[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE GAO REVIEW
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 4, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-67
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
Mr. Jason Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 4
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Jason Bair: Prepared statement............................... 7
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 30
Hearing minutes.................................................. 31
STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE GAO REVIEW
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each, we will then recognize members for their opening
statements for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witness.
Thank you. Without objection, your prepared statement will be
made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to
insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the
length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
The Antiterrorism Assistance Program, ATA, is one of the
State Department's key tools in advancing some of our national
security interests. Its primary mission is to enhance the
capabilities of foreign partner nations with the goal of
allowing them to better detect, deter, and prevent acts of
terrorism.
The program also gives our partners the tools, the skills,
and training required to respond to acts of terror and to
apprehend and prosecute the individuals responsible for these
atrocious acts. According to the State Department, since the
program was first implemented in 1983, 84,000 personnel from
154 countries have been provided training, and the United
States has provided bilateral ATA assistance to 34 partner
nations.
And while the majority of the ATA training occurs in host
countries, or at regional facilities, we do perform a
considerable amount of activities here in the U.S. This
domestic training includes tactical training, which State has
subcontracted out to just two facilities, one in Virginia and
the other in North Carolina. And it was concerns that there may
be lax security and oversight in at least one of these
facilities that has led to the report that GAO is here to
testify on today. So we welcome you.
In late 2015, a South Florida reporter approached Ranking
Member Deutch and me with some very concerning allegations
regarding the security measures in the Virginia facility. There
were also allegations from the local residents near the
facility that some of the trainees were taking unauthorized
departures from training.
The reporter filmed herself driving into the facility, no
questions asked. And, worst, she walked up to an explosives
storage area undeterred and undetected. And while Mr. Deutch
and I viewed this, we asked the GAO to conduct a review of the
security measures at the domestic facilities and to document
how the State Department selects, screens, and vets potential
students, particularly those who come to the United States. And
what we found as a result of this review is a mixed bag.
Vetting procedures are in place and appear to have been
followed and implemented. The domestic facilities had done
proper documentation, and likely as a result of the reporting
took voluntary measures to make their facilities more secure.
But then we run into many of the same issues we have repeatedly
heard from these GAO reports when it comes to program
management at State.
Most concerning is that we have incomplete or, even worse,
inaccurate participant data. This is troubling for several
reasons. First, we don't have complete or accurate data on the
participants. We won't be able to follow up, then, on measures
or measure the success of the program.
And, second, if we have incomplete or inaccurate data, how
can we be sure that these individuals were indeed fully and
properly vetted? That issue becomes compounded when looking at
another GAO finding, and that is that there have been
unauthorized departures from the ATA program. Perhaps more
troubling, while GAO was making inquiries of ATA officials, ATA
identified a further 20 former participants that DHS had no
indication who had departed from the United States. Wow.
So who are these people? Where did they go? Why is there
such a gap in communication between ATA and DHS? There was no
formal process of actually following up and ensuring that these
participants actually got on a plane and returned home. This
might be a small number of participants. But given what we
know, I suspect that if a deeper dive was done, we might find
more unauthorized departures.
It is frustrating for us. We know that there are important
programs that are vital tools that our State Department can use
to further our interests. But when we see time and again
serious deficiency when it comes to program management and
oversight, you have to start asking the hard questions.
State Department has obligated nearly \3/4\ of $1 billion
for the ATA program for fiscal years 2012 to 2016. But ATA has
had difficulties even getting that money out the door. GAO
reported that there was about $172 million in unobligated
balances for the ATA program for those years; and, worse, $36
million has expired. In some cases, when we do get that money
out, we have no way of following up, as a recent audit by the
State Inspector General's office reported.
That audit finds that there was an absence of performance
reporting in Pakistan that prevented ATA from measuring the
effectiveness of that program because our people were not given
the visas or the access to travel around the country as would
be required for proper oversight. I would imagine that there
will be more of that across the ATA program.
So how do we begin to address the shortcomings so that we
can ensure that this key program is as effective as it can be?
And that is what we are here to discuss with GAO, and we look
forward to hearing more from our witness.
And with that, I am so pleased to turn to my good friend,
the ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for convening
today's hearing and for joining together to request that this
GAO report be published to review the State Department's
Antiterrorism Assistance Program, or ATA as it is known.
I also want to thank our witness, Mr. Bair, for joining us
today and for the work that you do every day to ensure proper
government oversight.
