difference.
Mr. Engel. Well, Secretary Tillerson said this is a war
that will come to an end through a negotiated settlement. He
said, We will not win, but the Taliban won't win either. If
that is true, why are we, then, sending more troops to
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Wells. As Secretary Mattis testified, and I
believe General Nicholson, the conflict has been stalemate, a
stalemate generally in favor of the government, but a
stalemate. And it had not--the Taliban have not yet been
convinced that they are not going to win on the battlefield.
And so the provision of additional forces to enhance the train,
advise, and assist and to push it down to a lower level we
believe is going to be quite significant in making a difference
on the battlefield, along with the additional air assets that
are being provided.
And so, as I said at the outset, a key impediment to
achieving a peaceful negotiated settlement is the unwillingness
to date of the Taliban to engage directly with the Government
of Afghanistan. We have to change that calculus of the Taliban
using both military and political means.
Mr. Engel. You mentioned earlier that the administration
believes the war will come to an end through a negotiation. So
let me ask you: What is the administration doing to prepare for
this negotiation, and why aren't we more focused on touting a
potential peace process?
Ambassador Wells. We remain very active in all of the
regional architectures that have existed and have been
developed to reinforce a message that supports a negotiated
political solution. I just recently hosted a quadrilateral
meeting with the Chinese, the Afghans, and the Pakistanis. I
look forward to participating in the Heart of Asia Conference
that is coming up; the Kabul process; there is an international
contact group; there are a variety of diplomatic initiatives
that continue to work very closely. But fundamentally, we need
to get the parties to agree to talk to one another directly.
And that involves changing the Taliban's calculus.
We also believe--I also believe that we need to improve the
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan to see better
cooperation between the two countries. And so we have been
supportive of General Bajwa, chief of army staff's recent visit
to Kabul, his commitment to undertake specific initiatives with
his Afghan counterparts.
So on a variety of levels, bilaterally, trilaterally, and
then larger international groupings, we are pursuing this
effort, sir.
Mr. Engel. I don't believe that we should cut and run in
Afghanistan. I don't believe that we shouldn't care about what
happens there. Obviously, it is very important. But I think you
can understand that many of us are worried about getting bogged
down in a situation where we can't get out and use it more and
more as justification. And as the years go on and on, and we
are still going back to an AUMF that is old and antiquated--and
by the way, I said this under the previous administration and
under this administration, I would say it under any
administration--I do think Congress has to play a much more
important role. We are a coequal branch of government, and we
should be playing a more important role if, indeed, the effect
of our policy is going to be to wear us down and keep us there
in a war that we cannot win, that admittedly we cannot win. You
know, what changes? What changes 5 years from now, 10 years
from now, 15 years from now?
Ambassador Wells. And I think the steps that the government
of Afghanistan is taking and needs to take to enhance its
inclusivity to make itself a more attractive partner to
demonstrate that the central government is representative of
all the Afghan people are critical. And so, both President
Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, when they met with Secretary Tillerson,
discussed the Kabul Compact. The 200 Metrics that the Afghans
themselves have developed, to be able to measure specific
reforms across the fields of economics, governance, security,
and reconciliation are an important symbol of the fact that
with President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, we do have partners that
we can work with in this effort at reform.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, and thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We are honored by
your presence and thank you for the questions.
And I would like to recognize Ambassador Wagner to take
over our part of the subcommittee--joint subcommittee hearing.
Thank you, Ambassador.
Mrs. Wagner. [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for
5 minutes for questioning.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The American people have every right to be
concerned when we are talking about putting more troops into
Afghanistan, considering the fact that we have been there as
long as we have, and been suffering casualties. The 2,400 dead
does not include the wounded that we have had in Afghanistan,
which is a tremendous cost to families across our country. And
I think that it behooves decision-makers, if they are going to
try to use military force as a political tool, achieving
political ends, that we are also looking at what is necessary
for that to succeed. Let me just know that I am not as great an
expert as probably either one of you are, but I do have a long
history in Afghanistan. And the Constitution of Afghanistan, as
far as I can see, and people I know who are totally immersed in
Afghan culture, are constitutionally foisted on these people is
totally contrary to their culture, say, centralized in Kabul
power when, in fact, Afghanistan has the most decentralized
social framework of any country I know. I mean, it goes right
down to the village level, village family tribal, and then
provincial, and ethnic, and then way back up to Kabul. Are we
going to be making any changes in the Constitution that so far
has not succeeded?
