[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-51]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES FOR
NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 25, 2017
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-873 WASHINGTON : 2018
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RO KHANNA, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Benedict, VADM Terry, USN, Director, Navy Strategic Systems
Program........................................................ 6
Cange, Susan M., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Department of Energy............................... 8
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration................................ 3
Rand, Gen Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command 6
Soofer, Dr. Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense...... 4
Zangardi, Dr. John A., Acting Chief Information Officer,
Department of Defense.......................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Benedict, VADM Terry......................................... 69
Cange, Susan M............................................... 83
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 34
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G........................................ 35
Rand, Gen Robin.............................................. 54
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Soofer, Dr. Robert........................................... 47
Zangardi, Dr. John A......................................... 79
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Letter from Secretary of Energy Moniz to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget............................ 95
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 108
Mr. Franks................................................... 108
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 111
Mr. Rogers................................................... 101
FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, May 25, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order. I want to welcome you to our hearing on ``Fiscal Year
2018 Priorities for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense
Activities.''
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for
your service to our Nation. In uniform or out, your service to
the American people is greatly appreciated.
We have a full witness panel today because, due to the
compressed schedule for the budget request and defense
authorization bill, we are going to attempt to cover the
waterfront on all things nuclear. We have the Honorable Frank
Klotz, Administrator, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security; Dr.
Robert Soofer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Defense Policy; General Robin Rand, Commander, Air
Force Global Strike Command; Vice Admiral Terry Benedict,
Director, Navy Strategic Systems Programs; and I know I am
going to butcher this one up, but Dr. John Zangardi--is that
all right--Acting Chief Information Officer at the Department
of Defense; and Ms. Susan Cange--did I pronounce that right--
Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management.
Two and a half months ago, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Selva, testified before our full
committee that, quote: ``There is no higher priority for the
Joint Force than fielding all the components of an effective
nuclear deterrent, and we are emphasizing the nuclear mission
over all other modernization programs when faced with that
choice. We in the Joint Force put our nuclear deterrent as the
number one priority for modernization and recapitalization,''
close quote.
This priority has now been clearly stated by three
successive Secretaries of Defense: Secretary Hagel, Secretary
Carter, and Secretary Mattis. As my friend and ranking member
has repeatedly pointed out, this subcommittee agrees with that
prioritization on a bipartisan basis, and I am pleased to say
that the fiscal year 2018 budget request put forward by the
Trump administration 2 days ago reinforces that priority. This
is good news.
As a Nation, we need to put our money where our mouths are.
This committee played a key role in building the current broad
bipartisan agreement on the importance of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent and the urgent need to carry out the full nuclear
modernization programs put forth by the Obama administration.
Reflecting on the budget request, let's be clear about one
thing. The billion dollar increase for NNSA's [National Nuclear
Security Administration's] nuclear weapons activities goes a
long way but does not fully fill the gap identified by
Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz in his letter to the OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] Director in 2015.
The Secretary said there was over a billion dollar gap
between the program of record in fiscal year 2018 and the
funding allocated. We are still several hundred million dollars
short here. As the Trump administration embarks on its Nuclear
Posture Review, in which several of our witnesses are
intimately involved, we will take stock today of all the
priorities, policies, and programs related to nuclear
deterrence and nuclear security more broadly.
Let me briefly highlight two. Of particular concern to this
subcommittee are the nuclear advances made by foreign countries
and how those impact our own deterrent. As we heard from the
Defense Science Board earlier this year, quote, ``Nuclear
weapons are a steadily evolving threat in both new and familiar
directions,'' close quote. We must understand how the threat is
evolving and anticipate what must be done to compensate. The
U.S. focus in recent years has been on downplaying the utility
of nuclear weapons, but most other nuclear powers have not
downplayed that threat. The U.S. will ensure its nuclear
deterrent is robust and credible against all potential threats
today and for the long term.
Another longstanding concern of this committee has been the
state of the infrastructure within the NNSA enterprise. This
committee has had several hearings on the topic in the past
year, and I am pleased that the budget request provides
significantly additional funding here. We will take a look at
the projects that are being proposed and make sure they are
truly buying down the massive backlog of deferred maintenance
and repair needs. We will also look to see what authorities and
processes can be provided or streamlined to ensure we are doing
this smartly, effectively, and efficiently.
In closing, let me revisit something that General Hyten,
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, said at our hearing
back in March, quote: ``At a time when others continue to
modernize and expand strategic capabilities, nearly all
elements of the nuclear enterprise, our nuclear delivery
systems, weapons stockpile, NC3 [nuclear command, control, and
communications], and other critical infrastructure are
operating well beyond their expected service life''--``planned
sustainment and modernization activities must be completed on
schedule, as a delay will impact the execution of our strategic
deterrence mission and unacceptably degrade our ability, and
ultimately our credibility, to deter and assure,'' close quote.
For our number one priority defense mission, this is a
sobering reminder of the tremendously important job facing
these witnesses and this subcommittee, so let's get to work.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here, and I look
forward to our discussions.
With that, let me turn to my friend, the ranking member
from Tennessee, Mr. Jim Cooper, for any opening statement he
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to welcome the witnesses, and in order to save
time, I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement
be made part of the record. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Rogers. One of the many reasons I like him: He is short
and to the point.
All right. We are going to be called for votes in about an
hour. So, if the witnesses could, your full opening statement
will be submitted for the record. If you can summarize in about
3 minutes, then we will get to questions more rapidly.
General Klotz, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
General Klotz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize,
hopefully at 3 minutes. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
and other members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to present the President's fiscal year 2018 budget
request for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration. We value this committee's strong
support for the three pillars of NNSA's mission: the nuclear
weapons stockpile, nuclear threat reduction, and Naval
Reactors. Our budget request, which comprises approximately
half of the DOE [Department of Energy] budget, is $13.9
billion. This represents an increase, as you pointed out, of
nearly $1 billion, or 7.8 percent, over the fiscal year 2017
omnibus level.
This budget request is vital to ensuring that the U.S.
nuclear force remains modern, robust, flexible, resilient,
ready, and appropriately tailored to 21st century threats, and
to reassure our allies. It also is indicative of the strong
support of the administration for the mission and the people of
the National Nuclear Security Administration.
NNSA's fiscal year 2018 budget request for the weapons
activity appropriation is $10.2 billion, an increase of nearly
$1 billion, or 10.8 percent, over the fiscal year 2017 omnibus
level. This increase is needed to both meet our current life
extension program commitments and to modernize our research and
production infrastructure so we are positioned to address
future requirements and future challenges.
The 2018 budget request also includes $1.8 billion for the
defense nuclear nonproliferation account, which is consistent
with the funding level in the fiscal year 2017 omnibus. This
appropriation continues NNSA's critical and far-reaching
mission to prevent, counter, and to respond to nuclear threats.
The request for our third appropriations, the Naval
Reactors program, is nearly $1.5 billion. This represents an
increase of $60 million, or 4.2 percent, above the fiscal year
2017 omnibus level. Not only does the requested funding support
today's operational fleet, it enables Naval Reactors to deliver
tomorrow's fleet.
Our budget request for the fourth and final appropriations
account, Federal salaries and expenses, is $418 million, an
increase of $31 million, or 8.1 percent, over the fiscal year
2017 omnibus level. The request supports recruiting, training,
and retaining the highly skilled Federal workforce essential to
achieving success in technically complex 21st century national
security missions.
In closing, our fiscal year 2018 budget request reflects
NNSA's motto: ``Mission first, people always.'' It accounts for
the significant tempo of operations at NNSA which in many ways
has reached a level unseen since the Cold War. It includes long
overdue investments to repair and replace infrastructure at our
national laboratories and production plants, and it provides
modern and more efficient work space for our highly talented
scientific, engineering, and professional workforce.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
sir, and I look forward to answering any questions the
subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in
the Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
Dr. Soofer, you are recognized for the first of many
occasions before this committee, I am sure.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT SOOFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the President's fiscal year
2018 budget request for nuclear forces.
The President directed the Department of Defense to conduct
a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review [NPR], and we expect to
complete it by the end of this calendar year. I will not
prejudge the outcome of the NPR but will outline some of the
challenges and questions that we face.
For decades, U.S. nuclear forces have provided the ultimate
deterrent against nuclear attacks on the United States and our
allies. Nuclear weapons remain a foundational element of U.S.
strategy for deterring strategic attacks and large-scale war
and for assuring U.S. allies. Effective deterrence requires a
deliberate strategy and forces that are structured and postured
to support that strategy within the existing security
environment. Strategy, forces, and posture must also be
flexible enough to maintain stability while adjusting to both
gradual and rapid technological and geopolitical changes.
Recent years have, indeed, brought changes that U.S. policy
must address. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions against
its neighbors and threatened the United States and its allies.
It has elevated strategies for nuclear first use. It is
violating the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
and is modernizing a large and diverse nonstrategic nuclear
weapons force.
In the Asia-Pacific, China's increased assertiveness
suggests a desire to dominate that region. North Korea's
leadership has demonstrated a willingness to accept economic
countermeasures and international isolation in order to advance
its nuclear capability and develop ballistic missiles able to
strike the United States homeland as well our allies in the
region.
The United States remains committed to ensuring that Iran
never acquires a nuclear weapon. As the administration conducts
its policy review of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
[JCPOA], we will continue to meet our commitments under the
deal. Iran continues its ballistic missile program, which is
outside of the JCPOA.
It is against this backdrop that the President directed DOD
[Department of Defense] to ensure that the U.S. nuclear
deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats. Each of
these characteristics contributes to the effectiveness of our
deterrent strategy.
As we conduct the NPR, Secretary Mattis has directed that
we continue with the existing program of record for
recapitalizing our aging nuclear forces. After decades of
deferred modernization, replacement programs must proceed
without further delay if we are to retain existing deterrent
capabilities.
DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
approximately $230 billion to $290 billion over more than two
decades. This includes the total cost of strategic delivery
systems that have a nuclear-only mission and a portion of the
B-21 bomber, which will have both conventional and nuclear
roles. It also includes modernizing nuclear command and control
and communication systems.
During this coming period of increased spending for
replacement programs, nuclear forces will remain a small
fraction of the DOD budget with annual funding levels,
including sustainment and operations, projected to range from
approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2018 fully funds
DOD nuclear recapitalization programs and provides for nuclear
force sustainment and operations. It also adds more than $3
billion across the Future Years Defense Plan relative to the
previous year's request to continue improving the health of the
DOD nuclear enterprise. These investments demonstrate the
President's commitment to nuclear deterrence and national
defense.
The critical mission of ensuring an effective nuclear
deterrent is the highest priority mission of the Department of
Defense and one it shares with the Department of Energy and the
Congress, and we look forward to continuing to work together in
faithfully and responsively fulfilling this mission. Thank you
again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Soofer can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Dr. Soofer.
General Rand, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GEN ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL
STRIKE COMMAND
General Rand. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me to appear before you today to represent the men and
women of Air Force Global Strike Command. I have testified
multiple times for the subcommittee, and I am looking forward
to speaking about the progress and the changes that have taken
place in our command since our last meeting in July of 2016. I
am happy to provide my inputs and answer any questions on the
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, Long-Range Standoff Weapon
and the B-21 Raider, infrastructure requirements, nuclear
command and control and communication systems, and other
programs within the Air Force Global Strike.
Fiscal constraints, while posing planning challenges, do
not alter the national security landscape or the intent of
competitors and adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring
value of long-range strategic forces to our Nation.
Mr. Chairman, and subcommittee members, I want to thank you
for your dedication to our great Nation and the opportunity to
appear before the committee to highlight the need for
modernization and efforts across Air Force Global Strike
Command. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Rand can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Rogers. That was a record. Like 1 minute. Awesome.
Admiral Benedict, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAM
Admiral Benedict. Thank you, sir. Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify here today representing the
men and women of our Navy's Strategic Systems Programs [SSP].
I would like to briefly address the long-term sustainment
of the sea-based leg of the triad. While our current life-
extension efforts will sustain the D5 [Trident missile] system
until the 2040s, the Navy is already beginning to evaluate
options to maintain a credible and effective strategic weapons
system to the end of the Columbia-class service life in the
2080s.
At SSP, we are looking long term and across the spectrum,
from our workforce and infrastructure to our industry partners
and geographic footprint.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today about
the sea-based leg of the triad. I am pleased to answer your
questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in
the Appendix on page 69.]
