    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 115-55]

                        EVALUATING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                             EQUIPMENT AND UNIFORM

                      PROCUREMENT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 JULY 25, 2017

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                        ______

                              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                      VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman

    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    MATT GAETZ, Florida                  TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
    JIM BANKS, Indiana                   THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming                  JIMMY PANETTA, California
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
                  Elizabeth Conrad, Professional Staff Member
                           Barron YoungSmith, Counsel
                             Anna Waterfield, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman,
      Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations...................     1
    Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations...........     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Farb, Jessica, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
      Government Accountability Office...............................     8
    Roark, Michael J., Assistant Inspector General, Contract
      Management and Payments, Department of Defense Inspector
      General........................................................     6
    Sopko, Hon. John F., Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
      Reconstruction.................................................     4
    Velz, Peter, Director, Afghanistan (Resources and Transition),
      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy; and COL David
      Navratil, Country Director for Iraq, Office of the Under
      Secretary of Defense, Policy...................................    26

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Farb, Jessica................................................    71
        Hartzler, Hon. Vicky.........................................    43
        Moulton, Hon. Seth...........................................    45
        Roark, Michael J.............................................    63
        Sopko, Hon. John F...........................................    48
        Velz, Peter, joint with COL David Navratil...................    84

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [Submitted documents are retained in subcommittee files.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Banks....................................................    93
        Mrs. Hartzler................................................    93

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

                        EVALUATING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

           EQUIPMENT AND UNIFORM PROCUREMENT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                  Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                                Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 25, 2017.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler
    (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
                             INVESTIGATIONS

        Mrs. Hartzler. Good afternoon. This hearing will come to
    order.
        Welcome to our subcommittee members and witnesses
    testifying before us today.
        In connection with today's hearing, I welcome the members
    of the full committee, who are not members of the subcommittee,
    who are or will be attending. I ask unanimous consent that
    these committee members be permitted to participate in this
    hearing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee
    members will be recognized for questions prior to those not
    assigned to the subcommittee.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        One of the objectives of this subcommittee is to bring
    attention to programs or activities which face management
    challenges, are too costly, or could be administered better.
    Given the pressures on the budget of the Department of Defense
    [DOD], every dollar counts. We cannot afford to make avoidable
    mistakes.
        Vigorous oversight can help ensure that mistakes don't
    happen, and when they inevitably do, we learn lessons from
    these missteps. For this reason, I am happy to convene this
    hearing today on several recent reports highlighting
    deficiencies within the Department.
        Last month, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
    Reconstruction [SIGAR] released a report assessing that the
    Department overpaid as much as $28 million on uniforms for the
    Afghan National Army. Furthermore, the pattern selected by the
    Afghan minister of defense may not even be appropriate for
    Afghanistan's environment.
        I understand it is important to listen to and work
    collaboratively with our partner nations when we are helping to
    train and outfit their forces, but I am eager to know
    specifically how to avoid similar missteps in the future. I
    want to know what the Department is doing to ensure that Afghan
    troops are appropriately outfitted at a price that is right for
    the U.S. taxpayer.
        On Friday, the Secretary of Defense sent a very strongly
    worded memorandum to his senior-most deputies. In light of the
    Afghan uniform report, the Secretary directed them to, quote,
    ``bring to light wasteful practices and take aggressive steps
    to end waste in our department,'' end quote.
        This is essential. Other recent reports by the Government
    Accountability Office [GAO] and the Department of Defense
    Inspector General identified issues with the management of
    equipment funded by the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, or ITEF.
        GAO determined that DOD had difficulty tracking and
    accounting for material as it was procured, shipped to the
    theater, and then provided to Iraq security forces. Similarly,
    the Department of Defense's Inspector General has conducted two
    inquiries which determined that the Army had ineffective
    controls for processing, transferring, and securing ITEF
    equipment in Iraq.
        The Department must improve its monitoring and management
    of this equipment to be more accurate and transparent. I
    applaud the Army for already taking steps to do so.
        I look forward to hearing what progress the Department has
    made in continuing to remedy these various deficiencies.
    Vigorous oversight can ensure that hard-earned taxpayer dollars
    are being put to good use in securing our Nation's defense.
        Our first panel will address the findings and
    recommendations of the various reports.
        Our second panel will address how the Department is working
    to overcome the many challenges inherent to executing train and
    equip programs.
        So I now turn to my colleague, Ranking Member Moulton, for
    his introductory remarks.
        [The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in
    the Appendix on page 43.]

         STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
     MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
                             INVESTIGATIONS

        Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        You know, this situation with the Afghan uniforms reminds
    me of when I was in the Kuwait desert with my platoon, and we
    were getting ready to invade Iraq. And a few days before we
    invaded fully anticipating to be hit with chemical weapons, we
    were issued our chemical weapons suits. And we ripped open the
    black plastic packages, we took out green camouflage chemical
    weapon suits to invade Iraq.
        Now, this is back in the ``axis of evil'' days, and so we
    joked that they must be saving the desert ones for Korea. But
    you would think that we would learn from mistakes like that,
    and yet, a few years later, we see this happening again when it
    is completely within our control.
        The uniforms that were issued to the Afghan National Army
    have been deemed inappropriate for 97 percent of Afghanistan.
    At the same time, there were desert pattern uniforms owned by
    the Department of Defense that would have been perfectly
    appropriate.
        In response to this investigation, the House Armed Services
    Committee has acted and included a provision in the fiscal year
    2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that would
    require DOD to perform both cost and requirement analyses
    before awarding any new contract for uniforms in Afghanistan.
        It is designed to ensure this particular mistake never
    happens again, but I want to ensure this oversight body hears
    from you about whether you believe that is the case, whether it
    will work, and whether there is much more we should be doing.
        We need to get to the bottom of what went wrong. I can't
    tell you what I can do with $26 million in my district.
        I would also like to hear your thoughts on what we should
    do now that we have bought these uniforms for the Afghan forces
    and whether or not it makes sense to use additional taxpayer
    funds to buy replacements.
        It is easy to conclude that the Defense Department did not
    subject this decision to sufficient supervision or oversight.
    But it is also important to say that DOD regularly complains
    that Congress imposes onerous reporting requirements and other
    oversight measures that take too much time, require too much
    bureaucracy, and hurt the operational efficiency of our
    military. We don't want to do that, but these are the kinds of
    situations that demand it.
        Therefore, we want to better understand how these decisions
    were made and the broader policy changes you would recommend to
    prevent these outrageous mistakes in the future.
        In the absence of good answers, we will demand stricter
    oversight, and we will get into the weeds. My hope is that we
    can eventually gain the confidence that DOD will prevent the
    massive waste of taxpayer dollars in the future without
    requiring us to impose more bureaucratic oversight on daily
    operations.
        The second set of findings in some ways should concern us
    even more. If we are not adequately tracking and securing the
    weapons and equipment we send to our allies in Iraq or
    Afghanistan, or anywhere else, that endangers the critical
    efforts of the Iraqi security forces to defeat ISIS [Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria] and ensure they are able to stabilize
    the country after combat operations are complete.
        Both of the Department of Defense's own inspector general
    as well as the GAO have concluded that there are serious
    shortcomings remaining in our ability to sufficiently track and
    account for the weapons and other hardware we are providing via
    the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, or ITEF.
        More specifically, the GAO found the Department of Defense
    only maintains, quote, ``limited visibility and accountability
    over equipment funded by ITEF,'' end quote, and that a key
    tracking system is, quote, ``not consistently capturing key
    transportation dates of ITEF equipment.''
        Again, I myself have been responsible for delivering
    ammunition, weapons, and other equipment to the Iraqi security
    forces. My team and I have maintained strict accountability of
    what was delivered and showed up to inspect those deliveries.
    We held our Iraqi leaders, our counterparts, accountable. We
    made them sign for everything, and we followed up with other
    inspections to make sure that they still had the inventory they
    accepted.
        We can do this. We can do it right, and we need to do it,
    and the American taxpayer deserves it, not to mention our
    troops in the field, who certainly don't want to find
    themselves targeted by our own superior weapons and equipment.
        Some progress has been made, but I am eager to hear more
    specifics about how we can ensure that hundreds of millions of
    dollars in weapons and equipment are, indeed, accounted for and
    confirmed as properly delivered where intended.
        I thank you for your oversight work, and I look forward to
    your testimony today.
        And with that, I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Moulton can be found in the
    Appendix on page 45.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Moulton.
        And I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today, and I
    want to thank them for taking time to be with us.
        We have the Honorable John Sopko, the Special Inspector
    General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; Mr. Michael Roark, the
    Assistant Inspector General for the Contract Management and
    Payments directorate at the Department of Defense Inspector
    General, and Ms. Jessica Farb, director on the International
    Affairs and Trade team at the Government Accountability Office.
        So we will now hear your opening statements.
        Mr. Sopko, we will begin with you.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
                       AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

        Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much, Chairman Hartzler, Ranking
    Member Moulton, and members of the subcommittee and committee.
        It is an honor and a pleasure to be here again to discuss
    SIGAR's work in Afghanistan, and in particular, the purchase of
    uniforms for the Afghan National Army [ANA] by the Combined
    Security Transition Command in Afghanistan, commonly referred
    to as CSTC-A, which is responsible for the bulk of the
    training, advising, and assisting of the Afghan security forces
    there.
        CSTC-A, as you alluded to, procured over 1 million ANA
    uniforms with a proprietary pattern without testing its
    effectiveness and costing up to $28 million more than needed.
        As Secretary Mattis recently noted, quote, ``the key
    findings of the SIGAR report is not just that it exposes waste,
    but rather, it serves as an example of a complacent mode of
    thinking.'' He also refers to it as a cavalier attitude toward
    the expenditure of taxpayer funds.
        This $93 million procurement demonstrates what happens when
    people in the government don't follow the rules.
        Now, I would like to highlight 10 specific areas of concern
    for you to consider. First, it appears that CSTC-A only showed
    the Afghan minister of defense proprietary camouflaged patterns
    owned by one company, a Canadian company called HyperStealth.
        Secondly, CSTC-A failed to consider other available
    camouflage patterns, including those owned by the Department of
    Defense, which would have been cheaper and, perhaps, equally
    effective.
        Third, CSTC-A never tested the HyperStealth pattern for its
    effectiveness in Afghanistan.
        CSTC-A never justified the uniform requirements, which made
    those uniforms more costly than those used by other Afghan
    units and paid for by the U.S. taxpayer.
        CSTC-A recommended using a sole source award to
    HyperStealth, even though DOD contracting officers objected.
        CSTC-A got around those objections by using a de facto sole
    source process, which required whomever won the prime contract
    to use the HyperStealth pattern.
        CSTC-A also mysteriously alerted HyperStealth to, quote,
    unquote, ``wait by the phone'' for a call from the Atlantic
    Dive Supply Company, also known as ADS, who ultimately
    purchased the exclusive license for their camouflage pattern in
    Afghanistan.
        Now, Federal regulations dictate that brand name
    acquisitions like this require market research and require a
    justification. CSTC-A did neither.
        In addition, we found that CSTC-A was unable to determine
    the total amount of direct assistance spent on procuring ANA
    uniforms, nor the amount of uniforms actually purchased, due to
    poor oversight and poor recordkeeping.
        And lastly, an area of concern is that we uncovered that
    the Afghans did not adhere to the Berry Amendment, which
    requires the purchase of only U.S. textiles when procuring ANA
    uniforms of direct assistance.
        Instead, the Afghans used U.S. taxpayer dollars to purchase
    inferior Chinese textiles for their uniforms.
        Now, these problems, Madam Chairman, are serious. They are
    so serious that we started a criminal investigation related to
    the procurement of the ANA uniforms. But I must say, as a
    result of our work and as a result of conversations we have had
    with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy about
    other issues, that I want to announce today that we believe it
    is prudent to review all of CSTC-A's contracts related to the
    procurement of organizational clothing and individual equipment
    in Afghanistan.
        We are pleased that OSD Policy concurred with the report's
    recommendations, because if unmodified, this procurement, if it
    continues, would needlessly cause the taxpayer an additional
    $72 million over the next 10 years.
        I would also like to thank my colleagues in OSD Policy for
    identifying some contracts they believe ripe for oversight.
        I would also like to thank this committee and the committee
    members who recently voted for that amendment mandating a
    review of the cost-benefit analysis of this contract.
        I would also like to encourage the subcommittee to ensure
    DOD conducts proper oversight that addresses the broader
    problems that SIGAR identifies in its work.
        As we all know, oversight is mission critical, and we
    cannot afford to wait until we waste millions of dollars to try
    to fix it.
        Finally, I would like to thank Secretary Mattis for his
    support and leadership as shown by his recent memo to senior
    DOD officials supporting SIGAR's findings and reiterating the
    need to, quote, ``take aggressive action to end waste in the
    Department of Defense.''
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify, and I
    am happy to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sopko can be found in the
    Appendix on page 48.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Roark.

      STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. ROARK, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL,
        CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND PAYMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                           INSPECTOR GENERAL

        Mr. Roark. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    discuss our two audits on Iraq Train and Equip Fund equipment.
        We initiated these two audits in 2016 based on concerns
    identified during previous audits in Kuwait for Operation
    Inherent Resolve and a request from the Army's 1st Theater
    Sustainment Command, or 1st TSC, to review its policies and
    procedures for the ITEF mission.
        Our first audit focused on whether the Army had effective
    controls for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the
    Government of Iraq, or GOI. And our second audit focused on the
    procedures for securing ITEF equipment, including weapons, in
    Kuwait and Iraq.
        Congress created ITEF in 2014 to assist the GOI to combat
    the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria by providing assistance for
    training and equipment, logistic support, and supplies and
    services. Examples of ITEF equipment include body armor,
    weapons, and cargo trucks.
        Army regulations require maintaining visibility and
    accountability, securing, and conducting inventories of
    equipment. The Army's 1st TSC has primary responsibility for
    maintaining visibility and property accountability of ITEF
    equipment transferred to Iraq.
        ITEF equipment is typically staged in Kuwait and then
    shipped to multiple transfer sites in Iraq.
        Our first audit found that the 1st TSC did not have
    complete visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment prior
    to transfer to the Iraqis because the command did not use
    automated systems to keep track of that equipment.
        Specifically, we found two problems with accountability.
    First, the 1st TSC could not provide complete data for the
    quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including
    vehicles and ammunition.
        Instead, the 1st TSC relied on multiple spreadsheets
    developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to
    provide visibility and accountability. When we requested the
    quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand and that had
    been transferred to the GOI, the 1st TSC had to contact various
    officials and manually calculate the data based on multiple
    spreadsheets and systems and even after that, their response
    was still incomplete.
        Mr. Suozzi. I am sorry, Mr. Roark. Could you just tell us
    what a TSC is, please?
        Mr. Roark. The 1st Theater Sustainment Command is the Army
    command in Kuwait that is responsible for keeping track of the
    equipment.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you.
        Mr. Roark. Second, the 1st TSC did not consistently account
    for equipment in Iraq. In some cases, they did not enter the
    property into property records when it initially arrived in
    country, or they sent it to Iraq and considered that it was
    already transferred to the Iraqis, although it could still be
    under U.S. control.
        As a result, the 1st TSC did not have accurate up-to-date
    records on the quantity and dollar value of Iraq equipment that
    we valued at over $1 billion.
        As a result of our audit, the 1st TSC developed a shared
    spreadsheet for all commands to use to keep track of ITEF
    equipment, and then in the long term, they initiated steps to
    use automated systems by late 2016.
        Our second audit focused on inventory and security
    procedures for ITEF weapons. As of October 2016, there were
    over 11,000 ITEF weapons valued at $17.7 million in Kuwait and
    over 2,900 ITEF weapons valued at $2.3 million at the one
    transfer site in Iraq that we visited.
        Examples of these weapons included M-16 rifles, M-14 sniper
    rifles, and 12-gauge shotguns. We found that the Army did not
    have effective procedures for conducting inventories and
    securing ITEF weapons in both Kuwait and Iraq.
        In Kuwait, we identified three main security problems.
    First, the Army did not consistently conduct inventories of
    weapons. Second, and most concerning, ITEF weapons were stored
    in cardboard boxes, some of which had holes in them or had
    partially collapsed. Weapons were also stored in wooden crates
    that were not banded or locked. As a result, we were able to
    open numerous boxes and expose their contents.
        Third, we observed Syrian equipment managed by Army
    contractors that were stored right alongside ITEF equipment
    with no physical barrier separating the two. In response to our
    audit, the Army established inventory and security procedures
    for the Kuwait warehouse and then reorganized the warehouse to
    separate the ITEF and Syrian equipment.
        In Iraq, we found that the Army did not effectively secure
    ITEF weapons at the site we visited in accordance with Army
    regulations. Specifically, incoming weapons were stored at a
    storage yard that had a perimeter fence with multiple holes in
    it large enough to grant unauthorized access.
        As a result of our audit, the command repaired the fence
    and then later moved the equipment to a secured location.
        During the audits, the Army commands that we dealt with
    were very receptive to our recommendations and initiated steps
    to implement corrective actions. These two audits continued our
    longstanding practice of informing commands in a contingency
    environment of our observations during the audit to allow them
    to make real-time corrective actions rather than waiting for a
    final report to be issued months later.
        This concludes my statement, and I am prepared to answer
    any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Roark can be found in the
    Appendix on page 63.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
        Ms. Farb.