At a time when we are all concerned about the rise and
spread of terrorism, I think we should be thankful for the
important work of ATA. Since the program began in 1983, the
State Department has worked to educate and train local law
enforcement and security entities in over 150 countries across
the globe.
Building the capacity of partner nations to indigenously
prevent terrorist attacks, and then respond to and investigate
attacks when they happen, means fewer American forces need to
be sent overseas. ATA has spent hundreds of millions of dollars
training nearly 90,000 security forces in countries from
Morocco to India.
So the goal here today is to better understand that
investment and determine how we can improve the program. The
GAO report being discussed was initially requested because of
some excellent reporting by a local Miami journalist who
brought to the chair's attention, and to my attention, concerns
with the security and implementation of the ATA program at a
local training facility just a couple of hours from where we
sit today.
Thanks to her reporting, that facility in Virginia, which
she found to have left gates unlocked and open, allowing her to
walk up to unguarded explosive lockers, has since increased its
security.
She also raised concerns about international participants
in the training program leaving the courses to stay in the
U.S., and whether we are spending taxpayer dollars to train
security forces to fight terrorism. As we spend those taxpayer
dollars, I think it is fair to expect that they then use that
training to go home to fight terrorism.
This one example, though, raised much bigger questions
about how the State Department is using the roughly $150
million annually allocated for the ATA program. So we are here
today not to criticize the important work of the State
Department or the critical counterterrorism efforts of the ATA
program, but rather to fulfill our legal and constitutional
duty of program oversight to ensure that American taxpayers'
investments are being used effectively and efficiently.
The GAO is our trusted nonpartisan government watchdog who
just completed a report analyzing this program. Unfortunately,
but I would say predictably, the report finds some of the exact
same problems that past reports have highlighted. The State
Department struggles with management of these programs,
including data collection and an alarming inability to even
track participants in the program.
This has made it difficult to, then, monitor and evaluate
the effectiveness of the program. And if you can't evaluate how
effective a program is, you can't determine how to fix it. A
report from the State Department's Office of the Inspector
General in May of this year found that the ATA program in
Pakistan failed to implement the recommendations from the last
2012 GAO report; namely, that there is still no effective
monitoring and evaluation process. That is a problem.
At the same time, I think it is important to highlight some
of the good that was found in this report. ATA prides itself on
training programs that emphasize the rule of law and respect
for human rights, and this report showed that not to be an
empty slogan. The report states that all participants studied
in the program had gone through proper vetting, which prohibits
the U.S. from providing assistance to any security forces
implicated in any form of human rights abuses.
Additionally, the State Department performs criminal and
terrorism-related screening for all potential participants in
the ATA programs, allaying some concerns of potential security
risks. There is a lot embedded in this report, so I think we
are all looking forward to you, Mr. Bair, helping unpack it for
us. We hope that you will help us better understand the
significance of what you found and offer specific
recommendations for improving this important Antiterrorism
Assistance Program. We look forward to your testimony, and I
thank the chair. I yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much to the ranking member.
And seeing no other requests for opening statements, I am
delighted to introduce our witness, Mr. Jason Bair, who serves
as the acting director of the GAO's International Affairs and
Trade Team. Prior to this slot, Mr. Bair was assistant director
in the same office.
And while Mr. Bair's work is familiar to the subcommittee,
I am pleased that we now have the opportunity to have him
testify on his team's work for the first time. I tried to
convince him that we have a hazing procedure, but he didn't
fall for it.
But thank you, Mr. Bair, for being with us. I know that you
have led multiple teams in evaluating and proving the
effectiveness of U.S. efforts to fight terrorism abroad. Your
recent work has taken you to Pakistan, Yemen, the United Arab
Emirates, Kenya, and elsewhere. Thank you for being here. We
look forward to hearing your testimony. Congratulations on your
recent promotion.
And before we start, I am so pleased to see Mr. Charles
Johnson in the audience today with his GAO team. Charles is
very well-known to this subcommittee, and we thank him for all
of his work over the years. Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for being
here.
And with that, Mr. Bair, we will proceed on to your
testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. JASON BAIR, ACTING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Bair. Thank you. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
Deutch, and other members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
be here this morning to discuss GAO's work regarding the State
Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program.
My official statement for the record summarizes the report
that you have referred to, which we are releasing today, which
covers three main topics. Number 1, the security of domestic
training facilities; number 2, human rights vetting and
terrorist screening; and 3, oversight of ATA participants.
