[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA: COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNER OR FANNING THE FLAMES?
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JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 7, 2017
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Serial No. 115-75
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Vacant
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
Wisconsin DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D., political scientist, RAND Corporation.... 8
Svante Cornell, Ph.D., senior fellow for Eurasia, director of the
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, American Foreign Policy
Council........................................................ 20
Mr. Simon Saradzhyan, director of the Russia Matters Project,
assistant director of U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear
Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School......................................... 34
Michael Carpenter, Ph.D., nonresident senior fellow, Dinu
Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council, senior director of
the Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement,
University of Pennsylvania..................................... 47
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 11
Svante Cornell, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 23
Mr. Simon Saradzhyan: Prepared statement......................... 36
Michael Carpenter, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 49
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 86
Hearing minutes.................................................. 87
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe,
Eurasia, and Emerging Threats: Prepared statement.............. 88
RUSSIA: COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNER OR FANNING THE FLAMES?
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
and
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittees will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to
the length limitation in the rules. I will now recognize myself
for 5 minutes in my opening statement.
The purpose of this hearing is to unmask Putin's two-faced
game in the fight against terrorism. In 2015, Russia began a
military intervention in Syria claiming it was waging war on
ISIS and international terrorism.
To some, this was welcome news. It seemed that there may be
a rare moment of cooperation between former Cold War foes.
Moscow and Washington would be able to work together to combat
terrorism.
This was fantasy. Moscow's actions in Syria has shown it is
more interested in saving the brutal Assad regime than fighting
ISIS.
To accomplish this goal, the Kremlin partnered with Iran
and its terrorist proxies to suppress Syrians calling for
democracy. While Moscow certainly has killed some known
terrorists and helped reduce territory controlled by ISIS, it
has also strengthened other terrorists. Its reckless methods
and support for Assad the butcher destroyed any chance of
Russia being an effective counterterrorism partner with us.
Russia's indiscriminate bombing has targeted hospitals,
schools, convoys, and rescue crews, like the heroic White
Helmets. Its campaign of terror drove once moderate Syrians to
embrace extremist groups that also fight Assad and his backers.
Despite our success in retaking key ISIS strongholds,
Russian officials claim the U.S. supports ISIS and consistently
threatens our forces in Syria.
Meanwhile, new Russian-made military equipment is
increasingly showing up in the hands of Iranian-backed
terrorist groups like the notorious Hezbollah.
Even more dangerous, Russia is effectively carving an
Iranian-controlled corridor that stretches from Tehran to the
borders of Israel, threatening our valued ally Israel.
Putin is laying the foundation for chronic instability in
this vital part of the world. Moscow cannot be our partner so
long as it continues to enable the terrorist state Iran, prop
up Assad, arm Israel's foes, and contribute to the slaughter
and misery of millions of Syrians.
Syria is not the only place where the Kremlin is backing
terrorism. Senior U.S. military officials have claimed that
Russia is now arming its former enemies, the Afghan Taliban,
providing them with machine guns and other medium-weight
weapons.
We also know that Putin has backed violent separatists in
Ukraine and Georgia in his bloody quest to bully and conquer
his neighbors. He arms thugs, inflaming ethnic tensions, and
secretly sends his own soldiers, the little green men, across
the border. Putin is destabilizing countries that aspire to
have closer ties with the West.
We should not be fooled. These separatists are not noble
freedom fighters. Pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine have been
accused by the U.N. of murder, kidnapping, and torture.
In the last 16 months, these separatists have used car
bombs to target Ukrainian security guards, journalists, and
Kremlin critics, and they continue to ignore cease-fire
agreements. They are terrorists of a different stripe, but like
jihadists, they believe they can achieve their political goals
through violence and political terrorism.
This should be no surprise since their patron, the Kremlin,
uses terror to maintain its own grip on power. Putin routinely
orders the assassination of political opponents and journalists
exposing his corruption. According to U.S. intelligence
officials, at least 14 mysterious deaths are suspected to be
linked to the Kremlin that occurred in the U.K. alone.
Russian terrorism has even struck this city, the Nation's
capital, Washington, DC. In 2015, Putin's former media czar
came here to meet with our Justice Department and to discuss
issues that were common to the United States and to what this
individual had to say and share the inner workings of the
Kremlin's propaganda machine.
Mysteriously, he never made it to the meeting. Instead, he
was found dead from blunt force injuries. Investigators ruled
it an accident, but members of the FBI have claimed otherwise.
This is unacceptable. The pattern of prominent Russians and
Kremlin critics who end up dead under shady circumstances is
impossible to ignore. The fact that Putin's terror has reached
our shores should be taken seriously by Americans.
Russia does have a serious Islamic problem, there should be
no mistake about it. Since 1970, more than 3,500 Russians are
believed to have been killed in over 800 terrorist attacks.
Islamic radicals from Chechnya have conducted attacks across
Russia, including the 2004 Beslan school massacre that murdered
300 people. ISIS has also struck at Russia, blowing up a
Russian charter plane over the Sinai in 2015.
According to a recent report, Russia is the largest source,
however, of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.
With this shared threat, the United States and Putin should
be able to be natural allies against terrorism--but Putin's
brutal conduct and persistent ambition to rival the U.S. has
made Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. Putin arms terrorists
like the Taliban, Hezbollah, and thugs around the world so long
as they advance his personal goals to undermine democracy and
challenge America.
It is time we see Putin for what he is. He is an
international terrorist.
And I will yield to the ranking member on the subcommittee,
from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing today on Russia and the question of whether Russia can
be a reliable counterterrorism partner to the United States.
It is important because what we are talking about are human
lives at stake. These are our servicemen and -women overseas
risking their lives to fight terrorism. These are our neighbors
and loved ones. We just had an attack in New York City 1 week
ago where eight innocent lives were taken.
They are our children studying abroad, our friends, family
members finally taking that trip to Europe where our allies
have suffered far too many horrific terrorist attacks. They are
the brave law enforcement and first responders who run toward
the attack when everyone else is running away from it.
Today we are here to talk about who we trust to protect the
people we care about most. If we choose to partner with another
country to fight terrorism we need to know we are fighting with
the same people in mind and the same goals. I think we have all
seen and were touched by the illustration after the attacks in
Brussels last year that showed a tearful French flag comforting
a tearful Belgian flag.
A strong terrorism partner knows what is at stake and
fights alongside you so that both countries can be safer. We
have strong allies fighting terrorism. We have partners who we
can trust with our intelligence and who, when we put our own
men and women in harm's way to make us safer, do not actively
undermine their safety and counteract their hard-fought efforts
to reduce the threat of terrorism.
So the question at hand today is, can Russia be one of
those partners? Sure, there are instances where Russian self-
interest happens to intersect with ours, and absolutely we
should continue working toward better deconfliction when our
militaries are both operating in the same space.
But that is not what makes a true ally. When you head into
a foxhole together, it is pretty important you make sure you
know the guy or gal who is in there with you.
Well, Russia, Russia attacked the United States. Russia set
out in a coordinated plan to undermine and influence our
democracy, the very heart of what it means to be an American.
The Russian Government, the very government this administration
is arguing should be our partner on counterterrorism, did this
through spreading lies, through actual attacks on our voting
systems in 21 states. And as egregious as that is, it is not
over yet.
Allies do not attack each other. What we are uncovering as
we learn more about the Russian efforts to infiltrate American
social media is that their efforts are robust and they are
calculated. This is not some random account here or there. This
is a profound effort by a foreign country to attack the very
underpinnings of our democracy and our right to live freely in
it.
These are attacks on our country, let's call it what it is,
because when we look our servicemen and -women in the eyes, we
should be completely honest about who we are trusting as
partners to keep them and us safe.
Pretty soon we will have been at war in the fight against
terrorism for two decades. Within its first year in office this
administration has signed the orders to send more troops to
Afghanistan.
Well, we have a crystal clear illustration of what it means
to have Russia as a counterterrorism partner by looking at
Afghanistan. As we send more of our own, our children, our
spouses, our friends, off to fight for greater security and
stability, Russia is quite literally counteracting our efforts
through their support of the Taliban, and through the Taliban,
al-Qaeda.
This is not some tricky geopolitical, international
relations game theory puzzle. This is a question of who is
going to have our back when our women and men are in the field;
who is going to work to minimize the resources we expend in
this fight because we are fighting for the same goal of
eliminating terrorism together.
But Russia has time and time again been willing to risk the
safety of our men and women in uniform, and through their
apparently never-ending attacks on our democracy would rather
undermine our stability and security and weaken us than work
together with us to make a stronger counterterrorism partner.
So we must ask, why are we convening this congressional
hearing today? Well, we are asking this question because the
President of the United States keeps giving the wrong answer,
and we should be very concerned about his answer.
We should be concerned that new discoveries in the Trump-
Russian investigations, like the Russian attacks on our
democracy, keep coming to light. I believe the most recent
numbers I have seen now: There are nine individuals with
proximity to the now President who had contacts with Russia
during the campaign and transition. There are indictments now
in the special counsel's investigation into the campaign. And
we seem to never stop learning about more concerning ties
between Russia and this administration, including those still
serving.
We owe it to every victim of terrorism and to every
individual we are working to ensure never becomes a victim of
terrorism, we owe it to our servicemen and -women and every
American that we represent here in Congress to be very careful
when we choose who we are going to trust as a partner in
fighting terrorism.
Russia has failed time and time again to demonstrate it
shares our goal of a safe and secure America. Frankly, it just
doesn't add up how this administration can still be suggesting
that Russia can be our partner in this fight when Russia is so
intent on fighting us.
I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us on this
important topic.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
I will yield to Mr. Rohrabacher from California, who is the
chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
Subcommittee, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, thank you, Chairman Poe, and thank
you for initiating this hearing today. I am happy to be part of
what I think will be an important discussion, even though I
obviously disagree with everything that has just been said.
In my subcommittee, I held a hearing on a similar topic
just over 2 years ago. Since then, we have a new President in
the White House who is, as we have just heard, genuinely
interested to see if relations with Russia can be improved, as
compared to the last 10 years of unrelenting hostility from the
United States toward Russia.
I believe that the fact that our President wants to seek
out and try to see if there are areas we can actually cooperate
in--I think that is a good thing. I think it is a positive
development for both of our countries.
It is significant that today is the 100th anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution, a date which reminds us of the dark
and bloody Soviet history. And I am proud that I played a
significant part in the destruction of the Bolshevik regime
that controlled the Soviet Union up until Ronald Reagan ended
the Cold War as it should have been ended, peacefully, and
reaching out to those people--and standing up, I might add, as
well.
In Afghanistan, which has been mentioned, I seem to
remember who armed the Taliban. I seem to remember who armed
and organized the Taliban, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Yet I
have never heard so much volatileness that maybe the Russians--
I don't know what the Russians are doing in Afghanistan. I am
going to be very interested in hearing our witnesses on that.
So, although there are those who would treat Russia today
as if it were still the Soviet Union, that period of time is
now behind us, thank God. Although the flaws of the current
Russian Government are evident, as we have heard some described
in these last few moments, it behooves us to recognize that
there has been a major change in what Russia was when it was
the Soviet Union, a head of a Communist government that was
seeking to create atheist dictatorships throughout the world.
