    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 115-51]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                        FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES FOR

              NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                  MAY 25, 2017

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                                   __________

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                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair    JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               RO KHANNA, California
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
                     Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Mike Gancio, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Benedict, VADM Terry, USN, Director, Navy Strategic Systems
      Program........................................................     6
    Cange, Susan M., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
      Management, Department of Energy...............................     8
    Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National
      Nuclear Security Administration................................     3
    Rand, Gen Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command     6
    Soofer, Dr. Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense......     4
    Zangardi, Dr. John A., Acting Chief Information Officer,
      Department of Defense..........................................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Benedict, VADM Terry.........................................    69
        Cange, Susan M...............................................    83
        Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
          Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...................    34
        Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G........................................    35
        Rand, Gen Robin..............................................    54
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    31
        Soofer, Dr. Robert...........................................    47
        Zangardi, Dr. John A.........................................    79

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Letter from Secretary of Energy Moniz to the Director of the
          Office of Management and Budget............................    95

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................   108
        Mr. Franks...................................................   108
        Mr. Garamendi................................................   111
        Mr. Rogers...................................................   101

      FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY
                               DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                Washington, DC, Thursday, May 25, 2017.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Rogers. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
    order. I want to welcome you to our hearing on ``Fiscal Year
    2018 Priorities for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense
    Activities.''
        I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for
    your service to our Nation. In uniform or out, your service to
    the American people is greatly appreciated.
        We have a full witness panel today because, due to the
    compressed schedule for the budget request and defense
    authorization bill, we are going to attempt to cover the
    waterfront on all things nuclear. We have the Honorable Frank
    Klotz, Administrator, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security; Dr.
    Robert Soofer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear Defense Policy; General Robin Rand, Commander, Air
    Force Global Strike Command; Vice Admiral Terry Benedict,
    Director, Navy Strategic Systems Programs; and I know I am
    going to butcher this one up, but Dr. John Zangardi--is that
    all right--Acting Chief Information Officer at the Department
    of Defense; and Ms. Susan Cange--did I pronounce that right--
    Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
    Management.
        Two and a half months ago, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, General Selva, testified before our full
    committee that, quote: ``There is no higher priority for the
    Joint Force than fielding all the components of an effective
    nuclear deterrent, and we are emphasizing the nuclear mission
    over all other modernization programs when faced with that
    choice. We in the Joint Force put our nuclear deterrent as the
    number one priority for modernization and recapitalization,''
    close quote.
        This priority has now been clearly stated by three
    successive Secretaries of Defense: Secretary Hagel, Secretary
    Carter, and Secretary Mattis. As my friend and ranking member
    has repeatedly pointed out, this subcommittee agrees with that
    prioritization on a bipartisan basis, and I am pleased to say
    that the fiscal year 2018 budget request put forward by the
    Trump administration 2 days ago reinforces that priority. This
    is good news.
        As a Nation, we need to put our money where our mouths are.
    This committee played a key role in building the current broad
    bipartisan agreement on the importance of the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent and the urgent need to carry out the full nuclear
    modernization programs put forth by the Obama administration.
        Reflecting on the budget request, let's be clear about one
    thing. The billion dollar increase for NNSA's [National Nuclear
    Security Administration's] nuclear weapons activities goes a
    long way but does not fully fill the gap identified by
    Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz in his letter to the OMB
    [Office of Management and Budget] Director in 2015.
        The Secretary said there was over a billion dollar gap
    between the program of record in fiscal year 2018 and the
    funding allocated. We are still several hundred million dollars
    short here. As the Trump administration embarks on its Nuclear
    Posture Review, in which several of our witnesses are
    intimately involved, we will take stock today of all the
    priorities, policies, and programs related to nuclear
    deterrence and nuclear security more broadly.
        Let me briefly highlight two. Of particular concern to this
    subcommittee are the nuclear advances made by foreign countries
    and how those impact our own deterrent. As we heard from the
    Defense Science Board earlier this year, quote, ``Nuclear
    weapons are a steadily evolving threat in both new and familiar
    directions,'' close quote. We must understand how the threat is
    evolving and anticipate what must be done to compensate. The
    U.S. focus in recent years has been on downplaying the utility
    of nuclear weapons, but most other nuclear powers have not
    downplayed that threat. The U.S. will ensure its nuclear
    deterrent is robust and credible against all potential threats
    today and for the long term.
        Another longstanding concern of this committee has been the
    state of the infrastructure within the NNSA enterprise. This
    committee has had several hearings on the topic in the past
    year, and I am pleased that the budget request provides
    significantly additional funding here. We will take a look at
    the projects that are being proposed and make sure they are
    truly buying down the massive backlog of deferred maintenance
    and repair needs. We will also look to see what authorities and
    processes can be provided or streamlined to ensure we are doing
    this smartly, effectively, and efficiently.