The main message of our work is that State should improve
both its data and oversight of ATA participants. However,
before I focus on those areas for improvement I would like to
quickly summarize our fundings related to facility security and
vetting.
First, with regard to the security of ATA's domestic
training facilities, we found that following media reports in
2015 there were allegations of potential vulnerabilities, and
State Department officials and contractors have taken various
steps to ensure security, including some after the initiation
of our review. For instance, consistent with ATF regulations,
both training facilities maintain locked explosive containers
and have locked and alarmed armories for storing weapons and
ammunition.
Second, with regard to vetting, we found that State
completed required human rights vetting for ATA participants
and screens all ATA participants for links to terrorism.
However, with regard to the third topic of oversight of ATA
participants, we found weaknesses in two important areas.
First, ATA has not maintained adequate records of its
courses and participants. As a result, ATA data are incomplete
and, unfortunately, sometimes inaccurate. For instance, despite
reporting having trained about 56,000 participants since 2012,
ATA was only able to provide records for less than half, or
about 25,000 participants.
Such data weaknesses limit ATA's ability to manage the
program effectively and accurately report on its performance to
Congress and the American people. We are recommending that
State improve its collection of data regarding the ATA program,
and State has agreed to implement changes.
The second key weakness is related to ATA's oversight of
participants. Specifically, we found that while ATA does have
an oversight process in place during training activities, it
does not confirm that participants return home after the
completion of their training. With regard to overseeing
participants during training, we found that 10 participants
have made unauthorized departures from training, participating
in the United States since 2012.
As of September 2017, 2 of the 10 have subsequently
departed the United States; 6 remain in the United States,
having applied to DHS for asylum; 1 is believed to be in the
United States and is the subject of an open DHS investigation
but is not known to pose a security threat. And as of October
3, we had not received requested information from DHS regarding
the tenth individual.
I do have to note that while the vast majority of ATA
participants do return home after training is complete, we have
also learned about 20 individuals trained in the United States
since 2012 who do not appear to have departed. ATA officials
and staff at the facilities that we visited described their
responsibilities for overseeing ATA participant departures, to
include escorting the ATA participants to the airport, helping
them check in for their flights, and escorting them to airport
security.
Importantly, because ATA lacked a process for confirming
their return home, State was unaware of these 20 cases until
after we began our review, some of which are more than 4 years
old. State has finally notified DHS of these 20 individuals in
August 2017.
We have two primary concerns about State's lack of a
process to confirm that ATA participants returned to their home
countries. First, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to
which former participants are using their ATA training. And,
second, ATA may not be able to provide information to DHS about
participants whose failure to depart may warrant enforcement
action.
Therefore, we are recommending that State implement a
process to confirm that ATA participants return to their home
countries. State has agreed to do so by the end of this year
for ATA participants trained in the United States.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, other members
of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I
would be happy to answer your questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bair follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you for the
work that you and your team provided.
Thank you, Mr. Johnson, as well, and the entire GAO
program.
I wanted to ask you a question regarding one of your
recommendations that you talked about. You noted that the State
Department concurred with your recommendation to develop a
process to confirm the return home of any ATA participant
trained outside their home country, and State response seems to
indicate it only intends to implement such a process for those
trained in the United States and not necessarily for those
trained in one of the regional facilities or elsewhere outside
their home country.
Is that your understanding of how State plans to address
this issue going forward? And, if so, would you say that it is
important for State to also develop a similar process for those
trained overseas?
Mr. Bair. Thank you for the question and for identifying
the distinction between those two points. As we talk about in
the report, certainly from a security perspective, of course we
want to make sure that anyone who comes to the United States
for training does depart. However, we think it is also
important that the State Department make sure that those who
are trained at regional training facilities return, so that
they can use the training that we have paid for in order for
them to be able to enhance the capabilities of the units that
they return to.
Based on the comments that State has officially provided in
our report, which are published in the back, they have clearly
said that they are going to do the first part of that, but it
is not clear that they are going to do the second part. We will
continue to monitor that and follow up with the State
Department as they implement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And do let us know your
progress on that.
And regarding this inaccurate or incomplete information on
participant, I think that it is one of the most concerning
findings for your review. Did you identify the weakness in the
process design, or was it a management and oversight issue? And
without complete and accurate information, do you think that it
would be possible to gauge how effective the ATA program is?