Mr. Rogers. He beat you by 10 seconds, General. I am sorry.
They won't beat Cooper.
Dr. Zangardi, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN A. ZANGARDI, ACTING CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Zangardi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today on
the Department's nuclear command and control and communication
systems and the risks, challenges, and opportunities within the
system and related programs, policies, and priorities for
modernization and recapitalization of the NC3 system. I am the
Acting Department Chief Information Officer, and I am the
senior civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense for
information technology and the information enterprise that
supports the DOD command and control, which includes
responsibility for policy, oversight, guidance, and
coordination for the Department's NC3 system.
My written statement provides more detailed information on
these matters, but I want to highlight to you some of the
Department's activities in this critical, important mission
area. My office's fiscal year 2018 Capabilities Planning
Guidance states that we need to strengthen our national
leadership command capabilities to meet changing threats and to
help the President and national leadership ability to command
U.S. forces. I believe this budget will help both these areas,
as we identify threats and ways to mitigate them, which in turn
helps our Nation's leaders maintain positive control of the
U.S. nuclear armed forces.
Specifically, the Council on the Oversight of the National
Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems has
proved to be a crucial element of the Department's strategy. We
have been heavily focused on NC3 modernization and sustainment
programs. We continue that focus but will operationalize the
discussion based upon what our main customers, USSTRATCOM [U.S.
Strategic Command], Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern
Command], and the White House, require to accomplish their
mission over the short and long term. Our objective is to
ensure with high confidence that the systems provide the
operational capability in time of crisis.
Finally, communications is always the key. I believe the
two-way communication between your professional staffers and
our DOD teams have increased the capability and readiness of
our NLCC [National Leadership Command Capabilities] enterprise.
This communication's flow has provided clarity to the NC3
mission area, its acquisition process, provided stability for
NC3 program offices, and ensured warfighter capabilities. We
are not done. We have more work to do, and the Department is
actively pursuing modernization while operating within the
confines of a constrained budget environment.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Zangardi can be found in the
Appendix on page 79.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Ms. Cange, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN M. CANGE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Cange. Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be
here today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
Environmental Management and to discuss the important work we
have recently accomplished, as well as what we plan to achieve
under the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request.
The total budget request for the EM [Environmental
Management] program is $6.5 billion, and of that, $5.5 billion
is for defense environmental cleanup activities.
Before discussing this request, I would like to take a
brief moment to update you on a recent incident at the Hanford
site. As you know, there recently was a partial collapse of one
tunnel near the PUREX [plutonium uranium extraction] facility
that has been used since the 1950s to store contaminated
equipment. Based on extensive monitoring, there was no release
of radiological contamination from the incident, and no workers
were injured. Workers have filled in the collapsed section with
soil and placed a cover over the tunnel. We are working closely
with the State of Washington for a more permanent solution. We
take this event very seriously and are looking closely at
lessons learned. Maintaining and improving aging infrastructure
is a priority for EM, and this incident emphasizes the need to
continue to focus on these efforts.
With regard to recent accomplishments, we continue to
demonstrate our ability to make significant progress through
achievements like resuming shipments of transuranic waste to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP. Our fiscal year 2018
budget request will enable us to build on this momentum. The
request allows EM to continue to make progress in addressing
radioactive tank waste, as well as continuing other important
work, such as deactivation and decommissioning, soil and
groundwater cleanup, and management and disposition of special
nuclear materials, spent nuclear fuel, and transuranic and
solid waste.
Our request also includes funding to support the National
Nuclear Security Administration by tackling some of their high-
priority excess contaminated facilities in Oak Ridge and at the
Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
In particular, the 2018 request supports continued waste
and placement at WIPP. At the Savannah River Site, the request
supports continuing the tank waste mission through
commissioning the startup of the Salt Waste Processing
Facility. And at Hanford, the budget request supports continued
site remediation along the river corridor, and it supports
beginning to treat low-activity tank waste by 2023.
In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
Office of Environmental Management. We are committed to
achieving our mission safely and successfully. Thank you, and I
am pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cange can be found in the
Appendix on page 83.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank all the witnesses, and I will recognize
myself first for questions.
General Klotz, you talked about the $1 billion increase
that is in your budget, and while it looks like a lot--and it
is a lot--there is a lot of deferred maintenance in NNSA. This
is something that the Obama administration recognized early.
And, without objection, I would like to introduce a letter
to that effect from Secretary Moniz in December 2015 that
clearly states an extra billion dollars a year is needed
starting in fiscal year 2018.
[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 95.]
Mr. Rogers. In that letter, Secretary Moniz says, quote:
``We estimate that an additional $5.2 over the fiscal year 2018
through 2021 is needed. Failure to address these requirements
in the near term will put the NNSA budget in an untenable
position beginning in fiscal year 2018 and will provide a
misleading marker to the next administration as to the resource
needs of the nuclear security enterprise,'' close quote.
General Klotz, is this billion dollar increase for NNSA's
weapon activities just filling a gap, or is it an essential
part of a long-term recovery from your current circumstance?
General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question, Mr.
Chairman, and I appreciate all the support that this committee
has provided to dealing with the infrastructure issues that we
have within NNSA. And I also appreciate the broad bipartisan
support for that effort that you outlined in your opening
statement. We are very grateful for the level of spending that
has been proposed in the President's fiscal year 2018 budget.
It will allow us to tackle some of our very important
infrastructure recapitalization projects, such as the Uranium
Processing Facility at Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which we
expect a complete design this year and actually start
construction next year. But we didn't get into the situation we
face with aging and, in some cases, crumbling infrastructure
overnight, and we are not going to get out of it in a day. So
expect us to come forward next year and in subsequent years
with requests to begin funding some other very important
recapitalization efforts in the area of restoring our ability
to produce plutonium pits and restoring our ability to process
the lithium which we need for our nuclear weapons program and
investments to replace our ability to fabricate trusted
microsystems that we need to ensure that we have the radiation-
hardened electronics for our nuclear forces.
Mr. Rogers. It is fair to say, and my question is, is it
fair to say that this is the first year of 5 years funding that
was a program of record by the Obama administration as being
essential that was presented to this Congress?
General Klotz. I think it is fair to say that the new
administration came in and took a look at our requirements and
our needs with a fresh set of eyes, and that they agree that
ensuring that we can complete our life-extension programs in
order to deliver systems to the Air Force and the Navy on time,
on schedule, and on budget is essential and also fixing our
infrastructure so that we are flexible and responsive to the
needs of our nuclear deterrent, both now and well into the
future.
Mr. Rogers. General Rand, the GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic
Deterrent] and LRSO [Long-Range Standoff Weapon], TMRR
[technology maturation risk reduction] contracts are supposed
to be hitting their targets in August or September of this
year. Is that accurate?
General Rand. Yes, sir, that is accurate.
Mr. Rogers. So you don't see a problem with that slipping?
General Rand. No, sir. I have no indication that will be
delayed.
Mr. Rogers. There are many critics that believe LRSO is
destabilizing. Is that your opinion?
General Rand. No, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Can you tell us why?
General Rand. Well, we have had a nuclear cruise missile
since the 1960s. This is not a new capability. It is an
improved capability over the ALCM that we currently have, the
air-launched cruise missile. And when you have bombers and you
take off, first of all, there is a visible presence. And as we
fly today, the enemy, potential adversaries, don't know if we
are conventional or nuclear, and I don't view that as
destabilizing at all.
Mr. Rogers. With that, I will yield to the ranking member
for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are many good parts and many bad parts to the recent
budget that was submitted to Congress. I thought one of the
good parts was the termination of the MOX [Mixed Oxide]
facility in South Carolina.
General Klotz, would you like to reflect on that?
General Klotz. Thank you, Representative Cooper. As I
indicated, the new administration came in and looked at a lot
of programs that are within the scope of the Department of
Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration, and
came to the conclusion that the MOX Fuel Fabrication Project in
Savannah River, South Carolina, ought to be terminated. The
conclusion was based on the fact that this is an
extraordinarily expensive program: $5 billion have already been
invested in it. We estimate it would take an additional $12
billion to go, just to complete the project, and that doesn't
even begin to address the costs, long-term costs, of operating
the program.
We have developed an alternative strategy for disposing of
excess weapons-grade plutonium. It is called the dilute and
dispose approach, which we briefed to this committee last year.
It is a proven technology. We have already emplaced diluted
plutonium at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project, the WIPP
facility, in New Mexico. It is proven technology. The risks are
lower. The costs are lower. And it gets plutonium out of the
State of South Carolina far faster than the MOX project would.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General. I hope my colleagues will
pay attention to the general's comments because this is an
annual issue in the defense authorization bill. So I hope that
we can come to a sensible resolution. This issue has hung fire
for many, many years now.
Ms. Cange, regarding Hanford and the tunnel collapse, it is
my impression that, in the Trump budget, we are reducing the
appropriation or the authorization for Hanford by over $100
million. Is that right?
Ms. Cange. Yes, sir. The fiscal year 2018 budget request
for the Richland Operations Office is reduced from what the
2017 omnibus amount was.
Mr. Cooper. So you mentioned we are going to be cooperating
with the State of Washington on fixing that tunnel problem,
other than just putting dirt on it.
Ms. Cange. Yes.
Mr. Cooper. So what is likely to be the resolution?
Ms. Cange. There is a number of alternatives that have been
developed and are currently being evaluated. They range from
potentially filling the tunnel with a fillable grout material
to stabilize the tunnel and the contamination until such a time
that a permanent remedy will be implemented to, at the upper
end, constructing a structure over the tunnel. So the various
alternatives are still under evaluation.
Mr. Cooper. So we are really not talking about a fix. We
are talking about covering up the problem or stabilizing it?
Ms. Cange. We are talking about ensuring that we stabilize
the tunnel and the material that is contained within the tunnel
in a way that this type of incident will not occur again until
a final remedy is reached between the parties.
Mr. Cooper. But no one will be able to use the tunnel in
the meantime.
Ms. Cange. The tunnel has not been used since the early
1950s.
Mr. Cooper. Dr. Zangardi, many of the NC3 programs are
delayed or over cost. In fact, when you look at the long list
of those that are delayed and/or over cost, it is almost hard
to find one that is working on time as expected. What are we
going to do to improve the performance record here?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
Regarding NC3 programs, breaking the answer down into two
parts: First, I run the national, the NLCC, and as part of the
NLCC, we have taken a review of these programs and understand
your concerns and recognize the delays to the program. The Air
Force has been tasked by the chairs of the NLCC--AT&L
[Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] is one of the chairs,
along with the Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--to
review these programs, look for areas of causality--is there a
common cause or root cause between all these problems--and
develop solutions to get the programs back on track. The
Department is very focused on correcting these issues.
Additionally, we were in Omaha, where we had a group
meeting of about 30 seniors to look at the NC3 enterprise
several weeks ago. Tasks came out of that to begin looking at
things we can do to improve the overall operational resilience
of the systems that are currently out there. So we are looking
at it in two ways: one, with the NLCC, figuring out how we can
improve the programs' performance as they come on in the
future; and, two, dealing with the systems that are out there
that we must currently maintain.
Mr. Cooper. So is your answer consistent with the number
one priority that the nuclear mission has within the Department
of Defense?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir, it is. We have stated very clearly
in meetings with my leadership that this is the highest
priority. We have stated that very clearly in the NLCC Council
meetings, and it was very clear when we met at Omaha that this
is the highest priority. I am in lockstep agreement with
General Hyten on these issues, sir.
Mr. Cooper. So we are going to be performing better in the
future, and I can hold you to that?
Dr. Zangardi. Our objective is to perform better in the
future, sir, and I will be glad to come back and answer any
questions in the future if problems arise or to talk to you
about performance.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I think that sounds a little bit like
accountability, but I am not sure that that is full
accountability, the willingness to answer questions. Presumably
you would be willing to answer questions anyway.
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. It is accountable. I am working
these areas. I report directly to the DSD [Deputy Secretary of
Defense] on these areas and keep him apprised of it. The
accountability is very clear as it is defined in recent
legislation in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
about DOD's CIO having responsibilities in the NLCC area.
Mr. Cooper. As you well know, without command and control,
the weapons systems are largely useless.
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions
until the closed session.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
of Alabama, Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Benedict, I am concerned about the tight timeframe
for the Columbia class, and I know you are too. In looking at
it, I know that there is not too much wiggle room there, so I
would like to ask you this question: If the Columbia-class
program is delayed or slips by just one year, will there be a
gap in the sea-based leg of the triad?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Today, the current program has
basically one Columbia class entering service as one Ohio
replacement platform departs service. So, if there was a slip,
although we believe firmly that we can execute the program of
record, there would be a gap, yes, sir.