    STATEMENT OF JESSICA FARB, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND
                TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Farb. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and
    members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
    discuss our May 2017 report on DOD's accountability for
    equipment provided through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, or
    ITEF.
        Congress created ITEF to provide equipment and other
    assistance to Iraq security forces to counter the expansion of
    ISIS. As of December 2016, DOD had disbursed about $2 billion
    of the $2.3 billion Congress appropriated to ITEF in fiscal
    years 2015 and 2016. These funds purchased personal protective
    equipment, weapons, and vehicles for these forces, among other
    things.
        We found that DOD does not collect timely and accurate
    information on the status of equipment purchased through the
    fund. As a result, DOD cannot demonstrate that this equipment
    reached intended destinations in Iraq.
        Specifically, DOD does not ensure that SCIP, the Security
    Cooperation Information Portal, consistently captures key
    transportation dates of ITEF-funded equipment. SCIP is designed
    to provide end-to-end visibility over equipment that DOD
    provides to foreign governments. For Iraq, SCIP is intended to
    provide visibility over equipment as it moves through three
    phases: acquisition and shipment, staging in Kuwait and Iraq,
    and transfer to the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan
    Regional Government.
        We found that SCIP captured some of the key transportation
    dates for orders of equipment during the acquisition and
    shipping phases; however, SCIP captured none of the
    transportation dates for these orders during the staging and
    transfer phases.
        DOD officials attributed this to three potential
    interoperability and data reporting issues in SCIP. First, SCIP
    may not be importing key dates correctly from other DOD data
    systems. Second, SCIP's management report system may not be
    importing key dates from within SCIP itself. And third, DOD
    component staff may not be reporting key dates in SCIP. In some
    instances, staff are not required to do so, while in others
    staff reported difficulty recording these dates in SCIP due to
    the lack of clear procedures in a designated data field.
        In addition to issues with reporting in SCIP, we also found
    that DOD cannot fully account for ITEF funded equipment
    transferred to the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional
    Government due to missing or incomplete documentation.
        Most of DOD's transfer documentation lack case identifier
    information, which is key to tracking equipment throughout each
    phase of the process.
        Although DOD issued a verbal order requiring the use of
    case identifiers, this was not incorporated into standard
    operating procedures for ensuring accountability.
        We made four recommendations in our report. First, we
    recommended that DOD develop written procedures that specify
    the data field to be used to capture equipment transfer dates
    in SCIP. Second, we recommended that the Department develop
    written procedures for including case identifiers in the
    transfer documentation.
        Third, we recommended that DOD should identify the root
    causes of the problems, such as interoperability and data
    reporting issues within SCIP and other data systems. And
    fourth, we recommended that the Department should develop an
    action plan with milestones and timeframes to address the root
    causes that they identify.
        DOD has already taken some steps to begin to address these
    recommendations. With respect to the first two recommendations,
    the Department just this month provided us with updated
    procedures, and we are in the process of evaluating whether
    they fully address GAO's recommendations.
        In response to our third and fourth recommendations, the
    Department said that it has begun identifying the root causes
    of the data reporting issues in SCIP and will develop an action
    plan and timeframe for addressing them.
        In addition, DOD has requested GAO's assistance to ensure
    that the issues we identified are appropriately resolved.
        We have recently started new work that will examine the
    disposition of ITEF-funded equipment after it has been
    transferred to the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional
    Government. As we conduct this important analysis, we will
    continue to follow up on DOD's efforts to improve its
    accountability and visibility over ITEF-funded equipment.
        Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of
    the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
    be pleased to answer any questions you may have at this time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Farb can be found in the
    Appendix on page 71.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much. Very good work on all
    your behalf. I appreciate you looking into this very important
    issue of making sure our tax dollars are spent wisely and the
    equipment gets in the hands of those who really need it.
        I want to start with you, Mr. Sopko. So you address some
    new things. First of all, you provided all of us with some
    pictures here. I just wanted to, for the record and for the
    audience, make sure that they see what we are seeing here as a
    committee. That up here on the left is the pattern that was
    chosen that is proprietary, and the one on the right is the
    woodland battle dress uniform that goes to the Afghan special
    forces that I believe you said is not proprietary. And all of
    these patterns down below are owned by the U.S. Department of
    Defense and wouldn't have cost the additional money.
        [The pictures referred to are retained in the subcommittee
    files and can be viewed upon request.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Can you kind of walk through how you think--
    how this happened that we end up having this pattern here that
    looks like a forest, and that is what the Afghanistan security
    forces chose or wanted, but yet, we had these down here that
    were available at a much more economical cost that have--looked
    more like a sand environment and desert.
        So can you kind of walk us through the different patterns
    and how we came to have this in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Sopko. Thank you. And I am happy to do that, Madam
    Chairman.
        You are absolutely correct. This is the proprietary
    pattern. And what that basically means is that somebody owned
    that pattern, and the government has to pay a licensing fee for
    using it.
        The woodland pattern over here that you pointed out, that I
    don't think--that is a nonproprietary pattern, so we didn't
    have to pay for it.
        You asked the question, how did this happen? Well, that is
    part of our investigation. But it is pretty clear from our
    discussion with the CSTC-A officials in reviewing the files,
    the reason it happened is that the minister of defense,
    Minister Wardak, never saw the DOD-owned patterns down below.
    He was basically shown only patterns owned by one company, the
    Canadian company that I mentioned previously.
        So that is why--I mean, this kind of reminds me of an old
    joke about buying a Model T. Henry Ford can say, you can get
    any car you want, as long as it is black. Well, basically, we
    gave--the only options we gave the minister of defense was the
    proprietary patterns. We never showed him this.
        The bigger problem is, no one ever did an assessment as to
    what kind of camouflage is best in Afghanistan. And we talked
    to people who do that for a living. We talked to the military
    who do that for a living up in Massachusetts, and they said
    that is what you should do. You should look at the environment.
    And as a matter of fact, some of our military have two
    different uniforms, one for the desert and one for that small
    area where there is greenery. But that option was never
    provided.
        Basically, what we were told by CSTC-A, and we are
    researching this right now, is the minister of defense liked
    this color, so he picked it.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Now, some of the information I had read
    prior to this hearing said that one of the reasons that he
    chose that is he wanted it to be unique. He wanted it to be
    different than, perhaps, what U.S. might be wearing or others
    to identify them. So maybe he had that rationale.
        But I wanted to clarify, so if the U.S. Department of
    Defense owns these patterns down here, are they currently in
    use by our forces?
        Mr. Sopko. No, they are not. And they are not used--and no
    one is using them in Afghanistan. We have patterns that look
    like it, but not exactly the same. So if he wanted a unique
    pattern, he could have picked one of these if he had been
    shown. Some are green and some are brown or whatever color it
    is, but he could have picked those and wouldn't have cost the
    government anything extra.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Now, you mentioned--thank you.
        You mentioned that we need to get to the bottom of this or
    that in the future we could have $72 million additional money
    that was already spent. Can you clarify? What are you referring
    to there?
        Mr. Sopko. We are locked into providing the Afghans with
    uniforms. Every new soldier, Afghan soldier, gets four new
    uniforms when he starts, and they get replaced on a regular
    basis. And the way it is now, the only pattern we can buy is
    the pattern owned by the license--the company that owns the
    license. So we are locked into that. If we don't change this,
    we are going to pay extra, not just for the proprietary
    pattern, but the second part is they decided to have a more
    expensive uniform, a fancier uniform, more like the Americans,
    so it has zippers and a bunch of other things, they looked more
    fashionable, but no assessment was done why you needed that
    uniform for the Afghans.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Do you know how long the contract is
    currently?
        Mr. Sopko. I don't have that information right now. I can
    get that for you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 93.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. Well, I appreciate you
    looking at that.
        I wanted to ask the other witnesses regarding the ITEF
    issues that you raised. Is it concerning to you that it took
    three separate reports before the Department of Defense, you
    know, started agreeing to some of these changes, or would you
    say that they have been doing the needed changes and following
    your recommendations from day one?
        Mr. Roark. Well, for our two reports, I think it is
    important to remember that the command--the Army commands that
    we are discussing here today, in Kuwait and Iraq, asked us to
    come in and take a look at their procedures. So, you know, in
    late 2014, Congress created ITEF, and so then in 2015, we were
    starting to procure equipment and so forth.
        And so in 2016 when we did these two audits, they said,
    hey, I am adopting this new mission, can you come in and take a
    look at, as an independent party, how we are doing and, you
    know, make recommendations for how we could improve. And so we
    did that, and we thought the commands were very receptive to
    our feedback and did take corrective actions in a timely
    manner.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Great.
        Ms. Farb. My response would be similar. They have been
    working with us. They asked for our assistance in helping us to
    implement the recommendations. They actually also asked for
    underlying data to help identify the particular problems we
    were pointing out within the data system that they provided.
        GAO's previously done work on the standard operating
    procedures issues throughout the theaters that we have been in,
    and we have seen in the past that they have, you know, been
    very receptive to our recommendations. And so we look forward
    to our future work in terms of looking at this.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Ranking Member Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        So, Mr. Inspector General, you mentioned that you are
    opening a criminal investigation into this incident. I mean, it
    certainly seems to me like a place where we might not just find
    a mistake but fraud or other improprieties.
        What more should we be doing on this subcommittee to get to
    the bottom of what went on here?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, I would suggest that hearings such as this
    are important, bringing the spotlight of oversight is
    important.
        I would suggest, and I had the good fortune to work for Sam
    Nunn as well as for John Dingell on the famous or infamous
    ``Dingell-grams'' that went out. I wrote quite a few for
    Chairman Dingell. I think a ``Hartzler-gram'' should get known
    around the Department of Defense in which hard, tough questions
    are asked, and we are happy to help you in addressing those
    questions.
        But one question you could ask, and I think the full
    committee should ask, is how many people identified by my
    office, by the DOD office, or by GAO have actually lost their
    jobs because of wasting taxpayers' dollars? Send that letter to
    the Department of Defense. And while you are at it, send one or
    have somebody send one to USAID [United States Agency for
    International Development] or DOD and the Department of State.
        I bet you no one. We identify these problems, no one is
    held accountable. We make the recommendations, and they sound
    really good, and you could get great procedures. Everything we
    identified were in the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation].
    They totally ignored it. No one is being held accountable.
        Mr. Moulton. Mr. Roark, can you comment on that? Has anyone
    been held accountable for this gross error, this gross
    negligence?
        Mr. Roark. Well, we have been working on audits in
    Southwest Asia, in both Iraq and Afghanistan and in supporting
    countries like Kuwait, for many years, and each time we write a
    report or do an audit, we do think about does this--do the
    circumstances here meet the need for an accountability
    recommendation to hold someone accountable?
        But in the end, as IGs [inspectors general], we can make a
    suggestion or recommendation to the command, but we--it is up
    to the commands to take action on whether or not to hold
    someone accountable. So there are pretty frequently,
    recommendations in DOD----
        Mr. Moulton. I understand that. But do you know in this
    instance, has anyone been held accountable?
        Mr. Roark. In this instance, I am not aware of any.
        Mr. Moulton. Mr. Sopko, to go back to you, are there any
    specific witnesses or other folks that you think we should call
    before this committee to help get to the bottom of what is
    going on here?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, I would ask that you don't call any other
    witnesses until we get to the bottom of the criminality. But
    there are some, probably, some of the contractors, some of the
    contracting officers. But I am happy to sit down and discuss
    names of people privately.
        But, again, we are opening up an investigation. It is just
    in the beginning stage. So we can work with the committee if
    you want to talk about people, but I would defer, at least on
    this case--but we have many other cases that we have closed. We
    are happy to give you the names and locations of people who--
    remember, I have no subpoena authority over an individual. I
    cannot compel testimony. Okay? And I----
        Mr. Moulton. We will take you up on that offer.
        Mr. Sopko. Thank you.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much.
        Now, stepping back from this specific instance, can you
    comment on some of your observations--you have been doing this
    job for a long time, on the broader circumstances that lead to
    these situations?
        The Armed Services Committee of the House of
    Representatives should not have to pass a specific provision in
    our law to detail the supervision of the purchasing of uniforms
    for the Afghan National Army. I mean, at a certain level, that
    is absurd.
        We ought to just have an environment where these
    deficiencies, these mistakes, are caught, where proper
    supervision exists from the beginning so that gross--this gross
    waste of taxpayer dollars simply never occurs.
        So can you comment on those broader--the broader situation
    here?
        Mr. Sopko. You know, the questions you are asking are the
    type of questions I would love to discuss in more detail. And I
    think we could have a broader hearing just about how to fix the
    government.
        I have been looking at in this job----
        Mr. Moulton. I am not trying to fix the whole government.
        Mr. Sopko. Well, at least my little world for the last 6
    years. And then I have 25 years on the Hill doing oversight,
    and I know the frustration you feel.
        But based upon my experience in Afghanistan, I think a
    couple of things are very clear. Number one, there is no
    accountability. People are not being held accountable for
    wasting money.
        We occasionally indict people, but we only indict the slow
    and the lame. I mean, basically, that is about all we are
    getting. So people are not held accountable.
        We have a disincentive for good government. And I don't
    want to imply, first of all, that the people we send to
    Afghanistan are either very stupid or very venal. They are some
    of the best, bravest people in the world. But we have given our
    procurement people, our ambassadors, our generals a box of
    broken tools, the same broken tools that you see in the press
    with the VA [Department of Veterans Affairs], with the
    Department of Energy, Department of Commerce, HHS [Department
    of Health and Human Services], you name it.
        Procurement is broken. HR [human resources] is broken. Our
    rotation, we have what we call in Afghanistan the annual
    lobotomy. Every year we change everybody out. I think I have
    gone through 8 or 10 commanders of CSTC-A in the 5\1/2\ years
    that I have been there, 8 or 10.
        Mr. Moulton. How many times was General Eisenhower replaced
    due to an annual rotation requirement?
        Mr. Sopko. Zero. He was there the whole length of duration.
        I know we could also talk about Vietnam, while it may not
    be the best analogy. But what I am saying is--and I don't want
    to be hated by every spouse of every senior military officer,
    but the problem is this annual rotation. And in some areas, it
    is even shorter. There are FBI [Federal Bureau of
    Investigation] agents, there are Commerce officials, there are
    people there for just months at a time. They don't even know
    where the latrine is by the time they leave. So they are never
    ever held accountable for the screwups, because they are not
    around when the screwup is discovered by us, because we usually
    don't get there.
        DOD IG [Department of Defense Inspector General] and GAO
    and my office is really good. But by the time we get there, it
    is like the detective show you've seen on TV. If we are lucky,
    there is a chalk outline of the body. But usually, it is 7
