[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES: EXAMINING VISA SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
TASK FORCE ON DENYING
TERRORISTS ENTRY
TO THE UNITED STATES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 3, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-15
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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27-293 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
TASK FORCE ON DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John H. Rutherford, Florida Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
John Katko, New York (ex officio) (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Gallagher, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Task Force on Denying
Terrorists Entry to the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Task Force on
Denying Terrorists Entry to the United States.................. 4
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Michael Dougherty, Acting Assistant Secretary, Border,
Immigration, and Trade Policy Office of Policy, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 14
Mr. John Wagner, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 14
Mr. Clark E. Settles, Assistant Director, National Security
Investigations Division, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 14
Mr. Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Visa Services, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for the Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 53
Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for Edward Ramotowski..... 58
DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES: EXAMINING VISA SECURITY
----------
Wednesday, May 3, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Task Force on Denying Terrorists
Entry to the United States,
Washington, DC.
The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mike Gallagher
[Chairman of the task force] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gallagher, Higgins, Rutherford,
Garrett, Fitzpatrick, Katko, McCaul (ex officio), Watson
Coleman, Jackson Lee, Barragan, and Keating.
Mr. Gallagher. The Committee on Homeland Security's Task
Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States will
come to order. The task force is meeting today to examine the
security of the visa process, and the Visa Waiver Program. I
will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I want to start by welcoming back our expert witnesses to
the Capitol, and thank him for being here doing double-duty for
joining us yesterday for a Classified hearing. I look forward
to following up on some of the broader themes of the briefing
in order to inform the American people of the security of the
visa process and the Visa Waiver Program.
I also want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member
Thompson for prioritizing this task force and its mission. Last
Congress, this committee's task force on combating terrorist
and foreign fighter travel was not only successful in producing
legislative change, but also eye-opening in what it revealed.
The work done by Members and staff on both sides of aisle under
Chairman Katko's leadership raised awareness about gaps in
screening and information sharing, both at home and with our
foreign partners, which ultimately led to positive reforms for
protecting the homeland against terrorists and foreign
fighters.
This, of course, includes the Visa Waiver Program
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act that enacted
major VWP reforms into law in 2015. I hope that this task
force, Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United
States, will be as successful in its investigation and in its
final recommendations.
I also look forward to working with Ms. Watson Coleman from
New Jersey, and all the Members on both sides to ensure that it
is a success, and I thank you for the time that you spent, and
I really am looking forward to this.
This is a critical time for our Nation's security. The
previous task force rightly focused on the tens of thousands of
jihadist fighters traveling from the West to join the fight on
the ground in Iraq and Syria. Now, however, we see that number
dropping as these fighters seek to expand their actions beyond
Iraq and Syria. While coalition forces continue to advance and
squeeze ISIS territory, the threat against the West continues
to rise as the fighters leave the so-called caliphate.
As FBI Director Comey said this past September, ``Through
the fingers of that crush are going to come hundreds of very,
very dangerous people. There will be a terrorist diaspora
sometime in the next 2 to 5 years like we have never seen
before.'' Those chilling words should serve as a wake-up call.
Just last week, it was reported that two British nationals
and a U.S. citizen were detained by Turkish border police after
spending over 2 years in ISIS territory. With hundreds of
American fighters, and thousands of European fighters seeking
to return to their home countries, armed with lawful passports,
terrorist training, and jihadist connections, we must be able
to prevent them from gaining entry into the United States by
abusing our immigration system.
ISIS has already planned, conducted, or inspired more than
180 plots against the West, including the 2015 attacks in Paris
and the 2016 attacks in Brussels, Nice, and Berlin. The
majority of these attackers were European citizens with valid
passports, so it is easy to imagine any one of them gaining
access to the country through a valid visa or through the Visa
Waiver Program.
As Secretary Kelly recently said, the United States is the
prime terrorist target, especially since so many of these
fighters are citizens of VWP countries. But that is why we are
here today, to ensure our defenses are strong and to protect
the homeland as it continues to be targeted.
While there are numerous benefits to our country that stem
from our welcoming immigration system, like tourism, trade, and
business, we should never cease to examine our processes
through the lens of a terrorist in search of potential gaps. We
must always strive to stay one step ahead.
That is what we learned in the wake of September 11, where
all of the attackers entered the United States through legal
means, mainly through lawful tourist visas. This, of course,
prompted an overhaul of our immigration and transportation
security systems, as well as the creation of our Department of
Homeland Security.
But our work is not yet done. We still have a lot to learn
and a lot to adapt to. Despite the reforms undertaken in the
wake of 9/11, there are still gaps and weaknesses in our
system. One of the attackers who killed 14 people in San
Bernardino in 2015 legally entered the country on a K-1 fiance
visa, raising questions about the level of scrutiny given to
visa applications.
There are also remaining gaps in vetting and screening a
VWP applicant, and in information sharing with other countries,
which are both vital in the fight against a terrorist diaspora.
I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses on what
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State
are doing to ensure that visa and VWP applicants are receiving
sufficient screening and vetting before they are allowed to
enter into this country. I thank the witnesses again for being
here and for their service, as well as the many men and women
who serve our Nation, both at DHS and the State Department.
With that, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the task force, the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Watson
Coleman, for any statement she may have.
[The statement of Chairman Gallagher follows:]
Statement of Chairman Mike Gallagher
May 3, 2017
I want to start by welcoming back our expert witnesses to the
Capitol and thank them for being here today, as well as for the
Classified briefing we had yesterday. I look forward to following up on
some of the broader themes of the briefing in order to inform the
American people of the security of the visa process and the Visa Waiver
Program. I also want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member
Thompson for prioritizing this task force and its mission.
Last Congress, this Committee's Task Force on Combating Terrorist
and Foreign Fighter Travel was not only successful in producing
legislative change, but also eye-opening in what it revealed. The work
done by Members and staff on both sides of the aisle, under Chairman
Katko's leadership, raised awareness about gaps in screening and
information sharing--both at home and with our foreign partners--which
ultimately led to positive reforms for protecting the homeland against
terrorists and foreign fighters. This of course includes the Visa
Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act that
enacted major VWP reforms into law in 2015. I hope that this Task Force
on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States will be as
successful in its investigation and final recommendations. And I look
forward to working with Ms. Watson Coleman and all the Members on both
sides to ensure that it is a success.
This is a critical time for our Nation's security. The previous
task force rightly focused on the tens of thousands of jihadist
fighters traveling from the West to join the fight on the ground in
Iraq and Syria. Now, however, we see that number dropping as those
fighters seek to expand their actions beyond Iraq and Syria. And while
coalition forces continue to advance and squeeze ISIS territory, the
threat against the West continues to rise as the fighters leave the so-
called caliphate. As FBI Director Comey said this past September,
``through the fingers of that crush are going to come hundreds of very,
very dangerous people. There will be a terrorist diaspora some time in
the next 2 to 5 years like we've never seen before.''
Those chilling words should serve as a wake-up call. Just last
week, it was reported that two British nationals and a U.S. citizen
were detained by Turkish border police after spending over 2 years in
ISIS territory. With hundreds of American fighters and thousands of
European fighters--armed with lawful passports, terrorist training, and
jihadist connections--seeking to return to their home countries, we
must be able to prevent them from gaining entry into the United States
by abusing our immigration system. ISIS has already planned, conducted,
or inspired more than 180 plots against the West, including the 2015
attacks in Paris, and the 2016 attacks in Brussels, Nice, and Berlin.
The majority of these attackers were European citizens with valid
passports, so it is easy to imagine any one of them gaining access to
this country through a valid visa or through the Visa Waiver Program.
And as Secretary Kelly recently said, the U.S. is ``the prime terrorist
target,'' especially since so many of these fighters are citizens of
VWP countries. But that is why we are here today--to ensure that our
defenses are strong and to protect the homeland as it continues to be
targeted.
While there are numerous benefits to our country that stem from our
welcoming immigration system--like tourism, trade, and business--we
should never cease to examine our processes through the lens of a
terrorist in search potential gaps. We must always strive to stay one
step ahead. That is what we learned in the wake of September 11, where
all of the attackers entered the United States through legal means,
mainly through lawful tourist visas. This of course prompted an
overhaul of our immigration and transportation security systems, as
well as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. But our
work is not done. We still have a lot to learn and adapt to.
Despite the reforms undertaken in the wake of 9/11, there are still
gaps and weaknesses in our system. One of the attackers who killed 14
people in San Bernardino in 2015 legally entered into this country on a
K-1 ``fiance'' visa--raising questions on the level of scrutiny given
to visa applications. There are also remaining gaps in vetting and
screening of VWP applicants, and in information sharing with other
countries, which are both vital in the fight against the terrorist
diaspora.
I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses on what the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State are doing
to ensure that visa and VWP applicants are receiving sufficient
screening and vetting before they are allowed to enter into this
country. I thank the witnesses for being here and for their service--as
well as the many men and women who serve our Nation at both DHS and the
State Department.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am
delighted to be here and share this very important task with
you. I look forward to working with you.
I am pleased to join in holding today's hearings on denying
terrorists entry into the United States. I welcome the
opportunity to work with you and our colleagues on the task
force to examine how the Federal Government can continue to
strengthen our Nation's security, and do so in a way that
upholds our American values.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
has established the Department of Homeland Security, and
directed the implementation of significant and wide-ranging new
programs and policies to help prevent terrorist travel to this
country.
For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has
deployed visa security units to our embassies and consulates
overseas, supporting the State Department in vetting visa
applicants. U.S. Customs and Border Protection now utilizes the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization, ESTA, to screen
Visa Waiver Program travelers before they are permitted to
board a plane to the United States.
These agencies now also conduct recurrent vetting of all
visa and ESTA holders to check against any new derogatory
information. These are just a few examples of the security
initiatives that have been implemented in the aftermath of 9/11
on an on-going basis as other potential vulnerabilities have
been identified.
Of course, more work remains to be done to ensure we
continue to stay ahead of those who might seek to do us harm.
That work must be done on a bipartisan basis in the interest of
all Americans, and in keeping with our principles as a Nation
of immigrants.
Using rhetoric that divides us and alienates our foreign
partners is counterproductive to the security of the United
States. Banning certain groups of people from entering this
country based on their faith, whether explicitly or implicitly,
is unconstitutional.
Playing on people's fears and prejudices for political gain
is just downright un-American. As a country, we can do better,
and I hope that on this task force, we will do better. America
is always at its strongest when we stand together in support of
our common good and our shared values.
I appreciated hearing from our Government witnesses
yesterday in a Classified setting about the good work the
Departments of Homeland Security and State are doing to further
enhance our security. I hope to hear from these witnesses today
about what more can be done to identify and thwart attempted
terrorist travel on an individualized basis and how Congress
can support their efforts.
I also hope to hear from our Government Accountability
Office witness about what their work on these visa issues tells
us about the path that we must go forward. I look forward to a
very productive hearing today, and to working alongside my
colleagues on the task force and with you, Mr. Chairman, as we
go forward. Again, I thank you for holding today's hearing, and
I thank the witnesses for joining us, and I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the
full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for any
statement he may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chairman Gallagher and Ranking
Member Watson Coleman. In June 2000, three of the 9/11
hijackers flew from European cities to Newark International
Airport, and were admitted into the United States. Their names
were Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. Sadly, we
know the rest of the story.
In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.
Government went to great lengths to identify gaps in our
vetting systems, and in how our agencies share intelligence.
The Department of Homeland Security was created by the Bush
administration and Congress to help protect America from
terrorists by connecting the dots.
Now we face a new and growing threat to the homeland. In
his speech on April 18, Secretary Kelly described us as a
Nation under attack facing the highest terror threat level in
years. Due to our brave servicemen and women, ISIS and al-Qaeda
have incurred great losses in Syria and Iraq. Yet as territory
under their control shrinks, we are seeing an exodus of foreign
fighters returning to their homelands, 10,000 of which are in
Europe.
Our committee is taking a serious look at foreign fighters.
Last Congress, we pulled together a bipartisan task force to
examine the threat posed to the United States by foreign
fighters, especially those traveling in and out of Europe.
Through this extensive 6-month review, the task force produced
more than 50 actionable recommendations to safeguard the
homeland, and this committee and the House passed legislation
to address those recommendations.
Those which became law include the Foreign Fighter Travel
Review Act, which requires the President to review all
Americans who traveled to Iraq and Syria to join a foreign
terrorist organization, and the National Strategy to Combat
Terrorist Travel Act, which requires the administration to
develop a substantive strategy to combat the threat posed by
extremists and prevent them from entering our country
undetected.
Significantly, the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and
Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 ramped up the security
of the Visa Waiver Program by improved intelligence information
sharing through HSPD-6 agreements and keep terrorists from
entering the United States undetected. It also includes major
provisions that will make it harder for terror suspects to
cross borders, including enhanced counterterrorism screening of
travelers and measures to crack down on passport fraud.
This new task force will pick up where the last one left
off. Addressing the readiness of the homeland in light of the
foreign fighter exodus, I was pleased to name Congressman Mike
Gallagher of Wisconsin as the chair of this initiative. As a
former combat veteran and Middle East issue expert, I know he
will tackle these urgent issues with seriousness and
dedication. Together with the other seven members of this
bipartisan task force, I know that this will be equally
productive and essential for America's security.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the
important work performed by the Department and the State
Department to prevent terrorists from gaining access to our
homeland. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
May 3, 2017
In June 2000, three of the 9/11 hijackers flew from European cities
to Newark International Airport and were admitted into the United
States. Their names were Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad
Jarrah. Sadly, we know the rest of the story.
In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States
Government went to great lengths to identify gaps in our vetting
systems and in how our agencies share intelligence. The Department of
Homeland Security was created by the Bush administration and Congress
to help protect America from terrorists by ``connecting the dots.''
Now we face a new and growing threat to the homeland. In his speech
on April 18, Secretary Kelly described us as a ``Nation under attack''
facing the highest terror threat level in years. Due to our brave
service men and women, ISIS and al-Qaeda have incurred great losses in
Syria and Iraq. Yet as the territory under their control shrinks, we
are seeing an exodus of foreign fighters returning to their homelands,
10,000 of which are in Europe.
Our committee has taken a serious look at foreign fighters. Last
Congress, we pulled together a bipartisan task force to examine the
threat posed to the United States by foreign fighters--especially those
traveling in and out of Europe.
Through this extensive, 6-month review, the task force produced
more than 50 actionable recommendations to safeguard the homeland, and
this committee and the House passed legislation to address those
recommendations. Those which became law include the Foreign Fighter
Travel Review Act, which requires the President to review all Americans
who have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join a foreign terrorist
organization, and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act,
which requires the administration to develop a substantive strategy to
combat the threat posed by extremists and prevent them from entering
our country undetected.
Significantly, the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist
Travel Prevention Act of 2015 ramped up the security of the Visa Waiver
Program by improved intelligence information sharing through HSPD-6
agreements and keeps terrorists from entering the United States
undetected. It also includes major provisions that will make it harder
for terror suspects to cross borders, including enhanced
counterterrorism screening of travelers and measures to crack down on
passport fraud.
This new task force will pick up where the last one left off:
Addressing the readiness of the homeland in light of the foreign
fighter exodus. I was excited to name Congressman Mike Gallagher of
Wisconsin as the Chair of this initiative. As a former combat veteran
and Middle East issue expert, I know he will tackle these urgent issues
with seriousness and dedication. Together with the other 7 members of
this bipartisan task force, I know this will be equally productive and
essential for America's security.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on the important
work performed by DHS and the State Department to prevent terrorists
from gaining access to our homeland.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Other Members are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
May 3, 2017
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for your
leadership in convening the Task Force on Denying Terrorist Entry into
the United States.
On this the inaugural hearing of the task force, I recognize and
thank Chairman Mike Gallagher and Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
for leading this task force as we consider the important question of
``Denying Terrorists Entry to the United States: Examining Visa
Security.''
I welcome today's witnesses: John Wagner, Deputy Executive
Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Clark E. Settles,
Assistant Director, National Security Investigation Division, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security;
and Michael Dougherty, Acting Assistant Secretary for Border,
Immigration, and Trade, Office of Policy, Department of Homeland
Security.
In February 2017, Chairman McCaul with the consultation with
Ranking Member Benny Thompson announced the formation of this task
force.
The purpose of this task force is to examine all pathways by which
extremists might infiltrate the homeland and will seek to identify gaps
in U.S. Government information-sharing and vetting procedures.
As for those of us who are senior Members of this committee, we
understand how important it is to protect the security of our homeland
from those who would do it harm.
The route that the terrorist used on September 11, 2001 was
commercial aircraft that they turned into improvised explosives that
killed over 3,000 people, and caused life-changing injuries to hundreds
of others.
If they could have killed more innocent people they would have, and
we know they would have sought to do so.
The Committee on Homeland Security is committed to ensure that no
terrorists will have the opportunity to do such great harm to neither
the United States nor its people ever again.
As a former chair of the Homeland Security's Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Ranking Member of this subcommittee my
commitment to air travel security and protecting the homeland from
terrorist attacks remains unwavering.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State
share the critical responsibility of identifying and preventing foreign
fighters who may seek to enter the United States.
Since September 11, 2001, it has been a priority of this Nation to
prevent terrorists or those who would do Americans harm from boarding
flights whether they are domestic or international.
For this reason, in the last Congress I introduced H.R. 48, the
``No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act,'' which requires the director of the
Terrorist Screening Center to review the Terrorist Screening Database
and the terrorist watch list to determine if an individual boarding a
U.S.-bound or domestic flight poses a terrorist threat or is suspected
of being a member of a foreign terrorist organization.
H.R. 48 ensures that the Terrorist Screening Database is kept up-
to-date and that the watch list is as effective as possible in
preventing travel by those who would do harm to our Nation or its
people.
The No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act also directs that the DHS
report findings to the House Committee on Homeland Security and the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
The visa waiver program nations are long-time allies, which
include:
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom.
The visa waiver program nation participants also provide vital
intelligence on terrorist threats and those who may work against the
safety and security of our people.
However, I want to point out several important facts that Task
Force should consider regarding visa waiver program nations as we
consider this issue:
Several nations who are listed as part of the visa waiver
program also have serious social and cultural tensions among
minority populations that have erupted into violence;
Travelers from Europe and elsewhere around the globe are no
longer traveling along predictable routes to reach the battle
fields of Syria and Iraq; and
The exact number and identities of those who have traveled
to the region controlled by ISIS/ISIL to engage in the conflict
is still unknown.
An example of the tension that exists just underneath the surface
in the nation of France came to light in 2005.
Two youth, one Malian and other Tunisian, were electrocuted as they
fled police.
Following the tragedy the nation of France experienced 3 weeks of
riots that engulfed 274 towns throughout the nation.
The rioters were mostly unemployed minority youth from destitute
suburban housing projects. At the end of the 3 weeks of riots:
9,000 cars were torched;
Dozens of buildings were destroyed;
2,900 rioters were arrested; and
129 police and firefighters were injured.
In January 2006, another riot occurred this time lead by French
youth opposed to a new law that they believed would decrease job
security, cause lower wages, and weaken worker rights.
The riots were extensive and violent as a result the French
government revoked that law.
There was no similar redress of the issues that caused the 3 weeks
of riots by immigrant youth in October 2005.
The problems that are the underlying cause of the riots in 2005 are
systemic and still present.
The issues before the Task Force transcend geography.
Where there is poverty and systemic disparity in living conditions
and insurmountable forces to resist upward mobility by poor immigrant
communities of color therein lays the fundamental indisputable threat
to the United States' security.
We cannot solve these problems for other nations alone these
nations must be committed to working with groups within their
population to remove barriers that cause tensions.
The United States continues to struggle with its own scars from
its battles to bring justice, equality, and opportunity to persons of
color, women, and poor persons who were hindered by segregation as well
as social and economic barriers.
Our work as Members of this committee and this task force should
focus on making sure the Terrorist Screening Center Database and the
watch list used by DHS receives the full benefit of our relationships
with the intelligence agencies of the visa waiver program countries.
