[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEFFEATING A SOPHISTICATED AND DANGEROUS ADVERSARY: ARE THE NEW BORDER
SECURITY TASK FORCES THE RIGHT APPROACH?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 4, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-13
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
27-291 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Kathleen Crooks Flynn, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairwoman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina J. Luis Correa, California
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Val Butler Demings, Florida
Will Hurd, Texas Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Vice Admiral Karl L. Schultz, Director, Joint Task Force-East,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Paul A. Beeson, Commander, Joint Task Force-West, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Ms. Janice Ayala, Director, Joint Task Force-Investigations,
Homeland Security Investigations:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
DEFFEATING A SOPHISTICATED AND DANGEROUS ADVERSARY: ARE THE NEW BORDER
SECURITY TASK FORCES THE RIGHT APPROACH?
----------
Tuesday, April 4, 2017
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Duncan, Hurd, Rutherford,
Vela, Correa, Demings, and Barragan.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threat
posed by drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations
and the Department's unified effort to defeat those threats.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
At the subcommittee's first hearing this Congress, we
examined the advanced techniques and tactics utilized by our
adversary to evade or circumvent our border security efforts.
Obscene profit margins power the cartel's ability to be
creative, nimble, and entrepreneurial as they smuggle vast
quantities of illicit drugs across the border.
Threats posed to the Nation by transnational criminal
organizations whose influence extends beyond the immediate
border zone and into the major metropolitan areas of the
Nation, is a National security challenge.
Now that we better understand the lengths to which the
cartels will go to make the billions of dollars that they net
every year, I want to shift our focus to the Department of
Homeland Security's collective response and potential solutions
for this immense task.
I believe we should begin with the development of a
counter-network approach that looks to disrupting every level
of cartel operations. From the low-level scout on an Arizona
hilltop guiding drug loads away from Border Patrol agents, to
the local plaza boss taxing the movement of drugs and people
through his area, to the cartel kingpins at the very top of the
Sinaloa cartel.
General Stanley McChrystal is famous for his phrase, ``It
takes a network to defeat a network.'' That thinking can and
should be applied to the problem set of trying to defeat an
insidious adversary that brings death and ruin to so many.
Does DHS have a friendly network to defeat the cartel's
network? This is the question that we are starting to look at
today. Do we have a coherent transnational criminal
organizational strategy and, most importantly, is the
Department of Homeland Security organized in a way that sets us
up for success? I look forward to discussing those questions in
greater detail with our witnesses today.
As part of the Executive Order on transnational crime
recently signed by the President, the Secretary of State, the
attorney general and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
director of national intelligence are all asked to improve the
coordination of Federal agencies' efforts to identify,
interdict, investigate, prosecute, and dismantle transnational
criminal organizations. I will be interested in learning what
role DHS will play in this administration's increased focus on
TCOs.
Beyond our strategic approach to counter the cartels, we
need to be properly organized to fight them as well. In 2003,
the Department of Homeland Security was created from 22
disparate agencies. It should not be surprising that there
would be significant growing pains before the agency would
function as a truly unified Department.
Each component of the Department, be it CBP, ICE, or the
Coast Guard, has a tendency to operate in its own silo, without
coordination required to make border and maritime security
efforts successful, not to mention reducing redundancy and
overlap. This can have negative effects on logistics,
communications, and, most importantly, operations.
Several years ago, then-Secretary Johnson took a page from
the Department of Defense playbook and created three joint task
forces in an attempt to eliminate stovepipes and foster unity
of effort along the border.
Two of these task forces, JTF-East and West, are
geographically based. While one, JTF-Investigations is a
functional task force. The goal was simple: Establish a
streamlined and unified structure that prioritizes border
security operations and investigations against the most
meaningful cartel actors.
This committee, working with our Senate counterparts,
provided a temporary 6-year authorization for the joint task
force, which was included in last year's National Defense
Authorization Act.
The intent was to allow the concept to mature and provide
ample opportunity for the Department to demonstrate to this
committee that organizational structure has measurably
contributed to border security that would not have happened in
the absence of these task forces.
In drafting the authorization, we expressly borrowed
several concepts from the Department of Defense, including
joint duty training, and joint duty assignments to foster a
culture and operational mindset that we hope will transform the
way that DHS conducts border security operations. Having done
some joint assignments and joint training myself, I am uniquely
interested in seeing how this applies and translates over to
DHS.
Today is the very first time Congress has held a hearing on
new border security joint task forces, so I look forward to
hearing from the commanders as we discuss how best to counter
the growing sophistication of the Mexican cartels and the
serious National security threat that they pose.
[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
April 4, 2017
At the subcommittee's first hearing this Congress, we examined the
advanced techniques and tactics utilized by our adversary to evade or
circumvent our border security efforts. Obscene profit margins power
the cartels' ability to be creative, nimble, and entrepreneurial as
they smuggle vast quantities of illicit drugs across the border.
Threats posed to the Nation by transnational criminal organizations
whose influence extends beyond the immediate border zone and into the
major metropolitan areas of the Nation is a National security
challenge.
Now that we better understand the lengths to which the cartels will
go to make the billions of dollars that they net every year, I want to
shift our focus to the Department of Homeland Security's collective
response and potential solutions for this immense task.
I believe we should begin with the development of a counter-network
approach that looks at disrupting every level of cartel operations.
From the low-level scout on an Arizona hill-top guiding drug loads away
from Border Patrol agents, to the local plaza boss taxing the movement
of drugs and people through his area, to the cartel kingpins at the
very top of the Sinaloa cartel.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal is famous for the phrase, ``It takes a
network to defeat a network,'' and that thinking can and should be
applied to the problem set of trying to defeat an insidious adversary
that brings death and ruin to so many. Does DHS have a ``friendly''
network to defeat the cartel's network? Do we have a coherent
transnational criminal organization strategy and more importantly is
the Department of Homeland Security organized in a way that sets us up
for success?
I look forward to discussing those questions in greater detail with
the witnesses today.
As part of the Executive Order on transnational crime recently
signed by the President, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National
Intelligence, are all asked to improve the coordination of Federal
agencies' efforts to identify, interdict, investigate, prosecute, and
dismantle transnational criminal organizations. I will be interested in
learning what role DHS will play in this administration's increased
focus on transnational criminal organizations.
Beyond our strategic approach to counter the cartels, we need to be
properly organized to fight them as well.
In 2003, The Department of Homeland Security was created from 22
disparate agencies. It should not be surprising that there would be
significant growing pains before that agency would function as a truly
unified department. Each component of the Department, be it CBP, ICE,
or the Coast Guard, has a tendency to operate in its own silo, without
the coordination required to make border and maritime security efforts
successful, not to mention reducing redundancy and overlap.
This can have negative effect on logistics, communications, and
most importantly, operations.
Several years ago, then-Secretary Johnson took a page from the
Department of Defense playbook and created three joint task forces in
an attempt to eliminate stovepipes and foster unity of effort along the
border. Two of these task forces, JTF-East and -West, are
geographically-based, while one, JTF-Investigations, is a functional
task force. The goal was simple: Establish a streamlined, and unified
structure that prioritizes border security operations and
investigations against the most meaningful cartel actors.
This committee, working with our Senate counterparts, provided a
temporary 6-year authorization for the joint task forces which was
included in last year's National Defense Authorization Act. The intent
was to allow the concept to mature, and provide ample opportunity for
the Department to demonstrate to this committee that organizational
structure has measurably contributed to border security that would not
have happened in the absence of a task force.
In drafting the authorization, we expressly borrowed several
concepts from the Department of Defense including joint duty training,
and joint duty assignments to foster a culture and operational mindset
that, we hope, will transform the way that DHS conducts border security
operations.
Today, is the very first time Congress has held a hearing on the
new border security joint task forces, so I look forward to hearing
from the commanders as we discuss how best to counter the growing
sophistication of the Mexican cartels and the serious National security
threat they pose.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for any
statement he might have.
Mr. Vela. I thank the Chair for holding today's hearing to
examine the Department of Homeland Security Joint Task Forces.
Those of us who represent Congressional districts on the U.S.-
Mexico border know first-hand the essential role several
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security play in
securing America's borders and facilitating legitimate trade
and travel.
Integrating the operations of the 22 different agencies
that came together as DHS has been a challenge since the
Department commenced operations in 2003. Nowhere is this truer
than for border security.
Using the Department of Defense as a guide, former
Secretary Jeh Johnson established the Border Security Joint
Task Forces to help ensure Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Coast Guard worked
together to coordinate operations, maximize resources, and
reduce unnecessary duplication of efforts.
We know drug trafficking organizations adapt quickly to any
real or perceived weakness in our security, shifting to new
locations along the land border, using the ports of entry to
smuggle their contraband across the border, or exploiting the
maritime routes into this country.
That is why it is so imperative that all of DHS work
together to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the networks as
quickly as they are adapted to our operations.
Each of these agencies must work together and with their
Federal, State, and local counterparts if we hope to combat the
cartels effectively. With that in mind, I hope to hear from our
DHS witnesses today about how the Joint Task Forces are
operating currently, potential next steps and the vision for
the future.
I also hope to hear from our Government Accountability
Office witness, about what prior DHS coordination efforts tell
us about the likelihood of success with the Joint Task Forces.
Ultimately, I believe a whole-of-Government approach that
includes border security, cooperation with foreign partners,
and domestic demand reduction will be necessary to addressing
the threat that illegal drugs and those who traffic them pose
to our country. Getting DHS's role right will be essential to
that important effort.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and look forward
to a productive discussion.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Vela follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Filemon Vela
April 4, 2017
Those of us who represent congressional districts on the U.S.-
Mexico border know first-hand the essential role several agencies
within the Department of Homeland Security play in securing America's
borders and facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
Integrating the operations of the 22 different agencies that came
together as DHS has been a challenge since the Department commenced
operations in 2003.
Nowhere is this truer than for border security.
Using the Department of Defense as a guide, former Secretary Jeh
Johnson established the border security Joint Task Forces to help
ensure Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the Coast Guard work together to coordinate
operations, maximize resources, and reduce unnecessary duplication of
efforts.
We know drug trafficking organizations adapt quickly to any real or
perceived weakness in our security, shifting to new locations along the
land border, using the ports of entry to smuggle their contraband
across the border, or exploiting the maritime routes into this country.
That is why it is so imperative that all of DHS works together to
identify, disrupt, and dismantle the networks as quickly as they are
adapted to our operations.
Each of these agencies must work together and with their Federal,
State, and local counterparts if we hope to combat the cartels
effectively.
With that in mind, I hope to hear from our DHS witnesses today
about how the Joint Task Forces are operating currently, potential next
steps, and the vision for the future.
I also hope to hear from our Government Accountability Office (GAO)
witness about what prior DHS coordination efforts tell us about the
likelihood for success with the Joint Task Forces.
Ultimately, I believe a whole-of-Government approach that includes
border security, cooperation with foreign partners, and domestic demand
reduction will be necessary to addressing the threat that illegal drugs
and those who traffic them pose to our country.
Getting DHS's role right will be essential to that important
effort. I thank the witnesses for joining us today and look forward to
a productive discussion.
Ms. McSally. Other Members of the committee are reminded
that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 4, 2017
The establishment and authorization of the Department of Homeland
Security's Joint Task Forces was a major priority for former Secretary
of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson. Secretary Johnson was in a position
to observe first-hand many of the coordination challenges that continue
to face the Department of Homeland Security, almost 15 years after its
establishment.
Those of us who have conducted oversight of the Department since it
was created from 22 different Federal departments and agencies also
understand the effects of that legacy, which persist today.
Drawing on the example of the Department of Defense, and launched
as part of a Unity of Effort campaign, the Joint Task Forces are meant
to set the conditions for the Department to act in a more unified
fashion.
Coordination of the border security activities of the Department in
particular is critical, given the number of DHS components that play a
role in the mission, including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has closely examined
issues regarding coordination among Department components and programs
over the years. We are grateful to have Ms. Gambler from GAO with us
today to testify about her work on border security issues and DHS
coordination and share her thoughts about whether and how the Joint
Task Forces can be successful.
I also want to note that the discussion about facilitating border
security coordination and cooperation is moot if these agencies are not
properly resourced by the Trump administration.
Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol agents and ICE agents and officers
while ignoring critical CBP staffing shortages at ports of entry does
not enhance our Nation's border security.
Securing the areas of the border between the ports of entry while
leaving the proverbial front door to the country thousands of officers
short creates glaring security vulnerability.
Similarly, slashing the Coast Guard's already lean budget makes no
sense from a security perspective. Enhancing security on the land
borders but crippling the Coast Guard's ability to patrol our coasts
would undermine border security, as drug traffickers will surely shift
their operations to the path of least resistance.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the
resources they need to fulfill their border security mission, and how
the Joint Task Forces can be an important part of that effort.
Ms. McSally. We are pleased to be joined today by four
distinguished witnesses to discuss this important topic.
Vice Admiral Carl Schultz assumed the duties as the
director of DHS Joint Task Force East in August 2016. In this
role, Admiral Schultz is responsible for his joint operating
area, which covers the Caribbean Ocean and eastern Pacific
region and Central America.
In addition to those roles and responsibilities, Admiral
Schultz served as commander, Coast Guard Defense Force East,
which provides Coast Guard mission support to the Department of
Defense and combatant commanders.
Commander Paul Beeson is the commander of the Joint Task
Force-West, with responsibilities for security along the entire
southern land border and the coast of California. Previously,
Director Beeson was the commander of Joint Task Force-West
Arizona and chief of the Tucson Sector Border Patrol.
Ms. Janice Ayala is the director of Joint Task Force-
Investigations, which prioritizes and integrates support for
criminal investigations along both Joint Task Force-West and
East, to mitigate the risk of terrorism, dismantle
transnational criminal organizations, and reduce illicit
traffic. Previous to this assignment, Ms. Ayala served as the
deputy director of Joint Task Force-West and focused integrated
counter-network operations.
Ms. Rebecca Gambler is the director of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Homeland Security and Justice team,
where she leads GAO's work on border security, immigration, and
Department of Homeland Security's management and
transformation.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
The Chair now recognizes Admiral Schultz for 5 minutes to
testify.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL KARL SCHULTZ, DIRECTOR, JOINT TASK
FORCE-EAST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Schultz. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
Member Vela, Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to
appear today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security,
to discuss Joint Task Force East and our efforts to address
transnational criminal organizations and the threats they pose
to the safety and the security of the United States.
I request that my full written statement that was provided
earlier, be submitted into the record, as you noted, Madam
Chairwoman.
As the director of Joint Task Force-East and commander for
Coast Guard operations east of the Rocky Mountains, my staffs
collaborate across the Department of Homeland Security
component agencies with the Department of Defense and with
other interagency and international partners on a continual
basis, to deliver operational effect against transnational
criminal organizations, commonly referred within the law
enforcement community as TCOs.
These TCOs are highly resilient, highly adaptive, and they
require a whole-of-Government solution to thwart their illicit
activities. Our roughly 40-member JTF-East team is comprised of
members from Customs Border Protection, ICE, the United States
Coast Guard. My two deputy directors: One is a Customs Border
Protection and Marine director, and the other is from HSI.
JTF-East's geographic area of responsibility and joint
operations area is vast, as you noted, and that is included in
my written statement, ma'am.
Established to enhance unity of effort, build regional
cooperation, and define operational priorities, the DHS
Secretary gave the task force a wide mandate to achieve
effective enforcement interdiction across land, sea, and air
domains in order to degrade these transnational criminal
organizations, while facilitating the flow of lawful trade,
legal commerce across our borders.
At Joint Task Force-East, we strive to lead the planning
and coordination of DHS component, counter-network enforcement
operations directed at disrupting transnational criminal
organizations across our joint operating area.
To best coordinate across the many individual component
operational entities, JTF-East has adopted a regional
integrating group or RIG framework, with our initial focus
being on the eastern RIG, which encompasses Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands, a region replete with transnational
criminal activity.
Under this RIG construct, our DHS components are working in
close collaboration to develop standard operational plans that
support regional surge operations aimed at weakening and
defeating criminal networks.
Our efforts aim to enable better information sharing and
the optimal utilization of high-demand, low-availability
enforcement assets, such as cutters, aircraft, small boats, as
well as finite intelligence, analysts, and investigators. While
still nascent in our development, the benefits of improved
unity of effort to DHS mission accomplishments are promising.
For example, during our November 26 surge of resources to
the Puerto Rican-U.S. Virgin Island vector, JTF worked with DHS
components under their standing Caribbean guard operation and
with the Department of Defense to reallocate resources
stationed outside the region to support the Eastern Caribbean
RIG's resource shortfalls, as well as leverage refined
intelligence support from the Department of Defense's Joint
Interagency Task Force South, often referred to as JIATF-South.
The collaborative efforts enabled the arrests of 13
individuals, the interdiction of 88 migrants from both shore
and sea, the seizure of 500 kilograms of cocaine, 28 kilograms
of marijuana, $77,000 in bulk cash, and two vessels.
These efforts also disrupted a Nationally-identified
priority transnational criminal organization. As a director, I
am pleased that the unity of effort was enhanced across the
components in pursuit of joint operational priorities.
Our task force works to fill intelligence gaps between the
maritime and land domains in order to cultivate a comprehensive
perspective on emerging threats. Joint Task Force-East has been
identified as the Secretary's single touch-point in the event
of increased or mass maritime migration.
Zeroing in on the Joint Task Force shared operating area in
Central America, we are supporting aggressive efforts to
counter TCOs at the earliest possible points in their supply
chains.
