[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-54]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
THE FISCAL YEAR 2018
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 12, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
26-739 WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi (Vacancy)
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Jenness Simler, Staff Director
Tim Morrison, Counsel
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 7
Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr................................... 100
Mattis, Hon. James N......................................... 86
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 83
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 81
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Senate Testimony of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
Rose Gottemoeller, July 13, 2016........................... 121
Study by Dr. Colin Gray...................................... 115
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Dr. Abraham.................................................. 128
Mr. Byrne.................................................... 128
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 128
Mr. Langevin................................................. 127
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 128
Ms. Speier................................................... 127
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 145
Mr. Hunter................................................... 139
Mr. Langevin................................................. 135
Mr. O'Rourke................................................. 144
Ms. Rosen.................................................... 146
Mr. Scott.................................................... 136
Mr. Smith.................................................... 133
Ms. Speier................................................... 139
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 136
THE FISCAL YEAR 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, Monday, June 12, 2017.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 7:04 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets to receive the testimony of the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the administration's fiscal year 2018 budget request.
We welcome Secretary Mattis for the first time before our
committee, and we welcome Chairman Dunford back.
The question today, as it is each year for this hearing, is
how well the administration's proposal meets the security needs
of the Nation, factoring in both the external threats and the
current state of our military.
This committee has repeatedly heard testimony over the past
2 years that our country faces more serious, complex security
challenges now than we have ever faced before. And the hearings
and briefings we have held on the current state of our military
have been disturbing.
The administration's budget request of $603 billion for
base requirements is 6 percent above the 2017 enacted level and
3 percent above the last Obama administration budget proposal.
It is also $37 billion below what this committee assessed last
fall was needed and about $58 billion below the fiscal year
2012 Gates budget, which was independently validated by the
bipartisan National Defense Panel.
But, of course, the issue is not about numbers. The issue
is about what those numbers provide for the men and women who
serve and what security the budget provides to the Nation. It
is about whether we can defend the United States and our allies
against North Korean missiles, for example. It is about whether
we have the number of ships and planes and other military
capability to deter aggression and maintain peace.
It is about doing right by our most valuable asset: our
people. The men and women who serve deserve the best weapons
and equipment our country can provide, and I am afraid today
they are not getting it.
It is always tempting to divert this discussion into a
broader budget debate about taxes and other spending issues.
Those issues are not within the jurisdiction of this committee
or of these witnesses. But, regardless of our views on those
other issues, we cannot wait until we solve our budget problems
to adequately fund our military. We cannot wait until we
perfect our acquisition system to have planes that fly and
ships that sail. The world is not stopping and waiting on us to
get our act together. It moves on, and it is moving on in a
dangerous direction.
2018 is a key decision point. We have spent 6 years just
getting by, asking more and more of those who serve, and
putting off the choices that have to be made. We cannot keep
piling missions on our service members without ensuring they
have all they need to succeed.
Does the administration's budget proposal accomplish that
goal? That is the question we intend to examine tonight.
I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Smith, for any comments
he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 81.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I agree with much of what you said, and I think the
best way to sum it up is what you said about putting off
choices. That is what we have done for quite a while, and not
just on the defense budget but on our tax reform, on all
aspects of the budget as well.
And I think the impact on the military is as the chairman
describes. And the real problem we have right now is a major
disconnect between what we would like to do and the amount of
money that we are prepared to do it.
As the chairman mentioned, even the President's budget at
$603 billion does not match what our committee assessed was
needed. I think even more tellingly, it does not match what the
President has said he is going to do. In fact, it is very, very
distant from that.
If you talk about a 350-ship Navy and, I think, 570,000-
person Army, you talk about all the planes, all the nuclear
modernization that they want to do, I do not even begin to know
what the yearly number would be to get to that. I am suspecting
it is well north of $700 billion, $800 billion.
So we have all these grand ideas of what we want. We do not
have the money to get there. And who is left in the lurch? The
people that you serve. The men and women of the military are
left with missions that they do not have the resources to
fulfill.
And I think we have to start making choices. And I have got
a bit of a preview with your opening remarks, and I agree with
you. Certainly, the House of Representatives is in no position
to lecture you about making choices. We do not have a budget.
It is the middle of June. I have been here 20 years; we have
never gone this long without providing numbers for the basic
appropriations bills, defense being chief among them.
So we continue to stall, I think, in hopes that the money
will magically appear or we will figure out some way to spend
money that does not count, something. But we have got to make
choices. We have got to decide what we are going to fund.
And I will disagree with the chairman on one issue, and
that is the notion that somehow as the Armed Services
Committee, everything else that goes on in the budget really
does not have anything to do with us and we should not worry
about it. One thing most certainly does, and that is revenue.
Because how much money you have, in my experience anyway, has a
profound impact on how much money you are able to spend.
You know, I will skip for the moment the argument about the
Department of Homeland Security and how important the State
Department is--well, I lied. I did not skip it. But I think all
of those things are important.
But if you just want to get right down to the basics, even
if you just want to say forget about all that, all we are
concerned about is the Armed Services Committee and providing
for the men and women in our military the resources that they
need, the planes, the ships, the equipment, the training, the
readiness, all of that, it is nonsensical to say that the
amount of revenue we have available does not impact that. It
absolutely does.
And if we are talking about putting together--and I use
``we'' loosely here--a tax reform proposal that is going to
further cut taxes by $2 trillion to $3 trillion, and if there
are members of this committee who want to support that and then
want to keep coming back to this committee and talking about
how terrible it is that we do not fund our military, I think
that is a huge inconsistency that we need to reconcile.
We have clear needs in the Defense Department. Let us make
sure we provide the money for them. If we are not prepared to
provide the money for them, then we need to come up with a
different set of strategies, which I agree with the chairman:
It will be very difficult. We have a very complex threat
environment, from North Korea to Iran to Russia to a rising
China to--not to mention the terrorist groups that are still
out there and active. So it would be difficult to redo that
strategy. But we would be better off doing that than to have a
strategy that we have no intention of funding, and right now,
that is kind of what the executive branch looks like they are
doing. They have a strategy that they have no intention of
funding. We have to fix that.
Just two quick things, and I will ask questions about this
when we get the chance. I think countering what Russia is doing
is an enormously important step for us. They are in a very
comprehensive effort to undermine the very values that our
country has fought for in the post-World War II environment.
They have an incredibly complicated cyber effort, propaganda
effort. They are doing all of this stuff to basically foster
authoritarian regimes at the expense of democracies and to
undermine alliances that the United States has relied on in
that post-World War II world to maintain peace and security and
to protect our interests. I think we need a strategy on that.
And I will be very curious to get your take on exactly what
we are doing in Qatar. We hear what the Secretary of State says
about it, and mere hours later, the President says something
diametrically opposed to that. It is a very destabilizing
situation right now in the Middle East.
I agree with the Secretary of State. We should be finding
ways to solve that problem, not ways to throw gasoline on the
fire. But I am just not clear what the administration's
strategy is.
And considering the fact that CENTCOM [U.S. Central
Command] is located in Qatar, I would think that, Mr.
Secretary, you would have some opinions on what we ought to do
to try to resolve that situation. And I would look forward to
that comment.
And, with that, I yield back and look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 83.]
The Chairman. The committee is pleased to welcome the
Honorable James Mattis, Secretary of Defense; General Joseph F.
Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Mr.
David Norquist, the Under Secretary and Comptroller, who has
been on the job, I think, about a week.
So, welcome, all of you, to the committee.
Without objection, any written comments you would like to
make will be included in the record.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Mattis. Well, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Smith, and members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2018. And I appreciate the committee
accepting my written statement for the record.
I am joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department's new
Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist. As
noted by the chairman, he is new, but he will be vital to
gaining your confidence that we know where our money is going
once you give it to us through a good audit.
This budget request holds me accountable to the men and
women of the Department of Defense. Every day, more than 2
million service members and nearly 1 million civilians do their
duty honoring previous generations of veterans and civil
servants who have sacrificed for our country, and it is a
privilege to serve alongside them.
We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the
sacrifices made by the American people to fund our military.
Many times in the past, we have looked reality in the eye, met
challenges with the help of congressional leadership, and built
the most capable warfighting force in the world.
There is no room for complacency, however, and we have no
God-given right to victory on the battlefield. Each generation
of Americans, from the halls of Congress to the battlefields,
earns victory through commitment and sacrifice. And, yet, for 4
years, the Department of Defense has been subject to or
threatened by automatic across-the-board cuts as a result of
sequester, a mechanism meant to be so injurious to the military
it would never go into effect. But it did go into effect, and
as forecast by then-Secretary of Defense Panetta, the damage
has been severe.
In addition, during 9 of the past 10 years, Congress has
enacted 30 separate continuing resolutions to fund the
Department of Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and
adaptation to new challenges. We need bipartisan support for
this budget request.
In the past, by failing to pass the budget on time or
eliminate the threat of sequestration, Congress sidelined
itself from its active constitutional oversight role.
Continuing resolutions coupled with sequestration blocked new
programs, prevented service growth, stalled industry
initiative, and placed troops at greater risk.
Despite the tremendous efforts of this committee, Congress
as a whole has met the present challenge with lassitude not
leadership. I retired from military service 3 months after
sequestration took effect. Four years later, I have returned to
the Department, and I have been shocked by what I have seen
about our readiness to fight.
While nothing can compare to the heartache caused by the
loss of our troops during these wars, no enemy in the field has
done more to harm the combat readiness of our military than
sequestration. We have only sustained our ability to meet
America's commitments abroad because our troops have stoically
shouldered a much greater burden. But our troops' stoic
commitment cannot reduce the growing risk. It took us years to
get into this situation. It will require years of stable
budgets and increased funding to get out of it.
I urge members of this committee and Congress to achieve
three goals: first, fully fund our request, which required an
increase to the defense budget caps; second, pass a fiscal year
2018 budget in a timely manner to avoid yet another harmful
continuing resolution; and, third, eliminate the threat of
future sequestration cuts so we can provide a stable budgetary
planning horizon.
Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because
of four external forces acting on the Department at the same
time. The first force that we must recognize is 16 years of
war. When Congress approved the All-Volunteer Force in 1973,
our country never envisioned sending our military to war for
more than a decade without pause or conscription. America's
long war has placed a heavy burden on men and women in uniform
and their families.
A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the
worsening global security situation. We must look reality in
the eye. Russia and China are seeking veto power over the
economic, diplomatic, and security decisions on their
periphery. North Korea's reckless rhetoric and provocative
actions continue despite United Nations' censure and sanctions,
while Iran remains the largest long-term challenge to Mideast
stability. All the while, terrorist groups murder the innocent
and threaten peace in many regions and target us.
A third force acting on the Department is adversaries
actively contesting America's capabilities. For decades the
United States enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in
every operating domain or realm. We could generally deploy our
forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and
operate how we wanted. Today, every operating domain, including
outer space, air, sea, undersea, land, and cyberspace, is
contested.
A fourth concurrent force is rapid technological change.
Among the other forces noted thus far, technological change is
one that necessitates new investment, innovative approaches,
and new program starts that have been denied us by law when we
have been forced to operate under continuing resolution.
Each of these four forces--16 years of war, the worsening
security environment, contested operations in multiple domains,
and the rapid pace of technological change--requires stable
budgets and increased funding to provide for the protection of
our citizens and for the survival of our freedoms.
I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as
Secretary of Defense. The fundamental responsibility of our
government is to defend the American people, providing for our
security, and we cannot defend America and help others if our
Nation is not both strong and solvent.
So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the American
public and to the Congress to ensure we spend every dollar
wisely. President Trump has nominated for Senate approval
specific individuals who will bring proven skills to discipline
our Department's fiscal processes to ensure we do so.
This first step to restoring readiness is underway, thanks
to Congress' willingness to support the administration's
request for an additional $21 billion in resources for fiscal
year 2017 to address vital warfighting readiness shortfalls.
Your support put more aircraft in the air, more ships to sea,
and more troops in the field to train. However, we all
recognize that it will take a number of years of higher funding
delivered on time to restore readiness.
To strengthen the military, President Trump requested a
$639 billion top line for the 2018 defense budget. This budget
reflects five priorities:
The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter
readiness begun in fiscal year 2017, filling in the holes from
tradeoffs made during 16 years of war, 9 years of continuing
resolutions, and Budget Control Act caps.
The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality
while preparing for future investment, driven by results from
the National Defense Strategy. Our 2018 budget request ensures
the Nation's current nuclear deterrent will be sustained and
supports continuation of its much-needed modernization process.
The third priority is reforming how the Department does
business. I am devoted to gaining full value from every
taxpayer dollar spent on defense, thereby earning the trust of
Congress and the American people. We have begun implementation
of a range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act and are on track to enter into a full
agency-wide financial statement audit as required by statute. I
urge Congress to support the Department's request for authority
to conduct the 2021 Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC,
round. I recognize the careful deliberation that members must
exercise in considering it. But BRAC is one of the most
successful and significant efficiency programs. We forecast
that a properly focused base closure effort will generate $2
billion or more annually over a 5-year period, enough to buy
300 Apache attack helicopters, 120 F-18s, or 4 Virginia-class
submarines.
The fourth priority in the fiscal year 2018 budget request
is keeping faith with service members and the families.
Talented people are the Department's most valuable asset, but
we must continually balance these requirements against other
investments critical to readiness, equipment, and modernization
to ensure the military is the most capable warfighting force in
the world. Investment in military compensation, blended
retirement, the military health system, and family programs are
essential to fielding the talent we need to sustain our
competitive advantage on the battlefield.
The fifth priority is support for overseas contingency
operations. The fiscal year 2018 President's budget requests
$64.6 billion, focusing on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria, increasing efforts to sustain NATO's [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's] defenses to deter aggression and global
counterterrorism operations. ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] and other terrorist organizations represent a clear and
present danger, and I am encouraged by the willingness of our
allies and partners to share the burden of this campaign.
Moving forward, the fiscal year 2019 budget informed by the
new National Defense Strategy will have to make hard choices as
we shape the fiscal year 2019 to 2023 defense program. The
Department will work with President Trump, Congress, and this
committee to ensure future budget requests are sustainable and
provide the Commander in Chief with viable military options
that support America's security.
I am keenly aware that each of you understand the
responsibility we share to ensure our military is ready to
fight today and in the future. I need your help to inform your
fellow Members of Congress about the reality facing our
military and the need for Congress as a whole to pass the
budget on time.
Thank you for your strong support over many years and for
ensuring our troops have the resources and equipment they need
to fight and win on the battlefield. I pledge to collaborate
closely with you for the defense of our Nation and our joint
effort to keep our Armed Forces second to none.
Chairman Dunford is prepared to discuss the military
dimensions of the budget request.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis can be found in
the Appendix on page 86.]
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to join
Secretary Mattis and Under Secretary Norquist here tonight.
I am honored to represent your men and women in uniform,
and it is because of them I can begin by saying with confidence
that your Armed Forces today are the most capable in the world.
However, the competitive advantage that the United States
military has long enjoyed is eroding.
A number of factors have contributed to that erosion. Since
9/11, an extraordinarily high operational tempo has accelerated
the wear and tear of our weapons and equipment. Meanwhile,
budget instability and the Budget Control Act have forced the
Department to operate with far fewer resources than required
for the strategy of record. As a consequence, we prioritize
near-term readiness at the expense of replacing aging equipment
and capability development. We have also maintained a force
that consumes readiness as fast as we build it. We lack
sufficient capacity to meet current operational requirements
while rebuilding and maintaining full-spectrum readiness.
You know, the Secretary and the service chiefs have
addressed that dynamic in their testimonies, and I fully concur
with their assessments, but beyond the current readiness, we
are confronted with another significant challenge that I assess
to be near term. While we have been primarily focused on the
threat of violent extremism, our adversaries and potential
adversaries have developed advanced capabilities and
operational approaches, and these are specifically designed to
limit our ability to project power. They recognize that our
ability to project power is the critical capability necessary
to defend the homeland, advance our interests, and meet our
alliance commitments.
Secretary Mattis alluded to it today: Russia, China, and
Iran field a wide range of cyber, space, aviation, maritime,
and land capabilities. And these are specifically designed to
limit our ability to deploy, employ, and sustain our forces.
Russia and China have also modernized their nuclear arsenal
while North Korea has been on a relentless path to field a
nuclear ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that can
reach the United States. In just a few years, if we do not
change the trajectory, we will lose our qualitative and
quantitative competitive advantage. The consequences will be
profound. It will adversely affect our nuclear deterrence, our
conventional deterrence, and our ability to respond if
deterrence fails.
Alternatively, we can maintain our competitive advantage
with sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. To that
end, the fiscal year 2018 budget is an essential step. However,
this request alone will not fully restore readiness or arrest
the erosion of our competitive advantage. Doing this will
require a sustained investment beyond fiscal year 2018.
Specific recommendations for fiscal year 2019 and beyond
will be informed by the forthcoming strategy development.
However, we know now that continued growth in the base budget
for at least 3 percent above inflation is the floor necessary
to preserve today's relative competitive advantage.
We ask for your support, and while we do that, we recognize
the responsibility to maintain the trust of the American
taxpayer. We take that seriously and will continue to eliminate
redundancies and achieve efficiencies where possible.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you.
And, more importantly, thanks for ensuring that America's sons
and daughters are never in a fair fight. With that, I am ready
for your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in
the Appendix on page 100.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Norquist, do you have a statement you would like to
make?
Secretary Norquist. I agree with the Secretary, Mr.
Chairman. I have no statement to make.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me just alert members that under the circumstances, I
think it is important to hold members to the 5-minute rule,
and, therefore, short, direct questions will--I have no doubt
with these witnesses--evoke short, direct answers. They are
known for that. And put me on the clock, please.
Mr. Secretary, when the budget came to Congress on May 23,
I think, other than the past week, you were the only Senate-
confirmed person in the Department of Defense of the Trump
administration. And if you look at that budget request, it has
basically the same number of ships and planes, no change in end
strength for the Army and Marines that had already been
planned.
So is it fair to say that essentially what has been sent to
us for fiscal year 2018 is what was already in the works with
some minor adjustments?
Secretary Mattis. Chairman, what we attempted to do with
the fiscal year 2017 supplemental was to fill in as many of the
holes in our readiness as possible. With $21 billion, we were
unable to fill them all. So part of what we are doing,
admittedly, right now, is continuing to fill in holes.
But the growth that we are developing right now this year
is into areas where we balance the force. In other words, we
have got to bring in more cyber troops. We need to do some
things to expand where we have already got gaps that we cannot
simply repair our way out of.
We have got to actually buy some new equipment, this sort
of thing. So we are still in getting the force back on its
feet, a force that you have paid a lot of money for, but it was
not maintained at full readiness, sir.
The Chairman. Well, and just following up on Mr. Smith's
point, the President has said specifically he would like to
have a Navy of 350 ships. He has talked about 12 aircraft
carriers. He talked about Army end strength of 540,000. He has
talked about increasing the number of fighter aircraft and so
forth.
So, for this budget in 2018 that we have gotten so far, it
does not really advance any of those goals, does it?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, it gets us in the right direction.
As the Chairman and I said, it is going to take 3 to 5 percent
in the future to actually grow the force along the lines of
what you are talking about.
But I would also point out that this is $52 billion above
the BCA [Budget Control Act] cap, and that is not something
that we can simply walk in and ignore knowing it is a reality
that you have to deal with.
The Chairman. Yeah. I would just editorially comment: I do
not think anybody thinks that BCA cap is anywhere appropriate
to what we need for our military. And that is what we are
trying to focus on.
Let me just ask you one other question about this. Again,
the White House talks about developing state-of-the-art missile
defense systems. And I think the biggest surprise to me was to
look at the budget for the Missile Defense Agency and see that
go down in 2018 from what it is in 2017. Can you explain that
to me?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, it is a worsening situation. We have
a Ballistic Missile Defense Review underway. But right now, I
am confident that we have what it takes to secure us against
the North Korean threat and buy us some time until we can get
the review done and come to you with a defensible, sustainable
ballistic missile defense buildup.
The Chairman. Chairman Dunford, you talked about that the
2018 budget does not fill all the readiness holes. Secretary
just testified that he was shocked when he came back into the
Department and saw the state of our readiness. I looked through
all of the services' unfunded requirements, which they are
required to give by statute, and there is a lot of readiness in
those unfunded requirements.
So it is true, is it not, that, if there is additional
funds above the President's request, especially on readiness,
that those funds can be well used? Would you agree with that?
General Dunford. Chairman, I would. And I think it is
important at this point to realize that, you know, where
traditional readiness has been considered just operations and
maintenance money, when you have a squadron that has only six
of the primary aircraft authorized that it rates, you can only
have those aircraft so ready and it is still not going to make
a difference. The squadron is still 50 percent ready.
So I would just argue that there is really maybe, this year
now, as a result of the last several years, in many cases there
is a distinction without a difference between readiness and
procurement. In many cases, procurement is necessary in order
to get units ready.
The Chairman. I think that is what is--a point that we have
learned over the past year as well. Thank you.
I would yield to Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I am just wondering, has anyone added up all of the
President's promises in terms of defense, as the chairman and I
have outlined some of them, and is there any notion of what it
would cost to meet those goals in a 5-year plan?
If I am not mistaken, there actually was not a FYDP [Future
Years Defense Program] offered by the President's budget, which
is unusual. And I cannot help but think that it is because--and
you can start the clock on me--I cannot help but think that
that is because you did not want to look at it and see just how
outlandish those numbers would be versus the money we have.
So do you have a number, I mean, if you have 5-year
numbers, to begin to get to what we are--what the President has
talked about?
Secretary Mattis. I do not, sir. We have been digging down
into what we can do right now to get the force ready in its
current situation that we confront. I think there is pretty
common understanding here that the force is going to have to be
improved. That is the common ground we have. And we are going
to have to move out smartly and in concert with the Congress as
we sort out what can be done and what the targets are.
Mr. Smith. Well, I would suggest, as I said in my opening
remarks, that we get more realistic about that. I do not think
it serves any particular purpose to make promises that nobody
has any intention of keeping. So if we could down that to
something that is reasonable.
And, with that, let me just say, one of the things I hope
that the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] is able to
do is, when we are on the floor, we have an amendment to repeal
the BCA and the budget caps. And I would urge in a bipartisan
way that we try to get that out there on the floor and let
Members take that vote, because the Budget Control Act was 6
years ago. It was passed with the goal of reaching a grand
bargain. That did not happen. It is irrelevant. Now, that is
not to say that a $20 trillion debt and a $700 billion deficit
is not a problem. It is just that it is obvious that the Budget
Control Act is a terrible way to go about trying to address it.
Can you help me out on the Qatar question that I raised
earlier? Now, I certainly do understand that Qatar has a mixed
record. But, you know, we are doing this primarily at the
behest of Saudi Arabia, and if you want to talk about a mixed
record, they have a pretty mixed record too: 15 of the 19
hijackers; Wahhabism is one of the more extreme forms of Islam;
they funded madrasas all across the Middle East and South Asia
and North Africa. Now, I have met with the Foreign Minister. I
have been assured that they are trying to reform and move in a
more positive direction. But it just seems odd that we are
working with Saudi Arabia to go after Qatar because Qatar is
doing too much to support groups that are radical extremists.
So what is going on over there, and what should our policy
be?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, it is a very complex situation. You
know, each of those countries manifest its own trajectory of
forward progress. I would tell you that there is common ground,
and that is something President Trump was attempting to
generate and reinforce with the trip that we recently
witnessed.
In that regard, you see Qatar itself, for example, houses
the largest single airbase that we have and the forward
headquarters for our Air Force, our Central Command, and our
special operations.
I would simply point out that we have interoperability
capability with Qatar. And I believe that Prince Thani
inherited a difficult, very tough situation, and he is trying
to turn the society in the right direction.
But we all agree that funding of any kind of terrorist
group is inimical to all of our interests, and I believe that
it is moving in the right direction. We have got to try and
help sort this out with them all.
Mr. Smith. Well, why the disconnect between what Secretary
of State Tillerson has said about the situation and what the
President has said about it?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I believe that the President coming
back from the Middle East was extremely focused on what they
had done in order to try to get everyone to agree on how we
would stop the funding of the enemy groups, to include at times
gray funding. In other words, it is not black and white. It
goes into some kind of nebulous area and shows up there.
So what you are seeing is a continued focus on that. At the
same time, we have obviously got shared interests with Qatar
that, again, holds the biggest base that we have there. So it
is one of those areas where we have got to find the common
ground, make common ground, and move out together, and it has
been a challenge. It is not tidy, I will admit it is not tidy,
but it is something that we have got to work together on.
Mr. Smith. And just a couple of quick comments before my
time runs out. One, that Saudi Arabia is a country that we also
have to work on that issue, because while--I mean, they have
cut this deal. They will support the Wahhabism version of the
religion as long as they do not get violent. The Wahhabism
version of the religion pushes you right up to the edge of that
violence and some would argue is the logical conclusion of it.
So I think we need to put pressure on Qatar. Certainly, we
really need to put pressure on Saudi Arabia to stop the spread
of that ideology.
And I will assume that one of my other colleagues will ask
the question about Russia. We lack a comprehensive strategy to
counter what they are doing. I would like an update on, are we
going to develop one? Do you see that as a critical need? Am I
being, you know, alarmist about what Russia is attempting to do
in so many parts of the world?
So I would be curious about your comments on that, but I
will leave that to my colleagues to follow up on, and yield
back my time.
The Chairman. Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you for being here
and for your service.
Funding for cyber warfare command and U.S. Cyber Command
has been protected in the budget since 2013. This has been a
very high priority for me given responsibilities on both this
committee and House Intelligence Committee.
Admiral Rogers testified recently that, and I am quoting:
To execute our missions, I requested a budget of approximately
$647 million for fiscal year 2018, which is nearly 16 percent
increase from fiscal year 2017. However, cuts to the services
impact our cyber warfare capabilities. Cyber operations to
counter ISIS are funded via OCO [overseas contingency
operations], which could represent a hollow forces structure,
and cyber capability and readiness gaps still exist for
European Command against Russia and U.S. Pacific Command
against China and North Korea.
General Dunford, for you, could you describe the readiness
of our cyber forces to carry out the variety of missions they
need to conduct around the world?
General Dunford. I can, Congressman. Thank you.
We identified a requirement for 133 cyber mission teams,
and that was done in conjunction with U.S. Cyber Command. Right
now, 70 percent of those teams are what we call fully
operational capable. So they have had all the manning, they
have all the training, and they are fully operational capable.
The balance at 133 teams are in initial operational
capability, and they will be in the coming months fully
operational capable. So we are moving towards those 133 teams
being there.
But I think none of us are complacent with where we are in
cyberspace, given the number of threats we face every day. We
need it to defend the network, develop effective offensive
tools, and be in a position to grow the force.
And, Congressman, I think, in fiscal year 2018 and in 2017,
for that matter, we began to reverse a trend that, for over the
past 5 years, in areas like space, cyberspace, electronic
warfare, we have been underfunded. This year is the second year
in a row where we have increased our resources to Cyber
Command.
Mr. LoBiondo. And as a follow-up, General, right now we are
conducting operations against ISIS. But do we have the capacity
to ramp up for additional operations against a different
adversary simultaneously if required?
General Dunford. We do, Congressman. Without going through
details, we are actually simultaneously conducting cyber
operations now against multiple adversaries.
Mr. LoBiondo. And can we handle the current level of
aggressive cyber activity to counter Russia, North Korea,
China, Iran, and others that we are seeing today?
General Dunford. We need to continue to grow the force to
be able to deal with those emerging threats, Congressman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Can you talk to us about what we are doing to
track people and support cyber as a career field--to attract
people and support cyber as a career field?
General Dunford. Congressman, I know Admiral Rogers has
worked very hard on that, as have the services. And I think
there is a combination of incentives as well as going out there
and recruiting high-quality people and then setting good
conditions for them to be retained. But that is something that
we are working on very hard as well.
Mr. LoBiondo. So we are looking at things such as incentive
pay, or bonuses to attract and keep key cyber professionals?
General Dunford. We are actually using those tools now,
Congressman, and always monitoring the force to make sure to
what extent we need to increase use of those tools.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here as well.
Secretary Mattis, I know in your testimony you spoke about
the 3 million service members and civilians that make up the
Department of Defense. And I certainly agree with you and agree
with my colleagues that this committee cannot be expected to
deal with all the issues that we face today, but the reality is
that the people who come into our service, the men and women,
they came from somewhere. You know, they were educated. Perhaps
their families were on food stamps at one time. They got
Federal student loans.