I am a firm supporter of the visa waiver program and believe that
it provides economic, cultural, and social exchanges that enrich the
Nation in many ways.
I thank the Members of the task force who will work toward a better
understanding of the threats posed by terrorist and how this committee
and Nation may better prepare to repel them.
I am looking forward to hearing what our witnesses have to say and
I am sure they have important testimony.
Mr. Gallagher. We are honored to be joined by a very
distinguished panel of witnesses: Mr. Michael Dougherty, acting
assistant secretary for border, immigration, and trade at the
Office of Policy at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr.
John Wagner, deputy executive assistant commissioner at U.S.
Customs and Border Protection at the Department of Homeland
Security; Mr. Clark Settles, assistant director for the
National Security Investigation Division at Immigration and
Customs Enforcement at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr.
Edward Ramotowski, deputy assistant secretary for visa services
at the Department of State; and Ms. Rebecca Gambler, director
of homeland security and justice issues at the Government
Accountability Office. I thank you for being here today. The
witnesses' full written statements will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dougherty for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BORDER, IMMIGRATION, AND TRADE POLICY OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Dougherty. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman----
Mr. Gallagher. Just turn on your mic there. I did that five
times in my first week here.
Mr. Dougherty. Thanks.
Mr. Gallagher. Don't worry about it.
Mr. Dougherty. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and distinguished committee Members, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today with my DHS State
Department and GAO colleagues.
The Visa Waiver Program, or the VWP, was created by
Congress in 1986 to allow citizens of qualifying countries to
enter the United States for business or pleasure without having
to secure a visa, but only after necessary security clearances
were performed.
In addition to promoting and easing travel to the United
States, the VWP relieved the Department of State from having to
interview low-risk applicants from program countries at our
consulates overseas. The VWP has evolved since that time with
Congress having legislatively modified it five different times.
Today, the program can properly be viewed not just as a
means of easing travel to the United States, but as a means to
improve our security posture, modernizing screening and vetting
processes, increasing information sharing within our Government
and with foreign partners.
As the committee is aware, DHS Secretary Kelly has
emphasized that blocking terrorists ensures criminals from
entering the United States is a top priority of our Department,
and we are committed to working closely with Congress and our
interagency and foreign partners to protect our homeland.
Currently, 38 countries are approved to participate in the
VWP, which allows their nationals to travel to the United
States for up to 90 days. Travelers are required to complete an
on-line application in advance of travel. That is known as the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization, or ESTA.
Looking at the ESTA application, CBP conducts automatic
vetting to assess whether the individual is eligible to travel
under the VWP, or could pose a risk to the United States or to
the public at large.
To participate in the VWP, countries must share information
on terrorists and serious criminals, timely report lost and
stolen passports, have robust border and travel document
security practices, and engage in effective traveler and
migrant screening.
Looking at the criteria for lost and stolen passports, for
example, VWP countries have to report that loss or theft no
later than 24 hours after they become aware of it, and VWP
countries have contributed over 50 million such records to
INTERPOL, which accounts for 70 percent of the INTERPOL
holdings.
Rigorous National-level assessments of program countries
are conducted by the Department of Homeland Security to ensure
that they meet the security standards required for continued
participation in the program. The bottom line is that to join
or to continue in the VWP, a country cannot represent a threat
to the United States and must be working as a partner to
prevent terrorist travel.
The committee has contributed to the strengthening of the
Visa Waiver Program through its leadership in developing the
VWP Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015. I
would like to take a moment to highlight several important
changes that have resulted from DHS's implementation of the
act.
We have increased the sharing of terrorist and criminal
identity information. Several countries have increased the
frequency of their reporting of lost and stolen passports to
INTERPOL. Several countries have agreed to adopt new
technologies for vetting asylum, refugee, and other immigration
applications.
All VWP countries now are issuing and using for travel to
the United States fraud-resistant electronic passports that
meet or exceed international standards, and DHS has implemented
enhanced restrictions on travel under the VWP for individuals
who have traveled to certain countries of concern since March
2011 or are dual nationals of particular countries.
DHS manages the on-going statutorily-required monitoring
and regular assessment process to ensure the VWP countries are
consistently meeting program requirements. These assessments
are performed in consultation with DHS's component agencies,
the State Department, and other interagency partners, as well
as the intelligence community and the governments of VWP
countries themselves.
Be assured that the Department engages in regular
monitoring of all VWP countries to identify emerging threats
and vulnerabilities and to take appropriate action. As
Secretary Kelly recently indicated, we have to ensure the VWP
is prepared to counter the threat of foreign fighters returning
from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. Under his leadership,
DHS will continue to look at ways to work with this committee
to strengthen the security of the program.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I will look forward to answering any of your questions.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wagner, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Wagner. Thank you. Chairman Gallagher and Ranking
Member Watson Coleman and distinguished Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today about
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's role in securing
international travel.
Our agency works around the clock to adjudicate U.S.-bound
travel, and we have developed mechanisms to address National
security risks and other questions as far in advanced of
arrival on U.S. soil as possible. To provide a sense of scale,
last year, CBP inspected over 390 million arriving
international travelers, of which about 119 million flew into
our airports. That is about 327,000 international air
passengers each day, and that is just inbound.
Visitors make up about 50 percent of these arrival numbers,
and they are generally split into two categories: Visa and visa
waiver. Visitors from countries that need a visa go to the U.S.
embassy overseas, and work with Department of State to get a
visa. My colleague from the State Department will describe that
process in more detail in a few minutes.
For the Visa Waiver Program travelers, CBP has developed an
on-line application process known as the Electronic System for
Travel Authority, or ESTA, for short. These travelers must have
an approved ESTA in order to board the plane overseas, and we
have built a verification system with the airlines to support
this.
Now, CBP adjudicates ESTA applications against a series of
law enforcement and intelligence databases. For the first half
of this fiscal year, we have approved about 6.9 million ESTA
applications, and denied over 35,600. Of these denials, about
1,050 were due to National security concerns.
Following the enactment of the VWP Improvement Act of 2015,
CBP took several steps to apply the new restrictions for
individuals who would travel to the 7 countries and individuals
who are dual nationals. So far, this fiscal year, we have
denied ESTAs to about 13,000 people due to travel restrictions
and nearly 3,000 for the dual nationality.
Now, once a visa or ESTA is issued, CBP's National
targeting center conducts continuous vetting against a host of
law enforcement and intelligence databases to ensure travelers
remain eligible. If any issues arise, CBP may revoke the ESTA,
or work directly with Department of State to have the visa
revoked.
For the first half of this fiscal year, over 1,800 visas
have been revoked as a result of this, and over 450 of these
were due to National security concerns. Now, once the travel is
actually booked, CBP conducts predeparture vetting on all
international travelers coming to the United States.
By law, airlines provide CBP with advanced passenger
manifest information and access to their reservation systems.
CBP reviews this data along with previous crossing information,
intelligence reports, and law enforcement databases to identify
any potential risk factors.
When risk factors are identified, we built several
mechanisms to address those questions while the traveler is
still overseas: Preclearance operations, immigration advisory
program, and our regional carrier liaison groups. Let's start
with preclearance.
We have 15 air preclearance locations in six countries.
This is where uniformed CBP officers have legal authorities to
complete the same immigration, customs, and agriculture
inspections of travelers at a domestic airport. This is our
highest level of capability overseas. If found ineligible to
travel to the United States at a preclearance location, CBP has
the authority to deny entry on foreign soil.
In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers processed 18.3 million
travelers for entry into the United States at our preclearance
locations, totaling over 15 percent of our U.S.-bound
travelers. Of this total, CBP prevented 6,400 inadmissible
travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights.
Now, second, we have the Immigration Advisory Program and
the Joint Security Program. This is where we have plainclothes
CBP officers at major gateway airports in Western Europe,
Mexico, Central America, Asia, and the Middle East. Using
advanced information from our National targeting center, IAP
officers work in partnership with the host governments and the
airlines to address any National security risk and immigration
issues. If any concerns remain after our interview of the
passenger, CBP can issue a no-board recommendation to the air
carrier, and refer the traveler back to the U.S. embassy for a
more thorough review of their status.
Last year we recommended over 4,500 no-boards to the
airlines. Now, for foreign locations not covered by
preclearance or the IAP officers, we have regional carrier
liaison groups that work directly with the airlines to issue
no-board recommendations in cases where there is any National
security concerns or any immigration questions.
Now, once passengers arrive in the United States, all
people are inspected by CBP officers. The experience and the
intuition of each individual officer is invaluable, and this
provides the final piece to the prearrival vetting and all the
background checks. CBP officers review travel documents, review
the results of prearrival vetting, collect biometrics, if
required, and then interview all travelers to determine the
purpose and their intent of travel.
If there is any questions about their admissibility, their
customs declaration, agricultural concerns, or any National
security issues, the person is referred into secondary
inspection for more thorough examination.
So we continually strive to improve our vetting and our
intervention initiatives to identify and close any security
vulnerabilities, and remain closely engaged and coordinated
with our Government counterparts, foreign governments, and our
private-sector stakeholders.
So thank you again for the opportunity, and I look forward
to answering any of your questions.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Settles, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CLARK E. SETTLES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Settles. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson
Coleman, and distinguished committee Members, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the efforts of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement to enhance U.S. visa security and to
prevent the travel of terrorists and other criminal actors.
Visa security is an essential component of our
responsibility to protect the homeland, shared by both the
Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security,
which includes the Offices of Homeland Security Investigations,
HSI, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP.
At HSI, we strive to uphold our Homeland Security
responsibility by confronting dangerous challenges on a global
stage, with particular focus on those emanating from beyond
America's physical borders. I am honored to highlight our
security programs that protect the United States against an
ever-evolving diverse and global threat.
HSI special agents investigate transnational crime by
conducting a wide range of criminal investigations in
coordination with our foreign and domestic partnering agencies,
targeting the illegal movement of people, merchandise, monetary
instruments into, within, and out of the United States.
The agency has extremely broad authorities and jurisdiction
over the investigation of crimes with a nexus to U.S. borders
and ports of entry. HSI's three operational priorities are
border security, public safety, and National security. In an
effort to augment and expand visa security operations, HSI is
honored to manage the Visa Security Program in partnership with
CBP, the Department of State, the intelligence community, and
other DHS agencies and holdings.
The VSP's primary purpose is to identify terrorists,
criminals, and other individuals who pose a threat, or are
otherwise ineligible for a visa at the earliest possible point
in the visa application process, thereby pushing the U.S.
borders out as far as we possibly can.
Visa Security Program operations are currently conducted at
30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries. The Visa Security
Program is currently scheduled to expand to two visa-issuing
posts in fiscal year 2017 and plans to expand as resources
allow every year thereafter. We understand that one of our most
important priorities is to detect and prevent threats before
they reach our Nation's borders.
To achieve this objective, HSI's international operations,
in parallel with the Visa Security Program, also deploy highly-
trained personnel to 66 offices in 49 countries. The HSI
special agents deployed to the 30 visa-issuing posts world-wide
utilize available and investigative resources, in-person
interviews, and collaboration between U.S. agencies and foreign
government counterparts in order to investigate and disrupt the
travel of suspect individuals during the visa application
process.
Experience has shown the Department that there is no
technological tool available that can substitute for having
highly-trained and experienced investigators deployed overseas
to conduct informed interviews, enhance the information we have
of terrorists and other criminal networks, and share that
information with our foreign partners.
HSI's Visa Security Program is supported by the
preadjudicated threat recognition and intelligence operation
team, PATRIOT. PATRIOT is an interagency endeavor with CBP's
National targeting system. Through PATRIOT system, VSP conducts
automated screening of visa applicants' information against DH
holdings, as well as holdings of other U.S. agencies prior to
the visa applicant's interview and visa adjudication.
Derogatory information discovered during automated screening is
manually vetted by domestic PATRIOT personnel in the National
capital region utilizing law enforcement, open-source, and
Classified systems.
PATRIOT analysts then provide deployed VSP personnel with
the most enhanced information available well in advance of the
visa applicant's in-person interview. Following this enhanced
analysis of all known derogatory information, collaboration
with foreign government partners, and participation in the in-
person visa applicant interview, HSI-deployed special agents
provide a unified DHS recommendation on visa eligibility to the
Department of State.
In fiscal year 2016, VSP personnel facilitated the
screening and vetting of more than 2.2 million visa applicants,
recommended the refusal of 85,000 visas, and submitted 1,669
watch list nominations for counterterrorism reasons. We also
facilitated the legitimate trade of 442 visa applicants.
Honorable Members, if I may, I would like to recognize this
month we celebrate police week, a time to honor all law
enforcement officers who lost their lives in the line of duty,
to include a fellow HSI brother, Special Agent Jeremy Scott
McGuire, who lost his life in the line of duty last year, and
whose name we will be honoring and adding to the National Law
Enforcement Officers Memorial. I just want to say: Rest in
peace, Scott.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and for your continued support out of our law enforcement
mission. I would be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Dougherty, Mr. Wagner,
and Mr. Settles follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Michael Dougherty, John Wagner, and
Clark E. Settles
May 3, 2017
introduction
Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and
distinguished committee Members. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to prevent terrorists and other criminal actors
from entering the United States, either by acquiring U.S. visas or
traveling through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). This work involves
close interagency collaboration and partnership with foreign
governments. Ultimately, traveler screening and vetting is an integral
component of our responsibility to protect the homeland, and DHS
employs a multi-layered strategy to do so.
Furthermore, as called for in Section 5 of the President's
Executive Order (EO) 13780, Protecting The Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into The United States, DHS is diligently working with
the Departments of State (DOS) and Justice and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to implement a uniform
baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures. These
standards seek ``to identify individuals who seek to enter the United
States on a fraudulent basis, who support terrorism, violent extremism,
acts of violence toward any group or class of people within the United
States, or who present a risk of causing harm subsequent to their
entry.''
DHS Secretary John F. Kelly has made clear that blocking terrorists
and criminals from accessing the United States is one of his highest
priorities, and the administration is undertaking serious and sustained
efforts to ensure that we keep bad actors from reaching our shores and
endangering our people. As part of this effort, we are modernizing
screening, expanding information sharing within our Government and with
foreign partners, and exploring innovative approaches for detecting
threat actors. By focusing on better obstructing terrorists and
criminals, we can more effectively facilitate legitimate trade and
travel.
pushing out the zone of security
Secretary Kelly noted in his remarks at George Washington
University on April 18, 2017, that ``[t]he more we push our borders
out, the safer our homeland will be.'' The Secretary went on to
highlight in those remarks the importance of knowing who is coming into
the country and what their intent for coming is prior to their arrival
``at our doorstep.'' There are a multitude of activities, efforts, and
programs that DHS and its component agencies undertake to do just that.
In fiscal year 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
inspected over 390 million travelers at 328 ports of entry (POE), of
which over 119 million flew into air POEs. CBP's pre-departure strategy
is one of the ways by which DHS assists our interagency, foreign
government, and private-sector partners to deny international travel to
potential terrorists and criminals. A major component of this strategy
is the recommendation of denial of visas, as well as denial and/or
revocation of visa waiver approvals to individuals who may present a
risk to National security or public safety. It is a risk-based,
intelligence-driven strategy that extends our border security efforts
outward to detect, assess, and mitigate, at the earliest possible point
in the travel continuum, any risk posed by travelers before they reach
the United States. As threats evolve, CBP works in close partnership
with our foreign counterparts--including those in Europe, North Africa,
and the Middle East--to develop greater situational awareness of
emerging threats, leverage partner capabilities to affect threat
networks, and coordinate enforcement actions. These concerns are not
limited to the United States and there is a growing international
commitment to combating these shared threats to our security.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) also actively works
to push our defenses outward. To achieve this goal, ICE forward deploys
personnel to 66 offices in 49 countries. ICE's international staff
works in conjunction with overseas law enforcement counterparts to
detect, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal groups and
individuals who seek to harm our country and people. Furthermore, ICE
special agents investigate transnational crime by conducting a wide
range of criminal investigations in coordination with our foreign and
domestic partner agencies, targeting the illegal movement of people,
merchandise, and monetary instruments into, within, and out of the
United States.
Visa and Travel Authorization Security
As President Trump has stated, ``Homeland Security is in the
business of saving lives, and that mandate will guide our actions.''
Since taking office this administration has worked tirelessly to
enhance border security, promote public safety, and minimize the threat
of terrorist attacks by foreign nationals in the United States. Part of
this process is ensuring the security of international travel by
preventing dangerous persons from obtaining visas, travel
authorizations, and boarding passes. Before boarding a flight or vessel
destined for the United States, most foreign nationals must obtain a
non-immigrant visa from the DOS--issued at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate.
The visa process involves multiple security checks, including screening
of applicants against a wide array of criminal and terrorist databases
to verify the individual's identity and to detect derogatory
information that might lead to an inadmissibility determination, as
well as an in-person interview with the applicant.
CBP also conducts vetting of all valid immigrant and non-immigrant
visas. Although the visa application and adjudication processes rest
with the DOS, CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) conducts continuous
vetting of U.S. immigrant and nonimmigrant visas that have been
recently issued or revoked. Recurrent vetting ensures that changes in a
traveler's admissibility and eligibility for travel are identified in
near-real time, allowing CBP to immediately determine if it is
necessary to take action prior to subject's arrival to the United
States, such as a ``no-board'' recommendation to a carrier, and/or a
recommendation to the DOS to revoke the visa.
In an effort to augment and expand visa security operations, ICE
manages the Visa Security Program (VSP) for DHS. VSP's primary purpose
is to identify terrorists, criminals, and other individuals who pose a
threat or are otherwise ineligible for visas prior to visa adjudication
or application for admission to the United States. VSP operations are
currently conducted at 30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries.
Through the VSP, ICE deploys special agents to visa-issuing posts
world-wide to utilize available investigative resources, in-person
interviews, and collaboration between U.S. agencies and our foreign
counterparts, in order to investigate and disrupt the travel of suspect
individuals during the visa application process. Experience has shown
the Department that there is no technological substitute for having
experienced ICE special agents deployed overseas to apply law
enforcement capabilities to the visa process through investigative
measures, informed interviews with suspect applicants, and leveraging
local contacts for information.
Special agents assigned to international VSP posts are supported
through domestic-based screening and vetting of visa applicants, the
Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team
(PATRIOT). PATRIOT is an interagency endeavor between ICE and CBP's
NTC. Through PATRIOT, VSP conducts automated screening of visa
application information against DHS holdings, as well as holdings of
other U.S. agencies, prior to the visa applicant's interview and visa
adjudication. Derogatory information discovered during automated
screening is manually vetted and analyzed by domestic PATRIOT personnel
using law enforcement, open source, and Classified information. PATRIOT
analysts then provide deployed VSP personnel with relevant information
prior to interviews and other investigative activities. Following an
analysis of all known derogatory information, deployed ICE special
agents provide a unified DHS recommendation on visa eligibility to DOS
consular officers.
In fiscal year 2016, VSP deployed special agents and PATRIOT
personnel facilitated the screening and vetting of more than 2.2
million visa applicants, recommended the refusal of more than 8,500
visas, and submitted 1,669 Terrorist Screening Center Database
nominations. The VSP will expand to two additional posts in fiscal year
and is tentatively scheduled to add an additional two posts in fiscal
year 2018.
If travelers are eligible to travel under the VWP, they must apply
for and be approved for a travel authorization via the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). Through ESTA, CBP conducts
enhanced vetting of potential VWP travelers to assess whether they are
eligible to travel under the VWP or could pose a risk to the United
States or the public at large. All ESTA applications are screened
against security and law enforcement databases, and CBP automatically
refuses authorization to individuals who are found to be ineligible to
travel to the United States under the VWP. Similarly, current and valid
ESTAs may be revoked if concerns arise through recurrent vetting.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Recurrent vetting is on-going throughout the period of validity
of the ESTA. ESTA applicants who are denied may apply for a
nonimmigrant visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2016, CBP launched the Electronic Visa Update System
(EVUS). Similar to ESTA, EVUS is an on-line system used by visa holders
to periodically update their biographic information to facilitate their
travel to the United States.\2\ To maintain a valid visa for purposes
of seeking admission to the United States, travelers with designated
nonimmigrant visas from identified countries are required to maintain a
valid EVUS enrollment before traveling to the United States.
