- WATCHDOG RECOMMENDATIONS: A BETTER WAY AHEAD TO MANAGE THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

WATCHDOG RECOMMENDATIONS: A BETTER WAY AHEAD TO MANAGE THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

FEBRUARY 16, 2017

__________

Serial No. 115-5

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

__________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
26-399 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
John Katko, New York Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director

------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY

Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina J. Luis Correa, California
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Kathleen M. Rice, New York
John Ratcliffe, Texas Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Erica D. Woods, Interim Subcommittee Minority Staff Director

C O N T E N T S

----------
Page

Statements

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7

Witnesses

Mr. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19

For the Record

The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Email.......................................................... 5

Appendix

Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for John Roth................ 45
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John Roth... 46
Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Rebecca Gambler.......... 49
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Rebecca
Gambler........................................................ 50

WATCHDOG RECOMMENDATIONS: A BETTER WAY AHEAD TO MANAGE THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY

----------

Thursday, February 16, 2017

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitors Center, Hon. Scott Perry
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Perry, Ratcliffe, Higgins, Correa,
Rice, and Barragan.
Mr. Perry. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order. The
purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony regarding
recommendations from the DHS Office of Inspector General, the
OIG; and the Government Accountability Office, or the GAO; to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Before we begin I would like to welcome the new Members of
the subcommittee. They bring with them tremendous private
sector, law enforcement, and other experience, which will be
helpful in the subcommittee's oversight of DHS.
I also look forward to working with our colleagues on the
other side of the aisle. Ranking Member Correa and I met
recently to discuss the subcommittee's priorities, and I look
forward to working with him on areas--well, on all areas and
ones of mutual interest, as well.
Chair now recognizes himself for an opening statement.
For the past 8 years we watched the administration turn a
blind eye to bureaucratic waste, inefficiency, and
mismanagement. We witnessed an ever-expanding bureaucracy and
an ever-diminishing National security complex.
We raised alarms about security threats and watched
horrified as terrorists attacked us on our soil right here at
home; as hackers exploited vulnerabilities in our cyber
networks; and as smugglers trafficked drugs, weapons, and
unlawful immigrants across our porous borders.
The Department of Homeland Security simply must find a
better way to prioritize and tackle these challenges. Last fall
House Republicans proposed the ``Better Way'' agenda to do just
that--provide a better way to secure our homeland, grow our
economy, and make Government more accountable to the people.
Today's hearing will focus on a better way to manage DHS to
prevent waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, and to correct
the outright negligence of the previous administration.
I know first-hand that Americans are fed up with the status
quo and are looking for ways to improve how the Government does
business. As Chairman of this subcommittee I have seen that an
unchecked and bloated bureaucracy results in failed programs
and wasted taxpayer dollars.
Simply put, DHS's bureaucracy should get operators what
they need at the best cost to the taxpayer, and then get the
heck out of the way.
Last Congress I chaired hearings to examine instances where
that was not the case, where dysfunction and mismanagement
impeded the mission--instances such as DHS's botched management
of the multibillion-dollar Human Resources Information
Technology, or HRIT, program; DHS's total waste of taxpayer
dollars on the Federal Protective Service's vehicle program,
where it had literally more vehicles than officers to drive
them; and DHS's failed oversight of employee misconduct at the
Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Secret Service.
Every dollar wasted by inept bureaucrats is one less that
can be spent on securing our homeland. Mismanagement puts our
security at risk.
The Heritage Foundation recently recommended that DHS rein
in a bloated bureaucracy through a strong chain of command over
component management functions so that DHS effectively equips,
supports, and oversees its components. I am hopeful that the
new Secretary, John Kelly, will use his military experience to
do what the last administration couldn't or wouldn't, which is
provide front-line operators with the necessary tools for
getting the job done and keeping our Nation safe.
Agency watchdogs like those we will hear from today bring
invaluable insights to the issues facing the Department.
Collectively, the Government Accountability Office and the DHS
Office of Inspector General have made thousands of
recommendations to improve DHS programs since the Department's
inception. I look forward to hearing from GAO and OIG on the
ways that the Department can eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse,
and mismanagement.
In particular, I would like to hear about the steps DHS has
taken to get off GAO's high-risk list of areas in the Federal
Government that are most susceptible to mismanagement.
Yesterday GAO reported that DHS's management functions remain
ineffective, the Federal Government's cybersecurity activities
need strengthening, and DHS's National Flood Insurance Program
is unaffordable.
In addition to GAO's high-risk list report, each year the
OIG releases an annual report on major management challenges
facing DHS. The 2016 report identified six broad areas where
the Department faces serious management and performance
challenges. OIG also identified hundreds of millions of dollars
in questionable costs and funds.
Hundreds of recommendations by these watchdogs remain open
and unimplemented by DHS, and this is unacceptable. I urge the
Trump administration to fully leverage the work of these
watchdogs to drain the waste and inefficiency from DHS.
Washington bureaucrats may dismiss these management issues
as simply the cost of doing business in Government. That is
wrong. The American taxpayer deserves much better.
After years and years of failing to rein in Washington's
bureaucracy, Americans demand more from their Government. It is
time to demand more from and find a better way to manage the
Department of Homeland Security.
[The statement of Chairman Perry follows:]
Statement of Chairman Scott Perry
February 16, 2017
For the past 8 years, we watched the Obama administration turn a
blind eye to bureaucratic waste, inefficiency, and mismanagement. We
witnessed an ever-expanding bureaucracy and an ever-diminishing
National security complex. We raised alarms about security threats and
watched--horrified--as terrorists attacked us on our home soil; as
hackers exploited vulnerabilities in our cyber networks; and as
smugglers trafficked drugs, weapons, and unlawful immigrants across our
porous borders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) simply must
find a better way to tackle these challenges.
Last fall, House Republicans proposed the ``Better Way'' agenda to
do just that--provide a better way to secure our homeland, grow our
economy, and make Government more accountable to the people. Today's
hearing will focus on a better way to manage DHS to prevent waste,
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, and to correct the outright negligence
of the Obama administration. I know first-hand that Americans are fed
up with the status quo and are looking for ways to improve how the
Government does business. As Chairman of this subcommittee, I've seen
that an unchecked and bloated bureaucracy results in failed programs
and wasted taxpayer dollars. Simply put, DHS's bureaucracy should get
operators what they need at the best cost to the taxpayer, and then get
out of the way. Last Congress, I chaired hearings to examine instances
where that was not the case; where dysfunction and mismanagement
impeded the mission--instances such as:
DHS's botched management of the multi-billion dollar Human
Resource Information Technology (HRIT) program;
DHS's total waste of taxpayer dollars on the Federal
Protective Service's vehicle program, where it had more
vehicles than officers to drive them; and
DHS's failed oversight of employee misconduct at the
Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Secret
Service.
Every dollar wasted by inept bureaucrats is one less that can be
spent on securing our homeland. Mismanagement puts our security at
risk. The Heritage Foundation recently recommended that DHS reign in a
bloated bureaucracy through a strong chain of command over component
management functions so that DHS effectively equips, supports and
oversees its components. I am hopeful that the new Secretary, John
Kelly, will use his military experience to do what the last
administration couldn't--provide front-line operators with the
necessary tools for getting the job done and keeping our Nation safe.
Agency watchdogs like those we'll hear from today--bring invaluable
insights to the issues facing the Department. Collectively, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DHS Office of Inspector
General (OIG) have made thousands of recommendations to improve DHS
programs since the Department's inception. I look forward to hearing
from GAO and OIG on ways that the Department can eliminate waste,
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
In particular, I'd like to hear about steps DHS has taken to get
off GAO's ``High-Risk List'' of areas in the Federal Government that
are most susceptible to mismanagement. Yesterday, GAO reported that
DHS's management functions remain ineffective, the Federal Government's
cybersecurity activities need strengthening, and DHS's National Flood
Insurance Program is unaffordable.
In addition to GAO's High-Risk List report, each year the OIG
releases an annual report on major management challenges facing DHS.
The 2016 report identified six broad areas where the Department faces
serious management and performance challenges. OIG also identified
hundreds of millions of dollars in questionable costs and funds.
Hundreds of recommendations by these watchdogs remain open and
unimplemented by DHS--this is unacceptable. I urge the Trump
administration to fully leverage the work of these watchdogs to drain
the waste and inefficiency from DHS.
Washington bureaucrats may dismiss these management issues as
simply the cost of doing business in government. Wrong. The American
taxpayer deserves much better. After 8 years of failing to reign in
Washington's bureaucracy, Americans demand more from their Government.
It's time to demand more from, and find a better way to manage the
Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. Perry. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority
Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa, for his statement.
Mr. Correa. Chairman Perry, thank you very much for holding
this hearing today. I also look forward to working with you on
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency to help
ensure the Department of Homeland Security fulfills its
critical mission.
Thank you, Inspector General Roth and Ms. Gambler, for
being here today.
I would also like to take a moment to recognize the men and
women that serve in the DHS Office of the Inspector General and
the Government Accountability Office for the incredible work
that you all do.
Independent investigative bodies such as OIG and GAO are
critically important to keeping the Federal Government
accountable to the American people, to the American taxpayers.
The significance of your work cannot be overstated, as you are
responsible for protecting American taxpayers from fraud,
waste, and abuse.
The importance of your work was shown even more when on
February 1 you, Inspector General Roth, announced an
investigation into the President's Muslim ban Executive Order.
Once again, thank you.
Unfortunately, it appears that neither the President of the
United States nor senior White House aides seems to comprehend
nor appreciate the important role of oversight in our Nation's
system of checks and balances. This past Sunday the President's
senior policy advisor, Steve Miller, declared that this
President's National security decision will not be questioned.
Such a statement ignores a Constitutional responsibility
that we as Congress have to hold the Executive branch
accountable in the grand tradition of Americans challenging the
President on their National security stances. This White House
believes that it is above receiving oversight.
On the evening of January 13 an e-mail from the
Presidential transition team instructed all of his transition
team leaders to reach out tonight and inform the inspector
general and their agencies that they are being held over on a
temporary basis. This essentially insinuated that the inspector
general should seek other employment.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to request unanimous consent to
submit into the record the e-mail circulated by the
administration transition team stating that the inspectors
general were being held over on a temporary basis.
Mr. Perry. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Correa. Shortly before this e-mail was circulated the
new secretary at DHS, General John Kelly, Stated in his pre-
confirmation hearing questionnaire that he, ``will take
seriously the findings of the Department of Inspector General
and the GAO and will maintain a rigorous system to track
management issues and the implementation of corrective
actions.''
Today I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about
the important work they have completed, such as helping to
ensure DHS continues to improve its management operations and
to ensure that DHS puts those limited taxpayer resources toward
operating efficiently and effectively in a more critical role,
as DHS expects to direct up to $21 billion to build a wall
along the U.S.-Mexico border. As you know, as many as--many
drugs, I should say, and over 90 percent of the cocaine
produced in South America coming to America is done via the
oceans.
Turning to the GAO high-risk list, I am encouraged the
Department has made some very good progress since the last
report. I must extend credit to the former Secretary of
Homeland Security, Secretary Johnson, whose initiatives such as
Unity of Effort and the Joint Requirement Council helped move
the Department in a positive direction.
I do hope that the administration takes DHS management
seriously because effective management does lead to better
employee morale, program efficiency, and Department unity.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Correa follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member J. Luis Correa
February 16, 2017
I would also like to take a moment to recognize the men and women
that serve in the DHS Office of the Inspector General and the
Government Accountability Office for the incredible work that you do.
Independent, investigatory bodies, such as the OIG and GAO, are
critical to keeping the Federal Government accountable to the American
people. The significance of your work cannot be overstated, as you are
responsible for protecting the American taxpayer from waste, fraud, and
abuse.
The importance of your work was shown even more, when on February
1, you, Inspector General Roth, announced an investigation into the
President Trump's Muslim Ban Executive Order. Once again, thank you.
Unfortunately, it appears that neither the President of the United
States nor his Senior White House aides seem to comprehend nor
appreciate the important role of oversight in our Nation's system of
checks and balances. This past Sunday, President Trump's senior policy
advisor, Stephen Miller, declared that this President's National
security decisions ``will not be questioned.''
Such a statement ignores the Constitutional responsibility that we,
as Congress, have to hold the Executive branch accountable and the
grand tradition of Americans challenging Presidents on their National
security stances. This White House believes that it is above receiving
oversight.
On the evening of January 13, an email from the Trump transition
team instructed all transition team leaders to ``reach out tonight and
inform'' the inspectors general in their agencies ``that they are being
held over on a temporary basis,'' insinuating that the inspectors
general should seek other employment.
Shortly before this email was circulated, the new Secretary of DHS,
General John Kelly, stated in his Pre-Confirmation Hearing
Questionnaire that he ``will take seriously the findings of the
Department Inspector General and GAO and will maintain a rigorous
system to track management issues and the implementation of corrective
actions.''
Today, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about the
important work they have completed, such as helping to ensure DHS
continues improving its management operations.
Ensuring that DHS puts its limited taxpayer resources towards
operating efficient and effectively is all the more critical at this
moment in our Nation, when DHS is expected to be directed to spend
upwards of $21 billion to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border--
many drugs and over 90 percent of cocaine produced in South America
destined to the United States is done via maritime conveyance.
Turning to the GAO High-Risk List, I am encouraged that the
Department made some progress since the last report. I must extend
credit to the former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, whose
initiatives such as Unity of Effort and the Joint Requirements Council,
helped move the Department in a positive direction.
I certainly hope the Trump administration takes DHS management
seriously, because effective management leads to better employee
morale, program efficiency, and Departmental unity.

Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the Ranking Member.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 16, 2017
The work done to ensure that the Federal Government is accountable
to the American people is more valuable than ever. Over the years, both
the DHS Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office have
been reliable resources to this committee, warning us when programs
were not performing to our expectations and identifying ways that DHS
can do better. The reports you issue have driven change at DHS,
resulted in millions of taxpayer dollars being saved, and brought about
improvements throughout the organization.
Inspector General Roth, you put it best when you said, ``No
government agency, no matter how dysfunctional, will change on its own
accord. Independent oversight is a critical and necessary ingredient
for positive, constructive change.'' The dysfunction you speak of has
certainly been evident from Day One of President Trump's
administration. When, on the evening of January 27, 2017, President
Trump signed an Executive Order directing a seven-country Muslim-ban,
the Department of Homeland Security was suddenly thrust into utter
confusion.
Some travelers who were in the air when the EO was signed weren't
allowed to enter the country when they landed, some were detained, and
others were sent back to their country of departure. When confronted
with questions, some Customs and Border Patrol Officers suggested that
impacted travelers and their families should direct all their questions
to the President himself since they, themselves, lacked clarity about
the parameters of the EO that they were directed to enforce.
In fact, just last week, a Member of this subcommittee shared with
the committee how, when she went to the international airport in her
district in the hours after the EO's issuance and pressed CBP officials
for answers about how the Order was being implemented, they would not
speak with her.
The new DHS Secretary, General John Kelly, has defended President
Trump's EO, but testified before this committee last week that he does
not believe the roll-out should have happened so quickly, specifically
saying the EO should have been delayed ``just a bit'' so Members of
Congress could be prepared. Thank you, Inspector Roth, for taking on
the critical task of investigating this EO and for reviewing all
documentation related to its implementation.
This is a perfect example of why investigative bodies such as the
OIG and GAO are vital to maintaining the integrity and efficiency of
the Federal Government. It is more than a little disturbing to see the
statements issued by President Trump and the people in his inner circle
that reflect the view that they are not to be questioned and are
unwilling to subject their activities to oversight from the press,
Congress, and Federal watchdogs.
On January 13, the Trump transition team instructed transition
leaders via email to contact inspectors general that very same day, and
inform them they are being held over on a temporary basis.
It is hard to know whether the Trump folks were purposely seeking
to chill oversight with this directive but I am heartened that
courageous watchdogs not only in OIGs across the Government but also at
the Office of Government Ethics are standing their ground.
Impartial assessments from inspectors general that identify fraud,
abuse, mismanagement, and waste of taxpayer funds are essential to our
democracy. The statements out of this White House also send the wrong
message to the men and women that make up our Executive branch,
including within DHS.
While I am not surprised at all that the man who currently sits in
the Oval Office thinks he is above oversight, I am concerned that the
House Republican Leadership have, to date, refused to take a sober look
at the growing mountain of evidence of contacts between Trump's people
and Russian intelligence officials during the period where Russia was
interfering in the election to help get Mr. Trump elected.
Unless the House Republicans step up, they risk the American public
and history seeing them as puppets of a President who shows such
derision toward the Constitutional principles that undermine this
democracy.
Given that, to date, House Republicans have willfully refused to do
their job, Congress has to lean on you--the Watchdogs--to do more.
Inspector General Roth, I applaud your colleague at the Department
of Justice for investigating alleged misconduct by the FBI director and
other DOJ employees in the lead up to the 2016 election.
But that one review by one inspector general is not enough to fully
restore public confidence among the people I talk with in the
institutions that are Constitutionally charged with protecting our
Nation's democratic system.
There is still a need for an independent, non-partisan
investigation--akin to the one carried out by the 9/11 Commission--into
Russia's interference in the 2016 election. This is a critical moment
in our Nation.
All of us who took oaths to uphold the Constitution, whether we sit
in an OIG office or at the GAO or in the halls of Congress, need to ask
tough questions and demand answers from President Trump and his
administration.