        In closing, let me revisit something that General Hyten,
    Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, said at our hearing
    back in March, quote: ``At a time when others continue to
    modernize and expand strategic capabilities, nearly all
    elements of the nuclear enterprise, our nuclear delivery
    systems, weapons stockpile, NC3 [nuclear command, control, and
    communications], and other critical infrastructure are
    operating well beyond their expected service life''--``planned
    sustainment and modernization activities must be completed on
    schedule, as a delay will impact the execution of our strategic
    deterrence mission and unacceptably degrade our ability, and
    ultimately our credibility, to deter and assure,'' close quote.
        For our number one priority defense mission, this is a
    sobering reminder of the tremendously important job facing
    these witnesses and this subcommittee, so let's get to work.
        I want to thank our witnesses for being here, and I look
    forward to our discussions.
        With that, let me turn to my friend, the ranking member
    from Tennessee, Mr. Jim Cooper, for any opening statement he
    may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        I too want to welcome the witnesses, and in order to save
    time, I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement
    be made part of the record. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 34.]
        Mr. Rogers. One of the many reasons I like him: He is short
    and to the point.
        All right. We are going to be called for votes in about an
    hour. So, if the witnesses could, your full opening statement
    will be submitted for the record. If you can summarize in about
    3 minutes, then we will get to questions more rapidly.
        General Klotz, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        General Klotz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize,
    hopefully at 3 minutes. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
    and other members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to present the President's fiscal year 2018 budget
    request for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
    Security Administration. We value this committee's strong
    support for the three pillars of NNSA's mission: the nuclear
    weapons stockpile, nuclear threat reduction, and Naval
    Reactors. Our budget request, which comprises approximately
    half of the DOE [Department of Energy] budget, is $13.9
    billion. This represents an increase, as you pointed out, of
    nearly $1 billion, or 7.8 percent, over the fiscal year 2017
    omnibus level.
        This budget request is vital to ensuring that the U.S.
    nuclear force remains modern, robust, flexible, resilient,
    ready, and appropriately tailored to 21st century threats, and
    to reassure our allies. It also is indicative of the strong
    support of the administration for the mission and the people of
    the National Nuclear Security Administration.
        NNSA's fiscal year 2018 budget request for the weapons
    activity appropriation is $10.2 billion, an increase of nearly
    $1 billion, or 10.8 percent, over the fiscal year 2017 omnibus
    level. This increase is needed to both meet our current life
    extension program commitments and to modernize our research and
    production infrastructure so we are positioned to address
    future requirements and future challenges.
        The 2018 budget request also includes $1.8 billion for the
    defense nuclear nonproliferation account, which is consistent
    with the funding level in the fiscal year 2017 omnibus. This
    appropriation continues NNSA's critical and far-reaching
    mission to prevent, counter, and to respond to nuclear threats.
        The request for our third appropriations, the Naval
    Reactors program, is nearly $1.5 billion. This represents an
    increase of $60 million, or 4.2 percent, above the fiscal year
    2017 omnibus level. Not only does the requested funding support
    today's operational fleet, it enables Naval Reactors to deliver
    tomorrow's fleet.
        Our budget request for the fourth and final appropriations
    account, Federal salaries and expenses, is $418 million, an
    increase of $31 million, or 8.1 percent, over the fiscal year
    2017 omnibus level. The request supports recruiting, training,
    and retaining the highly skilled Federal workforce essential to
    achieving success in technically complex 21st century national
    security missions.
        In closing, our fiscal year 2018 budget request reflects
    NNSA's motto: ``Mission first, people always.'' It accounts for
    the significant tempo of operations at NNSA which in many ways
    has reached a level unseen since the Cold War. It includes long
    overdue investments to repair and replace infrastructure at our
    national laboratories and production plants, and it provides
    modern and more efficient work space for our highly talented
    scientific, engineering, and professional workforce.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
    sir, and I look forward to answering any questions the
    subcommittee may have.
        [The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in
    the Appendix on page 35.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
        Dr. Soofer, you are recognized for the first of many
    occasions before this committee, I am sure.

     STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT SOOFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
    Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to testify on the President's fiscal year
    2018 budget request for nuclear forces.
        The President directed the Department of Defense to conduct
    a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review [NPR], and we expect to
    complete it by the end of this calendar year. I will not
    prejudge the outcome of the NPR but will outline some of the
    challenges and questions that we face.
        For decades, U.S. nuclear forces have provided the ultimate
    deterrent against nuclear attacks on the United States and our
    allies. Nuclear weapons remain a foundational element of U.S.
    strategy for deterring strategic attacks and large-scale war
    and for assuring U.S. allies. Effective deterrence requires a
    deliberate strategy and forces that are structured and postured
    to support that strategy within the existing security
    environment. Strategy, forces, and posture must also be
    flexible enough to maintain stability while adjusting to both
    gradual and rapid technological and geopolitical changes.
        Recent years have, indeed, brought changes that U.S. policy
    must address. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions against
    its neighbors and threatened the United States and its allies.
    It has elevated strategies for nuclear first use. It is
    violating the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
    and is modernizing a large and diverse nonstrategic nuclear
    weapons force.