Mr. Bair. Yes. So let me take both of those questions in
turn. So on the first issue of kind of, what is the root cause
of what was going on here, why did we only get about half of
the participant records that we were looking for, the issue was
not with a policy. They in fact have a clear policy that
directs ATA staff to include all participants in that
participant data system. And so it was really an implementation
issue.
So when we probed with State Department officials about
what exactly was going on there, they pointed to recent staff
turnover. People weren't fully educated on exactly what they
were supposed to do. They didn't fully understand the policy,
and that is something that they have committed to address.
The second half of your question is also important in terms
of, how can you assess the effectiveness of the program? That
is something clearly we want to continue to focus on, and the
inability to say who it is that you have trained and how they
have continued to use that capability would undermine their
ability to give you a good, comprehensive answer.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. And one last question. This
is regarding State's future plans for the ATA program. State
has indicated that it wants to move most, if not all, domestic
training overseas, with Jordan as the most likely destination.
First, how far along is State in making this shift? As I
mentioned earlier, State has said it has been planning this
move for years. Hasn't happened yet.
And, second, you have a footnote in your report that says
that ATA officials compared costs and came to the conclusion
that it would be more cost effective to do this training
overseas, but that GAO did not evaluate ATA's analysis. Did ATA
provide you with any details or numbers at all? And tell us
more about this shift for training overseas.
Mr. Bair. Yes. So let me first talk about what we know
about the State Department's progress in implementing this
shift in the program. I guess I would first start by noting
about 10 percent over the last several fiscal years of the
training has occurred domestically, and so that is what was
really open for being moved to regional training facilities or
to host partner nations.
And so that is really what the focus has been, even though
during the course of our work when we were visiting the
facilities in Virginia and North Carolina, they were talking to
us about the fact that they had already seen some of those task
orders being moved overseas.
I would also note that State Department has out for
competition right now a request for proposals for a renewal of
the global antiterrorism assistance contract, and that I think
will govern exactly where the State Department goes. With
regard to the second half of your question about evaluation of
cost, we did obtain some limited information from the State
Department about their analysis on cost savings that they might
realize by moving overseas.
And it was really just the comparison for one theoretical
training course and the cost for things like facilities and
travel, whether that was completed at either the facilities
here in the United States or in the facility in Jordan. We
didn't evaluate that, so I can't tell you whether we would say
that that was a justified response.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. You are an excellent
witness, so congratulations.
Mr. Bair. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Deutch, I am pleased to recognize you
now for questions.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to--I agree
with the chair. I think you are an excellent witness, and it is
a fine opportunity to express our appreciation for the
important work that GAO does. So thanks to all of you.
Thanks for your testimony and for being here. Can you
provide us with some examples from your engagements review of
the ATA program of the most successes of the program? Where
does it work the best? We are getting into the challenges and
you addressed some of those, but are there successes you can
highlight?
Mr. Bair. Yes, certainly. I think this is one of those
areas where we want to focus on what works in a program. And I
would say in addition to GAO's analysis--and I know we have
already heard about the State Office of Inspector General who
recently did a review as well. I would note that there have
been evaluations, independent evaluations, by the
Counterterrorism Bureau that have looked at the program a
little more holistically and in countries.
And in some of the countries that they have looked at,
including Morocco as well as Bangladesh, they really cite the
growth of the bilateral relationship on a law enforcement level
in those countries, helping grow not only their
counterterrorism capability but also their willingness to
participate in joint investigations and things like that, which
clearly provide benefits to the United States.
Mr. Deutch. And if--so shifting, then, if GAO reviews
consistently find problems at the State Department with
oversight and management, why aren't we seeing greater
improvements? You talked about the recent staff turnover as
being one of the problems here. Do we need to do a better job
hiring career program managers instead of foreign services
officers at posts to manage programs like this? Would that help
address some of these problems? And if we did that, what would
that look like?
Mr. Bair. So I would say we don't specifically address that
question of career versus foreign service officers in this
report. I guess this is, again, just to be clear, a program
which is overseen by the Counterterrorism Bureau, the Bureau of
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism that provides
policy direction and oversight. But it is really implemented by
the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, especially their regional
security officers in the host countries.
We all are well acquainted with the challenges that--the
security challenges that we face at our Embassies and
consulates abroad. This is an additional duty that is upon
them. And as we have highlighted in a recent report looking at
overall diplomatic security key issues, we have, in September
of this year, put out a report that covers some of those key
issues for oversight, which make it clear the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security has a broad and deep set of
responsibilities, and this is, admittedly, one of the
responsibilities that doesn't make the press as much but
certainly is very important that they need to continue to focus
on.