Mr. Perry. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today. The witnesses' entire written
statements will appear in the record.
The Chair will introduce the witnesses first and then
recognize each of you for your testimony.
The Honorable John Roth assumed the post of inspector
general for the Department of Homeland Security in March 2014.
Previously Mr. Roth served as the director of the Office of
Criminal Investigations at the Food and Drug Administration,
and as an assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of
Michigan.
Ms. Rebecca Gambler is the director of homeland security
and justice issues with the Government Accountability Office.
Ms. Gambler leads GAO's work related to border security and
immigration as well as DHS's management issues, and is a proud
graduate of Messiah College, which is about a mile from where I
grew up.
Thank you for being here today.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Roth for an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Roth. Good afternoon. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Correa, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
here today to testify.
Homeland Security has made progress in the last 3 years,
yet faces long-standing, persistent challenges. We at the
Office of Inspector General have focused our energy on the
Department's major management and performance challenges.
We have identified six: No. 1, creating a unified
Department; No. 2, employee morale and engagement; No. 3,
acquisition management; No. 4, grants management; No. 5,
cybersecurity; and last, improving management fundamentals.
With a new administration the Department will face new
responsibilities. We understand the significant investment the
Department will be making to satisfy its obligations under the
President's Executive Order and the importance of spending that
investment efficiently and effectively.
The Department has historically performed very poorly in
this area, that is securing the southern land border. As many
recall, prior efforts to fortify the Southwest Border, known as
SBInet, were canceled in 2011 as being too expensive and too
ineffective. In a pilot program in Arizona, for example, DHS
spent about $1 billion to build the system across only 53 miles
of State's border before abandoning that initiative.
Given the risks involved, we will be using a life-cycle
approach to audit and monitor the Department's actions to
strengthen the physical security of the Nation's Southern
Border. A life-cycle audit approach means that we will be
auditing the project throughout its lifespan rather than
waiting for the project to be completed or partially completed
before looking at it. In this way, we have the opportunity to
stop waste and mismanagement before the money is spent, rather
than simply identifying it after the fact.
Our first report will address the lessons learned from the
Department's prior Secure Border Initiative and other relevant
acquisitions related to securing our borders. We hope to have
this report out in the next 6 weeks.
Subsequently, we plan to review CBP's comprehensive study
of the security of the Southern Border that the Executive Order
requires be completed within 180 days of the Executive Order.
Future audits will address the planning, designing,
acquisition, and construction phases of the Southern Border
barrier.
Similarly, the Department will face a number of challenges
in executing the President's Executive Orders directing the
Department to hire an additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents and
10,000 immigration officers.
We recently completed an audit that highlighted the
numerous bottlenecks in effective hiring. In fiscal year 2015,
for example, it took an average of 282 days, which is over 9
months, to hire a Border Patrol agent, measured from the time
that the job announcement closed to the date the applicant was
hired. Other positions have likewise encountered significant
delays.
As with the acquisition area, I have initiated the first in
a series of audits to further review the Department's human
capital strategies and management capabilities to ensure that
the Department can quickly and effectively hire a highly
qualified and diverse work force. Our first engagement will
compile and review open-source literature, other Government
reports, and our prior work to help the Department and its
components avoid previously-identified poor management
practices and their negative impacts.
One of the areas we will continue to focus on is
acquisition management. Acquisition management, which is
critical to fulfilling all DHS missions, is inherently complex,
high-risk, and challenging. There continue to be DHS major
acquisition programs that cost more than expected, take longer
to deploy than planned, and deliver less capability than
promised.
For example, the USCIS continues challenges in its efforts
to automate immigration benefits. After 11 years, USCIS has
made little progress in transforming its paper-based processes
into a modern automated system. It still uses a paper-based
process, something akin to the 1950's, to manage a complex and
growing workload.
The USCIS deployed the Electronic Immigration System in May
2012, but to date customers can apply on-line for only two of
about 90 different types of immigration benefits and services.
As we reported in March 2016, USCIS now estimates it will take
more than 3 years to address these issues--over 4 years longer
than estimated, and an additional $1 billion to automate all
benefit types. This delay will prevent USCIC from achieving its
workload processing, National security, and customer service
goals.
These failures have a real impact on our National security.
Errors can result in approved applicants unable to obtain
benefits, maintain employment, or prove lawful immigration
status. In the wrong hands, green cards may enable terrorists,
criminals, and illegal aliens to remain in the United States
and access immigration benefits.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I am happy to
answer any questions that you or other Members of the committee
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Roth
February 16, 2017
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss our
recommendations for improving the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
Since its establishment, DHS has progressed in addressing
challenges to accomplish its mission. However, to fulfill its vital
mission of protecting and securing our Nation successfully, the
Department must continue to overcome challenges that hinder its
efforts. The recommendations discussed below demonstrate our efforts to
assist the Department and its components in overcoming the persistent
challenges. By addressing these recommendations, DHS can continue to
improve effectiveness and efficiency of its operations and reduce
waste, fraud, and abuse.
priorities and challenges
Homeland Security faces many long-standing challenges, and we at
the Office of Inspector General (OIG) have focused our energy on the
Department's major management and performance challenges. We have
identified six:
Creating a unified Department;
Employee morale and engagement;
Acquisition management;
Grants management;
Cybersecurity; and
Improving management fundamentals.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security, OIG-17-08 (November 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, I will focus on the challenges the Department faces in four
areas: Creating a unified Department, acquisition management, grants
management, and management fundamentals, as well as newly-arising
challenges.
addressing new priorities
With a new administration, the Department will face new
responsibilities. We understand the significant investment the
Department will be making to satisfy its obligations under the
President's Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements, and the importance of spending that
investment efficiently and effectively. The Department has historically
performed very poorly in this area. As many recall, prior efforts to
fortify the Southwest Border, known as SBInet, were canceled in 2011 as
being too expensive and ineffective. In a pilot program in Arizona, DHS
spent about $1 billion to build the system across 53 miles of the
State's border before abandoning the initiative.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, e.g., Risk Management Advisory for the SBInet Program
Initiation, OIG-07-07 (November 2006); Controls Over SBInet Program
Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved, OIG-10-96 (June 2010); U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Management of the Purchase and Storage
of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative, OIG-12-05
(November 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the risks involved, we will be using a life-cycle approach to
audit and monitor the Department's actions to strengthen the physical
security of the Nation's Southern Border. A life-cycle audit approach
means that we will be auditing the project throughout its life span,
rather than waiting for the project to be completed or partially
completed before looking at it. In this way, we have an opportunity to
stop waste and mismanagement before the money is spent, rather than
simply identifying it after the fact.
Our first report will address lessons learned from the Department's
prior Secure Border Initiative and other relevant acquisitions related
to securing our borders. We hope to have this report out in the next 6
weeks. Subsequently, we plan to review U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) comprehensive study of the security of the Southern
Border that the Executive Order requires be completed within 180 days
of the date of the Executive Order. Future audits will address the
planning, designing, acquisitions, and construction phases of the
Southern Border barrier.
Similarly, the Department will face a number of challenges in
executing the President's Executive Orders directing the Department to
hire an additional 5,000 Border Patrol Agents and 10,000 Immigration
Officers. We recently completed an audit that highlighted numerous
bottlenecks in effective hiring. We found that historically DHS
components had insufficient staffing in the human resource area and had
inadequate systems to track and process applicants. In fiscal year
2015, it took an average of 282 days (over 9 months) to hire a Border
Patrol Agent, measured from the time the job announcement closed to the
date the applicant was hired. Other positions likewise encountered
significant delays.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel, OIG-17-05
(October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with the acquisition area, I have initiated the first in a
series of audits to further review the Department's human capital
strategies and management capabilities to ensure the Department can
quickly and effectively hire a highly qualified and diverse workforce.
Our first engagement will compile and review open-source literature,
other Government reports, and prior work of our office to help the
Department and its components avoid previously identified poor
management practices and their negative impacts. Subsequent audits will
address the collateral impact hiring 15,000 agents and officers will
have not only on other Departmental components, but also on other
Federal agencies.
Likewise, as we announced in the beginning of this month, we have
begun a review of DHS's implementation of the recent Executive Order,
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States. The review is being initiated in response to Congressional
requests and whistleblower and hotline complaints. In addition to
reviewing the implementation of the Executive Order, we will review
DHS's adherence to court orders and allegations of individual
misconduct on the part of DHS personnel. If circumstances warrant, we
will consider including other issues that may arise during the course
of the review. At the culmination of this review, we will provide a
final report to Secretary Kelly, the Congress, and the public. We
appreciate the cooperation we have received from the Department's
components as we conduct this review.
creating a unified department
DHS's primary challenge moving forward is transitioning from an
organization of 22 semi-independent components, each conducting its
affairs without regard to, and often without knowledge of, other DHS
components' programs and operations, to a more cohesive entity focused
on the central mission of protecting the homeland. A lack of
coordination and unity occurs in all aspects of DHS's programs--
planning, programing, budgeting, and execution--and leads to waste and
inefficiency.
Our previous audit and inspection reports are replete with examples
of the consequences of failing to act as a single entity:
Our 2013 audit of DHS's H-60 helicopter programs showed that
one component did not cooperate with another to realize
potential cost savings and other efficiencies. Specifically,
CBP was unwilling to coordinate with the Coast Guard to upgrade
its H-60 helicopters, even though both components were
converting the same helicopters. We estimated potential savings
of about $126 million if the two components had successfully
coordinated the conversion of CBP's H-60 helicopters at the
Coast Guard's Aviation Logistics Center. A subsequent H-60
Business Case Analysis by DHS's Office of Chief Readiness
Support Officer, the Aviation Governing Board, the Coast Guard,
and CBP confirmed the cost savings of having the Coast Guard
convert the helicopters, but it was too late.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DHS's H-60 Helicopter Programs (Revised), OIG-13-89 (May 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS employs approximately 80,000 Federal law enforcement
officers whose positions allow for the use of force as they
perform their duties; however, DHS does not have an office
responsible for managing and overseeing component use-of-force
activities. We discovered that each component varies on their
use-of-force activities and DHS has no centralized oversight of
use-of-force allegations, trends, training, facilities, and
resource challenges faced by field personnel. We recommended
that DHS establish a Department-level entity to actively
oversee and assist with component use-of-force activities,
update policies, and improve training.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force, OIG-17-22
(January 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since its formation, DHS has faced challenges in integrating
various component training facilities and programs, and does
not have adequate oversight of its workforce training. Multiple
prior audits have shown DHS does not have reliable training
cost data and information to make informed management
decisions. During our 2016 audit, we attempted to determine
total DHS training costs for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. When
we requested DHS training costs from the DHS Office of the
Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), it could not readily provide
the data. The OCFO did not have access to components' financial
systems; rather, it relied on data calls to provide the
training costs and could not validate the data. As a result, we
found significant discrepancies between the total amounts
reported by DHS. Although DHS has taken steps to improve the
reliability of its training data, further action is needed--
thus, we recommended that the under secretary for management
develop and implement a process to accurately capture and
report training information across DHS.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ DHS's Oversight of Its Workforce Training Needs Improvement,
OIG-16-19 (January 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2016, we issued a report on human trafficking and
the visa process. Our audit objectives were to determine how
individuals charged or convicted of human trafficking used
legal means to bring victims to the United States, and to
identify data quality and exchange issues that may hinder
efforts to combat human trafficking. In this audit, we compared
databases belonging to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
and found that ICE and USCIS could improve data quality to
facilitate data matching and identification of possible
instances of human trafficking. For example, when ICE employees
identified a human trafficker, they did not always advise USCIS
regarding the victims they identified. In turn, in selected
instances where USCIS obtained traffickers' names from the
victims, USCIS did not have a process to routinely share this
information with ICE. Without concerted DHS efforts to collect
and share information, the risk exists that some human
traffickers may remain unidentified and free to abuse other
individuals.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help
Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases, OIG-16-17 (January 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS has taken steps to develop a Departmental Pandemic
Workforce Protection Plan (PWPP) intended to protect the
workforce during a pandemic event. However, DHS cannot be
assured that its preparedness plans can be executed effectively
during a pandemic event. For example, DHS did not develop clear
requirements for pandemic readiness training, even though the
DHS PWPP requires components to train and exercise staff and
senior leadership on pandemic readiness at least annually. The
Department did not provide details on applicable trainings or
the frequency needed to meet this requirement. As a result,
seven of the components reviewed did not always include the
necessary details in their plans on how pandemic training
requirements would be met.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and
Execution, OIG-17-02 (October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these examples, DHS has made recent progress in tone and
substance. In the last 3 years, DHS leadership has taken steps to forge
multiple components into a single organization. New policies and
directives have been created to ensure cohesive budget planning and
execution, including ensuring a joint requirements process. The
Department also has a process to identify and analyze its mission
responsibilities and capabilities, with an eye toward understanding how
components fit together and how each adds value to the enterprise. A
new method for coordinating operations, the Southern Border and
Approaches Campaign, was created to try to reduce the silos and
redundancy.
However, in our report issued last November describing the
Department's major management challenges, we found that this progress
has been a result of the force of will of a small team within the
Department's leadership, and may not be sustainable. We warned that
absent structural changes within the Department to ensure streamlined
oversight, communication, responsibility, and accountability--changes
that we believed must be enshrined in law--that this progress could be
undone.
Fortunately, I am gratified to report that the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 establishes within the
Department the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans.\9\ This Office
will lead, conduct, and coordinate the development of the Department's
priority policies and will work with each component of the Department
in establishing or modifying policies. We believe that the creation of
this new office is an important first step toward the structural
changes that are needed to create a unified Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 1902
(2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
acquisition management
Acquisition management, which is critical to fulfilling all DHS
missions, is inherently complex, high-risk, and challenging. Since its
inception in 2003, the Department has spent tens of billions of dollars
annually on a broad range of assets and services--from ships, aircraft,
surveillance towers, and nuclear detection equipment to IT systems for
financial management and human resources. DHS's yearly spending on
contractual services and supplies, along with acquisition of assets,
exceeds $25 billion. There continue to be DHS major acquisition
programs that cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than
planned, or deliver less capability than promised.
The Department was established very quickly by combining many
legacy and new agencies, so DHS's earliest acquisition processes were
imperfect and slow to mature. Initially, DHS operated in disparate
silos focused on purchasing goods and services with minimal management
of requirements. In their transition to DHS, seven agencies, including
the U.S. Coast Guard, FEMA, and TSA retained their own procurement
functions. The expertise and capability of the seven procurement
offices mirrored their pre-DHS expertise and capability, with staff
sizes ranging from 21 to 346.
DHS has taken many steps to strengthen Department-wide acquisition
management, such as establishing an Acquisition Life-Cycle Framework--a
four-phase process to assure consistent and efficient acquisition
management, support, review, and approval. The framework is designed to
ensure that program managers have the tools, resources, and flexibility
to execute acquisitions and deliver products that meet user
requirements while complying with applicable statutes, regulations, and
policies.
The Department also created the Office of Program Accountability
and Risk Management (PARM) in 2011. PARM oversees major acquisition
programs and the acquisition workforce, develops program management
policies, and collects performance data. Within PARM, the Acquisition
Review Board determines whether components' acquisitions meet specific
requirements at key phases throughout the acquisition process. DHS
established a Joint Requirements Council to review high-dollar
acquisitions and make recommendations to the Acquisition Review Board
on cross-cutting savings opportunities.
DHS has also increased component-level acquisition capability. For
instance, the Department appointed component acquisition executives to
oversee and support their respective programs; it also initiated
monthly component acquisition executive staff forums to provide
guidance and share best practices. DHS has continued to enhance its
acquisition workforce by establishing centers of excellence for cost
estimating, systems engineering, and other disciplines to promote best
practices and provide technical guidance.
Most of DHS's major acquisition programs continue to cost more than
expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less
capability than promised. Although its acquisition policy includes best
practices, DHS sometimes approves moving forward with major acquisition
programs without appropriate internal oversight.
USCIS faces continuing challenges in its efforts to automate
immigration benefits. After 11 years, USCIS has made little
progress in transforming its paper-based processes into an
automated immigration benefits processing environment. Past
automation attempts have been hampered by ineffective planning,
multiple changes in direction, and inconsistent stakeholder
involvement. USCIS deployed the Electronic Immigration System
(ELIS) in May 2012, but to date customers can apply on-line for
only 2 of about 90 types of immigration benefits and services.
As we reported in March 2016, the current ELIS approach does
not ensure stakeholder involvement, performance metrics, system
testing, or the user support needed for an effective system.
USCIS now estimates it will take 3 more years to address these
issues--over 4 years longer than estimated--and an additional
$1 billion to automate all benefit types. This delay will
prevent USCIS from achieving its workload processing, National
security, and customer service goals.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ USCIS Automation of Immigration Benefits Processing Remains
Ineffective, OIG-16-48 (March 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These failures have a real impact on our National security. Because
of processing errors resulting from premature release of ELIS
software, USCIS received over 200,000 reports from approved
applicants about missing green cards. The number of cards sent
to wrong addresses has incrementally increased since 2013 due
in part to complex processes for updating addresses, ELIS
limitations, and factors beyond the agency's control. USCIS
produced at least 19,000 cards that included incorrect
information or were issued in duplicate. Most card issuance
errors were due to design and functionality problems in ELIS.
USCIS' efforts to address the errors have been inadequate.
Although USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the
inappropriately-issued cards, these efforts also were not fully
successful and lacked consistency and a sense of urgency.
Errors can result in approved applicants unable to obtain
benefits, maintain employment, or prove lawful immigration
status. In the wrong hands, Green Cards may enable terrorists,
criminals, and illegal aliens to remain in the United States
and access immigrant benefits.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Better Safeguards are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance,
OIG-17-11 (November 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recently issued a Management Alert regarding additional concerns
with ELIS that came up during an on-going audit of USCIS' use
of ELIS for naturalization benefits processing. Early this year
we learned of an impending decision by USCIS leadership to
return to ELIS processing late January 2017. We are concerned
about the feasibility and risk of such a decision given all the
ELIS problems that remain unsolved. As such, we recommended
that USCIS ensure the four minimal requirements of the Field
Operations Directorate are met prior to returning to ELIS
processing of N-400 naturalization applications and perform a
risk-based analysis of all unresolved ELIS technical issues to
ensure that, going forward, all systems improvement decisions
are based on potential agency operational impact and risk to
public safety.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Management Alert--U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services'
Use of the Electronic Immigration System for Naturalization Benefits
and Processing, OIG-17-26-MA (January 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are pleased to report that USCIS has agreed to delay the return
to ELIS processing until all of the technical issues have been
resolved.
As we reported in November 2015, FEMA has taken steps to
improve its IT management and developed numerous IT planning
documents, but has not coordinated, executed, or followed
through on these plans. FEMA struggles to implement component-
wide IT governance, in part because the Chief Information
Officer does not have sufficient control and budget authority
to lead the component's decentralized IT environment. As a
result, FEMA's IT environment has become overly complex,
difficult to secure, and costly to maintain. In response to one
of our recommendations, FEMA plans to implement and enforce a
standardized, component-wide process that sufficiently defines
and prioritizes the acquisition, development, operation, and
maintenance requirements for all systems by exercising
authorities through the IT Governance Board.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology, OIG-
16-10 (November 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2014, we reported that FEMA spent about $247
million over 9 years to implement a Logistics Supply Chain
Management System that cannot interface with its partners'
logistics management systems or provide real-time visibility
over all supplies shipped. In addition, FEMA estimated that the
life-cycle cost of the system would be about $556 million--$231
million more than its original estimate. These problems were
largely caused by FEMA's failure to comply with the
Department's acquisition guidance. For instance, the program
office responsible for the system did not analyze alternatives
to determine how best to close the gap in FEMA's logistics
capability; did not report life-cycle cost increases to the
component acquisition executives and the DHS Acquisition
Decision Authority; and did not formally report program
breaches as required, which hindered oversight.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain Management System May Not Be
Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster, OIG-14-151 (September 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As this subcommittee well knows, the Department is
challenged in using the most efficient and effective
composition of its motor vehicle fleet to meet mission
requirements, in part due to limited DHS authority over
components' fleet management decisions. We conducted three
audits in this area. Most recently, in October 2015, we
reported that the Federal Protective Service (FPS), based on
its workforce, has too many vehicles and pays too much for its
vehicles. Also, FPS officers in the National Capital Region
used their vehicles to commute to and from home without proper
justification. As a result, FPS may have missed saving more
than $2.5 million. DHS's insufficient oversight and potential
cost savings were partly due to the DHS Fleet Manager not
having enforcement authority to influence component vehicle
purchases. Because components receive funding for vehicle
fleets in their individual operational budgets, they make
independent decisions about the number and type of vehicles
needed to support their missions.
We appreciate this committee's support on this issue, and
appreciate the legislation originating out of this subcommittee
that will amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to make the
DHS Under Secretary for Management responsible for overseeing
and managing vehicle fleets throughout the Department,
including developing and distributing a standardized vehicle
allocation methodology and fleet management plan; ensuring that
components formally document fleet management decisions; and
approving component fleet management plans, vehicle leases, and
vehicle acquisitions.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The FPS Vehicle Fleet is Not Managed Effectively, OIG-16-02
(October 2015); DHS Does Not Adequately Manage or Have Enforcement
Authority Over Its Components' Vehicle Fleet Operations, OIG-14-126
(August 2014); DHS Home-to-Work Transportation, OIG-14-21 (December
2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS has instituted major reforms to the acquisition process and has
exerted significant leadership to gain control of an unruly and
wasteful process. However, we worry that these reforms, if not
continuously supported and enforced, could be undone. As DHS continues
to build its acquisition management capabilities, it will need stronger
Departmental oversight and authority, increased commitment by the
Department and components, as well as skilled personnel to effect real
and lasting change.
Congress has previously introduced legislation designed to address
DHS's acquisition challenges. We would support legislation that
codifies existing policy and relevant offices; provides the necessary
authority for key personnel and mechanisms within the Department to
effectively manage major acquisition programs; reinforces the
importance of key acquisition management practices, such as
establishing cost, schedule, and capability parameters; and includes
requirements to better identify and address poorly performing
acquisition programs.
homeland security grants management
FEMA administers millions of dollars in homeland security
preparedness grants. This is money given to States and communities to
increase their capacity to prepare for and respond to a homeland
security disaster. However, we find that FEMA does a fairly poor job of
ensuring that the money is not wasted. We believe that this is a result
of a failure of leadership on the part of FEMA and structural and
systemic issues inherent in the program.
Since 2001, FEMA has awarded fire departments and first
responder organizations almost $10 billion through the
Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program and Staffing for
Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants. In our
2016 audit, we reviewed whether recipients complied with grant
requirements and guidance to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of
grant funds. We found that 64 percent (243 of 379) of AFG grant
recipients (grantees) we reviewed did not comply with grant
guidance and requirements because they did not support
expenditures of more than $6.3 million with adequate
documentation. Based on the results of our statistical sample
analysis, $147.2 million (13 percent) of the $1.13 billion
appropriated grant funds are possible questioned costs.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did not Effectively Manage
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program-AFG Grants, OIG-16-100 (June
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also found that 63 percent (88 of 139) of SAFER grant
recipients (grantees) we reviewed did not comply with grant
guidance and requirements to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of
grant funds. We found that they did not support expenditures of
more than $17.75 million with adequate documentation, and they
may have expended more than $692,000 in grant funds on
ineligible items and activities. SAFER grant appropriations for
fiscal years 2010 through 2012 totaled approximately $1.16
billion. We examined about $72 million in grant funds spent and
are questioning $18.4 million.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program--SAFER Grants, OIG-16-98 (June
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of Congressional mandates, we have audited a
significant number of homeland security preparedness grants and have
made recommendations. Unfortunately, FEMA has largely failed to take
advantage of our recommendations in any kind of systemic or organized
way. In an overarching audit of OIG recommendations related to
preparedness grants, we reported that FEMA had not adequately analyzed
recurring recommendations to implement changes to improve its oversight
of these grants. Specifically, of the 58 homeland security grant audits
we looked at, which contained 490 recommendations, we found that 91
percent identified challenges that were present year after year. In
other words, we would identify an issue with one State's grant and make
recommendations, but FEMA would not make systemic changes to ensure
that the same issue was not repeated in other State grants. Simply put,
when it comes to administration of homeland security grants, FEMA is
not a learning organization and is content to make the same mistakes
over and over again.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Analysis of Recurring Audit Recommendations Could Improve
FEMA's Oversight of HSGP, OIG-16-49 (March 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on our recurring audit findings, it is critically important
that FEMA officials examine regulations, policies, and procedures and
assess the need for more robust changes throughout all grant programs.
FEMA should refocus its efforts to identify systemic issues and develop
solutions to address the cause and not just the symptoms. FEMA needs to
improve its oversight of State grantees and proactively engage with
States to improve management and guidance of subgrantees.
management fundamentals
Although neither exciting nor publicly lauded, the basics of
management are the lifeblood of informed decision making and successful
mission performance. Management fundamentals include having accurate,
complete information on operations and their cost; meaningful
performance metrics on programs and goals; and appropriate internal
controls. The Department has made strides in establishing its
management fundamentals, including obtaining an unmodified opinion on
its financial statements for the last 3 years. However, DHS still
cannot obtain such an opinion on its internal controls over financial
reporting. In plain terms, this means the Department can assemble
reasonably accurate financial statements at the end of the fiscal year,
but it has no assurance that its financial information is accurate and
up-to-date throughout the year. DHS has also instituted many positive
steps such as over-arching acquisition policies and other meaningful
acquisition reforms, but the value of these steps is undermined by the
lack of discipline in management fundamentals.
We have summarized the on-going challenges the Department faces
into three main categories, but caution that these challenges are both
interrelated and cumulative:
Collecting the Right Data
The Department does not prioritize collection of data in its
program planning, does not always gather enough data, and does not
validate the data it receives to ensure it is accurate and complete.
The lack of reliable and complete data permeates through the entire
Department and its components and is often accompanied by too little
management oversight and weak internal controls. DHS leadership does
not always assert its authority over the components to ensure it gets
the data it needs when it needs it. As a result, DHS and the components
often struggle making good decisions on acquisitions (what is needed
and how much is needed) and correctly deploying resources (people, as
well as acquired goods and services). Further, DHS does not have the
data required to measure performance and use the feedback to adjust and
improve programs and operations. We have identified numerous examples
of this issue, including DHS's lack of accurate and complete inventory
data for equipment, which hindered the provision of needed
interoperable radio equipment, and incomplete inventory data on
warehouse space, which led to wasted resources.\19\ Simply put, without
the foundation of solid data, DHS cannot be certain it will achieve its
mission and spend taxpayer dollars wisely and efficiently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Reporting and Oversight Needed to Help Manage DHS's Warehouse
Portfolio, OIG-15-138 (August 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collecting and Analyzing Cost Data
The Department, like most Federal Government agencies, does not put
sufficient emphasis on collecting cost data for operations and
programs. Successful businesses unfailingly track cost data because the
cost of their operations or products directly impacts their bottom line
revenue. Government does not have that bottom-line drive for cost
information; yet, all Government programs rely on informed decision
making to optimize performance. Without cost information, DHS cannot
conduct a reliable cost-benefit analysis of proposed program or policy
changes or new initiatives. Because it does not fully understand the
costs of its program choices, the Department is not equipped to analyze
its risk decisions. The lack of information on program costs also
limits basic investment decisions among competing programs. Our fiscal
year audit of CBP's unmanned aircraft system program highlighted CBP's
failure to capture complete cost data for the program. CBP did not
include all the actual operating costs because some costs were paid
from a different budget line item or program. We determined that CBP
was dramatically underestimating the cost of the program at the same
time it was considering expanding the program.\20\ Program decisions
based on inaccurate or incomplete cost analysis can lead to program
failure, poor performance, or significant delays. Since we issued our
audit report, DHS has made substantial progress toward developing a
common flying hour program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System
Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of
Operations, OIG-15-17 (December 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance Measurement
DHS does not routinely establish meaningful performance measures
for many of its on-going initiatives and programs. Multiple audit and
inspection reports identify deficiencies in or the absence of DHS
performance measures. Our audits have identified costly programs that
DHS has not measured for effectiveness. Therefore, we do not know
whether the investment of taxpayer resources is a good one. For
example:
TSA has continued to invest in its Screening of Passengers
by Observation Techniques program without valid performance
metrics to evaluate whether the investment is yielding
appropriate results. In fact, 3 years after our initial audit,
we found that TSA still is unable to determine its
effectiveness.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Verification Review of Transportation Security
Administration's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques/
Behavior Detection and Analysis Program, OIG-16-111-VR (July 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's Streamline, an initiative to criminally prosecute
individuals who illegally enter the United States, had flawed
measures of effectiveness and did not capture an accurate
picture of the alien's crossing history, re-entry, or re-
apprehension over multiple years. As a result, CBP did not have
good information to make management decisions about widening,
maintaining, or constricting Streamline's parameters.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing,
OIG-15-95 (May 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the Department's critical functions is to protect the
Nation by interdicting illicit drugs headed for the United
States through air, land, or maritime borders; however, the
Department's drug interdiction performance measures did not
effectively assess the impact of its drug interdiction efforts.
We found that the measures were not outcome-based or did not
assess activities directly related to combating drug smuggling
organizations. In one instance, the measure could be expanded
to more accurately assess component drug interdiction activity
effects toward dismantling transnational criminal
organizations. This occurred because the Department did not
establish minimum standards for components to use in developing
effective performance measures. The Department instead relied
on components to develop and implement performance measures to
satisfy the Office of National Drug Control Policy priorities.
As a result, DHS could not measure whether its drug
interdiction efforts effectively support required National drug
control outcomes.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ DHS Drug Interdiction Effects Need Improvement, OIG-17-09
(November 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reliable and relevant feedback on program performance is critical
to ensuring the Department does not invest its resources on
unproductive, inefficient, or ineffective programs and initiatives.
These critical business fundamentals, unglamorous as they may be,
are part of any mature and functioning Government enterprise. The key
to a more effective and efficient DHS is to focus on these basic
Government business practices. DHS achieved its unmodified opinion on
the financial statements through concentrated hard work and attention
to detail at every level of the Department. Similar emphasis must be
placed on mastering the fundamentals of business management before the
Department can fully mature as a world class organization.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I am happy to answer any
questions you or other Members of the committee may have.

Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Roth.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Gambler for her opening statement.

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ms. Gambler. Good afternoon, Chairman, Ranking Member,
Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify at today's hearing to discuss GAO's work on DHS's
efforts to strengthen and integrate its management function.
Since 2003 GAO has issued hundreds of reports addressing
the range of DHS's mission and management functions and we have
made about 2,500 recommendations to strengthen the Department's
management and performance measurement, among other things. DHS
has implemented more than 70 percent of these recommendations
and has actions under way to address others.
GAO also regularly reports to Congress on Government
operations that we have identified as high-risk because of
their greater vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, or the need for transformation. In 2003 we
designated implementing and transforming DHS as high-risk
because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one Department
and the failure to address associated risks could have serious
consequences for U.S. National and economic security. With
DHS's maturation and evolution we have narrowed the scope of
the high-risk area to focus on strengthening DHS's management
functions, which include human capital, information and
Technology, acquisition, and financial management.
My remarks today will focus on two areas: First, DHS's
progress and remaining actions to strengthen its management
functions; and second, cross-cutting issues or themes that have
affected DHS's efforts to implement its missions.
First, DHS has made progress in meeting GAO's five criteria
for removal from the high-risk list. Specifically, agencies
must have: No. 1, strong commitment and top leadership support;
No. 2, an action plan; No. 3, the capacity, which includes the
people and other resources, to address the risks; No. 4, a
program for monitoring progress; and No. 5, demonstrated
progress in implementing corrective actions.
In our 2017 high-risk update, which we issued yesterday, we
found that DHS has met three of our criteria: Demonstrating
leadership commitment, and having a corrective action plan, and
a framework for monitoring progress. DHS has partially met the
other two criteria.
To help the Department in addressing our high-risk criteria
GAO and DHS have agreed to 30 outcomes across DHS's management
functions. DHS has fully or mostly addressed 21 of these
outcomes and has partially addressed or initiated activities
relative to the others.
For example, within acquisition management the Department
has made progress in validating required acquisition documents
for its major programs, but more work is needed to demonstrate
that major programs are on track to achieve cost, schedule, and
capability goals. Further, within human capital management DHS
has developed and made progress on implementing a strategic
human capital plan; however, DHS has considerable work ahead to
improve employee morale.
Second, we have identified various themes that have
impacted DHS's progress in implementing its mission functions.
These themes include leading and coordinating the homeland
security enterprise, and strategically managing risks and
assessing homeland security efforts.
While DHS has made important progress in addressing these
themes, they continue to affect the Department's implementation
efforts. For example, while DHS has made important strides in
coordinating efforts with homeland security partners in various
mission areas, our work has shown that DHS could further
improve its coordination and outreach in such areas as facility
security and critical infrastructure.
Further, DHS and its components have strengthened their
risk and performance assessments of various programs and
initiatives. However, opportunities exist for the Department
and its components to improve their risk and performance
assessment efforts in such areas as the adjudication of
immigration benefits.
As I close I think it is important to note that DHS has
made progress in addressing those issues that contribute to its
designation as high-risk. While this progress has been
positive, DHS needs to continue to demonstrate measurable and
sustainable progress in implementing corrective actions and
achieving those outcomes we and the Department have identified.
Efforts by the Department and Congress--through proposed
legislation and continued oversight, for example--are important
to helping ensure that the Department has the people,
processes, and systems in place to strengthen management
functions and address remaining challenges.
GAO will also continue to work constructively with the
Department. For example, senior GAO and DHS officials have met
routinely over the past several years to discuss the
Department's plans and progress in addressing this high-risk
area, and we plan to continue these efforts.
This concludes my oral statement, and I am happy to answer
any questions Members have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
February 16, 2017
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) on-going efforts to strengthen and
integrate its management functions. In the 14 years since the
Department's creation, DHS has implemented key homeland security
operations, achieved important goals and milestones, and grown to more
than 240,000 employees and approximately $67 billion in budget
authority. We have issued hundreds of reports addressing the range of
DHS's missions and management functions, and our work has identified
gaps and weaknesses in the Department's operational and implementation
efforts, as well as opportunities to strengthen their efficiency and
effectiveness. Since 2003, we have made approximately 2,500
recommendations to DHS to strengthen program management, performance
measurement efforts, and management processes, among other things. DHS
has implemented more than 70 percent of these recommendations and has
actions under way to address others.
We also report regularly to Congress on Government operations that
we identified as high-risk because of their increased vulnerability to
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation
to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. In 2003,
we designated Implementing and Transforming DHS as high-risk because
DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with major management
challenges--into one department, and failure to address associated
risks could have serious consequences for U.S. National and economic
security.\1\ Given the significant effort required to build and
integrate a department as large and complex as DHS, our initial high-
risk designation addressed the Department's initial transformation and
subsequent implementation efforts, to include associated management and
programmatic challenges.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, DC:
January 2003).
\2\ DHS also has responsibility for other areas we have designated
as high-risk. Specifically, in 2005, we designated establishing
effective mechanisms for sharing and managing terrorism-related
information to protect the homeland as high-risk, involving a number of
Federal departments, to include DHS. In our 2017 update, we removed
this area from the High-Risk List because the Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment and key departments and agencies, such
as DHS, made significant progress to strengthen how intelligence on
terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well as other
information, is shared among Federal, State, local, Tribal,
international, and private-sector partners. In 2006, we identified the
National Flood Insurance Program as high-risk. Further, in 2003, we
expanded the scope of the high-risk area involving Federal information
security, which was initially designated as high-risk in 1997, to
include the protection of the Nation's computer-reliant critical
infrastructure. See GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk
Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317
(Washington, DC: February 2017); High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-
271 (Washington, DC: January 2009); High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
07-310 (Washington, DC: January 2007); and High-Risk Series: An Update,
GAO-05-207 (Washington, DC: January 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2003, the focus of the Implementing and Transforming DHS
high-risk area has evolved in tandem with DHS's maturation and
evolution. In September 2011, we reported in our assessment of DHS's
progress and challenges 10 years after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, that the Department had implemented key homeland
security operations and achieved important goals in many areas to
create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential.\3\ However,
we also reported that continuing weaknesses in DHS's management
functions had been a key theme impacting the Department's
implementation efforts. While challenges remain for DHS across its
range of missions, the Department has made considerable progress in
transforming its original component agencies into a single Cabinet-
level department and positioning itself to achieve its full potential.
As a result, in our 2013 high-risk update, we narrowed the scope of the
high-risk area to focus on strengthening DHS management functions
(human capital, acquisition, financial management, and information
technology [IT]), and changed the name from Implementing and
Transforming DHS to Strengthening DHS Management Functions to reflect
this focus.\4\ Finally, in our 2015 high-risk update, we found that
DHS's top leadership had continued to demonstrate exemplary commitment
to and support for addressing the Department's management challenges
and that DHS had made important progress in strengthening its
management functions. However, we also found in our 2015 update that
DHS continued to face significant management challenges that hindered
its ability to achieve its missions and concluded that DHS needed to
continue to demonstrate sustainable, measurable progress in addressing
key challenges that remained within and across its management
functions.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work
Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/
11, GAO-11-881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2011).
\4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, DC:
February 2013).
\5\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, DC:
February 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2000, we published our criteria for removing areas from
the High-Risk List.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and
High Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, DC: November 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, agencies must have: (1) A demonstrated strong
commitment and top leadership support to address the risks; (2) the
capacity (that is, the people and other resources) to resolve the
risks; (3) a corrective action plan that identifies the root causes,
identifies effective solutions, and provides for substantially
completing corrective measures in the near term, including but not
limited to steps necessary to implement solutions we recommended; (4) a
program instituted to monitor and independently validate the
effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures; and (5) the
ability to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures.
In a September 2010 letter to DHS, we identified and DHS agreed to
achieve 31 outcomes that are critical to addressing challenges within
the Department's management areas and in integrating those functions
across the Department. In March 2014, we updated these outcomes in
collaboration with DHS to reduce overlap and ensure their continued
relevance and appropriateness. These updates resulted in a reduction
from 31 to 30 total outcomes. The 30 key outcomes include, among
others, validating required acquisition documents in accordance with a
Department-approved, knowledge-based acquisition process; and
sustaining clean audit opinions for at least 2 consecutive years on
Department-wide financial statements and internal controls over
financial reporting. Achieving sustained progress across the outcomes
requires leadership commitment, effective corrective action planning,
adequate capacity, and monitoring the effectiveness and sustainability
of supporting initiatives.
My statement discusses: (1) DHS's progress and actions remaining in
strengthening and integrating its management functions, and (2) cross-
cutting issues that have affected DHS's progress in implementing its
mission functions.
This statement is based on GAO's 2017 high-risk update report as
well as reports and testimonies we issued from September 2011 through
mid-February 2017.\7\ For these products, among other things, we
analyzed DHS strategies and other documents related to the Department's
efforts to address its high-risk areas, including analysis from our
past reports issued since DHS began its operations in March 2003, and
interviewed DHS officials. More detailed information on the scope and
methodology of our prior work can be found within each specific report.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance
with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO-17-317. See also the related GAO products list at the end
of this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs has made important progress in strengthening its management
functions, but considerable work remains
DHS Progress in Meeting Criteria for Removal from the High-Risk List
DHS's efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions
have resulted in progress addressing our criteria for removal from the
High-Risk List. In particular, in our 2017 high-risk report, which we
released yesterday, we found that DHS's continued efforts to strengthen
and integrate its acquisition, IT, financial, and human capital
management functions have resulted in the Department meeting three
criteria for removal from the High-Risk List (leadership commitment, a
corrective action plan, and a framework to monitor progress) and
partially meeting the remaining two criteria (capacity and
demonstrated, sustained progress), as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1.--ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING THE STRENGTHENING DHS
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS HIGH-RISK AREA, AS OF FEBRUARY 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criterion for Removal From High-Risk List Met* Partially Met** Not Met***
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leadership commitment........................................ X ............... ...............
Capacity..................................................... ............... X ...............
Action plan.................................................. X ............... ...............
Framework to monitor progress................................ X ............... ...............
Demonstrated, sustained progress............................. ............... X ...............
--------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................. 3 2 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of DHS documents, interviews, and prior GAO reports. GAO-17-409T.
* ``Met'': There are no significant actions that need to be taken to further address this criterion.
** ``Partially met'': Some but not all actions necessary to generally meet the criterion have been taken.
*** ``Not met'': Few, if any, actions toward meeting the criterion have been taken.