Enrollments generally last for 2 years or when the traveler's visa or
passport expires, whichever comes first. Data collected through EVUS
helps us determine whether such travel poses a law enforcement or
security risk by checking against select law enforcement databases and
queries law enforcement databases that include terrorist screening,
lost/stolen passports, INTERPOL wants/warrants, and immigration
violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ At this time, EVUS is only a requirement for individuals
traveling on passports issued by the People's Republic of China who
have been issued unrestricted, maximum validity B-1 (visitor for
business) or B-2 (visitor for pleasure) visas, generally valid for 10
years, Chinese nationals. The requirement is new, and the U.S.
Government expects that it may be applied to additional countries or
nonimmigrant categories may be designated in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, thanks to the support of Congress, the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2015 \3\ provided the necessary
funds for CBP to initiate counter-network operations within the NTC.
The newly established Counter Network Division's (CND) mission supports
CBP, other DHS components, and interagency law enforcement and
intelligence community partners to develop an interoperable counter-
network process that provides a comprehensive understanding of emerging
threats, including those emanating from terrorism, special interest
aliens, transnational organized crime and illicit trade networks.
Informed through identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures of adversarial networks--including their efforts to exploit
legitimate travel pathways and processes such as the visa process and
the VWP--the CND quickly develops analytic solutions and makes those
available across DHS components to mitigate further risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. L. No. 114-4.
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Visa Waiver Program
An important way in which DHS is pushing out the zone of security
is to work with our international partners, including those countries
who are members of the VWP. DHS's focus and priority for the VWP is to
make it a comprehensive security partnership with America's closest
allies. The VWP must be a security program first and foremost--merging
together best practices in National security, law enforcement security,
and immigration security; and providing the United States with an
effective tool for fostering and deepening our National security
relationships with key partner countries. As Secretary Kelly recently
indicated, we have to continue to look at ways to strengthen the
security of the VWP given the threat of foreign fighters returning from
the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. DHS is committed to fully ensuring
that the VWP is serving the security interests of the United States.
Currently, 38 countries \4\ \5\ participate in the VWP, which
allows their nationals to travel to the United States for business or
tourism for stays of up to 90 days (with certain exceptions) after
applying and being approved through the ESTA.\6\ In return, these
countries must prove that measurable and consistently high requirements
are met, including: That information-sharing practices enable the rapid
relay of information concerning known and suspected terrorists and
serious criminals; that lost and stolen passport information is
consistently and timely reported; that robust border and travel
document security practices are in place; and that effective traveler
and migrant screening practices are standard operations. VWP countries
also undergo regular, in-depth security assessments conducted by DHS in
consultation with DOS to ensure compliance with these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ VWP-eligible countries: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brunei, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom.
\5\ Per the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, all references to
``country'' or ``countries'' in this document also apply with respect
to Taiwan.
\6\ Exceptions include citizens of countries under other visa
exempt authority, such as Canada. Citizens of countries under visa
exempt authority traveling to entering the United States via air are
subjected to CBP's vetting and inspection processes prior to their
departure for the United States. In the land environment, they are
subject to CBP processing upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The assessments of a VWP country's security standards and
operations are among the broadest and most consequential reviews
conducted under any U.S. Government program. Rigorous National-level
assessments are used to ensure that countries meet the security
standards required for continued participation in the program. DHS, in
coordination with the DOS and the intelligence community, conducts
statutorily-required reviews of each VWP country at least once every 2
years. The VWP assessment evaluates the country's counterterrorism and
law enforcement capabilities, immigration enforcement policies and
procedures, passport production and issuance processes, and border
security traveler screening capabilities. As needed, the review may
also include a site visit where an integrated U.S. Government team
conducts thorough inspections of airports, seaports, land borders, and
passport production and issuance facilities in the VWP country and
holds discussions with the host government, counterterrorism,
intelligence, law enforcement, border security, and immigration
officials. DHS submits a Report to Congress upon the completion of the
assessment. Notably, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
and the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) have reviewed and
written favorably of the methodology DHS uses in conducting these
assessments.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ DHS report OIG-13-07 ``The Visa Waiver Program,'' November
2012. GAO report GAO-16-498 ``Visa Waiver Program,'' May 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Separately, DHS also conducts an annual assessment of all 38 VWP
countries against the risk criteria defined in the Visa Waiver Program
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (VWP
Improvement Act), passed under this committee's leadership, and engages
in on-going monitoring of member countries to rapidly identify emerging
threats and vulnerabilities.
The bottom line is that in order to join or continue in the VWP, a
country cannot represent a threat to the United States and must be
working as a partner to prevent terrorist travel. In all instances, the
Secretary of Homeland Security retains the statutory authority to
suspend or terminate a country's participation in the VWP if there is a
credible threat originating from that country that poses an imminent
danger to the United States or its citizens.
Under the VWP Improvement Act, VWP countries are now required to
issue high-security electronic passports (e-passports); implement
information-sharing arrangements to exchange criminal and terrorist
identity information; establish mechanisms to validate e-passports at
each key POE; report all lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL or
directly to the United States no later than 24 hours after the country
becomes aware of the loss or theft; conclude a U.S. Federal Air
Marshals agreement; collect and analyze Advance Passenger Information
(API)/Passenger Name Record (PNR) information to identify high-risk
travelers; screen international travelers against the INTERPOL Stolen
and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database and notices; report foreign
fighters to multilateral security organizations, such as INTERPOL or
EUROPOL; and cooperate with the United States in the screening of
refugees and asylum seekers.
Since passage of the Act, DHS has confirmed the following changes
among VWP countries:
An increase in the sharing of terrorist and criminal
identity information;
Several countries \8\ have increased the frequency of their
reporting of lost and stolen passports--VWP countries account
for over 70 percent of the almost 73 million lost and stolen
travel documents reported to INTERPOL;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Including Brunei, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several countries have agreed to adopt new technologies to
work with DHS to jointly vet asylum, refugee, and other
immigration applications against each other's data,
establishing a formidable force multiplier for detecting
criminals, terrorists, and unqualified applicants; and
All VWP countries are now issuing and using for travel to
the United States fraud-resistant e-passports that meet or
exceed the International Civil Aviation Organization standards.
In addition, following the enactment of the VWP Improvement Act,
DHS has taken several steps to apply enhanced restrictions on visa-free
travel under the VWP for individuals who have traveled to Iran, Iraq,
Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, or Yemen or individuals who are dual
nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. Beginning January 13, 2016,
CBP initiated a protocol to identify ESTA holders who had travelled to
Iraq, Syria, Iran, or Sudan since March 1, 2011 who may be ineligible
for future travel if they do not meet the criteria for a waiver allowed
for under the Act. On February 18, 2016, DHS announced that individuals
who had travelled to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen also may be ineligible
for future travel if they do not meet the criteria for a waiver.\9\
Additionally, on January 21, 2016, CBP began denying new ESTA
applications and revoking existing ESTAs for individuals who indicated
dual nationality with Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ In fiscal year 2016, since implementing the new travel and dual
nationality restrictions to the Visa Waiver Program, CBP denied,
canceled, or revoked 39,303 ESTA applications. These individuals would
not be eligible to travel under the VWP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2014, in response to increasing concerns regarding
foreign terrorist fighters, DHS strengthened the security of the VWP
through the addition of new data elements to the ESTA application.
These enhancements included a series of additional questions a VWP
traveler must answer on the ESTA application, to include other names/
aliases, citizenships, contact information, and city of birth.
arrival processing
CBP's use of advance information, its pre-departure targeting
operations, and its overseas footprint all comprise critical parts of
CBP's multi-layered security strategy to address concerns long before
they reach the physical border of the United States. U.S. law requires
all private and commercial air and sea carriers operating routes to,
from, or through the United States to provide API and PNR data to CBP.
These data, which include travelers' biographic and travel reservation
information, are screened against U.S. and international law
enforcement and counterterrorism databases to identify high-risk
individuals before they fly to the United States. Even if issued a visa
or other travel authorization, however, it is important to note that
upon arrival in the United States, all persons are subject to
inspection by CBP officers. CBP officers review entry documents, query
CBP and other law enforcement databases, collect biometrics (including
from VWP travelers),\10\ and interview all travelers to determine the
purpose and intent of their travel, and whether any further inspection
is necessary based on, among other things, National security,
admissibility, customs, or agriculture concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Biometrics are collected for most foreign nationals arriving
at U.S. airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of note, CBP's Tactical Terrorism Response Teams (TTRT) are
deployed at U.S. POEs and consist of CBP officers who are specially
trained in counterterrorism response. TTRT officers utilize information
derived from targeting and inspection to mitigate possible threats.
TTRT officers are immersed in the current and developing threat picture
through the continuous review of information, and are responsible for
the examination of travelers identified within the Terrorist Screening
Database, and other travelers suspected of having a nexus to terrorism
who arrive to a POE. For fiscal year to date,\11\ as a result of the
dedicated efforts of the men and women serving on CBP's TTRT, and the
information discovered during secondary inspection, nearly 600 people
who had been granted visas or other travel documents, or had an
approved ESTA, have been refused admission to the United States. CBP
officers and agents remain our last line of defense against those who
would seek to enter the country to do us harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ As of April 19, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, CBP officers remove from circulation counterfeit,
fraudulent, and altered travel documents, as well as lost or stolen
travel documents presented for use by an individual other than the
rightful holder, such as those presented by impostors. CBP currently
uses 1:1 facial comparison technology at select primary lanes at John
F. Kennedy International Airport and Washington Dulles International
Airport on U.S. and non-U.S. travelers arriving in the United States.
This technology enables CBP officers to use facial recognition
technology as a tool to assist in determining whether an individual
presenting a valid e-passport is the same individual whose photograph
is contained in that passport. In those cases where the CBP officer is
unsure of the traveler's true identity, the traveler is referred for
additional checks to confirm identity or to document fraudulent use of
a passport. Since this technology was deployed in early 2016, over
400,000 travelers have had their identities confirmed with the use of
1:1 facial comparison technology.
Finally, CBP's Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit (FDAU) serves as
the central repository and point of analysis for all fraudulent travel
documents interdicted or recovered by CBP personnel. FDAU analysis of
fraudulent documents provides intelligence, alerts, and training back
to the field, as well as serves as a mechanism to remove fraudulent
documents from circulation to prevent their further use--a lesson
learned from the 9/11 Commission Report. This cyclical process adds a
layer of security to the homeland by removing an additional opportunity
for misuse.
identifying and apprehending threats to national security and public
safety within the united states
An important mission of DHS is to actively identify and initiate
enforcement action on persons who have overstayed their terms of
admission in the United States and who pose a threat to national
security, border security, or public safety. ICE undertakes this very
important activity for DHS. Within ICE, there are dedicated units,
special agents, analysts, and systems in place to address nonimmigrant
overstays. Through investigative efforts, ICE analyzes and determines
which overstay leads may be suitable for further National security
investigation. Once leads are received, ICE conducts both batch and
manual vetting against Government databases, public indices, and social
media (when appropriate). This vetting helps determine if an individual
who overstayed has departed the United States, adjusted to a lawful
status, has a pending immigration benefit application, or would be
appropriate for an enforcement action.
As part of this tiered review, ICE prioritizes nonimmigrant
overstay cases through risk-based analysis. ICE Homeland Security
Investigation's (HSI) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
(CTCEU) oversees the National program dedicated to the investigation of
nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a National security risk and/
or public safety concern. Each year, CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds
of thousands of potential status violators after preliminary analysis
of data from various Government systems, including the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and CBP's Arrival and
Departure Information System (ADIS), along with other information.
After this analysis, CTCEU establishes compliance or departure dates
from the United States and/or determines potential violations that
warrant field investigations.
CTCEU proactively develops cases for investigation in furtherance
of the overstay mission, monitors the latest threat reports, and
addresses emergent issues. This practice, which is designed to detect
and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk factors based on
intelligence reporting, travel patterns, and in-depth criminal research
and analysis, has contributed to DHS's counterterrorism mission by
initiating and supporting high-priority National security initiatives
based on specific intelligence.
In fiscal year 2015, CTCEU reviewed 971,305 leads regarding
potential overstays. Numerous leads were closed through an automated
screening and vetting process. The most common reason for closure was
subsequent departure from the United States. A total of 9,968 leads
were sent to HSI field offices for investigation. As a result in fiscal
year alone, HSI made 1,910 arrests, secured 86 indictments, and
obtained 80 convictions.
CTCEU refers leads that do not meet ICE HSI criteria for further
investigation to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations' National
Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center.
conclusion
The men and women of DHS and its component agencies do a tremendous
job every day to protect our country. As terrorists and criminals
change their methods and tactics and technologies continue to evolve,
DHS will work with its interagency and foreign partners--as well as
private-sector partners--to adapt and respond swiftly and effectively
to prevent their entry into the United States.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. We look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Settles.
Mr. Ramotowski. Am I saying it right? Ramotowski or
Ramotowski.
Mr. Ramotowski. That is absolutely right, Ramotowski.
Mr. Gallagher. Ramotowski. I apologize if I butchered that
before. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. RAMOTOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF VISA SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ramotowski. Thank you, Chairman Gallagher, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the
committee. I am pleased to assure you that the Department of
State takes our commitment to protect America's borders and
citizens very seriously. Toward this end, we constantly analyze
and update our screening and clearance procedures.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. visa system is a layered interagency
effort focused first and foremost on National security.
Beginning with a petition to DHS, or a visa application
submitted to a consular section abroad, during the interview,
prior to travel, upon arrival in the United States, and while
the traveler is in the United States, the Department of State
works together with our National law enforcement and
intelligence partners to protect our borders.
The vast majority of visa applicants and all immigrant visa
applicants are interviewed in person by a consular officer.
Each consular officer completes an extensive training program
which has a strong emphasis on border security, fraud
prevention, interagency coordination, and interviewing
techniques.
In addition to that, 122 assistant regional security
officer investigators at 107 diplomatic posts world-wide work
with consular officers to bring additional law enforcement and
antiterrorism expertise to the visa process.
All visa applicants are vetted against databases, which
contain millions of records of individuals found ineligible for
visas in the past or regarding whom potentially derogatory
information exists on terrorist, criminal, or other grounds. We
collect 10 fingerprint scans from nearly all these applicants,
and screen them against the DHS and FBI databases of known and
suspected terrorists, wanted persons, immigration law
violators, and criminals.
All visa applicants are screened against photos of known or
suspected terrorists and prior visa applicants. When an
interview raises any concerns that the applicant may be a
threat to National security, or the interagency screening
process shows potentially derogatory information, the consular
officer suspends the visa processing and submits a request for
a Washington-based interagency security advisory opinion
review, which is conducted by Federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, as well as the Department of State.
As my colleague noted, the Department of Homeland
Security's PATRIOT system and the Visa Security Program provide
additional protections at certain of our overseas posts. DHS
Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agents assigned to
29 embassies and consulates in high-threat locations provide
on-site vetting of visa applications, as well as other law
enforcement support and training to consular officers.
But security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued.
The Department and partner agencies continuously match new
threat information with our records of existing visas, and we
use our authority to revoke those visas when warranted. We
refuse more than 2 million visa applications each year. Since
2001, the Department has revoked more than 160,000 visas based
on information that surfaced after the issuance of the visa.
This includes nearly 11,000 visas potentially revoked after
information emerged, post-issuance, suggesting possible links
to terrorism. Notice of these revocations is shared across the
interagency in near-real time.
Executive Order 13780 on Protecting the Nation from
Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals signed by the President
of March 6, 2017, and the Presidential Memorandum on Heightened
Screening articulate the administration's commitment to
rigorously and continuously upgrade and refine our screening
and vetting processes to keep this country safe.
These actions range from interagency efforts to harmonize
screening and vetting standards across multiple immigration
programs to focusing on ways to improve our ability to deport
criminal aliens.
Additionally, the Department recently instructed posts
world-wide to develop criteria for identifying sets of visa
applicant populations that warrant increased scrutiny. We have
likewise heightened vetting for any visa applicant who was ever
present in any ISIS-controlled territory.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee,
the Department of State's highest priority is the safety of our
fellow citizens at home and overseas. Every visa decision is a
National security decision. We appreciate the support of the
Congress as we constantly work to strengthen our system. I
would encourage you to visit our consular sections when you are
abroad to see how we do this on a daily basis. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramotowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward J. Ramotowski
May 3, 2017
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
distinguished Members of the committee, and thank you for this
opportunity to testify at today's hearing. The Department of State is
fully dedicated to the protection of our borders. We have no higher
priority than the safety of our fellow citizens at home and overseas.
We and our partner agencies throughout the Federal Government have
built a layered visa and border security screening system, and continue
to refine and strengthen the five pillars of visa security:
Technological advances, biometric innovations, personal interviews,
data sharing, and training. We are the first line of defense in border
security, as the Department of State is often the first U.S. Government
agency to have contact with foreign nationals wishing to travel to the
United States, and we fully share your commitment to preventing
individuals from exploiting the visa process as a means of entering our
country with the intent to do harm.
This layered approach enables the Department of State to track and
review the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors from their
visa applications to their entry into the United States. Lessons
learned through the years have led to significant improvements in
procedures and capabilities. At the same time, recent terror incidents
both overseas and at home have demonstrated the changing nature of
threats and our obligation to constantly analyze, test, and update our
clearance procedures. We will never stop doing so.
a layered approach to visa security
In coordination with interagency partners, the Department has
developed, implemented, and refined an intensive visa application and
screening process. We require personal interviews in most cases,
including all immigrant and fiance cases, employ analytic interviewing
techniques, and incorporate multiple biographic and biometric checks in
the visa process. Underpinning the process is a sophisticated global
information technology network that shares data among the Department
and Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Security is our
primary mission. Every visa decision is a National security and public
safety decision. The rigorous security screening regimen I describe
below applies to all visa categories.
Visa applicants submit on-line applications--the on-line DS-160
nonimmigrant visa application form, or the on-line DS-260 immigrant
visa application form. On-line forms enable consular and fraud
prevention officers, and our intelligence and law enforcement partners,
to analyze data in advance of the visa interview, including the
detection of potential non-biographic links to derogatory information.
The on-line forms offer foreign language support, but applicants must
respond in English, to facilitate information sharing among the
Department and other Government agencies.
Consular officers use a multitude of tools to screen visa
applications. No visa can be issued unless all relevant concerns are
fully resolved. The vast majority of visa applicants--including all
applicants for which there are any concerns--are interviewed by a
consular officer. During the interview, consular officers pursue case-
relevant issues pertaining to the applicant's identity, qualifications
for the particular visa category in question, and any information
pertaining to possible ineligibilities including those related to
criminal history, prior visa applications or travel to the United
States, and/or links to terrorism and other security threats.
Consular officers also employ a variety of statutory tools to
adjudicate visa applications. Under the law that applies to most
nonimmigrant visa classifications, if the consular officer believes a
nonimmigrant visa applicant may fail to abide by the requirements of
the visa category in question, the application will be refused under
section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). A consular
officer may also initially refuse a case under INA section 221(g) to
confirm information presented in the application, request additional
information from the applicant, request a security or legal review from
Washington, or pursue local leads or other information to determine
whether the applicant is subject to a security or non-security-related
ineligibility. In fiscal year 2016, consular officers denied 2,980,271
visas (includes both final and administrative refusals), conducted
138,324 fraud case reviews, and sent 36,258 requests for
reconsideration to USCIS for petitions previously approved.
