[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BLACK FLAGS OVER MINDANAO:
TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-52
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson, senior fellow and director,
Transnational Threats Project , Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 8
Ms. Supna Zaidi Peery, research analyst, Counter Extremism
Project........................................................ 19
Sheena Greitens, Ph.D., assistant professor, University of
Missouri....................................................... 31
Mr. Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, Center for American Progress... 39
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific: Prepared statement.................................... 4
Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson: Prepared statement...................... 11
Ms. Supna Zaidi Peery: Prepared statement........................ 22
Sheena Greitens, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 33
Mr. Michael Fuchs: Prepared statement............................ 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 66
BLACK FLAGS OVER MINDANAO:
TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Yoho. Welcome, everybody. The subcommittee will come to
order. I welcome everybody here. This is a packed room. This is
great. I love to see all this excitement.
Members present will be permitted to submit written
statements to be included in the official hearing record
without objection.
The hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to
allow statements, questions, and extraneous material for the
record subject to length limitations of the rules.
And with that, I love the name of this or the title for
this hearing: ``Black Flags over Mindanao: Terrorism in
Southeast Asia.'' I think it is so important today to address
this growing threat throughout the region.
I am going to put on my new glasses my wife got me.
Most of the debate in Washington about U.S. policy toward
Asia focuses on state challenges such as the nuclear
belligerence of the DPRK, the rise of China and related issues.
The threat of transnational terrorism in Asia has been at
best a secondary consideration and, at worse, an afterthought.
The policy making community doesn't seem to consider
terrorism in Asia with the same seriousness as it does in the
Middle East.
But ISIS' increasingly aggressive moves in Southeast Asia,
which have to a head in recent weeks have shown us that the
issues are indivisibly related and that the laxity of our
approach is no longer tenable.
The looming threat of ISIS has exploded into open conflicts
in the city of Marawi on the island of Mindanao in the southern
Philippines.
ISIS fighters have occupied areas of the city for 7 weeks,
resisting efforts by the armed forces of the Philippines to
drive them out.
Fighters from domestic terrorist organizations who
previously operated under their own direction appear to have
united under an emir appointed by ISIS.
Reportedly, this criminal named Isnilon Hapilon has been in
contact with ISIS leaders in the Middle East and seeks to
establish an ISIS caliphate on Mindanao.
The Islamist militant in Marawi are an elite alliance of
Abu Sayyaf group and the Maute group, the Philippine
organizations who have come together for this audacious and
unprecedented attack.
To date, over 380 Islamist militants have been killed in
the fight, far surpassing early estimates, and the number of
militants--I mean, at first when this first started out we were
looking at about 250 to 300 people and it is already 380 have
been killed in fighting with more still keeping government
forces at bay.
An unknown number of foreign fighters have supplemented
militants from the Philippines. Deceased terrorists have been
identified as Malaysian, Indonesian, Saudi, Yemeni, Chechen,
and Indian nationals.
The destruction has been immense. Up to 400,000 civilians
have been displaced. Ninety soldiers and police officers have
been killed and hundreds--and hundreds wounded.
Large areas of Marawi have been flattened. The widespread
destruction is the latest sign that the nature of terrorist
activity in Southeast Asia may be changing.
Islamist militants in Southeast Asia were previously
focused on domestic concerns such as gaining independence and
establishing Sharia-style governance. Many were thought of as
little more than former for-profit criminal organizations.
As organizations throughout Southeast Asia have pledged
allegiance to ISIS, however, their priorities seem to be
shifting.
The siege of Marawi has shown that forces under Hapilon are
interested in seizing territory and contesting government
control similar to ISIS strategies in Iraq and in Syria.
The Solicitor General of the Philippines has stated what's
happening in Mindanao is no longer rebellion of Filipino
citizens.
It has transmogrified into invasions by foreign terrorists
who heeded the clarion call of ISIS to go to the Philippines if
they find difficulty in going to Iraq or Syrian. They want to
create Mindanao as part of the caliphate.
At the same time, Southeast Asia's youth, our Internet-
connected population, is fertile ground for online
radicalization of ISIS specialties.
A fragmented ISIS can inspire homegrown terrorists, send
trained jihadists all over the world and the porous borders of
the Southeast Asia region are especially vulnerable to both.
The dangers stand to grow as ISIS is driven from its
captured territory in Iraq and Syria and turns its focus
elsewhere. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia's historically tolerant
and inclusive brand of Islam is facing fundamentalist
challenges as well.
The recent electoral defeat and subsequent blasphemy
convictions of Jakarta government official Ahok, a member of
Indonesia's Christian minority, raised questions about the
independence of Indonesia's secular institutions and showcased
the rise of hardline Islamist politics.
The spread of fundamentalism throughout Southeast Asia,
exasperated by outside influences such as Saudi Arabia's
propagation of Wahhabist institutions risk contributing to
radicalization.
The United States has a role to play and has been quietly
supporting the armed forces of the Philippines outside of
Marawi with intelligence and surveillance assistance.
To date we have avoided a public role of combat or combat
operations. As the threat in the Philippines and throughout
Southeast Asia intensifies, we must determine what more the
United States, in cooperation with our ASEAN partners, can do
better to counter Islamist militancy in the region.
The siege of Marawi underscores the Islamist terrorism by a
generational challenge in Southeast Asia as it is throughout
the world. Strategies to counter the rise of the militancy must
be a central component of our Asia strategy rather than a
secondary issue.
Today we are joined by an expert panel--and I appreciate
you all coming--so that we can discuss the contours of the
threat and suggest policy options for forming a strategy so
that we can pass this on, hopefully, to the State Department
and to the executive branch.
[The opening statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]
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Mr. Yoho. Without objections, the witness written
statements will be entered into the hearing record and I now
turn to my ranking member for any remarks he may have.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding
these hearings. Thank you for the clever title. Thank you for
the comments about Saudi support not for--so much for terrorist
organizations but for extremist Islamic clerics who lay the
groundwork and advocate if they don't plan and conduct
terrorist operations.
I have had significant discussions with the foreign
minister of Saudi Arabia who tells me they are certainly not
doing it anymore--that at most they funded the construction of
mosques decades ago, which now may have been taken over by
clerics they don't support.
So I am hoping that one thing comes out of these hearings
and that is a letter to the Saudi foreign minister identifying
very particular mosques and clerics and that we think are being
funded by Saudi Arabia or individuals therein and let's run to
ground whether or not Saudi Arabia is at this time funding an
extremist version of Islam.
On Monday, the Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi declared
victory over ISIS in Mosul. That's a welcome development, but
the battle with ISIS-affiliated groups in Southeast Asia,
particularly the Philippine terrorist groups continues,
including Abu Sayyaf and Maute, and continues in the Marawi
area of the island of Mindanao.
A few dozen foreign fighters have traveled from abroad,
perhaps more than a few dozen. They include nationals not only
from nearby Indonesia and Malaysia but also Saudi Arabia,
Chechnya, Yemen, Morocco, Turkey.
The ongoing fighting in Marawi has reportedly left over 500
dead including 90 Philippine soldiers, 39 civilians and 381
ISIS-related fighters.
The Marawi battle illustrates that despite the
counterterrorism successes that considerably downgraded
Southeast Asian terrorist groups in the late 2000s and the
early 2010s, the terrorist threat in the region may be getting
a new lease on life and this new generation of terrorists could
gain strength by drawing on support from ISIS.
Southeast Asian countries continue to face threats of local
and international terrorism. There are over a dozen armed
Islamic groups in the region.
ISIS has already successfully recruited about 1,000
nationals from Southeast Asian countries to come support their
efforts in Syria and Iraq, their so-called caliphate--we hope
dying caliphate.
As to counterterrorism, in the past we have seen al-Qaeda's
influence appear through Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist
organization and its affiliates, which claimed responsibility
for the 2002 Bali attacks.
Today, the battle for Marawi we see ISIS influence
elsewhere, not only there but also in other parts of Southeast
Asia.
