[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE
NORTH KOREAN REGIME
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 1, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-78
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
VacantAs of 10/24/17 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
Mr. Thae Yong-ho (former Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the United Kingdom)... 4
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Thae Yong-ho: Prepared statement............................. 8
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 49
Written responses from Mr. Thae Yong-ho to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Nevada.............................. 51
AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE
NORTH KOREAN REGIME
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2017
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order. All
members, if you will have your seats.
Thae Yong-ho is one of the highest-ranking North Korean
officials ever to defect. As this former Deputy Ambassador to
the United Kingdom will tell us, he wanted his family to be
free. It is rare that we have the opportunity to hear from
someone with such unique insight into the most repressive
regime in the world and one that is now threatening us with
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Thae, I wanted to say thank you for speaking before
this committee today and wanted also to acknowledge that it
takes courage for you to do this.
I met with you in August in Seoul, along with Mr. Yoho of
this committee and Mr. Schneider and Mr. Bera. Your
observations and your recommendations to the committee today
will not only help inform U.S. policy, but it is my hope that
your message, including how we can peacefully denuclearize the
Korean Peninsula, will reach the ears of every North Korean
still suffering under Kim Jong-un's brutal rule.
As I know you agree, it is crucial that we get information
to North Koreans so that they can better understand the
corruption of the self-serving regime there. As we will hear,
elites live in relative luxury while millions barely survive.
Our efforts are already putting pressure on the regime by
creating and increasing defections from the country. I think
the Kim regime is vulnerable.
To support our information efforts, the House recently
passed legislation authored by Chairman Emeritus Ros-Lehtinen
to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act. This
important bill continues our broadcasts and it updates our
efforts to include more modern technology to help spread
outside information into North Korea. While we should take a
diplomatic approach to North Korea, the reality is that the
regime itself will never be at peace with its people, its
neighbors, or us.
But information is not our only tool. Congress also has
done its part to ramp up economic pressure. We passed my North
Korea Sanctions bill last February. In July, we increased the
tools at the administration's disposal by passing a big
sanctions package, which targets, among other things, North
Korean slave labor.
In August, the administration secured a major victory with
the unanimous adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution
2371. Myself and Mr. Engel saw Ambassador Nikki Haley last
night. Ambassador Haley called this ``the strongest sanctions
ever imposed in response to a ballistic missile test.'' And in
September, under her leadership, the Security Council passed
another resolution, further upping the pressure on the regime
in response to its sixth nuclear test.
To be effective, these tools must be implemented
aggressively. We will hear today how sanctions are having an
impact and hurting the regime there. The administration has
increased the pace, but we need to dramatically increase the
number of North Korean-related designations, and we need to do
that without delay.
By using all the tools at our disposal, we can bring the
necessary pressure to bear peacefully in order to denuclearize
the Korean Peninsula. Mr. Thae, your insights into the impact
of these efforts and life in North Korea will be invaluable and
I thank you for joining us here today.
I have been in North Korea once. Mr. Engel has been there
on two occasions, and I want to thank the ranking member. What
we are going to do now, Mr. Thae, is he will have his opening
statement.
Then we will go to you and we will hear from you, and
afterwards we will go to the members of the committee so that
they might ask you questions and then you can respond.
Mr. Engel, if you would like to make your opening
statement.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I stand
by every word you said in your opening statement. We have no
disagreement on this very important issue.
Mr. Thae, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee. We are
deeply grateful for your time this morning. As the chairman
said, several members of the committee, myself included, have
visited North Korea. I have been there twice, but not lately.
We have had dozens and dozens of diplomats and experts
appear before us to discuss our strategy for dealing with
Pyongyang, to shed light on the abuses of the Kim regime, to
provide insight on North Korea's development of nuclear
weapons.
You know, one of the things that was interesting when I was
in Pyongyang is I got up early in the morning and walked around
and we saw a lot of people going to work, and they looked well
fed. They looked well dressed. Everything was fine.
I was then told that--by others that these were the elites
and the only ones in North Korea that are functioning well and
they kept us out of any place other than Pyongyang. They didn't
want us to see what was going on in the rest of the country.
So the insight you can provide, Mr. Thae, will give our
members and the public a unique perspective on this challenge.
You come to us at an urgent time. Obviously, the Kim regime has
accelerated its development of nuclear weapons and ways to
deliver them.
Our allies--South Korea and Japan--are at risk and the day
is quickly approaching when North Korea will have the ability
to hit the United States with a devastating nuclear payload.
Any conflict on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear or
conventional, would entail horrific loss of life. This is one
of the most urgent challenges we face on the global stage--no
doubt about it.
And let's call it the way we see it. Administrations of
both parties have failed to put a lid on the Kim regime's
nuclear program over the course of decades.
But I feel that what's happening now--the President and the
administration are undermining diplomacy in North Korea, where
it is needed more than ever, hampering our ability to lead on
the issue.
The strategy that key cabinet officials laid out seems to
call for a combination of multilateral, diplomatic, and
economic pressure. These policies, along with shows of military
force like flying bombers in South Korean airspace, are aimed
at slowing North Korea's advances.
I am not sure we have seen evidence of that. Unfortunately,
what we have seen is rising tensions between Washington and
Pyongyang.
Kim's rhetoric and the President's rhetoric has thrown fuel
on the fire and I believe it has escalated the risk of
conflict. Let me just say, as I've said before, more than 9
months into this administration we still have no Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, no Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, no
Ambassador to South Korea, and I worry what may happen later on
in this month when the President travels to Asia.
So there is lots and lots of work to be done and I am glad
that this committee is staying focused on this issue. I hope we
will hear from the administration again soon on its path
forward.
This is especially important in light of the many senior
level discussions with allies and partners in Asia due to take
place over the next few weeks in conjunction with the
President's trip.
So I'll wrap up because I want to make sure most of our
time today is spent hearing from our witness. Again, we are
fortunate to have you, Mr. Thae, with us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
So this morning, members, we are pleased to be joined by
Mr. Thae Yong-Ho. He is the former Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy of the People's Republic of Korea in the United
Kingdom.
As a former high-ranking North Korean official, Mr. Thae
can provide us, I think, some unique insights into Kim Jong-
un's regime. And so without objection, the witness' full
prepared statements will be made part of the record. Members
are going to have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or
questions or any extraneous material for the record here today.
And, Mr. Thae, if you would summarize your remarks, the
floor is yours. Thank you, Mr. Thae. Yes.
STATEMENT OF MR. THAE YONG-HO (FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION,
EMBASSY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM)
Mr. Thae. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel,
distinguished members of the House committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to
Chairman Royce who kept his promise to accommodate my wishes to
visit the United States and gave me this opportunity to testify
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
As you are all aware, I worked at the front line of North
Korean diplomacy until I defected to South Korea in the summer
of 2016.
But my story is quite different from other defectors who
may have experienced political oppression, inhumane treatment
in political prison camps, or who left North Korea in order to
avoid hunger and economic difficulties.
Rather, today, I would like to tell you about my life as a
North Korean diplomat, why I defected to the free world, why
Kim Jong-un is developing nuclear and ICBM programs, and how
best to deal with the North Korean regime.
I went through elite educational courses in North Korea
which could not even be dreamed of by ordinary citizens there.
At the age of 14, I was sent to China for a special elite
educational program. More than 20 years of my past 55 years of
my life were very privileged by North Korean standards. I lived
and worked in foreign countries such as China, Denmark, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.
The North Korean system provided me with all kinds of
political privileges and economic benefits during this time and
in the course of my last posting I was fortunate enough to live
in the U.K. with my wife and two sons.
Throughout my life, my family members and relatives were
all dedicated true Communists. Ironically, however, I ended up
deserting that system and ideology and I am living in South
Korea where I do not have any friends or relatives. And today,
I am even testifying at the United States Congress, which I had
always been taught to fight against.
The reason why I gave up all the privileges and economic
benefit was that I felt I could not let my sons lead a life
like me as a modern-day slave. I believed the best legacy I
could leave for my sons was to give them the freedom that is so
common to everyone in America. Had we not defected, I feared
that someday my sons would have cursed me for forcing them back
to North Korea. They were used to online gaming, Facebook
messaging, email, and internet use. I believed my sons would
suffer a lot if they returned to the North Korean system.
Indeed, how could any boys raised in the London educational
system and familiar with freedom of thought ever go back and
reacclimatize to a life in North Korea? I could not confiscate
freedom and enjoyment of liberty from them.
I could not take back the happy smiles of my sons by
bringing them back to North Korea. I could not force my sons to
pretend to be loyal to Kim Jong-un and the North Korean system
and to shout, ``Long live the Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un--long
live the Socialist paradise of the DPRK,'' like I did all my
life.
As a North Korean diplomat, everyday activities and
services were like a leading ceaseless double life, which was
psychologically difficult. I have to pretend to be loyal to the
Kim Jong-un regime, even though my heart did not agree.
I often was asked questions by my British friends which
caught me flat footed, trying to justify the North Korean
system when deep down I knew their concerns were fair and
legitimate. They asked me things such as, how could Kim Jong-un
prosecute his uncle--why does North Korea continue to appeal
for humanitarian aid while pouring of millions of dollars into
its nuclear and missile development.
Communism has always opposed dynastic transference of
power--so how then does the Kim family's hereditary leadership
system prevail so long in North Korea? While dealing with these
kinds of questions was always painful and they made me
increasingly realize the deep-rooted contradictions upon which
the entire North Korean system is built.
You might think that living as a member of the elite class
in North Korea is all about luxury goods, fine wines, and abuse
of power. Yet, the reality for many privileged people in
Pyongyang is far different. For example, all high-ranking
leaders have to live collectively in separate apartments
according to their rank.
Moreover, getting promoted within this system actually
requires more sacrifices, reduced freedoms, and an increasing
risk of your life, even though you may enjoy more economic
benefits as a result.
Indeed, if it is discovered that a senior elite may have
different ideas or express private dissatisfactions then he or
she could be subject to persecution.
And as you all know, even the members of the Kim's family
have been subject to this type of persecution. Such was the
case with the killing of Kim Jong-un's uncle, Jang Song-thaek,
and half-brother, Kim Jong-nam.
Beyond these high-profile incidents, much more has been
going on beneath the surface over the past 5 years. Hundreds of
cadres have been persecuted without due process. For example,
families of former North Korean Ambassadors to Cuba and
Malaysia were sent to prison camps and nobody knows whether
they are now alive or dead.