        In the Asia-Pacific, China's increased assertiveness
    suggests a desire to dominate that region. North Korea's
    leadership has demonstrated a willingness to accept economic
    countermeasures and international isolation in order to advance
    its nuclear capability and develop ballistic missiles able to
    strike the United States homeland as well our allies in the
    region.
        The United States remains committed to ensuring that Iran
    never acquires a nuclear weapon. As the administration conducts
    its policy review of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
    [JCPOA], we will continue to meet our commitments under the
    deal. Iran continues its ballistic missile program, which is
    outside of the JCPOA.
        It is against this backdrop that the President directed DOD
    [Department of Defense] to ensure that the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats. Each of
    these characteristics contributes to the effectiveness of our
    deterrent strategy.
        As we conduct the NPR, Secretary Mattis has directed that
    we continue with the existing program of record for
    recapitalizing our aging nuclear forces. After decades of
    deferred modernization, replacement programs must proceed
    without further delay if we are to retain existing deterrent
    capabilities.
        DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
    approximately $230 billion to $290 billion over more than two
    decades. This includes the total cost of strategic delivery
    systems that have a nuclear-only mission and a portion of the
    B-21 bomber, which will have both conventional and nuclear
    roles. It also includes modernizing nuclear command and control
    and communication systems.
        During this coming period of increased spending for
    replacement programs, nuclear forces will remain a small
    fraction of the DOD budget with annual funding levels,
    including sustainment and operations, projected to range from
    approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending.
    The President's budget request for fiscal year 2018 fully funds
    DOD nuclear recapitalization programs and provides for nuclear
    force sustainment and operations. It also adds more than $3
    billion across the Future Years Defense Plan relative to the
    previous year's request to continue improving the health of the
    DOD nuclear enterprise. These investments demonstrate the
    President's commitment to nuclear deterrence and national
    defense.
        The critical mission of ensuring an effective nuclear
    deterrent is the highest priority mission of the Department of
    Defense and one it shares with the Department of Energy and the
    Congress, and we look forward to continuing to work together in
    faithfully and responsively fulfilling this mission. Thank you
    again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Soofer can be found in the
    Appendix on page 47.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Dr. Soofer.
        General Rand, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF GEN ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL
                             STRIKE COMMAND

        General Rand. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    allowing me to appear before you today to represent the men and
    women of Air Force Global Strike Command. I have testified
    multiple times for the subcommittee, and I am looking forward
    to speaking about the progress and the changes that have taken
    place in our command since our last meeting in July of 2016. I
    am happy to provide my inputs and answer any questions on the
    Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, Long-Range Standoff Weapon
    and the B-21 Raider, infrastructure requirements, nuclear
    command and control and communication systems, and other
    programs within the Air Force Global Strike.
        Fiscal constraints, while posing planning challenges, do
    not alter the national security landscape or the intent of
    competitors and adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring
    value of long-range strategic forces to our Nation.
        Mr. Chairman, and subcommittee members, I want to thank you
    for your dedication to our great Nation and the opportunity to
    appear before the committee to highlight the need for
    modernization and efforts across Air Force Global Strike
    Command. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Rand can be found in the
    Appendix on page 54.]
        Mr. Rogers. That was a record. Like 1 minute. Awesome.
        Admiral Benedict, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY STRATEGIC
                            SYSTEMS PROGRAM

        Admiral Benedict. Thank you, sir. Chairman Rogers, Ranking
    Member Cooper, distinguished members of the committee, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify here today representing the
    men and women of our Navy's Strategic Systems Programs [SSP].
        I would like to briefly address the long-term sustainment
    of the sea-based leg of the triad. While our current life-
    extension efforts will sustain the D5 [Trident missile] system
    until the 2040s, the Navy is already beginning to evaluate
    options to maintain a credible and effective strategic weapons
    system to the end of the Columbia-class service life in the
    2080s.
        At SSP, we are looking long term and across the spectrum,
    from our workforce and infrastructure to our industry partners
    and geographic footprint.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today about
    the sea-based leg of the triad. I am pleased to answer your
    questions at this time.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in
    the Appendix on page 69.]
        Mr. Rogers. He beat you by 10 seconds, General. I am sorry.
    They won't beat Cooper.
        Dr. Zangardi, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN A. ZANGARDI, ACTING CHIEF INFORMATION
                     OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Dr. Zangardi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
    this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today on
    the Department's nuclear command and control and communication
    systems and the risks, challenges, and opportunities within the
    system and related programs, policies, and priorities for
    modernization and recapitalization of the NC3 system. I am the
    Acting Department Chief Information Officer, and I am the
    senior civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense for
    information technology and the information enterprise that
    supports the DOD command and control, which includes
    responsibility for policy, oversight, guidance, and
    coordination for the Department's NC3 system.