Mr. Byrne. I appreciate your saying it as clearly as you
did because we need to hear that as we go forward into budgets,
not just this year, but as you know, in the entire cycle that
we have got here, we just don't have any room for not hitting
the mark each year. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral Benedict. That is a fair statement. We have already
taken a 2-year slip in the Columbia class, which pushed us
basically line on line with the Ohio's retirement. Yes, sir,
that gap has been eroded.
Mr. Byrne. Admiral, thank you for your candor. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Mrs. Davis, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here as well.
We are aware that, in this budget, there is a 5 percent
decrease for defense nuclear nonproliferation. And I am just
wondering how we justify that. I know you mentioned it was
consistent, I believe, with the 2017 omnibus. But at the same
time, we are requesting increasingly large sums of money for
our own nuclear arsenal.
Is there a disconnect here? And how do you translate this
to the general public?
General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question. My
explanation will be a little lengthy perhaps because I think
the misunderstanding has to do with how the budget
appropriations accounts are laid out in the budget. Under the
line that we call defense nuclear nonproliferation, I would
bend them in three different ways. First of all, there are
things that we do in the traditional nonproliferation mission
space. Then there are dollars that we pay for our ability to
counter nuclear terrorism and respond to, God forbid, a
radiological or nuclear incident anywhere in the United States
or abroad. And then there is also the construction project
under the defense nuclear nonproliferation account, which
includes the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility that Representative
Cooper just asked about. So the bulk of the reduction in that
appropriations account reflects the administration's proposal
that we terminate the MOX project. So the total amount of money
going to MOX goes from the fiscal year 2017 omnibus level of
about 345, I believe, down to 279. So that accounts for a lot
of it.
And we have also seen an increase in our ability, the
spending that we want to have for nuclear counterterrorism and
incident response in order to recapitalize all the equipment,
the radiation detectors, the secure wireless telephones, that
our people would use with other domestic partners in responding
to it.
In the pure defense nuclear nonproliferation area, the
funding is relatively flat. It would have been exactly flat if
the Congress had appropriated what we requested in fiscal year
2017, but you plussed us up a little bit a week or two before
the budget went to press, and so there is a very, very slight
decrease in the overall spending floor that we are proposing
for defense nuclear nonproliferation. It is still a very robust
program: $1.8 billion is a very robust program.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you for that. I appreciate it.
And I think, Dr. Soofer, to you as well, would you agree
that the nuclear deterrent is our number one priority?
Dr. Soofer. Yes, ma'am, I would. Deterring nuclear attack
and assuring our allies has been a fundamental and enduring
goal of the United States Government during the Cold War and
over the last three Nuclear Posture Reviews.
Mrs. Davis. Would it be a better, I guess, example or
demonstration of that if we did, as the NNSA did, a long-term
plan for nuclear weapons modernization? It is my understanding
that the Department of Defense doesn't really submit a 25-year
plan for its nuclear weapons plan. Is that accurate, and how do
we, again, connect that?
Dr. Soofer. Well, we currently have plans to modernize each
leg of the nuclear triad, as well as the nuclear command and
control system, and that modernization will take us out until
about 2040. We provide Congress an annual report on funding
over the next 10 years, the section 1043 report.
But you are correct, Congresswoman, we don't do a 25- or
30-year plan, but we have forces planned that will last over
those years.
Mrs. Davis. I think my time is up, but perhaps there is a
way to better frame that so that there is a sense of more
consistency. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here and your service.
Dr. Soofer, if we studied the technical feasibility of
mobile-capable ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles],
along with the advantages and disadvantages of those possible
weapons, would we learn possible useful information?
Dr. Soofer. I will ask General Rand to comment on that, but
I can assure you that, as we conduct a Nuclear Posture Review,
everything is on the table, and that is something that we will
have to look at.
General Rand. Sir, we have looked at that with the GBSD,
and it is our best judgment that we do not go to mobile. I can
talk more in the closed session on the reasons why.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I am going to ask General
Klotz and Dr. Soofer another question. I am not a fan of the
New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty. For one thing, it
is a relic of the Cold War. It did not address emerging powers
like China, just ourselves and the former Soviet Union. When it
was passed, we now know the Russians were cheating on the INF
[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. And whether or not
the Obama administration knew this, the Senators who voted on
it did not know that fact. So I have been distressed because
the Obama administration was quick to start the dismantling of
our nuclear forces that were called for under the New START
Treaty but slow to do the modernization that was promised as a
hedge against losing capability.
So, for either General Klotz or Dr. Soofer, please give an
update on what we have left to do, what is remaining to be done
to update our nuclear enterprise, which remains unfinished.
General Klotz. Thank you, Congressman.
On the NNSA, Department of Energy side, our priorities as
far as sustaining and modernizing our nuclear enterprise, at
the moment are focused on four major weapon systems that ride
on either the Navy sea-launched ballistic missiles or the Air
Force, two legs of the triad. So a level of effort, as I think
I suggested in the opening comments, that we have not seen
since the end of the Cold War.
So we are also focused on making sure that, within the
NNSA, within our nuclear enterprise, we have the scientific,
technical, and engineering base, and the production
infrastructure that is necessary to continue to sustain a
moderate and effective nuclear arsenal, and also to be able to
adapt or respond to any unexpected challenges, whether they are
technical challenges or whether they are political military
challenges. And our budget request for fiscal year 2018, I
think, reflects the importance of making, continuing to make
investments in this area.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let me follow up on that, and then we
will get to Dr. Soofer. Even if we do everything in the budget
that you recommend, and I hope we do, how much of a gap will we
still have? I am just asking in general terms, not specific
terms, for the public at large.
General Klotz. I still think, as I was responding to
Chairman Rogers' remarks, I still think we have underinvested
in the nuclear enterprise since the end of the Cold War. It is
almost as if, when the Berlin Wall went down and the Soviet
Union collapsed, we all heaved a sigh of collective relief and
said, ``Thank goodness, we don't have to worry about that
anymore.'' And so, for the subsequent years, we didn't make the
investments we needed. It was not a high priority, either in
the services or, for that matter, in the Department of Energy.
We have been trying to rectify that for a number of years
now on both sides of the Potomac. But as I indicated, it took
us a long time to get into this situation. It is going to take
us a while to get out of it, but we are working it very, very
hard. And with this particular budget, we make a huge down
payment in some key critical areas that we need to continue
sustaining our nuclear weapons stockpile and our
infrastructure. There will be more to follow as we go through
our process of deciding how best to recapitalize that. So I
would expect, in next year's budget and in subsequent budgets,
you will continue to see us place an emphasis on restoring our
infrastructure.
Mr. Lamborn. I know time is limited, Dr. Soofer.
Dr. Soofer. I am sorry. Sir, your comments about the New
START Treaty are well taken. In fact, when the Congress
considered the New START Treaty, particularly the Senate, they
realized that the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons, right,
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, between Russia and China was
something of great concern and that that needed to be
addressed. And since then, Russia has actually increased the
numbers of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and the INF Treaty
violation is just one example.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. O'Rourke for 5
minutes.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Benedict, I would like to get your comments and
your thoughts on commonality between Navy and Air Force. My
understanding is that you could have similar components for
land-based deterrence and sub-launched deterrence. Do you feel
that you have the level of cooperation with the Air Force
necessary to do that? And, also, could you talk about just what
that means in numbers in the budget? My understanding is we
would, in a strategy like this one, likely spend a lot more
upfront to save a lot more down the road. What are we looking
at in terms of numbers? And any comments or thoughts you would
like to share with us so that we are aware in the fiscal year
2018 budget and also, as we look ahead to future budget years,
the kinds of factors that we need to be looking at to make sure
this is a success.
General Benedict. Yes, thank you for the question.
I will provide my answer, and then I would like to offer,
if it is okay with you, General Rand's comments on the subject.
Commonality is an initiative that I have been pushing for a
number of years through the concurrence of, at that time,
Admiral Haney, out at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], and
the two RDAs [research, development, and acquisition], the two
assistants in the Navy and the Air Force. The Navy and the
United States Air Force were directed to do a commonality
study. That took about a year. We looked at a spectrum from
totally common missile, to piece parts, to the programs of
record.
Obviously, we came through a technical analysis that said
total commonality had a number of major technical challenges,
as well as infrastructure challenges, which made doing that in
today's environment financially--and from a schedule
standpoint--unfeasible. The concern is the budget, and we all
understand the budget to recapitalize. That has been discussed
here. So what we came up with, at a fairly deep technical
analysis, is opportunities in all the major subsystems. We
worked those together, and we pushed that back up through the
leadership chain.
In parallel with that, the United States Air Force was
running its preps for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence
program. Their acquisition strategy was to turn that over to
industry. All that information was passed to industry in a
bidder's library. And so the industry partners who bid on the
GBSD had the opportunity to draw from that library and submit
that as part of their proposals.
Those proposals are actually in process of review by the
United States Air Force, and General Rand can talk to that. I
think, once we see the results of that down-select as part of
the Air Force process, then we are prepared with the Air Force
to reengage and share and continue down the path of
commonality. But right now, we are--I will say we are paused as
the Air Force goes through its acquisition down-select, which
is appropriate.
Mr. O'Rourke. And I will allow General Rand to answer the
question as well. So, if I understand, you have decided that
total commonality doesn't make sense for the reasons that you
gave. There will be some level of partial commonality.
What I would like to know from General Rand and from you,
Admiral, is the year in which we can expect the answer to the
question that you are trying to get to that is currently
paused.
Admiral Benedict. If I may, I will just finish and then
turn it over to General Rand. In terms of dollar cost savings,
sir, I, again, I am going to contend that, based on the Air
Force decision of down-select to two from the three potential
bidders today to the final solution, I think we need to get to
that final solution working through this down-select before we
will be able to provide you a definitive dollar savings in the
year.
Mr. O'Rourke. When can we expect to get there?
General Rand. Yes, sir. We are right now hopefully going to
have a down-select to two competitors this summer. That will
give us more fidelity. We will run the TMRR, the Technology
Maturation Risk Reduction process, for 3 years with those two
competitors, and then we will further down-select to the source
in 2021. So it will take a little while to get some of this
fidelity.
If I may, sir, first of all, I am the requirements guy. I
am not the acquisition. I don't drive acquisition strategy. We
have set the requirements, and we have delivered those
requirements as we see for GBSD. However, I do think there is a
misconception, as Terry was talking about, of what commonality
is. A D5 is not going to work in the land-based missile. It is
not going to fit in our launch facilities. It would take a
major overhaul to do that.
So when you define ``commonality,'' the term that we have
used is ``smart commonality'' and where can we have synergy
together. We are looking at repair facilities, manufacturing
processes, test capabilities. All those could significantly
reduce redundant and multiple kind of platforms. And those are
where the savings will be. So we are very supportive of
commonality, but we believe in open competition, and that is
where the acquisition strategy is driving us right now.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. We just passed in the House Foreign Affairs
Committee a resolution dealing with Venezuela and the economic
circumstances that they face, and quite frankly, what Venezuela
is going through is devastating. Seventy-five percent of their
population has experienced a weight loss of at least 19 pounds
over the past year because they cannot get enough calories and
food to sustain their body weight. Medicines are now in short
supply because the people can't afford them. The government
can't afford them. You have got diseases that were once
eradicated coming back, and the reason I bring up these topics
is we have been warned by the Congressional Budget Office and
by the Comptroller General of the United States of America and
by the Government Accountability Office, that America's current
financial path is unsustainable, which means that, in the
future, we are risking a similar collapse. And you can imagine
the adverse effect that would have on our military capabilities
in particular if we go through the same thing that economic
reality dictates is going to happen if we don't change our
trajectory.
That being the case, and I don't know if any of you all are
in a position to answer this question, but what can you do in
the areas that you oversee to increase efficiency so that
taxpayers can get more bang for the buck, or in the
alternative, what can you eliminate if the need arises, thereby
saving money, that might reduce the dangers associated with our
deficit? And if you can't do anything in the fields that you
personally oversee, what do you think we should be doing on a
larger scale to minimize our risk of a debilitating insolvency
and bankruptcy that our financial gurus warn us is in our
future?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, thank you for the question, and I
understand your point--Trident has been a program, Strategic
Systems Programs has been in existence for 61 years, and as we
build the new Columbia class, the Navy's number one priority in
shipbuilding, that boat will be in the water through 2084. As I
have looked at my contribution to that program, the strategic
weapons system, we recently in discussions with Lockheed
endorsed their plan to move our workforce out of an extremely
high-cost area to two other locations within the United States
which----
Mr. Brooks. I hope Alabama is on that list?