As a matter of standard procedure, all visa applicant data is
reviewed through the Department's Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS), an on-line database containing approximately 36 million
records of persons, including those found ineligible for visas and
persons who are the subjects of potentially derogatory information,
drawn from records and sources throughout the U.S. Government. CLASS is
populated, in part, through an export of the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB), the Federal terrorism watch list. CLASS employs
sophisticated name-searching algorithms to identify accurate matches
between visa applicants and any derogatory information contained in
CLASS. We also run all visa applicants' names against the Consular
Consolidated Database (CCD, our internal automated visa application
record system) to detect and respond to any derogatory information
regarding visa applicants and visa holders, and to check for prior visa
applications, refusals, or issuances. The CCD contains more than 181
million immigrant and nonimmigrant visa records dating back to 1998.
This robust searching capability, which takes into account variations
in spelling and naming conventions, is central to our procedures.
We collect 10-print fingerprint scans from nearly all visa
applicants, except certain foreign government officials, diplomats,
international organization employees, and visa applicants over the age
of 79 or under the age of 14. Those fingerprints are screened against
two key databases: First, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
IDENT database, which is a database of available fingerprints of known
and suspected terrorists, wanted persons, and those who have committed
immigration violations; and second, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Next Generation Identification (NGI) system,
which contains more than 75.5 million criminal history records.
All visa photos are screened against a gallery of photos of known
or suspected terrorists obtained from the FBI's Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC), and against visa applicant photos contained in the
Department's CCD.
In 2013, in coordination with multiple interagency partners, the
Department launched the ``Kingfisher Expansion'' (KFE) counterterrorism
visa vetting system. While the precise details of KFE vetting cannot be
detailed in this document, KFE supports a sophisticated comparison of
multiple fields of information drawn from visa applications against
intelligence community and law enforcement agency databases in order to
identify terrorism concerns. If a ``red-light'' hit is communicated to
the relevant consular post, the consular officer suspends the
application and submits it for a Washington-based interagency Security
Advisory Opinion (SAO) review by Federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. In addition to this KFE ``red-light'' scenario,
consular officers are required to submit SAO requests in any case with
applicable CLASS name-check results, and for a variety of interagency-
approved policies developed to vet travelers that raise security
concerns, including certain categories of travelers with a particular
nationality or place of birth. In any case in which reasonable grounds
exist to question visa eligibility on security-related grounds or when
otherwise required by interagency policy, regardless of name-check
results, a consular officer suspends visa adjudication and requests an
SAO. Consular officers receive extensive training on the SAO process,
which under the aforementioned circumstances, requires them to deny the
visa per INA section 221(g) and submit the case for interagency review
via an SAO for any possible security-related ineligibilities. An
applicant subject to this review may be found eligible for a visa only
if the SAO process resolves all concerns.
DHS's Pre-adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence
Operations Team (PATRIOT) and Visa Security Program (VSP) provide
additional law enforcement review of visa applications at designated
overseas posts. PATRIOT is a pre-adjudication visa screening and
vetting initiative that employs resources from DHS/Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the
Department of State. It was established to identify National security,
public safety, and other eligibility concerns prior to visa issuance. A
team of agents, officers, and analysts from ICE and CBP perform manual
vetting of possible derogatory matches.
PATRIOT works in concert with the Visa Security Units (VSU) located
in 29 high-threat posts, and we are working with ICE to deploy VSUs to
more visa-issuing posts as rapidly as available resources will support.
ICE special agents assigned to VSUs provide on-site vetting of visa
applications and other law enforcement support to consular officers.
When warranted, DHS officers assigned to VSUs conduct targeted, in-
depth reviews of individual visa applications and applicants prior to
issuance, and can recommend refusal or revocation of applications to
consular officers. The Department of State works closely with DHS to
ensure that no known or suspected terrorist inadvertently receives a
visa or is admitted into our country.
training
Consular officers are trained to take all prescribed steps to
protect the United States and its citizens when making visa
adjudication decisions. Each consular officer completes an intensive,
6-week Basic Consular Course. This course features a strong emphasis on
border security and fraud prevention, with more than 40 classroom hours
devoted to security, counterterrorism, fraud detection, and visa
accountability programs which are supplemented by computerized self-
study tutorials to review this information. Adjudicators receive
extensive classroom instruction on immigration law, Department policy
and guidance, and consular systems, including how to review background
data checks and biometric clearances.
Students learn about the interagency vetting process through
briefings from the Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation; Consular Affairs' (CA) Office of Screening, Analysis,
and Coordination; CA's Counterfeit Deterrence Laboratory; Diplomatic
Security; and the DHS/ICE Forensic Document Laboratory.
In addition, officers receive in-depth interviewing and name-check
technique training, spending more than 30 classroom hours critiquing
real consular interviews, debriefing role plays, and participating in
other in-class activities. Basic interviewing training includes
instruction in techniques for questioning an applicant to elicit
information relevant to assessing visa eligibility. Officers practice
analyzing verbal and non-verbal cues to judge an applicant's
credibility and the veracity of the applicant's story. They examine and
assess documentation, including electronic application forms, internal
background check information, passports, and required supporting
documents during the interview.
Officers receive continuing education in all of these disciplines
throughout their careers. All consular officers have top-secret
clearances, and most speak the language of the country to which they
are assigned and receive training in the culture of the host country.
visas viper program
U.S. missions overseas report information about foreign nationals
with possible terrorist connections through the Viper reporting
program. Following the December 25, 2009 attempted terrorist attack on
Northwest Flight 253, we strengthened the procedures and content
requirements for Viper reporting. Chiefs of Mission are responsible for
ensuring that all appropriate agencies and offices at post contribute
relevant information for Viper nominations. Viper cables must include
complete information about all previous and current U.S. visas. On
December 31, 2009, we updated instructions regarding procedures and
criteria used to revoke visas. We added specific reference to cases
that raise security and other concerns to the guidance regarding
consular officers' use of the authority to deny visa applications under
INA section 214(b), if the applicant does not establish visa
eligibility to the satisfaction of the consular officer. Instruction in
appropriate use of this authority has been a fundamental part of
officer training for several years.
continuous vetting and visa revocation
Federal agencies have been matching new threat information against
existing visa records since 2002. We have long recognized this function
as critical to managing our records and processes. This system of
continual vetting evolved as post-9/11 reforms were instituted, and is
now performed in cooperation with the TSC, the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), FBI, DHS/ICE, and DHS/CBP's National
Targeting Center (NTC). All records added to the TSDB and Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) are checked against the CCD to
determine if there are matching visa records. In addition to
recurrently vetting against biographic data taken during the visa
process, biometric data taken during the visa process is likewise
available to interagency partners in their counterterrorism and law
enforcement efforts. Vetting partners send these matches electronically
to the Department of State, where analysts review the hits and flag
cases for possible visa revocation. We have information-sharing
agreements under which we widely disseminate our data to other agencies
that may need to learn whether a subject of interest has, or has ever
applied for, a U.S. visa.
The Department of State has broad authority to revoke visas, and we
use that authority widely to protect our borders. Cases for revocation
consideration are forwarded to the Department of State's Visa Office by
embassies and consulates overseas, NTC, NCTC, and other entities. As
soon as information is established to support a revocation (i.e.,
information that surfaced after visa issuance that could lead to an
ineligibility determination, or otherwise indicates the visa holder
poses a potential threat), a code showing the visa revocation, and
lookout codes indicating specific potential visa ineligibilities, are
added to CLASS, as well as to biometric identity systems, and then
shared in near-real time (within approximately 15 minutes) with the DHS
lookout systems used for border screening. As part of its enhanced pre-
departure screening, CBP uses these records, among other lookout codes,
to recommend that airlines not board certain passengers on flights
bound for the United States. Every day, we receive requests to review
and, if warranted, revoke visas for aliens for whom new derogatory
information has been discovered since the visa was issued. The
Department of State's Operations Center is staffed 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, to address urgent requests, such as when a potentially
dangerous person is about to board an aircraft. In those circumstances,
the Department of State can and does use its authority to revoke the
visa immediately. We continue to work with our interagency partners to
refine the visa revocation and associated notification processes.
Revocations are typically based on new information that has come to
light after visa issuance. Since individuals' circumstances change over
time, and people who once posed no threat to the United States can
become threats, continuous vetting and revocation are important tools.
We use our authority to revoke a visa immediately in circumstances in
which we believe there is an immediate threat, regardless of the
individual's location, after which we will notify the issuing post and
interagency partners as appropriate. We are mindful, however, not to
act unilaterally, but to coordinate expeditiously with our National
security partners in order to avoid possible disruption of important
investigations. In addition to the millions of visa applications we
refuse each year, since 2001, the Department has revoked approximately
160,000 visas, based on information that surfaced following visa
issuance, for a variety of reasons. This includes nearly 11,000 visas
prudentially revoked after information emerged post-issuance suggesting
possible for suspected links to terrorism.
going forward
We face dangerous and adaptable foes. We are dedicated to
maintaining our vigilance and strengthening the measures we take to
protect the American public. We will continue to apply state-of-the-art
technology to vet visa applicants. While increasing our knowledge of
threats, and our ability to identify and interdict those threats, the
interagency acts in accordance with the rules and regulations agreed
upon in key governance documents. These documents ensure a coordinated
approach to our security and facilitate mechanisms for redress and
privacy protection.
Executive Order 13780 on Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States (E.O.) signed by the President
on March 6, 2017, and the Presidential Memorandum on Heightened
Screening, articulate the administration's commitment to rigorously
enforce our immigration laws and continuously upgrade and refine our
screening and vetting processes to keep the people of the United States
safe. These actions range from interagency efforts to harmonize
screening and vetting standards across multiple immigration programs to
focusing on ways to improve our abilities to deport criminal aliens.
Additionally, the Department recently instructed posts globally to
develop criteria for identifying sets of visa applicant populations
warranting increased scrutiny. We have likewise heightened vetting for
any visa applicant that was ever present in ISIS-controlled territory,
for example. In addition, we are working with the Departments of
Homeland Security and Justice to implement these steps in compliance
with all relevant court orders.
We are taking several measures to confront developing threats and
respond to recent terrorist incidents both overseas and in the United
States.
We constantly analyze our current processes, including security
vetting, to identify areas where we could improve. We are working
closely with DHS and the interagency to explore and analyze the use of
social media screening of visa applicants. At the same time, we
continue to explore methods and tools that could assist in this type of
screening and potentially provide new methods to assess the credibility
of certain information from applicants. We believe these endeavors will
provide us insights to continue to ensure the visa process is as
secure, effective, and efficient as possible.
Information sharing with trusted foreign partners is an area that
has seen significant development in recent years. For example,
beginning in 2011 the Departments of State and Homeland Security
implemented arrangements for systematic information sharing with
Canada. The established processes provide for nearly real-time access
to visa and immigration data through matching of fingerprints, as well
as through biographic name checks for information that an applicant
previously violated immigration laws, was denied a visa, or is a known
or suspected terrorist. Canadian officers currently access the U.S.
records of Syrian nationals seeking refugee resettlement in Canada,
among other populations of visa and immigration applicants.
As part of our long-term strategic planning to improve efficiency
and accuracy in visa adjudications, we are investigating the
applicability of advanced technology in data analysis, risk screening,
and credibility assessment. Keeping abreast of high-tech solutions will
help us reduce threats from overseas while keeping the United States
open for business.
I assure you that the Department of State continues to refine its
intensive visa application and screening process, including personal
interviews, employing analytic interview techniques, incorporating
multiple biographic and biometric checks, and interagency coordination,
all supported by a sophisticated global information technology network.
We look forward to working with the committee on issues addressing our
National security in a cooperative and productive manner.
visa waiver program
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established as a pilot program in
1986 to more efficiently use U.S. Government resources. Since then, it
has been steadily strengthened. The program enables nationals of 38
participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or
business stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa but subject
to vetting through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA) that is equivalent to the checks done when issuing a visa.
Approximately 20 million people enter the United States each year under
this program, enabling the Department of State to focus more resources
on visa applicants from countries that do not meet VWP's high security
standards. The VWP enables the Department of State to focus more
resources on visa applicants who merit additional scrutiny. It also
allows us to benefit from information sharing with VWP countries.
All travelers coming to the United States under the VWP undergo the
same checks for ties to terrorism and are subject to the same multiple
layers of security reviews as visa applicants, including fingerprint
screening. While VWP travelers do not undergo a consular interview,
they are required to provide certain biographic information for
screening prior to travel through the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization. Only citizens of VWP countries with an ESTA approved by
DHS can travel to the United States under this program. Refugees,
asylum seekers, and non-citizen residents of VWP countries cannot
travel under VWP. The Department of State annually publishes the
visitor visa refusal rates for every country. This information garners
significant interest from countries aspiring to join VWP, as the
refusal rate is the most visible of the VWP requirements.
Members of the Visa Waiver Program are our closest and most
essential partners on counterterrorism. They are currently Andorra,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.
visa waiver program improvement and terrorist travel prevention act of
2015
Under the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel
Prevention Act of 2015, nationals of VWP countries who are also
nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria, or have traveled to or been
present in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Yemen, or Somalia on or
after March 1, 2011 are no longer eligible for VWP travel and require a
visa to travel to the United States.
Those nationals who travelled to these countries for official or
military service on behalf of a VWP country are statutorily exempt from
the new requirement. Also, under the new Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security may waive these travel-related VWP restrictions if he
determines that such a waiver is in the law enforcement or National
security interests of the United States. As a general matter, certain
types of travelers whose travel is in the U.S. National security
interest might include employees of humanitarian organizations,
journalists, and individuals who travel to Iraq or Iran for legitimate
business purposes. Such waivers are granted only on a case-by-case
basis. In fiscal year 2016, the Secretary of Homeland Security approved
211 such waivers.
Visa applications have increased by approximately 8 percent in Visa
Waiver Program countries since these legislative changes took effect in
early 2016. Our data indicate that through December 2016, we
facilitated visa services for 60,000 travelers affected by them. For
example, for those who need a U.S. visa for urgent business, medical,
or humanitarian travel to the United States, U.S. embassies and
consulates provide visa interview appointments on an expedited basis.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Ramotowski. We look forward
to doing just that.
Ms. Gambler, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good afternoon, Chairman Gallagher, Ranking
Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the task force. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify at today's hearing to
discuss GAO's work reviewing DHS's efforts to screen and
inspect travelers seeking to come to the United States. Each
year, millions of visitors legally enter the United States.
Some of them enter with a nonimmigrant visa, while others enter
the country under the Visa Waiver Program. Under this program,
nationals from 38 countries can apply for admission to the
United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure
for up to 90 days without obtaining a visa.
GAO has a body of work addressing DHS and other agencies'
efforts to screen travelers and manage and oversee the visa
process and the Visa Waiver Program. My remarks today reflect
our findings and recommendations related to these programs and
efforts.
First, with regard to CBP's screening efforts, CBP screens
travelers coming to the United States and seeks to identify
potentially high-risk travelers at the earliest point in the
travel life cycle. CBP also operates three predeparture
programs to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers
before they board U.S.-bound flights. These three programs are
preclearance, the immigration advisory and joint security
programs, and the regional carrier liaison groups.
Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and
serve as U.S. ports of entry. CBP officers at these locations
inspect travelers and make admissibility determinations prior
to an individual boarding a plane to the United States. Under
the immigration advisory and joint security programs, CBP
officers posted at foreign airports partner with air carriers
and host country government officials to help prevent
terrorists and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-
bound flights. Regional carrier liaison groups are located and
operate at domestic airports, and among other things, assist
air carriers with questions regarding U.S. admissibility
requirements and travel documents.
CBP data indicated that in fiscal year 2015, these programs
identified and interdicted approximately 22,000 high-risk air
travelers. However, we found that while CBP has data and
statistics on these programs, the agency has not evaluated the
effectiveness of these programs as a whole, including having
performance measures and baselines to assess whether the
programs are achieving their stated goals. We recommended that
CBP develop and implement such measures and baselines to better
measure the effectiveness of these predeparture programs, and
DHS concurred.
Second, with regard to the Visa Security Program, we
reported on efforts to expand the program and address
challenges in its operations. Under this program, ICE deploys
personnel to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to assist
the Department of State's consular officers with security
reviews of visa applications, among other things.
In our 2011 report on this program, we identified various
management and oversight challenges, such as limited guidance
regarding interactions between ICE officials and consular
officers, lack of comprehensive data for performance measures
to accurately evaluate the program, and variation from post to
post in the training of consular officers by ICE agents. We
also found that ICE did not track information on the time ICE
agents spent on non-Visa Security Program activities. We have
on-going work reviewing the Visa Security Program and visa
security efforts more broadly, and we plan to report on the
results of our work later this year.
Third, with regard to the Visa Waiver Program, last year we
reported on DHS's oversight of the program. In particular, we
reported that all 38 countries had entered into three
agreements required under the program to: No. 1, report lost
and stolen passports; No. 2, share identity information about
known or suspected terrorists; and No. 3, share criminal
history information. However, not all countries had shared such
information.
In August 2015, DHS established a new requirement for Visa
Waiver Program countries to implement the latter two
agreements. However, DHS did not establish time frames for
instituting these requirements.
We recommended that DHS specify time frames for working
with participating countries to address additional program
requirements, including the requirement to fully implement
these agreements, and DHS concurred with our recommendation.
In closing, our work on DHS's efforts to screen travelers
and manage the Visa Security Program and the Visa Waiver
Program has identified findings and recommendations to help
strengthen management and oversight of these programs and
efforts. DHS has actions planned or under way to address a
number of our recommendations, and we will continue to monitor
DHS's efforts.
This concludes my oral statement, and I am pleased to
answer any questions Members have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
May 3, 2017
Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of
the task force:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's body of work on U.S.
Government programs and activities related to screening foreign
nationals seeking to travel to the United States on a temporary basis--
either with a nonimmigrant visa, or in some cases, without a visa.\1\
Each year, millions of such temporary visitors legally enter the United
States. From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015, the Department
of State (State) issued more than 52 million visas for business travel,
pleasure, or for foreign and cultural exchange student programs, among
other things. In addition, from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year
2015, more than 116 million visitors were admitted to the United States
under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows nationals from 38
countries to apply for admission to the country as temporary visitors
for business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S.
embassy or consulate abroad.\2\
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\1\ Throughout this statement we generally use the term ``foreign
national'' to refer to an ``alien,'' which is defined under U.S.
immigration law as any person who is not a U.S. citizen or national.
See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(3). In addition, temporary visitors are
foreign nationals present in the United States on a temporary basis
pursuant to a specific nonimmigrant category (see 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. Sec. 214.1(a)(1)-(2)), including
those who are allowed to seek admission without a visa, such as Mexican
nationals and citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of
Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the
Bahamas) under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program
(VWP) participants. See 8 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 212.1, 214.6(d); 22 C.F.R.
Sec. Sec. 41.0 to 41.3. Foreign nationals seeking permanent status in
the United States must generally obtain an immigrant visa, which
provides a path to lawful permanent residency. For the purposes of this
statement, we use the term ``visa'' in reference to a nonimmigrant
visa.
\2\ See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1187. The VWP was established in 1986 as a
pilot program, under which the nationals of up to eight designated
countries which extended reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens and
nationals and fulfilled certain other program criteria, would not need
a visa for admission to the United States as temporary visitors during
the pilot program period. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, tit. III, pt. B, Sec. 313, 100 Stat. 3359,
3435-39. VWP became a permanent program in October 2000. See Visa
Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, tit. I, Sec. 101,
114 Stat. 1637 (2000).
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to identify and
interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United
States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human
traffickers, drug smugglers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the
earliest possible point in the travel life cycle to make the Nation's
physical borders the last, not the first, line of defense.\3\ DHS
adjudicates petitions for certain visa categories, and also has certain
responsibilities for strengthening the security of the visa process,
including establishing visa policy and managing the VWP. In particular,
DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among
other duties, securing U.S. borders and processing all travelers on
U.S.-bound flights; inspecting all people entering or applying for
admission to the United States; and screening VWP applicants to
determine their eligibility to travel to the United States under the
program. In addition, DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) oversees the Visa Security Program (VSP) under which it deploys
officials to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to strengthen the
visa process by working with State officials in reviewing visa
applications. State is responsible for visa adjudication and issuance
for foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States and is
responsible for managing the consular officer corps and its functions
at over 220 visa-issuing posts overseas.