Former North Korean Ambassador to Sweden and the former
North Korean Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to UNESCO were
also forced to return back to Pyongyang and expelled from the
foreign ministry after the death of Jang Song-thaek.
While on the surface the Kim Jong-un regime seems to have
consolidated its power through this reign of terror,
simultaneously there are great and unexpected changes taking
place within North Korea.
Contrary to the official policy and wishes of the regime,
the free markets are flourishing. As more and more people get
used to free and capitalistic style markets, the state-owned
socialistic economic system becomes increasingly forgotten
about.
The welfare system of North Korea has long collapsed and
millions of civil servants, army officers, and security forces
are dependent on bribes and state asset embezzlement for their
survival.
Citizens do not care about state propaganda but
increasingly watch illegally imported South Korean movies and
dramas. The domestic system of control is weakening as the days
go by.
Back in 2010, during the Arab Spring, many experts said
that it would be impossible to imagine such similar events
taking place in North Korea. These changes, however, make it
increasingly possible to think about civilian uprising in North
Korea.
As more and more people gradually become informed about the
reality of their living conditions, the North Korean Government
will either have to change and adapt in positive ways for its
citizens or to face the consequences of their escalating
dissatisfaction.
Until now, the North Korean system has prevailed through an
effective and credible reign of terror and by almost perfectly
preventing the free flow of outside information.
Today, Kim Jong-un thinks that only nuclear weapons and
ICBMs can help him avoid the continuing disintegration of the
North Korean system.
He also thinks that the existence of a prosperous and
democratic South Korea so close to the border is by itself a
major threat toward his dynasty.
While Kim Jong-un has already long had the tools to destroy
South Korea effectively, he also believes it is necessary to
drive American forces out of the peninsula, and this can be
done, he believes, by being able to credibly threaten the
continental United States with nuclear weapons.
On top of thousands of artillery pieces and short-range
missile capabilities long held on North Korean side, the
potential deployment of battle-ready nuclear ICBMs means the
threat is not only toward South Korea but also toward America.
In face of this emerging situation, the U.S. Government is
now pursuing a policy of maximum pressure and engagement.
However, it will take some time to assess the effectiveness of
the current economic sanctions and campaign of diplomatic
isolation.
As we wait to see the outcome, we shall seek to continue
the momentum and even expand targeted sanctions until the North
Korean regime comes back to the dialogue table for
denuclearization.
In the face of the emerging threat, we should strengthen
the U.S. and Republic of Korea alliance and enhance military
preparedness in order to prevent potential nuclear and ICBM
provocations by North Korea.
The U.S. and Republic of Korea Governments should enhance
the level of their coordination and communication under the
slogan of ``We go together.''
It is a long-established dialogue strategy of North Korea
to exclude South Korea while communicating only with the U.S.
The United States and South Korean Governments should frustrate
this North Korean strategy through strong concerted
coordination.
Frankly, Kim Jong-un is not fully aware of the strength and
might of American military power. Because of this
misunderstanding, Kim Jong-un genuinely believes that he can
break the sanctions regime apart once he compels Washington to
accept North Korea's new status after successfully completing
the development of his ICBM program and putting the new
missiles into deployment.
Some people do not believe in soft power but only in
military options. But it is necessary to reconsider whether we
have tried all nonmilitary options before we decide that
military action against North Korea is all that is left.
Before any military action is taken, I think it is
necessary to meet Kim Jong-un at least once to understand his
thinking and try to convince him that he would be destroyed if
he continues his current direction.
We cannot change the policy of terror of the Kim Jong-un
regime but we can educate the North Korean population to stand
up by disseminating outside information.
However, is the United States really doing enough in this
regard? The U.S. is spending billions of dollars to cope with
the military threat and yet how much does the U.S. spend each
year on information activities involving North Korea in a year?
Unfortunately, it may be a tiny fraction. Yet, we now know
that the communist systems of the Soviet Union and East
European countries crumbled as a result of dissemination of
outside information and the subsequent changes in thinking
caused among people within this systems.
Indeed, the Berlin Wall would not have easily collapsed if
East German people did not regularly watch West German TV.
To sum up, much more needs to be done to increase the flow
of information into North Korea. German reunification could not
have been achieved if the Hungarian Government did not open its
border with Austria to provide an exit route for the East
German people.
Now some 30,000 North Korea defectors have come to South
Korea. In China, however, tens of thousands of North Korean
defectors are living without papers under the shadows and are
being physically or sexually exploited.
While the U.S. should continue urging China and Russia to
support more economic sanctions, it should also do more to stop
Beijing repatriating defectors back to North Korea.
The world was united to abolish the South African
apartheid. Now it is time for the world to stop the widespread
and systematic human rights violations in North Korea, which
are tantamount to the crimes committed by the Nazis.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. Thank
you again for this opportunity and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thae follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you very much, Mr. Thae.
You made clear in your remarks that as more and more people
gradually become informed about the reality of their living
conditions and what they are told is a paradise but they found
out how people are living in South Korea or in the rest of the
world that North Korea will either have to change and adapt in
positive ways for its citizens or to face the consequences of
the people's escalating dissatisfaction.
As you said, it has been a powerful impact in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union and can have the same effect in
North Korea. So my question is what kind of messages should we
focus on sending into North Korea?
Who are the best? Is it former defectors who have a story
to tell, who can report the news of what they have seen in the
outside world?
And should our message to, as you said, the elites--should
our message to the elites be different than the message that we
would help people send to the common people in North Korea?
You have made clear that both are increasingly dissatisfied
with the regime. So what would be your suggestion?
Mr. Thae. First, the North Korean system can only be in
place by making its leader a god. So we have to find out where
is the Achilles heel.
Now, after 5 years in power, Kim Jong-un still cannot tell
the North Korean people his date of birth. Nobody in North
Korea knows his date of birth.
Nobody in North Korea knows who his mother is. Nobody in
North Korea knows his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam. Nobody in
North Korea knows that he is the only third son of Kim Jong-il
and now Kim Jong-un is brainwashing the North Korean population
that he is the only bloodline of Paektu Mountain.
But after 5 years of this kind of continuous brainwashing
he still cannot provide the North Korean population with a
single photo with his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Why?
Because he was a hidden boy by his father. He was kept
secretly and silently in Switzerland throughout the years. But
a majority of the North Korean population do not know this
fact.
So we should disseminate the information about him first,
who he is--why, even now, Kim Jong-un cannot present even a
single photo with his grandfather.
Because his grandfather himself didn't know the existence
of this boy. The majority of the North Korean people do not
know that his father, Kim Jong-il, had several ladies to live
with.
So we should tell the North Korean people that Kim Jong-un
and his father, Kim Jong-il and his grandfather, Kim Il-song,
the whole member of Kim dynasty are not gods.
That is the first thing we should do and we should
disseminate the basic concepts of freedom and human rights.
North Korea is a country with a system of classification.
The population of North Korea is divided into different
classes and we have to tell the North Korean population how
stupid this system is. It is similar to a feudal class system
from several hundred years ago.
So we have many things to tell the North Korean people that
it is not a paradise. It is not a socialist welfare system. It
is the worst inhumane system in human history.
Chairman Royce. In terms of our dialogue with Beijing, what
should we be pressing Beijing on with respect to North Korea?
Mr. Thae. I think we should continue the current momentum
to inducing the Chinese Government to support economic
sanctions against North Korea. But that is not enough.
We should urge the Chinese Government not to repatriate
North Korean defectors back to North Korea. The Chinese
Government knows well that once these defectors are repatriated
back to North Korea, they would be the subject of torture.
They would be the subject of enforcement of labor. So we
should let the Chinese Government open the route to South Korea
for all the hiding North Korean defectors in China.
I mentioned a little bit about the cooperation between the
West German Government and Hungarian Government during the
process of German reunification.
If the Chinese Government helps North Korean defectors to
go freely to South Korea, I think that there could be a massive
exodus of North Korean population to China through their
borders with China.
Chairman Royce. To South Korea through China?
Mr. Thae. Yes, that is right. And if the Chinese open its
routes for defectors to South Korea, I think the North Korean
system would collapse in a very short span of time.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Thae.
We go now to Mr. Eliot Engel, our ranking member.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thae, your comments are very riveting, very
interesting, and very important to give us an insight.
You know, when I was there, Kim Jong-il was the leader and
I know that he was referred to as the Dear Leader and his
father was referred to as the Great Leader--Kim Il-song.
I am wondering if Kim Jung-un has a similar title. You walk
into every room. There were pictures of the two of them on the
wall. It was something very, very scary and eerie. Is that
still the case with Kim Jong-un?
Mr. Thae. Of course, and Kim Jong even is upgrading his
propaganda campaign to make him appear as a god of the North
Korean people.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. So let me ask you, is there any
scenario you envision in which North Korea might freeze or
dismantle its long-range missile or nuclear weapons program?
What would be the best means to persuade North Korea to do so?
Mr. Thae. I think, first, Kim Jong-un still believes that
he can achieve this goal. So we should continue to tell the
North Korean leadership and, if possible, Kim Jong-un himself
that America will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed
state.
North Korea has seen how India and Pakistan achieved that
goal and they want to follow the example of India and Pakistan.
But we should clarify that this will not be the case for North
Korea.
Mr. Engel. From what you know about the internal dynamics
of the North Korean political and economic systems, how might
increased external pressures such as unilateral and
multilateral sanctions lead the North Korean Government to
change course? Would it? If not, why not?
Mr. Thae. Oh, as I've said, the current economic sanction
so far is not enough. So we should increase more targeted
sanctions. And second, we have to wait and see the
effectiveness of the current economic sanctions.
North Korea is used to that kind of sanctions and North
Korea has a certain amount of stockpiles of war. So we have to
wait until when North Korea opens its doors for war stockpiles.
When North Korea starts to open its war stockpiles of food
and oil, then we may see how long North Korea can sustain.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
You know, one of the things that shocked us when we first
came into Pyongyang were these massive billboards--propaganda,
political propaganda ones--and one of them had--I don't know if
Joe Wilson is here--he was with me.
But he took a picture of one of those posters and it was a
North Korean soldier putting a bayonet in the head of an
American soldier, and we knew it was an American soldier
because his helmet said USA on it.
