    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      A DANGEROUS AND SOPHISTICATED ADVERSARY: THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
                           POSED BY CARTEL OPERATIONS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                   BORDER AND
                               MARITIME SECURITY

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 16, 2017

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 115-4

                                   __________

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                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Peter T. King, New York              Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    Jeff Duncan, South Carolina          Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
    Tom Marino, Pennsylvania             William R. Keating, Massachusetts
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Filemon Vela, Texas
    John Katko, New York                 Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Kathleen M. Rice, New York
    Martha McSally, Arizona              J. Luis Correa, California
    John Ratcliffe, Texas                Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York     Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
    Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin
    Clay Higgins, Louisiana
    John H. Rutherford, Florida
    Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
    Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
                       Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
                        Joan V. O'Hara,  General Counsel
                        Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                      Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY

                      Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairwoman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Filemon Vela, Texas
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
    Jeff Duncan, South Carolina          J. Luis Correa, California
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
    John H. Rutherford, Florida          Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex             (ex officio)
        officio)
                  Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
         Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
      and Maritime Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     3
    The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
      Maritime Security..............................................     4
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Prepared Statement.............................................     6

                                   Witnesses

    Vice Admiral Charles W. Ray, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
      U.S. Coast Guard:
      Oral Statement.................................................     7
      Prepared Statement.............................................     9
    Chief Paul A. Beeson, Commander, Joint Task Force--West, Arizona,
      U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................    12
      Prepared Statement.............................................    13
    Mr. Matthew C. Allen, Assistant Director for HSI Investigative
      Programs, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................    28
      Prepared Statement.............................................    30
    Mr. Luis E. Arreaga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
      of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
      Department of State:
      Oral Statement.................................................    35
      Prepared Statement.............................................    37

                                 For the Record

    The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of New York:
      Article, The Daily Beast.......................................    54
      Article, Daily Caller..........................................    56

      A DANGEROUS AND SOPHISTICATED ADVERSARY: THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
                           POSED BY CARTEL OPERATIONS

                                  ----------

                          Thursday, February 16, 2017

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
                  Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., in
    room HVC-210, Capitol Visitors Center, Hon. Martha McSally
    [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Duncan, Hurd,
    Rutherford, Vela, Correa, Demings, and Barragan.
        Also present: Representatives Katko and Jackson Lee.
        Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security,
    Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
    order. Let me first apologize for being a little bit late. We
    need to clone ourselves around here. I was in an Armed Services
    Committee hearing, very important on the F-35 and the way ahead
    for our troops, so appreciate your patience.
        The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threat
    posed by drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations.
    I will recognize myself for an opening statement.
        First, I would like to welcome the newest Member of our
    subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rutherford.
    Welcome. I look forward to working with you and other new
    Members of the committee.
        As we begin the 115th Congress, let me be clear from the
    outset. I hope, over the course of this Congress, we can engage
    in thoughtful and productive conversations that lead to
    legislation and partnerships that will help secure our
    homeland.
        One of my goals this year as Chair of the subcommittee is
    to drill down on the threat that an unsecured border poses to
    our fellow Americans, which will be the focus of our
    conversation today. At our next hearing, we will hear from
    leaders of the Border Security Joint Task Forces, authorized by
    this committee last Congress, to examine the Nation's counter-
    network approach to combatting this threat.
        Protecting our borders is a multi-faceted effort. The job
    of securing the land border falls primarily to U.S. Border
    Patrol, while the job of the U.S. Coast Guard is to secure our
    maritime border.
        We do have Office of Field Operations, an important role of
    securing more than 300 ports of entry, and Air and Marine
    Operations carries out air and marine maritime environment
    activities and admissions to detect and interdict unlawful
    people and cargo approaching our borders.
        Finally, HSI, Homeland Security Investigations, supports
    National security through its investigatory authorities and
    responsibilities.
        These are not simple or easy tasks. The Southwest Border is
    a dynamic place with sometimes unforgiving terrain: Rugged
    mountains, scorching desert, high cliffs, canyons, and more
    than 1,000 miles of river.
        The maritime border is more than 4.5 million square miles
    of vast ocean patrolled by a limited number of assets,
    providing cartels with enormous expanses of territory to which
    to conduct their illicit activities.
        Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to shore up
    our border defenses. Today, we have an impressive array of
    technology, infrastructure, and personnel deployed to keep the
    Nation safe. Despite our best efforts, we have seemingly made
    little progress, though, over the last few years to secure the
    border.
        Most recent reports and testimony suggest that between our
    ports of entry we are a little more than 50 percent effective
    at stopping people from crossing the border illegally, and
    narcotics continue to pour into our communities unabated.
        But on the other side of the border, the adversary, Mexican
    drug cartels, operate a wide-reaching network. Nothing moves in
    or out unless the cartel plaza boss says so.
        Cartel presence, influence, and power throughout Mexico is
    ubiquitous. Corruption is endemic. Local law enforcement in
    Mexico often find themselves ill-equipped to handle the vast
    amount of cartel activity.
        Smuggling drugs and people is a billion-dollar business,
    and the individuals in charge have one goal in mind: Make as
    much money as possible delivering illicit narcotics, people,
    and other assets across the border and into the United States.
        Obscene profits incentivize the cartels to be
    entrepreneurial and innovative in the tactics they use to
    successfully smuggle their illicit cargo. For instance, we know
    they conduct extensive counter-surveillance activities against
    our agents. They place spotters or scouts on hilltops and use
    the high ground to guide the drug loads away from agents and
    other detection assets.
        Sophisticated and deep tunnels that include the use of
    ventilation systems and railcars to expedite the movement of
    drugs have also been used. We have seen a proliferation of
    unorthodox methods of smuggling, such as the use of propane-
    powered double-barrel cannons in my district and around in
    other areas to shoot hundreds of pounds of drugs over the
    fences and barriers.
        Ultralight aircraft, difficult to detect on radar, have
    been used under the cover of darkness to fly drugs over the
    border, dropping it very quickly and then returning undetected
    to Mexico.
        In my district, authorities broke up a complicated
    smuggling ring recently in Cochise County. The criminal network
    specialized in drive-through operations that used vehicle
    convoys laden with thousands of pounds of drugs to cross remote
    parts of the border. They used scouts, encrypted
    communications, specialized codes to avoid detection.
        It was not an amateur operation by any means. To the
    contrary, it was a sophisticated criminal enterprise with
    advanced tactics designed to thwart law enforcement at every
    turn. This is the nature of the adversary that we are facing
    along the border.
        San Diego was once one of the busiest sectors for illicit
    traffic in the Nation, but concerted efforts in the 1990's and
    early 2000's, included additional barriers and manpower,
    brought the situation under control.
        But nonetheless, because the cartels are nimble, they
    responded by using small open-hold vessels called panga boats
    to push the drug loads farther and farther off the coast of
    California--I am sure we will hear about that from you today,
    Admiral--and making them more difficult to detect, track, and
    ultimately interdict.
        Semisubmersibles, painted blue to blend in with the ocean,
    barely visible above the waterline, have been used to deliver
    multi-ton cocaine loads to Mexico. Their ultimate destination
    is cities and towns across our Nation.
        As we increase our focus this Congress on securing the
    border, which I welcome, we have to be clear-eyed about the
    dangerous and sophisticated threat that we face from these
    adversaries on the other side. Rest assured, the cartels will
    not sit idly by while we increase manpower, technology,
    infrastructure, or adjust our strategy, and that will threaten
    their business model.
        They will adapt. They will innovate like they always do,
    and just plain sometimes outsmart us if we do not leverage the
    full power of all of us together to focus on countering the
    cartel network.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here today this
    morning. I really look forward to your testimony and the
    discussion ahead.
        Before I recognize the Ranking Member, I ask unanimous
    consent that the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, be
    permitted to participate in today's hearing. Without objection,
    so ordered.
        [The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:]
                     Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
                               february 16, 2017
        First, I would like to welcome the newest Member of our
    subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rutherford. I look
    forward to working with you and the other new Members of the committee.
    As we begin the 115th Congress, let me be clear from the outset, I hope
    that over the course of this Congress we can engage in thoughtful and
    productive conversations that lead to legislation that will help secure
    our homeland.
        One of my goals this year as Chair of this subcommittee is to drill
    down on the threat that an unsecure border poses to our fellow
    Americans, which will be the focus of our conversation today. At our
    next hearing, we will hear from the leaders of the border security
    joint task forces, authorized by this committee last Congress, to
    examine the Nation's counter-network approach to combating the threat.
        Protecting our borders is a multi-faceted effort. The job of
    securing the land border falls primarily to the U.S. Border Patrol,
    while it is the job of the U.S. Coast Guard to secure our maritime
    border. The Office of Field Operations has the important role of
    securing more than 300 ports of entry while Air and Marine Operations
    carries out air and maritime environment missions to detect and
    interdict unlawful people and cargo approaching our borders.
        Finally, Homeland Security Investigations supports National
    security through its investigatory authorities and responsibilities.
        These are not simple or easy tasks.
        The Southwest Border is a dynamic place with unforgiving terrain--
    rugged mountains, scorching desert, high cliffs, canyons, and more than
    a thousand miles of river. The maritime border is more than 4.5 million
    square miles of vast ocean, patrolled by a limited number of assets,
    providing cartels with enormous expanses of territory in which to
    conduct illicit activities.
        Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to shore up our
    border defenses. Today we have an impressive array of technology,
    infrastructure, and personnel deployed to keep the Nation safe. Despite
    our best efforts, we have seemingly made little progress over the last
    few years to secure the border. Most recently reports and testimony
    suggest that, between our ports of entry, we are little more than 50%
    effective at stopping people from crossing the border illegally, and
    narcotics continue to pour into our communities unabated.
        But on the other side of the border, our adversary, the Mexican
    drug cartels, operate a wide-reaching network. Nothing moves in or out
    unless the cartel plaza boss says so. Cartel presence, influence, and
    power throughout Mexico is ubiquitous. Corruption is endemic, and local
    law enforcement in Mexico often find themselves ill-equipped to handle
    the vast amounts of cartel activity. Smuggling drugs and people is a
    billion dollar business and the individuals in charge have one goal in
    mind: Make as much money as possible delivering illicit narcotics and
    people across the border and into the United States.
        Obscene profits incentivize the cartels to be entrepreneurial and
    innovative in the tactics they use to successfully smuggle their
    illicit cargo. For instance, we know that they conduct extensive
    counter-surveillance against our agents. They place spotters, or
    scouts, on mountains, and use the high ground to guide the drug loads
    away from agents and other detection assets.
        Sophisticated and deep tunnels that include the use of ventilation
    systems and rail cars to expedite the movement of drugs have also been
    used. And we have seen a proliferation of unorthodox methods of
    smuggling, such as the use of propane-powered double barrel cannons to
    shoot hundreds of pounds of drugs over the fence.
        Ultralight aircraft, difficult to detect on radar, have been used
    under the cover of darkness to fly marijuana over the border--dropping
    it very quickly and then returning undetected to Mexico.
        In my district in Arizona, authorities broke up a complicated
    smuggling ring in Cochise County. The criminal network specialized in
    drive-through operations that used vehicle convoys laden with thousands
    of pounds of drugs to cross remote parts of the border. They used
    scouts, encrypted communication, and specialized codes to avoid
    detection. It was not an amateur operation by any means. To the
    contrary, it was a sophisticated criminal enterprise with advanced
    tactics designed to thwart law enforcement at every turn.
        That is the nature of the adversary we face along the border.
        San Diego was once one of the busiest sectors for illicit traffic
    in the Nation, but concerted efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s that
    included additional fence and manpower brought the situation under
    control.
        Nonetheless, because the cartels are nimble, they responded by
    using small open-hulled vessels called ``panga boats'' to push drug
    loads farther and farther off the coast of California, making them more
    difficult to detect, track, and ultimately interdict. Semi-
    submersibles, painted blue to blend in with the ocean, and barely
    visible above the water line, have been used to deliver multi-ton
    cocaine loads to Mexico. Their ultimate destination is cities and towns
    across our country.
        As we increase our focus this Congress on securing the border, we
    have to be clear-eyed about the dangerous and sophisticated threat that
    we face from our adversaries on the other side.
        Rest assured, the cartels will not sit idly by while we increase
    manpower, technology, and infrastructure that threaten their business
    model. They will adapt, innovate, and just plain out-smart us if we do
    not leverage the full power of the Government to focus on countering
    the cartel network. I thank the witnesses for being here this morning
    and look forward to their testimony.

        Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
    the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a
    statement he may have.
        Mr. Vela. Thank you, Chairwoman, for calling this very
    important hearing.
        As we have discussed, I think this is one area where many
    of us can agree that we are going to be able to work together
    to achieve our ultimate goal, which is to do as much as we can
    to impact the negative work that the cartels do in South
    America, Mexico, and all throughout the United States and, at
    the same time, do what we can to take drugs off our streets.
        I would first like to welcome and introduce our newest
    Members to the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security.
    Congressman Lou Correa represents California's 46th
    Congressional District and most recently served in the
    California State Senate.
        Congresswoman Val Demings represents Florida's 10th
    Congressional District and previously served as the chief of
    the Orlando Police Department, the first woman to hold that
    position.
        Congresswoman Nanette Barragan, an experienced attorney,
    represents the 44th Congressional District, which includes the
    Port of Los Angeles.
        I would also like to recognize my colleague, Mr. Richmond,
    who is a senior Member in the committee and has joined us on
    this subcommittee for the first time. I look forward to working
    with all of you in the coming months, because each of you bring
    a unique perspective and expertise regarding border and
    maritime security to this subcommittee.
        The subject of our hearing today is one of particular
    interest to me given that, like Congresswoman McSally, I
    represent a border district, and mine is in the Rio Grande
    Valley of Texas. For years now, Tamaulipas, Mexico, the state
    across from my Congressional district, has been coping with
    serious security issues due to cartel violence.
        In fact, this coming Thursday, my Mexican colleagues at the
    Federal level in the state of Tamaulipas and I will be
    launching a social media effort to help promote the idea of
    bringing peace to the state of Tamaulipas.
        As Mexican cartels have fought for control of smuggling
    corridors within Mexico and along our Southern Border,
    communities on the Mexican side have seen record levels of
    drug-related homicides and violence.
        The threat is not confined to our Southern Border. Cartels
    use criminal networks within the United States to traffic
    illicit drugs, weapons, and other contraband. The security and
    prosperity of all of our districts and so many communities
    across the Nation depend in part on security and prosperity
    across the border.
        I want to continue to be supportive of United States'
    efforts to that end. I am also appreciative of Secretary
    Kelly's recent comments with respect to what he would like to
    do to address the issue of demand in this country.
        I hope to hear from you today about how the various
    components within DHS are coordinating with our counterparts in
    Central America and Mexico to combat transnational criminal
    organizations and enhance border security.
        I would ask all of our witnesses to speak to the
    subcommittee about how the threat has evolved and changed over
    time, what you need to address this threat, and what we as
    Members of Congress can do to support all of your efforts.
    Border communities, like the ones that many of us represent,
    and our neighbors in Mexico are counting on us to get this
    right.
        Madame Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and I
    appreciate our witnesses joining us today. I look forward to a
    productive Congress with you and all the Members of the
    subcommittee. I yield back the balance of my time.
        Ms. McSally. OK, thanks. Other Members of the committee are
    reminded opening statements may be submitted for the record.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                               february 16, 2017
        Today, the matter before the subcommittee is one where I expect
    there to be a great deal of bipartisan agreement. Drug cartels seek to
    exploit our borders to smuggle narcotics into the United States and
    bulk cash and weapons out of this country.
        The Department of Homeland Security and its Federal partners are
    charged with combatting the cartels and securing America's borders,
    ports, and waterways from their contraband.
        This is no easy task, to be sure. The cartels are sophisticated
    operations with thousands of members, the best technology, and almost
    limitless resources to spend on their illicit activities.
        That is why we need to use our border security resources wisely.
    Why waste billions on walls that we know cartels are already defeating
    by sending their drugs over, under, or through, or by concealing in
    conveyances at ports of entry?
        Instead, we need to dedicate funding to the personnel, technology,
    and assets that will help DHS interdict illicit drugs and identify,
    disrupt, and dismantle the organizations responsible for bringing drugs
    into our country.
        For example, Customs and Border Protection is thousands of officers
    and agents short of what the agency's own staffing models say is
    necessary to carry out its operations. Simply saying you are going to
    hire more agents pays lip service to the problem, but does nothing to
    address the underlying issues that have prevented CBP from recruiting,
    hiring, and retaining personnel.
        Also, Coast Guard's air and maritime assets are woefully outdated
    and in dire need of recapitalization. Even so, through the dedication
    and hard work of its men and women, the Coast Guard is credited with
    seizing tons of cocaine in the source and transit zones each year.
        Imagine what they could do with the right kind of modern assets and
    the proper number of personnel to carry out the drug interdiction
    mission that Congress has charged them with.
        These are the kinds of things we, as a country, need to invest in
    if we want to be serious about combatting the cartels and achieving
    meaningful border security.
        Real border security does not come from vaguely worded, politically
    charged Executive Orders or fancy signing ceremonies, but rather by
    providing the right personnel and tools to get the job done. I look
    forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how we can do just
    that.

        Ms. McSally. We are pleased to be joined today by four
    distinguished witnesses to discuss this important topic.
        Vice Admiral Charles Ray assumed duties as the Coast Guard
    deputy commandant for operations in August 2016. In this role,
    Admiral Ray is responsible for the development of operational
    strategy, policy, guidance, and resources that address the
    Coast Guard's National priorities.
        Admiral Ray has previously served as a Pacific area
    commander and in the Middle East as the director of Iraq
    training and advisory mission for the Ministry of Interior.
        Commander Paul Beeson is the commander of the Joint Task
    Force--West, Arizona and chief of the U.S. Border Patrol's
    Tucson sector. As commander of JTF-West, Arizona, he is
    responsible for implementing strategic guidance from Joint Task
    Force--West, and commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection, or CBP, through command, control, and coordination
    of CBP operational functions within the State of Arizona.
        In addition to those roles and responsibilities, Commander
    Beeson has oversight of the Tucson sector, encompassing the
    tactical and strategic operation of eight stations and
    approximately 420 personnel, many of which are in my district.
        Mr. Matthew Allen is the assistant director for
    investigative programs for Homeland Security Investigations
    within the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Mr. Allen
    is responsible for programmatic oversight of HSI's strategic
    planning, National policy implementation, and the development
    and execution of operational initiatives.
        Mr. Allen previously served as a special agent-in-charge of
    Homeland Security Investigations in Arizona, where he had
    oversight of the full spectrum of ICE investigative activities
    and led more than 500 personnel assigned to offices throughout
    the State.
        Ambassador Luis Arreaga--did I pronounce that correctly?--
    was appointed deputy assistant secretary of state for the
    Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
    in November 2013.
        In this role, he is responsible for State Department
    programs combating illicit drugs and organized crime, as well
    as support for law enforcement and rule of law in the Western
    Hemisphere. Prior to this appointment, Ambassador Arreaga
    served as United States Ambassador to the Republic of Iceland
    from 2010 to 2013.
        The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
    record.
        The Chair now recognizes Admiral Ray for 5 minutes to
    testify.

    STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
                      OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Ray. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
    Member Vela, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the Coast Guard's role in combating
    transnational criminal organizations and the continued threat
    it poses to the homeland.
        I am particularly pleased to testify alongside three of our
    most important partners in the fight against transnational
    crime: CBP, ICE, and the Department of State. I would like to
    thank Chief Beeson, Assistant Director Allen, and Ambassador
    Arreaga for their leadership in this effort.
        Before I continue, I will just draw your attention to the
    exhibit over there of the North America, Central America, and
    South America. When I talk about the transit zone, I am
    generally speaking to that and when we speak of the maritime
    transit zone, it is that area between South America, Central
    America, and Southern Mexico.
        We continue to face a significant threat from transnational
    criminal networks whose drug transit routes lead to the
    southern approach of the United States. The Coast Guard
    protects the maritime border not just here at home, but also
    off the coast of South and Central America as part of our
    layered security strategy.
        As Secretary Kelly stated just a few days ago, the defense
    of the Southwest Border really starts about 1,500 miles south
    of there, when transnational violent transnational criminal
    organizations harm economies and threaten governments and
    citizens throughout the hemisphere.
        They are agnostic to borders, engage in all manners of
    illicit activity, and they actually destabilize Latin America.
    The wide-spread violence they employ has reached epidemic
    levels, is spreading, and drives the continued flow of migrants
    from Central America and Mexico who attempt to illegally enter
    the United States.
        As one of the Nation's five Armed Forces and the only one
    with broad law enforcement authority, the Coast Guard is
    uniquely positioned to attack these criminal networks where
    they are most vulnerable--at sea.
        In the offshore transit zones, the Coast Guard employs an
    interdiction package consisting of a cutter, an airborne use of
    force-capable helicopter, high-speed pursuit boats and, of
    course, highly trained boarding teams.
        We seize multi-ton loads of drugs at sea before they are
    broken into small quantities, which are extremely difficult to
    detect and cause devastation at each step of their journey as
    they make their way to North America.
        Beyond our own capabilities, we leverage over 42 maritime
    law enforcement bilateral agreements, 29 of which are in the
    Western Hemisphere, to enable partner nation interdiction and
    prosecutions. In many affected areas, we are the only maritime
    presence to enforce universal criminal statutes with our
    maritime neighbors.
        Our Coast Guard personnel assets are effective. Coast Guard
    and partner agencies interdicted more cocaine at sea in 2016
    than was interdicted in all the land and across our country by
    all Federal, State, and locals combined, because we did it in
    bulk quantities off-shore, sometimes in the thousands of kilos.
    By doing so, we pushed the border south, protect the Nation,
    and significantly impact the transnational criminal
    organizations.
        Beyond demonstrating our effectiveness, these statistics
    indicate that cocaine and illicit trafficking of all kinds are,
    unfortunately, on the rise. However, resource constraints and
    the lack of capable surface assets allow the U.S. Coast Guard
    to only attack or target 30 percent of the known cases.
        We have good intelligence, really high-confidence
    intelligence. As a result of a lack of resources last year, we
    were prevented from getting after 580 known smuggling events,
    and those shipments made their way on north.
        Unfortunately, the other significant National security
    demands on our great Navy now preclude their participation in
    this area of operations. In his testimony before the committee,
    Secretary Kelly noted there hasn't been a significant sustained
    Navy presence in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific for almost 4
    years.
        In that time, our Coast Guard has doubled down our presence
    in the region, and we are your armed force in the maritime
    approaches to the United States. We continue to look for ways
    to increase our offshore cutter presence. As I have said, we
    just don't have the assets to address all the intelligence that
    we have.
        For that reason, recapitalizing our medium-endurance cutter
    fleet with our off-shore cutter patrol program is a must to
    enable the Coast Guard to meet mission demand. We appreciate
    the support thus far, and continued support from this Congress
    will be essential as we move on to commission our first off-
    shore patrol cutter in 2021. These new assets will make us more
    effective.
        Just like the other Armed Forces, we are also facing
    significant readiness challenges with our aging assets and
    infrastructure and a strained work force. Like our fellow
    service chiefs, the commandant has said he believes it will
    stay this way as long as the Budget Control Act is in effect.
        We will continue to use risk-based approach to allocate our
    resources. We have an outstanding and dedicated group of
    professional women and men, as evidenced by the 201 metric tons
    of cocaine we seized in 2016. It is a Coast Guard record.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
    and for all you do for the women and men of the Coast Guard. I
    look forward to addressing your questions and concerns. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Charles W. Ray
                               February 16, 2017
                                  introduction
        Good morning Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the
    subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast
    Guard's role in combating transnational organized crime and
    specifically how we address the drug smuggling methods of these
    networks.
        Drug trafficking has destabilized regional States, undermined the
    rule of law, terrorized citizens, and driven both families and
    unaccompanied children to migrate to the United States. To be clear,
    the flow of illicit drugs funds Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)
    networks, which pose a significant and growing threat to National and
    international security.
        Today's Coast Guard is a direct descendant of the Revenue Cutter
    Service, created by Alexander Hamilton in 1790, to stem the flow of
    maritime contraband into our newly-formed Republic. It is one of the
    Nation's five Armed Services, and the only branch of the military
    within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While our missions
    and responsibilities have grown significantly since then--addressing a
    full range of security, safety, and stewardship concerns--our anti-
    smuggling roots continue to be an essential part of our service to the
    Nation. The Coast Guard is the lead Federal maritime law enforcement
    agency, the lead Federal agency for drug interdiction on the high seas,
    and the only agency with both the authority and capability to enforce
    National and international law on the high seas, outer continental
    shelf, and shoreward from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to our
    inland waters.
        For over two centuries, the Coast Guard has built a reputation as
    one of the most agile and adaptive agencies within the Federal
    Government; these qualities have served the Coast Guard well in its
    efforts to combat smugglers' ever-evolving conveyances and tactics. The
    modern role of the Coast Guard in this fight can be traced to the
    demand for a variety of illegal drugs. From 1973 through 1991, the
    Coast Guard removed over 26 million pounds of marijuana, targeting and
    interdicting a variety of smuggling conveyances including commercial
    fishing vessels, ocean-going cargo freighters, and pleasure craft.
    Beginning in the late 1990's, through the present day, cocaine has been
    the predominant drug being trafficked via maritime routes, bringing
    with it shifts in smuggling tactics. Cartels initially began using some
    of the very same conveyances used by marijuana smugglers, which
    included multi-ton loads of cocaine vulnerable to interdiction by Coast
    Guard forces. Cartels quickly adapted to Coast Guard efforts and began
    expanding tactics to include the ubiquitous ``go-fast vessel,'' as well
    as more modern conveyances including the purpose-built self-propelled
    semi-submersible (SPSS), to disperse loads onto more numerous and
    harder-to-detect conveyances.
        Today we face a sophisticated and well-funded adversary that
    leverages high-tech conveyances such as low-profile vessels and semi-
    submersibles, employs multiple go-fast vessels to outnumber
    interdicting forces, and deploys GPS beacons if forced to jettison
    bales of contraband to allow later relocation; all are advanced and
    coordinated means to avoid detection and evade apprehension.
        The change in flow of cocaine toward the United States from South
    America from 2015 to 2016 was the largest increase the service has
    observed to date. The rise of cocaine production is attributed to the
    largest single-year increase of coca cultivation in Colombia ever
    recorded (immediately following the second-largest single-year increase
    in more than a decade). To meet this growing threat, the Coast Guard
    has dedicated additional focus and assets to the Western Hemisphere
    Transit Zone\1\, and is investing in the people and platforms necessary
    to carry out an agressive interdiction effort, in addition to helping
    build regional partner capabilities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The maritime portion of the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone is
    a 6 million-square-mile area, roughly twice the size of the continental
    United States. The Transit Zone includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of
    Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         current threat: transnational organized crime, violence, and
                                  instability
        One of the goals of the Coast Guard's drug interdiction program is
    to interdict illicit traffic as close to the source zone as possible.
    This helps to stem the flow of drugs from reaching Central America,
    Mexico, and the United States. Over the past 5 years, Coast Guard
    cutters and aircraft have removed more than 630 metric tons of high-
    purity cocaine from the high seas, with a wholesale value of nearly 18
    billion dollars.\2\ Our annual seizures at sea amount to more than
    three times the quantity of cocaine seized at our borders and within
    the United States, combined. Despite these successes, TOC networks
    operate throughout Central America, vying for power through drug-fueled
    violence and corruption of Government officials; in fact, eight out of
    the world's ten countries with the highest per capita rates of homicide
    are along the cocaine trafficking routes in the Western Hemisphere.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
    2013 United States Illicit Drug Prices, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA-
    DCW-DIR-012-15, January 2015.
        \3\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNODC
    Research and Trend Analysis Branch, Global Study on Homicide 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In response, the Coast Guard released its Western Hemisphere
    Strategy that indentifies three priorities for the maritime domain in
    the Western Hemisphere: Combating Networks, Securing Borders, and
    Safeguarding Commerce. To meet these priorities, the strategy
    emphasizes the importance of a robust off-shore airborne use-of-force
    (AUF)-enabled cutter capability, which is supported by fixed-wing
    maritime patrol aircraft and sophisticated intelligence capabilities.
        combating toc networks--a layered approach to drug interdiction
        The Coast Guard uses a ``maritime trident'' of cutters, boats, and
    aircraft in a layered approach to combat TOC networks as they transport
    illicit goods from the source zone, through Central America and
    Caribbean islands, into the United States. This approach maintains
    operational control by confronting the threat beyond our land borders,
    beyond Mexico, and beyond Central America on the high seas where
    traffickers are most exposed and vulnerable to interdiction by the
    United States. This layered approach begins overseas, spans the off-
    shore regions, and continues into our territorial seas and our ports of
    entry.
        The Coast Guard is the major maritime interdiction asset provider
    to Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S), which executes the
    Department of Defense statutory responsibility for the detection and
    monitoring of illicit drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains
    bound for the United States in support of law enforcement agencies such
    as the Coast Guard. Our most capable force package is flight deck-
    equipped major cutters with embarked Airborne Use of Force (AUF)-
    capable helicopters and deployable pursuit-capable boats, supported by
    fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, along with Coast Guard law
    enforcement detachments embarked on U.S. and allied ships. When they
    are able to target cases, they have been 80-90 percent effective in
    disrupting drug shipments.
        As an example of their effectiveness, Coast Guard Cutter HAMILTON,
    the fourth and newest of nine National Security Cutters (NSC) to be
    built for the Coast Guard, returned to her homeport of Charleston,
    South Carolina from her inaugural patrol on December 16, 2016. On deck,
    she carried more than 24 metric tons of high-purity cocaine from 27
    different interdictions by U.S. forces with a street value of nearly
    $700 million.\4\ These interdictions also netted 111 suspects bound for
    U.S. prosecution.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
    2013 United States Illicit Drug Prices, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA-
    DCW-DIR-012-15, January 2015.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our interdicting capabilities continue to prove their value against
    TOC networks' conveyance of choice--the go-fast vessel. In 2016, our
    Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) of AUF-capable
    helicopters--along with partner aircraft from the U.S. Navy, the
    Netherlands, and United Kingdom operating under our law enforcement
    authority with Coast Guard precision marksmen--set a record 63 at-sea
    interdictions, netting over 44 metric tons of cocaine.
        In addition, the Coast Guard began providing high-speed pursuit
    boats and crews to U.S. Navy Patrol Coastal class ships operating in
    the transit zone in 2016 to increase interdiction opportunities.
    Coupled with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments, this innovative
    force package capability netted 11 interdictions and removed 6.5 metric
    tons of cocaine in just a few months. In total for fiscal year 2016,
    the Coast Guard removed 201 metric tons of cocaine (7.1 percent of
    estimated flow)\5\ and 52,600 pounds of marijuana from the transit
    zone, worth an estimated wholesale value of $5.7 billion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector
    General, Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control
    Performance Summary, OIG Report, OIG-17-33, February 1, 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The importance of interdictions transcends the direct removal of
    drugs taken off the high seas; when the Coast Guard apprehends suspects
    from drug smuggling cases, they disclose information during prosecution
    and sentencing that is used to help indict, extradite, and convict drug
    kingpins in the effort to disrupt and dismantle TOC networks.
    Interdictions also take profits out of the pockets of criminal networks
    by denying them financial resources. Additionally, they contribute to
    actionable intelligence on future events, producing follow-on seizures
    and intelligence. TOC networks cause much of the corruption and
    violence that spurs the increased migrant flow seen in recent years.
        While more than 90 percent of our 2016 interdictions were cued by
    intelligence, the Coast Guard's aging major cutters limit our ability
    to respond to all intelligence-cued events. Critical acquisitions like
    the National Security Cutter (NSC) and Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) are
    essential to our long-term success in our fight against TOC networks.
                           international cooperation
        In coordination with JIATF-S, the Coast Guard is engaging with
    partner nations in Central and South America, and Mexico, leveraging
    their capabilities and local knowledge to improve maritime governance
    in the littoral regions being exploited by TOC networks. Among the
    efforts to foster international cooperation and build partner capacity,
    Coast Guard personnel are posted as attaches, liaisons, and drug
    interdiction specialists at several of our embassies in the Western
    Hemisphere. These personnel develop strategic relationships with
    partner nations that facilitate real-time operations coordination,
    confirmation of vessel registry, waivers of jurisdiction, and
    disposition of seized vessels, contraband, and detained crews. The
    Coast Guard's law enforcement, legal, and regulatory expertise are in
    high demand from Central American partners, whose Navies more closely
    resemble the U.S. Coast Guard than the U.S. Navy. Coast Guard
    International Training teams, as well as Coast Guard units deployed in
    the region increase professional interaction, shiprider activities, and
    training in conjunction with operations, and also execute maritime
    exercises coincident with port visits and patrols.
        Working in conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice,
    the Coast Guard has negotiated, concluded, and maintains over 40
    counterdrug bilateral agreements and operational procedures with
    partner nations throughout the world, the majority of which are in the
    Western Hemisphere. These agreements enable the Coast Guard to rapidly
    gain authority to board suspect vessels, prevent suspect vessels from
    using under-patrolled territorial waters of partner nations as safe
    havens, and coordinate interdiction and apprehension operations in the
    transit zone. Highlighting their importance to Coast Guard counterdrug
    efforts, 59 percent of all Coast Guard interdictions in fiscal year
    2016 involved the use of a bilateral agreement or operational
    procedures agreement.
                                the arrival zone
        Closer to United States shores, Coast Guard operational commanders
    work with the other operational components within DHS and across the
    interagency to provide a robust presence in the U.S. maritime
    approaches by deploying Fast Response Cutters, high-speed pursuit
    boats, medium-range fixed-wing aircraft, and land-based AUF-capable
    helicopters. To achieve Unity of Effort, the Coast Guard is a major
    contributor to DHS's Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan. The
    Coast Guard Atlantic Area Commander, Vice Admiral Karl Schultz, serves
    as the director of Joint Task Force--East overseeing coordination
    efforts for DHS components operating in the maritime approaches in the
    Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern Pacific Ocean.
                                   conclusion
        The Coast Guard endeavors to secure our vast maritime border by
    identifying emergent threats, countering them in a layered approach,
    utilizing strong international relationships, and maximizing domestic
    and regional partnerships; this approach has been key to combatting TOC
    networks. The Coast Guard stands ready to meet off-shore, coastal, and
    inland drug trafficking threats in the maritime domain posed by TOC
    networks.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for
    your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to
    answer your questions.

        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Admiral Ray.
        The Chair now recognizes Commander Beeson to testify for 5
    minutes.