In our 2017 high-risk report, we found that DHS's top leadership,
including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security,
demonstrated exemplary commitment and support for addressing the
Department's management challenges. DHS established a framework for
monitoring its progress in its Integrated Strategy for High-Risk
Management, in which it has included performance measures to track the
implementation of key management initiatives since June 2012. In
addition, we found that since our 2015 high-risk update, DHS has
strengthened its monitoring efforts for financial system modernization
programs that are key to effectively supporting the Department's
financial management operations, resulting in DHS meeting the
monitoring criteria for the first time. We also found that DHS has
updated its Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management, demonstrating
a continued focus on addressing this high-risk designation, and made
important progress in identifying and putting in place the people and
resources needed to resolve Departmental management risks.
Congress also has taken a number of actions to support and oversee
DHS's progress in strengthening its management functions. For example,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a
mandate that the DHS Under Secretary for Management report to us every
6 months to demonstrate measurable, sustainable progress made in
implementing DHS's corrective action plans to address the Strengthening
DHS Management Functions high-risk area until we submit written
notification of the area's removal from the High-Risk List to the
appropriate Congressional committees.\8\ Similar provisions were
included in the DHS Headquarters Reform and Improvement Act of 2015,\9\
the DHS Accountability Act of 2016,\10\ and the DHS Reform and
Improvement Act.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Pub. L. No. 114-328, Sec. 1903(b) (codified at 6 U.S.C.
Sec. 341(a)(11)).
\9\ H.R. 3572, 114th Cong. (as passed by House, Oct. 20, 2015).
\10\ S. 2976, 114th Cong. Sec. 101(b) (as reported by S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Gov'tal Affairs, June 28, 2016).
\11\ H.R. 6381, 114th Cong. (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below we provide more detailed information on DHS's progress in
meeting criteria for removal from the High-Risk List.
Leadership commitment (met).--We found in our 2017 high-risk report
that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the DHS
Under Secretary for Management, and other senior DHS officials
demonstrated exemplary commitment and top leadership support for
addressing the Department's management challenges. We also found that
they took actions to institutionalize this commitment to help ensure
the long-term success of the Department's efforts. For example, the
Secretary of Homeland Security's Unity of Effort initiative helped to
strengthen the integration of DHS's business operations across the
Department by, for example, finalizing a management directive in June
2015 that formally establishes multiple senior leader forums for on-
going review of Departmental initiatives.\12\ The Secretary's Unity of
Effort initiative also established enhancements to DHS's budgeting
process by creating a new approach to mission-focused, cross-DHS budget
development and assessment. Senior DHS officials have also routinely
met with us over the past 8 years to discuss the Department's plans and
progress in addressing this high-risk area. During this time, we
provided specific feedback on the Department's efforts. According to
DHS officials, and as demonstrated through their progress, the
Department continues to be committed to demonstrating measurable,
sustained progress in addressing this high-risk area. For example,
during monthly leadership meetings with the Under Secretary for
Management, the Department's Chief Executive Officers for each
management area provide status updates on their respective business
function's efforts to achieve progress on outstanding actions that are
to be accomplished related to the high-risk area. According to DHS
officials, these meetings provide an opportunity to maintain leadership
support and accountability for making progress toward resolving
management challenges facing the Department. We concluded in our 2017
high-risk report that it will be important for DHS to maintain its
current level of top leadership support and commitment to ensure
continued progress in successfully completing its corrective actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ DHS, Secretary of Homeland Security, Strengthening
Departmental Unity of Effort, Memorandum for DHS Leadership
(Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2014). This memorandum committed to, among
other things, improving DHS's planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution processes through strengthened Departmental structures and
increased capability. DHS, Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort,
Management Directive 071-01 (Washington, DC: June 30, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capacity (partially met). In our 2017 high-risk report, we found
that DHS has taken important actions to identify and put in place the
people and resources needed to resolve Departmental management risks;
however, DHS needs to make additional progress identifying and
allocating resources in certain areas to sufficiently demonstrate that
it has the capacity to achieve and sustain corrective actions and
outcomes. Toward achieving the 30 outcomes we identified and DHS agreed
were needed to address the high-risk area, DHS has issued 10 updated
versions of its initial January 2011 Integrated Strategy for High-Risk
Management, most recently in August 2016.
Prior to the January 2016 Integrated Strategy for High-Risk
Management, DHS did not identify sufficient resources in a number of
areas, which could undermine DHS's efforts to strengthen its management
functions. For example, in June 2015, DHS identified that it had
resources and personnel needed to implement 8 of the 11 key management
initiatives it was undertaking to achieve the 30 outcomes, but did not
identify sufficient resources for the 3 remaining initiatives. In
addition, our prior work has identified specific capacity gaps that
could undermine achievement of management outcomes.
In contrast, DHS's January and August 2016 updated versions of its
strategy stated that it had addressed previously identified capacity
shortfalls in areas such as IT human capital management and acquisition
management, it had sufficient resources to achieve all 30 outcomes, and
it had self-assessed the capacity criterion as fully met. In its August
2016 updated version of its strategy, DHS also provided illustrative
examples of actions it had taken within and across its management areas
to demonstrate the Department's ability to resolve potential risks to
achieving the 30 outcomes, such as establishing a permanent office for
the Unity of Effort Integration within the Office of Policy to oversee
Unity of Effort implementation.
However, we found in our 2017 high-risk report that DHS needs to
make additional progress identifying and allocating resources in
certain areas.
Acquisition Management.--With respect to acquisition, DHS's
2016 staffing assessments focused on identifying critical
acquisition-related position gaps rather than all major program
acquisition-related positions; consequently, some programs were
assessed as being fully or almost fully staffed for critical
positions despite significant staffing shortfalls in the
overall program. We concluded that this increased focus on
critical gaps may limit DHS's insight into the size and nature
of acquisition-related staffing shortfalls, making it difficult
for DHS to develop a plan or process to address these
vacancies. In December 2016, DHS updated its staffing
assessment guidance to re-focus the assessment process on all
major program acquisition-related positions. However, DHS plans
to pilot the implementation of this policy update incrementally
during 2017 and the timing of full implementation is not yet
known.
IT management.--DHS's fiscal year 2015-2018 IT Strategic
Plan introduced the department's plan to shift the IT paradigm
from acquiring assets to acquiring services and acting as a
service broker. The Department's August 2016 updated version of
its strategy reported that this shift is a mechanism for
building capacity to resolve risk. However, while DHS issued a
workforce planning contract in July 2016 to help DHS
headquarters transition to the skillsets needed to accommodate
the service broker model, Department officials stated that they
have not yet defined what those skill sets are or analyzed the
skills gaps resulting from the paradigm shift. Because DHS has
yet to comprehensively assess IT human capital gaps within
headquarters, it remains unclear whether DHS has the capacity
to support this paradigm shift.
Financial Management.--Additionally, although DHS continues
to make progress toward modernizing its financial management
systems, critical information needed to determine the resources
required for two of three key modernization projects is not
available as the projects are not yet to a point where DHS can
determine what resources are required. We reported that the
discovery phase of these projects provides essential
information for determining the implementation schedule and
finalizing cost estimates that are needed prior to approving
the projects for implementation; however, this phase is not
expected to be completed for DHS's Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
modernization projects until April 2017.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The discovery phase includes an in-depth analysis of the
requirements and capabilities of the new system, also known as a gap
analysis, and is also performed to determine the feasibility of
implementing, deploying, and maintaining financial management services
for the chosen solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our 2017 high-risk report we found that DHS has taken actions to
address some of its previous capacity shortcomings and ensure that the
Department has the people and resources necessary to resolve risk.
However, we also found that additional progress is needed to ensure
that DHS has sufficient capacity not only to resolve risks, but to
fully achieve and sustain the 30 outcomes. As a result, we assessed DHS
as having partially met the capacity criterion. We concluded that DHS
needs to continue to comprehensively identify the people and resources
necessary to make progress toward achieving all 30 outcomes; work to
mitigate shortfalls and prioritize initiatives, as needed; and
communicate to senior leadership about critical resource gaps requiring
resolution.
Action plan (met).--In our 2017 high-risk report, we found that DHS
previously established a plan for addressing this high-risk area as
discussed above, and has continued to take critical, actionable steps
toward addressing challenges faced within the Department. As with prior
iterations, DHS included in its most recent August 2016 version of its
Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management key management initiatives
and related corrective actions for addressing each of the management
challenges and related outcomes we identified. For example, the August
2016 updated version of its strategy includes information on actions
DHS is taking for an initiative focused on financial systems
modernization and an initiative focused on IT human capital management,
which support various outcomes. We concluded that DHS's strategy and
approach, if effectively implemented and sustained, provides a path for
DHS to be removed from our High-Risk List.
Monitoring (met).--We found in our 2017 high-risk report that DHS
has met the monitor progress criterion as a result of steps the
Department has taken since our 2015 high-risk update to strengthen its
monitoring of key financial system modernization programs. DHS
established a framework for monitoring its progress in implementing key
management initiatives in the Integrated Strategy for High-Risk
Management. In the June 2012 updated version of its strategy, DHS
included, for the first time, performance measures to track its
progress in implementing all of its key management initiatives. DHS
continued to include performance measures in its August 2016 updated
version of its strategy. For example, to monitor progress made toward
strengthening the DHS acquisition process by improving the acquisition
workforce, DHS management continues to monitor the percent of its nine
acquisition certification policies completed--policies related to
program management, cost estimating, and contracting among others--and
the percent of required acquisition certification training developed.
However, in our 2015 high-risk update, we found that DHS could
strengthen its financial management monitoring efforts and thus
concluded that the Department had partially met the criterion for
establishing a framework to monitor progress. In particular, according
to DHS officials, as of November 2014, the Department was establishing
a monitoring program that would include assessing whether the projects
modernizing key components of their financial management systems were
following industry best practices and meeting users' needs. In 2015, we
concluded that effectively implementing these modernization projects is
important because until they are complete, the Department's systems
will not effectively support financial management operations. Following
the 2015 high-risk update, DHS entered into a contract for independent
verification and validation services that should help ensure that
financial management systems modernization projects meet key
requirements. We concluded in our 2017 high-risk report that moving
forward, DHS will need to continue to closely track and independently
validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions
and make mid-course adjustments, as needed.
Demonstrated progress (partially met).--In our 2017 high-risk
report, we found that DHS has continued to make important progress in
strengthening its management functions, but needs to demonstrate
additional sustainable and measurable progress in addressing key
challenges that remain within and across these functions. For example,
DHS established the Joint Requirements Council, an acquisition
oversight body, through which it has created a process for validating
capability and requirements documents, among other things. DHS has also
worked to improve the management and oversight of its IT investments by
establishing and implementing a tiered governance and portfolio
management structure. In addition, DHS obtained a clean audit opinion
on its financial statements for 4 consecutive fiscal years--2013, 2014,
2015, and 2016.
However, in our 2017 high-risk report we found that considerable
work remains as DHS continues to face significant management challenges
in key areas that hinder the Department's ability to meet its missions.
For example, we found that while DHS has initiated acquisition program
health assessments to demonstrate that major acquisition programs are
on track to achieve their cost, schedule, and capability goals, it will
take time to demonstrate that these initiatives will improve program
performance. In addition, DHS does not have modernized financial
management systems, which affects its ability to have ready access to
reliable information for informed decision making. It is important that
DHS retain and attract the talent required to complete its work--a
challenge the Department continues to face due to employee morale
issues. As a result, we concluded that addressing these and other
management challenges will be a significant undertaking, but will be
critical to mitigate the risks that management weaknesses pose to
mission accomplishment.
In the coming years, DHS needs to continue implementing its
Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management and maintain engagement
with us to show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing
corrective actions and achieving outcomes. In doing so, it will be
important for DHS to:
maintain its current level of top leadership support and
sustained commitment to ensure continued progress in executing
its corrective actions through completion;
continue to identify the people and resources necessary to
make progress toward achieving outcomes, work to mitigate
shortfalls and prioritize initiatives, as needed, and
communicate to senior leadership critical resource gaps;
continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk
area and periodically provide assessments of its progress to us
and Congress;
closely track and independently validate the effectiveness
and sustainability of its corrective actions and make mid-
course adjustments, as needed; and
make continued progress in achieving the 17 outcomes it has
not fully addressed and demonstrate that systems, personnel,
and policies are in place to ensure that progress can be
sustained over time.
We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in this high-risk area to
determine if the outcomes are achieved and sustained over the long
term.
DHS Progress in Achieving Key High-Risk Outcomes
As previously discussed, key to addressing the Department's
management challenges is DHS demonstrating the ability to achieve
sustained progress across the 30 outcomes we identified and DHS agreed
were needed to address the high-risk area. In our 2017 high-risk
report, we found that DHS has fully addressed 13 of these outcomes,
mostly addressed 8, partially addressed 6, and initiated the remaining
3. Addressing some of these outcomes, such as those pertaining to
improving employee morale and modernizing the Department's financial
management systems, are significant undertakings that will likely
require multi-year efforts. Table 2 summarizes DHS's progress in
addressing the 30 key outcomes and is followed by selected examples,
including recommendations that DHS should implement to strengthen its
management functions.

GAO ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING KEY OUTCOMES, AS OF FEBRUARY 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fully Mostly Partially
Key management function addressed* addressed** addressed*** Initiated**** Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acquisition management........................ 2 2 1 ............. 5
Information technology management............. 3 3 ............ ............. 6
Financial management.......................... 2 ........... 3 3 8
Human capital management...................... 3 3 1 ............. 7
Management integration........................ 3 ........... 1 ............. 4
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 13 8 6 3 30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of DHS documents, interviews, and prior GAO reports. GAO-17-409T.
* ``Fully addressed'': Outcome is fully addressed.
** ``Mostly addressed'': Progress is significant and a small amount of work remains.
*** ``Partially addressed'': Progress is measurable, but significant work remains.
**** ``Initiated'': Activities have been initiated to address the outcome, but it is too early to report
progress.

Acquisition Management.--In our 2017 high-risk report we found that
DHS has fully addressed two of the five acquisition management
outcomes, mostly addressed two outcomes, and partially addressed the
remaining outcome. For example, we reported that DHS has validated the
required acquisition documentation for all of its major acquisition
programs, and plans to continue to ensure that all major acquisition
programs have approved acquisition program baselines and to use a pre-
Acquisition Review Board checklist to confirm that programs have all
required documentation for Acquisition Decision Events. In addition,
DHS has taken a number of recent actions to establish and operate the
Joint Requirements Council. These actions include: (1) Establishing a
process for validating capability and requirements documents, and (2)
piloting a joint assessment of requirements process that is intended to
eventually inform the Department's budget decisions. We also found that
DHS continues to assess and address whether appropriate numbers of
trained acquisition personnel are in place at the Department and
component levels.
Further, we reported in March 2016 that 11 of the 25 major DHS
acquisition programs we reviewed remained on track to meet their
current schedule and cost goals, while 8 experienced schedule slips,
cost growth, or both.\14\ We found that major milestone dates for these
programs slipped an average of 11 months, and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
increased by a total of $1.7 billion. In our 2017 high-risk report we
found that DHS has initiated acquisition program health assessments to
report to senior DHS management the status of major acquisition
programs toward achieving cost, schedule, and capability goals;
however, it will take time to demonstrate that such initiatives are
improving program performance. In March 2016, we also reported that DHS
leadership was taking steps to improve the affordability of its major
acquisition portfolio, and that 14 of the 25 programs we reviewed had
funding plans covering at least 93 percent of their estimated costs
through fiscal year 2020.\15\ However, we found that DHS guidance does
not require components to quantify cost estimates, funding streams, and
the monetary value of proposed tradeoffs, and that it was uncertain
whether DHS leadership will assess the remaining programs in a timely
manner because the assessments are not required until major decisions,
which can occur infrequently. In our March 2016 report, we concluded
that without timely affordability assessments, the acquisition funding
plans presented to Congress are less likely to be comprehensive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The remaining 6 programs lacked Department-approved schedule
and cost goals at the time of our review (as of December 2015). See
GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management,
but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-338SP
(Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2016).
\15\ GAO-16-338SP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recommended in March 2016 that DHS: (1) Quantify information
when assessing programs' funding gaps, (2) conduct these assessments in
a timely manner, (3) communicate results to Congress, and (4) require
components to establish formal affordability review processes. DHS
concurred, and implemented the first recommendation by establishing
guidance for components to provide detailed information about available
funding and any associated shortfalls. DHS also has efforts under way
to address the remaining three recommendations by requiring Department
components to submit key funding information annually for major
acquisition programs and ensuring all components establish formal,
repeatable processes for addressing major acquisition affordability
issues, among other actions. These actions, which DHS plans to complete
by April 2017, will address our remaining recommendations once
implemented.
IT Management.--In our 2017 high-risk report we found that DHS has
fully addressed three of the six IT management outcomes and mostly
addressed the remaining three. For example, DHS established and
implemented a tiered governance and portfolio management structure for
overseeing and managing its IT investments, and annually reviews each
of its portfolios and the associated investments to determine the most
efficient allocation of resources within each of the portfolios. We
found that the Department also made progress in implementing strategic
IT human capital planning goals that support the Department's IT
Strategic Plan. In this strategic plan, DHS shifted its IT paradigm
from acquiring assets to acquiring services and acting as a service
broker, or intermediary between the purchaser of a service and seller
of that service. However, according to DHS officials, this shift will
require a major transition in the skill sets of DHS's IT workforce, as
well as hiring, training, and managing staff with those new skill sets.
While DHS issued a contract in July 2016 for support services to
assist DHS headquarters in implementing this transition, Department
officials stated in September 2016 that they have not yet defined the
skill sets needed to implement the paradigm shift or identified what
skills gaps exist. Additionally, we found that DHS continues to take
steps to enhance its information security program. According to
independent auditors of the Department's financial statements, DHS had
made progress in correcting its prior year IT security weaknesses.
However, in November 2016--for the 13th consecutive year--the auditors
designated deficiencies in IT systems controls as a material weakness
for financial reporting purposes.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of
deficiencies, in internal control such that there is a reasonable
possibility that a material misstatement of the entity's financial
statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a
timely basis. A significant deficiency is a deficiency, or combination
of deficiencies, in internal control that is less severe than a
material weakness, but is important enough to merit attention by those
charged with governance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Management.--We found in our 2017 high-risk report that
DHS has fully addressed two financial management outcomes, partially
addressed three, and initiated three.\17\ Most notably, DHS received a
clean audit opinion on its financial statements for 4 consecutive