By increased collaboration with DHS and Homeland Security
investigations, international attaches, the Department of
Defense, international and interagency partners, efforts such
as the JTF-East led Western Hemisphere Illicit Pathways
Initiative, or what we refer to as WHIP, promote information
sharing and collaboration in the fight against TCOs in Central
America, by enabling partner nations to enroll, share, and
collaborate on biometric data on migrants and special interest
aliens transiting through Central America.
In closing, I am pleased to report that the DHS Joint Task
Forces are enhancing unity of effort, building regional
cooperation, and more clearly defining operational priorities.
From my vantage point at the helm of Joint Task Force-East,
continued progress on these fronts is instrumental to defeating
transnational criminal organizations and making America safer.
Continued maturation of the JTS will strengthen the
Department of Homeland Security and enable broader cooperation
and coordination across the whole-of-Government enterprise and
internationally as well.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Schultz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Karl L. Schultz
April 4, 2017
introduction
Good morning Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Vela, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here
today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss
how Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E)--one of three Joint Task Forces
established under the DHS Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan
(SBACP)--is working to address the threats posed by Transnational
Criminal Organizations (TCOs) to the safety and security of the United
States.
I assumed the duties as director of Joint Task Force-East in August
2016 and look forward to continued strong partnership and collaboration
with my counterparts, U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Chief Paul Beeson,
director of the Joint Task Force-West; and Janice Ayala, director of
the Joint Task Force-Investigations, from U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).
jtf-east background
Before the creation of the DHS Joint Task Forces (JTFs), DHS
agencies in the field regularly worked together to achieve significant
enforcement results; however, these results frequently relied upon a
network of informal personal relationships and overlapping agency
priorities, versus a clear framework that directed regional efforts.
The JTF construct formalizes operational processes between regional-
and National-level DHS components, and establishes enduring functional
relationships between DHS agencies. JTF-E's organization provides a
platform for operational continuity at the National level and optimizes
a complex network of relationships with other non-DHS law enforcement
and inter-agency partners.
Joint Task Forces were established to enhance unity of effort,
build regional cooperation, and define operational priorities. The
SBACP gave the JTFs a wide mandate to achieve effective enforcement and
interdiction across land, sea, and air domains; and to degrade TCOs
while facilitating the flow of lawful trade, travel, and commerce
across borders. As the JTF-E director, I thank the committee for its
role supporting the authorization that enabled the DHS Secretary to
formally establish JTFs.
Today I am pleased to report, under the JTF construct, DHS
components in the field are working in close collaboration to develop
standard operational plans supporting regional operations to defeat
these criminal networks. We leverage existing DHS facilities and
capabilities to stand-up Joint Information Operations Centers to best
coordinate information sharing and asset utilization. The enhanced
coordination and sharing of resources and information is improving our
ability to more comprehensively target and dismantle TCOs through a
``whole of Department/unity of effort'' approach. While still nascent
in our development at JTF-E, the benefits to DHS mission accomplishment
are very promising.
JTF-E's geographic responsibility includes the international waters
of the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the Eastern Pacific
Ocean--southward to the north coast of South America, the airspace
spanning U.S. territorial lands and waters; also, the international
airspace in the approaches to Central America is shared with JTF-West.
My dual-hatted status as a member of the Armed Forces responsible
for Coast Guard operations east of the Rocky Mountains, and as the JTF-
E Director, positions me well to coordinate and collaborate across DHS
agencies and with Department of Defense (DoD) Geographic Combatant
Commands, including U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S.
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). This positioning enhances information
sharing and assists in identifying DoD resources that could be
requested to support DHS Component-led operations. JTF-E's two deputy
directors are Senior Executive Service (SES) representatives from U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--Air and Marine Operations; and
ICE-HSI, with additional members from CBP's Office of Field Operations
and the USBP. The JTF-E staff of just over 40 detailees provide key
touch points and experience essential to building relationships and
processes crucial to JTF-E's performance.
current status of jtf-east
JTF-E's task is to lead the coordination of DHS component
enforcement efforts to plan and implement enhanced counter-network
operations directed at disrupting TCOs across its Joint Operating Area
(JOA). Secretary Kelly has directed the JTFs to target individuals and
organizations whose criminal conduct undermines border security or the
integrity of the immigration system, including alien smuggling or
trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal entry and reentry, visa fraud,
identity theft, unlawful possession or use of official documents, and
acts of violence committed against persons or property at or near the
border. These broad responsibilities make the JTFs distinct from other
DHS task forces which have more specific functional roles.
Given the geographic size and complexity of our JOA, coordinating
efforts among the hundreds of individual component operational entities
with distinct missions, chains of command, responsibilities, and
operating areas remains a challenge. JTF-E has focused its efforts on
coordinating operations within our newly created Regional Integrating
Groups (RIGs), beginning with the Eastern Caribbean RIG. JTF-E has also
conducted initial planning meetings with the Central Caribbean and Gulf
Coast RIGs.
The JTFs seek to harmonize DHS-wide operational priorities with the
priorities of local front-line component offices working at the
tactical level. Through a repeatable, deliberate planning process that
best aligns available resources against both regional and National
Department-level threats, JTF-E enhances enforcement at the field
level.
For example, from November 10 to November 22, 2016, JTF-E,
partnering with the Eastern Caribbean RIG, coordinated a push of
resources to Puerto Rico in support of the Caribbean Border Interagency
Group's (CBIG) operation ``Caribbean Guard,'' a standing joint
operation in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands that seeks to
deter, disrupt, and dismantle TCOs.
JTF-E and regional DHS leadership received and validated resource
requests from ICE, CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other
partners, and developed a consolidated, interagency resource request in
order to reallocate resources stationed outside of Puerto Rico to meet
the joint operational requirements. These resources included additional
CBP aircraft, DoD linguist support, and a USCG Maritime Safety and
Security Team operating out of the Virgin Islands. Additionally, JTF-E
leveraged refined intelligence support from Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force-South (JIATF-S). The collaborative effort enabled by JTF-E
yielded 13 arrests, 70 migrants intercepted ashore and 18 migrants
interdicted at sea, the seizure of more than 500 kilograms of cocaine
and 28 kilograms of marijuana, over $77,000 in bulk cash, and two
vessels. These actions also disrupted a Nationally-identified priority
TCO. However, these numbers only partially capture the results of the
integrated field operations.
Enhancing Unity of Effort in the pursuit of joint operational
priorities is also a key goal of the JTF concept. JTF-E improves
synchronization of cross-component capabilities that provide timely,
actionable, fused ``all-source'' intelligence. Additionally, JTF-E
intelligence efforts fill in the intelligence gaps between the maritime
and land domains, while also leveraging cross-component personnel to
cultivate a comprehensive perspective on emerging threats. Our most
recent example includes JTF-E compiling and coordinating existing
intelligence prepared by CBP, ICE, USCG, USSOUTHCOM, JIATF-S, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, and others, in order to produce an all-inclusive
threat overview, termed a Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operating Environment (JIPOE).
To thwart illegal maritime migration, the recently-developed DHS
Maritime Migration Contingency Plan identifies JTF-E as the Secretary's
single touch-point in the event of increased or mass maritime
migration. JTF-E's recently clarified roles will enable the Secretary
to receive consolidated information and make validated requests for
assistance to DoD, thus allowing for more rapid decision making and
analysis. JTF-E recently exercised this role in a large-scale multi-
week USSOUTHCOM exercise and implemented it during the recent
termination of the wet-foot/dry-foot policy affecting Cuban maritime
migration.
future jtf-east engagements
In addition to our responsibility to coordinate within our
Department, JTF-E supports DHS's aggressive efforts to counter TCOs at
the earliest possible points in their supply chains via increased
collaboration with our partners in Mexico, Central and South America,
and the Caribbean. JTF-E leads the Western Hemisphere Illicit Pathways
Initiative (WHIP), promoting information sharing and collaboration with
our partner nations to fight against TCOs in Central America and
Special Interest Aliens transiting through Central America and the
Caribbean. Through collaboration with DoD's Combating Terrorism and
Technical Support Office, JTF-E continues to explore technology
solutions that enable the law enforcement missions of U.S. and
international partners, while illuminating illicit pathways throughout
the Western Hemisphere.
JTF-E is actively working with the Eastern Caribbean RIG, the
Central Caribbean RIG and the Gulf Coast RIG to facilitate additional
near-term joint operations. These efforts will build upon the lessons
learned from prior joint operations supporting regional DHS components,
as well as enhanced collaboration across departmental and interagency
lines. Enhanced intelligence sharing and informational analysis will
also be incorporated as interagency law enforcement coordination is
improved and future operational processes are further refined.
conclusion
The JTFs are new and reside in a department with a short 14-year
history that is responsible for the critical and complex task of
securing our homeland and our borders. JTF-East, JTF-West, and JTF-
Investigations operate collaboratively to unify operations on a daily
basis to achieve the objective of the Southern Border and Approaches
Campaign Plan. All three Task Forces are enhancing unity of effort,
building regional cooperation, and are more clearly defining
operational priorities. Continued progress on these fronts is
instrumental to defeating TCOs and making America safer. TCOs are
adaptive and resilient, investing a significant amount of resources and
time in adjusting tactics to subvert our efforts. Combating TCOs will
continue to be a priority for the JTFs, as they play a key role in our
layered border security strategy. As JTFs mature, they will continue to
strengthen cooperation within DHS and improve coordination both
internationally and across the whole-of-Government enterprise.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Admiral Schultz.
The Chair now recognizes Commander Beeson for 5 minutes to
testify.
STATEMENT OF PAUL A. BEESON, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE-WEST,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Chief Beeson. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
Member Vela, and distinguished Members of this subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss
Joint Task Force-West.
During the hearing before this committee on February 16 of
this year, we discussed the unique challenges faced by several
DHS components in combatting the threats posed by transnational
criminal organizations.
During that hearing, I discussed the advanced tactics and
techniques and the networks used by TCOs to smuggle drugs, and
humans, toward and across our Southwest Border, into the United
States.
Today I would like to discuss with you Joint Task Force-
West and some of the steps that DHS has taken to confront the
threats posed by these sophisticated TCOs and their illicit
networks.
Thanks to the support of Congress in the past decade, DHS
has deployed more personnel, resources, technology, and
tactical infrastructure to secure our borders than at any other
time in history.
While DHS components are now better equipped because of
these investments, we must continue to evolve to a more cross-
functional operations model, to counter a threat that exploits
our jurisdictional seams.
In response to the growing TCO threat, DHS has sought to
capitalize on past successes realized through increased
coordination between DHS components. Pursuant to the Southern
Border and Approaches Campaign, we piloted a structure for
coordinating operational integration of the joint task forces.
JTF-West was responsible for the Southwest Border with
Mexico from California to Texas. The land approaches through
Mexico to this border, the littorals of the Gulf of Mexico off
Texas, and then the Pacific Ocean off California and the air
space spanning U.S. territorial land and waters.
JTF activities are coordinated and conducted through DHS
components situated in four operational corridors, aligning DHS
enforcement efforts with known traffic flows of illegal cross-
border activities.
This integration across geographic and agency boundaries
along the entire Southwest Border, is helping us to identify
priority TCOs and complex and expansive networks, operatives,
and affiliates. This enables us to design strategies to disrupt
and ultimately dismantle these TCOs and illicit networks.
While the JTFs are still in the early stages of integration
and organizational set-up, we have realized some successful
outcomes of our coordination efforts. In fiscal year 2016, JTF-
W identified a total of 19 TCOs prioritized for disruption or
dismantlement, using a developed and standardized interagency
process.
Four of these original TCOs have been dismantled. JTF-W and
JTF-I continue to coordinate with DHS components to disrupt and
dismantle those remaining TCOs that are still active.
In addition to these longer-term efforts, JTF-W led the
coordination and execution of Operation All-In. This operation
sought to synchronize intelligence-gathering investigations,
interdictions, and other efforts against known human smuggling
facilitators across the Southwest Border and into the interior
of the United States. These individuals had been operating with
impunity up to that point and profiting financially from their
criminal enterprise.
Based on the initial success of Operation All-In, we have
transitioned this operational concept to an open-ended steady-
state enforcement effort.
These JTFs are examples of how DHS has embarked on enhanced
information sharing and joint operational planning and
execution. TCOs recognize no borders or authorities. The only
way to combat a threat of this nature is to leverage the
collective capabilities of DHS partner agencies and
governments.
In support of the recent Presidential Executive Orders
related to immigration enforcement, border and National
security, and the guidance set forth by DHS Secretary Kelly,
JTF-W will continue to employ its counter-network strategy
against TCOs and illicit networks to enhance the safety and
security of the homeland.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Chief Beeson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul A. Beeson
April 4, 2017
introduction
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today on
behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department),
to discuss how the Joint Task Force-West (JTF-W)--one of three Joint
Task Forces established under the DHS Southern Border and Approaches
Campaign (SBAC)--is working to address the threats posed by
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) to the safety and security
of the United States.
Although I officially assumed my duties as Director of JTF-W in
December 2016, I reported to JTF-W Headquarters in San Antonio, Texas,
on March 5, 2017. I look forward to working closely with my
counterparts, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Vice-Admiral Karl Schultz,
director of the Joint Task Force-East, and Janice Ayala, director of
the Joint Task Force-Investigations, from U. S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).
Thanks to the support of Congress, during the past decade DHS has
deployed more personnel, resources, technology, and tactical
infrastructure to secure our borders than at any other time in history.
DHS has harnessed this support to expand the whole-of-Government
approach to border security--one that leverages the authorities and
capabilities of multiple departments and agencies and extends
international partnerships--to multiply our efforts to counter the
dynamic and sophisticated tactics and techniques that TCOs use to
penetrate our border.
The Southwest Border (SWB) of the United States is a highly diverse
environment with equally diverse threats to the security and safety of
our border communities and communities throughout the United States.
TCOs operating along the SWB are engaged in the smuggling and
trafficking of aliens, narcotics, weapons, currency, and other illicit
goods. The nearly unlimited financial resources generated by TCOs'
criminal activities afford them a freedom of action that challenges
traditional law enforcement strategies. TCOs are also highly mobile and
maintain sophisticated cross-border networks, operating throughout the
SWB environments including at and between ports of entry (POE), and in
the land, air, and maritime domains.
jtf-w history and structure
JTF-W, which became fully operational in July 2015, was established
as a pilot program as part of the SBAC. The SBAC leverages the range of
unique Department authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities to
enhance and unify our operational approach to address comprehensive
threat environments and complements the biennial National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy. JTF-W, with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) serving as its executive agent, supports the
Department's Unity of Effort initiative, through the integrated
Corridor structure, by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling threats
posed by TCOs to the SWB of the United States. We coordinate and
support integrated counter-network operations against priority TCOs
engaged in criminal cross-border activity, employing a whole-of-
Government approach to deliver the greatest possible consequences
against these prioritized TCOs. What is different today is that JTF-W
leads the coordination of these efforts in a joint environment. We
build on the collective capabilities of the DHS components to plan and
coordinate operations using the collective strength of the Department,
in support of DHS goals. It is in a joint environment such as
JTF-W where the full capabilities of DHS can be leveraged and focused
to address emerging and priority threats to the Homeland.
The JTF-W Joint Operating Area (JOA), established by the SBAC,
includes the land border with Mexico from California to Texas, the land
approaches through Mexico to this border, the littorals in the Gulf of
Mexico off Texas and in the Pacific Ocean off California, and the
airspace spanning U.S. territorial land and waters. JTF-W and JTF-E
share Central America as part of their respective JOAs. JTF-W
activities are coordinated and conducted through four operational
corridors pursuant to the CBP Commissioner's Integrated Corridor
Operations Model memorandum: The South Texas Corridor; the New Mexico/
West Texas Corridor; the Arizona Corridor; and the California Corridor.
This Integrated Corridor Operations Model facilitates cross-component
coordination, enabling the DHS components in these corridors to execute
targeted border security operations across the JTF-W JOA against
prioritized TCOs in a manner and scope that previously did not exist.
Corridor leadership is comprised of senior representatives from each
DHS component within the geographic region, including CBP, ICE, and
USCG. By drawing leadership from each DHS component, JTF-W coordinates
through existing command-and-control structures to synchronize
component efforts, specifically to:
Integrate and align component intelligence capabilities to
achieve the JTF-W mission;
Prioritize investigative efforts to disrupt, degrade, and
dismantle TCOs and illicit networks;
Institutionalize and standardize integrated counter-network
operations to identify and target TCOs and illicit networks;
Strengthen international, prosecutorial, and deterrent
efforts against TCO enterprises and significant activity
impacting the JTF-W JOA; and
Advance the JTF-W mission through unified communication and
messaging efforts.
Since its inception, JTF-W has employed and continues to refine a
standardized, DHS-wide counter-network strategy throughout its JOA.
JTF-W works to ensure that intelligence is shared, threats and targets
are prioritized, and operations are planned and executed jointly by
facilitating the coordination and collaboration of the operational
Components across DHS, specifically CBP, ICE, USCIS, and USCG. To
achieve maximum operational flexibility, JTF-W is currently staffed
with not-to-exceed (NTE) and temporary duty (TDY) personnel from these
components. All employed equipment and assets are temporarily realigned
from the components to support JTF-W activities. JTF-W staff from the
represented components coordinate efforts related to intelligence,
operations, logistics, administration, and external engagement. JTF-W
further supports the efforts of DHS in external outreach and engagement
with other Federal partners such as Department of Justice, Department
of State, and Department of Defense.
jtf-w efforts to counter tcos
The dynamic threats posed by TCOs necessitate a united,
comprehensive strategy and an aggressive approach by multiple entities
across all levels of Government. To combat the challenges posed by
TCOs, JTF-W is focused on both long-term investigative operations
against priority TCOs, as well as short-term operations against other
associated networks, operatives, and affiliates.