When Russia was the Soviet Union it was thus our primary enemy.
One thing Ronald Reagan did is he prioritized: That is our
primary enemy. What is the goal? Our goal is we win and they
lose--they come down.
Now that enemy today is no longer the Soviet Union and now
it is Russia who is there, but it is not our primary enemy.
Radical Islamic terrorism--we just heard that 3,500 Russians
were killed by terrorist activity in the last decade, okay,
that is a lot of people--so Islamic terrorism threatens both
the United States and Russia. And we might add that we have
heard the figure, the largest group of members in Syria of the
ISIL and those groups that are fighting there come from
Chechnya, Russia.
No wonder there is something that tells the Russians they
need to pay attention to this. But we should be working with
them to try to create a more peaceful situation and defeat the
radical Islamic terrorists that threaten both of us and are the
basic problem in the Middle East.
So I think there are great opportunities for cooperation,
and they should not be passed up because of basically what I
have seen as hostility, hostility, hostility toward any idea of
cooperating with the Russians for the last 10 years.
The fight against violent radical Islam is the major threat
of our time. As we saw last week in the streets of Manhattan,
the threat of radical Islam is pervasive. Radicalized Muslims
have slaughtered innocents not just in the Middle East, but in
Europe. And yes, as we have just heard, 3,500 in Russia--not
counting the airplanes that were shot down over the Sinai
Desert filled with Russian tourists.
These terrorists have declared war on modern and Western
civilization. The future of America and Russia and, yes,
Western civilization depends on the defeat of this enemy.
We have been in this spot before. We took on that threat to
Western civilization. It was called Nazism, the Nazis. How did
we defeat the Nazis? Yeah, we actually reached out to Joseph
Stalin. Yeah, we defeated Nazism, and then we defeated
Communism. And we will defeat radical Islam, but we have got to
prioritize our effort and quit this, as I say, unrelenting
hostility toward Russia and anybody who is their ally.
In the aftermath of the Boston bombing in May 2013--and I
will say that you went with me to that hearing, that meeting
that we had in Moscow--we met with the Russian Government and
with Russian intelligence officials to discuss the threat of
terrorism. They actually gave us the documents that they sent.
And they also gave us other documents that had they sent--had
it been a more of a--I can't do an opening statement? Okay.
Anyway----
Mr. Poe. You can do an opening statement.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But not longer. Okay. I will finish up.
Let me just say, we were given an example of cooperation.
Had we been cooperating at a heavy level at that time that we
could have been doing we would have probably been able to stop
that slaughter at the Boston Marathon. They had further
information that would have alerted us to that.
That is the type of thing we can do. That is the type of
thing that we should be reaching out and trying to cooperate
with, rather than simply trying to state what we believe is an
analysis of the Russian wrongdoing, which some of this is very
debatable.
So with that said, thank you, Mr. Poe. Sorry I took so
long.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
The Chair yields to the ranking member, Mr. Meeks from New
York. You have 5 minutes for your opening statement.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for holding this
hearing to provide us with an opportunity to discuss
counterterror cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. And I am
almost tempted to go off of what I wanted to say in listening
to my good friend, the chairman of our subcommittee.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We are buddies. Don't worry about it.
Mr. Meeks. I am going to try to stay disciplined because I
think that the facts as we look at them today and as we found
from every--just about all of our intelligence sources that
there are some other things that is going on in Russia.
When you think about it, it is great that we are having a
hearing now, particularly with the expert panel that we have,
including people who have worked on U.S. policy to cooperate
with Russia in an area of similarly mutual benefit, you would
think, on common sense, maybe it makes sense. The timing is
also perfect for us to debate the merits of potential
cooperation in Syria, as well.
So on the surface, yes, you can say you can see Russia as a
potential partner in many areas--cultural issues, trade, for
example--not only on counterterror efforts. And I am a firm
believer, as many know, in multilateral efforts to solve the
world's problems.
However, it would be naive to promote a policy of
cooperation in counterterror efforts without a sober
understanding of today's Russia and the history of attempts to
cooperate and establish clear goals that incorporate and
leverage our allies across the globe.
Russia faces a problem of internal extremism related to its
history first of brutality suppressing the Chechnyans, Russian
citizens, in the 1990s. Journalists who bravely investigated
this were killed and the situation remains a cauldron for
Moscow.
This is where today's Russian leadership honed its
counterterror strategy that it uses abroad today. The strategy
can be seen on display in its scorched earth policies in Syria
and the funneling of fighters from Chechnya to other areas of
conflict in the region, including the Ukraine.
Given the Kremlin's cooperation with the Iranians in Syria
and its support for a larger Shia crescent, where can we find
common interests? I don't know. If anything, in Syria we should
call it deconfliction and not cooperation.
Indeed, while the Obama administration moved forward with
its reset policy, counterterror cooperation was on the table.
Instead, there was a demonstrable lack of interest in deep
cooperation from the Russian side. And I believe that some who
will testify today, we will hear that from them, they will talk
about that.
We learned from the experience, however, about the motives
of this cooperation. Any proposed cooperation would give the
Kremlin cover for its indiscriminate bombing in Syria, and
thereby stroke anti-American feelings in the region. It would
put us then on the side of the Shias in Iran. Finally, it would
give Russia generous inroads for its intelligence services--not
as counterterror experts.
So does this mean we stop talking to Moscow or looking for
areas to cooperate? No, I don't think so. But let us recognize
the unfortunate limitations of today's Kremlin. Let us put
Putin's dreams of grand bargains to the side. Let us strive to
promote peace by supporting our allies in the Middle East and
Europe; let us not fall for the games.
I agree. At one time I thought that, as Mr. Rohrabacher
talked about, you are no longer the Soviet Union, we can do
certain things. Well, clearly, that was not the opinion of Mr.
Putin. And he has shown over and over by what has happened in
the United States and what has been happening in Europe, and
you talk to our European allies, that the areas of cooperation
are very limited because what he wants to do is make you think
one thing while they do something else.
So, I look forward to honestly assessing the potential
areas for cooperation with the Kremlin, and I look forward to a
robust conversation with our esteemed panel to get a back and
forth on this very important issue. And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from New York.
Without objection, all witnesses' statements will be made
part of the record. I ask that each witness limit their
presentation to no more than 5 minutes. All members of both
subcommittees have copies of your written testimony and had so
before this hearing this afternoon.
I will introduce each witness and give them time for their
statements.
Dr. Colin Clarke is a political scientist at the RAND
Corporation where he focuses on terrorism, insurgency, and
criminal networks. In addition, he is an associate fellow at
the International Center for Counterterrorism and lecturer at
the Carnegie Mellon University.
Dr. Svante Cornell is the director of the Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council. He
is also the cofounder of the Institute for Security and
Development Policy in Stockholm.
Mr. Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of the Russia
Matters Project at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs. He previously worked as a
consultant and journalist in Russia for 15 years.
Dr. Michael Carpenter is the senior director of the Penn
Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and a
nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Carpenter
previously served in the Pentagon as a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense with responsibility for Russia, Ukraine,
Eurasia, Balkans, and conventional arms control.
Dr. Clarke, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF COLIN P. CLARKE, PH.D., POLITICAL SCIENTIST, RAND
CORPORATION
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member
Keating, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Meeks, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee for inviting me to
testify today.
Throughout my testimony I will highlight the following
areas. First, Russia's recent history with jihadist terrorism.
Second, Russian counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics
and strategy in the Caucasus. Third, the potential backlash
from Russia's foray into Syria and its military campaign there.
Fourth, what the future might hold for Russia now that ISIS'
caliphate has collapsed. I will conclude with implications that
Russia's struggle with jihadist terrorism has for the United
States.
On recent history, Russia's modern trouble with Islamic
militancy dates back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979. Throughout the former Soviet Union, as well as in areas
like Chechnya and others along Russia's southern flank, civil
war and conflicts raged, many of which were fueled by militant
groups inspired by religion and active throughout the Caucasus
in Central Asia.
Even beyond the battlefields of the Caucasus, Islamic
militants have launched many high profile attacks on Russian
soil, including one specifically targeting transportation
infrastructure.
Militants have also conducted spectacular attacks,
meticulously planned operations specifically designed to kill
civilians and spread terror throughout the population, such as
the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school
siege in 2004.
On Russian COIN and counterterrorism. During the first
Chechnyan war--from 1994 to 1996--the Russian military followed
a scorched earth policy of destroying everything in sight.
Chechnya's capital, Grozny, was completely besieged by Russian
artillery and indiscriminate bombing. Russian counterinsurgency
strategy in the Caucasus has frequently employed zachistkas, or
mop-up operations, designed to kill or capture terrorists and
their supporters although noncombatants are often caught up in
these sweeps. Other tactics have included forced
disappearances, collective punishment, and the targeting of
suspected insurgents' families, friends, and neighbors.
This heavy-handed approach is myopic. It trades longer-term
stability for short-term security as the domestic population in
large swaths of the Caucasus has been traumatized by
extrajudicial killings, torture, and widespread assassinations.
In line with Russia's seeming refusal to even attempt to
win hearts and minds, the insurgents' social, political, and
economic grievances have largely been ignored; practically
ensuring that future generations of militants will pick up the
mantle of jihad.
Russia's focus has been largely kinetic, as the military
has relied on its capitation strategy to eliminate successive
high-ranking insurgent military commanders over the years.
On backlash from Syria--Russia has been one of the primary
forces propping up the Assad regime, which has ruthlessly
targeted its opponents, most of whom are Sunnis, with barrel
bombs and chemical weapons.
Russia and Iran are also deepening their political and
military alliance as their respective militaries work together
to help Assad reclaim pockets of territory from opposition
forces. Russian special forces and warplanes serve as a force
multiplier for Hezbollah fighters who have bloodied Sunni
militants in battle. Moscow's desire to expand Russian
influence in the Middle East has pitted it squarely against
Sunnis and their interests.
For Russia, the demographics are also daunting. There are
thousands of Russian citizens fighting with ISIS and another
5,000 to 7,000 Russian-speaking jihadists, making Russia the
second-most popular language spoken within ISIS. This means
that Sunni jihadist groups have a ready-made native force
capable of returning back home to Russia where militants can
more easily blend in with local populations.
With respect to what the future holds, Russia's deepening
involvement in Syria means that Moscow has essentially chosen
sides in a sectarian conflict abroad, a strategy that could
lead to tragedy at home. A new report by the Soufan Group
estimates that Russia is indeed the largest exporter of foreign
fighters to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, with more than
3,200 fighters.
One factor that could play a significant role in the scale
and scope of the threat facing Russia in the future is the
struggle for supremacy between jihadist groups in the Caucasus.
A competition for recruits and resources is intensifying
between the two dominant jihadist entities, fostering
decentralization of the insurgency.
In its quest to become more assertive geopolitically by
assuming a more aggressive role abroad, Russia has made itself
more vulnerable to terrorism at home. Still, Putin could see
the threat of Sunni militancy at home as the inevitable
tradeoff for restoring Russian hegemony in its former sphere of
influence and bringing the country back to what he views as its
rightful place as a true global power.