years--fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016--fully addressing two
outcomes. In addition, in November 2016, DHS's financial statement
auditors reported that one of four material weaknesses in its internal
controls over financial reporting had been remediated since our last
high-risk update. We found that DHS has continued efforts to improve
internal controls and expects that it will remediate the remaining
three by fiscal year 2017. As we reported, until remediated, these
weaknesses will continue to hamper DHS's ability to establish effective
internal controls over financial reporting and comply with financial
management system requirements. We found that DHS also continues to
make progress on three multi-year projects to modernize financial
management systems for selected DHS components. Specifically, DHS has
made progress on its U.S. Coast Guard modernization project, whereas
additional efforts need to be completed on its projects to modernize
FEMA and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement financial management
systems before DHS will be in a position to implement modernized
solutions for these components and their customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ As previously discussed, in March 2014, we updated the actions
and outcomes in collaboration with DHS to reduce overlap and ensure
their continued relevance and appropriateness. These updates resulted
in a reduction from nine to eight total financial management actions
and outcomes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, discovery phase activities to determine the
feasibility of implementing, deploying, and maintaining the chosen
solution are not expected to be completed for these two projects until
April 2017. Such information is essential for determining the
implementation schedule and finalizing cost estimates that are needed
prior to approving the projects for implementation. We concluded in our
2017 high-risk report that without sound internal controls and systems,
DHS faces long-term challenges in sustaining a clean audit opinion on
its financial statements and in obtaining and sustaining a clean
opinion on its internal controls over financial reporting, which are
needed to ensure that its financial management systems generate
reliable, useful, and timely information for day-to-day decision making
as a routine business operation.
Human Capital Management.--In our 2017 high-risk report, we found
that DHS has fully addressed three human capital management outcomes,
mostly addressed three, and partially addressed the remaining one. For
example, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed a human capital
strategic plan in 2011--which was revised and reissued in 2014--that
DHS has since made sustained progress in implementing, thereby fully
addressing one outcome.\18\ In addition, we found that DHS fully met
one outcome for the first time by linking workforce planning efforts to
strategic and program planning efforts. Specifically, DHS successfully
demonstrated the ability to conduct structured workforce planning for
the majority of its priority mission-critical occupations at the
Department in fiscal year 2015, and for all mission-critical
occupations in fiscal year 2016. To support this planning, DHS issued
its Workforce Planning Guide in 2015, which enabled DHS components to
apply a consistent and Departmentally-approved methodology, including
the use of standardized tools and templates.\19\ DHS also published and
implemented a Department-wide Employee Engagement Action Plan, which
DHS's components used to develop tailored action plans for their own
employee engagement and outreach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ DHS, Human Capital Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2015-2019
(Washington, DC: October 2014).
\19\ DHS, Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, DHS Workforce
Planning Guide (Washington, DC: July 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we found that DHS has considerable work ahead to improve
employee morale. For example, the Office of Personnel Management's
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey data showed that DHS's scores
generally declined in four areas (leadership and knowledge management,
results-oriented performance culture, talent management, and job
satisfaction) from 2008 through 2015. DHS has developed plans for
addressing its employee satisfaction problems and improved scores in
all four areas in 2016, but as we recommended in September 2012, DHS
needs to continue to improve its root-cause analysis efforts related to
these plans.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to
Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting
Action Plans, GAO-12-940 (Washington, DC: Sept. 28, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS also needs to continue strengthening its learning management
capabilities. Specifically, in February 2016, we reported that DHS had
initiated the Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT) investment
in 2003 to address issues presented by its human resource
environment.\21\ With respect to learning management, in February 2016
we found limitations resulting from nine disparate learning management
systems that did not exchange information.\22\ DHS established the
Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS) to consolidate DHS's
nine existing systems into one system and enable comprehensive training
reporting and analysis across the Department, among other things.
However, in our 2016 report, we found that selected PALMS capabilities
had been deployed to DHS headquarters and two components, but full
implementation at four components was not planned, leaving uncertainty
about whether PALMS would be used enterprise-wide to accomplish these
goals. As of September 2016, DHS had deployed selected PALMS
capabilities to one additional component and had plans to implement it
at two additional components in the first half of fiscal year 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ GAO, Homeland Security: Oversight of Neglected Human Resources
Information Technology Investment is Needed, GAO-16-253 (Washington,
DC: Feb. 11, 2016).
\22\ GAO-16-253.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Management Integration.--In our 2017 high-risk report, we found
that DHS has sustained its progress in fully addressing three of the
four management integration outcomes, and partially addressed the
remaining outcome. For example, in January 2011, DHS issued a
comprehensive action plan to guide its management integration efforts--
the Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management. Since then, DHS has
generally improved the strategy with each updated version based on
feedback we provided. DHS has also shown important progress in
addressing the last and most significant management integration
outcome--to implement outcomes in each management area to develop
consistent or consolidated processes and systems within and across its
management functional areas. For example, the Secretary's April 2014
Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort memorandum highlighted a
number of initiatives designed to allow the Department to operate in a
more integrated fashion.
Further, in support of this effort, in August 2015, the Under
Secretary for Management identified four integrated priority areas to
bring focus to strengthening integration among the Department's
management functions. According to DHS's August 2016 updated version of
its strategy, these priorities--which include, for example,
strengthening resource allocation and reporting reliability and
developing and deploying secure technology solutions--each include
detailed goals, objectives, and measurable action plans that are
monitored at monthly leadership meetings led by senior DHS officials,
including the Under Secretary for Management. Accomplishments DHS
officials attribute to the Unity of Effort initiative and integrated
priorities initiatives include the following, among others:
DHS's Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management
developed and implemented a policy directive to monitor and
track critical staffing gaps for major acquisition programs to
ensure that such gaps are identified and remediated in a timely
manner.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ DHS, Major Acquisition Program Staffing Management, DHS Policy
Directive 102-05 (Washington, DC: June 30, 2016). In December 2016,
based in part on our input, DHS subsequently updated its staffing
assessment guidance to re-focus the assessment process on all major
program acquisition-related positions. This will be discussed further
in our assessment of DHS's major acquisitions programs, to be issued in
March 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Science and Technology Directorate established
Integrated Product Teams to better link the Department's
research and development investments with the Department's
operational needs.
DHS strengthened its strategy, planning, programming,
budgeting, execution, and acquisition processes by improving
existing structures and creating new ones where needed to build
additional organizational capability. DHS has institutionalized
these reforms by issuing a range of Departmental management
directives and instructions.
However, as we reported in the 2017 high-risk report, given that
these main management integration initiatives are in the early stages
of implementation and contingent upon DHS sustaining implementation
plans and efforts over a period of years, it is too early to assess
their effects. We concluded that to achieve this outcome, DHS needs to
continue to demonstrate sustainable progress integrating its management
functions within and across the Department and its components, as well
as fully address the other 17 outcomes it has not yet achieved.
key themes continue to impact dhs's progress in implementing its
mission functions
In September 2011, we identified three key themes that had impacted
DHS's progress in implementing its mission functions since it began
operations: (1) Executing and integrating its management functions for
results, (2) leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise,
and (3) strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security
efforts.\24\ As previously discussed, DHS has made important progress
with respect to the first theme by strengthening and integrating its
management functions, but considerable work remains. Our recent work
indicates that DHS has similarly made progress related to the other two
themes of leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise and
strategically managing risk and assessing homeland security efforts,
but that these two themes continue to impact the Department's progress
in implementing its mission functions. Further, our recent work has
also found that by addressing these two key themes, DHS could improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ GAO-11-881.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise.--As we
reported in September 2011, while DHS is one of a number of entities
with a role in securing the homeland, it has significant leadership and
coordination responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland
security enterprise.\25\ To satisfy these responsibilities, it is
critically important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective
partnerships with its stakeholders while at the same time addressing
DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS
began operations, we reported that to secure the Nation, DHS must form
effective and sustained partnerships among components and also with a
range of other entities, including Federal agencies, State and local
governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and international
partners.\26\ DHS has made strides in providing leadership and
coordinating efforts. For example, in December 2015, we reported on the
efforts of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), an agency within DHS,
to collaborate with the General Services Administration (GSA) to
implement their joint responsibilities to secure and protect
approximately 8,900 Federal facilities.\27\ We found that FPS and GSA
have taken some steps to improve collaboration, such as drafting a
joint strategy and renewing negotiations to update their 2006
memorandum of agreement on roles, responsibilities, and operational
relationships concerning the security of GSA-controlled space.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ GAO-11-881.
\26\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, DC: Aug.17, 2007).
\27\ GAO, Homeland Security: FPS and GSA Should Strengthen
Collaboration to Enhance Facility Security, GAO-16-135 (Washington, DC:
Dec. 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, our recent work has also identified opportunities for DHS
to improve its partnerships, and in turn, improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of its operations. For example, our 2016 annual report on
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication identified strengthening FPS
and GSA collaboration as an opportunity for improving efficiency and
effectiveness.\28\ We reported that in December 2015, the two agencies
had made limited progress in agreeing on several key practices GAO has
previously identified that can enhance and strengthen
collaboration.\29\ Specifically, FPS and GSA had not fully defined or
articulated a common outcome or established mutually-reinforcing joint
strategies; collaborated in communicating existing policies and
procedures to operate across agencies and regions; or jointly developed
mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of their
related missions regarding facility protection. The incomplete
implementation of key collaboration practices leaves day-to-day
operational decisions to the regional and facility levels, a situation
that may result in inconsistent management practices and may increase
security lapses, putting facilities, tenants, and the public at greater
risk. Thus, we recommended that FPS and GSA take actions to improve
their collaboration by, among other things, establishing plans with
time frames for reaching agreement on: (1) A joint strategy defining
common outcomes and (2) roles and responsibilities. DHS concurred and
as of December 2016, FPS reported that it had begun to take steps with
GSA to resolve differences in agency opinions on security-related
authorities for protecting Federal real property. FPS also stated that
once an agreement has been established, both agencies would be better-
positioned to devise a plan with time frames for finalizing a joint
strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ GAO, 2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial
Benefits, GAO-16-375SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 13, 2016).
\29\ See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, DC: Oct. 21, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, in March 2016, we reported on Federal efforts to address
the risks of electromagnetic pulse or solar weather events--events
which could have a debilitating impact on critical electrical
infrastructure and communications systems.\30\ We found, among other
things, that DHS and the Department of Energy (DOE), the two primary
Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing risks to the
energy sector, had not taken action to identify key electrical
infrastructure assets, as called for in DHS's National Infrastructure
Protection Plan.\31\ We recommended that DHS and DOE collaborate to
leverage their expertise to review existing Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission analysis to determine whether further assessment is needed
to adequately identify critical electric infrastructure assets. DHS and
DOE concurred and stated that they intend to review the analysis by
April 2017 and increase collaborative efforts on addressing risks to
electrical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Agencies Have
Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks, but Opportunities Exist
to Further Assess Risks and Strengthen Collaboration, GAO-16-243
(Washington, DC: Mar. 24, 2016).
\31\ The National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides the
overarching approach for integrating the Nation's critical
infrastructure security and resilience activities into a single
National effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security
efforts.--As we reported in September 2011, risk management has been
widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for
homeland security, enhancing the Department's ability to make informed
decisions and prioritize resource investments.\32\ Since DHS has
limited resources and cannot protect the Nation from every conceivable
threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its homeland
security approaches and strategies. Our recent work has found that DHS
offices and components have continued to engage in risk management
activities. For example, in April 2016, we reported that DHS conducted
a risk assessment to characterize risks, threats, current and future
trends, and critical uncertainties that will most affect homeland
security in the 2015 to 2019 time frame for its second Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review--a comprehensive examination of the homeland
security strategy of the United States.\33\ However, DHS did not
incorporate all elements of a successful risk assessment for its
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Specifically, DHS did not
document how its various analyses were synthesized to generate results,
thus limiting the reproducibility and defensibility of the results. In
addition, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review describes homeland
security hazards, but does not rank those hazards or provide
prioritized strategies. We recommended that DHS improve its risk
assessment documentation and prioritize risks to better justify cost-
effective risk management strategies. DHS concurred with our
recommendations and stated that it will implement them during the 2018
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ GAO-11-881.
\33\ GAO, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Improved Risk
Analysis and Stakeholder Consultations Could Enhance Future Reviews,
GAO-16-371 (Washington, DC: Apr. 15, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, our recent work has identified opportunities for DHS
components to better strategically manage risks in various programs.
For example, in December 2015, we reported that DHS's U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ)
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)--the two agencies that
adjudicate asylum applications--have limited capability to detect and
prevent asylum fraud and that both agencies' efforts to date have
focused on case-by-case fraud detection rather than more strategic,
risk-based approaches.\34\ To help ensure fraud prevention controls are
effective and appropriately targeted, we recommended that USCIS and
EOIR conduct regular fraud risk assessments. DHS and DOJ concurred. DHS
indicated that USCIS was in the process of developing a risk assessment
tool and implementation plan for completing regular fraud risk
assessments, and expected the first assessment to be completed by the
end of fiscal year 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ GAO, Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address
Fraud Risks, GAO-16-50 (Washington, DC: Dec. 2, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2011, we also reported that limited strategic and
program planning, as well as assessment and evaluation to inform
approaches and investment decisions, had contributed to DHS programs
not meeting strategic needs or doing so effectively and efficiently.
For example, we reported that DHS had missed opportunities to optimize
performance across its missions because of a lack of reliable
performance information or assessment of existing information.\35\ Our
recent work has also indicated that strategic and program planning
challenges continue to affect implementation of some DHS programs. For
example, in April 2015, we identified enhancing oversight of FEMA's
Disaster Relief Fund as an opportunity to save millions of dollars.\36\
In December 2014, we found that FEMA's average annual administrative
cost percentage (i.e., the percentage of total costs devoted to
administrative costs) for major disasters had doubled since fiscal year
1989.\37\ To better control and reduce its administrative costs for
major disasters, we recommended that FEMA develop an integrated plan
that includes all steps the agency will take, milestones for
accomplishing cost reductions, and clear roles and responsibilities,
including the assignment of senior officials/offices responsible for
monitoring and measuring performance. In response, in December 2015,
FEMA developed and issued an integrated plan to control and reduce
administrative costs. In addition, in February 2016, Congress passed
and the President signed the Directing Dollars to Disaster Relief Act
of 2015 into law, which requires FEMA to implement an integrated plan
to control its costs and report on progress for the next 7 years.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ GAO-11-881.
\36\ GAO, 2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial
Benefits, GAO-15-404SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 14, 2015).
\37\ See GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities
Exist to Strengthen Oversight of Administrative Costs for Major
Disasters, GAO-15-65 (Washington, DC: Dec. 17, 2014). Examples of FEMA
administrative costs include the salary and travel costs for the
disaster workforce, rent and security expenses associated with field
operation locations, and supplies and information technology for field
operation staff. FEMA obligated $12.7 billion from the Disaster Relief
Fund to cover its administrative costs for the 650 major disasters
declared during fiscal years 2004 through 2013.
\38\ Pub. L. No. 114-132, 130 Stat. 293 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our other recent work has indicated that further strengthening
assessment and evaluation, including using reliable performance
information, would better inform DHS approaches and investment
decisions. For example, in May 2015, we reported on USCIS efforts to
transform its outdated systems for processing the millions of
applications for persons seeking to study, work, visit, or live in the
United States, into a modern system with electronic adjudication and
case management.\39\ We found that USCIS expected the Transformation
Program--which was started in 2006--to cost up to $3.1 billion and be
fully deployed by March 2019, which is an increase of approximately $1
billion and delay of over 4 years from its initial July 2011 baseline.
Further, we found the program's two key governance bodies had not used
reliable information to make decisions, and that a key change in the
acquisition strategy--the program architecture approach--was made
without information on the added costs associated with implementing the
change. In our 2015 report we recommended that DHS take actions to
improve governance and oversight of the Transformation Program,
including re-baselining cost, schedule, and performance expectations;
and ensuring that the two key governance bodies are relying on complete
and accurate program data to effectively monitor performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ GAO, Immigration Benefits System: Better Informed Decision
Making Needed on Transformation Program, GAO-15-415 (Washington, DC:
May 18, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS concurred with these recommendations and has taken some steps
to address them, such as approving a re-baseline of cost, schedule, and
performance to measure progress going forward; however, DHS needs to
take additional actions to improve its performance monitoring data and
strengthen management of the Transformation Program. For example, in
July 2016, we reported that cost and schedule data reported monthly by
the program office to the Department to monitor program performance are
not always accurate or present a full picture of the program.\40\ In
July 2016, we also reported on the extent to which the Transformation
Program is using IT program management leading practices and found that
key practices, including performance monitoring-related practices such
as ensuring software meets expectations prior to being deployed and
defining measureable development outcomes, were not consistently
followed. As a result, the program runs the risks that the system will
continue to face delays, that the functionality deployed will be of
limited quality, and that production issues will delay performance of
the system and the processing of filings for citizenship and
immigration benefits. To improve program management, in July 2016 we
made 12 recommendations, including that DHS review and update, as
needed, existing policies and guidance and consider additional controls
to help ensure it follows its own policies and leading practices--such
as those to monitor performance through the collection of reliable
metrics, ensure software meets expectations prior to deployment, and
establish outcomes for software development, among others. DHS
concurred and described plans to complete actions associated with the
recommendations by July 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ GAO, Immigration Benefits System: U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services Can Improve Program Management, GAO-16-467
(Washington, DC: July 7, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions may have at this time.