    years old. Remember, this contract is 7 to 10 years. It is
    ongoing, but the problem started back then. So there has to be
    something done to fix our personnel system. There has to be
    something done to fix our procurement system. We have to stop
    this disincentive of spend money.
        I don't know how many contracting officers have told me, I
    get rewarded at the end of the year on how much money I put on
    contract, not on whether the contract is good or not.
        We have to change that system, and I would highly recommend
    take a look at the HR system in the Defense Department, take a
    look at the procurement system, take a look at the incentives
    that you are allowing to occur, which create this problem.
        And that may be the first place and the best place to look.
    Look at the personnel system and look at the incentives.
        Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you very much. Madam Chairwoman.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Mr. Gaetz.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        It appears as though we bought uniforms that didn't work
    and paid about $28 million more than we should have to do so.
        One of the reasons why that is so frustrating to all of us
    here on this panel is that we are the ones, Republicans and
    Democrats, who work hard every day to convince our colleagues
    that we need the resources in the Department of Defense to
    effectively protect the warfighter and military families.
    Circumstances like this undermine our bipartisan efforts to
    support warfighters and their families.
        This appears to be either an event of stupidity or
    corruption. What is your assessment as to which of the two we
    are facing?
        Mr. Sopko. I don't mean to dodge the question. That is why
    we are doing the investigation right now. It is either venality
    or it is stupidity, or it is, like I say, it is a system that
    was set up where the person who was working this contract was
    rewarded by getting the contract out.
        Mr. Gaetz. Is there any evidence that these proprietary
    uniforms have greater capability than the nonproprietary
    patterns?
        Mr. Sopko. We didn't look at that. I mean, we are not
    assessing whether the proprietary uniform is better or the
    camouflage pattern is better or not better. We are just saying
    that there were proprietary uniforms; there are also
    nonproprietary.
        Mr. Gaetz. What is our current working theory as to why the
    customer was only shown the proprietary product of one Canadian
    company?
        Mr. Sopko. We don't know. That is why we are doing the
    investigation.
        Mr. Gaetz. And we have no mechanism to determine whether or
    not that is stupidity or corruption at this time?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, we hope after the end of the criminal
    investigation we will find that out, but that is what we are in
    the process of doing right now, sir.
        Mr. Gaetz. What is your expectation on the timeline there?
        Mr. Sopko. That is frustrating for me, as for everyone
    else. It takes a long time. One of the problems is, I don't
    have subpoena authority to compel somebody to talk to my
    agents. They can slam the door in their face.
        Mr. Gaetz. Is there any person that you wish you could
    subpoena now that you can't?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, I can't subpoena anyone.
        Mr. Gaetz. Right. Who would be the first three people you
    would subpoena if you had that power?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, I don't want to name names, because I
    think that is sending the wrong message to the people we are
    investigating.
        Mr. Gaetz. I disagree. I think it sends exactly the right
    message. I mean, our committee has the subpoena power. So if
    the challenge is we have no timeframe, we have no mechanism to
    find out whether people were stupid or corrupt, we have
    subpoena power in the Congress, you don't, it seems as though a
    partnership here would be beneficial.
        Mr. Sopko. Well, I am happy to discuss names privately,
    sir, at any time with the chairman, or ranking member, or you.
        Mr. Gaetz. Well, Mr. Roark, you indicated that your office
    has made accountability recommendations. Did those
    accountability recommendations name names?
        Mr. Roark. We used the position title of the person, that
    is usually how we do it.
        Mr. Gaetz. And would you be willing to provide those
    accountability recommendations to the subcommittee so that we
    might be able to see who the individuals are that you seem to
    believe ought to be held accountable?
        Mr. Roark. We can. Now, just for a clarification, the
    accountability recommendations that I have issued in the past
    are on that body of audits that I have done over time not on
    this particular audit--these two audits we are discussing
    today.
        Mr. Gaetz. Mr. Roark, I believe you gave testimony about
    weapons that were not properly guarded. In that particular
    circumstance, was there an accountability recommendation that
    came from your office?
        Mr. Roark. Sir, for the weapons storage issue, we made
    recommendations in real time to the command, and oftentimes
    they fix that right away.
        In Iraq, I am thinking of the example where they used the
    storage lot that had holes in the fence. And, really, they
    were--that was the only yard that they were given, the only one
    that was available, and then they--I think the reluctance to
    fix that at the time was that they knew they were moving to a
    more secure location down the road. And so we kind of expedited
    that by recommending that they fix the fence no matter whether
    it was just for a short time or not, just because of the
    security risk there.
        Mr. Gaetz. And so in that instance, was there an
    accountability recommendation tied to a specific individual?
        Mr. Roark. No, we did not make an accountability
    recommendation for that instance. We just basically talked with
    the command and made recommendations with them and then wrote
    about that in our report, and they fixed the problem in real
    time, so.
        Mr. Gaetz. And I will go back to Mr. Sopko for my final
    question.
        Will you--can you illuminate this committee as to any
    evidence of improper influence that this particular Canadian
    company may have had within our Department of Defense as it
    related to the sweetheart circumstances that led to their
    products being the only products shown to the customer?
        Mr. Sopko. At this stage, I can't. We haven't developed it
    that much.
        Mr. Gaetz. I yield back.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Mr. O'Halleran.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I am new at this. And I am sitting here in amazement, and
    we have just approved a tremendous amount of money within this
    body here to go out and fund new weapons, new uniforms, new
    personnel, and yet, we have a system before me that sounds like
    it is systemic in its problems with audits.
        Now, I know the Secretary, when we were listening to him at
    the beginning of the year, made it clear that he understands
    that there is a problem within the system. But I can't believe
    that we haven't known that there is a problem within the system
    for a number of years.
        And so I am--and I am confused by the fact that there is a
    trail of letters to a commander, Mr. Roark mentioned it. And is
    there--is that commander required to send back to you the
    information--the reason why they rejected what you wanted to
    have done or recommendations?
        Mr. Roark. So in these cases the commanders did not reject
    our recommendations. They adopted them and agreed with them.
    But I think the process you are discussing is follow-ups. So we
    will make a recommendation and then the command will either--
    you know, either agree or disagree with it. In this case, they
    agreed and took action.
        However, we don't take their word for it. We either visit
    ourselves to do follow-up and make sure it was done, or we
    request documentation and photos to prove that it was done so
    that we can close out that recommendation.
        Mr. O'Halleran. I was mentioning before about the stupid or
    corrupt. And I just, sitting here, feel that is going to happen
    in any system. But what can't happen in any system is that the
    system is broken, and that the system is at play here. If you
    don't have enough auditing power, then let us know. But if we
    are at a level here where the taxpayer's money is being spent
    without any accountability or limited accountability, then we
    have a real problem.
        So my question is, to what extent does the current
    organizational structure help to--help the Department's ability
    to ensure accountability for the program?
        Mr. Sopko. Any witness? I didn't----
        Mr. O'Halleran. Any witness.
        Mr. Sopko. You know, I may defer to my colleague from DOD.
    I don't think the way the system is currently created helps
    accountability in the DOD, State, AID, or anywhere. I hate to
    say that. I don't--I am usually not invited to parties like
    this, because I always am the--like the crazy uncle; you don't
    want him at the wedding.
        But it is broken. I hate to say it. The system is broken on
    accountability, because we are not holding people accountable.
    Because by the time we get out there, the money has been spent,
    and the person who was involved is either retired or long gone.
    Because there is a 2-year or shorter appropriation cycle, and
    everyone's got the incentive to spend money.
        It is--we have got to get ahold of how the government is
    working. It is not working quite well or as well as we would
    like to see it work.
        Mr. O'Halleran. So how many times have you requested that
    the system be changed in written form or verbally or to people
    up the ladder?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, I am like a broken record in the last--
    this current job. Every time when I have been asked to testify,
    and I think some of you have heard me testify before, I have
    talked about that, that what we need to fix is not Afghanistan
    or how we do in Afghanistan. We need to fix it back here.
        Mr. O'Halleran. That was my--that was what I thought needed
    to be done, that this is just a systemic problem throughout the
    process. But I would like to know, any one of you, the three of
    you, how you have worked to change it and so we can identify
    how many times within this group that there has been a request
    to change it, and it hasn't been changed?
        Mr. Sopko. I don't know if I should hog the answer, but
    this is also one of the problems. I am the Inspector General
    for Afghanistan Reconstruction. I have no jurisdiction over OPM
    [Office of Personnel Management]. I have no jurisdiction over
    the internal procurement at DOD, although the GAO has had
    defense procurement on a high-risk list since 1991.
        I mean, that is kind of telling you we have a problem with
    DOD procurement. But I have no jurisdiction. That is also part
    of the problem. Every one of the IGs are limited.
        Now, I have jurisdiction over any money spent on
    reconstruction in Afghanistan. And I am unique of any IG, but
    usually, we are stovepiped, and I think that is the problem
    here.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Mr. Banks.
        Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. There is so much to
    cover, and yet I only have 5 minutes.
        But, Mr. Sopko, thank you for what you do. I think I told
    you before, when I was in theater, Sopko was a four-letter
    word. But on behalf of the American taxpayer, I sure appreciate
    what you do in exposing situations like these.
        To begin with, on the note of uniforms, as I understand it
    there would have been a memorandum of request [MOR] that was
    signed by the commander of CSTC-A, the comptroller of CSTC-A,
    and others that would have authorized the purchase of the
    uniforms. But in your testimony, you talk about pattern of
    issues between November of 2008 and January of 2017. Would that
    imply that there were numerous memorandums of requests, or was
    there a single MOR that was involved in this procurement?
        Mr. Sopko. I don't think we have found those records at
    all. Let me ask my colleague.
        We don't have them, and CSTC-A doesn't have those records.
        Mr. Banks. But would it be safe to assume that there were a
    number of issues--I mean, in your testimony, between November
    of 2008 and January of 2017, a pattern of issues resulted in
    what you have exposed, therefore, there were, as you said,
    numerous commanders of CSTC-A that would have been involved in
    these, in a pattern of issues throughout those years rather
    than a single accountable commander at the beginning--at the
    outset of the procurement?
        Mr. Sopko. You are correct, but we have found no
    justification for lack of competition, no----
        Mrs. Hartzler. Could you put your microphone on, please.
        Mr. Sopko. Oh, I am sorry.
        We have found no records in CSTC-A dealing with the one
    source, the use of the brand name, the acquisition planning,
    market research, or describing agency needs. So none of those
    have been signed.
        And I know where you are getting to. When you do a sole
    source over a certain amount, it has to go up the chain. We
    found nothing.
        Mr. Banks. Okay. But, again, I want to emphasize. I want to
    move on to something else very quickly. In your testimony you
    said between November of 2008 and January 2017, DOD spent
    approximately $93.8 million to procure X number of uniforms, et
    cetera. That means a pattern of issues in almost a 10-year span
    period, which would lead me to believe rather than stupidity or
    corruption, as one of my colleagues mentioned, that this is the
    result of a broken system at the end of the day that needs
    fixed rather than making accusations about stupidity or
    corruption.
        Mr. Sopko. We don't know until we do the investigation.
        Mr. Banks. Fair enough. Moving beyond uniforms. I have with
    me a copy of your 2012 report regarding end-use monitoring
    findings for vehicles provided to ANDSF [Afghanistan National
    Defense and Security Forces].
        Your data at the time described a total shipment of 30,761
    vehicles shipped to ANDSF through 2010, and based on my own
    experience in theater as recently as 2015, I know that we far
    surpassed that number in 2017. However, while your report from
    2012 was generally positive, I am concerned about the struggles
    that I witnessed in terms of effective EUM, or end-use
    monitoring, of vehicles in theater, and the ultimate lack of
    accountability when it comes to the resources purchased by the
    American taxpayer.
        So given our current troop levels, I am concerned about our
    ability to track the equipment that we are providing to our
    Afghan partners, whether weapons and ammunition, or uniforms,
    or vehicles, et cetera.
        Can you describe for us the current environment in
    Afghanistan when it comes to maintaining accountability of
    resources provided to ANDSF? And since I have only got a minute
    and less than 20 seconds, can you also describe with a new
    ambassador chosen in Afghanistan, your ability to get out
    around the country and do the important work that you do,
    whether or not there are any limitations on your ability to do
    that with the current leadership at the embassy?
        Mr. Sopko. Real quickly, we would have to get back to you
    on what the state is on the equipment. I don't have the data.
    As for ability----
        Mrs. Hartzler. Mic, please.
        Mr. Sopko. Sorry.
        I would have to get back to you on the equipment. We have
    done a number of audits, but I don't have that data in front of
    me as to what the status is, and we are happy to get back to
    you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 93.]
        Mr. Sopko. As to our ability to get around, we have had
    problems. Over the last year, we have seen a greater reluctance
    to get out.
        Now, the security situation has deteriorated, we understand
    that. But that is a serious problem. Even when we have U.S.
    military guardian angels protecting us, and even on my last
    trip, General Nicholson wanted me to visit a site that the U.S.
    military normally goes to, and we have an MOU [memorandum of
    understanding] with the Department of Defense to get us out
    there, the ambassador refused to allow me or my staff to go
    there. So that is problematic.
        There was no objection for security reasons. It was just an
    objection--and, again, the explanation I got was, I am chief of
    mission, and I am the one who is accountable, and I am not
    going to let you go.
        Now, I was surrounded by a lot of guys in green uniforms
    and there are green uniforms, not the Afghans, who had a lot of
    high-powered weapons, and I felt very secure. I have always
    felt secure. My staff has always felt very secure being
    protected by the U.S. military. But for some reason, the acting
    ambassador has abrogated our MOU with the Department of Defense
    and basically installed his restrictions on that.
        That is a problem. If that continues, we will not have a
    whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan. We will have a
    hole in our government approach to Afghanistan. And what that
    means is no matter how many troops you give, it is not going to
    get an answer.
        I think I am speaking too long.
        Mr. Banks. Thank you.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Suozzi.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you.
        First of all, thank you very much for your testimony and
    for your good work you have done in this instance.
        My background, I am new to Congress. I am a freshman, but
    my background is as a certified public accountant and an
    attorney. I was the mayor of a small city and a county
    executive of a very large county with a $2.8 billion budget.
        We have heard it our entire lives, everybody in this room,
    about the $500 hammer. We hear about waste, fraud, and abuse
    that takes place in huge government enterprises and, certainly,
    in the DOD. And more recently, people have come to talk to me
    about corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan from the Iraq and
    Afghani side.
        These issues that you are bringing up, I agree with
    Congressman Banks, you know, this is a systemic problem that
    exists that we need to address.
        I am very attracted to the idea when you suggested earlier
    that, you know, we can help to bring a higher profile to some
    of the work that you are doing, not just by doing hearings like
    this, but if you can share with us areas that you would like us
    to probe in further by sending a letter, by making a phone
    call, by trying to call attention to areas where there is waste
    that is taking place, where there are bad decisions being made
    or procedures or processes don't exist.
        Mr. Sopko----
        Mr. Sopko. Sopko
        Mr. Suozzi [continuing]. Sopko, you have been doing this a
    long time. You have been around this stuff for a long time. Is
    this, you know, an isolated incident do you think that you are
    seeing here, or do you see a systemic problem that is taking
    place?
        Mr. Sopko. No, it is not isolated, sir. It is a systemic