    STATEMENT OF PAUL A. BEESON, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE--WEST,
             ARIZONA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Chief Beeson. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
    Member Vela, and the distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection to discuss the evolving drug
    smuggling tactics and techniques used by transnational criminal
    organizations and how CBP is working to address this threat and
    secure our Nation's borders.
        I began my career as a Border Patrol agent in 1985, and in
    my 32 years of service I have seen the border change from a
    barbed wire fence and a Nation-wide work force of just a few
    thousand Border Patrol agents, to today, with over 600 miles of
    fencing and almost 20,000 Border Patrol agents on duty.
        The border has changed and become more complex. Over the
    course of my career, I have seen the creation of the Department
    of Homeland Security, funding increases and decreases, and the
    committed evolution of criminals who seek to exploit our
    borders.
        I have also seen CBP and the legacy offices that make up
    CBP work with Congress to improve the border environment.
    Personnel, resources, technology, and tactical infrastructure
    have shaped the border that we see today.
        We have realized greater situational awareness and
    significant reductions in activity from a high of over 1.6
    million arrests in fiscal year 2000 to just over 400,000
    arrests last fiscal year. Throughout my career, I have seen
    TCOs demonstrate unending resolve in their intent to exploit
    the border for their own gain.
        They have used nimble and innovative tactics to illegally
    cross our borders and smuggle both people and contraband. TCOs
    operate throughout the border environment, including at and
    between the ports of entry in the various domains such as land,
    air, and sea.
        CBP has met and combated these illegal activities, but TCOs
    continue in their intent to circumvent border security
    measures. Drug smuggling is a part of many TCO enterprises, and
    today these groups smuggle drugs by foot, vehicle, air,
    tunneling, and even through the use of projectile-type systems.
        TCOs also rely on scouting and counter-surveillance,
    concealment and logistical support to further their illegal
    drug smuggling operations. While illegal drug smuggling still
    occurs, CBP continues to take steps in combatting their
    efforts.
        In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers seized or disrupted more
    than 3.3 million pounds of narcotics. In addition to
    interdictions and seizures, CBP has also disrupted the manner
    in which TCOs attempt to smuggle drugs.
        As an example, prior to fencing and technology deployments
    in the Tucson sector area of operations, over 1,000 vehicle
    drive-throughs were recorded in 2006, and last year, only 18
    such events recorded. While ramping and drive-throughs still
    occur, the efforts of CBP have diminished their probability of
    success and shaped these illicit operations.
        What I have seen in over 30 years of law enforcement is
    that TCOs remain persistent in their intent to engage in
    illegal cross-border activity. I have also seen CBP, through
    collaboration and coordination with law enforcement partners,
    make progress in improving the security of our borders.
        This is the result of investments over the years in our
    border security, and in the blood, sweat, and tears of the men
    and woman who are engaged in the daily battle to secure our
    borders. With continued support from Congress, CBP, in
    coordination with our partners, we will continue to further
    refine and enhance the effectiveness of our detection and
    interdiction capabilities.
        While TCOs may be intent in their smuggling operations, CBP
    is no less determined to safeguard the borders of this great
    country with vigilance, service, and integrity.
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished
    Members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Chief Beeson follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Paul A. Beeson
                               February 16, 2017
                                  introduction
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today on
    behalf of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss the
    evolving drug smuggling tactics and techniques used by transnational
    criminal organizations (TCO) and how CBP is working to address this
    threat and secure our Nation's borders.
        CBP is responsible for America's front-line border security and has
    a significant role in the Nation's efforts to combat the cross-border
    criminal activity of cartels and other TCOs. Thanks to the support of
    Congress, in the past decade, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    has deployed more personnel, resources, technology, and tactical
    infrastructure for securing our borders than at any other time in
    history. As America's front-line border agency, CBP protects the United
    States against terrorist threats and prevents the illegal entry of
    inadmissible persons and contraband, while facilitating lawful travel
    and trade. CBP's mission demands we examine all border security
    threats, from human smuggling to drug smuggling. TCOs continue to
    exploit the border environment for their own gains, employing various
    capabilities to carry out illegal operations. We continue to meet and
    combat these capabilities.
        CBP plays a critical role in the effort to keep dangerous drugs
    from illegally entering the country. Specifically, by leveraging a
    comprehensive, multi-layered, intelligence driven, and threat-based
    approach to enhance the security of our borders, we can diminish the
    effectiveness of TCO drug operations, as well as other border security
    threats. This dynamic approach to security both reduces the
    vulnerability of any single operational approach and extends our zone
    of security to include the avenues of approach, allowing threats to be
    addressed before they reach our borders. By leveraging international
    partnerships, we can ensure that our physical borders are not the first
    or last lines of defense.
                         the current border environment
        The border environment today is both challenging and complex. TCOs
    continually adjust their operations to circumvent detection and
    interdiction by law enforcement, and are quick to take advantage of
    technology advances, cheaper transportation and improvements to
    distribution methods, and improving fabrication and concealment
    techniques. Also, while the threats of illegal immigration and drug
    smuggling continue to be the principal criminal concerns in the border
    environment, TCOs continue to maintain a diverse portfolio of crimes to
    include fraud, weapons smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion. DHS, with
    the support of Congress, has made significant improvements to the
    physical security infrastructure along the Southwestern Border and has
    invested in personnel, training, and information sharing. These
    investments have been valuable in combating the TCOs and have helped
    shape the current border environment.
        In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers and agents seized and/or
    disrupted more than 3.3 million pounds of narcotics across the country
    \1\ including approximately 46,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 4,800
    pounds of heroin, and 440 pounds of fentanyl. The vast majority of CBP
    drug interdictions occur along the Southwest land border from all
    environments and transportation modes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Fiscal Year 2016 Border Security Report, U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/
    documents/2016-Dec/CBP-fy2016-border-security-report.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Much of the illegal drug trafficking encountered by CBP officers
    and agents is facilitated by TCOs operating in Mexico. The reach and
    influence of Mexican cartels, notably Los Zetas, and the Gulf, Juarez,
    Jalisco New Generation, and Sinaloa Cartels, stretches across and
    beyond the Southwest Border, operating through networks and loose
    affiliations with smaller organizations in cities across the United
    States. According to a 2016 Drug Enforcement Administration report,
    Mexican TCOs pose the greatest criminal drug threat to the United
    States. These criminal organizations traffic heroin, methamphetamine,
    cocaine, and marijuana throughout the United States, using established
    transportation routes and distribution networks.\2\ TCOs also maintain
    influence over U.S.-based gangs as a way to expand their domestic
    distribution process. Gang members are heavily involved in the domestic
    distribution of narcotics and, to a lesser extent, the actual movement
    of contraband across the Southwest Border.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Drug Enforcement Administration,2016 National Drug Threat
    Assessment Summary, ``Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations'',
    page 1, DEA-DCT-DIR-001-17, November 2016. https://www.dea.gov/
    resource-center/2016%20NDTA%20Summary.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 tco operations
        In examining TCOs, it is apparent that they continue to seek ways
    to exploit the border environment. These TCOs pose a significant threat
    to both U.S. and international security. The illegal operations of TCOs
    affect both public safety and economic stability. Not only are these
    criminal networks resilient, but they maintain illicit pathways through
    foreign countries and toward the U.S. border, which could be
    exploitable by terror organizations to move personnel and assets into
    the United States. Furthermore, their operations are often diversified
    with separate operational cells, and with TCO participants often having
    the capability to participate in multiple roles. These TCOs are highly
    mobile and maintain sophisticated cross-border networks and are
    involved in a wide range of organized criminal activities including
    firearms trafficking, drug smuggling, and alien smuggling (See Exhibit
    14). Additionally, TCOs operate throughout the spectrum of the border
    environment including at and between the ports of entry (POE), and in
    the various domains such as land, air, and sea.
        The vast expanses of remote and rugged terrain between our POEs,
    and the large volume of trade and traffic at our POEs, continue to be
    targeted for exploitation by TCOs. These groups use a wide range of
    ever-evolving methods to move illicit goods into the United States.
    Some of these techniques include the movement of drugs by foot,
    conveyance, tunneling, and even through the use of projectile-type
    systems. These groups also rely on supporting tactics such as
    countersurveillance, concealment, and logistical support to further
    their illegal drug smuggling operations.
        The Southwest land border POEs are the major points of entry for
    illegal drugs, where smugglers use a wide variety of tactics and
    techniques for concealing drugs. CBP officers regularly find drugs
    ingested, concealed in body cavities, taped to bodies (body carriers),
    hidden inside vehicle seat cushions, gas tanks, dash boards, tires,
    packaged food, household and hygiene products, in checked luggage, and
    concealed in construction materials on commercial trucks. While many
    smuggling attempts occur at POEs, the mail and express consignment
    environment, as well as maritime cargo also remain attractive options
    for smugglers.
        TCOs have increased both the number and the sophistication of
    smuggling tunnels (See Exhibits 11-13). The tunnel threat consists of
    four categories of tunnels: Conduit, rudimentary, interconnecting, and
    sophisticated. In the Arizona border regions specifically, TCOs also
    continue to attempt ``drive-throughs''--incursions into U.S. territory
    by driving vehicles on ramps over the fence, or by attempting to cut
    the fence to drive vehicles containing illegal drugs across the border.
    Drive-through incursions generally involve large loads of illegal
    drugs, an expansive network of individuals (to include scouts),
    strategic logistics, and sophisticated communications equipment. TCOs
    have also improved their capabilities in passing drugs over existing
    fencing. Whereas TCOs previously threw, by hand, small loads of drugs
    over the border fence, they now utilize compressed air cannons to
    launch bundles of illicit narcotics in excess of 100 pounds over the
    border fence. These illegal operations are indicative of the ever-
    evolving and persistent intent of TCOs to exploit the border
    environment.
        As interdiction and enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico
    border have become more effective, TCOs continue to use maritime and
    air smuggling routes to transport contraband into the United States.
    TCOs use a variety of methods to enter the United States via maritime
    routes, including the use of small open vessels known as ``pangas.''
    These small, wood or fiberglass, home-made fishing vessels cross the
    border at night, attempting to use their relatively high-speed and
    small radar signature to evade detection by CBP and U.S. Coast Guard
    (USCG) patrol vessels and aircraft. TCOs also use pleasure boats or
    small commercial fishing vessels--Sometimes equipped with hidden
    compartments--and attempt to blend in with legitimate boaters and
    transport contraband during broad daylight. Smuggling operations using
    this technique rely on the sheer number of similar boats on U.S. waters
    on any given day to elude detection. TCOs have also turned to new
    methods of smuggling by air with the emergence in recent years of the
    use of ultralight aircraft (See Exhibit 1). Under the cover of
    darkness, ultralights fly across the Southwest Border and air-drop
    drugs to waiting ground crews.
        TCOs regularly use countersurveillance tactics. This type of
    activity ranges from the use of scouts, individuals performing
    surveillance activity against law enforcement agencies, to more
    complicated activity such as interception of law enforcement
    communication. Scouts embed deep in the remote, rugged, terrain as well
    as urban communities, watching and reporting on border law enforcement
    activities. TCOs who deploy these scouts utilize a robust, highly
    technical, communication method--with the deliberate intent of
    concealing their communication from law enforcement (See Exhibits 2-5).
    While some of these operations are illegal in their execution (such as
    attempts to illegally obtain Law Enforcement Sensitive information)
    others simply exploit the public venues from which, and within which,
    law enforcement operates (such as monitoring the coming and going of
    patrol vehicles from a Border Patrol station).
        As TCOs involved in smuggling continue to explore new tactics and
    techniques to attempt to evade detection and interdiction, CBP, our
    Federal partners, and other law enforcement entities continue to adapt
    and increase our enforcement resources, enhancing our capabilities, and
    refine our strategies to anticipate and disrupt TCO activity.
           cbp efforts, resources, and capabilities to counter tco s
        Addressing the TCO threat necessitates a united, comprehensive
    strategy and an aggressive approach by multiple entities across all
    levels of government. In close coordination with local, State, Tribal,
    international, and Federal law enforcement partners--specifically U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the USCG--CBP's continued
    efforts to interdict illegal aliens, drugs, cash, and weapons at the
    border are a key aspect of U.S. border security efforts. We must also
    concentrate on increasing our understanding and identification of
    transnational criminal networks in order to identify, interdict,
    investigate, and prosecute TCOs and their criminal activity.
    Along U.S. Borders
        Since 2004, the number of Border Patrol agents has nearly doubled,
    from approximately 10,800 in 2004 to over 19,500 agents today. Along
    the Southwest border, DHS has increased the number of law enforcement
    on the ground from approximately 9,100 Border Patrol agents in 2001 to
    more than 16,000 today. At our Northern Border, the force of 500 agents
    that we sustained 15 years ago has grown to over 2,000.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ As of January 7, 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To combat the threat of TCO drug smuggling activities along the
    Southwest Border between the POEs, CBP relies on a network of systems
    comprising of information, integration, personnel, technology, and
    infrastructure. CBP has deployed sophisticated detection technology,
    including fixed towers, mobile surveillance units, ground sensors, and
    thermal imaging systems to increase the ability to detect illegal
    cross-border activity and contraband and maintains 654 miles of border
    fencing and other tactical infrastructure in key trafficking areas. The
    CBP ReUse effort utilizes Department of Defense (DOD) technologies,
    including aerostat technology, spectrometers, land, air, and maritime
    radar, and night-vision equipment that are not needed by DOD but can be
    used to satisfy critical border security missions with minimal up-front
    costs for DHS. These resources are matched with personnel of various
    skill sets who work with other Federal, State, and local law
    enforcement agencies to interdict TCO drug smuggling operations.
        As part of its efforts to prevent the illicit smuggling of drugs
    and other contraband, CBP maintains a high level of vigilance on
    avenues of egress from our Nation's borders. TCOs deploy a
    sophisticated network of scouts into rough and remote terrain as well
    as highly-populated urban areas along the Southwest Border, making the
    identification and disruption of scout activity highly challenging. CBP
    utilizes predictive analysis, available technology, targeted
    enforcement, and the ability to rapidly readjust counter surveillance
    activities to affect and degrade the ability of scouts to operate in a
    given environment. When the location of a scout is discovered, we work
    quickly to counter the scout's ability to take advantage of major
    vantage points and force spotter displacement or relocation; thus
    forcing them into more costly, vulnerable, and continuous
    reorganization.
        When tunnels are detected and investigated, each U.S. Border Patrol
    (USBP) sector follows established protocols for coordination,
    confirmation, assessment, investigation, exploitation, and remediation.
    The USBP is an active participant in ICE Homeland Security
    Investigations' (HSI) tunnel task forces. Since 2010, CBP has operated
    a Tunnel Detection and Technology Program, to integrate the efforts of
    CBP, ICE, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the
    Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), to address tunnel-related
    activities and technology.
        As an example of further CBP counter tunnel efforts, in March of
    2016, collaboration through the cross-border coordination initiative
    and bi-national tunnel teams led Mexican officials to alert USBP agents
    in Nogales, Arizona, that a tunnel entrance in Nogales, Sonora had been
    located. During their investigation, USBP discovered that the
    incomplete cross-border tunnel extended approximately 30 feet into the
    United States. Since agents discovered the first illicit tunnel in 1990
    in Douglas, Arizona, there have been 195 illicit cross-border tunnels
    discovered--194 along the Southwest Border and one discovered along the
    Northern Border near Lynden, Washington. Investigating a cross-border
    tunnel is a particularly dangerous task that requires an agent to crawl
    into what is usually a dark and confined space of unknown structural
    integrity and the potential to encounter a variety of threats. In some
    of the most narrow, dangerous tunnels, the Nogales tunnel team deploys
    a wireless, camera-equipped robot to investigate the passages. After a
    tunnel is investigated, the passage must be thoroughly remediated, or
    blocked to prevent further use.
    At U.S. Ports of Entry
        To support CBP's evolving, more complex mission since September 11,
    2001, the number of CBP officers ensuring the secure flow of people and
    goods into the Nation through POEs has increased from 17,279 customs
    and immigration inspectors in 2003, to over 21,000 CBP officers and
    2,400 agriculture specialists today. At POEs, the Office of Field
    Operations (OFO) utilizes CBP officer expertise and experience,
    technology, such as non-intrusive inspection (NII) X-ray and gamma ray
    imaging systems, and canine teams to detect the illegal transit of
    drugs hidden on people, in cargo containers, and concealed in
    conveyances (See Exhibit 6 and 8-10).
        As of February 1, 2017, 313 Large-Scale (LS)-NII systems are
    deployed to, and in between, our POEs. In fiscal year 2016, LS-NII
    systems were used to conduct more than 6.5 million examinations
    resulting in more than 2,600 seizures and over 359,636 pounds of seized
    narcotics. NII systems are particularly valuable in detecting concealed
    contraband in vehicles. Two months ago, CBP officers working at the
    World Trade Bridge in Laredo, Texas, referred a driver and vehicle for
    secondary inspection. Using both non-intrusive inspection equipment and
    a narcotics-detection canine, CBP officers discovered and seized 201
    pounds of alleged crystal methamphetamine concealed in fiberglass
    pottery, with a street value of more than $4 million.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-
    seize-more-4-million-crystal-meth-world-trade-bridge.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Personal vehicles are not the only means by which TCOs attempt to
    smuggle illegal drugs. In April 2016, CBP officers used non-intrusive
    inspection equipment to discover approximately 121 pounds of heroin and
    8 pounds of cocaine in a shipping container of vegetables transiting
    from Ecuador to Miami, Florida, through the Red Hook Container Terminal
    in Brooklyn, New York.\5\ TCOs also move drugs--especially hard drugs
    such as heroin and methamphetamine--in smaller quantities to try to
    evade detection. This past December, CBP officers working express
    consignment operations in Cincinnati intercepted a shipment containing
    53.46 pounds of methamphetamines concealed in decorative concrete
    sculptures shipped from Mexico.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-
    seize-approximately-121-pounds-heroin-and-8-pounds-cocaine.
        \6\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cincinnati-
    cbp-seizes-stone-statue-filled-meth.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The OFO National Canine Program (NCP) deploys specialized detection
    canine teams throughout the Nation. OFO's 489 canine teams are trained
    to detect narcotics, currency, firearms, and concealed humans. The
    majority of the canine teams are concentrated in four field offices
    along the Southwest Border. Of those 489 canine teams, 49 of these
    teams also trained to detect firearms and currency. During fiscal year
    2016, OFO canine teams were responsible for the seizure of 533,783
    pounds of narcotics, $38,629,557 in seized property, and $21,530,795 in
    currency seized. The currency/firearms detection canine program was
    also responsible for 154 firearms and 14,000 rounds of ammunitions
    seized.
        Because TCOs are also known to use legitimate commercial modes of
    travel and transport to smuggle drugs and other illicit goods, CBP
    partners with the private sector to provide anti-drug smuggling
    training to air, sea, and land commercial transport companies
    (carriers). The overall goals of these programs and their training
    component are to encourage commercial carriers to share the burden of
    stopping the flow of illicit drugs; to deter smugglers from using
    commercial carriers to smuggle drugs; and to provide carriers with the
    incentive to improve their security and their drug smuggling awareness.
    The Carrier Initiative Program is a voluntary training program directed
    at employees of carriers with route systems that are high-risk for drug
    smuggling. The Super Carrier Initiative Program is for those carriers
    that face an extraordinarily high-risk from drug traffickers.
    Participating carriers sign agreements stating that the carrier will
    exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in securing their
    facilities and conveyances, while CBP agrees to conduct site surveys,
    make recommendations, and provide training. CBP and various carriers
    have signed over 3,800 Carrier Initiative Agreements and 27 Super
    Carrier Agreements.
    In the Air and the Sea
        To advance counternarcotic efforts in the air and at sea, CBP
    deploys capable and effective aerial and marine assets, including
    manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems and strategic and tactical
    aerostats, providing critical surveillance coverage and domain
    awareness (See Exhibit 7). CBP's Air and Marine Operations (AMO)
    employs high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels specifically designed
    and engineered with the speed, maneuverability, integrity, and
    endurance to intercept and engage a variety of suspect non-compliant
    vessels in offshore waters, including the Great Lakes on the Northern
    Border.
        CBP AMO P-3 Orion Aircraft (P-3s) have also been an integral part
    of the successful counternarcotic missions operating in coordination
    with Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). The P-3s patrol in a
    42 million-square-mile area known as the Source and Transit Zone, which
    includes more than 41 nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico,
    Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches to the United States. In fiscal
    year 2016, CBP's P-3s operating out of Corpus Christi, Texas, and
    Jacksonville, Florida, flew more than 6,100 hours in support of
    counternarcotic missions resulting in 129 interdiction events of
    suspected smuggling vessels and aircraft. These events led to the total
    seizure of 87,657 kg of cocaine with an estimated wholesale value of
    $2.5 billion.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013 United States Illicit
    Drug Prices, page 7, DEA-DCW-DIR-012-15, January 2015. 2013 National
    Price Range, Cocaine, Approximately $28,700 per kilogram.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the air domain, AMO detects, identifies, investigates, and
    interdicts potential air threats to the United States including general
    aviation (GA) aircraft involved in the transit of contraband. The Air
    and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), a state-of-the-art law enforcement
    surveillance center, monitors complex airway traffic to identify
    illicit use of aircraft and those attempting to blend in with
    legitimate traffic. CBP's eight Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems (TARS)
    form a network of long-range radars deployed along the border, which
    can identify and monitor low-altitude aircraft and vessels. TARS and
    hundreds of other domestic and international radar data are integrated
    through AMOC, located in Riverside, California, to identify and track
    suspect aircraft incursions. Also, AMO actively participates in
    Operation Martillo, an international counter illicit trafficking
    initiative whereby U.S. and regional partner nations' military and law
    enforcement agencies patrol the air and sea environments in the
    Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific on a year-round
    basis.
                      intelligence and information sharing
        Substantive and timely information sharing is critical in targeting
    and interdicting TCOs involved with drug-trafficking along the
    Southwest and Northern borders. CBP contributes to several initiatives
    to improve and integrate the combined intelligence capabilities of
    multiple Federal entities--including DHS, the intelligence community,
    and DOD--as well as our State, local, Tribal, and international
    partners. For example, CBP participates in the Office of National Drug
    Control Policy-led Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy
    implementation effort, which includes a focus on the improvement of
    intelligence and information sharing among law enforcement agencies on
    the Federal, State, local, and Tribal levels. From the use of labs to
    improved relationships with partners, we are committed to the creation
    of an intelligence and information enterprise for the benefit of all
    those combating drug smuggling. Improved technology and enhanced
    capabilities have expanded the collection, analysis, and dissemination
    of information among law enforcement partners working to dismantle TCO
    networks.
        For example, the CBP Laboratories and Scientific Services
    Directorate uses advanced techniques to provide qualitative
    identification and quantitative determination as well as analysis of
    heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine to assist with
    identifying potential drug smuggling routes. In addition, S&T is
    working to develop, test, and pilot new technology for securing and
    scanning cargo, improving surveillance of the Southern border, and
    enhancing detection capabilities for radar-evading aircraft. S&T is
    also pursuing and fielding new technology to monitor storm drains,
    detect tunnels, track low-flying aircraft, monitor ports, and enhance
    current mobile/fixed radar and camera surveillance systems to increase
    border security. S&T-developed technology recently put into operational
    use at the U.S.-Mexico border includes a new general aviation aircraft
    scanner in Laredo, Texas, and a new Brownsville-Matamoros Rail Non-
    Intrusive Inspection Microwave Data Transmission System.
        CBP also hosts monthly briefing/teleconferences with Federal,
    State, and local partners regarding the current State of the border--
    the Northern Border and Southwest Border--in order to monitor emerging
    trends and threats and provide a cross-component, multi-agency venue
    for discussing trends and threats. The monthly briefings focus on
    narcotics, weapons, and currency interdictions and alien apprehensions
    both at and between the POEs. These briefings/teleconferences currently
    include participants from the government of Canada, the government of
    Mexico; ICE; USCG; DEA; FBI; U.S. Northern Command; Joint Interagency
    Task Force-South; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives;
    U.S. Attorneys' Offices; Naval Investigative Command; State and Major
    Urban Area Fusion Centers; and other international, Federal, State, and
    local law enforcement as appropriate.
        CBP also contributes to the whole-of-Government effort to combat
    narcotics-related threats by sharing critical information on travelers
    and cargo with investigative and intelligence partner agencies to
    identify and disrupt sophisticated routes and networks. Recognizing the