How do we reconcile--and in your position, where I think
you have such a strong voice in this--how do you work with
those issues while we are struggling here to fund defense
appropriately and looking at all of our readiness issues and,
at the same time, we see that the President is cutting many of
the programs that service the people who actually are in the
military? We know that over a third of kids are obese today,
and they cannot serve. They are not able to serve because they
have--they had drug addictions.
There are so many issues that we kind of put them over
there and say, ``Well, those do not really relate to our
military and certainly not to our national security.'' I know
you have thought about this issue. And what is the role that
you see yourself playing even within the Cabinet to try and
have people focus on these issues?
Secretary Mattis. Well, Congresswoman, as you know, I am
not shy about speaking up. I would tell you that we are meeting
our own quality demands right now. We have not had to lower our
standards at all.
But you are absolutely accurate that we have a shrinking
percentage of our 18-year-old, 20-year-old--that population we
do a lot of recruiting from--we have a shrinking percentage
that can qualify to enlist in the Army, for example, as a
private. So I would take no issue with it. I think it is all of
our responsibilities, whether we are in the executive branch,
the legislative, or we are a local school district member.
But it is not one that I can speak about with authority. I
have been rather consumed, as you will understand, with the
portfolio I have. But I do not take any issue with what you are
saying.
So far, I will tell you, it has not inhibited our quest for
high-quality young men and women who are rallying to the flag.
Mrs. Davis. Do you hear other voices speaking up on this in
this room?
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Well, I hope so. And I appreciate your
doing that as well.
I wonder if you could just turn for a second and,
certainly, General, as well, and just speak to us about your
current thinking on Afghanistan. As I think that the public is
aware, it is becoming--feels much more chaotic and violent, and
there are very few options for us.
What do you see as the status, and where can we go with
this?
Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, we are taking a regional
approach to this. We are looking at everything from the
situation between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan,
obviously Iran, that whole South Asia area, because if we look
at it in isolation, you will probably have something that is
lacking in some area.
We are going to have to recognize that problems that come
out of ungoverned spaces like that, as we experienced on 9/11,
those problems do not stay there. They can come home to roost
here. So there will be no turning a blind eye to it.
We have got to determine what level of support is necessary
and how we orchestrate the international community, not just
the American but the international community, to deal with
this. We will take that forward to the President for a decision
very soon.
Mrs. Davis. And, General Dunford, I know that you serve
very actively there as well. Do the numbers that are being
talked about and--are those in isolation from other tools in
our toolbox essentially? Do we need to be doing something else
with civilians?
General Dunford. Sure. We have listened very carefully to
General Nicholson's assessment of the situation. I think we are
all concerned about the security trends over the last 2 years,
not the least of which is the significant number of casualties
the Afghan forces have suffered.
So we have gone to Secretary Mattis and the President with
some options that might be considered in order to reverse those
trends. But as the Secretary said, we will consider Afghanistan
in the broader context of a regional strategy as well.
But we do have some things that we are considering to turn
around the trends and better enable the Afghan security forces,
who, as you know, have been in the lead for the last 2 years
providing security for their country. So this is not about us
being in the fight. It is about us doing things for the Afghans
to be more successful than they have been over the last two
summers.
Mrs. Davis. Do you have the resources that you need, both
in the military and on the civilian side?
General Dunford. As you suggested, Congresswoman, the
options will include not just--it is not just about numbers of
troops. It is about authorities. It is about other things we
can do, diplomatic and economically as well.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, thank you for being here. You referenced
that President Trump has talked about rebuilding the military
and has called for an end to sequestration. You have called on
us to help you rebuild the military and to end sequestration.
And on all that, we agree.
As we look to 2018, though, we are very concerned that this
budget falls short of our ability to help you do that. There
are important needs that you know that we see that are not met,
and one of those is the concerns that we have for the end
strength and what numbers are needed.
So, in the discussion of what do we need, we can look to
your statements, that we currently have an Army that is doing
more than it has ever done. And if we look backwards to a time
when the Army had less to do, when we thought the world was
more safe, it certainly is pre-9/11. Pre-9/11, we had 482,000
troops in Active Force. Today, we have 476 in current Active
Force.
Now, we know where we were going. President Obama had
proposed drawing down the Army even further. He was going to be
460 for fiscal year 2017, 450 for fiscal year 2018. Chris
Gibson and I working with the chairman drafted the POSTURE Act
[Protecting Our Security through Utilizing Right-Sized End-
Strength Act of 2016], and the Republican Congress prevented
that drawdown, which keeps us at 476 today, still below the
peacetime 482 of pre-9/11.
Now, General Milley has recently come out and said: I need
100,000 more. In this article here, he is proposing that we
have Active Forces of 550,000, higher than the pre-9/11.
If we look at the unfunded requirements for fiscal year
2018, we know that the Army has asked for an additional 10,000
Active, an additional 7,000 National Guard. Those are troops
that they said that they needed but did not get. And it is very
unusual in unfunded requirements to actually have force
requests. Usually, they have like planes and tanks, not people.
So, Secretary Mattis, we do not want to give you a hollow
force. But if we are going to do more, do you need more
soldiers?
Secretary Mattis. I believe we do. I do not take any issue
with the unfunded priorities list as far as a requirement. I
think the base budget has the right priorities. If there is
more money available, then I think that is a pretty good list:
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines.
I would add, however, that we have got to have a stable
budget horizon in the future. If we bring those troops in and
we do not have a good budget by next year, then it is going to
come out of our operation and maintenance and our modernization
as we pay their salaries because, if we go under a CR
[continuing resolution]--again, 9 out of the last 10 years, we
have had some form of this--then we end up with an Army that
actually, with the best of intentions, starts hollowing out.
So it has got to be a balanced approach, sir. And right
now, I think this is the way to set the conditions with fiscal
year 2018. Excuse me, go ahead, sir.
Mr. Turner. No, that is okay. As you know, we have been in
those CRs because we have not had agreement between the House
and the Senate and the outgoing administration on what to do.
And so I am going to ask you about your conversations with OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] because that currently is
where one of our problems are as we are looking at the House
trying to increase spending to give you what it is that you
need.
Could you give us some ideas? What do they say? Do they
know that you have planes that cannot fly, that you have pilots
that do not get flying time, that you have soldiers that are
not ready, and that you have shortfalls in ammunition,
training, and spare parts? Because the budget that they gave us
does not fix that. And what is OMB saying? Because we would
like to fix it now. We do not want to wait.
Secretary Mattis. Well, sir, as you know, that is why we
came to you for $21 billion just a few months ago to start
reversing this. Fiscal year 2018 is how we are going to try to
stabilize the problem and fill it in in a way that allows us to
balance the force.
This is where we will get the additional cyber troops and
start building out like this. But the real growth comes in 2019
to 2023 with a program that OMB is keenly aware we need and
President Trump has highlighted to OMB. So we have his support
on this.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mattis, I have got a question and I
think I know the answer and that you are going to want to
answer, and that is on sequestration: 142 of us sent the
Speaker of the House a letter asking him to put on the House
floor a bill repealing sequestration. Every member of the Armed
Services Committee signed it on the Republican side. We
certainly believe that the President's call for ending
sequestration is important.
I recall--and I am not sharing classified information
here--when you called us in for a classified meeting on North
Korea, we were all waiting to hear what you were going to say,
and the first thing you said is repeal sequestration. That was
more important than what you were going to tell us about what
the threat was from North Korea.
So I have got a question for you: Secretary Mattis, should
we vote to repeal sequestration?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
service to the Nation and for your testimony today.
Secretary Mattis, in the past, you have acknowledged the
impacts of climate change on our National Security Strategy,
stating, and I quote: ``Climate change is impacting stability
in areas of the world where our troops are operating today,''
end quote.
We are certainly aware of these coming dangers, first here
in Rhode Island, being a coastal State. As such, I think it is
critical to address how the Department of Defense quantifies
the cost of climate change.
I also assume that there is a cost in adapting our National
Security Strategy to defend new sea-lanes in the Arctic or
respond to regional instability abroad as a result of
desertification, famine, and climate-related economic
challenges.
As someone who has thought deeply about this in the past,
how are you guiding DOD [Department of Defense] to address
these strategic and tactical challenges?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I cannot quantify the cost. I
will tell you, it is part of the physical environment, the
warming. And for us, it comes down to, for example, we have a
new sea that is navigable more year round, where the winter ice
no longer extends as far south. So that is a national security
consideration.
We look at these as they develop, sir, from the warming
climate. And we take it into account. But it is hard to
quantify the cost. It is simply part of the broadening
appreciation of the situation that we confront.
Mr. Langevin. Can you talk about the steps that at least
you are taking to identify those costs?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, let me get back--I want to give you
a good answer. Let me get back to you on that one.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough.
Secretary Mattis. Because there is, as you know, almost a
Rubik's Cube of ways that you address one thing because it
impacts another, and how you contain the analysis is actually
quite challenging.
But the bottom line is we have to address whatever the
physical environment brings, whether it is storms in an area
where we are responding with humanitarian or whatever else. I
mean, this is all part of the physical environment.
Mr. Langevin. I take you at your word, and I look forward
to your more thorough answer then, Secretary.
Secretary and Chairman Dunford, I believe that the value of
our American power projection lies in our diverse and flexible
abilities beyond traditional warfighting domains. Today, these
strengths are jeopardized by the administration's shortsighted
budget proposal, which fails to recognize the overlapping
impacts of these varied interests.
For example, underfunding the State Department will strain
U.S. efforts to maintain our present level of diplomatic and
military influence across the globe, and underfunding the
Department of Education and Health and Human Services will
undermine the military's ability to recruit the best and the
brightest should we fail to invest in science, innovation, and
programs that ensure Americans can meet the educational and
fitness criteria of the Armed Forces.
This is especially important in areas where technological
change is outpacing our ability to match our adversaries and
especially where focusing heavily on the third offset strategy.
Would you agree with this assessment? What other specific
challenges do you face when national interests are underfunded?
General Dunford. Congressman, I will start with that. Look,
I would agree with the point that you make. In every challenge
that we are dealing with right now, there is a military
dimension to the challenge, but also we require assistance from
the State Department, Justice Department, other elements of the
government, what we call whole-of-government solutions are
required.
And all of the challenges that you recited all require
whole-of-government challenge. What we have done in the fiscal
year 2018 budget, of course, is address the resources necessary
for the military dimension of those challenges you referred to.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the State Department, the Defense
Department are tied very tightly as we go into these
situations. I will give you an example of ISIS. We just had a
conference here. State Department hosted it. Sixty-six nations
plus INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization],
Arab League, NATO, European Union, and they all sat down
together, not to talk about just the combat part, which we were
able to address in about 15 percent of the conference, but 85
percent was spent talking about the post-combat and how do we
make certain, when we defeat them, how do we keep the next
group from rising?
My point is that these take the whole-of-government effort.
And right now, the Defense Department and State Department work
very closely. Not a week goes by where Secretary Tillerson and
I are not personally sitting down together for hours. And we
talk probably five, six, seven times a week as we try to make
this a real tight team to address this sort of situation.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dunford and Secretary Mattis, the last
administration was not very aggressive or, in my opinion,
serious in confronting Russia about its INF [Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces] violations. We have not had a senior military
or DOD official testify before this committee that they believe
that Russia is going to come back into compliance with the INF
Treaty.
So my question is, is this administration going to
seriously confront Russia about their INF violations? And are
you prepared or will you be prepared anytime in the near future
to give us a set of military options for their violation--
continued violation?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we are meeting on the apparent
violations, alleged violations, what looks like violations to
us. We are meeting on it interagency-wide as we speak. And
probably in closed hearing, at least initially, because we will
also be consulting with NATO allies, for example, on this.
As we build the international understanding of what has
happened, we can brief you, I would say, soon. I cannot give
you a specific date, but we are engaged on the effort right
now.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you.
General Dunford, in March, your Vice Chairman, General
Selva, testified before us and said, quote: ``There is no
higher priority for the Joint Force than fielding all of the
components of an effective nuclear deterrent, and we are
emphasizing the nuclear mission over all other modernization
programs when faced with that choice. Nuclear modernization can
no longer be deferred as a result of previous delays in
deferrals, all well considered. We are currently depending on
just-in-time modernization and replacement of many of the
components for our nuclear triad,'' closed quote.
General, do you share this priority and emphasis on
ensuring our nuclear modernization programs remain on schedule?
General Dunford. Congressman, I do. And that priority has
been reflected in both the 2017 and the 2018 budget.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Secretary Mattis, do you believe that we should fully fund
your fiscal year 2018 budget request for these programs or
decrease the funding until we see the results of the NPR
[Nuclear Posture Review]?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I am confident right now that
maintaining a safe and secure nuclear deterrent is supported by
the current budget, and we do not have to wait. What that
review will do is tell us where we are going in the longer
term, but right now, we know what we can do right now to keep
the deterrent safe.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Secretary Mattis, I would like to commend you a study by
Dr. Colin Gray, which I request be entered into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
[The study referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
115.]
Mr. Rogers. In it, Dr. Gray states, quote: ``The American
triad now begs for modernization to remain operational in
coming years and deserves the attention and support of the U.S.
leadership. In particular, the LRSO [Long Range Standoff]
cruise missile will be a weapon with a performance character
that must be highly desirable, even essential, to meet the kind
of challenges of most concerned,'' closed quote.
Dr. Gray also points out the long history of the use of
dual-capable cruise missiles by both Russia and the United
States, and said concerns about the LRSO as being destabilizing
are overwrought, overstated, and unpersuasive.
Secretary Mattis, I am going to save my question for the
record, but I know you are a reader. And I would commend this
study to you as you review the NPR.
Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, everyone.
Mr. Norquist, I have got a question for you, just very
quick. Do you anticipate, as Comptroller, that you will be able
to keep the timelines this committee would like to see the
Pentagon keep in conducting the audit of Pentagon programs?
Secretary Norquist. Yes. We will have the Department, all
the major elements of the Department under audit in 2021--in
2018, as required. That will include stand-alone audits for
many of the organizations and an overarching audit of the
entire Department overseen by the DOD IG [Department of Defense
Inspector General].
Most of those contracts are already awarded. There is one
or two that are waiting to be finalized and awarded. But we
have every expectation to be fully compliant and fully under
audit.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. And I anticipate other folks will have
questions for you on that, but I wanted to be sure you were
listening. No, I am sure you are.
General Mattis, I want to return to Mr. Rogers' questions
in theme only when it comes to the Nuclear Posture Review. Do
you anticipate the NPR will decide on a triad versus dyad
debate, or do you anticipate it will focus on specific programs
within the nuclear enterprise? How are you approaching it?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we are going to have to address
both. I think that whether it is a triad or a dyad will be
resolved very, very early because of the strength of the triad
right now, frankly. And then we will continue with the rest of
the review.
Mr. Larsen. At that--okay. All right. Do you anticipate
that it will come out in stages like that, or do you anticipate
one report at one time?
Secretary Mattis. Right now, I anticipate one report, but,
you know, if it looks like it can come out in stages, I would
be willing to look at it. Right now, it is going to come out as
one report.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Thank you.
Perhaps for General Dunford: So some of this debate in the
recent past is that the NSC [National Security Council] has
been more of an operational--too operational. It needs to
return to being more strategic. And part of that discussion has
resulted in this conversation about giving operators and
combatant commanders and those below them in the hierarchy more
authorities, additional authorities, especially when it comes
to anti-ISIS and other counterterrorism operations.
I do not have a big heartburn with that myself, but I do
believe that there is still the oversight question is
important, that it is still--whether it is policies set at NSC,
whether it is policies set at NSC and DOD together, or if it is
a set of actions taken by operators that then evolves into a
policy, it is still policy, and it should be coming back to us
for oversight.
Now, that is a statement. And I kind of want to get your
feel on, one, do you think the changes on authorizations have
been either that noticeable or that great in the last 4 months,
first? And, second, what is your thought on the oversight
question from this committee?
General Dunford. Congressman, I think the issue really is
speed of decision making. And that more than the level at which
decisions are made has been the point that Secretary Mattis has
emphasized since he came in.
I will tell you, having been in both administrations, the
fundamental issues of force levels, authorities, and those
kinds of things have rested either with the Secretary of
Defense or the President in accordance with established policy.
So there has not been a change in that regard. What the
Secretary has emphasized is speed at the speed of relevance,
meaning to support the commander. So we have emphasized that.
And the other thing I would just say is that, in my
experience, the national security decision-making process
reflects the decision-making style of the President. And I am
not sure there is a good or bad. It is the process reflects the
degree of detail that the President wants to maintain oversight
on.
So what we have seen is that the President has delegated to
the Secretary certain authorities in order to make him more
responsive to commanders on the ground. But I can assure you
that, on some of the major issues, there has been no change in
the oversight nor will there be a change in what Congress is
able to provide oversight for.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. Just in my last 30 seconds, it is
really not a question, but I do want to put a plug in for the
Electronic Warfare EXCOM [Executive Committee]. It has been a
long road to get to an EXCOM, and I urge you to make EW
[electronic warfare] a priority both in terms of leadership and
investment and training and in R&D [research and development].
We have lost it in the past, and I think we finally got the
Pentagon where it needs to be on EW overall, not just sort of
service-to-service, so I would like to make sure you note that.
Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, for
your lifetime commitment to human freedom.
Thank you, Secretary Mattis, that you keep our enemies
awake at night.
Secretary Mattis, defense officials in South Korea and the
U.S. as well have confirmed claims by North Korea that their
ballistic missile launch of a liquid-fuel Hwasong-12 on May 14
successfully survived reentry. I consider that to be a very
significant and dangerous development. And then, a few days
ago, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency Vice Admiral
Syring, testified in open committee before the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee that, quote: We must assume that North Korea today
can range the United States with an ICBM carrying a nuclear
warhead.
Mr. Secretary, this new and alarming judgment suggests that
the North Koreans are making significant progress as a result
of their ballistic missile tests, yet the President's budget
request for the Missile Defense Agency is $7.9 billion, which
is the average MDA budget throughout the Obama administration.
So my question is, in your best military opinion, is the threat
posed by ballistic missiles greater now than it was under the
Obama administration, and is that threat growing, shrinking, or
staying the same? And if the threat is increasing, why would we
wait for the Ballistic Missile Defense Review to at least fund
the $1 billion unfunded request recently submitted by the
Missile Defense Agency?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, right now, I would say that
the threat is growing. However, what we have in Fort Greely now
and in California I believe is sufficient to buy us time so
that, when we come to you with a program, I can defend it and I
will not come back and say we had it misjudged or targeted in
the wrong direction.
As you know, this is something that takes a high-tech, very
focused effort, and I want to make certain that what I am
asking for can sustain the way ahead in terms of giving us a
real capability. And I also assume that every time they fire
one of these, they are learning something more. So it is a
worsening situation. But we can buy the time right now,
Congressman.
Mr. Franks. Well, let me, if I could, just leverage off of
that and say that, under your budget requests, in Fort Greely
and Vandenberg, once we deploy those 44 ground-based
interceptors this year, we will not be able to continue to test
and improve their reliability of the system without having to
pull interceptors out of the ground, which means we will fall
below 44 operational deployed interceptors to protect the
United States homeland. And I guess I would just ask, are you
aware of that, and do you believe that is an acceptable risk in
this threat environment?
Secretary Mattis. I am aware of it, and based on what we
think North Korea has and could have in the near future, I am
still confident that we can defend the country, and we will
take steps to expand and distribute this capability, ballistic
missile defense capability, further.
In fact, right now, should we need another site, for
example, on the East Coast to defend the East Coast, we are
doing the environmental impact statement, so, in the event we
have got to come to you and say we need to do more, we are not
starting at that point with something that would take some
time.
So we are not at all blind to this, Congressman, and I
accept your concern 100 percent.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Secretary. And General Dunford,
would you have anything to add to either one of those points?
General Dunford. The only thing I would say, Congressman,
is that, when we look at the North Korean threat, you correctly
point out ballistic missile defense as being critical, but when
we balance it and you look at our investments in cyber
capabilities in the intelligence community, maritime
capabilities, all of those also are designed for North Korean
threats. When we look at the North Korean challenge, we have
got to balance capability development across multiple areas and
not just the missile defense capability area.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you both, and keep them awake if
you can. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
witnesses, Secretary Mattis, Chairman Dunford, and Under
Secretary Norquist.
Secretary Mattis, it was a pleasure to meet you during the
CODEL [congressional delegation] that our chairman led to the
Shangri-La Dialogue. With two visits to the Indo-Asia-Pacific,
I have particularly appreciated your commitment to positive
engagement within the region. While we, our allies, and
partners have been subjected to mixed messages, at best, from
the administration, it is my hope that the rhetoric and the
actions of the Department of Defense will signal consistency.
So, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, if you could
speak about the value of forward-deployed forces in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific region in augmenting your toolbox, given political
and financial considerations, what additional value is gained
by having forces stationed on a United States territory? And
what flexibility does it provide and what limitations does it
remove to allow you and your force providers to be ready and
ready to engage, when necessary?
Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, the Asia-Pacific theater
is a priority theater for the United States for the United
States Department of Defense. The value of the forward-deployed
forces in themselves is that they are a stabilizing element. If
we did not have them out there and we had to flow them in the
event of a crisis, it could actually be a destabilizing
element, as people were adjusting to a force that was not there
before, whereas if they are out there in position, then they
are present and any adversary would have to consider that if
they were up to mischief.
I would also say that having these forces on United States
territory, whether it be Guam or Hawaii, obviously our
sovereignty allows us certain freedoms of action and
sustainment out there that we would not otherwise have the
confidence in.
Ms. Bordallo. General Dunford.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, the Secretary kind of
outlined it. From our perspective, I would just tell you,
having been in the Pacific with you last week let me look at it
through the lens of our allies and our adversaries. I would
tell you us being forward certainly is great assurance to our
allies that we can meet our alliance commitments, and it also
serves as a deterrent to our potential adversaries in a region,
as well.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I thank you both for your comments. I
have another question for you, Secretary Mattis. Reflecting on
your visits and discussions with senior military and political
officials in the region, what role do our alliances,
particularly the United States-Japan relationship, play in
strengthening our posture and furthering our national
interests?
Additionally, how is the DOD strengthening partnerships
through incorporating inter-organizational cooperation into
planning and operations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region?
Secretary Mattis. Well, ma'am, I came into the Department
with the priorities of strengthening our military,
strengthening our alliances, and reforming our business
practices so we get the best use of every dollar that we get.
In terms of strengthening alliances, the United States-
Japan alliance has stood the test of time. They pay an enormous
amount of the costs of our forces that are there in the
Japanese islands, and we also have a technological relationship
with them. They are a very capable force. Their navy, as you
know, uses our systems, our ballistic missile defense systems,
for example. So this is a two-way street in terms of benefit
for the defense of our own homeland as well as for the defense
of Japan.
But I do not think that right now we can find--they are in
that top tier of allies, frankly, that we have around the
world. I do not think we can find a better one.
Ms. Bordallo. So you feel then that Japan and the United
States in its partnership for the buildup in the United States
territory is solid?
Secretary Mattis. I absolutely am certain. I have met with
Prime Minister Abe, and he is committed to it, to include
helping to fund the move of the Marines from Okinawa and the
other Japanese islands down to Guam, and we will continue
working it along those lines of a partnership with Japan and
get the Marines in place.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I thank you both for your support. And
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you.
General Mattis or Secretary Mattis, thank you for your
clear statement on supporting the audit of the books and
records of the financial statements of the Department of
Defense. Thank you for that continued leadership and
supportive, obviously, leadership from the top.
General Dunford, I took a quick look at your statement, did
not necessarily see something there, but I hope we can count on
your leadership among the uniformed folks, because they are the
ones at the pointy end of the sword on most of those
transactions, and making sure that you have added your
leadership to making sure that happens, and so I assume that is
the case.
General Dunford. That is the case, Congressman.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you. And, Mr. Norquist, welcome to a
terrific team. You and I were having a brief conversation at
the start of the hearing that your experience--was it DHS
[Department of Homeland Security]?
Secretary Norquist. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. They have now finished 4 years of audited
financial statements?
Secretary Norquist. Correct. They did not have a clean
opinion when I was brought there as the CFO [chief financial
officer], but they already had an audit, and we implemented a
process to turn that around with corrective action plans. DHS
now has had four clean opinions.
Mr. Conaway. Well, that is fantastic. Obviously, the
Department of Defense spends a few more dollars than DHS, but
thank you for bringing your talent and leadership to that task
as well.
General Dunford mentioned something about a 3 percent above
the base rate of inflation would be necessary just to simply
keep pace with where we are going. Mr. Norquist, could you give
us a dollar amount what that might look like, assuming just a
flat 3 percent, a zero-based inflation, what the dollar amount
would be? I know the math, but would you put that in record
what that math would look like?
Secretary Norquist. I would be happy to. You want it for
the record, sir?
Mr. Conaway. I would rather have you just state it right
out, something in the order of $20 billion.
Secretary Norquist. $639 billion at 3 percent would be
about $18 billion to $20 billion a year, sir.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Thank you very much. I appreciate
that. I did not mean to put you on the spot. General Mattis,
you mentioned BRAC in 2021. Obviously, it takes a lot of money
to implement a BRAC--obviously a BRAC process to go through
will spend that money, but actually those recommendations then
result in a--construction and decommissioning, all kinds of
expenses that go into that. Saving those dollars on the back
end are clearly important, but could you talk to us somewhat
about, are there operational reasons why we would go through a
BRAC, given that today's force looks dramatically different in
terms of training needs--I am maybe trying to answer your
question for you, but I want folks to know that, while it takes
a long time to recoup those dollars, there may very well be
things that, other than the dollars and cents, that would lead
us to make some of those hard decisions.
Secretary Mattis. Well, exactly, sir. The money that we
free up from closing an unneeded base continues to accrue to
us. It takes a couple years to start taking the profits, of
course, because we have to close the base down, but once those
reduced costs for that unnecessary base go away, then every
year you are gaining that money for training, for buying new
equipment, for modernization.
I am not comfortable right now that we have a full 20-some
percent excess. I need to go back through and look through this
again because I do not want to, you know, get rid of something
or come to you with something that we cannot sustain and we try
and say we have got to buy some land here in 10 years. So we
will take a look at it, sir, but it is a great way to free up
money.
Mr. Conaway. Clearly, we try to do that, and the 2005 BRAC
may today be saving us money, but I guess what I was looking
for, are there reasons, operational reasons, training, better
locating folks together that have been in separate bases
across, are there reasons why we would do that separate and
apart from the savings and where those savings would accrue to
the future?
Secretary Mattis. I am sure we would find some of that,
sir. I would have to look at each individual case to state that
firmly.
Mr. Conaway. I think as we start down that path of doing a
BRAC, the checkered history of the 2005 BRAC, we are going to
need reasons other than just a straight savings in terms of
making that happen, and if there are operational reasons why we
would close some bases, open other bases, build new places and
certain other spots in order to train better, more efficiently,
be able to deploy quicker and more efficiently, all those
things would be helpful as well.
So, again, thank all three of you for your service. And I
yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony today. I
would like to go back to where the chairman and ranking member
started off talking about this budget in the context of a lot
of the expectations that have built up before it was submitted,
in particular in terms of the Navy.
Over the last 3 years, we have had strategic reviews
including a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower--
actually, General Dunford participated in that review again--
which talked about the need to grow the fleet larger than 308
ships. We had the Force Structure Assessment that Secretary
Mabus submitted last December, which, again, put an exact
number saying that we should build a fleet of 355 ships. We
had, in early 2017, an accelerated shipbuilding plan, which
Assistant Secretary Stackley sent over, which actually showed a
roadmap in terms of how we can jump-start that process and
called for a minimum of 12 ships in the 2018 budget to again
get us moving in that direction. Three force structure and
architectural studies that Navy--architectural studies that
this committee commissioned--which actually talked about even
bigger numbers in terms of the fleet.
And now we get a budget which, on the 23rd, it actually had
only eight ships on it; on the 24th of May, it grew a ship.
But, you know, there is just no debate really about the fact
that, you know, what is going on out there, and we hear from
Admiral Harris, and we hear from General Scaparrotti in terms
of the demands out there, and we are living off a legacy fleet
in terms of the ships that we have out there.
I do not understand the hesitation in this budget in terms
of taking advantage of all the work that has been done over the
last 3 years to have, again, a more robust shipbuilding plan
than what was sent over.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I think, once we get our
strategy review done, so we can give you a compelling logic,
not just for number of Navy ships but number of Air Force
fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons, the number of Army
brigades--we have got to weave this whole fabric together to
make certain we have a joint force that is ready to fight. I
would love to have more ships. You are right. There are nine
ships in this one, in this 2018 budget, and we know that we
need more, but we have got to get our plan together. As you
know, we have been in place here only about 5 months, and we
need to get our analysis basically harvested from all those
that you just mentioned and then come up with a planned way
ahead.
