[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING THE IRAN DEAL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2017
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Serial No. 115-23
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Jason Chaffetz, Utah, Chairman
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member
Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida
Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont
Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matthew Cartwright, Pennsylvania
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California
Will Hurd, Texas John Sarbanes, Maryland
Gary J. Palmer, Alabama
James Comer, Kentucky
Paul Mitchell, Michigan
Jonathan Skladany, Majority Staff Director
William McKenna General Counsel
Sharon Eshelman, National Security Subcommittee Staff Director
Ari Wisch, Professional Staff Member
Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on National Security
Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman
Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts,
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Ranking Member
Justin Amash, Michigan
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Jody B. Hice, Georgia
James Comer, Kentucky
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 5, 2017.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Lieutenant General Michael Barbero, U.S. Army, Retired, Advisory
Board Member, United Against Nuclear Iran
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and
International Security
Oral Statement............................................... 13
Written Statement............................................ 15
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, Chief Executive Officer, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 29
Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Oral Statement............................................... 55
Written Statement............................................ 57
Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Security Studies
Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 62
Written Statement............................................ 64
APPENDIX
Response from Lieutenant General Barbero, United Against Nuclear
Iran, to Questions for the Record.............................. 90
Response from Mr. David Albright, Institute for Science and
International Security, to Questions for the Record............ 92
Response from Dr. Dubowitz, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, to Questions for the Record....................... 97
Response from Dr. Takeyh, Council on Foreign Relations, to
Questions for the Record....................................... 108
ASSESSING THE IRAN DEAL
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Wednesday, April 5, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m., in
Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Gosar, Hice,
Comer, Lynch, Demings, and Welch.
Also Present: Representative Jordan.
Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will
come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to
declare a recess at any time. We will have some additional
colleagues that are not here now. I will recognize them and
waive them in when they are here.
On July 14, 2015, the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Russia, and China reached an agreement with
Iran called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, widely
known as the Iran nuclear deal. The Obama administration pushed
an agreement giving Iran massive and immediate sanctions
relief. In return, the world's largest state sponsor of
terrorism agreed to temporarily pause its pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
Shortly after announcing the deal, then-President Obama
called it, quote, the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever
negotiated, and promised it, quote, cuts off all of Iran's
pathways to a bomb. But over a year and a half later, those
words ring hollow. Instead of cutting off a path to the bomb,
the JCPOA gives Iran a clear road to the bomb.
The nuclear deal's sunset clauses phased out most of its
significant restriction on Iran's nuclear agreement over the
course of the next 10 or 15 years. Once this happens, Iran will
have access to a large-scale nuclear program powered by
advanced technology and vastly increased resources due to the
lifting of sanctions. President Obama acknowledged that lifting
sanctions would give Iran access to advanced centrifuges, and
by year 15 of the deal, the time it takes for Iran to, quote,
break out and create a nuclear weapon will, quote, have shrunk
down almost to zero, end quote.
This is a bad deal. That's why President Trump called it
the worst deal ever negotiated. It's also why Senate Minority
Leader Schumer and the Democratic ranking members of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations
Committee all opposed it. And that's only part of the story.
After the JCPOA was adopted, the Obama administration made
a bad deal even worse through its feeble implementation. The
Obama administration failed to penalize Iranian violations,
gave Iran exemptions from the JCPOA's nuclear restrictions,
weakened sanctions far beyond the terms of the agreement,
allowed Iran's ballistic missile launches and regional
aggression to go unchecked. Not only did the Obama
administration give Iran a pass, Secretary of State John Kerry
actually served to lobby on behalf of Iran, flying to London
and pitching European bankers that Iran was, quote, open for
business, as his staff pressed Governors across the country to
drop their State's Iran's sanctions.
Thankfully, the Trump administration signaled the beginning
of a different approach this February. When Iran continued
pursuing an agenda of regional aggression against us and our
allies, the new administration responded by putting Iran,
quote, on notice, and imposing new sanctions.
This hearing will highlight the numerous problems with the
Iran nuclear deal that demand correction by the new
administration, as well as Iran's destabilizing activities
throughout the Middle East. The Obama administration failed to
hold Iran to the JCPOA's nuclear restriction on critical issues
like uranium, heavy water, and centrifuge restrictions.
Independent experts have identified numerous ways in which Iran
has been allowed to violate the deal's provisions, exploit
loopholes, and being granted secret exemptions with no penalty.
There are also serious questions about the effectiveness of
the IAEA's verification process and the degree of access its
inspectors are receiving. There are other serious problems with
the deal besides the implementation of its nuclear provisions.
After numerous U.S. sanctions on Iran were lifted on
implementation day, Department of Treasury officials continue
to weaken the sanctions. Treasury changes official guidance on
a Friday evening before a holiday to allow foreign companies to
do business with entities controlled by the Iran Revolutionary
Guard Corps, IRGC, process on dollar transactions involving
Iran and loosen due diligence standards.
Treasury also removed a number of entities tied to Iran's
ballistic missile program and the IRGC from its sanctions list.
For example, Treasury lifted sanctions on Bank Seppa, which it
previously called the financial linchpin of Iran's missile
procurement network.
Despite all these concessions, the deal failed to quiet
Iran's belligerence. Just last week, the head of U.S. Central
Command testified before Congress that, quote, we have not seen
any improvement in Iran's behavior since the deal was finalized
in July of 2015. This is evident from Iran's numerous ballistic
missile tests conducted in defiance of U.N. restrictions and
its escalating aggression towards the U.S. Navy in the Persian
Gulf.
The State Department has identified Iran, still to this
day, as the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. And
now the funds Iran has gained through the deal sanctions relief
are flowing in part to terrorists and insurgent groups,
something former Secretary of State Kerry admitted would likely
happen. The IRGC continues to use terror and insurgency to
expand Iran's influence throughout the Middle East, including
support for the Assad Government in Syria, radical Shiite
militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Houthi rebels in
Yemen.
Simply put, the deal, along with the way it has been
implemented, is not a viable course of action going forward.
The U.S. must make clear that Iran's nuclear violations,
illicit financial networks, ballistic missile tests, and
otherwise malignant activities will not be tolerated. This
hearing will specifically identify where these problems
originate, and discuss what we need to do to fix them.
And with that, I will now recognize the ranking member of
the subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd also like
to thank you for holding this hearing to examine the continued
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
otherwise known as the Iran nuclear agreement. I'd also like to
thank today's witnesses for helping the subcommittee with its
work.
As reported by director--former Director of National
Intelligence, Jim Clapper, in 2016, worldwide threat
assessment, Iran remains the, quote, foremost state sponsor of
terrorism and presents an enduring threat to U.S. interests
because of its support to regional terrorists and militant
groups and the Assad regime, as well as its development of
advanced military capabilities.
Similarly, the most recent State Department
counterterrorism report issued by the Obama administration in
2016 again underscored that Iran has been designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism since 1984, and is maintaining its
terrorist-related activity through support for Lebanese
Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia terrorist groups in Iraq, Palestinian
militant organizations in Gaza, and Iraqi, Afghan, and
Pakistani Shia fighters aiming to bolster the Assad regime in
Syria.