Any Russian attempts to compare the Russian campaign
against jihadists with America's war on terrorism would be
inaccurate. Russia has never been an equal partner in the fight
against Islamic extremism. Moreover, Russia has too often
exacerbated the global problem through brutal reprisals and an
iron fist response to Islamic communities within its own
borders.
Accordingly, the United States should not view Russia as a
viable counterterrorism partner at present. Any efforts to
cooperate in this area should be judicious, measured, and
treated with the requisite degree of skepticism it deserves.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clarke follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Clarke.
Dr. Cornell.
STATEMENT OF SVANTE CORNELL, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR EURASIA,
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTITUTE, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL
Mr. Cornell. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, Ranking
Member Keating, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, for
the opportunity to testify today.
I would like to start by pointing out that I think there
has been a bipartisan U.S. policy over the past decade or more
to seek Russian cooperation on major international issues.
Obviously, this was the case with the Bush administration
after 9/11 on Afghanistan, Iran, and on resolving unresolved
conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian region.
The Obama administration's reset policy was obviously
predicated on the assumption that Russia could be a partner on
all of these issues and on Syria later on.
And the Trump administration has been to some extent
influenced by thinking that Russia shares interests with the
United States in fighting radical Islamic terrorism.
As several of the opening statements made clear, and I
agree with that, Russian behavior suggests otherwise. I would
argue that it suggests that Russia's main aim is to undermine
U.S. leadership in the world, and when insurgents and
terrorists contribute to this goal in one way or another,
Russia has no problem with coordinating with them, support
them, and of course, manipulate them.
Chairman Poe mentioned the conflict in Ukraine, and I think
going further it is clear that a central instrument in Russian
policy in the whole post-Soviet space has been the manipulation
and sometimes creation of so-called frozen conflicts. We have
seen this in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and lately Ukraine.
The first three cases, this was dating back to the early 1990s.
In Ukraine these conflicts were basically manufactured out
of thin air. There were no preexisting conflicts that Russia
interfered in--they created them to undermine the statehood of
Ukraine.
Now, what do all the countries that are suffering from this
problem have in common? They all are trying to escape from the
Russian sphere of influence and looking to the United States
for leadership in the world. The countries that have accepted
the Russian sphere of influence, such as Belarus, such as
Armenia, don't have a problem on their own territory with
unresolved conflicts.
More vexing than this issue in Russia's neighborhood is
Russia's attitude to Islamic terrorism. I would point out that
Russia's support for insurgency extends directly to anti-
American actors, including Islamic extremism.
Chairman Poe mentioned that in Afghanistan since 2015, we
have reports of Russian support for the Taliban. Back then, a
Russian official said that Russian interests objectively
coincide with those of the Taliban. This Russian official
claimed that the major purpose of that was opposing ISIS.
However, a senior Taliban official who was interviewed at
the time said that Russia and the Taliban had been in contact
since 2007, long before ISIS even existed, and that the main
cause for that was the existence of the main enemy, the United
States--and that Russia--also like the Taliban, wanted the
United States out of Afghanistan.
Now, this obviously flies in the face of the notion that
Russia has been a supporter in the U.S. efforts, war efforts in
Afghanistan, because just while President Obama was lauding
Russia for supporting a transportation network through Russia
and Central Asia known as the Northern Distribution Network,
Russia was already ramping up its support for the Taliban. As
we know now, and as multiple U.S. high military officials have
testified, this now includes arms deliveries and other types of
support.
Ranking Member Meeks and the previous speaker mentioned
Chechnya, and indeed the insurgency against Russian rule there
in the 1990s was mainly a nationalist and a secular insurgency.
The Chechnyan nationalists were viewed as quite a legitimate
actor by many in the West, including on Capitol Hill, but
gradually--after the 1994 to 1996 war--there was a radical
Islamic component that emerged within Chechnya and within the
North Caucasus.
Now, you would think that Russia would target this
component rather than the nationalists and secularists with
whom you would actually be able to negotiate, but in fact the
opposite was true. As I detail in my written testimony, Russia
actively worked to destroy particularly the nationalist and
secular forces in the insurgency, and, in fact, bolstered
directly and mainly indirectly, the Islamic extremist groups,
some of which Russia had infiltrated and succeeded in
manipulating. These are, by the way, some of the forces that
are now in Syria.
And the purpose--and this becomes very relevant in the
Syrian context--was basically to force everybody, ordinary
Chechnyans, outsiders, including the United States, to confront
a binary choice. Either you support Russia's own loyal
Chechnyan administration or you are left with the radical
Islamic terrorists and there is nothing in between.
Now, going to Syria, I mentioned Chechnya in particular
because this is exactly the blueprint that Russia has presented
to the world by its support for the Assad regime. By focusing
its energies on destroying the moderate U.S.-supported parts of
the insurgency that targeted Assad they leave ordinary Syrians
and the rest of the world with, again, the same binary choice,
either oppose Assad or you are left with ISIS.
Now, as I close, I would just like to reflect on why Russia
is following this policy.
Now, Russia is ruled by a regime that is dominated not by
the national interests, but by the regime interests of Mr.
Putin and his allies, and the key regime interest is to create
an international environment that is conducive to maintaining
that system of government in Russia.
For this purpose, Western democracies, especially the
United States, are a threat--not a military threat--but a
threat to the survival of the Russian regime because of the
attraction of the democratic system of government. And,
therefore, there is an underlying aim of all of Russian policy
to undermine U.S. leadership in the world and to undermine the
legitimacy of the U.S. democracy.
That is why Russian media depicts the West as morally
decadent and chaotic. That is why Russia interferes in U.S.
elections. And that is not about supporting one candidate or
another, it is about generating chaos and crippling the
political system of this country.
And by definition, by the way, this means that if Russia
supports one candidate prior to an election, the moment that
that candidate wins, that is a candidate that Russia will now
be undermining. And that is, by the way, why Russian trolls
that had worked against Hillary Clinton's campaign shifted tack
as soon as President Trump won the election and immediately
began questioning the legitimacy of President Trump's election.
So to end, I would say that Russia actually holds a fairly
weak hand in international affairs. They have a very vulnerable
economy and a very vulnerable political system. They are
playing, if you will, a very bad hand very well.
We, on the other hand, have a much stronger hand in
international affairs, but we are not playing it as well as the
Russians do--and I think it is time for the U.S.--if you will,
to call the bluff that is Russia's foreign policy. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cornell follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Cornell.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Saradzhyan for his 5-minute
opening statement. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON SARADZHYAN, DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIA
MATTERS PROJECT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF U.S.-RUSSIA INITIATIVE
TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
Mr. Saradzhyan. Thank you, distinguished members of the
committee, for inviting me to give my testimony, which reflects
my personal views only, rather than the views of the
organizations I work for.
I have been asked to answer five questions. The first one
is, can Russia be an effective counterterrorism partner for the
United States? In my view, yes, Russia can be an effective
counterterrorism partner for the United States in theory.
Why I think so--as some of you have mentioned, the U.S. and
Russia do share common interests in reducing the threat posed
by Islamist militant nonstate actors that seek to build
caliphates, or a global caliphate, in the Middle East and in
parts of the post-Soviet neighborhood.
The U.S. and Russia also share a vital national interest in
preventing any nonstate actors, including these Islamist
groups, from acquiring nuclear weapons. And we know that both
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have displayed practical
interest in getting those nuclear weapons.
At the same time, as we know, the events, the conflict in
Ukraine, the conflict in Syria, Russia's alleged meddling in
the U.S. elections, have imposed constraints on realizing the
potential for this cooperation. Therefore, I am skeptical that
in the short-to-medium future the two countries would act on
their joint common interests in countering such groups.
The second question I have been asked, what is actually
Russia's counterterrorism strategy? I would say Russia's
counterterrorism strategy employs both forceful and nonforceful
elements.
The forceful elements are best displayed in Russia's North
Caucasus, from which more than 80 percent of attacks against
targets in Russia have originated, according to the global
database on terrorism maintained by the University of Maryland.
At the same time, we have seen in the past few years that
the threat of militant Islamism has proliferated to some of the
other regions of Russia, including Volga region, the Urals, and
even Siberia.
So Russia's counterterrorism approach, the forceful
component, has been focused on removing the leadership of the
groups operating in these regions and also neutralizing members
of these groups. In the process of doing so, Russian law
enforcement officials have been accused of abuses, including
enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture.
In my view, and in the view of scholars who study Russia's
North Caucasus, these are some of the root causes that fuel
insurgency and terrorism in Russia.
At the same time, there is a nonforceful component, and
that has been displayed in the North Caucasus, too, where
Russian authorities have sought to reduce at least some of the
disengagement costs for the terrorists and rebels who have not
committed grave offenses. However, these efforts fall short of
addressing all the root causes behind an insurgency.
The same can be said about Russia's counterterrorism
strategy abroad, mainly in Syria, where it is mostly a military
operation, but where some special forces operate against
certain leaders of the insurgency. But here, the accent on
forceful methods has been much more emphasized, and, again,
NGOs have accused Russian aircraft of indiscriminate bombing
that again fuels grievances and can contribute to the rise of
insurgency.
The third question I have been asked to answer was, what is
Russia's military engagement in the Middle East? Again, it is
mostly focused on Syria. And here I would say Russia's vital
interest in Syria is not Assad, per se, but Syria has been
Russia's ally for many years. So preserving Syria as an ally is
an important interest.
At the same time, Russia also wants to make sure that Syria
does not become a haven for terrorist groups that can attack
Russia, given the fact that there are about 5,000 nationals of
Russia and about 4,000 nationals of Central Asia in the ranks
of terrorism and insurgency groups in Iraq and Syria, according
to Russia's own estimate. So neutralizing these individuals and
making sure they do not pose a threat to Russia is a vital
interest of Russia.
The fourth question I have been asked to answer is, what
are the current terrorist threats within Russia? As I have
said, these are posed by Islamist groups, but also there is a
smaller number of threats posed by individual avengers who use
terrorist methods, and also by ethnic Russian ultranationalists
who have used terrorist methods to attack foreigners, but also
some of Russia's own government officials, including judges.
We have seen the surge in the number of terrorist attacks
in Russia in 2010. Since then it has been declining.
And finally, the final question I have been asked to answer
is: How do Russian counterterrorism and military operations
impact the terror threat worldwide?
I would say the impact in the North Caucasus is of dual
nature. On one hand, the threat of terrorism is being reduced
because leaders have been taken out and members of an
insurgency have been arrested. But on the other hand, the
abuses I have described fuel some of the grievances and recruit
fertile ground for recruitment of new members into existing
insurgency networks. The same can be said about Russia's
operations abroad.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saradzhyan follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Dr. Carpenter, your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CARPENTER, PH.D., NONRESIDENT SENIOR
FELLOW, DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SENIOR
DIRECTOR OF THE BIDEN CENTER FOR DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL
ENGAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. Carpenter. Chairman Poe, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking
Member Keating, and members of the committee, thank you for
this opportunity to testify today.
President Putin and other Russian officials have long
proposed that Russia and the United States should work more
closely together on counterterrorism. President Trump has also
said that we should work with Russia on CT. And at first glance
it might seem natural that two nations that have suffered from
terrorist attacks should collaborate more closely on fighting
terrorism.