But as you know, ships are expensive, and we have got to
make certain that we have the budget to support it. And, right
now, I cannot ignore the reality of the U.S. Army situation or
the Air Force fighter squadrons, the Navy aircraft, all the
other things we are having to spend money on.
Mr. Courtney. Well, again, I mentioned all those prior
studies, which really were built around a strategic foundation.
Again, it was not just a wish list that was put out there.
And I would also just know, having been on the subcommittee
for 10 years now, is that shipbuilding is a long game. You have
got to send a demand signal out, not just the big shipyards but
also the supply chain, which frankly went through a
shipbuilding holiday in the early 2000s and which really
destroyed, you know, a really healthy industrial base and
supply chain. And I, frankly, think this budget, you know,
undercuts that demand signal that people really, I think, were
really starting to believe in, in terms of what we have seen
over the last 3 years.
So I would just say that I think our subcommittee is not
going to wait. I mean, I think you are going to see, frankly,
some work being done on this side to really take advantage of
the great work that all these studies have accumulated over the
last 3 or 4 years and, again, which we hear in person from
combatant commanders about the fact that they are playing zone
defense out there against the Chinese navy and the Russian
navy. And that is really just not an acceptable state of
affairs, particularly given the fact that we are going to see
legacy ships coming offline in greater numbers than the
replacement volume that a nine-ship budget calls for. That is a
308-ship Navy budget that was sent over here, not a 350-ship
budget.
And, again, I have the highest respect for all of you, and
I think you understand, you know, what is going on out there
and the need to grow the fleet, but we have got to do better
than what was sent over.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dunford, Secretary Mattis, Mr. Norquist, again,
thank you so much for your commitment and service to our
Nation. I do want to continue along the lines of questions
about shipbuilding.
Secretary Mattis, you stated, which I think is
extraordinarily important, the need for us to understand that
we have been marking time, at best, here in the last several
years and that our adversaries are advancing. That is
problematic. You also talked about the capabilities that they
have, the ones they continue to develop, and if we are going to
have the ability to make sure that we influence the course of
events, United States presence is critical around the world.
The Navy-Marine Corps team is a critical part of that, and I
know I am speaking to the choir here.
But I do want to build on the question asked before, and
that is, across the spectrum, I have not heard anybody that has
disagreed with saying 355 is not a number that we should direct
our efforts toward. And this year's budget has us on track to
get to the number that is in the outdated 30-year shipbuilding
plan of 308 ships.
So the question being is, if there is this near universal
agreement that 355 is where we need to be, we cannot mark time;
we need to catch up. Our adversaries are doing everything they
can in building additional capacity, whether it is under the
seas, across the spectrum with aircraft carriers, surface navy.
The question is, is it does seem counterintuitive to say we are
just going to do eight ships this year or nine ships. I
understand wanting to maintain those and making sure we are
doing those things. But another thing that is additionally
troubling, not with just the number of ships, but this year's
budget request actually cuts a billion dollars out of
shipbuilding accounts.
So, in that realm, my question is, why only nine ships this
year, but more fundamentally, with cutting a billion dollars
out of the shipbuilding accounts, how do we see our Navy
getting to 355 ships, and when will we be able to get there?
You know, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] has done an
assessment about when we believe we can get there. We think we
have the industrial capacity to get there. The question is
strategically for our Nation the urgency of getting there.
Give me your perspective, both Secretary Mattis and
Chairman Dunford, about those two elements, the numbers and the
dollars reflected in this year's budget.
Secretary Mattis. Well, I share your sense of urgency, sir.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we did not get into this
situation in one year, and we are not going to get out of it in
one year. And I recognize that Congress has responsibility to
raise armies and sustain navies, but we cannot do in one year
or put a marker down in one year. It is unrealistic. And I
mentioned that we are going to have to have sustained growth
fiscal year 2019 to 2023, and this is where you will see the
biggest growth Army, Air Force, and Navy showing up, as we are
still digging ourselves out of a readiness, operation, and
maintenance hole. Furthermore, we are engaged in operations
where we have to come to you and ask for OCO funding, overseas
contingency operations funding. When you get done, there is a
carrying capacity that we can carry as part of the present
budget, and we just have to recognize that.
But I take no issue with what you are saying or the sense
of urgency as we try to deal with what amounts to years of
falling behind.
Mr. Wittman. Chairman Dunford.
General Dunford. Congressman, I think that this highlights
the debate we had internal inside the Department as a result of
not modernizing in so many areas at the same time. What I can
tell you is I am confident we have the right priorities within
the budget, but I am also, as the Congressman mentioned
earlier, I was part of at least one of these studies that
articulated the need for more ships, and so I understand that
also as Secretary Mattis' global force manager trying to meet
on a day-to-day basis the combatant commanders' demands.
This really does reflect the challenge outlined in my
opening remarks, is that this year and last year it started, we
are confronted with literally what has been described as a bow
wave of modernization in the nuclear enterprise, in the cyber
capabilities, our electronic warfare capabilities, space
resilience, maritime capabilities, land forces. And so what we
try to do is just get the right balance within the top line
that we have been given.
It is also why I highlighted that minimum of 3 percent just
to maintain the competitive advantage that we have today. And
that actually is a marker for saying that if we do want to get
to 355 ships, if we do want to get to the number of the brigade
combat teams that have been identified, if we do want to get to
the numbers of squadrons that are required, it is going to take
sustained growth over time. And that is why 2019, 2020, 2021,
and 2022 are so important because we just could not get there
in 2018.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to you
both this evening. It is good to see you before us. It seems to
me, as we have been talking here today and you have both given
voice to the variety of threats we face, whether it is from
those who wish us ill but also from the changing dynamics of
how we have to respond to, for example, cyber and making sure
we are making all the appropriate investments, it is sort of a
dual-track challenge we have.
It is clear to me that the military services, you all need
to recruit from a talent pool that is as broad as possible.
General Dunford, you represented, you said how important it is
to secure our competitive advantage, and, Secretary Mattis, you
talk about having the most capable warfighting force in the
world, and that does come down to people.
An analysis conducted for the Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services estimated that only 29 percent of young
people ages 18 to 23 are eligible to serve after you apply all
the filters that rule people out. And I think you referenced
that number, too. Of that population of eligible individuals,
more than 51 percent happen to be women. However, less than 20
percent of today's Active Duty Force is comprised of women. In
an era where the eligible military recruiting population
remains on the decline, it seems to me it is ever more
important that we recruit from the entire population and not
disregard or discourage half of our Nation's talent pool.
So, with that in mind, how do we--how are you all thinking
about your recruiting efforts around bringing women into the
military so that you do have that full array of talents that
are needed in this very dynamic environment, and in thinking
about that, how do you make the case for the invaluable
contributions they could be making to serving their country in
the military?
So I will start with you, Secretary Mattis.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, Congresswoman.
I do not think in any way we disregard or discourage it. In
fact, we are fortunate for decades now to have had superb
women--they are not good; they are outstanding--in our ranks. I
think the quality standards are being met across the board, men
and women, enlisted and officer ranks. So right now I would
just tell you that they are, without the pressure of
conscription or the draft, we are getting volunteers of eye-
watering quality of men and women.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, I would agree that is the case of those
who come in, but the reality is, of that larger pool, only 20
percent are seeking to serve. So, yes, I think there has to be
some thinking on better recruitment efforts in order to bring
more of that pool in.
But I also wanted to follow up that I was glad to hear in
January that, in your confirmation hearings, you were committed
to having men and women serve alongside each other as long as
all parties met the standards necessary for the job. Under your
predecessors, the services launched a review of the physical
standards that all services have to meet in combat arms--and I
have seen some of that process at Natick Soldier Systems in
Massachusetts--but to establish the physiological standards in
order to integrate women into every occupation specialty.
My question is, how are you planning on assessing the
progress of ongoing integration efforts?
Secretary Mattis. I would have to see if the services have
identified any problems or our various surveys find a problem.
If there is a problem, we will assess it and solve it, I
guarantee you.
Ms. Tsongas. So, in your time, as has been a rather brief
tenure, are you monitoring those efforts?
Secretary Mattis. Ma'am, I have met with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the service chiefs, with Chairman Dunford. I did it
in my quarters to make it a casual evening where this issue was
brought up, and none of them surfaced any problems right now.
Ms. Tsongas. And then one other quick question. In the wake
of the various social media scandals, what do you think needs
to be done to improve the culture of respect across the
Department as a whole?
Secretary Mattis. I believe that it is very important, as
we recruit from American society, that we make clear not just
what the military stands for but what it absolutely will not
stand for and make certain we maintain good order and
discipline.
A unit cannot be effective in combat that does not maintain
a disciplined lifestyle. I do not care whether it is DUI,
driving under intoxication, or sexual harassment or anything
else, when a unit does not maintain discipline standards, it is
of less capability on the battlefield. So we maintain a mission
orientation and make very clear what we will not tolerate, and
we field the force.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Secretary Mattis, and thank you for
your service.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you so much
for your service to this country.
Secretary Mattis, current law requires that military pay is
to keep pace with government inflation projections. This year,
that would be a 2.4 percent pay raise. Unfortunately, the
administration submitted a budget request that would cut our
service members' pay raise. Secretary Mattis, were these
decisions based on budget constraints or your belief that pay
for the military should not keep pace with government inflation
projections?
Secretary Mattis. Thank you, Congressman.
We have a responsibility to take care of our families, take
care of our troops and make certain they are paid what we need
to draw very good people and that they do not go off to combat
worried about whether or not their family is being taken care
of. Whether it be healthcare or retirement program pay, all
those go into making certain we keep faith with them.
I also have a responsibility to ensure that they can win on
the battlefield, that we are providing them the best equipment,
that we are doing the research and development that will keep
them at the top of their game. It is a balancing act, sir, as
we try to balance what we need to outfit them with to bring
them home alive and victorious with what we need to pay them to
maintain basically our obligation to these people who volunteer
to serve.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Secretary Mattis.
Military services are already having trouble recruiting men
and women to join the services due to competition with an
improving private sector economy. How do you maintain the All-
Volunteer Force if you will not pay them competitive wages?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I think our analysis shows that we
are paying them very competitive wages. When you stack them up
against high school graduates, for example, for the enlisted
ranks, we probably have a better benefits package than most
places, not all of them. I mean, there are some out in Silicon
Valley, where I lived for 3 years, that could probably beat us
hands down. When you look across the United States, we are
drawing in very high-quality people because we are competitive.
Mr. Coffman. Secretary Mattis, one thing that I would like
you to take a look at in terms of containing costs where we can
shift those resources around to things like pay raises that
keep up with inflation is to look at every opportunity to shift
capability to the Guard and Reserve, and granted those training
requirements would have to probably be revised accordingly if
we are going to rely on them more, but I just think that there
are cultural impediments within the Active Duty Force that
argue against that, and I think we need to look beyond that in
terms of our force structure and how we can maintain
capability, how we can certainly maintain capability without
compromising national security, but at a lower cost.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and
leadership.
I will try to do some quick questions here about choices.
We are looking at tax cuts that might create a $3 trillion to
$7 trillion deficit in the next 10 years. We are looking at a
State Department budget immediately that calls for a $30
billion reduction and a dyad and a triad. How would you
prioritize these?
Secretary Mattis. Well, sir, in my role maintaining a safe
and secure--inside the Department of Defense--maintaining a
safe and secure nuclear deterrent with a decisive conventional
force that can also fight, has the capability of fighting
irregular warfare, the problem--Dr. Colin Gray was mentioned
earlier. The most near-faultless strategist alive today has
pointed out the enemy will always move against your perceived
weakness. So we cannot decide we are only going to upgrade the
nuclear, we are only going to upgrade the Navy, because the
enemy will move against our weak area. So it is going to be
safe and secure nuke capability deterrence so those weapons are
never used; and a conventional capability that no one wants to
take us on, or if they do, we change their mind very quickly.
Mr. Garamendi. So we do not have to make choices, we can do
all the above.
Secretary Mattis. I believe that we can, that America can
afford survival, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Even though it is estimated to be a
trillion-plus dollars in the next two decades for the nuclear?
Secretary Mattis. We have gone through this twice before in
our history, sir, where we had to hit one of these upgrade
times, and both times the Congress rose to it, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will just move on to something
perhaps a little less important. Current law prohibits
military-to-military contacts with Russia. Should the new
National Defense Authorization Act continue that policy?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I think that we are right now
carrying on deconfliction. We do not do cooperation or
collaboration. We do deconfliction in the Syria theater, but
for right now, I believe that there cannot be business as usual
military-to-military. There may be advantages to us
deconflicting and perhaps even having talks once they are led,
first of all, by our foreign policy and our State Department to
set the conditions for the military-to-military talks.
Mr. Garamendi. So we should continue the prohibition on
military-to-military, other than deconfliction?
Secretary Mattis. I think at least the Congress should give
a sense of its direction. If it is not a requirement, if it
leaves some flexibility to the executive branch and the
Secretary of State and the President, it would be best.
Mr. Garamendi. You mentioned that we have a new ocean or a
sea opening up. I assume you are referring to the Arctic. Is
the U.S. Coast Guard an important and integral part of the U.S.
defense, and if so, is a heavy icebreaker necessary?
Secretary Mattis. I believe the Coast Guard is essential--
an integral--distinct but integral--part of our Nation's
defense, and that is not an area I am an expert in, I assure
you, sir, but I would imagine getting through the ice is
probably a pretty good idea up there when it starts moving in
to keep us relevant.
Mr. Garamendi. An icebreaker is about a billion dollars a
copy, a heavy icebreaker. Should we allow $1 billion of the
$638 billion budget to be used to build an icebreaker?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, this is really beyond my area of
expertise. I am not trying to get out of the question, but it
is not one I have studied. I would prefer to study it before
answering it.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you. And I yield back my remaining
time.
The Chairman. Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for your service.
I have a few questions I would like to ask on the LRS [Long
Range Standoff] program.
Secretary Mattis, last July, then Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control Rose Gottemoeller testified before Congress
regarding the Long Range Standoff cruise missile program, and I
would like to introduce her written testimony for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 121.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Here are a few quotes from Secretary
Gottemoeller's testimony, which she said were focused on three
key points: ``First, the LRSO is consistent with our arms
control commitments and the President's Prague agenda. Second,
the LRSO supports strategic stability and does not undermine
it. Third, it is important in the eyes of our allies.'' She
elaborated: ``There is no evidence that the LRSO or our nuclear
modernization program are prompting an action-reaction cycle or
catalyzing arms race. . . . The LRSO is valuable at maintaining
strategic stability. . . . Indeed, it is the absence of a
nuclear armed cruise missile that might leave us more
vulnerable to unintended escalation during a crisis. Without a
standoff cruise missile option, future Presidents may find
themselves facing the unpalatable choice of responding to
nuclear coercion or attack with SLBMs [submarine-launched
ballistic missiles] or ICBMs.''
So, Mr. Secretary, as the Nuclear Posture Review continues,
and you examine the LRSO program, how will you and your team
consider the input of the Nation's senior diplomats like Ms.
Gottemoeller, and do you agree with her position that the LRSO
enhances strategic stability and is important for assuring our
allies?
Secretary Mattis. Ms. Gottemoeller's reputation stands on
its own merit. I have had private discussions with her as
recently as this last month in Brussels, and she is a trusted
adviser.
As far as whether or not I would stand on the LRSO right
now, I am going to wait until we have the study done, and then
I can let you know, but I have no reservations about taking Ms.
Gottemoeller's ideas on board, no reservations at all.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. And I hope you will read her comments
and her testimony on that because I think it was very good
insight there.
I want to shift gears just a little bit here to another
topic. So, General Dunford, in 2012, the Obama administration
ended the U.S. military strategy that required a force
structure and readiness levels capable of fighting two large-
scale wars simultaneously. At the time, the Pentagon stated
that times have changed, and the United States no longer faced
a peer military on par with the Soviet Union. This worldview
was quickly disrupted by a resurgent Russia and expanding China
and continued instability of North Korea and Iran.
So my question is, what do you see as the force structure
requirement in order to guarantee American security of our
allies across the globe? Do we need to be able to fight a
conventional war with China and Russia simultaneously? And are
we currently able to fight two conventional wars at once, and
if not, what do you see as the greatest capability gap that
must be addressed?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, we do confront today
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism. And we
are going to go through the Defense Security Review. We are
going to have a closed hearing on Thursday night, and I would
like to talk to our force size and construct and the challenges
we face in a closed hearing if we can do that.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes, but you agree it is important to be
able to address all of these at the same time?
General Dunford. Certainly one or more.
Mrs. Hartzler. Right. Okay. I look forward to that.
The last question, back to Mr. Secretary. I remain deeply
concerned about our strike fighter shortfall. According to the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill Moran, two-thirds,
more than 60 percent, of our Navy's strike fighters, the planes
that are launching the entirety of the Navy's attacks against
ISIS, cannot fly. I am pleased to see the fiscal year 2018
budget request including 14 F/A-18 Super Hornets as well as
another 10 Super Hornets as a top priority of the Navy's
unfunded priority list. So can you talk about how important it
is for us to address the Navy's strike fighter shortfall and
how important new procurement is in that effort?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, ma'am. The bottom line is we cannot
simply repair enough fighters to bring them back up to full
strength, so we actually are going to have to buy more
fighters.
Furthermore, when you look at the $21 billion that Congress
gave us as fiscal year 2017 supplemental, much of that went
into buying spare parts for fighters for the very reason you
are highlighting here and Admiral Moran highlighted. So we are
on to the problem. We have got to keep the modernization going,
but we are going to need some gap fillers. Before we get the F-
35, we are going to have to have more Hornets, for example, for
the Navy to address this problem.
So we share your appreciation of the problem, and we are
addressing it, but at the same time, it is going to take a
little while before you hear better testimony in here.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To all three of you, I want to just say that, on behalf of
the American people, I think they are all breathing a sigh of
relief tonight because you exhibit the kind of confidence and
steady leadership that I think we desperately need in the
military right now. I am going to ask you three questions for
the record that I will just ask them, and then I will move on
to a question that you can answer orally.
The Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the
Military Service Academies was just released a couple months
ago, and it is stunningly bereft of answers to some of the most
jarring statistics. Forty-eight percent of the service academy
cadets and midshipmen indicate that they are sexually harassed.
And of those that actually report sexual assaults, they suggest
that there is a retaliation rate of 47 percent. So, for the
record, I would like for you to provide to me and to the
committee what you are going to do to address what I think is a
staggering statistic.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Ms. Speier. Along with retaliation, James LaPorta was the
reporter that broke the Marines United case. I think all of us
here were shocked by the revelations. It is not just in the
Marines; it is in all of the services. But he just recently was
told that he is debarred from coming onto the Lejeune Base by
the deputy commander. And I would like for you to explain to us
why, after he did a great service I think to all service
members by outing this conduct, that he would be debarred.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Ms. Speier. And, thirdly, there have been, to our
knowledge, a number of government meetings, including meetings
with foreign counterparts, that have been held at properties
owned by the President. I would like to ask each of you if you
or your staff have participated in official government events
at properties owned by the President, and if so, did the
Department of Defense expend taxpayer money to pay for costs
associated with that event, including room and board, meals, or
other incidental costs?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Ms. Speier. Those are the three questions.
Now, the one I would like for you to answer publicly.
Secretary Mattis, you have been blunt in your assessment of
Russia as a principal threat to the United States. Russia has
been seemingly relentless in its provocations: buzzing our
ships in an irresponsible and dangerous manner, flying long-
range strategic bombers to Alaska, and violating the INF
[Treaty]. The President has been silent about these hostile
actions. There is much speculation as to why. But I guess my
question to you, Mr. Secretary, is, do you believe that
Vladimir Putin has any real interest in a mutually beneficial
good-faith partnership with the United States?
And, General Dunford, how do you plan to respond to these
Russian military provocations?
Secretary Mattis. At this time, Congresswoman, I do not see
any indication that Mr. Putin would want a positive
relationship with us. That is not to say we cannot get there as
we look for common ground, but at this point, he has chosen to
be competitive--a strategic competitor with us, and we will
have to deal with that as we see it.
Ms. Speier. General.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, last year, in fiscal year
2017, we requested $3.7 billion for what is called the European
Reassurance Initiative. This year, we have requested $4.8
billion. That money is designed to increase our forward
presence in Europe. It will increase the three brigade combat
teams as well as additional preposition equipment. It increases
the exercises that we conduct in Europe, all of which is
designed to deter Russia and assure our partners that we can
meet our NATO alliance commitments.
So we have significantly changed our force posture in
Europe and, again, our exercises and capability development
with our partners in response to growing Russian capability and
aggression.
Ms. Speier. Do you believe that Russia is our adversary?
General Dunford. I think we have an adversarial
relationship with Russia, a competitive adversarial
relationship, yes, Congresswoman.
Ms. Speier. Secretary Mattis.
Secretary Mattis. Mr. Putin has chosen to be a strategic
competitor, yes.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for your service.
Just to refresh people's memory on the Budget Control Act,
the reason the Budget Control Act was put in place was to
effectively create so much pain on the discretionary side of
the spending that it would force formula changes to the
mandatory side of the budget. Those mandatory changes never
came about. One of the challenges that we have is that we are
just living longer, and that has created challenges with the
funding of Medicare and Social Security. Probably better than
the alternative, though.
But as it is, we live under the Budget Control Act. We as a
Congress have been reactive to trying to resolve this problem,
and it has created a very serious challenge for the three of
you at that table. We have talked about the military budget on
an annual basis for the last several years, but, General
Dunford, if the BCA is not repealed, what does our military
look like 4 years from now if we are working under the Budget
Control Act numbers?
General Dunford. Congressman, we will have some tough
choices to make, and it is either going to be a significantly
smaller military incapable of meeting the strategy, or we will
try to maintain capacity, in which case it will be the hollow
force that I joined in the late 1970s. In either case, it is
not what the United States of America needs to defend itself.
Mr. Scott. I would just suggest that the sooner we deal
with the BCA, the better off we will be. It makes no sense to
start building a ship today that cannot be completed because
the Budget Control Act forces the termination of the contract
early.
As we talk about those tough choices, a lot of countries
were mentioned. Some countries that were not mentioned in your
testimony were Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico.
I had time to visit with Admiral Tidd in Miami a few months
ago. We talked about the narcotics flow into the United States
from those countries. Approximately 50,000 Americans died from
drug overdoses last year. At a minimum, half of that, half of
those drugs originated from the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern
Command] area of responsibility. A lot of other countries down
there with chaos that are going on outside of the transnational
criminal organizations.
What additional resources do we need to combat the
transnational criminal organizations within the SOUTHCOM
region? Given the threat that they pose to Americans, why is
this not a higher U.S. national security priority?
General Dunford. Congressman, the two major capability
areas that Admiral Tidd probably shared with you when you were
down there is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
so he can support the interagency effort to stop drug flow, as
well as maritime capability to interdict that drug flow. Those
are the two main capability areas that he would want to have
and that we have not been able to routinely meet the
requirements that he has identified.
Mr. Scott. General, they are so short-funded that, when
they have the intel that there is a load of cocaine coming into
the United States, in many cases, they have to sit there and
watch it go by.
I know, as we talk about all of these other concerns, you
have got a lot to balance, but I just wonder if maybe, just as
we do for OCO, maybe there should be a direct funding line for
SOUTHCOM with regard to the drug interdiction mission. I know
that, without training dollars, they simply would not be able
to function at this stage. And so I would just encourage you as
you go forward to just keep in mind that over 50,000 Americans
died from drug overdoses last year, significantly more than
have died from acts of terrorism in the last decade, and that
war is on our border. It is right here. It is on top of us.
With that said, I appreciate your service to the country,
your commitment to the country.
And, Mr. Norquist, I look forward to getting to know you
better, but thank you for your service as well.
With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for your service and for joining us here this evening.
Secretary Mattis, after the attacks on 9/11, the leaders of
our country made a commitment to the American people that they
would go after and defeat Al Qaeda, yet we have not carried out
a serious campaign to do so to defeat Al Qaeda in Syria
specifically where, as a result of that, Al Qaeda has been able
to gain strength and territory.
In your budget request this year, your request of $500
million to counter ISIS in Syria does not include any mention
or dollars to go after Al Qaeda. So my question is, is this for
military reasons or political reasons, namely that Al Qaeda is
allied with and so deeply intertwined with the so-called
moderate rebels that the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
and other Gulf states have been financing and supporting in
their fight to overthrow the Syrian Government?
Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, we have had a serious
campaign, as you know, against Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in the FATA
[Federally Administered Tribal Areas] area has been shredded as
a capable outfit. They have been unable to attack America for
many, many years.
Now, they have franchised out is the point you are making
and from Yemen to Somalia, from the Sahel to certainly Syria,
and all this is a franchised Al Qaeda metastasizing threat.
Ms. Gabbard. And, respectfully, sir, I agree and understand
that Al Qaeda has spread, but specifically with Syria, Al
Qaeda's presence in Syria is far greater today than it ever was
before, which speaks to my question about our lack of taking
them on in a serious way, specifically in Syria.
Secretary Mattis. The location of where they are at in
Syria makes them very difficult for us to reach, frankly, and
we would have to deconflict even more vis-a-vis the Russians.
Let me ask General Dunford if he has anything to add to this.
But you are right. They are embedded pretty deeply, and they
are hard to get to.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, I know you visited and you
probably know--well, you can argue whether we have had
sufficient resources. We do have a dedicated campaign against
Al Qaeda in Syria. We do have specific resources dedicated just
for the fight against Al Qaeda, but it is fair to say our
priority in Syria has been ISIS because we are operating
largely in the east, and that is where ISIS has been.
Ms. Gabbard. To both of you gentlemen, when your budget is
for a counter-ISIS program, your commander's mission on the
ground for Inherent Resolve is to defeat Daesh or ISIS, and
there is no mention of Al Qaeda and the fact that Al Qaeda has
become so difficult to target specifically because our country
has not been taking them on in a serious way and they have
become so deeply intertwined with these armed militants that
have been and continue to be working alongside and oftentimes
under the command of Al Qaeda with our support through the CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency] and Saudi Arabia and Qatar and
these other countries.
So, given the fact that this is the group that has been
targeting us since that attack on 9/11, what can we do in
Congress and the administration to stop that support of these
armed militants that are strengthening Al Qaeda and actually go
after them?
Secretary Mattis. I think, Congresswoman, we can start, if
this is Congress' intent, with an authorization for the use of
military force in Syria against Al Qaeda with the funding and
resourcing. The statement by Congress would show the spirit of
Congress, frankly.
Ms. Gabbard. Yes, sir, but the authorization that you are
currently operating under in Syria was the one passed by
Congress in 2001 to go after Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Is
that not right?
Secretary Mattis. We used that authority, yes, ma'am. The
challenge is that, right now, we have a greater clear and
present danger with ISIS, and you saw why in 2014, and we went
after what we thought was the priority danger through two
different--well, through one administration and now with this
administration.
Ms. Gabbard. Sir, I think the reason why ISIS you are
saying is now a greater danger is because it was not taken
seriously--one reason among many--it was not taken seriously
from the beginning. And that is the concern here with Al Qaeda,
is that because it has been largely ignored, it has grown to a
point where it has now become difficult to take on and now
presents a greater threat to the United States, and this must
be addressed.
Secretary Mattis. I think that is fair, and we are
addressing it from Yemen to Somalia and other areas, but we are
certainly--we will look at what you are talking about here. It
is not that we are not addressing it there. It is just that we
do not have the reach right now, and we will take a look at it,
but there are plenty of enemies in Syria, and I would agree
with you on that.
The Chairman. Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank everybody for being here tonight. I know we
have had a long session here, but Mr. Scott asked some of these
issues, and it is something I am very concerned about. Quite
frankly, I came to Congress to be on this committee, and maybe
I might not be as empathetic to some of the other issues that
are going on. Everyone's got their own area that they are
really interested in. But I am sorry; with what is going on in
the world and everything else, that your testimony is so
important, and we have had testimony about being C3, C4, which
translates--and, quite frankly, I do not think the rest of the
Congress or the Senate know exactly the implications of being
not combat ready. And that means, basically, if the balloon
goes up, we are going to have to commit troops to a conflict
where they are going to die or at least be wounded. And so that
is a big priority with me.