Admiral Benedict. No, sir.
Mr. Brooks. You might want to look at the cost of doing
business in Alabama. Go ahead. I am sorry. Go ahead.
Admiral Benedict. But, once we do this, and it is a very
fast-paced move--we will move to Colorado and to Florida--the
returned savings to the program is somewhere in excess of $55
million a year. So we understand our contribution to the
strategic deterrent, to the triad, to the Nation. We also
understand our responsibility to do so in the most cost-
effective manner possible. So that is I would say one of the
solution spaces that we constantly review and invoke within the
program, given the long-term future that we have in support of
this mission.
Mr. Brooks. Vice Admiral Benedict, that is wonderful news.
Does anybody else have any suggestions as to what we can do to
try to protect America's financial status?
Dr. Zangardi. In the area that I work in the, sir, in the
CIO [Chief Information Officer] area, I am specifically tasked
to look at effectiveness and efficiency, and I work very
closely with the DCMO [Deputy Chief Management Officer] for the
Department of Defense. And we are looking at competition, more
importantly in the IT [information technology] space, if you
will, much of what we procure is commercial off-the-shelf
technology, so increased use of commercial off-the-shelf
technology where we don't engage in making changes to it. So
imposing and using change management to constrain costs in the
procurement of business systems is very important, I know not
directly related to this, but the savings you generate from
those systems can be used for other purposes. For example, we
are looking at the Defense Travel System right now, and we are
looking at moving to commercial applications. I am currently
assessing pilots to put in place about 15,000 to 30,000 users
to see how it goes and eventually to move to something that is
commercial with very little change management.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Dr. Zangardi.
We are running out of time. I have got 10 seconds. I would
strongly encourage each of you to do whatever you can to try to
put more efficiency into the Federal acquisition process,
particularly the Federal acquisition regulatory process. In my
experience and observation over the decades, it seems that the
procurement process has gotten drawn out more and more at
higher and higher cost, and there has to be a way to fix that.
Thank you for your time and insight.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Norcross, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Klotz, I want to
follow up on your comments on MOX. I was down there last year,
and some of the numbers that you were quoting are in direct
contradiction to what we saw and what we heard in terms of the
percentage finished of the plan. Literally, a few weeks ago, we
allocated $345 million, and you said, in year 2018, we had $279
million. What is that being used for if you are canceling the
project?
General Klotz. The actual amount would be $270 for the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility itself. There is another $9 million
that is associated with other aspects of our plutonium
disposition mission. In any large government contract,
particularly one, a large construction effort that has been
underway for some years in South Carolina, there are
termination costs. There are a series of steps we have to take
dictated by statute and dictated by our own regulations to wind
down a contract. So, if the Congress agrees with the
administration's proposal to terminate MOX, then we will come
back to you with a specific plan as to what we have to do to
meet those regulatory requirements and at the same time how we
will proceed with the facility that has been constructed thus
far.
Mr. Norcross. So a half a billion dollars for termination
fees?
General Klotz. I would be happy to come back to you and lay
out what the costs are associated with termination.
Mr. Norcross. So, a year ago, they were almost 70 percent
complete. I assume they got further along?
General Klotz. Well, we don't, quite frankly, and with
respect to those who calculate a higher percentage, the
standard practice for calculating percent complete, at least
within the Federal Government, is costs already expensed and
costs to go. So, if you accept our estimates--or you don't have
to take my estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the
total project cost is $17 billion. We have already spent, as I
indicated, $5 billion. That would leave $12 billion to go. So 5
divided by 12 is less than 50 percent. So our assumption of the
way in which we calculate percent complete is different than
others have calculated it.
Mr. Norcross. Certainly, then, we have to get to the bottom
of that because we are talking some considerable money as
compared to what we just heard about a few minutes ago.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
South Carolina, Chairman Wilson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you Chairman Mike Rogers for your leadership of
the subcommittee with the bipartisan input of Ranking Member
Jim Cooper. Again, thank each of you for your service. It is
extraordinary on behalf of our Nation.
And, of course, General Klotz, I am keenly interested in
the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. Last year, Congress
thoughtfully, in a bipartisan manner, rejected the prior
administration's shortsighted proposal to terminate the Mixed
Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, the MOX Program, which is 70
percent completed in the area of South Carolina and Georgia.
The Congress had many concerns with alternatives, including the
legal, regulatory, and political issues with storing the
entirety of 34 metric tons; the fact that it does not comply
with the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement, PMDA, with
the Russian Federation; and the fact that Congress does still
not have a complete valid cost estimate of the MOX program
because the Department of Energy never completed a full
rebaseline. Ultimately, the authorizers and appropriators both
agreed to continue construction of MOX as the best path forward
and included legislative text requiring it in the fiscal year
2015, 2016, and 2017. And the question: Has an industrial-scale
dilute and dispose method with weapons-grade plutonium ever
been done before? If not, what is the--if not processed, what
is the timeline for removal from South Carolina and Georgia?
General Klotz. Thank you very much, Congressman Wilson. In
terms of what we know about dilute and dispose, we already have
5 metric tons of diluted plutonium largely from the Rocky Flats
facility that used to be in Colorado in WIPP as we speak. We
have also diluted plutonium that existed at South Carolina--was
in South Carolina and have shipped that to WIPP. In fact, we
have done three shipments already this year since. As was
alluded to earlier, WIPP has reopened for operations.
I went down to WIPP about a month or so ago and personally
toured the site and was briefed on what they believe the
capacity of WIPP is to hold not only nonweapons-grade plutonium
but all 34 metric tons, and I came away from that quite
convinced that 34 metric tons can fit within the WIPP facility.
So the other, I think, very, very interesting point about
this whole process is it allows us to get plutonium out of the
State of South Carolina far sooner than would be the case with
MOX.
Mr. Wilson. Let's get to that now, because WIPP is not
industrial grade now, but you are describing something
industrial grade.
And what is the timeline? And, specifically, how many years
are you talking about, because my constituents are very
concerned about it being a dump and a disposal area, which puts
our region at risk.
General Klotz. Well, I don't understand the term
industrial----
Mr. Wilson. Capability to truly process a large amount.
General Klotz. Yes. We have the ability to--what we would
have to do is--like I said, we are already processing plutonium
at Savannah River. What it would require would be adding----
Mr. Wilson. Back again, because time is running out. What
is the timeline? My constituents and the people of South
Carolina and Georgia would like to know.
General Klotz. Let me give you the specific timeline. It is
not showing up on what I have right here sitting in front of
me. But I will tell you it is far faster than anything that can
be done with MOX.
Mr. Wilson. And that timeline would be? Because the
reprocessing is going, but what you are describing could take
years.
General Klotz. Okay. Here is our estimate: If we went down
what we call the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project, we
expect that we would complete the work that we need to do that
by 2027 and plutonium disposition would begin in 2028 and end
in 2049. If we go down the MOX route, we would not complete the
project until 2048. That is, my rough calculation, 20-some odd
years later, and we would not begin disposing of plutonium
through a MOX facility until the year 2050 to 2051, assuming
that we get all the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Council] licensing
completed, and plutonium disposition would not end until 2065,
which is, again, 15, 20 years after what we would be able to do
with the surplus--the approach we would like.
The main difference, however, is the total project cost for
MOX we estimate to be $17 billion. The total project cost for
the surplus disposal that we have suggested, right now we have
a range of $200 million to $500 million to do that. And if
Congress gives us the authority----
Mr. Wilson. My time is up. And please look at the--we want
it removed by reprocessing the weapons-grade plutonium. What
you are describing is, I consider, long term. But thank you
very much.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms.
Hanabusa, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am going to direct
this question to Dr. Soofer because of the fact that your
testimony referenced it. We are in the process of doing the
Nuclear Posture Review--or you are in the process of doing
that. And I think it is a review that is usually done every 5
to 10 years. I think the last one was in 2010.
My question is really one more practicality. We have heard
people take positions on the triad and what we should be
funding. I think even the Secretary of Defense at one time had
taken a position questioning whether or not the triad is the
way to go.
We have someone who we have all listened to in terms of his
review of the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], and that, of
course, is former Secretary of Defense William Perry at
Stanford, who has said, basically, he doesn't like the triad
system and questions the whole use of long-range missiles, for
example. And I think, at one point, he even questioned whether
we should have the concentration of ICBMs as well.
So, given that and given the fact that this review isn't
going to be done until the end of the year--and I understand
that we should continue along the way--decisions that are to be
made on major expenditures, such as the new bomber, B-21s, and
all the different types of what is expected to do the nuclear
defense posture for this country, how do you justify that at
this particular point in time where we have got people whose
opinions some of us value, I think most of us at least will pay
attention to--how can you come before us and take a position
when we know that there is at least enough of a concern that
the posture has been required to be reviewed?
Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think there is a
sense we--we feel there is a sense of urgency to get on with
the program of record, because the current systems will age out
within the next 10 to 15 years. And if we do not begin or
continue the process of acquiring new systems, there will be a
gap in deterrence capability.
The previous administration has laid in a nuclear
modernization program that, again, appears to be consistent
with general principles of nuclear deterrence. We will examine
these principles and determine in light of the new strategic
environment whether they still obtain.
But there are some basic fundamentals, such as maintaining
a nuclear triad, that the Secretary of Defense has already
endorsed. And so, quite frankly, it is just a sense of urgency
that, if we do not continue the programs this year, there may
be a gap if it is ultimately determined that the systems are
needed.
Ms. Hanabusa. Well, I understand that the Secretary may
have said he is endorsing it now, but there was a point in
time, maybe it was before he became Defense Secretary, that he
called into question the premise of the triad as well. And the
fact that the NPR has basically now been mandated is
problematic.
I understand--the urgency that we speak about here,
theoretically, I understand all of that, however, we have never
had such an emphasis, that I recall, where most of the
briefings that we have had in a very short period of time has
concentrated on our nuclear position. And I understand it is
probably triggered by Russia, China, and North Korea. However,
the concept of developing a systematic posture and to review
that posture seems to be one that we need to be very certain
about that threat and how we best address that threat. And that
is why, for the expenditures that we are being asked to
authorize, how do we know that this is the best way for us to
proceed?
And I am out of time. So we may have to take----
General Rand. If I may, ma'am, I need to comment on one
comment that you made about the B-21. We can have the
discussion about the nuclear posture and the triad, but the B-
21 will be a dual-capable airplane. There is a requirement for
long-range strike conventionally, and that will be, obviously,
what that airplane would be doing. Any delay to that program
would be devastating. Our newest bomber is 25 years old.
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand that, General. The question is
more a matter of number, whether it is 100 or 200. We have
heard two numbers. That is a huge amount of numbers, but
shouldn't we know whether----
General Rand. The requirement right now is for 100 B-21s.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Chair, I yield back. I think that votes
were called.
Mr. Rogers. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr.
DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.
Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the Chair. This will be a question
for Ms. Cange and General Klotz.
During our Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
hearing in March on NNSA's deferred maintenance and
infrastructure challenges, we briefly discussed how certain OMB
directives have negatively impacted NNSA's ability to get after
its decaying infrastructure. In particular, OMB Management
Procedures Memorandum 2015-01 was identified as a huge problem,
because it, perhaps unintentionally, slows NNSA's ability to
tear down old buildings and build new ones. General Klotz can
you give us your personal views on that OMB memorandum and
whether it impedes NNSA from making smart decisions and moving
efficiently to deal with infrastructure problems?
General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question. I
think the intent behind the directive, which is, as you build
new buildings, you ought to dispose of excess facilities, is a
good one. In the--when I was in the Air Force, the rule used to
be: Build a building, tear a building down. Otherwise, you see
this behavior where people start to move into those buildings
which you have moved out of, and you still have an
infrastructure issue. However, I think the notion that you have
to do this simultaneously is more constraining than it needs to
be. I hear anecdotally, I haven't had a chance to get the
empirical data on that, that maybe some site directors would
choose to wait to build a new building until they knew they had
enough money that they could dispose of an older building.