But this would be a grave mistake that damages our national
security interests and runs contrary to our values. The Kremlin
is, as has been said, a state sponsor of groups that use
terrorist tactics against civilians. It is attacking the
foundations of our democratic institutions and fueling
conflicts from Syria to Afghanistan that contribute directly to
radicalization and extremism.
In Ukraine, for example, the Kremlin directly contributed
the missiles, the hardware, the training that resulted in the
shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, killing all 298
people on board. The Ukrainian intelligence services have also
accused the Russian FSB of standing behind bombings of
civilians in 2014 and 2015, as well as more recent vehicle-
borne bomb attacks in the capital city of Kiev.
In Syria, the Kremlin's number one goal has been to prop up
the murderous Assad regime, together with its allies, Lebanese
Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Due to the
involvement of its forces on the ground and in the air, Russia
bears direct responsibility for the annihilation of the city of
Aleppo, where civilian areas were indiscriminately bombed
together with humanitarian relief convoys.
Let's not fool ourselves. Partnering with Russia in Syria
would be the equivalent of partnering with Hezbollah or Iran.
Indeed, Russia's military intervention in Syria has allowed its
ally, Iran, to gain significant influence across the region,
stretching from southern Iraq to southern Syria to Lebanon.
In Afghanistan, as has also been mentioned, Russia provides
weapons to the Taliban, where these arms are likely used
against U.S. CT forces and NATO-trained Afghan national forces.
The Kremlin has taken this decision consciously, both to
increase its influence in the region and to deliberately weaken
the NATO Resolute Support mission.
Inside Russia itself, Russia's security forces are
responsible for killings, torture, physical abuse, and
politically motivated abductions. The Kremlin's strategy is not
geared toward winning hearts and minds. Instead, its singular
focus is on the physical liquidation of insurgents. Security
forces in Russia, whether Federal or local, apply the principle
of collective retribution against suspected militants. Russian
CT operations also pay little regard for the possibility of
civilian casualties among noncombatants.
Finally, Russian authorities have used the pretext of
fighting extremism to crack down on Russia's democratic
political opposition and other dissidents.
In the United States, Russia has tried to fan the flames of
anti-Muslim xenophobia. Fake Russian accounts on Facebook and
Twitter spread false allegations of crimes committed by Muslim
migrants and try to stoke discord and hate in the very
districts where your constituents live.
This has been happening for years. In 2015, the Russian-
linked hacking group reportedly posed as an Islamic State front
to mount a cyber attack on a French television network.
We should also remember that we have tried to partner with
Russia on CT issues in the recent past. The results of these
efforts indicate Russia is more interested in collecting
intelligence on us than sharing information on terrorist
threats.
Under a different Kremlin leadership it might make sense to
work with Russia on CT operations or countering violent
extremism. But today, the Putin regime's geopolitical ambitions
and CT strategy are directly antithetical to U.S. national
security, contribute directly to the radicalization of
extremist groups, and are contrary to our basic values.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Carpenter. And we understand that
you have to leave at some time after 3 o'clock. Go ahead and
excuse yourself. No one will arrest you on your way out the
door.
Mr. Carpenter. Chairman, I have to leave at 3:25.
Mr. Poe. Alright, 3:25. We will watch the clock.
I will recognize myself for some questions, and then we
will have the other members.
As you can see, there is a wide range of views among our
two subcommittees on this issue. I want to talk specifically
about the question at hand, Russia's involvement in terrorist
activities. I would like to compare, if possible, Iran, which
is labeled a state sponsor of terror--the number one state
sponsor of terrorism in the world is Iran--with some of the
actions of the Russians.
Dr. Carpenter, you mentioned the Malaysian plane that was
shot down. Did the Russians shoot that down?
Mr. Carpenter. Chairman, the Russians provided the system,
the hardware, the missiles to infiltrate that system from
Russia into Ukraine. We do not know who the triggerman was, but
in all likelihood that person was trained in Russia by Russian
special forces.
Mr. Poe. Alright.
Does Russia, Dr. Cornell, supply arms and assistance to
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization?
Mr. Cornell. Sir, I don't have any more information on that
than what I read in the papers. I read that that is the case. I
don't have anything additional--I would call Russia the number
one state manipulator of terrorism, if that is helpful.
Mr. Poe. That is a new term that we may have to deal with.
Do any of the other three of you wish to comment on whether
Russia does or does not supply any materials to Hezbollah, a
terrorist group?
Dr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. So, Chairman, I can't speak directly to
whether they contribute weapons or material. However, it is
clear that Russian special forces on the ground in Syria
coordinate their actions with their allies, their principal
allies being Assad regime forces, Hezbollah forces, and the
Quds Force from Iran.
Mr. Poe. So they work with them. They may not supply
material support, but they work on the same side, so to speak,
in supporting the Assad regime.
Mr. Carpenter. Sir, they coordinate both tactical and
strategic missions.
Mr. Poe. Is the elimination of journalists, political
opponents--I alluded to 14 of them in my opening statement that
were suddenly disappeared by so-called accidents in the United
Kingdom--was that inspired or supported or done by the Russian
Government? Do any of you want to comment on that?
Dr. Carpenter again.
Mr. Carpenter. So, Chairman, we know that the U.K.
Government has fingered two Russians, Andrei Lugovoi and his
partner, in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko with polonium,
and they have provided a great deal of information about how
that was done specifically. And I think I will leave it at
that.
Mr. Poe. Would any of you consider cyber attacks by one
nation, specifically Russia, into the United States, would you
consider that terrorism, an act of war, or something else?
Dr. Cornell.
Mr. Cornell. Mr. Chairman, I think, depending on what that
cyber attack does, it could be any of the above.
I think the important part to understand about Russia is
that the advantage they have, in spite of the weakness in terms
of economic power and the vulnerability of their political
system, is that they have a highly hierarchical power vertical,
as Mr. Putin likes to call it, that has a whole different set
of instruments, a toolbox, that they can choose from. They can
use direct military attacks on their neighbors, as in the cases
of Ukraine and Georgia. They can choose to use cyber attacks,
subversion, support or manipulation of insurgency.
All of these are available to Mr. Putin through the press
of a button. We are not organized to respond to that type of
behavior from a state like Russia, and I think that is really
where the problem is.
Mr. Poe. Any of the rest of you want to comment on that?
Dr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke. Not specifically on cyber, but to get back to
one of your earlier points about the Russians and Lebanese
Hezbollah. I think if Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism,
Russia is a sponsor of a state sponsor of terrorism by
sponsoring the Iranian regime and working closely to deconflict
with Lebanese Hezbollah on the ground.
Mr. Poe. State sponsor of a sponsor of terrorism. Alright.
Okay.
Let me ask you one other question, the four of you, just
yes or no. Should the United States work with Russia in trying
to combat international terrorism?
Dr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke. No.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Cornell.
Mr. Cornell. Not under the current regime in Russia, sir.
Mr. Poe. Not under Putin.
Dr. Saradzhyan.
Mr. Saradzhyan. In my view, if there is a credible, serious
threat to the United States posed by terrorist groups, then the
answer should be yes.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. We should not cooperate with Russia. We
should communicate with them, but under no circumstances should
we cooperate.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Thank you.
The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since Dr. Carpenter is leaving, I am intrigued on one
thing. I traveled to Sochi prior to the beginning of the Winter
Olympics to learn more. It was a two-person codel. Frankly, we
had some difficulty getting in, but we made it in there. And
both Members of Congress were very surprised when we got there.
We were there to look at the cooperation that exists and
how we could learn from that with a major event. When we got
there it was clear that there was cooperation with almost every
other country working together and with our FBI and other
intelligence people that were there, but it was a total wall
with Russia, which I found odd because that is their sovereign
area and we have a vested interest, I think, in pooling those
resources.
So, Dr. Carpenter, you gave me maybe an answer as to at
least why that was the case. I thought it was just one of
sovereignty and pride, but you have a different theory in part.
So I am very intrigued. Could you expound on that?
Mr. Carpenter. So, Ranking Member Keating, I also traveled
to Sochi as part of an international set of security,
diplomatic, and intelligence officials to discuss preparations
for security arrangements in advance of the games. It was clear
then that the Russians were not willing to divulge a great deal
of information about the preparations that were underway, other
than that they were creating a massive perimeter around the
Olympic facilities, and they intended to----
Mr. Keating. The ring of steel, right?
Mr. Carpenter. The ring of steel, as it was called,
correct, sir.
But at the time our chief interlocutor on the Russian side
was the top FSB general responsible for counterintelligence,
not counterterrorism, Mr. Syromolotov, and it was clear from
the engagements that we had at the time that their primary
concern was counterintelligence and not sharing information on
terrorist threats.
Later, subsequently, when I was NSC director for Russia, we
engaged in bilateral conversations with the Russian Security
Council on Sochi, which I participated in, and I have to say
the tone of those conversations was very cordial. The mood was
okay. But we did not receive any significant information from
the Russians in the leadup to the games, despite having an
enormous interest in terms of being the largest sponsor with
the largest number of athletes and the largest number of
sportsmen contributing to the games.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
I think it was Dr. Cornell. If it wasn't, I will let anyone
jump in. But I was intrigued because you can look at it from
the other side and say, you know, why wouldn't it be in
Russia's interest to cooperate with us?
And I think it was Dr. Cornell who said in your opening
remarks that they are doing it because they have a unique
regime and they want to protect that regime. If it wasn't Dr.
Cornell, please anyone who wants to answer this.
But what did you mean by preservation of their unique
regime and why this is the way they conduct themselves in terms
of counterterrorism and other actions to preserve that
uniqueness?
Mr. Cornell. Ranking Member Keating, what I referred to was
specifically and primarily Russia's behavior toward its
neighbors. It was very much predicated on an answering to the
so-called color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kurdistan
from 2003 to 2005, which the Russian Government saw as a mortal
threat to its own form of government.
Because if those neighboring states would be able to
develop into successful democracies, especially if Ukraine,
which shares linguistic and cultural ties with Russia, if
Ukrainians would be able to live in a state that was not
authoritarian, not corrupt, not kleptocratic--why should the
Russian population itself tolerate continuing to live under
those circumstances.
And therefore what had previously been mainly a
geopolitical, board game type Realpolitik relationship with the
West became very ideological. For Russia after that,
undermining the very notion of democracy, popular support for
democracy, both among its neighbors, among the Russian public
itself, and even in the West, became an aim of the regime,
because by discrediting democracy, and especially democratic
uprisings and revolutions, and making the West appear to be
chaotic and decadent, that bolstered support domestically for
the Russian regime itself. That is mainly when I referred to.
But part of that is also undermining the leadership of the
United States in the world, including--and that is one of the
main reasons why Russia moved to Syria, not because--partly
because Syria is important to Russia, but also because they saw
a vacuum that enabled them----
Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt for 2 seconds, I just
have one more question. Because I think it is maybe more than
ideological. How much is Putin worth? How much would you
estimate, any of you?
Mr. Cornell. I have heard figures of $40 billion, but that
was a long time ago.
Mr. Keating. Anyone else want to venture a guess?
Mr. Carpenter. So, Ranking Member Keating, I can't hazard a
guess because Putin is the beneficial owner through a variety
of shell corporations and accounts. Other people hold money for
him. But it is in the billions of dollars, likely the tens of
billions of dollars.