For example, the Threat and Intelligence Priorities Assessment
(TIPA) is component-neutral assessment tool that provides a thorough
analysis of the threats facing each unique operating environment. This
approach enables multiple agencies to examine the same set of threats
within and across mission and geographic areas of responsibility. It
provides the ability to individually and collectively identify and
understand the highest-priority threats in the region. This is the
first time that these DHS entities along the SWB have utilized one
process to produce a joint threat assessment.
JTF-W led the initiative to implement a standardized operational
planning process across the SWB Corridors. This process was aligned
with the overarching DHS Operational Planning Guidance and the DHS
Campaign Plan for Securing the U.S. Southern Border and Approaches.
Through this process, JTF-W is able to articulate how strategic goals
are being implemented tactically through named operations, targeting
prioritized TCOs. An example of this collaboration was Operation OPTAR.
In Arizona this past year, DHS components from the JTF-W Arizona
Corridor jointly planned and executed an operation targeting heroin
smuggling through the POE. This joint effort resulted in the seizure of
almost 5,000 kilograms of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, marijuana,
and methamphetamines bound for the United States and 12,000 rounds of
ammunition and approximately $80,000 bound for Mexico.
JTF-W is uniquely situated to centralize mission requirements to
expand information sharing and Information Technology systems across
the Department. While the mission requirements are not new, JTF-W has
served as a catalyst for inter-agency information sharing. For example,
JTF-W expanded access to traditional component-centric systems by
establishing a true joint environment where enforcement personnel could
leverage the breadth of information and authorities of the Department
to target every level of these criminal networks. JTF-W will continue
to coordinate expanded information-sharing capabilities, enhancing
operational capabilities, and more efficiently leveraging DHS and our
partners' resources.
In fiscal year 2016, JTF-W and JTF-I identified 19 TCOs prioritized
for disruption or dismantlement, using a standardized inter-agency
process that did not exist prior to the creation of this task force.
This prioritization allowed DHS to focus its enforcement efforts on
permanently dismantling these TCOs. JTF-W monitored and evaluated
enforcement actions (i.e., civil penalties, arrests, removals, and
seizures) to evaluate its effectiveness based on existing DHS
performance measures. Of these original 19 TCOs, JTF-W has dismantled
four. JTF-W and the JTF-I continue to coordinate with DHS components to
disrupt and dismantle the remaining TCOs that are still active. For
fiscal year 2017, these processes are being refined, standardized, and
institutionalized.
In addition to these longer-term efforts, JTF-W led the
coordination and execution of Operation All In. This Secretary-approved
operation, the first of its kind within the Department, synchronized
intelligence-gathering, investigation, and interdiction cross-component
efforts against known human-smuggling facilitators across the SWB and
parts of the interior United States. As a result of Operation All In,
204 targets with extensive ties to human smuggling networks, who had
been operating up to that point with impunity and profiting financially
from this criminal enterprise, were identified and encountered. Based
on the initial success of Operation All In, the DHS Secretary approved
this operational concept as an open-ended, steady-state enforcement
effort.
Recognizing that DHS is not alone in the fight against TCOs, JTF-W,
through the integrated corridor structure, actively partners with
numerous other Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
agencies, as well as international partners. These partnerships are
critical to JTF-W's ability to coordinate operations to disrupt and
dismantle TCOs engaged in illicit smuggling activities across the JOA.
Of note, prosecutors accepted 97 percent of the Operation All In
targets that were presented for criminal prosecution at either the
Federal or State level, demonstrating the high-degree of external
coordination between law enforcement and prosecuting attorneys.
In the international arena, JTF-W prioritizes its efforts to
advance border and regional security in alignment with DHS's
International Engagement Strategy, and supporting the binational
programs with the government of Mexico, and in the near future, Central
America. These initiatives, which are coordinated through existing
mechanisms at the attache, component, and Department level, advance
border security through binational partnerships, foreign country
capacity building, and enhanced international engagement.
In addition to these enforcement efforts, JTF-W has leveraged
internal and external relationships as part of a public messaging
campaign. For example, JTF-W has created an on-going series of short
videos as a cost-neutral effort to deter illegal migration and raise
awareness of the atrocities, abuses, extortion, and natural hazards
migrants will encounter on their journey. These videos, which are
produced internally using organic resources and personnel, received
extensive distribution both domestically and abroad. To date, three
videos have been viewed 555,000 times via multiple social media
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and have been broadcast by
Univision, Telemundo, and other Spanish-language television outlets.
next steps
President Trump recently issued two Executive Orders \1\ that
direct additional tools and resources for securing the Southern
Border--to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and
acts of terrorism. The Executive Orders also prioritize enforcement of
Federal law in order to thwart TCOs and other groups engaged in illicit
activities that present a threat to public safety and National
security. Specifically, per Secretary Kelly's February 20, 2017,
implementation memo,\2\
JTF-W will plan and implement enhanced counter-network operations
directed at disrupting TCOs, particularly those involved in human
smuggling. Working with our Federal, State, and local law enforcement
partners, the JTF-W will target individuals and organizations whose
criminal conduct undermines border security or the integrity of the
immigration system, including offenses related to alien smuggling or
trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal entry and reentry, visa fraud,
identity theft, unlawful possession or use of official documents, and
acts of violence committed against persons or property at or near the
border. We will take all appropriate steps to implement the provisions
of the President's Executive Orders, which support the Department's
efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs that are fortifying their illicit
networks in the border region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Executive Order 13767: Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements, January 25, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-
immigration-enforcement-improvements; and Executive Order 13773:
Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal
Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/Presidential-executive-
order-enforcing-Federal-law-respect-transnational.
\2\ Memo: Implementing the President's Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies. February 20, 2017.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-
Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving forward, JTF-W, through its coordination and collaboration
efforts, will support DHS Secretary Kelly's vision for the Joint Task
Forces to enhance counter-network operations directed at disrupting
TCOs impacting the SWB. Our efforts will remain focused on human
smuggling TCOs and illicit networks, while additionally targeting those
involved in drug trafficking, currency smuggling, and other related
cross-border crimes. Through integration, collaboration, and
coordination efforts, JTF-W will prioritize efforts to disrupt and
dismantle TCOs and illicit networks presenting the greatest risk to the
homeland.
JTF-W will continue to evaluate, refine, and institutionalize
processes and procedures to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. We
will expand investigative and operational reach by leveraging domestic
and international partners to increase intelligence and information
sharing and coordinate law enforcement actions beyond the SWB region.
This same approach will be instrumental in enhancing domestic
relationships with Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners
to effectively share information and optimize enforcement actions
against those illicit organizations that threaten the security of the
SWB and its approaches. This whole-of-Government approach will enable
DHS and its partners to attack TCOs and illicit networks at their most
vulnerable points, regardless of where they reside.
conclusion
DHS is committed to mitigating the threats posed by TCOs operating
along the SWB. With continued support from Congress, JTF-W will support
component efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs by improving the
coordination and collaboration with all partners, foreign, and
domestic. The JTF-W counter-network strategy will expand the
enforcement zone from point-of-origin to point-of-destination;
including transit zones, the Southern Border, and the approaches,
harnessing the collective capabilities of DHS and its partners through
a Unity of Effort.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. As I
mentioned earlier, DHS is embarking on a new era of joint operational
planning and operations. TCOs recognize no borders or authorities. The
only way to attack an enemy of this nature is to leverage the
collective capabilities of DHS, partner agencies, and governments. JTF-
W will continue to employ its counter-network strategy against TCOs and
illicit networks to enhance the safety, security, and prosperity of the
homeland. I look forward to your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Commander Beeson.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Ayala for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JANICE AYALA, DIRECTOR, JOINT TASK FORCE--
INVESTIGATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
Ms. Ayala. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today. As a senior executive of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security
Investigations, I serve as the director of Joint Task Force-
Investigations, or JTF-I.
JTF-I, JTF-East, and JTF-West are responsible for
establishing operational priorities and synchronizing
capabilities. While JTF-East and West are geographically-
focused task forces, JTF-I is a functional task force with no
geographic boundaries, established to improve the investigative
functions within DHS.
Consisting of over 60 interagency investigators and
analysts and operators, primarily from ICDP, and Coast Guard,
we utilize a process that prioritizes and integrates support
for criminal investigations along the U.S. Southern Border and
approaches, to dismantle transnational criminal organizations,
prevent their reconstitution and reduce illicit flows.
Our success depends upon a high level of cooperation,
transparency, and communication in consolidating resources and
leveraging unique domestic and international authorities to
combat TCOs. The primary TCOs that threaten border security on
the Southwest Border are Mexican cartels.
Over the last decade, the United States, working with
foreign law enforcement and military counterparts, has had
sustained success in attacking cartel leadership. However, this
success is countered by the fact that the cartels are highly
networked with built-in redundancies and adaptability.
Cartels move illicit proceeds. They hide assets and exploit
vulnerabilities in the financial system through trade-based
money laundering, funnel accounts, and the misuse of money
service businesses. We have an abundance of investigative tools
in our arsenal to target money laundering and financial
violations.
ICE has assigned more than 1,500 special agents to
investigate crime along the Southwest Border by TCOs, some of
them assigned to the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces,
which provide a comprehensive regional approach or response to
the regional border security threats.
In addition to leveraging domestic assets, we work closely
with attache personnel assigned to 66 offices in 49 countries,
to include the engagement of ICE HSI Transnational Criminal
Investigative Units or TCIUs. They are composed of DHS-trained
host country vetted counterparts who have the authority to
investigate and enforce violations in their respective
countries.
These efforts, often thousands of miles from the U.S.-
Mexico border in countries like Colombia and Mexico,
essentially act as an outer layer of security for the Southwest
Border.
In fiscal year 2016, drug-smuggling investigations
conducted by the five HSI Southwest Border SAC offices,
resulted in over 6,000 arrests and nearly 4,000 indictments.
JTF-I prioritizes these and other DHS component
investigations across international boundaries, prosecutorial
jurisdictions, agency missions, programs in operation areas,
and as a result of which is the scores of the United States and
foreign investigations and prosecutions.
To accomplish this, JTF-I developed and manages the DHS-
wide nominations election process for priority criminal
networks, called HomeCort, or Homeland Criminal Organization
Target.
JTF-I also developed National case coordination that
manages the most serious and complex criminal investigations
impacting Homeland Security, in support of DHS taskforce and
component priorities.
JTF-I staff produces over 3,500 hours of monthly support,
analytical and investigative, to HomeCort investigations, while
developing and improving best practices related to joint
investigations, analysis, and targeting.
Over the last 20 months, JTF-I coordinated and supported
the targeting of 14 homeland criminal networks comprised of
several hundred individual criminal investigations involved in
money laundering, sex trafficking, and the smuggling of drugs
or cash, weapons and human cargo, to include special interest
aliens. As of today, 11 of those 14 criminal networks have been
dismantled to the point they no longer pose a threat to
homeland security.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today, for your continued support of DHS and its mission, and I
will be happy to take any questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ayala follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice Ayala
April 4, 2017
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) solutions to threats posed by
drug cartels and smugglers, and the efforts of the DHS Joint Task
Forces (JTFs). As a senior executive of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the primary
criminal investigators of DHS, I serve as director of Joint Task Force-
Investigations (JTF-I). ICE has been designated as the executive agent
of JTF-I.
Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson
announced the Department's new Unity of Effort Initiative in April
2014. On May 8, 2014, former Secretary Johnson announced and directed
our Department-wide Southern Border and Approaches Campaign (SBAC)
Plan. The SBAC is part of a comprehensive security strategy designed to
unify efforts across DHS components to address threats specifically
associated with terrorism, illicit market-driven flows, and illegal
migration across our Southern Border and approaches. In furtherance of
the Department-wide SBAC, former Secretary Johnson commissioned three
pilot Joint Task Forces (JTFs) on November 20, 2014. The three Joint
Task Forces, JTF-I, JTF-East (JTF-E), and JTF-West (JTF-W), are
responsible for establishing operational priorities and synchronizing
capabilities in order to achieve SBAC objectives.
Two of the JTFs, JTF-East (JTF-E) and JTF-West (JTF-W), are
geographically-focused task forces that concentrate on the southern
land and maritime borders of the United States and the approaches to
our border--all the way to Central and South America. As a
``functional'' task force, JTF-I was established to improve the
investigative functions within the Department in furtherance of the
SBAC Plan. JTF-I uses a Department-wide process that prioritizes and
integrates support for criminal investigations along the U.S. Southern
Border and approaches to mitigate the risk of terrorism, dismantle
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), prevent their
reconstitution, and reduce illicit flows.
JTF-I operates within the diverse mission space of the SBAC. JTF-
I's ability to facilitate cross-cutting partnerships between components
with overlapping mission responsibilities allows the SBAC to operate
with a higher level of cooperation, transparency, and effectiveness. By
consolidating resources and refining duplicative efforts, the JTF-I
leverages unique domestic and international authorities that are
integral to the elimination of targeted TCOs. JTF-I's coordination has
led to the successful disruption of several smuggling networks, which I
describe in detail below.
We leverage HSI's broad authority, unique investigative tools, and
global footprint to secure our borders, working in close coordination
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG), Joint Task Forces-East and -West, and many other domestic and
international law enforcement and customs partners to target TCOs.
Today, I will provide JTF-I's perspective on the solutions to the
sophisticated smuggling threats that we face on our Southwest Border,
the approaches that lead up to our border, and some of what we do to
address TCOs and their smuggling activities before contraband arrives
at our borders, and even in the interior of the United States.
the cartels along the southwest border
The primary TCOs that threaten the Southwest Border of the United
States are Mexican drug cartels (the cartels). Over the last decade,
the United States, working with our Mexican law enforcement and
military counterparts, has had sustained success in attacking cartel
leaders, as evidenced by the recent extradition of Joaquin Guzman
Loera, aka ``El Chapo'', to face prosecution in the United States.
However, every law enforcement success against the cartels is countered
by the fact that the cartels are highly-networked organizations with
built-in redundancies that adapt on a daily basis based on their
intelligence of U.S. border security and law enforcement.
While drug smuggling remains the focal point for media and
community interest, the threat and crimes associated with human
smuggling are prevalent and very much real. Based on investigatory
evidence and collected intelligence, we observe that human smuggling
enterprises and the cartels maintain a symbiotic relationship with each
other. Certain members of these criminal enterprises control the major
U.S. and foreign drug markets and others control the smuggling flow
across certain geographic areas of the border on behalf of their
cartel. Some/most human smugglers are required to pay taxes and fees to
cartels for access to smuggling routes through specific geographic
areas and are subject to physical violence and/or death if proper
coordination and compensation are not rendered. In addition, failed
coordination between the cartels and human smuggling enterprises
greatly increases the risk of unwanted law enforcement attention and
investigative efforts.
The cartels move illicit proceeds, hide assets, and conduct
transactions globally. Among the various methods cartels use to
transfer and launder their illicit proceeds are bulk cash smuggling,
trade-based money laundering, funnel accounts, professional money
launderers, and the misuse of Money Service Businesses (MSB) and
emerging payment systems. The cartels exploit vulnerabilities in both
the U.S. and Mexican financial system and conduct layered financial
transactions to circumvent regulatory scrutiny, which presents
difficulties for authorities attempting to distinguish between licit
and illicit use of the financial system. The U.S. Government has
refined our ability to target money laundering and financial violations
through various techniques, to include interagency investigations,
training, and capacity-building, targeted financial sanctions, and
direct engagement with at-risk financial institutions and
jurisdictions.
U.S. Anti-Money Laundering laws and regulations impose customer
identification, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations on covered
financial institutions that help deter criminals from moving illicit
proceeds through the financial system. These preventive measures also
create valuable evidentiary trails for law enforcement to employ during
an investigation. As such, HSI has an abundance of investigative tools
in our arsenal to disrupt and dismantle cartel money laundering
operations as well as to discourage new actors from engaging in illicit
activity.
smuggling trends along the southwest border
The Southwest Border is a diverse environment, including maritime
borders in both the Gulf of Mexico and on the Pacific Ocean that
transition to vast land border areas that include rivers, rural
agricultural lands, and densely-populated urban areas along the nearly
2,000 miles of our Southern Border. In response to these vastly
different areas, the cartels adapt their methods and cargo to the
smuggling environment.
Mexico is a major source and transit country for illicit drugs
destined for the United States. It is a primary source of marijuana,
methamphetamine, and heroin, and a key transit area for cocaine.
As a result of Mexico's dominant role as either a source or transit
point for illicit drugs destined for the United States, it has also
become a primary destination for the illicit proceeds that the cartels
earn from their distribution networks in the United States. Mexican
cartels use a variety of techniques to repatriate illicit proceeds,
from bulk cash smuggling to sophisticated trade-based money-laundering
schemes. Many of the more complex techniques rely on third-party money
launderers and corrupt individuals at financial institutions.
attacking the tcos
To investigate TCOs impacting Southwest Border security, ICE has
assigned more than 1,500 special agents and almost 150 intelligence
research specialists to Southwest Border offices, to include the Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs), which provide a comprehensive
regional response to the growing threat to border security, public
safety, and National security. This includes border security at land,
maritime, and international airports. In fiscal year 2016, ICE drug
smuggling investigations conducted by the five HSI Special Agent in
Charge offices along the Southwest Border resulted in 5,659 criminal
arrests, 3,941 indictments, 3,383 convictions, and 330 administrative
immigration arrests.
JTF-I prioritizes these and other DHS component investigations, to
best focus on an integrated approach transcending border-centric
activities, into broad counter-network operations. These networks are
comprised of international, border, and domestic elements conspiring
together that require a multitude of investigations from a variety of
offices.