        My written statement provides more detailed information on
    these matters, but I want to highlight to you some of the
    Department's activities in this critical, important mission
    area. My office's fiscal year 2018 Capabilities Planning
    Guidance states that we need to strengthen our national
    leadership command capabilities to meet changing threats and to
    help the President and national leadership ability to command
    U.S. forces. I believe this budget will help both these areas,
    as we identify threats and ways to mitigate them, which in turn
    helps our Nation's leaders maintain positive control of the
    U.S. nuclear armed forces.
        Specifically, the Council on the Oversight of the National
    Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems has
    proved to be a crucial element of the Department's strategy. We
    have been heavily focused on NC3 modernization and sustainment
    programs. We continue that focus but will operationalize the
    discussion based upon what our main customers, USSTRATCOM [U.S.
    Strategic Command], Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern
    Command], and the White House, require to accomplish their
    mission over the short and long term. Our objective is to
    ensure with high confidence that the systems provide the
    operational capability in time of crisis.
        Finally, communications is always the key. I believe the
    two-way communication between your professional staffers and
    our DOD teams have increased the capability and readiness of
    our NLCC [National Leadership Command Capabilities] enterprise.
    This communication's flow has provided clarity to the NC3
    mission area, its acquisition process, provided stability for
    NC3 program offices, and ensured warfighter capabilities. We
    are not done. We have more work to do, and the Department is
    actively pursuing modernization while operating within the
    confines of a constrained budget environment.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Zangardi can be found in the
    Appendix on page 79.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        Ms. Cange, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF SUSAN M. CANGE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
             ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Ms. Cange. Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
    Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be
    here today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
    Environmental Management and to discuss the important work we
    have recently accomplished, as well as what we plan to achieve
    under the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request.
        The total budget request for the EM [Environmental
    Management] program is $6.5 billion, and of that, $5.5 billion
    is for defense environmental cleanup activities.
        Before discussing this request, I would like to take a
    brief moment to update you on a recent incident at the Hanford
    site. As you know, there recently was a partial collapse of one
    tunnel near the PUREX [plutonium uranium extraction] facility
    that has been used since the 1950s to store contaminated
    equipment. Based on extensive monitoring, there was no release
    of radiological contamination from the incident, and no workers
    were injured. Workers have filled in the collapsed section with
    soil and placed a cover over the tunnel. We are working closely
    with the State of Washington for a more permanent solution. We
    take this event very seriously and are looking closely at
    lessons learned. Maintaining and improving aging infrastructure
    is a priority for EM, and this incident emphasizes the need to
    continue to focus on these efforts.
        With regard to recent accomplishments, we continue to
    demonstrate our ability to make significant progress through
    achievements like resuming shipments of transuranic waste to
    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP. Our fiscal year 2018
    budget request will enable us to build on this momentum. The
    request allows EM to continue to make progress in addressing
    radioactive tank waste, as well as continuing other important
    work, such as deactivation and decommissioning, soil and
    groundwater cleanup, and management and disposition of special
    nuclear materials, spent nuclear fuel, and transuranic and
    solid waste.
        Our request also includes funding to support the National
    Nuclear Security Administration by tackling some of their high-
    priority excess contaminated facilities in Oak Ridge and at the
    Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
        In particular, the 2018 request supports continued waste
    and placement at WIPP. At the Savannah River Site, the request
    supports continuing the tank waste mission through
    commissioning the startup of the Salt Waste Processing
    Facility. And at Hanford, the budget request supports continued
    site remediation along the river corridor, and it supports
    beginning to treat low-activity tank waste by 2023.
        In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
    Office of Environmental Management. We are committed to
    achieving our mission safely and successfully. Thank you, and I
    am pleased to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Cange can be found in the
    Appendix on page 83.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank all the witnesses, and I will recognize
    myself first for questions.
        General Klotz, you talked about the $1 billion increase
    that is in your budget, and while it looks like a lot--and it
    is a lot--there is a lot of deferred maintenance in NNSA. This
    is something that the Obama administration recognized early.
        And, without objection, I would like to introduce a letter
    to that effect from Secretary Moniz in December 2015 that
    clearly states an extra billion dollars a year is needed
    starting in fiscal year 2018.
        [The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on
    page 95.]
        Mr. Rogers. In that letter, Secretary Moniz says, quote:
    ``We estimate that an additional $5.2 over the fiscal year 2018
    through 2021 is needed. Failure to address these requirements
    in the near term will put the NNSA budget in an untenable
    position beginning in fiscal year 2018 and will provide a
    misleading marker to the next administration as to the resource
    needs of the nuclear security enterprise,'' close quote.
        General Klotz, is this billion dollar increase for NNSA's
    weapon activities just filling a gap, or is it an essential
    part of a long-term recovery from your current circumstance?
        General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question, Mr.
    Chairman, and I appreciate all the support that this committee
    has provided to dealing with the infrastructure issues that we
    have within NNSA. And I also appreciate the broad bipartisan
    support for that effort that you outlined in your opening
    statement. We are very grateful for the level of spending that
    has been proposed in the President's fiscal year 2018 budget.