    problem.
        Mr. Suozzi. So what can we do to help you to shine a light
    on these things? You know, often this stuff becomes partisan,
    one party is going against the other party.
        Now, with the change in administration, this is a good time
    for us to work together on a bipartisan basis to try and make
    our Defense Department more efficient and less wasteful. And we
    are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars, and there
    has got to be opportunities for us to work together as a team
    to try and identify places that we can improve the procedures
    and processes to get rid of this waste.
        Mr. Sopko. Congressman, I am happy to come up, and I can
    bring my staff up and brief any and all of you, including the
    chairman and ranking member, on issues where you can shine that
    light.
        And having worked on your side for 25 years, that is so
    important. And I will take you up on that offer.
        And, Madam Chairman, I will take up--ranking member also--
    on any offer you have.
        We have a lot of areas where you can help us on, and that
    is the important role of working together. And as I have told
    people, waste is not red or blue. Waste is green. I am here to
    try to save the green, and I think all of you are, too. And we
    are looking for champions such as yourselves to do that.
        So--and I am certain all of my colleagues in the DOD IG and
    the GAO would be happy to do that, too. I have a list we can
    give you.
        Mr. Suozzi. I will have a staff member of mine get your
    number, and you are going to get his number. His name is
    Connor. He is in the back right now. We are going to work
    together. And I am going to take you up on that briefing idea.
    If any of my colleagues want to join, certainly.
        Madam Chairwoman, I don't want to overstep my bounds here,
    but if you don't mind, I want to pursue this further. I am very
    interested in this topic, and I would like to work with you to
    try to address this issue.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. And thank you for your
    contribution. Your expertise on this subcommittee, really,
    really appreciate that.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you so much.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Absolutely.
        We are going to go now to our last member of the
    subcommittee, our newest member, Mr. Jimmy Panetta. We want to
    welcome you. We look toward to having you here on our
    subcommittee as well as Armed Services Committee.
        And so I will be happy to turn it over to you if you have
    any questions.
        Mr. Moulton. Madam Chairman, if I may, Representative
    Panetta is also a former Naval Intelligence officer and someone
    who served, himself, in Afghanistan.
        So we particularly appreciate your expertise here this
    afternoon.
        Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Moulton, other
    members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here,
    absolute honor to be here.
        Thank you to the witnesses who came here, prepared and
    testified. I apologize for being late. I did miss some of your
    testimony. I was meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations,
    Admiral Richardson.
        And one of things we talked about, I told him I was going
    to my first subcommittee hearing, and it is on oversight. I
    said, what do you think, you know, for the Navy what would be a
    big change when it came to these types of issues? And he talked
    about procurement.
        And he said, you know, for now, right now--and he mentioned
    a couple of ships, including the Ford, Zumwalt, that he was
    having issues with, and he talked about how the procurement
    process is too long, too--contracts are too far out, especially
    with the advances of technology and how quick those are coming
    now, and that you needed to shorten them, shorten those
    contracts.
        Mr. Sopko, obviously, thank you for your work. You
    mentioned your box of broken tools. And the first one you
    mentioned was procurement. And I don't know if this is
    something where you can talk to us about, but I think right
    now, with the procurement, with an issue like this, how would
    we make it better? How would we fix that broken tool of
    procurement?
        Mr. Sopko. There are many ways to do that. The first of all
    is to eliminate the incentive to spend quickly. That is one
    thing. And that is a--something I don't think you can
    legislate, but you could, but I think the first thing is look
    at how people are rewarded in the contracting office.
        If that is what they tell you, what they are telling me and
    my staff out there, then we have a disincentive for good
    contracting. We just have an incentive for pushing money out
    the door.
        I think the other issue is in procurement is the files and
    the records are horrendous. I think one of your colleagues
    asked before, he said, this is a 10-year contract. Didn't they
    do X, Y, and Z. We can find no records. They don't keep them.
        Now, if you were working in the private sector, you would
    go to jail for the kind of records that the Department of
    Defense keeps. That is something we can maybe learn from the
    private sector. Somebody here was a certified public
    accountant. He would be shocked at the quality of records. And
    we did a whole investigation on the task force for business
    stabilization and operation, and we are going to be issuing a
    final audit on that. And it took us so long, because there was
    nobody in the Department of Defense who could discuss a nearly
    billion dollar program.
        Mr. Panetta. Culture, laziness? Where did that come from?
        Mr. Sopko. No incentive. No incentive. Not my watch. Not my
    job. That is the other thing, and that goes to procurement is,
    you do the procurement, then you are gone.
        So when the proverbial stuff hits the fan, you are in
    another job, you may be in a whole different area of the world.
        Mr. Panetta. That goes to your third point of annual
    turnover, the constant turnover? You mentioned HR?
        Mr. Sopko. Well, the whole HR system is--we--and for
    procurement we--President Reagan was faced with the buildup--
    and I think Congress was at the time, and I am old enough to
    remember that, and we tried to design a real procurement core
    where people had incentives to do procurement and to stay with
    it. And I think that has kind of dissipated.
        I don't think people are there. But there are probably
    smarter people on my staff who could give you a list of things
    to fix procurement.
        And, again, we are happy to discuss that. Again, my world
    is Afghanistan. My colleagues here can speak, the GAO and DOD
    can also speak of broader issues.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you. You have been doing it a while, and
    obviously, we have the uniform issue.
        Mr. Banks talked about a vehicle issue. Is this the worst
    you have seen it? Have you seen--you have got worse examples?
        Mr. Sopko. Oh, far worse. This is de minimus in comparison.
    We spent $8 billion on counternarcotics; $8 billion, with a
    ``b.'' And there are more drugs being put out now than when we
    started.
        The insurgents are getting more drugs, money now than
    before. The insurgents are bribing more Afghan officials than
    before. We occasionally catch, again, the slow and the lame and
    those that don't pay the bribes, but that is one of the biggest
    things. That is $8 billion.
        We have buildings that are falling down. We had a building
    down in Camp Leatherneck, a 64,000 square-foot building, the
    best-built building in Afghanistan. The general who was there
    said, I don't want it, don't build it, I won't use it. His
    supervisor, General Allen, said, We don't want it, don't build
    it, we won't use it. By the time it was built, it was built for
    the surge. By the time it was finished, the surge was over, and
    we were pulling out.
        We gave the name of the general who was responsible for
    ignoring General Allen and ignoring the Marine Corps general
    there. The Department of Defense--and not under the current
    leadership, I must say, but in the prior leadership--basically
    said, we didn't find the waste of 60--of $36 million enough to
    hold the general accountable.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. We are glad Mr. Jones is joining
    us today. And we appreciate your interest and your advocacy for
    wise spending. I turn it over to you.
        Mr. Jones. Madam Chairman, I thank you, and I thank Mr.
    Moulton as well.
        You know, I have been here 22 years. I was here in 2001
    when we voted for the AUMF, authorization [for use] of military
    force on Afghanistan. I have sat in many, many hearings on the
    Armed Services Committee, both subcommittee level and full
    committee, and this is just what is just absolutely disgusting
    to the American people. If this could be on national TV, you
    would probably be having rallies out there right now
    protesting, because there is no one held responsible.
        Mr. Sopko, you and your staff have done numerous reports
    through the years. I have read quite a few of them. Not all,
    but quite a few of them. You have recommendations in those
    reports that the American people can see as well as Members of
    Congress.
        I think about the stories about ghost soldiers: we pay
    200,000 Afghans millions and billions of dollars, don't even
    exist. Nobody is accountable for that. You testified to the
    Senate, and you told Senator McCaskill, I believe it was, she
    asked you about the fact that we bought nine goats for $6
    million. Your people looked for the goats, you can't find them,
    and maybe somebody ate them. Nobody knows.
        Mr. Sopko. But they were good goats.
        Mr. Jones. Well, they were from Italy, I remember that.
    They were from Italy. They were quality goats to start a goat
    business. It is just one thing after another, after another,
    after another. I do have a question.
        I wrote to President Trump, had it delivered on July the
    18th. I wanted him, if he was going raise the troop levels in
    Afghanistan, to please come to Congress, ask Congress to meet
    its constitutional responsibility and have a debate.
        After 16 years, we have had no debate on the future of
    Afghanistan. I want to read this, and then I am going get to
    the question:
        You also tweeted that your let's get out of Afghanistan,
    our troops are being killed by the Afghanis we train and we
    waste billions there. Nonsense. Rebuild the United States of
    America.
        In addition, I put the next paragraph that: Mr. President,
    I agree with those remarks, and so does the 31st Commandant of
    the Marine Corps, my friend and unofficial adviser General
    Chuck Krulak, as he said in a recent email to me, no one has
    ever conquered Afghanistan and many have tried. We will join
    the list of nations that have tried and failed.
        That is Commandant Krulak not Walter Jones.
        This is what is to me why the taxpayers are so frustrated
    with Members of Congress, because every time we get these
    hearings, and I want to thank the chairman again and ranking
    member, we will keep funding Afghanistan. To your point and the
    point of the other two witnesses, nobody is ever held
    responsible. It just goes on and on and on. Our Nation is $21
    trillion in debt. We are headed for an economic collapse, but
    yet, we will find money to keep spending in Afghanistan.
        And thank you and all the others who are here today for
    whatever you are doing to try to bring some accountability to
    the taxpayer. This is what I have never heard--and I am going
    to ask in the minute and 40 seconds left: If we have spent over
    $800 billion in Afghanistan, what percentage of the $800
    billion would you estimate should be written off as waste,
    fraud, and abuse? Five percent? Six percent? Ten percent? What
    would you estimate should be written off as waste, fraud, and
    abuse out of $800 billion of the taxpayers' money?
        Mr. Sopko. Congressman, I--again, I am not trying to avoid
    the issue.
        I can't tell you what percentage. I know Stuart Bowen, who
    was the SIGIR [Special Inspector General for Iraq
    Reconstruction] in Iraq, came up with a number and was later
    attacked because he had no basis. And I would have no basis for
    giving it. All I can say is too much, way too much. Billions,
    but I can't tell you what percentage. I would love to, but I
    would be spending all my time--I can't get records on ongoing
    contracts nevertheless go back to that.
        And of course, of that $800 billion, a lot of it is the
    warfighting. And that is extremely difficult. I mean, did they
    fire too many shells this day or less? That's more difficult. I
    really can't tell you. But too much was wasted.
        Mr. Jones. Well, I guess the last comment, because time is
    running out. I would hope that the Congress would feel as I do
    that we are just as responsible for waste, fraud, and abuse
    when we are told by experts like the three of you here today of
    what is going on and, yet, we keep spending billions and
    billions of dollars, and it just keeps going on and on. It is
    just like it is endless in this black hole of money, money
    going while Americans are being killed there.
        And so Madam Chairman, and Ranking Member, thank you for
    this time.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
        Now, we do have two panels today, and the Department of
    Defense officials are coming up here in a minute. But I do want
    to give members an opportunity for a second round of questions.
        I do have a couple of questions still for this panel I want
    to address. With the GAO, your testimony highlighted the
    importance of maintaining accountability over the equipment
    that the DOD provides to Iraq security forces.
        And you alluded to it in your testimony, but I wonder if
    you can go into a little bit more details, what is the nature
    of the interoperability and data reporting issues that you have
    identified as a potential root cause of the problem and how can
    DOD improve them in a meaningful way?
        So, basically, just walk through the process. We send over
    some guns or some body armor, and the different steps that are
    needed and what has been lacking and what you think needs to be
    done or have they addressed those issues to keep track of
    everything?
        Ms. Farb. Well, as I mentioned, there are three phases,
    generally speaking, in the process of sending the equipment
    over. So there is the procurement and shipment from the United
    States, the staging in Iraq and Kuwait, and then the transfer
    over to the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional
    Government.
        We found that, you know, only the very beginning phase, the
    procurement and shipment phase, that the dates, the
    transportation dates were reported in the SCIP system, which is
    the Security Cooperation Information Portal, which is a system
    that should give end-to-end visibility to the Department over
    where the equipment is in the process. When we looked at the
    other two phases, we found no dates entered into the system at
    all.
        We did not determine the root causes ourselves. We
    suggested that--we made a recommendation to the Department that
    they should look into the root causes, because they are best
    positioned to understand the interoperabilities that we found.
        They could not explain exactly why we weren't seeing the
    dates in the system. We had a lot of discussions with staff,
    their contractor, and other experts, which is detailed in our
    report. And it seems to us that they should be able to sort of
    under--look under all of this and understand better where the
    breakdowns are.
        They did ask for our underlying data so that they could
    pinpoint some of the information that we were not seeing and
    try to go backwards and look from there.
        So I think that is a question that hopefully the second
    panel will be able to address.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Do they have--does our equipment have the
    identification number, like a bar code or something that can be
    scanned at various stages along the way, like, you know, FedEx
    and Amazon and post office and other people do?
        Ms. Farb. Yes, I am looking back at my team. Yes, it does
    have--there are identifiers, case identifiers, that are
    associated in the system as well as individual equipment and
    procurement----
        Mrs. Hartzler. So you say the dates weren't entered. Does
    that require somebody to type the date in, like scan it with a
    bar code scan and then record it, or can they just scan it?
        Ms. Farb. I think for the dates themselves, there are a
    couple of different ways that they are entered into the system.
    Either users can enter them into the system, or the dates are
    pulled from other DOD sources. So there may be an external data
    system.
        There are a couple of different information suites that we
    described also in detail in our report, that are used to pull
    the date--the dates from, but sometimes the dates are in those
    systems but not showing up in the Security Cooperation
    Information Portal.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. I am going to follow up with this more
    with the DOD officials. But I did want to ask another question
    of Mr. Roark.
        Today, if the committee were to request that DOD provide
    the immediate quantity, dollar value, and location of equipment
    on hand in Kuwait and Iraq, how quickly do you estimate that
    information could be found, and is the Department working on a
    system to improve recordkeeping?
        Mr. Roark. So we asked the same question during our audits;
    so one of the biggest problems that we found was automated
    systems weren't being used, so a lot of things were based on
    individual spreadsheets and so forth.
        So we recommended that the commands implement some more
    recognized Army accountability and visibility systems. And so
    the commands wrote me back last week when I asked for a follow-
    up to see what had happened over the last few months, and they
    indicated that they have implemented an automated system called
    the Global Combat Support System-Army. So that would be the
    system that they are using as of last week, and that would be
    the first place to go to try to get that information.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. I think we have checked,
    there are no other questions on this round. So we want to thank
    you very much for your testimony.
        And now we will move on to the second panel. And as they
    are making the transition there, I am going to go ahead with
    the introductions.
        On this panel, we are going to be joined by Colonel David
    Navratil, the country director for Iraq at the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Peter Velz, the
    director for Afghanistan, Resources and Transition, at the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        So we appreciate you gentlemen being here, and sitting
    through the first panel. And that will probably be very helpful
    to you beginning our--your testimony and questions. You know
    some of the issues that have been raised by the subcommittee
    for questions, and so, you know, we appreciate you addressing
    those.
        So would you please go ahead and proceed with your
    statements.