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\3\ Foreign fighters are individuals who leave home, travel abroad
to terrorist safe havens, and join or assist violent extremist groups.
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Foreign nationals who wish to come to the United States on a
temporary basis and are not citizens or nationals of countries that
participate in the VWP must generally obtain a visa authorizing their
travel. U.S. law provides for the temporary admission of various
categories of nonimmigrants, such as tourists, foreign students,
diplomats, and temporary workers, who are admitted for an authorized
period of stay, consistent with any time limitation and other terms of
admission. The process for determining who will be issued or refused a
visa contains several steps, including document reviews; collection of
biometrics (fingerprints and full-face photographs); cross-referencing
an applicant's name and biometrics against multiple databases
maintained by the U.S. Government; and in-person interviews. Personal
interviews with consular officers are required by law for most foreign
nationals seeking visas. For an overview of the visa process, see
figure 1.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prior to this step, some nonimmigrant visas require petitioners to
file a petition on behalf of the beneficiary, or on their own behalf,
as appropriate, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is
responsible for approving or denying the petition, notifying the
petitioner, and sending the approved petition to the Department of
State.
The VWP was established in 1986 to facilitate the legitimate travel
of visitors for business or pleasure to the United States. Qualifying
nationals from the 38 countries participating in the VWP--for example,
France, Germany, and Hungary--may travel without a visa to the United
States for business or pleasure stays of up to 90 days.\4\ In 2007,
Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which mandated several changes to
modernize the program through enhanced bilateral cooperation on
critical counterterrorism and information-sharing initiatives, support
and expansion of tourism and business opportunities to enhance long-
term competitiveness, and strengthening of bilateral relationships.\5\
In particular, the U.S. Government began requiring each VWP country to
enter into a
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\4\ The 38 VWP countries include Taiwan. Although the United States
does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations
Act provides that ``[w]henever the laws of the United States refer or
relate to foreign countries, nations, States, governments, or similar
entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with
respect to Taiwan.'' Pub. L. No. 96-8, Sec. 4(b), 93 Stat. 14, 15
(1979) (classified at 22 U.S.C. Sec. 3303).
\5\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. VII, subtit. B, Sec. 711, 121 Stat.
266, 338-45.
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Lost and Stolen Passport (LASP) agreement to report
information about the theft or loss of passports,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6)
arrangement to share watch list information about known or
suspected terrorists,\6\ and
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\6\ Among other things, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-6--Integration and Use of Screening Information, issued on
September 16, 2003, directed the Secretary of State to develop a
proposal for enhancing cooperation with certain foreign governments,
beginning with those countries for which the United States has waived
visa requirements, to establish appropriate access to terrorism
screening information of the participating governments.
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Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreement to
establish frameworks for enhanced law enforcement cooperation,
including sharing of criminal history information.
The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention
Act of 2015, which became law in December of that year, amended certain
requirements to provide enhanced security measures for the program,
among other purposes.\7\
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\7\ Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. O, tit. II, 129 Stat. 2242, 2988-95.
The law now prohibits individuals who are nationals of VWP countries
who have been present in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, or
Yemen on or after March 1, 2011, from traveling or being admitted to
the United States through the VWP, with certain exceptions. According
to CBP, these new eligibility requirements do not bar travel to the
United States; instead, a national of a VWP country who does not meet
the requirements must obtain a visa for travel to the United States.
The law also now requires that countries fully implement passenger
information exchange agreements in order to participate in the VWP.
Additional requirements have been added regarding machine-readable,
electronic passports for individuals; country certifications of a
mechanism to validate passports; termination of designation for
countries that fail to share information or fail to screen individuals
admitted to, or departing, the country for unlawful activity;
designation of high-risk program countries that may be suspended from
the program; and other enhancements to the electronic system for travel
authorization.
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My testimony discusses: (1) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-
risk travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, (2) ICE's management
of the VSP, and (3) DHS's oversight of the VWP. This testimony is based
on our prior reports, in particular, those published in March 2011, May
2016, and January 2017.\8\ For these reports, we examined program
documentation, such as standard operating procedures and agencies'
policies and guidance, as well as agency data on program performance.
We also interviewed DHS and State officials, among others, in
headquarters and at U.S. embassies and consulates. Additional details
on the scope and methodology are available in our published reports. In
addition, this statement contains updates to selected information from
these reports. For the updates, we collected information from DHS on
actions it has taken to address findings and recommendations made in
prior reports on which this statement is based. All of our work was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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\8\ GAO, Border Security: CPB Aims to Prevent High-Risk Travelers
from Boarding U.S.-Bound Flights, but Needs to Evaluate Program
Performance, GAO-17-216 (Washington, DC: Jan. 24, 2017); Visa Waiver
Program: DHS Should Take Steps to Ensure Timeliness of Information
Needed to Protect U.S. National Security, GAO-16-498 (Washington, DC:
May 5, 2016); and, Border Security: DHS's Visa Security Program Needs
to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk World-
wide, GAO-11-315 (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2011).
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cbp's air predeparture programs interdict high-risk air travelers, but
cbp has not fully assessed the programs' performance
CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers Before They Board
U.S.-Bound Flights
As we reported in January 2017, CBP electronically vets all
travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so
until they land at a U.S. port of entry.\9\ Through these vetting
efforts, CBP seeks to identify high-risk travelers from the millions of
individuals who travel to the United States each year. As we reported
in January 2017, CBP's vetting and targeting efforts are primarily
conducted by its National Targeting Center (NTC) and entail: (1)
Traveler data matching and analysis, (2) rules-based targeting, and (3)
recurrent vetting. Specifically:
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\9\ GAO-17-216. Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the
controlled entry into or departure from the United States.
Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location
(seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers inspect
persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the
United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law.
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CBP's primary method of identifying high-risk individuals is
through the comparison of travelers' information (such as name,
date of birth, and gender)\10\ against records extracted from
U.S. Government databases, including the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB)--the U.S. Government's consolidated terrorist
watch list.\11\ Traveler data matching focuses on identifying
known high-risk individuals--that is, individuals who may be
inadmissible to the United States under U.S. immigration law or
who may otherwise pose a threat to homeland or National
security. CBP's primary tool for vetting and targeting
travelers is the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a
computer-based enforcement and support system that compares
traveler information against intelligence and law enforcement
data to identify high-risk travelers. Traveler data matching
occurs throughout the travel process and, upon a positive or
possible match, CBP officers can select these individuals for
further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.
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\10\ According to CBP officials, information from both the Advance
Passenger Information System, which includes biographical information
such as full name, date of birth, gender, flight number, date of
arrival and departure, citizenship, and passport/alien registration
card number, among others, and the Passenger Name Record, which refers
to reservation information contained in an air carrier's electronic
reservation system and/or departure control system that sets forth the
identity and travel plans of each traveler or group of travelers
included under the same reservation record, are utilized in the
targeting and vetting of individuals attempting to travel to the United
States. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44909; 19 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 122.49a, 122.49d.
\11\ Information in the TSDB comes from two sources: The National
Counterterrorism Center, which provides information on known or
suspected international terrorists, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, which provides information about known or suspected
domestic terrorists. For more information about the process by which
the U.S. Government manages this watch list, see GAO, Terrorist
Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions Since the
December 29, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts,
GAO-12-476 (Washington, DC: May 31, 2012).
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CBP's rules-based targeting efforts seek to identify unknown
high-risk travelers--that is, travelers for whom U.S.
Government entities do not have available derogatory
information directly linking them to terrorist activities or
any other actions that would make them potentially inadmissible
to the United States but who may present a threat and thus
warrant additional scrutiny. CBP identifies unknown high-risk
individuals by comparing their information against a set of
targeting rules based on intelligence, law enforcement, and
other information. NTC officials stated that these rules have
identified potential high-risk travelers, including potential
foreign fighters. Rules-based targeting evaluates travelers
during the travel process and, in some cases, in advance of the
travel process. If a traveler is a rule ``hit,'' this
individual can be selected for further vetting, interviewing,
and inspection.\12\
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\12\ In general, when a traveler is identified through rules-based
targeting, the traveler is considered to have hit a rule.
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CBP supports its traveler data matching and rules-based
targeting efforts through the use of recurrent vetting. NTC's
vetting, targeting, and traveler data matching activities in
ATS run 24 hours a day and 7 days a week and automatically scan
updated traveler information, when available. This process is
to ensure that new information that affects a traveler's
admissibility is identified in near-real time. Recurrent
vetting occurs throughout the travel process and continues
until a traveler arrives at a domestic port of entry. For
example, after checking into a foreign airport, a traveler may
have his or her visa revoked for a security or immigration-
related violation. Due to recurrent vetting, CBP would be
alerted to this through ATS and could take action, as
appropriate.
CBP's Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk Travelers on U.S.-
Bound Flights, but CBP Has Not Evaluated Overall Effectiveness
of Air Predeparture Programs
As we reported in January 2017, throughout the travel process,
CBP's predeparture programs use the results of NTC's efforts to
identify and interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United
States while they are still overseas; however, we found that CBP had
not evaluated the effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a
whole, including implementing a system of performance measures and
baselines to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated
goals.\13\
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\13\ GAO-17-216.
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CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible
for all U.S.-bound air travelers--Preclearance; The Immigration
Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the
regional carrier liaison groups (RCLG). As we reported in January 2017,
CBP data indicated that these programs identified and ultimately
interdicted approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year
2015, the most recent data available at the time of our review.
Information on individuals who the NTC identifies through traveler data
matching or rules-based targeting, including recurrent vetting, is
compiled automatically through ATS into a daily high-priority list, or
traveler referral list. CBP officers at the NTC review the traveler
referral list for accuracy and to remove, if possible, any
automatically-generated matches determined to not be potential high-
risk individuals. After this review, CBP officers at the NTC use ATS to
send the traveler referral list to officers at each Preclearance, IAP,
JSP, and RCLG location, as shown in figure 2.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Preclearance.--Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports
and serve as U.S. ports of entry. Preclearance operations began in 1952
in Toronto to facilitate trade and travel between the United States and
Canada. As of January 2017, CBP operated 15 air Preclearance locations
in six countries.\14\ Through the Preclearance program, uniformed CBP
officers at a foreign airport exercise U.S. legal authorities to
inspect travelers and luggage and make admissibility determinations
prior to an individual boarding a plane to the United States.\15\
According to CBP officials, an inspection at a Preclearance location is
the same inspection an individual would undergo at a domestic port of
entry, and officers conducting Preclearance inspections exercise the
same authority as officers at domestic ports of entry to approve or
deny admission into the United States.\16\ As a result, travelers
arriving at domestic air ports of entry from Preclearance locations do
not have to be re-inspected upon entry.\17\ According to CBP data, in
fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at Preclearance locations determined
that 10,648 air travelers were inadmissible out of the approximately 16
million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through a
Preclearance location. In addition to requiring that all travelers
undergo a primary inspection, CBP officers in these locations also
referred almost 290,000 individuals for secondary inspection.\18\
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\14\ See 19 C.F.R. Sec. 101.5. CBP's Preclearance location in
Victoria, Canada, only processes maritime travelers and, as a result,
we did not include it in our January 2017 report. See GAO-17-216.
\15\ See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1103(a)(7); 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1629. See also 8
C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 235.1, 235.5; 19 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 148.22, 162.6,
162.8; and Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125,
tit. VIII, subtit. B, Sec. 813, 130 Stat. 122, 217-18 (2016)
(classified at 19 U.S.C. Sec. 4432) (authorizing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to establish and maintain CBP preclearance operations
in a foreign country).
\16\ Individuals denied admission to the United States at a
Preclearance location are not permitted to proceed beyond the point of
inspection and, thus, are unable to board a flight to the United
States.
\17\ According to CBP officials, in accordance with CBP's current
Preclearance agreements and processes, CBP officers retain the
authority to inspect these travelers and their accompanying goods or
baggage after arriving in the United States should further inspection
be warranted.
\18\ Primary inspection refers to the procedure that CBP uses to
conduct an initial inspection of individuals seeking to enter the
United States to determine if additional review or scrutiny is needed
to ensure compliance with U.S. law. Persons who need additional
scrutiny and persons selected as part of a random selection process are
subjected to a more detailed review called a secondary inspection. This
involves, for example, a closer inspection of travel documents and
possessions, additional questioning by CBP officers, and cross
references through multiple law enforcement databases to verify the
traveler's identity, background, purpose for entering the country, and
other appropriate information.
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Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program
(JSP).--IAP and JSP operate at 9 and 2 foreign airports, respectively,
as of January 2017. According to CBP officials, under this program,
unarmed, plainclothes CBP officers posted at foreign airports partner
with air carriers and host country government officials to help prevent
terrorists and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-bound
flights by vetting and interviewing them before travel.\19\ According
to CBP program documentation, CBP established IAP in 2004 to prevent
terrorists, high-risk travelers, and improperly documented travelers
from boarding airlines destined to the United States. Building on the
IAP concept, CBP established JSP in 2009 to partner with host country
law enforcement officials to identify high-risk travelers. CBP officers
at IAP and JSP locations have the ability to question travelers and
review their travel documents. They are to act in an advisory manner to
the air carriers and host governments and do not have authority to deny
boarding to individuals on U.S.-bound flights or fully inspect
travelers or their belongings. IAP and JSP officers are authorized by
CBP to make recommendations to airlines as to whether to board or deny
boarding (known as a no-board recommendation) to selected travelers
based on their likely admissibility status upon arrival to the United
States. The final decision to board travelers, however, lies with the
carriers. According to CBP data, CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations
made 3,925 no-board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the
approximately 29 million air travelers bound for the United States from
such locations. During this same time period, CBP data indicated 1,154
confirmed encounters with individuals on the TSDB, including 106 on the
No-Fly List.\20\
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\19\ See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1225a(b).
\20\ A confirmed encounter refers to when a representative of the
U.S. Government (in this case a CBP officer) comes into contact, either
through physical interviewing or inspection or through electronic
vetting, with an individual whose identity is confirmed as a match to a
record in the TSDB. The No-Fly List, which is a subset of the TSDB,
identifies individuals prohibited from boarding flights to, from,
within, or overflying the United States.
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Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG).--RCLGs are located and
operate at three domestic airports--Miami International Airport, John
F. Kennedy International Airport, and Honolulu International Airport.
CBP established RCLGs in 2006 to assist air carriers with questions
regarding U.S. admissibility requirements and travel document
authenticity. According to CBP officials, RCLGs are responsible for
coordinating with air carriers on all actionable referrals from NTC on
U.S.-bound travelers departing from an airport without an IAP, JSP, or
Preclearance presence. Each RCLG is assigned responsibility for
travelers departing out of a specific geographic location.\21\ Similar
to IAP and JSP, CBP officers in RCLGs also make no-board
recommendations, as appropriate, to air carriers. CBP officers at RCLGs
do not have authority to make admissibility determinations about U.S.-
bound air travelers, and the final decision to board or not board a
traveler lies with the carrier. CBP officers working at the three RCLGs
made 7,664 no-board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the
approximately 59 million travelers bound for the United States from
locations within the RCLGs' spheres of responsibility. During this time
period, CBP data indicated that RCLGs also reported 1,634 confirmed
encounters with individuals in the TSDB, including 119 on the No-Fly
List.
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\21\ RCLGs are not responsible for travelers departing from
Preclearance locations.
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In January 2017, we reported that CBP had not evaluated the
effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including
implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to assess
whether the programs were achieving their stated goals.\22\ We reported
that CBP had taken some initial steps to measure the performance of
these programs. Specifically, CBP officials told us that they had
collected a large quantity of data and statistics regarding the actions
of their predeparture programs and had done so since program inception
for all programs. However, due to changes in operational focus,
technology updates, and the use of separate data systems at program
locations, CBP had not collected consistent data across all of its
predeparture programs. As a result, CBP did not have baseline data on
which to measure program performance. However, CBP officials stated at
the time that they had updated and uniform data collection systems that
were consistent across all predeparture programs, which would enable
CBP to identify performance baselines from fiscal year 2015 onward.
According to senior CBP officials, some of the results of these
programs were not easily measured. Officials also noted that relying on
data alone may not always present the most accurate picture of the true
impact of predeparture programs because changes to the travel process
or other factors may impact the programs in ways that are not fully
captured by the data. However, on the basis of our analysis of CBP's
documentation, including official hearing statements, and interviews
with program officials, we found that CBP used these data as indicators
of the programs' success.
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\22\ GAO-17-216.
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According to GAO's Program Evaluation Guide, which articulates best
practices for program evaluation, a program evaluation is a systematic
study using research methods to collect and analyze data to assess how
well a program is working and why.\23\ Moreover, consistent with
requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010,
performance measurement is the on-going monitoring and reporting of
program accomplishments, particularly toward pre-established goals, and
agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress
toward goals.\24\ Agencies can use performance measurement to make
various types of management decisions to improve programs and results,
such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and identify
problems and take corrective action. Therefore, we recommended that CBP
develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines
for each program to help ensure that these programs are achieving their
intended goals. By using data from fiscal year 2015, for example, to
develop initial baselines, CBP could better measure program performance
toward meeting stated goals. In response, CBP established a working
group to develop and implement a system of performance measures and
baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP's predeparture programs.
As of December 2016, the working group was gathering baseline data from
fiscal year 2015 to compare with fiscal year 2016 data. In February
2017, CBP officials stated that the working group had identified
potential performance measures but needs to further refine them. CBP
officials stated that they expect to complete this work by the end of
June 2017.
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\23\ GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G
(Washington, DC: January 2012). The best practices outlined in GAO-12-
208G are based on GAO studies, policy documents, and program evaluation
literature. To ensure the guide's competence and usefulness, drafts
were reviewed by selected GAO, Federal and State agency evaluators, and
evaluation authors and practitioners from professional consulting
firms.
\24\ See, generally, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993)
(GPRA) and Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (updating GPRA).
In particular, see 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1115 (relating to agency performance
plans and performance measurement).
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ice aims to strengthen screening of visa applicants through its visa
security program
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized DHS to assign officers
to each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued, and
also authorized DHS to immediately assign personnel to Saudi Arabia to
review all visa applications prior to final adjudication.\25\ In
response, DHS implemented the Visa Security Program (VSP) in 2003, and
as of March 2016, ICE had established 26 visa security units in 20
countries. VSP aims to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible
travelers from attempting to enter the United States by screening visa
applicants before the travel process begins. When reviewing
applications for visas under VSP, ICE screens applicant information to
identify applicants that potentially match records of individuals who
are known or suspected threats to the United States or have immigration
violations or derogatory information related to their criminal
histories. In accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS
officers assigned overseas are authorized to perform the following
functions:
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\25\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, tit. IV, subtit. C, Sec. 428(e), (i), 116
Stat. 2135, 2191 (classified at 6 U.S.C. Sec. 236(e), (i)).
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provide expert advice and training to consular officers
regarding specific security threats relating to the
adjudication of individual visa applications or classes of
applications,
review any such visa applications either on the initiative
of the employee of the department or at the request of a
consular officer, or other persons charged with adjudicating
such applications, and
conduct investigations with respect to consular matters
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland
Security.\26\
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\26\ See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 236(e)(2).
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In March 2011, we reported, among other things, on DHS's efforts to
expand VSP and challenges to VSP operations overseas.\27\ For example,
we found that training of consular officers by VSP agents varied from
post to post, with some consular officers at some posts receiving no
training. Therefore, we recommended that DHS issue guidance requiring
ICE to provide training for consular officers. DHS concurred and issued
guidance to enhance the training of consular officers by VSP offices
abroad.
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\27\ GAO-11-315.