In Indonesia, the mujahideen Indonesia Timor MIT pledged
allegiance to ISIS. ISIS even has a dedicated Southeast Asian
unit, Katibah Nusantara, that is fighting in Syria.
As smaller splinter terrorist groups create their own space
in Southeast Asia, breaking from larger groups that may have
been very relevant a decade ago. We need to continue to
monitor, prioritize, and designate.
We should continue to work with our regional partners to
combat and eliminate terrorist organizations as well as prevent
ISIS terrorists from returning from the countries of origin in
Southeast Asia.
As to our budget, we must ensure that American leadership
is maintained particularly in Southeast Asia. The President's
budget seems to do the opposite.
Southeast Asia is the home of 625 million people and about
15 percent of the world's Muslim population. American foreign
affairs programming in this region should not be reduced but
the 2018 budget proposal would reduce VOA broadcasting to
Indonesia in the Bahasa language of Indonesia. That is not a
reduction that I support.
We should not neglect the tools that strengthen long-term
fight against terrorism. Those are, among others, democracy,
the rule of law, human rights, education, and development.
Without robust State and USAID programs, Southeast Asia
would likely be a less stable area and provide for increased
space for terror recruitment.
That is why more than 120, three- and four-star retired
generals and admirals wrote to House leadership in February
this year urging that the U.S. maintain a robust foreign
affairs budget. Never have we heard clearer words from our
retired military.
I yield back.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Ranking Member.
For you guys that are here--are going to testify, we run
our meeting a little bit different--our hearing. It is a little
bit more informal.
I want you to be engaged, because what we are looking for
is solutions--solutions to bring this threat that is affecting
all of humanity--it is a scourge on humanity--to an end.
It is isolated right now in that one area in Mindanao. I
mean, it is all over that whole area. But if we can bring it to
an end, I want you to think of solutions that you can give us,
and I have read every one of your testimonies and I am going to
switch now to my colleague, Ms. Ann Wagner, to introduce a
person from her state and I will take it over. Go ahead.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this
important hearing.
I would like to take my time to welcome Dr. Sheena
Greitens, who, among her many accomplishments, happens to be
the first lady of my home state of Missouri.
Dr. Greitens holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a
Master's from Oxford University where she studied as a Marshall
Scholar. She has previously served with the U.S. Department of
State's Policy Planning staff and is a nonresident senior
fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Dr. Greitens has distinguished herself as a professor at
the University of Missouri where she has played a leading role
in establishing the Institute for Korean Studies. Your books,
``Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and
State Violence,'' hit the shelves last summer and it is a
fascinating take on the foundations of authoritarian power in
Asia.
It is, I think, exceptional and all too rare that a busy
mother and professional, much less one who is so involved in
Missouri's public service--and I speak knowing something about
all of these things--makes time to produce world class research
on Asia's internal security forces.
We are delighted to have you and such a notable scholar in
the governor's mansion and I particularly appreciate your work
on Korea and the Philippines and I look forward to our
continued collaboration and to your testimony today. So
welcome, Dr. Greitens.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, and I appreciate--again, I can't tell
you how much I appreciate you guys taking your time out. The
way this works--I am sure you have been here before--you got
the timer in front of you.
You get 5 minutes. Try to get as close to that as you can
and I look forward to getting into the question area.
With that, we have Mr. Thomas Sanderson, senior fellow and
director for the Transnational Threats Project at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, welcome here.
Ms. Supna Peery, research analyst for the Counter Extremism
Project. Welcome. And then we have Mr. Michael Fuchs, senior
fellow at the Center for American Progress.
Look forward to hearing your testimony. Mr. Sanderson, we
will just go down the line. Press your mic button and make sure
it is on.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT , CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Sanderson. It is on. Excellent. Thank you.
Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the honor
and opportunity to testify before you today on the threat that
ISIS poses to Southeast Asia, an issue that has gained greater
attention since the battle in Marawi, Philippines began on May
23rd of this year.
This now 7-week-old conflict involves U.S.-advised
Philippine armed forces and police and ISIS-affiliated
terrorists groups including the Abu Sayyaf group and the Maute
group.
My written submission for the record covers the history of
terrorism in Southeast Asia, touches briefly on the activities
of Arabian Gulf states in the region and then goes into detail
on the global threat of foreign terrorist fighters, or foreign
fighters, in the battle at Marawi and well beyond, and the
implications for that region and for the United States.
My oral comments now will focus on what I see as the most
significant issue at hand, ISIS foreign fighters and their
presence in Southeast Asia.
Reports from Southeast Asia find that several foreign
fighters are among the militants that have died with reports
stating that the casualty count shows fighters from Indonesia
and Malaysia, nearby states, Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
Chechnya, and now one from Singapore, and the chairman also
noted one from India.
Furthermore, there are indications that between 40 and 80
foreign fighters are in the immediate vicinity of the battle.
For the past 2 years, my colleagues and I at CSIS have been
investigating various dimensions of the foreign fighter threat
and, as you all know, since 2012 more than 40,000 fighters from
120 countries joined the battle in Syria and Iraq primarily on
the side of ISIS.
I would discourage anyone from thinking about killing down
that number because more can join. That 40,000 number is not
finite.
An unknown number have been killed in battle. Some are in
prison in the region or back home. But an unknown number still
engage in battle planning and onward movements. To where, we do
not know.
Let me also note, as the chairman noted, there are between
800 and 1,000 Southeast Asians that have made the visit to
Syria and Iraq. That, again, number is not certain but it is,
roughly, in that range.
What we see in Marawi tells us that the grim reality is
something else. Many who went to Syria and Iraq had no prior
military training.
What they did go with was a sense of purpose, a desire for
adventure, revenge, income, and respect. Some were politically
and religiously radicalized. Some went for the good
compensation package.
For those that did survive and seek to return home, they
realized that they have few options. Most nations do not have a
program to demobilize and reintegrate those fighters who played
more of a support role.
Indonesia and Malaysia do have a demobilization
deradicalization program. The Philippines does not.
This off-ramp to membership in a militant group is an
important way to divide those who can rejoin society from those
who pose a grave danger and should be prosecuted.
The actors that we are most concerned about are those that
receive combat training and experienced high-intensity combat
in Syria and Iraq.
These are terrorists who are accustomed to the rigors of
urban warfare, who know how to build and disguise bombs,
operate small and light arms, launch mortars and rocket-
propelled grenades, conduct secure communications with
encrypted devices, raise and move money, manage logistics, and
funnel images and propaganda into the social media stream.
These conflict-hardened terrorists, if they do make it back
to their home countries or end up in third countries, in many
cases would face police and military with little or no fighting
experience. It would not be a fair match.
These violent extremists have experienced what they see as
legitimate divinely-sanctioned fighting. They are heroes to
their friends and many others and are unlikely to want to
return to a lifestyle less meaningful, in their eyes, and they
know that returning to their families and communities is not
likely an option.
Governments know that these terrorists have long
unexplained absences or have even been bragging about their
exploits in the Middle East. Back home, torture, prison, and
execution awaits them. Again, the options are few.
Meanwhile, U.S. and coalition-backed Iraqi forces, Kurdish
forces, and others have made strong gains against ISIS-
controlled territory in Syria and Iraq.
What was once an area as large as Jordan under their
control is much smaller. At least 60,000 enemy combatants have
been confirmed killed and ISIS revenue is falling fast, and it
is vital for attracting, equipping, and retaining ISIS members.
In Moscow a few months ago, a colleague and I were able to
interview the family of Dagestani fighter who joined the battle
in Syria before ISIS emerged and then came under their control.
Heading back to Dagestan is not an option for this
individual. We heard for 3 hours the contortions that he and
his family have gone through to find a third country in which
to find themselves and secure themselves. That means these guys
are moving on often not back to their own home.
Three years ago when my team began looking at foreign
fighters, energy and attention was focused on stopping them
from going to Iraq and Syria, on discovering and disrupting
their facilitators at home and en route and trying to get an
understanding of what foreign fighters were doing inside the
so-called Islamic State.