So, you know, we are going to have this debate whether we
are going to have a continuing resolution. I think it will be
so stupid if we send that message again and even worse if we do
not end that sequester.
Now, my question, you know where I stand, but I will be
damned if I am going bury anymore Marines on my watch. If we
continue with that, as I described, and we have units that are
C3 and C4, and we have all these commitments in Europe all over
the world, what kind of message will it send to our allies and,
in this case particularly, our NATO allies that we have been
after them to meet their 2 percent commitment, yet we ourselves
cannot have our units combat ready?
And in light of the RAND [Corporation] study, Mr. Secretary
and General Dunford, if you could address that in terms of, you
know, those 28 countries--actually, it is 29 now with
Montenegro in there right under the gun of the Russians. And
what kind of message would we be sending them?
Secretary Mattis. Well, Congressman, we share your priority
you place on this. That is the reason why we came for the
fiscal year 2017 supplemental. It is why this budget grows
significantly. I share the concern that it does not grow
enough, but, again, we are trying to balance a lot of things
along with a debt. And I just have to recognize that this is
going to take some time to get out of.
What is the message we send, sir? I would say the message
to our allies would be worrisome. It will not be reassuring.
But more importantly, it is the message to our adversaries that
would concern me that this is a time to test us.
General Dunford. Congressman, I think you raised two
issues, and the Secretary spoke about one of them. The first is
that I think history tells us that the perception of strength
has a lot to do with the probability of conflict. And so if our
adversaries look at us and we are strong and the perception is
that we are strong, that drives down the probability that we
will have to fight.
But then the second thing you raise is, if deterrence fails
and we do have to respond to a conflict, it will be come as you
are. And the cost of not being ready will be in time to
accomplish our objectives and in casualties, which is what you
spoke about.
So I could not agree with you more. And when our allies in
NATO or elsewhere look to the United States, what they see is
what gives them confidence that we can meet our commitments and
that we will be strong. And so I think it is fair to say they
have concerns about that.
Mr. Cook. I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to begin by extending
my sympathies to you and those who are serving currently in
Afghanistan and to the families of those who lost their lives,
U.S. service members who lost their lives in Afghanistan this
weekend.
And I think so much of what we are talking about and the
support that you are asking us to provide is to ensure, as you
mentioned, that we are ensuring the readiness and the ability
of those brave service members to do the jobs that we have
asked them to do.
And you have also mentioned, and I think accurately so,
that Congress has sidelined itself from some of its key
responsibilities, and the effects of those are very serious.
And I would add that I--I would say Congress has sidelined
itself from its oversight and ownership of the wars that we
have been fighting. And I want to make sure that we work more
effectively together to ensure that we are doing our part.
In this budget, in our projections for this coming year,
what should we expect to see in Afghanistan? How many service
members do we have there now? How many do we project to see
over the course of the year that we have a budget for, or a
proposed budget for?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. We have got, as you know, a
little under 10,000 U.S. service members there at this time.
The commander on the ground, in light of the situation, has
asked for more. Those discussions are ongoing right now with
the President and myself and the Chairman advising him.
And I think the decision will be taken soon. We have got to
come up with a more regional strategy. So what we are doing is
connected to the geographic reality of where this enemy is
fighting from. As you know, it is not just from Afghanistan.
And so we are engaged in this. However, the bulk of the
fighting will continue to be carried by the Afghan forces, as
we have seen over the last several years.
Mr. O'Rourke. Are the proposals in those ongoing
conversations reflected in the overseas contingency operations
numbers that you presented earlier?
Secretary Mattis. They are not right now, Congressman.
Mr. O'Rourke. There may be a supplemental request depending
on the outcome of that conversation?
Secretary Mattis. There would be, yes, sir, which we would
have to have a discussion with you to explain it.
Mr. O'Rourke. Something that you told us when we first had
a chance to meet with you that has stuck with me since is that
the United States has two principal powers, the power of
intimidation and the power of inspiration.
And I guess, to bring it back to the subject of the hearing
and what the cost is of those two powers, do you feel that we
have the appropriate balance of the two? Are we trying to do
too much around the world through our powers of intimidation?
And to use Afghanistan again.
And you mentioned doing more with regional powers. How
could we complement the extraordinary service of those who are
deployed and whose lives are on the line with the resources
necessary to provide the inspiration side of the equation?
Secretary Mattis. Well, sir, the inspiration side is more
than just what we deploy with. However, in the deployed
category, where we are out there with USAID [U.S. Agency for
International Development], U.S. diplomatic service, that sort
of thing, our education efforts, where we fund students to come
back to the United States on exchange tours, there is a host of
things we do in terms of building the broader power of
America's inspiration so that it is actually a player in this
competitive--against competitive ideologies right now.
So are we doing enough? Well, I mean, you can always do
more, but you can always do more in the military realm. We try
to get the right blend. And I think that we are at least going
in the right direction on that.
Mr. O'Rourke. Do you think we need to do anything
fundamentally different in Afghanistan to achieve a different
result as we approach almost 16 years in? Or, by and large,
will it be more of the same for the foreseeable future?
Secretary Mattis. I think we have got to do things
differently, sir, and it has got to be looked at as across the
board, whole-of-government, not just military efforts, plus
allied efforts and internationals.
Along the same lines of what Secretary Tillerson is
orchestrating against, for example, ISIS, right now, what NATO
is orchestrating in Afghanistan, but even broader than we are
doing it up until now.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, thank you both for
your wonderful dedication and service to our country. We all
appreciate that.
Secretary Mattis, I want to ask you about research and
development for space and then research and development for
missile defense. And I know you see the need for both of those
important areas.
In your testimony on page 5, you said, ``Outer space, long
considered a sanctuary, is now contested. This creates the need
to develop capabilities and capacities for more resilient
satellites designed to withstand persistent kinetic and
nonkinetic attack.''
So in your written testimony, you certainly point out the
need for more capacity and more capability for space. And also
in missile defense, I know you are a proponent of exploring
boost phase missile defense, when the adversaries' missiles are
at their most vulnerable state.
But I am just concerned, and the chairman asked you this at
the very beginning of the hearing, we are cutting the budget
for missile defense research and development. And in the space
R&D budget, it is at a 30-year low. So in both cases, we are
really not putting our money where our mouth is.
And I know President Trump wants to have a state-of-the-art
missile defense system. So how do we square the needs out there
with the fact that we are cutting and not necessarily--and, Mr.
Norquist, I am going to ask you to jump in on this also--why
are we not putting our money where our mouth is?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, it is a prioritization. As you know,
right now, we have the ballistic missile defense capability at
Fort Greely and down in California, Vandenberg. And I think
that right now we can first do the study to make certain we
know what is the--what are we lacking, define the problem well
enough that we are targeted like a laser beam on exactly what
we need.
Boost phase, as you know, is geographically dependent, for
example, and that just may not be something that we want to put
a lot of money into because, you know, it just may not be as
relevant as increased naval capability that we can move around.
It would be one example up and down our coast to help defend.
I want to get this right. Before we come to you and spend a
lot of money, you are going to count on us that we did our
homework, and I have not yet done it. And that is probably the
best answer I can give you.
As far as space, we are taking advantage of some things
that the intelligence services are telling us, but I would
prefer to, again, study this a little more. I am not
disagreeing that we do not need the R&D in these two areas at
all, however.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Norquist, you are probably itching to answer a lot of
questions here tonight, so could you jump in on it.
Mr. Norquist. Thank you, Congressman.
I would just point out two things. I do not know how the
R&D breaks out among the individual programs, but overall the
science and technology piece of RDT&E [research, development,
test, and evaluation] that the research adds. That is $13.2
billion, which is up $600 million from the 2017 budget. So
there has been an investment in research and technology in the
S&T [science and technology] area.
And on the space----
Mr. Lamborn. That is DOD-wide, right?
Mr. Norquist. That is DOD-wide, correct. So I do not know
the individual piece of that, but DOD-wide, there has been an
increase in investment in that area.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear that. But you
would agree with the need for space and missile defense
research and development in particular. Would you not?
Mr. Norquist. Correct.
Mr. Lamborn. And, General, do you have anything to add to
this conversation?
General Dunford. I do not, Congressman.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, when I was a young second lieutenant
standing in the Kuwaiti desert, you gave me a lot of confidence
as my division commander. And I have to say that you give me a
lot of confidence today as our Secretary of Defense. So thank
you for continuing to serve the country.
Mr. Chairman, I will withhold my praise for you, lest I be
unduly accused of favoring the Marine Corps. But suffice it to
say, we are lucky to have you as well.
Speaking of that confidence, Mr. Secretary, do you have
confidence in our post-Mosul, our day-after plan in Iraq? It
would be--I would never have believed standing in that Kuwaiti
desert 14 years ago that we would still be there today.
With the plan as it is resourced today, are you confident
that we will be able to win Iraq once and for all and bring the
substantial number of our troops home?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, it is going to be a long
fight. Even in Iraq, as we throw ISIS out, we are going to have
to deal with the aftermath. I would tell you that we are
working this by, with, and through allies, and so I do not have
the same control over the day-to-day activities of what is
going to happen, for example, in west Mosul in the post-combat
phase.
But I think that we are going to have to work with the
Government of Iraq in the--what I would call post-combat pre-
reconciliation phase so we do not end up in this same situation
again. And we are committed to working with the Government of
Iraq and Prime Minister Abadi, who, as you know, visited here
in Washington 2 months ago, month and a half ago.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Secretary, from your view, does the State
Department have the resources it needs to support the Iraqi
Government as you describe?
Secretary Mattis. I believe they do. I would defer to the
State Department evaluation of that, however.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Mr. Secretary, in order to do your job,
you need to have a workforce. You need to have personnel in the
Department of Defense. And there has been a lot of concern
about just filling positions. How many positions at the
Pentagon do you have unfilled today?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I need to take that for the
record. Day by day, we are getting more people through the
process. As you know, the Senate Armed Services Committee has
very high ethical standards, higher than any other department
for the people that come to work, so it takes a while for some
to disentangle their finances. It is challenging. But----
Mr. Moulton. Have there been any nominations or any names
that have been rejected by the administration, names not
requiring Senate confirmation?
Secretary Mattis. I am not aware of any rejected at the
White House. There were some that we were told would not make
it through Capitol Hill. But I had no one that I can think of
rejected there.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Mr. Moulton. Is there anyone that you have brought on to
the Department of Defense who has subsequently been pulled out
for political reasons by the White House?
Secretary Mattis. I cannot think--I have only had a few, as
you know, brought on and--Secretary of the Air Force,
Comptroller. I do not have very many--I have not had any pulled
out by the White House.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Mr. Secretary, I would like to move on
to the role of Congress in all of this. And you have outlined,
as has the Chairman, the responsibilities that we have to
ensure a proper budget, proper resources to come to grips with
the financial situation of the country, which people in your
position have cited as one of the greatest threats to our
national defense.
What are, if you could name the top five programs or
projects, that you do not want at the Department of Defense but
we here in Congress force upon you, thereby taking away
resources from requirements that you need to fund? I think that
would be helpful as we go through the NDAA process.
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I better do a little
homework and get back to you on that. I have mentioned that
BRAC is one that I do want that Congress may not want, but I
think I can make a persuasive argument on that. But I cannot
think of something that Congress is forcing right now, but I
will look into this and get back to you.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Secretary, would you be able to get back
to us before the NDAA markup with that list?
Secretary Mattis. I should be able to get back to you this
week, I would imagine. If there is something out there, I will
find it quick.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Thank you both again very much for your
service. We are proud to have you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I think you will find broad bipartisan
support for the budget request that we have received, which, of
course, increases defense spending a little bit. I think you
will also find some bipartisan support for even more.
As a former Navy pilot currently serving the Oklahoma Air
National Guard, I used to fly counterdrug missions. I would
like to piggyback for a second on what Mr. Scott from Georgia
was talking about. I used to fly the E-2 Hawkeye, VAW-77, the
Nightwolves.
In 2013, my squadron under the sequester was eliminated. My
squadron was responsible for busting about $2 billion worth of
cocaine every year on the high seas, $2 billion. That cocaine
now comes into the United States, and, of course, Mr. Scott
mentioned, I think you said 50,000 Americans die in drug
overdoses every year, which is more than all the Americans we
lost in Vietnam, if not--maybe close to if not more.
So this is a big concern. As far as the capability gap, I
understand when you mentioned that the concern is if we spend
too much too fast, it could end up putting us in a position
where it is not sustainable and we could end up with a, as you
mentioned, a hollow force, which is a concern, I think, for
pretty much everybody on this panel.
I would also say that there are a lot of unfunded
requirements that ultimately we could be working on today. And
I would just ask General Dunford, when we deploy an Aegis
cruiser or a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]
missile battery, are we deploying those with the full
complement of interceptors?
General Dunford. We have some precision munition challenges
that bleed over into our Navy weapons systems.
Mr. Bridenstine. And are you aware that when we deploy one
Aegis, many times there is an underway switching of missiles
from one Aegis to another Aegis?
General Dunford. I am aware of that, Congressman.
Mr. Bridenstine. So these are examples of unfunded
requirements that ultimately we could meet today if the
resources were there that ultimately would not put us into a
position to have a hollow force in the future?
General Dunford. Congressman, I would like to just address
that precision munitions challenge. We today have requested
resources that get to the maximum amount that industry can
produce. But there is a caveat to that: Industry can produce at
the level of prediction that they have right now; in other
words, they can only produce so much today based on what we are
able to tell them about tomorrow.
So one of the areas that the Secretary has highlighted is
the need for predictability and stability in the future as
well. And the only way we are going to get around the challenge
is--that is a great example of why we need stable, predictable
budgets because we actually cannot buy the precision munitions
we need until we do have stable, predictable budgets at
adequate levels.
So, again, industry is telling us today we are producing at
the maximum rate we can. But if we were able to tell them what
resources would be available 2, 3, 4, 5 years down the road,
they would be able to increase the industrial capacity and
actually address that particular issue.
So that is just one of the second-order effects of the
challenge we have been in living year to year with a number of
CRs that we have had is we are not able to give industry the
predictability they need to actually meet our requirements. And
that is actually the story of precision munitions.
Mr. Bridenstine. So if we are doing a defense appropriation
annually, how do we address that?
General Dunford. We would have to, with a program, be able
to provide our industry partners with some degree of accuracy
the rough order of magnitude of resources that would be
available in the out-years. And because of the budget situation
right now, we are simply not able to do that.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. I would encourage, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Secretary, as you look at the budget and as we work as a body
here, know that we fully support increasing the defense
spending, that we have capabilities that we are leaving on the
table. And if we can support you in that effort, whether it is
long term or next year, we want to do it. And I would encourage
you to look at unfunded liability or unfunded requirements
specifically.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here this evening.
Secretary Mattis, your testimony you have five priorities.
The fifth, of course, is the support of what we call the OCO
funding. OCO has been something that I never quite understood
for the time that I have been here. It is sort of--it was
originally not even on budget so to speak, then we kind of
report it, but it is still a question as to whether it counts,
it does not count.
So in your mind, when you say your fifth priority is in
support of the OCO budget, what do you anticipate the $64
billion to be used for?
Secretary Mattis. This is for operations, Congresswoman,
against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. It has to do with any place
that we have active areas of hostilities, Afghanistan, for
example. And this is over and above the standard budget to
maintain our military. These are for the operations we actually
conduct there.
Unfortunately, we have seen at times things that belonged
in the base budget put into the OCO. And I share Congress'
frustration, the base budget should have the base budget and it
should only be for those things that grow based on overseas
contingency operations.
Ms. Hanabusa. So your overseas contingency operation
definition is the battle against ISIS, and it is Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Syria. Would that be a correct statement?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, it also pays for units that
are at home station preparing to go to those particular fights.
And we also have some OCO outside of that with the Al Qaeda
fight in Africa, as an example.
Ms. Hanabusa. In Africa as well? But it is also tied to
ISIS?
General Dunford. It is tied to violent extremists.
Ms. Hanabusa. Some terrorist organization?
General Dunford. That is right.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Secretary, I do know from your history
that you are a very interesting person in the sense that, your
time at Hoover, you have written a lot, you have thought a lot.
One of my favorite reading materials that you did was
``Warriors and Citizens'' that you put together at Hoover
Institute.
So given that philosophy that I call it, your philosophical
bet on a lot of this, how do you want to put together or come
to grips with the fact that we have a QDR [Quadrennial Defense
Review] in 2018, you have authorized an NPR in 2017, and I
believe somewhere in there there is going to be a review of the
ballistic missile defense.
So do you feel that it is premature, or do you feel that
any of these studies could somehow affect what you are coming
here and asking us for today?
Secretary Mattis. Certainly, it will affect it via there
will be implications downstream. But right now we know the
situation, the threats we face today. We know the force we have
today. We know the readiness shortfalls we have today.
And I am confident right now that we can justify the
dollars that we are asking for. Certainly, we will define the
problems, strategic and operational problems for the future
that need further addressal. But right now, I am confident that
what we are asking for we can defend.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Secretary, you cannot come to Congress
and on page 11 of your testimony talk about BRAC and not expect
any of us to just have a free pass at that. So can you tell me
when you talk about BRAC and you want the ability--you want
Congress to give you the authority to consider BRACing, can you
tell me what your criteria is?
You must have some idea by requesting it as to what kind
of, quote, establishments, facilities, whatever you may want to
call it, you want to BRAC, because you must feel that somehow
it is excess, that we do not need it?
Secretary Mattis. Right. It would be facilities that we no
longer need nor can we foresee using them in the future even if
we have to mobilize, for example, significant parts of our
Reserves. It would be the ones that we do not--the facilities
that do not perhaps any longer have training capability because
of urban spread around them where we can no longer safely do
what we used to do there. It would be that sort of a situation.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Secretary, is a list or some kind of a,
you know, potential BRAC list exist? Does it exist today?
Secretary Mattis. I have been told we have 20 percent
excess capacity, but as I said earlier, I am not confident in
that figure. And I would want to look at it again and make
certain that we validate the criteria that was used to get
there and then go back through it.
Ms. Hanabusa. Before my time runs out, can you provide us a
list, whatever you have?
Secretary Mattis. I cannot right now, ma'am, because I am
not willing to put my name to it. I want to study it first.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for your service, especially in an
extremely challenging time for our Nation and for the world.
And neither of you have to be here, and you are choosing to do
it. And it is a tremendous challenge. As I said, our threats
are so many. It is so multifocal, it is so multifaceted that it
is even hard to list. And the chessboard is more than three-
dimensional, in my opinion.
You know, with that in mind, one of the things that you
mentioned, Mr. Secretary, was that it is going to be a long
slog. A lot of these things are going to be long, drawn out.
You know, as a soldier in the field, when you know that is the
situation, then you look for your short gains, right, because
you want to have that motivation there.
So I guess my first question is, how do you see the morale
of our military today?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I would like the Chairman also to
respond to that. In my discussions, in the e-mails I receive,
the young people are quite--they show a lot of initiative in
helping me to run the Department. I would just tell you that so
far I think we have got--the morale is holding. The affection
of the American people is understood, and that has a lot to do
with why the morale is held.
That said, I believe the families in many cases have become
riddled with repeated deployments of their husbands, wives,
mothers, fathers, whatever. And I think that there is some
question about the level of commitment when people cannot fly
the airplane that they know they have got to be good at flying.
They cannot put their vehicles in the field. The ships are
not going to sea on schedule or they are deployed longer
overseas because they are waiting for the ship that had to go
through more extensive repairs to get out.
But let me ask the Chairman to give a few words on that,
sir. He is a little closer.
General Dunford. Congressman, you know, one of the
privileges is having the chance to go around and meet with
members and families from all the services. And I think, by and
large, morale is very high.
But the Secretary spoke about families, and I think I do
see some challenges with our families. And also, if you look at
some of these readiness challenges, they cannot help but affect
morale. If you are a pilot that is flying 10 or 11 hours a
month and you are in a squadron that should have 12 aircraft
and only has 6 aircraft, it cannot help but affect you.
Now, I will tell you, we are recruiting and retaining high-
quality people. I think morale is better than any of us should
expect that it would be after 16 years at war. As the Secretary
said, the All-Volunteer Force was never envisioned to be at war
for this enduring period of time.
So I think there is a lot of reasons for us to be proud of
the morale and proud of the quality of people that we are
recruiting and retaining. But I do not take it for granted. And
I do think some of the challenges we have with our families and
some of the challenges we have with people who are in units
most affected by these readiness challenges, those are going to
have an impact over time and we should be attentive to that.
Dr. Wenstrup. Yeah, I think that sometimes the country does
not always understand the sacrifices that are being made by the
troops and their family and then the challenges that they face
when we really do not have them at full readiness the way that
we would like to. And so I think that is in part on us here to
make sure that the country is aware of that.
And as you look ahead, you know, our current readiness
state, as you just mentioned, it has us doing less things than
we would like. And so to me, it is very difficult and
challenging for you to make a list of what we are going to do
next, you know, how do we have a step-by-step plan, you know.
I think traditionally in wars, you know, we take this land,
we go to the next step and we keep moving on. This is very
challenging, a different environment than we have ever seen,
and you are talking about terrorism as well as near-peer
adversaries.
So I think it would be helpful to us to be able to explain
how difficult it is if we are not fully ready and equipped to
even compile a plan that can get us where we want to be someday
where there may be some peace.
And so my question is, do you have a list and based on
that, does it reflect what you need but do not have?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we have an assessment that tells us
what we need to be ready for and that assessment comes to us
from our regional commanders based on any treaties that we are
in, the protection of the American homeland. There is all sorts
of things that figure into what national security looks like.
Based on that, we know a number of forces that we need and
what level of readiness, how fast they have to be ready to
deploy. So that is the way we parse it out. And then we look at
what each of those forces needs, an Air Force, Navy, this sort
of thing for readiness to deploy.
So we break it down into something that is manageable by
unit commanders who know what they are expected to do. An Army
brigade commander knows he must be able to move, shoot, and
communicate with his brigade of troops, close with and destroy
an enemy.
A ship commander knows he must be prepared to deploy on so
many days' notice with this much ordinance and his people
trained to do things. So we do have it. It is broken down. It
is very complex to make the joint force work. But the
commanders know and the troops know, the NCOs [noncommissioned
officers] know, sir.
The Chairman. Ms. Rosen.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you.
I want to thank you for being here into these late hours
and your willingness to answer all of our questions so
candidly.
And, you know, a question was asked a few minutes ago by
Representative O'Rourke that mentioned America's role and
inspiration in being a world leader. And, Secretary Mattis, in
2013, you said yourself that if you do not fund the State
Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition
ultimately.
So we know that the President's budget slashes funding for
the State Department and foreign aid about 32 percent. In a
recent op-ed by a retired Admiral Michael Mullen and retired
General James Jones, they mentioned that research does suggest
that investing in prevention is 60 times--I will say that
again--60 times less costly than war and post-conflict costs.
So do you support this decrease of foreign diplomatic
support by the President, and does it not seem to undermine our
success and our stature around the world if we do this?
Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, that is a tough one for me
to answer because I have not looked at where those cuts lie,
you know. I cannot give you an authoritative answer.
I will tell you that when the President's budget was
released, due to the teamwork between Department of Defense and
Department of State, we immediately--Secretary Tillerson and I
met and we looked at where is the money that I have for
development aid, what does he still anticipate receiving, and
looking at how do we jointly figure out the priorities.
So we are working on it within a sense of teamwork, a
spirit of collaboration between DOD and Department of State to
try to get the best return on the money. But I have not--I
honestly have not looked at his budget and looked at where the
cuts are coming from, so I would rather not speak about
something I have not studied.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you.
I guess what I want to say about that then is, does that
relate--how does that relate to what you are going to request?
Because if we do not put money into prevention, is that going
to increase your budget request, and where will it do it,
especially in regards to ISIS, cyberterrorism, some of those
issues? If we are not stopping and preventing, then what do you
have to do on the back end?
Secretary Mattis. Well, I mean, the challenges we face in
some cases, having fought this enemy for a long time, there is
probably very little we can do to rationally move them out of
where they are at because they did not rationally gain their
perspective.
That does not mean we should not try to take the next
generation and prevent them from going down this path. But I
would just tell you that in terms of defense of the country,
that is what Department of Defense does when it comes to the
kinetic side, the lethal side and making the Department the
most lethal it can possibly be is where I focus in, although I
work very, very closely with Secretary Tillerson to support his
efforts.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I will yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being so patient with us. If you
do not mind, I would like to go back to the discussion we had
earlier about the size of our Navy fleet. Now, we know from the
Navy's Force Structure Assessment that has been just last year
that they recommend 355 ships.
Our President, our Commander in Chief says he knows we need
350 ships, pretty close to one another. So we know where we
want to go. The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] gave us an
estimate that to build a 355-ship Navy would require an
additional $5 billion a year for shipbuilding.
General Dunford, let me start with you. Do you agree in
general with CBO's analysis to what more we need to be spending
per year on shipbuilding?
General Dunford. Congressman, I have seen that study and it
looks about right to me based on my experience.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, sir.
Well, looking at this year's budget, obviously, after you
heard the questioning from Chairman Wittman, we know that we
are actually not going in that direction with the proposed
budget for 2018. At what point, in your estimation, General,
are we going to get to the point where we are spending that
extra $5 billion to get to the size of fleet we are trying to
get to?
General Dunford. No, Chairman, thanks for asking that
question. I mean, you know, my characterization of 2018 is that
it is the second year in a row we begin to turn around a trend
that really was 7 or 8 years in the making. And it is going to
take several years to get us out of the hole that we are in
right now, which is why I just maybe highlight in my opening
remarks that just to maintain the relative competitive
advantage today would require a 3 percent above inflation.
And so in the coming years--and, of course, we do not have
a long-term program now. We will have that in the future--when
we think about what is adequate in the future, we need to have
it in context of those requirements that you have identified
and the real growth above inflation that will be required to
realize that.
Mr. Byrne. Mr. Courtney made a very important point. When
you are building ships, the timeline is very long. And so every
year that you wait you push that timeline back further. Do you
have any concerns that we are pushing that timeline back
further with what is happening with retirement of some of our
ships that are presently in the fleet?
General Dunford. Congressman, I do. And the other thing I
have a concern about is, you know, back to the example I used
of precision munitions, you know, if we told a shipbuilder, you
know, with predictability we were going to build 10 ships, they
would be able to buy 10 ships worth of steel, 10 ships worth of
copper piping--copper wiring and so forth; it would cost X.
The fact that we are not able to provide predictability and
actually make multiyear contracts for things like shipbuilding
means we pay much more, which means we cannot get after meeting
the requirements that you have identified.
So I am concerned on two fronts: I am concerned that we are
late to need in getting after these requirements; and I am also
concerned that a failure to provide predictability means we
will not be able to afford getting to this number of ships with
the top line envisioned.
Mr. Byrne. Mr. Secretary, if I could turn to you for a
moment. Your boss, the Commander in Chief, wants a 350-ship
fleet. You just heard what General Dunford said. Where do you
see--with the pace that we are on right now, where do you see
the fleet being at the end of President Trump's Presidency in
January of 2025?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I think that depends on
whether or not sequester is repealed, whether or not we start
going for multiyear--there is a lot of variables here.
Mr. Byrne. Assume we do not have sequester. Based upon your
budget request for 2018 and what you are--I know you are
planning for years after that, where do you see the fleet 8
years from now?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I need to come back to you with a
reply that is researched here.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Secretary Mattis. The challenge is, sir, that we are in a
position right now where we have got to get the fleet back to
sea that we have now. We are trying to address this--trying to
eat this elephant one bite at a time.
And so we are going to have to increase--I would think it
is going to take a budget that is probably up around 5 percent
growth, real growth in order to get towards where we want to
go. Three percent will not do it. A 3 percent growth will not
suffice, I will tell you that. It is going to have to be up
over 5 percent.
Mr. Byrne. Well, both--General, both to you and to the
Secretary, I said this to you when we were together in
Singapore a couple weeks ago, I strongly support what we need
to do to give you the resources you need to protect the people
of America. And if that means we need to repeal the Budget
Control Act, I am prepared to do that.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you all for being here.
Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, I cannot tell you how
relieved I am that you are in the positions you are in. You
actually provide great adult supervision to this
administration, and I am just extremely grateful for your
service and for you being where you are at.
Secretary Mattis, I would like to follow up on the question
that--Mr. Langevin's question regarding climate change. One of
the many reasons why I find President Trump's decision to
withdraw from the Paris climate accord disturbing is because of
all the security risks we will face if we do not address
climate change.