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We also found that ICE did not gather comprehensive data on all the
performance measures needed to evaluate the VSP mission objectives and
that the data that ICE collected on VSP activities were limited by
inconsistencies. Therefore, we recommended that ICE collect reliable
data to allow it to accurately evaluate VSP performance. DHS did not
concur with this recommendation and stated that VSP captured all the
required performance metrics. However, as we reported, we determined
that ICE was collecting some data on the required performance measures,
but that the data were not sufficient to accurately demonstrate the
progress made toward the program's stated objectives. We continue to
believe that without collecting comprehensive data on performance
measures, DHS cannot accurately demonstrate progress of VSP in
enhancing National security. In addition, we found that VSP agents
performed various investigative and administrative functions beyond
their visa security responsibilities, which limited their time spent on
visa security activities, and ICE did not track this information in its
tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on
investigative and administrative functions. Therefore, we recommended
that ICE develop a mechanism to track the amount of time its agents
spent on visa security activities and other investigations to determine
appropriate staffing levels and resource needs for VSP operations. DHS
did not concur with our recommendation and stated that ICE tracked case
investigation hours through its case management system, and that adding
the metric to the VSP tracking system would be redundant. However, we
found at the time, according to ICE documentation, that ICE could not
accurately determine the amount of time that VSP agents spent on
investigative and visa security activities because ICE did not
distinguish between the hours logged by VSP agents and hours logged by
other ICE officials at posts abroad and that ICE did not maintain
accurate data on the time VSP agents spent on visa security activities
at posts.
ICE did not take action to implement these recommendations and we
continue to believe that it needs to take steps to address issues we
identified. We have on-going work assessing DHS, State, and other U.S.
agency efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process,
including oversight of VSP, in which we plan to follow up on the
findings and recommendations from our March 2011 report related to
ICE's efforts to enhance VSP performance measurement, among other
things. We plan to report later this year on the results of this work.
all vwp countries have entered into information-sharing agreements or
equivalents, but not all are sharing information as required
In May 2016, among other things, we reported that all 38 countries
participating in the VWP had entered into the three types of required
information-sharing agreements, or their equivalents, to: (1) Report
lost and stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known
or suspected terrorists, and (3) share criminal history
information.\28\ However, we reported that not all countries had shared
information through two of the agreements. Specifically, we reported
that all VWP countries reported passport information through the first
agreement, but about one-third of VWP countries were not sharing
terrorist identity information through the second agreement and about
one-third of the countries had not yet shared criminal history
information through the third agreement. Although U.S. agencies receive
law enforcement and National security information from VWP countries
through other means, such as multilateral entities, the U.S. Government
identified the information-sharing agreements as critical for
protecting the United States from nationals of VWP countries who might
present a threat. For example, as we reported, information provided
through HSPD-6 arrangements has enhanced U.S. traveler-screening
capabilities and improved U.S. agencies' ability to prevent known and
suspected terrorists from traveling to the United States. Prior to the
December 2015 enactment of the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and
Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, U.S. law required VWP
countries to enter into, but did not specifically require that
countries implement, the information-sharing agreements. DHS announced
in August 2015 that it had developed a new requirement that countries
implement the agreements by sharing information.\29\ However, as we
reported, DHS had not specified time frames for working with VWP
countries to institute this and other new VWP security requirements. In
May 2016, we recommended that DHS specify time frames for working with
VWP countries to institute the additional VWP security requirements,
including the requirement that the countries fully implement agreements
to share information about known or suspected terrorists through the
countries' HSPD-6 arrangements and PCSC agreements with the United
States. DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of April 2017,
reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on
time frames for implementing program requirements.
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\28\ GAO-16-498. In this statement, such required agreements are
referred to as both agreements and arrangements.
\29\ See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, Sec. 204(c)-(d), 129
Stat. at 2991-92 (requiring countries to fully implement information-
sharing agreements in order to participate in the VWP); 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1187(c)(2)(F).
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Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of
the task force, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you so much, Ms. Gambler. I guess sort
of going off that, one of the last points you made, Mr.
Dougherty, would you agree with GAO's assessment that one-third
of VWP countries are not currently in compliance with their
obligations? What happens when DHS discovers a country to be in
noncompliance or lacking in full implementation of their
obligations?
Mr. Dougherty. DHS, in the last GAO report, had agreed with
recommendations that GAO had made on the remarks made here. Our
point at this point in time is that the countries that are in
the Visa Waiver Program are in compliance. There are many ways
that DHS can engage those program countries to get further
compliance.
We engage them in many ways. Our assessments are
ordinarily--take place by going to those countries and looking
for them to make enhancements that we know that they can make.
So the Department is very interested in making sure that all
countries are current, and that is our position right now is
that the countries within the Visa Waiver Program are compliant
with both HSPD-6 and the other agreements that we expect from
them.
[Additional information follows:]
That assessment is not current. The May 2016 GAO report provided a
snapshot of how many countries were meeting the requirements for formal
information sharing of terrorist and serious criminal identities
immediately following the enactment of the enhanced requirements under
the VWP Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015.
Congress passed the Act in December 2015, and GAO's data collection for
this audit ended in January 2016. DHS concurred with GAO's
recommendation to engage with VWP countries, where needed, to ensure
that they meet, what were at the time, newly enacted requirements.
DHS, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, has
implemented GAO's recommendation to great success. Today, all VWP
countries have arrangements for sharing terrorist identities under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6). All VWP countries
also have signed Preventing and Combatting Serious Crime (PCSC) or
equivalent agreements, with six countries still needing to ratify. In
addition, these formal tools for information sharing supplement
existing informal channels that exist between the United States and
each VWP country and which DHS verifies to be occurring as part of its
VWP country assessments.
Mr. Gallagher. How often are those reviews conducted?
Mr. Dougherty. Ordinarily, they are every 2 years, but if
we find that somebody is not quite up to speed, we can
accelerate that and engage in more dialog with them.
Mr. Gallagher. Is that--if you find someone who is not up
to speed or noncompliant, is there a formal process for
addressing that or is it more an informal, hey, this is a
problem----
Mr. Dougherty. Well----
Mr. Gallagher [continuing]. Do something about it.
Mr. Dougherty. I think, technically--yes, right. We are
engaged at various levels in different governments, from the
top down over to law enforcement, so we can--we can have an
informal communication with them, we can also demarche them, if
we wish. So I think the process would come through DHS
headquarters eventually, if things were getting very serious,
in that we would have to tell them we are getting to a point
where we need to engage in some type of activity, such as
shortening the period of time in which your nationals can come
to the United States in order to get compliance from those
countries.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Ms. Gambler, just so I
understand. Is it GAO's position that DHS is currently not
meeting the 2-year time line for a compliance review, and if
so, what are the obstacles to adhering to that time line?
Ms. Gambler. In the report that we issued last year, as
well as in previous reports on the Visa Waiver Program, we did
find that DHS was not consistently submitting to Congress those
GAO reports within a timely fashion, and so we have made
recommendations to the Department to take steps to ensure that
those reports are submitted in a timely way.
Based on our work, following up on those recommendations,
DHS is taking steps to address that recommendation, but it
remains open at this point.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Mr. Ramotowski, your written
testimony states that the vast majority of visa applicants are
interviewed by a consular officer. Who wouldn't be? Who would
not be included in that vast majority? How does that process
work?
Mr. Ramotowski. Under the INA, there are some statutory
exemptions, which include diplomats and officials, children
under the age of 14, and individuals over the age of 79, and
individuals renewing a visa that has expired less than 12
months previously. But even with those exceptions, if there is
any kind of an indication in our screening and vetting process
that that applicant might present a threat, we can and do
conduct interviews.
Mr. Gallagher. Just when it comes to the screening and
vetting process, give me a sense of the overall--your
assessment of the overall workload of your consular officers
who, you know, we are asking them to do a very important job,
and also, what sort of training do they get in the questioning
process? Is it just a checklist, or what does that look like?
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, in terms of workload, we handle about
14 million visa cases of all types each year, refusing over 2
million, and issuing about 11\1/2\ million. The volume varies,
of course, by country, by region, and we limit our officers to
120 interviews per day.
The training that they get begins when they first join the
Department of State. They take the basic consular officer
training course at our training center out in Arlington, and
they are trained in the immigration law, interviewing
techniques, and law enforcement officers from various partner
agencies speak to these groups and have helped us develop our
training materials.
They are trained in the culture and language of the country
and region to which they are going. Once they have arrived at
their embassy or consulate duty station, they continue to get
in-service training. Most of our posts have a fraud prevention
unit that is focused exclusively on detecting, deterring, and
defeating fraud of all types, criminal activity, and the
personnel in that unit work with the line officers who are
conducting the interviews to ensure that the line officers are
aware of any recent scams, any fraud trends, things of that
sort. As officers progress through their careers, they will get
enhanced mid-level training, management training, leadership
training, and so forth. So it is a comprehensive process.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Ramotowski. One hundred
twenty seems like a lot. As a former military interrogator,
that is--we are asking them to do a lot.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Ms. Watson
Coleman, for 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would
like to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from
Massachusetts--oh, what happened to the gentleman from
Massachusetts?--be allowed to sit and question the witnesses as
well.
Mr. Gallagher. Without objection.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Second, I would like to yield my time
at this moment to Hon. Barragan, who has a time issue.
Mr. Gallagher. Ms. Barragan, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I represent the Los Angeles Port,
which is how we like to call it, America's port, one of the
largest ports, and I had a chance to visit with CBP down at the
port and to see what they do. The work that they do is so
excellent on making sure to secure our ports.
According to staffing numbers in March, CBP was almost
1,400 officers short of its staffing target, and likely,
thousands of officers below what your staffing model would
indicate is optimal for security and facilitation at our ports
of entry. While the men and women of CBP's office are doing
their best under the circumstances, at some point, security and
facilitation suffer.
Attrition is a problem and hiring is slow. Meanwhile, the
President has proposed hiring 5,000 additional Border Patrol
agents, but zero new CBP officers for our Nation's ports of
entry. What needs to be done to address CBP's staffing needs
for ports of entry?
Mr. Wagner. So you are correct, we are still about 1,400
officers short. We still have not fulfilled the original 2,000
that Congress provided to us about 3 years ago now. Thankfully,
our attrition is fairly low. We are at about 3.4 percent per
year in the CBP officer ranks, about 750 to 800 officers per
year.
But you are correct, the hiring has been slow. We are
barely keeping pace with the attrition right now, so I know we
continue to go through the entire hiring process from the
written exam to the polygraph to some of the other
requirements, and look at where people are failing out of the
process and how do we do a better job at recruiting, and how do
we get right people into this occupation and will take the jobs
where we need them.
So we are having a pretty extensive review of that with our
Office of Human Resources, and looking at ways to shorten the
process and get better applicants in, and then look at, you
know, like we can do with the military and veterans that are
coming out of service, and how do we--how do we make it a lot
easier for them to take these occupations?
As far as additional officers, you know, we annually submit
a workload staffing model report, which articulates our needs.
It is all based on the workload, the data, how long it takes to
perform each function that we have at the ports of entry. You
are correct, the numbers are still a couple of thousand in
that, and we submit that report annually to the Hill.
So in the mean time, you know, we look at balancing those
vacancies with the use of overtime and the use of technology to
help us do that so we are not vulnerable and we do close those
security gaps.
Ms. Barragan. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Ramotowski, Reuters has reported that Secretary
Tillerson had sent a series of internal cables, four in total,
to consulate and embassies abroad, instructing them of new
measures to increase vetting of visa applicants. In these
cables, Secretary Tillerson has directed U.S. consulates and
embassies to specifically identify population risks that
warrant, ``increased security,'' and to implement tougher
screening procedures for this particular group of people.
Applicants who fall into one of the tougher screen--
applicants who fall into one of the identifiable population
groups will be subjected to a higher level of security
screening. Have you worked to develop a uniform system for
identifying populations who pose a security threat?
Mr. Ramotowski. We are actually engaged in that process now
with our partner agencies, some of which are represented here
and others that are not, to do exactly that. You know, the
Department of State works with and tries to take a whole-of-
Government approach to analyzing and detecting potential
threats against our country, so we are in the process of doing
that.
The Secretary did direct embassies and consulates to begin
that process to focus on areas that--and groups that might
present a higher degree of risk and to ensure that those groups
get effective screening.
Ms. Barragan. Are we doing something to make sure it is a
uniform process, that there is a uniform standard?
Mr. Ramotowski. Yes. There is definitely a uniform standard
foundational base to our vetting process, which I outlined in
my initial comments. Every visa applicant--well, most visa
applicants give electronic fingerprints. Every visa applicant
is checked through our facial recognition system, through a
series of sophisticated biographic name checks, and so forth.
Ms. Barragan. If I could just quickly interrupt, because I
have a few seconds.
Mr. Ramotowski. Yes.
Ms. Barragan. My understanding is that the instruction was
for them to identify groups----
Mr. Ramotowski. Correct.
Ms. Barragan [continuing]. That could be a higher risk. So
my question is more of like how do you identify those
populations having a uniform standard?
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, the degree of risk is going to vary
with each particular region and country, and that is why we are
asking our folks in the field to meet with their other agency
counterparts to identify potential groups that present a higher
risk.
Certain regions, certain areas certainly do present a
higher risk than others, and, for example, to respond back to
the Chairman's question regarding 120 interviews, that is a
maximum. We will take all the time we need to drill down and
get to the bottom of an individual case in order to assure
ourselves that that applicant does not present a threat. So
that is what we are trying to do, to identify and focus our
resources on areas that present a greater risk.
Ms. Barragan. All right. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for 5 minutes for
questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask my
questions, I do want to commend you and Ms. Watson Coleman and
the others on this task force. Having led one of these last
term, what you are looking into is critically important to the
security of our country, and recognizing the diffusion, if you
will, of ISIS from strictly in the Syria and Iraq area to now
metastasizing, if you will, to other areas of world, it is
clear that they want to infiltrate the West, it is clear they
want to get into the United States, and these things that you
are looking into are very important and helps keep our country
secure, so I thank you for that.
I thank the whole panel for what you do to try and keep our
country safe and secure, and I appreciate that very much.
Mr. Wagner, I was troubled not by anything you said, but
the statistics you talked about, and being that you are still
down about 1,400 from the authorization you had. I know you
touched on it briefly, but if you could expound a little bit
more on what you are finding as the reasons for the delays and
what we can do to help you expedite that process?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. So it is--the numbers are about 1,000 from
the original 2,000, and then due to some of our reimbursable
agreements that we have entered into, that number is then
bumped up a little bit, so it is total about 1,400 officers
right now between what level we are funded from, from
appropriations, and then from the reimbursable agreements that
we have.
So we try to balance that, you know, try to balance that in
places where we can absorb that understaffing using overtime
and other means to be able to do that. What this also means is,
you know, sometimes we have to say no to additional requests
for service.
We are getting a lot of requests for service, a lot of
airports, land border locations coming in asking us to be able
to process more flights and more people. So we try to find
creative ways really to be able to do that.
Now, the process itself, we have made some progress in
shortening the length of time it takes to hire people. We have
done some work, what we call consolidated hiring hubs, where we
move some of those administrative procedures together, working
closely with the military to be able to do this. But, still,
when we look at the different steps in the process, and you
know, for people that apply for the job, you know, about half
of them don't even bother to show up for the written exam.
You know, and only about 38 percent of the people pass the
written exam, and then the other steps in the process, the
interview, the medical screening, the physical fitness
screening, you look at the polygraph, knocks out a lot of
people, and we have worked some exemptions to that, I
understand.
Mr. Katko. Just basically, the process you have set up just
substantially weeds out a ton of the people?
Mr. Wagner. It does.
Mr. Katko. Is that the biggest problem?
Mr. Wagner. We have got to get more sophisticated in the
recruiting and the advertising of these occupations. They are
great jobs, and we want to be able to put the right people in
them, of course, without also reducing our criteria for doing
so, which will hurt us down the road to do that for the job.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Mr. Wagner. So it is very strict. The backgrounds have to
be very strict, but they are very good Federal jobs, so we have
to just find the right people that are willing to take them in
the locations where we have those vacancies. Most of those
vacancies are on the Southwest Border area.
Mr. Katko. Gotcha. Thank you.
Mr. Settles, I want to switch gears for a minute. We spoke
previously about the use of biometrics and the importance of
biometrics, biometrics going forward in the enforcement of our
laws, and keeping our country safe and on an immigration
standpoint as well. So could you talk about some of the
advances that have taken place with respect to biometrics, and
any problems you see in gaining biometric data from various
agencies in pursuit of the Visa Waiver Program?
Mr. Settles. So I could talk about that generally. If it is
OK, I would like to make a correction to the record. In my
statement, I added a zero to a number. I actually meant to say
8,599 recommended refusals from our VSP post, not 85,000, so I
just wanted to correct that for the record.
What I can say is ICE HSI doesn't play as large a role. We
are more of a consumer of that information. We do have a
program that is under way that we are working with DOD that I
would have to probably share in a more Classified setting.
Mr. Katko. I understand.
Mr. Settles. Which we would love to, but I would probably
yield to my other esteemed colleagues here at the State
Department and CBP to talk a little bit more about the
biometric side of it.
Mr. Katko. OK. Someone like to take that?
Mr. Ramotowski. I can.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Ramotowski.
Mr. Ramotowski. Yes, thank you. The Department of State
shares all of the information we collect through the visa
process with our interagency partners, and that includes, of
course, the electronically collected fingerprints, which go
into the DHS IDENT database, and it is accessible to all of our
DHS partners, as well as FBI. We send the fingerprints for
screening through the FBI's criminal fingerprint database and
to other agencies as well.
Other biometrics include the photograph, which we get from
all applicants, and that is screening against our facial
recognition system, which includes, among other things, up
beyond 60,000 terrorist photographs that have been collected by
the intelligence community. If there is a facial recognition
match, that would, of course, signal a consular officer to halt
action on that case.
So we continue to share all of our data and to develop
capabilities even further.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. I am running out of time. I want to
thank the Chairman for letting me ask questions. I have to run
to another meeting, but I encourage all of you in this space to
look at the advances being made in the biometric field and make
sure you apply them on the front lines, and to the extent you
need help from us, you have got to let us know, because we will
be there for you. So thank all of you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee for
5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chair very much. I thank the
witnesses for their testimony. I am going to pursue a lining of
questioning. First of all, let me say the task force is asking
a very important question, and I hope that we can work on these
matters in a bipartisan manner and expand to look at a number
of other issues that impact the security of Americans.
I do want to indicate that we have, on this committee,
great respect for all of the personnel that are in the service
of our country for its domestic security and National security.
I think sometimes policies cause our very dedicated staff
persons to really have to perform in a way that is inconsistent
with our values of democracy and justice and fairness for all.
Let me, first of all, say to Mr. Settles, my sympathy as
well to your team for the loss of your fallen agent and to his
family.
I want to indicate to Mr. Wagner, we have worked together
for a number of years, and I thank you for your service. You
remember the Muslim ban and the Russian, which it came before
the court orders, and everyone was scrambling, and many Members
of Congress were trying to help their constituents, and the
awkwardness of what has been normally good relationships was
evident. So I hope that, going forward--I hope we don't have
that order in place, but going forward, that those dispatched
in local offices can recognize that we are on their team
seeking information.
I had a 16-year-old Jordanian-statused young man traveling
on his own being held and his family could not see him, I
couldn't see him, and he was shipped off to Chicago, and he
lived in Houston, Texas.
So anyhow, what I wanted to ask was the question of reports
that we received on the implementing of the rules, and when
that ban was in place. That conflict in implementation guidance
resulting in different ports implementing the order
differently, such as taking a statused Jordanian. Currently,
what guidance does CBP issue to CBPOs operating at the ports of
entry regarding implementation of the travel ban? What is the
status of the travel ban with respect to your officers
throughout the country?
Mr. Wagner. Well, I believe they are subject to litigation,
and, you know, we are following what the court orders. So we
put that information out to the front-line personnel to comply
with all of the court's instructions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Meaning that there is no travel ban--there
is no Muslim ban. You are not operating under a Muslim ban
right now.