Their influence back home via social media was also of
great concern. But as ISIS' fortunes changed, attention shifted
to what foreign fighters might do next.
The battle in Marawi, Philippines provides a sobering
example of one of those options. Bringing the fighters'
expertise, networks, funding, and fighting credibility to bear
on insurgencies in other countries is appealing to some of
them.
Returning to their home countries or to third countries to
stimulate moribund terrorist groups, recruit new members, and
take revenge on governments they see as repressive extends
their lives as heroic fighters and gives them purpose and
status.
Marawi is a powerful reminder of what they are likely to
face in other parts of Southeast Asia and a wider globe when
foreign fighters move on from Syria and the Iraqi battlefield.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson follows:]
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Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Ms. Peery.
STATEMENT OF MS. SUPNA ZAIDI PEERY, RESEARCH ANALYST, COUNTER
EXTREMISM PROJECT
Ms. Peery. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and
members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the threat from extremism in
the Philippines.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, could she pull the mic a little
closer maybe?
Ms. Peery. My name is Supna Zaidi Peery. I am a strategic
policy analyst at the Counter Extremism Project, a not for
profit nonpartisan international policy organization that works
to combat the growing threat from extremist ideology.
Fears of growing ISIS activity in Southeast Asia became all
too clear over the siege on the city of Marawi that began on
May 23rd.
Despite President Duterte's statements yesterday that the
siege is likely to end within 10 to 15 days, he conceded that
ISIS remains a long-term threat to the Philippines and the
region.
In addition to the domestically radicalized Muslim youth by
Abu Sayyaf and the Maute group, Philippine intelligence
believes that some of the ISIS-linked fighters in Marawi were
foreign fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East,
as mentioned already.
The presence of foreign fighters reinforces the argument
that pro-ISIS propaganda has the power to unify militants
across borders in Southeast Asia, raising the possibility that
the Philippines could become an ISIS hub if extremism in
Mindanao is not addressed immediately.
ISIS is the most successful brand of Islamist extremism
globally because it has identified a formula to connect its
fundamentalist principles to proactive action but its
adherents.
It has been effective and consistent in spreading its
propaganda over the Internet and via social media platforms in
numerous languages without much interference from tech
companies or effective challenges from progressive Islamic
organizations online, which we often call counter narrative.
In the Philippines, ISIS ideology filled the void left by
the death of Abu Sayyaf group founder and charismatic cleric
Abdurajak Janjalani.
There is unfortunate continuity in this statement since the
ASG under Janjalani and ISIS are both al-Qaeda offshoots
ideologically.
Janjalani fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s under an al-
Qaeda Mujahideen Abdul Rasul Abu Sayyaf for whom Janjalani
named his terrorist organization once he returned home to the
Philippines in 1989.
ISIS rhetoric now replaces Janjalani's voice to radicalize
youth in Mindanao along with other extremists like the Maute
group, whose leader studied in Egypt and Jordan before
successfully recruiting via social media and through the
Islamic schools in Mindanao itself.
ISIS ideology targets Muslims in person online by preying
on existing grievances and co-opting them, offering a singular
solution based on the distinctive identity marker of faith
without requiring an adherent to understand the faith itself.
Examples include the oft-cited identity issues of lone
wolves in the West and secular separatist movement turned
Islamist, like Chechnya in the 1990s and '80s, or even economic
marginalization as in the Philippines today on the island of
Mindanao.
A critical bridge connecting root causes to violence in the
name of faith is the proliferation of proselytizing within
Muslim communities by individuals or organizations often
labelled orthodox, fundamentalist, or puritanical.
Professor Mohammed Osman of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies in Singapore argues that this
indoctrination toward fundamentalism needs to be addressed by
governments wanting to combat extremism.
For example, in Malaysia he notes that the increased
fundamentalism of the community has damaged the coexistence
between Muslims and non-Muslims present for centuries in the
region.
That attitude is problematic, he states, because once one
starts dehumanizing one group by saying they are deviant,
infidels, or hypocrites, it makes it easier for people to be
influenced by the ideas of ISIS, which advocates the murder of
Muslim religious minorities, non-Muslims, and homosexuals, as
examples.
Consequently, the U.S. must expand its counter extremism
strategy to push allies like the Philippines to embrace a two-
prong strategy beyond military policies, which are important.
First, we must work to remove extremist propaganda online
and on the ground, especially among student organizations and
schools.
Second, we need to replace the extremist propaganda with
counter narrative ideology and messaging formulated by moderate
and progressive Muslim organizations. To succeed, these ideas
must be implemented domestically and regionally as well as
online.
The U.S. can assist the Philippine Government in their
effort to remove extremist propaganda from the Internet and
social media platforms by working with them to develop policy
and by helping them discuss the issues within the private
sector and within the tech industry specifically.
Indonesia is of particular importance, given that it hosts
about 70 percent of pro-ISIS Web sites in the region and that
information--the visuals, the YouTube videos--it reaches the
Philippine population as well as the rest of the region.
Second, the U.S. can advocate for the Philippine Government
to support community efforts to prevent radicalization because
community leaders rather than government are possessed with the
credibility to build grassroots counter extremism programming
that focuses on educating the public on the values underlying
pluralism, tolerance, and community building across race,
ethnicity, sect, and gender.
The Philippine Center for Islamic Democracy is one such
organization that deserves government and international
support. The center has been working with the Muslim religious
sector, particularly female religious scholars and madrasa
teachers to develop capacities and competencies and
strengthening their role as advocates for peace and human
rights.
For this purpose, the center has developed human rights
training within a Sharia framework and the peace education
manual.
Regionally, we can also support cross collaborations with
organizations like the center to build counter narrative
information books and content that can go online as well.
Regionally, like-minded organizations include Nahdlatul
Ulama and the Wahid Institute in Indonesia, Sisters in Islam in
Malaysia, which specifically Sisters in Islam focuses on
promoting universal human rights including advocacy for women
through an Islamic lens. Sisters in Islam has challenged in the
past the legality of child marriage and polygamy, for example.
It is critical to legitimize peaceful debate within Muslim
communities and protect balance and progressive grassroots
voices.
The U.S. can encourage allied governments in Southeast Asia
to recognize grassroots organizations as a source of strength
to counter extremism and protect their right to speak and
engage with the public.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Peery follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Dr. Greitens.
STATEMENT OF SHEENA GREITENS, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
Ms. Greitens. Thank you very much.
Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear today to
discuss the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.
My remarks will focus on American security cooperation with
the Philippines, the U.S. ally most affected by this threat.
For time's sake, I will focus today on the policy
recommendations that are contained in my longer written
testimony.
Before that, there are two brief points that may be useful:
First is that the Philippines has a more complex security
environment than most other U.S. allies in Asia because of its
internal challenges. Manila has always had to balance between
external defense and internal needs, which include both
disaster relief and counter insurgency or counter terrorism.
Under the previous President, the Philippines had begun to
shift toward a more external maritime focus, but Duterte's
presidency, combined with recent developments, are returning
them toward a more traditional inward focus.
Second is that the Philippines is an incredibly pro-
American place. There is, however, a long-running concern,
particularly on the Philippine left, about potential
encroachment by the United States on Philippine sovereignty,
and that has directly affected our security cooperation and
basing agreements in the past. Our alliance generally fares
best when we acknowledge this domestic political reality.
In the past two decades, U.S.-Philippine security
cooperation has focused on counter terrorism and, most
recently, on maritime security.
As we all know, we are here today because in the past year
or so concerns about terrorism have increased. Those concerns
center on the so-called black flag militant groups in the
southern Philippines who have sworn loyalty to the Islamic
State and achieved recognition from them, as well as on the
ISIS-affiliated fighters who are returning to the region.
Today, these ISIS-linked groups in Marawi have held territory
in an urban siege that has lasted almost 2 months and claimed
an estimated 500 lives.
Abu Sayyaf has also increased its kidnapping for ransom
operations, which have raised substantial revenue for the
organization and jeopardized the safety of trade in waters
around the southern Philippines.
Today, I would like to offer seven primary recommendations.