It was very, very frightening, very scary. And we mentioned
it, of course, to all the North Korean authorities. But one
thing stuck in my mind.
When we were talking about the nuclear program, one of the
higher--we never did meet with the Dear Leader but we met with
what I think is the next person whose name I think was also Kim
and we were told blankly, and it is the one thing I came home
from, they said--he said Saddam Hussein didn't have nuclear
weapons and look how he wound up--look what he wound up.
And it really-really showed me a bit of the mind set about
how they really think that the nuclear weapons are the key to
being players. Otherwise, South Korea would run circles around
them because of the prosperity and the economic opportunities
and the dynamism of the Seoul regime.
But they, even back then--this was probably about 12 years
ago--talked about nuclear weapons as their key to success in
the future. Is that still the mind set?
Mr. Thae. Yes. Still the Kim Jong-un regime believes that
they can guarantee the permanent system of North Korea by
nuclear and ICBM because they think that a prosperous and
democratic South Korea itself is threatening the existence of
North Korea itself.
That is why they think and believe that ICBM tipped with
nuclear weapons in the guarantee for their survival.
Mr. Engel. Let me ask you one brief question. My final
question is have you observed any changes in North Korea in
recent years that might suggest that an expanded United States
information campaign targeting audiences inside North Korea
might be more successful than past efforts.
How would you go about changing North Korea's perception of
the outside world?
Mr. Thae. When the South Korean cultural content first
arrived in North Korea through smuggling, North Korean
authorities tried every measure to prevent it even by
conducting public executions and rampant arrest of the people
who watch South Korean movies and dramas.
But whatever measures they take, the demand for South
Korean cultural content increased. So the North Korean regime
learned that that kind of enforcement cannot solve the problem.
That's why for the past few years they are now developing
their own footage to prevent the North Korean population from
watching South Korean movies and dramas. How?
They decided to open the film archives of Kim Jong-il and
decided to filter for those foreign films from former Soviet
Union and former socialist eastern European countries to find
out the films which can meet the demand of enjoyment for North
Korean people.
So now if you are in the Pyongyang streets there are a lot
of stores where they sell those DVD discs with hundreds of
Russian films, former East German films, Chinese films and even
these days American cartoons like Tom & Jerry, Lion King or
Beauty and the Beast, of these even cartoons for the children.
So they learned that in order to fill the demand for
outside cultural contents they should do something. So that is
why this proved that the North Korean regime is very afraid of
dissemination of information.
So I think if we continue to disseminate and if we continue
to make tailor-made content for North Korea then I think we can
make a change in North Korea.
Up until now, those cultural contents of South Korea which
North Korean people are watching are the contents which are
produced for South Korean audience, not for North Koreans. So
they just watch it for their amusement and entertainment.
But those cultural content so far do not actually relate
the North Korean citizens' way of thinking. Those cultural
contents cannot make North Koreans critically analyze the life
in North Korea.
That's why we should make tailor-made contents which can
educate the North Korean population. And I think it is time we
should invest to make that kind of very simple tailor-made
content which can tell the basic concepts of freedom, human
rights, and democracy.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much. And Mr. Thae, thank you
for your courage and for being here providing your insights and
observations.
I remember during the worst days of the Cold War it used to
be said that the Iron Curtain isn't soundproof, and your idea
of really ratcheting up the freedom broadcasting couldn't come
at a more timely point in this terrible escalating conflict. So
thank you for that, and that has to be followed up on.
Let me ask you two things. First, you've made a stunning
observation and recommendation that if China were to receive
defectors and facilitate their passage into South Korea that
that could truly debilitate this dictatorship and lead to its
demise. My question--China, and I've held several hearings on
this--China violates the Refugee Convention with impunity.
The whole idea of rapprochement--they send people back who
didn't go to the gulag or they benefitted by trafficking those
people who come in, particularly the women, into sex
trafficking and labor trafficking.
So they are making money out of it and they are also
violating the Refugee Convention. My hope is that your words to
the Chinese Governments as well as our own Governments will act
upon that because that is a very benign and certainly a way of
trying to de-escalate and lead to an end to this escalating
crisis. So thank you for that. You might want to speak to that
further.
Secondly, we underestimate the whole idea of Juche and the
cult of personality. Emperor Hirohito and the fanaticism of
imperial Japan was based on the belief that he was God and, as
you have said, that is exactly how they look at the Kims,
particularly Kim Il-sung, and I think there is a gross under
appreciation of how that leads to fanaticism and the
willingness to die for now the new Kim because he is God.
And I wonder if you could shed some insights into whether
or not the people still believe that and to what degree,
particularly in the army. We know they have 1 million people
active, about 5 millionfive deg. or so ready reserve.
I mean, that is a potent force, coupled with nuclear, where
they are willing to die for God.
Mr. Thae. First of all, about the defectors' case in
China--if you visit the Chinese border with North Korea, you
can easily learn that the Chinese Government has built up the
extensive network of catching the North Korean defectors along
its borders and if a North Korean defector is caught, then he
or she could immediately be repatriated.
And if we visit those borders these days, the Chinese have
built more fences, more river banks in order to prevent the
vast exodus of the North Korean population.
Now the Chinese Government is saying that they are very
much concerned of any possible refugee crisis if the North
Korean system collapses. But that is not really the truth
because North Korean defectors and the North Korean population,
they have a place to go once they arrive China.
They have South Korea, which would welcome to accommodate
all North Korean defectors from China. So the Chinese argument
that they would cover or they would be burdened by all the
economic costs of North Korean refugees is not true because
there is the Government of South Korea which can accommodate
all those North Korean defectors.
So we continue to ask the Chinese Government to open the
exit route for North Korean defectors to go to South Korea. We
should ask the Chinese Government to establish camps for North
Korean defectors for temporary stay and for continuation of
their journey to South Korea.
I think that is the thing we should do. And China is the
member of Refugee Convention. That's why, as a big country, the
Chinese Government has an obligation to observe its
international obligation by letting North Korean defectors to
go to China.
And the second thing, the personal culture in North Korea,
it is really, really surprising because in North Korea when you
reach the age of four or five from the age of kindergarten you
are brainwashed.
For instance, every morning the young children of 3 or 4
years are forced to bow in front of the portraits of Kim Jong-
il, Kim Il-sung, and Kim Jong-un. Then they are offered a cup
of milk.
They should stand up and express their thanks before they
drink the milk to Kim Jong-un. When there is a harvest of
apples, the apples will be distributed to the population as a
gift of Kim Jong-un.
So the Kim Jong-un regime established a full scale stupid
brainwashing system in order to depict Kim Jong-un as the god.
So I think we should try or concentrate efforts to educate
the North Korean people that Kim Jong-un is not a god. He is
just a normal human being and the Kim family is not the family
of the god.
And we should continue to tell the North Korean people--we
should touch the Achilles heel of Kim Jong-un regime. That is
my viewpoint.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Albio Sires of New Jersey is next in the
queue.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I am fascinated by your comments but I am not
really surprised because I've seen the indoctrination process
in other countries and how it works.
I am concerned with the nuclear program. It seems that they
have developed this nuclear program very rapidly. Can you talk
a little bit about who's assisting them? Because it seems that
it is so rapid that somebody had to assist them.
Is it China? Is it Iran? Is it Russia? In your opinion, is
anybody involved in assisting with their nuclear proliferation?
Mr. Thae. Oh, it is common knowledge that North Korea's
basic knowledge of nuclear weapons all came from the former
Soviet Union.
In late of 1960s and the '70s it was the policy of the
former Soviet Union to control all the nuclear experts and
nuclear industries of former socialist countries by inviting
and educating all those nuclear experts in Russia.
So North Korea started to send its young nuclear experts to
Russia's nuclear institute from late of 1950s. So, actually,
North Korea accumulated the vast knowledge of making these
nuclear weapons from Russia.
But, of course, at that time the Soviet Union Government
did not intend to tell North Korean nuclear experts how to make
nuclear weapons but they educated the North Korean nuclear
experts in order to expand their nuclear power industry and in
order to control the whole socialist world of nuclear energy.
But the North Korean regime took advantage of this
education system built in '50s and '60s and they accumulated
the knowledge on how to make it.
But in the past 5 years, we witnessed that there is all of
a sudden a kind of quick acceleration of this process of ICBM
and nuclear development. So how was it possible?
We learned that in March 2013 the Kim Jong-un regime, the
Workers' Party of Korea, adopted a policy of simultaneously
developing nuclear weapons and the economy, which is called the
Pyongyang policy.
Then what is the difference between Kim Jong-un's policy of
nuclear development with his father and with his grandfather?
Throughout the history of North Korea, Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il never stopped developing nuclear program.
But the main difference between Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-il
is that Kim Jong-un wants to achieve that goal in a very short
span of time and in a very open way.
During Kim Jong-il's period, the North Korean regime
developed a nuclear program under the pretext of denuclearizing
the Korean Peninsula. So in other words, when the Chinese wants
to force North Korea to stop it, they always justify to the
Chinese Government that, hey, Chinese brother, we need this
nuclear weapon in order to lend the ears of Americans.
So our final goal is not the acquisition of nuclear weapons
but to reach a kind of deal with Americans. So they cheated the
Chinese again and again and again. But these days, no. The
justification is different.
North Korea openly stated to China that we want to achieve
this goal openly at any cost. And secondly, from March 2013,
the North Korean regime decided to invest all available
materials and finance for the completion of nuclear weapons.
So that is the main difference between the present North
Korean regime and the previous Kim Jong-un's period.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Congressman Dana Rohrabacher
of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you very much to our witness today. I appreciate the
insights that you are providing us.
A couple of things that you've mentioned I'd like to get
some clarification on. Do the people of North Korea know that
Kim Jong-un, if I am pronouncing it correctly, was educated in
Switzerland and at an elite private school? Do they know that?
Mr. Thae. A majority of the North Korean population didn't
know that he was educated in Switzerland. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Don't we have broadcasts going into North
Korea? Why would the people of North Korea not know that what
he is doing to them he was spared and that he lived in a
totally different life than what they are expected to live? Are
broadcasts not being aggressive enough if the people of North
Korea don't know that?
Mr. Thae. Oh, but maybe about those--you know, the balloons
of the pamphlets or the numbers of the radios have reached
inside of North Korea in secret ways.