Mr. Keating. I would just suggest that maybe it is a little
bit more than ideological.
And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
I am of the mind that I don't believe that Russian
intervention in Syria was by any means a counterterrorism
objective. I think it was certainly a counterinsurgency
objective against those that would have stood against Assad.
I think in doing that you could say that they stepped in
it. I think that would be a good way to put it. I think the
terrorist activities that have resulted in Russia are proof of
that. There have been calls for jihad, obviously by ISIS, by
al-Nusrah. There are estimates of 5,000 to 7,000 Russians that
are over there fighting on behalf of the Islamic State.
And that brings me to my first question. Do you think that
Russia is going to allow those thousands of fighters back into
Russia? What is your speculation or take on that piece of it?
By all means, sir.
Mr. Clarke. Absolutely not. I mean, I think that was part
and parcel of the strategy in the leadup to Syria, was to usher
these individuals out and to encourage them to go to Syria,
full well knowing that the Russian Air Force would then bomb
them from the skies and then put up a fairly robust border
security forest to prevent anyone from returning home, although
that does not prevent the radicalization of individuals who
were prevented from leaving, never left in the first place.
Mr. Mast. That kind of creates a very good segue for my
followup question. It has been said within Russian
counterterrorism efforts that the family is the thread that
needs to be pulled to unravel a terror group.
Could any of you unpack that a little bit in terms of
whether that has been a successful policy within the borders of
Russia for Vladimir Putin?
Mr. Carpenter. So I can start, I think Dr. Clarke has also
written and spoken about this.
But collective retribution is one of the policies that
especially local security forces use in Chechnya, Ingushetia,
Dagestan, and the other North Caucasus Federal Republics. It is
singularly ineffective.
Some analysts will tell you that it is brutal but effective
in the short run, but over the long run clearly it is myopic
and leads to radicalization of entire communities who feel that
the regime is bearing done upon them. But it is common for
family members of insurgents or would-be militants to be
kidnapped, to be tortured, to be interrogated, held, sometimes
even killed.
Mr. Mast. Any further? Please, by all means.
Mr. Saradzhyan. I would like to point out that according to
Russia's independent Meduza newsline outlet, whose journalists
have gone and interviewed people in the North Caucasus,
Ingushetia has set up, one of the republics in the North
Caucasus, has set up a commission to try to accommodate some of
the people who tried to return from Syria to Russia.
But I would be very surprised if a large number of
individuals would use that channel because they are still
liable according to the Russian law and they would be jailed if
tried and convicted for participation in illegal formations.
There has also been an effort to bring in wives and
children of the killed rebels, and that has been done in the
North Caucasus, and I think the numbers is in dozens.
But again, 5,000 people fighting and only dozens of cases
being successfully returned to Russia.
Thank you.
Mr. Clarke. Sir, I can speak to some of the empirical
evidence that I have come across in my own research on this
topic. I was one of the coauthors at RAND of a study on
counterinsurgency looking at every single insurgency since the
end of World War II to 2009. We roundly found that what we call
the ``crush them'' approach, a draconian, authoritarian
approach to counterinsurgency, was indeed counterproductive in
the long term.
Mr. Mast. Very good.
I have one more question and this is open to any one of
you. All of you said pretty much unanimously that we should not
cooperate with Russia. That is a very ambiguous statement when
we are talking about counterterrorism.
So please, if any of you could give me some examples of
normal counterterrorism cooperation that would exist between
nations that you believe we should not undertake. Give me some
concrete examples of what you wouldn't like to see happen in
terms of counterterrorism cooperation, that being the word that
you all used.
Mr. Carpenter. Perhaps I can start again and I will have to
leave after this.
But in terms of counterterrorism cooperation, I would not
want the U.S. Government to be sharing any information that
could compromise sources or methods. I would not want the U.S.
Government to share any information with the Russian Government
that could be used against dissidents inside Russia.
And certainly, I would not want the U.S. military to be
engaging in any sort of combat missions or operations or
sharing of information on targets in Syria or any other
military battlefield, because that would essentially make the
U.S. complicit in any civilian casualties that result from
Russia's bombing campaign, as well as it would tie us to the
toxic axis that Russia has formed with Hezbollah and Iran that
we have spoken about earlier.
Mr. Mast. My time has expired. If the chairman wishes to
give you all time to answer, by all means, but I thank you for
your responses.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know you have got to go, Dr. Carpenter, and I was going
to ask a very similar question as Mr. Mast, and I guess you
just answered it. Because I wanted to know specifically what
U.S. interests that cooperation would undermine. And I think
basically you just said that there are several intelligence
pieces that Mr. Putin. So just in case, is there anything that
you wanted to add to that before you leave?
Mr. Carpenter. Well, I think the only other thing I would
say is that we all have to remember that Russia right now is
engaged in an ongoing attack against our democratic
institutions.
Russia sees the United States as its chief geopolitical
adversary for some of the reasons that my friend Svante has
outlined, namely that it sees the United States and the West,
Western democracies, as the ones who are undermining its
kleptocratic and authoritarian regime. So, to protect its
wealth and power it is striking out against the United States
and other countries.
And for us to be engaged in a cooperative effort at the
very same time that Russia is attacking our institutions and
seeking to gain advantage over the United States and our
military just doesn't make sense to me.
Mr. Meeks. You have answered. I am going to ask this to all
of the panelists.
I think President Trump has recently suggested that
cooperation with Russia on counterterrorism efforts should lead
to sanctions relief on Ukraine. Now, I have my own opinion, but
let me just ask you for your opinion. Should that lead to
sanctions relief? Should a counterterrorism agreement with
Russia lead to sanctions relief with Ukraine?
Mr. Clarke. I am sure Moscow would love that and that would
be the intended purpose of any kind of proposed cooperation.
But I think as you said, Ranking Member Meeks, in your own
opening statement, Russian self-interest will occasionally
intersect with ours and it is nothing more beyond that.
Mr. Cornell. If I may add, Ranking Member Meeks, I think
this is exactly the mistake that the Obama administration did
after Russia invaded Georgia following years of using
insurgents to undermine the sovereignty of that country.
As you know, only months after that any sanctions that had
been imposed on Russia by the U.S. and Europe were tabled and
the reset policy was started which sent a signal to Russia
that: We can do whatever we want to, the West will back off,
and will cooperate with us again.
And I think that is exactly the signal that we would send
by doing, and by doing so, we would set ourselves up for even
larger troubles with Russia in the future.
The only way to get Russia to be a constructive partner is
to show them what is acceptable behavior and what it not. Once
they have understood that, I am all for cooperation.
Mr. Meeks. Dr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. I generally agree with that statement. As
someone who was working on Georgia policy at the time though, I
would simply add that the Obama administration took office in
late January and the Bush administration made absolutely no
effort to put sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Georgia,
nor impose any other lasting consequences, which was a mistake.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Let me go back. Dr. Cornell, real quick. I think, if I am
not mistaken, you were a witness at a hearing that we had on
Azerbaijan a few years ago. And you recently wrote about how
the United States inadvertently promotes extremism, right, in
the name of religious freedom, if I am not correct.
Mr. Cornell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meeks. Which goes to show how blanket policies can be
dangerous in the local politics.
What missed opportunities are there in Central Asia for
cooperation with Russia, in your opinion?
Mr. Cornell. Ranking Member Meeks, I think there are
enormous opportunities for cooperation in Central Asia with the
governments and states of Central Asia. They would like to
cooperate with us directly. They don't need any intermediaries.
With Russia, we know that one of the reasons why Russia in
2010 supported the ouster of the government of Kyrgyzstan was
because that government refused to eject the United States
military base that was existing in that country. That triggered
the move by Russia against that government, led to a coup
d'etat, which was followed by large-scale ethnic unrest in the
south of that country. So, subsequently, the U.S. military base
in Kurdistan was closed.
I think that tells you everything you need to know about
how Russia would view any form of cooperation with the United
States in Central Asia.
However, as I said, these are countries that are
attempting, in spite of many domestic flaws in terms of human
rights, freedoms, and so on, to build secular states in the
Muslim world. We have not acknowledged that. That was the
subject of the article that you referred to that I cowrote with
two colleagues. We have tended to hector them about not
respecting religious freedom without understanding that they
are trying to maintain secular societies, secular systems of
education and law. And that is something where we can cooperate
with them.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
I think I am out of time, so I will yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes Chairman Rohrabacher for his
questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There
is a lot of ground to cover and I am the only over here trying
to present an alternative right now.
But let me just note that after 9/11 I think that we could
say that there is no other country in the world that did more
to help cooperate and had a major influence on what we did to
defeat the Taliban and kick Saddam Hussein out. They made their
bases available to us, because we came in from the north,
instead of through Pakistan.
And the reason we didn't go through Pakistan, because
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the ones who invented the
Taliban, who we were at that point going to war with because
they had slaughtered 3,000 Americans, their Taliban. And also
the Saudis, who almost all of the hijackers were Saudis. Okay?
But Russia stepped up. That doesn't count, does it? No, we are
good friends with the Saudis and the Paks.
Let me just get in a couple of things. I am sorry the
gentleman had to leave. I don't know if he--it sounded like he
was or was not suggesting that the Russians were culpable in
the shooting down of that aircraft.
But let's just note that we support a lot of groups all
over the world. Do we have a double standard here? Is that what
it is all about, if the Russians can do something, but that
doesn't apply to the United States when we support people and
they do some bad things with the weapons that we give them?
I think that if I was a Russian listening to this, that is
what I would come to the conclusion of: Oh, the Americans have
this double standard.
I am going to ask one question, I am sorry again, very
quickly. Can any of you tell me why the Russians gave $150
million to the Clinton Foundation when Hillary Clinton was the
Secretary of State? Can anybody tell me on the witness stand?
Okay. Well, that shouldn't be out of the equation. When we
are trying to discuss what Russia does, we know that that
happened, even though there seems to be an effort to try to
cover that up and now don't pay attention to it.
Assad. Is Assad demonstrably different than any number of
five or six other dictatorships in the Middle East? Is he
capable more, if any of those people had uprisings in their
country, is he capable, is he doing more than what they would
do to destroy the uprising?
Mr. Clarke. Chairman Rohrabacher, I would note that Assad
has used chemical weapons twice against his own population, and
that seems to be more than anyone else has done in the region.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How many people were killed in that? So we
are talking about----
Mr. Clarke. How many----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, using chemical weapons is bad. Using
a rocket bomb that kills 10 times as many people is bad as
well. And the bottom line is, I have heard this chemical,
biological. Yes, I am against chemical biological weapons.
But what is important here is the number of people who are
being--civilians especially--who are being killed to intimidate
them. And the bottom line is Assad is a bad guy. So are a bunch
of regimes that we support there.
And let us also suggest this, that Assad has had a chance
to be a force for peace with Israel all of these decades, and
that should be taken into consideration when we judge Assad.
And also let us note about Russian support for Assad, the
Russians tried to convince us: Look, we can make a deal with
Qadhafi, it will settle things down, it is better than what
will happen if Qadhafi is overthrown.
The same thing with Saddam Hussein. Now they are trying to
tell us that is true with Assad. What are the chances? Think
about, what are the chances, Assad is overthrown, that you get
a radical Islamic government that hates us and is willing to
support terrorism? The chances are very high.