There is no doubt that Iran is a destabilizing force in the
Middle East and continues to provide arms, financing, and
training to terrorist groups in the region. It also remains
unequivocally clear that we cannot trust the Iranian
leadership, given these subversive military and foreign policy
objectives. That is precisely why the U.S., the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, China, Germany, and Iran sought to contain
them. For these same reasons, successful implementation of the
Iran nuclear agreement is not dependent on our trust that Iran
will simply abide by the terms of the deal and limit its
nuclear program and nuclear weapons capabilities.
A key advantage we gained is the ability to place
inspectors and investigators on the ground in Iran. In
referencing adversarial nations in the nuclear arms race in his
1960 inaugural address, President Kennedy remarked that the
sincerity of negotiations, quote, ``is always subject to
proof,'' close quote. And to this end, a determination of
whether Iran is living up to its commitments under the nuclear
agreement is entirely based on the proof in the form of on-the-
ground, realtime, robust nuclear inspections conducted by the
independent International Atomic Energy Agency.
On March 8, the IAEA director general, Yukiya Amano,
released his latest report on Iran's compliance with the
nuclear agreement and corresponding U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2231. As reported by the IAEA, Iran has already
permanently disabled the core of the heavy water reactor at its
water plant--heavy water plant in Iraq by filling it with
concrete, quote, ``such that the agency was able to verify that
it is not useable for a future nuclear application,'' close
quote. In addition, all existing uranium pellets and fuel
assemblies related to the original design of the Iraq reactor
remain under continuous IAEA supervision.
This is solid verified proof that Iraq has abided by its
commitment under the Iran nuclear agreement to render the Iraq
reactor inoperable so they can no longer produce weapons grade
plutonium. According to the IAEA, Iran is thus far abiding by
its commitment to refrain from producing or attaining uranium
enriched at a level greater than 3.67 percent for 15 years, and
is far less than the approximate 90 percent enrichment level of
weapons grade uranium and the 20 percent level of uranium that
Iran had previously stockpiled.
The IAEA also reports that there are currently no more
centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant than are in
accordance with Iran's obligation to dismantle two-thirds of
its centrifuges to enrich uranium for the next 10 years.
The IAEA enjoys unprecedented and open access to Iran's
nuclear facilities. It conducts formal reviews on at least a
quarterly basis, and has determined that Iran has met its
commitments in every one of its reports. This is a vast
improvement over previous international ballpark estimates to
try to assess Iran's nuclear capabilities based on hypothetical
breakout times. It is in light of the critical and continued
work of the IAEA to verify Iranian compliance with the nuclear
agreement that we must make every effort to ensure that the
agency is able to carry out its inspections and verification
workload.
Director General Amano recently stated that absent a 2.1
percent increase to its operating budget in 2018, or $400
million from its contributing member states, the IA will not be
able to implement the verification and monitoring activities
required in Iran. In stark contrast, the budget blueprint
recently submitted to Congress by President Trump proposes a
nearly 29 percent, or $10 billion, cut to the State Department
budget. This could drastically decrease our estimated $200
million annual contribution as the IAEA's largest contributor,
given that our typical 25 percent share of IAEA funding comes
from the State Department.
While I understand that members on both sides of the aisle
may have concerns with the rationale behind the agreement
itself, I strongly believe we must continue to support the
IAEA's work of inspection that the Iran nuclear deal is in
place.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing with today's
witnesses what additional steps we can take in furtherance on
the sole purpose of the agreement, and, quote, ``that under no
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any
nuclear weapons,'' close quote, as required in the agreement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of
our time.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
I'll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any
members who'd like to submit a written statement.
We'll now recognize our panel of witnesses. I'm pleased to
welcome Michael Barbero, retired lieutenant general, United
States Army, and advisory board member for United Against
Nuclear Iran; Mr. David Albright, president of the Institute
for Science and International Security; Mr. Mark Dubowitz,
chief executive officer at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies; Mr. Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., the Hasib Sabbagh senior
fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations; and Mr. Jim Walsh, Ph.D., senior research associate
for the Security Studies Program at MIT.
Welcome to you all.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
before you testify. Can you please rise and raise your right
hands?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you're about to give
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God.
Okay. Please be seated.
All witnesses answered in the affirmative.
In order to allow time for discussion, we'd appreciate it
if you limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written
statement will be made part of the record.
We now recognize General Barbero for 5 minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL BARBERO
General Barbero. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the threat posed by the
ever-expanding ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
I served as an infantry officer for 38 years, including a
total of 46 months in Iraq over three combat tours from 2003 to
2011. And as a soldier and commander in Iraq, along with my
good friend, Congressman Steve Russell, I witnessed Iran's
subversive activities, hegemonic ambitions, and the direct
targeting of American troops. In the 3 years since my
retirement from the Army, I've made more than 20 trips to the
region, meeting with many senior government and business
leaders, witnessing the spreading domination of the Iranian
regime from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea.
Just 2 weeks ago, I was part of an international group in
Israel to review the situation on the ground and assess the
threat of Hezbollah and meet with national security leaders,
including Prime Minister Netanyahu.
In the next few minutes, I'd like to highlight how Iran is
directing its proxies, specifically those in Lebanon and Iraq,
to successfully pursue a strategy of regional hegemony and
carving a permanent zone of control. And I believe the actions
of Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon present the most
imminent challenge to the United States interests in the
region.
In Lebanon, as we all know, Hezbollah is a creation of
Iran, and today, it's funded by Iran to the tune of estimates
of $800 million annually. Until September 11, 2001, Hezbollah
was responsible for killing more Americans than any other
terrorist organization. Iran's military support to Hezbollah in
Lebanon has only grown over time. In 2006, the last time
Israel--hostilities broke out between Hezbollah and Israel,
Hezbollah had approximately 13,000 mid- to short-range missiles
and rockets. Since then, Hezbollah's influence and capabilities
have increased dramatically.
According to Israeli estimates, Hezbollah now has an
expanded arsenal of over 100,000 rockets and missiles,
including long-range systems that possess greater precision,
lethality, range, greatly threatening Israel population centers
and critical infrastructure. Also, Hezbollah has fully
integrated itself into Lebanon's political, social, and
military and security apparatus. In recent combat operations in
Syria to support the Assad regime, Hezbollah has gained
important conventional capabilities, and is now a hybrid
military power that is stronger than many conventional armies,
including Lebanon. In Israel, the universal accepted view is
that the third Lebanon war is not a question of if, but when,
and that when is very short-term.
Turning to Iraq. The good news on Iraq is that ISIS is
being driven from Mosul. The bad news comes the day after
Mosul, when Iraq is sunk into endless sectarian strife fueled
by Iran's support for brutal Shia militias, and the inability
of the Iraq Government to control them. The Badr Organization,
Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asaib al-Hak, these and other Iranian
proxies fighting in Iraq are commanded by Qasem Suleimani, the
commander of Iran's Quds Force, and have evolved into a
permanent force in Iraq.
In a post-ISIS Iraq, these Iranian proxy forces represent
the greatest threat to stability and security. The well-
documented sectarian actions of Iranian-backed Shiite militias
are establishing the de facto sectarian partition of Iraq. The
brutal treatment of Sunnis and other minorities by these
militias has served to deepen sectarian divisions and increase
Sunni alienation from Baghdad Government, thereby damaging the
prospects for post-ISIS political reconciliation in Iraq.
Our closest ally, the Kurds, have already clashed with
these militias, and Kurdish leaders say their next fight is
with these Iranian-controlled militias. If unchallenged, these
well-resourced Iranian proxy forces will serve in the vanguard
of the Hezbollahization of Iraq.