In addition to leveraging domestic assets, we work closely with
attache personnel deployed to 66 offices in 49 countries that are
uniquely positioned to utilize established relationships with host
country law enforcement, to include the engagement of Transnational
Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs). These TCIUs are composed of DHS-
trained host country counterparts who have the authority to investigate
and enforce violations of law in their respective countries. Since our
law enforcement officers working overseas do not possess general law
enforcement or investigative authority in most host countries, the use
of these TCIUs enables ICE to promote direct action in its
investigative leads while respecting the sovereignty of the host
country and cultivating international partnerships. These efforts,
often thousands of miles from the U.S.-Mexico border in countries like
Colombia and Panama, essentially act as an outer layer of security for
our Southwest Border.
Mexico has proven to be an outstanding partner in the fight against
TCOs, taking down the cartels' top leadership and working to dismantle
these organizations. ICE's attache office in Mexico City is the largest
ICE presence outside of the United States and has coordinated the
establishment of TCIUs in Mexico comprised of Mexican law enforcement
officers. ICE attache personnel work daily with Mexican authorities to
combat these transnational threats. Additionally, ICE--along with other
DHS components--actively works through the Department of State to
provide training and technical assistance to our Mexican counterparts.
The spirit of collaboration and joint effort between DHS components and
our counterparts in Mexico is unprecedented.
JTF-I is responsible for enhancing and integrating criminal
investigations in support of the operational priorities of JTF-East,
JTF-West, the components, and DHS Headquarters. To accomplish this,
JTF-I manages the DHS-wide nomination and selection process for
Homeland Criminal Organization Targets (HOMECORTs), the top
transnational criminal networks impacting homeland security, and then
coordinates the dozens of investigations and operations targeting each
HOMECORT.
HOMECORT consists of three parts. The first is a nomination and
selection process for prioritizing the top transnational criminal
networks that are threatening homeland security based on the specific
threats prioritized and described in
JTF-E and JTF-W operational priorities. The second is the development
of comprehensive knowledge about the criminal network (hierarchy,
associations, activities, etc.), which is called Comprehensive Criminal
Network Analysis (CCNA). The third is National Case Coordination, a
term used to describe centralized management and support of complex and
priority investigations of entire criminal networks that cross
jurisdictions, programs, and interagency and international boundaries.
The ultimate goal of a HOMECORT investigation is the complete
dismantlement of the criminal network that is the subject of the
investigation. Dismantlement is defined as destroying the target
organization's leadership, network, and financial base to the point
that the organization is incapable of reconstituting itself.
HOMECORT criminal networks typically cross international
boundaries, prosecutorial jurisdictions, agency missions, programs, and
operations areas; and, as a result, are linked to scores of U.S. and
foreign partner investigations, operations, prosecutions, seizures, and
apprehensions. HOMECORT cases are the most serious and complex criminal
investigations conducted by the Federal Government, as they typically
involve all functions of Federal policing and governance including
investigations, patrol, inspections, immigration, citizenship, finance,
justice, public integrity, public health and safety, trade, and
diplomacy.
JTF-I consists of over 60 interagency investigators, analysts, and
operators, primarily from ICE, CBP, and Coast Guard, located in ICE
headquarters and embedded in National Capital Regional Centers. As
members of an ICE HSI-led Task Force, these detailees have full access
to Investigative Case Management systems, analytical tools, and other
unique and useful investigative information that they typically would
not have at their own agency. JTF-I staff provides over 3,500 hours of
monthly analytical support to HOMECORT investigations and SBAC and JTF
priorities while developing and improving best practices related to
joint investigations, analysis, and targeting.
By filling a gap in the coordination of National-level cases and
leveraging the broad knowledge, skills, and capabilities of its
interagency detailees, JTF-I achieved significant successes disrupting
several transnational criminal networks (involving hundreds of criminal
investigations) that threatened homeland security. Equally important,
JTF-I coordination has helped overcome many of the obstacles to
information sharing, investigative integration with operational forces,
tactical cueing, and intelligence support that previously plagued other
task forces, interagency initiatives, and National programs.
Over the last 20 months, JTF-I coordinated and supported the
targeting of 14 HOMECORT criminal networks, comprised of several
hundred individual criminal investigations. Presently, 11 of these 14
criminal networks have been dismantled to the point they no longer
threaten homeland security. The 11 networks include human smugglers,
sex traffickers, drug smugglers, money launderers, bulk cash smugglers,
weapons smugglers, and smugglers of special interest aliens. The three
other HOMECORT criminal networks continue to be the targets of active
criminal investigations. Efforts against current and future HOMECORT
criminal networks will be enhanced by Executive Order 13773, Enforcing
Federal law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and
Preventing International Trafficking (the EO). Among other things, the
EO directs the entire Executive branch to strengthen its enforcement of
Federal law to thwart TCOs, prioritize and dedicate sufficient
resources to disable and dismantle TCOs, develop strategies to counter
the crimes committed by TCOs, and otherwise pursue and support efforts
to defeat TCOs. Solidifying HOMECORT as the DHS-wide process for
identifying and prioritizing the top criminal networks impacting
homeland security will help to fulfill all of these objectives. The EO
also directs DHS to use HOMECORT to identify and describe homeland
security threats to the National Security Council's Threat Mitigation
Working Group. And, the EO supports further JTF-I engagement with
foreign partners to build investigative capacities through operations
such as HSI's CITADEL, an investigative surge operation to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs),
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and terrorist networks by
targeting the mechanisms they use to move people, illicit funds, and
contraband through the Central America (CENTAM) corridor. CITADEL
integrates each of the JTF-I HOMECORT cases and associated targets with
International Operations, as well as other HSI priority cases.
Specifically, CITADEL focuses on leveraging HSI and Partner Nation (PN)
authorities and subject-matter expertise to dismantle priority TCO
targets involved in human and bulk cash smuggling, as well as narcotics
smuggling.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of DHS and its mission. JTF-I is committed
to stemming cross-border criminal organizations through the various
efforts I have discussed today. I appreciate your interest in these
important issues.
Ms. McSally. Thank you Ms. Ayala.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gambler for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally. Good morning
Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing to discuss
GAO's work on collaborative mechanisms and other programs DHS
has used in its border security effort.
My remarks today will summarize GAO's work in two areas:
First collaborative mechanisms for coordinating border security
operations, and second, DHS efforts to assess its use of
resources and programs to secure the border.
With regard to the first area, over time DHS and its
components have used various mechanisms and task forces to
coordinate and collaborate on border security efforts. These
have included entities like component-led border security task
forces, broader multi-agency collaborative groups to share
information and leverage access, and the more recent joint task
forces that are the subject of today's hearing.
Our work on some of these different groups has identified
various practices that contributed to successful
collaborations, such as the sharing of resources and
information and the building of positive working relationships.
However, our work has also identified barriers or
challenges to successful collaboration. These challenges
included resource constraints or limited resource commitments
by participating agencies and lack of common objectives.
We previously recommended that DHS evaluate the effects of
some of its past collaborative mechanisms to include collecting
information on and reviewing best practices and identifying
areas for possible improvement. Consideration of past successes
and challenges could assist DHS's current task forces in
building capacity and implementing their organizations.
Through our work, we have also identified the need for DHS
to strengthen coordination for specific border security
programs.
For example, in a report we issued to the subcommittee in
February of this year, we found that CBP needs to better
document procedures for coordinating its operations using
Predator B unmanned aerial system, and we recommended that CBP
do so. CBP concurred with our recommendation and plans to take
steps to address it.
With regards to my second area, we have reported on the
need for DHS to strengthen its efforts to assess the
effectiveness of a range of border security programs and
resources. For example, we have reported on CBP to deploy
sensing and surveillance technologies along the Southwest
Border.
A key finding from these reports has been the need for DHS
to establish metrics for assessing the contributions of
infrastructure and technology to border security. In
particular, while CBP collects data that could be useful in
assessing contributions to border security, such as the
location of the legal entries, CBP has not developed metrics to
make these assessments, and we have recommended that CBP do so.
In other areas, we have reported on the need for CBP to
strengthen its data collection or methodologies for reporting
results. For example, in a February 2017 report for the
subcommittee, we recommended that CBP improve its practices for
collecting and reporting data related to Predator B and
tactical aerostat operation to help the agency better assess
the effectiveness of these operations.
We also reported in January on steps CBP could take to
strengthen its methodology for calculating recidivism rates,
which is the percentage of aliens apprehended multiple times
along the Southwest Border.
In particular, we found that CBP's methodology does not
account for an alien's apprehension over multiple years or
apprehended aliens for whom there is no record of removal from
the United States and he may remain in the country.
Among other things, we recommended that CBP strengthen its
methodology for calculating recidivism by accounting for an
alien's apprehension history beyond one fiscal year, and
excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal.
In closing, we will continue to follow up on and monitor
for actions DHS and its components have taken in response to
our recommendations across a number of border security
programs, assets, and efforts.
The ability of DHS and its components to effectively assess
and measure the contributions of various border security task
forces, programs, and assets is important for providing
insights on current border security investments and can help
inform future decision making.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be pleased to
answer questions Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
April 4, 2017
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to coordinate and assess its
border security operations. Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility
of DHS, in collaboration with other Federal, State, local, and Tribal
entities. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the
lead agency for border security and is responsible for, among other
things, keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their
contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country.\1\ The United
States international border with Mexico (Southwest Border) continues to
be vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity, and DHS reported
apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants and making over 14,000
seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015.
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\1\ See 6 U.S.C. 211(a) (establishing CBP within DHS), (c)
(enumerating CBP's duties).
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Over time, DHS and CBP have established various collaborative
mechanisms along the southern U.S. border, including the Southwest
Border and southern maritime approaches, to integrate CBP operations
and improve interagency coordination. For example, CBP, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (Coast
Guard), and other stakeholders have partnered to form multiple joint
task forces. To further support collaboration, DHS and CBP coordinate
use of resources, including a variety of technology and assets such as
aircraft. For example, CBP's Air and Marine Operations (AMO) uses
Predator B unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and other aircraft equipped
with video and radar surveillance technology along the Southwest Border
to conduct border security efforts, in part, through coordination with
joint task forces.
GAO has identified best practices for implementing interagency
collaboration--broadly defined as any joint activity that is intended
to produce more public value than could be produced when agencies act
alone.\2\ Among other things, these best practices note that agencies
can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by developing
mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. In addition, we
found that all collaborative mechanisms benefit from certain key
features, such as implementing processes to track and monitor progress
toward short-term and long-term outcomes. With regard to assessing its
progress and efforts to secure the border, CBP components collect a
variety of data on their use of resources and programs. For example,
CBP's U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) collects data that support
efforts to address smuggling and other illegal cross-border activity
along the U.S. Southwest Border through its Consequence Delivery System
(CDS) program--a process to classify each apprehended alien into
criminal or noncriminal categories and apply various criminal,
administrative, and programmatic consequences, such as Federal
prosecution, most likely to deter future illegal activity. In addition,
Border Patrol collects a variety of data on its apprehension of aliens
and seizures of narcotics along the Southwest Border and on use of
resources such as tactical infrastructure--fencing, gates, roads,
bridges, lighting, and drainage--and surveillance technology, such as
towers equipped with video cameras and radar technology. AMO also
collects data on its use of air and maritime assets; for example,
seizures and apprehensions provided for by support from its Predator B
UAS and Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program--fixed site
unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground equipped with radar
technology.
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\2\ GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, DC: Oct. 21, 2005) and Managing for Results: Key
Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms,
GAO-12-1022 (Washington, DC: Sept. 27, 2012).
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Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS
faces in implementing its border security efforts, including
establishing collaborative mechanisms and assessing the effectiveness
of its use of resources and programs along the border. My statement
discusses our past findings on: (1) DHS's efforts to implement
collaborative mechanisms along the Southwest Border and (2) DHS's
efforts to assess its use of resources and programs to secure the
Southwest Border.
My statement today is based on reports and testimonies we issued
from September 2013 through February 2017 that examined DHS efforts to
enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border
security operations (see Related GAO Products at the end of this
statement). Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we
obtained by examining DHS's collaborative mechanisms established along
the Southwest Border; reviewing CBP policies and procedures for
coordinating use of assets; analyzing DHS data related to enforcement
program and asset assists or instances in which a technological asset
assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants, seizure of drugs or
other contraband; and interviewing relevant DHS officials. In addition,
since 2013, we assessed the extent to which DHS and CBP have
implemented recommendations by reviewing supporting documentation. More
detailed information about our scope and methodology can be found in
our reports and testimonies. We conducted all of this work in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
dhs and cbp have established collaborative mechanisms along the
southwest border, but could strengthen coordination of predator b uas
operations
DHS and CBP Have Implemented a Variety of Collaborative Mechanisms to
Coordinate Border Security Efforts
DHS and its components have used various mechanisms over time to
coordinate border security operations. In September 2013, we reported
that the overlap in geographic and operational boundaries among DHS
components underscored the importance of collaboration and coordination
among these components.\3\ To help address this issue and mitigate
operational inflexibility, DHS components, including those with border
security-related missions such as CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE, employed a
variety of collaborative mechanisms to coordinate their missions and
share information. These mechanisms had both similarities and
differences in how they were structured and on which missions or
threats they focused, among other things, but they all had the
overarching goal of increasing mission effectiveness and efficiencies.
For example:
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\3\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Visibility Over Collaborative Field Mechanisms, GAO-13-734
(Washington, DC: Sept. 27, 2013). Among other things, we recommended
that DHS take steps to increase its visibility over how collaborative
field mechanisms operate. DHS concurred and implemented actions to
collect information about the mechanisms.
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In 2011, the Joint Targeting Team originated as a CBP-led
partnership among the Del Rio area of Texas, including Border
Patrol, CBP's Office of Field Operations, and ICE. This
mechanism was expanded to support the South Texas Campaign
(STC) mission to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal
organizations, and its membership grew to include additional
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international law
enforcement agencies.\4\
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\4\ CBP developed and implemented the STC to identify and address
current and emerging threats along the border in South Texas. The STC
conducts targeted operations to disrupt and degrade the ability of
transnational criminal organizations to operate throughout the South
Texas corridor while it simultaneously facilitates legitimate trade and
travel.
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In 2005, the first Border Enforcement Security Task Force
(BEST) was organized and led by ICE, in partnership with CBP,
in Laredo, Texas, and additional units were subsequently formed
along both the Southern and Northern Borders. The BESTs'
mission was to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and
emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders.
In 2011, CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE established Regional
Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoM) to utilize the fusion of
intelligence, planning, and operations to target the threat of
transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal
border. Coast Guard served as the lead agency responsible for
planning and coordinating among DHS components.
In June 2014, we reported on STC border security efforts along with
the activities of two additional collaborative mechanisms: (1) The
Joint Field Command (JFC), which had operational control over all CBP
resources in Arizona; and (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational
Threats (ACTT), which was a multi-agency law enforcement partnership in
Arizona.\5\ We found that through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS
and CBP had coordinated border security efforts in information sharing,
resource targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets. For
example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintained an
operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence
information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners worked jointly to
target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal
cross-border activity. The STC leveraged assets of CBP components and
interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and
conducting joint operations.
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\5\ GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen
Collaborative Mechanisms Along the Southwest Border, GAO-14-494
(Washington, DC: June 27, 2014).
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More recently, the Secretary of Homeland Security initiated the
Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan in November 2014 to
address the region's border security challenges by commissioning three
DHS joint task forces to, in part, enhance collaboration among DHS
components, including CBP, ICE, and Coast Guard. Two of DHS's joint
task forces are geographically-based, Joint Task Force-East and Joint
Task Force-West, and one which is functionally based, Joint Task Force-
Investigations. Joint Task Force-West is separated into geographic
command corridors with CBP as the lead agency responsible for
overseeing border security efforts to include: Arizona, California, New
Mexico/West Texas, and South Texas. Coast Guard is the lead agency
responsible for Joint Task Force-East, which is responsible for the
southern maritime and border approaches. ICE is the lead agency
responsible for Joint Task Force-Investigations, which focuses on
investigations in support of Joint Task Force-West and Joint Task
Force-East. Additionally, DHS has used these task forces to coordinate
various border security activities, such as use of Predator B UAS, as
we reported in February 2017 and discuss below.\6\
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\6\ GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen
Collection of Unmanned Aerial Systems and Aerostats Data, GAO-17-152
(Washington, DC: Feb. 16, 2017).
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Collaborative Mechanism Participants Identified Practices that Enhanced
or Served as Challenges to Collaboration
In September 2013, we reported on successful collaborative
practices and challenges identified by participants from eight border
security collaborative field mechanisms we visited--the STC, four BESTs
and 3 ReCoMs.\7\ Their perspectives were generally consistent with the
seven key issues to consider when implementing collaborative mechanisms
that we identified in our 2012 report on interagency collaboration.\8\
Among participants who we interviewed, there was consensus that certain
practices facilitated more effective collaboration, which, according to
participants, contributed to the groups' overall successes. For
example, participants identified three of the seven categories of
practices as keys to success: (1) Positive working relationships/
communication, (2) sharing resources, and (3) sharing information.
Specifically, in our interviews, BEST officials stated that developing
trust and building relationships helped participants respond quickly to
a crisis, and communicating frequently helped participants eliminate
duplication of efforts. Participants from the STC, BESTs, and ReCoMs
also reported that having positive working relationships built on
strong trust among participants was a key factor in their law
enforcement partnerships because of the sensitive nature of law
enforcement information, and the risks posed if it is not protected
appropriately. In turn, building positive working relationships was
facilitated by another collaborative factor identified as important by
a majority of participants: Physical collocation of mechanism
stakeholders. Specifically, participants from the mechanisms focused on
law enforcement investigations, such as the STC and BESTs, reported
that being physically collocated with members from other agencies was
important for increasing the groups' effectiveness.