Mr. Wagner. No, we are not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. OK. Let me further ask--and I know we are
in an open setting. I had a bill dealing with foreign fighters.
What can you tell me about your procedures for individuals who
come through a Visa Waiver Program--excuse me, country, and may
have fought and gone to the caliphate to fight and are now
coming through a Visa Waiver Program, or may come through a
Visa Waiver Program, what procedures are your officers using
with respect to that population?
Mr. Wagner. So a couple of different ways we would look at
that. First is the granting of the ESTA approval to even
travel. They have got to fill out an on-line application with
us, including their place of birth, all of their passport
information. We run that through a series of law enforcement
databases, and we also bounce that against--certain data fields
against the intelligence community.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does that include preventing them from
getting travel documents as well?
Mr. Wagner. Correct. So that would prevent them from
traveling under the Visa Waiver Program if there were any
concerns identified there. Once they get that approval, then
they actually book their travel, we do look at the airline
reservation data, we look at what their trip consists of, we
look at all the different parts and the data pieces within that
reservation, as well as the airline manifest information, which
is basically your passport details.
We run that through a series of what we call rule sets, and
we take all of that reservation data, and we take intelligence
reports, and we translate that into rules. We say: Give me all
of these passports from this country with males between these
ages traveling from this country or this route, and we start
with a list and then further cull it down on the basis of that,
and narrow that down to people we need to talk to or question
about things.
Or we link it against known pieces of information. So
again, in conjunction with the law enforcement and intelligence
community, known pieces of information that we can connect the
person to more than likely would deny their travel under that
program or cause them to go through additional scrutiny or
inspections either overseas or when they arrive.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have got a quick question. Thank you so
much to Ms. Gambler. I just want to know, you are sitting on
the panel with the implementators of rules of security. What is
your--what is the GAO's perception of the layered approach in
the Visa Waiver Program, and do you think it is structured
enough or is there more that we need to do?
Ms. Gambler. Based on our work looking at not just the Visa
Waiver Program, but some of the other programs that we have
talked about today, I think we have seen progress in
implementation in terms of DHS's oversight of the program. One
of the key areas that we have talked about as it relates to
some of the predeparture programs that I mentioned in my oral
statement is the need for DHS and CBP to develop metrics and
baselines to really help them assess the effectiveness of some
of these programs.
So that is a key recommendation that we have made to DHS
related to some of their screening and predeparture efforts
that we think it is important for them to implement going
forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. To the Chairman and the Ranking Member,
let me thank you for your indulgence, and to all of the
witnesses, thank you for your service to the Nation. I yield
back.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, the Chair now recognizes the
sheriff, now Congressman Rutherford, 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like the
start off, first of all, by thanking all of you for your great
service. As I have had an opportunity to travel around the
country and observe some of your agents and employees in
action, it has been refreshing, and so I thank you for that.
You have a lot of dedicated members out there.
I want to touch base with something that Mr. Settles said
about the--you corrected the number, the 8,500 in admissions.
Now, GAO reports that we identified 22,000 high-risk travelers
in 2015, and so these 85, were they in that 22,000, I presume?
Mr. Settles. Yes. These are the numbers for the 30 visa-
issuing posts we have in 25 countries that we strategically
placed.
Mr. Rutherford. OK. So that only includes the VSU folks,
right?
Mr. Settles. That is the VSU, the Visa Security Program.
The units overseas, we call them the units. The program is the
Visa Security Program, and so that is for those 30 posts.
Mr. Rutherford. OK. So about--does that mean about half of
these or a little more than half are being determined to be
high-risk, but they are being allowed to come in? Is that a
correct assessment or no?
Mr. Settles. No, because the number starts at about 2.2
million for those 30 posts, and we whittle it down and we have
derogatory information on about 74,000.
Mr. Rutherford. OK.
Mr. Settles. Then utilizing automated vetting, as I talked
about yesterday in the Classified setting, what I can say is
the information is as good as what is in there.
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Settles. I think, like I mentioned, Director Comey
said, You can vet until the cows come home, but if the
information isn't in the system. So we amplify that information
with analysts, both here and the United States that when we
have derogatory hits, then we send it to our agents over there
that are solely there to do that cop-to-cop foreign liaison
partnership, and also, to, you know, increase the information
so we have more in the system for the future. So that 8,500 is
part of that process.
Mr. Rutherford. OK.
Mr. Settles. Then from there, we go down to where we watch
listed 1,669.
Mr. Rutherford. OK. I know that Mr. Wagner, the CBP is, in
fact, following up on the GAO's recommendation about the
baselines, can you talk a little bit about where you are at on
those measures? I am curious of the 8,500, particularly, or any
of them. Do we know of any that have actually been subject to
the Visa Security Program and then allowed in and committed a
terrorist act here, or not allowed in and committed a terrorist
act in France or Germany or somewhere else?
Mr. Settles. So I don't have specific information like
that. As a matter of fact, I don't know of an incident, but
what I can tell you is, of the ones that we watchlisted, you
know, obviously they didn't come into the country.
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Settles. Whether or not, it is kind-of complicated with
reporting as far as whether our foreign partners would have
shared that with us, but we do share what we can, obviously,
back out of this whole process. That is the biggest part of
us----
Mr. Rutherford. Back to our foreign partners?
Mr. Settles [continuing]. Being there, back to our foreign
partners.
Mr. Rutherford. OK.
Mr. Settles. I did provide, in the Classified setting, a
pretty good example, I think, of what happens every time we
kind of go through that process yesterday.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you for that as well.
The Visa Security Program has been, I think, incredibly
successful in providing increased information and
recommendations to the consular offices regarding visa
applications. Can you talk a little bit, Mr. Settles, about how
the ICE attaches at embassies and consulates where they don't
have VSU, how do you assist with the screening and the vetting
of visa applications at those locations?
Mr. Settles. They are--so in the 66 countries--I am sorry,
at the 66 posts where we have--and 49 countries, you know, our
agents are there to do a lot more than just the Visa Security
Program. They are there to help with transnational criminal
networks, you know, the kind-of broader perspective of what
Homeland Security investigation does.
It is more of on a request from State Department and the
consular affairs officer. If they see something during their
routine process and the high site vetting----
Mr. Rutherford. They reach out.
Mr. Settles [continuing]. They come over to us and ask for
our help, and you know, that is kind-of the difference. We
provide training and any recent trends or intel we have, but
it's more on a case-by-case instead of it being like a full-
time responsibility of the agent.
Mr. Rutherford. OK. Listen, again, I think all of my time
has run out, but I really appreciate all of your service to our
country. God bless.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Ms. Watson
Coleman.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank each and every one of you for what you represent and who
you represent here today, and it just seems to me that,
collectively, we are doing a heck of a job and interacting with
one another.
Mr. Settles, a real quick question. Just like Mr. Wagner
was asked, did he need more help on the CBP, do you need more--
do you have greater requests than you are able to address with
the things that you are doing in the foreign countries?
Mr. Settles. Yes, ma'am. With more--certainly we can do
more.
Ms. Watson Coleman. We just need to know that.
Mr. Settles. We have an aggressive--we are doing as much as
we can aggressively with the resources we have.
Ms. Watson Coleman. At some point, we would like to have
some information specifically about what additional things,
resources, whatever, staff you need to do what you are doing. I
think what you are doing is very important, as I believe every
one of you are doing very important things.
Last month, Secretary Kelly stated that we needed to start
looking very hard at the security of the Visa Waiver Program,
and do you know what he meant by that, Mr. Dougherty? Has the
DHS begun a review of the VWP, and what security enhancements
are being considered?
Mr. Dougherty. Thank you. Secretary Kelly, when he was
making remarks about taking a hard look at the VWP, was
basically iterating, I think, the concern that we all have,
that foreign fighters may be coming out of the Levant, making
their way into Europe, and those people are Europeans. They
have European citizenship.
So Secretary Kelly's intention, and the intention of, I
think, everyone represented by DHS here, is to look at
additional things that the Department can do to make visa-free
travel to the United States more secure than it is now.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Can you discuss what kind of additional
things you are doing, what kind of enhancements, security
enhancements are under consideration----
Mr. Dougherty. I think----
Ms. Watson Coleman. In this setting?
Mr. Dougherty. I would like to have that conversation with
you off-line if we could, and I think it is a dialog. I know
that the committee is very conversant on opportunities that the
Department can take. We have some of our own, but I think we
are at a point, ma'am, where we are looking at several things,
and we would prefer to discuss that in a quieter setting.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you. One last question to Mr.
Wagner. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and in the wake of
the attempted attack on Northeast--Northwest Flight 253 in
2009, the Nation's visa and passenger vetting processes have
been completely revamped and strengthened, obviously, with the
individualized threat assessment for each traveler to the
United States that includes screening against all kind of
Government holdings, biometrics, capture, and interview.
Tell me how can this individualized threat assessment be
strengthened, and what do you need from us to support your
efforts?
Mr. Settles. Yes. The underwear bomber, the Christmas day
bomber, I mean, that was the whole genesis really behind our
predeparture program, and we looked at a very close call in
that situation. We looked at the opportunities we missed. You
know, we had officers overseas at the airport that that guy had
come through. We weren't necessarily having them focused on
that type of particular threat, so we adjusted that.
We put this--the whole predeparture process and the no-
board recommendation process into place with a very strong
focus on, besides the immigration issues, the National security
focus, and really, to err on the side of caution. If there is
any concerns about an individual, we ask the airline not to fly
them and refer them back to the U.S. embassy where, across
Government, we have more time to assess this person and look at
them. That was really the genesis of that program.
As far as just--I think we look for support in, you know,
what we request in our appropriations request as far as the
capabilities at our National targeting center and the systems
we build to continue to conduct the analysis and the vetting of
this information across Government against as many sources as
we possibly can to make sure we are not missing any gaps, and
that we don't have to wait for another incident to sit down and
figure out what gaps we missed or what information wasn't
available at the right time to prevent that person from moving
into this, say, the next step of the process.
So we have been focused on it since then, and we have
really built a really strong capability with a National
security focus ever since that. That was a close call.
Ms. Watson Coleman. So you don't need anything from us?
Mr. Wagner. Well, I think we put it in the appropriations
request, and there is money, I believe, for our National
targeting center to support, and Congress has been very
generous and very supportive of us building out an entirely new
facility in Northern Virginia. We had two National targeting
centers. We consolidated them into one location. I please
invite any of you to come out and see the work that goes on
there and the partnerships across Government that we have
established.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fitzpatrick for
5 minutes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo my colleagues. I thank you all for your
service. I come here via the FBI, so I consider you all family,
needless to say. You have got a very tough job keeping us all
safe, but we thank you for doing it.
I just want to explore for 1 second the hypothetical of
terminating the Visa Waiver Program. Obviously, the world in
2017 is much different than it was back in 1986 when that law
was implemented. Obviously, all of those countries are very
different as well. There are obviously a lot of bad people who
live in many of those, if not all, of those 38 countries. As
Chairman McCaul stated in his opening statement, several of the
9/11 hijackers came in via Europe with no vetting whatsoever.
Hypothetically, if that program were to terminate, would
DHS even have the bandwidth and the capacity to deal with that
new world if we were ever at that point where we needed to go
there?
Mr. Wagner. I would really defer to the Department of
State.
Mr. Ramotowski. If they terminated the program, then,
presumably, all of those travelers would have to apply for a
visa from the Department of State, so it is really our
bandwidth. Certainly, in Europe, the capacity to handle 18
million visa applications a year when globally, right now, we
are doing 14 million just isn't there. It would take quite a
bit of time and resources to ramp up to be able to handle that
caseload, if the entire program was suddenly eliminated.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. What would you see that looking like,
numerically? Could the embassies handle it or are we at the
point now where it wouldn't even be possible?
Mr. Ramotowski. It wouldn't be possible with that volume,
with the current physical plant and staffing that we have, no,
it wouldn't be possible, not in any reasonable length of time.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. So we have grown dependent upon the Visa
Waiver Program then, essentially?
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, resources that were used to handle
visa applications when the program started in the mid-1980's,
have since been reallocated, both real estate and officer
positions, to other countries where the visa demand was
greater. We didn't just keep officers in Europe with nothing to
do.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK.
Mr. Wagner. The volume is about 19.5 million travelers last
year under the Visa Waiver Program. So the volume is
substantial, but I think if you look at comparison of the visa
versus Visa Waiver Programs, both programs collect similar
biographical data from the individual. The vetting queries that
are run in the analysis is fairly similar on the two programs.
The big distinction is the point in time when that traveler
meets with the U.S. Government official. For a traveler with a
visa, they meet with a consular officer to give their
fingerprints, have their photo taken, and be interviewed at the
U.S. embassy while still overseas.
The Visa Waiver Program, we allow that traveler, after that
prescreening, that their first interaction with a U.S.
Government official would then be a CBP officer at the port of
entry where they would get interviewed, collect the same
fingerprints, run the same queries, and also have their photo
taken. So it is really whether you allow that person to get on
the plane to travel here to collect the same kind of
information and go through a similar type of interview.
The background checks and the biographical data that serves
at the platform for the two are fairly similar in that. So it
is also looking at it from, you know, asylum claims and some of
the admissibility issues is do you allow the risk of the person
getting on the plane to the same level of information once they
get here or do you do it overseas? That is probably the biggest
distinction between the two.
Mr. Ramotowski. I would also add that the information
sharing that is so important to populating our watch lists
about threats from these countries might be endangered also if
the program were to be suddenly terminated, because a number of
our partner countries use their membership in the Visa Waiver
Program to justify any enhanced information sharing with the
United States that benefits both sides. So that is a factor to
consider as well.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Is it fair to say, though, that the Visa
Waiver Program presupposes that we have confidence and faith in
the security protocol of these other countries? If so, is that
warranted today?
Mr. Dougherty. Sir, if I could answer that, I think it is
probably as strong as it has ever been. The assessments that
are performed by the Department of Homeland Security are very
granular. So we look at, for example, how do you train your
people? Do you have a legal system that we would recognize as
putting criminals away or terrorists away? Do you have security
processes that we recognize as essential to making sure that
you don't have a lawless population or a group of terrorists in
your midst who then could become part of the Visa Waiver
Program?
I haven't physically sat down and counted everything that
we consider in an assessment, but there is a significant number
of security features that are involved in those assessments and
they are very, very detailed.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. The Chair recognizes Mr. Higgins for 5
minutes. Votes went off, but we should be good with 5 minutes
and some words at the end.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will move fast.
Deputy Commissioner Wagner, thank you for your service to
the Thin Blue Line. Sir, I recognize and respect the mourning
band upon your badge. How long have you been behind a badge,
sir?
Mr. Wagner. Over 25 years, sir.
Mr. Higgins. In the 25 years, have you managed to be able
to recognize a damn good cop when you see one and when you
interview one?
Mr. Wagner. Absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
The applicants that try to come to work for your agency,
are not many of them experienced and recognized and decorated
officers and deputies from other agencies?
Mr. Wagner. Yes, some of them are.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir. What is the failure rate for the
psych eval and the polygraph test for those deputies and police
officers?
Mr. Wagner. I don't know that we have the data by their
previous occupation. I wouldn't know.
Mr. Higgins. Your best guesstimate on that?
Mr. Wagner. No visibility into that, sir. It is a different
part of an organization.
Mr. Higgins. I am getting at the 1,400 agents that you need
and that there seems to be a built-in resistance in the system.
By my own experience, I am recognized as a police officer for
14 years, sometimes officers choose to advance their career and
go to another department. They can't pass the psych eval and
they can't pass the polygraph. It is a rather bizarre
circumstance. Tell this committee, are you running into that?
Mr. Wagner. Well, there is no psychological exam for the
CPB officer occupation. For the polygraph, yes, there is a
very, very high failure rate for that.
Mr. Higgins. What would you say the failure rate is?
Mr. Wagner. It is upwards of 60 to 70 percent.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
I would just like the committee to recognize that this is a
common circumstance across the country when experienced and
highly decorated and capable police officers apply for jobs at
Federal agencies, they can't get hired. When the ranking
officers that are interviewing them sometimes know that they
are turning away a damn good cop for that job.
Deputy Secretary Ramotowski, we have--it seems to me there
is a tendency in our Nation and perhaps the world to give a
certain pedigree to a visa. That visa comes with a certain
expectation that that individual has been properly vetted and
cleared and whatnot. I would like to address that for a moment.
The beginning process of applying for a visa, the person
applying for that visa has to present what is referred to as
proper certificates to proper Government authorities, like
birth certificates and marriage licenses. Is that correct?
Mr. Ramotowski. Depending on the type of visa, yes, that is
correct.
Mr. Higgins. Those documents are frequently coming from--
you know, we are familiar with certain levels of security
measures on our own identifications here in America:
Watermarks, barcodes, magnetic scans, et cetera. But a birth
certificate and a marriage license coming from a rural area in
some of these nations that the citizens are seeking access to
our country, given the very advanced state of the ability to
forge documents, it would seem to me that that would be a very
weak link in the chain, and that is where the chain begins,
that these documents are presented from some rural community. I
mean, I have arrested men with many excellent IDs, driver's
licenses, American driver's licenses that would pass muster
that any cop would look at and say, that is a real driver's
license, and the whole thing is fake. The ID is fake. The whole
thing is fake. The only thing real on it is his picture. If
that can happen with an American driver's license, what are
they doing with marriage licenses and birth certificates at
these--in this vetting procedure?
Mr. Ramotowski. You are quite right, sir. That is why we
never depend exclusively on the documents for granting an
immigration benefit, because in many countries, they could be
and are fraudulent. We have fraud prevention offices at all of
our large- and medium-sized embassies. Even at the smaller
ones, an officer is always designated as a fraud prevention
officer. They are focused on reviewing and investigating any
suspicious documents.
Our officers have a network of contacts throughout the
country with civil registrars, government passport offices,
courthouses, and so forth to verify documents when necessary.
Also, the value of the consular interview is ascertaining
whether the applicant matches the documents that he or she is
presenting; does the story make sense? If a marriage is claimed
but the two parties do not know anything about each other, then
there is maybe a problem there.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for your answer, sir.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I have further
questions that I'll submit in writing. I yield back.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
We now have to go vote, as one does in Congress from time
to time.
I want to thank the witnesses for their time and for their
testimony, both yesterday and today. This was a great way to
start the work of the task force with serious, thoughtful
conversation.
I want to thank the Members of the task force on both sides
of the aisle for being here, for being thoughtful. I am very
excited about where this headed. We have an incredible,
incredible range of experiences, local law enforcement, Federal
law enforcement, military, diverse backgrounds. My hope is that
we are able to harness that, harness the outside expertise that
you bring, and come up with some recommendations that are
serious, that are smart and, ultimately, will make the homeland
more secure. And for waking up every day in pursuit of that
noble objective, and I can't think of an objective more noble
than that. I want to thank each and every one of you.
So with that, pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without
objection, the task force stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the task force was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for the Department of Homeland
Security
Question 1a. What is the status of biometric exit implementation,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1365b?
Answer. Since the 2018 deadline was set by Secretary Johnson and
the issuance of the Executive Order, ``Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,'' CBP has accelerated
the implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is deploying
key components of a biometric air exit solution through face
recognition capture at airport gates in eight airports during the
summer of 2017, plus a series of additional programs through airline
partnerships, and will have the capability to accept biometric
departure data at the top 20 airports by the third quarter of fiscal
year 2018. CBP is also moving forward with a practical and achievable
implementation strategy in the land environment by focusing on
biometric exit capabilities for third-country nationals. CBP will
continue to test new innovative solutions for biometric capture for at-
speed vehicles until a feasible solution is found.
Question 1b. How does DHS expect this capability to enhance its
ability to identify terrorists in the terrorist detection?