Mr. Deutch. Right. As you highlight in your report and here
today. And, finally, are there other State Department security
assistance programs that can serve as a model for improved
monitoring and evaluation of the ATA program? Specifically,
thinking about the difficulties in Pakistan.
Mr. Bair. So I would say, I wouldn't point to any specific
program that I would say is doing a great job in monitoring and
evaluation. I would, though, to be fair to the State
Department, give them credit. They have a clear and explicit
policy for monitoring and evaluation. And as I talked about in
my statement and in response to earlier questions, they are
doing some evaluations. They are doing some of those deeper
dives.
I think some of the issues that the State OIG and we have
identified over time really fall into that monitoring bucket.
And that for us is more focused on managing the day-to-day
operation of the program as opposed to taking that step back
every few years and saying, how well are we doing at achieving
our goals? And so I think that monitoring piece is where we
want to focus on, and we want to see them continue to put their
time and effort.
Mr. Deutch. Terrific. This is very helpful, and we
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Bair.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
I am so pleased to recognize Mr. Mast, another great
Floridian in our subcommittee, for his questions.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you very much.
I appreciate your time. I just have one specific line of
questioning, and it falls in line with this as we layer down
the conversation. You know, you can always talk about what is
possible out there in the world, and that can be an important
conversation. I try to spend more time on what is probable,
because I think that does often get us a little bit closer to
what the real threats are.
So from you, I just want to simply know, gauge your
assessment of an insider threat and our capability of
combatting insider threats. What is your take on the true
probability of nefarious inside activities and our ability to
go out there and combat those activities? What is your
assessment of that?
Mr. Bair. So with regard to the Antiterrorism Assistance
Program that we focus on in this report, I would highlight the
work that we did confirming the State Department's vetting, not
only for gross violations of human rights as well as for
terrorist screening. I can't get into all of the details of all
of the systems that they might check for terrorist screening,
but I will say----
Mr. Mast. Then they would know what we do.
Mr. Bair. Correct.
Mr. Mast. Exactly. Please continue.
Mr. Bair. Yes. So what we did is we confirmed that in fact
the State Department ATA program was doing all of the vetting
that was required of them. Under the State Department Leahy
Law, we are able to look at a generalizable random sample and
confirm that every one of the individuals for whom we were able
to get data was vetted as required.
In terms of the terrorist screening, we also confirmed that
in the first instance every ATA participant is subject to
terrorist screening. And then, second, for those individuals
who are brought to the United States for training, obviously
they need to get visas to come to the United States, and there
is that additional layer of security.
And so I would say we did find a number of screens in place
to ensure that State Department is doing everything that they
can. Having said that, there is no system which is going to be
perfect. And they do, though, I think have a reasonable
assurance that they are taking the steps that they need to.
Mr. Mast. Exactly right. No system is going to be perfect.
When you are combatting threats like this, you are combatting
the imagination of somebody else. It is a game of cat and
mouse. It is never easy to do, and so that is where I am really
just looking for your opinion on, if you were given carte
blanche, is it where you would want it to be at, or would you
see drastic changes?
Mr. Bair. So it is not--unfortunately, it is not something
we specifically addressed in the report. But I would say,
again, the State Department was able to satisfy us that they
were taking the steps that they need to and there is not
tremendous concern about insider threats with this program,
because one of the things that they pointed out to us is that
the people trained in the program are foreign law enforcement
officials whose charge is to combat terrorism in their home
country.
And while, again, that doesn't provide perfect assurance,
these are people that we are partnering with on a day-to-day
basis to try to combat--to combat terrorism in those countries.
Mr. Mast. Certainly. And I have worked with law enforcement
in Afghanistan, and not always a group that, you know, in some
cases it was successful work, and in many cases it was not a
group that I wanted to necessarily turn my back on. And, you
know, that is the reality of the situation. It is very
difficult for you to deal with as well, and I appreciate your
comments. Thank you.
Mr. Bair. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Mast, very much.
Now we turn to Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And, again, thank you for having
this hearing.
Mr. Bair, thank you so much for being here and sharing your
report. A number of questions, and I think you have touched on
these but I am going to ask them again. Would you say you are
satisfied that the security issues identified leading up to the
report have been addressed by the Department of State and the
ATA program?
Mr. Bair. Yes. I would say what we have done is we looked
at the foundation for what are the security requirements.