Ambassador Wells. If I could start on the question of the
use of military force. I agree with you, sir, it is--it is an
awesome responsibility. The troops that are going in today are
performing a very different function. It is a train, advise,
and assist function. It is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like an answer to my question.
Ambassador Wells. Absolutely.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are we doing----
Ambassador Wells [continuing]. On the Constitution----
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. Any reform of the
Constitution and the way the government works?
Ambassador Wells. The Constitution is an Afghanistan
document.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We foisted that on them. I was there when
we did.
Ambassador Wells. And it was endorsed by Loya jirga, but
underneath the Constitution, within the Constitution, there is
the ability for the Afghan Government to amend its
Constitution. It can follow its own Constitution----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are there moves to do that? Are there
efforts to do that?
Ambassador Wells. I am not aware that there are efforts
now.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Obviously, the Constitution has not worked
to create a better Afghanistan, because we are talking about
sending more troops into Afghanistan.
Let me ask this: Fifteen years ago, we developed a fungus
that could be dropped from the air and would affect only the
poppy plants, and would eliminate the poppy production for not
only that year, but for 10 years, but would affect no other
crop. Are you aware of that?
Ambassador Wells. I am not aware of the program.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Huger. No, sir, I am not.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let me note for the record, I have
stated this publicly, stated in hearings like this. Obviously,
our government has not been willing to stop the poppy
production. That is a major source of revenue for those people
who have been killing and maiming our American soldiers who
have gone to Afghanistan.
As far as Pakistan, let me ask you this about Pakistan. So
you have stated Pakistan has been our partner? You had
mentioned partner?
Ambassador Wells. In combating al-Qaeda, and currently in
combating ISIS, we have worked closely with Pakistan and
achieved significant results. Historically, you know the Cold
War history. But more recently, there are elements of
partnership, and then elements of extreme disagreement, which
is the focus of the south Asia strategy today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that in--when 9/11, which
got us all involved in this, 9/11, I think there were two
Afghans involved in 9/11, and the rest were Saudis, and it was
planned in Pakistan. And, you know, we have had, as I say,
suffering--the Pakistani people are suffering under their own
government. And I think before we commit more troops to that
part of the world, we should certainly seek changes in the way
those areas are governed, or all we are doing is condemning
more people to die and to be maimed.
And, Madam Chairman, this is a very serious issue. And we
know we are up against radical Islam. But we can't just solve
it by thinking--I don't buy any of the reforms that you have
been talking about are going to make any difference in
Afghanistan, because you haven't gone to the heart of what
isn't working. And if we just send more troops, we are going to
have more dead bodies, and it doesn't make sense to me.
Mrs. Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Asia
Subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Ambassador, in private conversations with the
Pakistani leaders, do they tacitly admit that at least elements
of their government were aware where bin Laden was? Or do they
stick to the talking point that, oh, we were looking for him,
every element of the Pakistani Government was looking for him,
we just couldn't find him?
Ambassador Wells. Sir, I have never heard any Pakistani
leader suggest that Pakistan knew where Osama bin Laden was
located.
Mr. Sherman. And they tend to suggest that they were
looking real hard and they just couldn't find him.
Since 2001, we have provided over $100 billion of economic
and security assistance to Afghanistan, not to mention the
blood and treasure of fighting the war, and $20 billion of
economic assistance and military assistance to Pakistan. I want
to focus a little bit on human rights. The Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan reported over 700 people were
disappeared, kidnapped, never heard of again. And that is just
in 2016. Elements of the Pakistani government and military just
see it as a good political tactic to cause their opponents to
disappear.
Ambassador, I would like to get you to focus on one
particular incident. Two years ago, in November 2015, Sindhi
leader Dr. Anwar Laghari was brutally murdered in Pakistan. The
Pakistani Government has not been responsive to numerous
inquiries about that murder, and he was murdered while he was
conducting political activities. His perpetrators have not been
brought to justice. Days before his death, he had sent a
memorandum to the U.S. Government about human rights violations
by Pakistani security forces.