    need for open and sustainable channels to share information with our
    law enforcement and intelligence partners, personnel are co-located at
    the National Targeting Center to support efforts to combat narcotics
    and contraband smuggling by integrating real-time intelligence and all-
    source information into CBP targeting efforts and enforcement actions.
        Information exchange with our partners within the Government of
    Mexico, facilitated by the CBP Attache office in Mexico, has allowed
    for an unprecedented exchange of real-time information through
    deployments of personnel between our countries. Representatives from
    Mexican Customs (Servicio de Administracion Tributaria) are deployed at
    the CBP National Targeting Center in Sterling, Virginia, to share
    information and assist in targeting narcotics and other contraband.
    Likewise, CBP personnel are assigned to Mexico City and Panama under
    the Joint Security Program where we exchange alerts on suspicious TCO
    movements through the monitoring of our Advance Passenger Information
    System.
        Enhancing counternarcotic information sharing in the air and
    maritime environments, the AMOC integrates data from multiple sensor
    sources to provide real-time information on suspect targets to
    responders at the Federal, State, and local levels. AMOC's capabilities
    are enhanced by the continued integration of DHS and other Federal and
    Mexican personnel to increase efforts to identify, interdict, and
    investigate suspected drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains.
                            operational coordination
        A whole-of-Government approach that leverages interagency and
    international partnerships as a force multiplier has been and will
    continue to be the most effective way to keep our border secure.
    Providing critical capabilities toward the whole-of-Government
    approach, CBP works extensively with our Federal, State, local, Tribal,
    and international partners to address drug trafficking and other
    transnational threats along the Southwest Border, Northern Border, and
    coastal approaches. Our security efforts are enhanced through special
    joint operations and task forces conducted under the auspices of multi-
    agency enforcement teams, composed of representatives from
    international and U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies who work
    together with State, local, and Tribal agencies to target drug and
    transnational criminal activity, including investigations involving
    National security and organized crime.
        Under the Department's Unity of Effort initiative, and with the
    establishment of three new DHS Joint Task Forces (JTFs), CBP is
    enhancing our collaboration with other DHS components--specifically ICE
    and USCG--to leverage the unique resources, authorities, and
    capabilities of each agency to more effectively and efficiently execute
    our border security missions against transnational criminal
    organizations, drug-trafficking, and other threats and challenges. The
    operation of the JTFs increases information sharing with Federal,
    State, and local law enforcement agencies and improves border-wide
    criminal intelligence-led interdiction operations to disrupt and
    dismantle TCO operations. CBP, together with our international,
    Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, is committed to reducing
    the risk associated with TCOs by addressing threats within the Southern
    Border and Approaches Joint Operating Area.
        Joint Task Force--West (JTF-W), with CBP as executive agent,
    developed specific security objectives to frame and focus operations
    against prioritized TCOs, including integrating and aligning our
    intelligence capabilities; institutionalizing integrated counter-
    network operations to identify and target TCOs and illicit networks;
    prioritizing investigative efforts to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle
    TCOs and illicit networks; and strengthening international,
    prosecutorial, and deterrent efforts against TCO enterprises and
    significant activity impacting the JTF-W Joint Operating Area.
    Additionally, JTF-W continues to plant the seed for the next evolution
    of border security by targeting priority TCOs and their supporting
    illicit networks in ways never done before. As a result of the joint
    infrastructure that has been established during this past year, JTF-W
    is now able to plan, coordinate, and execute integrated counter network
    operations beyond traditional DHS component operational capabilities
    and the immediate border. The ability to leverage the full spectrum of
    DHS intelligence, interdiction, and investigative efforts has maximized
    consequence application to illicit network members exploiting our
    operational seams, prosecutorial thresholds, and those abusing current
    immigration benefits.
        TCO activity is a global problem and CBP continues to work with our
    international partners, especially the government of Mexico to share
    information and leverage resources to combat this threat. Through the
    21st Century Border Management Initiative, the U.S. Government, and the
    government of Mexico are working to strengthen our collaborative
    relationship and efforts to secure and facilitate the cross-border
    flows of people and cargo. International Liaison Units (ILU) facilitate
    cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement authorities as
    part of a multi-layered effort to target, disrupt, and dismantle
    criminal organizations.
        The Cross Border Coordination Initiative (CBCI) provides an
    operational framework to enhance public safety and degrade and disrupt
    the ability of TCOs to engage in the smuggling of illegal drugs,
    currency, weapons, ammunition, and people. CBP works with the
    government of Mexico to deliver targeted consequence strategy through
    patrols, interdictions, prosecution, investigations, and intelligence.
    In fiscal year 2016, USBP and the Mexican Federal Police conducted
    1,584 coordinated patrols. Additionally, bi-national operations, such
    as Operation Double Threat/Blue Thunder, are innovative and mutually
    beneficial mirrored patrols that are key to border security and safety
    for both countries. Operation Double Threat/Blue Thunder took place
    between USBP and Mexican Federal Police on April 17-30, 2016, in Sonora
    and Nogales, Arizona. During the time of the operation, entries and
    arrests dropped by almost 50 percent in the targeted zone, and 3,504 kg
    of marijuana, 727g of cocaine and 55g of methamphetamine were seized.
        On Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean waters, CBP partners with
    the USCG and the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to conduct maritime operations on
    both sides of the border and maintain a dynamic presence. For example,
    AMO along with DOD's Air Forces North (AFNORTH) have partnered to
    deploy International Air and Marine Operations Surveillance Systems (I-
    AMOSS) to SEMAR locations. This system has proven to be an invaluable
    part of their anti-cartel mission and contributes to CBP/USCG/SEMAR
    joint planning. As such, efforts to expand this capability to other
    SEMAR locations are under way. Moreover, AMO supports SEMAR with
    Operation Albatros, providing maritime patrol aircraft over the Eastern
    Pacific with a SEMAR host-nation-rider on-board acting as a mission
    commander. Albatros patrols target cocaine-laden vessels transiting
    from the source and transit zone to the shores of Mexico.
        CBP is committed to working with the government of Mexico to
    identify and prosecute TCOs, and is working with Mexico Attorney
    General (PGR) to explore additional areas where CBP and the government
    of Mexico can target and degrade TCOs. For example, the Operation
    Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS) is a bi-
    national prosecutorial program with the PGR that is focused on
    combating human smuggling across the Southwest Border, by identifying
    and prosecuting Mexican nationals arrested for alien smuggling in the
    United States. Since the implementation of OASISS in August 2005 to
    October 2016, a total of 2,556 cases have been generated in the United
    States. From these cases, a total of 3,009 principals have been
    presented to the government of Mexico for prosecution, and 2,196 of
    those principals were accepted for prosecution. In fiscal year alone,
    99 criminal cases were generated in the United States with a total of
    111 principals and 70 of those principals were accepted by the
    government of Mexico for prosecution.
        AMOC's coordinating efforts with the government of Mexico and the
    deployment of shared surveillance technology continue to enable the
    government of Mexico to focus aviation and maritime enforcement efforts
    to better combat TCO operations in Northern Mexico and the contiguous
    U.S.-Mexico border. AMOC's joint collaboration with the government of
    Mexico leverages intelligence and operational capabilities to further
    both air and maritime domain awareness. During fiscal year 2016, this
    improved collaboration resulted in 15 Mexico-based seizures, six of
    which were mixed loads of narcotics. Smuggling events involved
    aircraft, semi-submersibles, pleasure craft, and panga-type
    conveyances. The most recent example of these efforts was in October
    2016, when AMOC detected and tracked an aircraft to a landing in Baja
    California, Mexico and alerted Mexican authorities. Mexican air and
    ground forces responded and reported the seizure of a Cessna 206, one
    vehicle, and 504 lbs. of methamphetamine.
        In January 2016, AMO's Tucson Air Branch participated in Operation
    ``El Diablo Express,'' a HSI-led investigation, resulting in a multi-
    agency operation that utilized HSI, DEA, FBI, Arizona DPS, Scottsdale
    PD, other CBP components, and Mexican government agents. The operation
    was designed to combat Mexican drug cartels operating in Sonora,
    Mexico, south of Arizona. AMO air crews were instrumental in escorting
    Mexican Government aircraft and personnel through Arizona airspace on
    the day of mission, and provided real-time information to them as they
    covertly crossed the border back into Mexico to conduct an early
    morning raid on a suspected drug cartel location, leading to multiple
    arrests and seizures.
        It is important to acknowledge the significant strides that Mexico
    has taken in recent years to address transnational organized crime
    generally and narcotics smuggling specifically. Our relationship with
    Mexican counterparts is stronger today than it has ever been and their
    officers face the same challenges and threats that CBP experiences. We
    receive information from Mexican authorities on a daily basis that
    helps us better target narcotics smugglers at the border. In 2016,
    CBP's commissioner participated in a high-level bilateral and
    interagency security cooperation meeting in Mexico City, where senior
    Mexican officials committed to working with the U.S. Government even
    more closely--including expanding efforts to combat heroin cultivation,
    production, and trafficking, and sharing more information on smuggling
    routes and networks. CBP will continue to work in close cooperation
    with our counterparts in Mexico as we seek to identify, interdict,
    investigate, and prosecute TCOs.
                                   conclusion
        CBP, through collaboration and coordination with our many Federal,
    State, local, Tribal, international government, and other partners, has
    made great strides in protecting the integrity and security of our
    borders. The investments over the years in our border security have
    been valuable and have helped shape the current border environment.
    Vulnerabilities have been addressed and this has led to the reduction
    of illicit activity in many areas along the border. CBP continues to
    maintain a vigilant watch on the changing dynamics of border security
    threats.
        With continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our
    partners, will continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness
    of our detection and interdiction capabilities to combat transnational
    threats and the entry of illegal drugs into the United States.
    Furthermore, through the JTFs, we will continue to work with the
    intelligence community and our law enforcement partners to improve the
    efficiency of information sharing with relevant partners, to guide
    strategies, identify trafficking patterns and trends, develop tactics,
    and execute operations to address the challenges and threats posed by
    TCOs to the safety and security of the American public. The
    establishment of JTFs marks a renewed commitment to seek out and
    coordinate optimal, multi-component authorities, capabilities,
    competencies, and partnership expertise to combat all threats to the
    homeland.
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
    of subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
    forward to your questions.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Commander Beeson.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Allen for 5 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF MATTHEW C. ALLEN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR HSI
    INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Allen. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
    Vela, and distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity
    to appear before you today to discuss the threats posed by
    transnational criminal organizations, and the efforts of the
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to identify, target,
    investigate, disrupt, and dismantle these criminal elements.
        Today I will provide ICE's perspective on the sophisticated
    smuggling threats that we face on our Southwest Border, the
    approaches that lead up to our border, and what we do to
    address TCOs and their smuggling activities before contraband
    arrives at our borders and even once it makes it to the
    interior of the United States.
        I have brought with me today a troubling graphic that
    represents the interagency assessment of the areas of influence
    of the major Mexican transnational criminal organizations in
    the United States. I want to thank the Drug Enforcement
    Administration for sharing that and its use today.
        The Mexican cartels, notably Sinaloa, Jalisco New
    Generation, Los Zetas, and the Gulf Cartels, stretch across and
    beyond the Southwest Border, operating through networks and
    loose affiliations with smaller organizations in cities across
    the United States.
        As many of you know first-hand, the Southwest Border is a
    very diverse environment with vast maritime and land border
    areas where the cartels have adapted their methods and the
    cargo to the local environment.
        From an operational point of view, this means that there is
    not a single strategy, tactic, or technology that will succeed
    in eliminating the smuggling threat on every part of the
    Southwest Border.
        To give you a sense of the variety of smuggling challenges
    that we collectively face, it is important to start by talking
    about the specific drug threats such as heroin, fentanyl,
    cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
        Mexican-produced heroin has become the most significant
    drug consumed in the United States. The purity of Mexican-
    produced heroin makes it marketable because it can be smoked or
    snorted, as well as injected intravenously.
        The Mexican cartels have also quickly added fentanyl to
    their inventory in response to the explosion of opioid abuse in
    the United States. The smugglers include fentanyl in contraband
    loads also containing heroin and our methamphetamine,
    reinforcing the poly drug nature of the cartels.
        Mexico is a transit country for South American-sourced
    cocaine, which is most exclusively seized at the ports of entry
    in modified compartments of privately-owned vehicles, or deeply
    concealed within commercial conveyance and cargo shipments.
        The majority of methamphetamine consumed in the United
    States is now produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals that
    come from Asia. Methamphetamine is almost exclusively seized in
    modified compartments of personally-owned vehicles. The second-
    most common method of smuggling methamphetamine is by
    pedestrians.
        Last, marijuana which is cultivated by Mexican cartels,
    makes Mexico the largest foreign supplier of marijuana to the
    U.S. drug market. The majority of the marijuana seized by the
    DHS agencies is seized as it is being smuggled between the
    ports of entry.
        When marijuana is seized at U.S. ports of entry it is most
    often found concealed among commercial cargo. Recognizing that
    the border in Southern California is different than the border
    in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, the cartels adapt their
    smuggling methods to suit a specific area, blending into normal
    traffic in a given area in order to avoid law enforcement
    attention.
        The cartels conduct surveillance on law enforcement
    operations along the border, principally focusing on U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection operations at and between the
    POEs.
        As the Department changes its tactics and techniques or
    introduces new technology and infrastructure, the cartels adapt
    their operations to undermine our border security efforts.
        One of the major factors allowing the cartels to sustain
    their existence and proliferate is public corruption in both
    Mexico and the United States. The cartels rely on corrupt
    Mexican and U.S. law enforcement officials to operate and avoid
    seizures and arrest.
        In response to the smuggling threats along the Southwest
    Border, ICE has assigned more than 1,500 special agents and 150
    intelligence research specialists to our Southwest Border
    offices. Additionally, ICE leads and participates in a number
    of task forces focusing on investigating this criminal element.
        Our relationship with Mexico has also proven to be an
    important partnership in the fight against TCOs. For example,
    taking down the cartels' top leadership as evidenced by the
    recent extradition of Joaquin Guzman Loera, aka El Chapo,
    demonstrates how binational cooperation can affect cartel
    leadership.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
    today and for your continued support of ICE and its law
    enforcement mission. ICE is committed to stemming cross-border
    criminal organizations through the various efforts I have
    discussed today, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Matthew C. Allen
                               February 16, 2017
        Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members:
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
    threats posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and the
    efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to identify,
    target, investigate, disrupt, dismantle, and bring to justice these
    criminal elements.
        ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) leverages its broad
    authority, unique investigative tools, and global footprint to secure
    our borders. We work in close coordination with U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and many other domestic
    and international law enforcement and customs partners to target TCOs.
    Today, I will provide ICE's perspective on the sophisticated smuggling
    threats that we face on our Southwest Border, the approaches that lead
    up to our border and some of what we do to address TCOs and their
    smuggling activities before contraband arrives at our borders, and even
    in the interior of the United States.
                     the cartels along the southwest border
        The primary TCOs that threaten the Southwest Border of the United
    States are Mexican Drug cartels (the cartels). Over the last decade the
    United States, working with our Mexican law enforcement and military
    counterparts, has had sustained success in attacking cartel leaders, as
    evidenced by the recent extradition of Joaquin Guzman Loera, aka ``El
    Chapo'', to face prosecution in the United States. However, every law
    enforcement success against the cartels is challenged by the fact that
    the cartels are highly networked organizations with built-in
    redundancies that adapt on a daily basis based on their intelligence
    about U.S. border security and law enforcement.
        I have brought with me today a troubling graphic that represents
    the interagency assessment of where the various cartels in Mexico
    operate and the ``approaches'' or ``corridors'' that each controls
    along the U.S. Southwest Border. Mexican cartels, notably Sinaloa,
    Jalisco New Generation, Los Zetas, and the Gulf cartels, stretch across
    and beyond the Southwest Border, operating through networks and loose
    affiliations with smaller organizations in cities across the United
    States. The areas controlled by each cartel have evolved over time,
    often as a result of U.S. or Mexican law enforcement successes that
    have weakened cartel influence in certain areas, and as alliances
    between cartel leadership shifts over time.
        In addition to drug smuggling, another criminal threat that we face
    along our Southwest Border is human smuggling. One of the questions we
    are often asked is whether human smuggling organizations are part of
    the cartels or operate as distinct criminal enterprises. Based on HSI
    investigations and intelligence, it is our opinion that, although alien
    smuggling organizations pay taxes and fees to the cartels to smuggle in
    a specific geographic area, they are generally run as distinct criminal
    enterprises in both Mexico and the United States. Certain members of
    these criminal enterprises control the major drug markets and others
    control a portion of the border on behalf of their cartel. We believe
    that these drug cartel leaders and associates play a coordinating role
    in the immediate border areas, dictating when and where human smugglers
    will be allowed to cross the border. This coordination ensures human
    smugglers and their human cargo do not bring unwanted law enforcement
    attention, particularly in the United States, to their smuggling
    efforts. Our investigations have shown that when human smugglers do not
    heed warnings from drug smuggling organizations about where and when
    they smuggle, they can be targeted for physical violence, including
    murder, by cartel members.
                  smuggling trends along the southwest border
        As many of the Members of this subcommittee know first-hand, the
    Southwest Border is a very diverse environment, starting with a
    maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico and on the Pacific Ocean that
    transitions to vast land border areas that include rivers, rural
    agricultural lands and densely populated urban areas along the nearly
    2,000 miles of our border. In response to these vastly different areas,
    the cartels adapt their methods and cargo to the smuggling environment.
    From an operational point of view, this means that there is not a
    single strategy, tactic, or technology that will succeed in eliminating
    the smuggling threat on every part of the Southwest Border.
        Mexico is a major source and transit country for illicit drugs
    destined for the United States, including marijuana, cocaine,
    methamphetamine, heroin, and, more recently, fentanyl. Intelligence
    reports indicate that Mexico is not only a source country for the
    production of fentanyl, it is also a transit country for fentanyl
    originating from Asia. Finally, in the last two decades, Mexico has
    also become the largest transit country for South American-sourced
    cocaine destined for the United States.
        As a result of Mexico's dominant role as either a source or transit
    point for illicit drugs destined for the United States, it has also
    become a primary destination for the illicit proceeds that the cartels
    earn from the distribution networks in the United States. Mexican
    cartels use a variety of techniques to repatriate illicit proceeds,
    from bulk cash smuggling to sophisticated trade-based money laundering
    schemes. Many of the more complex techniques rely on third-party money
    launderers and corrupt financial institutions.
        To give you a sense of the variety of smuggling challenges that we
    collectively face, it is important to start by talking about the
    specific drug threats, smuggling methods, and modes used across the
    spectrum of the Southwest Border.
    Heroin
        Mexico has become the most significant source of heroin consumed in
    the United States, and according to the 2016 National Drug Threat
    Assessment Summary, the U.S. Government estimated that Mexican cartels'
    potential production of heroin was 70 metric tons in 2015, a 66 percent
    increase from 2014. The purity of Mexican-produced heroin has also
    increased over time, making it more marketable because it can be smoked
    or snorted as well as injected intravenously.
    Fentanyl
        The Mexican cartels have quickly added fentanyl to their smuggled
    drugs in response to the explosion of opiate abuse in the United
    States. Based on recent seizures it has been learned that smugglers are
    mixing fentanyl in contraband loads also containing heroin and/or
    methamphetamine, reinforcing the poly drug nature of the cartels. While
    U.S. law enforcement continues to assess how much of the fentanyl
    market in the United States is supported by Mexican-sourced fentanyl,
    the size of individual seizures and the proximity of Mexico to the U.S.
    drug market is a troubling sign.
    Cocaine
        Mexico is a transit country for South American-sourced cocaine.
    Cocaine is almost exclusively seized at Ports of Entry (POEs) in non-
    factory compartments of privately-owned vehicles (POVs). Alternatively,
    the cocaine may be deeply concealed within commercial conveyances and
    cargo shipments.
    Methamphetamine
        The majority of methamphetamine consumed in the United States is
    now produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals from Asia.
    Methamphetamine is almost exclusively seized in non-factory
    compartments of POVs. The second most common method of smuggling
    methamphetamine is by pedestrians who secrete it on their bodies or
    within body cavities. Methamphetamine is seized in both crystalline and
    liquid forms.
    Marijuana
        As I mentioned earlier, the Mexican cartels cultivate marijuana,
    with Mexico being the largest foreign supplier of marijuana to the U.S.
    drug market. The majority of the marijuana seized by DHS agencies is
    seized as it is being smuggled between the POEs. When marijuana is
    seized at U.S. POEs it is most often found concealed among commercial
    cargo shipments.
    Southwest Border Smuggling Methods and Related Challenges
        Recognizing that the border in Southern California is different
    than the border in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, the cartels adapt
    their smuggling methods to suit a specific area. The unifying goal of
    all smugglers is to try to blend into normal traffic in a given area in
    order to avoid law enforcement attention. On a daily basis the cartels
    conduct surveillance of law enforcement operations along the border,
    principally focusing on CBP operations at and between the POEs. As the
    Department changes its tactics and techniques, or introduces new
    technology and infrastructure, the cartels adapt their operations and
    probe our border security to determine the best way to accomplish their
    goals.
    Land Ports of Entry
        At POEs along the Southwest land border, smugglers use a wide
    variety of tactics and techniques for concealing drugs. Our special
    agents work every day with CBP officers from the Office of Field
    Operations to identify, seize, and investigate drug smuggling
    organizations that attempt to exploit POEs to introduce drugs into the
    United States. Within the POE environment there are three distinct
    threat areas exploited by the cartels: Pedestrians; POVs; and
    Commercial Cargo. Pedestrians are primarily used to smuggle cocaine,
    heroin, and methamphetamine on or within their bodies. POVs are used to
    smuggle cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and marijuana,
    often using deep concealment methods like non-factory compartments, gas
    tanks, and other voids. At Commercial POEs, the cartels utilize
    commercial tractor trailers to commingle narcotics with legitimate
    commercial goods or to conceal the narcotics within the tractor
    trailers themselves.
        The cartels also attempt to exploit CBP programs that facilitate
    the expedited entry of travelers and cargo into the United States. CBP
    seizures and ICE investigations have documented smuggling
    organizations' attempts to exploit the Secure Electronic Network for
    Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) and Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
    Programs.
        The cartels also use spotters/scouts and counter-surveillance
    techniques both at and between the POEs in order to increase their
    chances of success in smuggling ventures. Spotters/scouts watch and
    report on border law enforcement activities.
    Between the Ports of Entry
        The cartels use the areas between the POEs primarily to smuggle
    marijuana in bulk. In these areas, the cartels use a variety of
    techniques that are tailored to the terrain and other environmental
    factors. In Texas, the Rio Grande River creates a natural barrier that
    poses unique challenges for the U.S. Border Patrol.
        Outside of urban areas along the land border, one tactic used by
    the cartels is vehicle incursions, or ``drive-throughs,'' whereby
    smugglers breach the border by either going over or through border
    fences. Smugglers move vehicles over the fence using ramps or, on more
    rare occasions, lift vehicles over the fence using cranes. Going
    through the fence involves cutting fence panels and lifting them up or
    creating a gate in the fence allowing a vehicle to pass through.
    Vehicle incursions often rely on networks of scouts that are staged on
    the area's highest points to warn them of U.S. Border Patrol or other
    law enforcement presence.
        In areas where the cartels cannot conduct vehicle incursions, they
    have experimented with ways to throw or launch marijuana bundles over
    the fence to co-conspirators waiting in the United States. Recently, we
    have seen cartel attempts to use air or propane cannons to launch
    bundles of marijuana weighing more than a hundred pounds over the
    border fence.
        Another tactic cartels use in remote areas between the POEs is to
    have backpackers carry bundles of marijuana on their backs using
    improvised backpacks made of burlap or other materials. Backpackers
    often travel in groups and have been known to travel for days before
    getting to pre-designated locations where they are picked up by other
    members of the organization in the United States.
        Smuggling by general aviation aircraft from Mexico has not been a