But so far, the effect of that kind of devices is not very
efficient. So I think in order to vastly disseminate the
information to the North Korean people I think we should
develop new ways to do it.
For instance, one thing I have in mind is that now we can
have a kind of satellite TV transmissions for North Korean
people and we can smuggle in the small devices like DMB things
which is the similar size of smart phone or radio so let the
North Koreans watch the South Korean and American TV networks
through that kind of device by the transmission from satellite.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That sounds like a--frankly, that sounds
like an effective use of money as compared to some of the other
things that we are doing to try to deal with this threat
because if we do not deal with this threat we are putting not
only the people of South Korea but putting the American people
in severe jeopardy here--in danger.
Let me ask--you mentioned--how is religion treated in North
Korea?
Mr. Thae. Oh, the North Korea system is based on
contradictions. For instance, the North Korean constitution
allows the freedom of belief.
But in North Korean society where the constitution does not
prevail. The charter of the Workers' Party of Korea and the
teachings by Kim Jong-un prevails over the constitution.
So if you read the charter of Workers' Party of Korea and
the teachings of Kim Jong-un and the works of Kim Il-sung and
Kim Jong-il, it clarified very clearly that two-tier ideology
and Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-ilism should be the only idea of
North Korean society.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do they permit people to go to church?
Mr. Thae. There are a few churches only in Pyongyang just
for show for foreign audiences, not for North Korean people.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do the North Korean people have, as I have
understood has happened in China in the beginning, worship
services in their homes?
Do they get together and pray and is there a religious
movement in--South Korea has a tremendous expansion of faith
and is that anywhere experienced in North Korea?
Mr. Thae. If that kind of practice is detected by the
regime, then it could be the imminent subject of persecution or
public execution. That is why I don't think that the people
would gather for that kind of the religious practice. But I am
not quite sure whether there are individuals who do that kind
of belief practices secretly inside their homes. But in my
life, I haven't seen that kind of secret practice of religious
belief.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, we need to be the champion of these
oppressed people around the world, especially when it comes to
Christians who are oppressed like this because our own national
security will be enhanced by that.
So doing what's right by religious people being persecuted
for their religion can probably help us, and thank you very
much for sharing your insights with us today.
Mr. Thae. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Representative Bill Keating of
Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And Mr. Thae, thank you
very much for your desire and courage to be here.
Just this morning I was at a breakfast of experts
discussing North Korea's threat to us as well as their
rationale for many of their activities.
They suggested that their ICBM and their nuclear
development was to preserve the regime from international
threats but also they said it is there for domestic support as
well.
And you had said there is an escalating dissatisfaction
among the people. So could you explain their rationale and
saying is there a group that sees support of the regime because
of that nuclear development?
Mr. Thae. I don't understand your last question. What was
it?
Mr. Keating. That Kim Jong-un is developing nuclear weapons
and ICBMs just to gather support and stability in his regime in
his country, within it.
You said that it is de-escalating, his support. So what is
the rationale as other people that see that development as
stabilizing and give the regime support as a result?
Mr. Thae. Yes. The first, Kim Jong-un is very well aware
that the North Korean system is in the process of
disintegration. That is why he looked for any solution to do it
and he believes that a ICBM tipped with nuclear weapons can
provide him a kind of legitimacy of the leadership for next
several decades. Why? Yes----
Mr. Keating. So the people inside feel that this will help
them from an outside threat, as they perceive it. Is that
correct?
Mr. Thae. Both ways. Kim Jong-un thinks that with the
nuclear weapons he can guarantee the sustainability of his
rule.
And the second thing is that in order to get the legitimacy
of long-term leadership, something that he wants to convince
the whole North Korean elite and the people that he is the one
who made North Korea a nuclear power and he wants to convince
the North Korean population that once he acquired these nuclear
weapons he can easily break the sanctions scheme with America.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Thank you very much. That's the
rationale. This is a really tough question I am going to ask
you, one we should all be asking, frankly, because there is a
great deal of discussion, even this morning, that there is
indeed a likelihood of military intervention preemptively by
the U.S. as a defense.
And here is my question: What's going to happen when the
missiles stop? What's the next day going to be like? Who is
going to be in charge? How are we going to keep stability?
What is China going to do? What are we going to do with the
human impact of that as well? As someone that has been in
Europe, will our partners be on board? What are your thinkings
on this very important issue?
Mr. Thae. After Kim Jong-un finishes his completion of
nuclear weapons, then he wants to open a dialogue and deal with
America.
He would continue to blackmail America with a possible
nuclear war with America and may ask America to pull American
forces from South Korea.
Mr. Keating. Right. I apologize. But what would happen--
here is the scenario, that if we did that----
Chairman Royce. If I could just interrupt for a minute. He
has a follow-up point that he wants to make about what--I think
about what would happen next to South Korea if that happens.
Then we will continue with your question.
Mr. Keating. Oh, if I could give him time to answer that.
Thank you.
Mr. Thae. Yes. So what he thinks--what his roadmap and
strategy is like this. Once he has this nuclear weapon and
ICBM, he wants to make a deal with the Americans by asking for
scaled-down joint military exercises against North Korea and,
finally, pull American forces out from the Korean Peninsula.
If America does not accept his offer, then he may continue
to blackmail, like, another test fire or ICBM or something like
that so that it will compel Washington to accept his demands.
And Kim Jong-un thinks that if American forces are out of
the Korean Peninsula, the next day the foreign investment would
follow the American forces, and then when the foreign
investments are out of South Korea then the elite and the
companies of South Korea would follow the exit.
So he thinks that he can create a kind of massive exodus in
South Korean system if he has these nuclear weapons. That is
what North Korean regime learned from the case of South
Vietnam, when America pulled its troops out from South Vietnam
in 1974.
At that time, I think we should remember that the army of
South Vietnam was number four in military terms. But when
America pulled its forces from South Vietnam, later the foreign
investments left. When foreign investments left South Vietnam
then the elite of South Vietnam ruling class started to flee.
So within 2 years, within 2 years in South Vietnam there was a
kind of huge trend of fleeing.
So North Vietnam waited for 2 years and then started an
offensive in 1976 and all of a sudden the huge military
establishment of South Vietnam was useless to defend its
system.
So the North Korean regime learned all these processes.
That's why they want to follow the same suit on South Korea.
That's why with that ICBM they want to change the current tide
of struggle between North Korea and South Korea.
Mr. Keating. Wow. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this is one of the most complex challenging foreign
policy issues of our time and whenever a power becomes a
nuclear power you can't take it away from them.
And we saw that happen in Pakistan in the A.Q. Khan network
proliferating to Iran, North Korea. I think this is the result
of a policy of neglect in prior administrations, both
Republican and Democrat, not dealing with North Korea and now
we are in a situation where we are today where I don't see a
whole lot of good options on the table.
It is a fact that he has this ICBM capability, that he's
miniaturized the nuclear warheads. By all accounts, the IC,
while maybe not definitive, we think he may have that
capability now as well.
And I talked to the Ambassador from Japan the other day and
they are terrified of the prospects. I don't know now to get
rid of this guy, and we talk about regime change. We talk about
opening channels, letting people defect and a lot of different
things.
We know China is the strongest country to deal with North
Korea and it is in their best interest, in their back yard. And
yet, we are seeing satellite photographs after the U.N.
sanctions was voted defying those sanctions with boats going
back and forth between China and North Korea.
So that hasn't had a whole lot of impact. So, you know, it
has been very interesting. I mean, let me commend you for your
courage coming here today in light of the dangers and the
obvious risks that you're taking. I think you're a courageous
individual.
But they are almost deified, this dynasty. So I don't--I
just--how do we change that? First question.
Second one is if the military option is on the table and
Secretary Mattis has warned against it, but if that happened
what would the Peninsula look like? What would be the aftermath
of the military option?
Mr. Thae. The first, I think many people do not understand
why the North Korean regime believes that nuclear weapons can
solve their problems and why Kim Jong-un's regime is so much
obsessed with this kind of nuclear weapons program, which can
do nothing but all those, you know, sanctions or whatever.
But from the perspective of the North Korean regime and the
Kim Jong-un regime, so far they really believe in this kind of
goal can be achieved.
So for instance, now let's review about a U.S. and R.O.K.
military alliance. Let's compare the military alliance between
South Korea and America and a military alliance between China
and North Korea.
The North Korean regime learned that there are a lot of
loopholes in the military alliance between South Korea and
America. For instance, in that military alliance treaty there
is not any clause of compulsory involvement in military
alliance with South Korea.
So if a state of war or any kind of war happens on the
Korean Peninsula, both sides would discuss. That is the clause.
There is nothing legally binding.
But if you read the North Korean military alliance with
China, there is a compulsory clause. If war happens on Korean
Peninsula, then Chinese side will automatically naturally be
involved in this war.
And secondly, if we see the military alliance treaty
between South Korea and America, there is a kind of very loose
clause how this treaty goes on and how this treaty breaks down.
If one party of this treaty says goodbye 1 year in advance,
then this military alliance would disappear. That is the
present reality. But if we read the North Korean military
alliance with China, it is a kind of divorce agreement.
If one of the parties do not agree to break this treaty,
then this treaty would last again and again and again. So I
think we have to cover up all those loopholes in military
alliance between R.O.K. and America.
That is why North Koreans still believe that if they have
these nuclear weapons and continue to blackmail and it can make
the strategists in Washington to think whether America is ready
to sacrifice their citizens in return for protecting the whole
South Korea territory and it strongly believes to do that
because they learned from the history about the lessons of
Acheson line.
In January 1950, then the Secretary of State, Acheson, drew
that Acheson line. Actually, that is the line of defense
between South Korea and Japan. So at that time, America did not
include South Korea as their own sphere of protection.
That prompted the decision of Korean War by Stalin and Kim
Il-sung? Why? Because Soviet Union succeeded in nuclear tests
in August 1949 and after the success of nuclear tests by Soviet
Union the strategists in Washington thought how to prevent any
kind of accidental nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
So they decided to draw a line of defense and
unfortunately, they drew that red line not on 38th Parallel but
the place on the sea between South Korea and Japan. So from
these precedents of Vietnam case, Korean War case, even Chinese
case, because the Chinese Communist Party also succeeded in
driving American forces out from Taiwan in 1979 by completing
its ICBM program.