The Iranian resourcing and control of these militias and
other proxy forces operating in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain is
part of a well-established strategy following the Hezbollah
model. More than a year after signing the deal to postpone its
ability to acquire nuclear weapons, as its actions across the
region clearly demonstrate, Iran's desire is to dominate rather
than be a positive force in the Middle East. Unfortunately,
with the lifting of sanctions that accompanies the signing of
the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran's resourcing of its proxy forces
has continued unrestricted. And as we have seen in its
aggressive and subversive actions across the Middle East, Iran
will continue to pursue its strategic goals at the expense of
regional stability, the security of our allies, and most
importantly, at the expense of American strategic interests.
I thank you, and look forward to your questions.
[Prepared statement of General Barbero follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Albright, you're up for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT
Mr. Albright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
other members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify today.
The Iran deal needs to be implemented more effectively and
its nuclear conditions strengthened and better verified. At its
core, the Iran deal is a bet that by the time the nuclear
limitations end, Iran, the region, or both will have changed so
much that Iran will no longer seek nuclear weapons. But despite
immense sanctions relief, Iran has been increasing its
conventional military power in efforts at establishing regional
hegemony. The bet does not appear winnable under the current
circumstances, and Iran's current trajectory is a threat to the
United States and its allies in the region.
Armed with substantial funds and a growing economy, Iran is
challenging the U.S. in the region and appears as committed to
maintaining the capability to pursue a nuclear weapons path as
before, just a longer path. A solution needs to be thought
through and a remediation path developed that will strengthen
and fix the JCPOA, but as this longer term process develops,
the deal needs to be better enforced and verified. A priority
is knowing how Iran has been violating the deal and associated
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. Also important is
understanding how Iran exploits loopholes in the deal and
pushes the envelope of tolerated behavior.
In my written testimony, I conclude that Iran is not in
full compliance with the Iran nuclear deal and is flirting with
violations in several areas. It is fair to conclude that Iran
is not in compliance with the arms and ballistic missile
provisions of Resolution 2231. However, it is difficult to
argue that Iran has so violated the Iran deal, nuclear deal or
the Resolution 2231's provisions as to justify snapping back
sanctions.
Based on available information, certain patterns of Iranian
noncompliance are clear. Iran often conducts small scale
cheating on the nuclear deal's limitations, such as we were
able to identify at least two cases involving centrifuge
research and development. It misinterprets clauses to justify
actions that should be viewed as violations. Iran policy to
deny IA inspectors access to military sites should be viewed as
fundamentally inconsistent with the nuclear deal and, in fact,
renders its weaponization development ban, called section T,
unverifiable.
A damaging pattern developed during the Obama
administration where Iran could create a crisis over a
potential violation, the United States and allies would find--
would have to find a, quote, solution, and Iran would cynically
demand compensation as part of that solution. A far more
effective approach would have simply been the United States
insisting that Iran solve its own compliance issues or simply
be in noncompliance with the JCPOA.
The deal's implementation under the Obama administration
was too permissive and tolerant of Iran's violations of the
deal, its exploitation of loopholes, and its avoidance of
critical verification requirements. The result was that Iran
was able to push the envelope of allowed behavior in directions
harmful to the U.S. national security. Moreover, U.S. actions
muddied the waters of determining compliance with the JCPOA.
Until today, the Trump administration has continued to
implement the deal, and I hope that policy continues. However,
that does not mean that the Trump administration should
continue the previous administration's overly permissive way of
implementing the deal and its avoidance of dealing with the
deal's shortcomings. I certainly expect the Trump
administration to chart a new path forward that better protects
U.S. interests in national and Middle East regional security.
A key part of a new approach is looking again at
compliance. As the leading negotiator of the JCPOA, the United
States has a special responsibility to thoroughly evaluate
Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal and Resolution 2231.
The Trump administration can look freshly at the issue and
provide a more objective review than done previously.
If the nuclear deal is to succeed, let alone survive, the
Trump administration will need to take aggressive actions to
adequately enforce the nuclear deal and Resolution 2231 toward
a policy of stricter enforcement. The administration should
announce that the United States will strictly interpret these
deals, it will demonstrate zero tolerance for Iranian
violations, and will respond both within and outside the
context of these agreements. Where violations are significant,
the United States should start the process of snapping back
U.S. and U.N. sanctions. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Dubowitz, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK DUBOWITZ
Mr. Dubowitz. Thank you. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member
Lynch, members of the committee, on behalf of the FDD and our
Center on Sanctions Illicit Finance, thank you for the
invitation to testify.
At the heart of the JCPOA is a fatal flaw. Iran does not
need to cheat to reach threshold nuclear weapons capabilities.
By following the deal and waiting patiently for key constraints
to sunset, Tehran can emerge as a threshold nuclear power with
an industrial-size enrichment program; near-zero breakout time;
an easier clandestine sneak-out pathway; an advanced long-range
ballistic missile program, including ICBMs; access to advanced
heavy weaponry; greater regional dominance; and a more powerful
economy, which will be increasingly immunized against our
ability to use sanctions.
The U.N. snapback is deal ending, which makes it highly
ineffective against Iran's incremental cheating strategy that
Dr. Albright has outlined.
Since the announcement of the nuclear agreement in July
2015, Iran has received a significant economic stimulus through
sanctions relief and additional unilateral concessions from the
Obama administration. In spite of or because of these economic
benefits, Iran's destabilizing and malign activities have only
accelerated.
To address these threats, Congress and the new
administration need to follow in the footsteps of Ronald
Reagan. In the early 1980s, President Reagan instructed his
National Security Council to develop a comprehensive strategy
to undermine the Soviet Union. We need a similar plan now, one
that uses both covert and overt economic, financial, political,
diplomatic, cyber, and military power to subvert and roll back
the Iranian threat.
The administration, with assistance from Congress, needs to
reinvigorate the sanctions regime aimed at deterring Iran's
support for terrorism, ballistic missile development, human
rights abuses, war crimes, and destabilizing activities
throughout the Middle East. It's very clear that these
nonnuclear sanctions are fully consistent with the JCPOA. In
particular, Congress should apply the terms of Executive Order
13224, the terrorism executive order to the IRGC, and require
the Treasury Department to expand the number of IRGC entities
designated from the current 68 to the thousands of entities it
owns or controls. There is overwhelming evidence to support
this designation. Congress should reject the argument that this
designation will provoke the IRGC to threaten or commit
violence. To do so would hold American policy hostage.
Since 2013, the conclusion of the interim agreement and
through the final agreement, there has been enormous increase,
particularly in Syria, in Iran-related terror attacks, again,
terror attacks that deliver the use of violence against
civilians with a political objective. Iran has perpetrated and
supported these attacks through the IRGC, Hezbollah, and
Iranian-backed militias. This is part of the reason why the
State Department calls Iran the leading state sponsor of
terrorism.
Congress should also require the administration to
investigate whether or not Iran Air is supporting Iran's malign
activities in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. As the first slide
indicates, since implementation day on January 16 of last year,
there have been 696 flights from Iran to Syria. Of those
flights, 114 were Iran Air, including some to and from an IRGC
resupply base in Abadan, Iran.