But now here is the new information. Just a few days ago,
Dr. Anwar Laghari's son, Asad Laghari, was found dead in
suspicious circumstances, very possibly poisoned. I had met
with Asad Laghari when he was in Washington. He was pursuing a
master's degree at Mehron University of Engineering and
Technology at its U.S.-Pakistan Center for advanced studies in
water.
What is suspicious about this is that Asad Laghari's death
comes just weeks after I had, along with six other Members of
this House, sent a letter focusing on human rights issues in
Sindh. And that letter especially focused on disappearances,
murders, extrajudicial killings. To what extent does the
administration take up these human rights issues and
disappearances with the Pakistani Government? And to what
extent was the issue of human rights and disappearances in
Sindh been raised at the recent visits to Pakistan by yourself
and by Secretary Tillerson?
Ambassador Wells. So we regularly raise the human rights
situation in Pakistan. As you know, our human rights report on
Pakistan is quite candid about the--you know, the
disappearances, the other abuses that we see, and that
organizations inside of Pakistan, including journalists and
human rights organizations themselves, document. And, so, this
is a serious concern.
Mr. Sherman. And did Secretary Tillerson bring this up
directly and orally in his conversations?
Ambassador Wells. I am not able to comment on whether he
brought them up directly, but I can assure you----
Mr. Sherman. How about you?
Ambassador Wells [continuing]. That we bring them up
directly, the Ambassador and the consulate----
Mr. Sherman. Can I ask you to personally bring up, with
high-level Pakistani authorities, the November 2015 death of
Dr. Anwar Laghari and the death just a few weeks ago of Dr.
Laghari's son, Asad Laghari?
Ambassador Wells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Shifting to Pakistan, any chance that the doctor who helped
us, I believe his name is pronounced, Dr. Afridi, is going to
be released?
Ambassador Wells. We continue to raise Dr. Afridi's case in
every high-level encounter, and we have not yet seen the
Pakistani Government move to do so. As you know, we have
withheld $100 million in assistance as a result of his
continued incarceration.
Mr. Sherman. Not enough. Let's do more.
I was going to bring up, for the record, the issue of
Ahmadi Muslims. Sorry for the mispronunciation, but I want to
pick up on Dana Rohrabacher's point. Is it the policy of the
United States in Afghanistan to destroy poppy crops to the full
extent that that can be done without destroying legitimate
agriculture?
Ambassador Wells. The destruction of poppy crops is always
sensitive, and our policy has always been to support the
destruction of poppy crops in areas where local leaders agree
to this strategy. For most local leaders, this is difficult
because of who is impacted most directly, which is the local
farmer. So, sir, I recognize the concern, its attention. But,
at this stage, the overwhelming majority of poppy is being
produced in Taliban-controlled and Taliban-contested areas. The
Taliban has become addicted to the drug trade, which is, you
know, why we do need to go after the next higher level of
drug----
Mr. Sherman. Well, it is hard to go back to my district and
say we died by the thousands to protect poppy farmers that are
sending heroin to the United States, because that is the crop
that they prefer to grow and we don't want to be unpopular with
them.
Ambassador Wells. But we are, sir, working very closely
with the police forces, the counternarcotics police forces, and
the two specialized units that we helped set up to target the
next level up quite aggressively in order to try to----
Mrs. Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. So I say
welcome to the witnesses, especially Mr. Huger, who hails from
Missouri's Second Congressional District and is a Priory
graduate, and your daughters, a graduate of my alma mater. So,
welcome, sir.
The continued involvement of the Pakistan military in the
civilian government is damaging to the country. Assistant
Secretary Wells, my understanding is that the fiscal year 2018
request for Pakistan's IMET account is five times the amount
request for fiscal year 2016. Can you please explain this
increase in IMET funding, what it will be used for, and what
the figure is, please?
Ambassador Wells. IMET funding has been a useful tool for
us to establish relations with members of the Pakistani
military and through those training courses, to try to
inculcate some of the values that we believe are essential to
appropriate civilian military relations in any country,
certainly in any democratic country.
Mrs. Wagner. I am glad you mention values, Ambassador
Wells. Does the IMET program contain coursework on human rights
and democracy? And I do have some concerns as to why it was
increased five times the amount since fiscal year 2016.