    significant threat since the late 1990's. However, in the last decade
    we have seen the cartels experiment with the use of ultralight aircraft
    to smuggle marijuana in Arizona and eastern California. More recently
    we have also seen the cartels experiment with the use of small
    recreational drones to smuggle very small quantities of drugs, often
    just a couple of pounds.
        In 1990 the first cross-border tunnel was discovered in Douglas,
    Arizona. Since that time a total of 194 tunnels (both completed and in
    progress) have been located along the Southwest Border, primarily in
    Arizona and Southern California. The discovery of illicit subterranean
    tunnels is evidence that smugglers are moving away from traditional
    smuggling techniques due to enhanced law enforcement efforts. In
    recognition of the significant smuggling threat present in Arizona and
    San Diego, ICE leads two Tunnel Task Forces in San Diego and Nogales
    under the auspices of the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)
    Program, described in more detail below.
    Maritime Smuggling
        As infrastructure, technology, and staffing have been added to the
    border in the San Diego area, we have seen an increase in maritime
    smuggling of marijuana from Mexico to California coastal areas north of
    San Diego. The cartels use pleasure boats or small commercial fishing
    vessels known as ``pangas'' that are able to achieve relatively high
    speeds under the cover of darkness to attempt to evade detection by CBP
    and USCG surface patrol vessels and patrol aircraft. Bulk quantities of
    cocaine are seized along the maritime approaches to our border during
    the transportation phase through either the Eastern Pacific Ocean or
    the Caribbean Sea prior to being broken down into much smaller loads
    for transport along land routes through Central America and Mexico.
    Corruption
        One of the major factors allowing the cartels to sustain their
    existence and proliferate is public corruption in both Mexico and the
    United States. In Mexico, the cartels rely on corrupt Mexican law
    enforcement and other public officials at every level of government to
    operate. U.S. law enforcement is not immune to corruption by the
    cartels, who have used corrupt law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE,
    and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to avoid
    seizures and arrests.
             attacking transnational criminal organizations (tco s)
        In response to the smuggling threat along the Southwest Border, we
    have assigned more than 1,500 special agents and almost 150
    intelligence research specialists to our Southwest Border offices.
        In fiscal year 2016, HSI drug smuggling investigations conducted by
    the five HSI Special Agent in Charge Southwest Border offices resulted
    in 5,659 criminal arrests, 3,941 indictments, 3,383 convictions, and
    330 administrative immigration arrests. We have continued to
    collaborate with our partners in Federal, State, and local law
    enforcement agencies to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and
    dismantle the cartels. The following is a list of the various
    initiatives we use to combat TCOs:
    DHS Joint Task Forces
        In 2015 the Secretary of DHS created three Joint Task Forces (JTFs)
    to address the smuggling threats identified in the Southern Border and
    Approaches Campaign Plan. Two of the JTFs, JTF-East (JTF-E) and JTF-
    West (JTF-W), are geographically-focused task forces that concentrate
    on the southern land and maritime border of the United States and the
    approaches to our border all the way to Central and South America. HSI
    has provided Senior Executives to serve as the Deputy Directors of JTF-
    E and JTF-W, as well as staff-level support in the JTF-E and
    JTF-W Joint Staffs.
        ICE has been designated as the executive agent for the third Joint
    Task Force, Joint Task Force Investigations (JTF-I), with other DHS
    components supporting. JTF-I is a joint, integrated, ``functional''
    task force that has the responsibility of targeting top-tier criminal
    investigations and supporting JTF-E and JTF-W. The success of JTF-I in
    these diverse environments depends upon a high level of cooperation
    among HSI and our Federal, State, local, and foreign partners in
    consolidating resources and leveraging unique international maritime
    authorities in combating TCOs.
    Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
        Our BEST units employ a threat-based/risk mitigation investigative
    task force model that recognizes the unique resources and capabilities
    of all participating law enforcement partners. This model enables each
    unit to apply a comprehensive approach to combating TCOs, while
    recognizing the distinctive circumstances and threats facing the
    various border environments, be it land borders, seaports, or airports.
    Additionally, BEST units are designed to incorporate other DHS-partner
    agencies, including CBP and the Transportation Security Administration,
    and are vehicles for establishing unity of effort, the cornerstone of a
    successful DHS mission. BEST units further solidify HSI's role as the
    primary investigative entity for DHS.
        We continue to expand the BEST program, which currently operates in
    44 locations throughout the United States. BEST leverages more than
    1,000 Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agents and
    officers representing over 100 law enforcement agencies. BEST also
    provides a co-located space that allows for collaboration in conducting
    intelligence-driven investigations aimed at identifying, disrupting,
    and dismantling TCOs that operate in the air, land, and sea
    environments. In fiscal year 2016, the BEST program accounted for 3,710
    criminal arrests, 991 administrative arrests, and prosecutors obtained
    2,248 indictments and 1,923 convictions.
    Money-Laundering Efforts
        The cartels move illicit proceeds, hide assets, and conduct
    transactions globally. Among the various methods cartels use to
    transfer and launder their illicit proceeds are bulk cash smuggling,
    trade-based money laundering, funnel accounts and professional money
    launderers, and misuse of money service businesses (MSB) and emerging
    payment systems. The cartels exploit vulnerabilities in the financial
    system and conduct layered financial transactions to circumvent
    regulatory scrutiny, which presents difficulties for authorities
    attempting to distinguish between licit and illicit use of the
    financial system. HSI has refined our ability to target money-
    laundering and financial violations through various techniques, to
    include interagency investigations, training and capacity-building,
    targeted financial sanctions, and direct engagement with at-risk
    financial institutions and jurisdictions.
        U.S. Anti-Money Laundering laws and regulations impose customer
    identification, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations on covered
    financial institutions that help deter criminals from moving illicit
    proceeds through the financial system. These preventive measures also
    create valuable evidentiary trails for law enforcement to employ during
    an investigation. As such, HSI has an abundance of investigative tools
    in our arsenal to disrupt and dismantle cartel money laundering
    operations as well as to discourage new actors from engaging in illicit
    activity.
        Our National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC), located in
    Burlington, Vermont, generates long-term, multi-jurisdictional bulk
    cash investigations by analyzing incident reports and conducting
    intelligence-driven operational support to field offices. When
    contacted by Federal, State, and local law enforcement for support, the
    BCSC assists that jurisdiction as much as possible by engaging the full
    scope of its law enforcement intelligence data sources and referring
    requests for assistance to local HSI field offices for immediate
    response. Since its inception in August 2009, the BCSC has initiated or
    substantially contributed to over 1,428 investigative leads, which have
    yielded 1,182 criminal arrests, 747 indictments, 546 State or Federal
    convictions, and seizures of bulk cash totaling over $326.5 million.
    HIDTA--High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces
        The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program was
    initiated in 1990 by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
    in order to designate certain geographical areas as having especially
    high concentrations of drug trafficking activities such as
    distribution, transportation, and smuggling. The HIDTA Program provides
    these areas with Federal funding, which supports coordinated law
    enforcement counter drug efforts.
        The ONDCP designates geographic areas as HIDTAs and allocates
    Federal resources to establish formal cooperative law enforcement
    efforts between local, State, and Federal drug enforcement agencies.
    HSI, using its combined immigration and customs authorities, leads
    several HIDTA initiatives along the Southwest Border.
        The OCDETF Program allows our Special Agents to partner and
    collaborate in investigations using our unique and far-reaching
    authorities to enforce and regulate the movement of carriers, persons,
    and commodities between the United States and other nations. We have
    dedicated personnel on all 11 OCDETF co-located Strike Forces. These
    Strike Forces logically extend the OCDETF program beyond the creation
    of prosecutor-led task forces that join together on case-specific
    efforts and then disband at the end of the investigation. Now,
    permanent task force teams work together to conduct intelligence-
    driven, multi-jurisdictional operations against the continuum of
    priority targets. We also participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center,
    which support investigations of TCOs through interagency coordination.
    International Partners and Cooperation
        ICE HSI works closely with our Federal law enforcement and
    international partners to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. We have 63
    offices in 47 countries and are uniquely positioned to utilize
    established relationships with host country law enforcement, to include
    the engagement of Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs).
    These TCIUs are composed of DHS-trained host country counterparts who
    have the authority to investigate and enforce violations of law in
    their respective countries. Since our law enforcement officers working
    overseas do not possess general law enforcement or investigative
    authority in most host countries, the use of these TCIUs enables ICE to
    promote direct action in its investigative leads while respecting the
    sovereignty of the host country and cultivating international
    partnerships. These efforts, often thousands of miles from the U.S.-
    Mexico border in countries like Colombia and Panama, essentially act as
    an outer layer of security for our Southwest Border.
    Working with Mexican Authorities
        Mexico has proven to be an outstanding partner in the fight against
    TCOs, taking down the cartels' top leadership and helping in efforts to
    dismantle these organizations. ICE's attache Office in Mexico City is
    the largest ICE presence outside of the United States. ICE has
    coordinated the establishment of TCIUs in Mexico comprised of Mexican
    law enforcement officers. Through our attache in Mexico City and
    associated sub-offices, HSI assists in efforts to combat transnational
    drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, human smuggling, and money-
    laundering syndicates in Mexico. ICE attache personnel work daily with
    Mexican authorities to combat these transnational threats.
    Additionally, ICE--along with other DHS components--actively works
    through the Department of State to provide training and technical
    assistance to our Mexican counterparts. The spirit of collaboration and
    joint effort between DHS components and our counterparts in Mexico is
    unprecedented.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
    for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission. ICE
    is committed to stemming cross-border criminal organizations through
    the various efforts I have discussed today. I appreciate your interest
    in these important issues.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. McSally. Thank you Mr. Allen.
        The Chair now recognizes Ambassador Arreaga for 5 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF LUIS E. ARREAGA, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
         SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW
             ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Arreaga. Thank you very much. Chairwoman McSally,
    Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
    the Department of State's efforts to combat transnational
    organized crime in the Western Hemisphere.
        With your permission, I have a formal statement which I
    would like to submit for the record.
        As this committee knows well, transnational crime
    undermines our border security, inflicts harms in our
    communities and threatens the rule of law. The Department of
    State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
    Affairs, INL, which I have the honor to represent, leads our
    country's efforts to combat crime overseas.
        We do this by supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies'
    efforts to strengthen the capacity of partner governments'
    criminal justice system. The fact is that we need strong and
    effective partners overseas to combat narcotics and production
    and trafficking.
        We advance our efforts through four partnerships, the
    Merida Initiative, the Central America Regional Security
    Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and our
    long-standing partnership with Colombia.
        Under the Merida Initiative, we are working to strengthen
    the capacity of Mexican institutions to identify, investigate,
    and dismantle criminal networks to uphold the rule of law and
    to protect our shared border.
        Since 2007, the United States has delivered nearly $1.6
    billion in assistance. This includes inspection and detection
    equipment, which is now deployed along Mexico's border, as well
    as training and equipping to enhance the capacity of Mexican
    officials to identify and dismantle clandestine drug
    laboratories and to carry out complex investigations of
    organized crime.
        Our investments, and I emphasize this, have fostered
    unprecedented collaboration between American and Mexican law
    enforcement authorities. In Central America, violence from
    gangs and other drug trafficking criminal networks are driving
    citizens to leave their home in search of safety, opportunity,
    and family living abroad.
        Many travel through Mexico in an attempt to reach the
    United States. Our programs in Central America help governments
    strengthen border security and fight narcotraffickers,
    transnational gangs, and human smugglers.
        In 2016, Central American security units, many of which are
    supported by U.S. law enforcement agencies, reported seizing
    over 116 metric tons of cocaine. On the corruption front,
    Honduras fired nearly 2,000 corrupt police officers, while in
    Guatemala the attorney general is bringing corruption charges
    against former and current high-level government officials.
        In the Caribbean, approximately 10 percent of cocaine
    movement is destined for the United States transit region. Our
    program supports maritime interdiction by training and
    equipping law enforcement agencies in partner countries. In
    2015, reported cocaine seizures in partner countries reached 24
    metric tons, a 152 percent increase over the previous years.
        Let me conclude with Colombia. Colombia remains the world's
    largest producer of cocaine and is the origin of approximately
    90 percent of the amount seized in the United States.
        In light of the troubling increase in coca cultivation
    since 2013, we know that we need to deepen our collaboration
    with our Colombian partners. The good news is that Colombia,
    with our support, has intensified their interdiction efforts.
    In fact, cocaine seizures increased 42 percent in 2016.
        The Colombian government has been our steadfast partner in
    the fight against crime and narcotics since before the start of
    Plan Colombia in 1999. We are confident that this partnership
    will endure.
        Let me close by reiterating our commitment to continue
    working with our partner governments to protect our homeland.
    But it must be said that achieving lasting change will be
    neither easy nor quick. We are encouraged however by results to
    date and remain confident that a sustained investment will
    benefit the security of the United States.
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, again, thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Arreaga follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Luis E. Arreaga
                               February 16, 2017
        Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of
    the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss the work of the Department of State's Bureau of
    International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to combat
    transnational organized crime and drug cartels in the Western
    Hemisphere. As this subcommittee knows well, the United States is
    deeply affected by crime and violence perpetuated by transnational
    criminal organizations, including drug cartels, whose smuggling
    networks undermine our border security, inflict harm in our
    communities, and threatens the stability of our allies in the region.
    Today, the trafficking by drug cartels of illicit fentanyl, heroin, and
    other opioids into this country is fueling a National epidemic with
    fatal consequences. The CDC reports between 2000 and 2015, the rate of
    heroin-related overdose deaths in the United States more than
    quadrupled. The impact of transnational crime is felt, too, by American
    businesses and financial institutions who suffer when crime disrupts
    legitimate commercial sectors, depriving workers of a level playing
    field to compete globally. The cartels that operate today are more
    fluid, more nimble, more diverse than ever before and effectively
    combatting them requires a comprehensive, committed, and well-
    coordinated approach.
        INL leads the Department's efforts to combat transnational
    organized crime by strengthening the capacity of foreign governments'
    law enforcement and criminal justice systems, combatting narcotics
    production and trafficking, and fighting corruption. Our efforts abroad
    complement those of, and are closely coordinated with, the efforts of
    our U.S. interagency colleagues, including those represented here today
    from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
        INL does not approach today's challenges at point zero. Decades of
    experience and lessons learned teach us that eradicating drug crops in
    Latin America, in and of itself, is not sufficient; it must be coupled
    with robust alternative development efforts in order to take hold over
    the long term. In addition, the growing threat of synthetic drugs like
    fentanyl--which are not produced from illicit crops--limits the
    effectiveness of eradication on today's drug threat. Interdiction is
    critical to reducing the flow of drugs to our communities, but
    traffickers adapt quickly and shift their routes and methods. Taking
    down the leadership of cartels and other criminal organizations
    disrupts drug flows in the short-term, but also often exacerbates
    violence and leaves room for criminals to vie for power. To address
    these challenges, INL executes two mutually supportive lines of effort-
    building cross-border law enforcement cooperation and building
    stronger, more transparent criminal justice systems. To deny safe
    havens to criminal networks, INL assistance strengthens governments'
    ability to enforce their laws and to serve as reliable, trusted
    partners to U.S. law enforcement. INL programming throughout the
    hemisphere, including in Mexico, Colombia, Central America, and the
    Caribbean, is guided by this two-pronged approach, coupling law
    enforcement efforts to deny transnational criminal organizations the
    ability to operate, with building stronger, more accountable
    institutions that reduce corruption and bring criminals to justice.
    Building strong, effective institutions capable of confronting and
    stopping transnational organized crime before it reaches U.S. borders
    is a long-term endeavor that requires a sustained commitment. Cartel
    operations today present a complex set of national security challenges
    that do not lend themselves to simple solutions but the strategic
    approach we have put in place provides a solid foundation for
    strengthening security over time.
                                     mexico
        The flow of illicit narcotics across our shared border with Mexico
    threatens citizen security in both countries. Mexico is the primary
    source country for heroin and methamphetamine consumed in the United
    States and a key transit country for cocaine from South America. Since
    2008, under the Merida Initiative, the $1.9 billion appropriated for
    International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding has
    provided training, equipment, and technical assistance to complement
    Mexico's much larger investment in building the capacity of Mexican
    institutions to counter organized crime, uphold the rule of law, and
    protect our shared border from the movement of illicit drugs, money,
    and goods. This includes more than $130 million in fixed and mobile
    non-intrusive inspection equipment and related detection devices
    provided at Mexico's border crossings, checkpoints, and ports of entry,
    and for which CBP, USCG, and ICE provided training and technical
    assistance. INL provided over 500 canines to Mexican law enforcement
    and military units--many of which CBP helped to train--to ensure they
    have a vital, sustainable capability to detect, interdict, and deter
    the illicit movement of illegal drugs, cash, and other contraband
    headed for the United States. Under Merida, INL works closely with ICE,
    CBP, the USCG, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to
    train and equip Mexican law enforcement officials to identify and
    safely dismantle clandestine drug laboratories used to produce
    methamphetamine, heroin, and synthetic drugs and to better track and
    prevent the shipping of precursor chemicals used to manufacture these
    drugs. From April 2014 to September 2015, Mexico seized over 1,346
    metric tons (MT) of marijuana (a 45 percent increase from this period
    2013 to 2014), two MT of opium gum (a 43 percent increase), 26.5 MT of
    methamphetamine (a 74 percent increase), 10.2 MT of cocaine (a 183
    percent increase) and 653 kg of heroin and closed 272 clandestine
    laboratories (a 90 percent increase). Included in these statistics is
    238.9 MT of illicit drugs Mexico seized using equipment and resources
    provided through the Merida Initiative. Mexican security forces have
    also carried out a series of successful raids of methamphetamine
    laboratories in recent months and made significant arrests in
    confrontations with drug trafficking organizations.
        Our programs also strengthen the intelligence analysis and
    investigative capabilities of Mexican law enforcement agencies to carry
    out complex investigations against organized crime. Merida provides
    equipment and training to Mexico's specialized law enforcement units
    that combat kidnapping, money laundering, human trafficking, and
    narcotics trafficking. Strengthening these units diminishes drug
    trafficking organizations' funding sources. Over $300 million of
    targeted assistance via Merida supported Mexico's reforms to its
    justice system across every facet of the criminal justice system,
    including police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections. When fully
    implemented, Mexico's reformed accusatory justice system will more
    effectively reduce corruption and impunity and bring transnational
    criminals to justice. In coordination with Mexican authorities, Merida
    programming continues to expand to address shared challenges. Our U.S.
    investment has fostered unprecedented collaboration with Mexico's
    national security actors to address irregular migration and stem the
    flow of illegal drugs. In partnership with DHS, we are currently
    contributing $78 million to the development of a communications network
    and $75 million to a national biometric system to enhance the ability
    of Mexican officials to apprehend criminals and share critical
    information with U.S. law enforcement before a threat reaches the
    United States. We also partner with ICE and CBP to train and mentor
    Mexican migration and customs officials. Under Merida, the United
    States is an essential partner in Mexico's reform efforts to address
    criminal organizations and insecurity that affect Mexico and the United
    States.
                                central america
        In Central America, gangs perpetuate violence and foster conditions
    that drive people to leave their homes in search of safety,
    opportunity, and family abroad, often traveling through Mexico in an
    attempt to reach the United States. Under the Central America Regional
    Security Initiative (CARSI) as part of our overall Central America
    Strategy, INL programs assist governments in their fight against
    narcotraffickers, transnational gangs, and human smugglers by assisting
    Central American nations in improving investigative and border security
    capacity. The result is a more stable and prosperous Central America.
    We are helping Central American governments seize record levels of
    narcotics and build justice institutions throughout the region which
    are strong enough to prosecute, convict, and imprison criminals. An
    estimated 90 percent of documented northbound cocaine movements transit
    the Central America and Mexico corridor before reaching the United
    States. To target this threat, INL works with U.S. interagency and
    international partners to train, advise, and equip police task forces,
    vetted units, and maritime law enforcement. In 2016, Central American
    governments seized over 116 metric tons of cocaine. Many of the
    seizures were conducted by police units and security forces vetted or
    supported by INL, working in coordination with CBP, ICE, the DEA, and
    FBI. INL is also increasing its partnership with the USCG to more
    effectively interdict maritime routes often used to transport illicit
    goods. Corruption and limited partner government resources and capacity
    continue to pose challenges in the fight against narcotics trafficking
    and other forms of transnational crime, but we are seeing positive
    developments. In Honduras, an INL-supported police vetting program
    dismissed 1,946 corrupt officers, and is continuing to conduct
    investigations. In Guatemala, the Attorney General is bringing
    corruption charges against former and current high-level government
    officials.
        This is a unique moment in our relationship with these countries.
    Goverments in Central America are increasingly willing to work with the
    United States to arrest and extradite drug traffickers. INL will
    continue to leverage this strong political will to effectively target
    the most at-risk people and places, and to help the governments extend
    their presence and services. Drug trafficking is a major source of
    revenue for organized crime groups in Central America and irregular
    migration is again on the rise. INL is addressing the underlying
    conditions driving irregular migration through crime prevention and
    community policing programs, while strengthening border security, and
    disrupting human smuggling and trafficking networks to minimize the
    impact on the U.S. Government and Americans.
                                   caribbean
        Approximately 10 percent of documented cocaine movements from the
    source zone to the United States transit the Caribbean. Through the
    Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), INL supports countries with
    the training and equipping of vetted maritime law enforcement
    interdiction units. These efforts contribute to increased drug
    interdictions, particularly in the waters surrounding the Dominican
    Republic, helping to stop the flow of drugs before they reach the
    United States. Cocaine seizures in all CBSI countries increased 152
    percent, from 9.6 metric tons in 2014 to 24.3 metric tons in 2015.
                                    colombia
        Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine and is the
    origin of approximately 90 percent of the cocaine seized in the United
    States. As cocaine makes the long journey from Colombia to the United
    States, it fuels violence and instability as is passes through the
    transit zones of Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Between
    2013 and 2015, we witnessed a troubling increase in the amount of coca
    cultivated in Colombia--an increase of nearly 100 percent.
    Unfortunately, we expect this updward trend to continue. Working hand-
    in-hand with our Colombian partners, INL assistance supports the
    government of Colombia in its robust interdiction efforts against
    trafficking organizations and criminal networks on land and at sea;
    last year alone, the Colombian government reported seizing 421 metric
    tons of cocaine and cocaine base, a 42 percent increase over 2015, and
    the destruction of more than 4,800 drug labs.
        However, we must do more to combat the tremendous growth of coca
    cultivation in Colombia. Together with our Colombian partners, we must
    increase forced eradication and provide for crop substitution and
    robust rural development. Now, at a time the Colombian government is
    implementing a peace accord with the FARC, we have an important
    opportunity to work with the Colombian government on focused
    counternarcotics support. We understand they are reassigning police and
    military units to increase eradication of coca. To restrict the ability
    of transnational criminal organizations, narcotics producers and
    traffickers from continuing to operate in the rural regions of the
    country, we must also continue our long-term efforts to support the
    expansion of Colombia's rule of law. The Colombian government has been
    our steadfast partner in the fight against crime and narcotics since
    before the start of Plan Colombia in 1999. We are confident that we
    will continue to effectively work together to tackle the considerable
    challenges before us.
                                   conclusion
        Achieving lasting change is not easy, nor quick, but INL has
    programs and partnerships that, over time and with concerted effort,
    work to keep us safer by strengthening the capacity of our foreign
    partners to combat transnational organized crime before it reaches U.S.
    borders.