For example, rising sea levels will affect the stability of
military sites on the coastlines, including but not limited to
sites in California, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, as they are at higher risk of severe flooding
and other extreme weather events.
In 2008, the National Intelligence Council found that over
30 military sites in the continental United States are already
facing elevated risks because of sea-level rise.
Secretary Mattis, what actions is the Department taking to
protect against the effects of sea-level rise and climate
change in general, especially in terms of protecting critical
military infrastructure; and two, how can climate change
complicate our strategic objective especially in terms of our
Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, first, I would say that
withdraw from the Paris accord is not--the administration is
not going to do anything about it. They are going to do it
under a different framework, but it is not that they are not
going to address climate change, a warming climate.
As far as what we do to address this inside the military, I
have frankly been a little consumed by the situation in Korea
and Europe and some others, so I need to get some specifics on
this. But I know that we look at protection of our physical
infrastructure wherever we are at, and along the coast,
obviously, it is a significant concern with the effects of
water, you know, whether it be a hurricane or rising sea
levels.
But I do not have a good answer for you right now, sir. But
I will get you one.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Secretary Mattis, it is estimated that it will cost $1
trillion to sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent over 30
years. We extensively discuss whether such modernization is
necessary or not, whether we need more nuclear weapons.
However, an area we tend to sideline is the threat of nuclear
proliferation.
What actions are you taking to address the threat of
nuclear proliferation? How vital are nonproliferation programs?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I think nuclear nonproliferation has
not received enough attention over quite a few years. I have
met with former Secretaries of Defense to gain from them their
perspective when they were in the job I am in now.
A former Secretary of Defense is coming in to see me
tomorrow afternoon after I get done testifying in the morning
over on the Senate side on this very issue. Rose Gottemoeller
was mentioned earlier by one of your colleagues. I have met
with her in Brussels.
But I think this is going to be critical to what we turn
over to our children's generation. We have a responsibility to
reenergize the nuclear nonproliferation effort.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen.
I want to talk about North Korea. Kim Jong-un has
threatened to build the capability to hit the United States
with an ICBM and a nuclear warhead. He seems to be obsessed
towards gaining that capability.
Secretary Mattis, do you believe that is an existential
threat to our country if he were to gain that capability?
Secretary Mattis. I do, Congresswoman. He does not have it
yet, but we do not have to wait until it is there to start
addressing it, yes, ma'am.
Ms. McSally. Exactly, and I agree with you.
Should diplomacy fail and we need to use conventional
capability to deal with this threat, can you paint a picture in
this environment of what that would entail and what is left of
North Korea when it is over?
Secretary Mattis. It would be a war like nothing we have
seen since 1953. And it would--we would have to deal with it at
whatever level of force was necessary. I am not the most
articulate on this, ma'am, but it would be a very, very serious
war.
Ms. McSally. General Dunford, do you want to comment on
that?
General Dunford. You asked about North Korea, Congresswoman
McSally. Let me talk about South Korea. Regardless of what
happens, there is 25 million people in Seoul, 300,000 of those
are Americans, who are within range of thousands of rockets,
missiles, and artillery pieces along the border.
I do not have any doubt in my mind if we go to war with
North Korea that we will win the war. We will be successful in
accomplishing our objectives. I am equally confident in what
Secretary Mattis said in that that conflict we will see
casualties unlike anything we have seen in 60 or 70 years.
And many of those casualties will be in the first 3, 5, 7
days of that war where all those people in the greater Seoul
area are exposed to the North Korean threat that we will not be
able to mitigate initially.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. I just think the American people
need to understand the gravity of the situation that we are
dealing with. But also our enemies need to know that
ultimately, even as we are discussing readiness challenges and
other challenges, we will win. But this is like something we
have never seen in my lifetime anyway, should deterrence fail
and should diplomacy fail.
One of the capabilities you will need in that scenario--I
was on the hook to deploy over there in the OPLANs [operational
plans]--is the mighty A-10 Warthog. I was pleased to see in the
President's request of fully funding the remaining 283
aircraft, which is 9 operational squadrons. But we do not have
the funding in there for re-winging the remaining 110 that need
re-winging. They will be grounded soon if they are not re-wung.
It is on your unfunded request, which is good.
But nine squadrons is not a lot. Right now they are on the
DMZ [demilitarized zone]. They are fighting against ISIS. They
are deploying periodically to Europe to deal with the threat
from Russia. And last week, we had Air Force generals testify
that they are, you know, willing to go down to six squadrons, a
cut of 33 percent, should the re-winging not happen.
So you have agreed that you want this capability at least
until 2030, and I appreciate finally getting to that point. And
I realize the limitations we have had fiscally in the last
years. So we want the capability to at least to 2030. But if we
were to provide that funding for the re-winging of the
remaining 110, would you appreciate having the capacity of
having those nine squadrons given the threats we are facing?
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely. The priorities are right
where they are right now, but if we got the money for the
additional ones, it would increase our warfighting capability.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
General Dunford, anything else to add?
General Dunford. The only thing I would say, Congresswoman,
I think you understand that dynamic. What I always tell the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force is, I said, look, to meet our
requirements right now, I need all out of your legacy
capability and a little bit more. And I also need you to start
taking your legacy capability offline to grow the Air Force
that we need tomorrow.
So they really have--I think they have got it about right
in terms of prioritization within the top line they have been
given. But the truth of the matter is that there is more
requirement than there is capability and capacity at 55
squadrons.
Ms. McSally. Exactly. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate
it. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service, for your
presence here this evening, your stamina, and your patience. I
think my question is primarily for Secretary Mattis. You are
not only well read, as I understand, but also well written. One
of your works has already been referred to this evening.
I had an opportunity to read an essay that you coauthored
entitled, ``Restoring Our National Security,'' in which you
wrote that for the past 20 years, across administrations of
both political parties, the United States has been operating
largely unguided by strategy.
You say that while we have experienced tactical successes,
they do not add up to strategic victories. And, in fact, they
have cost lives, both soldiers and diplomats, national
treasure, and global credibility.
So I am a little confused as to why and how you can say
that you are confident today about what is being proposed when
we are looking at a proposal for a fiscal year 2018 budget
without what we normally see, which is the Future Years Defense
Program.
I do acknowledge that in your testimony, your written
testimony, I believe you stated as well that we will make hard
choices as we develop our new defense strategy for fiscal year
2019 to 2023, and that will be informed by national defense
strategy.
But as we sit here today, would you not say that this is a
costly undertaking that you are asking us to take without a
strategy? There has been some conflicting comments, sometimes
silence on issues like what are the decision rules regarding
North Korea's development of nuclear capabilities? What is an
acceptable end state regarding China's aggression in the South
China Sea?
And there are just a lot of other components that would go
into a strategy. So what we are seeing here now seems here like
a budget designed more for tactical success and not strategic
victory. Can you just sort of respond or--yeah, respond to
that?
Secretary Mattis. Right. What we have to do is define very
clearly what is the threat that we see, and, in fact, a number
of studies have been mentioned here this evening that have
helped in that definition.
So far as the point I was making in the article, the
chapter you read there from George Shultz's ``Blueprint for
America,'' what I was referring to was why did we go into
Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and why did we end up with tactical
victories and not a strategic outcome.
There is a very interesting article by the president
emeritus Jim Wright, president emeritus of Dartmouth University
in the Atlantic, July of 2013, that said, why do we go into
these wars when we do not know how to end them. And the point
he made was if you do not define the political end state when
you go in, then you cannot figure out how to end the war on a
positive note.
Notice I left out one war, Desert Shield, Desert Storm,
where very clear political guidance was given. But when you
shift from those kind of tactical events to more broadly, we
can define the threats to this country pretty well right now.
That is why I am confident, Congressman.
Mr. Brown. Are you confident though that we have a strategy
for the post-ISIL Syria and Iraq, how we ensure security and
stability?
Secretary Mattis. That is being put together. We have been
here a couple months. Secretary Tillerson, in his role as
Secretary of State, I inform him of the military factors, but
this foreign policy of the United States should largely be
drawn up by the--basically the State Department. And I believe
he is putting that together very, very well. His diplomats are
literally serving alongside us in Syria right now with our
officers who are in that fight.
So I am confident it is being put together. It is not
complete yet. But I know that we have got to fight this enemy
no matter what. So that is just part of the current situation
we have to address. It does not require a fully fleshed out
strategy yet, but we are going to have to have one pretty darn
quick.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
And, finally, if I can get this in, I do not want you to
necessarily--you do not have to comment on what you think about
the reduction of 29 percent in the State Department's budget,
but is that proposed--because you talked about whole-of-
government approach.
The reduction, does that inform the budget that we see in
front of us? You know, fewer State Department dollars, you
acknowledged that that means more Defense Department dollars.
Is that reflected in the numbers?
Secretary Mattis. I do not believe so, sir. This is--I
mean, I have diplomats from State Department serving alongside
us right now, so I have not been affected by a reduction in
State Department's budget. And, again, I do not feel I am
knowledgeable enough to give you a detailed understanding of
what those cuts are. I would have to defer to the Secretary of
State.
Mr. Brown. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Russell.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, each,
for being here tonight.
Probably, there is no greater historical example of
unpreparedness than what happened in the Philippines in 1942. I
would like to read just a couple of brief excerpts from one of
those soldiers that was there. There were 10,000 Americans that
surrendered, 650 died on the Baatan Death March by itself. All
of those that survived that were weakened and endured horrific
suffering, and more than two-thirds of them died.
One of the survivors stated, ``I am one of the few
Americans who has lost a war and who has seen an American Army
overrun and defeated by a combination of starvation, sickness,
unpreparedness, and superior enemy forces. . . . It was a
lonesome feeling. I have seen a country we were defending
occupied by hostile enemy forces occupied thoroughly,
efficiently, sadistically, and completely.
``I have seen the American way of life change in one moment
and have seen the stunned bewildered faces of the erstwhile
American high command as they tried to comprehend the enormity
of the blow that had just struck them. I have seen veteran
officers schooled for 30 years in traditional authority and
routine of command, change overnight into tired, dirty, beaten,
unshaven old men just trying to keep walking.
``From American soldiers with the heritage of generations
of liberty and our blood, we became the chattel. We used to
say, if what is happening here could happen to everyone in the
United States for just one week, what a change it would make in
their attitude about the future insurance of our way of life.
``Use the prayers of our good people, but remember that
prayers work better where the guns are bigger and the planes
are faster and the regiments are more numerous. So in the back
of all of these plans, I say, let us have what it takes just in
case some gentleman does not get the word.
``I do not know if all the peoples in the different nations
will understand our high ideals and unselfish motives, but I do
know one thing they will understand: They will know what force
we have to back up what we say, and if it is big enough, they
will act accordingly.
``The United States is big business. It is bigger than you
and bigger than I, and I say there is no cost too great to
preserve it.''
Secretary Mattis, you stated in the remarks tonight that
the enemy will move against our weak areas and that Congress
has at times risen to the challenge to provide what the
military needs. I think we are in one of those moments now.
When we take the President's budget and what this committee
is proposing, when the DOE [Department of Energy] and defense-
related dollars are subtracted, this committee is proposing
about an additional $25 million baseline over the President's
budget of 574. Why could the President not want to take
Congress' lead, and which budget would best prepare our
military?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, thank you for what you read.
I have read about that campaign, and I share your appreciation
that either--you do not want to be in second place. And we have
no right to victory on the battlefield. That takes commitment
and that takes leadership. And how we got into this situation,
I mean, I told you I was shocked when I came back and saw this.
We are going to have to move this forward in a stable way.
I will just give you an example. We could not afford--we could
not recruit right now 100,000 more troops for the U.S. military
additional right now. You heard the acknowledgment earlier
about what percent of our young people are even eligible.
We could not right now have the industrial base to build
the number of ships, even if you were to somehow repeal the
BCA, repeal the Budget Control Act, say you are going to pass
budgets on time. We literally could not do some of this that
would fully address what you rightly bring up in your role to
raise armies and sustain navies.
I would just tell you that we are going to have to work
together, and if this is the will of the Congress that they be
willing to spend that amount, I am confident that the Commander
in Chief would be in your corner all the way.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Halleran.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
your service to our country and for those that you lead. Thank
you for their service and their family's.
I want to bring us back to a couple of things, but one of
them is the cost issue. It is obvious that we need to invest,
and it is also obvious to me that we need to eliminate the
Budget [Control] Act issues and all the other issues associated
with it. But we still have a situation here where as much as
you want to know where we are going to go with--for you, we
need to know where you want to go in the future.
And then we have heard the issue of studies so far. We have
talked about $19 billion plus a year for inflation at 3
percent. We have now talked about $5 billion potentially for
additional ships puts us up to 24 plus billion dollars not
compounded over the years, but just at today's rates. And this
is just a statement, but I really have a concern with being
able to get to next year and where we are going to be with the
larger scope of budget needs that the Congress has before it.
The second thing is, Secretary, you mentioned that the--for
the enlisted people that we are competitive with salary with
the high school diplomas, and we probably are. But we are not
asking--and I am not saying something you do not know. But I
just want to make clear that we are not asking these young men
and women to go and do work here in the United States at one
location and not move their families around and not put
themselves in harm's way. This is something that we need to be
better than the competitive atmosphere in our society today.
And I want to go back to the Secretary of State's issue.
The cut is 32 percent to the State Department. That includes
the U.S. Agency for International Development and a cut of
nearly half to development assistance. These are programs that
obviously, talking does one thing, you have to be able to
negotiate with a package and stop terrorism by getting to the
hearts of people.
These are what a lot of these programs are for. And,
Secretary, you had made a statement that reducing regional
chaos in tandem with our interagency partners and international
allies to help foster a coherent order requires adequate
diplomatic resources. And former Chairman Admiral Mullen has
stated that cutting the budget in this manner puts the lives of
our men and women in uniform at risk.
So instead of getting into the cost issue, can we have
agreement that it is critical that our State Department be able
to function at the highest level necessary to work in unison
with you, the Defense Department and other agencies so that we
can stop wars and therefore stop the bloodshed that we are
trying to prevent through both the kinetic energy and the State
Department side of the equation.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir, and I want to always make
certain our diplomats under Secretary Tillerson are negotiating
from a position of strength that the U.S. military, well-funded
U.S. military can provide.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Secretary. And I just want to
say thank you for the great work that you are doing right now
and bringing Mr. Norquist on, I think you have a job that you
are going to have a challenge at, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
The Chairman. Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. The Russians and Chinese are allocating
more and more resources towards advanced weaponry and
technology and are making rapid gains in these areas,
especially hypersonics. As you may be aware, several news
outlets have reported that Russia recently conducted tests of
its Zircon hypersonic missile nearly a year ahead of schedule.
Defense analysts have described this as a quantum leap in
technology. When it comes to hypersonics, do you feel like we
are where we need to be to meet these threats?
Secretary Mattis. No, sir, this is the fourth concurrent
force I mentioned about rapid technological change. I think we
have got to increase our hypersonic R&D effort.
Dr. DesJarlais. Do you feel the bureaucracy and
compartmentalization of our budget process is putting us in a
vulnerable position in areas such as R&D?
Secretary Mattis. There are areas, sir, where we need to
get acquisition reform, and we need it quickly. I am bringing
in people from private industry with those specific skill sets
in order to identify to you the problems well enough that you
can see the solution here because some of it requires
legislative relief. Much of it requires reform inside the
Department.
Dr. DesJarlais. Is part of your reevaluation of the missile
defense budget going to be allocated towards hypersonic defense
systems? I think right now $75 million has been set aside.
Secretary Mattis. I am not sure where the money will be
taken from or if it will be added on, but I know we are going
to have to put more money into hypersonic R&D.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Suozzi.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, whenever I
am in this hearing room I am always sobered by the important
responsibility we as elected officials have, and I am
incredibly sobered by the awesome responsibility that each of
you have. And I thank you again for your wonderful service.
Secretary Mattis, you talked about this close collaboration
you have with Secretary Tillerson trying to work together to
have a joint strategy. I was fortunate to go to Afghanistan in
April and was very impressed by the 4-year plan that there
was--the by, with, and through strategy of building up the
Afghan army and air force and the special forces and putting
pressure on trying to get a little bit more out of Pakistan to
do their responsibilities--but I did not see a similar 4-year
plan with the State Department.
Are you developing plans together that are long-term plans
in conjunction with each other as a whole-of-government?
Secretary Mattis. Secretary Tillerson and I are tied at the
hip on this, sir. I assure you the planning is ongoing to keep
us in step with one another and to ensure that we have a tandem
approach to this, not just a military or even a principally
military, it has got to be a collaboration.
Mr. Suozzi. It would be great if there were documents that
showed this collaboration between these two branches, this
whole-of-government, that showed a long-term plan as to how to
address or the short-term plan even how to address our
situation in Afghanistan.
In this current budget the request for funds is for the
current 8,448 troops, and when we went to Afghanistan General
Nicholson and others made a very persuasive case that a few
thousand, 3,000, 5,000 more troops for force protection and to
replace some of these private contractors really made a lot of
sense, it will save money, it will build morale, it will be
effective in helping out.
In May a report came out in a Bloomberg article that the
intelligence community is pushing for 50,000 more troops, and
it looked like it was a move away from by, with, and through.
So can you put us at ease as to what the current thinking is
regarding the current force level versus an increase, a modest
increase for force protection versus this report of 50,000 more
troops?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, I give no credibility to any report
about 50,000 more troops. I can assure you neither the
commander in the field nor the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
have given me any requests like that, not even close. That is
somebody's flight of fantasy, I assure you, sir.
Mr. Suozzi. Thank you. And the by, with, and through
strategy is the strategy that we are going to continue in the
foreseeable future?
Secretary Mattis. And how we enable them by, with, and
through, but also perhaps a little more regional approach, sir.
Mr. Suozzi. General Scaparrotti was here on March 28th of
2017, and he said that ``Additional Russian activity short of
war range from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include
Russia's outright denial of involvement in the lead-up to
Russia's occupation and attempted annexation in Crimea,
attempts to influence elections in the United States, France,
and elsewhere, its aggressive propaganda campaigns targeting
ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors, and cyber
activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic
nations and the Ukraine. In all of these ways and more Russia
is attempting to exert its influence, expand its power, and
discredit the capability and relevance of the West.''
And, you know, we hear this all the time, and a lot of it
is caught up in the partisanship these days, but Russia is a
bad actor, especially in Europe and Eastern Europe. Forget
about the United States now and everything everybody is in the
news this days.
What is the DOD's responsibility regarding hybrid warfare
to combat--you know, we talk heavily about troops and about
equipment. What are we doing to combat this hybrid warfare of
propaganda disinformation from the DOD's perspective and what
can we do and how else can we assist you?
Secretary Mattis. I will have the Chairman speak to this
for a moment, sir. What you defined with General Scaparrotti's
words there, Russia has chosen to be a strategic competitor.
They want a veto authority over the diplomatic, economic, and
security interests of their near abroad and actually a little
deeper than just near abroad. The changing character of war,
this deniable gray zone, cyber--this is what you are saying.
Mr. Suozzi. And beyond that corruption, outright
corruption----
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely.
Mr. Suozzi [continuing]. They are trying to make money by
undermining governments in Eastern Europe and Europe.
Secretary Mattis. Absolutely, sir. How do we adapt to this
so that we are not waiting with tank columns for an enemy that
never can be taken on? It is the changing character of war.
Let me have the Chairman just give a few groups on this. It
is a heavily military education issue, as well of our own----
General Dunford. Congressman, we have spent a lot of time
over the past year looking at this issue, and if you really
break it down into political influence, economic coercion,
information operations, cyber capabilities, military posture,
all put together to advance Russia's national interest, I think
U.S. military presence in Europe is a key piece of it, our
assurance. Our cyber capabilities are an important part of it.
Information operations is something we can do from a military
perspective.
The one thing that Russia is able to do is very quickly
integrate their entire government to advance their interests in
Europe. And one of the things that they are doing, of course,
is undermining the credibility of our alliance structure in
NATO and causing people to question whether we can meet our
alliance commitments.
And so I think at least three out of the five major areas
or areas where there is a military dimension, but the thing I
would emphasize is that what you are describing, I call it
adversarial competition, it has a military dimension. It falls
short of war, but it also is the whole-of-government, and I
think probably three out of the five areas I mentioned are
areas where the military can contribute, but the entire
government needs to be waging in this adversarial competition.
Mr. Suozzi. I have used up all my time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. And I look forward to discussing this further in the
future. Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr. Abraham.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
endurance tonight, gentlemen. I have heard some phraseology
used tonight: prioritize, challenges with families, do not have
the reach, balancing act.
And it all goes back to the Budget Control Act, just we are
not giving you guys the money that you have to do, and I know,
Secretary Mattis, your burden must be very great trying to
balance this on a daily basis.
So certainly us on the committee but all of Congress we
have got to put our money literally where our mouth is and
break this Budget Control Act, and I know we on the committee
with the chairman's leadership certainly would love to do that.
One of your priorities with your 2018, in your testimony,
was saying was to keep the faith with the service men and women
and their families. I saw where in Italy, for example, you have
got two naval hospitals and one Air Force hospital that are on
a closure list, and I worry that when and if those do get shut
down that standard of care for the service members and their
families will suffer greatly.
And I guess my question of Secretary Mattis is, What is
your opinion on that? What is your take on the closure of those
three hospitals and hospitals like those? Where will these
people go? I am worried about the standard of care being
lowered, and I will let you answer.
Secretary Mattis. I have got to look at it, sir. I would
have to look at the specifics of the location, but the bottom
line is we cannot deploy troops and families where we do not
provide sufficient hospital care. So let me look at those three
in Italy and come back to you with what we have in mind and
what we are going to do to mitigate any loss of capability, but
I cannot give you a good answer right now, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Dr. Abraham. That is fine. You can get back to me as soon
as you can. It has been referenced with the maintenance issue
on the aircraft, we in this particular hearing room we also
have been told by others where we are 1,500 to 1,600 pilots
short. We are about 3,400 to 3,500 maintainers short.
You have got the commercial airlines that are pulling
pilots from the military daily, and even with the commercial
carriers incentivizing with perks and monies they are still not
able to meet their demands, and they are even talking about
reducing routes commercially.
What is the DOD doing to retain, build a pilot cadre, and
is it even solvable with money? Where would it go?
General Dunford. Congressman, you have just identified an
issue that actually is keeping the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps awake at night. And there actually is
collaboration right now with industry to look at this as a
national problem for the aggregate number of pilots both for
the commercial sector as well as for the Department of Defense.
And so General Goldfein has been leading an effort to do
that, to open up that dialogue and look at what will it take to
rebuild that pilot base to meet both commercial needs and
military needs. And, of course, in the near term, one thing we
use is the incentive system to keep our pilots in. A key piece
of the incentive system, though, is not just base pay and
bonuses for flying it's--we call it quality of work, it is the
numbers of hours you fly and your confidence in your aircraft
and those kinds of things.
So those are the areas that the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force is focused on the squadron level, that is where it makes
a difference, and in a number of initiatives that he is doing
they are designed specifically to retain pilots. But as you
point out, it is going to take a public-private dialogue and
solution to get at both the commercial requirements and the
Department's requirements.
Dr. Abraham. Well, like you gentlemen, I have the highest
faith in the Chief of the Air Force also, Dr. Goldfein.
So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. McEachin.
Mr. McEachin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mattis, I am a new Congressman, and I have to
tell you that I was surprised by the amount of engagements we
have across the globe. I quickly became a disciple of a 355-
ship Navy. You have spoken in your testimony today or at least
alluded to that our future defense strategy might change or
evolve. I do not want to put words into your mouth, sir.
My initial question is this, I understand our National
Defense Strategy to be being capable of fighting two major
conflicts simultaneously, perhaps one with a state actor,
perhaps one with a non-state actor. Do you envision--I know
your crystal ball may not be perfect--but do you envision that
aspect of our National Defense Strategy changing over time?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, if the enemy, our adversary has four
courses of action that I prepare for, I am pretty confident
number five will be the one he uses. What I am saying is we
have a fundamentally unpredictable phenomenon that this
committee deals with, and that is called war. That is the
auditor that we have to be prepared for. Ultimately it audits
our recruiting, our equipping, our research, our pay, it audits
everything about the military.
So how do we create a military that has got a shock
absorber in it so that when surprise strikes, we are ready for
it? I believe that we will have to be ready for more than one
adversary at one time because we are up against thinking,
cunning adversaries, and if they see us engaged with one in one
arena and they have mischief in mind, they certainly will take
advantage of our distraction. So in creating a military with a
shock absorber in it we have to be prepared to do more than one
thing at a time.
Mr. McEachin. I would also ask you, I know that maybe it
was Mr. Wittman, maybe it was Mr. Courtney, but someone asked
you about the billion dollar reduction in the shipbuilding
account, and I have to confess to you that I either missed your
answer or did not understand your answer. Would you mind
repeating your answer as to why that is justified at this time?
Secretary Mattis. I would not justify reducing the
shipbuilding account. Right now we are trying to prioritize
readiness. In other words, we have ships that you have already
bought that we already have manned that cannot go to sea. So in
some cases what we are doing is putting money into readiness
while trying to save the shipbuilding account so we have
tomorrow's readiness being constructed today.
But this is a matter of prioritization, Congressman, as we
deal with the reality of too many years of these ships not
being maintained in a way that we get full use out of them. So,
you know, what we cannot do is cease to put in operations and
maintenance money there because we are putting it all into
building new ships. As much as I would love to build new ships,
it is a balancing act, sir.
Mr. McEachin. So, Mr. Secretary, would you reject the
characterization then that the funding for the Navy's
shipbuilding and conversion account relative to fiscal year
2017 has been reduced?
Secretary Mattis. No, sir. I just ask for your patience
that we are digging our way out of a readiness hole, and in
order to do that we cannot always build or put the money where
we would want to if we did not have to deal with this reality
that comes from years of living under the Budget Control Act
where we have been unable, unable to maintain the ships. It is
not the option that I would prefer.
Mr. McEachin. And, again, I apologize if this question has
already been asked, but at what point in the future do you see
us making strides towards that 355-ship Navy, positive strides
whether it is getting out of whatever holes you perceive us
being in or just what?
Secretary Mattis. I think even this year with nine ships in
the budget, sir, at least it starts us in the right direction,
but it is only a start, and I share your impatience or your
concern about it.
And in 2019 to 2023 obviously we need the kind of growth
that Chairman Dunford was referring to of 3 to 5 percent a year
in order to start enlarging the fleet. We need a larger fleet.
I do not seem to get much argument on that from anybody, so I
think it is a matter of allocating the resources.
Mr. McEachin. Sadly my time is used up, but I thank you,
sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all you
gentlemen for being here.
I still currently serve in the Mississippi Army National
Guard, served there for almost 32 years, it will be 33, I
think, in December. Our readiness level is not where I have
seen it in my entire career, and I think there are units that
are really good. I think there is equipment, but we have got to
maintain our equipment and get back to the level that we can
sustain. And I do not think that we can do that on the budget
that is proposed of $603 billion. I think we need to be more in
the range of 604.
We talked about munitions. Those can come out of OCO
because they are being used in operations or overseas
contingency operations, so I do not understand why we cannot
have a little certainty in purchasing new munitions through the
OCO funding that is specifically to buy those munitions that we
are shooting at the bad guys.
Equipment. We have got to--right now what I am seeing, and
it is all underhanded and nobody said this, this is just Trent
Kelly's little assumption, but right now what I am seeing is
most of the Active Component services are eyeballing the
equipment of the Guard and Reserves and saying we can transfer
this to us and give them the old stuff and fall in on their
stuff to help us get through. I do not blame them for doing
that.
That does not help us [with] long-term readiness. We have
got to be equipped. If you want me to go fight the enemy as a
National Guardsman, I have got to have an M1A2 SEPv2 tank. I
cannot deploy in an M60A3 and achieve the effects that I need
to achieve.
Our communications do not work. We have got to look and
smell the same, whether it is Active or Reserve and get the
force structure to meet that, but when we start trying to take
equipment from one to shift to the other--in the old Army that
I grew up in, you did not hot rack tanks, you did not use other
people's equipment. You painted your name on yours, and you
owned it, and you took a lot of pride in it.
Our soldiers and airmen and Marines, they do not have to do
that anymore because they do not deploy with their equipment,
they deploy with somebody else's. And they leave it over there
for the next guy to fall in on, and the guys back here cannot
train because of readiness.