So from these precedents in history, North Korean
communists learned that once they acquired this technology and
means to attack America and if they continue to blackmail until
America and Washington accepts their deal, they can prevail in
this game. That is their strong belief.
And the second thing about the military, the option, of
course, I strongly believe that if there is any preventive or
surgical strike or whatever, I think the war will be won by
America and South Korea.
There is no doubt about it. But we have to see the human
sacrifice from this military option. Now there are tens of
thousands of North Korean artilleries and short-range missiles
are ready to fire at any moment along the military demarcation
line and North Korean officers are trained to press the button
without any further instructions from the general command if
something happens on their side.
So if there is any sound of fire or bomb or strike from
Americans, the military artilleries and short-range missiles
will fire against South Korea. And we have to remember that
tens of millions of South Korean populations are living 70 to
80 kilometers away from this military demarcation line, a very
short distance of range of fire--and nobody can calculate but I
think certain human sacrifice would happen because of this
military option.
So as I've said, there are tremendous changes that are
taking place inside North Korea in spite of this reign of
terror by the Kim Jong-un regime. If we are determined to use
and expand our soft power, I think one day we can reach the
same goal we achieved with the former Soviet Union and those
former East European socialist countries.
Mr. McCaul. Very insightful. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Representative Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your courage and your openness and
being here to share your story and experience not only with us
but with everyone who is watching this.
To follow up on your last statement, so what you are saying
is that if there is even a very limited preemptive military
strike from the United States that this automatic response
using the artillery and short-range missiles would occur. Is
that right?
Mr. Thae. Yes, that is right.
Ms. Gabbard. You spoke earlier in your testimony about
exhausting all diplomatic measures before turning toward
military action and you mentioned about the need to meet with
Kim Jong-un directly.
Mr. Thae. Yes. That is right.
Ms. Gabbard. What would need to happen in that conversation
to create even just the beginnings of a process that would
result ultimately in dismantling and denuclearization of the
Peninsula? And how would that be different from previous failed
efforts in the past?
Mr. Thae. Oh, I think, first of all, we should tell Kim
Jong-un that the North Korean nuclear case is quite different
from India, Pakistan, or China because India and Pakistan
achieved their goal without making any enemies with the big
powers like America, China, or Russia.
So that is why in reality there was not big country who was
so serious to stop the nuclear arming in India and Pakistan.
But the North Korea case is different because North Korea wants
to achieve that goal by blackmailing, by threatening America's
interests and the American continent.
So that is the great difference, though. So we should tell
Kim Jong-un that his goal to achieve the nuclear status cannot
be achievable because as long as America will not accept North
Korea as a nuclear state forever.
We have to tell him correctly, and we should tell Kim Jong-
un that America is ready to use all military options if Kim
Jong-un continues this process and we should tell Kim Jong-un
that if Kim Jong-un stops this process and gives up his
ambition of ICBM and nuclear development, America is ready to
help Kim Jong-un to build his economy and to make North Korea a
prosperous country. I think that is the point we should
directly deliver to Kim Jong-un.
Ms. Gabbard. You know, it has been spoken about how one of
the major reasons why Kim Jong-un is holding and tightening his
grip on these nuclear weapons is as a deterrent against any
attempts by the United States or others to topple him and his
regime, thinking that this will be the only thing that will
protect him.
Why is it that if the United States sits down directly with
Kim Jong-un that you think he will react positively to a
message of we will help you--make sure that your people and
your economy prosper? That doesn't appear to seem something
that he's been concerned about in the past.
Mr. Thae. Oh, as I've said that Kim Jong-un and the North
Korean regime believes that their rival is South Korea, is the
biggest threat to the North Korean system itself because Kim
Jong-un is very aware that the North Korean population are
watching South Korean movies and dramas.
He knows that the minds of North Koreans are changing
toward South Korea. So he needs a kind of permanent guarantee
to protect his dynasty from that kind of gain and he strongly
believes that nuclear weapons can be used as a kind of very
strong defense of his dynasty.
So I think we should tell Kim Jong-un that this cannot be
the effective way for his sustainability of his leadership and
rule in North Korea.
Ms. Gabbard. And you've talked about a little bit of a
change in the current in the feeling of the North Korean
people. Given the threats upon anyone who expresses even a
little bit of dissent or disagreement, do you think Kim Jong-un
or his regime is even aware of this change in currents of the
North Korean people?
Mr. Thae. Yes, he's very well aware of that because he has
a very good network of reporting of the happenings inside of
North Korea and so far the Kim Jong-un regime has taken huge
measures to prevent the North Korean population from watching
South Korean movies and dramas.
But it turned out to be a failure, and also they threw out
the system of free market. The North Korean regime tried to
prevent the escalation of a free market system in North Korea
but failed. So now North Korea is at the stage of more or less
accepting this trend of the free marketization process in North
Korea.
So they know quite well of this disintegrating process.
Chairman Royce. We need to go to General Scott Perry of
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Thae, we are impressed by your courage and we are
privileged to have you here today.
Would there be any effect at all on North Korea being named
a state sponsor of terror once again? Would that have any
effect whatsoever to the regime or their actions?
Mr. Thae. I think that that can be very helpful because
once North Korea is reregistered as the state sponsor of
terrorism, it can be easier to drive North Korea from all
international financial systems and we can also convince the
other partners of the world to detect or stop all those--the
channels North Korea uses these days to fund their nuclear
development.
Mr. Perry. It seems to me that a big part of our strategy
should be and is the relationship with China and North Korea.
But it also seems to me that China isn't forthcoming with their
agreements.
They water down the agreements. They don't follow the
agreements that they have. Is China really the lynchpin that we
think it is? Is it the center of gravity? Can they make the
difference?
If they stop--where China is--90 percent of North Korea's
trade is with China. You know, coal alone $1 billion annually.
If China would live up to its agreements can it have the effect
that we hope it would with North Korea? Can it bring Kim Jong-
un; not the people, unfortunately, but can it bring the regime
to its knees?
Mr. Thae. First of all, I would like to avail this
opportunity to tell you that during the Trump administration's
short span of time America has made a great success in
convincing Chinese to take more sanctions against North Korea.
But meanwhile, we should continue to ask the Chinese to
stop and crack down on all those smuggling networks between
North Korea and China because if the Chinese Government
officially limits the trade with North Korea it can easily
produce another negative effect by more smugglings between
China and North Korea because along the border line between
China and North Korea there are hundreds of private traders,
small companies who are smuggling and who are involved with
dealing these illicit activities with North Korea.
And so far, the Chinese Government has been reluctant to
crack down all these other smuggling networks between China and
North Korea.
So I think it is time you should raise the issue of this
smuggle with the Chinese Government and if Chinese Government
further upgrades the level of sanctions I think it will create
a big pain on the Kim Jong-un regime.
Mr. Perry. Could that Chinese smuggling be used to our
advantage regarding the information flow into North Korea?
There is one thing to get the information there whether you
broadcast, whether you somehow smuggle it in, DVDs, thumb
drives, what have you, but I also wonder about the other side
of that equation, the North Korean people's ability to access
it. Is that a possibility, since you mentioned it?
Mr. Thae. Oh, it has two aspects. For instance, I think if
the possibility of smuggling is expanded there can be more
opportunity of smuggling these devices into North Korea.
But on the other end, if the smuggling opportunity is
expanded I think the North Korean regime will be able to import
what they wanted.
But the materials which the North Korea regime wants to
import are big things like oil or those special--the metals or
engines for their military and equipment.
But the things we want to disseminate is the very small
things. For instance, due to the recent development of
ideology, the technology, the devices of these for
dissemination is getting smaller and smaller.
For instance, 5 years ago, if you want to disseminate the
contents, you should make this size of DVD and this size of USB
stick.
But nowadays, those devices become smaller, around this
size of a small SD card. So in North Korea, young children call
this SD card, nose card, because why they call it nose card? If
their bodies are searched, they can easily put that card inside
their nose to avoid searching.
Mr. Perry. Mr. Thae, may I ask you one question, one more
question in the short amount of time I have left? Since I've
been a little boy, I've heard about American prisoners from
Vietnam and the Second World War being held in POW camps in
North Korea.
Is there any truth of that, to your knowledge? Would you
have any knowledge of that? Was it ever discussed? What do you
know about that, if anything?
Mr. Thae. Oh, to be honest, I have no idea about it.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Representative Norma Torres
from California.
Ms. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thae, thank you for joining us today. I am trying to
comprehend what caused you and the wave of defectors to leave
during the time that you left versus under the previous Supreme
Leader. Can you talk a little bit about that?
Mr. Thae. You mean my case?
Ms. Torres. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Thae. Oh, first of all, I would like to tell the
members here that I am not the only North Korean diplomat who
defected in----
Ms. Torres. It was a wave. Right.
Mr. Thae. There are more North Korean defectors who--I
mean, diplomats who defected. But this is the matter of whether
they are willing to open their identity or not. But, you know,
as I have told you that I was fortunate to bring my wife and
two sons here in----
Ms. Torres. We have very limited time, sir.
Mr. Thae. Yes. Yes.
Ms. Torres. I apologize.
Mr. Thae. That's right. So but out of my colleagues who are
also diplomats, they have their, you know, their siblings and--
--
Ms. Torres. Why now and not before, sir?
Mr. Thae. Yes. So actually the number of diplomat
defections is more than we estimate.
Ms. Torres. More now or more under the previous----
Mr. Thae. Under previous--yes, I meant in the past 2 or 3
years.
Ms. Torres. 2 or 3 years under----
Mr. Thae. Kim Jong-un regime.
Ms. Torres. Right.
Mr. Thae. Yes.
Ms. Torres. Why now under this regime and not the previous?
What's the difference? What caused you to say enough is enough?
Mr. Thae. Because the first Kim Jong-un escalated his reign
of terror of this kind of thing. So many diplomats and elite
group lost confidence on the system and also now Kim Jong-un is
desperately accelerating this nuclear process which is very,
very dangerous to the existence of North Korea.
Ms. Torres. Was there something specific to you personally
that caused you to say this is it, it's time for me to leave?
Mr. Thae. Oh, there is not that kind of, you know,
triggering point. But as I have said that I have watched and
followed those growing process of my sons in London and I
thought that it is not the right thing for me to take them
back.
Ms. Torres. Mr. Kim Jong-un is a young man. He's going to
have a birthday on January 8th.