    It will allow us to tackle some of our very important
    infrastructure recapitalization projects, such as the Uranium
    Processing Facility at Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which we
    expect a complete design this year and actually start
    construction next year. But we didn't get into the situation we
    face with aging and, in some cases, crumbling infrastructure
    overnight, and we are not going to get out of it in a day. So
    expect us to come forward next year and in subsequent years
    with requests to begin funding some other very important
    recapitalization efforts in the area of restoring our ability
    to produce plutonium pits and restoring our ability to process
    the lithium which we need for our nuclear weapons program and
    investments to replace our ability to fabricate trusted
    microsystems that we need to ensure that we have the radiation-
    hardened electronics for our nuclear forces.
        Mr. Rogers. It is fair to say, and my question is, is it
    fair to say that this is the first year of 5 years funding that
    was a program of record by the Obama administration as being
    essential that was presented to this Congress?
        General Klotz. I think it is fair to say that the new
    administration came in and took a look at our requirements and
    our needs with a fresh set of eyes, and that they agree that
    ensuring that we can complete our life-extension programs in
    order to deliver systems to the Air Force and the Navy on time,
    on schedule, and on budget is essential and also fixing our
    infrastructure so that we are flexible and responsive to the
    needs of our nuclear deterrent, both now and well into the
    future.
        Mr. Rogers. General Rand, the GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrent] and LRSO [Long-Range Standoff Weapon], TMRR
    [technology maturation risk reduction] contracts are supposed
    to be hitting their targets in August or September of this
    year. Is that accurate?
        General Rand. Yes, sir, that is accurate.
        Mr. Rogers. So you don't see a problem with that slipping?
        General Rand. No, sir. I have no indication that will be
    delayed.
        Mr. Rogers. There are many critics that believe LRSO is
    destabilizing. Is that your opinion?
        General Rand. No, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Can you tell us why?
        General Rand. Well, we have had a nuclear cruise missile
    since the 1960s. This is not a new capability. It is an
    improved capability over the ALCM that we currently have, the
    air-launched cruise missile. And when you have bombers and you
    take off, first of all, there is a visible presence. And as we
    fly today, the enemy, potential adversaries, don't know if we
    are conventional or nuclear, and I don't view that as
    destabilizing at all.
        Mr. Rogers. With that, I will yield to the ranking member
    for any questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        There are many good parts and many bad parts to the recent
    budget that was submitted to Congress. I thought one of the
    good parts was the termination of the MOX [Mixed Oxide]
    facility in South Carolina.
        General Klotz, would you like to reflect on that?
        General Klotz. Thank you, Representative Cooper. As I
    indicated, the new administration came in and looked at a lot
    of programs that are within the scope of the Department of
    Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration, and
    came to the conclusion that the MOX Fuel Fabrication Project in
    Savannah River, South Carolina, ought to be terminated. The
    conclusion was based on the fact that this is an
    extraordinarily expensive program: $5 billion have already been
    invested in it. We estimate it would take an additional $12
    billion to go, just to complete the project, and that doesn't
    even begin to address the costs, long-term costs, of operating
    the program.
        We have developed an alternative strategy for disposing of
    excess weapons-grade plutonium. It is called the dilute and
    dispose approach, which we briefed to this committee last year.
    It is a proven technology. We have already emplaced diluted
    plutonium at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project, the WIPP
    facility, in New Mexico. It is proven technology. The risks are
    lower. The costs are lower. And it gets plutonium out of the
    State of South Carolina far faster than the MOX project would.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General. I hope my colleagues will
    pay attention to the general's comments because this is an
    annual issue in the defense authorization bill. So I hope that
    we can come to a sensible resolution. This issue has hung fire
    for many, many years now.
        Ms. Cange, regarding Hanford and the tunnel collapse, it is
    my impression that, in the Trump budget, we are reducing the
    appropriation or the authorization for Hanford by over $100
    million. Is that right?
        Ms. Cange. Yes, sir. The fiscal year 2018 budget request
    for the Richland Operations Office is reduced from what the
    2017 omnibus amount was.
        Mr. Cooper. So you mentioned we are going to be cooperating
    with the State of Washington on fixing that tunnel problem,
    other than just putting dirt on it.
        Ms. Cange. Yes.
        Mr. Cooper. So what is likely to be the resolution?
        Ms. Cange. There is a number of alternatives that have been
    developed and are currently being evaluated. They range from
    potentially filling the tunnel with a fillable grout material
    to stabilize the tunnel and the contamination until such a time
    that a permanent remedy will be implemented to, at the upper
    end, constructing a structure over the tunnel. So the various
    alternatives are still under evaluation.
        Mr. Cooper. So we are really not talking about a fix. We
    are talking about covering up the problem or stabilizing it?
        Ms. Cange. We are talking about ensuring that we stabilize
    the tunnel and the material that is contained within the tunnel
    in a way that this type of incident will not occur again until
    a final remedy is reached between the parties.