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\7\ GAO-13-734.
\8\ GAO-12-1022. We identified seven features of successful
collaborative mechanisms: (1) Outcomes and accountability; (2) Bridging
organizational cultures; (3) Leadership; (4) Clarity of roles and
responsibilities; (5) Participants; (6) Resources; and (7) Written
guidance and agreements.
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Participants from the eight border security collaborative field
mechanisms we visited at the time also identified challenges or
barriers that affected their collaboration across components and made
it more difficult. Specifically, participants identified three barriers
that most frequently hindered effective collaboration within their
mechanisms: (1) Resource constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel,
and (3) lack of leadership buy-in. For example, when discussing
resource issues, a majority of participants said funding for their
group's operation was critical and identified resource constraints as a
challenge to sustaining their collaborative efforts. These participants
also reported that since none of the mechanisms receive dedicated
funding, the participating Federal agencies provided support for their
respective representatives assigned to the selected mechanisms. Also,
there was a majority opinion among mechanism participants we visited
that rotation of key personnel and lack of leadership buy-in hindered
effective collaboration within their mechanisms. For example, STC
participants stated that the rotation of key personnel hindered the
STC's ability to develop and retain more seasoned personnel with
expertise in investigations and surveillance techniques.
In addition, in June 2014, we identified coordination benefits and
challenges related to the JFC, STC, and ACTT.\9\ For example, DHS and
CBP leveraged the assets of CBP components and interagency partners
through these mechanisms to conduct a number of joint operations and
deploy increased resources to various border security efforts. In
addition, these mechanisms provided partner agencies with increased
access to specific resources, such as AMO air support and planning
assistance for operations. Officials involved with the JFC, STC, and
ACTT also reported collaboration challenges at that time. For example,
officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies we interviewed reported
coordination challenges related to the STC and ACTT, such as limited
resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common
objectives. In particular, one partner with the ACTT noted that there
had been operations in which partners did not follow through with the
resources they had committed during the planning stages. Further, JFC
and STC officials cited the need to improve the sharing of best
practices across the various collaborative mechanisms, and CBP
officials we interviewed identified opportunities to more fully assess
how the mechanisms were structured. We recommended that DHS establish
written agreements for some of these coordination mechanisms and a
strategic-level oversight mechanism to monitor interagency
collaboration. DHS concurred and these recommendations were closed as
not implemented due to planned changes in the collaborative mechanisms.
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\9\ GAO-14-494.
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CBP Has Established Mechanisms to Coordinate Its Use of Predator B UAS,
but Could Benefit From Documented Procedures for Coordinating
its Predator B UAS Operations
In February 2017, we found that as part of using Predator B
aircraft to support other Government agencies, CBP established various
mechanisms to coordinate Predator B operations.\10\ CBP's Predator B
aircraft are National assets used primarily for detection and
surveillance during law enforcement operations, independently and in
coordination with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States. For example, at AMO National Air Security
Operations Centers (NASOC) in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas,
personnel from other CBP components are assigned to support and
coordinate mission activities involving Predator B operations.\11\
Border Patrol agents assigned to support NASOCs assist with directing
agents and resources to support its law enforcement operations and
collecting information on asset assists provided for by Predator B
operations. Further, two of DHS's joint task forces also help
coordinate Predator B operations. Specifically, Joint Task Force-West,
Arizona and Joint Task Force-West, South Texas coordinate air asset
tasking and operations, including Predator B operations, and assist in
the transmission of requests for Predator B support and communication
with local field units during operations, such as Border Patrol
stations and AMO air branches.\12\
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\10\ GAO-17-152.
\11\ As of fiscal year 2016, CBP operated nine Predator B aircraft
from four AMO NASOCs in Arizona, Florida, North Dakota, and Texas.
CBP's Predator B aircraft are launched and recovered at its NASOCs in
Sierra Vista, Arizona; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Grand Forks, North
Dakota; while the NASOC in Jacksonville, Florida remotely operates
Predator B aircraft launched from other NASOCs. CBP's Predator B
aircraft are equipped with video and radar sensors primarily to provide
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
\12\ Joint Task Force-West, Arizona's area of responsibility
includes Tucson and Yuma Border Patrol sectors. Joint Task Force-West,
South Texas's area of responsibility includes Rio Grande Valley,
Laredo, and Del Rio Border Patrol sectors.
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In addition to these mechanisms, CBP has documented procedures for
coordinating Predator B operations among its supported or partner
agencies in Arizona specifically by developing a standard operating
procedure for coordination of Predator B operations through its NASOC
in Arizona. However, CBP has not documented procedures for coordination
of Predator B operations among its supported agencies through its
NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota. CBP has also established National
policies for its Predator B operations that include policies for
prioritization of Predator B missions and processes for submission and
review of Predator B mission or air support requests. However, these
National policies do not include coordination procedures specific to
Predator B operating locations or NASOCs. Without documenting its
procedures for coordination of Predator B operations with supported
agencies, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that practices at
NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota align with existing policies and
procedures for joint operations with other Government agencies. Among
other things, we recommended that CBP develop and document procedures
for Predator B coordination among supported agencies in all operating
locations. CBP concurred with our recommendation and stated that it
plans to develop and implement an operations coordination structure and
document its coordination procedures for Predator B operations through
Joint Task Force-West, South Texas and document its coordination
procedures for Predator B operations through its NASOC in Grand Forks,
North Dakota.
dhs and cbp could strengthen efforts to assess use of resources and
programs to secure the border
Border Patrol Could Benefit From Improving Its Methodology to Assess
Effectiveness of its Consequence Delivery System Program
In January 2017, we reported that Border Patrol agents use the CDS
to classify each alien apprehended illegally crossing the border and
then apply one or more post-apprehension consequences determined to be
the most effective and efficient to discourage recidivism, that is,
further apprehensions for illegal cross-border activity.\13\ We found
that Border Patrol uses an annual recidivism rate to measure
performance of the CDS; however, methodological weaknesses limit the
rate's usefulness for assessing CDS effectiveness. Specifically, Border
Patrol's methodology for calculating recidivism--the percent of aliens
apprehended multiple times along the Southwest Border within a fiscal
year--does not account for an alien's apprehension history over
multiple years. In addition, Border Patrol's calculation neither
accounts for nor excludes apprehended aliens for whom there is no ICE
record of removal from the United States. Our analysis of Border Patrol
and ICE data showed that when calculating the recidivism rate for
fiscal years 2014 and 2015, Border Patrol included in the total number
of aliens apprehended, tens of thousands of aliens for whom ICE did not
have a record of removal after apprehension and who may have remained
in the United States without an opportunity to recidivate.
Specifically, our analysis of ICE enforcement and removal data showed
that about 38 percent of the aliens Border Patrol apprehended along the
Southwest Border in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 may have remained in the
United States as of May 2016.
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\13\ GAO, Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of
Post-Apprehension Consequences, GAO-17-66 (Washington, DC: Jan. 12,
2017). Under U.S. immigration law, an ``alien'' is any person that is
not a U.S. citizen or national. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3). According to
the National Institute of Justice, recidivism refers to a person's
relapse into criminal behavior, often after the person receives
sanctions or undergoes intervention for a previous crime.
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To better inform the effectiveness of CDS implementation and border
security efforts, we recommended that, among other things, (1) Border
Patrol strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism, such as
by using an alien's apprehension history beyond one fiscal year and
excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal; and (2) the
Assistant Secretary of ICE and Commissioner of CBP collaborate on
sharing immigration enforcement and removal data to help Border Patrol
account for the removal status of apprehended aliens in its recidivism
rate measure. CBP did not concur with our first recommendation and
stated that CDS uses annual recidivism rate calculations to measure
annual change, which is not intended to be, or used, as a performance
measure for CDS, and that Border Patrol annually reevaluates the CDS to
ensure that the methodology for calculating recidivism provides the
most effective and efficient post-apprehension outcomes. We continue to
believe that Border Patrol should strengthen its methodology for
calculating recidivism, as the recidivism rate is used as a performance
measure by Border Patrol and DHS. DHS concurred with our second
recommendation, but stated that collecting and analyzing ICE removal
and enforcement data would not be advantageous to Border Patrol for CDS
purposes since CDS is specific to Border Patrol. However, DHS also
stated that Border Patrol and ICE have discussed the availability of
the removal and enforcement data and ICE has agreed to provide Border
Patrol with these data, if needed. DHS requested that we consider this
recommendation resolved and closed. While DHS's planned actions are a
positive step toward addressing our recommendation, DHS needs to
provide documentation of completion of these actions for us to consider
the recommendation closed as implemented.
CBP Collects Data That Could be Useful in Assessing How Border Fencing
Contributes to Border Security Operations but Needs Metrics to
Assess the Contribution to Its Mission
In February 2017, we reported on CBP's efforts to secure the border
between U.S. ports of entry using tactical infrastructure, including
fencing, gates, roads, bridges, lighting, and drainage.\14\ For
example, border fencing is intended to benefit border security
operations in various ways, according to Border Patrol officials,
including supporting Border Patrol agents' ability to execute essential
tasks, such as identifying illicit-cross border activities. CBP
collects data that could help provide insight into how border fencing
contributes to border security operations, including the location of
illegal entries. However, CBP has not developed metrics that
systematically use these data, among other data it collects, to assess
the contributions of its pedestrian and vehicle border fencing to its
mission. For example, CBP could potentially use these data to determine
the extent to which border fencing diverts illegal entrants into more
rural and remote environments, and border fencing's impact, if any, on
apprehension rates over time. Developing metrics to assess the
contributions of fencing to border security operations could better
position CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best
information available to inform competing mission priorities and
investments.
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\14\ GAO, Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to
Better Assess Fencing's Contributions to Operations and Provide
Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps, GAO-17-331 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 16, 2017). Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the
controlled entry into or departure from the United States.
Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location
(seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or
employees are assigned to clear passengers, merchandise, and other
items; collect duties; and enforce customs laws; and where DHS officers
inspect persons seeking to enter or depart, or applying for admission
into, the United States, pursuant to U.S. immigration law.
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To ensure that Border Patrol has the best available information to
inform future investments and resource allocation decisions among
tactical infrastructure and other assets Border Patrol deploys for
border security, we recommended, among other things, that Border Patrol
develop metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle
fencing to border security along the Southwest Border using the data
Border Patrol already collects and apply this information, as
appropriate, when making investment and resource allocation decisions.
DHS concurred with our recommendation and plans to develop metrics and
incorporate them into the Border Patrol's Requirements Management
Process. These actions, if implemented effectively, should address the
intent of our recommendation.
CBP Has Taken Actions to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Predator B UAS
and Aerostats for Border Security, but Could Improve Its Data
Collection Efforts
In February 2017, we found that CBP has taken actions to assess the
effectiveness of its Predator B UAS and tactical aerostats for border
security, but could improve its data collection efforts.\15\ CBP
collects a variety of data on its use of the Predator B UAS, tactical
aerostats, and TARS, including data on their support for the
apprehension of individuals, seizure of drugs, and other events (asset
assists). For Predator B UAS, we found that mission data--such as the
names of supported agencies and asset assists for seizures of
narcotics--were not recorded consistently across all operational
centers, limiting CBP's ability to assess the effectiveness of the
program. We also found that CBP has not updated its guidance for
collecting and recording mission information in its data collection
system to include new data elements added since 2014, and does not have
instructions for recording mission information such as asset assists.
In addition, not all users of CBP's system have received training for
recording mission information. We reported that updating guidance and
fully training users, consistent with internal control standards, would
help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to assess
effectiveness. For tactical aerostats, we found that Border Patrol
collection of asset assist information for seizures and apprehensions
does not distinguish between its tactical aerostats and TARS. Data that
distinguishes between support provided by tactical aerostats and
support provided by TARS would help CBP collect better and more
complete information and guide resource allocation decisions, such as
the redeployment of tactical aerostat sites based on changes in illegal
cross-border activity for the two types of systems that provide
distinct types of support when assisting with, for example, seizures
and apprehensions.
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\15\ GAO-17-152. Tactical aerostats are relocatable unmanned
buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with video
surveillance cameras. As of fiscal year 2016, CBP deployed six tactical
aerostats sites along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To improve its efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator
B and tactical aerostat programs, we recommended, among other things,
that CBP: (1) Update guidance for recording Predator B mission
information in its data collection system; (2) provide training to
users of CBP's data collection system for Predator B missions; and (3)
update Border Patrol's data collection practices to include a mechanism
to distinguish and track asset assists associated with tactical
aerostats from TARS. CBP concurred and identified planned actions to
address the recommendations, including incorporating a new
functionality in its data collection system to include tips and
guidance for recording Predator B mission information and updating its
user manual for its data collection system; and making improvements to
capture data to ensure asset assists are properly reported and
attributed to tactical aerostats, and TARS, among other actions.
CBP Uses Other Assets to Provide Security at the Arizona Border, and
Would Benefit From Reporting and Tracking Asset Assist Data
In March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified mission benefits
for technologies under its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology
Plan--which included a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help
provide security for the Arizona border--but had not yet developed
performance metrics for the plan.\16\ CBP identified mission benefits
such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. Further, a DHS
database enabled CBP to collect data on asset assists, instances in
which a technology--such as a camera, or other asset, such as a canine
team--contributed to an apprehension or seizure, that in combination
with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, could be used to
better determine the contributions of CBP's surveillance technologies
and inform resource allocation decisions. However, we found that CBP
was not capturing complete data on asset assists, as Border Patrol
agents were not required to record and track such data. We concluded
that requiring the reporting and tracking of asset assist data could
help CBP determine the extent to which its surveillance technologies
are contributing to CBP's border security efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-
14-368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 3, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies at the Arizona
border and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, we recommended
that CBP: (1) Require tracking of asset assist data in its Enforcement
Integrated Database, which contains data on apprehensions and seizures
and (2) once data on asset assists are required to be tracked, analyze
available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists,
in combination with other relevant performance metrics to determine the
contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP's border security
efforts. DHS concurred with our first recommendation, and Border Patrol
issued guidance in June 2014 and Border Patrol officials confirmed with
us in June 2015 that agents are required to enter this information into
the database. These actions met the intent of our recommendation. DHS
also concurred with our second recommendation, and as of September 2016
has taken some action to assess its technology assist data and other
measures to determine contributions of surveillance technologies to its
mission. However, until Border Patrol completes its efforts to fully
develop and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all
technologies to be deployed under the Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Plan, it will not be well-positioned to fully assess its
progress in determining when mission benefits have been fully realized.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Ms. Gambler.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. I think
my experience in the military, to include moving past
Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, is probably a strength and a
weakness in the way I look at this.
But I think what we are talking about here is as if we were
a couple of years into Goldwater-Nichols and trying to review
what the military services and how they were organizing jointly
and how effective they were. So we are early on in this
process, and I really do appreciate the efforts to be focused
more on unity of effort and more joint in the way we address
these issues.
We are in a resource-constrained environment, for sure, as
many of you have referenced. My first thought, Admiral Schultz,
was looking at and deep-diving into JTF-East and what you are
doing, seems like there is potential for redundancy with JIATF-
South.
Now, I realize they have a specific mission and
authorities, but we all have the same objective here, right? To
interdict transnational criminal organizations and illicit flow
of traffic coming from South and Central America into the
United States.
So when I think--I know there are different authorities,
but we are responsible for authorities here, but we have
similar objectives here as a country.
When we are talking about interagency whole-of-Government
specifically to address the issues, more in the maritime
domain, I think about, if you have two different operation
centers, two different computer systems, overhead, all that
comes with that, is there a way for us to think outside the
box?
Can you just comment, based on your experiences also, at
SOUTHCOM, you are at SOUTHCOM, and is there a place for us to
look freshly at--the JTF-East is focused on homeland security.
JIATF-South is trying to be more and more the interagency-
focused area.
Like, where is there a place that we can find better
synergies, perhaps, even between those two efforts, so that
even on overhead and air conditioning bills, you know, spending
where we don't need to? Just to have more of a unity of effort.
Admiral Schultz. Well, Chairwoman, thank you for the
question. Clearly, there is always a better way to look at
every problem. So I would say I think you have an understanding
of JIATF-South.
They have been in existence here for about 26 years now. It
is probably the most recognized global interagency operation
that gets after the counter threat network, particularly for
drugs. That is their origin and that is really where their
authorities lend them.
Under 10 USC 124, they do the detection and monitoring
business for the Department of Defense. They have no law
enforcement authorities, as you know with your defense
background and homeland duties.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Admiral Schultz. That is where they turn over the endgame
to either our 7th or 11th district Coast Guard operations.
I think where you see this task force, Joint Task Force-
East and JIATF-South lash up is they are very complementary.
You know, we try to leverage what they call the critical
movement alert system.
We just did some recent operations back in November, as I
mentioned in my oral statement here. Most recently in the last
couple of weeks in March, surge operations down in Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands-Puerto Rico vector.
That is a vector where there is quite a bit of cocaine
coming out of South America. There is a lot of violence,
weapons, money moving back south through Puerto Rico.
JIATF's focus, because it is resource-informed, like
everything else in the Federal Government, has been very much
in the eastern Pacific and the western Caribbean.
About 85 percent of the drugs that come out of Columbia are
in the eastern Pacific. But there are also threats in Puerto
Rico--Puerto Rico, part of our U.S. soil here. We have got some
responsibilities down there. JIATF and us work there.
We are able to enhance Unity of Effort with the DHS
components. We are able to link. I think this works well with
my dual status as the Coast Guard Atlantic area commander.