Mr. Thae. That's right. But nobody knows which year.
Ms. Torres. Between Russia and China, who do you think is
more involved in advising him on issues dealing with the U.S.?
Mr. Thae. I don't think China or Russia is advising Kim
Jong-un on that matter. He is advised by his close associates.
Ms. Torres. Yet, China is very dependent on workers from
North Korea.
Mr. Thae. Yes.
Ms. Torres. So how can it be that China is not advising him
on how to deal with the U.S.?
Mr. Thae. Oh, I mean that I don't think that the Chinese
has any kind of, you know, the diplomatic instrument which can
change the thought of Kim Jong-un and also it is a common fact
that China is exercising the double standard--the approach on
North Korea on one hand.
China is keeping its obligation with United Nations
sanctions but on the other hand it is also opening the
possibilities for North Korea to fund its program by importing
a lot of North Korean laborers to their country.
Ms. Torres. Smuggling networks, private traders, small
companies, do you have an idea of, you know, who they are and
how we can as a U.S. policy impact that activity?
Mr. Thae. I think that is the matter of the Chinese
decision. I think we should continue to convince the Chinese
Government that the North Korean nuclear threat is not only a
threat to America but it can be the threat to China itself.
So I think we should continue to convince the Chinese
Government to cooperate to stop North Korea's nuclearization
and if the Chinese are convinced then I think the Chinese
Government will take effective measures to stop and crack down
all the smuggling networks.
Ms. Torres. So what I am understanding----
Chairman Royce. Okay. Well, the time has expired, though.
Ms. Torres. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Okay. We have got to go to Joe Wilson of
South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Ambassador Thae, I appreciate your courage on behalf of
the Korean people. I represent many constituents in South
Carolina who have served in Korea.
They developed a great affection for Korean families. I can
identify because my dad served in the Flying Tigers to World
War II and he developed a great affection for the people of
India and China.
Additionally, I want you to know that the Korean-American
population is so important across the United States but in my
home state of South Carolina this weekend we had the Korean
festival and it is to celebrate the extraordinary culture of
Korea.
And at Columbia, South Carolina, the Korean Presbyterian
Church led by Reverend Dong-young Kim, there will be a great
celebration of how much the people of America appreciate the
culture of Korea.
And Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your leadership promoting
freedom for the Korean citizens, which is of the utmost
importance for the people of South Korea and American families
for our security.
It is for this reason I'd like to thank the chairman for
his attention to a bill that has been proposed by Congressman
Adam Schiff of California.
It's a bipartisan bill that supports and clarifies and
compliments the State Department's recent prohibition on the
tourist travel in North Korea, sadly reflecting on the murder
of Otto Warmbier.
Mr. Thae, would you agree that, sadly, North Korea is a
supremely dangerous place? And I applaud the State Department
with the leadership of President Donald Trump and U.N.
Ambassador Nikki Haley for their efforts, through the
expeditious passage of the H.R. 2397, the North Korea Travel
Control Act.
The danger that North Korea poses to America and our allies
is a bipartisan concern and I am just so grateful that both
Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking Member Eliot Engel have supported
its passage out of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
And Ambassador Thae, I have recently visited the beautiful
country of South Korea. What an extraordinary country, and I
know the critical relationship that we have that ``we go
together.''
Additionally, I am grateful that with Chairman Royce and
Congressman Eliot Engel we are possibly the only Members of
Congress who have been to North Korea.
We saw the destitution, oppression of the people in
Pyongyang but that is in contrast to the extraordinary success
of the people of South Korea, the Republic of Korea, and in
Seoul.
With that in mind, there have been measures passed both in
Congress and at the U.N., led by Ambassador Nikki Haley--the
former governor of my home state, South Carolina--that targeted
North Korean textiles, coal, iron ore, seafood, and other
sectors that are used to finance the illicit programs of the
North Korean regime.
Are there any other sectors or streams of revenue that we
could act? I am also grateful that President Donald Trump has
begun a process of what's called secondary sanctions. Can you
suggest to the President any secondary sanctions that should be
enforced to help the people of Korea?
Mr. Thae. Oh, I think they could target the measures taken
by something like a secondary boycott. I strongly believe that
these kind of secondary boycott measures should be expanded to
target the Chinese and Russian companies who helps the illicit
activity by North Korea.
But meanwhile, I also want to use diplomatic soft power,
something like a campaign to isolate North Korea and in
diplomatic world.
Ironically, so far only a few countries in the world
expelled North Korean Ambassadors as a protest of the current
continuation of nuclear program.
For instance, now North Korea has conducted six nuclear
tests. But except Spain, no European countries so far have ever
expelled or downgraded the current diplomatic relations with
North Korea.
What happened between Iran and European countries in the
past because of the case of Rashid, the Iranian novelist, at
that time the whole European Union, together with America,
joined in their efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically by
withdrawing all the Ambassadors from Tehran and asking Iran to
withdraw their Ambassadors from all European capitals. But so
far, we haven't seen that kind of concerted or unified response
from Western European countries which we share common ideas and
values.
So that is why I think the American Government should beef
up more its campaign of diplomatic isolation against North
Korea, asking the American allies to follow the suit, to follow
the America's policy to isolate North Korea diplomatically.
Now, North Korean workers--tens of thousands of North
Korean workers are working in American Middle East allies like
Kuwait, the Arab Emirates. But these Arab countries are still
allowing North Korean workers working in their countries.
American allies like Poland are still allowing the North
Korean workers working in their shipyards. So a lot of measures
can be taken with the cooperation with American allies. Why
can't the American Government ask Arab allies to do more?
Chairman Royce. And if I could interrupt at that point. We
have passed sanctions legislation which allows us to deploy
sanctions against those entities and we should be doing that.
It's a very good point.
We need to go to Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Wilson. Ambassador, you're an inspiration. So is our
chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
providing this opportunity for Mr. Thae to join us.
It was an honor to be with the chairman in South Korea in
August and a chance to meet with you there. I thank you for
that time. I appreciate you coming here and sharing your
experiences, your insights. It's very important that you're
here and your candor and frankness is very much appreciated.
One of the things you mentioned is that as the elite within
North Korea get promoted, it involves greater sacrifice and
entails increasing risk.
Given that, what would be the impact in North Korea of
providing more opportunities for the elite to defect and how
might the international community go to creating those
opportunities for defection?
Mr. Thae. Yes. I think we should have a tailor-made system
for North Korean elites to defect. For instance, before I
defected to South Korea, I studied about the system of South
Korea what can I do--what kind of life in my future in South
Korea.
I searched all the contents on the Internet. But before my
arrival to South Korea and spent a few months in South Korea, I
could not get any informations what kind of treatment or what
kind of status I can be given by the South Korean Government.
But, of course, the policy of equal treatment for North
Korean defectors in South Korea. But as for high elite
defectors, I think we should make a tailor-made law so that if
we make the exit of North Korean elites for defection I think
we should upgrade more the current treatment the policies of
North Korea's elite group because the country, like North
Korea, can be easily collapsed if the group of elite leave that
system.
Mr. Schneider. Great. Thank you.
I liked how you described the thumb drives that are now
nose drives that young people can hide. But that is just a
mechanism to get more information into the mass population of
North Korea.
I know others have touched on it a little bit but could you
expand a bit about some of the most important messages we need
to communicate to the people of North Korea to try to unravel
the brainwashing that is coming from the Kim regime and expose
North Koreans to what is the reality within their country but
also the reality in South Korea and the rest of the world.
Mr. Thae. I think we can make tailor-made contents
comparing the reality in North Korea and South Korea because
North and South, we share the same language, same culture, and
also we have huge separate families who also have bloodlines.
That's why I think if we make good tailor-made contents to
educate the North Korean people, something like we may use the
ordinary daily life of North Koreans. For instance, in North
Korea there is no concept of a proper payment for the labor
they sacrificed.
North Korea was in place for several decades without proper
payment. For instance, when I worked as the deputy general
director of North Korea's foreign ministry, my monthly salary
was $2,900 North Korean won.
At that time, one kilo of rice was $3,400 won. So with 1
month's salary, I cannot even afford to buy one kilo of rice.
So the North Korean system is kind of stupid but people just
take it for granted because they are used to this kind of
stupidity for a long time and nobody thinks it is strange.
So that is why we should educate the North Korean people
that everyone in the North Korean system are entitled for
proper payment.
Mr. Schneider. In your sense and your experience, is this
something that should be done in high production qualities or
is it more important that it is coming from people--as you
mentioned, there were the connections--familiar connections,
North Koreans and South Koreans share those bonds--is it
something that should be done showing every--just everyday life
in South Korea?
Mr. Thae. No, every life in North Korea, I mean.
Mr. Schneider. Right. But showing to the North Koreans what
it is like, everyday life in South Korea--that there is
opportunity, that someone gets a fair day's wage for a fair
day's work--that there is opportunity to raise your family and
give them a better future than what their parents are enduring
right now?
Mr. Thae. Yes, something like that. For instance, yesterday
I told a very interesting story at CSIS about the cultural
concepts in North Korea.
In North Korea, for instance, when the girls with physical
beauty reaches the age of 14, they are automatically and
naturally registered by the regime. And when the girls reach
the age of 16 and 17 and if they--the girls keep that physical
beauty then they would be mobilized to be sent to the capital
to be employed either in special hospitals or guest houses for
the entertainment of the Kim family.
But in North Korea, if the young girl with physical beauty
is sent to Pyongyang for that purpose, the villagers of that
village would regard it as a kind of honor of the family.
It is really a stupid culture which was practiced and
prevailed, say, for hundreds of years ago in Yi Dynasty of
Korea. But still the North Korean people believe that they--the
Kim family can exploit sexually their daughters--you know,
beautiful daughters.
So it is really stupid, the system and culture. We should
educate the North Korean people how stupid they are by sending
their beautiful daughters to the capital.
Mr. Schneider. Okay. Well, I am out of time. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. We need to now--yes. We need to now go to
Brian Mast from Florida. Major?
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, sir, for your
remarks today. You have spoken a little bit about the history
of nuclear development in North Korea.
I believe you were speaking about the Joint Institute for
Nuclear Research previously--that overlap between Russia and
North Korea, going back quite a long way. And we are all very
familiar with the proliferation efforts of A.Q. Khan.
I want to ask a little bit more modernly to your knowledge.