First, Congress can play a real positive role in
strengthening America's security cooperation with the
Philippines. Despite Duterte's rhetoric, the Philippines
remains strongly pro-American, and congressional engagement
could productively focus on places like the legislature, the
departments, the military, local governments, and civil
society, all places where the value of the alliance with the
U.S. is broadly recognized.
Second, Congress can build on broader outreach to ASEAN to
show that U.S. support for the region is strong and bipartisan.
I commend the subcommittee's activities on that front thus far
and hope that Congress continues its engagement in this
economically and strategically vital region.
Third, the United States can continue or consider expanding
maritime security assistance. Congress played an important role
in establishing the Maritime Security Initiative in Southeast
Asia, and it is important that, even as the Philippines
confronts intensifying internal threats, it does not ignore
external defense needs.
Maritime security assistance can improve Manila's ability
to address multiple challenges at once--disaster relief,
counter terrorism, and places like the South China Sea. It also
allows Congress to support our two countries' shared security
goals while remaining a strong voice for human rights and the
shared values that underpin the alliance between our two
democracies.
Fourth, if the Philippines requests, the United States
should examine its options for reactivating formal counter
terrorism cooperation initiatives such as the previous Joint
Special Operations Task Force Philippines based in Zamboanga.
Our military is already providing technical assistance in
Mindanao, so clearly defining the parameters of that engagement
and its compatibility with the Philippine constitution can help
avoid domestic blowback, and keep the focus where it
fundamentally needs to be--preventing ISIS from establishing a
foothold inside the territory of a U.S. Asian ally.
Fifth, we can support Manila's cooperation with other U.S.
security partners. Trilateral patrols, which have recently
begun with Indonesia and Malaysia, are an important step and
will be more meaningful as the Philippines continues to improve
its maritime capacity. That is a place where partners like
Japan, Australia, and South Korea can all play an important
role.
Sixth, the United States can identify productive forms of
economic engagement, including regional tools for counter
terrorism finance. Like maritime capacity building, financial
tools can address multiple priorities at once, such as
counteracting North Korea's money laundering and revenue-
generating activities in the region. It will be important to
limit the flow of funds, especially now, from ISIS agents in
the Middle East to groups in the Philippines and Southeast
Asia.
Seventh, the United States should monitor two issues that
are likely to affect recruiting and support for ISIS-linked
groups throughout Southeast Asia. First is the peace process in
Mindanao, where the collapse of the 2014 agreement has
contributed to individuals and factions splintering away from
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front toward these more radical
groups. Second, the treatment of the Muslim population in Burma
could well become a recruitment tool and a rallying cry for
Islamic militants region wide. The U.S. needs to be carefully
monitoring these issues and supporting effective, inclusive,
long-term solutions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Greitens follows:]
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Mr. Yoho. Thank you, and I appreciate the passion in that.
That was good.
And now we will go to Mr. Fuchs, if you would.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL FUCHS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS
Mr. Fuchs. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear at today's important and
timely hearing.
Terrorism in Southeast Asia is a serious challenge and a
direct threat to the lives of innocent civilians in the region
and to U.S. national security interests.
The United States has a direct interest in working with the
countries of Southeast Asia to counter terrorist threats and
can do so most effectively through building capacity,
supporting democracy and human rights, and investing in the
necessary diplomatic and development tools.
Terrorism has long been a threat in Southeast Asia and the
potential return home of Southeast Asian fighters who have
fought in Iraq and Syria are raising fears that they might
exacerbate an already dangerous network of terrorist groups in
the region.
The Governments of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia,
and others, including the United States, are focused on
countering these threats.
There is much work to be done and we must be vigilant. This
threat, while dangerous, is a threat that we can tackle.
With focus and practical efforts, the United States can
help these countries make real progress. There are many
challenges that the United States and the countries of the
region face in combatting this threat.
Governments in the region are often hamstrung by lack of
development in governmental capacity, few economic
opportunities, weak government institutions and rule of law,
and porous borders are just some of the many obstacles the
countries of the region are up against.
The United States too faces difficulties. An over
militarized CT approach can be counterproductive where rhetoric
and actions that feed a ``us versus them'' dynamic hurts U.S.
counterterrorism efforts and, likewise, a lack of investment in
resources can hamstring U.S. policies.
There are a series of steps that the United States can take
to make more progress and I, too, have seven recommendations.
First, the United States must strengthen its diplomatic and
development capacities in Southeast Asia including through more
personnel and resources. U.S. diplomats are best equipped to
lead the charge.
They often know best what is happening in these countries,
have the best relationships with foreign governments and are
best positioned to develop locally-tailored strategies to
prevent terrorism.
Gutting the budgets and State and USAID, as has been
proposed by the Trump administration, will unilaterally disarm
U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Second, the United States must prioritize support for
democratic rights-respecting governments and societies in
Southeast Asia.
The stronger the democratic institutions, rule of law, and
tolerance in these countries, the more effective they will be
at preventing terrorism and the more resilient they will be in
weathering any threats.
Third, the United States needs to support the institutional
capacity of partner governments. We should look carefully at
how best to support countries developing legal frameworks for
combatting terrorism and training law enforcement and
intelligence officials, to name just a couple of examples.
Fourth, the United States should invest in economic growth
and development. While the region overall has grown
economically, millions of people remain impoverished and living
in communities cut off from economic opportunities, creating
environments where people are too often susceptible to
terrorist propaganda.
Education and cultural exchanges are crucial here. We
should be inviting young leaders from around the world to learn
in the United States, not making it harder for them to come to
this country.
Fifth, the United States should use the military sparingly
and judiciously. The U.S. military can help prevent terrorist
acts when used carefully in conjunction with other tools, as
has been proven in the southern Philippines.
But at the same time, we must be aware of the sensitivities
of heavy-handed U.S. presence in the region.
Sixth, the United States should support regional
international efforts that can strengthen cooperation amongst
the countries of Southeast Asia.
From ASEAN to the Global Counterterrorism Forum to working
with other partners like Japan and Australia, there are
numerous opportunities for the United States to support
regional counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia.
And seventh, the United States should engage with the
countries and peoples of the region as partners instead of
lecturing and criticizing.
People around the world look to the United States for
leadership and to uphold the universal values. And so the
United States must act in both word and deed to strengthen
those universal values, not to foster perceptions of an ``us
versus them'' mentality.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fuchs follows:]
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----------
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, and I appreciate everybody's
testimony, and we are going to break rank a little bit here,
and I am going to let Ms. Wagner go first because she has got
another meeting that she has too and then we will let the
ranking member go. Go ahead.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you very much both to the chairman and to
the ranking member for their courtesy. I have got a press
conference on human trafficking with the Speaker in about 12
minutes.
So the conflict in Marawi is highly concerning and my heart
goes out to all those who have lost their lives and been
displaced.
It is clear that improving U.S. counterterrorism engagement
with our ASEAN partners and allies is critically important.
Dr. Greitens, you mentioned in your statement the June
launch of joint patrols and information sharing between
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
Increased regional cooperation has the potential to be
helpful. How can the United States better support regional
counterterrorism and border control efforts?
Ms. Greitens. Thank you very much.
You know, we are seeing the very beginning of some of these
forms of multilateral cooperation, particularly, as you
mentioned, the joint patrols, which are only a couple of weeks
old. One of the things the United States can do is continue to
support the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
capabilities that would guide and support those patrols and to
continue to build, via assistance to the Philippines, its
overall maritime capacity.
My general sense of these patrols is that the capacity of
the Philippine Government in the Sulu Sea and around those
southern waters is an area that particularly needs to be beefed
up. That is an area where the United States, along with other
U.S. security partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia,
can be particularly helpful.
Ms. Wagner. Great. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sanderson and Ms. Peery, as you know, many Indonesian
officials have been educated in Saudi-funded schools. There are
multiple strains of Salafi ideology, as I understand it.
How does Salafi ideology express itself in Indonesia and
how influential is Wahhabism? Mr. Sanderson.