On the second slide, you'll see an example of a flight that
is supposed to travel between Tehran and Damascus, but is
actually flying by the IRGC resupply base in Abadan. If Iran
Air is complicit in Tehran's illicit behavior, as I believe it
is, Iran Air should face new sanctions, U.S. licenses for
aircraft sales should be revoked, and the Boeing and Airbus
deals with Iran Air should be canceled.
When Washington implements stricter sanctions,
international banks and companies will think twice about
working with the Iranian entities engaged in this malign
conduct, especially with the IRGC. I agree with Mr. Albright.
We need to rigorously enforce the deal, but it presents a
bedeviling paradox. The greater the focus on enforcement, the
higher the likelihood that Iran will take a patient pathway to
nuclear weapons capability as a result of the agreement's
sunset provisions and the lack of an effective mechanism to
physically inspect Iranian military sites.
To address this, as Mr. Albright has recommended, the Trump
administration should work with Congress to design a statutory
architecture that freezes the Iranian nuclear program where it
is today, and impose new crippling sanctions if the nuclear
breakout time drops under 1 year. To achieve this, Iran's
advanced centrifuge research, development, and deployment
levels, for example, need to be significantly constrained, and
IAEA's physical access to military sites must be guarantied.
There is no compelling reason for Iran to have a breakout time
of less than 1 year.
The Trump administration also needs to put Iran on notice
that the U.S. will use force to counter Iranian aggression.
Sanctions without the credible threat of military action will
always be insufficient to change the regime's calculus.
And, finally, the administration must make it clear to the
Europeans, the Chinese, and the Russians that it is prepared to
negotiate a follow-on agreement that addresses the fatal flaws
of the original deal. Iran still struggling to attract foreign
investment because of its continued malign activities could
benefit from such an offer if it is prepared to halt its
subversive behavior.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Takeyh, you're up for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D.
Mr. Takeyh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, for
inviting me. And it's a privilege to be here with my co-
panelists.
I actually come with good news. The Islamic Republic is at
an impasse. It is an ideological experiment born in the 20th
century that has managed to crawl into this century, but this
journey will end and the theocratic dictatorship will join
their radical counterparts in the dustbin of history.
In some ways, Iran today resembles the Soviet Union of the
1970s, a bloated state that avoids reforms and eventually
brought about its own collapse. The foremost function of U.S.
policy, therefore, is to continuously weaken the wobbly
foundations of the clerical regime by pressing it both
internally and in the region.
The theme of today in Washington today, these days, is to
push back on Iran. I think it is important to remember that
pushing back on Iran must begin in Iran itself. The summer of
2009 and the rise of the green revolution will always be
recalled as a watershed moment after which things are not the
same. No less than Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has confessed
that the movement brought Iran, quote, to the edge of the
cliff. General Mohammad Jafari, the Commander of the Guards,
has suggested that the Green Movement was a greater danger for
the system and the Islamic revolution, and we went to the brink
of the overthrow and the sedition. Sedition is the pejorative
term they use for the Green Movement. The regime's security
services proved unreliable, dissension spread within the
Guards, a number of commanders had to be dismissed, the ruling
elites, which had perfected the strategy of staging counter-
demonstrations, failed to do so for 6 months.
The Islamic Republic was never and is never a typical
totalitarian state. Its electoral processes and institutions
provided the public at least with a veneer, an impression of
democratic representation. That republican element of the
regime evaporated in 2009, and with it vanishes legitimacy.
The task of American diplomacy is, as Mr. Dubowitz
suggested, is similar to that as Ronald Reagan facing the
Soviet Union, not just negotiate or renegotiate a better arms
control agreement, but devise a comprehensive strategy that
undermines the regime. As the administration at that time did
with Solidarity in Poland and other such organizations, we
should find a way of establishing ties with opposition
movements within Iran.
Given the Islamic Republic's cruelty and corruption, the
opposition spans the entire social spectrum. The Iranians have
given up, not just on the Islamic Republic, but on religious
observance itself, as most mosques are empty during most Shia
commemoration days. Three decades of theocratic rule has
transformed Iran into one of the most secular nations in the
Middle East. The middle class, the working poor are equally
hard pressed by the regime's incompetence and corruption. Even
some of the senior members of the clergy are beginning to
recognize the toll that politics has taken on religion. America
has ready allies in Iran and must make an effort to empower
them.
Economic sanctions, in my view, are a critical part of any
strategy of pressuring Iran. The experience of the past few
years has shown that the United States and its partners have
real capacity to shrink Iran's economy. The fewer resources
that the regime has at its disposal, the less capable it is of
sustaining a cadre whose loyalty today is purchased, and the
guardians of the revolution are well aware of that. Once
deprived of money, the state will find it difficult to fund
patronage networks that are essential to its rule and its
imperial ventures.
For Iran's leadership to yield to international norms, all
the walls around them have to close in, so it is important to
stress its economy, divide the society, but also to push back
on its influence in the Middle East, as was mentioned before.
By contesting Iran's gains, Washington can pose additional
costs on the regime and contribute to regional stability.
Iran's leaders believe that the vitality of the revolution
mandate its exports, and it is that export that must be negated
as means of undermining that revolution.
The best arena to push back on Iran, I think, still remains
in the Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia are locked into the regional
conflict. We should assist all Gulf allies. Iraq, as was
mentioned, is also a place where the United States can
potentially have steady allies if it rehabilitates that
country's institutions and the military. Iraq cannot be whole
and free so long as Iran interferes in its affairs. A
commitment by the United States to Iraq will go far to
diminishing its ties to Iran.
Some in Washington believe that the Iran problem is
secondary to violent jihadists. For all their achievement,
those movements do not yet possess the resources and capability
of a large sophisticated state. It must be noted that the
Iranian regime was the original Islamic revolutionary state.
Its successes inspired a wave of radicals across the Middle
East. At the most basic level, this is a confrontation between
a super power and a second rate autocracy, and therefore, we
should emulate Ronald Reagan's famous injunction in dealing
with them: We win, they lose.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Walsh, you're up for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JIM WALSH, PH.D.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the
committee, it's an honor to be here today to discuss the
implementation of the nuclear agreement with Iran and our P5+1
international partners.
Let me begin first by looking at Iran's compliance with the
JCPOA. The JCPOA is a nuclear agreement. It's not an agreement
on regional relations, human rights, or other issues, and it's
a nuclear agreement for good reason. Denying Iran nuclear
weapons is the uncontested single most important American
objective in the Gulf. Yes, Iran supports policies that run
contrary to American interests, but the only thing worse than
an Iran that does bad things is an Iran that does bad things
and has nuclear weapons.
It's also worth noting, as I have explained in past
testimony, that the JCPOA is arguably the strongest
multilateral nonproliferation agreement negotiated in the
nuclear age. No country has been subjected to the kind of
intrusive inspection and verification embodied in this
agreement. Today, IAEA has more inspectors on the ground in
Iran than ever before.
To assess Iran's compliance, I use a variety of metrics.
One, Iran's implementation of specific provisions. Did Iran
remove 98 percent of its uranium stockpile? Yes. Did Iran
dismantle two-thirds of its centrifuges? Yes. Did it destroy
the calandria of the Arak reactor? Yes. Time does not permit me
to go through the whole list, but I think you get the idea.
Next, I look at, two, assessments by others. The
International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. intelligence
community, our European partners, including Britain, France,
Germany, and the EU, have all concluded that Iran is in
compliance with its obligations. The Israeli military, for its
part, has changed its threat assessment as a result of the
nuclear agreement.