     STATEMENT OF PETER VELZ, DIRECTOR, AFGHANISTAN (RESOURCES AND
    TRANSITION), OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, POLICY;
     AND COL DAVID NAVRATIL, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR IRAQ, OFFICE OF
                 THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, POLICY

        Mr. Velz. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton,
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting Department
    of Defense witnesses to testify here today, and thank you for
    the unwavering support that you and the defense committees give
    to the men and women of the Department of Defense, military and
    civilian alike, who serve and defend our country all over the
    world.
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of
    Defense's efforts to ensure that taxpayers' funds used to
    train, equip, and sustain partner forces in Afghanistan are
    effectively managed and deliver results in support of our
    national security objectives.
        You have our written testimony, so we will each provide a
    brief overview of the key points. Secretary Mattis has made it
    clear that even small instances of inefficient or ineffective
    use of DOD funds can have strategic impacts that can
    reverberate negatively on the DOD mission and our budget
    situation, and that we must earn the trust and confidence of
    Congress and the American people that we are diligent stewards
    of taxpayer dollars.
        The Secretary expects all DOD organizations to end wasteful
    practices in any mission area and to bring forward proposals
    that make the Department more effective and efficient.
        This guidance certainly applies to the Department's
    management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, or the
    ASFF, which is the subject of Mr. Sopko's testimony, and all
    other DOD partner capacity building appropriations.
        The Department greatly appreciates the strong support from
    Congress in general and the defense committees in particular
    for the ASFF appropriation. This appropriation is the center of
    gravity of the DOD mission in Afghanistan.
        It has enabled the United States and our coalition partners
    to transition responsibility for the security of Afghanistan to
    the Afghan defense and police forces. The Afghan forces have
    shown over the last 2\1/2\ years since the end of the U.S.
    combat mission that with limited U.S. enabler assistance they
    have been able to prevent the insurgency from achieving its
    strategic objectives, including capturing and holding a major
    city.
        The Afghan forces have also proven to be very capable and
    critical partners in our counterterrorism efforts in
    Afghanistan. The work by the DOD IG, the SIGAR, and GAO are
    critical enablers of the Department's oversight and our
    oversight of the ASFF and the Afghanistan mission.
        Throughout the course of audits, investigations, and other
    projects and through implementation of recommendations and
    production of their statutorily required quarterly reports to
    Congress, my office in the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, as well as our commanders in the field and
    their staffs, work closely with the DOD IG and SIGAR, each of
    which have a robust presence in Kabul, Afghanistan, to identify
    opportunities for improvement.
        We also work closely with GAO in their efforts to support
    congressional oversight requirements. These interactions with
    oversight organizations provide valuable insights into our
    efforts to implement the Secretary's guidance to effectively
    manage these funds while achieving the critically important
    national security outcomes for which these funds are intended.
        The Department's congressionally chartered Afghanistan
    Resources Oversight Council, or the AROC, which has statutory
    authority to approve acquisition strategies and funding
    requirements for ASFF funding procurements, uses the results of
    IG work as a key input in the decision making and oversight.
        And I would note that the Secretary Mattis letter that you
    referenced, it was directed to the three chairs of the AROC. So
    he intended those three principals to be accountable for the
    actions of the Department and specifically in the ASFF area.
        We also use regular internal DOD staff interactions among
    OSD Policy staff, Joint Staff, CENTCOM [Central Command], and
    commanders in the field to ensure a common understanding of
    actions that are needed to improve accountability for the use
    of ASFF and to take appropriate corrective action when needed.
        Regarding the SIGAR report on Afghan National Army
    uniforms, we agreed with SIGAR's suggestion that a DOD
    organization with expertise in military uniforms should conduct
    an analysis of whether there might be a more effective, a more
    cost-effective uniform design and camouflage pattern that meets
    operational requirements.
        We believe this is the best way to determine the merits of
    the report's claim that DOD may have spent as much as $28
    million over 10 years more than was needed on uniforms that may
    be inappropriate for Afghanistan's operational environment.
        The appropriate DOD experts have begun developing a plan
    for conducting the study, which we expect to begin in the
    coming weeks. Secretary Mattis has made it clear in a recent
    memo to the three under secretaries, who are chairs of the
    AROC, as I mentioned, that rather than minimize this report or
    excuse wasteful decisions, DOD should use it as a catalyst to
    take aggressive steps to end waste in our Department.
        The bottom line is the Department must continually seek
    ways to improve and enhance existing oversight of ASFF, just as
    we must across all of DOD's mission areas, whether that
    involves providing assistance to our partner forces in
    Afghanistan and Iraq or ensuring the readiness of U.S. forces.
        As Secretary Mattis wrote in a memo to DOD personnel on his
    first day as Secretary of Defense, quote, ``Every action we
    take will be designed to ensure our military is ready to fight
    today and in the future,'' unquote.
        Madam Chairwoman, thank you again for inviting us to
    participate in this hearing, and I welcome any questions you or
    other members of the subcommittee may have.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Velz and Colonel
    Navratil can be found in the Appendix on page 84.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much, appreciate you being
    here. And I very much appreciate Secretary Mattis' very, very
    prompt and timely statement on this that we need to get
    accountable and look into all of this. I think that is what is
    needed certainly.
        I did want to follow up on the subject of the uniforms. In
    our NDAA, we did put language in there requesting that this be
    looked at, and one of the recommendations is that the cost and
    feasibility of transitioning the uniforms of the Afghan
    military security forces to a pattern owned by the United
    States using existing excess inventory where available and
    acquiring the rights. That is something that is supposed to be
    looked at.
        And I know that you have just said that a study is going to
    be done by DOD. But I wanted to ask your opinion about that.
    How much excess inventory do we have currently of uniforms?
        And if we were to give those to the Afghan security forces,
    does that jeopardize our own security by having a foreign
    government wearing the same uniform perhaps that we had worn at
    least in the past?
        So can you kind of explain the excess inventory we may or
    may not have and the viability of perhaps using this in the
    situation?
        Mr. Velz. Madam Chairwoman, I will have to get you the
    specifics on how much each of the services may have as excess.
    I know that, for example, there might be some quantity of older
    woodland uniforms--I don't know for sure--that the Army might
    have.
        But, you know, what is excess and what is just in the
    inventory but not currently used and being held for eventual
    distribution is a fine science to determine. So I would like to
    get you a specific answer for the record on how much is
    available.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 93.]
        Mr. Velz. In general, I think it is probably best to focus
    on trying to make sure that we determine what is the actual
    best operationally suitable camouflage pattern and design that
    is cost effective for the Afghan forces. The statute, the HASC
    [House Armed Services Committee] amendment on requiring that
    study, I think it is entirely parallel with what we have signed
    up to do in the SIGAR report.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. That will be very interesting to see
    certainly the cost involved. If you switched it totally over
    and whether you use excess inventory or whether you tried to
    replace it, it sounds costly to me.
        But I would like to ask Colonel Navratil, since you oversee
    Iraq in that issue, can you kind of go into detail about what
    steps have been taken to address the recordkeeping issue that
    the GAO as well as Inspector General of DOD identified.
        And have you coordinated with any private companies in our
    country, whether it be UPS or FedEx or any others on logistics
    and how they keep track of inventory? Have you incorporated any
    of their ideas?
        Colonel Navratil. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for that
    question. There have been several steps taken by mostly the 1st
    Theater Sustainment Command, as the IG and GAO reported is the
    theater sustainment headquarters, the logistic headquarters in
    charge of all this equipment going through to Iraq and through
    Kuwait.
        So as inspector general mentioned, on site, after some
    issues were identified immediately, the 1st TSC and supporting
    units took steps to either properly safeguard the equipment,
    banding and packaging sealing boxes, or replacing holes in
    fences that were identified by the inspector general. So those
    are a couple things to point to.
        For the GAO report, it has been only a couple months since
    those issues were identified, but I can tell you, we work
    closely again with 1st TSC. And what they have done is update
    their standard operating procedures, ensured that their
    supporting units below them, their at least three mentioned in
    the report, follow those procedures.
        What GAO didn't mention in great detail is we are going to
    be working with them probably for a year or more, I would
    estimate, on some kind of system. And they have an automated
    system.
        And we have heard reference to SCIP, the Security
    Cooperation Information Portal, that we are using and also
    GCSS-Army [Global Combat Support System-Army], which is Army,
    of course, you could tell by the name, Army internal system
    that maintains accountability for all Army units.
        But what we want to do is find the root cause using the
    Security Cooperation Information Portal and trace it back to
    the people here at Defense Security Cooperation Agency, where
    the order is essentially placed, to the points of shipment from
    the U.S. and finally to receipt in OCONUS [outside the
    continental United States], whether Kuwait or Iraq, wherever
    the final destination is and kind of find out where the system
    is broke and the process is now being followed.
        At this point we are not sure for that process that it is
    an IT issue or just a following-the-instructions issue. So we
    have heard GAO and SIGAR mention that some of these forces
    rotate through theater at periodic intervals. Army standards is
    9 months on ground and then back at home station for at least
    twice that long.
        So keeping the knowledge base is important, especially in
    written procedures, but I am not exactly sure the context when
    these investigations were performed what the situations were to
    see the unsecured weapons and the problems with the database.
        Mrs. Hartzler. So you feel confident the database is
    adequate. It is just a matter of personnel training and people
    not following procedure?
        Colonel Navratil. Ma'am, at this point, I cannot conjecture
    on the exact cause. That is why I said, we are not taking our
    time, but we are moving forward systematically with GAO to find
    out the steps from start to finish and where it is broken.
        What we do know is, 1st TSC has changed some procedures. So
    what we are going to do is measure the information in the
    portal since May when they have updated their SOP [standard
    operating procedure], they changed procedures. We will see what
    kind of reaction we have to that.
        And then we will just kind of narrow it down the root cause
    and work backwards and kind of reverse engineer the problem. So
    we will find out, if it is not in 1st TSC, where in the system
    it is broke.
        We are not sure the system is broke, the information
    technology system is broke or the procedure is at this point,
    but we think it is probably a combination of the two. We just
    want to make sure we find this and identify so we can be better
    like some of the civilian companies you mentioned.
        Mrs. Hartzler. What was that last phrase? Because I was
    going to ask, have you--it sounds like you have not visited
    with any private companies on how they do logistics. You're
    just trying to address this internally or----
        Colonel Navratil. No, ma'am. We have not yet. Let me caveat
    that. We have not yet, it is a great idea. I will have to ask
    some folks in the logistics community what they have done in
    the past. Because I know, the Army's transition, I have been in
    about 24-plus years. Since I first got in, it was all internal
    Army units delivering parts and other things by supply system.
        Then we transitioned to using commercial supply systems,
    whether overseas or CONUS. It worked very well CONUS, OCONUS,
    it worked in some cases. Not sure why it is not used more. I
    mean, I have a feeling some of these bulk procurements, the
    heavy lifts are better done by TRANSCOM [Transportation
    Command] and mobility forces. But we will have to find out more
    information for you on that question because I think it is
    valid.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Ranking Member Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        Going first to Afghanistan, Mr. Velz, can you talk about
    what changes DOD made in response to this particular incident?
    You talked about how you think that we did the right thing here
    on the committee by instituting this requirement. I would
    certainly like to think that that kind of thing is not required
    in the future. So what changes has DOD actually made?
        Mr. Velz. Ranking Member Moulton, I think the Secretary's
    memo that he just sent to the AROC principals, the Under
    Secretaries for Policy, ATL [Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics] and Comptroller, will really be the catalyst.
        Mr. Moulton. So it is safe to say, no changes have been
    made to date?
        Mr. Velz. The report has been out for about a month. The
    primary suggestion in the report was that we determine whether
    or not there is a uniform pattern that is more suitable.
        So certainly that was something that was not done 10 years
    ago, in 2007. There wasn't, you know, a real requirement study
    that is normally done for something like this. That is what we
    are going to do now. The new commander of CSTC-A is supportive
    of that approach, and so that is how we are remedying this
    immediate issue.
        The broader issue you are talking about though, as far as
    accountability for other aspects of execution of ASFF, I think
    that will flow from the Secretary's memo to the AROC
    principals. And then, you know, that will probably lead to
    further implementation guidance and more rigorous structures in
    oversight by those principals of decisions to expend ASFF.
        Mr. Moulton. So could you comment for a second on some of
    the recommendations made by the special inspector general, some
    of the things that he said about everything from rotations of
    units and commanders down to contracting procedures and
    incentives and whatnot.
        Did you agree with most of what he had to say? Did you have
    specific areas where you disagreed? We would really appreciate
    DOD's perspective on this.
        Mr. Velz. Sir, I think, in some of those areas I think
    there is a recognition within the Department at the senior
    levels that are involved in Afghanistan that those are issues
    and concerns. There are short-term rotations of people into
    theater.
        They may not have the exact expertise that is needed for
    the more complex jobs that are done in the security assistance
    arena, for example. When Congressman Banks was there, I think
    he probably saw some of this firsthand.
        And those are things that we are very cognizant of. General
    Nicholson is very cognizant of them. We are looking at things
    like making significant improvements to adviser training before
    advisers deploy.
        We also--we have put in place structures in the last 2
    years or so, a governance board, if you will, that my immediate
    boss is the chairman of that is bringing together people who
    have been advisers over the last 2 or 3 or 4 years to stay part
    of the dialogue so that they don't just do their year and
    wander off into DOD and they are never heard from again.
        So that is a mechanism that can bring in continuity of
    mission, and that is a really important principle for it
    because as people rotate in and out they lose corporate
    knowledge. So we are trying to put in place structures that
    maintain that corporate knowledge.
        Mr. Moulton. So just going to Iraq for a minute, Colonel