I have operational forces east of the Rockies and the task
force. We can work in that space where we bring resources to
the DHS components. We link in DOD capabilities, the linkage
with JIATF-South and then we get after the threats most
pressing to the homeland.
So I think they are complementary. Could there be an
eventual change in authorities for JIATF-South? I think so. But
I think if you look at the origins, if you look at the
resourcing right now, there are some muscle movements here that
are fairly significant to tackle.
In the interim period, I think we are working very well
together. I think, again, the military status that I bring,
dual-hatted, allows some linkages there. My recent experience
in SOUTHCOM, I think, also plays well to that.
Because bringing the heft of DOD and all that capability
and capacity down to working with an HSI attache or a small
team in a foreign location or even a place like Puerto Rico,
there is different lexicon there.
Ms. McSally. Yes, that is----
Admiral Schultz. I think that is sort-of that middle space
we work very well in, ma'am.
Ms. McSally. Absolutely, and I would like to follow up with
you, again, and just to think outside the box to whether there
needs to be new authorities to look at this freshly for the
best, at this moment in time, whole-of-Government approach, you
know, to address this problem set.
Chief Beeson, looking to the organization for JTF-West and
its division into corridors, are those corridors perfectly
aligned with the sectors? If not, is there an opportunity for
us to align sectors to corridors so we are all operating in
similar areas?
Just again, as we are evolving this process, if your border
patrol sectors are your ground force of this joint force, and
your, you know, the JTF is looking jointly at each corridor, is
there a way to line those up if they are not lined up? Is that
being looked at at all?
Chief Beeson. I want to say that they are aligned. As I
think about the corridors there are four, the California
corridor, which covers the two sectors in California. Arizona
corridor covers the two Arizona sectors. West Texas-New Mexico
covers two sectors, and then you have got the south Texas,
which has three, the Laredo, del Rio, and Rio Grande valley.
So each one of those corridors has a commander that is
responsible for the coordination and collaboration of the DHS
efforts. So I think that the way that they are aligned, if I
understand your question correctly, I think, works.
Ms. McSally. OK, great. Thank you. I am over my time.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Vela, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vela. Yes. I would kind-of like to follow up with the
Chairwoman's questions.
That is, Vice Admiral Schultz, with respect to JIATF-South
and JTF-East, I am curious as to your thoughts as to why we
need both?
Admiral Schultz. Well, Ranking Member Vela, great question.
I think we need both because, I think their focus is definitely
different. At the end of the day, as I mentioned, the statutory
responsibility that JIATF-South has supports drug interdiction,
drug interdiction in the maritime domain.
Are there possible expansions of authorities that allow you
to do different, you know, counter-network-type stuff at JIATF-
South? Clearly, that is in the realm of the possible. I think,
we work--not we think--but we clearly work in that space with
DHS components.
Again, we at JTF-East are not directing operations from my
parent location in Portsmouth, Virginia. We are enabling
operations. We are synchronizing operations.
We are getting after that unity of effort. We are getting
after than collaboration of regional DHS component work. We are
linking that to the operational priorities that are established
from the Secretary of Homeland Security.
They are mutually compatible reinforcing with JIATF-South,
but I would say, right now, as I mentioned to the Chairwoman,
because JIATF-South's work is resource-informed, they put their
focus against the highest threats.
Right now, the eastern Pacific, given that JIATF's focus is
drugs, most of the cocaine is moving in that vector. We support
that. I mentioned in my oral statement that we are organized
under these regional integration groups. We have an eastern
Pacific RIG. That is one of our frameworks. It is very well-
standing and well-oiled.
Back when Chief Beeson and I were stationed out in
California in our previous assignments, we worked this coastal
California corridor and the partnership was terrific there.
When this whole task force model started up the question was,
why don't you just take that collaboration--and nationalize
that? It worked well there. I have been other places it didn't
work so well.
March forward, we have these task forces now. I think we
leveraged that learning, that coordination at the tactical
level and that is where you get the differences.
There are the DHS components. There is the local State,
Federal tie-in there. Then you have got JIATF that has got a
National mission getting after drugs.
But again, as the Chairwoman suggested, there are always
ways to revisit authorities, broaden authorities. The question
would be, you know, how do you resource that? How do you fund
that? What is their bandwidth to take on too many different
things?
They are the best in the world at the counter-narcotics and
the maritime mission right now. I am not sure what happens, you
know, if you don't commensurately resource that and you just
put more work on them. You may take your eye off the ball and
not be as effective at your primary mission at the end of the
day.
Mr. Vela. So, I know we have JIATF-South. We have JIATF-
West, right, stationed in California or Hawaii?
Admiral Schultz. JIATF-West, sir, is out of Hawaii.
Mr. Vela. Do we have another JIATF? Or are those the two
JIATF?
Admiral Schultz. Sir, under the counter-narcotics
frameworks, there is JIATF-West, JIATF-South. There are other
JTFs under the Department of Defense that do different things.
There is JTF-North, JTFs that support different entities, but I
think in the realm I believe you are asking, it is west and
south.
Mr. Vela. I am not anywhere familiar with the work of
JIATF-West but my question for you, Chief Beeson is basically
the same thing.
What do you see as the distinction between what JIATF-West
does and what JTF-West does and maybe you could comment on your
thoughts, in terms of the reasons that we need both as well?
Chief Beeson. So I look at the task force, the Joint Task
Force-West, East and I as what is really a whole-of-Government
approach.
I was a chief in a sector when these task forces were stood
up, and I was also the commander of that task force in the
corridor. What I saw, I felt like we had a very good
relationship with our DHS partners in the corridor, but I did
see it get better.
We were able to get more assets to come together and look
at threats, to identify priorities, and then take the actions
that we needed to take against the priorities, the appropriate
law enforcement consequences.
As I look at what we are doing as a JTF-West, it is really
furthering that DHS Unity of Effort, bringing together the
partners. We are doing a much better job, I think, on
identifying our threats and sharing our intelligence now than
we were in the past.
I think this task force is a way to continue that effort,
to continue to align the DHS assets as we go after these
transnational criminal organizations.
Mr. Vela. Yes. I am running out of time as well. I am
just--so what is JIATF-West doing that is different than what
JTF does?
Chief Beeson. Well, like you, I have to admit I am not real
familiar with JIATF-West.
Mr. Vela. OK. Fair enough. I am out of time, and Ms. Ayala,
maybe we can explore later. I kind-of have the same questions
with respect to JTF-Investigations, HSI and HIDTA, but we can
address that later.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Vela.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. You know, I
just had the distinct privilege to go and visit Task Force-
West. I have to tell you, I came back much encouraged by what I
saw from the Joint Task Force operations.
Admiral, if I could ask you first, you know, I think as we
see more pressure placed on our land borders, we are going to
see more pressure. You know, as I heard it explained several
times, when you squeeze the balloon, the air goes to the, you
know, the ends. Particularly in San Diego, we saw that with the
panga boats that started making the end runs but you responded
to that.
Now, to disrupt their business model, they are being forced
to go hundreds of miles out to sea and around. I think the
highest I heard that they even went up to San Francisco Bay, I
think they said one time. I realized that wasn't practical for
their business model.
So my question is this: On the maritime response, I know
that you all have some very old cutters and things, but can you
talk a little bit about the needs--now I am shifting to Joint
Task Force-East, I think, because I am--being from Florida, I
am really concerned about the maritime borders over there.
Can you talk about the threat when we tighten up the Rio
Grande Valley and how that is going to impact our JTF-East?
Admiral Schultz. Yes, Congressman. Clearly, if, as you
noted the balloon analogy, if you squeeze the balloon, the
pressure sort-of releases elsewhere. So when there is a focus
on the land border, clearly, there is a nice enhanced risk of
more maritime smuggling.
You know, we and our partners patrol the waters routinely
and we are paying great attention to that. Some of the stuff,
the manifestation we saw as you talked about California with
the panga threat, that was marijuana in large quantities, some
methamphetamines coming up.
It used to be human smuggling on the waterfront there. We
stymied that with this JTF-like model before in a collaborative
environment just working with our DHS partners. I think that
shows the power of what enhanced collaboration, unity of
effort, Federal, State, local linkage can do together.
So we are very much aware of the pressure at the land
border. I say we are constantly, because of our partnerships,
because of the shared intelligence, the fusion of intelligence,
I think if we see a trend, a threat vector that moves land
smuggling to the maritime domain, we will be ready for that.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. Thank you.
Chief Beeson, I will first tell you that having dealt with
span of control quite a lot in my previous career, I did not
see--I thought you all had a very good span of control in the
JTF.
Another thing that I know is this. You cannot build
relationships in the middle of a crisis. You can only access
the relationships that you have already built.
One of the things that I notice about HSI and the Border
Patrol working together across the border that there is a lot
of relationship-building going on there that I had no idea
existed. That was eye-opening.
The ability to integrate your intelligence, your
communication, and your response on the border to respond to
those invasions was--was quite impressive.
So my question is, Chief, what technologies would you say
are needed in each of your sectors to better achieve that
detection so that we have a good response time?
You know, what I saw in Tucson was excellent. The BigPipe
in the intelligence work that was going on there. Can you talk
a little bit about what you need in some of the other sectors
where I saw less technology?
Chief Beeson. So as the commander for the Joint Task Force-
West, my responsibility is to leverage a whole-Government
approach against counter network operations, against the TCOs
that are, you know, out violating the borders.
In my current capacity, I am not the technology guy. That
would be to the component to Customs and Border Protection, so
I would want to defer to them on their technology needs.
I can tell you that they are buried and, you know, quite--
as you saw when you were out there, the terrain is vast. It is
diverse. So the technology to address that is going to be
pretty complex, and we have to get back to you from them on
that.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
I am out of time, but let me just say, Ms. Ayala, the HSI
folks were doing a fantastic job working across that border and
congratulations to all of you on JTF. I think it is working
well.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Demings from Florida, for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Chairwoman and to our
Ranking Member as well and to our witnesses this morning. Thank
you for being here.
Admiral Schultz, yesterday the commandant of the U.S. Coast
Guard was quoted as saying even though the service he commands
faces the same readiness concerns as the other military
services, the Coast Guard is left behind while other branches
of the military receive budget increases.
Given that the current administration's fiscal year 2017
supplemental budget requests are supposed to bolster military
and border security capabilities, how will JTF-East strategy
and operations be impacted, if the Coast Guard continues to be
excluded from the overall discussion on resources and needs?
Admiral Schultz. Well, Congresswoman, thank you for the
question. Clearly, with the fiscal year 2018 budget only being
a blueprint at the Hill and the formal budget with a
Congressional justification not coming until May, I am at limit
at what I can speak to there.
I am confident that Coast Guard will be able to sustain our
current level of operations and our on-going acquisitions
efforts with the budget that is proposed. There is talk of a
defense supplemental out there, I think to the tune of $52
billion.
I think the commandant's comments speak to, you know, we
are one of the five armed services. Clearly, when you talk
about National security, homeland defense, there are Coast
Guard equities as part of that discussion.
I believe that will be a multi-year effort. The Department
of Defense has many readiness challenges as we have been a
Nation at war here for more than the past decade.
The Coast Guard clearly shares some of those readiness
challenges, some of our force construct challenges. Clearly, as
one of the five armed services, we would like to see, you know,
potential future inclusion there.
But again, we understand the demands on DOD, the challenges
on DOD. I think the comments, the commandant's comments
yesterday were framing it in don't forget the Coast Guard is
one of your five armed services and we have National security
and homeland security missions, and just to keep the aperture
broad for future inclusion in those discussions. But by no
means are we at risk in 2018 here to sustain our level of
operations.
As it impacts the Task Force, as it impacts my Coast Guard
duties, I am confident the Secretary, having served under his
leadership at SOUTHCOM, understands the unique capabilities
that the Coast Guard brings to the problem set better than
anyone in this town here.
I think we will be in fine shape, here. But clearly, we as
an armed service, we want to be considered on those readiness
challenges, because they are very real in the Coast Guard as
well.
We had 6 years of funding at or below the Budget Control
Act level. I think when you play that forward, looking back
playing forward, that is about a 10 percent loss of purchasing
power. So we do have some readiness challenges, but----
Mrs. Demings. Isn't there a recommendation to cut the Coast
Guard's budget by 28 percent? Are you saying if that occurred,
that there would be no effect on your readiness to meet your
responsibilities?
Admiral Schultz. No, Congresswoman. I am saying that the
2018 budget, which has been bantered around in the press is
pre-decisional. There is talk about cuts in there. I am not
going to speak to that.
I believe the commandant and my leadership would say
conversations with the Department, with the Secretary about our
needs, and I believe those needs will be addressed that will
allow us to sustain our operations and maintain our critical
momentum on our acquisitions programs.
But we have come out of multiple years of funding at the
BCA level or below, which has not allowed us to sustain grown
with, you know, the increasing costs of things.
Mrs. Demings. OK. Thank you.
Chief Beeson, it is good to see you again. Thank you for
being here. How has the creation of JTF-West affected the way
CBP and its DHS partners interact with other State, local, and
Federal law enforcement as well as Tribal partners?
Chief Beeson. The local level corridor--so there are within
JTF as mentioned, there are the four corridors. At that level,
the commanders there are interacting with State, local, Tribal
law enforcement partners, something that we have been doing
since I have been a Border Patrol agent.
I mean, certainly, the ability for us to work together to
address border security issues has been very impactful for us.
You know, we utilize Operation Stonegarden to provide some
source of funding for some agencies so that they are able to
leverage that stream of funding and provide some border
security assistance through increased patrols by law
enforcement in particular areas. Then it usually runs the whole
gamut from the State, local, and Tribal.
Mrs. Demings. I know my colleague asked about technology.
What other areas are there room or is there room for
improvement?
Chief Beeson. So I think, you know, technology is certainly
one. Staffing, you know, we continue to look to increase our
size. Then, of course, and then there are still the border
barriers. We are still looking to enhance those.
Mrs. Demings. OK. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South
Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madame Chairman. We have been
focused on the Southwest Border for a long time for
interdiction of smuggling and narcotrafficking.
In fact, in 1974, in response to a study by the Justice
Management Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, the
study was entitled ``A Secure Border, Recommendation Number 7:
A Secure Border.''
Recommendation No. 7 of this study suggested the
establishment of a Southwest Border intelligence center now
known as EPIC, led by the DEA and staffed by representatives of
that agency, U.S. Customs and now probably 15 other agencies
involved in EPIC.
I have visited that center and I point out 1974, and here
we are in 2017. So the question I have for the panel is is how
is EPIC leveraged in your JTF?
I will start with Ms. Ayala.
Ms. Ayala. Well, JTFI as a functional task force is
primarily involved in the improvement of the investigative
process. Of course, part of that is to leverage as much
intelligence as possible. Our main goal is to focus on a
customer service model, the special agent in the field working
on investigation.
EPIC, just like all of the National capital region centers,
are leveraged to ensure that there is no duplication of effort,
that there is significant deconfliction, and that we are
maximizing the broad knowledge that there is out there and the
capabilities of our interagency partners. So from that
perspective, we are utilizing EPIC.
But mostly in our models we are looking at transnational
criminal networks and how they impact homeland security. So we
are focusing in on prioritizing those threats and then creating
models that actually enable us to look at a network.
So instead of looking at individual targets or
organizations, we are looking at multiple cells and
organizations that are supported by multiple sources of supply,
money launderers, and illicit pathways and other illicit
support systems. That is the breadth of what we are looking at.
So we are not looking at individual intelligence or small
organizations. We are looking at networks that are impacting
the international arena that sometimes are the subject of
dozens of investigations and hundreds of arrests and
indictments and prosecutions on both sides of the border.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, ma'am.
Admiral, on the East with air and marine, I mean I visited
EPIC so I have seen some of the capabilities. Are they helping
you guys, you know, I guess, triangulate and find the aircraft
and the marine assets that are maybe smuggling contraband or
drugs into the country? How do you utilize EPIC? It is just for
my edification, really.
Admiral Schultz. Congressman, most of our maritime
activities here through the transit zone are coordinated
through JIATF-South. But JIATF-South has linkages across all
the Federal intelligence centers. They have international
linkages with Interpol.
We have representations there from it is more than a dozen
international partners. So that is the fusion point or the
consolidation point. So there is a relationship there with the
DOJ, the justice centers in the El Pasos of the world, the El
Paso Intelligence Center. So that is sort of our fusion point.
When all that works through one lens it is fused. It is the
best intelligence. It is pushed out to our operational
resources.
You know, at the end of the day, the best capability for us
with my Coast Guard hat on, which is complementary to the Task
Force that is a Coast Guard cutter, a major cutter with the
capability of carrying a helicopter in the back, ideally an
airborne use of force capable helicopter, which can shoot out
the engines. A lot of the threat is fast boats smuggling about
a thousand, plus or minus, kilograms cocaine.
When you can push that intelligence from those centers
through JIATF-South to the tactical operational units out
there, whether it is a Coast Guard law enforcement attachment
on a Navy ship or on a allied partnership or a Coast Guard
cutter, there is patrol aircraft. We can leverage that
intelligence.
We have visibility through all the National intelligence
capabilities on about 80 percent of the maritime activity. We
action about less than a third of that, about 30 percent of
that. So there is really a capacity discussion here.
We could roll more drugs up out of the transit zone with
more capabilities, but we are pretty darn good at doing what we
do. It is more of a capacity discussion. We reach back to all
those centers like EPIC to fuse that information and give us
the best ability to target our efforts.
It is intelligence-driven operations is really what we are
driving for because we are capacity-constrained. When I was a
young ensign, you know, 33 years ago, we were boring holes in
the ocean just out there sort of aimlessly patrolling, looking
for some vessel that might move through our patrol box.