Mr. Perry. Thank you, Ms. Gambler.
The Chair now recognizes himself and offers for unanimous
consent to have Mr. Higgins, from Louisiana, speak out of turn
because he has got a time issue. If anybody has objection to
that? All right, so ordered.
Mr. Higgins, the gentleman from Louisiana, is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Inspector General Roth, thank you for your service to your
country, sir.
Ma'am, thank you for appearing, as well.
Inspector General, the Office of the Inspector General and
the Government Accountability Office has named cybersecurity as
one of the most serious and complicated challenges facing our
country and the Department of Homeland of Security. GAO
reported that the Federal Government, including the Department
of Homeland Security, needs to implement several cybersecurity
initiatives before it can be removed from GAO's high-risk list
report. Likewise, your Department reported that the Department
of Homeland Security needs to better oversee component
cybersecurity and privacy of sensitive information.
Cybersecurity is the warfare that goes on around us unseen,
and I am quite concerned about it, as are the Members of this
committee. Please share with us your view of where we are on
that after your efforts as inspector general. What can we do,
and is it being done? What can this committee do to help?
Mr. Roth. Thank you for the question. You note that it is a
very, very difficult task.
Really, for the Department of Justice they really have two
things. One, they have to secure their own networks, which is a
challenge and something that we have looked at time and again.
But DHS also has the obligation to secure the entire Federal
network, the so-called dot-gov network, as well as working with
States and private industry to secure their networks, as well.
So they really have three different tasks that they have to do.
With regard to the first task, they have been challenged
over time. I would estimate or I would assess that it is
improving and has improved in the last 3 years.
I think the cyber attack or the breach of the Office of
Personnel Management, in which all those personnel records were
stolen, really served as a wake-up call. So in the last I would
say 18 months there has been a cyber sprint, if that is the
right word to use, to try to secure the DHS networks in a
better way--for example, basic kinds of cybersecurity like two-
factor authentication, where you need a specialized card that
you plug into your computer as well as a password.
The Department historically had very low levels of
compliance. Now they are almost at 100 percent.
They still have a long way to go, though. For example,
there is a thing called an authority to operate, which is
functionally like a airworthiness certificate on an aircraft.
It is a certification by an objective person--in this case it
would be the chief information officer--that the system is
locked down according to Government standards. We have found
while that number has gone down over time--which is a good
thing, fewer systems are operating without an authority to
operate--there are still something like 79 systems within the
Department of Homeland Security that are not locked down.
So it is a constant challenge. Part of the challenge is
some of the I.T. equipment is simply old. They are legacy
systems that don't have the security built in.
So these are constant challenges that they have.
I know that GAO has done some work on, for example,
EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated, which is the DHS system that is
attempting to monitor the dot-gov networks, and I will let GAO
talk about that.
Mr. Higgins. Ma'am.
Ms. Gambler. Similar to the I.G., GAO has identified
challenges not just at DHS but across the Federal Government as
it relates to cybersecurity, and that is one of GAO's high-risk
areas. In fact, it has been on the list since, I believe, 1997,
and it is an area where we see not just at DHS but across the
board that there is, you know, need for additional attention
and progress.
With regard specifically to DHS, that is also an area we
have identified the need for DHS to continue to work to
strengthen its own information system security.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, ma'am. There seems to be a little bit of
a breakdown in just cyber communications. You had issued a
report in January 2016 that ICE computers and USCIS computers
were not communicating with each other, and that led to a lack
of arrests that should have been made.
You know, we are discussing the Department of Homeland
Security itself, and the computer systems, and the networks
being on a high-risk list. This is quite concerning, and I
would encourage my esteemed colleagues on this committee that
as we move forward we make it a high priority to focus on
cybersecurity.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentleman from Louisiana.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, the
Ranking Member.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Question for Mr. Roth.
Statements recently made by our President seem to indicate
a lack of appreciation and desire for an independent oversight
of the new administration. Question to you, sir: What would you
say to critics who believe that the Federal agencies can
operate without the work of inspector generals? Please explain
the importance of your work.
Mr. Roth. Thank you for that question.
Yes, I mean, I have been at this job for 3 years, and in
that 3 years I have seen a number of different agencies--for
example, TSA--in which we have done independent oversight,
reported those findings both to the administration but also,
for example, this committee and other committees within
Congress, and as a result of that have really changed the way
that they have done business. We can cite a number of examples,
for example, with regard to FEMA, with regard to TSA, with
regard to the Secret Service.
We are independent oversight--that is, oversight by our
office and by the GAO. But also oversight by Congressional
committees has assisted in improving operations.
So I am a firm believer that independent oversight is a
very positive thing for Government to be able to issue public
reports that sort-of shine the disinfectant of sunlight on
Government operations. I think it is extraordinarily important.
Mr. Correa. My further question would be, what do you
believe the impact would be if Federal programs were no longer
monitored by an independent organization such as yours, sir?
Mr. Roth. Well, I think the I.G. principle has proven
itself over time. I think across the I.G. community it is
something like a 17-1 ratio of--for every dollar spent on the
I.G.s we return $17 in savings. That doesn't include the public
safety and National security benefits, for example, that you
get in oversight of TSA or Secret Service, where there are no
monetary benefits but there are very real benefits to the lives
and safety of the American people.
Mr. Correa. Another question for you, sir. Switching
subjects, are you currently or do you have any future plans to
investigate allegations of Russian hacking in the U.S.
elections this past year?
Mr. Roth. I do not, no.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
I yield the remainder of my time, sir.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentleman from California, the
Ranking Member.
Chair now recognizes himself.
Mr. Roth, just looking at the--there is a whole range of
issues and 5 minutes is, as you know, clearly not enough.
Ms. Gambler, we could spend all day.
But let me just start somewhere that is kind-of close and
near and dear to my heart. I live in what is called the
Susquehanna Valley, one of the most flood-prone areas east of
the Mississippi. Looking at FEMA and the National Flood
Insurance Program, where I read that they currently cannot
systematically review information on claims by policyholder
types to reflect the risks faced by an individual property.
This means it can't--FEMA can't look at policy rates at a more
meaningful granular level and adjust rates accordingly.
Quite honestly, you know, with an organization that is
$17.5 billion or $18 billion in debt, you know, looking at the
FEMA map issue--I am sure you are well familiar--et cetera, and
the policies and the premiums put upon people in these areas,
it is fairly insulting. I am just wondering, you know, when
they could--if they had a database that worked that would
better adjust policy rates for policyholders.
Have you taken a look at that? Do you have any idea when
that is going to be addressed, that database, either one of
you?
Ms. Gambler. The National Flood Insurance Program, as you
said, is on the high-risk list, and one of the key management
issues we have identified with FEMA's oversight of the program
relates to the modernization of their I.T. systems to include
their claims and policy system.
I believe that, based on what is in our high-risk report,
that FEMA is moving forward to making some progress to--or is
moving forward to take some steps to address the challenges
that you identify, Chairman, and we would be happy to follow
back up with you and provide any information we have on time
frames for that.
Mr. Perry. OK. I would appreciate that when you can. Thank
you.
Since April 2016 USCIS has been accepting paper EB-5
applications, where then the adjudicators process them by
verifying applicant information by consulting several different
I.T. systems. But what I find interesting is the applications
are not scanned in and information that could be useful in
identifying program participants linked to potential fraud is
not required to be entered. It is not required to be entered
into the USCIS' database, i.e. the applicant's name, address,
and date of birth.
I am just wondering, you know, they say--I guess the plan
is that they are going to have something better in 2017, but
that is--there is 12 months. A month of that is already shot, a
month-and-a-half is shot.
Do either of you have any idea of when in 2017? I find this
to be an interesting issue, especially when you look at the
dollars that go with it and some of the other political
ramifications with the EB-5 program.
Any idea when they are going to get a solution set in 2017?
Mr. Roth. You know, we have looked at the ELIS system over
the course of a number of years. I think our first report was
in 2005 and we have done I think something like eight or nine
reports. It is very much a moving target.
We did a report in March of last year in which we set forth
what they believe some of their time lines were going to be for
introducing sort of automated reports, reports that would be,
in fact, scanned in and then cross-referenced. Those deadlines
have long since gone.
For example, they attempted to automate their N-400, their
application process, last year. It overwhelmed and functionally
broke the system, so they had to go back to the old paper-based
system while they figured out a new way to do this.
So I would not commit to any time line with regard to that
kind of improvement.
Mr. Perry. Certainly we are not asking you to commit. I was
just wondering if you knew, and I just think it is astounding
in 2017, the paper applications that can't be cross-referenced,
vetted, and aren't even scanned in--aren't even bothered to be
scanned in at this point. I just find that overwhelming.
Let's move on to something quickly, because time is of the
essence here.
Both OIG and GAO have reported on significant management
issues at DHS and its various component--operational
components. TSA's list of failures alone in acquiring effective
tools is astounding.
In your assessment--well, let me just go right to my point,
I think. What is the Department Secretary's role in overseeing
components' management-related activities? So you got all these
different agencies who were thrown together in a hurry. We get
it. It is hard. You know, they got their own processes and
systems.
We have a Secretary. In your opinion, each of you, what is
the Secretary's role? What is top management's role regarding
all the disparate organizations under DHS?
Mr. Roth. Certainly there has been progress made in the
last 2 or 3 years under Secretary Johnson's tenure in making an
acquisition process that is more rational. For example, they
have instituted the Joint Requirements Council, which is--in
fact, for the first time--an effort to look at DHS as an entire
entity and figure out what the joint requirements are for each
piece of acquisition.
They have also given more strength to the under secretary
for management to ride herd and do oversight over each of the
individual components within the Department of Homeland
Security.
I think most importantly, and what is very encouraging, is
legislation that Congress passed in December of this--of last
year that creates an under secretary for policy, which I think
is going to be a key role in figuring out how it is to make
these components, which historically have never worked
together, work together in a meaningful way.
So I think the--for the first time the DHS upper
management, including the Secretary, will have some authority
and some teeth to ride herd over the disparate components.
Mr. Perry. Quickly, Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
Ms. Gambler. Chairman Perry, we would say that top
leadership attention at the Department is critical to ensuring
effective oversight of acquisition, I.T., and other
investments. Across our body of work on investments and
acquisitions at DHS one of the key findings we have had is the
need for improved oversight and governance of those
acquisitions and investments.
That relates to things like the human resources;
Information technology system; the USCIS transformation
program, which Mr. Roth talked about. So across the board it is
imperative that top leadership at the Department is involved
and overseeing acquisitions and investments through executive
steering committees, through the Acquisition Review Board,
through the Joint Requirements Council, and so on.
Mr. Perry. So just to kind-of wrap it up, what it sounds
like to me there is no prohibition. This is top management.
This is the Secretary, et cetera, that is in charge, for lack
of a better term, of all this stuff, right?
To me, when you are in charge you bring your leaders in
from your disparate components and you say, ``What are your
issues?'' or if they are already identified, ``What is the
solution set? What is your time frame? Here is your report back
to find out how you have done, and then we go on from there. If
you don't complete that--and if you don't complete your mission
maybe this isn't your life's work,'' or something like that.
That is, I think, what we are looking for. I didn't see or
hear anything that you said that precluded that.
I will move on and yield.
The Chair would now recognize the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Barragan.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
This question is for Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth, it has been reported that DHS personnel,
including Border Patrol officers, faced a great deal of
confusion when the President initiated the Executive Order
instituting the travel ban on the seven Muslim-majority
countries. In fact, Members of Congress, like myself, showed up
at airports, were redirected, ignored, didn't get any answers.
This happened across the country seeking information.
Did anybody within your Department complain about the lack
of guidance that resulted from this Executive Order?
Mr. Roth. We have started an inquiry with regard to that,
an investigation as to CBP's implementation of the Executive
Order. It is really in two parts.
No. 1, how was the Executive Order implemented? What were
the communications like? How was it communicated? In addition
to the various court orders that were coming down at various
times during the implementation of that. Basically, how was the
Executive Order executed?
Then as a separate matter we are looking into specific
allegations of misconduct with regard to various CBP or other
DHS personnel. So that is on-going right now. We are conducting
interviews and looking at documents, and hopefully we will have
a report or some kind of conclusion in the near term.
Ms. Barragan. Do you know if any--do you happen to know if
any employees complained about the roll-out?
Mr. Roth. As I said, right now it is on-going so we are
getting the kinds of information that ultimately we will be
able to report out, but I don't have any information to share
at this point.
Ms. Barragan. OK. Do you have any information on what this
may have done to employee morale?
We heard a minute ago Ms. Gambler talk about the need to
increase employee morale. Do you have any information on what
the--what I call the botched roll-out of this may have done to
employee morale?
Mr. Roth. I do not at this point. As I said, we will
continue to look at this issue and then hopefully we will have
some answers for everyone.
Ms. Barragan. OK.
I wanted to follow up on what one of my colleagues was
asking about earlier. My understanding is Secretary Kelly and
President Trump have contradictory viewpoints on the role of
the Office of the Inspector General and Government
Accountability Office. You know, e-mails from the Trump
transition team instructed the transition team leaders to,
``reach out and inform the inspectors general and their agents
that they are being held over on a temporary basis,'' and that
they should seek out other employment.
Inspector general by tradition have been open-ended
appointments, regardless of party that controls the White
House. Do you plan on investigating how these sudden and
unprecedented changes in authority are impacting the Department
of Homeland Security?
Mr. Roth. I am not. I received one of those calls prior to
the transition. That got worked out to my satisfaction. I was
told that, in fact, I would be allowed to stay. As far as I am
concerned, I am moving forward in the kind of aggressive,
independent oversight that I have done in the last 3 years.
So I don't have any intention of investigating that. As far
as I am concerned, it is over.
Ms. Barragan. OK. My understanding was you testified a
minute ago about how Congressional oversight has been important
in helping the efficiency at DHS. Is that correct?
Mr. Roth. Yes, absolutely.
Ms. Barragan. So I really appreciate that you said that
because I cannot think of a more important time on them needing
Congressional oversight than with this administration. I
sometimes feel as though we get an order and the President is
challenging that somebody go tell him he can't do something, as
opposed to consulting in advance and making sure it is
something that can be done.
Do you have any thoughts on this theory that maybe
Congress--in particular, this committee, Homeland Security--
should hold hearings after Executive Orders are conducted
within maybe 15 days?
Mr. Roth. I can only reflect on my own experience, which
has been, you know, examination of the programs and operations
of DHS by both Congress and the inspector general is a healthy
thing. That is the only thing I can talk about.
Ms. Barragan. Ms. Gambler is there anything you would like
to add?
Ms. Gambler. I think we would just add, as it relates
specifically to the high-risk list, for example, our
comptroller general testified yesterday with the issuance of
the high-risk reports and just talked about the helpful role
that Congress can play in holding hearings and conducting
oversight related to, like, the high-risk areas, for example.
Ms. Barragan. Great. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentlelady.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Ratcliffe, the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start out, follow up on the line of questioning
by my colleague from Louisiana, Congressman Higgins, on the
issue of cybersecurity. It is certainly not a surprise, I
think, to any of us that both OIG and GAO have named
cybersecurity as one of the most serious challenges that DHS
faces.
As the Chairman of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Protection Subcommittee I am of the opinion that it is perhaps
our greatest National security issue at this time. With all of
the focus on our physical borders, I believe that perhaps the
invasion of our digital borders presents a more daunting, more
pressing, and more difficult challenge for all of us.
I want to start with you, Ms. Gambler. I had the chance, in
preparing for this hearing, to review the GAO's high-risk
reports both for 2015 and 2017, where GAO recommended specific
changes that should be adopted with respect to the security of
Federal information systems and critical cyber infrastructure.
I noticed in there that you have got some 1,000 open
information security-related recommendations that are noted. I
am not going to ask you to prioritize those, but I am curious:
Does GAO plan to examine the relationship between the extent of
information security activities at each department and agency
and the associated number of information security incidents?
Ms. Gambler. So I am not GAO's cybersecurity expert. I
would be happy, sir, to take that back and get you a response
for the record.
Mr. Ratcliffe. OK. Well, I guess the reason I ask the
question is sometimes it is easy to identify the problem but we
need to be helpful in terms of providing solutions. It would
seem to me that that would provide a valuable performance
metric by which DHS might be able to approach some of these
challenges.
Ms. Gambler. I would be happy to take that back, sir.
Mr. Ratcliffe. OK.
I didn't see it in the report, but are there any current
practices for obtaining metrics in the cybersecurity are that
you think that DHS ought to consider? Or is that something you
would just prefer to circle back on?
Ms. Gambler. We can definitely circle back and get you some
specifics for the record, but we--I would say, as I had
reflected earlier, that it is also important for DHS to focus
on its own information system securities, as well, and so that
is an important piece of identifying some of the high-risk
areas that we have identified.
Mr. Ratcliffe. OK.
I am going to shift to the inspector general here in a
second, but--because I heard him mention--you mentioned the six
challenges, and you mentioned cybersecurity as one of them. I
want to know if you prioritize those at all.
But before I do I want to give, Ms. Gambler, you a chance.
Was any prioritization done with respect to where DHS, from the
GAO's perspective, is weakest with respect to its management at
this point in time?
Ms. Gambler. In terms of overall management, we would
identify three key areas where we think DHS needs to focus its
attention. One is in acquisition management, to ensure that its
programs are on track to meet cost, schedule, and performance
expectations; No. 2, within the financial management area DHS
needs to give attention to modernizing its financial management
systems and making more progress there; and then No. 3, within
the area of human capital management we would like to see DHS
focus a little more on addressing employee morale issues.
Mr. Ratcliffe. OK. So thank you.
Inspector General, let me give you a chance to comment on
my question, in terms of prioritization.
Mr. Roth. Well, certainly it has been a priority for us to
ensure that we take a look at how DHS is handling its own
networks, both its Classified networks and its normal sort-of
Sensitive but Unclassified networks. We do every year the
Congressionally-mandated annual review, the FISMA, Federal
Information Security Management Act review, and we are able to
sort-of log exactly how the Department is doing every year.
I would say that for--last year there was a fairly
significant improvement, but in years previous it was sort-of
plateaued or in a rut. So I really do think that the--there was
a sense of urgency in the last year that probably hadn't been
present before. I look back at some of the high-profile hacks,
for example, the one at OPM that I think created a sense of
urgency within OMB that then drove it down into the various
departments.
So I would give them better marks this year than I have in
the past, but there is still a long way to go.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Terrific.
I see my time is expired, but I do want to relay to the
inspector general there was some speculation here about your
tenure, the length of your tenure. I did want to state for the
record that I wanted to commend you for your performance,
whatever your tenure may be in your respective role. Oversight
has at times been a challenge over the last couple of years,
but in terms of your oversight with respect to DHS and this
committee, I have nothing but praise for you and I have heard
nothing but praise for you from other Members of this
committee. So I thank you for your service and hope that it is
a continued service.
Mr. Roth. Thank you for that.
Mr. Ratcliffe. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Roth. Thank you.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentleman from Texas.
The Chair thank--correction, the Chair recognizes the
gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Roth, just minutes ago the President defended leaks
that we saw during the campaign season and condemned leaks
since he was sworn in. I think everyone on this committee has
long valued the role that whistleblowers play in protecting the
Federal Government from waste, fraud, abuse, inefficiency,
mismanagement.
But we have heard several members of the administration,
including the President himself, complain about what he calls
``leaks'' from within Federal agencies. What concerns me about
this--and this is my question to you--is it is not just an
issue of semantics; it is not ``I say leaks, you say
whistleblower.''
This rhetoric by the President of the United States, I
believe, can have a chilling--could have a chilling effect on
whistleblowers in--I am speaking here specifically within DHS,
but anywhere, for that matter, in any Federal agency, from
coming forward when they see something that is not right.
Now, I know that--and I don't know if you are speaking to
any people who were what I would call whistleblowers during the
rollout of the Executive Order, the travel ban, saying, ``The
place is a mess. We are not getting any direction. We need
help.'' How do you feel about this issue?
You know, whistleblower, leak--I mean, I think most people
would agree that if they were working for a Federal agency they
would worry about coming forward, especially when the President
is talking about these so-called ``leakers,'' they should face
criminal charges. So what do you say about that?
Mr. Roth. Well, it is never a leak to come to the inspector
general. Regardless of the level of classification of the
material, the Whistleblower Protection Act has a safe harbor
that any individual who is a contractor or employee of the
Department of Homeland Security has the right--and, in fact,
the obligation--to inform the inspector general of gross
mismanagement; gross waste; violation of law, regulation, or
policy. We encourage people to do that.
Just this week we sent an e-mail to all 250,000 or 235,000
employees of the Department of Homeland Security reminding them
of, No. 1, their obligation to report those kinds of things;
and No. 2, their protections under the Whistleblower Protection
Act, that they are, in fact, protected from retaliation.
We do have a very vigorous program in which we will
investigate allegations of retaliation. In other words, if
somebody appropriately blows the whistle--that is, discloses
information in the appropriate way--we will protect those
individuals from any kind of retaliation or personnel action as
a result of those disclosures.
Miss Rice. Well, I think that I would ask that you--and I
would echo what my colleague, Mr. Ratcliffe, said about your
performance. I would encourage you to make that known so that
people at least within the agencies that you--agency that you
oversee understand that and understand that they have a
protection even though there is a President who is saying
things that might indicate to the contrary.
You discussed challenges that DHS was facing in executing
the Executive Order because it, I believe, directed the
Department to hire an additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents and
10,000 ICE officers. Since you have recently finished an audit
detailing the DHS's slow hiring process, how is the Federal
hiring freeze going to affect this what you have already--what
you have determined to be an already very lengthy process--
hiring process?
Mr. Roth. As I understand it, the Executive Order exempts
positions that are either National security or public safety.
The Department has a process to determine basically position-
by-position what is exempted and what is not exempted.
We will certainly look at that in the course of our review
of this program.
Miss Rice. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentlelady.
We are going to try a second round. We are expecting votes
momentarily, but if we can do 3 minutes we are going to
proceed, and then when we have to end it we will end it.
So I will recognize myself for 3 minutes.
Regarding asylum fraud, the GAO reported that DHS's U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service's and the Department of
Justice's Executive Order--Office for Immigration Review, or
the EOIR, have limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud,
which GAO concluded may affect the integrity of the asylum
system. GAO also reported that neither DHS nor the Department
of Justice had assessed fraud risk across the asylum process.
Since this review was not completed by the last
administration it is safe to say that illegal immigrants who
provided fraudulent information to the U.S. Government may--
may--have been granted asylum. Does this point need to be--does
this point to the need for enhanced vetting of the asylum
applicants?
Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. Yes, thank you, Chairman.
In that report we made a number of recommendations to DHS
and USCIS to strengthen their ability to detect and address
fraud in the asylum process. Among the recommendations we had
were that they needed to do a better fraud risk assessment so
that they could, you know, get a sense of what the risk
tolerance is that you want to have in the asylum fraud program.
We also pointed to the need for additional tools for detecting
and addressing fraud in the process and the need for additional
training, among other things.
Mr. Perry. So do you know, then, does the DHS have plans to
review those risks or ones across the entire spectrum of their
process?
Ms. Gambler. DHS did concur with the recommendations that
we had in the report and identified plans to be responsive to
our recommendations.
Mr. Perry. Do you have any idea of the time line for
addressing a solution set? Has anything--that been fleshed out
yet? When can we expect an answer?
Ms. Gambler. Yes. They have been working toward addressing
some of the recommendations in the report. Be happy to follow
up and give you more specific time frames for the record.
Mr. Perry. All right. As you know, that is an important
issue, as well, so I would appreciate that.
Ms. Gambler. Absolutely.
Mr. Perry. With that, the Chair now recognizes the
gentleman, the Ranking Member, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Just a very quick question regarding the civilian hiring
freeze implemented by the President. As of February 9 specific
guidance has yet to be issued on how DHS will implement the
provisions of that hiring freeze. Given critical areas such as
our colleague from Texas was pointing to cybersecurity, any
thoughts on what this hiring freeze--how that will impact our
National security?
Ms. Gambler. We haven't specifically looked at that issue
yet. One of the things that we have pointed out, though, within
the DHS management high-risk area is that the Department does
need to do a better job of assessing what their human capital
needs are in a number of areas, including acquisition and I.T.
management. So as DHS moves forward in making those assessments
we would say that that would be an important part of the
consideration.
Mr. Correa. Just a quick follow-up question, Mr. Chair.
So we have got to go back and figure out what we need in
the first place and try to figure out where the holes are at?
Ms. Gambler. In certain management areas, yes, we have
reported that DHS needs to do--could strengthen its processes
for assessing the staff it needs.
Mr. Correa. Including in the areas of cybersecurity?
Ms. Gambler. Related to, yes, acquisition, I.T., yes.
Mr. Perry. Does the Ranking Member yield?
Mr. Correa. I yield.
Mr. Perry. So, you know, just in closing here, you know,
282 days to hire a Border Patrol agent. That is astounding and
I think that if most civilian organizations saw that, I mean,
most people aren't going to wait around for a month once they
provide application and know that they might be considered. I
mean, people gotta move on with their life.
I am hoping that you are going to provide some
recommendations for shortening that time line. I mean, even
half of that is twice as much as it should be. I mean, it
should be some reasonable amount of time.
But with that, I want to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions.
For my part, Mr. Roth, Ms. Gambler, we are always happy to
see you. Thank you for your valuable service and professional
service, and we hope we continue to see you long into the
future.
Members may have some additional questions for the
witnesses and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
remain open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