And when we discuss these things, those things should be in
our calculation as to what our policies should be and they
don't seem to be. What we seem to be talking about is
everybody's--the faults of anybody who is associated with
Russia. Let's note that we have some of those same faults and
we shouldn't have a double standard.
And I noticed the last time, Mr. Chairman, that we had this
whole bombing attack, I remember there was 84 civilians that
were killed in that hospital and nobody would justify that.
But I would have to suggest that since we invaded and tried
to get out of Saddam Hussein, and even right now in our efforts
to try to overcome the radicals and Assad's forces, many, many
thousands of people, civilians, have lost their lives to
American bombs. Not intentionally that we wanted to single them
out, but that that was the byproduct of that.
And I would just suggest that if we want to have peace in
this world, especially with radical Islam the way it is, we
better work and not have a double standard and try to work with
people, as we needed to when we defeated Hitler. And otherwise
Hitler would not have been destroyed, and Stalin was really was
an awful person.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New
Jersey.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After those 5 minutes I
have to collect my thoughts. They are kind of scrambled.
So, first of all, I would like to associate myself with the
comments of the chairman and the ranking member. I certainly
agree with you 100 percent.
I grew up in Cuba. I left in 1962. I think I know a little
bit about Communism. And I remember very clearly when they
started the indoctrination process, when they started trying to
inculcate into your mind that the things in the world that are
wrong were wrong because of the United States, that we were the
evil of the world, that we needed to destroy the United States
of America. Fortunately, I was taken out of that situation and
brought to this country.
And I don't know anywhere in this world where the Russians
have a footprint that is better off today than before. They
create nothing but chaos, they create nothing but destruction,
because that is how they thrive.
Because if you give those countries the ability to stop and
think what Russia stands for--what that government stands for--
and I am not saying the Russian people are bad, but that
government, people will never accept that.
So, unfortunately, you know, this is such a great country
that we have my colleague from California different from me,
and he will go home and he will have coffee and everything
else. He will have the Kool-Aid, too, regarding Russia.
But I just don't know anywhere in the world where they are
better off when the Russians are in. I remember we came close
to nuclear war when they tried to put nuclear weapons 90 miles
away from here.
We had a visit, we had a defector here the other day from
Korea, and he stated that the reason North Korea has developed
such rapid nuclear weapons is because the Russians have helped
them develop it.
Now, is that someone we can work with? I mean really, my
thoughts are still scrambled.
So I really don't have any questions, Chairman, because I
am kind of, you know, I am, like, flabbergasted that somebody
can think of Russia and think so much of it. If I were in
Russia, Dana, I would hire you. I would hire you as a lobbyist
here in this country.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You mean like they did with Hillary?
Mr. Sires. That is right, Hillary and you.
Mr. Wilson. It was Bill that got the money.
Mr. Sires. Look, as I look at this and I see what is going
on now in the Western Hemisphere where the Russians are trying
to influence and trying to damage any kind of a system that you
have there, they are arming Nicaragua in the Western
Hemisphere, they are propping up a regime in Venezuela that is
the destruction of Venezuela. I mean, as you look, obviously,
they just opened up the hearing in Cuba, they had a whole big
hearing to eavesdrop on Americans' communication, it is all
open now.
So, I just can't buy the fact that we can somehow work with
this government. I would not trust any information that we get
from Russia if we were ever working together. And when you talk
about Putin, he is KGB years ago and he is KGB now.
And the KGB's mission was to destroy this country, and we
saw what they did in this election. And we are still feeling
the effects of this election where we have our groups at each
other's throats because of what Russia did in this country by
hacking all these different places.
So, Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. And I
yield back the rest of my time.
Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Thank you, Congressman Sires. And
we appreciate so much your Cuban American heritage and your
strength on behalf of freedom in Cuba.
Chairman Poe has assigned myself for the balance of the
hearing. He had an additional meeting that he would be
attending.
At this time I will defer to myself for questions,
Congressman Joe Wilson from South Carolina.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was correctly
identified by Ronald Reagan as the Evil Empire, I was so
hopeful for a new modern Russia participating in Europe,
participating in Asia, positively participating around the
world.
And I have visited Russia a number of times. It is always
very impressive to me, the wonderful people, the positive
people who I met, the extraordinary Russian culture, the art,
the music, the literature, the architecture.
But, sadly, with the Putin regime there has been a return
to an authoritarian status, which I think is so disappointing
for what should be such a positive country.
Russia has taken strong action against terrorism
domestically, as it is a fertile field for radical Islamic
terrorists, as we all, sadly, saw with the massacre at the
school in Beslan.
Also, they have targeted ISIS and other groups that have
infringed on them in their allies. But, sadly, in other cases
they have supported Iranian-backed militia through their
support of the Assad regime in Syria.
In any of your opinions, does Russia actually have a
strong, coherent antiterrorism policy or do they have a policy
of convenience? And by that, they seem to support destablizing
efforts of terrorism when the action supports a short-term
strategic goal of Russia and ignore the long-term effects of
supporting terrorist organizations which one day would actually
come back to kill Russian citizens.
And we can begin with Dr. Clarke or whoever would like to
proceed.
Mr. Cornell. I would like just to bring up one example,
sir, which is a man by the name of Shamil Basayev. This was
Russia's terrorist number one for a number of years until he
died in 2006. This is a person that Russia trained to fight in
the insurgency against Georgia and Abkhazia in 1991 to 1992.
After a few years, he came back and became the leader of
the jihadi resistance in Chechnya, which shows an exact example
of what you are talking about, namely, how Russia themselves
created their owns Frankensteins, if you will, that came to hit
back against Russia. That is because their policy is
shortsighted and tactical in nature rather than long term and
strategic.
Mr. Wilson. Dr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Congressman.
I would add to that, as I have alluded to in my written
testimony, that several prominent individuals from the former
Soviet Union, including an individual known colloquially as
Omar the Chechen, rose to fairly high ranks within the Islamic
State. It kind of shows the prominence with which certain
Russians have attained within ISIS.
And so, that would be one of my main concerns, you know,
were I Russia, for kind of blowback in the aftermath of the
collapse of the caliphate.
Mr. Saradzhyan. I would like to point out that this
particular individual, if you are referring to the minister of
war, he was actually a native of Georgia, ethnic Chechen, he
wasn't Russian national or ethic Russian.
In general, I would like to point out that terrorism is a
strategy. I condemn that strategy because it targets innocent
people, but whether a country actively pursues terrorists,
unfortunately, it many times depends on what national interests
are. Okay?
But if you look at the national interests of the U.S. and
Russia, I would still argue that it is in the vital interest of
both countries to prevent innocent people being killed by
terrorists. So in that sense, whenever lives of innocent people
are at state, I would suggest cooperation with Russia, with any
other country for that matter, that can prevent killing of
innocent people.
Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you each.
Russia's aggression into the Ukraine--and it should be
remembered that 10,000 people have died due to that
aggression--and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine,
of the Republic of Georgia--I just returned from Tbilisi. What
an extraordinary country, and how brave the people are of the
Republic of Georgia and what great allies they are of the
United States. Also, there has been destabilization in Moldova.
And would you view their direct support for government
separatists as supporting terrorism and another example of
antiterrorist policy of convenience? In addition, should the
United States consider these groups terrorist organizations? I
would like your input on that.
Mr. Cornell. So definitely in Ukraine we see examples of
terrorist tactics being used. And the other conflicts we would
have to go back to events in the early 1990s. We could discuss
what was terrorism and what was not. But in Ukraine definitely.
Mr. Wilson. And my time is up. Part of being chairman, we
have to abide by the time.
And so I would like now to proceed could Congresswoman
Robin Kelly of Illinois.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the United States works to defeat the Islamic State
there are opportunities to work with Russia, but the U.S. must
create clear lines when working together on counterterrorism.
The Russian tactics of indiscriminate bombing and targeting of
civilian populations run contrary to our values and the long-
term benefits of counterterrorism. The Kremlin's support of
nonstate actors that align with their interests also endangers
any potential partnership in the Middle East as doing so
legitimizes rogue actors and discourages long-term stability.
In addition to interfering in our elections with
propaganda, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan, General John
Nicholson, testified that Russia is trying to legitimize the
Taliban by spreading a false narrative that the Taliban is
fighting the Islamic State. These are very concerning
developments that undermine our ability to build mutual trust
between the U.S. and Russia.
So to the panel, given Russia's extremely poor track record
on human rights, how should the U.S. cooperate with Russia
without undermining our American values? In addition, what
assurances should we seek from Russia? And what are the
potential risks of increasing counterterror operations?
I can repeat it again if that is too long.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you very much for your question,
Congresswoman.
As I have stated, I don't think the United States should
cooperate with Russia, I don't think that Russia is a reliable
partner. I think that Russia is not accountable to its own
citizens. And as you mentioned, the human rights abuses are one
example of that.
And I think just the lack of trust that permeates the
overall relationship speaks volumes. There is a reason for that
lack of trust. And I haven't see seen any evidence or any
reasons of why that lack of trust should have dissipated.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
Mr. Cornell. Congresswoman, I concur with the previous
speaker.
Ms. Kelly. The other panelist?
Mr. Saradzhyan. As I have said before, I think whenever
lives of innocent people are at stake, that countries should
cooperate to prevent killing of innocent people.
And the domestic order in Russia--Russia is no democracy,
of course. It is a semi-authoritarian regime, but what is the
vital interest? Is that preventing terrorist attacks against
citizens of a country? I think it is a vital interest. So
acting with Russia in that interest would benefit the United
States, in my view.
At the same time, of course, given the current atmosphere
and the rivalry between the two countries, it is difficult to
expect any kind of golden age we saw relatively robust
cooperation when the Bilateral Commission was established.
So for Russia to be embraced as a full partner in this
sphere, as I said, several things should happen. The conflict
in Ukraine should be resolved, the conflict in Syria should be
resolved, and these conflicts can be resolved, although the one
in Ukraine is difficult to resolve.
But even if these things happen, we have to wait for
results of the congressional and the FBI inquiries, because
these would determine the scope of cooperation or rivalry or
whatever happens between the United States and Russia in this
sphere.
Thank you.
Ms. Kelly. It seems like the President has this expectation
that Russia can help us with North Korea. Do you see that at
all?
Mr. Cornell. Congresswoman, as I noted in my opening
remarks, I think the problem with Russia is that when
confronted with a choice between either supporting the United
States in solving an international problem, even one that may
be problematic for Russia on the one hand, and taking a course
of action that would further undermine the interests of the
United States, Russia chooses the latter option. And that is
why I think it is highly unlikely.
I think at this point Russia is probably, after China has
shown tendencies of becoming fed up with North Korea, Russia--I
wouldn't be surprised if they turned out to be the major
lifeline of the North Korean regime in the years going forward.
Mr. Clarke. Congresswoman, I think any cooperation with
Russia needs to be viewed within the broader relation, and also
within the broader set of Moscow's geopolitical ambitions, and
not through the narrow lens, whether it is cooperation in Syria
or the North Korea problem set. I think we need to look at this
more comprehensively.