Today, we, with specific information fused through JIATF-
South, we can go not quite to the spot on the map, but we can
get pretty darn close, launch an unmanned aerial system from
the back of a cutter, put a DOD patrol aircraft over the top,
then we can get on that vessel and create an end-game, an
interdiction or a disruption at sea.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Well, thank you for that.
I chair the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on Foreign
Affairs. So I meet with the leaders in Panama and Costa Rica
and Colombia. One thing that they keep driving home is
apprehension of drugs in large bulk shipments as they are
coming out of Colombia is more effective than those parcels
being broken up in smaller, as they migrate North and being
broken up even into backpack size parcels to be brought across
the border.
So the question I have, I guess for you Admiral, but Ms.
Ayala may answer this. How well are our partners working in
Panama, Costa Rica, really, Honduras, El Salvador, the whole
Central American isthmus, but Colombia as well? Can you all
touch on is it effective working with our foreign partners on
this?
Ms. McSally. If you can make it quick? The time is----
Admiral Schultz. Congressman, absolutely it is effective.
The partner nations, when I talk about the JIATF successes, the
Coast Guard interdicted more than 200 metric tons last year
with our interagency partners.
When you roll up the contributions of the other partner
nations, I think there are about 340 metric tons taken out of
the entire transit system. About two-thirds of those cases have
a partner nation connection. About 35 to 40 percent is a
partner nation end-game asset, a boat, a cutter, a naval ship
from one of those countries does the interdiction.
Sometimes that is informed with U.S. intelligence that we
can push through, you know, the right filters to them.
Sometimes it is a DOD or a Coast Guard or CBP aircraft that
brought that Guatemalan special naval vessel to the scene.
So I would say the partnerships have grown exponentially in
recent years. DOD does some support and capabilities for them,
Border Patrol, Coast Guard, CBP, we are training them. We have
a persistent presence in those countries. We have attaches. We
have liaisons.
So I would tell you that is a very good news story.
Sometimes that story, I think, is lost in the collaboration,
but our partners are in that fight, because they are kind-of
caught as the meat in the sandwich.
The end-users of drugs in the United States, the source
country in the Indian Ridge and Central America is feeling, you
know, that squeeze that manifests itself with people showing up
at our Southwest Border.
Ms. McSally. All right, the gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Duncan. Thanks.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa from
California, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General question to all of you, big picture statement. Vice
Admiral Charles Ray at the last hearing we had here mentioned
that the Coast Guard was unable to interdict, his words, ``580
known smuggling events due to capacity challenges.'' It sounds
to me like he just didn't have the assets to interdict those
580 known smuggling events.
Some of the comments you have all made right now, which is
working with other countries, collaborating with other
countries, and given the fact that we are all limited by
resources in trying to come up with an optimal resource
allocation in terms of investing our taxpayer dollars, what
would you say would be our highest yield in terms of asset
investment going forward?
New ships for the Coast Guard, greater cooperation with our
neighbors to the south in terms of intelligence, multi-layered
defense, multi-layered border system, so to speak? It is a
general question, but I am asking you to answer it given your
experience out there in the field?
Ms. Ayala. I would say probably a little bit of both on the
multi-layered and the foreign investment. But I will say that
as we look at criminality and our opportunities to engage it,
we always want to engage it as far away from the U.S. border as
possible. So investment in capacity building with a foreign
partner is always crucial to us.
Mr. Correa. How? Specifics.
Ms. Ayala. Well, in many cases in working with Department
of State, our intention is to train them to be able to
investigate better, to be able to work with host countries, to
strengthen some of their laws or some of their capacities, to
engage in investigative surges with them.
Every year we do engage in that type of investigative
search where we deploy HSI, CBP, and DOD personnel to Central
America and other countries to work on priority investigations
that have impact on both sides of the border.
These type of operations in just a short time yield up to,
like, 800 arrests, identification of 32 transnational criminal
organizations, a dismantlement of nine.
But mostly to identify the networks and look for
vulnerabilities that we can exploit so we can better attack the
adversary further away from the border.
So international----
Mr. Correa. So that is based on local intel that you pick
from sources outside the United States?
Ms. Ayala. Yes, and sources in the United States also.
Ms. Gambler. If I can add, Congressman? I think it is a
really important question, and it gets at the heart of what has
been a key finding from GAO's work on border security programs
and investments, which is that the Department has not
established those metrics and those assessments to provide
information for looking at which investments are yielding which
types of results and to help inform decision making, whether it
is technologies, whether it is additional infrastructure,
whether it is additional manpower.
That is why the Department putting in place some of the
metrics that we have been recommending through our work is so
important.
Mr. Correa. Thank you.
Admiral Schultz. Congressman, per my answer to Congressman
Duncan, it is a capacity conversation. I think from a Coast
Guard perspective I think the best way to get after that for us
is to maintain the momentum we have on our recapitalization
efforts, our National security cutters, our off-shore patrol
cutters, our fast response cutters.
The Congress has been very supportive keeping steady
predictable funding moving forward for us will allow us to
replace 50- soon to be 60-year-old ships that are working on
those threat vectors.
Our folks are doing a terrific job. But kind-of walking
back to my answer about the readiness challenges, when you are
maintaining a 50-plus-year-old ship, you know, suppliers for
those parts don't exist anymore. There's--it's challenging. We
are doing a little bit of that on the backs of our people.
So getting those new ships fielded, putting the
helicopters, we have C-27s, 14 C-27s that came to the Coast
Guard from DOD with the support of Congress. We need to
missionize those. They are slick aircraft.
Right now they go out and they can patrol, but they don't
have any capabilities to detect and surveil out there. Getting
the predictable funding going forward to make them
operationalized is part of the solution.
Mr. Correa. Admiral Ray, let me interrupt you and say,
Admiral Ray--I should say Admiral Shultz--mentioned again 580--
--
Admiral Schultz. Right.
Mr. Correa [continuing]. Known drug-smuggling targets.
Admiral Schultz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. Not enough assets to go after them. It sounds
like you need assets as opposed to a predictable revenue
stream, predictable funding.
Admiral Schultz. Well, Congressman, more clearly adds to
the equations, you know. I talked about the 70 percent we
didn't act. We have intelligence and we acted against 30
percent of that. So that is a conversation purely about
capacity.
But you need to have the right type of assets. There have
been many forays in recent years about pushing vessels out
there. You need that vessel. I mentioned previously about what
is that capability that really allows you to be effective on
that mission?
It is that flight deck-equipped Coast Guard cutter with an
embarked helicopter that can deploy use of force and an over-
the-horizon boat supported by unmanned aerial surveillance or
maritime patrol aircraft.
So the right capabilities adds to the equation. Just
pushing ships out there with the wrong capabilities--we have
ally partners that contribute. The Navy was very much part of
this mission set. But the Navy is subscribed elsewhere in the
world with a rising, you know, Russian threat and the South Sea
China threat.
We are not seeing a lot of the Navy in this hemisphere.
Admiral Tidd--General Kelly talked about the Coast Guard being
his Navy in the Western Hemisphere. That is reality.
So there is a resource component, sir. But I think the
momentum getting those assets out there is probably the
practical way to keep moving forward here.
Mr. Correa. I yield, Madam Chair.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hurd from Texas,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Chairwoman. Admiral Shultz, if you had
$999 million in fiscal year 2017 how would you use it? How
would you suggest it be used in JTF-East?
Admiral Schultz. Congressman, I would have to first get
some more people to execute $999 million, about 40 people. If
we had additional resources in JTF-East, kind of agnostic to
the number, talking about additional resources, we would build
on the momentum we have.
My goal since I have been here the last 8 months is we are
the startup JTF-East. I say we are like the commercials that
talk about BASF. We don't build it. We make it better. We don't
direct operations, we power operations.
Mr. Hurd. So maybe let me redirect the question. If Coast
Guard, and again I know you are wearing your JTF-East hat,
right. But if Coast Guard had $999 million, how would they use
it?
Admiral Schultz. So if we had just under $1 billion, we
would get after some of our readiness challenges that we have
been forced to kick the can on a little bit here. That is
maintenance. That is operations.
We are looking to----
Mr. Hurd. Can you buy any more boats with that?
Admiral Schultz. We are looking to maintain momentum on
bringing an icebreaker into our ranks. We have got two
icebreakers--one medium, one heavy.
There are demands in the Artic that warrant a heavy
icebreaker right now. We are looking to move that down the
rails. The commandant has talked about trying to field that
ship by 2023. That is an ambitious endeavor. Some, you know,
additional funding toward that to meet that--support.
Mr. Hurd. Might help make it a little bit quicker.
Admiral Schultz. Absolutely.
Mr. Hurd. Good. Copy.
I just want to confirm, and you say this multiple times,
and Chief Beeson, I am coming to you with the next question.
A third of the actionable intelligence that Coast Guard
has, they can only act on a third of that because of capacity
issues.
Admiral Schultz. We action about one-third of the
information we have. We have information on about 80 percent of
the maritime movements. We get after about a third of that.
Mr. Hurd. So Chief Beeson, is that a similar problem that
Joint Task Force-West and Border Patrol has when you look at
our Southern Border with Mexico?
Chief Beeson. I would say that it is not. I mean, we are
not in terms of having a vast number of intelligence targets to
go after. That is something that if you were to give me $999
million I would be looking at building our intelligence
capabilities.
You know, I think that I have seen some really, to me,
phenomenal intelligence successes where leveraging the
intelligence community has really paid off for us.
But it is for us, in terms of intelligence targets, it is
not what I would call a target-rich environment. It is
something we need to continue to build on.
Mr. Hurd. So this question, again, to you Chief Beeson, and
Ms. Ayala, I welcome your impact. As a former human
intelligence officer I would say that countering
narcotrafficantes and kingpin human smugglers is not a National
intelligence priority.
If we made it a National intelligence priority, had it as
one of the top three of the NIPF, that we would see increased
intelligence coming from Mexico and Central America that can be
used to direct some of your limited human resources. Am I crazy
to think that? Would you agree? Help me refine that
understanding.
Ms. Ayala, you can go first if you are interested.
Ms. Ayala. Yes. I would say that I would be happy to answer
that question and give you certain examples of how we
prioritize and are able to leverage that in a different
environment in Classified setting.
Mr. Hurd. Sure. So are you happy with the amount of
intelligence that is being produced on the 19 criminal
organizations that are operating in Mexico?
Ms. Ayala. I know from our perspective we are beyond the 19
criminal organizations as we are looking at the network. We
could always use more intelligence. We could always use more
systems and order in individuals to be able to go through that
intelligence, properly analyze it and determining what we go
after first.
Our goal is----
Mr. Hurd. Which is the lead agency responsible for
collecting intelligence on drug trafficking networks coming
through Mexico? What agency within the Federal Government? CIA?
What is DEA's role? Can you--microphone?
Ms. Ayala. The DEA's role is also to be overseas and
collect intelligence. But as we know and as being former
military operator and I know that you have a background as a
significant operator, there are a lot of other individuals that
are out there doing that work and funneling it through
different places. So again, I would be happy to discuss that
with you in a different environment.
Ms. McSally. Great. We are going to go through a second
round here. I want to talk about the process and prioritization
of air assets.
So we have two geographic JTFs. And then we have your air
force is air and marine. Can you guys talk me through the
process of how you prioritize requirements for specifically ISR
air assets? Who makes the decision on where those air assets go
and how nimble that is?
Then, Ms. Gambler, I think you talked a little bit about
this related to Predator B. I want your perspective after I
hear.
So obviously they may have competing requirements, so who
decides where the air assets are going? How quickly does that
turn and is it modified on a daily, weekly, monthly basis? Do
either of you guys want to go first?
Chief.
Chief Beeson. So I will go back to having recently come
from the Tucson sector. We had an air tasking operations group.
So it was basically all of the providers of air support within
the corridor, primarily the Office of Air Marine.
There was some DOD support. We did get some State and local
support and even civil air patrol provided support to us. So
they are meeting on a biweekly basis, sitting down looking at,
getting an intel brief to start with.
OK. Here is what we are seeing, here is where we see the
activity occurring, the threats, things of that nature. This is
we think we are going to need air support and then plugging in
based on that.
So the priorities are set by the commanders in the field.
Primarily, the agents in charge at the stations are saying
these are my priorities. Those would come up and get vetted at
the sector level. We are perfecting that at the maritime.
When you get to land-centric, if Chief's team comes forward
with a request to the Coast Guard, maybe out of San Diego in
that quarter, we will respond to those on a case-by-case basis.
We don't fly a lot over the land. But we certainly will support
those requests when they come in.
Ms. McSally. Great. But generally speaking, there is not a
lot of fluidity between JTF-East and JTF-West support assets.
You are generally talking about what is within your ability to
task in JTF-East. But there----
Admiral Schultz. Well, if we are talking in the wet domain
I would say there absolutely is a coordination, to where at the
very point end, at our sectors in the Gulf of Mexico at the
regional coordinating mechanisms, they would work across that
seam without border.
I mean, if there is a need we talk to CBP air marine, they
talk to Coast Guard. We can interchange. We can be a--you know,
what we try to do is minimize redundancy.
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Admiral Schultz. So I say in Chief's world, you know,
predominantly in the land-centric border we are not flying a
lot of Coast Guard air there. So I would say you are not that
synergy because there is not that sort of demand signal. We are
working in different spaces most of time in West.
Ms. McSally. Yes, but specifically air and marine assets I
guess is what I am getting at.
Admiral Schultz. Yes, I would tell you ma'am, I think there
is a great story there.
Ms. McSally. OK.
Admiral Schultz. I think we schedule jointly together, we,
you know, rooted out any redundancies. We can do hot hand-offs
where, you know, these cases, particularly in the water when
they are fast-moving targets operating at night, shutting down
the daytime, if you are not on top of them, they are very
difficult to go back and detect again.
So it is all about that efficiency, that crisp hand-off. I
think we have got that wired pretty well.
Ms. McSally. Ms. Gambler, your perspective on----
Ms. Gambler. Yes, related specifically to Predator Bs,
Chairwoman, we found that there were some differences across
the different air and marine operation centers for Predator B.
So some of those operation centers did have procedures for
coordinating requests for Predator B support and then some
didn't. So our recommendation was to better improve those
coordination procedures as they relate across all of the
different air and marine operation centers for the Predator Bs.
Ms. McSally. So they are specifically asking requests for a
platform as opposed to a capability in some of these centers?
Ms. Gambler. So we looked at what are called the four
operation centers from which air and marine flies the Predator
Bs. So some of those air operation centers have procedures for
coordinating the request that they receive for air support and
that kind of thing and some didn't. So hopefully that
clarifies.
So, our recommendation was related to strengthening those
coordination procedures and making sure they exist across the
different operation centers from which Predator Bs fly.
Ms. McSally. Yes. My only point is, again, I am coming from
my military experience, you don't ask for an asset. You ask for
capability. There are other manned surveillance capabilities
out there.
So if you need intelligence you don't say this is the
platform I want. So an intelligence process needs to look at
what the requirements are, what the prioritization is, and then
what platforms can meet that requirement. Not I need my
Predator today, is all I am getting at. So OK.
I am over my time, so you want another round?
Mr. Correa. If I may? Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. McSally. Recognize Mr. Correa, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Correa. Question to everybody again, but I will start
out with Ms. Gambler if I can? About a decade ago the
Department of Homeland Security deployed physical
infrastructure, fence, wall, anything you want to call it and
technology on the Southern Border.
At the request of this committee, the GAO ultimately issued
multiple reports, many of them not too favorable, showing
mismanagement, cost overruns, and ultimately led to the
cancellation of SBInet technology program.
To this day, CBP lacks a metric to show how these kinds of
investments or that investment a decade ago actually
contributed to our security, border security.
So my, you know, my question to you is in general. Lessons
learned, are we heading down that same road today which is
essentially, again, investing heavy sums of taxpayer dollars,
not sure of what the ultimate return will be in terms of
security, securing our taxpayers and citizens?
Ms. Gambler. I think there are several lessons learned from
GAO's past work looking at DHS's efforts to deploy
infrastructure and technology. One, Congressman you already
mentioned, which is the need to have in place performance
metrics to be able to assess what we are getting out of those
investments.
The second one relates to DHS oversight and management of
these acquisition programs. We have reported on technologies,
infrastructures, and even in other areas that DHS doesn't
always follow its own acquisition management processes.
Because it doesn't always follow those processes
consistently it leads to some of the things you mentioned,
Congressman, in terms of schedule slippages, cost overruns, and
performance than is less than what is desired.
So it is important for the Department as it moves forward
with acquisition programs to ensure it is following its
management processes. That it is testing the technologies that
it is putting out there to make sure that they operate in the
environments where they are being deployed.
So, I think those are two key lessons learned from GAO's
work on border security technology and assets.
Mr. Correa. So again, it is a matter of rolling out some
metrics to assure that we are watching the results of these
investments, and No. 2, constant vigilance to make sure that
what we bought is what we are getting.
Ms. Gambler. Management and oversight are two important
words there, Congressman, yes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you.
Any other comments from the rest of the panel?
Madam, I yield my time.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
Mr. Rutherford, do you want a second round of questions?
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Ayala, could you talk a little about one of the
vulnerabilities of the TCOs is once they move their drugs
north, they got to move their money south.
I know speaking with a couple of the HSI agents, they spoke
about some very good coordination of effort that identified a
particular bank that I think was moving like $20 million.
Could you talk a little bit about that and how that could
be replicated across the whole Joint Task Force area?
Ms. Ayala. OK. I am not sure specifically which case that
you are referring to, but I will tell you that, I mean,
obviously the components here--specifically, HSI has over 40
years of money laundering expertise that dates back to the Bank
Secrecy Act. So we have a lot of experience in all different
areas.