        Mr. Cooper. But no one will be able to use the tunnel in
    the meantime.
        Ms. Cange. The tunnel has not been used since the early
    1950s.
        Mr. Cooper. Dr. Zangardi, many of the NC3 programs are
    delayed or over cost. In fact, when you look at the long list
    of those that are delayed and/or over cost, it is almost hard
    to find one that is working on time as expected. What are we
    going to do to improve the performance record here?
        Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
    Regarding NC3 programs, breaking the answer down into two
    parts: First, I run the national, the NLCC, and as part of the
    NLCC, we have taken a review of these programs and understand
    your concerns and recognize the delays to the program. The Air
    Force has been tasked by the chairs of the NLCC--AT&L
    [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] is one of the chairs,
    along with the Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--to
    review these programs, look for areas of causality--is there a
    common cause or root cause between all these problems--and
    develop solutions to get the programs back on track. The
    Department is very focused on correcting these issues.
        Additionally, we were in Omaha, where we had a group
    meeting of about 30 seniors to look at the NC3 enterprise
    several weeks ago. Tasks came out of that to begin looking at
    things we can do to improve the overall operational resilience
    of the systems that are currently out there. So we are looking
    at it in two ways: one, with the NLCC, figuring out how we can
    improve the programs' performance as they come on in the
    future; and, two, dealing with the systems that are out there
    that we must currently maintain.
        Mr. Cooper. So is your answer consistent with the number
    one priority that the nuclear mission has within the Department
    of Defense?
        Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir, it is. We have stated very clearly
    in meetings with my leadership that this is the highest
    priority. We have stated that very clearly in the NLCC Council
    meetings, and it was very clear when we met at Omaha that this
    is the highest priority. I am in lockstep agreement with
    General Hyten on these issues, sir.
        Mr. Cooper. So we are going to be performing better in the
    future, and I can hold you to that?
        Dr. Zangardi. Our objective is to perform better in the
    future, sir, and I will be glad to come back and answer any
    questions in the future if problems arise or to talk to you
    about performance.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, I think that sounds a little bit like
    accountability, but I am not sure that that is full
    accountability, the willingness to answer questions. Presumably
    you would be willing to answer questions anyway.
        Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. It is accountable. I am working
    these areas. I report directly to the DSD [Deputy Secretary of
    Defense] on these areas and keep him apprised of it. The
    accountability is very clear as it is defined in recent
    legislation in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
    about DOD's CIO having responsibilities in the NLCC area.
        Mr. Cooper. As you well know, without command and control,
    the weapons systems are largely useless.
        Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions
    until the closed session.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
    of Alabama, Mr. Byrne.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Benedict, I am concerned about the tight timeframe
    for the Columbia class, and I know you are too. In looking at
    it, I know that there is not too much wiggle room there, so I
    would like to ask you this question: If the Columbia-class
    program is delayed or slips by just one year, will there be a
    gap in the sea-based leg of the triad?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Today, the current program has
    basically one Columbia class entering service as one Ohio
    replacement platform departs service. So, if there was a slip,
    although we believe firmly that we can execute the program of
    record, there would be a gap, yes, sir.
        Mr. Byrne. I appreciate your saying it as clearly as you
    did because we need to hear that as we go forward into budgets,
    not just this year, but as you know, in the entire cycle that
    we have got here, we just don't have any room for not hitting
    the mark each year. Is that a fair statement?
        Admiral Benedict. That is a fair statement. We have already
    taken a 2-year slip in the Columbia class, which pushed us
    basically line on line with the Ohio's retirement. Yes, sir,
    that gap has been eroded.
        Mr. Byrne. Admiral, thank you for your candor. Mr.
    Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
    Mrs. Davis, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here as well.
        We are aware that, in this budget, there is a 5 percent
    decrease for defense nuclear nonproliferation. And I am just
    wondering how we justify that. I know you mentioned it was
    consistent, I believe, with the 2017 omnibus. But at the same
    time, we are requesting increasingly large sums of money for
    our own nuclear arsenal.
        Is there a disconnect here? And how do you translate this
    to the general public?
        General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question. My
    explanation will be a little lengthy perhaps because I think
    the misunderstanding has to do with how the budget
    appropriations accounts are laid out in the budget. Under the
    line that we call defense nuclear nonproliferation, I would
    bend them in three different ways. First of all, there are
    things that we do in the traditional nonproliferation mission
    space. Then there are dollars that we pay for our ability to
    counter nuclear terrorism and respond to, God forbid, a
    radiological or nuclear incident anywhere in the United States
    or abroad. And then there is also the construction project
    under the defense nuclear nonproliferation account, which
    includes the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility that Representative
    Cooper just asked about. So the bulk of the reduction in that
    appropriations account reflects the administration's proposal
    that we terminate the MOX project. So the total amount of money
    going to MOX goes from the fiscal year 2017 omnibus level of
    about 345, I believe, down to 279. So that accounts for a lot
    of it.