Let me turn now to Iran's regional activities. Iran's
regional activities pose problems for U.S. interests in the
region, but by way of context, few countries in the Middle East
have been shy about meddling in the affairs of their neighbors.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt, for example, have all
recently intervened in other countries, directly or through
proxies. Moreover, these practices have been a prominent
feature in the region for decades.
Now, none of this means that Iran's unwanted behavior
should be simply accepted; it shouldn't. What it does suggest,
however, is that regional meddling is not new, it is unlikely
to go away any time soon by any of the players, and it should
be judged in context and not in isolation. In short, this is
the Middle East, and it has been like this for a very long
time. But when it comes to Iran, ambition is one thing,
capability is another.
And even when one looks at the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, it's
pretty clear who has the upper hand. In this competition, the
Kingdom is supported by the Gulf Emirates, Pakistan, Egypt, and
the U.S., among others. The Iranian side is poor and weak by
comparison. It includes Lebanon, a weak state, Syria, in the
middle of a civil war, and possibly Iraq, although I doubt that
for the long-term, but is also fighting a war on its own
territory. Saudi Arabia alone, without counting its many
allies, is far wealthier than Iran and outspends its rival on
defense.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported
that Saudi Arabia spends almost four times as much on its
military as Iran. It goes on to conclude that, quote, Saudi
Arabian Armed Forces remain the best equipped of all of the
states in the region except Israel. So while Iran may have
aspirations of hegemony, it lacks the economic and military
capabilities to achieve that status, particularly in a region
where Sunnis vastly outnumber the Shia.
Terrorism. Iran is said to be the largest state sponsor of
terrorism in the world, though some experts would instead point
to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Critics of the agreement have
suggested that it would free resources that Iran would use for
increased terror activity. As my past testimony explains, there
are reasons to doubt this. In addition, I went back and tested
the proposition using the University of Maryland's global
terrorism database. I examined terror attacks for all four
groups that Iran has supported in the past. The results are
striking and surprising.
First, terror attacks by the most active groups are all
significantly down from their historic highs. More tellingly,
attacks are all down beginning around 2013, 2014, that is to
say, with the JPOA and the JCPOA. Now, one will have to keep an
eye on this to see if it changes, but to date, the data is
clear: the rise in terror attacks by Iranian-backed groups
predicted by critics simply did not happen.
Ballistic missiles. Under the Security Council resolution,
Iran has, quote, called upon not to carry out ballistic missile
tests of nuclear-capable missiles. To be clear, the language in
the resolution does not mandate that Iran end missile tests,
and the resolution actually provides for missile technology
transfers in the agreement. Since the time its cities were
attacked by ballistic missiles by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
war, Iran has viewed missiles as a defense need, not
surprisingly, and has achieved virtual self-sufficiency in that
program. Sanctions cannot change that reality. Only a reduction
of regional tensions can do that, but until then, the U.S. has
other options at its disposal.
In conclusion, I believe that Congress has an important
role to play in the JCPOA's implementation, and I stand ready
to work with this committee to make sure we achieve our common
goal and our first priority: ensuring that Iran never acquires
nuclear weapons.
Thank you very much.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
General Barbero, you mentioned, which we don't mention
enough, I think, the number of U.S. troops that were killed at
the hands of Iran while we were in Iraq. And by my estimate, it
was definitely hundreds and may have been over a thousand. Do
you agree that those numbers are accurate?
General Barbero. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. And these are attacks that are directed by,
in many cases, Iran's Quds Force, correct?
General Barbero. They were active in equipping, training,
and directing these attacks.
Mr. DeSantis. And has there ever been any type of remorse
or anything, Iran take responsibility, this deal, anything for
all the American deaths?
General Barbero. Absolutely not.
Mr. DeSantis. Now, Iran is pursuing this ballistic missile
program. What type of a threat does that pose to the United
States and how should we respond to it?
General Barbero. Well, I'm not the expert on ballistic
missiles, but as a leader in the Middle East just described,
the combination, the continued advancing of certain related
technology, such as their centrifuge, and linking them with the
long-range ballistic missile program is not good for the United
States in the future, and that this deal is further described
as zero nukes today, 100 nukes tomorrow.
Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Dubowitz, 2231 has restrictions on
ballistic missile activity. It talked about missiles designed
to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. How do you define
a nuclear-capable missile? Is there a difference between that
and conventional? Because what you'll hear people who defend
Iran will say is, yeah, they did this ballistic missile, but
that's not necessarily anything having to do with nuclear.
They're just testing missiles.
So how do you make that distinction, or do you?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, I think the key point, there are
missiles that are capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and
many of Iran's missiles already are capable of delivering a
warhead. And certainly Iran has a very active long-range
ballistic missile program and an ICBM program that they are
working on, not only by themselves, but always important to
remember the extensive cooperation between Iran and North Korea
on missiles and the long progress that North Korea has made on
their ICBM program.
Mr. DeSantis. And so what--is there a different purpose
that would be reasonable for this ballistic missile program
other than to deliver a nuclear payload?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, there's certainly no reason to have an
ICBM, unless you're interested in delivering a nuclear payload.
And the long-range ballistic missile program that Iran has is
getting more sophisticated, more lethal, ranges are increasing.
And it is absolutely clear, as you know, Secretary Kerry
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2015,
that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 was designed to
prohibit Iran from testing and developing those missiles.
Mr. DeSantis. So how close is Iran, in your estimation,
right now to developing an ICBM that could reach the United
States?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, according to open source information,
it's not imminent and still may be years away, but it's
important to remember that the way Iran has structured and
architected this nuclear deal is that there are multiple
pathways. And what Mr. Walsh is not telling you is he--it's not
the status quo today, it's the trajectory, it's Iran's
trajectory on the nuclear side because of sunset provisions to
an industrial size nuclear enrichment program; it's the
trajectory on missiles, to a long-range ballistic missile
program with an ICBM; and it's the economic trajectory, where
they'll continue to fortify their economy against our ability
to use economic pressure. It's the trajectory; it's the patient
pathway to nuclear weapons capability, long-range ballistic
missiles and an ICBM.
Mr. DeSantis. So the lifting of sanctions, has that helped
to boost the ballistic missile program?
Mr. Dubowitz. The lifting of sanctions has helped to boost
all of Iran's malign activities, because Iran is now--has
resources that are available to it. The $100 billion in frozen
oil money that was released, access to oil markets, the lifting
of sector-based sanctions on key strategic sectors of the
economy. Iran in 2013 was 4 to 6 months away from a severe
balance to payments crisis. They were ready to collapse. So
they were making very, very painful budgetary decisions at the
time. Those decisions are a lot less painful when their economy
is growing at 7, 8 percent, as it is today, inflation is down
to single digits, and Iran's foreign exchange reserves are at
least five or six times greater.
Mr. DeSantis. So can additional sanctions imposed by
Congress help rein in the ballistic missile program, and if so,
how should they be targeted?
Mr. Dubowitz. Congress needs to design a secondary
sanctions regime that's predicated on Iran's ballistic missile
malign activity, it needs to designate key entities that are in
the ballistic missile supply chain, both foreign and domestic,
and it needs to provide punishing sanctions against any foreign
entity or any foreign bank that does business with any Iranian
entity in support of that ballistic missile program. We are a
long way from that, but I think the legislation that was
introduced in the House and the Senate begins that process.