Answer. In response to a 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress
directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement a
biometric entry/exit screening system which would help identify
terrorists, by for example, preventing terrorists from ``tossing an old
passport and slightly altering the name in the new one.'' A biometric
exit solution, in addition existing checks of any biographic watch list
information, will assist CBP in identifying imposters and tie the
information to any biometric watch list hits, strengthening current
capabilities. Full biometric exit capability will improve DHS's ability
to more accurately and completely identify overstays, as more complete
arrival and departure information will then be available for all
travelers.
Question 1c. Will the current funding stream be sufficient for
implementation at the Nation's busiest international airports by 2018?
Answer. The current funding stream will be sufficient to execute
CBP's plan to begin accepting biometric exit data at the Nation's
busiest airports by the third quarter of 2018. CBP's primary focus in
fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 is developing the essential
program elements and back-end infrastructure for biometric air exit.
The funds will be utilized for information technology, program
management, operational support, outbound enforcement (CBP officers),
and technology innovation for other modes of operation such as land and
sea. CBP is currently developing an official Life-cycle Cost Estimate
for the Biometric Entry/Exit program. CBP will continue working with
the airlines and airport authorities as we further our biometric exit
requirements.
Question 2. Please explain how DHS continually vets visa holders or
individuals who enter via the Visa Waiver Program for ties to terrorism
or other derogatory information once they have entered the United
States.
Answer. For visa holders and applicants, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) visa screening operations are currently
supported by two units--the Visa Security Coordination Center and the
Counterterrorism Criminal Exploitation Unit. ICE Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) special agents deployed to international posts
through the ICE Visa Security Program (VSP) are supported by screening
and vetting efforts of the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and
Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT).
PATRIOT is an inter-agency coordination effort to conduct advanced
visa application vetting and enhance visa security. Participating
agencies include Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), ICE, and Department of State (DOS).
PATRIOT identifies National security, public safety, and other visa
eligibility concerns at the earliest point of an individual's visa
application life cycle. Upon issuance of a visa and subsequent
admission to the United States, ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit then tracks the visa for the remaining validity and
life cycle in the overstay enforcement system.
DHS, in collaboration with DOS and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, continues to engage visa waiver countries to enhance the
exchange of known or suspected terrorists and watch list data. Further,
ICE has expanded the VSP to a number of Visa Waiver Program countries
to support the whole-of-Government effort to secure travel to the
United States.
CBP conducts continuous vetting of nonimmigrant and immigrant visas
to ensure that changes in a traveler's eligibility are identified in
near-real time. This allows CBP to immediately determine whether to
provide a ``no-board'' recommendation to a carrier in imminent travel
situations, to recommend that DOS revoke the visa, to deny an
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application, or
whether additional notification should be made for individuals
determined to be present in the United States.
Through ESTA, CBP conducts enhanced vetting of Visa Waiver Program
(VWP) applicants in advance of travel to the United States in order to
assess whether they are eligible to travel under the VWP, including
whether the traveler constitutes a National security risk or public
safety threat. Additionally, CBP requires air carriers to verify that
VWP travelers have valid authorization prior to boarding an aircraft
bound for the United States. CBP vets ESTA applicants against the
INTERPOL Lost and Stolen Passport Database, the Terrorist Watchlist,
and other Law Enforcement Databases.
ESTA applications are subject to continuous re-vetting, which means
that even though an applicant has an approved authorization for travel,
that authorization is continuously reviewed throughout its validity
period for new derogatory information and is subject to further review
and subsequent denial if warranted.
Question 3. A major lesson from 9/11 was the importance of
interagency intelligence sharing. While we had derogatory information
on some of the attackers, it did not make it into the hands of those
who could have prevented their entry into the United States.
How has the Department improved their ability to move derogatory
information around the USG in a way that effectively identifies and
interdicts known or suspected terrorists?
How confident is the Department that the changes are tough enough
to prevent any known or suspected terrorist from gaining entry?
What gaps still exist, if any?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has matured its
ability to move both derogatory and identity information around the
United States Government (USG) to improve identification and
interdiction of known or suspected terrorists (KST) through
watchlisting and screening. Data held in the FBI's Terrorist Screening
Center's Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, ``The Terrorist
Watchlist'') is made available for searching by appropriately cleared--
FOUO level--partners, in real-time either through direct access to TSDB
or through Department-maintained screening databases such as TECS
(DHS). The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), through the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), shares terrorism-
related information with other intelligence agencies to help identify
KSTs and take action to prevent their entry to the United States or
lead to their arrest. DHS supports the USG's terrorist watchlisting as
part of its day-to-day mission and adheres to established processes and
procedures for Federal agencies to make their information available in
the TIDE.
International actors that qualify as KSTs, are submitted to the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which determines whether the
information is credible. If so, the information is entered into the
TIDE database, to which DHS and other Federal agencies have access.
TIDE KST unclassified names and identifiers are provided to the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) where another review of the nomination
and the relevant intelligence is conducted to verify the information
before updating the TSDB. The TSDB is distributed to DHS screening
systems for use, by various components, in their screening activities.
Purely domestic actors who qualify for nomination as KST's are
nominated directly to TSDB.
In addition to the TSDB, the TSC has provided its Biometric
Watchlist to the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT),
which is managed by the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM);
all DHS enforcement encounters are run against in the IDENT Biometric
Watchlist. The Department of Defense Biometrically Enhanced Watch List
(BEWL) has also been loaded into IDENT, and all biometric encounters
are matched against the BEWL. The U.S. Army National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC) is notified of any matches and coordinates
with DHS as to appropriate actions that need to be taken. All entrants
into the United States (including Visa Waiver Program travelers on
their first trip into the United States) have their fingerprints
captured and matched against the Biometric Watchlist. The TSC is
notified of any matches and will coordinate any actions to be taken
when a watch-listed person is encountered.
The Department is confident the current processes have improved the
USG's ability to identify and block KSTs from gaining entry to the
homeland.
U.S. Custom and Border Protection (CBP) employs matching
algorithms to compare biographic identities from TECS records
against identities in the TSDB. When a potential match is
identified, NTC adjudicates the match and pulls information
from CBP holdings that can augment or enhance the data
contained in the TSDB record.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) also
contributes information derived from encounters with KSTs
directly into TIDE via the DHS Watchlist Framework. After the
information is entered into TIDE, a subset ``addendum B'' of
qualified information is down-streamed to TSDB to bolster
vetting and screening purposes. In 2016, TSA made 1,100
watchlist nominations based on information acquired during
routine operations, and in the first quarter of 2017 added 222
nominations.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)/Fraud
Detection and National Security Directorate maintains a cadre
of staff who are certified as watchlist analysts through DHS
I&A's Watchlist training effort program. These analysts update
TIDE records of KST's with biographic information from USCIS
data systems.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) is the largest partner with FBI and
currently provides the Deputy Director to the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). With HSI Agents in every JTTF
office Nation-wide, ICE is able to quickly assist with all
National security investigations to prevent KST entry.
Question 4. Foreign fighters are currently in and leaving conflict
theaters where the Department does not have a presence on the ground.
Generally speaking, how does the Department work with other
agencies that may have an in-theater presence (i.e. DOD and the IC) to
incorporate information collected in theater into the screening and
vetting process?
Answer. DHS works extensively with our interagency partners to
identify and disrupt terrorist travel. DHS personnel embedded at
several Department of Defense locations in the United States and
overseas review information collected from conflict zones--including in
the Syria and Iraq theater--and work with interagency partners to
incorporate appropriate information into databases and systems to
bolster watchlisting and traveler screening. All pertinent information
collected on known or suspected terrorists in an operating theater is
required, via Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, to be sent to
the National Counterterrorism Center for inclusion in the Terrorist
Identity Datamart Environment (TIDE). The unclassified names and
identifiers in TIDE are pushed (in near-real time) to the Terrorist
Screening Center where they are loaded in the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB). Once in TSDB, all of the information is made available
or provided at the FOUO level to Federal partners, as well as State and
Local Law Enforcement use in their screening and day-to-day operations.
Question 5a. Partnerships with our European allies will be crucial
in identifying potential foreign fighters returning to their home
countries as part of a ``terrorist diaspora.'' These Western foreign
fighters are certainly a threat as they may more easily circumvent
security measures--largely due to visa-free travel to the United States
and ease of travel throughout Europe. Without knowing who these
individuals are, it will be impossible for the United States to
adequately screen and vet them to ensure they are not permitted to
travel to the homeland.
How does the Department work with our European allies to identify
returning foreign fighters?
Question 5b. Is there additional information that could be shared
that would bolster your screening and vetting efforts?
Question 5c. If so, why are they not sharing it (lack of
capabilities, unwillingness, etc.)?
Question 5d. How does the Department leverage international
organizations, such as INTERPOL, to enhance your screening and vetting
capabilities?
Answer. The Department maintains close cooperation with European
allies to combat terrorism, including the threat posed by returning
foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Our countries share information on
FTFs through formal arrangements (such as Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6)) and through informal intelligence
and law enforcement channels, as well as through international
organizations, such as INTERPOL. This sharing enhances U.S. holdings,
which enables the United States to identify foreign terrorist fighters
more effectively and take appropriate action to safeguard the United
States.
The U.S. Government conducts extensive vetting of foreign
travelers. All individuals seeking to travel directly to the United
States from Europe are known to the Department prior to their departure
because of either the submission of an Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA) for travel under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) or
a visa application, as well as the receipt of pre-departure passenger
data required from all airlines and ships bound for the United States.
The Department extensively vets this data to determine whether the
prospective traveler should receive additional physical screening, be
denied boarding or, ultimately, denied admission to the United States.
Most European allies participate in the VWP. Since 1986, the VWP
has evolved from a travel facilitation program into a comprehensive
security partnership between the United States and the individual VWP
countries. VWP countries must meet stringent security requirements to
ensure their designation does not pose a risk to U.S. National
security, law enforcement, or immigration enforcement interests. These
requirements include implementing a series of arrangements to share
terrorism information, cooperate on criminal threats, and improve
identity management relating to and reporting lost and stolen passport
information. In 2015 and 2016, the Department implemented additional
security enhancements to the VWP, requiring participants to collect and
analyze passenger data (Advance Passenger Information and Passenger
Name Records), screening travelers at borders against National and
international databases, cooperation with the United States on refugee/
migrant vetting, allowing U.S. Federal Air Marshals on U.S.-bound
flights, and implementing additional identity document security
provisions. DHS conducts evaluations of each VWP country at least once
every 2 years and engages in on-going monitoring between formal
evaluations to assess participants' counterterrorism, law enforcement,
immigration enforcement, border management, and identity document
security capabilities. European partner countries and the European
Union have taken significant steps to improve counterterrorism and
border security capabilities in Europe over the past year, to include:
Enhancing border controls to require systematic database checks of all
persons crossing Europe's external Schengen borders (effective April
2017); passing the E.U. Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive in April
2016 (to be implemented by May 2018); creating a new European Border
and Coast Guard Agency (effective October 2016); and improving vetting
programs through greater database interoperability. European partners
have also established the European Counterterrorism Centre (ECTC) at
Europol in January 2016, which functions as a central hub for E.U.
member states to share terrorism-related information.
The Department continuously looks for new ways to build on existing
partnerships with European allies to respond to current and emerging
threats. For example, the Department has offered its expertise and
technical assistance to assist European partners in developing air
passenger data collection and analysis capabilities, and has conducted
numerous workshops sharing best practices and collaborating on travel
trends and passenger targeting. The Department is also working with a
number of European partners to leverage both existing and new
information-sharing agreements to cooperate directly on vetting
priority travelers against our respective immigration, law enforcement,
and National security data at a system-to-system level. In addition,
the Department is working with nine European countries to establish
Preclearance facilities at last-point-of-departure airports. Countries
participating in a Preclearance arrangement adopt a close and
continuous partnership with the Department that allows the United
States to leverage its full authorities and capabilities prior to
departure. Pursuing these initiatives requires the Department and the
prospective partner to address a number of challenging legal, policy,
operational, and resource issues.
Multilateral partnerships, such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL, facilitate
U.S.-European cooperation. INTERPOL provides an efficient and
accessible way for U.S. and European partners to share information on
lost and stolen passports, as well as foreign terrorist fighters and
criminals, thereby enhancing countries' own screening. Moreover, it is
a requirement for VWP countries to report to INTERPOL lost and stolen
passport information and foreign terrorist fighter data. The United
States leverages these data sets in its screening and vetting programs.
Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016,
DHS worked closely with EUROPOL to share terrorist-related information
and provide investigatory support. The Department has assigned officers
to EUROPOL, and to its ECTC, to facilitate the exchange of information
with European counterparts and to enhance cooperation on investigations
of terrorist and criminal networks.
Question 6a. How does U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services'
(USCIS) Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate screen
immigration benefit applications for National security concerns?
Answer. USCIS conducts background and security checks against law
enforcement, intelligence, and other databases and other sources of
information. When information indicates a potential National security
or fraud or public safety concern, adjudicators refer the case to the
Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate for further
vetting.
FDNS Immigration Officers evaluate National security, public
safety, and fraud referrals and determine what additional vetting may
be necessary to obtain a complete understanding of the concern. FDNS
officers possess a range of tools for researching concerns, including
access to additional databases and the ability to conduct a site visit,
and work with counterparts in adjudications to determine the impact of
a concern on eligibility for the immigration benefit request. As part
of the vetting process, FDNS officers also seek and share information
with law enforcement agencies and other U.S. Government partners as
appropriate.
Question 6b. How can USCIS improve its document fraud detection and
overseas verification procedures?
Answer. USCIS continually strives to update and improve its
fraudulent document training for immigration officers and adjudicators.
They receive fraudulent document training during basic training at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. In subsequent courses,
immigration officers and adjudicators receive fraudulent document
training from USCIS staff assigned to ICE's Homeland Security
Investigations Forensic Laboratory. Additional training is offered via
in-person instruction, on-line instruction, and self-study materials.
USCIS also continues to expand collaboration with the Department of
State to meet overseas verification needs.
Question 7a. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Secretary
of Homeland Security authority to assign DHS employees to diplomatic
and consular posts to provide expert advice and training to consular
officers regarding specific security threats relating to the
adjudication of individual visa applications or classes of
applications. Today, ICE agents conduct this mission under the Visa
Security Program (VSP), which has been successful at providing
increased information and recommendations to Consular officers
regarding visa applicants and potential travelers to the United States.
With the growing threat of foreign fighters traveling to the United
States, how does having ICE agents stationed abroad in Visa Security
Units (VSUs) add to the security of the homeland?
Answer. In addition to these written responses, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would welcome the opportunity to provide
a briefing regarding further information on the programs outlined below
in a closed forum with additional law enforcement and/or intelligence
sensitive details.
ICE, through the Visa Security Program (VSP), deploys special
agents to visa-issuing posts world-wide to utilize available
investigative resources and apply ICE's broad law enforcement
authorities to the visa process. Deployed special agents
responsibilities include, but are not limited to:
investigating suspect visa applicants;
conducting comprehensive visa applicant interviews;
conducting further interviews as part of broader criminal
investigations;
collaborating with Department of State consular officers;
and
directly coordinating with other law enforcement,
intelligence, and host government entities.
These capabilities make VSP unique among screening efforts in that
it does not simply recommend the denial of travel; instead, ICE special
agents investigate and exploit suspect travelers in an effort to
identify unknown threats and potential violations of criminal law.
Further, deployed special agents gather and receive threat information
from host governments on potential terror threat networks and foreign
fighter information. These efforts enable ICE Visa Security Units
(VSUs) to build an understanding of transnational terrorist and
criminal networks, and broadly share and document that information with
other U.S. Government entities and indices to proactively combat
terrorist and criminal travel networks.
Question 7b. How do ICE attaches at Embassies and Consulates where
there is not a VSU assist with the screening and vetting visa
applicants?
Answer. ICE believes in a whole-of-Government effort to promote
increased visa security. ICE attaches engage and support the various
consular offices within their operational responsibility to support the
interagency screening enterprise.
They share threat information, and, in coordination with Diplomatic
Security, provide investigative support related to identified
violations within ICE's authorities. Further, all ICE special agents
are trained in immigration law, to include visa ineligibilities, and
support case-by-case requests made by consular officers to facilitate
Department of Homeland Security vetting efforts on applicants
identified by consular officers as warranting increased scrutiny. At
specified VSP posts, ICE screens 100 percent of all non-immigrant visa
applications prior to visa adjudication and dedicates a special
agent(s) to support visa security efforts.
Question 7c. Given the limited resources available, how does ICE
decide which overseas posts warrant the stationing of a VSU?
Answer. In fiscal year 2016, ICE expanded VSP operations to an
additional 5 visa-issuing posts in 5 countries. As a result, the ICE
VSP now screens 30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries. In fiscal year
2017, ICE will expand operations to two additional posts. ICE is
committed to the aggressive expansion of VSP operations, maximizing
available resources domestically and internationally to enhance the
screening, vetting, and investigative efforts.
To guide expansion efforts, ICE utilizes a site selection process
to determine high-risk and strategically important posts for expansion.
The site selection process encompasses a three-part process: (1) A
risk-based post evaluation; (2) an assessment of each post's expansion
capabilities; and (3) an analysis of intelligence current threat
reporting. The first part of the process uses a myriad of Government
and publically-available data sources to evaluate the risk to mission
posed by each visa-issuing post. The second and third parts of the
process consider a number of factors to further determine the
accessibility of a post, as well as the operational value of
deployment. Some of these factors include regional need, post support,
and operational capabilities in country to ensure deployment to posts
that would be most effective and valuable to the VSP mission. ICE will
continue to evaluate the criteria used to update and improve site
selection process. ICE would welcome the opportunity to further brief
the site selection process in a closed forum with additional law
enforcement or intelligence sensitive details.
Question 7d. Are there any specific regions where VSU presence is
not significant enough given the threat?
Answer. ICE is committed to the aggressive expansion of VSP
operations, as resources allow, addressing identified threats. As part
of the site selection process, ICE assesses regional need when
considering deployment to ensure geographic placement of VSP operations
benefits the global Department of Homeland Security mission and whole-
of-Government effort to prevent terrorist travel. Going forward, ICE
will continue to conduct an annual site selection process to identify
geographic areas requiring placement of VSP operations in accordance
with available resources.
Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for Edward Ramotowski
Question 1. Foreign fighters are currently in and leaving conflict
theaters where the Department does not have a presence on the ground.
Generally speaking, how does the Department work with other
agencies that may have an in-theater presence (i.e. DOD and the IC) to
incorporate information collected in theater into the screening and
vetting process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. A major lesson from 9/11 was the importance of
interagency intelligence sharing. While we had derogatory information
on some of the attackers, it did not make it into the hands of those
who could have prevented their entry into the United States.
How has the Department improved their ability to move derogatory
information around the USG in a way that effectively identifies and
interdicts known or suspected terrorists?
Question 2b. How confident is the Department that the changes are
tough enough to prevent any known or suspected terrorist from gaining
entry? What gaps still exist, if any?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. Mr. Ramotowski, you testified that since 2001 there
have been nearly 11,000 visas potentially revoked after information
emerged, post-issuance, suggesting possible links to terrorism.
How many of these 11,000 individuals were subsequently removed from
the United States after their visas were revoked?
Question 3b. How quickly did the removal occur?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. Partnerships with our European allies will be
absolutely crucial in identifying potential foreign fighters returning
to their home countries as part of a ``terrorist diaspora.'' These
Western foreign fighters are certainly a threat as they may more easily
circumvent security measures--largely due to visa-free travel to the
United States and ease of travel throughout Europe. Without knowing who
these individuals are, it will be impossible for the United States to
adequately screen and vet them to ensure they are not permitted to
travel to the homeland.
How does the Department work with our European allies to identify
returning foreign fighters?
Question 4b. Is there additional information that could be shared
that would bolster your screening and vetting efforts?
Question 4c. If so, why are they not sharing it (lack of
capabilities, unwillingness, etc.)?
Question 4d. How does the Department leverage international
organizations, such as INTERPOL, to enhance your screening and vetting
capabilities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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