Mr. Saradzhyan. I think Russia's participation in the talks
with Iran on its nuclear program has showed that despite of
certain deterioration of the relationship, when it is in the
vital interest of Russia to attain a certain outcome, it can
cooperate.
I see Russia's vital interest in having no nuclear
neighbors. So if we want to continue down the diplomatic path,
you could expect Russia to behave accordingly in the United
Nations Security Council. But if the path of war had been
chosen, Russia would probably oppose that path because it is
located next to North Korea and it just doesn't want a major
conflict on its borders.
That said, we should bear in mind that Russia's leverage
vis--vis North Korea is fairly limited. And the only country
that is considered as a lifeline for North Korea is China. If
China stops supplies, North Korean Government will not last
long. So it if there is a country where there is a silver
bullet, so to say, the country is China, not Russia.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Kelly.
We now proceed to Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I find it fascinating, some of the dialogue today. Just my
mind wanders from one point to another.
Sir, where you just said that Russia would oppose action in
North Korea because it doesn't want conflict on its borders,
yet I don't know, to anybody that is noticing world events on a
daily basis, Russia creates conflict on every single border
every single day, unprovoked, in my opinion.
But that having been said, like I said, I am curious about
the meaning of this hearing or the reason for this hearing. I
mean, Russia has been a strategic adversary, if not an outright
enemy since its existence. And yet, we have people--and they
confront America from without and within every single day. And
it is well documented. It is well documented. And we have had
Presidents cooperating, I mean, to the height of the
Presidency.
Once again, I must mention Mr. Harry Hopkins. And how about
John Service working within the FDR administration? The heck
with working within the administration, working in the Oval
Office with the President. I mean, the history is replete.
That having been said, I have just got to say that I think
that we must separate the Russian people generally from the
apparatchik, from the management, if you will, the leadership
of the country. I think the people, generally speaking, of the
Russia have a different mindset and would like to lead a
different life to a certain extent, devoid of what the actions
and the aims and interests of their leadership are. But there
are two different things and we are dealing with their
leadership.
And I also must say that any kind equivocation or moral
equivalency by some Members of this august body up here at the
dais that the United States in its interest is similar to
Russians and their interests when we inadvertently hurt
civilians in some kind of a campaign, where the Russians don't
care about hurting civilians, that is a very stark difference
and I think it is important to draw that.
That having been said, nations acting in their own self-
interest--and Russia is going to act in its own self-interest
and always has. And I would agree with Dr. Clarke and Dr.
Cornell, particularly, I think, that would say that any time
that they can use it against the United States in particular,
even sometimes irrationally, that they seem to be willing to do
that and they have a history of doing that.
But I have one curiosity at a minimum: The Tsarnaev
brothers, the Boston Marathon bombing where allegedly they
tipped off. I say ``allegedly'' because these days you just
don't what the truth about anything is reported from anywhere.
But if they did inform our intelligence community in the
United States in advance, what would have been their interest
in doing that? I mean, were they just being Good Samaritans, I
mean, at that level, or is there a different game here? Is it
every now and then you throw the dog a bone and the big one is,
``We are going to take over this country over here while you
guys watch the Tsarnaev brothers blow up your marathon''? What
is your opinion on that?
Mr. Clarke. I can't speak to what Russian interests might
have been in providing that information or whether, if that
information was provided, if it was a complete picture. What I
can say is whatever information was provided did not prevent an
attack still.
And I would also say I agree with you that I think nations
will always act in their own self-interest, but we should not
mistake that with altruism.
Mr. Cornell. Congressman, on the issue of the Tsarnaev
brothers, I think I know little about this, the intelligence
agencies know more, but it seems to me that intelligence
agencies always trade with one another. And any information
provided to the United States would be in the expectation of
requiring something more valuable in return.
Mr. Perry. Fair enough.
Alright. So you have Georgia, you have Ukraine, you have
Syria, but it is a little bit of a different circumstance, in
my opinion. We opened the door for Russia to go in, as opposed
to Russia creating the opportunity.
With the diminishing time that I have, you have, like I
said, Georgia and Ukraine in particular. I would say, who is
next based on the model that Russia has used of creating the
problem and then the insurgency and so on and so forth and
fomenting a problem and then going in at some point and
essentially just kind of taking over and creating a lot more
discord?
And then the other question is, in the China, Russia, North
Korea gambit, if China decides that they are going to kind of
start choking off North Korea economically, Russia will no
doubt, will no doubt fill the void. What should our action be
at that time?
So those two questions, who is next and what action should
we be contemplating?
Mr. Clarke. Sir, I would say from--and again, I am a
terrorism expert and I focus mostly on the Middle East, but
from my broader reading, I would say I would be concerned about
Moldova or one of the countries in the Baltics from a NATO
purview.
Mr. Cornell. Congressman, I think Russia is not finished in
either Georgia or Ukraine, particularly in Georgia. The aim of
the invasion in 2008 was not just to grab two pieces of land,
Russia grabbed those pieces of land when it failed to achieve
regime change, which Sergey Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice on the
phone he wanted Saakashvili to go. Russia failed in achieving
regime change.
Right now, Russia has, if you will, they have seen that
because of a vacuum left by the United States in the Middle
East they haven't really paid so much attention to the post-
Soviet space in the past years. They have set their sights
further to play an outsize role in areas of the Middle East and
in Europe where the United States has normally been, so to
speak, more influential.
At some point I wouldn't at all be surprised if they return
to the South Caucasus either by targeting Georgia again or, as
we saw examples of in April 2016, of fomenting a renewed war
between Armenian and Azerbaijan that would enable them to move
in to control the whole South Caucasus, which forms the access
route for the United States and Europe into Central Asia and
Afghanistan.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Perry. And actually
Ranking Member Keating has some input for you about the
Tsarnaev brothers.
Mr. Keating. Just briefly, I don't want to take other
members' times, but being familiar myself with that issue,
Russia did indeed inform U.S. intelligence, including the FBI
and CIA, of their concern. And they also asked our cooperation
in giving them information because they perceived Tamerlan
Tsarnaev as a threat and wanted the U.S. to give the
information back. That is part of it. Thank you for allowing me
to----
Mr. Wilson. Right. And thank you, Congressman Keating, for
your very interesting input on that.
And we now proceed to Congressman Brendan Byrne of
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Boyle. Well, I am Brendan Boyle. Brendan Byrne was
Governor of New Jersey. And Bradley Byrne is a colleague from
Alabama.
Mr. Wilson. Well, it is a southern pronunciation.
Mr. Boyle. Well, thank you.
And thank you to our witnesses for this rather interesting
hearing for various reasons.
A few different points. The first is I had the opportunity
this weekend to meet Yevgenia Albats, who is one of the few
remaining truly independent journalists in Russia, and to hear
from her firsthand about what it is like to try to be part of a
free press, a rather dwindling free press in Russia, and it was
eye opening; also sobering.
She is in the United States this week doing a fellowship at
the University of Pennsylvania. If you have or anyone has had
the opportunity to watch the excellent two-part series by
``Frontline'' called ``Putin's Revenge,'' you will see her as
well as a number of others that make quite clear Putin's
intentions and actions.
The second point I want to raise is something that is
always in the back of my mind any time we discuss Russia. In
1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, in East Germany, stationed
there, was a KGB agent by the name of Vladimir Putin. He would
go on to call the fall of the Soviet Union the single largest
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.
So any time, again, that we discuss Russia, we should keep
that if not in the back of our mind, certainly the forefront,
that that is the prism through which he views the U.S.-Russia
relationship.
Now, I was going to ask Mr. Carpenter a question about
something he pointed out in his written testimony. I will open
that up to anyone who wants to comment. In his testimony he
outlined quite well Russia's disregard for civilians in air
strikes in Syria. In fact, according to Physicians for Human
Rights, 90 percent--90 percent--of the attacks against
hospitals and medical personnel were conducted by Russia and
the Assad regime.
A, do you agree with this statistic from the Physicians for
Human Rights? And second, how could anyone reasonably argue
that Russia could possibly be an ally when it comes to
counterterrorism when clearly their definition and our
definition are quite different?
Mr. Clarke. I would have to look at the data myself, but
that is not really a surprising figure given what we know of
the current situation in Syria, and I think just another reason
to underscore why we should keep the Russians at arm's length
in Syria and be very, very reticent of cooperating with Russia
in the CT space.
Mr. Cornell. Congressman, I have no doubt--no reason to
doubt that statistic.
I think an important point when we talk about regimes
abroad is there are a lot of authoritarian regimes. Now, there
are authoritarian regimes that we can work with because that is
the reality of the world. There are others that we should not
work with.
And that brings back to my mind the brilliant essay by
Jeane Kirkpatrick back in the late 1970s about dictatorships
and double standards and I think we should apply a similar kind
of thinking today.
If you look at various authoritarian regimes, what is their
ideology? Are they fundamentally opposed to U.S. interests in
the world? And are they fomenting anti-American opinions and
values among their own population? Clearly, that is the case in
Russia.
Whereas there are others, we can talk about many regimes
that we work with that are also authoritarian, but they may
allow their young people to form their own opinions and don't
necessarily point in an anti-American direction or work to
undermine the interests of the United States abroad.
I think in those cases we should work with authoritarian
regimes because we may even improve the situation in those
countries by working with them, rather than standing out and
hectoring them and pointing fingers at them.
But when dealing with regimes that are so obviously
domestic--just switch on RT or Sputnik and you find out the
spewing out of anti-American propaganda and outright lies that
is coming out of Russia, and they are doing that for a reason.
And we have to keep that in mind.
Mr. Boyle. I only have 30 seconds left, so I just want to
switch very briefly to Hezbollah, because I recently had an
amendment as part of legislation we passed that addressed
Russian support for Hezbollah.
Russia has transferred weapons to Hezbollah, provided air
cover through air strikes for Hezbollah foot soldiers, and
protected Hezbollah-held territory with Russian air defense.
Could any of you talk a little bit about Russia's motivations
here for this strategic support for Hezbollah?
Mr. Clarke. Sure, Congressman. I have written a lot about
Lebanese Hezbollah, including Lebanese Hezbollah's gains in
Syria and what we expect Hezbollah to look like post-Syria. It
has received a lot of training. It has experienced a lot of on-
the-ground tactical cooperation with the Russians; so working
with a nation-state in support of the Assad regime.
And I think Russia's main interest is not having to deal
with its own military, but actually working through a proxy or
a cutout, and a highly capable one, I might add, in Lebanese
Hezbollah, to fight against various jihadist groups on the
ground, to include ISIS.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Brendan Boyle.
And we now proceed to Congresswoman Lois Frankel of
Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You got that right.
Mr. Wilson. As an old friend, of course.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you.
First of all, gentlemen, thank you all for being here. This
has been a very interesting conversation or discussion today.
I am going to get back to the subject matter of this
hearing, ``Russia: Counterterrorism Partner or Fanning the
Flames?'' I want to start with two questions and maybe I will
get a chance to ask another one.
The first is, I would like to know, what do you think are
the implications, if any, of our President not recognizing or I
think denying Russian interference with our election, despite
the fact that our intelligence community unanimously has said
there is interference? That is number one.
Number two, in my effort to be bipartisan in some sense, I
would like you to give me your opinion of how a Russian
involvement in the Iran agreement and, for example, removing
chemical agents from Syria plays into your opinion that there
should be no cooperation.