Mr. DeSantis. And, finally, my last question. Mr. Takeyh,
you talked about Iran, really this regime is on unstable
foundations. You mentioned the 2009 Green Movement. What does
this administration need to do to kind of further erode some of
these foundations so that the Iranian people could have a
better pathway forward?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, I do think that it's very important to
focus as much on human rights infractions as it is on nuclear
infractions and terrorism. Iran is also member of various
international bodies and has to adhere to international
conventions on human rights behavior, which it is egregiously
in violation of. I would actually support a sanctions regime
along the lines of Mark that actually targeted human rights and
human rights abuses that are ongoing in the country so there
will be actual punishment.
As I mentioned, our task is to continuously weaken the
regime's coercive power and the regime itself. That actually
now relies on the transactional relationship with its cadre. It
essentially gives them money as enforcers. If it has less
money, it has less capacity for enforcement.
Mr. DeSantis. Thanks. My time's expired.
I'll now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walsh, thank you for your testimony. I'm going to give
you a couple of comparisons. We have a situation with Pakistan
where they have nuclear weapons; not only that, they're fixated
on India, they have mobile nuclear weapon capacities. So they
keep--as a matter of defense, they keep moving their nuclear
weapons around to avoid any first strike vulnerabilities. In
the meantime, the Taliban and various warlords in those areas,
they're not on the eastern border of Pakistan, they're more on
the western part that is controlled, in large part, by the
Taliban. And then we have North Korea that has nuclear weapons
capacity already and highly unstable leadership, to say the
least.
What is greater risk right now? Is it North Korea that has
nuclear weapons and, you know, like I say, a very unstable--I'm
being generous here--a very unstable leader, Pakistan that has
nuclear weapons and is moving them back and forth, or Iran that
is stuck in a freeze here.
And just--I just want to go through the checklist here. Did
Iran remove 98 percent of its lightly enriched uranium
stockpile? Yes, it did. Did Iran dismantle two-thirds of its
centrifuges? Yes, it did. That's all been verified. Did Iran
destroy the calandria at the Arak reactor? Yes. Our inspectors
were there. They filled it with concrete. It cannot be used.
That was a big step. That was a lot of research and effort on
their part. Did Iran cap its level of enrichment to 3.67
percent? Yes. Did Iran convert the Fordow underground facility?
Yes, it did, mid-construction. Did Iran submit to 24/7
International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its sensitive
facilities? Yes, it did. And is it reprocessing plutonium? No,
it is not.
So, again, what's the greatest danger here?
Mr. Walsh. Yeah. Number one by far, I think--first of all,
India, Pakistan, and North Korea are in a class by themselves
in terms of nuclear danger. They're nuclear weapon states. You
can only have a nuclear war if you have nuclear weapons.
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Walsh. And, frankly, the India-Pakistan situation has
deteriorated recently. Even though it doesn't get as much play
as this other stuff, I think it's far more serious. And then I
worry about North Korea, having been to North Korea and studied
it for years. I don't think Kim Jong-un is going to start a war
on purpose, because he knows he's going to lose, but I fear
that we're one dead fisherman away from some crisis that
escalates. Because everyone is leaning forward, it's a very
escalatory environment.
Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon. It's not going to have
one for 15 years. I, frankly, think it's going to be a lot
longer than that. I don't think these things compare.
And let me say, within the region, you know, Iran is not 10
feet tall. It's not the Soviet Union. It's not even the most
powerful country in its own region. By my estimation, Israel,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia are all far stronger by GDP, military
expenditures, quality of weapons. It's--if it's fourth, it's
lucky.
Mr. Lynch. Let me ask you, recently President Trump tweeted
out, this was his tweet: ``Iran has been formally put on notice
for firing a ballistic missile,'' close quote. Is there--is
there a--is there a legal or defense terminology to being put
on notice? Is there any technical thing that I'm missing there?
Mr. Walsh. I--it's not my job to interpret the tweets of
the President. It certainly doesn't add up to a policy.
Listen, most of the experts you've talked to, Michael
Elleman, who's a missile expert, others, they'll say that the
program is largely indigenous. Its purpose is asymmetric
deterrence. It fears an attack by another state. It has no ICBM
program, I'm going to have to disagree with my good friend,
Mark. And if you look at my testimony, there are footnotes to
that effect.
It hasn't flight tested an ICBM. You can't have an ICBM
program if you haven't flight tested a missile. So I think
that's a missile program. I wish they didn't have missiles, I
wish no one had missiles, but I don't think sanctions are going
to somehow change the defense needs.
Mr. Lynch. I have to reclaim my time. And I appreciate your
remarks. And also ballistic missile control is an aspirational
statement within the agreement; it's not a requirement.
Mr. Walsh. Right.
Mr. Lynch. Just yesterday, North Korea, a nation, again,
with dangerous nuclear weapons, fired a ballistic missile that
was just the latest in a series of test firings. Here's what
Secretary Tillerson said: ``North Korea launched yet another
immediate-range ballistic missile. The United States has spoken
enough about North Korea. We have no further comment,'' close
quote.
So, you know, there are some dangers out there, but I don't
think giving Iran back the ability to develop nuclear weapons
is the way to go.
I yield back.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the
subcommittee, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today.
General Barbero, it's great to see you. I guess my first
question, I'm a little taken aback that Iran does not present a
significant imminent, unusual threat to U.S. interests. How
would you characterize Iran as a threat? Do you agree with that
statement?
General Barbero. I don't agree with that, Congressman. You
know, Iran's actions have been diametrically opposed to U.S.
interests in the region, and they're acting on those and
executing a strategy.
Mr. Russell. And in one of your capacities, you took a lot
of interest in explosively formed projectiles, IEDs, and the
destruction that they caused on U.S. soldiers in theater. Who
was behind most of the EFPs?
General Barbero. These were copper plates that were used
and designed for one purpose: to burn through American armor,
and they were used exclusively targeting American vehicles and
forces, causing, you know, casualties across the board.
There is intelligence that forensically links and tracks
these plates back to their factories in Iran by lots, and we're
now starting to see the same type of plates in Bahrain being
used by the Iranian proxies there.
Mr. Russell. And so I just--you know, we've stood on the
same turf together on some very dark days, and I--I just kind
of take--you know, I'm taken aback that Iran is not an
imminent, unusual, or significant threat, or somehow because
the neighborhood is a bad neighborhood, that they are justified
in their criminal activity. I think that that is absurd.
Mr. Walsh, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. So they promised that they wouldn't proliferate nuclear
weapons. Why didn't we just leave it at that?
Mr. Walsh. Well, we didn't leave it at that, sir. We have
extensive safeguards arrangements that have grown more
intrusive over time and now have been expanded again under the
JCPOA. We--normally, we don't take people at their word.
Mr. Russell. Well, in your initial testimony, you talked
about that this was the best safeguard to prevent them from the
quick track of developing nuclear weapons, but they signed the
nonproliferation treaty, so why didn't we just take them at
their word? We're taking them at their word now. Why isn't
their word good enough by them signing the treaty?