What are we doing to get the spare parts and to get the
current fleet across the board not to transfer readiness from
one unit to the other, but to actually start building the OR
[operational readiness] rates of these units?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the first step that was the $21
billion that Congress gave us for the fiscal year 2017
supplemental was directly targeted on this. This budget this
year is designed to further that, but, sir, it took us a long
time to get here, and again, I share your impatience with this,
but I would tell you, too, that OCO will not tell industry with
any confidence that they should open another line, put in the
money into their industrial plant because they do not know if
that is going to be there next year.
This has got to be part of a budget plan if we want them to
make the industrial contribution that their stockholders are
going to have to put money up for because for them to go broke
is not part of their responsibility.
So OCO does not help us expand the industrial base. We can
get max out of the industrial base, but they are not going to
build more industrial base on OCO.
Mr. Kelly. So then why do we not ask for 640 instead of 603
and call it all top-line spending and not OCO?
Secretary Mattis. Well, I mean, that is an option, sir. As
you know, we are already coming in asking you to violate, bust
the Budget Control Act. I mean, at some point we have to
recognize the law that you have passed, and I do not have an
answer because that law was passed with the idea that it would
be so injurious that it would never go into effect.
Well, it has been in effect for years now, and frankly, the
Department of Defense cannot change that law, only Congress
can.
Mr. Kelly. I agree wholeheartedly, Secretary, and we have
got to break the sequester in the BCA. I do think that we need
a higher number, and I think we need the certainty to go with
that. If we give that to you can you spend that on training
soldiers? We do not have enough slots to train soldiers. We
cannot send soldiers to additional training to developing
classes, AIT [Advanced Individual Training] and NCOES [Non-
Commissioned Officer Professional Development System] and OES
[Officer Education System]. Can you spend that money in new
schools and new things to train these soldiers and equipment if
we get that BCA busted and we give you the money on the top
line?
Secretary Mattis. We can, sir. It would help if it was in
multiyear money so that we could have a program that we know we
are going to implement over a couple of years. It would help if
it came in a budget on time, not a continuing resolution with
the paralysis a continuing resolution will apply to us.
So with fiscal discipline we will do our level best to
spend every bit of it and address every problem you have got.
We share your assessment of what the problem is.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you all for your service, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Khanna.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for your service to our country and for being so patient to
take questions from some of the junior members.
Secretary Mattis, Geo Saba on my staff tells me how
respected you were back home at Stanford. I appreciate your
service. I have two questions. I want to read from the
[Section] 809 Panel interim report, which as you are aware, was
the commission panel created to help streamline the defense
acquisition process.
And they wrote, ``According to DOD, the last major defense
downturn in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in more
than 300 prime contractors, platform providers, and subtier
companies merging to form [the] five megaprimes of today:
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and
General Dynamics.''
My question is, do you think there is enough competition in
the defense industrial base and what steps are you taking to
create more competition?
Secretary Mattis. It is very hard for us to create
competition, sir. It is based on how much budget we have and
how many different companies feel they can compete and stay
healthy. We saw this coming in the 1990s. What the Defense
Department did--I happened to be the executive secretary to two
Secretaries of Defense, William Perry and William Cohen. They
looked at each case where they concentrated the industrial base
into smaller and fewer and fewer companies, a larger actually,
but fewer companies, but there was no way to maintain the
vitality, the financial vitality of the companies if we stood
in the way of it.
So it was forced on us. We were worried about it then. We
saw this coming, whether it would be less competition, but
frankly, we were unable to sustain an effort to maintain the
wider industrial base.
Mr. Khanna. Well, I hope you will consider things we can do
to have more competition if it is possible.
My second question concerns I mean, your testimony was very
eloquent where you said our Nation has been at war for 16
years, the longest war our country has faced, and that this has
been in part why our resources have been strained.
And I think if you were to look objectively at Iraq and
Afghanistan and Libya and ask has our country met the
objectives we set out to meet, you would probably get people on
both sides of the aisle saying that has not been the case. I
mean, as you know much better than I, Taliban still controls 40
percent of Afghanistan. And so where I come in Silicon Valley,
you know, when you have a business and they come for more
funding, one of the questions will be, well, is the strategic
plan working or do we need a change in strategy?
And my question is, I have great confidence in our troops.
I have less confidence in the policymakers. Do we need before
we talk about more funding, a clear sense of what the strategy
is going to be so that we know that the last 16 years if we
have not achieved our goals that we will achieve our goals in
these regions?
Secretary Mattis. Well, I think we do need a change in
strategy, and I think it has got to be one that starts with a
good exchange between the Congress and the level of resources
they believe is appropriate to the Department of Defense. And I
would start there by saying that continued BCA, which makes the
Congress a spectator to all this, is probably an irresponsible
way to go.
I am much more comfortable coming up here and defending a
strategy and a good relationship and a good discussion back and
forth than I am with coming up here as we all watch BCA put us
into a position that some of the serving members who have been
in the National Guard and the Armed Forces say is destroying
that very military readiness.
So it is a balancing act of getting a good strategic
dialogue, determining what level of the government's treasure
we are willing to put into defense and make certain that what
we have got are well-defined objectives that we can accomplish.
I am not going to condemn what someone has done before me. I
will leave that to history. I am here to deal with the reality
of the threat to the country today.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you for your answers. I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, 2
years ago Lieutenant General Glueck told this committee that
the COCOM [combatant command] demand for amphibs [amphibious
assault ships] was closer to 54 than the nominal Navy-Marine
Corps unconstrained goal of 38. Is that still the case?
General Dunford. That is pretty close to being the case,
Congressman. I remember those numbers. I was the Commandant of
the Marine Corps at the time.
Mr. Gallagher. And, if anything, I would submit that the
Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment where the formal
requirement was raised from 34 to 38 suggests that in a greater
threat environment the amphibious demands are growing.
Despite this trend, your budget request does not support
another amphibious ship until fiscal year 2020. Navy officials
have supported the long-term layup of certain amphibious ships,
which, while it will support certain modernization readiness
requirements, will also take them out of the fleet and further
reduce our amphib capacity.
Your fiscal year 2018 request also reduces the planned
procurement of ship-to-shore connectors from six in the fiscal
year 2017 FYDP to three, so I guess my question at the end of
the day is in light of that does the fiscal year 2018 budget
request improve or degrade the capacity of the Navy-Marine
Corps team to project power?
General Dunford. Congressman, I have to go back and check
the numbers, but it certainly does not enhance the capacity of
the Navy-Marine Corps to project power.
Mr. Gallagher. I think the answer we have heard sort of in
the five or so shipbuilding or Navy questions we have asked
tonight is that you have chosen to prioritize readiness over
long-term shipbuilding, and I understand why readiness is so
important, I just do not understand why we cannot do both at
the same time.
I mean, you look at Reagan's first full-year budget he
added $3 billion on Navy O&M [operations and maintenance], $10
billion on shipbuilding. So why have we chosen this sort of
false choice, that is my word, right now between readiness and
long-term shipbuilding in this budget?
Secretary Mattis. Right. It is a good question,
Congressman, and I do not take any issue with where you are
going with it. I would just tell you that when we are already
busting the BCA cap by $52 billion this is not a budget that
has taken readiness or modernization laying down, but we have
got to marry our time.
Congress has the Budget Control Act in effect. I mean, if
we walk into here acting as if there is nothing that you have
said and put into law has any effect, you would understandably
or at least some Members of the Congress would understandably
question our judgment. We have got to at least deal with this.
And if you come out and tell us that you are willing to go
right now as a Congress, not this committee, this committee has
stood by us through thick and thin.
This committee is not the problem, nor are your colleagues
in the Senate Armed Service Committee. You know where the
problem lies. It is more broadly. And please guide us. Talk to
us. We are eager to do what you are talking about.
Mr. Gallagher. I guess my only difference of opinion on
that approach is it suggests that the Pentagon and the
President are passive spectators in this process and have
priced in sort of what the congressional market can bear. When
we know that sort of leadership from Article I can change the
market dynamics themselves.
Secretary Mattis. Well, Article I, if I remember right
sir----
Mr. Gallagher. Article II, excuse me.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I think Article I is you.
Mr. Gallagher. If you are indeed urging us to--you both
condemned BCA, why does the budget extend the reductions under
BCA from 2021 when they expire through 2027? Are those just
placeholders? It grinds it down to roughly 2 percentage of GDP
[gross domestic product].
Secretary Mattis. Go ahead.
Mr. Norquist. When you are looking at the FYDP, the out-
years numbers, those are placeholders. Secretary Mattis's
reference, when the studies are done next year will include the
out-years in the implications, but right now they are just
placeholders.
Mr. Gallagher. Sure. And then quickly going back to a line
of questioning that Mr. Conaway and Ms. Hanabusa brought up,
you said that, you made the claim in your testimony that a
round of BRAC could allow to us buy something like 120 Super
Hornets. What is the Department's assessment of what we have
been able to buy from the last round of BRAC?
Secretary Mattis. We could go in and show the amount of
money that we have saved, and we just obviously it goes into
the defense budget. We can give you some examples of what--I
was showing examples of what that savings would translate to in
terms of combat capability, but we could certainly go back,
show you what we have saved from past BRACs and then tell you
what that translates into in terms of number of ships or
airplanes or tanks or whatever.
Mr. Gallagher. And I think we all appreciate that, and also
an assessment of what investments and readiness we are prepared
to forego in order to fund another round of BRAC.
In other words, sort of reverse the dynamic and say how
many Hornets would it cost us to fund BRAC? But I think we
really would appreciate that assessment.
Secretary Mattis. You mean for a couple of years until it
started paying off?
Mr. Gallagher. Yes. All the cost on the front end.
Secretary Mattis. Okay.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the last round of BRAC took
more than 10 years to break even, so just part of the reason
there is concern on this committee is--and last time I checked
with CBO they did not have it breaking even yet.
Now that has been a year or so, but there is no doubt it
took more than 10 years to break even--not a couple--and so
that has left a bitter taste in a lot of folks' mouth. It did
not achieve the savings that were promised. So just an
editorial comment. I am happy to continue to talk, as I know
other members are, but the last one is not a very good basis to
go on.
Secretary Mattis. I would try to align--I told you I do not
accept the current----
The Chairman. And I appreciate that.
Secretary Mattis. And what we will do is we will look at
what can we do to make certain what we get rid of this next
time starts paying off in 5 years, not 10 or 20.
The Chairman. It has got to be a different approach.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
patience in being here and for your leadership.
A lot of great insightful comments tonight, and I thank you
for them. One of the ones that stands out is the fact that we
have this huge bow wave of modernization as the Chairman
pointed out, and you have had to work within the top line that
you have been given and that the BCA has had that huge impact,
so I think it is just a great summary of what you had to
contend with here.
My first question is for the Chairman dealing with
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Today only 30
percent of our combat commanders' airborne intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, or ISR, are being met by the
capabilities from the combatant commanders, their requirements.
This means we are choosing between providing ISR support
for counterterrorism or collection of peer competitors like
Russia or China. Is 30 percent good enough and does the current
budget proposal by you or by the executive branch here, is it
helping to narrow that gap?
General Dunford. Congressman, just a little bit of history,
we actually have grown the ISR enterprise by 1,200 percent
since 2001. We have increased in numbers of platforms by 600
percent since 2008, and we are currently meeting 30 percent of
the requirements. So this is one of those areas in the
Department I actually do not think we can buy our way out of,
and it is probably number one, not probably, it is number one
for me in terms of innovation initiatives, leveraging big data
and finding a different way to feed decision-making.
In other words, we will not be able to buy enough platforms
to meet the current articulated requirement by the combatant
commanders, and yet we still need to get the intelligence
necessary to feed decision-making.
So I guess what I am suggesting to you is that we do have--
we are growing now from 60 caps to 90 caps over the next couple
years. That is our program growth, and so that is a 50 percent
growth, and at the end of that period of time I suspect we will
be somewhere at 34 percent or 35 percent.
So the areas that we need to burn some intellectual capital
on this particular problem is at the top of the list.
Mr. Bacon. Secretary Mattis, do you have anything else to
add to that?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, as our military has shrunk in size
the need for more precise intelligence is one of the ways we
mitigate the risk that smaller military. So part of this is a
growing need for a level of what is over the next hill, where
is the enemy, what is going on as we have gotten a smaller
military that we are still committing, as you know, around the
world.
We did not pull everybody out as we had anticipated a few
years ago and reconstituted at a time when we could have put
more effort into this, more finances into it. So we are going
to have to continue to work this, but what we are doing right
now is challenging for us, very challenging to shrink this gap.
Mr. Bacon. Another area of concern is electronic warfare.
When I came in in 1985 we had, I would say, a dominant
electronic warfare capability compared to our near peers, we
will say, but in the 1990s and I think the 2000s we let it
atrophy, and I would say today the Russians and Chinese are
producing electronic warfare capabilities technology-wise and
capacity-wise that exceeds us.
Does this budget, Chairman, does it help narrow that gap in
electronic warfare realm?
General Dunford. Congressman, it does, and we started in
2017, and I could not agree with you more that our competitive
advantage has eroded over time in electronic warfare, and we
talk about our ability to project power and we talk about
adversaries like China and Russia specifically targeting our
ability to move into an operational area and operate freely
within that area. You have heard the term anti-access/area
denial. Electronic warfare is one of the key areas that we need
to improve our competitive edge.
Mr. Bacon. Mr. Secretary, anything else to add?
Secretary Mattis. No.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each
of you, sirs, for joining us late into the evening tonight to
talk about these important issues.
Mr. Secretary, General Nicholson suggested and you endorsed
efforts to add a, quote, ``few thousand'' additional troops to
prop up the Afghan security forces in the face of aggressive
Taliban attacks. I want to dig more deeply into testimony that
you have already provided related to the budget related to
Afghanistan. Why would a new total of approximately 15,000
troops be decisive when just a few years ago they were close to
100,000 troops in Afghanistan? Have our interest or the mission
changed?
Secretary Mattis. The Afghan Army, as you know, has been
fighting hard, and you will just have to look at the casualty
figures to see that reality. The troops that are being asked
for by General Nicholson, and I do not want to characterize
them all this way, but many of them are going to be what we
call train, advise, assist. These are troops that will go, that
are specifically trained by our U.S. Army to go out in the
field, and you apply them with the brigades, the Afghan
brigade.
Now remember, we have been operating at what we call the
three-star headquarters, the corps level headquarters. Below
them is the two-star division headquarters, then you get down
to the one-star and colonels in the brigades. We are talking
now about putting people who can call NATO air support down at
the brigade level, so that when they are in contact the high
ground is now going to be owned by the Afghans.
It is a fundamental change to how we bring our, what I
would call, our real superiority in terms of air support to
help them. So, in other words, we are not talking about putting
our troops in the front line and saying somehow a few thousand
more troops in the front line alongside them are going to help
taking the hill by closing with the rifles and machine guns.
These are going to be people specifically designed,
trained, and organized and equipped to go in and advise them
how to take the hill, get them the air support, the artillery
support, the rocket support that will enable them. Does that
help to address your question?
Mr. Banks. Yes. Mr. Secretary, like you, I am supportive of
ensuring that Al Qaeda and groups that want to attack the U.S.
homeland are unable to gain safe haven again in Afghanistan,
and I support those efforts. But when it comes to corruption
and ensuring to the American taxpayers that the investment is a
sound one in Afghanistan, what do we need to do to ensure that
our support for the Afghan security forces is used
appropriately and effectively.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, I think corruption has been probably
the biggest strategic vulnerability that we faced in terms of
the Government of Afghanistan gaining the respect and the trust
of their own people. The authorities we give and the
expectations we give to these troops that we are plugging in
down at lower levels for one thing will help to change that,
but furthermore, I went to Afghanistan here a month and a half
ago, and I met the officer who has now been put in charge of
going after corruption.
I find a fellow who is serious, but as you know this is a
society that is run by reciprocity. It is a tribal society by
and large, and we are going to have to deal with the corruption
in a way consistent with that society. They recognize the
problem there. They recognize that something has got to be done
about it, but this is a critical problem.
I would say this biggest strategic problem we face is
corruption, and we will be dealing with it, President Ghani has
a program to deal with it, and we will do our best to address
it. We have got to.
Mr. Banks. Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford.
I appreciate your time here this evening.
First of all, I want to say I completely agree. We have got
to repeal the Budget Control Act. I believe there is no more
important obligation we have as Members of Congress than
providing resources necessary for the defense of the Nation. It
does not matter how much healthcare reform we do, how much tax
reform we do. It does not matter if we balance our budget. If
we get this wrong, none of that matters, and we cannot get this
right without repealing the Budget Control Act.
Having said that, though, I am very troubled by the budget
that the administration has put forward. And I think that in
both of your written testimony to the committee and in
testimony here tonight you have done a tremendous job at laying
out the gravity of the threats that we face, laying out the
seriousness of the situation, the pace of advancements that our
adversaries are making against us, including in areas we may
not be able to counter or defend against. And dominance lost.
And in particular, General Dunford, in your written
testimony you talk about within 5 years the potential that we
would lose the ability to project power. Yet the budget that
has been presented to us is at best a holding pattern. At best.
When we face an existential threat from North Korea and this
budget cuts missile defense, it cuts directed energy funding,
which in your testimony, Secretary Mattis, you said is crucial.
I want to understand, General Dunford, this is a question
for you, how can we possibly justify, you know, we have heard
tonight this budget is a holding pattern before we get to real
growth? How can we possibly justify a year of holding pattern?
Why is it not better to begin the real growth today when we
should have begun it yesterday?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, all I can do is tell you if
our priorities are correct within the top line that have been
given, and when I talked about that 5 years, and we will talk
more in detail on Wednesday night, we came up with that by
analyzing our peer competitors by functional area and taking a
look at where are we today, where will we be in 5 years based
on projected resources? Where are our potential adversaries
today, and where will they be in 5 years?
So I am trying to share with you the problem. I cannot
solve it. I can tell you that we have the right priorities in
the top line we have been given, but I also emphasize that if
we do not turn around the trend, if we do not change the
trajectory that we are on, that is where we will be at a
competitive disadvantage within 5 years. So I am trying to do
the best I can with candor to share the situation as it exists
today and what it will be in 5 years if we do not actually take
action.
Ms. Cheney. I appreciate that. Who gave you the top line?
Are we talking about OMB?
Secretary Mattis. That is correct. It is a growth of about
5 percent, a little over 5 percent over 2017, and it is, as I
said it is $52 billion above the BCA cap. At some point we have
got to get some freedom, and OMB will need the same freedom.
Ms. Cheney. But with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, we are
in a hole that may be greater than we have, you know, certainly
been in since the 1970s. We are facing an array of threats, you
said in your testimony, that is basically more volatile than
any time in your career.
And so I am trying to understand how it is that we could
possibly have an administration that is saying but it is okay,
we can wait until next year to begin the serious buildup?
Secretary Mattis. I do not think anyone is saying that,
ma'am. Five percent growth, that is a bit of a change to say
the least.
Ms. Cheney. Well, it is 3 percent, as I understand it, Mr.
Secretary----
Secretary Mattis. Over 2017?
Ms. Cheney [continuing]. Over the Obama administration
request for 2017.
Secretary Mattis. Okay. Well, Congresswoman, we are growing
the budget, we are dealing with readiness problems that we
inherited that the Congress has watched for some time. We are
going to do our best to create combat capability as swiftly as
we can using an All-Volunteer Force and trying to get ships
back to sea, trying to get airplanes back in the air.
Ms. Cheney. But I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, but I just do
not understand when you say we are doing it as quickly as we
can, why, you know, tonight we have said we are going to begin
real growth next year. Why are we all right to wait until next
year to begin that real growth?
Secretary Mattis. Well, for one thing, ma'am, we have got
to put a lot of money into readiness where we are already in a
hole. I mean, I have looked at the unfunded priorities list,
and after the priority we have already set, I agree with every
one of the unfunded priorities, as well. And that is 33 billion
more dollars, but the bottom line is you are asking us to come
in with a budget request beyond what we have now that would be
even more of a violation of the act that Congress has passed.
I mean, we need some direction from you, as well. I mean,
frankly, as I recall my civics textbook the President does not
even have to send a budget.
Ms. Cheney. Right, but, Mr. Secretary, with all due
respect, I know my time is up, just to echo what my colleague
Mr. Gallagher said, the President has got to lead on this, and,
you know, in terms of the budget proposal that came up, and I
know you dealt with this issue of the proposed caps, but the
President's budget extends the Budget Control Act out 6 years.
So we can say it is a placeholder, but table S7 foresees the
Budget Control Act and the caps going beyond where they are
supposed to be today.
And so I think we can all agree we have got to repeal the
Budget Control Act. It is crucially important. But we cannot be
in a holding pattern in my opinion with all due respect for a
year, you know, while we face the grave nature of the threats
we face.
Thank you.
Secretary Mattis. Okay.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Dunford,
Secretary Mattis, Mr. Norquist. I am grateful tonight to see
the bipartisan appreciation of your service.
It is clear that we all want you to be successful for
American families. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Daniel Allyn, testified that quote ``based on current readiness
levels, the Army can only accomplish defense planning guidance
requirements at a high military risk,'' end of quote.
General Dunford, what is your assessment of the impact on
our soldiers of being able to accomplish requirements at a high
military risk? How many casualties does this mean for the Army
to incur when it is ordered to fight at a high military risk?
How many casualties at a low military risk?
General Dunford. Congressman, without talking about a
specific scenario, I cannot talk about casualties, but when
General Allyn did testify, and when we all testified to risk,
we do look at two variables. One is the time it takes to
accomplish the objectives and then the amount of casualties we
would estimate under particular circumstances.
So I think what General Allyn was suggesting is that
readiness translates into casualties, and I would subscribe to
that, as well.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate that Colonel Paul Cook has
reflected such concern and wants to work with you obviously.
And, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your very clear
warnings about the destructive consequences of sequestration.
But at the same time, the budget level in your request, how
many years do you think it would take normally to address high
military risk?
Secretary Mattis. It is a constantly moving target, sir,
because the enemy does not stand still. But I would just tell
you that between 2019 and 2023 we intend to significantly grow
the force, the Navy fleet, the Army brigade, and the fighter
squadrons to reduce that risk.
Mr. Wilson. And, Mr. Secretary, I am very concerned as Ms.
Cheney, too, the defense budget request states, quote, ``The
condition of mission facilities, airfields, training areas,
housing barracks directly impacts the readiness of the units
and the morale of the soldiers, civilians, and families.''
Yet the budget also tells us that the Army has $10.8
billion in unmet needs, the Navy at $9.5 billion short, and the
Air Force is $25 billion short. How long will it take to fix
these critical backlogs, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years? Will we
ever be able to fix these facilities for our soldiers, airmen,
and Marines to train for war and for their families to live?
Secretary Mattis. Well, we are increasing the MILCON
[military construction] budget, sir. You know, as we look more
broadly at this, as I said earlier, Congressman Wilson, we did
not get into this overnight, and it is going to take time to
get us out of this. We are given a top line as the President's
budget had to deal with a lot of priorities, and we are doing
the best we can with the money that we have been given, which
is an increase over what past years have committed to DOD. Is
it enough?
Can I give you a timeline on this? Probably not right now,
but it is going in the right direction, and I think we would
all agree with that even if it is not sufficient in terms of
getting us where we need to go. But the Congress has the purse
strings, and if the Congress decides to fund the unfunded
priority list, some of these issues are listed right there,
then that money can be applied to it.
Mr. Wilson. And specifically, Mr. Secretary, the Navy alone
submitted unfunded requirements of more than $690 million for
critical repairs to airfields, dry docks, wharfs, and other
facilities. The Air Force asked for more than $858 million, the
Army for $820 million. What is the explanation for the
committee and how should we accept whether the budget request
is adequate when the services are asking for so much, and
really there has been a great description by Congresswoman
Cheney that we are in a holding pattern, and so we want to work
with you, and so how quickly can we get this done?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, the budget is growing, so a holding
pattern I do not agree with. It is not sufficient to address
all the shortfalls that grew over the years. I will be the
first to admit that, and if the Congress sees fit to give us
enough money to do all that then we can probably do it a lot
faster. But for me to give you an estimate would take a heck of
a lot of analysis and a firm, stable budget horizon that we
have not enjoyed in a decade.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much again for all of you being
here tonight.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz. Make it good.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure when the
Secretary said that he kept others up at night, he quite had
this in mind.
Mr. Secretary, please know that the warfighters in my
district in northwest Florida are as proud of you as I am
certain you are of them. We have spent now 4 hours in this
hearing to essentially answer this question: If we gave you
more money than the administration requested with a stable
budget horizon, could you use it effectively?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, Congressman, we could.
Mr. Gaetz. And would that effective use of money above and
beyond what the administration has requested make our troops
safer in combat?
Secretary Mattis. We would ensure it did.
Mr. Gaetz. And would the money that we could provide above
and beyond what the administration has requested do a great
deal to advance America's interests throughout the world?
Secretary Mattis. I would presume so, yes.
Mr. Gaetz. And as we sit here today is it accurate that the
average airplane in our Air Force is about 27 years old?
Secretary Mattis. I would have to confirm that, but it
sounds--it is in the ballpark.
Mr. Gaetz. At any other time in the Air Force's history has
the average age of an aircraft been higher?
Secretary Mattis. I do not believe so, but, again, I would
have to look at the specific data.
Mr. Gaetz. And today in the Air Force would we have to say
that more or less than half of our fighter squadrons are full-
spectrum ready?
Secretary Mattis. Well, Congressman, again, I prefer not to
get too specific in open hearing, but I think you are about
right.
Mr. Gaetz. And the fact that we have an Air Force where
perhaps readiness is less than optimal with aircraft that are
older than at any other time in the Air Force's history, could
you take just a moment and reflect on the impact that has on
our ability to project power and the safety of those that we
send into combat?
Secretary Mattis. Well, Congressman, I think you have heard
from the Chairman tonight. We have pilots who are not flying
enough to stay current in their aircraft or have their
confidence in the aircraft. We have readiness problems across
the force and these for anyone I think who has been on this
committee for more than a year probably this is not a surprise.
It was a bit of a shock for me coming back to the
Department. But what you are outlining appears to be a pretty
good definition of the problem.
Mr. Gaetz. Earlier in response to a question you indicated
that you thought Qatar was moving in the right direction. I
appreciated that characterization because it is quite binary.
In a world that is always moving, things are always going in
the right direction or in the wrong direction. What
characterization would you apply to Turkey, are they going in
the right direction or the wrong direction?
Secretary Mattis. Well, in what regard, sir?
Mr. Gaetz. In the same regards in which you answered the
question as it related to Qatar.
Secretary Mattis. Qatar was in regard to whether or not
they were moving away from funding, and much of it was private
funding, not governmental, but funding of any kind of violent
extremist, and in that regard they are moving in the right
direction. I am not aware of Turkey funding violent extremists.
Mr. Gaetz. Then in the broadest sense, Mr. Secretary, of
Turkey's interaction with the world, with our allies, taking
into account our utilization of Turkish airspace, military
assets, also taking into consideration, you know, the
challenges that we have in the Aegean with the Greeks and the
Turks, is Turkey moving in the right direction or the wrong
direction?
Secretary Mattis. Turkey is a NATO ally, as you know. It
has got internal political issues that they are dealing with.
They provide an air base that has been invaluable in the fight
against ISIS.
It is a mixed bag in that regard, but I think right now we
are doing the best we can to work with Turkey in areas where we
have common interests in order to take advantage of the
situation that they provide being right on the border of being
a frontline state against terrorists.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you so much, Secretary Mattis.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, both, for responding to all the
questions that this committee put to you.
I think you can tell, there is bipartisan interest in going
above 603. There is also bipartisan interest in working with
you to reform the Department to be more agile and more
efficient, which is also a part of the equation.
So needless to say, we have got lots of work together yet
to come.