        Ms. McSally. Thank you Ambassador Arreaga.
        I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions and
    since we started late I am going to start off by yielding to my
    vice chair, Mr. Hurd from Texas, and I will go at the end of
    our colleagues.
        Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Chairwoman. And to our esteemed
    panelists, appreciate you all being here today and for all the
    work that you and the men and women in your organizations do. I
    recognize the difficulty of the task.
        Admiral Ray, my first question is to you. In your opening
    remarks, you talked about how 30 percent of the intelligence is
    action on this high confidence intelligence. What would you
    need to get that number to 100?
        Admiral Ray. Sir, thank you for the question. I don't know
    if we will ever get it to 100, but to raise it to the levels
    that we would like to see it, it is pretty straightforward. You
    need more Coast Guard cutters on the water and the package that
    goes with them, the airborne use of force helicopter, the
    overhead maritime patrol aircraft.
        When you raise that number--right now, our current numbers
    down in that transition region are about 6.0 cutter presence
    and usually we have four airborne use-of-force helicopters. So
    that is why we are able to action the 30 percent to raise it
    up.
        You double that and you would make a pretty good dent. That
    is why our off-shore patrol cutter program which is a
    recapitalization is so important for that.
        Mr. Hurd. Can you give us some context of how it would--you
    know, let us say, you were able to double your resources. How
    long would it take to actually make that operational?
        Admiral Ray. Well, once we put the resources in theater,
    sir, the long pole in the tent is building the ships out. The
    first off-shore patrol cutters we have--with the support of the
    Congress, we have got it on our budget--or excuse me--on
    contract, and she will be commissioned in 2021. That is a fleet
    of 25.
        Now, there are more bills to pay on that, and that is why
    we appreciate your support in advance. Soon as they are
    commissioned we put them down range. That is our highest
    priority mission area or one of our highest.
        Mr. Hurd. We have the folks? We have the people?
        Admiral Ray. Well, they would come with the ships, sir. We
    would be recruiting those and building the forces as the ships
    came on-line.
        Mr. Hurd. Good. Copy. My next question is to Chief Beeson
    and Mr. Allen. My sense is that when it comes to, let us call
    it the ground war, we are having the opposite issue that we
    have on the seas, where the level of intelligence that is
    coming out of the TCOs and the groups operating from in Mexico
    and the rest of Central America can be increased.
        I have always said that when you look at the 19 criminal
    organizations that are operating in Mexico alone, that we are
    not making them a National intelligence priority. Do you
    disagree with that assessment? Would you like to see more NSA
    collection, more CIA collection on the threat in order to drive
    your operations?
        Chief Beeson, I will let you go first.
        Chief Beeson. Thank you, Congressman. We do work with the
    intelligence community to get information. So my experience
    most recently has been as the chief of the Tucson sector and as
    the commander of that task force there in Tucson.
        We have been able to synthesize, if you will, if that is
    the right word, the intelligence that we received from the
    intelligence community and then take action against it.
        We work very closely with Homeland Security Investigations.
    They have personnel assigned to our facility where we handle
    that type of information.
        When there is an interdiction based on that type of
    information that we have been able to do parallel construction
    on and such, we will hand that off to them and they will, of
    course, take it to fruition with regard to the investigation.
        We are always looking for ways to improve on our
    intelligence capabilities and that is something that we
    continue to work at is to get better and better at the
    intelligence.
        Mr. Hurd. Mr. Allen, what would be helpful to improve the
    intelligence collection?
        Mr. Allen. I would, you know, echo Chief Beeson's comments.
    You know, we work on a daily basis with the intelligence
    community. No one is going to turn down any more assistance or
    more information.
        I think our biggest challenge, and I think what we, you
    know, what we are seeing in our investigations that we have
    that I think the ICE could really help us with is what I would
    call network identification and identifying the networks that
    are out there.
        More and more, I think the challenges that we face is the
    ability to kind-of illuminate the network and figure out and
    connect people and events in ways that we could use, you know,
    prosecution.
        I think, you know, there has always been a challenge in
    turning intelligence into evidence because in the end, you
    know, our primary focus is criminal investigations and our goal
    is to present cases for prosecution.
        While it is great to know and there is a not-so-fine-line
    difference between intelligence and evidence, in our world we
    need to be able to turn intelligence into evidence.
        Mr. Hurd. Good copy. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
    Member Vela for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Vela. Thank you.
        Admiral Ray, just want to point out that your personnel
    have been tremendous over the last 4 years, as I have been on
    this committee. There is nothing like seeing it for yourself,
    and they have consistently worked with our office and reached
    out to show us what they do.
        I would just, you know, let you know that with respect to
    our newer Members, to the extent that you can do the same thing
    in the regions that they represent, that it is a very helpful
    experience. Thanks for everything you do.
        I think my first question is for Chief Beeson and Mr.
    Arreaga, and if you could comment, you referred to the
    eradication efforts in Colombia.
        If you could maybe go first Chief Beeson, just generally
    summarize where we are with respect to eradication efforts in
    Colombia and the other two South American countries where we
    see cocaine production? Then maybe briefly comment on that as
    it pertains to poppy production in Mexico.
        Chief Beeson. So the Border Patrol, Customs and Border
    Protection, we are really working on the capability. So what we
    are doing is working to interdict the narcotics, the
    contraband, things like that, that are being smuggled across
    the border.
        We are not heavily involved in eradication and so----
        Mr. Vela. So maybe this is a better question----
        Chief Beeson [continuing]. I am going to punt to the State
    Department.
        Mr. Vela. Yes, I was going to suggest that.
        Mr. Arreaga. Yes. On the issue of coca plantings in
    Colombia, indeed there has been a doubling of the area
    cultivated since 2013. This is the result of a number of
    factors. No. 1, there was a WHO report which the Colombian
    courts used to ask for the end of aerial eradication. That is
    one reason.
        Another very important reason is as our aerial eradication
    continues quite successfully, the coca planters took
    countermeasures to cultivate in areas where aerial eradication
    was made difficult, to plant it in areas where aerial
    eradication was not allowed. But for instance, some of the
    indigenous areas, some of the border areas, some of the
    mountain areas.
        Then the third factor is that we believe the FARC actually
    encourage farmers to plant, anticipating that perhaps there was
    going to be a peace process where coca farmers would be
    compensated for eradicating their crops. So those are the main
    reasons as to why there was an increase.
        Nonetheless, the Colombian authorities are very much
    committed to eradicate manually, to eradicate voluntarily. We
    are in very intense conversations with them to figure out how
    we can support those efforts.
        There is also the interdiction part, but that refers mostly
    to the actual action to produce cocaine.
        Mr. Vela. Well, and in the future, I think what I would
    like to do is explore that issue and compare eradication
    efforts in the other countries and, for example, pocket
    production in Mexico.
        But I will go ahead and move to my next question for Mr.
    Allen, but I think this is something perhaps probably deserving
    of a hearing in and of itself.
        But Mr. Allen, my question for you is how would you, with
    respect to our cooperative efforts in Mexico and with law
    enforcement in Mexico and the United States, how would you
    describe the State of that cooperative effort today? What would
    you like to see in the future?
        Mr. Allen. I think the one word answer is ``good,'' and I
    would expand on it by saying ``growing.'' You know, I talked
    earlier about, you know, our goal being criminal investigations
    and criminal prosecutions.
        The largest HSI presence outside the United States is
    actually in Mexico. That is where we have the largest number of
    agents deployed internationally.
        I think if we are going to become more effective and impact
    the TCOs and the cartels in particular, we need to grow that
    presence and the relationships that we have with the Mexican
    Federal police, with Mexican customs, with the Mexican
    military, and ANOME in Mexico that focuses on migration through
    Mexico to the United States.
        So, you know, we have a good relationship, but we need to
    continue to work to grow it.
        Mr. Vela. Real quickly Chief Beeson, on the trends on the
    TCO chart of the influence of Mexican TCOs across the United
    States, I know it looks like the Sinaloa Cartel has quite a
    presence along the East Coast. Can you tell us about that? How
    do they extend that deeply?
        Chief Beeson. I have got to remember the button. It is
    through the use of networks. They are leveraging their
    networks, the transportation infrastructure.
        Ms. McSally. OK.
        The Chair will now recognize other Members of the
    subcommittee for questions they have for the witnesses. In
    accordance with the committee rules and practice, I plan to
    recognize a Member present at the start of the hearing by
    seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
    recognized in order of arrival.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida.
        Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you panel
    for being here today. Thank you for all the service that you
    have provided in the past and will in the future to keep our
    country safe.
        I want to shift the focus just a little bit though if I
    could? Admiral Ray, you know, we have talked a lot about the
    drugs and the harm that that brings to our country. But also,
    the United States Coast Guard interdicted several migrants from
    former Eastern Bloc countries in fiscal year 2015 and 2016.
        Could you please discuss how it is not just South and
    Central Americans that these cartels are smuggling into the
    United States, but also people from other countries?
        In addition to that, could you address the potential of
    foreign terrorists utilizing these cartels to utilize the
    maritime domain to gain entry to the United States and do us
    harm?
        Admiral Ray. Thank you, Congressman Rutherford. Thank you
    for your years in law enforcement service, sir.
        Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
        Admiral Ray. It is an honor to take a question from you.
    The Coast Guard last year, we interdicted over 6,000 primarily
    Cubans at sea and they were in the straits of Florida and
    certainly in the eastern approaches to Florida. A few, a
    handful over on the West Coast, which was a big year. The
    biggest year since 1994.
        Like I say, it is primarily Cubans. With regards to what we
    call special interest aliens, those from countries associated
    with terrorism, small numbers in the maritime approaches right
    now. You know, less than 20 over the course, each year of the
    last couple of years. So not a great threat vector there at
    present.
        However, to address your, kind-of, the real question is,
    are these transnational criminal organizations capable and
    would they? There is no doubt in my mind.
        They are sophisticated smuggling organizations, which start
    in the southern reaches of our hemisphere, and as the chief
    addressed and the graphics addressed, go all the way to New
    York City. They work for profit, and I don't think they check
    passports before they pick people up. So I think they will do
    anything for a profit.
        We have not seen evidence of terrorist connections right
    now, Congressman. But I don't think anybody is--we must
    maintain vigilance on that. So with that.
        With regards to people from other nations that are not
    special interest, sir, we get them. Just last week, we had a
    boat seized off of the Bahamas en route to the United States
    that had a dozen Chinese people on-board.
        Mr. Rutherford. Well.
        Admiral Ray. So the tales of these migrants that come from
    all over the world trying to get to America, there are plenty
    of them.
        Mr. Rutherford. See, and I think the potential, Admiral,
    highlights the fact that Mr. Hurd brought up earlier about the
    gap that is created between our abilities now and the
    recapitalization of the fleet and your capabilities down the
    road. We certainly have a gap there.
        That is one reason I want to salute, Madam Chairman, the
    United States Navy who made the decision just yesterday to
    locate the MQ4C Triton Program in Jacksonville at the Mayport
    Naval Station, which will give us that unmanned aerial vehicle
    capability that I hope will certainly be used to fill some of
    that gap that was created when the Navy did away with their
    frigate program which, you know, certainly increased the gap.
        So, I bring that up to also ask, kind-of following up on
    Mr. Hurd's question, I know that the President has made it
    clear that one of his top priorities will be rebuilding the
    Navy to 350-plus ships but I believe this effort also should
    include the U.S. Coast Guard. That is why I think you are here
    today.
        As Secretary Kelly told us during the full committee
    hearing, many of your ships are very, very old. In fact the
    Valiant in Jacksonville, I think, is 50 years old. But one of
    those ships--can you give us your--I know you talked about this
    a little earlier but, how long will it be before we get those
    25? Is that wasn't the 2019 you were talking about, correct?
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Well, thanks for the question. The
    off-shore patrol cutter, we have got them under contract now,
    and it is a multi-year contract. The first one is supposed to
    be commissioned in 2021.
        So we are maintaining our medium-endurance cutters. As you
    said, some of them, in fact, almost all of them are older than
    the parents of the young men and women that are serving on
    them. That is just kind-of a data point.
        So we have got other medium-endurance cutters that are
    averaging in the 35-year length. We will be able to stretch
    those out for another 15 years until we get on-board. That is
    why our off-shore patrol cutter is so important to get back in
    service, or to get in service.
        Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. I certainly hope that the Triton
    program will be of great assistance to you as well.
        Thank you Madam Chair, and I yield back.
        Ms. McSally. This Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa from
    California for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all,
    gentleman, I appreciate your being here today. I represent
    Southern California. I am a father of four children. So to me,
    drugs and keeping that poison away from our children is top
    priority. I have been blessed. My children have avoided those
    scourges, but a lot of my neighbors have not.
        You know, drugs are something we can all agree on stopping
    from getting to our communities. Yet as I look at our Mexican
    border, when I was State senator I chaired the California
    Mexico Select Committee. You begin to realize the tremendous,
    huge trading partnership that we have with Mexico, our biggest
    or second-biggest trading partner that we have in the world.
        That border is the most traveled cross-border in the world.
    I have always advocated for smart borders, meaning you can
    check folks, you can check merchandise before it gets to the
    border so we can make sure things flow smoothly, effectively,
    and we stop the negativity.
        Vice Admiral Ray, you said something that really bothered
    me, and that is that you had intelligence on 500 events--500
    events--and you did not have the assets to stop them from
    possibly reaching our shores. So I am going to repeat the same
    question that has been asked of you is, what do you need and
    where?
        As I look at that chart on the side, I look at those red
    lines. Given that Colombia is now at peace with FARC, I think
    those red lines are going to get thicker in the very near
    future. So where do you need those assets? Do you need them in
    the United States or do you need them somewhere in Latin
    America to stop all of that cocaine production from coming in
    to our shores?
        Admiral Ray. Thank you, sir. Those assets would be based in
    the United States, hopefully in one of your districts, and they
    would sail from there and go anywhere we need them. But
    primarily right now where we need them and where they could be
    most effective is in that area between South America and
    Central America.
        You know, that is a huge area. It is as big as the
    continental United States. So covering that is difficult.
    However, with the intelligence we have now that is what let us
    know who is out there.
        We know on a given morning, and we do this on a 24-hour
    cycle and we create these packages, and we know who is there,
    who we can get after. Of those, we literally had to let 580 of
    them--we couldn't take a pass at them because we didn't have
    sufficient assets.
        So as I have mentioned to Congressman Rutherford earlier,
    or Congressman Hurd about doubling down on the amount of assets
    we have in that transit zone, that is how you get after them.
    That is how you affect them.
        Mr. Correa. So that would be your priority, sir, in terms
    of investment.
        Mr. Allen, you also mentioned that you have a tremendous
    working relationship or a better working relationship with the
    Mexican government.
        A number of years ago I had the opportunity to go down to
    Mexico City and look at one of their central intelligence
    monitoring stations where they were looking at almost every
    vehicle coming across their Southern Border. That information
    would be digitalized, sent to Mexico City, and I presume that
    was sent eventually to Langley, Virginia.
        My question is what else do you need? What is it that we
    need to do to increase, enhance our partnership with Mexico to
    make sure that these drugs don't reach our shores and our
    borders?
        Mr. Allen. Well, as I said, and I think, you know, building
    the capacity of Mexican agencies and, you know, increasing the
    rule of law in Mexico is a key part of that. Our role is a
    liaison role and increasing our footprint in Mexico and making
    sure that we can have good, productive relationships with our
    Mexican----
        Mr. Correa. So what do you need from us to do that?
        Mr. Allen. More people. You know, one of the things we
    haven't talked about today is the, you know, the President's
    Executive Orders which calls for 10,000 more ICE employees.
    Some of those, I think, if the Secretary gets his way, will be
    special agents. Our plan would be to deploy some of those
    outside the United States.
        So coming up----
        Mr. Correa. Outside the United States and within Mexico and
    other countries as well?
        Mr. Allen. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Mr. Correa. Final question to Chief Beeson. In terms of
    folks, people of interest, do you have a number of how many of
    those have been apprehended crossing the Southern Border versus
    the Northern Border?
        Chief Beeson. So when we talk about--we would use the term
    ``special interest alien.'' We are looking at folks and their
    travel patterns, where they have been, that would lead us to
    have some concern about those individuals.
        So that is information that we do keep. I do not have it
    with me here today, so I would have to take that back for the
    record.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you.
        Madam Chair.
        Ms. McSally. OK. The Chair now recognizes myself for
    questions.
        Chief Beeson. Director Allen, I mentioned in my opening
    statement a sophisticated drive-through operation that was
    recently broken up in Cochise County, Arizona.
        According to press accounts anyway, looks like they
    successfully smuggled large quantities of drugs through Arizona
    for years, not days or weeks or months, but for years before
    they were actually caught.
        These drive-through operations are something that I hear
    from my constituents and border residents often about. We have
    seen encrypted communication, you know, special code words,
    other tactics to avoid detection.
        The last breach that I personally saw on the border was
    where they used pretty sophisticated blowtorch and, you know,
    welding equipment to be able to cut through, basically, a gate
    in the barrier with hinges.
        So they were able to prep that in advance through their
    spotters and scouts. They knew when they weren't going to be
    detected or where they weren't going to be detected.
        If you actually went by it, you wouldn't be able to see the
    breach. But then at the time and place of their choosing, they
    open it up, put the ramp, drive through, shut it, and go
    through essentially undetected.
        So just giving that case study of them being able to
    conduct these operations for years in Cochise County, do you
    think this is the level of sophistication is like the new, you
    know par, this is the new normal for cartel operations?
        Are there additional tools or authorities that we need to
    give you in order to detect and interdict these types of
    operations so they don't go on for years before they are
    detected?
        I congratulate them being rolled up and a number are being
    prosecuted right now, but, you know, what could we learn from
    it and do you need any additional tools or authorities?
        Chief.
        Chief Beeson. So we do have this phenomenon, if you will,
    of the drug trafficking organizations and their smuggling. They
    certainly are very sophisticated in their approaches.
        They have the benefit of time. So they have got plenty of
    time to wait and seek the right opportunity to engage in their
    illegal activity.
        They use scouting networks, as you have mentioned. They
    utilize encrypted communications. They are utilizing, of
    course, these vehicles, sometimes very rudimentary vehicles. It
    looks like a car carrier, and then they just use it to ramp
    over the fence.
        For us to combat that, we are continuing to work on
    situational awareness, making sure that we are improving our
    detection capabilities along the Southwest Border.
        Very critical for us to continue to engage with our law
    enforcement partners, certainly with Homeland Security
    Investigations to make sure that we are all sharing the same
    information, know about who the networks are, who is operating
    in the area.
        Then, of course, getting information from the intelligence
    community that is going to provide us with the pre-event intel
    so that we can take action against these folks as they are----
        Ms. McSally. Are there any, and I know we have been out
    there visiting. Are there any additional tools specifically
    related to or authorities related to intercepting or cracking
    the encrypted comms? Or you know, we introduced a bill last
    Congress related to the scouts, that oftentimes, when you roll
    them up, you can't prosecute them for anything unless you can
    tie them to a specific drug load.
        So we made that a Federal crime. It didn't make it into
    law, but we are going to keep pushing that issue. But are there
    any additional tools or authorities you would need in order to
    get out in front of their decision loop and their techniques?
        Chief Beeson. So we have had some success against scouts.
    As you mentioned, we have been able to prosecute some of them.
    It does require some effort, right? I mean, good solid police
    work to sit there and investigate and do that. We are certainly
    happy to do that and do that very well, I think.
        We have been having what I think is a really good
    relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Office in terms of being
    able to present these cases and for them to take a prosecution
    on individuals that really don't have any narcotics with them
    but they are still able to prove conspiracy and take those
    cases.
        We are going to continue to plug away on technology,
    certainly on the tactical infrastructure, the barriers, and we
    need to keep applying those things to really improve the
    situational awareness that we need along the border.
        Ms. McSally. Mr. Allen.
        Mr. Allen. You know, the one thing I would add to Chief
    Beeson's picture there is the foreign piece. There was a very
    good example last year, just south of your district, or in your
    district but on the Mexican side where by having a good
    relationship with our Mexican counterparts we were able to make
    sure that the border was not actually a barrier.
        When we had information about a failed drive-through or a
    drive-through that had been thwarted, we were able to cue
    Mexican law enforcement to go and take law enforcement action
    on the Mexican side.
        I think that is another piece that we need to continue to
    work on to make sure that, you know, when we do develop
    intelligence about a drive-through, you know, if we can't
    action that on the U.S. side of the border we can action it on
    the Mexican side.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Can I follow up on that? In all of your
    testimony, most of your testimonies, you talked about better
    coordination with authorities in Mexico, yet endemic
    corruption, you know, through their government and law
    enforcement.
        How do you balance those two and cooperating but not
    tipping them off related to the elements of corruption that
    would be involved in your partner agencies?
        Mr. Allen. I will start on that. Some of it, you know,
    first of all, you have to go in with your eyes wide open. You
    have to, you know, acknowledge right up front that corruption
    is a challenge. But some of it comes down to who you talk to
    and where and at what level of government.
        Our best relationships are often in Mexico City away from
    the border. As an example, to kind-of demonstrate how important
    that can be, last year HSI and CBP and State and local law
    enforcement authorities in Arizona did a somewhat unprecedented
    operation in which we identified targets in northern Sonora
    that we had--or indictments on, in the United States and we
    wanted to go get.
        We enlisted the support of the Mexican Federal Police and
    got them to send more than a hundred law enforcement officers
    and stage on the U.S. side of the boarder, in Arizona and
    conduct, frankly, an air mobile assault into Mexico from the
    United States, fully armed, coordinated amongst all the U.S.
    agencies from the State Department through all law enforcement
    very successfully.
        It was not compromised because we worked with, you know,
    U.S.-trained, U.S.-vetted law enforcement units that made that
    possible. I think that is the way we want to continue to move.
        Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. I will have another round of
    questions, but my time has expired.
        So the Chair now recognizes Ms. Barragan from California
    for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service, and thank you for
    being here today.
        I want to start with you, Vice Admiral Ray. There has been
    a lot of talk of building a wall on the Southern Border and
    investing $25 billion or so in it. If that is done, do you
    think that is going to increase and shift more focus onto the
    seas and our maritime ports of entry?
        Admiral Ray. I think there is a highly likelihood of that,
    ma'am. You know, we found that when determined, illegal
    traffickers meet a hard barrier on the land then there is a
    percentage of them that will go to sea and try their hand
    there.
        We see it on both sides of the country when it comes to
    illegal smuggling and when it comes to human trafficking. So I
    think there is a reasonable potential for that.
        Ms. Barragan. You also testified about if you had resources
    it may be a good place to put it in the seas between, I guess,
    the United States and Central and South America.
        What about, do you foresee any increased threats coming
    into the west side of the U.S. coast? Or is there a greater
    need down in that area----
        Chief Beeson. Well----
        Ms. Barragan [continuing]. That you mentioned?
        Chief Beeson. We would do both, ma'am, in answer to your
    question. We have an on-going operation just south of Los
    Angeles between, well, from San Diego north, called Baja
    Tempestad, where we work with our partner agencies.
        We have had a big effect and quite a few seizures of
    marijuana trafficking going along there and illegal smuggling.
    We have been doing that on-going for the last 4 years.
        So that is an on-going right at our border, operation. When
    I talk about the down-range, further down closer to Central
    America, that is where we have the effect because that cocaine
    is bound for Central America where it causes all the unrest and
    criminal activity.
        It is just fuel for the fire there in those violent
    countries. That is what drives the young people out of there.
    That is why they show up on our border. So it is both of those.
        Ms. Barragan. Great. The last question I have is for
    everybody. We have been hearing a lot from--all the panelists
    talk about the importance of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, the
    importance of the role they play in helping us address and deal
    with the drug cartels and the criminal organizations.
        Yet we have been hearing from this administration lots of
    talk about building a wall, about having Mexico pay for the
    wall, even about talks of a possible tariff of 20 percent on
    Mexico. One of my concerns is all this talk is going to weaken
    the cooperation between the United States and Mexico, having us
    become more of a--less of a partner, I should say, between the
    two.
        Can you comment on what would be the impact if we had that?
    If we had the United States and Mexico weaken the cooperation,
    what that will do on the impact to the drug cartels and us
    having the ability to fight that threat?
        Chief Beeson. So I will just say that, you know, I have
    been doing this job for a long time now, you know, over 30
    years. It is certainly we have enjoyed throughout the course of
    that time what I think is a good relationship with the
    government of Mexico. That relationship has gotten better and
    better and better throughout the years.
        We have a number of operations, as the ones that Director
    Allen mentioned, we engage with local authorities on a regular
    basis to address border violence, to address cross-border
    communication so that we both understand what the threat is
    that is operating in that area because we both want a secure
    border.
        We look forward to continued relationship with the
    government of Mexico. It is important for us. What we are doing
    from a law enforcement perspective is paying dividends on the
    border security front.
        Ms. Barragan. Chief, so just so I want to make sure you
    answer my question, and that is, what will the impact be if
    there is less cooperation with the United States and Mexico?
    Because I understand what you are saying. I completely agree
    with you.
        My concern is that a lot of the rhetoric we are hearing
    from this administration only leads to less cooperation. I want
    to know what the harm will be on less cooperation to this
    fight, this very important fight, against the drug cartels and
    the criminal organization. Can you address what that impact
    might be?
        Mr. Allen. You know, I think the short answer is that it
    would hurt it. But I think, as Chief Beeson has mentioned, and
    I think our experience would illustrate as well, you know, we
    have weathered similar storms before in our relationships.
    Fortunately we deal very well, law enforcement to law
    enforcement, with our Mexican counterparts.
        So we have not seen any degradation in our relationship. I
    think we will be able to soldier on and make our way through
    it.
        Mr. Arreaga. I agree with my fellow panelists. We have not
    detected any deterioration, but naturally we work on the basis
    that partner governments want to work with us. Without it, we
    couldn't accomplish much.
        Ms. McSally. OK. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
        The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Demings from Florida.
        Mrs. Demings. Thank you very much, Chairwoman.
        To all of you, thank you so much for your service, but not
    just to you, but to the men and women who also serve with you.
        Mr. Allen, we have heard quite a bit of talk, and I do
    believe we have a very strong relationship with Mexico. I am
    thankful for that. But what about our working relationship with
    your counterparts in Central America? Could you talk a little
    bit about that?
        Mr. Allen. Absolutely. While we definitely have focused a
    lot on our relationship with Mexico, you know, HSI has attache
    offices throughout Central America and into South America. A
    lot of the same relationships that we enjoy with our Mexican
    law enforcement counterparts we also share with our Central
    American and South American counterparts.
        In my written testimony one of the things we talk about are
    our transnational criminal investigative units where we work
    cooperatively with U.S.-trained investigators from host
    countries that allow us to project our priorities and our
    authorities into the areas that provide that land bridge to the
    United States, whether it is drug trafficking or illegal
    migration.
        And we see those relationships as just as important as our
    relationships with our Mexican counterparts because, in the
    end, the further we can push out that border and identify bad
    things or bad people that are coming to the United States, the
    better off that we are by pushing out that border.
        Mrs. Demings. What do you think can be done to better
    improve or enhance that relationship? You talked about the
    number of agents that you have on the ground in Mexico. What
    could be done to enhance that relationship in Central and South
    America?
        Mr. Allen. I would say continuing to help them build their
    capacity, you know, working with the Department of State, in
    particular INL, who often funds a lot of our relationships and
    that the U.S. training that we provide to our foreign
    counterparts is often funded through INL.
        So increasing that, the ability to help them improve their
    capabilities which, in turn, helps us protect our border is a
    key part of that relationship.
        Mrs. Demings. OK.
        Chief Beeson, in previous years, many agents have
    complained or requested communication systems that would allow
    them to better communicate and share information with their law
    enforcement partners. Is this still a challenge for you? If so,
    what can be done to improve communications, intercommunications
    between those partners?
        Chief Beeson. We work, I think, very hard at improving
    relationships with our law enforcement partners. I mean, this
    is really, for us, we look at it as a whole-of-Government
    approach. We want to make sure that law enforcement agencies
    that are able to work with us on these border security issues,
    that we have got good communication.
        We will engage in task force operations with them.
    Oftentimes, those task forces are led by Homeland Security
    Investigations. We will--of course we do have car-to-car
    communications, you know, assuming that our radios are
    compatible. There are still from time to time, some challenges
    with compatibility on radios.
        Oftentimes we are able to overcome that now, especially
    nowadays with the advent of cell phones and things like that.
    Always working on ways to improve communication.
        We enjoy what I think is a very good relationship with the
    law enforcement community and something that we look forward to
    continuing in the years to come.
        Mrs. Demings. Have you had any challenges with the security
    of the communications?
        Chief Beeson. So our communications are encrypted and so we
    are continually assessing the viability of the encryption and
    looking forward to, you know, we want to make sure that they
    remain that way.
        We do lose radios from time to time or they get stolen.
    Generally when that happens we are able to inhibit the radios
    and as long as we are aware that that has happened, but that is
    something that we are always looking at.
        Mrs. Demings. OK. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Ms. McSally. The gentlelady yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Katko from New York for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Katko. I appreciate the Chair for allowing me to come
    in and ask a few questions here.
        I want to thank the panel for being here. I started out my
    career as a Federal organized crime prosecutor in El Paso,
    Texas. I saw first-hand on the border the profound problems
    that we confront. I finished my 20-year career on the Northern
    Border.
        My concern, at times, is that, well, there is not enough
    attention being paid to the Northern Border. There have been
    some recent articles to that effect, that everyone is focusing
    on the Southern Border and no one is really paying attention to
    the Northern Border, at least from our standpoint. I am not
    saying law enforcement--from our standpoint.
        I can tell you, the Northern Border is largely a sieve. We
    have an Indian reservation in the northern district of New York
    that straddles both sides of the border and is involved in
    hundreds of millions of dollars a year, at a minimum, in
    cocaine and marijuana trafficking and smuggling of aliens.
        Many people view the Northern Border as far more vulnerable
    to a terrorist infiltration than the Southern Border.
        With that being said, I would just ask that at some point
    that the Chairman maybe schedule a hearing so we can dedicate
    an entire hearing to the Northern Border issues, because they
    are profoundly different than the Southern Border. But they do
    merit more attention.
        I am a Chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee for
    Transportation Security. As we saw this week, there are still
    gaping holes in the drug trafficking components at our
    airports.
        We saw a case in Puerto Rico that has spanned now more than
    a decade, and they smuggled more than 20 tons of cocaine onto
    aircraft from Colombia through Puerto Rico into the United
    States. That, to me, is a profound problem, and that is another
    border-type issue.
        So for Director Allen, as you are well aware of this
    instance, I would like to hear from HSI as to whether you have
    enough resources to fund these types of investigations at our
    Nation's airports. That is not the first time we have had this
    at the airports with HSI, and I am concerned about that.
        Second, how can TSA or the FBI or other State and local
    partners better support your efforts? I don't want FBI to be at
    odds with you, running separate investigations at airports. I
    want you to coordinate better with Homeland Security. So if you
    could answer that, I would appreciate it.
        Mr. Allen. Sure. Well, I will probably not talk about the
    Puerto Rico investigation since it is a pending prosecution. I
    am happy to talk about what we often refer to as internal
    conspiracies, whether they be at airports or seaports and
    looking at that insider threat.
        You are correct. They present a tremendous challenge for
    law enforcement and everything from a counterterrorism point of
    view, the ability to get a firearm or other explosive device
    onto an aircraft by using an insider threat certainly falls
    well within the scope of our counterterrorism responsibilities
    at the Department.
        But from a drug trafficking point of view as well, we are
    well aware that drug trafficking organizations want to use that
    inter-State ability to move commercially to get their products
    from point A to point B.
        In terms to your question about resources and our ability
    to work on that challenge, the vehicle that we use for that is
    the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces. We have been
    expanding the BESTs, as we refer to them. We have now----
        Mr. Katko. Yes, I helped stand one up on Massena, New York
    before I left.
        Mr. Allen. Exactly, yes. So we now have four airport-
    focused BESTs, one of them in Puerto Rico, that are chartered
    to focus on that internal conspiracy threat.
        Our goal would be to expand them and increase the number of
    BESTs we have around the United States that can focus both on
    the physical land border, but also on other chokepoints, in
    this case in airports and seaports.
        Mr. Katko. What about, I know FBI, for example, the FBI has
    headed up some major operations Nation-wide. The example was
    the Dallas-Fort Worth case where--that was a multi-airport case
    there. How would you, kind-of, make FBI's efforts jibe with
    yours better, if you could?
        Mr. Allen. I think, for us, that all comes down to, you
    know, coordination and deconfliction. I think one of the things
    that I have seen change in my career, certainly accelerated
    after 9/11 and a huge transformation in Federal law
    enforcement, is the willingness and openness of agencies to
    coordinate and deconflict investigations.
        I think as long as all of us are doing that and we know
    that someone is working an issue and that if resources are
    needed from the Bureau or the Bureau needs resources from any
    of the DHS components, that we are standing by to do that. As
    long as we are talking and coordinating and deconflicting our
    investigations, we are on the right track.
        Mr. Katko. Thank you. Very quickly, I have 20 seconds so I
    can't help it, but I am going to have to ask a Northern Border
    question of the Vice Admiral, and that is the Shiprider Program
    which you use up on the Northern Border has been, I think, a
    very good success.
        You marry the Canadian law enforcement with American law
    enforcement. I think it is a good way to patrol the Great Lakes
    and the St. Lawrence as best you can. How is that program
    doing? Is there any discussion about possibly expanding it?
        Admiral Ray. As you stated, sir, that program is doing
    great. They have done about 900 boardings since that has been
    stood up, several arrests. It closes seams on the border with
    the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who are real proud of it: St.
    Lawrence, Great Lakes, and also out in Puget Sound.
        What it needs is more people and that is really what it--
    you know, operations and maintenance money. There is not a--it
    is boarding team members, carrying a gun, being trained, and
    operating with the Canadians, and that is what we are short of.
        Mr. Katko. I appreciate that, and hopefully we can have
    another hearing on this if the Chairman is so inclined.
        I just wanted to note two things for the record here. These
    are reports on FBI, two articles, one recently, titled ``FBI
    Reports Show Terror Suspects Coming from Canada While Trump
    Stares at Mexico.''
        The other one is from The Daily Caller, another article
    about illegal refugees are now streaming across the Quebec/New
    York border. That was recently done this week. I ask both of
    them be entered into the record.
        Ms. McSally. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]
              Article Submitted For the Record by Hon. John Katko
    FBI Reports Show Terror Suspects Coming From Canada While Trump Stares
                                   at Mexico
    Jana Winter 02.07.17 1:13 AM ET
    http://www.thedailybeast.com/fbi-reports-show-terror-suspects-coming-
            from-canada-while-trump-stares-at-mexico
    Documents reviewed by The Daily Beast show way more suspected
            terrorists encountered at the northern border than at the
            southern one. Why is Trump so eager to build a wall down there?
        Donald Trump keeps talking about the threat from the U.S.-Mexico
    border. But he may be looking in the wrong direction. FBI reports
    reviewed by The Daily Beast reveal that far more suspected terrorists
    try to enter the country from the northern border with Canada than from
    the south.
        Seven FBI Terrorist Screening Center ``monthly domestic encounter
    reports'' dating from April 2014 to August 2016 detail the number,
    type, and location of encounters with known or suspected terrorists
    across the United States. The encounters are based on information in
    various watchlist databases. In all seven reports, the numbers of
    encounters at land border crossings were higher in northern states than
    southern.
        ``We are looking the wrong direction,'' said a senior DHS official
    familiar with the data. ``Not to say that Mexico isn't a problem, but
    the real bad guys aren't coming from there--at least not yet.''
        On Monday, press secretary Sean Spicer told reporters he would not
    disclose evidence behind the President's claims that jihadis are
    ``pouring'' into the country. ``I'm not going to get into specific
    information that the President has,'' he said.
        The FBI reports obtained by The Daily Beast provide data on known
    or suspected terrorists attempting to enter the country, or who are
    already in the United States.
        These reports show hundreds of watchlisted passengers encountered
    on domestic flights--meaning they are already in the country--and a
    smaller percentage crossing the border over land.
        Those encounters are reported back to the FBI's Terrorist Screening
    Center and used to compile the monthly domestic encounter overview
    reports, which are classified ``Law Enforcement Sensitive.''
        Newly installed Department of Homeland Security Secretary John
    Kelly traveled to Texas last week to survey the border in the Rio
    Grande Valley with local law enforcement. He is scheduled to testify
    Tuesday morning at a House Homeland Security Committee hearing on
    threats to the southern border.
        But the FBI data shows concerns about terrorists crossing into the
    U.S. from Canada may be a more immediate concern, or is at least worthy
    of considerable attention, according to border and Congressional
    officials.
        ``We often hear about security concerns on the southern border, but
    bad actors intent on entering our country will always seek the path of
    least resistance, so we must have the necessary tools and resources to
    secure both the northern and southern borders,'' Sen. Gary Peters (D-
    MI) said in a statement to The Daily Beast.
        In August 2016, for example, more than twice as many watchlisted
    individuals were encountered at land border crossings in northern U.S.
    border states than in all states on the Mexican border combined.
        The reports do not say whether the land border crossings were
    attempts or successful entries into the United States. (Being
    watchlisted does not necessarily prevent you from entering the
    country.) The people documented in these encounters can include people
    holding valid visas, applying for asylum, or caught between ports of
    entry by U.S. law enforcement.
        From Aug. 1 to Aug. 31, 2016, the Terrorist Screening Center
    recorded 538 encounters with known or suspected terrorists in the U.S.
    or at its borders. That includes incidents on domestic and incoming
    international flights, at land and maritime border crossings, during
    law-enforcement investigations, at Customs and Border Protection inland
    checkpoints, and in the process of administrative work including
    vetting for visa and refugee applicants.
        Of those, only 68 happened at land borders. Michigan alone had 26
    such encounters; New York had 17. Arizona and Texas had none at all--
    even Vermont and Washington state had more--and California had 19.
        FBI Terrorist Screening Center monthly reports from 2014 and 2015
    tell a similar tale. New York, Michigan, and Washington have the most
    encounters with suspected terrorists at land border crossings. North
    Dakota and Vermont encounter one or two per month on average. The
    numbers at the southern border were comparatively small. In April 2014,
    for example, there were 12 border encounters in California and Texas
    combined and 17 in Washington, New York, Michigan, and Vermont. In the
    same month the following year, southern states reported two encounters;
    northern states: 18.
        In some months, some southern states had higher encounter numbers
    overall, but fewer at land border crossings.
        In April 2014, for example, there 141 encounters overall in
    California, but just five at the land borders. (New York, by contrast,
    had 154 overall and seven at the land border.)
        ``So often there's just talk about the southern border, but we
    can't ignore the northern border,'' Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, a North Dakota
    Democrat, said in a statement to The Daily Beast. ``When I brought
    then-Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas to Pembina, North
    Dakota, we heard about issues ranging from recruiting and retaining
    quality border patrol workers to inefficient or out-of-date
    technologies.''
        (The Department of Homeland Security referred requests for comment
    to Customs and Border Protection headquarters, which did not respond to
    The Daily Beast.)
        Canada Embassy spokesperson Christine Constantin told The Daily
    Beast in a statement ``it is relevant to note that no terrorists have
    ever been successful in attacking the United States coming through
    America's northern border.'' Constantin also highlighted ``robust
    security measures'' on the border including integrated U.S.-Canada law
    enforcement teams.
        A new threat assessment report by the Texas Department of Public
    Safety, released just days before Trump signed his refugee and
    immigration executive order, describes terrorists' potential use of
    existing Latin American human-smuggling routes that ``have long
    transported Syrians, Iraqis, and other immigrants from countries where
    terrorist groups operate to our land border with Mexico, where they
    often seek asylum too,'' sometimes fraudulently. It does not say this
    network is currently being utilized in this fashion. (In fact, this
    report and others say that the more pressing issue may be terrorist
    sympathizers crossing the U.S. border into Mexico--a dozen of whom have
    been arrested over the last four years--to evade the U.S. no-fly list
    as they make their way to joining ISIS overseas.)
        This DPS report is being widely circulated among White House and
    Congressional policy makers close to the administration, Congressional,
    White House, and border security officials said. And it is being relied
    heavily upon for immigration-related policy decisions. DHS Secretary
    Kelly met privately with the Texas DPS last week to discuss aspects of
    the report.
        But Aaron Heitke--U.S. Border Patrol Grand Forks sector chief
    patrol agent, who oversees all Customs and Border Protection activities
    in North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, South
    Dakota, and Nebraska--thinks all the attention to the southern border
    may be a bit myopic.
        After all, the northern border is the longest land border in the
    world, stretching 5,525 miles and 120 border crossings. The U.S. shares
    1,933 miles with Mexico, according to information on CBP's website.
        In an interview with The Daily Beast, Heitke said the numbers of
    watchlist encounters have been consistently higher in northern states,
    though he said he's seen more steady numbers than the sharp uptick
    suggested by the nationwide FBI reporting.
        ``It's been reasonably steady,'' he said.
        He and other border sources noted that the northern U.S. hosts more
    large immigrant populations that often come under scrutiny by federal
    authorities. For example, Minneapolis has a large Somali community; it
    can sometimes be more convenient for a passenger traveling from Somalia
    to Michigan to travel to Canada first, and then cross into the United
    States.
        He also stressed that the northern border doesn't get as much
    overall traffic as the southern one, and border patrol efforts in the
    northern are aided by portions of near impossible to traverse terrain
    and a ``fantastic'' relationship with Canada.
        In contrast, a senior border official based in Texas said the
    increasingly hostile relationship with Mexico will only make securing
    that border more difficult. The official would not speak on the record,
    citing concerns over incurring the wrath of President Trump and the new
    administration from whom CBP is requesting vast increases in resources.
    The official was unaware of data contained in the FBI terrorist
    encounter reports. When asked if surprised that the number of
    encounters was higher on the northern border, the official said ``yes,
    a bit,'' before adding that this did not mean the danger of terrorists
    entering the U.S. from the south was any less.
        This official and Heitke both suggested that the attention from the
    President and in the press on the Mexican border could inspire an
    increase in future attempts to enter the country undetected through
    Canada.
        ``While all eyes are on Mexico the bad actors will take another
    look at Canada,'' said the DHS official. ``Unless you're incredibly
    stupid you're not going to try to sneak into the country where everyone
    is looking. You'd put on a coat and head to Canada.''
        Editor's Note: This story was updated with a response from the
    government of Canada.
                                     ______