----------

Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for John Roth
February 16, 2017
Question 1a. This subcommittee has a long-standing track record for
proposing bipartisan management reform legislation to streamline DHS
bureaucracy. In January 2017, the House unanimously passed the Stop
Asset and Vehicle Excess Act (SAVE Act) aimed at improving DHS's
ability to manage its vehicle fleets, which was based off of a body of
important work done by the OIG.
What additional authorities are critical to ensuring the Department
improves its management functions to ensure that taxpayer dollars
aren't wasted?
Question 1b. Would legislation, such as that previously introduced
by Members of this subcommittee related to acquisition management, help
DHS improve management and outcomes of programs?
Answer. DHS OIG would support legislation that codifies existing
DHS policy and relevant offices relating to acquisitions; provides the
necessary authority for key personnel and mechanisms within the
Department to effectively manage major acquisition programs; reinforces
the importance of key acquisition management practices, such as
establishing cost, schedule, and capability parameters; and includes
requirements to better identify and address poorly performing
acquisition programs. In addition to the SAVE legislation, which we
believe would be very beneficial, the committee recently proposed
legislation intended to reform acquisition programs within DHS by
expanding certain DHS officials' authority and responsibility for
acquisition management, requiring DHS to develop a multi-year
acquisition strategy, and authorizing the Department to expand its use
of acquisition innovation.\1\ We support legislative efforts like
these, and believe they could have a beneficial impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See H.R. 1249, 115th Cong. 1 (2017); H.R. 1252, 115th Cong.
1 (2017); and H.R. 1365, 115th Cong. 1 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2a. DHS has not done enough to address chronic employee
morale issues across the Department, as both the OIG and GAO have
recently reported.
To what extent does DHS know what the root causes are behind poor
employee morale?
Question 2b. What risks does dismal employee morale pose to the
Department?
Answer. DHS is the third-largest Federal agency and its employees
serve a variety of missions critical to the security of our Nation. The
public relies on DHS to keep America safe, from ensuring the security
of the Nation's transportation systems to the security of our borders.
To achieve its mission, it is vital that DHS employ and retain a high-
caliber workforce. But low-employee morale and a dysfunctional work
environment have plagued the Department since its inception, negatively
impacting DHS's recruiting and retention efforts. DHS OIG has performed
work aimed at helping to identify for the Department many of the root
causes contributing to low morale. As we reported in November 2016,
these issues appear to be connected to challenges we repeatedly
identify: The Department's failure to develop, implement, and widely
disseminate clear and consistent guidance; a lack of communication
between staff and management; and insufficient training.\2\ DHS has
also had problems determining how to assign staff appropriately and
hiring and retaining enough people to handle a reasonable workload
while maintaining a work-life balance. At times, DHS employees' jobs
are made more difficult by the lack of needed support, such as useful
IT systems and up-to-date technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security, OIG-17-08 (November 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address these issues, Department leadership must sustain its
focus on addressing employee morale in order to fulfill its important
mission of protecting and securing our Nation successfully.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John Roth
Question 1a. Secretary Kelly has defended President Trump's
Executive Order (EO) on immigration, but stated before this committee
that he does not believe the roll-out should have happened so quickly,
specifically saying the EO should have been delayed ``just a bit'' so
that Members of Congress could be prepared. There are also conflicting
reports on Secretary Kelly's involvement with the EO prior to the roll-
out.
Please describe for the subcommittee how conflicting messages
related to the EO may negatively affect the DHS workforce.
Question 1b. In an agency already plagued with management issues,
is DHS leadership sending the right message when it comes to the EO and
its implementation, especially knowing many employees lacked clarity
and information about the implementing the order?
Answer. In response to Congressional requests and whistleblower and
OIG Hotline complaints, we announced in February 2017 that our office
had initiated a review of DHS's implementation of the EO, ``Protecting
the Nation from Terrorist Entry into the United States by Foreign
Nationals.'' The scope of our review is focused on the manner in which
the EO was implemented by the Department--from the time the EO went
into effect until it was stayed by Federal court order. The review will
address the effect on employees engaged in the work, but it is too
early to assess the broader impact on employee morale. At the
culmination of our review, we will provide a final report to Secretary
Kelly, the Congress, and the public.
Question 2. According to the DHS website, there are 54 positions at
the Department for ``senior leaders.'' As of February 9, 24 of those
positions are filled by individuals in an acting capacity, and 14 are
vacant.
Based on your research of the Department, what impact do these
vacancies and temporary leadership have on sound management practices
and reform efforts at the Department?
Answer. Our office has not done any work on the effect of vacancies
on the overall functioning of an office. However, based on personal
experience, I know it is important to quickly fill leadership
positions, particularly in a National security agency such as DHS.
Question 3. IG Roth, were you contacted last month by the Trump
Transition Team to discuss your employment status as inspector general?
When, if at all, were you made aware of the email circulated to the
transition team regarding the temporary employment status of inspectors
general?
Answer. I was contacted on the evening of January 13, 2017 by the
head of the DHS transition team and informed that I would continue to
serve as DHS Inspector General only on a ``temporary'' basis following
the inauguration. I was encouraged to look for alternative employment.
I received a subsequent phone call on January 18, 2017 rescinding the
earlier message and notifying me that I would be permitted to stay. I
learned of the existence of the email instructions on January 17, and
received a copy of the email from another inspector general shortly
thereafter.
Question 4. IG Roth, in the past the DHS workforce has stated that
they do not trust their management, particularly citing concerns of
retaliation. What areas should DHS leadership focus on in order to
restore faith in the DHS workforce?
Answer. The Department continues to rank last among large agencies
in employee engagement and continues to suffer poor employee morale and
a dysfunctional work environment. It is imperative that DHS leadership
take all steps necessary to strengthen esprit de corps. The Partnership
for Public Service has made recommendations to improve employee morale
and engagement within DHS, including:
Holding executives accountable for improving employee
morale;
Partnering with employee groups to improve working
relationships;
Designing and executing short-term activities to act on
employee feedback and contribute to a potential long-term
culture change;
Developing and committing to shared organizational values
and aligning agency activities and employee interactions to
those values;
Increasing transparency and connecting employees to the
mission, the Department, and their co-workers; and
Investing in and developing employees through leadership and
technical training and by providing mentoring.
Each of these steps requires a commitment from leadership, which
involves constant attention to measuring employee engagement and
implementing programs to improve morale. It also requires the
leadership to publicly commit to workforce engagement.
Beyond improving employee engagement, the Department can make
significant strides in restoring the workforce's faith in its
leadership by openly and actively supporting the important oversight
function played by the OIG with respect to whistleblower protection. We
have raised our profile within DHS as the entity to which whistleblower
complaints are reported, and with effective results. It is our duty to
protect these individuals from being retaliated against as a result of
stepping forward and we remain committed to empowering and protecting
agency whistleblowers. The Department has an important role to play in
supporting our work, from publicizing the OIG hotline, to training
supervisors and employees on whistleblower protections, to providing
complete and timely cooperation to OIG investigators, auditors, and
inspectors. The Department's unequivocal commitment to facilitating OIG
oversight--voiced from the top down--is a critical step in earning back
the trust of the DHS workforce.
Question 5a. IG Roth, please describe for the subcommittee your
role and responsibilities as it relates to oversight and investigation
of the Department of Homeland Security.
Can you please provide an example of information you uncovered
about the Department, which led to money being saved, an employee being
protected, and/or any other positive outcome?
Question 5b. What do you believe the impact would be to DHS if your
role were diminished in any way?
Answer. Inspectors general play a critical role in fostering
positive change in an agency. During my tenure as inspector general for
DHS, I have witnessed three agencies--FEMA, TSA, and the Secret
Service--that have had to confront the necessity of changing the manner
in which they do business. It is a wrenching process that no agency
would undergo voluntarily. Change in a bureaucracy happens as a result
of three things: A dramatic intervening event, followed by intense
scrutiny of agency programs and operations, and a resultant leadership
commitment to change. Independent oversight by both the inspector
general and Congress is a critical and necessary ingredient to
positive, constructive change.
For example, FEMA's approach to disaster response changed only
after Hurricane Katrina revealed the shortfalls in its operations,
consistent IG and Congressional scrutiny brought further analysis to
the problem, and the administration and FEMA leadership committed to
change the manner in which FEMA responded. As we saw in the Superstorm
Sandy response, FEMA has dramatically improved its response operations.
TSA was likewise confronted with the need to change as a result of
dramatic and troubling shortfalls discovered by our covert testing
program, as well as other OIG reports about deficiencies in TSA's
judgment of risk in relation to expedited screening, vetting airport
employees, and managing the access badge program. It was only through
IG oversight, oversight by this and other Congressional committees, and
TSA's then-new leadership strongly embracing the message, that TSA at
last publicly acknowledged the need for change and started the long
road to becoming a more effective organization.
Finally, the well-publicized protective failures by the Secret
Service resulted in hearings and investigations by Congress, by my
office, and by the independent Protective Mission Panel. This oversight
resulted in an excruciating process of examination and self-
examination, which is by no means over, about the manner in which the
Secret Service does business. As a result, the Secret Service has taken
steps to fix some of the systemic issues that have plagued the agency
over time.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the
Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel, OIG-17-10 (November
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oversight makes Government better and fosters positive change. The
critical and skeptical review of programs and operations, both by the
inspectors general and by Congressional oversight committees, acts as
the ``disinfectant of sunlight'' to ensure a more efficient Government.
It works in conjunction with the Inspector General Act's requirement
that IGs keep Congress fully and currently informed of problems,
abuses, and deficiencies within the Department.
Moreover, our efforts to promote efficiency and ferret out fraud,
waste, and abuse help streamline DHS programs and operations, prevent
wasteful spending, and ensure that DHS operates efficiently,
effectively, and with integrity. Any diminishment of our work can be
expected to result in an increase in program inefficiency and
ineffectiveness.
Question 6a. What work does the OIG have planned to audit
activities in the area of ``Unity of Effort'' and employee morale and
engagement, whether Department-wide or specific to a DHS component,
during 2017?
What types of management and performance audits, if any, does the
OIG typically conduct in the period of transition to a new
administration and what are examples of such audits currently under way
or planned?
Question 6b. What concerns should the subcommittee be aware of as
it relates to a change in administration, particularly regarding
employee morale?
Answer. In 2017, a portion of our work will focus on DHS's
acquisition management, an area where increased ``Unity of Effort''
would pay dividends for the Department. Since its inception in 2003,
DHS has spent tens of billions of dollars annually on a broad range of
assets and services--from ships, aircraft, surveillance towers, and
nuclear detection equipment to IT systems for financial management and
human resources. However, the Department's lack of uniform policies and
procedures, a dedicated core of acquisition professionals, as well as
component commitment to adhere to Departmental acquisition guidance,
adequately define requirements, develop performance measures, and
dedicate sufficient resources to contract oversight has resulted in
inefficiencies and wasteful spending. In 2017, our audit work will
evaluate DHS's progress in the area of acquisition management, with an
emphasis on ``Unity of Effort.'' For instance, we have opened an audit
to determine whether the Department and its components effectively
identify capability needs for all levels of acquisitions prior to
obtaining goods and services.
Beyond acquisition management, our work in 2017 will look at
``Unity of Effort'' in other areas as well. For instance, we have on-
going work to determine whether DHS fosters collaboration and unity of
effort Department-wide to enforce and administer immigration policy. We
are also evaluating the extent to which DHS's Joint Task Forces
effectively coordinate DHS assets and personnel, and whether they
achieve expected results.
With a new administration, the Department will face new
responsibilities. We understand the significant investment the
Department will be making to satisfy its obligations under the multiple
President Executive Orders. We are currently finalizing a report that
will address lessons learned from the Department's prior Secure Border
Initiative and other relevant acquisitions related to securing our
borders. We expect to issue this report in early April. Subsequently,
we plan to review U.S. Customs and Border Protection's comprehensive
study of the security of the Southern Border that the Executive Order
requires be completed within 180 days of the date of the Executive
Order. Future audits will address the planning, designing,
acquisitions, and construction phases of the Southern Border barrier.
Similarly, the Department will face a number of challenges in
executing the President's Executive Orders directing the Department to
hire an additional 5,000 Border Patrol Agents and 10,000 immigration
officers. As with the acquisition area, I have initiated the first in a
series of audits to further review the Department's human capital
strategies and management capabilities to ensure the Department can
quickly and effectively hire a highly-qualified and diverse workforce.
Our first engagement will compile and review open-source literature,
other government reports, and prior work of our office to help the
Department and its components avoid previously-identified poor
management practices and their negative impacts. Subsequent audits will
address the collateral impact hiring 15,000 agents and officers will
have not only on other Departmental components, but also on other
Federal agencies.
Question 7. IG Roth, in your November 2016 report on DHS
Management, you state that in the last 3 years, DHS leadership has
taken positive steps to forge multiple components into a single
organization. Further, you state new policies and directives have been
created to ensure cohesive planning and execution, including ensuring a
joint requirements process. What role do you feel these new programs
and initiatives, such has Unity of Effort, have in the future of the
Department?
Are there any concerns the Department should keep in mind if the
new administration elects to eliminate these new programs and
initiatives?
Answer. I believe that the steps the prior leadership took to
increase Unity of Effort were very important, and extended over a
number of areas of the Department's operations. These have benefited
the Department and created efficiencies and synergies that would not
have otherwise existed. However, the key to maintaining these
improvements is constant vigilance and effort to ensure that the
Department moves forward as a single entity. To do otherwise will
result in a return to DHS consisting of a number of siloed
organizations, each operating independently of each other.
Question 8. DHS employee morale has been a major concern and focus
of this subcommittee. DHS improved in employee engagement and survey
participation this year, but still has a ways to go. What areas can DHS
management improve upon as it relates to bettering the front-line
workforce's morale, particularly at agencies such as TSA and the Secret
Service, which rank the lowest?
Answer. As I indicated in my answer to question 4 above, there are
a number of steps that the Department can and should take to improve
morale. The first is a public commitment from the leadership to
prioritize and promote workforce engagement. Next is a commitment to
fostering an environment conducive to high employee morale--i.e., an
environment where transparency, constructive feedback, education and
training, mentorship and sponsorship, and professional development
opportunities are provided and encouraged.
Question 9. The OIG, like the rest of DHS, is operating both under
a continuing resolution and a hiring freeze.
What has been the impact, whether realized or expected, of any
budget or hiring constraints on the capacity of the OIG to perform
management and performance audits?
Answer. Section 6(a)(5) of the Inspector General Act states that
inspectors general are to be treated as independent entities for
purposes of staffing and training, and OMB Memorandum M-17-18, Federal
Hiring Freeze Guidance, dated January 31, 2017, further clarified that
``in the case of an Inspector General's (IG) office, the Inspector
General is considered the agency head for the purposes of determining
which positions in the IG office are exempt'' from the freeze.
Exercising my authority as an agency head under the Presidential
Memorandum entitled ``Hiring Freeze,'' I have determined that none of
the OIG positions that are currently open are subject to the hiring
freeze given the critical role the OIG plays in ensuring that the
National security and public safety operations and programs
administered by DHS are run effectively and efficiently.
However, operating under a Continuing Resolution has hampered our
ability to grow to the level that the Department, OMB, and Congress
have deemed appropriate to allow us to accomplish our critical mission.
This level requires approximately 80 additional full-time employees.
Moreover, based on the fiscal year 2018 budget blueprint recently
released by President Trump, it appears that our budget is, in effect,
being cut to below fiscal year 2016 levels. This will necessarily limit
the amount of work we can do, which calls into question whether we will
be able to address many of the important issues this subcommittee has
raised.
The Brookings Institute's Center for Effective Public Management
has analyzed the financial impact on Government when OIGs' budgets are
cut and found that cuts to OIG budgets actually cost the Government
money and contribute to the Federal deficit.\4\ Notwithstanding the
President's budget blueprint, we are hopeful that Congress will approve
a budget that reflects the value and importance of the function we
provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ John Hudak and Grace Wallack, Sometimes Cutting Budgets Raise
Deficits: The Curious Case of Inspectors' General Return on Investment,
Brookings Institute (April 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Rebecca Gambler
Question 1a. This subcommittee has a long-standing track record for
proposing bipartisan management reform legislation to streamline DHS
bureaucracy. In January 2017, the House unanimously passed the Stop
Asset and Vehicle Excess Act (SAVE Act) aimed at improving DHS's
ability to manage its vehicle fleets, which was based off of a body of
important work done by the OIG.
What additional authorities are critical to ensuring that the
Department improves its management functions to ensure that taxpayer
dollars aren't wasted?
Answer. GAO has not identified any additional authorities needed to
ensure that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) improves its
management functions, but the Department should leverage the
authorities it has to continue its progress.
Question 1b. Would legislation, such as that previously introduced
by Members of this subcommittee related to acquisition management, help
DHS improve management and outcomes of programs?
Answer. While the legislation introduced, such as the Reducing DHS
Acquisition Cost Growth Act (H.R. 1294), would codify some actions that
are already included in DHS acquisition policy, such legislation could
also increase the oversight and accountability of DHS major acquisition
programs.
Question 2a. DHS has not done enough to address chronic employee
morale issues across the Department, as both the OIG and GAO have
recently reported.
To what extent does DHS know what the root causes are behind poor
employee morale?
Answer. In fiscal year 2012, we reviewed and reported on actions
DHS took to address the morale of its employees.\1\ We reported, among
other things, that DHS had taken steps to understand morale problems,
such as holding focus groups, implementing an exit survey, and
routinely analyzing the results of the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey--a tool that measures
employees' perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions
characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency.
However, we found that the DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital
Officer (OCHCO) and DHS components could improve their efforts to
determine root causes of morale problems. We recommended that OCHCO and
component human capital officials examine their root cause analysis
efforts and, where absent, add the following: Comparisons of
demographic groups, benchmarking against similar organizations, and
linkage of root cause findings to action plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to
Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting
Action Plans, GAO-12-940 (Washington, DC: Sept. 28, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of February 2017, DHS OCHCO officials and supporting
documentation indicate that DHS has taken some actions to incorporate
these techniques. Specifically, as of December 2016, officials provided
copies of DHS's fiscal year 2016 Component Employee Engagement Action
Plans that components tailor for their own employee engagement and
outreach. We reviewed the action plans and spoke with DHS OCHCO
officials to determine the extent to which the action plans addressed
our recommendation. Several action plans we reviewed included evidence
of utilizing the three survey analysis techniques we recommended, while
other action plans did not include evidence of utilizing some or all of
the techniques. For example, components whose action plans fully
address the recommendation include: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Components whose action plans partially address
the recommendation are: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). In
contrast, the National Protection and Programs Directorate's (NPPD)
action plan did not address any of the three survey analysis
techniques. According to DHS OCHCO officials, while OCHCO developed a
checklist that components could consult when creating action plans to
address employee survey results, senior management decided not to
require that components use the checklist in developing their action
plans as it may limit their freedom to develop their goals and plan. To
fully address the recommendation we made and thereby strengthen DHS's
evaluation and planning process for addressing employee morale, DHS
OCHCO officials need to continue to provide documentary evidence of
demographic analysis, benchmarking, and root cause linkage efforts
completed for components that have not fully addressed the
recommendation in their action plans. DHS OCHCO officials agreed with
our analysis and reiterated their efforts to fully implement this
recommendation.
Question 1b. What risks does dismal employee morale pose to the
Department?
Answer. DHS employee concerns about job satisfaction are one
example of the challenges the Department faces in implementing its
mission to protect the security and economy of our Nation. We have
previously reported that successful organizations empower and involve
their employees to gain insights about operations from a front-line
perspective, increase their understanding and acceptance of
organizational goals and objectives, and improve motivation and
morale.\2\ In January 2003, we designated the implementation and
transformation of DHS as high-risk, including its management of human
capital, because it represented an enormous and complex undertaking
that would require time to achieve in an effective and efficient
manner, and it has remained on our high-risk list since that time. In
our 2017 high-risk report, we found that DHS still had considerable
work remaining to address employee morale, and that employee morale
issues had contributed to management challenges that hinder the
agency's ability to achieve its mission.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-
03-120 (Washington, DC: January 2003).
\3\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While
Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, DC: Feb.
15, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Rebecca Gambler
Question 1. Cited in the high-risk report is the necessity for DHS
to identify workforce needs and address deficiencies within acquisition
personnel, who oversee and manage contracts that have become
increasingly expensive and complex. What impact do you anticipate
President Donald Trump's Federal Hiring Freeze Executive Order will
have on DHS's ability to remain consistent with this recommendation,
particularly regarding our ability to address areas of critical need
via the workforce?
Answer. GAO has not looked at the effects of the 2017 Federal
Hiring Freeze Executive Order on DHS's ability to assess and address
whether appropriate numbers of trained acquisition personnel are in
place at the Department and component levels. However, GAO has
previously reported on the effects of Government-wide hiring freezes,
and found they are not an effective means of controlling Federal
employment. In March 1982, we reported that because Government-wide
hiring freezes did not account for individual agencies' missions,
workload, and staffing requirements, they disrupted agency operations
and, in some cases, increased costs to the Government.\4\ Specifically,
we found that because such hiring freezes disregarded agency workload
requirements and did not cover all personnel resources used by the
Government, they created an incentive for managers to use alternative
sources of labor. Any potential savings produced by these freezes would
be partially or completely offset by increasing overtime, contracting
with private firms, or using other than full-time permanent employees.
We concluded that improved workforce planning and use of the budget as
a control on employment, rather than arbitrary across-the-board hiring
freezes, is a more effective way to ensure that the level of personnel
resources is consistent with program requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Recent Government-Wide Hiring Freezes Prove Ineffective in
Managing Federal Employment, FPCD-82-21 (Washington, DC: Mar. 10,
1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. GAO found that DHS components were inconsistent in how
they implemented the Department's acquisition management policy. The
example GAO presented in March 2016 involved the Coast Guard, which had
prepared incomplete funding plans. Has the Department indicated to you
how it plans on ensuring that all of its components fully implement its
acquisition management policy?
Answer. DHS components have continued to make progress implementing
the Department's acquisition management policy. For example, in August
2016, DHS approved the Acquisition Program Baseline for the U.S. Coast
Guard's (USCG) Medium-Range Surveillance program--marking the first
time all of the programs included in our annual assessments of DHS's
major acquisition programs have had approved baselines. However,
additional work remains to be done to effectively manage acquisition
programs. For example, in April 2015, we recommended DHS account for
all of the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding the USCG plans to
allocate to its acquisition programs in its annual reports to Congress.
DHS concurred with the recommendation, but the USCG has yet to take
action. Given that an acquisition program's O&M activities can account
for more than 80 percent of program life-cycle costs, DHS's continued
inability to account for all of the O&M funding the USCG plans to
allocate to its acquisition programs is significant. Until DHS
implements our April 2015 recommendation, this issue will continue to
obscure the size of the USCG's funding shortfalls and undermine DHS's
efforts to address the USCG's funding gaps in an informed manner. We
continue to monitor DHS's actions to address program affordability and,
at the request of Congress, have initiated a review to assess the
extent to which DHS has accounted for programs' O&M costs and funding.
Question 3. As the transition to a new administration continues,
what management and administration structures are currently in place to
enable DHS to continue with implementation of both the human capital
strategic plan and its workforce planning initiatives? How is GAO
staying apprised of developments related to human capital management
during this period?
Answer. In its August 2016 Integrated Strategy for High-Risk
Management--the framework DHS established to monitor progress and
implementation of key management initiatives for strengthening it
management functions--DHS describes steps the agency has taken and
plans to take to implement its human capital strategic plan and
workforce planning efforts. For example, DHS indicated the Department's
senior human capital leadership intends to continue to review the human
capital strategic plan on an annual basis to develop an operational
plan for the next fiscal year. The operational plan is to provide the
tactics and associated evidence of progress toward implementing the
human capital strategic plan. In addition, the August 2016 Integrated
Strategy for High-Risk Management states that senior human capital
leadership will provide on-going monitoring of the human capital
strategic plan through the Human Capital Dashboard--which provides
information on progress towards targets--and quarterly review meetings
to discuss measures, goals, and progress in implementing the associated
operational plan. With regard to workforce planning, in September 2016,
DHS officials indicated that DHS will continue to implement its
workforce planning model in fiscal year 2017. This model is documented
in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide and involves the following five
steps:
set the strategic direction, including linking the workforce
and the strategy, considering the scope, and determining the
workforce balance;
conduct a supply analysis, demand analysis, and identify
gaps in capacity and capability;
develop an action plan including strategies and actions to
address identified gaps;
implement the action plan; and
monitor, evaluate, and revise the plan.
To stay apprised of DHS's human capital management efforts, we will
continue to engage with DHS leadership through various means to help
ensure the Department maintains its progress in implementing corrective
actions through completion. Specifically, we will continue to:
Assess and provide feedback to DHS leadership on reports the
Department submits on its progress in addressing the
Strengthening DHS Management Functions high-risk area, which
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
mandates the DHS Under Secretary for Management provide to us
every 6 months.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
includes a mandate that the DHS Under Secretary for Management report
to us every 6 months to demonstrate measurable, sustainable progress
made in implementing DHS's corrective action plans to address the
Strengthening DHS Management Functions high-risk area until we submit