Mr. Sanderson. That is not an area of expertise of mine but
let me indicate from field work that I have conducted in the
region among all these countries is that Indonesia in
particular has a very large moderate mainstream Muslim
community. They have large----
Ms. Wagner. Are there moderate political and jihadi strains
involved or----
Mr. Sanderson. Absolutely. I mean, in every country you
would find those. Indonesia happens to be an excellent example
where you have very large communities that have rejected those
more extreme intolerant interpretations of Islam.
Groups like Nahdlatul Ulama Muhammadiyah and other
communities group are--have rejected that. You saw it in the
response to the 2002 Bali bombing where there was a rejection
of JI's vicious attack that killed 202 people.
So that works to our advantage in the region. But you do
have the influence of more extreme forms of Islam that have
come in from the Arabian Gulf, that have been pushed through
schools and through mosques, and that is of concern to us.
But let me turn to my colleague for more details on that.
Ms. Wagner. Ms. Peery.
Ms. Peery. Thank you.
I think the issue of Gulf State funding in general, non-
Arab countries with Muslim majority populations is an issue
because when we look at the way various Muslim communities
practice Islam, it varies greatly and I can full well
understand and respect the confusion that there is when people
are trying to understand that spectrum and try to create policy
with that in mind.
But to your question specifically, the foreign funding that
comes into countries like Indonesia are not only spent
necessarily to construct mosques or create Islamic schools but
they can go to civic organizations like a women's club to do
anything that is not really on its face a religious issue.
But that coming together, the way they engage, what they
talk about usually is--builds on a foundation of a very, very
traditional fundamentalist way of life and that is what is
advocated through conversation, socializing, and, for example,
in Ramadan the activities that you would have that bring
communities together.
I have had conversations that--take this with a grain of
salt because it is anecdotal--but people don't want to talk
about the fact that, for example, if the Indonesian Government
wants to push back on funding that they are not comfortable it
has been alleged that the Saudi Government will then come back
and say, well, we won't give visas to Indonesians that want to
come on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.
Now, for practising Muslims like my mother, even, going on
pilgrimage is a big deal. So for a Muslim-majority country
government to do something that can be perceived in the public
space as preventing Muslims from practising their faith, the
nuances of the issue won't be discussed.
It will become another point that extremists can grab on to
and say, this government is not allowing you to be a good
Muslim.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Mr. Sanderson, there have been reports of Saudi Arabia
collaborating with Indonesia on efforts to prevent
radicalization and King Salman visited Indonesia this spring.
How effective do you think such deradicalization programs
are and is there a role for the U.S. in promoting peaceful
ideologies?
Mr. Sanderson. The Government of Saudi Arabia does not have
any interest in sponsoring groups or movements that would then
target its own government, which they do.
So what the government may do bilaterally in this case does
not always reflect what happens at a different level among
clergy, among wealthy individuals who want to fund more
conservative ideology, more conservative mosques, more
conservative madrasas.
So I applaud Saudi Arabia's effort to work with the
Indonesian Government. I think that is a good thing to do. But
that is not the only channel of influence and money that comes
from Saudi Arabia.
A lot of that comes under the table or it comes privately
and I think that is important and that is what we should focus
on.
I think the U.S. has a role, certainly, in promoting a
range of voices and making sure that there are multiple sources
of information and interpretations available to citizens of
countries like Indonesia.
Ms. Wagner. All right. Thank you, Mr. Sanderson.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Ms. Wagner.
We will go to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. We talk to the Saudis. They say they are not
doing anything to promote the extremist views, and I want to
draw a distinction between intense orthodox Muslim on the one
hand and Islam that has been perverted by those who teach
hatred or terrorist acts against those they disagree with.
If a mosque says five times a day means five times a day,
no matter what, that doesn't hurt anybody.
If it says fast, continue the fast until the sun goes down
and even if there's an ember and better wait another 20 minutes
just in case, that doesn't hurt anybody.
So I am focused here on the madrasas and mosques that teach
or preach a hatred and the wisdom of engaging in violence
against those they disagree with.
Ms. Peery, you talk about Saudi Arabia pushing Indonesia to
have the right to fund certain extremist organizations. Is that
only anecdotal or do you have the facts that would allow me to
confront the Saudi Government with that?
Ms. Peery. Unfortunately, so far only anecdotal. But----
Mr. Sherman. Then I ask every witness here to try to
furnish specific instances where there is an organization--a
mosque, a madras, or other organization that you then identify
has engaged in a particular act of preaching or teaching hatred
or terrorism so that we can turn that to the Saudis and say,
are you funding any of these.
I would especially want you to highlight those that you
have any evidence that the Saudis are in fact funding. I get
all these anecdotal reports, then I get a denial, and then I go
on to another subject.
Does any witness here have an example of an entity in
Southeast Asia that isn't a terrorist group but which preaches
or teaches hatred or violence? Ms. Peery.
Ms. Peery. There is an organization called Hizb ut-Tahrir
which is not specifically connected to Saudi Arabia or any one
country that funds any type of extremism or fundamentalism.
But----
Mr. Sherman. So you are saying that this is an organization
doing things on the ground in Southeast Asia?
Ms. Peery. Yes, as well as 40 other countries.
Mr. Sherman. This organization is funded by whom?
Ms. Peery. Multiple sources, apparently. But the issue with
Hizb ut-Tahrir is--for example, there is even a chapter in the
United States.
I have attended one of their events maybe 2 years ago in
Virginia where they are very comfortable with the headline of
the conversation being pro-caliphate or caliphate in the U.S.
or something like that. We are lucky in the United States
that----
Mr. Sherman. And you are using the term caliphate----
Ms. Peery. Islamic State, specifically. I went there just
to see what kind of audience comes and I was very happy to say
three people, if that, and they didn't look particularly into
the topic.
But if you look at Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia, they have
school organizations. They send pamphlets out. They have
conferences or book clubs and Indonesia only now----
Mr. Sherman. And we don't know who funds them but we think
that Saudi individuals or government might?
Ms. Peery. I don't think it is Saudi specifically, no. But
it----
Mr. Sherman. Well, I don't--so you--do you think their
funds include donors from the Government or citizens of Saudi
Arabia?
Ms. Peery. It is possible.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. I would ask you to document for the
record how this organization preaches or teaches hatred,
support for a caliphate.
Ms. Peery. I point to that example.
Mr. Sherman. I mean, when I say support for a caliphate I
don't mean, like, the peaceful union of----
Ms. Peery. Right.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Adjoining predominantly Muslim
states. I mean, North and South Yemen joined together and that
is fine. It hasn't worked out so well but it is not----
Ms. Peery. If I may, I just mentioned Hizb ut-Tahrir to
make the point that it is one of the most organized and most
expansive----
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Ms. Peery [continuing]. In terms of reach.
Mr. Sherman. Does any other witness have specifics here on
organizations that teach or preach hatred?
I will move on to another subject--broadcasting. How
important is Voice of America and other U.S.-paid broadcasting
to achieving the goals we are trying to achieve in Southeast
Asia?
Mr. Sanderson.
Mr. Sanderson. I made a visit many years ago in which I
interviewed several militant groups in Indonesia, the
Philippines, and other areas and it also included engaging with
the topic you are discussing here now in terms of putting a
message out there to promote American values, to promote
democracy, to give people alternative sources of information.
There is a broad, broad community of individuals in these
countries that are eager consumers of this information but the
groups that we are most concerned with have long ago rejected
any kind of message coming from the United States from their
own Government, from moderate imams in their communities.
So when you speak of the influence of Voice of America, it
is influential on people who may be too young to make a
decision at this point. They haven't been influenced yet.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. I mean, obviously, somebody that----
Mr. Sanderson. But the folks we are concerned about--those
being recruited into battle----
Mr. Sherman. I am concerned with the 10-year-olds who might
go one way or another when they are 15 or 20.
Mr. Sanderson. I don't know how appealing Voice of America
is to a 10-year-old anywhere in the world, to be honest.
Mr. Sherman. And their--and their parents.