Again, as we were having the conversation about before, that is
fundamentally what is in the contract that the State Department
has signed with the facilities.
Admittedly, those requirements are relatively general, but
they do include things like having the appropriate licenses in
place, whether they be from the ATF or from state or local
officials, and that covers everything from controlling
explosives, guarding ammunition, things like that. As well we
observed not only during our site and surveillance visits that
they have made some additional changes in terms of improving
perimeter security, building additional fences, gates, things
like that. We saw evidence that all of those things had taken
place.
Mr. Schneider. Great. Now, security is not static. It is a
dynamic, constant-changing challenge. Are you comfortable--to
what extent and what reasons would you say you are comfortable
that ATA and our contractors are committed to constantly
reviewing and making the necessary changes to ensure security
is up to the level we expect?
Mr. Bair. Yes. So I would say in our conversations with
both the State Department officials overseeing the program on a
day-to-day basis, as well as the contractors that we visited in
both Virginia and North Carolina, that we are certainly
committed to that.
Having said that, as you acknowledge, we looked at this in
a point in time, and there is going to be need for continued
vigilance to make sure that, you know, any new security threats
would be addressed. Having said that, though, certainly the
media reports did focus everyone's attention not only at the
State Department but on the part of the facilities on the need
to make sure that strong security measures were in place.
Mr. Schneider. Great. Shifting gears a little bit here,
whose responsibility is it to oversee the effectiveness, but
also the return on investment of the ATA program, that we are
actually getting a return on the monies we are investing in
these programs?
Mr. Bair. So, again, as I talked about before, the program
has a unique structure in that the Bureau of Counterterrorism
and Countering Violent Extremism is responsible for policy and
oversight, and they do some of that oversight evaluation piece
that we were talking about before, and the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security really does the implementation.
So I would say this is really a Bureau of Counterterrorism
and Countering Violent Extremism that has that oversight piece.
Mr. Schneider. So, but there is--what I am hearing is kind
of a split between responsibility and authority for the
program. And in that dynamic, who ultimately ends up being
accountable for its effectiveness and making sure we get the
return on the monies we are spending?
Mr. Bair. So I would still say that it is the Bureau of
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. And I will
say, over the course of our job--and we did a similar report
back in 2008 where we identified some challenges for the
coordination between those two bureaus and made
recommendations, which the bureaus have implemented to kind of
solidify and clarify their relationship and what the
responsibilities were for the Bureau. So that is an area where
we have seen improvement, but we think certainly continued
oversight will help that.
Mr. Schneider. And the last question, as we run out of
time, looking forward, you mentioned a report in 2008. We have
a report now in 2017. Is the frequency of review sufficient to
address the challenges, or is this something that we should be
working to review on a more frequent basis?
Mr. Bair. So I will say we at GAO are always happy to do
work for the subcommittee, if you have a continuing interest. I
would add, back to my remarks before, there have been other
evaluations, both State Department OIG completed a report
earlier this summer, but they looked at specifically the
program in Pakistan, and I think they may have other work
ongoing, as well as the independent evaluations that have been
contracted for by the Bureau of Counterterrorism.
There is an ongoing level of oversight. But having said
that, certainly this committee's interest in the issue does
focus the Department's perspective and attention to making sure
that the program is running as effectively and efficiently as
possible.
Mr. Schneider. Great. Thank you again, and I appreciate you
sharing your perspective and your candor. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Bair. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
And now we are so pleased to hear from Mr. Connolly of
Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am not sure
you know that I spent 10 years----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I had heard something about----
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. On the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Yes.
All right. Welcome, Mr. Bair. The--no, let me say, the
original report of GAO had I think 22 recommendations?
Mr. Bair. So if you are referring to the draft report that
we submitted to the agencies for review, it had three
recommendations in it, and our final one has two.
Mr. Connolly. No, that is not what I am referring to.
Mr. Bair. Okay. I am sorry.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Engel and I wrote a letter in November
asking the State Department to implement all of your
recommendations, and that was at the time 22. Seven reqs were
resolved, 15 remained unresolved, and then you added 2 in the
latest report, meaning there are 17 unresolved recommendations
or partially resolved.
Mr. Bair. I think you may be referring to broadly our
recommendations overall to the State Department.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Bair. What we have started as a process for----
Mr. Connolly. Well, is it overall State Department, or is
it Diplomatic Security Bureau?
Mr. Bair. So we have--overall State Department. However,
the vast majority of the recommendations that we have
identified as priorities for the State Department to implement
do relate to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Mr. Bair. And I apologize, my----
Mr. Connolly. No, that is all right.