Mr. Walsh. Well, we've never taken any country at its word
on nonproliferation. As I said, we have safeguards agreements
that came with the NPT and we have verification measures in
Iraq. I mean, we have 24/7 electronic monitoring of their most
sensitive nuclear facilities. Their----
Mr. Russell. Unless they're military, right? The IAEA is
not granted access to military----
Mr. Walsh. That's not true, sir. Under the additional
protocol, they are absolutely granted----
Mr. Russell. Under the protocols they are. How is that
access going with them?
Mr. Walsh. Well, I know of no instances in which the IAEA
has demanded access to a military site and not received it.
Now, if they did, they are----
Mr. Russell. You stated in your testimony, sir, that they
were denied access, but that they were given, as I read the
testimony, because I realize that we didn't have time to go
through all of it, but they were given assurances from the
Iranian Government that everything was okay at those
facilities. So we're taking them at their word, yes or no?
Mr. Walsh. I think that's David's testimony, not mine.
Mr. Russell. Oh, David. My apologies, Mr. Walsh. Is it
still true?
Mr. Walsh. Well, under the agreement, the IAEA both under
the initial protocol and the agreement has access to it. And if
they feel that they are not getting satisfaction, then they're
able to take that directly to the U.N. Security Council and
U.S. snapback sanctions. And by the way, the U.S. has its own
intelligence community, the Israelis have an intelligence
community, the Russians have an intelligence community. If they
find that--if they think that there's cheating, I'm pretty sure
you're going to see a file before the U.N. Security----
Mr. Russell. Well, we're already seeing evidence of a lot
of cheating, which is why we're all ready for a little
snapback.
And, I guess, two things with regard--ballistic missile
tests not being part of a threat, and yet you are one of the
most accurate writers of the dangers and the imminent threat of
North Korea. Why are we even concerned that they launched a
missile yesterday? Shouldn't--I mean, if missiles don't really
matter, why are we concerned about North Korea's missiles?
Mr. Walsh. Well, I think we're worried about North Korea's
missiles because they're going to mate a nuclear weapon to
them. That's not going to happen in the case of Iran because we
have the JCPOA. I also----
Mr. Russell. Can they at the end of 10 years? They can do
whatever they like. It's wide open.
Mr. Walsh. It's not 10 years. And some of the restrictions
of the JCPOA go in perpetuity, they last forever. Like, they're
not bringing the calandria back, right? That's destroyed
forever. Some of the restrictions go for 20 years, 25 years.
Mr. Russell. Well, in my remaining time, Mr. Chairman, I
just want to make the statement that as far as Iran just being
part of the--you know, its bad neighborhood, no one is a
greater proliferator of terrorism than Iran. They've killed
more Americans since 1979 than any other state. We have seen
repeated attacks. General Joseph Votel, commander of CENTCOM:
Iran poses the most significant threat to the central region
and to our national interests and the interests of our partners
and allies.
We've seen the Director of National Intelligence 2016
report: Iran presents an enduring threat to U.S. national
interests because of its support to regional terrorism.
And I would argue that any dropoff in terrorist activity,
Mr. Chairman, has not been because of goodwill of the JCPOA;
it's been because they're fighting in Yemen and Syria and in
militias in Iraq.
Hopefully, we'll get a round two. And I appreciate your
indulgence. I'm out of time.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Walsh, what would you say, I mean, with the Syria deal,
with the chemical weapons? The administration heralded it,
they're gone. Even the Israelis said, oh, it was good. Well, it
turned out not to be the case. And so we--and I agree with you,
there are Israelis you talk to, and they think that from what
they can tell, they may have been in check, but we don't know
what we don't know, and that's what I'm concerned about. In
Syria, a lot of people thought that that had been taken care
of, and obviously, tragically this week we found out it didn't.
Mr. Walsh. Yeah. I think it's way easier to produce a
chemical weapon, which is basically just using industrial
chemicals and weaponizing it, than to make a nuclear weapon and
a miniaturized warhead. They're just in terms of the capacity
required, you know, night and day.
So I think it was a good thing to get all that agent out.
Had we struck Syria, we might have sent a weak deterrent
message, but all that agent would have been there. We got a lot
of it out, but they went back to making it.
Mr. DeSantis. All right.
And I will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont for 5
minutes.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for this hearing, and Ranking Member Lynch.
First, I want to say thank you to General Barbero and also
to his colleague and fellow soldier, my colleague, Mr. Russell,
for your service. And let me tell you, listening to both of you
is very powerful, because you were on the receiving end of a
lot of malign behavior from Iran. So how can I express my
appreciation for that, we all are. But I know that you also
appreciate that this is about a policy that is important to the
U.S. and its allies.
And the question for me on this whole Iran nuclear deal was
not whether I was going to turn a blind eye to what you
experienced, it was whether in the longrun the region would be
safer with a malign but nonnuclear Iran than with a malign and
nuclear Iran. And we had a lot of debate here and will continue
to have disagreement about whether the Iran deal was a good
deal or a bad deal, but where we're at now is we have a deal,
and I share the concern about wanting it to be enforced.
The concern I have is that some folks who are of the view
that it was a bad deal, from my perspective, may go too far in
using enforcement arguments as a way to try to unravel it, but
that's a--that's in the eye of the beholder. I think we're all
in agreement that we have to enforce this deal.
One of the questions I have, you know, President Trump, as
you know, thought it was a terrible deal, he said that during
the campaign. But the budget that he's proposing is going to
significantly cut State Department funding. I saw that General
Mattis said that we need State Department funding, because the
less money they get, the more I have to ask for for ammunition.
But that's going to directly affect the boots on the ground of
the IAEA.
And I'll just ask you, General Barbero, I know you oppose
the agreement, but do you think it would jeopardize our
capacity to monitor and enforce if we have a significantly
reduced budget for the enforcement agency?
General Barbero. Well, I think it would damage our
abilities to monitor this deal. But if I could, Congressman,
you know, this is not--hopefully, do not come across as an old
soldier who is bitter about what happened.
Mr. Welch. I didn't hear that.
General Barbero. But this is about American national
interests----
Mr. Welch. Right.
General Barbero. --and currently in the region, and what I
here from leaders, where are--where is the United States? This
is a zero-nukes-today-100-nukes-tomorrow deal. This is a
postponement, not a cessation. And we should look--we should
not sacrifice other American interests in the region at the
expense of this deal. And it seems from the capitals there that
America has pulled back and American leadership is lacking in
confronting this real, and in some cases, existential threat to
our friends and allies in the region.
Mr. Welch. A lot of people agree with what you just said.
But, you know, if we're honest with ourselves, this is a tough
situation. It's not like there's a definitive answer. And a lot
of times, the American people want a military response, partly
because they trust the military, and partly because when
something really bad happens, they want a definitive action
that is going to make it go away. But we saw it with our
engagement in the Middle East, and I think President Trump
talked about this during the campaign, that some of those
decisions didn't work out the way it was hoped. You know, we
did nation building in Afghanistan and Iraq; it didn't work. We
aided people in Libya, and it was a mess. And we stayed out of
Syria, and that's a mess.
So I'm just asking all of you, even with your point of
view, which is I think different than mine, to acknowledge that
there is not an easy call for the President, whether it was
Obama or it's Trump.
General Barbero. If I could go further?
Mr. Welch. Sure.
General Barbero. I agree. This is not an easy challenge,
but the argument is not to, you know, reinvade and 100,000
troops and do nothing. There are plenty of actions we could
take. Sanctions, declare the IRGC a terrorist--a foreign
terrorist organization, which they clearly are. Go after the
financing of the IRGC and their----
Mr. Welch. I note that Mr. Lynch is very active in the
financing.