Ambassador Wells. I would have to check on the number being
a five times increase. I am sorry I can't respond to that. But,
traditionally, our IMET courses do have a very heavy component
of rule of law, of respect for--you know, of how a military
operates, and more time--respect for human rights. And so, yes,
that is a critical component of many of our IMET programs.
Mrs. Wagner. I don't believe that the program does include
specific and vigorous coursework on human rights and democracy.
So I would like you to----
Ambassador Wells. I will take that back.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. To take that back and put forward
some of the coursework. And I would also like an exact number
and some reasoning as to why it was increased five times from--
in 2018 over fiscal year 2016.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Alice G. Wells to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Ann Wagner
The Administration's request for Fiscal Year 2018 actually
decreases the level of funding for the IMET program in Pakistan to $3.5
million, or approximately 27 percent lower than the Fiscal Year 2016
level of $4.8 million.
Since Fiscal Year 2010, the following IMET-funded programs for
Pakistan have included human rights, democratic norms, rule of law,
and/or civil-military cooperation in their curricula:
Gender-Based Violence and Women's Health;
Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights;
Legal Aspects of Defense Support for Civil
Authorities;
Civil-military Responses to Terrorism;
Legal Aspects of Combatting Terrorism;
Military Judge Course;
International Law of Military Operations;
Military Police Basic Leadership Course;
Military Police Captains Career Course;
Judge Advocate Staff Officer course;
Operations Law;
International Military Law Development Program;
International Military Law; and
Military and Peacekeeping Operations Law.
Additionally, senior Professional Military Education (PME)
programs, such as the war colleges, staff colleges, and National
Defense University, all include democratic norms and human rights in
their curricula.
__________
Mrs. Wagner The administration's funding request for the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Program
would decrease the Afghanistan account by nearly 50 percent,
and the Pakistan account by nearly 40 percent. My understanding
is that this account is used to support criminal justice
institutions and the judicial sector, fight corruption, and
reform security forces. Assistant Secretary Wells, is this how
this account was used in Afghanistan and Pakistan? And what
gains does the administration hope to make by cutting this
program?
Ambassador Wells. We have supported these programs for many
years at significant amounts of funding and have to show for
it, you know, specialized structures now, institutions that
have been developed, counternarcotics police forces that have
been stood up, special investigative units that are working in
conjunction with our drug enforcement agency. And so the cut in
funding also reflects the idea that having stood up these
institutions, we are able to transfer now the responsibility to
these host government agencies while continuing to work with
them in partnership.
Mrs. Wagner. And you believe these institutions have, in
fact, been stood up and are, in fact, fighting corruption and
reforming--and reformers have been put in place in the security
sector?
Ambassador Wells. We have stood up these institutions. We
continue to work with them and to mentor them. But the change
in funding reflects a shift, again, toward shifting the
responsibility to the host government.
Mrs. Wagner. I just want to make sure that we are shifting
priorities, especially as I see IMET plussed-up over five
times, that we are also shifting toward increased human rights
and democracy programs at all levels. Thank you.
Mr. Huger, is the administration intending to reduce the
democracy and governance programs that we fund in these
countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Mr. Huger. We are focusing our efforts on the points that I
mentioned. Within them is--helped to reduce corruption and to
have credible elections in Afghanistan, and to help Pakistan
establish governance in the ungoverned area of FATA. FATA has
had the Frontier Crimes Regulation since 1902 when the British
established it. And there is significant will among the people
in FATA to normalize their legal framework. So our emphasis on
normalizing the border area will include helping the government
establish local jurisdictions that can respond to the needs and
desires of the population.
So we intend to have a very significant focus on governance
and Democratic elections in both countries.
Mrs. Wagner. Great. Thank you, Mr. Huger. My time has
expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I have got some comments, and I am going to ask some
questions.
This war began in 2001. Now it is ongoing for roughly 16
years. That is the longest active military conflict in the
history of the United States. Early on, the Taliban government
was toppled, and al-Qaeda, to a very large degree, was
destroyed. And, quite frankly, goals were achieved. Our
American military won.
Later on, Osama bin Laden was killed as a result of our
presence in Afghanistan. Another goal was achieved, and
America's military won yet again. However, we have persisted in
Afghanistan, despite those victories and achievements by our
military. And the cost, in monetary terms, is estimated to be
as low at $800 billion to $1 trillion, as high as $4 trillion
to $6 trillion, when including ``long-term medical care and
disability compensation for servicemembers, veterans and
families, military replenishment and social costs,'' according
to a study by Harvard economist Linda Bilmes.