Has there been any effort by China to share either nuclear
technology or ballistic missile technology with North Korea in
modern history?
Mr. Thae. Oh, first of all, I do not have any clear
information in fact of this nuclear cooperation between North
and China.
But it is a common fact that all those--the ferries which
carry all those--the trucks which carry the ICBMs are Chinese-
made trucks. This is a very common thing. Even though China
claims that those trucks were exported to North Korea for the
timber industry but it is a proven fact that North Korea is
actually using all those China-made trucks for ICBM deployment.
So and another thing--it is true that in '60s and '70s the
basic technology of North Korean submarines were imported from
China and hundreds of Chinese technicians helped North Korea to
build the first class of submarines.
Mr. Mast. I do want to get to submarines in a moment. That
is part of, you know, the whole idea of nuclear triad. Before I
ask that question, though, to your knowledge has North Korea
had a desire to or actually engaged in sharing their
advancements with Iran?
Mr. Thae. Oh, in the past, whenever North Korea test those
satellites, Iranian scientists were invited to the site and it
is the common fact that during the war between Iraq and Iran,
North Korea supported the Iran side by supplying vast--the
military equipments and after that ended, because of that there
was strong cooperation between Iran and North Korea on all
military terms.
But in terms of nuclear cooperation, I do not have any
clear fact information of that in that regard.
Mr. Mast. North Korea is not a member of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. It's known that they pulled out in 2003.
In your opinion, would they share their advancements in nuclear
technology with Iran? Do you think that they would have a
desire to do that?
Mr. Thae. Absolutely, because North Korea is a country who
wants to sell anything for hard currency. It has proved on a
couple of occasions that North Korea was engaged in illicit
activities like counterfeiting currencies, drugs. So why not
their nuclear technology?
Mr. Mast. So you did bring up submarines and there is quite
often the emphasis and conversation is placed on ICBM
technology.
I would like to know, from your knowledge, has there been
an effort to advance capabilities that would allow delivery of
a nuclear weapon from a submarine system where they could get
off the coast of Japan or South Korea or the United States or
any other area of the coast? Has there been a desire or an
effort to advance in their submarine delivery capabilities?
Mr. Thae. Oh, it was reported a couple of times and North
Korea also claimed that it made dramatic improvements in their
submarine delivery especially by--in terms of code launching
the technology.
And last year, North Korea proved a couple of times that it
made great advancements in SLMB, the test and I am sure that
North Korea will continue on that process.
Mr. Mast. I have one final question as it pertains to, I
guess the best way I could put it, would be safety. You know,
historically speaking, in the world of nuclear weapons between
the United States of America and Russia there have been very
known protocols.
At one point, it was mutually assured destruction and then
there was a ladder of escalation--that everybody knew what the
various steps of that were--you know, selective ambiguity.
And so what I would like to know is has North Korea, in an
effort to obtain a nuclear weapon, have they also made an
effort to secure any of the safety protocols that have existed
with the United States of America or Russia to ensure that
there is not an accidental launch of a weapon or that somebody
that is not part of the regime in control could get in control
of a nuclear football, as we call it here, and make a launch?
Has there ever been any safety efforts?
Mr. Thae. Oh, last year North Korea announced that the
North Korean army's strategic military unit, which means the
ICBM missile unit, directly belongs to Kim Jong-un himself.
They officially announced it.
So this means that Kim Jong-un wants to delegate the direct
instructions from his command directly to the general who is in
charge of that whole missile unit.
And I haven't read or seen any of that kind of safety--the
regulations how to control or manage North Korea's nuclear
arsenal. Personally, I haven't heard any of that kind of the
regulations or procedures.
Chairman Royce. We need to go to Colonel Ted Lieu of
California.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, sir, for your courage and for
testifying before the United States Congress, and thank you,
Chairman Royce, for holding this important hearing and giving
us the opportunity to ask questions.
You, sir, had mentioned elites in your testimony. You said
you were one of the elites. How many people are we talking
about in that category, would you say?
Mr. Thae. You mean in the total elites or only just
diplomats?
Mr. Lieu. The total elites in North Korea, just a ballpark
figure.
Mr. Thae. Oh, it is really difficult to give exact
percentage of the elite group. But according to the recent
survey, the North Korean society is a class society.
While there are three classes, the main ruling class is
called core class and next is wavering class and the last one
is hostile class, and according to the academic search by
calculating the population of Pyongyang, the capital of North
Korea, the experts are arguing maybe 25 percent of North Korean
population belong to the core class and usually elite are
chosen only from core class. To my impression, when we say
about elite I think maybe less than 10,000, to my knowledge.
Mr. Lieu. And you, as an elite, clearly saw the truth,
which is why you defected. Is your sense that most of the
elites also see the truth? Or do you think most of them are
brainwashed and don't really know what's going on?
Mr. Thae. North Korea is a very strange and unique system.
For instance, if you are in high rank, that does not mean that
you have more access to information.
For instance, inside North Korea the most powerful
institution which controls every sector of life is guidance and
organization of Department of Central Committee of Workers'
Party of Korea.
There are around 300 or 400 people actually who control the
whole North Korea. But do these people have access to outside
information like me?
No, because there are only 10,000 diplomats--there are only
1,000 diplomats working in Foreign Ministry who have that kind
of access to world news, for instance, all those--the
newspapers or all these foreign magazines.
But the people who are working much higher in the ranks do
not have any ability to access this kind of outside
information. So even though you are in high rank that does not
mean that you have the access of information.
Mr. Lieu. And if we could deliver information to the
elites, do you think that would be enough? Or do you think we'd
actually have to do what you said, just give a lot of
information to the people?
Mr. Thae. I think--oh, that we should make a different
contents which can be targeted for the different--you know, the
people and class of North Korea.
For instance, there is not a sense of solidarity between
the core class and the wavering or hostile. There is a kind of,
you know, hidden hatreds between core class and hostile class
because during the Korean War and before the Korean War
actually their ancestors fought each other.
So that is why now the ruling class, or elite, in North
Korean society are afraid of any kind of political revenge if
there is any change of the system or if there is any sudden
contingency in North Korean society.
So we should continue to deliver a kind of message that if
they cooperate with the rest of the population to change the
North Korean regime, then their future would be guaranteed.
For instance, America, together with South Korea, can
control and prevent any political revenge, any physical revenge
from those victims of Kim Jong-un.
So we should try to make a kind of accommodation of
feelings and those, you know, the hatreds between elite class
and wavering and hostile class. So that is the best way to make
a change.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
We go now to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Thae, good seeing you again. As you can see this
is on TV. It's being broadcast here. If it is being broadcast
here with the astuteness of the North Koreans being able to
hack in, we can probably assume that if Kim Jong-un and his
people wanted to watch they are watching us right now. So I am
going to direct this probably more to them.
And, you know, it was brought up that he's getting his
ICBMs and his military weapons to protect his regime and
preserve himself.
And I would think that if any other country wanted to
topple him they would have done it by now. So I don't think
that is really an issue.
I think what we really need to focus on is bringing him to
the table and have a diplomatic end to this nonsense--you know,
building nuclear wars in the 21st century.
And I wanted to ask you, without having North Korea on the
state sponsor of terrorism list, do you think that makes the
sanctions less effective versus putting North Korea back on the
state sponsor of terrorism list? What's your thoughts?
Mr. Thae. I think we should avail every bit possible of
nonmilitary options to stop North Korea's continuation of this
process.
Mr. Yoho. And, in your opinion, if we put North Korea--
being a diplomat from North Korea, if we were to put North
Korea back on the state sponsor of terrorism list, do you think
that would have more effect by other countries that you
visited?
Mr. Thae. Absolutely.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Let me ask you this. What kind of
relationship does North Korea have on a diplomatic level with
other countries? What did they focus on?
When you're in a country--when you were a North Korean
diplomat and you were in the countries that you were in, was it
a feeling of respect you got from another country or was it a
feeling of tolerance--that they put up with North Korea?
Mr. Thae. Oh, for instance, as a diplomat working in United
Kingdom, I was always instructed to use the British
Government's North Korean policy of critical engagement and I
always tried my best to convince the British Government to let
them use their role to prevent any possible war scenario on the
Korean Peninsula.
For instance, if there is a key reserve for exercise of the
British military representative or a small personnel were
always invited to take part in that war exercise and it is my
job to visit the British Foreign Office and the defense
ministry to convince them not to go to joint military
exercises.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. So you focused more on military, whereas my
experience has been with most Embassies from country to country
they focus on trade, economies, building economies, and
cultural exchanges. You're saying you just focused on military
and don't attack us?
Mr. Thae. Of course. You know, for instance, there is
almost not any trade relations between North Korea and Britain.
That's why there is no point for me to build that kind of
things.
But as for cultural exchanges, the British side tried to
invite as many as North Korean civil servants to take part in
English short-term training course and I thought that it will
be helpful for North Korean elites to look around democracy and
freedom in U.K.
Mr. Yoho. All right. But you didn't see many Embassies
sending people to North Korea, did you?
Mr. Thae. Oh, some countries----
Mr. Yoho. Other Embassies.
Mr. Thae [continuing]. Some countries and some countries
not.
Mr. Yoho. All right. I just want to do a brief review of
history and, again, this is directed at the people of North
Korea that may be listening to this.
You know, we had a war with Germany and Japan. We had a war
with South Korea and Vietnam. A lot of people died. A lot of
buildings got destroyed.
But there is a common denominator and that common
denominator is war. But the other common denominator is trade.
You know, so we fought these wars and at the end we are all big
trading partners.
South Korea has a market economy. They are our sixth
largest trading partner. Vietnam is a communist country that
engaged in market economies. They are our sixteenth largest
trading partner.
Germany and Japan are huge trading partners. And so what I
would encourage the Kim Jong-un regime is don't go to war. If
we are going to trade, let's just start trading now and do
whatever we can to come to the negotiating table.
And that is what I would encourage them to do, and the
illicit activities they do in their Embassies from wildlife
trafficking and endangered species, you know, bring that to an
end and let's just work on the trade.
Thank you for your time and I will see you at lunch.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go now to Joaquin Castro of Texas.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Ambassador, for your testimony today
and for your courage to defect.
Before I ask you a question, I just want to make a quick
statement for the historical record. Some have suggested that
perhaps we should have taken or suggested--intimated that
perhaps we should have taken military action before to stop
North Korea's nuclear program.