              Article Submitted For the Record by Hon. John Katko
          Illegal Refugees Now Streaming Across Quebec-New York Border
    Posted by David Krayden Contributor 12:23 PM 02/14/2017
    http://dailycaller.com/2017/02/14/illegal-refugees-now-streaming-
            across-quebec-new-york-border/
        Despite all the media reports of refugees illegally entering Canada
    from the U.S. at remote Manitoba crossings, more are actually getting
    through along the Quebec-New York border--and it can be just as cold as
    the temperatures reported along the prairies that have sometimes
    induced frostbite.
        The Canadian Border Security Agency says Quebec is now the
    flashpoint for ``asylum seekers'' or double refugees who first entered
    the U.S. as refugees and are now fleeing there and trying to sneak into
    Canada over fears that President Donald Trump will have them deported.
        The numbers speak for themselves, with 42 asylum claimants showing
    up at the Quebec border last weekend alone and 452 for January--a 230
    percent increase from the year before.
        RCMP spokesman Cpl Camille Habel told CBC News that he attributes
    the popularity of the Quebec border to its relative closeness to major
    U.S. cities like New York and Washington, D.C. and the fact that
    international airports are nearby.
        ``Bigger cities on each side can mean more people trying to cross
    here.''
        The ``refugees'' are deliberately crossing illegally so they can
    bypass the Safe Third Country Agreement, which is supposed to prevent
    people seeking asylum from choosing more than one ``safe'' destination
    when the flee their country of origin. The U.S. and Canada are both
    considered safe under this international legislation. But,
    paradoxically, the act only applies at legal border crossings; so
    double refugees are crossing illegally in order avoid their official
    refugee status from being questioned.
        Should refugees be stopped from crossing into Canada?
        But the agreement only holds at official border crossings, so
    people crossing illegally into Canada are able to apply for asylum
    here, even if they arrived in the U.S. first.
        Julie Lessard, who specializes in business immigration law, told
    the CBC that the current illegal flow of refugee claimants that is
    spreading across the longest undefended border int the world is fast
    becoming the status quo.
        ``People are just trying to get better lives, so if the ban comes
    back in another form--and because of the insecurity that it all
    created--well definitely, there was an increase in the last couple of
    weeks of the number of people trying to cross the border,'' Lessard
    said.
        ``I don't see it ending at this point in time.''