    Navratil, what sort of timeline should we expect to see the
    changes, the increased accountability, the improvements in
    security that you discussed?
        I am the co-chair of the Iraq Caucus here in the House of
    Representatives, and we are going to be making a trip to Iraq
    this fall. We would like to know what we can expect to see by
    then and where to find it?
        Colonel Navratil. Yes, sir.
        I think talking to IG, like I said, we work pretty well
    with IG--it sounds like the improvements have been done, either
    a work order has been implemented to fix the fence, they have
    changed to a new location with a more secure perimeter, and the
    boxes and crates that were identified before in a previous
    report are already banded up and better secured.
        So it sounded like those two instances are done. But I
    agree with the IG where he wants to see it, they have to see
    pictures, they have to do an on-site visit just to make sure
    that it is done, for one; and for two, in the future when we
    receive more packages, they continue to use updated security
    procedures.
        For the GAO report, it is a little more complex. I owe an
    action plan very shortly, I would say within 30 days, I mean,
    as far as working with GAO. I won't be ready to brief Congress
    within 30 days. But at least to GAO we are working out some
    sort of timeline on this action plan.
        And we already started the work a month or so ago, initial
    discussions. But it is a big project. And speaking of
    accountability, which I know is a big discussion on the
    previous panel, I won't be in DOD and OSD for more than another
    year, but I fully expect this project to follow me wherever I
    end up.
        So I will make sure it is completed, whether it is by
    myself or handing it off to somebody who replaces me. But this
    is a big project. So I think within the quarter we will have a
    solid plan as we figure out what the actual problems are in the
    system.
        And probably within a quarter after that, we will have buy-
    in with the system, if you will, probably mostly in the Army
    system up through Defense Security Cooperation Agency to get
    this fix-it plan in place.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, we would certainly appreciate follow-up,
    and my staff and the committee staff can help get that follow-
    up from you. If you have this plan within 30 days and say in
    about 40 days we would appreciate a brief on it, because that
    would be in anticipation of our trip to Iraq where we hope to
    see some of these changes and improvements.
        You know, to me, the bigger issue than the few boxes with
    holes in them is really the fundamental accountability in the
    system and ensuring that that is fixed.
        You know, it also strikes me that we have spent literally
    tens of millions of dollars delivering weapons to the Iraqis.
    The same could be said about Afghanistan. But to focus on Iraq
    for a second, tens of millions of dollars of weapons,
    equipment, et cetera.
        There are plenty of pictures on the internet that we see
    today of ISIS using many of those pieces of equipment, weapons,
    and associated ammunition against us. You know, at what point
    does Iraq have enough weapons? At what point are there enough
    weapons in the country that we should stop just spending
    millions of American taxpayer dollars on putting more guns on
    the ground in Iraq?
        Colonel Navratil. Sir, that is a great question. And I
    cannot provide a very detailed answer on that. What I can say
    is, we do not yet have what the Government of Iraq and what
    CENTCOM and the commanders in the DOD think are enough hold
    forces to protect these areas after ISIS has been defeated,
    like for Mosul, recent example.
        So we continue to work with the Government of Iraq, by,
    with, and through them, and with our coalition partners, but we
    are not at a point yet. A lot are destroyed, some highly
    visible examples, you know, that weapons may be compromised or
    stolen or whatever the case may be, given to people who should
    not have them.
        But those are things that as we identify them, we work
    through the Government of Iraq to take care of that situation.
    And they take those seriously. I can't say they get many
    results getting them back or what action they do take, but they
    take those seriously and we talk to them all the time. If we
    find any violation of that sort.
        Mr. Moulton. If you came to me and you said, you know,
    Congress, we really need to appropriate some money to send some
    oil to Iraq because Iraq is running short on oil, we would say
    that seems a little absurd because there is an awful lot of oil
    in Iraq.
        Well, at some point there are enough guns in Iraq that we
    shouldn't be buying more; that we should tell the Iraqis to get
    the guns off the street or wherever else they need to get them
    from, or from the insurgents, and start putting them back into
    their inventory, it seems to me. I mean, maybe I am being too
    logical about this, but at some point this is not a good use of
    American taxpayer dollars.
        Colonel Navratil. No, sir. And I don't want to make an
    excuse for what we are doing, because I am not the commander on
    the ground. I know as we fight ISIS and we continue to fight
    them--and there is probably a year or two, maybe more left, as
    we fight them and eradicate them in Iraq, you know, we
    continually arm the soldiers that we are arming in the Iraqi
    security forces. Some of the partnered, vetted forces that we
    are working with with ITEF support provided by Congress.
        So at some point we are going to cut the weapons off. I
    would just offer a data point that this war is very cheap
    compared to previous OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OND
    [Operation New Dawn], as you are probably aware. So I hate to
    compare it, but economy to scale, it is very--it is a lot
    better this way.
        And when you look at the American people who have
    sacrificed in this war as well, there have been only been like
    six over the past 3 years that have died in hostile acts. So a
    couple measurements, but I just think at some point you are
    correct, we will cut them off. But that point is not yet.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Mr. Gaetz.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Colonel, no one is really responsible for overseeing end
    use of equipment that we provide once we provide it to the
    Iraqi military. Isn't that right?
        Colonel Navratil. So that is not quite accurate. The Office
    of Security Cooperation in Iraq has that responsibility on
    them.
        Mr. Gaetz. And how would you assess their performance?
        Colonel Navratil. That is a difficult one to answer. But
    what I will tell you, it is a difficult environment. And I
    won't make excuses for them. We all know there is a lot of
    conflict in Iraq and those folks are over there trying to do a
    good job.
        What they do is work with, through the GOI, the Government
    of Iraq, through the various ministries to get reports back,
    usually the quarterly reporting cycle.
        Mr. Gaetz. I am speaking more to outcomes and less about
    process. So if we were to evaluate not the process that they
    use but the outcomes, would you say they have been effective at
    managing end use or ineffective at managing end use?
        Colonel Navratil. I am going to cut it down the middle and
    say so-so. I mean, I know there is a DSCA [Defense Security
    Cooperation Agency] report, I think from last year, that said
    they need improvement. But I can't get into that many more
    specifics on the topic because we weren't really prepared for
    this.
        Mr. Gaetz. Okay. Well, so in 2015, Senator McCain said
    that--and I am quoting here--``The Iraqi military is a long way
    from being prepared to act in an impactful fashion. Meanwhile,
    the vacuum is being filled by Shia militias that are Iranian
    backed.'' And he continued, ``Some of those arms have come from
    the United States of America.''
        So is the statement from Senator McCain accurate that the
    U.S. has allowed arms that are our arms to fall in the hands of
    Shia militia?
        Colonel Navratil. Sir, I would never contradict anything
    Senator McCain said. But what I can say is, I mean, ``allowed''
    is kind of an exaggeration and I am not saying he exaggerated.
    But some U.S. equipment bought for ISF has more than likely
    found its way into enemy hands, whether--and I don't want to
    lump all the PMF [Popular Mobilization Forces] into enemy, but
    some of them have strong Shia backing, some strong Iranian
    ties. We all know this reading the paper.
        So the same as before, when we determine these situations
    exist, we work with State and our partners through the
    Government of Iraq and the ministries to get those back in
    proper hands.
        And we are--we deal with these issues infrequently, but
    when we do we treat them very seriously because, like you all
    know, we are putting a lot of money into this country trying to
    support them and enable them to govern and police themselves.
    That is a serious concern for us.
        Mr. Gaetz. Madam Chair, I would like to seek unanimous
    consent to enter into our subcommittee's record a January 8,
    2015, Bloomberg News article titled, ``Iran-Backed Militias Are
    Getting U.S. Weapons.''
        Mrs. Hartzler. So ordered.
        [The information referred to is retained in the
    subcommittee files and can be viewed upon request.]
        Mr. Gaetz. And Madam Chair, I also would seek unanimous
    consent to enter into our subcommittee's record a series of
    photographs showing U.S. tanks, U.S. equipment all flying under
    the flags of Iranian Shia militias.
        Mrs. Hartzler. So ordered.
        [The photos referred to are retained in the subcommittee
    files and can be viewed upon request.]
        Mr. Gaetz. My final question, Colonel, is what can we do to
    move from so-so performance on the management of end use to
    improved performance where the warfighters from my district and
    the districts of my colleagues all over the country are not
    having to fight against American equipment?
        Colonel Navratil. Sir, at this point it is partly a process
    of procedures, partly a--sorry. It is dependent on security and
    some is dependent on procedures and people following
    procedures. I think for the most part people know what the
    procedures are. We have written procedures, very easy to follow
    usually in the Army, and we do it that way for a reason.
        The situation we are in right now, it is getting better in
    Iraq. There is still a lot of fighters, a lot of ISIS out
    there, so it is not as easy to get out and follow up as we
    should.
        But at least for the very visible incidents, like the
    pictures you mention there, there is a lot of pressure from up
    high, and Secretary Mattis is, of course, tracking that very
    closely, to get the tanks where they should be, to get other
    weapons and equipment, if it is in the wrong hands, back to
    where it should be.
        It is a delicate situation now with, you know,
    counterbalancing Iranian influence with all the other countries
    that are surrounding Iraq and may want some part of that
    country after this fight is done.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Madam Chair, I thank you again.
        And Mr. Velz, I think you and I met a few months ago when I
    wrote the former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to please
    explain to me how we made the mistake of taking the taxpayers'
    money and paying over 200,000 Afghans who didn't exist. The
    article said ghost soldiers, and I expressed that in the
    letter.
        You and Mr. Royal, very kind, came to chat with me about
    that. And the only thing I took from the discussion was that
    they are changing the metrics on how they keep up with who we
    are paying for this and that. I still don't question you or Mr.
    Royal, but I still think it is an impossible situation. But
    that is my problem, not yours.
        Last night I saw Peter Walsh, I believe his name is, with
    CNN [Cable News Network], with marines, I don't know if it was
    Helmand, but somewhere in Afghanistan, that they were waiting
    for the Afghan unit to come in to help them with a possible
    firefight.
        I think they were--the unit was about 500 Afghan soldiers.
    It ended up that they got less than 100 soldiers. So, again,
    that just adds to the frustration of our military, I am sure,
    but also the taxpayers and those of us who represent the
    taxpayers.
        Also this morning, I get in the office around 7:00, and I
    turn on the TV. And then I hear that the Russians are now doing
    a--quite an extensive supply of weapons to the Taliban. As we
    know, the Taliban make up the Afghan people. Most of them are
    Pashtuns. They have been fighting for 1,000 years and probably
    will for the next 1,000 years.
        And I said to you and Mr. Royal, and I know we are going to
    try to get together in September, I just don't know how in the
    world--when I hear the testimony, I want to thank again the
    chairwoman and also Mr. Moulton. This has been an excellent
    hearing, and I think that it should be on national TV. I said
    that early on the stand.
        But when we get to a point that we are spending billions
    and billions and billions in Afghanistan and we can't even get
    the majority--not all but the majority of the Afghans to stand
    up. And particularly what has distressed me--I represent Camp
    Lejeune, I represent Cherry Point Marine Air Station.
        When I know that these marines that I talk to, who have
    been there many, many times, feel that there is nothing that is
    changing--I don't expect you to tell me today in 2 minutes that
    everything is changing. I understand that. But it is the
    accountability that I think is missing.
        I don't know why someone cannot say to the Congress, you
    have spent close to $800 billion. We have been training the
    Afghans for 16 years. Honest to God, I don't mean this is too
    ugly, but you can train monkeys to ride a bicycle in 16 years.
        But we keep training and training, and half the people that
    we are training end up going with the Taliban. And a few of
    those we are training they killed two marines from my district,
    Major Palmer, Benjamin Palmer, and Sergeant Kevin Balduf, they
    both were shot and killed by the Afghans they were training.
        And just in the last month, there were three Army fellows
    who were shot by the people they were training. And at some
    point in time, somebody has got to be honest with the American
    people and the Congress and say to us, what is the benchmark?
    What are we trying to do?
        This 16 years cannot become 32 years. I will be dead and
    gone, but so America will be financially broke. When is the
    truth going to be told as to what is the benchmark?
        Mr. Velz. Sir, I think--first of all, thank you for your
    comments and questions. I think the main answer to your
    question will be when we get a decision from President Trump on
    our strategy and policy in Afghanistan. That is under review
    right now.
        Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson, National Security
    Adviser McMaster have been in discussions with him about that.
    I think they are very close to making a final recommendation
    and decision on what our posture will be going forward. And the
    outcome of that, I think, will include some points that can
    address your concerns, sir.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you.
        Mr. Velz. So I can't offer you anything more on that.
        If you don't mind, sir, a couple quick comments on some of
    your other points.
        On the situation in Helmand, that has long been the most
    difficult security environment, most difficult area of
    responsibility within Afghanistan. And the problems of the
    Afghan National Army corps in that area are well known and have
    been the focus of a lot of attention over the last couple of
    years.
        There are other parts of Afghanistan where the Afghan army
    and the Afghanistan police, and certainly the Afghan special
    forces are frankly better organized, better led. Although,
    there have been leadership changes in the 215th Corps that are
    beginning to show improvements, but it still remains a work in
    progress.
        But, sir, the key metric I would hold out to you as to
    Afghan will is the number of casualties that they are
    suffering: 7,000 or 8,000 a year KIA [killed in action]; 14,000
    or 15,000 wounded in action. I think there is no question about
    the will of the Afghan soldier and police to fight.
        There are questions about whether they are all adequately
    led, as we would like them to be, in some cases, perhaps not
    adequately equipped and supplied. But they are doing the bulk
    of the fighting.
        Our combat forces are providing minimal support right now.
    Our special forces are working with the Afghan special forces
    who are highly, highly capable and are having a lot of
    successful counterterrorism operations.
        But I would just note that it is the Afghans' fight now; we
    are there to support. They are fully responsible for the
    security of their country. The U.S. and dozens of other
    coalition partners are assisting them.
        And, sir, I think, as I mentioned at the beginning, you
    know, once we have a decision from President Trump, I think we
    will be able to have more in-depth discussions on your
    question.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mrs. Hartzler. I want to thank the witnesses today for your
    testimony as well as your service to our Nation. That concludes
    our hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 July 25, 2017