Mr. Sanderson. Yes, so it could get to their parents. Their
parents could influence them but----
Mr. Sherman. Right. Does anyone else have any comment?
Mr. Fuchs.
Mr. Fuchs. Yes. I would just say, agreeing in part with my
colleague. I would also point out that I think broadcasting
mediums like VOA are part of a broader strategy that the United
States and other countries I think can use very effectively to
show people of the region, first of all, what U.S. values are
but also as alternative mediums for getting information, as Mr.
Sanderson pointed out.
I think similarly, just as I mentioned in my testimony,
vehicles like cultural educational exchanges that the United
States supports in the region are vital. I understand that they
may not be on a level of hundreds of thousands of people.
But even so, on the level of hundreds of people and
sometimes thousands of people they have ripple effects in their
communities. So I think that supporting those sorts of efforts
are very valuable.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Yoho. I kind of want to just set the stage. You guys
all probably know--I am sure you know this very well.
But when you look at the Asia Pacific region and you look
at nation states--archipelago nations like the Philippines has
7,000 islands, Indonesia 17,000-plus.
I was reading where the government really doesn't know how
many. I would hope they would. But when you look at that land
mass with that much separation between continuity of a country,
I don't know how you police that.
So it is ripe for the development of any kind of a
movement. It could be peaceful but in this case we are looking
at the growing threat.
I have got so many different questions and it is you and I
so we are going to have fun and you guys will have to tolerate
us, if you will, please.
But when you look at the land mass and just the logistics
problem of policing, it just adds to the potential terrorist
threat than can affect not just that region but the whole
world. We've got more displaced people today than we have since
World War II and now we are adding another 400,000 displaced
people just on the island of Mindanao. So this is something
that we have to take very seriously.
It is something we have to get under control, and one of my
first questions is what have we learned from Afghanistan and
Iraq with us going in there militarily, without taking in the
culture, the norms of a society, tribal communities in the
Middle East, what have we learned from there?
Because in Robert Gates' book that was one of the downfalls
that we went in there--we were going to show them how America
does it without taking into consideration what the people of
those countries want. Does anybody want to tackle that?
Mr. Sanderson.
Mr. Sanderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first indicate or suggest that our familiarity with
the cultures in Southeast Asia is better than it was with
Afghanistan for certain.
It doesn't mean it is perfect but we have, of course, had a
long history in the Philippines. We have a good relationship
with Malaysia and Indonesia.
So we are more familiar with those nations. We have had
bilateral exchanges, multilateral exchanges with them on law
enforcement, military, civilian levels. So we are in better
shape there. But nonetheless, you still have to work with your
local partners.
What we have learned in Afghanistan is legion--well, I hope
we have learned it. But what we have observed is quite
comprehensive.
One of the most important things, in consideration of your
comment, is it is not easy or effective to work with corrupt
governments. If we do not have good partners on the other side,
and we have a mixed bag here in Southeast Asia, then we will
not be that successful.
Also, you mentioned the number of islands, 23,000-plus
among those two. One thousand islands in Indonesia are
inhabited, 600 permanently inhabited.
So there is a lot of space where these guys can go and go
various activities. However, they do need infrastructure in
order to carry out activities.
So not all of those places are hospitable even to militant
groups. But it is a big space. Encouraging more activity in the
maritime space is excellent, as Dr. Greitens pointed out, and I
hope we will do that.
Mr. Yoho. Okay.
Dr. Greitens, let me move to you. Reading your testimony
here, from 2002 to 2015, the U.S. deployed several hundred
special operations personnel to southern Philippines for
counter terrorism purposes.
Why was that not effective? Why--I feel like this has kind
of just been off the radar. I am sure there is a select few
that were there that were aware of this. But it seems like from
a U.S. foreign policy standpoint, this is something that has
kind of bypassed us and it is, like, uh-oh, we now--now we have
to catch up.
Why was that not effective in what we are doing? You know,
and I will take just the number of insurgents we thought that
were in Marawi.
It was, what, 200 to 300--now we know it is over 400 or
500, and there is no telling how many it is going to be. What
is your thoughts on that?
Ms. Greitens. Thank you.
Sir, I think that the decision to wind down the task force
was a product of several different factors. One of which was an
estimation that perhaps the task force had been more successful
in its primary mission, which had to do more with Abu Sayyaf
than what was going on on the land.
The Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines was
principally dealing with Abu Sayyaf. At the time there was also
a peace process underway in Mindanao, and there was an
agreement reached in 2014, the year before the task force
terminated in February 2015, I believe.
And so at the time, things in Mindanao looked like they
were perhaps coming together a little bit better than they
were. So that is one factor that I think affected the decision.
As I know that you are aware, Secretary Mattis has stated that
perhaps that decision was premature.
But the other factor that we have to think about is that
what's happened in the Middle East has produced displacement
effects into Southeast Asia. So we are also seeing that as
pressure is exerted against Islamic State in the Middle East,
that the Philippines has become more appealing. These groups
that splintered away from the MILF, some of whom have been in
the lead, really, in Marawi, are both a little bit different
and driven by different factors than were the principal
emphasis for the Joint Special Operations Task Force
Philippines.
But, as I noted in my testimony, if the Philippine
Government recommends it, that is something the U.S. should at
least be willing to consider, among a range of other options.
Thank you.
Mr. Yoho. That is what we need to be prepared for because
as these radicals, the terrorists, come back over, the fighters
come back over, being displaced from Iraq, Syrian, wherever,
that they are going to come there and there is going to be a
coalition or they are going to coalesce together and it is
going to form a stronger--it is going to be ISIS Part II, and
that is what I think we all need to be concerned about and that
is what we are trying to prevent.
So I am going to go to you, Ms. Peery. One of the questions
I wanted to ask you is about the Internet and social media and
how it is all interconnected.
How could the U.S. Government, working with the regional
governments, work with social media and other technological
companies to reduce terrorist groups' ability to leverage
social media platforms to spread their extremist messages? Do
you have any recommendations on that?
Ms. Peery. I think there needs to be encouragement to have
a collaboration between the government, specifically its law
enforcement arms and its intelligence services to work with the
private sector to look at what the infrastructure specifically
looks like.
As I mentioned in my testimony, for example, if Indonesia
has 70 percent of the servers that serves--that proliferates
the information in the entire region, that is an opportunity
for the Philippines to go directly to Indonesia and have a
conversation.
It can be as simple as getting them to talk to each other
to understand what information they have, what these--where the
companies are that run the servers, whether there is an
opportunity to further that collaboration with companies like
Facebook and Twitter, which are saying more and more that they
are willing to take down extremist information and propaganda.
The second part of that, as I mentioned also in my
testimony, is taking down extremist propaganda is only half of
the problem.
You have to replace it with an understanding of Islam that
not only talks about tolerance and pluralism, excuse me, but
also rejects ISIS propaganda point by point, and that is
something that only the local governments within the region can
do if they support the grassroots organizations in the
respective countries.
Mr. Yoho. All right.
And when you look at it, it just seems like such a daunting
task. You have got the 23,000 islands or whatever it is--to try
to police that, and you have different nations in there,
different rules of law, different levels of the rule of law.
How do you--how do you police that, and I don't know if you
can take an island like Mindanao and just say, we are going to
shut down the Internet.
I know this is getting broadcast and I am going to--people
are going to say I am against First Amendment. I am not. We are
trying to get something under control that if we don't get it
under control we are going to be fighting for generations and
generations, and certainly we have seen that in the Middle
East.
Mr. Fuchs, I wanted to ask you, because one of the things
that we learned and you had recommended it here was in one of
your opening statements was that in the long run, managing the
security challenge and preventing it from growing into a more
direct threat to the U.S. interests above all else requires
capable governments--I think we are all in agreement with
that--that follow the rule of law, prioritize sustainability
and equitable economic growth strategies and which protect the
values of human rights and tolerance and work to strengthen
democratic institutions.
This is something I have struggled with for years in
Foreign Relations because we all agree with that. I mean, those
are the founding principles, the core values of our country
and, of course, it has taken us over 200, 300 years to get to
this point and we have fought several wars to protect these
rights, number one, to get them and to protect them.