So I would like to see--it is good intent, but I would like
to see a little more flexibility in terms of how we actually
balance new construction with demolition and disposition of old
buildings.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
And, General, I understand your budget request would put an
additional $195 million above the fiscal year 2017 appropriated
level toward deferred maintenance and repair needs at NNSA and
that you, Ms. Cange, have a line in your budget for $225
million to deal with four excess facilities at Y-12 and
Lawrence Livermore.
This is good news, but I need to ask you, General Klotz,
could you execute additional money on deferred maintenance and
repair needs if it was provided by Congress?
General Klotz. The backlog of deferred maintenance is so
large that what we have asked is not going to buy all of it
down.
So it is a question of, you know, timing in terms of which
the money comes. We do have--there are some capacity limits in
terms of local craft and companies to be able to do that. The
other challenge we have at NNSA, and this is where Ms. Cange
could--has to help us out is many of the facilities you have,
particularly facilities in Y-12 and our other laboratories are
contaminated with, you know, either radioactive materials or
other contaminants, and we have to go through the process of
decontaminating those facilities first before we can do the
standard, you know, demolition of that.
So there are some significant costs associated with some of
our--some of our facilities.
Dr. DesJarlais. So the $3.7 billion backlog isn't going to
get fixed without additional funding in all likelihood?
General Klotz. Well, thanks to this committee's strong
support, we stabilized the level of deferred maintenance we had
in fiscal year 2016. With 2017, we will see it--we will see it
decrease slightly, modestly. And if the Congress supports the
fiscal year 2018 budget, we will continue that downward slope.
I am might add, again, through the support of Congress, one
of the good news things that came out of the passage of the
omnibus, fiscal year 2017 omnibus bill, is we will be able to
proceed with the demolition of the Bannister Federal Complex in
Kansas City, which is a 5-million-square-foot facility, World
War II facility, of which we used about 3 million. That is
now--with the funding provided by the Congress, we will now be
able to go ahead and do that and also save the Federal
Government a considerable amount of money in how we do that by
allowing a private developer to do the demolition and the
remediation of the property.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Ms. Cange, do you expect to continue
into fiscal year 2019 and beyond the excess facilities line
with environmental management program? I think it is a great
idea, and I would encourage you to continue it, but is that
your intent?
Ms. Cange. Yes, we certainly hope to be able to continue to
address excess contaminated facilities across the DOE complex.
I will mention that the 2016 report to Congress that the
Department submitted on excess contaminated facilities
estimates approximately $32 billion to address all of the
excess facilities across the Department's entire complex.
Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. We have about 9 minutes left to vote. So
I am going to go ahead and try to get Mr. Garamendi in before
we head over to the Chamber, and then we will come back after
votes for the closed session.
The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Obviously, all of this is extremely important. I want to go
to follow up on Mr. O'Rourke's questions about commonality,
and, specifically, Admiral Benedict, you have a couple of new
bombs that are being reworked, the W-88 and W-76. Are those--my
understanding is those are supposed to last some 20 years or
more into the future? Is that correct?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, our planning factors are--the life-
extension programs are 30-year extensions to the existing life
of the weapon itself.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So some 30 years. Do you need the
interoperable weapon?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, at the direction of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, the Navy, the Air Force, and NNSA were
directed to conduct a study. That study was scheduled to
commence in 2020, and we will do both the technical analysis of
the IW [interoperable warhead] as well as the cost analysis.
That information will be presented approximately late 2021,
2022 to the Nuclear Weapons Council for review, concurrence,
and approval, if they so deem so.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry. Late 2021, 2022, what is that?
Admiral Benedict. 2020, 2021.
Mr. Garamendi. For the next 3 years, we will continue to
spend money on the interoperable----
Admiral Benedict. We will spend money to do the technical
analysis between the services and NNSA----
Mr. Garamendi. If I--excuse me.
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Back and forth here and I hope in a way that
it is not--so if you have a--two weapons that currently work on
the missiles and your missiles are good for 30 years and your
weapons are good for 30 years, do you ever need an
interoperable for those 30 years?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, I would say--and then I will defer
to General Klotz here for one second--the Navy does not have a
requirement for a third reentry body. However, as we look at
the complex in total, this issue of IW is larger than just a
single Navy issue. It involves Navy, Air Force, and the NNSA.
Mr. Garamendi. So where would the Air Force use this new
interoperable?
General Klotz. If I could, Congressman Garamendi, the--
first of all, there is no money in the NNSA account for working
on the interoperable.
Mr. Garamendi. There is some money somewhere.
General Klotz. Well, not explicitly for interoperable in
ours. We--recall, a few years ago, we deferred the need date
for that until 2030. So our expectation as we have laid it out
is we will begin the very serious work on that in 2020 because
it is about a 10-year process.
And the reason why we have been proceeding down the path of
having an interoperable is there is an Air Force system that
will require a life-extension program in about the 2030
timeframe. That is the W78 warhead.
So there was--the thinking when this strategy was developed
was, well, if we are going to do a life-extension program to an
Air Force system, wouldn't it make sense in terms of long-term
cost and efficiency if, as you did that particular warhead, you
designed it in such a way that it could be used by both the Air
Force and the Navy and subsequent interoperable warheads so
that you had some commonality beyond back and forth between the
two services as you got in the 2030, 2040, 2050 timeframe.
Mr. Garamendi. And your 50 to 80 new pits--your requirement
for 50 to 80 new pits, plutonium pits, is it based on this
interoperable scheme that is somewhere out there in the future?
Mr. Klotz. It is based on a number of factors. One the
factors is requirements for, you know, the next series of life-
extension programs, which would include the interoperable
warhead----
Mr. Garamendi. We don't have too much time to get into
this, but I really want to get into this in great detail,
because it seems to me that we are about to spend billions of
dollars to do something that ultimately isn't going to happen.
This interoperable warhead, I'm looking over here at the Navy
and they're saying, not for 30 years. And I haven't had a
chance to get to General Rand about this, but I would like know
exactly when his 30-year period is going to begin.
And I am out of time, and we have votes, and thank you so
very, very much.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Just in closing, before we recess to meet after votes in
the SCIF [secure compartmented information facility] for the
closed session, I want to put on the record, General Rand, in
2006, the Air Force identified the UH-1N helicopter is not
effective for the ICBM security mission. Last year, Secretary
James recommended an acquisition strategy that would have sole-
sourced these helicopters. Secretary Carter then shelved that
strategy and directed full and open competition.
General Rand, can you commit that you will make it clear to
the entire Air Force that anyone who attempts to interfere with
the acquisition of this capability will have absolute hell to
pay?
General Rand. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir. We are in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 25, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 25, 2017
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 25, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 25, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, would you please describe to us why
Secretary Moniz tasked the three NNSA laboratory directors to carry out
the study titled ``U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the Coming Decades''?
What did it examine and why? What were some of its high-level
conclusions?
General Klotz. Secretary Moniz tasked this study as part of the
Department's mission to ensure an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent
through the application of science, technology and engineering. The
Department of Energy (DOE) strives to ensure U.S. nuclear capabilities
meet the challenges of known and future geopolitical and technology
trends.
The 2014 tri-laboratory study 1) examined known and projected
future characteristics of global nuclear stability; 2) provided
perspective on the evolution of U.S. strategic deterrence; 3) assessed
current policy and programs; 4) examined potential future geopolitical
and technological trends and scenarios that test the robustness of U.S.
capabilities; and 5) outlined preliminary recommendations and areas
meriting further study. The study examined these topics to challenge
U.S. thinking about DOE programs of record and inform future decisions
to reduce the risk of technological or geopolitical surprise.
The three national laboratories agreed that the United States
needed to take action to ensure that U.S. nuclear capabilities can meet
the challenges of emerging geopolitical and technological trends. A key
recommendation was to conduct and periodically update a comprehensive
assessment of the current and emerging threats to the effectiveness of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including the review of options to address
identified gaps.
Mr. Rogers. Please tell us about the Joint Strategic Deterrence
Review (JSDR) process that was created in December 2016? Why was it
created and what does it do? How does the Trump administration view the
JSDR process? How is it incorporating this type of process into the
Nuclear Posture Review?
General Klotz. The Joint Strategic Deterrence Review (JSDR) was a
recommendation that came out of the deterrence study that was tasked to
the national laboratory directors. The Deputy Secretaries of Energy and
Defense signed a memorandum of agreement on JSDR to strengthen
Department of Defense, Department of Energy and the Intelligence
Community cooperation in analyzing potential threats to the United
States' ability to maintain strategic deterrence as well as potential
options for mitigating those threats.
Each new Administration since the mid-1990s has conducted a Nuclear
Posture Review. This Administration has followed suit and has directed
an NPR to be conducted to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern,
robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter
21st-century threats and reassure our allies. NNSA will contribute to
DOD's review, which will account for a broad range of views.
All NPR deliberations are under executive privilege and not
releasable. The NPR will be in full accord with the President's
direction given in the National Security Presidential Memorandum on
Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces from January 27, 2017.
Mr. Rogers. The bad idea fairy seems to visiting some folks in this
town and proposing that we should defer spending on the LRSO and GBSD
programs until the Nuclear Posture Review is complete. Does the
administration support this idea?
General Klotz. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget Request for
NNSA supports the program of record for W80-4 Life Extension Program,
which is intended for integration into the Air Force's Long Range
Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile, as determined by the Nuclear Weapons
Council. Both the LRSO and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
are Air Force programs of record.
Mr. Rogers. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
more difference? Does the FY18 budget request in these areas deviate
from the Obama administration's plans in any very substantial way?
General Klotz. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 President's Budget Request
continues the program of record detailed in the FY 2017 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan. NNSA's Weapons Activities budget
includes planned increases to the program of record as well as
increases to adapt to emerging changes, such as updates to the baseline
costs for the B61-12 Life Extension Program and the W88 Alteration 370.
Mr. Rogers. Please tell us about the Joint Strategic Deterrence
Review (JSDR) process that was created in December 2016? Why was it
created and what does it do? How does the Trump administration view the
JSDR process? How is it incorporating this type of process into the
Nuclear Posture Review?
Dr. Soofer. The JSDR is a joint project between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy to ensure our nuclear programs
remain informed by the future threat environment. Because we will be
fielding recapitalized forces decades from now, it is important we
anticipate the future operational environment so these forces can
perform their intended functions. The Nuclear Posture Review is
similarly focused on both the current and future threat environments,
and is informed by the work of the JSDR.
Mr. Rogers. The bad idea fairy seems to visiting some folks in this
town and proposing that we should defer spending on the LRSO and GBSD
programs until the Nuclear Posture Review is complete. Does the
administration support this idea?
Dr. Soofer. No, the Administration does not support any delay to
these programs and requested full funding for these and all other
nuclear recapitalization programs. Further delays in recapitalizing our
nuclear forces could create critical capability gaps and undermine our
ability to meet deterrence requirements as our current forces age out
of service. At this critical juncture in the LRSO and GBSD programs,
deferring or reducing funding would lead to significant delays and
effectively prejudge the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.
Therefore, we urge Congress to continue its ongoing support for the
current recapitalization programs as we conduct the Nuclear Posture
Review. Should the Administration conclude that changes to these
programs are required, we will work with Congress to adjust
accordingly.
Mr. Rogers. What are the consequences if we were to defer spending
on LRSO and GBSD until we have a completed Nuclear Posture Review in
hand? How would that impact the programs and the Air Force's ability to
meet STRATCOM's requirements and schedules?
Dr. Soofer. There is virtually no schedule margin between legacy
system age out and the deployment of modernized replacement systems. As
a result, delays in recapitalizing our nuclear forces could create
critical capability gaps and undermine our ability to meet deterrence
requirements as our current forces age out of service. At this critical
juncture in the LRSO and GBSD programs, deferring or reducing funding
would lead to significant delays and effectively prejudge the outcome
of the Nuclear Posture Review. Therefore, it is essential that we
continue to support the current program of record in order to ensure
the U.S. maintains a credible, effective nuclear deterrent into the
future.
Mr. Rogers. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
more difference? Does the FY18 budget request in these areas deviate
from the Obama administration's plans in any very substantial way?
Dr. Soofer. The fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget for DOD nuclear forces
and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities reflects more continuity than
change. The FY 2018 budget supports, as did the FY 2017 budget,
continued recapitalization of each element of our nuclear forces and
infrastructure.
Mr. Rogers. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of
delaying or cancelling key nuclear modernization programs--such as the
GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range stand off
(LRSO) cruise missile, or the new Columbia-class submarine? How firm is
the need for the current schedules for these programs--is there room
for slipping their schedules? Do you believe these programs are
executable on-schedule and on-budget, if they are funded on-time by
Congress?