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 July 25, 2017

    =======================================================================

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 July 25, 2017

    =======================================================================

               RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

        Mr. Sopko. The Department of Defense currently contracts for the
    provision of uniforms for the Afghan National Army (ANA) on an ``as
    needed'' basis. The most recent contract was issued as a $7.8 million
    firm-fixed-price, sole-source award in September 2016 for the
    production of fabric printed with the Spec4ce Forest uniform pattern
    necessary for the assembly of an additional 195,000 ANA uniforms. The
    contract was awarded to Atlantic Diving Services (ADS), Inc., which
    holds the exclusive rights to the proprietary ANA camouflage pattern
    developed by HyperStealth, Inc., of Canada. The Department is not
    locked into any future purchases of uniforms from ADS, to SIGAR's
    knowledge. However, purchases using the existing camouflage pattern can
    only be made through ADS, as it holds the license from HyperStealth.
    [See page 11.]
        Mr. Velz. The Department of Defense does not have enough excess
    uniforms in inventory of a type that could be transferred to the Afghan
    Security Forces without jeopardizing our own security to outfit more
    than a few thousands Afghan soldiers at one time.
        U.S. combat military uniforms may be eligible for sale or transfer
    to foreign countries via Foreign Military Sales if the following three
    conditions apply:
        1) The uniform must be designated as excess by the U.S. Armed
    Forces; 2) The uniform must no longer be actively used by the U.S.
    Armed Forces or Reserves; and 3) The uniforms cannot contain
    Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) technology.
        The Defense Logistics Agency has confirmed that only three types of
    uniforms in its inventory currently meet all three requirements:
        1) Three-color Woodlands Battle Dress Uniforms; 2) Three-color
    Desert Camouflage Uniform; and 3) Six-color Desert Camouflage Uniform.
        Of these three types of uniforms, the quantities available of a
    full set are in the low 1000s whereas the annual requirement for Afghan
    National Army uniforms is in the hundreds of thousands.
        As I mentioned in my opening remarks, and in accordance with
    SIGAR's suggestions, DOD experts are undertaking a study to determine
    whether an Afghan National Army uniform could be produced that would be
    more cost effective and meets operational requirements, taking into
    account clothing design and camouflage pattern.   [See page 28.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
        Mr. Sopko. SIGAR has consistently observed and reported on poor
    record keeping, limited oversight, and unclear roles and
    responsibilities, in regard to maintaining accountability for equipment
    purchased through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and
    provided to the ANDSF by CSTC-A. For example, in April 2017, SIGAR
    issued report 17-40, ``Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: DOD
    Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment,''
    which included recommendations to CSTC-A to improve accountability of
    uniforms and equipment provided to the ANDSF. SIGAR found that CSTC-A's
    ability to develop and validate clothing and equipment requirements for
    the ANDSF is limited by poor data, reliance on questionable
    assumptions, and a lack of clear roles and responsibilities. For
    example, because CSTC-A relies on unreliable Afghan data, coalition
    officials assume that the Afghan military is operating at full capacity
    and consumes all its clothing and equipment every year without any
    surplus left over. CSTC-A's history of delivering large shipments of
    clothing and equipment at a level that often exceeds the number of
    assigned personnel in the ANDSF, makes it unlikely that the ANDSF is
    using all of its clothing and equipment every year. Reports from DOD
    describing unopened shipping crates of clothing that is not reflected
    in the ANDSF's current inventories lends credence to that presumption.
    SIGAR also found that CSTC-A did not demonstrate that it conducted
    effective oversight and accountability of clothing, equipment, and
    funds transferred to the Afghan government. The Department of Defense
    concurred with the five recommendations SIGAR made in the report,
    including improving needs forecasting models, and improving inventory
    records. In addition, SIGAR report 14-84, ``Afghan National Security
    Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability,'' found that
    poor record keeping by the Afghan National Army and Afghan National
    Police limited the Department of Defense's ability to monitor weapons
    after transfer to the ANDSF, as required by the National Defense
    Authorization Act of 2010. SIGAR will continue to conduct regular
    oversight into CSTC's ability and effectiveness to maintain
    accountability for equipment purchased through ASFF and provided to the
    ANDSF, and will keep the subcommittee apprised of SIGAR's findings.
    [See page 19.]

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