When you go into a country, a foreign country--and
certainly we learned this in the Middle East--to instill our
values and say this is a part of the process, I would like to
hear your thoughts.
Should that be at the beginning or should that be the goal
and bring that country to those beliefs as success happens?
Because what I see is the foreign policies of the past, we
put these conditions and say this is the only way we are going
to help you if you do these things, and put that up here
instead of focussing on peace, security, rule of law, and good
governance.
What are your thoughts on that and how can we do that
different and yet accomplish that, say, maybe over a 5- to 10-
year goal if we are working in that direction? I think
everybody would be better off.
Mr. Fuchs. Absolutely. I think that is a great question.
I think the reality is that you have to do all of it at
once, unfortunately, as difficult as it is.
I think that one of the things to recognize about Southeast
Asia as compared to, say, the Middle East or some other places
is that over the arc of the last few decades we have actually
been dealing with a better and better situation on that time
span.
These are countries that have become more democratic,
transitioned for authoritarian to democratic, in many
instances.
So, for instances, in a country like Indonesia we actually
have a partner government that is relatively capable in certain
aspects and that we can work with on a lot of these very, very
challenging issues.
The Philippines, I will say, which has been up and down,
right now is a much more difficult task and I think is a good
example of exactly the challenge that you are raising here
because with President Aquino up until last year, the United
States I think was able to support a lot of aspects of Filipino
policy that would get at the roots of terrorism in the region
including strengthening anti-corruption efforts, growing of the
economy, which I think are important aspects of that.
But with President Duterte, whose interests and policies
are quite different--his respect for human rights seems quite
low, frankly, in my estimation--it makes it much more difficult
for the United States with at the one hand to make sure that we
are partnering with him and his government to go after
terrorist groups and other security threats while at the same
time not condoning the sorts of heavy-handed tactics that he
has been using domestically in his fight against drugs.
Mr. Yoho. I just want to end with this before I go to my
colleague over here, Mr. Connolly, it was nice to see that
President Trump called the leaders of those nations and that
Vice President Pence went down there, and then Secretary
Tillerson has put an emphasis on that area and General
participating in the Shangri-La Dialogue.
The message that I want to come out of this hearing today,
out of this committee, that goes out, that is being broadcast
is that America is back and our focus in on the Asia Pacific
region and we are focussing on economics, trade, national
security, and, as you've brought up multiple times, cultural
exchanges because I think that is the one missing link that we
haven't done in the Middle East like we should have and that is
an emphasis that we want to put on that.
With that, I am going to turn to my good friend, Mr.
Connolly from Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, though I must say I hardly
think America is back. I think in the brief 6 or 7 months of
this administration we have done nothing but retreat including
from this area.
Nothing is more catastrophic, starting with the retreat
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It creates an enormous void
in this region and gives enormous opportunities to our rival,
China.
Maybe some think that is a great leap forward. I think it
is a great leap backward and definitely not in U.S. interests,
and the proof of that was within 1 week Beijing convened a
meeting in Beijing of all the remaining TPP partners to see if
they could carve out a trade agreement that circumscribed that
part of the globe but without us and without our standards.
I also think it was an enormous retreat and again gave the
Chinese in this part of the world an enormous diplomatic
advantage in withdrawing unilaterally from the Paris Climate
Accord.
We are now in the happy company of two countries exactly--
Nicaragua and Syria. What a proud moment for the United States.
If that is called we are back again, I would rather not be.
So I think there are other points of view about what has
happened in this brief period of time and I honestly believe
that those two things actually will be seen by history akin to
our refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles that most
certainly helped precipitate a successor war to World War I,
the war to end all wars. But that is a different matter.
Let me ask--Mr. Fuchs, I don't know--I thought I heard kind
of squishy language from you just now on the Philippines. This
is a dictator who has said, have at it, vigilante violence, and
I think the number I think is 7,000 dead that we know of.
He has even advocated for rape as a tactic--as a tool in
order to get rid of what he has decided are criminal elements
and druggies and drug dealers and drug users and undesirables.
Now, my friend, Mr. Yoho, read from a statement, quite
correctly, that our goal is to establish governments--capable
governments that follow the rule of law.
How is this a capable government other than being more
efficient and killing people in extrajudicial ways that
certainly the United States cannot condone, let alone the rule
of law?
I mean, I don't want to put words in your mouth but you
sounded like, well, except for that--granted, that is a little
messy but other than that we have got strategic goals we share.
Well, I mean, Duterte hasn't even been consistent in that
respect. I mean, one day he likes China. One day he likes us. I
mean, he is threatening. He is not threatening. He could cut a
deal with China. He could throw us out.
My head spins with this guy who seems, frankly, unstable
and thuggish if not murderous--hardly a partner we want to do
business with, though we do. But we will get to that in a
minute.
So did you want to clarify your squishy remarks or----
Mr. Fuchs. Sure. Thank you, Congressman.
Well, I will try to restate I think what I was getting at,
which is that this is a very, very difficult challenge and I
think that without a doubt, democracy and human rights needs to
be an essential component of our strategy for a wide variety of
goals but including counterterrorism in Southeast Asia.
Now, the United States, obviously, has a long-time alliance
with the Philippines. With the previous government, with
President Aquino, there was, I think, a very robust partnership
on democracy and human rights as well as a variety of other
issues.
At the same time, I don't think that the terrible things
that President Duterte is doing--and they are absolutely
terrible and I think that they merit a response from the United
States, some of which I know that you and your representant and
your colleagues have already tried to send in a number of
different ways--I think at the same time we need to focus on
what our interests are there in supporting democracy and human
rights in that country, supporting economic growth and ensuring
that our security interests are met.
So I think that while we do not break off diplomatic
relations altogether with the country, there are a variety of
things the United States needs to be doing to send messages to
Duterte about how unhappy we are with what he's been doing. Can
I----
Mr. Connolly. Excuse me. Is one of those things to invite
him, among the very first international leaders, to come visit
Washington and the White House?
Mr. Fuchs. And that was exactly going to be my next point,
which I actually--just as soon as President Trump made that
invitation I actually wrote a piece that said specifically the
President should not be inviting the President of the
Philippines here.
But I think that there are also a number of other things
that we can be considering doing to send our--to signal our
displeasure including the potential of cutting off certain
types of assistance to the Philippines.
The Leahy vetting process is one way of doing that--that
already exists. But there, frankly, are other types of
cooperation with law enforcement with the armed forces of the
Philippines that, frankly, can be suspended or cut off to show
him that there is a red line that he is crossing right now in
the way that he is running his country and that our cooperation
is not a blank check.
Mr. Connolly. I knew you weren't squishy.
Let me ask you final question on this one and then I am
going to turn to Mr. Sanderson on foreign aid.
So the Duterte government decided that they needed a
special envoy to the United States of America and in light of
what you just said, do you believe the selection of Jose
Antonio, who is a business partner with Donald Trump in
building a tower in the Philippines, is an appropriate choice
and sends the right signal?
Or, I mean, is this somebody with whom we can do business?
Is this somebody who is designed to flatter the President but
not to ameliorate a real human rights crisis underway in the
Philippines as we speak?
Mr. Fuchs. I completely agree with you that this is sending
exactly the wrong signal and I think that it is actually
indicative of a broader problem that we may have with the
relations of the United States and the countries in this region
right now and President Trump's conflicts of interest--his
businesses and his conflicts of interest and what that might
wreak on our relationships in the region. That is one example.
But, frankly, their corruption is a widespread problem in
Southeast Asia. It is a way of doing business in some of these
countries, unfortunately, and part of the problem is that one
of the signals that has been sent to some of these countries by
President Trump's unwillingness to get rid of his business
holdings before taking office is that the United States may
actually be moving closer to them in terms of the way we do
business and that the result of that in part might be more
envoys like this or more entreaties to the United States about
business.