A lot of, obviously, authorities that help us to intercept,
whether it be cash or look for vulnerabilities in our financial
systems, whether they be funnel accounts or the misuse of
certain things. We also work with private sector in order to
develop best practices.
I can tell you that we are looking at all of the movements
of bulk cash on the way down. Not just at the border, but
throughout the United States and pipelines. We are working on,
obviously, to seize assets in bank accounts.
Obviously some of that is difficult when we are looking at
funnel accounts and the rapid way in which they move and the
way that that system is used in order to then remove money near
the border and then try to bulk cash it out.
So those are certain ways. There are many vulnerabilities
along the way for the organization. Where it becomes
complicated is their use of trade-based money laundering,
which, of course, is in large scale and it involves billions
and billions of dollars in money that is going south through
trade investments that are not what they appear.
So one of the main things that we do in JTFI is prioritize
the top threats of criminal networks. Many of them involve
money-laundering investigations.
So we are looking at the complete network. We are
prioritizing the same investigations that are in the field so
that we can lend value to them and increase the possibility,
not just for seizures, but for increasing prosecutions and the
seizure of assets.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
Chief Beeson, could you talk a little bit about BigPipe and
how that works in Arizona? Why something like that hasn't been
replicated in the Rio Grande Valley sector?
Chief Beeson. So BigPipe is a platform, a software
platform. Let us see how I can explain this. But basically it
provides a secure method for law enforcement that have an
account, that can sign into it to chat.
There is like a chatroom, if you will, about what is going
on within the area of operations. There is also the ability to
downlink video from an ISR platform that might be out operating
in the area. One of the--either the Predator or a helicopter
with a camera mounted onto it.
So what they are doing is it is just a way for folks
operating within the tactical operation centers to look at what
the threats are, request assets, maybe do some coordination of
resources. It could be replicated across the Southwest Border.
I don't know that it is or isn't being used in Rio Grande
Valley. I just know, having come from Tucson, that we were
making effective use of it there.
Mr. Rutherford. I don't believe they are using it, well,
they are not using BigPipe, but I mean they are trying some
integration.
But that is why I was asking about the technology needs
for, you know, across the board. Because, that is something
that--the integration that we saw there that I guess you
started is something that we need to replicate over in the Rio
Grande Valley.
Chief Beeson. I would like to take credit for starting it,
but the reality is I had a number of predecessors before me
that actually did that, so----
Mr. Rutherford. Oh, OK. Well, you just mentioned that you
were there so I just think--OK. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. Still have some more questions if
you guys don't mind? Bear with me here.
Ms. Ayala, can you share with us, and I know we are in an
Unclassified setting, the presence of TCOs within the United
States, within the 50 States?
I mean, I have seen some different numbers out there about
how many cities we have a pretty significant presence of cartel
activity and operatives. Can you just share your perspectives
on that at the Unclassified level?
Ms. Ayala. Well, I probably can't really go into the
numbers, the specifics of city by city, but what I can tell you
is that our strategy is to pursue every element of those
transnational criminal organizations from a network point of
view, whether they are in China, coming up through the Southern
Border and approaches through the border and into, you know,
Chicago or Detroit or wherever that is.
That we are looking at all of the sources of supply, the
distribution, the transportation networks and putting that
together and looking at supply chain investments and seeing how
we can look for vulnerabilities in their actions along the
entire crime spectrum to be able to then pursue some
enforcement action against them.
So they are everywhere. We have transnational criminal
organizations in every city across the United States. We are
working to minimize the impact in all those cities.
Ms. McSally. Is there anything that we can do, that
Congress can do, to help your activities to combat cartel
activity within the 50 States?
Ms. Ayala. Well, I think that when we look at individual
agency missions and goals and some of the infrastructure that
we built to support that, sometimes we look at it in
stovepipes.
So for instance, when we are looking at the hiring of
agents, special agents for criminal investigations, we often
forget that we really need, you know, forensic auditors and
financial experts and other analysts and other missions to
support that effort.
Even if we were able to take on everything we wanted
without prioritization, we would still need more assistant U.S.
attorneys, and more infrastructure in the court system to be
able to support those investigations.
So I think looking at a holistic approach to what hiring 10
Border Patrol agents or office of field operations or Coast
Guard would require as far as investigators and all of the
support infrastructure as a whole, I think would help in our
endeavor.
Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. Back to just overall
effectiveness of the JTF so far, can you think of an example--I
know we are in an Unclassified setting--of a case or a mission
that you saw now that we have JTFs that show that JTFs are
effective?
Like, had we not had this new construct perhaps you
wouldn't have been able to operate in a way that impacted a
specific mission. Like, can you give any examples that actually
show that what we are doing here is increasing effectiveness?
Ms. Ayala. So what I was going, we will fill in three
distinct gaps in DHS capabilities, things that we are doing now
that weren't available before that we developed jointly, most
of us together in our integrated teams.
So in the past, DHS lacked a mechanism to prioritize the
top transnational criminal networks and now we have. We
developed the HomeCort process. The deputies of all of the
components and the task force directors and the heads of all of
the investigative services are on there.
We also lacked a way to consistently tie together and
manage all of the investigations, operations, arrests related
to a criminal network. We were able to develop that, which is
Comprehensive Criminal Network Analysis, which we did not have
before in the Department.
We also were able to develop National case coordination,
which now manages that and is able to coordinate across the
entire domain and spectrum.
The main thing, third, though is that we have been able to
focus on the investigative process of work, which we really
necessarily did not before. The criminal investigative process
and looking for ways to support that through technology and
weaknesses.
So this enables us to have better cross-programmatic and
cross-domain visibility. Our strength is in the interagency
team and the broad knowledge that they are bringing together to
National centers.
Because of that we have been able to do things like not
looking at ways of maybe couching future metrics, but in ways
of value-added statements.
Like, for instance, like in a human trafficking
investigation, a network that we assisted in and did
comprehensive criminal network analysis, we were able to expand
the knowledge of the network by 200 percent in half of the
time, which builds in all those efficiencies in man hours.
In addition, that resulted in tripling the number of
indictments more than tripling from 10 to 12 to 38. You know,
how does that matter? Because then now it is harder to
reconstitute itself.
In this case, because it was human trafficking, obviously
prevented people to continually be victimized or create larger
victims. I can go on in many different scenarios----
Ms. McSally. No. That is great. Thank you. So you are a fan
of the JTFI organizations it sounds like?
Ms. Ayala. I am a fan of my team and the support that I
receive from my executive agents and my partners in West and
East that support those efforts.
Ms. McSally. Commander Beeson.
Chief Beeson. I always forget that button. I think that a
couple of examples for me come to mind. Most recently in
Arizona, a capacity was needed by the team out there in order
for them to further their investigative efforts.
So that capacity request came into Joint Task Force-West.
It was then sourced out. Then we did source it also to Joint
Task Force-I. They have been able to meet the capacity request.
So they will be getting that resource down to Arizona, if it is
not there already, for them to utilize.
I think that that is something that prior to the task
forces, that probably would have gone just up one particular
stovepipe and might not have been met. But I do think it was
met.
Additionally, I think of some, you know, bringing in
citizenship and immigration services into the taskforce has
enabled us to identify, I mean, very recently, within the last
couple of weeks, individuals who were pending immigration
benefits in the United States that we know were engaged in
narcotics smuggling in Mexico.
They are not going to get those benefits now. That is, to
me, something that certainly adds value.
Ms. McSally. That is great.
Admiral Schultz.
Admiral Schultz. Madam Chairwoman, I would tell you in a
couple places. First and foremost, I think our DHS partners
have collaborated well in the past. I think we have upped that
game. We are able to bring in capabilities and capacities from
outside regional locations toward better end effect against
transnational criminal organizations.
Our recent efforts in Puerto Rico, where we linked in DOD
linguists, we linked in DOD analysts. We brought in P-3 support
that wouldn't normally support that vector in the Western
Hemisphere Initiative, illicit pathway initiative I talked
about.
In Central America we are fielding a capability with
partner nations where they can enroll migrants moving up
through the Central American corridor. We can enroll them.
We have biometrics as they move across, you know, they
leave the Indian Ridge, they show up in the Darien, the jungle
regions there. They move through the Darien into Costa Rica and
up the chain. We enroll them. The partners see that. As they
move up, their stories change.
They start to dial in on what are those folks with these
changing stories? At what point do we need to get a partner
nation lashing up with the U.S. law enforcement folks to figure
out who that person really is before they present at the
Southwest Border?
So I think there are many places. I use the metric that
when I reach out to my DHS partners in the field and they say,
hey, we want more support from you, to me that is the greatest
testament. We are building relationships and they are asking
for more support to be more effective in their work.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
All right. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Barragan for 5
minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I just left a meeting with
Secretary Kelly, and I didn't have an opportunity to get a
clarification so I was hoping maybe somebody here maybe to
elucidate on this.
Right now when an agent goes out for an enforcement action
they have, as he stated, they have a name of somebody who is a
target and that agent has orders to go find this target.
But if, for example, the order is to go out and arrest
Nanette and my friend, you know, Tim is with me, and it turns
out Tim is undocumented, he is being picked up, too. Are there
any policy memos or any guidelines that are being used on
prosecutorial discretion as it pertains to collaterals?
Ms. Ayala. I would say that that is a question that I would
leave to the component to answer from a joint task force
perspective. What we are looking at is the targeting of human
smuggling organizations and people involved in the fraudulent
processes and abuses along the way. So our warrants or our
arrests would be involved, large transnational criminal
networks involved in the process.
Ms. Barragan. Anybody else up here that might be able to
shed some light on this?
Chief Beeson. So I am the director for the Joint Task
Force-West for Arizona, so like Director Ayala, we are focusing
on transnational criminal organizations. CBP is focusing on
border security.
We are not in the business that you just described. That is
not within our portfolio of--at the moment we are focusing on
the actual border itself, border security there.
Ms. Barragan. OK.
Ms. Ayala, Mr. Trump wants to add more enforcement and
removal operations. What does that do to the workload of
Homeland Security Investigations?
Ms. Ayala. Well, I think we just had a bit of a discussion
on anytime that we increase the number of enforcement removal
or CBP officers. That there is always a correlation between the
number of HSI investigators that you would need in order to
support the investigative process.
I know there is a ratio out there that we could probably
look at that I would be happy to maybe get to you as far as how
many investigators to other operators within the Department.
Ms. Barragan. What does it do to ICE's Office of the
Principal Legal Advisor?
Ms. Ayala. This is what we were speaking about earlier
about the holistic approach to looking at the assets and the
support that is always needed, because you are always going to
need--any time you plus-up in one area you have to plus-up the
support mechanisms.
So that would be Office of Principal Legal Advisor. That
would be mission support. That would be analytical support. It
could be other technological support and other equipment that
goes along with it.
So it is a complete, let us say, huge pie of percentages
and trying to figure out which correlates to what. I know that
there are work force models that are out there that each
component has that addresses that.
Ms. Barragan. So that reminds me, you know, we have been
hearing a lot about ramping up and hiring a lot of new ICE
agents and, you know, adding 10,000 agents, but we haven't
heard a lot about adding support for the courts, right? The
courts are already backed up.
As somebody who has actually represented a woman--in an
asylum case from Guatemala, you know, my case took years. I was
limited to maybe an hour-and-a-half in court. I would keep
going back until I got, you know, a full 6 hours.
We aren't really hearing anything about ramping up cost for
courts and making sure that we are following through on the
judicial side. Do you foresee that we are going to see that or
do you have any comment on that?
Ms. Ayala. Our goal is always to have more prosecutorial
resources or space and so that we are separating that from
looking at transnational criminal organizations.
We could go out there with all the assets we have and make
20 time more cases, but we don't have the prosecutorial
resources to take those investigations, and we don't have pre-
trial services to go through and meet all those individuals.
We don't have detention space to house them, then, you
know, we can't take on those number of cases. So that is why
there is prioritization everywhere.
So we could definitely support the increase of support in
all aspects of Government that correlate back to our
investigative process.
Ms. Barragan. OK.
Then the last question is to you, Vice Admiral. You know, I
was hearing about the possible cuts for the Coast Guard and TSA
to build a border wall. How do the Coast Guard's aging assets
limit your ability to carry out your missions?
Admiral Schultz. Well, Congresswoman, I would say that due
to the terrific capabilities of our folks and the commitment we
are getting the work done with our aging assets.
But you can only squeeze so much life out of a ship. You
know, we have got ships that are 50-plus years old. With the
help of Congress we have momentum to recapitalize those ships,
our offshore patrol cutters.
We just awarded a contract back in September to build the
first 9 of what we hope will be a fleet of 25. We just had a
ceremony in Seattle, here for the Coast Guard Cutter Monroe
this past weekend with the secretaries--and the commandant.
That is the most capable platform we ever had. So the end
of the day predictable, sustained budgets allow us to continue
our recapitalization efforts to get those old ships out of
service, put new ships on there.
The new ships are more capable. The living conditions for
the men and women on-board are much more adequate and, you
know, we want to continue that momentum. I think we are on a
good trajectory to recapitalize the Coast Guard.
Clearly we can do more with more, but getting those old
ships out and new ships fielded is really a critical part of
our continued success.
Ms. Barragan. Great. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa for some
final questions.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
You know, gentlemen, if you looked at the border area, 100
miles plus 100 miles plus-minus north-south, if you look at it
economically probably would be one of the world's largest
economies. Probably one of the top five economies in the world.
It is just a lot of economic activity in that area.
So it behooves all of us to try to coordinate our
activities north and south of the border when it comes to a lot
of these criminal elements because, of course, otherwise we
would be fighting a war, so to speak, with one hand tied behind
us.
Chief Beeson, a minute ago you said that through your
coordination, a person that was about to get immigration
benefits was denied those benefits because you had intel that
that person had been engaged in narcotics activities in Mexico.
How did you come up with that information, if you can say?
Chief Beeson. Not sure that I can in this setting.
Mr. Correa. Be as general as you can.
Chief Beeson. It was the result of an investigation. So as
the result of investigation, which is the gathering of
information, gathering of law enforcement intelligence, they
were able to determine that was the case.
Mr. Correa. Any of those investigations with coordination
of assets or government south of the border?
Chief Beeson. Thinking of that particular event, it does
not come immediately to mind. I would have to take that back
for the record.
Mr. Correa. Is one of the--one prior life as a State
legislator in California, one of the complaints I had from
folks in the Tijuana area was the lack of coordination with
immigration folks and when it came to following individuals
that have criminal records, especially when it came to
deportations.
In those days, and I don't know if it is still the case,
deportation you are opening some gates. Folks walk out into
Tijuana and the folks in the southern side wouldn't know if you
were deporting somebody based on a speeding ticket or that
person was a convicted murderer that was now being released
into Mexico.
So my question in general is do we have coordination with
Mexican authorities to make sure that we can follow some of
these bad hombres, so to speak, not only north of the border
but south of the border to make sure that folks are kept in
check that should be kept in check?
Chief Beeson. So I believe the answer is yes. Routinely
before we remove anybody to Mexico we provide Mexico with a
list of the individuals, and I am speaking specifically for CBP
in terms the folks that we remove, with a list of the
individuals that are being removed and the reasons for it.
We work closely with Mexico to check and see if individuals
that we have arrested are wanted, if there are outstanding
warrants for them in Mexico.
On occasion we do see where there are individuals that we
have arrested in the United States that have outstanding
criminal warrants in Mexico so we are making sure that when
they are returned to Mexico that Mexico knows and we are
essentially meeting them at the border and turning them over to
them.
Mr. Correa. My final question, shifting gears a little bit;
drug law in Mexico is a little bit different than it is in the
United States right now, given the emerging pattern in the
United States, clear pattern of legalization of marijuana in
the United States whereas in Mexico it is still a serious
crime. If you are caught with possessions of significant
amounts you are going to do 10, 20 years in jail.
Is that complicating the relation between the United States
and Mexico in terms of enforcement of drug----
Admiral Schultz. Congressman, I would tell you this.
Mr. Correa [continuing]. Policy?
Admiral Schultz. The government of Mexico remains a key
partner, I think, in the land domain under drug enforcement. On
the maritime domain we have a great working relationship with
CMAR, which is the Mexican navy. We will be meeting with
Mexican counterparts here coming up in April.
You hit the nail on the head. I mean, there is key economic
trade across the border and our challenge is to disrupt these
TCOs while allowing and enabling that trade to continue to
happen.
If you look at Mexico, you know, from my time at SOUTHCOM,
everyone focuses at the goal line defense at the Southwest
Border. I think Mexico's focus is clearly their Guatemalan-
Mexican border.
If you think about this as a layered defense of why are
folks showing up at our border, most of these days they are
Central Americans, not Mexicans anymore.
It is that instability in Mexico--excuse me, in Central
America by the transnational crime that is ending up there.
That is where the drugs land. Most of the drugs land in Costa
Rica now, increasing amounts, in Panama, in Guatemala.
Guatemala is the first stop country for most of the drugs.
That is the violence that comes with the drugs. There is a
question about breaking big bulk drugs that you could interdict
at sea down to small--once it is in the land domain it is very
much a problem set, and there is a tremendous violence that is
associated with it.
So I think the Secretary's view is push the border out. You
partner with the Mexicans where you can at our land border, but
clearly at their land border with Guatemala. That is part of
the problem set as well.
We have a very good working relationship across our
respective components. I think the task force is apt to
complement that, but not create new entities and new
partnerships with the Mexicans that confuse them. I think there
are existing strong relationships that we will continue to
build on.
Mr. Correa. Thank you.
Chair, I yield the remainder of my time.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and Members for their questions. Members of the committee may
have some additional questions, and for the witnesses we will
ask you to respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee
Rule VII(D) the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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