        And we have also seen an increase in our ability, the
    spending that we want to have for nuclear counterterrorism and
    incident response in order to recapitalize all the equipment,
    the radiation detectors, the secure wireless telephones, that
    our people would use with other domestic partners in responding
    to it.
        In the pure defense nuclear nonproliferation area, the
    funding is relatively flat. It would have been exactly flat if
    the Congress had appropriated what we requested in fiscal year
    2017, but you plussed us up a little bit a week or two before
    the budget went to press, and so there is a very, very slight
    decrease in the overall spending floor that we are proposing
    for defense nuclear nonproliferation. It is still a very robust
    program: $1.8 billion is a very robust program.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you for that. I appreciate it.
        And I think, Dr. Soofer, to you as well, would you agree
    that the nuclear deterrent is our number one priority?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, ma'am, I would. Deterring nuclear attack
    and assuring our allies has been a fundamental and enduring
    goal of the United States Government during the Cold War and
    over the last three Nuclear Posture Reviews.
        Mrs. Davis. Would it be a better, I guess, example or
    demonstration of that if we did, as the NNSA did, a long-term
    plan for nuclear weapons modernization? It is my understanding
    that the Department of Defense doesn't really submit a 25-year
    plan for its nuclear weapons plan. Is that accurate, and how do
    we, again, connect that?
        Dr. Soofer. Well, we currently have plans to modernize each
    leg of the nuclear triad, as well as the nuclear command and
    control system, and that modernization will take us out until
    about 2040. We provide Congress an annual report on funding
    over the next 10 years, the section 1043 report.
        But you are correct, Congresswoman, we don't do a 25- or
    30-year plan, but we have forces planned that will last over
    those years.
        Mrs. Davis. I think my time is up, but perhaps there is a
    way to better frame that so that there is a sense of more
    consistency. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
    Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here and your service.
        Dr. Soofer, if we studied the technical feasibility of
    mobile-capable ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles],
    along with the advantages and disadvantages of those possible
    weapons, would we learn possible useful information?
        Dr. Soofer. I will ask General Rand to comment on that, but
    I can assure you that, as we conduct a Nuclear Posture Review,
    everything is on the table, and that is something that we will
    have to look at.
        General Rand. Sir, we have looked at that with the GBSD,
    and it is our best judgment that we do not go to mobile. I can
    talk more in the closed session on the reasons why.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I am going to ask General
    Klotz and Dr. Soofer another question. I am not a fan of the
    New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty. For one thing, it
    is a relic of the Cold War. It did not address emerging powers
    like China, just ourselves and the former Soviet Union. When it
    was passed, we now know the Russians were cheating on the INF
    [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. And whether or not
    the Obama administration knew this, the Senators who voted on
    it did not know that fact. So I have been distressed because
    the Obama administration was quick to start the dismantling of
    our nuclear forces that were called for under the New START
    Treaty but slow to do the modernization that was promised as a
    hedge against losing capability.
        So, for either General Klotz or Dr. Soofer, please give an
    update on what we have left to do, what is remaining to be done
    to update our nuclear enterprise, which remains unfinished.
        General Klotz. Thank you, Congressman.
        On the NNSA, Department of Energy side, our priorities as
    far as sustaining and modernizing our nuclear enterprise, at
    the moment are focused on four major weapon systems that ride
    on either the Navy sea-launched ballistic missiles or the Air
    Force, two legs of the triad. So a level of effort, as I think
    I suggested in the opening comments, that we have not seen
    since the end of the Cold War.
        So we are also focused on making sure that, within the
    NNSA, within our nuclear enterprise, we have the scientific,
    technical, and engineering base, and the production
    infrastructure that is necessary to continue to sustain a
    moderate and effective nuclear arsenal, and also to be able to
    adapt or respond to any unexpected challenges, whether they are
    technical challenges or whether they are political military
    challenges. And our budget request for fiscal year 2018, I
    think, reflects the importance of making, continuing to make
    investments in this area.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let me follow up on that, and then we
    will get to Dr. Soofer. Even if we do everything in the budget
    that you recommend, and I hope we do, how much of a gap will we
    still have? I am just asking in general terms, not specific
    terms, for the public at large.
        General Klotz. I still think, as I was responding to
    Chairman Rogers' remarks, I still think we have underinvested
    in the nuclear enterprise since the end of the Cold War. It is
    almost as if, when the Berlin Wall went down and the Soviet
    Union collapsed, we all heaved a sigh of collective relief and
    said, ``Thank goodness, we don't have to worry about that
    anymore.'' And so, for the subsequent years, we didn't make the
    investments we needed. It was not a high priority, either in
    the services or, for that matter, in the Department of Energy.
        We have been trying to rectify that for a number of years
    now on both sides of the Potomac. But as I indicated, it took
    us a long time to get into this situation. It is going to take
    us a while to get out of it, but we are working it very, very
    hard. And with this particular budget, we make a huge down
    payment in some key critical areas that we need to continue
    sustaining our nuclear weapons stockpile and our
    infrastructure. There will be more to follow as we go through
    our process of deciding how best to recapitalize that. So I
    would expect, in next year's budget and in subsequent budgets,
    you will continue to see us place an emphasis on restoring our
    infrastructure.