Mr. Bair. It was about our report here.
Mr. Connolly. Right. Right. We are looking at the whole
thing and trying to actually get them to comply. Is it your
sense that you are getting cooperation?
Mr. Bair. I would say that the State Department has
certainly become more focused on implementing the
recommendations. Historically, I think their implementation
rate of GAO recommendations is slightly under about 80 percent.
We want to--we would love for that to be 100 percent, but I
think they are increasingly focusing on making sure that they
are providing us timely information in response to our
information request, so that we can confirm that they have in
fact taken the steps that we have recommended.
Mr. Connolly. We had a hearing last week on the State
Department reorganization. How is that reorganization affecting
your recommendations and the work you have done in this sphere?
Mr. Bair. So I don't know that I have a broad answer for
you with regard to the work that we are doing----
Mr. Connolly. Narrow is fine.
Mr. Bair [continuing]. On a day-to-day basis. So what we
have--what I can speak to specifically on this report regarding
the Antiterrorism Assistance Program is we are not aware of any
organizational changes, either in the pipeline or being
considered, with regard to this specific program. It certainly
is something that, you know, we want to continue to focus on to
provide you all the information that you need as you continue
to do oversight.
Mr. Connolly. Well, may I be so bold as to recommend that
GAO might want to pay attention to it, because we are not
talking about trivial cuts. If they go forward with the Trump
recommendation, you are talking about a 32-percent cut to the
State Department NAID. That undoubtedly would affect this
Bureau and the personnel necessary to carry out your
recommendations and to make sure there is decent evaluation and
oversight. So I really think it is very relevant to the subject
at hand, and I strongly urge you to look at it.
What is your--I was a little puzzled by the discussion
about people not being properly monitored as they completed the
program and were supposed to leave the country. Is there
evidence that people who were in the program have stayed
illegally in the United States?
Mr. Bair. Yes. So let me clarify a little bit.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Mr. Bair. So, really, what we are talking about probably is
the 20 individuals--the group of 20 individuals that we
identified. All of those individuals did in fact complete their
ATA training domestically between 2012 and 2016. State
Department's policy is to escort them to the airport and to
airport security.
Mr. Connolly. No, I got all of that. What is your concern?
Mr. Bair. Our concern is twofold. First and foremost, if
those people haven't left the country, there is a concern about
what they are doing here.
Mr. Connolly. No, no. Mr. Bair, unfortunately, I have 1
minute and 14 seconds left. That is why I am interrupting you.
Forgive me. Is there evidence that any of those 20 stayed here
illegally?
Mr. Bair. Nineteen of the 20 individuals, according to DHS
records, are likely still in the United Sates.
Mr. Connolly. Ah. Okay. And so we have reason to be
concerned.
Mr. Bair. They have not fulfilled the responsibilities as
when they came in and were admitted to the United States.
Mr. Connolly. Got it. And final question, there has been--
OIG did a report on ATA in Pakistan.
Mr. Bair. Right.
Mr. Connolly. What are the concerns with the program in
Pakistan?
Mr. Bair. So, again, that is a very country-specific focus.
Mr. Connolly. I know, but it is----
Mr. Bair. I was talking about monitoring of the program and
some of the contract elements of that as it related to Pakistan
were really the key focus there. There was also some equipment
that hadn't been used that had been sitting there for a long
time because training wasn't occurring, and that is something
that the IG pointed out that was potentially an opportunity for
efficiency. That equipment could be taken to other places.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. All right. Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
And Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Bair, so let me follow up where Mr. Connolly left off
because funding always becomes an issue, and actually it is a
discussion we had last night as it related to making sure that
there is proper funding.
And yet I guess the GAO continues to find that there is
either expired or unobligated funds in this particular program.
I guess my question to you is, why? I have never found a
Federal agency that can't spend the money other than perhaps
now we have found one. So why is that?
Mr. Bair. Yes. So, first and foremost, State Department
should have an excellent answer for that question. I can relay
to you the answer that we got from them as we probed the----
Mr. Meadows. So I take it from your comment that it wasn't
an excellent answer.
Mr. Bair. I will let you be the judge of whether it is an
excellent answer or not. I can tell you what they told us.
First and foremost----
Mr. Connolly. It might be a Garrison Keillor pretty good
answer. [Laughter.]