Mr. Connolly. That is why a number of ethicists both
Republican and Democrat strongly advocated an absolute blind
trust so that you weren't having ongoing questions tainting
foreign policy as well as other kinds of decisions.
Unfortunately, that advice was not taken.
I don't wish to impose on the chairman. So if you will
allow me one--just one last set of questions, and I don't mean
to preclude anyone else that may want to comment. But I thought
I would put it to you first, Mr. Sanderson, listening to your
testimony.
If you look at the budget submitted by the President and,
apparently, supported by the Secretary of State, Mr. Tillerson,
we make some very substantial cuts in foreign assistance
programs including democracy-building efforts in the countries
we are talking about here today in terms of humanitarian
services, in terms of institution building, you name it--co-
ops, health clinics, small micro businesses, women-owned
businesses, empowerment, all that stuff, where we have been
doing a lot of good work actually for quite some time and we
actually have some metrics that show some results.
Takes a little time but, all of that is cut. I mean, not
just cut--really cut, I mean, right to the bone. To make it all
special, apparently Secretary Tillerson is thinking of
absorbing USAID into State Department as just another bureau,
even though their missions are quite different.
I wonder if you could comment on that. How does that help
us in the mission we are talking about in this region if this
America's back again, it looks another example to me of no, we
are not--we are retreating and, again, allowing the Chinese to
enter that vacuum with their foreign assistance, which isn't as
punctilious or meritorious as ours in terms of setting metrics
that have to be met, and making sure there are clear rationales
that benefit large numbers of people.
Mr. Sanderson. Nor does it come with the oversight that
ours does. You bring up some great points, Congressman. I think
it is a mistake to cut the State Department's budget at all.
But I understand that all budgets are going to be coming under
the knife except for DoD.
Mr. Connolly. Not defense.
Mr. Sanderson. Yes, except for DoD. So but that does recall
the secretary and then General Mattis' comments during his
confirmation hearing when he said, if you cut the State
Department I have to buy more bullets.
I do think those budgets will not be cut that sharply. I
hope they are not cut much at all because those are
tremendously important programs.
They seed the field with a lot of positive things that have
short, medium, and long-term benefits. We are a great partner
overseas. I see it in all the countries that I go to.
People want the assistance that covers everything from
military to civilian to economic, judicial. You name it, they
want that activity. It is an important part of counterterrorism
because you are strengthening economies in communities.
When you have idle hands, they get pulled into the gray
market and then they get pulled into militant groups sometimes.
To your comment about engagement, the President has sent
mixed messages but largely messages about retreat. His national
security staff, which is superb, goes out after those messages
and tries to reassure our allies.
So we have gone into Asia and to Southeast Asia to reassure
our allies. These are important relationships. The Department
of Defense likes to say they--you can't surge trust.
When you are dealing with a complicated environment like
Southeast Asia, like foreign fighters, and all the insurgencies
that you have there, a good healthy widespread multifaceted
relationship between the United States and our Asian partners
in Southeast Asia in particular is excellent for the
counterterrorism partnerships.
If the rest of the relationship is good, that often
redounds to the--to the other issues that we are looking at and
that is why I would encourage deep engagement and budgets that
do bring American culture, society, and engagement on a high
level.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Yoho. And I appreciate that dialogue and I can always
appreciate my colleague bringing the politics into this.
But truth be known, TPP wouldn't have passed. There wasn't
support in the House, either Republicans or Democrats, or in
the Senate, Republicans or Democrats. So it was off the table.
It was a good call so it can be renegotiated and that is
why we put in free trade agreements with many countries in the
Asia Pacific that we are working on now.
And let us see--what was the other one? I forget. You were
talking about----
Mr. Connolly. The Paris climate----
Mr. Yoho. Oh, the Paris climate--and, again, that would
have put this country at a disadvantage. We are going to lead
on energy and you are going to see great things come out of
that.
So I do feel like we are back in that area. The President
being down there, the Secretary of State, and the State
Department is light on people.
People are working double time in these positions. Over 130
positions have been appointed. They just haven't gone through
the process in the Senate. So it is being held up in the Senate
again.
But I do want to point out you were talking--Mr. Fuchs, you
were talking about the importance of diplomatic relations in
that area. You said strong diplomatic ties will help thwart
terrorism.
Have we not had that over the last 8 years in the previous
administration? I mean, what is your thoughts on that or
anybody else that wants to weigh in on that.
Mr. Fuchs. Well, I think that we actually have had very
positive relationships with a number of the countries in the
region over the last 8 years and, of course, it does not mean
that you are going to prevent every terrorist threat from
spawning in the region.
But I think that fundamentally you are not going to get
anything done on counterterrorism in the region if you do not
have those strong diplomatic relationships because, again,
these are the ones who have the relationships with their
counterparts in the governments in Indonesia and Malaysia and
the Philippines.
They are the ones who have the best information about what
is going on in the cities and towns and villages in these
countries and the best feel for these countries.
They really are the front lines here in Southeast Asia for
our counterterrorism strategy. Of course, they are not 100
percent of the strategy but they are an essential component of
it.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Then I guess my question is if we have got
these great relationships, did we just drop the ball on this?
Did we not follow up or was this just behind the scene we were
distracted by North Korea? The Middle East? Anybody's thoughts
on that.
Mr. Fuchs. If I----
Mr. Sanderson. I would remark that we do have a very full
plate worldwide----
Mr. Yoho. We sure do.
Mr. Sanderson [continuing]. And it is hard to dedicate
sufficient energy to every single relationship, and then when
things like Marawi--the battle of Marawi flare-up then we shift
our resources here and so it is a question of resources and
attention.
But that gets also back to cutting budgets and making sure
the Senate moves people through and what not, which I hope that
you do because we do retain the leadership position globally.
We do need to be a part of most of these issues and then
solving problems and I don't know if it is a question of
dropping the ball or just being distracted by somewhere else.
Mr. Yoho. Well, when you look at where we are as a nation.
We are $20 trillion in debt. I was at a meeting last night.
They said our deficit spending next year is going to be
around $750 billion. We are getting worse. There are going to
be some austerity measures.
We want to make sure that we cut in the right area, and I
agree with General Mattis--if you cut foreign aid you are going
to have to buy more bullets and that is certainly not the
direction we want it.
So we want to have strong diplomacy, we want to have strong
policies, and we want to make sure that the ideas that you give
us that we can enact in the legislation are that much stronger.
I think I had one more question and it was for you, Dr.
Greitens. Talking about North Korea, funnelling money through
there--what nexus does that go through?
Does that go through any of the Chinese banks or any of the
world banks that we could put secondary sanctions on?
Ms. Greitens. Yes. It does both, sir. North Korea has
revenue-generating operations throughout Southeast Asia, and
one of the things that we've seen in recent months is that
countries in Southeast Asia--Singapore, Malaysia, some other
countries in the region--have actually started to tighten down
on some of these North Korean revenue-generating operations.
There is banking that goes through Singapore and some of
the other financial nodes in the region. But as you indicated,
a lot of the companies that do business with North Korea,
around 80 percent, maybe 90 percent of North Korea's trade, is
with China. So from both a banking and a trade perspective,
China is really the dominant actor.
That said, North Korea has been very good at adapting when
one source of revenue or one set of banking networks comes
under pressure. I have in the past advocated for the United
States to engage on the North Korean question in Southeast
Asia, in part to keep North Korea from moving its center of
activity to Southeast Asia if China comes under pressure, and I
think that is an important part.
The Philippines, according to the World Trade Organization,
is the third largest trade partner of North Korea today, after
India and China, and that is not insignificant. So we should be
putting all tools on the table.
Mr. Yoho. We really do and, of course, we just saw that
load of ivory tusks--I think it was 7,000 pounds--that just got
confiscated and those are the kind of things that are funding
terrorist organizations and it doesn't serve humanity.
I can't tell you how much I appreciate it and, again, feel
free to offer suggestions that we can do legislation with. We
have done this in the past and I look forward to your input.
I thank you for your time. I value your time and everybody
else here.
So with that, we thank the panel for joining us today to
share their experience, and this meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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