Moving on, in a more difficult part of the cost are lives
lost and casualties incurred. We have had roughly--well, more
than 2,000 American military personnel who have lost their
lives, roughly 1,000-plus American contractors, civilians, who
have been serving in this war zone who have also lost their
lives. And we have had roughly 20,000 wounded American
casualties, many of whom have come home with debilitating
injuries.
We had a protester at the beginning of this hearing, and I
am going to make some comments about him. The protester's
remarks were about: How long are we going to stay in
Afghanistan? And, quite frankly, in my judgment, those views
reflect the views of a growing number of American citizens who
grow justifiably weary of America's treasury spent, American
lives lost, and American men and women coming home horribly
injured and permanently disabled.
Earlier this year, on August the 21st of 2017, the
President, in a speech, stated, ``My original instinct was to
pull out, and, historically, I like following my instinct.''
Someone apparently persuaded President Trump to disregard his
instinct, and, rather than pull out, we are now looking at a
dramatic increase in our troop levels and ultimately our
casualties and our costs.
So I want to get back to one of the questions that was
raised by an audience member. How long are we looking at before
we can declare victory? We didn't do it after we toppled the
Taliban and debilitated al-Qaeda. We didn't do it after Osama
bin Laden was killed and justice obtained. Are you talking
years? Are you talking decades? And at what cost?
Ambassador Wells, in your judgment, are we talking years or
are we talking decades?
Ambassador Wells. I am sorry, I can't answer that question.
But I would note, as the President said in his speech, that the
reason he reverted was because he was convinced that the
national--the threat to our own national security remained. And
if you look----
Mr. Brooks. Well, okay, I am sorry. That is not answering
my question. But nonetheless, I am going to follow up on your
comments. I am also familiar with his speech and he is talking
about terrorists, correct? Please, for the record, state yes,
not just nod your head.
Ambassador Wells. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Does that justify then us invading every
single other country on the planet in which there are al-Qaeda
or Islamic State forces? Is that the suggestion there, that
that is the justification for still being in Afghanistan
despite this already about being the longest active military
engagement in the history of the United States?
Ambassador Wells. Sir, I think this is specific to
Afghanistan's role as being a launching pad for the attack on
9/11.
Mr. Brooks. But we have killed those people.
Ambassador Wells. Al-Qaeda continues to operate----
Mr. Brooks. But al-Qaeda continues to operate in a dozen,
at least a dozen, other countries in the Middle East, and in
Africa, and in Asia. But let's get back to Afghanistan more
particularly. Is it your testimony that you have no judgment,
no insight whatsoever, on behalf of this administration, that
will help the American people ascertain how many more lives
will be lost, how many more of our American troops will come
home disabled, and how many more years we will be there, and at
what great cost? You have no estimate whatsoever?
Ambassador Wells. So the judgment is that there are
multiple terrorist groups operating in ungoverned spaces in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. That is not answering my question,
Ambassador Wells. My question is, do you have a judgment as to
the length of time--I am not asking for an explanation. I am
already at the end of my 5-minute remarks. But do you have an
estimate of the length of time and how much more cost there is
going to be to the American people with this engagement in
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Wells. The President's strategy specifically
does not attach a calendar to this commitment----
Mr. Brooks. I understand the President----
Ambassador Wells [continuing]. Because it will be
conditions-based. And so I am not able to answer you on how
long this will take.
Mr. Brooks. So it could be decades?
Ambassador Wells. We would like to get to the negotiating
table as soon as possible.
Mr. Brooks. It could be decades, and thousands more of
American lives lost, tens of thousands more of American lives
coming home disabled, and trillions of dollars spent that we
don't have, can't afford to get other than by borrowing, and we
can't afford to pay back. Is that your testimony?
Ambassador Wells. We would like to get to the negotiating
table as soon as possible.
Mrs. Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
Mrs. Wagner. Seeing no more members present in committee, I
would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony here
today, and I would declare the Joint Middle East and Asia
Subcommittee hearing on the President's Plan for Afghanistan
and Pakistan adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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