Dr. Soofer. There is virtually no schedule margin between legacy
system age out and the deployment of modernized replacement systems. As
a result, further delays in recapitalizing our nuclear forces would
create critical capability gaps and undermine our ability to meet
deterrence requirements as our current forces age out of service.
Therefore, it is essential that we continue to support the current
program of record in order to ensure the U.S. maintains a credible,
effective nuclear deterrent into the future. We appreciate Congress'
continued support for these vital development efforts, and we are
making every effort to ensure these programs deliver on-time and within
budget. However, we need everyone to understand that our choice is not
whether or not to modernize our forces now or later. Rather, the choice
is between modernizing those forces or watching an unacceptable
degradation in our ability to field a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear force--an outcome that incurs significant risk in our ability
to deter strategic threats to the nation.
Mr. Rogers. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
with this estimate? CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly
6 percent of the total defense budget during this time period. Do you
believe this is an appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear
deterrence?
Dr. Soofer. The DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
approximately $230-$290 billion from FY 2018 to FY 2040, in constant FY
2018 dollars. This projection includes the total cost of nuclear-only
systems, and a portion of the cost of the B-21 bomber, which will have
both conventional and nuclear roles. The DOD projection for total
recapitalization cost also includes modernizing nuclear command,
control, and communications systems. I would defer to my Department of
Energy colleagues for specifics relating to estimated NNSA costs. U.S.
nuclear weapons deter the only existential threat to the Nation. The
nuclear enterprise is affordable if nuclear deterrence is prioritized
appropriately. During the coming period of increased recapitalization
spending, nuclear forces will remain a small fraction of the DOD
budget--with annual funding levels that are projected to range from
approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending. This
includes spending to sustain and operate the existing force--currently
about $12-14 billion per year--as well as recapitalization spending to
develop and field modernized replacements.
Mr. Rogers. Do you think that NATO allies should be asked to share
part of the costs of the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP)? Would having
the NATO allies pay for part of the LEP be contrary to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty?
Dr. Soofer. Forward-deployment of B61s is a key aspect of our
commitment to extend deterrence to our NATO Allies in Europe. NATO has
repeatedly affirmed the role of nuclear deterrence as a core element of
its defense strategy and posture, including in the July 2016 Warsaw
Summit Communique. It is not in the best interest of the United States
to ask NATO Allies to provide direct funding of the B61 LEP. The B61
LEP is a key element of our strategic Triad as well as our extended
deterrence posture around the world, and is not solely focused on the
deterrence and defense of NATO. Further, allied funding would almost
certainly create a perception problem regarding U.S. and allied
compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Mr. Rogers. We know there are military requirements on the books
that the U.S. cannot meet because of our adherence to the INF Treaty--
the treaty that Russia continues to violate. General Selva and others
have said that they see no indication the Russians will ever return to
compliance with this treaty. How does the Trump administration view
this violation and Russia's other arms control violations? What
response options are being pursued? When will decisions be made on this
and plans announced?
Dr. Soofer. Currently we are able to satisfy both our military
requirements as well as remain in compliance with the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Although there is a military
requirement to prosecute targets at ranges covered by the INF Treaty,
those systems do not have to be ground-based. However, ground-based
systems would increase both the operational flexibility and the scale
of our intermediate-range strike capabilities. The Administration is
conducting an extensive review of Russia's ongoing INF Treaty violation
in order to assess the security implications to the United States and
its allies and partners. The status quo is untenable and the
Administration is considering potential response options that could
address the threat and also remind Russia why it agreed to the INF
Treaty in the first place. The United States must consider all
possibilities in developing our response including a world without the
INF Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. A United Nations disarmament panel recently released
its first draft of a proposed global treaty to ban nuclear weapons. The
U.S. and other nuclear powers have all boycotted these negotiations.
What is the Trump administration's position on this treaty? Are these
negotiations damaging the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? How would
this treaty affect our ability to uphold our extended deterrence and
assurance commitments? How might it affect our ability to forward-
deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable aircraft? What would be the
U.S. view towards any of our allies that might support or sign onto
this treaty?
Dr. Soofer. The Administration strongly opposes a nuclear weapons
ban treaty, which completely disregards the realities of the
international security environment that make nuclear deterrence
necessary. The proposed ban treaty would not result in the elimination
of a single nuclear weapon and would not enhance any country's
security. Instead, such a treaty risks creating an unbridgeable divide
among the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Parties, further
polarizing the political environment. Although the draft treaty clearly
attempts to undermine the legitimacy of extended deterrence--our
extended deterrence partners have been clear that they will not support
a treaty that is in conflict with NATO policy, with our alliance
commitments, or with the NPT.
Mr. Rogers. The last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was published 7
years ago. The world was very different in 2010, particularly when
talking about Russia. Today, it's hard to see Russia as the partner and
friend like the 2010 NPR envisioned. Would you please provide us your
on what has changed in the world since the 2010 NPR? How will this
affect the NPR and its deliberations?
Dr. Soofer. The Nuclear Posture Review's analytical process will
include a full assessment of the strategic environment, including what
has changed since the 2010 NPR. Recent years have indeed brought
changes to the security environment that U.S. nuclear policy must
address. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions against its neighbors
and threatened the United States and its NATO Allies--including nuclear
threats. It has elevated strategies of nuclear first use in its
strategic thinking and military exercises, is modernizing a large and
diverse non-strategic nuclear weapons force, and is violating the
landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. While Russia
presents significant set of challenges, it is only one element of an
increasingly complex global strategic environment. The President
directed the Department of Defense to review U.S. nuclear posture and
ensure that our nuclear forces are modern, robust, flexible, resilient,
ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and
reassure our allies and partners.
Mr. Rogers. How important are dual-capable aircraft to the U.S.
nuclear posture? Do they constitute a critical and necessary component
of our nuclear deterrence and assurance?
Dr. Soofer. Yes. U.S. dual-capable aircraft are a critical and
necessary component of U.S. nuclear posture. The United States must
continue to maintain the capability to forward-deploy dual-capable
aircraft as part of its extended nuclear deterrence posture.
Mr. Rogers. What role do dual-capable aircraft serve in the
deterrence posture of the NATO alliance? What are the consequences that
would result from a delay in the initial operating capability of dual-
capable F-35 to our NATO allies?
Dr. Soofer. The Department of Defense projects no significant delay
in the delivery of dual-capable F-35A fighters to our NATO Allies. The
F-35 program maintains schedule margins to account for various risks of
short-term delay, and those margins remain adequate today. A longer-
term delay could impact the ability of Allies to support the dual-
capable aircraft (DCA) mission. Therefore, it is essential that the
program remain fully-funded and mitigate schedule risk.
Mr. Rogers. What role do dual-capable aircraft serve in our
deterrence and assurance posture on the Korean Peninsula?
Dr. Soofer. The United States maintains the capability to forward-
deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft in
support of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. Allies and
partners. Deployment of DCA signals U.S. resolve and commitment, and
provides a forceful reminder to an adversary that might be
contemplating aggression. The United States remains firmly committed to
the defense of the Republic of Korea and to strengthening extended
deterrence using all elements of national power, including the U.S.
nuclear umbrella, as well as conventional strike and missile defense
capabilities.
Mr. Rogers. What are the consequences if we were to defer spending
on LRSO and GBSD until we have a completed Nuclear Posture Review in
hand? How would that impact the programs and the Air Force's ability to
meet STRATCOM's requirements and schedules?
General Rand. Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the
nation's replacement program for the aging Minuteman III (MMIII) weapon
system. The GBSD program is currently funded through the Technology
Maturation Risk Reduction (TMRR) (concept design) phase of the program
(2020). We expect the TMRR contract to be awarded in the 4th Quarter
Fiscal Year 2017. Public sources identify the Nuclear Posture Review as
being completed by the end of the year 2017. If spending was delayed
beyond the end of TMRR in 2020, there will be a significant sustainment
cost to support continued MMIII operations through 2035 and beyond.
MMIII reliability and effectiveness will continue to degrade and it
will be difficult to maintain a plausible deterrent force that meets
warfighter needs with assets falling below New START levels in 2030.
For example, MMIII flight system (or missile itself) begins to age out
in 2026 followed by obsolescence and attrition of assets affecting
other crticial weapons systems and facilities issues that have only
received minimum sustainment pending a major upgrade such as GBSD.
Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) is the replacement for the aging
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which was designed in the 1970s,
fielded in the 1980s is twenty years past its 10-year life expectancy.
ALCM is no longer cost effective to maintain past 2030 an in future
years, enemy air defense modernization will challenge ALCM's
penetration capability. Additionally, testing attrition is depleting
the inventory. LRSO is currently on schedule to meet its threshold
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date of 2030: just in time
replacement for the ALCM. Deferred spending on LRSO will delay IOC and
the United States would lose significant deterrence/assurance
capability. Down-select will occur in August, and if spending were
delayed to wait on a signed Nuclear Posture Review, numerous waterfall
effects would occur. Of note, numerous bomber and facility
modernization and upgrade tests would be impacted, as these test are
waiting on LRSO to ``set the stage'' or lay the infrastructure for
them. Additionally, the LRSO schedule is aligned with its associated
warhead, the W80-4, and a delay in the cruise missile will have
significant negative effects on the warhead development and production
schedule.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the military requirements that are
driving U.S. nuclear modernization plans in your respective services.
What do we see other countries doing and how does that impact our
requirements? How does aging or vulnerabilities in our own U.S. nuclear
forces impact requirements and modernization plans?
General Rand. [The information provided is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of
delaying or cancelling key nuclear modernization programs--such as the
GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range stand off
(LRSO) cruise missile, or the new Columbia-class submarine? How firm is
the need for the current schedules for these programs--is there room
for slipping their schedules? Do you believe these programs are
executable on-schedule and on-budget, if they are funded on-time by
Congress?
General Rand. If the Air Force does not develop and produce the B-
21, the U.S. will lose bomber penetration capabilities in highly
contested threat areas. The B-21 will support the nuclear Triad,
providing a visible and flexible nuclear deterrent capability that will
reassure allies and partners. A fleet size of 100 B-21s is appropriate
and ensures sustained high-end conventional operations while supporting
the nuclear Triad as a visible and flexible deterrent to assure allies
and partners. Analysis has shown that the B-21 is needed to address
decreasing survivability and combat capabilities in our current bomber
force, ensuring penetration capabilities in highly contested combat
airspace. Delaying B-21 production or procuring any less than 100 B-21s
will have a detrimental impact on the B-21 contract, causing increases
in the average procurement unit cost and total program cost similar to
what was seen with the B-2 program. Global Strike Command has developed
its Bomber Vector based on the current B-21 development and production
schedule. The Bomber Vector lays out planned modernization,
sustainment, and aircraft retirement plans. Any delays or decreases to
the B-21 program will result in capability gaps and/or Bomber Vector
adjustments requiring additional modernization programs, manpower
solutions, and costly force mix decisions.
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the nation's replacement
program for the aging Minuteman III (MMIII) weapon system. The GBSD
program is currently funded through the Technology Maturation Risk
Reduction (TMRR) (concept design) phase of the program (2020). We
expect the TMRR contract to be awarded in the 4th Quarter Fiscal Year
2017. Public sources identify the Nuclear Posture Review as being
completed by the end of the year 2017. If the program was delayed
beyond the end of TMRR in 2020, there will be a significant sustainment
cost to support continued MMIII operations through 2035 and beyond.
MMIII reliability and effectiveness will continue to degrade and it
will be difficult to maintain a plausible deterrent force that meets
warfighter needs with assets falling below New START levels in 2030.
For example, MMIII flight system (or missile itself) begins to age out
in 2026 followed by obsolescence and attrition of assets affecting
other critical weapons systems and facilities issues that have only
received minimum sustainment pending a major upgrade such as GBSD. GBSD
is just in time, no room to slip, to meet critical MMIII age out,
obsolescence and asset depletion/attrition issues. The program is ready
to execute and award the TMRR contract on time and on schedule.