Without objection, members have 3 legislative days in which
to submit extraneous material for inclusion into the record
consistent with the committee policy limits.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 12, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 12, 2017
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 12, 2017
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 12, 2017
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Secretary Mattis. The cost of climate preparedness and resilience
is spread across much the Department's portfolio. Areas affected
include operational planning, infrastructure, training, weapon systems
operations and maintenance, and personnel health. At the same time,
climate effects are localized and require evaluation on a case-by-case
basis. The Department approaches climate effects as a risk factor to
our mission. There is no single bill to pay for climate preparedness
and resilience. The costs associated with enhancing climate
preparedness and resilience address long-term mission risks and must be
factored into the Department's overall cost of doing business. Climate
risks have and will continue to be a factor prevalent in our
operational, programmatic, and planning processes. [See page 17.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Secretary Mattis. The Military Service Academies continue to make
clear and demonstrable progress in supporting those who report sexual
assault and harassment. However, this year's survey results underscore
the unique challenges the Academies face in sustaining long-term
decreases in the occurrence of sexual assault. Department research
indicates that retaliatory behavior associated with crime reporting
occurs with less frequency at the Service Academies than in the Active
Duty force, but remains an important concern. All three Academies took
steps aimed at eliminating retaliatory behavior, improved resources for
victims perceiving such behavior, and provided tools for faculty,
staff, and peers to better prevent and respond to it. The Department's
Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy (RPRS) details actions to
address retaliatory behavior against victims who report a sexual
assault, complainants of sexual harassment, witnesses, bystanders who
intervene, and first responders, such as SARCs and SAPR VAs. Work to
implement the strategy across the Military Departments began in
February 2016 and remains ongoing. The Academies are leveraging the
RPRS to drive changes in retaliation. However, in response to the
issues and statistics addressed in the report, I met with the
Superintendents in March to discuss ways to decrease prevalence of
sexual assault, sexual harassment, retaliation, and increase reporting.
As a result, the Secretaries of the Military Departments have been
directed to address several key areas of concern at the Academies, to
include reinvigorating prevention efforts and improving sexual assault
and harassment reporting by reducing barriers to reporting within the
Academies. Their plans to address these issues are due not later than
October 30, 2017. [See page 34.]
Secretary Mattis. On 4 March 2017, Mr. Thomas Brennan, not Mr.
LaPorta, broke the Marines United story. Mr. LaPorta was debarred prior
to the release of the Marines United story for conduct that occurred on
5 February 2017. The debarment decision was formalized on 10 February
2017. Mr. LaPorta was debarred for failing to comply with regulations
addressing media conduct aboard Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and at
naval correctional facilities generally. [Base Order P5720.7G;
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1640.9C] On 5 February 2017, Mr.
LaPorta, without coordinating with Camp Lejeune public affairs
personnel, traveled to the on-base residence of an alleged child sexual
assault victim to obtain information from the child's parents for a
story he was working on. The alleged victim's family did not invite Mr.
LaPorta onto the installation or to their quarters, and were upset by
his unannounced appearance. Prior coordination with the installation's
public affairs office is required before media representatives may
enter the installation to gather information. On the same day, Mr.
LaPorta visited a pretrial detainee at the Camp Lejeune Brig, but
failed to identify himself as a member of the media. The detainee is
pending trial on several charges, including the alleged sexual assault
of a child. Personal interviews between prisoners and media
representatives are not permitted without prior authorization. [See
page 34.]
Secretary Mattis. No. [See page 35.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE
Secretary Mattis. Under the Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget
out-year planning profile, the Navy's fleet will grow from 276 ships
today to 308 ships by January 2025. With additional topline over a
number years, the Navy estimates the fleet could grow to 315 ships by
January 2025. This modest difference highlights the long build times
and high costs of shipbuilding. Even with significant additional
topline for multiple years, the Navy's forecast is that we could not
reach 350 ships until Fiscal Year 2041. [See page 51.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Secretary Mattis. There are 243 political positions in the
Pentagon. All but 93 positions have been hired or are in the process of
being hired. [See page 43.]
Secretary Mattis. Rather than offer five specific programs that
place an undue burden on the Department, I submit that mandates that
adversely affect the Department's priorities fall into two categories:
congressional adds and restrictions. The programs and projects included
in the Fiscal Year 2018 budget request represent my highest, balanced
priorities. Congressional adds are usually aligned with the Services'
list of unfunded requirements, though valid and executable, should not
replace my highest priorities. The Fiscal Year 2018 request represents
the best approach to rebuild readiness while repairing damage from five
years of unstable budgets and budget caps in preparation for future
investments. Likewise, congressional restrictions on the Department's
reform initiatives limit investment opportunities. Authorization for a
new round of Base Realignment and Closure in 2021 would reduce excess
infrastructure and save at least $2 billion per year. Additionally, the
enactment of proposed TRICARE reforms would yield an additional $5.7
billion over five years. These savings could be invested in more
planes, helicopters, and ships to improve our warfighting readiness,
increasing both capacity and lethality. [See page 44.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Secretary Mattis. In my view, the changing climate is a driver of
instability that requires a broader, whole-of-government response. At a
practical level, the Department of Defense incorporates consideration
of the effects of a changing climate into our infrastructure planning
cycle. As we develop new projects, climate effects is one of the risks
that is factored into planning and programming analysis. Furthermore,
the Department developed scenarios for sea level rise and extreme water
levels on our installations and issued specific policy requiring the
consideration of risk associated with construction in flood plains. Our
methodology to managing the changing climate is one component of our
overall strategic commitment to the security and prosperity of the
Asia-Pacific, and the Department will continue to work to secure a
peaceful, prosperous, and free region. [See page 52.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM
Secretary Mattis. To clarify, the hospitals you mentioned are to be
transitioned to outpatient clinics meaning that substantial DOD-
provided medical capability will remain at each location. The
outpatient clinics will continue to address the vast majority of the
care given at these facilities. These hospitals have extremely low
volumes of inpatient care, have limited capabilities with emergency or
complex inpatient care being routinely transferred to larger and more
capable local hospitals. We would be asking these same local hospitals
to take on a marginal inpatient workload comprised of less complex
patients. As we move forward with the transitions, we are committed to
ensuring that patient access and standards of care will not be
compromised and are working with the local facilities to address
access, language, and bedside nursing needs. Senior members of my
medical staff, with Navy participation, have visited these facilities
and spoken with military providers, visited the local hospitals and
beneficiaries and have not identified any insurmountable barriers to
transitioning these hospitals. The Army's successful transition of its
inpatient facility at Vicenza, Italy to outpatient-only status provides
lessons learned for similar changes at these facilities.
I think it's important to mention that, as these facilities
transition, military surgical staff can be to be relocated to hospitals
with greater inpatient volume, diversity, and acuity that are better
able to sustain the lifesaving clinical skills that are key to
supporting our deployed warfighters. To answer your question directly,
I believe that we can transition these hospitals to outpatient clinics
without compromising the care that will be given to our service members
and their families at these locations. Further that these transitions
support the Department's focus on ensuring that our medical force
maintains the clinical readiness that has been so amply demonstrated
over the past 15 years of conflict. [See page 61.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 12, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. 1. There has been widespread concern about the
President's proposed cuts to the international affairs budget, as
exhibited by the following:
a. Op-ed from former Secretary of State Colin Powell, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/opinion/colin-powell-trump-budget-state-
department.html
b. Joint Testimony to SASC on June 13, 2017 by General Philip
Breedlove, USAF (Ret.); General George Casey, USA (Ret.); General
Carter Ham, USA (Ret.); General James Jones, USMC (Ret.); General;
George Joulwan, USA (Ret.); General Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.);
Admiral William McRaven, USNA (Ret.); Admiral Michael Mullen, USN
(Ret.); Admiral Eric Olson, USN (Ret.); General John Paxton, USMC
(Ret.); General David Petraeus, USA (Ret.); General Joe Ralston, USAF
(Ret.); Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.); General Hugh Shelton USA,
(Ret.); Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.); and Admiral Sandy
Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), https://s3.amazonaws.com/one-org/us/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/13115833/2017-06-13-joint-testimony-to-SASC.pdf
c. Op-ed from General James Jones, USMC (Ret.) and Admiral Michael
Mullen, USN (Ret.), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/12/
budget-foreign-aid-cuts-national-security-000456
d. Letter from 120 retired military officers, http://www.usglc.org/
downloads/2017/
02/FY18_International_Affairs_Budget_House_Senate.pdf
Secretary Mattis [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. 2. There has been widespread support and a claim that
``Strategic investments in diplomacy and development make America safer
and more prosperous.''--as exhibited by the following: a. Letter from
225 business leaders, http://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/05/Business-
Letter-Tillerson-May-22.pdf
3. There has been widespread support from the faith-based community
to support and protect the international affairs budget, claiming that
diplomatic and development tools lead to ``peaceful, productive
societies that do not turn to violence or terrorism'', as exhibited by
the following: a. Letter from Faith Leaders, http://www.
usglc.org/downloads/2017/04/Faith-Letter.pdf
Secretary Mattis. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Smith. In light of paragraphs 1-3 above, please answer
questions 4-8.
4. Would you agree that 32% is a severe cut to the State Department
and USAID or any department or agency? Would you agree that cuts to the
State Department and USAID will impact national security and American
security? How? How would the President's proposed budget for the State
Department and USAID impact American power projection and global
leadership?
Secretary Mattis. I defer to Secretary Tillerson on how he intends
to manage the budget cuts across the State Department and US AID to
ensure that the United States is able to maintain its leadership role
in the international order. He will need to make some tough decisions
about how to manage risk. The foundation of American power rests on our
unmatched ability to project influence, both militarily and
diplomatically. Adequate diplomatic resources are as critical as
military resources to defeating ISIS as well as to preventing state
actors, like Russia or China, from challenging established
international norms.
Mr. Smith. 5. From a defense perspective, how would the President's
proposed budget for the State Department and USAID make America safer
and advance U.S. national security interests?
Secretary Mattis. Again, I defer to Secretary Tillerson on how he
intends to manage the budget cuts across the State Department and USAID
to ensure that the United States is able to maintain its leadership
role in the international order. With regard to funds related to
building the capacity of partner security forces, Secretary Tillerson
and I have directed our staffs to deepen collaboration to ensure that
our security sector assistance funds address the highest priorities to
minimize risks to interoperability and our partners' ability to address
shared threats.
Mr. Smith. 6. From a defense perspective, how would the President's
proposed budget for the State Department and USAID impact stability in
the world and/or potential conflict?
Secretary Mattis. The U.S. Government is most effective when it
leverages the expertise resident across its departments and agencies to
plan and employ all its tools of national power in a coherent,
synchronized manner. Just as I have to manage risk across the Defense
Department's sequestration budget, Secretary Tillerson needs to manage
the proposed budget cuts to the State Department and USAID in a way
that will minimize risk to the stability and security of the
international order.
Mr. Smith. 7. What is the Department's planning and what resources
are required to address those potential impacts to stability and
conflict?
Secretary Mattis. As I've consistently stated in testimony and
public statements, my first priority is to restore warfighter
readiness, filling in the holes from trade-offs made during 16 years of
war, nine years of continuing resolutions, and Budget Control Act caps.
Restoring readiness enables the U.S. Armed Forces to defend the United
States and perform its roles with regard to promoting stability and
preventing conflict. Congress has a critical role to play in supporting
the Department's planning and resources. Passing a Fiscal Year 2018
budget in a timely manner, avoiding yet another continuing resolution,
eliminating the threat of future sequestration cuts, and providing a
stable budgetary planning horizon will better enable the Department to
promote stability and deter conflict.
Mr. Smith. 8. Would you agree that the adequate resourcing of
diplomacy, development, and defense is critical to advancing U.S.
national security interests? If funding is cut for diplomatic and
development avenues, how would this complicate the Department's ability
to operate with coalitions or work with our allies, partners, and other
actors? How could this complicate negotiations with host nations where
our service members are operating missions from or are stationed in?
How could this complicate the Department's ability to work by, with,
and through partners and other stakeholders?
Secretary Mattis. I agree that adequate resourcing of diplomacy and
development is just as critical to advancing U.S. national security as
adequate resourcing of defense. However, I am encouraged by the
willingness of our allies and partners to share the burden of the
campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other
terrorist organizations that represent a clear threat to international
order. I believe a willingness to address shared challenges will
continue to motivate allies and partners to collaborate with the United
States. In some cases, the United States must provide support to
partners to ensure that they have the capability and capacity to
operate alongside, or in lieu of, U.S. forces. In these cases, the
State and Defense Departments are collaborating closely to ensure that
the security sector assistance funds that each Department oversees are
directed to the highest priorities.
Mr. Smith. 1. There has been widespread concern about the
President's proposed cuts to the international affairs budget, as
exhibited by the following:
a. Op-ed from former Secretary of State Colin Powell, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/opinion/colin-powell-trump-budget-state-
department.html
b. Joint Testimony to SASC on June 13, 2017 by General Philip
Breedlove, USAF (Ret.); General George Casey, USA (Ret.); General
Carter Ham, USA (Ret.); General James Jones, USMC (Ret.); General;
George Joulwan, USA (Ret.); General Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.);
Admiral William McRaven, USNA (Ret.); Admiral Michael Mullen, USN
(Ret.); Admiral Eric Olson, USN (Ret.); General John Paxton, USMC
(Ret.); General David Petraeus, USA (Ret.); General Joe Ralston, USAF
(Ret.); Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.); General Hugh Shelton USA,
(Ret.); Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.); and Admiral Sandy
Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), https://s3.amazonaws.com/one-org/us/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/13115833/2017-06-13-joint-testimony-to-SASC.pdf
c. Op-ed from General James Jones, USMC (Ret.) and Admiral Michael
Mullen, USN (Ret.), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/12/
budget-foreign-aid-cuts-national-security-000456
d. Letter from 120 retired military officers, http://www.usglc.org/
downloads/2017/
02/FY18_International_Affairs_Budget_House_Senate.pdf
General Dunford. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. 2. There has been widespread support and a claim that
``Strategic investments in diplomacy and development make America safer
and more prosperous.''--as exhibited by the following: a. Letter from
225 business leaders, http://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/05/Business-
Letter-Tillerson-May-22.pdf
3. There has been widespread support from the faith-based community
to support and protect the international affairs budget, claiming that
diplomatic and development tools lead to ``peaceful, productive
societies that do not turn to violence or terrorism'', as exhibited by
the following: a. Letter from Faith Leaders, http://www.
usglc.org/downloads/2017/04/Faith-Letter.pdf
General Dunford. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. In light of paragraphs 1-3 above, please answer
questions 4-8.
4. Would you agree that 32% is a severe cut to the State Department
and USAID or any department or agency? Would you agree that cuts to the
State Department and USAID will impact national security and American
security? How? How would the President's proposed budget for the State
Department and USAID impact American power projection and global
leadership?
General Dunford. Both Secretary Mattis and I work closely with
Secretary Tillerson. DOD and State are one team. The State Department
has yet to release the details of the proposed budget cuts, so I cannot
comment on the impact to security. However, I do not see one security
issue or threat we face that can be solved by military power alone. Our
most pressing national security issues can only be addressed within a
foreign policy framework. We will work collaboratively with the
Department of State and USAID to ensure we fully leverage our
collective capabilities and capacities to protect the Homeland and
advance our foreign policy interests.
Mr. Smith. 5. From a defense perspective, how would the President's
proposed budget for the State Department and USAID make America safer
and advance U.S. national security interests?
General Dunford. The State Department has yet to release the
details of the proposed budget cuts, so I cannot speculate on the
impact to our national security interests. I cannot name a single
security issue that can be solved by military power alone. We will work
collaboratively with the Department of State and USAID to ensure we
fully leverage our collective capabilities and capacities to protect
the Homeland and advance our foreign policy interests.
Mr. Smith. 6. From a defense perspective, how would the President's
proposed budget for the State Department and USAID impact stability in
the world and/or potential conflict?
General Dunford. The State Department has not revealed the details
of the proposed budget cuts, so I cannot speculate on their impact. A
cornerstone of our ability to project power, and support stability, is
our network of allies and partners. Every relationship we have with
another country has diplomatic, economic, and military elements. In
order to be successful, any military relationship, or action, must be
crafted within a foreign policy framework maintaining our national
security interests and end states. We will work collaboratively with
the Department of State and USAID to ensure we fully leverage our
collective capabilities and capacities to protect the Homeland and
advance our foreign policy interests.
Mr. Smith. 7. What is the Department's planning and what resources
are required to address those potential impacts to stability and
conflict?
General Dunford. We will not be able to identify or mitigate
potential impacts until we fully understand the details of the State
Department's budget going forward.
Mr. Smith. 8. Would you agree that the adequate resourcing of
diplomacy, development, and defense is critical to advancing U.S.
national security interests? If funding is cut for diplomatic and
development avenues, how would this complicate the Department's ability
to operate with coalitions or work with our allies, partners, and other
actors? How could this complicate negotiations with host nations where
our service members are operating missions from or are stationed in?
How could this complicate the Department's ability to work by, with,
and through partners and other stakeholders?
General Dunford. I would agree that diplomacy, development and
defense are all critical to advancing U.S. security interests. There is
no security threat today that can be solved by military power alone. At
the core of our alliances and partnerships are intertwined military,
economic, political, and intelligence sharing relationships that allow
us to collectively take action against threats. We have not seen the
details on the State Department's proposed budget cuts, so I cannot
comment on specific impacts. Our relationship with allies and partners
is critical. We will collaborate with the State Department to ensure we
can meet our alliance commitments and maintain our network of allies
and partners.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Last year's NDAA established U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM) as its own Unified Combatant Command and formalized the
relationship with the Principal Cyber Advisor. The steps taken by
Congress recognized the importance of governing the development of DOD
cyberspace policy and strategy. Leveraging the successes and lessons
learned, the Principal Cyber Advisor will maximize the result of each
strategic objective and ultimately the success of each strategic goal
of the Cyber Mission Force. What steps is the Department taking to
establish
CYBERCOM as a Unified Combatant Command and to enable the Principal
Cyber Advisor to serve as the service-like secretary? How will this
elevation serve your broader strategic goals for the Department?
Secretary Mattis. The Department is preparing for the elevation of
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to a Unified Combatant Command,
consistent with Section 167b of Title 10, U.S. Code. I have provided
recommendations to the President on how and when to proceed with
elevation and remain in discussions with the White House about this
matter. Elevation would enhance the Department's position in the cyber
domain by streamlining and consolidating responsibility for cyberspace
operations in a single operational commander. Elevation would empower
the Commander to interact as a peer with other Combatant Commanders,
increase coordination of cyber forces and their training, and
demonstrate commitment to cyberspace as a warfighting domain; thereby
assuring partners and enhancing deterrence messaging. The additional
oversight responsibilities of the Principal Cyber Advisor under section
167b are closely aligned with the plan that will be developed for a
more optimized cyber organizational structure, as prescribed in Section
902 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. The
organizational efforts will be sequenced to allow the Department to
maintain focus on the lethality and mission readiness of an elevated
USCYBERCOM.
Mr. Langevin. I have advocated for the transition of mature, game-
changing technologies to our warfighters so that we never send them
into a fair fight. Last year's NDAA required the installation of a
Designated Official for DE technologies, and it is critical that this
position focus not just on research and engineering, but especially on
facilitating technologies' transitions to the joint battlefield. Can
you provide an update on where the Department is in installing this
official?
Secretary Mattis. I am fully committed to furthering the
development and transition of directed energy weapons that complement
kinetic weapon systems to fulfill near- and long-term warfighter needs.
We are creating a detailed strategic plan to develop, mature, and
transition directed energy technologies to acquisition programs of
record as directed in Section 219 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This roadmap will be the cornerstone
for future studies focused on other directed energy technologies, such
as high-energy lasers and high-power microwave, which could fulfill
warfighter needs. Once the reorganization of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), creating the Under
Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering) and Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment), is complete, as directed by
section 901 of the FY 2017 NDAA, the Department will designate a senior
defense official for directed energy technologies.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. On May 8, 2017, Deputy Secretary of Defense Work sent
a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chiefs
of the Military Services directing an assessment of their readiness to
access transgender applicants into the military services beginning on
July 1, 2017. The memorandum stated that ``[w]e do not intend to
reconsider prior decisions unless they cause readiness problems that
could lessen our ability to fight, survive and win on the
battlefield.'' Subsequently, the Army and Marine Corps requested a
delay of the July 1 deadline for implementation of service plans to
access transgender applicants. Please describe the process OSD intends
to follow in assessing the Army and Marine Corps's requests and the
standard that will be used for any reevaluation of the transgender
policy or implementation timelines based on impacts to readiness.
Secretary Mattis. There is no modification to the current policy
until we receive the President's direction to the Department. In the
meantime, we will continue to treat all our personnel with respect. As
importantly, given the current fight and challenges we face, we will
all remain focused on accomplishing our assigned missions.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. 1. As the battle to liberate Raqqa gets underway, I'd
like you to describe your long-term vision for Syria and how you expect
the U.S. military mission in Syria to change or evolve after the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been pushed from major city
centers.
a. What is the desired end-state? b. In addition to our obvious
counter-terrorism objectives in Syria, what other U.S. national
security objectives do we have in Syria? c. How do you prioritize those
and would you advocate for expending U.S. military resources to achieve
or sustain those objectives?
2. The President's budget assumes troop levels will stay constant
in Syria.
a. Is that your expectation? b. If not, where would that extra
funding come from? c. Do you plan on requesting additional funding
through a supplemental? d. Or do you intend to take from other areas in
an already insufficient budget request?
3. Do you anticipate a confrontation with regime-aligned forces
will in southern or eastern Syria?
4. How do we prevent unintentional escalation with the regime or
the state-actors supporting the regime?
Secretary Mattis. We remain focused on defeating the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) physical caliphate and plan to surround the
enemy to ensure foreign fighters are not able to escape and return
home. The liberation of Raqqa is a necessary step in defeating ISIS,
but it is not the last step. ISIS remains entrenched along the
Euphrates River Valley, and operations to defeat ISIS and prevent its
resurgence will take many more months. The U.S. desired end state is to
defeat ISIS's physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria; destroy ISIS'
ability to conduct external operations; protect partner and allied
nation borders and preserve the coalition; and create the conditions
for a secure environment that prevents the rise of ISIS ``2.0'' and
other violent extremist organizations. The United States seeks a
unified Syria and a political solution that addresses the root causes
of terrorism and instability and where Syrians decide their own
government. The Department of Defense's (DoD) number one priority is to
protect the homeland by defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria and destroying
its ability to plan and execute external attacks against the United
States and its partners and allies.
We are continuously assessing the force management levels in Syria
to ensure we are able to balance the Defeat-ISIS mission effectively
with other regional and global priorities. As the environment on the
ground changes, we will adjust manning to meet operational needs and
will keep Congress informed. In fiscal year (FY) 2017, DOD requested
(and Congress passed) funding for the Defeat ISIS mission in the
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) to meet
operational requirements in support of emerging decisions on
contingency operations without disrupting approved program execution or
force readiness. Congress provided DOD the flexibility to reprioritize
operations, identify assets, and employ forces quickly to meet the
challenges of trans-regional counterterrorism activities, and provided
DOD the ability to apportion funding to the Military Departments
directly impacted to enable them to meet urgent operational needs. The
funding provided in the DOD Appropriations Act, 2017 for the Counter-
ISIS OCOTF allows for flexibility and responsiveness to address
emergent requirements related to the Defeat-ISIS mission. In addition
to the $1.6 billion available in the Counter-ISIS OCOTF, DOD will
continue to monitor emergent requirements in order to reprioritize
resources or request additional funding, as necessary.
The United States and the Coalition do not seek to fight the Syrian
Government, the Russians, or pro-regime forces and take careful
measures to avoid engagements with those forces. It is in neither the
Coalition's nor Syria's best interest to provoke a confrontation. The
Department will remain focused on our efforts to defeat ISIS, and
encourage the Syrian Government and Regime-aligned forces to do the
same. The U.S. Government has established effective multi-level de-
confliction channels with Russia to prevent incidents between Coalition
forces and Syrian Government and pro-Regime forces. There are daily
communications between our forces in the field and Russia to mitigate
the risk of unintended escalation or miscommunication between air and
ground forces.
Mr. Scott. Given the threat the transnational criminal
organizations and other networks pose, what additional budgetary
resources or authorizations does the Department need in order to combat
those organizations within the Southern Command region?
Secretary Mattis. As this Committee knows, the Department has not
been able to source U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and other force requirements in
full due to competing global priorities. To support U.S. and partner
nation law enforcement entities, intelligence capabilities in all forms
of collection and analysis are critical to identifying and disrupting
the leadership, financial, and communication infrastructure of both
criminal and extremist networks. Although USSOUTHCOM receives minimal
U.S. Navy presence to support its statutory detection and monitoring
(D&M) mission, the pursuit and use of non-traditional commercial
(leased) alternatives does allow USSOUTHCOM to address some of its D&M
resourcing shortfalls. Although Department of Defense-enabled law
enforcement actions mitigate threats to the homeland, Department of
Defense-enabled diplomatic and developmental actions (e.g., Defense
Institution Building, humanitarian and civic assistance, information
operations) provide a more long-term sustainable solution and should be
resourced in tandem with more direct efforts.
Mr. Scott. Given the Presidential Budget Request for Fiscal Year
2018 and the Service's own unfunded priorities list, both have
displayed that we cannot fund our military to execute what we ask of it
today under the current Budget Control Act. We have been discussing
what happens in the near term with the 2018 budget, but my question is;
what will the U.S. Military look like in four years if we stay under
the caps?
The Air Force has made it clear that it is the smallest, oldest and
least ready it's been in its history. Yet in its unfunded requirements
list, the Air Force shows the need to accelerate the MC-130J
recapitalization by procuring 12 additional aircraft ($1.2 billion) and
the need to accelerate the HC-130J recapitalization by procuring one
additional aircraft ($100 million).
How does this budget reverse the years of underinvestment that has
left us with the smallest, oldest and least ready force in history?
General Dunford. The PB18 base budget request is $575B, $52B above
Budget Control Act (BCA) levels. This plus-up is intended to reverse
the negative funding trends created by BCA, which has underfunded the
Department since 2012. The PB18 base budget continues the progress
started in FY17 toward restoring and improving warfighting readiness,
and achieving program balance by addressing pressing shortfalls. While
PB18 is not intended to grow the force, it will set the conditions for
growth in FY19 and beyond. This budget includes sufficient funding to
support our commitments around the world, however, our competitive
advantage is eroding and without adequate and stable funding, we will
be challenged to maintain these commitments.
Mr. Scott. 1. As the battle to liberate Raqqa gets underway, I'd
like you to describe your long-term vision for Syria and how you expect
the U.S. military mission in Syria to change or evolve after the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been pushed from major city
centers.
a. What is the desired end-state? b. In addition to our obvious
counter-terrorism objectives in Syria, what other U.S. national
security objectives do we have in Syria? c. How do you prioritize those
and would you advocate for expending U.S. military resources to achieve
or sustain those objectives?
2. The President's budget assumes troop levels will stay constant
in Syria.
a. Is that your expectation? b. If not, where would that extra
funding come from? c. Do you plan on requesting additional funding
through a supplemental? d. Or do you intend to take from other areas in
an already insufficient budget request?
3. Do you anticipate a confrontation with regime-aligned forces
will in southern or eastern Syria?
4. How do we prevent unintentional escalation with the regime or
the state-actors supporting the regime?
General Dunford. We remain focused on destroying ISIS' physical
caliphate, with an emphasis on surrounding the enemy to ensure foreign
fighters are not able to escape and return home. The liberation of
Raqqa is a necessary step in defeating ISIS, but it is not the last
step. ISIS remains entrenched along the Euphrates River Valley, and
operations to defeat them and prevent their resurgence will take many
more months. The desired end-state is to destroy ISIS' physical
caliphate in Iraq and Syria; Defeat ISIS' ability to conduct external
operations; protect partner and allied nation borders and preserve the
coalition; and create the conditions for a secure environment that
prevents the rise of ISIS 2.0 and other violent extremist
organizations. In addition to counter-terrorism objectives in Syria,
other U.S. national security objectives are: a political solution in
Syria that addresses the root causes of terrorism and instability;
local security forces capable of providing security to Syrian citizens;
and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their
place of origin. The first and foremost military priority is to protect
the Homeland by destroying core ISIS in Iraq and Syria and defeating
its ability to plan and execute external attacks against the United
States and its partners and allies. To do this we must preserve the
Coalition and prevent the rise of ``ISIS 2.0'', which is vital to
ensuring we can achieve our end state.
2. We are continuously assessing the force management levels in
Syria to ensure we are able to effectively balance the Defeat ISIS
mission with other regional and global priorities. As the environment
changes, we will adjust manning to meet operational needs and keep
Congress informed. In FY 2017, the Department requested (and the
Congress enacted) funding for the Defeat ISIS mission in the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF), $1.6 billion, to meet
operational requirements in support of emerging decisions on
contingency operations without disrupting the approved program
execution for force readiness. The Congress provided the flexibility to
quickly reprioritize operations, identify assets, and employ forces to
meet the transregional nature of counterterrorism activities, with the
ability to issue funding to the Military Departments directly impacted
to meet urgent operational needs.
3. The United States and the Coalition do not seek to fight the
Syrian Regime, Russian, or pro-Regime forces and we take great effort
to avoid confrontation. It is in neither the Coalition's nor Syria's
best interest to provoke a confrontation. We will remain focused on our
efforts to Defeat ISIS, and we encourage the Regime and Regime-aligned
forces to do the same.