But the problem with that is that post-911, once we were
knee deep in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea that
the United States in 2006 or 2008 or 2009 was going to jump
into another war in Asia I think seems very strange and
unrealistic.
There has also been conflicting reports about North Korea's
nuclear capabilities. So let me ask you very directly, what is
your understanding of their ability to deliver a nuclear weapon
to, say, Japan or South Korea, or beyond that?
Mr. Thae. Oh, North Korea has started its nuclear
development from late of 1950s. So that means that North Korea
spent several decades on completing this nuclear program.
So I think it is--we should admit that North Korea has
reached this certain level of nuclear development and actually
they are at the doorstep before final completion.
Mr. Castro. Do you think they can deliver a nuclear weapon
to South Korea?
Mr. Thae. Oh, I am not quite sure whether they will
definitely deliver or not. But if we see the current North
Korean brainwashing education system, they are educating the
North Korean military officers that they should blindly follow
what Kim Jong-un instructs them.
Mr. Castro. Well, I guess let me ask you this, Ambassador.
Are you certain that they can't deliver a nuclear weapon to
South Korea?
Mr. Thae. I think if Kim Jong-un believes that his life is
threatened, I think he can do anything as long as he has
something.
Mr. Castro. Okay. What's your understanding of North
Korea's abilities within cyberspace?
Their ability to attack on a cyber level the way the
Russians have interfered with our elections, for example, and
the way that North Korea purportedly interfered with Sony's
systems and did a big data dump? What's your assessment of
their cyber capabilities?
Mr. Thae. I do not have the exact information about the
cyber attacking--you know, the network of North Korea. But what
I have seen during my life in North Korea has a very good
educational system to educate those cyber professionals.
Mr. Castro. So people are being trained in cyber very
actively?
Mr. Thae. That's right, from middle school age. So North
Korea has a very good educational system to do that.
Mr. Castro. Okay. In addition to China, which other world
economies--which other nations are propping up the North Korean
economy?
I know China makes up the lion's share of it. But in your
experience, based on what you saw, what other countries are out
there that are helping prop up this economy?
Mr. Thae. I think the first, China, and the--naturally,
Russia is the second and Southeast Asian countries like
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand these, the geographically
nearest countries are the number third trading partners of
North Korea.
Mr. Castro. And with what kind of activities? What kind of
goods or what kind of things are being traded? What kind of
activity makes up?
Mr. Thae. Oh, North Korea are exporting most of its raw
materials like coal, the iron ore, seafood--of these things to
China and in return North Korea buying the highly--technologies
and modern goods from China.
So I think North Korea's foreign trade is mostly dependent
on China.
Mr. Castro. And then one last question for you. It's been
many decades now since North and South Korea have basically
been two separate distinct nations.
Supposing that the North Korean Government and society did
crumble. Do you believe that North Korea and South Korea, being
apart now for so long, could realistically reunify?
Mr. Thae. Yes, I think so because, you know, we share same
language and same blood and same culture. North and South are--
has been divided only for 70 years.
But what I learned after my arrival to South Korea I
learned we have so many things in common. There is no problem
for me to understand Chinese culture or system or language.
So I think it will be a very easy process to accommodate
the North and South Korea if the two Koreas are reunified.
Mr. Castro. Thank you. And then just to bookend my comment
from the beginning, I think that this debate over whether we
take--we should have taken military action in North Korea
earlier, perhaps a decade ago, really underlines the mistake of
the Iraq War.
We went into the Iraq War believing that Saddam Hussein was
developing nuclear capabilities that North Korea was actually
developing. But we took no action there.
Without making a judgment about whether we should or should
not have taken military action, I think the mistake of Iraq is
made worse by that realization.
Thank you for your testimony today, Ambassador.
Mr. Thae. Thank you for your question.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go now to Adriano Espaillat
from New York.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Ambassador, for your insightful testimony.
For many years, we heard of the hunger and famine impacting
the North Korean people. What's the status of the hunger and is
there any famine?
Often, when peoples are facing those kinds of very adverse
conditions there is an instinct to dissent and to rebel. Is
there--what's the status of the food situation in North Korea
right now?
Mr. Thae. Before the 1990s, North Korea maintained a very
effective ration system. At that time, everyone in North Korea
enjoyed certain rations of the food every month.
But these days, this ration system is only available for
the civil servants or, like, working in the ministries or
army--armies or security forces.
And if we see the effect of this malnutrition and famine in
North Korea for the past 20 and 30 years, now if we compare the
general height of North Korean young children and South Korean
young generation, there is even 10 centimeters gap between
South Korean young generation and North Korean young
generation.
So because of this long decade of malnutrition, even the
physical toll of North Koreans are changing. So I think this
clearly proves that this kind of, you know, malnutrition--
famine are still severely going on in North Korea.
Mr. Espaillat. You mentioned in your testimony about North
Korea's forced labor and China benefits. Which are the other
countries that benefit from forced labor and are there any
particular areas or products that they are producing that we
can identify and potentially boycott?
Mr. Thae. For instance, the North Korean workers are the
main source of labor in Russia for their timber industry. In
Russian society now there is no Russian wanting to work in that
cold weather conditions in Siberia. It is North Korean workers
who help Russia's timber industry and for the construction
industry the main source of labor are from North Korea.
And if you see the Middle East countries like Kuwait or
Arab Emirates, of these countries there are more than 50,000
North Korean workers are working in those countries, especially
in construction building.
And if you see the countries in Africa like the Angola or
Uganda now there are many North Korean medical teams working in
very bad severe conditions of rural hospitals to earn the hard
currency in those countries.
Mr. Espaillat. Okay. What are the--beyond the Chinese and
the Russian sphere of influence, are there any relationships
between the North Korean Government and countries in the
Western Hemisphere?
Mr. Thae. Yes, of course. North Korea has diplomatic
relations and they are with almost all European countries
except France and Estonia, and North Korea has 11 Embassies in
Europe. That's why this proves that North Korea still has a
vast network of diplomatic service in European countries.
Mr. Espaillat. What about in Latin America and the
Caribbean?
Mr. Thae. In Latin America, to my knowledge, now there are
Embassies in five countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru,
and so on--that to my knowledge, yes.
Mr. Espaillat. Okay. Finally, you mentioned that there are
thousands of defectors in China and in South Korea and the need
to protect them is paramount, and if they are sent back to
North Korea they will be torture--submitted to forced labor.
What kind of pressure do you think should be exerted
against China to prevent this from happening but also to
protect defectors there in the mainland of China?
Mr. Thae. Before I traveled to America, I happened to visit
one school in Seoul where they kept the children born by this
sex exploitation in China.
The children in school in Seoul where I visited the
children even cannot speak Korean languages. They only speak
Chinese. They are the children born between the ladies who
worked as sex slaves in China and with Chinese husbands.
So when these--the poor North Korean ladies arrive in South
Korea and they brought back all those--the children they had
with their Chinese husbands. But the status of the children are
very poor because they--these children were not registered
while they were in China----
Mr. Espaillat. What kind of pressures do you think----
Chairman Royce. I am going to have to interrupt at this
point.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We have very few minutes--very little time
left. I am going to as if Mr. Garrett and if Mr. David
Cicilline would join me at lunch immediately after--a lunch
which we are supposed to be doing right now with our witness.
We are far past out of time and we have been asked several
times to wrap this up. But we have had one person waiting in
the queue for a while who has a problem with his knee and that
is Mr. Gerry Connolly from Virginia.
Gerry, would you like to ask your questions? And then the
rest of us are going to go to lunch with this guest.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll try to be
succinct.
Mr. Thae, you indicated that essentially Kim Jong-un and
his regime are going to pursue nuclear-tipped ICBMs at all cost
because they see it as the key to the preservation of the
regime.
Is there anything the Western alliance--the United States
working with Japan and Korea and maybe--South Korea and even
China or whoever--do we possess something he wants so much that
he would stop the nuclear development and possibly even roll it
back the way we did with Iran?
Mr. Thae. I don't think so.
Mr. Connolly. So we are way past the point of no return?
Mr. Thae. That we should continue the current--the momentum
of sanctions and campaign of diplomatic isolation. I think that
is the only way to force North Korea to give up its nuclear
ambition.
Mr. Connolly. Sanctions don't have the appreciable effect
because of the black market economy both through China and
Russia that you were describing as well as some other business
relationships North Korea has been able to establish. Is that
your view?
Mr. Thae. Oh, but, you know, only sanctions is not
effective to stop this process. But if we build up our pressure
on China to stop the smugglings and also if we continue and
expand our activity of disseminating information to educate the
North Korean people, in the long run I am absolutely sure that
North Korean people one day will stand up to change the course.
Mr. Connolly. Do you--a final question--do you believe Kim
Jong-un and his regime understand that the use of nuclear
weapons would almost certainly bring enormous retaliation in
kind, destroying the regime he seeks, purportedly, to
perpetuate?
Mr. Thae. I think Kim Jong-un is aware of that but
meanwhile, he also believes that if he has these nuclear
weapons he can successfully compel Washington to pull its
troops out from Korean Peninsula.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. I am going to yield back my time.
I thank the chairman for his graciousness.
Thank you, Mr. Thae, for your courage and thank you for
being here today.
Mr. Thae. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
And Mr. Thae, I want to thank you for sharing your story
and your insights with the committee here and also thank the
National Endowment for Democracy, which has supported your
trip.
As Ranking Member Eliot Engel said, we have had many
hearings with experts on North Korea. No one has brought the
insights that you have brought today and your testimony will be
of great and lasting value, I believe, to the committee.
One area I wanted to underscore is the abysmal human rights
situation of the North Korean people. We know how badly North
Koreans are abused. Hundreds of thousands are in gulags.
The Kim regime's aggression against us reflects their
aggression against North Koreans and I think one message we
have heard again and again is the importance of communicating
with the North Korean people, letting them know of the true
nature of the brutal and very corrupt regime there.
And I think the Korean people deserve so much better than
the government that they have and to that end we need to do a
much better job with our international broadcasting efforts and
other efforts.
I think our national security depends on it and, Mr. Thae,
we appreciate your courage. Again, in appearing before us you
have presented outstanding testimony that will help all Korean
people and the cause of peace. You should be proud.
And the hearing stands adjourned.
Mr. Thae. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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