General Barbero. --and work with our allies in the region.
General Jones, Jim Jones, former national security adviser,
SACEUR, said let's lead the way in formulating a NATO-like
defense agreement and body within the Gulf--with the Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia. I think they're ready for that. So
there's a number of things we can do.
Mr. Welch. My time is up. But thank you, General.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired.
We have a procedural vote, but I'm not going to stop the
hearing for it, so members can go and come back. We're going to
keep it going, because I think it's just one vote and done.
These are not our actual votes that we had scheduled at 4
o'clock. And I don't want to have to adjourn twice in 30
minutes.
So with that, I will now recognize Mr. Comer for 5 minutes.
Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question is for Mr. Albright and Mr. Dubowitz. Are the
joint comprehensive plan of actions current, inspection and
transparency measures sufficient to verify Iran is abiding by
its terms?
Mr. Albright. In theory, the international inspectors have
tremendous rights of access. It's given by what's called the
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Unfortunately, Iran's
policy is to deny access to military sites, and it has done so
on multiple occasions. And even in the example of the Parchin
site, which was finally accessed by the IA, it only got one
visit, and it got partial access.
If you take bans in the JCPOA against nuclear weapons
development activities inside Iran, those need inspections of
military sites. And they are not--those military inspections or
the visits to the military sites are not happening.
So I would say that parts of the JCPOA are not verified.
Parts of it have not been tested yet, that in the sense that
the IA is going to ask to go to military sites, and the
expectation is that Iran is going to say no, because that's
been its policy. So I think that the bottom line is, is that
parts of the JCPOA are unverified, parts are untested. The
parts that are well verified are the declared sites.
Mr. Walsh referred to those as sensitive. They're the known
sites. And so those have been verified quite a bit, but the IA
is still unable to answer the basic question: Does Iran have
undeclared nuclear activities? It still does not know the
answer to that question. And when it tries to do that, it very
well could be there's going to be a major confrontation with
Iran over access.
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, I mean, I agree. I mean, Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei, quote, ``Inspection of our military sites is out
of the question.'' Foreign Minister Zarif before the Iranian
parliament: We've successfully achieved the goal of preventing
IAEA access to military facilities. Ali Velayati, an adviser to
Khamenei, quote, ``Entry into our military sites is absolutely
forbidden.''
And Mr. Albright mentioned Parchin. Remember, the IAEA
didn't get physical inspection of the Parchin military site. It
got self-inspection, where the Iranians were providing samples.
Interestingly enough, even when providing samples to the IAEA
and not letting them in through the gates, naturally, manmade
uranium particles were actually discovered.
The IAEA should have insisted, under the comprehensive
safeguards agreement, for a follow-on physical inspection. They
did not. So now you have to the Parchin precedence, which is--
you know, it's not the name of some Robert Ludlum novel. It is
what the Iranians will invoke the next time we want to go into
their military sites. They'll say, you're not getting in. And
maybe at the end of the day they'll let in another self-
inspection.
But I think as Mr. Albright, as my colleague, Dr. Olli
Heinonen has said, it is insufficient. And unless you get into
these sites, into these small sites, you're not going to be
able to confirm whether there are weaponization activities
taking place.
Mr. Comer. Mr. Dubowitz, let me ask you this: How did
updates to the Department of Treasury's OFAC frequently asked
questions weaken sanctions on Iran?
Mr. Dubowitz. So in three major ways. One, it provided
explicit permission for Iran to use dollars outside of the U.S.
financial system and clear dollars in offshore dollar clearing
facilities. Again, that was a concession not negotiated by Iran
as part of the JCPOA.
Second, it weakened the restrictions on doing business with
the Revolutionary Guards in providing more--more of a space for
foreign companies to do business with entities where they were
not majority controlled by the IRGC.
And third, it lowered the know-your-customers customer due
diligence requirements, which had been a longstanding feature
of U.S. anti-money laundering and counter-financing of
terrorism laws.
Again, all three concessions unilaterally given by the
Obama administration in exchange for nothing from Iran and not
part of the JCPOA's explicit text, as far as I can find.
Mr. Comer. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back.
Do we have--I guess the Dems have left the building. Let me
just--we're going to go out for votes.
But, Mr. Albright, you pointed out Iran is basically doing
serial violations, but they're doing it kind of up to the point
before it would lead to an actual response. And that's
concerning, because it seems like they can get away with a lot
bit by bit.
What would it take for them to do--to engage in conduct
that would actually lead to snapback sanctions? Because my
sense is that a lot of the Europeans, who are a part of the
deal, don't have a lot of appetite for that.
Mr. Albright. In fact, it's actually--even though it
appears to have been a very strong part of the deal, it's
actually one of the problems of the deal, is that if the IA,
let's say, really gets aggressive and asks to go to the
military sites, it has a list that it would like to look at for
various reasons, it has to worry that it will bring down the
entire deal.
And so I think part of the challenge for the Trump
administration is to--how to enforce this deal more effectively
within the context of the deal. And I think the Europeans would
actually be interested.
I mean, there's a whole range of issues that are on the
table in these discussions among the P5+1 where Iran is, I
would say, violating the deal. It's on heavy water. It's on
centrifuge research and development. It's on--it is on the IA
ability to do its inspections. I mentioned section T on
weaponization bans. I mean, they do need to verify that this--
this part of the JCPOA is being agreed--abided by by Iran.
So I think the mechanisms will probably be in the joint
commission within the procurement working group, but I think a
critical thing would be for the Trump administration to make it
very clear that it is going to--it is going to enforce this
deal strictly, and it's no longer going to tolerate,
essentially, what is Iranian games to push the limits of the
deal and at the same time get compensation for those. It could
be in the form of money for sales of heavy water or in terms of
uranium imports. It's short on uranium, and it has been able to
use the deal to increase its uranium supply.
Mr. DeSantis. So given some of the deficiencies that you've
outlined, I think it's really good stuff. I mean, is it--is it
correct to say for certain we know Iran is--that this deal has
worked? I mean, it seems to me that even if some of the areas
that people discussed, even if you take that at face value,
there's still stuff we don't know. So can we definitively say
that the deal has worked?
Mr. Albright. I think you can say that the deal has
accomplished certain objectives. And Mr. Lynch went through--
went through several of them, and those are important. But will
the deal succeed in preventing Iran from building nuclear
weapons? I think that's a very open question, and it's a
worrisome question given the current trajectory of this deal.
And I think it really is a time to get much tougher on Iran
and to make sure that it's going to abide by it, and that--and
that, in addition--and Mark discussed this--we have to fix the
weaknesses in the deal, particularly in the long term. And
that--and that--but we first have to get the deal in order,
strictly enforce it, and then we have to start looking at how
do you improve this deal to make sure that Iran does not have a
huge nuclear weapons capability that starts to grow in year 10.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, thank you.
We--I was actually wrong about we're going to do the rest
of the votes for the day. We're--the members have left because
of that, so I know we had others who wanted to participate.
I think it was a very informative panel. I want to thank
you guys for coming, offering your views, and answering the
questions.
And clearly, this is going to be an issue that this
administration is going to deal with and that we in the
Congress are going to have to deal with in one form or another.
So with that, the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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