4. We have established effective multi-level deconfliction channels
with the Russians to prevent incidents between the Coalition and the
Syrian Regime and pro-Regime forces. There are daily communications
between our fielded forces and the Russians to mitigate the possibility
of unintended escalation or miscommunication between air and ground
forces.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. President Trump signed a Defense Production Act
Presidential Determination (Number 2017-09) on June 13, 2017 stating
that ``critical technology item shortfalls affecting adenovirus vaccine
production capability; high strength, inherently fire and ballistic
resistant, co-polymer aramid fibers industrial capability; secure
hybrid composite shipping container industrial capability; and three-
dimensional ultra-high density microelectronics for information
protection industrial capability are critical to national defense.''
The Determination goes on to say that ``Without Presidential action
under this Act, the United States defense industrial base cannot
reasonably be expected to adequately provide those capabilities or
technology items in a timely manner.'' Given the urgency of these
programs as determined by the President, what is the Department's
timeline (i.e. funding and initiating the program) to address these
industrial base shortfalls? Please provide timelines for each of the
technologies identified as critical in Presidential Determination No.
2017-09.''
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense is actively working to
address the four shortfalls within the President's June determination:
1. We are expecting the adenovirus vaccine production project
contract to be awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2018 (FY18).
We have allocated $15.42M for this project.
2. The effort to address the industrial capability of high-
strength, inherently fire- and ballistic-resistant, co-polymer aramid
fibers is currently in the contracting phase, and execution is planned
for FY18. We have allocated $35.38M for this project.
3. The secure hybrid composite shipping container project is also
in the contracting phase and award(s) are expected in the first quarter
of FY18. We have allocated $19.08M for this project.
4. Our effort to address three-dimensional microelectronics for
information protection has resulted in a contract awarded to Draper
Labs, effective July 28, 2017. We have committed $13.20M to this
effort.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. There have been numerous reports of official government
meetings, including meetings with foreign counterparts, being held at
properties owned by the President. Because of the President's refusal
to divest himself of those business interests, there is the prospect of
the President and his family making a personal profit off of that
official government business. The American people have a right to know
whether Department of Defense money--taxpayer money--is ending up in
the President's personal wallet.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have either of you, or any of your
staff, participated in official government events at a property owned
by the President? If so, did the Department of Defense expend
appropriated money to pay for costs associated with that event--
including room and board, meals, or other incidental expenses?
Secretary Mattis. No.
Ms. Speier. Last school year, fewer students at the military
service academies reported sexual assault and harassment, but the
estimated rates of unwanted sexual conduct increased. Both of these are
trending in the wrong direction. One reason could be the ostracism of
sexual assault victims. 47% of those who reported their unwanted sexual
contact experienced social isolation or maltreatment. We must foster an
environment at the service academies in which students who have been
sexually assaulted or harassed feel like they can come forward without
fear of retaliation.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Were you aware of these depressing
statistics? If so, what are you doing about them?
Secretary Mattis. The Department must focus its attention on
defeating this crime and learning how to do that begins at places like
the Military Service Academies. Consequently, I met with the three
Academy Superintendents and the four Service Chiefs in March to discuss
ways to better understand the unique environments at the academies. As
a result of that meeting, I directed the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) and the Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Office to work with the Academies this summer to help them
address issues identified in the report, including improving sexual
assault prevention efforts, enhancing their climates to reduce sexual
harassment and other readiness-impacting behaviors like retaliation,
encouraging healthier alcohol choices, and increasing reporting of
sexual assault. I have every confidence the Superintendents will make
the kinds of changes that will result in the progress we're seeking.
The Academies' plans to address these issues are due to the Department
not later than October 30, 2017.
Ms. Speier. On June 7, the non-profit group Protect our Defenders
issued a report on ``Substantial and Persistent Racial Disparities
Within the United States Military Justice System.'' POD's findings show
that, for every year reported and across all four branches, black
service members were substantially more likely than white service
members to face military justice or disciplinary action. These
disparities have not improved, and in some cases have increased, in
recent years.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have you been made aware of these
findings? Do you agree that this is a concern--and, if so, what will
the Department do in response?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense is an inclusive
organization that continually strives to ensure equal opportunity and
justice for all its Service members, regardless of race or ethnicity.
The Department first became aware of the subject report through a
published story by USA Today on June 7, 2017. The subject report and
subsequent news story were written in part based upon information
received from the Military Services through Freedom of Information
requests.
The Department's initial review of the report findings reveals that
the data provided by the Military Services to Protect Our Defenders
(POD) is not consistent, primarily because of the disparate ways in
which demographic information is tracked by the Military Services. As a
result, the conclusions reached by POD are somewhat limited.
Specifically, the conclusions drawn by POD, and subsequently
reported on by USA Today, are based on the assumption that all Military
Services define and track demographic data similarly; however, this is
not the case. Furthermore, the information provided by the Military
Services, specific to military justice and disciplinary action, is not
standardized; thus, each of the Military Services track and report
dissimilar information.
Nevertheless, the Department agrees that further study of this
important topic is needed and continues to review and refine how to
analyze the data. The Department is looking forward to engaging the
Military Services in developing standardized tracking and reporting
systems, specific to the types of information collected and published
regarding demographic data, military justice involvement, and final
adjudication outcomes.
Ms. Speier. On June 6, the Acting Director of Operational Testing
and Evaluation upgraded the Department's assessment of the Ground-Based
Midcourse missile defense system, now stating that the system is no
longer ``limited.'' The Acting Director judged that the system now has
the capability to intercept intercontinental missiles targeting the
homeland. This judgment was made shortly following the most recent
intercept test of the system, which was judged a success. However, that
test increases the overall test success rate to only 40 percent since
2010. Further, these tests are tightly scripted and controlled, with a
single target, known flight parameters, and with no countermeasures or
decoys. Finally, there are significant questions surrounding the
reliability of the interceptors already deployed. I'm concerned that
the capabilities of the system are being oversold.
General Dunford, would you sign off on an operation or a
contingency plan that has a 60 percent probability of failure?
Mr. Secretary, given all this, how can the Department's assessment
of the system be upgraded based on the results of a single test?
Secretary Mattis. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program
is continuing to improve. A total of 25 Ground-based Interceptors
(GBIs) are new or have recently been upgraded in the past 3-years. The
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully intercepted an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target during the Flight Test
Ground-based Interceptor-15 (FTG-15) flight test on 30 May 2017. This
was the first live-fire test event against an ICBM-class target
included countermeasures for GMD and the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). The test was representative of real world timelines and
geometries. FTG-15 demonstrated a new GBI configuration with a three-
stage Configuration 2 (C2) booster vehicle and a CE-II Block 1
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that contains new alternate divert
thrusters. The C2 design increases reliability through design and
producibility improvements. Sustainment of fielded hardware was
enhanced by addressing obsolescence in booster components. The
successful intercept of an ICBM-class target supports the decision to
emplace nine additional GBIs. These new interceptors provide improved
reliability, discrimination performance, and safety when compared to
previously fielded interceptors. MDA emplaced the first of nine new
GBIs in the FTG-15 configuration on 28 June 2017 and will complete the
deployment of 44 GBIs by the end of 2017.
I have confidence in the Operational Test and Evaluation's Homeland
Defense BMDS Director's assessment that the GMD has demonstrated
capability to defend the U.S. Homeland from a small number of
intermediate-range or intercontinental ballistic missile threats with
simple countermeasures when the Homeland Defense BMDS employs its full
sensors/command and control architecture.
Ms. Speier. There are reports that the Army and Marine Corps have
requested that you delay the deadline of July 1, set by Secretary
Carter, for the Services to implement policies for recruiting enlisted
troops and commissioning officers who are transgender. Such a delay
would be unwise and detrimental to readiness, as documented in studies
by DOD, RAND, and others. The military has been benefiting from open
transgender service by current service members since October 1, 2016,
and has had a full year to prepare their accession policies.
Mr. Secretary, can you affirm that you will hold the Services to
the deadline imposed by your predecessor?
Secretary Mattis. There is no modification to the current policy
until the Department receives the President's direction. In the
meantime, we will continue to treat all our personnel with respect. As
importantly, given the current fight and challenges the Department
faces, we will all remain focused on accomplishing our assigned
missions.
Ms. Speier. The Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest
program, or MAVNI, offers a path to citizenship through military
service for noncitizens and certain qualified members of the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. MAVNI, which impacts
approximately 4,300 future soldiers throughout the United States, has
had a start-stop history over the past two years, and delays are
compounded by the lethargic pace of requisite background and
counterintelligence investigations. These delays are especially
concerning, as the future soldiers have contractual ``drop dead'' dates
when their eligibility has been mandated to expire if the MAVNI
accession program does not continue processing applicants in a timely
manner. Recruiters and regional commanders do not seem to have
information regarding what is going on. Applicants have put other
educational and professional decisions on hold waiting for this program
to move.
Mr. Secretary, what is the current status of the MAVNI program? Is
it DOD's intent that the program will continue?
Is there an expected timeline when the freeze on
counterintelligence interviews will be lifted? Will individuals who
incurred cancellation of their interviews have those interviews
rescheduled?
Is DOD considering an Exception To Policy regarding the current
policy to drop MAVNI future soldier contracts after 730 days, or an ETP
around the current security protocol requirements (NIAC, SSBI, CI
interview) before a MAVNI future soldier may depart for basic combat
training?
Some program applicants have been waiting for 1-2 years due to
program delays at DOD. If their contractual eligibility windows
approach their end-dates due to program delays, are there any
intentions at DOD to extend the individual eligibility windows for
those applicants?
Does DOD have any advice to MAVNI applicants on what to expect or
how best to proceed at this moment in time and process?
Secretary Mattis. Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the current status of
the MAVNI program? A: The MAVNI pilot program is currently suspended.
Policy was issued on September 30, 2016, that included increased
vetting requirements for MAVNIs. There have been no new MAVNI
Accessions since June 2016; however, vetting of all MAVNIs in the
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and Delayed Training Program (DTP)
continues.
Q. Is it DOD's intent that the program will continue? A. A
determination on the future of the program has not been made.
Q. Is there an expected timeline when the freeze on
counterintelligence interviews will be lifted? A. There is no freeze on
counterintelligence interviews. The intelligence community has
prioritized vetting those individuals currently in the force before
conducting vetting on those in the DEP and DTP. Counterintelligence
interviews are ongoing.
Q. Will individuals who incurred cancellation of their interviews
have those interviews rescheduled? A. DOD continues to conduct
counterintelligence interviews and individuals will receive a
notification once their interview has been scheduled.
Q. Is DOD considering an Exception To Policy regarding the current
policy to drop MAVNI future soldier contracts after 730 days, or an ETP
around the current security protocol requirements (NIAC, SSBI, CI
interview) before a MAVNI future soldier may depart for basic combat
training? A. By law, individuals may remain in the DEP for 365 days,
with the Secretary concerned authorized to extend that time by 365 days
for a total of 730 days. The Department is examining all available
options to extend MAVNIs in DEP to complete requisite screening
requirements.
Q. Some program applicants have been waiting for 1-2 years due to
program delays at DOD. If their contractual eligibility windows
approach their end-dates due to program delays, are there any
intentions at DOD to extend the individual eligibility windows for
those applicants? A. Recent changes to the investigative service
provider background check and vetting program have resulted in long,
complex, and costly processes, particularly for higher tiered
background investigations and vetting. The average wait time for a Tier
5 investigation is approximately 422 days for MAVNI applicants. The
Department is examining all available options to extend MAVNIs in DEP
to complete requisite screening requirements.
Q. Does DOD have any advice to MAVNI applicants on what to expect
or how best to proceed at this moment in time and process? A. MAVNI
applicants were advised to maintain their immigration status until such
time they shipped to basic training. For those who may have fallen out
of status, the Department has advised MAVNIs to seek a renewed status
or deferred action from the Department of Homeland Security based on
their enlistment contract.
Ms. Speier. Exposure to blast overpressure is the leading cause of
mild traumatic brain injury for military personnel. Brain science
research points to a clear relationship between Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder and even non-concussive blast overpressure events caused by
activities such as heavy weapons training. The Army has purchased tens
of thousands of DARPA-developed gauges to monitor, record, and analyze
blast overpressure data--however, my understanding is that they may not
in widespread use in overseas operations or in training environments.
What actions are you taking to mitigate exposure to your personnel
in the field and training environments?
How many of our men and women are using the DARPA gauges in the
field or in training? Do high-risk units have access to the devices?
How many devices have been purchased and where are they today?
Secretary Mattis. Blast overpressure (BOP) injuries account for 10%
of all traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) within the Department of Defense
(DOD). The DOD has taken actions to improve our understanding while
simultaneously implementing policies to protect, screen, diagnose, and
treat not just TBIs, but potentially concussive events. In parallel to
policy efforts, the DOD monitors BOP exposure through the Environmental
Sensors in Training (ESiT) program. The ESiT effort fields blast gauges
in training with the goals of 1) optimizing the use of current or next
generation sensor technologies, 2) understanding the health effects of
BOP, and 3) establishing evidence-based injury thresholds.
In 2012, the Army procured approximately 108,000 gauges for use in
Operation Enduring Freedom. The data from this effort did not provide
actionable information or insights into the impact of single or
cumulative BOP. The Army's effort to understand low-level BOP shifted
to a more tailored approach in the training environment. Within the
current Army effort (Environmental Sensors in Training (ESiT)), there
are 1600 gauges in use on select training ranges: artillery, breacher,
mortar, grenade, engineers, and shoulder fired weapons. These gauges
are drawn from both existing inventory and purchase of newer designs.
The gauges are available to ``high-risk units'' as commercial off the
shelf (COTS) devices.
Ms. Speier. There have been numerous reports of official government
meetings, including meetings with foreign counterparts, being held at
properties owned by the President. Because of the President's refusal
to divest himself of those business interests, there is the prospect of
the President and his family making a personal profit off of that
official government business. The American people have a right to know
whether Department of Defense money--taxpayer money--is ending up in
the President's personal wallet.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have either of you, or any of your
staff, participated in official government events at a property owned
by the President? If so, did the Department of Defense expend
appropriated money to pay for costs associated with that event--
including room and board, meals, or other incidental expenses?
General Dunford. No. Additionally, all travel is conducted in
accordance with the Joint Federal Travel Regulations.
Ms. Speier. Last school year, fewer students at the military
service academies reported sexual assault and harassment, but the
estimated rates of unwanted sexual conduct increased. Both of these are
trending in the wrong direction. One reason could be the ostracism of
sexual assault victims. 47% of those who reported their unwanted sexual
contact experienced social isolation or maltreatment. We must foster an
environment at the service academies in which students who have been
sexually assaulted or harassed feel like they can come forward without
fear of retaliation.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Were you aware of these depressing
statistics? If so, what are you doing about them?
General Dunford. I am aware of the statistics and the impact that
any form of retaliation has on a victim's decision to report incidents
of sexual assault and harassment. The Department recently released the
DOD Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy as a comprehensive
approach address this issue. The strategy aligns Departmental efforts
in combating retaliation and targets five areas: standardizing
definitions, improving data collection and analysis, streamlining
investigation and accountability efforts, strengthening reporter
protections, and creating a culture intolerant of retaliation. It
applies to Service member bystanders and witnesses as well as DOD first
responders. We are committed to addressing retaliatory behavior and
have dedicated resources to that end.
Ms. Speier. On June 7, the non-profit group Protect our Defenders
issued a report on ``Substantial and Persistent Racial Disparities
Within the United States Military Justice System.'' POD's findings show
that, for every year reported and across all four branches, black
service members were substantially more likely than white service
members to face military justice or disciplinary action. These
disparities have not improved, and in some cases have increased, in
recent years.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have you been made aware of these
findings? Do you agree that this is a concern--and, if so, what will
the Department do in response?
General Dunford. I am aware of POD's findings. The Department of
Defense and military services are firmly committed to maintaining the
highest levels of discipline and readiness in the joint force by
upholding the integrity of the military justice process while ensuring
fair treatment and equal opportunity for all Service members. I am
confident that the services will appropriately address any issue that
interferes with the impartial administration of military justice.
Ms. Speier. On June 6, the Acting Director of Operational Testing
and Evaluation upgraded the Department's assessment of the Ground-Based
Midcourse missile defense system, now stating that the system is no
longer ``limited.'' The Acting Director judged that the system now has
the capability to intercept intercontinental missiles targeting the
homeland. This judgment was made shortly following the most recent
intercept test of the system, which was judged a success. However, that
test increases the overall test success rate to only 40 percent since
2010. Further, these tests are tightly scripted and controlled, with a
single target, known flight parameters, and with no countermeasures or
decoys. Finally, there are significant questions surrounding the
reliability of the interceptors already deployed. I'm concerned that
the capabilities of the system are being oversold.
General Dunford, would you sign off on an operation or a
contingency plan that has a 60 percent probability of failure?
Mr. Secretary, given all this, how can the Department's assessment
of the system be upgraded based on the results of a single test?
General Dunford. The Department's assessment of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system is based on results of all testing to date,
warfighter integration and system-wide enhancements. A rigorous
complement of ground and flight testing allows for the verification of
system performance. The Homeland Defense system, including the
supporting sensors and communications architecture are continually
improved through hardware and software upgrades which increase overall
effectiveness in defense of the Homeland. A few of the performance and
capability upgrades utilized by the Acting Director of the Operational
Test and Evaluation to make the determination to remove ``limited''
from the original assessment include:
--25 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) are new, or have been
upgraded in the past three years.
--The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully intercepted an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target during the Flight Test
Ground-based Interceptor-15 (FTG-15) test on May 30, 2017. This was the
first live-fire test event against an ICBM-class target for GMD and the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
--The successful intercept of an ICBM-class target supports the
decision to emplace nine additional GBIs. These new interceptors
provide improved reliability, discrimination performance and safety
when compared to previously fielded interceptors. MDA emplaced the
first of nine new GBIs in the FTG-15 configuration on June 28, 2017 and
the full the deployment of 44 GBIs will be complete by the end of 2017.
We will continue to work collaboratively within the Defense
Department, to ensure we fully leverage our collective capabilities as
well as advancing technologies to fully protect the Homeland.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE
Mr. O'Rourke. If forces under the control of Bashar al Assad or
another country engage forces in Syria that the U.S. has trained and/or
equipped, does the United States have the legal authority to defend
against such engagement? If so, please explain the legal authority the
U.S. can use.
Secretary Mattis. The efforts of the U.S.-led Coalition in Syria
are aimed at the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
and the United States does not seek to fight the Syrian Government or
pro-Syrian-Government forces. However, the United States will not
hesitate to use necessary and proportionate force to defend U.S.,
Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign against ISIS, if
necessary.
As a matter of domestic law, the 2001 Authorization to Use Military
Force (AUMF) authorizes the use of force in Syria against ISIS and al-
Qa'ida. The 2001 AUMF also provides authority to use force to defend
U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat
ISIS to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate
measure in support of these counter-ISIS operations.
As a matter of international law, the United States is using force
in Syria against ISIS and al-Qa'ida and is providing support to Syrian
partners fighting ISIS, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the
collective self-defense of Iraq (and other States) and in U.S. national
self-defense. Consistent with the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, the United States initiated necessary and
proportionate actions in Syria against ISIS in 2014 and reported those
actions to the UN Security Council consistent with Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. Those necessary and proportionate actions may
include the use of force as needed to defend U.S., Coalition, and U.S.-
supported partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS from
threats by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian Government forces.
Mr. O'Rourke. Under what legal authority did the U.S. act when
launching missile strikes on April 7th, 2017, against Syria? Under what
legal authority did the U.S. act when engaging and shooting down a
Syrian Su-22 on June 18th, 2017?
Secretary Mattis. The U.S. military action on April 6, 2017,
against Syrian military targets directly connected to the chemical
weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017 was a justified,
legitimate, and proportionate measure to deter and prevent Syria's
illegal and unconscionable use of chemical weapons.
The use of force against the Syrian Su-22 on June 18, 2017, was a
limited and lawful measure to counter immediate threats to U.S. partner
forces engaged in the campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). As a matter of domestic law, the 2001 Authorization to
Use Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the use of force in Syria against
ISIS and al-Qa'ida. It also provides authority to use force to defend
U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat
ISIS to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate
measure in support of these counter-ISIS operations.
As a matter of international law, the United States is using force
in Syria against ISIS and al-Qa'ida and is providing support to Syrian
partners fighting ISIS, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the
collective self-defense of Iraq (and other States) and in U.S. national
self-defense. Consistent with the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, the United States initiated necessary and
proportionate actions in Syria against ISIS in 2014 and reported those
actions to the United Nations (UN) Security Council consistent with
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Those necessary and proportionate actions
may include the use of force as needed to defend U.S., Coalition, and
U.S.-supported partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS
from threats by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian Government forces.
Mr. O'Rourke. If forces under the control of Bashar al Assad or
another country engage forces in Syria that the U.S. has trained and/or
equipped, does the United States have the legal authority to defend
against such engagement? If so, please explain the legal authority the
U.S. can use.
General Dunford. The United States may use necessary and
proportionate force to defend U.S., Coalition, or partner forces
engaged in the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS). The 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) authorizes
the use of force against ISIS and al-Qa'ida under domestic law. To the
extent a use of force is necessary and appropriate to defend U.S.,
Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the ISIS campaign, the 2001
AUMF provides such authority. Under international law, U.S., Coalition,
and partner forces are fighting ISIS in the collective self-defense of
Iraq, and in U.S. national self-defense, consistent with the U.N.
Charter. The U.S. may use necessary and proportionate force to defend
U.S., Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign to Defeat
ISIS from threats posed by Syria or another country.
Mr. O'Rourke. Under what legal authority did the U.S. act when
launching missile strikes on April 7th, 2017, against Syria? Under what
legal authority did the U.S. act when engaging and shooting down a
Syrian Su-22 on June 18th, 2017?
General Dunford. The April 7, 2017 missile strike taken by the
United States against Syrian military targets was a justified,
legitimate, and proportionate response to Syria's illegal use of
chemical weapons on April 4. These military targets were directly
connected to Syria's indiscriminate use of chemical weapons in Khan
Sheikhoun. The June 18, 2017 strike taken by the United States against
the Syrian Su-22 in the vicinity of Tabqah, Syria, was a limited and
lawful measure to respond to an immediate threat to partner forces
engaged in the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS). The efforts of the U.S.-led Coalition are aimed at the defeat
of ISIS, acting in the collective self-defense of Iraq and in U.S.
national self-defense, and are consistent with the U.N. Charter.
Additionally, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
authorizes the use of force in Syria against ISIS and against al-Qa'ida
and associated forces. To the extent the use of force is necessary and
appropriate to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in
the ISIS campaign, the 2001 AUMF provides such authority.
Mr. O'Rourke. How does declaring parts of Somalia as areas of
active hostilities affect the funding necessary to carry out U.S.
missions in that country? Did additional authorities to pursue Al
Shabaab's forces in that country result in an increase to the
President's Overseas Contingency Operations or any other request? If
so, how much is that increase? If not, will the Department require
additional appropriations in the future for Somalia? How much had the
U.S. previously spent on operations per year on Department of Defense
operations in Somalia?
Mr. Norquist. In March 2017, the President approved a Department of
Defense proposal to conduct precision air strikes against al-Shabaab in
Somalia to enable African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali
National Army (SNA) operations to defeat al-Shabaab. Counterterrorism
operations in support of our partners in the East Africa region are
funded within the amounts appropriated in the Department's Fiscal Year
(FY) 2017 budget and FY 2018 budget request. The Department will
continue to assess the duration, frequency, and intensity of support to
our partners in Somalia in order to determine whether additional
resources are required.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. The Air Force and Navy are recapitalizing the
aging KC-135 tanker and P-3 anti-submarine warfare fleets with the new
KC-46A and P-8 aircraft. Industry has the capability to more rapidly
and cost efficiently produce these critical enablers, but PB18 does not
provide adequate funds in the base budget as seen in the Air Force and
Navy unfunded requirements requests. How does this budget ensure that
our service men and women have the equipment they need to execute their
missions while getting the most out of every dollar for our taxpayers?
Secretary Mattis. The Department annually balances the funding
within the national defense enterprise. However, the Department's
ability to fully fund all mission requirement is constrained by the
2011 Budget Control Act. Both President Trump and President Obama have
repeatedly recommended that the Congress repeal this law. The fact that
the law has not been repealed means the Department continues to face
many difficult resource decisions.
Mr. Bridenstine. What is the USAF's plan to phase in the B-21 and
phase out older bombers?
Secretary Mattis. The acquisition of the B-21 Raider and its
integration into the long range strike force structure are a national
security imperative. The Air Force and Air Force Global Strike Command
have conducted extensive analysis to determine the right mix of B-21
and legacy bombers considering adversary capabilities, future defense
strategies and our current fiscal constraints. The Bomber Vector
provides the roadmap for the future bomber force structure and is being
socialized with Congress with an anticipated public roll-out in the
fall of 2017.
Mr. Bridenstine. What is the USAF's plan to phase in the B-21 and
phase out older bombers?
General Dunford. Our bombers represent a multi-role, long range,
intercontinental strategic part of the Air Force arsenal. The U.S. Air
Force is best suited to provide further details that address your
concerns on the plan to phase in the B-21 and phase out older bombers.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
Ms. Rosen. Iran continues to exercise direct and indirect military
influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. How do Iranian-backed forces and
Iranian political influence in Iraq and Syria affect our own strategy
and military operations against ISIL in both countries? As the Assad
regime consolidates power, what are your concerns about Iran and
Hezbollah strengthening their influence and presence in Syria? What are
your overall concerns about a broader regional Shia-Sunni sectarian
conflict emerging? Will Iran remain the greatest long-term threat to
U.S. interests in the region, as General Votel has stated? If so, why
and how can the United States, its allies, and partners best deter and
contain that threat?
Secretary Mattis. Iran remains a key strategic and enduring
challenge for the United States and our partners in the Middle East
because of its regional destabilizing activities. Iran's sectarian
approach in both Iraq and Syria is destabilizing the situation further,
which may be a root cause of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria's
appeal among select Sunni Arab populations. In Syria, Iran's
destabilizing support to the murderous Asad regime is a key impediment
to solving the Syrian crisis. Left unchecked, Iran and Hizballah's
continued influence and military presence in Syria would pose a direct
threat to U.S. and allied interests. Their activities contribute to
extremism and instability in the country and hinder any attempt for a
lasting political settlement. Tehran's continued unprofessional and
unsafe conduct on the seas, sponsorship of terrorists and proxies
around the region, malicious cyber actions, and ballistic missile
launches in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions
remain top issues for me. To deter and contain Iran's conventional
capabilities and irregular warfare activities, the Department maintains
military plans, preparations, and a strong force posture. Our robust
partnerships strengthen the regional security architecture in a manner
that blunts Iran's ability to coerce its neighbors.
Ms. Rosen. Iran continues to exercise direct and indirect military
influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. How do Iranian-backed forces and
Iranian political influence in Iraq and Syria affect our own strategy
and military operations against ISIL in both countries? As the Assad
regime consolidates power, what are your concerns about Iran and
Hezbollah strengthening their influence and presence in Syria? What are
your overall concerns about a broader regional Shia-Sunni sectarian
conflict emerging? Will Iran remain the greatest long-term threat to
U.S. interests in the region, as General Votel has stated? If so, why
and how can the United States, its allies, and partners best deter and
contain that threat?
General Dunford. Iran is the greatest long term threat to U.S.
interests in the region. Iran will attempt to generate political
influence through Iranian-backed forces that backfill areas of Iraq and
Syria previously controlled by ISIS. While this may not directly impact
U.S. Defeat ISIS operations, it does certainly impact our longer term
interests in the region as Iran seeks to displace U.S. and Western
influence with its own. As the Assad regime consolidates power we are
concerned about the strengthening of Iran and LH's influence in the
region. This expanded level of influence could further destabilize Iraq
and increase the chance of conflict between Israel and LH. The U.S.
works to contain the spread of Iran's influence and deter conventional
conflict by being ready to respond through a robust network of partners
and allies and maintaining a posture in the region that allows the U.S.
to an-
swer Iranian aggression quickly and effectively. While a broader Shia-
Sunni sectarian conflict is possible, Islam in the Middle East is more
complex than that. Ethnic, tribal, political, economic, and other
cultural factors drive identities and actions in the Middle East and
will factor into any Middle East conflict.