And then, I think, I guess, I do have a third question,
which is could you explain what is the difference between, I
think you said, we should communicate but not cooperate?
Mr. Cornell. Congresswoman, with regard to the election
issues, it is not my area of research. The only thing I would
like to point out is I think everybody should understand that
it is not about the support for a particular person or against
a particular person, but an effort to undermine the legitimacy
of the United States and its political system both at home and
abroad, and it is unfortunate that that becomes a partisan
issue where it shouldn't be.
I think on the issues of Syria and Iran, when we talk about
cooperation on counterterrorism, and several of us have said
that we are skeptical of that notion, it doesn't mean we
shouldn't have diplomatic relations with Russia.
Counterterrorism cooperation is something much deeper. It is
about intelligence sharing, actual joint operations, which
would send exactly the wrong signal to Russia, particularly in
view of their other activities.
Now, I think Iran and Syria fall into that category. I
think, unfortunately, the previous administration opened the
door, as was said by one of the Congressmen earlier, for Russia
to take a position in the Middle East that it has not
traditionally had. A colleague of mine calls Mr. Putin's regime
the vacuum cleaner. Wherever they find a vacuum in
international politics they fill that vacuum. And we have to
make sure we don't create that type of vacuum for them.
On Iran, the only thing I would say, that yes, the Russians
were partly cooperative in the Iranian nuclear agreement. They
were also the force that helped bolster the Iranian nuclear
program to begin with, beginning with all the Iranian nuclear
reactors that they have built and all the material that they
have sold to Iran.
Ms. Frankel. Did anyone else want to respond? If not, I
have another question.
Mr. Saradzhyan. The cases you pointed out are cases, in my
view, that show that when it is in Russia's interest it
cooperates with the U.S. on issues. It is in Russia's interest
to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and therefore it
is in Russia's interest to reach an agreement with Iran on that
issue if it puts constraints on Iran's ability to acquire
nuclear weapons.
But if Russia were to choose between a diplomatic solution
or a conflict with a nuclear weapon state, it would choose a
diplomatic solution, even if it doesn't work. So Russia would
not support the military operation against North Korea.
Ms. Frankel. Alright. Let me just go to my last question.
One of my colleagues asked about, I think, what are the do's
and the don't's of our communications or our interaction with
Russia. I think Mr. Carpenter gave us some don't's. Does
anybody have some do's?
Mr. Clarke. Trust in God, but lock your car. I mean, I
think we should be open minded with the relationship with
Russia, but also very guarded. So, I mean, I know that sounds
contradictory, but I don't think we should completely shut off
the relationship, we should be highly skeptical, and as I noted
earlier, I think very measured and very judicious.
Ms. Frankel. Alright. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Frankel.
We now proceed to Congresswoman Norma Torres of California.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Clarke, I have another saying: Pray for the best, but
plan for the worst.
Overall, I think terrorism is a serious threat to our
national security and we need partners, allies, to help us
fight terror and protect our homeland. Fortunately, we have
some great allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Latin
America who share our interests and our common values and human
decency.
Russia, on the other hand, does not share any of that.
Russia certainly does not share our values or human decency.
I am sorry that Dr. Carpenter is no longer here, but I am
hoping, Dr. Cornell, you can answer or you can try to address
this issue.
Can you go into greater detail about corruption in the
Russian Government? What is the impact of that corruption on
the countries that Russia is currently involved in?
And I don't know if we speak about Russia in the same tone
as we would speak about Putin since you have said that he is
worth in the billions.
Mr. Cornell. Congresswoman, I think there are two aspects.
One of course, which is well known, I would only point to Karen
Dawisha's book about Putin's kleptocracy, which details the
rise of the system in detail.
I think the more important point, as we look at Russia's
behavior on the international scene, is that Russia utilizes
corruption as an instrument of statecraft. As I mentioned
previously, Russia has its toolbox with everything from cyber,
to military aggression, to economic sanctions, and everything
in between, that they can use.
Corruption is one of those elements. And as I have done for
many years, looked at Russian foreign policy, especially toward
the Independent States of the former Soviet Union, I think we
find very clearly that one of the reasons they are against the
development of democratic institutions and accountability in
those states is because they prefer to be able to deal, to
build a sphere of influence, by having weak, corrupt semi-
authoritarian governments in those countries, which are
answerable to Russia because of the corrupt deals they have
with Russia, rather than be answerable--accountable to their
own people.
And I think you see this in Russia, the state of Russia.
You see it also, obviously, in Russian corporations, Gazprom
being the most important example, that are able to enter
markets in a way that obviously American companies cannot do by
the use of corruption, coercion, and intimidation.
Mrs. Torres. So in other words, it is a Russian way of
life.
Mr. Cornell. I think it is Mr. Putin's regime's way of
life. As you may have seen in the past couple of months, there
are growing protests, public protests in Russia, by truck
drivers and by other groups in society against the system in
which they live. Because, as I mentioned previously, this is a
regime, I wouldn't quite call it on the ropes, but this is a
regime that is very vulnerable economically as a result of its
overreliance on oil, as a result of its corruption and
kleptocracy, which is based on stealing money rather than
investing money into the society.
Mrs. Torres. Which is why I really like to speak about the
Russian people in a different way that we would speak about the
Russian Government and their current leader.
Mr. Cornell. I absolutely agree, Congresswoman. The only
caveat I would say is that people are vulnerable to propaganda.
Propaganda exists for a reason, which is that it works. And
with the constant anti-American propaganda coming out of the
Russian media, that unfortunately affects the opinion of the
Russian people and will do so for years to many could.
Mrs. Torres. Let me try to get another question.
Dr. Clarke, do you think that Russia's information war
could expand to other parts of the world beyond Europe and the
United States?
For example, one of our closest allies and neighbors here
in the Western Hemisphere, Mexico, they have a pretty large
election, a national election coming up next year. What do you
think are the odds of Russia moving in to influence that
election the way they influenced our election last year?
Mr. Clarke. So I think--and my colleagues, Dr. Christopher
Paul and Dr. Miriam Matthews, have a really great piece on this
called ``The Russian Firehose of Falsehood,'' that is a really
excellent look at what Russia is doing in the information
operation space.
And I think the odds are quite high simply because it has
worked, and we have seen it work. And so when something works,
the recipe is usually, yes, more of that. So I would not be
surprised to see Russia meddling in other areas, as well,
beyond its traditional sphere of influence.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Congressman Torres.
And now Congressman Brad Sherman of California, who was my
colleague yesterday at a conference here in Washington, a soul
mate.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
I would point out that, especially after the fall of the
Soviet Union, the U.S. gratuitously took anti-Russian
positions. Wherever there was a dispute over territorial
integrity versus self-determination, in each case we came out
against the Russian position, whether that be Kosovo or
northern Kosovo or the border regions of Croatia, et cetera.
That being said, I don't think any of us is surprised. We
have to do business with Russia. But we shouldn't be fooled.
And don't only lock your car, Dr. Clarke, get an alarm, park
under the light, et cetera.
The Muslim world is in a three-way civil war between
moderate Sunnis, extremist Brotherhood-influenced Sunnis, and a
Shiite alliance based in Tehran. You have got over 20 million
mostly Sunni Muslims in Russia, yet Russia has decided to take
the Shiite position.
Is there any effort by Russia's over 20 million Sunni
Muslims to get their country to be less accommodating to the
Shiites and more accommodating to the Sunnis?
Mr. Cornell. Congressman, I think there are growing
frustrations among Russia's Sunni Muslim population on this
issue. I think, however, that most of these people--and
actually most of the people in Russia's neighborhood continue
to be dominated by Russian-controlled media, state-controlled
media, which means that they are not--I don't think they fully
have the same information space as we do, to put it mildly.
Mr. Sherman. Well, they know that the Russian Government is
supporting the Alawites in Syria. They know that the Russian
Government is friendly toward Tehran. They know there is a
Shiite-Sunni conflict. Is this fine with the imams among the
Tatars and Chechnyans and others?
Mr. Cornell. Congressman, I think that is one of the
reasons why so many young people of Muslim origin in Russia are
being recruited into jihadi groups.
I would also point out that we very often talk about
Central Asia as a locus of radicalization. In fact, all of that
radicalization takes place outside of Central Asia. Over 85
percent of the Central Asian recruits into ISIS and other
jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq have been radicalized while
being labor migrants in Russia, not in their home countries,
and that points to a serious problem there.
Mr. Sherman. I mean, there was a man who came from
Uzbekistan to the United States and he radicalized here as far
as we can tell.
Mr. Cornell. Yes, yes.
Mr. Sherman. And is Russia more friendly with the Shiites
because they don't pose a radicalization threat? It would be
hard for Iran to emerge as a leader of Sunni Muslims in Russia
or anywhere in their near abroad. Have they intentionally
picked the side that has the least appeal for their own
Muslims?
Mr. Cornell. Sir, that may be a contributing factor. I
think the main factor is that Iran has been a strategic partner
for Russia because of its posture against the United States in
the Middle East, and because they early on in the 1990s joined
forces in preventing the growth of U.S. influence in the
neighborhood of Russia, especially in Central Asian and the
Caucasus, Iran being in the south of the Caspian Sea, Russia in
the north, trying to thwart U.S. influence in that region
between them.
It is a purely geopolitical interest that predates the real
big conflict between Sunnis and Shias.
Mr. Clarke. I would say ditto for Syria, a traditional
longstanding Cold War ally, as well, and long-time purchaser of
Russian weapons.
Mr. Sherman. And is our broadcasting to the Russian people
effective on these issues?
Dr. Cornell.
Mr. Cornell. Sir, I just call the attention to studies by
the U.S. Government itself that have found foreign broadcasting
to be very subpar. I think there is a serious problem in the
efforts by the United States to reach out to communities that
are potentially interested in hearing the American viewpoint on
things in the world.
Mr. Sherman. Is this because our technology doesn't get the
message onto their device, whether it be computer or radio, or
because our message is lame, or just because we are not
believed?
Mr. Cornell. I think it is the two first ones. I think the
message needs serious improvement. I think also, if we look at
the staffing of the radios and TV stations that we operate,
they are heavily operated by people who are exiles from their
own countries who have lost touch with their countries many
years ago. I think there are many aspects to be looked at
there.
Mr. Sherman. And are we as effective on the Internet as we
are--I mean, there is a tendency for the government to lag
behind technology. Are we doing as much as we should on the
Internet as opposed to radio broadcasting, the technology of
the 1970s, where we at least have a bureaucracy that is into
that? What about the Internet?
Mr. Clarke. So, I think this falls into the general sphere
and extends to our areas to counter violent extremism or
prevent terrorism writ large. We are very good at the kinetic
aspects of CT, tanks, guns, bombs. We have for too long put off
countering the narrative as the softer side of counterterrorism
and we have seen with the current conflict with the Islamic
State that we have got a long way to go.
Mr. Sherman. My time has expired. I thank the chairman for
staying late and----
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Mr. Sherman.
I want to thank Ranking Member Keating, all of our
witnesses today, thank you for being here, and the professional
staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The United States is
fortunate to have such dedicated personnel.
Thank you very much, and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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