written notification of the area's removal from the High-Risk List to
the appropriate Congressional committees. See Pub. L. No. 114-328,
1903(b) (codified at 6 U.S.C. 341(a)(11)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hold quarterly meetings with DHS leadership to discuss the
Strengthening DHS Management Functions high-risk area and other
pertinent issues.
Discuss the results of our audit work within DHS's
management areas with DHS leadership.
Perform outreach to senior DHS officials regarding the
extent to which the Department has implemented our
recommendations, including those related to the Strengthening
DHS Management Functions high-risk area, to help ensure that
they are implemented effectively and in a timely manner.
Question 4. Initiated in 2003, the Human Resources Information
Technology (HRIT) investment is intended to consolidate, modernize, and
integrate the human resources information technology infrastructure at
DHS. Of 15 strategic improvement areas measured, GAO reported that only
one had been fully implemented. This subcommittee held a hearing last
year to get an understanding of what went wrong and to galvanize the
Department's reform efforts.
Please explain to the subcommittee the issues that the investment's
inefficiency continues to create for DHS and how the Department can
address those challenges.
Answer. The HRIT investment is intended to address the fragmented
systems, duplicative and paper-based processes, and the lack of
uniformity of data management practices within the Department's human
resources environment. According to DHS, these issues are compromising
the Department's ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its
mission. For example, according to DHS, reporting and analyzing
enterprise human capital data are time-consuming, labor-intensive, and
challenging because the Department's data management largely consists
of disconnected, stand-alone systems, with multiple data sources for
the same content. Additionally, according to DHS, the Department does
not have information on all of its employees, which reduces its
abilities to strategically manage its workforce and best deploy people
in support of homeland security missions. Further, based on its current
human resources environment, DHS reported that it, among other things:
is unable to support enterprise reporting of human resources
information and has data quality issues;
does not have enterprise-level employee performance
information available or standardized performance measures
across the components; and
incurs significant costs associated with maintaining seven
different systems for personnel action requests, and
experiences inefficiencies due to duplicative data entry into
multiple systems.
To address these challenges and effectively implement HRIT, DHS
needs to fully implement the 14 recommendations we had made in our
February 2014 report.\6\ To its credit, the Department has fully
implemented 3 of the 14 recommendations, including re-evaluating HRIT's
strategic improvement opportunities to determine whether they are still
valid and reflective of DHS's current needs and re-prioritizing the
improvement opportunities as needed to determine on which ones to focus
first. Going forward, the Department needs to fully implement the
remaining 11 recommendations, including
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Homeland Security: Oversight of Neglected Human Resources
Information Technology Investment Is Needed, GAO-16-253 (Washington,
DC: Feb. 11, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ensuring that the HRIT executive steering committee is
consistently involved in overseeing and advising HRIT,
developing a complete life-cycle cost estimate, and
updating and maintaining a schedule estimate for
implementation of the improvement opportunities.
Question 5. Can you please describe for the subcommittee your views
on the role of independent, impartial oversight of Federal agencies?
In your opinion, what impact would Federal agencies face without
the work of GAO?
Answer. GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its
Constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
ensure the accountability of the Federal Government for the benefit of
the American people. We examine how taxpayer dollars are spent and
advise lawmakers and agency heads on ways to make Government work
better. GAO is a unique Federal entity that can look across the
Government and follow Federal spending internationally and domestically
across Federal, State, and local government levels. In this role, we
continue to monitor and address the Nation and Government's most
pressing challenges. For example, GAO's ``Key Issues'' website (http://
www.gao.gov/key_issues) provides incoming Members of Congress and the
American people with quick and easy access to bodies of GAO work on
issues of critical importance to the nation, including collections of
cross-cutting work on the Fiscal Outlook, High-Risk List, and
Duplication and Cost Savings.
In fiscal year 2016, we documented $63.4 billion in financial
benefits for the Federal Government--a return of about $112 for every
dollar we spent--and 1,234 improvements in broad program and
operational areas across the Government. In addition, in fiscal year
2016, 73 percent of our recommendations were implemented by Federal
agencies or Congress, and 68 percent of the products we issued
contained recommendations.
Question 6. Ms. Gambler, please describe what you believe is the
most important area DHS can improve upon, particularly as it relates to
employee morale.
How does a change in administration, leadership, and priorities
typically impact workforce morale?
Answer. While GAO has not done work on how changes in
administration, leadership, and priorities impact workforce morale, it
will be important for DHS to consider employee morale as it works to
implement the new administration's priorities. As we reported in our
2017 high-risk report, DHS has taken steps but still has considerable
work ahead to improve employee morale.\7\ For example, in response to
our recommendation that OCHCO and component human capital officials
establish metrics of success within the action plans that are clear and
measurable, DHS officials have regularly provided us with copies of
annual component employee engagement action plans, most recently as of
December 2016. We reviewed the action plans and spoke with DHS OCHCO
officials to determine the extent to which DHS's action plans addressed
our recommendation. Our review in January 2017 indicated that two
components' action plans included clear and measureable targets.
However, several other component plans did not fully address both
elements. For example, components whose action plans fully address the
recommendation include ICE and NPPD. Components whose action plans
partially address the recommendation are CBP, USCG, FEMA, TSA, and
USSS. USCIS's action plan did not address the recommendation. To fully
address this recommendation, DHS OCHCO officials need to continue to
provide documentary evidence of improved measure clarity and
incorporate measurable targets in their action planning efforts for
components whose action plans do not support closure of the
recommendation. DHS OCHCO officials agreed with our assessment and told
us that they are planning to provide training to component officials
over the coming year to address action planning needs. We will continue
to monitor DHS's efforts to address our recommendation to help
strengthen employee morale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO-17-317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 7. Ms. Gambler, you note several improvements the
Department made, particularly related to Human Capital Plans. However,
some components, such as CBP have struggled to fully staff at the
allotted Congressional cap. It is also expected that the workforce will
need to further increase under the new administration. Has the
Department addressed staffing needs, particularly of Border Patrol
agents, in its Human Capital Plan?
How will the Plan need to be adjusted given the new
administration's priorities?
Answer. DHS's human capital strategic plan outlines high-level
goals and objectives that describe desired future states and outcomes,
but does not include specific plans to address CBP or Border Patrol
workforce challenges.\8\ However, as part of its workforce planning
process, DHS has assessed Border Patrol workforce capacity gaps, worked
to identify root causes for its continued challenges in meeting
staffing goals, and developed an action plan to address the priority
root cause it identified. For example, in fiscal year 2016, DHS
identified attrition as the highest priority root cause of its Border
Patrol agent staffing challenges, and identified actions, such as
utilizing pay and compensation flexibilities to incentivize mission
critical personnel to remain with CBP. Moving forward, DHS will need to
incorporate any changes in Border Patrol staffing requirements into its
workforce planning efforts, reassess capacity gaps and root causes, and
design an action plan that addresses the highest priority challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ DHS, Human Capital Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2015-2019
(Washington, DC: October 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 8. In his exit memo, former Secretary Jeh Johnson cites
the need for ``an aggressive campaign to improve morale and
satisfaction at the Department.'' Based on your review of the
Department, what are ways the new administration can continue the
aggressive campaign the former Secretary started?
What particular programs or policies did the DHS workforce seem to
take a particular interest in and/or respond the most positively to?
Answer. As we reported in our 2017 high-risk report, DHS has taken
steps but still has considerable work ahead to improve employee
morale.\9\ For example, DHS has implemented a Department-wide Employee
Engagement Action Plan, which DHS's components use to develop tailored
action plans for their own employee engagement and outreach; however,
to continue to make progress in addressing employee morale, DHS needs
to fully implement our prior recommendations to: (1) Comprehensively
examine root causes and (2) establish clear metrics of success with DHS
and its components' actions plans.\10\ By implementing these
recommendations DHS would be better-positioned to design action plans
that address root causes of employee morale issues and determine the
effectiveness of their plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO-17-317.
\10\ GAO-12-940.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, while we have not examined the particular DHS efforts
to which DHS's workforce has responded most positively, we have
previously identified key drivers and lessons learned for strengthening
employee engagement that DHS could leverage in its efforts to improve
employee morale.\11\ In 2015, we reported that overall, what matters
most in improving engagement levels is valuing employees--that is, an
authentic focus on their performance, career development, and inclusion
and involvement in decisions affecting their work. Specifically, our
regression analysis of selected Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
questions identified the following six practices as key drivers of
engagement, as measured by OPM's Employee Engagement Index: (1)
Constructive performance conversations, (2) career development and
training, (3) work-life balance, (4) inclusive work environment, (5)
employee involvement, and (6) communication from management. Further,
our case studies of three agencies also identified three key lessons
for improving employee engagement:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO, Federal Workforce: Additional Analysis and Sharing of
Promising Practices Could Improve Employee Engagement and Performance,
GAO-15-585 (Washington, DC: July 14, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any change must be implemented using effective management
practices, such as top leadership involvement, consistently
applying policies, creating a line of sight between the
agency's mission and the work of each employee, and reaching
out to employees and their labor union representatives, if
applicable, to obtain insights and inform efforts.
The Employee Engagement Index alone is not enough; agencies
must look to other sources of data for a complete picture of
employee engagement levels in their organization and its
components.
Improving engagement and organizational performance takes
time and does not neatly follow the survey cycle; change may
involve several efforts and effects are seen at different
points in time.
Question 9. Building the morale of DHS's workforce was a high
priority for the previous administration, including former Secretary
Jeh Johnson. How much more difficult does President Donald Trump's
Federal Hiring Freeze Executive Order make that challenge for the new
DHS Secretary General John Kelly?
Based on your research on human capital challenges at the
Department, what areas warrant particular attention and consideration
in order to maintain positive momentum with DHS morale?
Answer. While GAO has not assessed the Executive Order, it will be
important for DHS to consider its impacts as the Department moves
forward with its efforts to address employee morale. We have previously
identified specific actions that DHS should take as well as key drivers
and lessons learned DHS could leverage to continue to strengthen
employee engagement.\12\ In 2012, we reviewed and reported on actions
DHS took to address the morale of its employees and recommended that
DHS: (1) Comprehensively examine root cause analysis efforts and, where
absent, add the comparisons of demographic groups, benchmarking against
similar organizations, and linkage of root cause findings to action
plans; and (2) establish clear metrics of success with DHS and its
components' actions plans for employee engagement and outreach.\13\ As
we reported in our 2017 high-risk report, DHS must implement these
recommendations, among others, in order to make continued progress in
achieving the outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges
within the Department's high-risk management areas.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See GAO-12-940 and GAO-15-585.
\13\ GAO-12-940.
\14\ GAO-17-317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, in 2015, we identified key drivers and lessons learned
for strengthening employee engagement that DHS could leverage in its
efforts improve employee morale.\15\ Overall we found that what matters
most in improving engagement levels is valuing employees--that is, an
authentic focus on their performance, career development, and inclusion
and involvement in decisions affecting their work. Specifically, our
regression analysis of selected Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
questions identified the following six practices as key drivers of
engagement, as measured by OPM's Employee Engagement Index: (1)
Constructive performance conversations, (2) career development and
training, (3) work-life balance, (4) inclusive work environment, (5)
employee involvement, and (6) communication from management. Further,
our case studies of three agencies also identified three key lessons
for improving employee engagement:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ GAO-15-585.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any change must be implemented using effective management
practices, such as top leadership involvement, consistently
applying policies, creating a line of sight between the
agency's mission and the work of each employee, and reaching
out to employees and their labor union representatives, if
applicable, to obtain insights and inform efforts.
The Employee Engagement Index alone is not enough; agencies
must look to other sources of data for a complete picture of
employee engagement levels in their organization and its
components.
Improving engagement and organizational performance takes
time and does not neatly follow the survey cycle; change may
involve several efforts and effects are seen at different
points in time.
Question 10. Ms. Gambler, what is the single most important action
DHS can take to address the remaining two requirements to be removed
from the High-Risk List?
In addition, what is the most important action DHS must continue in
order to prevent backsliding?
Answer. In order to address the remaining two criteria for removal
from the High-Risk List and prevent backsliding, DHS needs to achieve
sustained progress across 30 outcomes that we identified and DHS agreed
were needed to address the Strengthening DHS Management Functions high-
risk area. In our 2017 high-risk report, we found that DHS has fully
addressed 13 of these outcomes, mostly addressed 8, partially addressed
6, and initiated the remaining 3.\16\ Furthermore, we found that in
order to achieve the 30 outcomes, DHS will need to make additional
progress identifying and allocating resources in the following areas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO-17-317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acquisition Management.--With respect to acquisition, DHS's
2016 staffing assessments focused on identifying critical
acquisition-related position gaps rather than all major program
acquisition-related positions; consequently, some programs were
assessed as being fully or almost fully staffed for critical
positions despite significant staffing shortfalls in the
overall program. We concluded that this increased focus on
critical gaps may limit DHS's insight into the size and nature
of acquisition-related staffing shortfalls, making it difficult
for DHS to develop a plan or process to address these
vacancies. In December 2016, DHS updated its staffing
assessment guidance to re-focus the assessment process on all
major program acquisition-related positions. However, DHS plans
to pilot the implementation of this policy update incrementally
during 2017 and the timing of full implementation is not yet
known.
Information Technology (IT) management.--DHS's fiscal year
2015-2018 IT Strategic Plan introduced the Department's plan to
shift the IT paradigm from acquiring assets to acquiring
services and acting as a service broker. The Department's
August 2016 updated version of its strategy reported that this
shift is a mechanism for building capacity to resolve risk.
However, while DHS issued a workforce planning contract in July
2016 to help DHS headquarters transition to the skillsets
needed to accommodate the service broker model, Department
officials stated that they have not yet defined what those
skill sets are or analyzed the skills gaps resulting from the
paradigm shift. Because DHS has yet to comprehensively assess
IT human capital gaps within headquarters, it remains unclear
whether DHS has the capacity to support this paradigm shift.
Financial Management.--Additionally, although DHS continues
to make progress towards modernizing its financial management
systems, critical information needed to determine the resources
required for two of three key modernization projects is not
available as the projects are not yet to a point where DHS can
determine what resources are required. We reported that the
discovery phase of these projects provides essential
information for determining the implementation schedule and
finalizing cost estimates that are needed prior to approving
the projects for implementation; however, this phase is not
expected to be completed for DHS's FEMA and ICE modernization
projects until April 2017.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The discovery phase includes an in-depth analysis of the
requirements and capabilities of the new system, also known as a gap
analysis, and is also performed to determine the feasibility of
implementing, deploying, and maintaining financial management services
for the chosen solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 11a. Ms. Gambler, DHS has struggled with the modernization
of its information technology systems. Did you evaluate any of those
programs during your review of the High-Risk List?
Answer. Yes, we evaluated and monitored eight of DHS's previously
or currently troubled IT investments as part of our High-Risk List
review. Specifically, we included the following investments:
1. Analysis and Operations' Homeland Security Information Network
2. CBP's Automated Commercial Environment
3. DHS HRIT
4. FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain Management System
5. ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
6. ICE's TECS Modernization
7. NPPD Federal Protective Service TacCom
8. USCIS Transformation
To monitor and evaluate these investments, we tracked their
respective Chief Information Officer (CIO) ratings that DHS reported on
OMB's IT Dashboard, as well as analyzed the results of DHS's internal
IT program health assessments. We also reviewed documentation
demonstrating actions that DHS oversight officials had taken or were
currently taking to improve the performance of the troubled
investments. Further, we relied on reports and documentation from other
GAO audits, such as our 2016 report on DHS's major acquisition
programs, to track the cost, schedule, and performance of these
investments.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ GAO, IT Dashboard: Agencies Need to Fully Consider Risks When
Rating Their Major Investments, GAO-16-494 (Washington, DC: June 2,
2016); Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management,
but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-338SP
(Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2016); GAO-16-253; Immigration Benefits
System: Better Informed Decision Making Needed on Transformation
Program, GAO-15-415 (Washington, DC: May 18, 2015); Homeland Security
Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to
Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2015);
and Border Security: DHS's Efforts to Modernize Key Enforcement Systems
Could be Strengthened, GAO-14-62 (Washington, DC: Dec. 5, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 11b. What are your suggestions for the Department to
finally get programs such as HRIT and USCIS Transformation on the right
track, both of which were initiated a decade ago?
Answer. To help get programs such as HRIT and USCIS Transformation
on the right track, the Department should focus on the use of
incremental development, consistent with Office of Management and
Budget guidance directing that IT investments deliver functionality in
6-month increments. The Department's use of ``big bang'' approaches,
which scope requirements broadly and aim to deliver functionality
several years after initiation, too frequently fail. According to the
Defense Science Board, such an approach--which DHS had used on programs
such as USCIS Transformation--is often too long, ineffective, and
unaccommodating of the rapid evolution of IT.
Additionally, the Department should focus on improving its capacity
to successfully acquire IT by fully implementing the CIO oversight and
management authorities described in the Federal IT Acquisition Reform
Act (FITARA).\19\ The Department should also promptly address the
numerous outstanding recommendations that we made to HRIT and USCIS
Transformation, which are consistent with FITARA.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Pub. L. No. 113-291, div. A, 831(a), 128 Stat. 3292, 3438-
3440 (2014).
\20\ GAO, Immigration Benefits System: U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services Can Improve Program Management, GAO-16-467
(Washington, DC: July 7, 2016); GAO-16-253; and GAO-15-415.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 12. Ms. Gambler, what impact do you feel initiatives such
as Unity of Effort and the Joint Requirements Council have on the
Department's management integration?
Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security's Unity of Effort
initiative and the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) are positive steps
toward strengthening management integration, but it is too early to
assess their effects. Specifically, the Unity of Effort initiative has
helped to strengthen the integration of DHS's business operations
across the Department by, for example, finalizing a management
directive in June 2015 that formally establishes multiple senior leader
forums for on-going review of Departmental initiatives.\21\ The
Secretary's Unity of Effort initiative also established enhancements to
DHS's budgeting process by creating a new approach to mission-focused,
cross-DHS budget development and assessment. Additionally, DHS
officials attribute the following accomplishments, among others, to the
Unity of Effort initiative and integrated priorities initiatives:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ DHS, Secretary of Homeland Security, Strengthening
Departmental Unity of Effort, Memorandum for DHS Leadership
(Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2014). This memorandum committed to, among
other things, improving DHS's planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution processes through strengthened Departmental structures and
increased capability. DHS, Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort,
Management Directive 071-01 (Washington DC: June 30, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS's Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management
developed and implemented a policy directive to monitor and
track critical staffing gaps for major acquisition programs to
ensure that such gaps are identified and remediated in a timely
manner.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ DHS, Major Acquisition Program Staffing Management, DHS Policy
Directive 102-05 (Washington, DC: June 30, 2016). In December 2016,
based in part on our input, DHS subsequently updated its staffing
assessment guidance to re-focus the assessment process on all major
program acquisition-related positions. This will be discussed further
in our assessment of DHS's major acquisitions programs, to be issued in
March 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Science and Technology Directorate established
Integrated Product Teams to better link the Department's
research and development investments with the Department's
operational needs.
DHS strengthened its strategy, planning, programming,
budgeting, execution, and acquisition processes by improving
existing structures and creating new ones where needed to build
additional organizational capability. DHS has institutionalized
these reforms by issuing a range of Departmental management
directives and instructions.
However, given that these Unity of Effort initiatives are in the
early stages of implementation and contingent upon DHS sustaining
implementation plans and efforts over a period of years, it is too
early to assess their effects.
Additionally, the re-establishment of the JRC after many years
without such an active body is a positive demonstration of senior-level
commitment to improving the DHS-wide capabilities and requirements
processes. The JRC has the potential to help DHS reduce duplication and
make cost-effective investments across its portfolio; however, specific
outcomes will not materialize in terms of budget decisions for several
years. Since full implementation of the JRC's Joint Assessment of
Requirements--and its use to inform the Department's budget decisions--
is several years away, it is too soon to tell how effective it will be
in prioritizing requirements and reducing duplication and
inefficiencies, as intended.
Question 13a. What has DHS done during the past year to mitigate
staffing shortfalls in key positions, such as program managers, systems
engineers, and logisticians?
Answer. As part of its fiscal year 2016 workforce planning cycle,
DHS identified 17 priority mission-critical occupations. According to
DHS, the 17 priority mission-critical occupations account for
approximately 64 percent of the civilian workforce and are the most
critical to performing core DHS mission areas.
For each of the 17 priority mission critical occupations, DHS
applied its workforce planning cycle, which involves the following five
steps:
set the strategic direction, including linking the workforce
and the strategy, considering the scope, and determining the
workforce balance;
conduct a supply analysis, demand analysis and identify gaps
in capacity and capability;
develop an action plan including strategies and actions to
address identified gaps;
implement the action plan; and
monitor, evaluate, and revise the plan.
As part of its fiscal year 2016 monitoring and evaluation efforts,
DHS reported that many of the 17 occupations met their defined targets
or showed improvement in closing gaps.
Additionally, DHS components develop annual Component Recruiting
and Outreach Plans to guide recruiting efforts to fill gaps in priority
mission-critical occupations. The Component Recruiting and Outreach
Plans are to assist components in developing a systematic, sustainable
process to ensure communication between recruiters and workforce
planners to identify and address short- and long-term human capital
needs.
Question 13b. Another challenge is program-funding gaps, whereby
estimated costs exceed projected funding. How has DHS addressed the
emergence of funding gaps for key programs? What steps has the
Department taken, or does the Department plan to take, to reduce the
size and frequency of these gaps?
Answer. In April 2014, we reported that DHS's major acquisition
programs faced a 30 percent funding gap over a 5-year period, and made
nine recommendations to help DHS take steps to close this gap.\23\ In
June 2014, the DHS chief financial officer established a new process
for improving the affordability of the Department's acquisition
portfolio, which addressed one of our recommendations. In March 2016,
we reported that this process has enhanced the Department's acquisition
management process by creating a formal mechanism to address
affordability issues at Acquisition Review Board meetings.\24\ However,
we identified opportunities for DHS leadership to expand upon these
efforts and made recommendations that they take additional actions,
such as improving the information components provide on program
affordability, conducting affordability assessments for programs that
have not been reviewed at an Acquisition Decision Event since the
funding certification requirement was established, and strengthening
DHS's communications with Congress and the processes components use to
address and communicate affordability information to leadership. Making
such refinements to DHS's processes would better position the
Department to ensure that Congress and taxpayers understand the
investment needed to deliver the intended capabilities to the end-
users. We will continue to track the Department's progress in this
area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage
Its Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with
Congress, GAO-14-332 (Washington, DC: April 17, 2014).
\24\ GAO, Homeland Security Acquisition: DHS Has Strengthened
Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-
338SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 14a. GAO has indicated that the Department has sustained
its progress in implementing a human capital strategic plan. A
significant initiative related to workforce planning in the
administration of President Obama was the Balanced Workforce Strategy,
which sought to identify the appropriate balance of Federal and
contractor employees required to achieve the DHS mission.
What is the current status of the Balanced Workforce Strategy and
does GAO anticipate that the initiative will continue in the new
administration? What specific changes in the strategy for and
composition of the DHS workforce have resulted from the initiative?
Answer. In December 2012, we reported that after issuing the
Balanced Workforce Strategy in 2010, DHS developed an automated tool to
help components perform the necessary analysis to determine the
appropriate mix of Federal employees versus contractors.\25\ In its
August 2016 Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management, DHS reported
that the use of this tool became mandatory in fiscal year 2014. In
addition, DHS reported that the Balanced Workforce Strategy Division
regularly monitors component use of the tool and that it had completed
audits of ICE, NPPD, USCIS, FEMA, the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Centers, and TSA's implementation of the Balanced Workforce Strategy
and tool. We have not assessed how the Balanced Workforce Strategy has
impacted the DHS workforce or how the change in administration may
affect the implementation of the strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ GAO, DHS Strategic Workforce Planning: Oversight of
Department-wide Efforts Should Be Strengthened, GAO-13-65 (Washington,
DC: Dec. 3, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 14b. Are there any other workforce planning initiatives
under way in the Department?
Answer. DHS has developed a workforce planning model that involves
the following five steps:
set the strategic direction, including linking the workforce
and the strategy, considering the scope, and determining the
workforce balance;
conduct a supply analysis, demand analysis, and identify
gaps in capacity and capability;
develop an action plan including strategies and actions to
address identified gaps;
implement the action plan; and
monitor, evaluate, and revise the plan.
In September 2016 DHS officials indicated that DHS will continue to
implement its workforce planning model in fiscal year 2017.
Additionally, DHS components develop annual Component Recruiting and
Outreach Plans to guide recruiting efforts to fill gaps in priority
mission-critical occupations. The Component Recruiting and Outreach
Plans are to assist components in developing a systematic, sustainable
process to ensure communication between recruiters and workforce
planners to identify and address short- and long-term human capital
needs.

[all]