        Mr. Katko. Thank you.
        Ms. McSally. I look forward to working with you and the
    potential for future discussions on the Northern Border.
        OK. We are going into round two here. Vice Admiral Ray, as
    much as you can in an open setting, can you share some
    perspectives on increased sophistication of cartel activities
    in the maritime domain?
        We have heard about them armoring their engines to avoid
    being shot out, or using infrared technology, night vision
    devices, sub-submersibles, those types of things. Can you share
    some other examples of what you have seen of their evolving
    tactics and sophisticated technology?
        Admiral Ray. Yes, ma'am. I will have to think my way
    through what I can talk about in this setting, but they are,
    without a doubt, as all the panel members have said, they are
    an innovative, adaptive, agile organization. As you said in
    your opening statement, it is sophisticated operations.
        If you can buy it in the open market, they have got the
    funds to buy it. If it is anything that has to do with locating
    illicit goods, communicating via satellite, they are doing it
    and they get that.
        When it comes to their ingenuity on the maritime, it is
    really impressive that they can build in a ditch in the jungle
    in Ecuador a craft capable of sailing about the distances going
    from Florida to Washington State and carrying about 7,000 or
    8,000 pounds of cocaine. I mean, that is pretty impressive.
        So incredibly innovative, incredibly resourceful, and so,
    that is what makes the problem so tough, they are adaptable.
        Ms. McSally. Great, thanks.
        Chief Beeson, we talk a lot about situational awareness and
    operational control. So on the land border, there has been much
    discussion today about pushing the border south and disrupting
    the networks, and that is all an important part of the
    strategy.
        But as any sort of breaches come to the border, whether it
    is going to go over, through or under or around, you know, we
    have got to make sure we have got the situational awareness
    that those breaches are happening and then the ability to have
    operational control to intercept those breaches as close to the
    border as possible. We have had many discussions about this.
        In a previous hearing last Congress, Acting Chief Vitiello
    said that the situational awareness on the 2,000-mile Southern
    Border, if something breaches, if it moves, being able to see
    it real time is a little over 50 percent, 56 percent.
        Do you agree with that number? Has any of that changed?
    What do we need to do in order to increase situational
    awareness so that if something moves, you see it?
        Chief Beeson. So Chief Vitiello, I think, was referring to
    deployment density, and that encompasses situational awareness
    among other things, how you are, you know, putting down your
    resources and things like that.
        From my perspective, that has gotten better. We have
    implemented integrated fixed towers in Nogales. As you know, we
    have got a system coming on-line in your district any day now,
    should becoming operational in Douglas.
        We have another system that will be going operational in
    Sonoyta in the very near future. Then let's not forget the
    value of men and women in the Border Patrol, and certainly
    within Customs and Border Protection of the field office as
    well, being on the line and being able to observe and report
    what they are seeing.
        You know, the barriers that we have deployed and that we
    will continue to deploy, the technology that we have deployed.
    All of that has to have a response element built into it, and
    that is the men and women.
        So we need to make sure that we are continuing to deploy
    personnel, and certainly our objective is to get them down as
    close to the border as possible.
        Obviously, we want to push it south. We would like to get
    the traffic before it ever gets to us. Absent our ability to do
    that, we want to get it at the border.
        But then we do not want the border to become a single point
    of failure, and so we do need to be able to respond
    appropriately should something get past us on the line.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks, Chief. Additionally, we have talked a
    lot about the strategy of defense-in-depth in the rural areas,
    like my community, where we have fixed checkpoints which
    still--no real measurements of effectiveness there, but just
    really allowing the cartels to traffic through communities for
    hours, days, miles, you know, before they are potentially
    intercepted, which is a public safety threat.
        As we are coming with a, you know, new leadership, is there
    going to be a fresh look at that strategy and trying to, you
    know, push closer to the border as opposed to where we have
    had, you know, almost 50 percent of the interceptions in the
    Tucson sector, as you know, are north of 5 miles from the
    border. There are a lot of people who live in that area. That
    is a continuous public safety concern.
        Chief Beeson. So we are constantly assessing our strategy
    and looking for ways to improve upon it. As I mentioned, our
    objective, really, we want to work and push the border south as
    far as we can.
        I think we have had some pretty good success stories, a
    couple of which Director Allen mentioned here today. Working
    with the government of Mexico to really get some of these bad
    things before they are even crossed into the United States.
        We are continuing to deploy the men and women down to the
    border with the objective that we are going to make the arrests
    as close to the border as possible. On the whole, when you look
    at it, that is occurring in a wide number of areas.
        There are some areas where we still have challenges with
    access to the border. You know, there are some environmentally-
    sensitive areas. There are areas where there are no roads. So
    those are areas where that is a challenge for us, and so we are
    continuing to work.
        Really, we want it as close to the border. We want to
    prevent it in the first place. Then, of course, absent our
    ability to do that, which does happen, then we want to make
    sure that we do not allow the border to become that single
    point of failure. We want to make sure that we have got the
    capability to interdict anything that does make it across.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks, Chief. So let's talk barriers for a
    minute. There is the 2,000-mile Southern Border. Seven hundred
    miles is land and about 1,300 is water. We have got some level
    of barriers in 654 miles.
        Secretary Kelly testified last week that he would be
    listening to you and the troops on the ground to hear in
    different sectors where barriers need to be replaced or added.
    In your assessment, where do we need additional barriers or
    different types of barriers?
        I will tell you, even some of the replacements going on in
    my district are causing some responses from local residents who
    are living on the border and their concerns.
        So could you just comment on your perspective, which
    Secretary Kelly said he would be listening to on what we
    actually need?
        Chief Beeson. Secretary Kelly did come down to the border.
    He has been to my sector. He has also been to the San Diego
    sector. Subsequent to the visit with us, he went to San Diego
    and did receive briefings from us on what our current laydown
    is, and some of the areas where we would look to enhance that
    when given the opportunity.
        Customs and Border Protection and the Border Patrol, we
    have a process. The acronym for it is, because we love
    acronyms, the CGAP analysis.
        So what we are doing with that is looking at what our
    critical needs are, where there are gaps, and then making sure
    that we have the plans moving forward on where we want to put
    these things. So we can, I think, provide you with another
    briefing----
        Ms. McSally. Great.
        Chief Beeson [continuing]. To, kind-of, give you a better
    idea of where exactly we would like to put up barriers.
        Ms. McSally. I appreciate that.
        All right, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair. Very quickly,
    gentlemen, wanted to say that, you know, during the Obama
    administration, we had a record number of deportations, I
    believe, under Obama. Deportations were more than the last few
    Presidents combined.
        So my question to all of you is it is my understanding that
    the folks migrating north from Mexico has really slowed down
    tremendously. Assuming that is the case, how much of that is
    due to a growing Mexican economy, growing middle class, growing
    number of jobs in Mexico that provide for folks to stay and
    essentially find a living in Mexico?
        Mr. Allen. For me, that is more of an economics question. A
    little outside my area of expertise. So I pass on that one.
        Mr. Correa. Everybody pass on that one?
        Admiral Ray. Well, I----
        Mr. Correa. It is an economics question, but I think it is
    a relevant one when we are looking at possibly putting tariffs
    on imports. That is really a monetary policy that could reduce
    economic growth south of the border.
        But the other question I have, one is a sensitive one which
    is on the issue of corruption on our side. Do we have any
    reports? I know we have had some newspaper articles in the past
    about some of our border agents, unfortunately, you know,
    looking the other way. Any update on that? Any status on the
    corruption on our side of the border?
        Mr. Allen. I don't have any numbers, and I refer to it both
    in my written and my oral statement. You know, the reality is
    that U.S. law enforcement is not immune to corruption.
        While I think anecdotally it is certainly at a much lower
    level in the United States than it is in Mexico, you know, back
    to the question about internal conspiracies in the air
    environment, that we face that same challenge, that insider
    threat challenge, on our borders as well.
        It is ICE is not immune. CBP is not immune. State and local
    law enforcement in the United States is not immune. It is
    something that we have to focus on and acknowledge.
        Mr. Correa. I say that because there is so much money
    involved in this business of drugs that nobody is immune. At
    the same time, let me take the opportunity to thank all of the
    men and women in uniform who do protect our borders, who do
    protect our citizens, because you do a darn good job.
        My final question is really kind-of a comment. Got a chance
    to go into Mexico about 4 or 5 months ago. I went through some
    of the small villages, and the issue of public safety is a big
    one. Folks won't go out of their homes after the sun goes down
    because they fear for their lives.
        It was very interesting. A few days before I got there, the
    Mexican marines came in and swept up the whole area. It is my
    understanding, unofficially, about 40 casualties. Forty of the
    bad guys were actually taken out.
        But I want to encourage you to continue to cooperate with
    the Mexican authorities because you notice when Mexican marines
    go in with U.S. leadership they do make a difference when it
    comes to folks living in those small villages throughout
    Mexico. So please continue to do a good job.
        Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida for a
    second round. No? OK. Great. Just a few more questions.
        Admiral Ray, have you seen--can you share any changes in
    trends from the change to the wet foot, dry foot policy as far
    as Cubans trying to head north?
        Admiral Ray. Yes, ma'am. As I said, last year was a record
    year in terms of growth of Cuban immigration, illegal
    immigration, since 1994, the biggest year we have had. After
    the wet foot, dry foot was repealed last month, we saw a
    dramatic downturn.
        Now some of this is not really the season, right, this time
    of year when the weather and other things. So we are certainly
    not letting our guard down now because there is always the
    threat.
        Certainly the conditions in Cuba and the conditions in
    America haven't changed. So we see the threat is still out
    there, but the facts on the water as of right now since that
    was repealed, there is a lot less attempts that we have seen
    thus far.
        Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. Can any of you comment on we
    have had a number of States in the country that are now
    legalizing marijuana, and whether that is impacting the
    business model of the cartels and changing from marijuana to
    other drugs or human trafficking related to the supply-and-
    demand issue?
        Mr. Allen. I think that might fall into, you know, what we
    could call the intelligence gap. But, you know--and we talked
    earlier about heroin. In my mind, there is no mistaking the
    explosive, you know, growth in the cultivation of poppies in
    Mexico and the transition to, you know, heroin as one of their
    primary drugs that they are exporting to the United States.
        Ms. McSally. So, I mean, correlation doesn't mean
    causality, so there is----
        Mr. Allen. Correct.
        Ms. McSally [continuing]. Probably a couple of different
    elements in that to include the increased demand and the opioid
    addictions----
        Mr. Allen. Absolutely.
        Ms. McSally [continuing]. In the country. I do want to talk
    about that. Despite all the amazing efforts that you gentlemen
    represented today and all the individuals that are doing the
    job every single day in order to defeat these networks and
    intercept the activity, we still have a drug epidemic going on
    in our country.
        The price of drugs is still, unfortunately, affordable for
    people to be ruining their lives. So that has not changed. The
    hard drugs coming through the ports of entry, primarily, most
    of you have testified to.
        Mr. Allen, what else do we need to do at the ports of entry
    related to these hard drugs that are making their way through?
    There are pretty innovative techniques, as you have testified
    to and many of you have testified to.
        Mr. Allen. Well, I think, you know, CBP has done a
    tremendous job in refining and improving how they target, you
    know, at the ports of entry.
        I think focusing more, you know, resources on that problem
    set. You know, the reality is that CBPOs who are on the border
    have a very, very short time to make a decision about whether
    they should admit somebody or refer a vehicle or a person to
    secondary for further inspection.
        So I think, you know, giving them the resources and the
    capabilities to target as effectively as they can, both in the,
    you know, kind-of the personally-owned vehicle and pedestrian
    environment, and then in commercial cargo, is key to that. That
    is certainly an interagency problem.
        You know, ICE and HSI contribute, you know, information
    that helps refine targeting. But, you know, giving them as much
    good information to use to target is where we want to go.
        Ms. McSally. Is there additional technologies that are
    needed or technologies that have been proven that are not
    deployed to each of the ports of entry?
        Mr. Allen. I would defer to Chief Beeson on that.
        Ms. McSally. Chief.
        Chief Beeson. I will have to take that back, for the
    record.
        Ms. McSally. OK.
        Chief Beeson. I will have to ask my----
        Ms. McSally. OK.
        Chief Beeson [continuing]. Field ops, Congresswoman.
        Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. I will say I agree with many of
    the comments made by my colleagues here today that, you know,
    we have got to make sure that the legitimate economic activity
    that comes north and south continues to be able to flow while
    we are intercepting the illegitimate activity and the drugs and
    the human smuggling and what has been talked about today that
    happens both between the ports of entry and at the ports of
    entry.
        If we are talking about border security, we have got to
    look at that in its completeness: The maritime domain, the air
    domain, the land domain, but then at the ports of entry. So we
    have seen in my community, the Douglas port of entry, just as
    an example, is one that is old, is not capable for addressing
    the commerce.
        But also it is a security issue, right? Because they need
    upgrades to be able to address the illegitimate activity that
    is coming through the ports of entry. My hope would be--we had
    a hearing on this last time but, you know, upgrades to the
    ports of entry have been somehow--they are involved in other
    Federal buildings and priorities related to GSA.
        I think we need to look at this more holistically as a
    security issue. When we are talking about infrastructure in
    this Congress and with the administration, I think we need to
    be focused at our ports of entry both for economic drivers and
    for security drivers, and I don't think that should be lost.
        So that is more of a statement. I don't know if anybody has
    a comment on that, but I think somehow we, you know, often just
    talk about between the ports of entry, but the security at the
    ports of entry is just as critical. All right.
        The Chair now recognizes my colleague for any last
    statements.
        Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. Again, I want to thank
    everybody for being here today, and I also concur with our
    chair that--very good discussion. Learned a lot today.
        I just wanted to leave, again, focusing what our Madam
    Chair has said, ports of entry, inland ports. This is a concept
    I picked up from my colleagues in Texas, that checking our
    cargo, checking those things that are about to cross the border
    a few miles before they get to the border be sealed.
        So that once you get to the border, your jobs is a whole
    lot easier than they are now. Has there been any further
    thought about working on those inland ports of entry?
        Chief Beeson. So CBP has engaged in several different pilot
    programs. The one that I think you are referring to was in
    California. Most recently in Arizona they have a program, a
    joint customs program, with Mexican customs that has been
    working quite well for them. They speak very highly of it. So
    it is something that, you know, we continue to assess.
        Ms. McSally. Great. I want to thank the witnesses for their
    valuable testimony and the dialog and the questions and answers
    today. I thank the Members for their questions as well.
        The Members of the committee may have some additional
    questions for the witnesses. I would ask you to respond to
    these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the
    hearing record will be open for 10 days. Without objection, the
    committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]