Mr. Bair. So first and foremost, the vast majority of the
funds that were unobligated were fiscal year 2016 funds. The
way the appropriations are----
Mr. Meadows. Yes. But prior year's, they expire.
Mr. Bair. Correct. So the expiration of funds is something
that we don't want to occur. We want to focus on getting them
to spend those funds within the time periods that they are
allotted.
Mr. Meadows. So why are they not?
Mr. Bair. So the explanation largely hinged on changes in
the program as it evolved over time. So let's say a training
event is scheduled in Pakistan. If it is near the end of the
fiscal year, and let's say the trainers can't get a visa to
travel, it would have to be bumped to the next fiscal year. And
if it didn't occur in the fiscal year that it needed to, those
funds wouldn't have been used in time.
Mr. Meadows. All right. Well, so I could buy that with 2016
unobligated funds, but, as I mentioned, 2015 funds expired. Is
this not a historical problem with this program?
Mr. Bair. This is something that we certainly have had
concerns about over time, and have provided----
Mr. Meadows. So their answer does not bear out in terms of
what we know historically has happened on this program. So
should we do away with the program, Mr. Bair?
Mr. Bair. So we don't make a judgment about whether the
program should continue.
Mr. Meadows. I do. But go ahead. What is your opinion? I am
asking you your opinion.
Mr. Bair. So it is complicated, as the chair talked about
before. There are aspects of the program that are working very
effectively, and there are many tens of thousands of officials
that have been trained, but we think the program, if it
continues, needs to be operated more effectively from a program
management----
Mr. Meadows. So where does the buck stop? Where at State
does it stop? Who are the people that we ought to have there in
the hot seat instead of you to get better answers where Madam
Chairman can drill down and make sure that we are effective and
efficient with taxpayer dollars?
Mr. Bair. Yes. So the Bureau of Counterterrorism and
Countering Violent Extremism provides policy oversight and
guidance, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security actually
implements the program on the ground.
Mr. Meadows. So both of them is what you are saying?
Mr. Bair. Both of them are----
Mr. Meadows. Who are in those positions right now?
Mr. Bair. I am not familiar with exactly who is in those
positions. As we have talked about, there is a lot of changes
going on at the State Department.
Mr. Meadows. So if you don't know who the--who would know?
Mr. Bair. The State Department should be able to give you
an answer to who is acting in the relevant----
Mr. Meadows. I guess who are you talking to at State--I
mean, obviously, you are not talking to a fictitious person.
Who is your contact at State?
Mr. Bair. Yes. So I am certainly happy to come and brief
you and your staff on the specific individuals that we met
with. They were largely program-level officials. I think the
answers that you are more interested in are----
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Here is what I would ask you get back to
the chairman on, is we need to know the two individuals
responsible for this particular issue at State, get that back
to this subcommittee and the chairman, and then if you will let
them know and take back that we are very concerned with the
inefficient use of taxpayer dollars on a critical mission, and
if it is not clear enough, if you will get back to me
personally, I will be glad to make a personal phone call. Would
you do that, Mr. Bair?
Mr. Bair. I am happy to carry that back, yes.
Mr. Meadows. All right. Thank you.
I will yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Would the gentleman yield for a second?
Mr. Meadows. Sure.
Mr. Deutch. I would ask Mr. Bair if, given the role that
diplomatic security plays here, does it make a difference,
should it make a difference, that the Assistant Secretary of
State for Diplomatic Security is currently--that position is
currently vacant, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Diplomatic Security, and the Director of the Diplomatic
Security Service, that that is also a vacant position?
Mr. Bair. It may make a difference insofar as policy
decisions and who is empowered to make those decisions.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. Because I would--perhaps my friend might
join me in urging that we move forward as quickly as possible
to fill those positions in this vitally critical area, which--
--
Mr. Meadows. I will make----
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Are highlighted by----
Mr. Meadows [continuing]. A bipartisan agreement here. I
will make sure the administration acts quickly on those
appointments, if you make sure your Senate colleagues in the
upper chamber will confirm and due diligence. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. I look forward to working with my friend on
that. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to--and who knows? There might
be more vacancies at the top or topper levels of State today.
Who knows? What is happening?
Thank you so much, Mr. Bair. Thank you to the excellent
team at GAO. We appreciate everything that you have done. We
will follow up with the request of Mr. Meadows--excellent
request--and Mr. Deutch, and we will attempt to get those
answers, as soon as we get those folks there. Thank you.
With that, our subcommittee is adjourned. Muchas gracias.
[Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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