If we do not develop and produce the Long Range Stand Off missile
(LRSO), the U.S. could lose the following capacities. Deterring
potential adversaties from nuclear weapon usage--central to today's
national security strategy. Deterrence requires a range of US military
capabilities and LRSO is a key piece of this strategy. An option the
president currently has and a capability that our peers/near-peers
already have or are developing. Flexible stand-off capability supports
hedge requirements in the event another leg of the Triad encounters
issues. LRSO allows the U.S. to continue to impose costs on potential
adversaries long into the future, as it provides continued flexibl
response options. LRSO is a force multiplier compatible with the B-52,
and the B-21; extends range, enables simultaneous targeting of multiple
targets, lowers risk to aircrew/aircraft by reducing target overflight
requirements, reduces tanker and support requirements. LRSO assures
U.S. allies by signaling resolve to defend itself and its allies. This
resolve is significantly enhanced by the credibility of the bomber
force to hold almost any target at risk by extending its effective
range with standoff capability. LRSO provides presidential options and
overt strategic messaging to peer nations as a visible indication of
operational status and national intent, e.g. bombers on nuclear ground
alert.
Mr. Rogers. What are the military effectiveness and cost
implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III
missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue
GBSD?
General Rand. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of
Alternatives that received Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) sufficiency review concluded
that investment is required to extend intercontinental ballistic
missile life beyond 2030. The analysis revealed a replacement system,
mitigating capability shortfalls, as the most cost-effective strategy.
``Life Extending'' Minuteman III will cost more than full system
recapitalization, and would not address warfighting capability gaps
validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The following
are the analysis of alternatives costs identified:
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 50 year life cycle cost--$159.2B
Minuteman III Service Life Extension Program (Baseline) life cycle
costs--$160.3B
Over the next twenty years, nearly the entire Minuteman III system
requires investment to address declining reliability, aging and
supportability issues.
Mr. Rogers. Why is LRSO required if we also have a B61-12 nuclear
gravity bomb carried by a penetrating B-21 bomber--is this duplicative?
Do we need both?
General Rand. [The information provided is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. We understand that the Air Force and its potential
contractors are considering a more mobile concept for the command and
control of the GBSD missile system, rather than relying on the
redundancy and survivability of a distributed system of many fixed
launch control centers as in the current ICBM fields. As STRATCOM has
pointed out, this is a technologically challenging approach with
considerable risk. Why is the Air Force going down this path? What is
the Air Force doing to address these risks and ensure this concept does
not decrease the size of the missileer career field such that it is no
longer sustainable?
General Rand. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Force
Development Concept does pursue capabilities such as a hybrid/mix of
mobile command and control (C2), similar launch control centers as
utilized in Minuteman III, on-base integrated launch control center,
and an alternate/airborne launch control system (ALCS). The concept
does not provide exact numbers of nodes. A from-the-ground-up GBSD
system design allows for Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) to
take advantage of technologies to pursue a more cost effective and
efficient approach on to how intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) are operated, maintained, and secured. The final number of
launch control centers will be assessed for survivability and apply
robust risk management even if it is the same number of centers used in
Minuteman III. AFGSC is adding additional oversight in cyber, wireless
(if this is included in the final solution), and nuclear safety areas
to manage risk.
The Airborne Launch Control System--Replacement program executing
in parallel may advance launch control center suite development and
provide the hooks in design to become common with the GBSD application.
This would allow commonality in missileer training and operations,
versus the differences which currently exist between Minuteman III ICBM
console and ALCS console. Mobile and integrated operations using a
common console would enhance career opportunity and offer different
operating environments for the missileer career field.
Mr. Rogers. How important are dual-capable aircraft to the U.S.
nuclear posture? Do they constitute a critical and necessary component
of our nuclear deterrence and assurance?
General Rand. Global Strike Command's B-2 and B-52 are both dual-
capable bombers. The B-21 is being developed as a dual-capable bomber
and will be nuclear capable within two years of declaring conventional
initial operational capability (as directed by the Fiscal Year 2013
National Defense Authorization Act). These bombers, along with the
weapons they carry, constitute the entirety of the air-breathing leg of
the Triad. Additionally, they are the most visible leg of the nuclear
Triad, and inherently stabilizing. The process of arming bombers and
delivering weapons is a time consuming effort requiring hours to days,
not minutes. Bombers are the leg of the Triad seen as the least
threatening to stability, which is why arms control experts afforded a
discount for bomber weapons in New START. Second, bombers are
intrinsically stabilizing in the nuclear arena due to the ability to be
launched and then recalled prior execution. Third, nuclear bombers
offer the ability to signal National intentions in a very visible
manner. Fully loaded nuclear bombers on alert are a very powerful
message. This visibility is critical to providing nuclear deterrence
for our adversaries and even more critical to providing assurance to
our allies. The bomber, since its inception, has been a sysmbol of
America's commitment to its allies and serves as a deterrent to the
proliferation of nuclear capabilities.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the military requirements that are
driving U.S. nuclear modernization plans in your respective services.
What do we see other countries doing and how does that impact our
requirements? How does aging or vulnerabilities in our own U.S. nuclear
forces impact requirements and modernization plans?
Admiral Benedict. In order to support the Commander, STRATCOM
mission requirement for sea-based strategic deterrence, the Navy must
provide a minimum force of 10 operational SSBNs. Today, we meet that
requirement with 14 OHIO Class SSBNs. In the future, we will meet the
requirement with a force structure of 12 COLUMBIA Class SSBNs, as the
class will not require a lengthy engineered refueling overhaul due to a
life of ship core. The Navy has already extended the existing OHIO
Class service life from 30 years to 42 years, and there is no
engineering margin left for further extension. This extension provides
an additional 40 percent service life and will result in the OHIO Class
being in service longer than any SSBN or SSN in U.S. history. Any delay
to the COLUMBIA Class program could reduce the total SSBN force
structure below that required to provide 10 operational SSBNs during
the transition period from the OHIO Class to the COLUMBIA Class, which
would prevent the Navy from meeting the STRATCOM at-sea requirements.
The assumptions of adversaries' nuclear force structures,
capability developments, and doctrines play a major role in our
assessments of the current and future threat environment and contribute
to strategy and force structure decisions. Maintaining our ability to
deter and, if deterrence fails, respond to future threats underpins our
national strategy. The results of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review
will inform any recommendations to the existing nuclear triad program
of record.
Mr. Rogers. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of
delaying or cancelling key nuclear modernization programs--such as the
GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range stand off
(LRSO) cruise missile, or the new Columbia-class submarine? How firm is
the need for the current schedules for these programs--is there room
for slipping their schedules? Do you believe these programs are
executable on-schedule and on-budget, if they are funded on-time by
Congress?
Admiral Benedict. There is no margin in the COLUMBIA Class SSBN
program--it is imperative that we remain on schedule. The OHIO Class
SSBN was originally designed for a 30-year service life. In 1998, Naval
Reactors and NAVSEA completed a detailed engineering analysis including
evaluation of the current material condition of the class, remaining
fuel levels, and expected future operational demands of the platform.
At that time, the OHIO Class service life was extended to 42 years (a
40 percent increase). Any further extension would erode the engineering
safety margin to an unacceptable level. The longest serving nuclear
submarine to date was the USS KAMEHAMEHA at 37 years of service. Any
delay to the COLUMBIA Class program could reduce the total SSBN force
structure below that required to provide 10 operational SSBNs during
the transition period from the OHIO Class to the COLUMBIA Class, which
would prevent the Navy from meeting STRATCOM at-sea requirements. While
there is no schedule margin left, the COLUMBIA Class program of record
is executable, assuming adequate and stable funding. This is true for
the entire nuclear enterprise in general. The nation chose to defer
modernization efforts on our nuclear weapons enterprise after the Cold
War and it cannot be deferred any longer without loss of capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. What is your (military) opinion of the value of the new
START Treaty? What would the risk be of preventing negotiations to
extend the New START Treaty as long as Russia is not in compliance with
the INF Treaty?
General Rand. This question was covered quite extensively during
the ratification process for New START by a wide variety of witnesses.
As noted at the time by the CDRUSSTRATCOM (Gen Chilton), New START
``does not constrain America's ability to continue to deter potential
adversaries, assure our allies and sustain strategic stability''. I
believe those observations remain true today. I would also note that
New START limits the number of Russian warheads that can target the
United States. New START's flexible limits on deployed and non-deployed
delivery platforms retain sufficient flexibility to manage our Triad of
deterrent forces to hedge against tactical or geopolitical surprise.
Lastly, New START continues a strategic nuclear arms control
verification regime of notifications and on the ground observations/
inspections of Russian strategic forces by U.S. personnel. There are
obvious risks in preventing negotiations on extending New START due to
Russian non-compliance with the INF Treaty. First, having the U.S. tie
discussions on one treaty to disputes in another would likely cause
Russia to adopt the same approach. In my opinion, this would
unnecessarily complicate resolving issues in either treaty. Secondly,
while I vigorously support holding Russia to account for complying with
all treaties, we have to keep in mind that without treaty constraints,
Russia is free to do as it wants. It is important to weigh the impact
of treaty disputes against the possibility of a treaty not being
extended, or of Russian withdrawal from one or more treaties. The
issues that we have with Russian non-compliance with INF are serious
and should be dealt with, however my recommendation is that the U.S.
not bring INF issues in other treaty areas.
Mr. Cooper. Is there a military requirement for a conventional
Long-Range Stand-Off weapon? What would the costs be to make it
conventional?
General Rand. [The information provided is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. What is your (military) opinion of the value of the new
START Treaty? What would the risk be of preventing negotiations to
extend the New START Treaty as long as Russia is not in compliance with
the INF Treaty?
Admiral Benedict. I believe that bilateral and verifiable arms
control agreements are a key component of our national security and
provide insight into potential adversary capabilities to maintain the
strategic status quo. However, further reductions of nuclear forces
should only be undertaken after a complete assessment of the current
security environment, particularly in regards to our nuclear armed
adversaries. Any future arms control agreements should take into
account prior actions, verifiability, and the arms control agreement's
contribution to maintaining strategic stability. These things, along
with a full intelligence assessment of the present and future threat
environment will be central to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The
results of the NPR will inform any decisions on adjustments to
strategy, force structure, and recommendations on how to best address
the future threat environment.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
more difference?
General Klotz. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 President's Budget Request
continues the program of record detailed in the FY 2017 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan. NNSA's Weapons Activities budget
includes planned increases to the program of record as well as
increases to adapt to emerging changes, such as updates to the baseline
costs for the B61-12 Life Extension Program and the W88 Alteration 370.
Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
over the next 10 years-including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
with this estimate?
CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
General Klotz. NNSA publishes future year cost estimates in our
annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP), but NNSA has not
estimated costs for the Department of Defense portion of the $400
billion estimate and therefore has no basis by which to judge its
accuracy. The DOE portion of Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) $400
billion estimate was $134 billion. Our own current estimate for that
period (2017-2026), as detailed in the SSMP, is $112-120 billion.
Since the end of the Cold War, investments in the strategic
deterrent have fallen to under 4 percent of the defense budget, but
historically has been much higher than 6 percent during periods of
recapitalization, particularly prior to the end of the Cold War. Over
the past 40 years, Weapons Activities funding has ranged from 1.0 to
1.7 percent of total Defense discretionary spending. At currently
planned levels, Weapons Activities spending over the next 10 years
would constitute about 1.6 percent of defense spending.
The National Nuclear Security Administration's missions include
maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of the
nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear
propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and
submarines. NNSA's budget is vital to ensuring that U.S. nuclear forces
are modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately
tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure America's allies.
NNSA's budget represents a prudent investment in a key component of our
overall defense strategy. Significant and sustained investment is
needed to replace aging infrastructure, provide for warhead life
extension programs, revitalize our production capabilities, continue to
advance the science which guarantees the safety, reliability and
effectiveness of the stockpile, and sustain our highly talented
workforce. Failure to make the right investments could significantly
impact the deterrent.
Mr. Franks. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
more difference?
Dr. Soofer. As NNSA Administrator Lieutenant Colonel Klotz noted in
testimony, the President's FY 2018 budget request reflects an increase
for NNSA nuclear weapons activities. For the Department of Defense
portion, the fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget reflects more continuity than
change. The FY 2018 budget supports, as did the FY 2017 budget,
continued recapitalization of each element of our nuclear forces and
infrastructure.
Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
with this estimate?
CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
Dr. Soofer. The DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
approximately $230-$290 billion from FY 2018 to FY 2040, in constant FY
2018 dollars. This projection includes the total cost of nuclear-only
systems, and a portion of the cost of the B-21 bomber, which will have
both conventional and nuclear roles. The DOD projection for total
recapitalization cost also includes modernizing nuclear command,
control, and communications systems. I would defer to my Department of
Energy colleagues for specifics relating to estimated NNSA costs. U.S.
nuclear weapons deter the only existential threat to the Nation. The
nuclear enterprise is affordable if nuclear deterrence is prioritized
appropriately. During the coming period of increased recapitalization
spending, nuclear forces will remain a small fraction of the DOD
budget--with annual funding levels that are projected to range from
approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending. This
includes spending to sustain and operate the existing force--currently
about $12-14 billion per year--as well as recapitalization spending to
develop and field modernized replacements.
Mr. Franks. The last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was published 7
years ago. The world was very different in 2010, particularly when
talking about Russia. Today, it's hard to see Russia as the partner and
friend like the 20101 NPR envisioned.
Would you please provide us your assessment on what has changed in
the world since the 2010 NPR?
How will this affect the NPR and its deliberations?
Dr. Soofer. The Nuclear Posture Review's analytical process will
include a full assessment of the strategic environment, including a
review of how that environment has changed since the 2010 NPR. Recent
years have indeed brought changes to the security environment that U.S.
nuclear policy must address. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions
against its neighbors and threatened the United States and its NATO
Allies--including nuclear threats. It has elevated strategies of
nuclear first use in its strategic thinking and military exercises, is
modernizing a large and diverse non-strategic nuclear weapons force,
and is violating the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty. However, while Russia presents a significant set of challenges,
it is only one element of an increasingly complex global strategic
environment. The President directed the Department of Defense to review
U.S. nuclear posture and ensure that our nuclear forces are modern,
robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter
21st-century threats and reassure our allies and partners.
Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
with this estimate?
CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
General Rand. The $400 billion estimate is based on a snapshot in
time. Global Strike Command's portion for the nuclear enterprise
funding was included in the CBO estimate, therefore I can't speak for
our sister services and the Department of Energy. The estimated amount
could fluctuate based on future budgets, adversary advancements, and
new/competing requirements. Increases from 2015 are rightly attributed
to modernization and replacement programs becoming more mature.
While the CBO report covers 2017-2026, the current cost estimates
for Air Force Global Strike Command peak in 2030 when a number of
modernization and replacement programs are going on all at once.
Considering the deterrence and assurance provided by our nation's
nuclear weapon programs, the CBO's number of 5-7% of the total national
defense budget is quite a bargain. While I can't speak to Navy and
Department of Energy costs, the CBO numbers on Air Force Global
Strike's portion of sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear
deterrent are in line with our projections.
It is encouraging that the CBO included estimates for the command
and control, communications (NC3) and early warning systems in the
report. When discussing nuclear modernization, these critical systems
are omitted from discussions. This country relies on positive command
control of nuclear forces. Only the President may authorize the use of
nuclear weapons by utilizing NC3 systems.
Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
with this estimate?
CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
Admiral Benedict. The CBO estimate of $400 billion represents many
elements across multiple agencies and services within the overall
nuclear deterrence mission. The 1-2 percent of the national defense
budget for the sea-based strategic deterrent is appropriate and
consistent with what our nation previously invested to build both the
``41 for Freedom'' in the 1960s and the first nuclear modernization
with the OHIO Class in the 1980s. The Navy is continually reviewing and
validating the requirements needed to sustain the sea-based leg of the
triad. A safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent underpins our
ability to conduct conventional operations around the world. Beyond
deterring the threat of nuclear attack on the United States, having
credible nuclear forces is essential to assuring our allies of our
extended deterrence commitments, thereby convincing them that they do
not need to pursue their own nuclear weapons. Recapitalization is a
significant investment that happens every other generation, making it
critically important that we do it right. We remain focused on cost-
efficiency to ensure an affordable sea-based strategic deterrent.
Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
with this estimate?
CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
Dr. Zangardi. The Congressional Budget Office's cost estimate for
sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent is not the
same dollar amount that DOD will provide Congress in its classified
Fiscal Year 2018 annual report on the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,
Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear
Weapons Command and Control System (the ``Section 1043 Report''). I
believe that the proposed funding stated in the Department of Defense's
Section 1043 Report reflects the funding needed to support our Nation's
nuclear deterrence.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Why do we need the IW-1 rather than a life-extended
W78? What steps is NNSA taking to ensure that any changes to the
warhead, including any modifications to the nuclear components, do not
affect the reliability of the warhead?
General Klotz. The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC's) August 2016
Strategic Plan reaffirmed the need for the interoperable warhead 1
(IW1) as the first ballistic missile in the 3+2 Nuclear Stockpile
Strategy. The 3+2 Strategy is a long-term strategy with emphasis on
reduced warhead types, interoperability to enable smaller inactive
stockpile, and reduced burden on production infrastructure. The IW1
objective is to deploy an interoperable nuclear explosive package for
use in the Mk21 intercontinental ballistic missile aeroshell and the
Mk5 submarine-launched ballistic missile aeroshell with adaptable non-
nuclear components.
IW1 will accomplish the following: 1) replaces capability currently
provided by the aging W78; 2) rebalances sea-leg deployment to reduce
risk against technical failure; and 3) along with IW2, enables
replacement of capability provided by the W88. A W78 life extension
program may not provide the capability envisioned for IW1 or meet the
long-term requirements of the 3+2 Strategy. The pending NPR may shed
greater light on this issue.
Warhead reliability is one of many requirements established by the
Department of Defense in what are called Military Characteristics
(MCs). The IW1 MCs will be generated by the DOD and approved by the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), but they are not officially established
yet. As with all ongoing nuclear warhead life extensions programs and
major modifications, NNSA performs extensive testing and analytical
assessments to meet reliability requirements prior to deployment of the
warhead. With over 70 years of experience, the NNSA (through its Design
and Production Agencies) has established proven processes to meet
reliability and other objectives for both newly manufactured and reused
components and expects to do so for IW1.
Mr. Garamendi. The Trump administration has decided to terminate
the MOX project, noting that ``major cost overruns and schedule
slippages have led to a re-examination of how best to achieve [our
nonproliferation commitments]'' and ``It would be irresponsible to
pursue this approach when a more cost-effective alternative exists.''
Why did this administration decide to terminate the MOX Project?
Have any new reviews taken place under the new administration?
Is DOE considering other missions for Savannah River Site? Which
ones?
General Klotz. Independent cost reviews and estimates directed by
Congress have all concluded that the MOX program of record is
significantly more expensive and would take more time than originally
planned. The new Administration reviewed all independent reports and
met with all parties including MOX Services, the current contractor,
and their parent companies to fully understand the costs, challenges,
and risks associated with constructing the MOX project or pursuing the
dilute and dispose approach. After careful review, the Administration
came to the same conclusion as the last Administration--that the
current MOX program of record is unaffordable and the dilute and
dispose approach meets the nonproliferation requirements much faster
with significantly lower cost and risk.
Most of the information reviewed by the new Administration and key
decision makers were from prior studies, including the recent U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers report on the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility
contract structure and the Government Accountability Office's Plutonium
Disposition report to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces.
Mr. Garamendi. To what extent are Weapons Activities infrastructure
investments driven by the 50-80 pits per year production requirement
and to what extent is the 50-80 pits per year production requirement
driven by the IW-1?
General Klotz. NNSA's Plutonium Strategy includes a number of
investments intended to sustain the capabilities necessary to support
stockpile requirements. These include a combination of line-item
projects and resource investments that help reduce mission dependency
on aging facilities, modernize our infrastructure, and help NNSA meet
statutory pit production requirements, including achieving a 50-80 war
reserve (WR) pits per year (ppy) production capacity in the 2030s. Much
of this investment would be required, regardless of the pit production
requirement.
The January 16, 2014, Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Pit Production
Requirements Report to Congress confirmed the need for achieving 50-80
ppy production capacity by 2030, citing multiple drivers. Key among
these drivers are both the need to support future stockpile planning
requirements and address stockpile needs due to pit aging. The
requirement to achieve a 50-80 ppy production capacity was codified by
Congress most recently in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act
(Sec. 3140). Although the current build plan of Interoperable Warhead 1
(IW1) is the main driver for the current pit production requirements,
any replacement life extension program for the W78 warhead could
require similar, if not higher, production requirements.
Mr. Garamendi. Previous Nuclear Posture Reviews, which are
comprehensive, interagency reviews of our nuclear weapons policy, have
often taken more than a year to complete. This administration plans to
complete its Nuclear Posture Review in about 8 months. Should we take
this to mean that the review is a forgone conclusion and that it will
reaffirm the status quo? Why such a constrained timeline? Further, how
will the lack of confirmed appointees at relevant offices and bureaus
at the State Department (such as the Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security, Bureau of Arms Control Verification and
Compliance, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation)
affect non-DOD input on the process?
Dr. Soofer. The Nuclear Posture Review includes subject matter
experts from across the government, including the Department of State.
The effort is being overseen by the Secretary of Defense and will
include a full and thorough assessment of our nuclear weapons policy to
ensure that our nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible,
resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century
threats. If more study time is necessary we will extend the review to
ensure we adequately meet the President's objectives.
Mr. Garamendi. President Obama stated in 2013 that ``After a
comprehensive review, I've determined that we can ensure the security
of America and our allies--and maintain a strong and credible strategic
deterrent--while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up
to one-third.'' Do you agree with that statement? Should the United
States seek further reductions in coordination with Russia?
Dr. Soofer. The President tasked the Department of Defense to
review U.S. nuclear posture and ensure that our nuclear forces are
modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored
to deter 21st-century threats. The security environment has changed
since President Obama's statement; I will not prejudge the outcome of
the NPR and endorse this statement. If any future reductions are
possible for the U.S., they should not be done unilaterally.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe that it would be in the national
security interests of the United States to pursue an extension of the
treaty in 2021? Would you advocate for any modifications? What would
the risk be of preventing negotiations to extend the New START Treaty
as long as Russia is not in compliance with the INF Treaty?
Dr. Soofer. It is too early to consider extending or modifying the
New START Treaty. This year, we are focused on completing our force
reductions under the Treaty and ensuring that Russia meets its
obligations by February 2018 when the Treaty's central limits go into
effect. Russia remains in compliance with the New START Treaty and the
Treaty continues to provide predictability of and transparency into
Russia's strategic forces. The President directed the Department of
Defense to review U.S. nuclear posture and ensure that our nuclear
forces are modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Soofer, do you believe it is within the ability
of the Department of Defense to provide to Congress a 25-year cost
estimate of DOD's portion of our nuclear deterrent, including
operation, sustainment, and modernization?
Dr. Soofer. In making these long-term cost projections, there are
always legitimate questions about what to include, what timeframe to
cover, and what level of uncertainty is reasonable to expect. At this
time a reliable 25-year cost estimate for of the Departments of
Defenses portion of our nuclear deterrent does not exist. However, the
attached chart provides a cost estimate of operation, sustainment and
modernization of our nuclear deterrent through 2040.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
.epsMr. Garamendi. Dr. Soofer, thank you for providing your 20-year
cost estimate for DOD's nuclear modernization costs and for providing a
clear and full explanation of which costs and programs are included.
However, your cost estimate is provided in constant FY18 dollars,
making comparisons with most other congressionally mandated nuclear
cost estimates which use then-year dollars difficult. Please provide to
the committee an updated version of this cost estimate using then-year
dollars.
Dr. Soofer. DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
approximately $230-$290 billion spread over more than two decades, from
fiscal year (FY) 2018 to FY 2040, in constant FY 2018 dollars. In then-
year dollars the range is adjusted to $280-$350 billion.
Mr. Garamendi. There have been some changes to this year's funding
requests for the LRSO and GBSD in comparison to the FY18 plans in last
year's budget. GBSD was reduced by $78 million and LRSO was increased
by $31 million. General Rand, can you briefly explain those changes?
General Rand. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) focus
since the Milestone A decision has been on source selection related to
the Technical Maturation Risk Reduction Contract Award we expect to be
awarded in the 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2017. Some planned activities
were deferred due to the source selection activity. The program is
currently funded to the Independent Cost Estimate.
The $31 million adjustment to the Fiscal Year 2018 budget for Long
Range Standoff Missile (LRSO) is in response to the updated cost
estimate developed and approved during the Milestone A approval
process. This updated estimate was approved after the Fiscal Year 2017
President's Budget submission. The $451.3 million Fiscal Year 2018
funds support technology maturation and risk reduction weapon
development, test planning, and aircraft integration efforts.
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