        Mr. Lamborn. I know time is limited, Dr. Soofer.
        Dr. Soofer. I am sorry. Sir, your comments about the New
    START Treaty are well taken. In fact, when the Congress
    considered the New START Treaty, particularly the Senate, they
    realized that the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons, right,
    nonstrategic nuclear weapons, between Russia and China was
    something of great concern and that that needed to be
    addressed. And since then, Russia has actually increased the
    numbers of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and the INF Treaty
    violation is just one example.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. O'Rourke for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Benedict, I would like to get your comments and
    your thoughts on commonality between Navy and Air Force. My
    understanding is that you could have similar components for
    land-based deterrence and sub-launched deterrence. Do you feel
    that you have the level of cooperation with the Air Force
    necessary to do that? And, also, could you talk about just what
    that means in numbers in the budget? My understanding is we
    would, in a strategy like this one, likely spend a lot more
    upfront to save a lot more down the road. What are we looking
    at in terms of numbers? And any comments or thoughts you would
    like to share with us so that we are aware in the fiscal year
    2018 budget and also, as we look ahead to future budget years,
    the kinds of factors that we need to be looking at to make sure
    this is a success.
        General Benedict. Yes, thank you for the question.
        I will provide my answer, and then I would like to offer,
    if it is okay with you, General Rand's comments on the subject.
    Commonality is an initiative that I have been pushing for a
    number of years through the concurrence of, at that time,
    Admiral Haney, out at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], and
    the two RDAs [research, development, and acquisition], the two
    assistants in the Navy and the Air Force. The Navy and the
    United States Air Force were directed to do a commonality
    study. That took about a year. We looked at a spectrum from
    totally common missile, to piece parts, to the programs of
    record.
        Obviously, we came through a technical analysis that said
    total commonality had a number of major technical challenges,
    as well as infrastructure challenges, which made doing that in
    today's environment financially--and from a schedule
    standpoint--unfeasible. The concern is the budget, and we all
    understand the budget to recapitalize. That has been discussed
    here. So what we came up with, at a fairly deep technical
    analysis, is opportunities in all the major subsystems. We
    worked those together, and we pushed that back up through the
    leadership chain.
        In parallel with that, the United States Air Force was
    running its preps for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence
    program. Their acquisition strategy was to turn that over to
    industry. All that information was passed to industry in a
    bidder's library. And so the industry partners who bid on the
    GBSD had the opportunity to draw from that library and submit
    that as part of their proposals.
        Those proposals are actually in process of review by the
    United States Air Force, and General Rand can talk to that. I
    think, once we see the results of that down-select as part of
    the Air Force process, then we are prepared with the Air Force
    to reengage and share and continue down the path of
    commonality. But right now, we are--I will say we are paused as
    the Air Force goes through its acquisition down-select, which
    is appropriate.
        Mr. O'Rourke. And I will allow General Rand to answer the
    question as well. So, if I understand, you have decided that
    total commonality doesn't make sense for the reasons that you
    gave. There will be some level of partial commonality.
        What I would like to know from General Rand and from you,
    Admiral, is the year in which we can expect the answer to the
    question that you are trying to get to that is currently
    paused.
        Admiral Benedict. If I may, I will just finish and then
    turn it over to General Rand. In terms of dollar cost savings,
    sir, I, again, I am going to contend that, based on the Air
    Force decision of down-select to two from the three potential
    bidders today to the final solution, I think we need to get to
    that final solution working through this down-select before we
    will be able to provide you a definitive dollar savings in the
    year.
        Mr. O'Rourke. When can we expect to get there?
        General Rand. Yes, sir. We are right now hopefully going to
    have a down-select to two competitors this summer. That will
    give us more fidelity. We will run the TMRR, the Technology
    Maturation Risk Reduction process, for 3 years with those two
    competitors, and then we will further down-select to the source
    in 2021. So it will take a little while to get some of this
    fidelity.
        If I may, sir, first of all, I am the requirements guy. I
    am not the acquisition. I don't drive acquisition strategy. We
    have set the requirements, and we have delivered those
    requirements as we see for GBSD. However, I do think there is a
    misconception, as Terry was talking about, of what commonality
    is. A D5 is not going to work in the land-based missile. It is
    not going to fit in our launch facilities. It would take a
    major overhaul to do that.
        So when you define ``commonality,'' the term that we have
    used is ``smart commonality'' and where can we have synergy
    together. We are looking at repair facilities, manufacturing
    processes, test capabilities. All those could significantly
    reduce redundant and multiple kind of platforms. And those are
    where the savings will be. So we are very supportive of
    commonality, but we believe in open competition, and that is
    where the acquisition strategy is driving us right now.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Brooks. We just passed in the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee a resolution dealing with Venezuela and the economic
    circumstances that they face, and quite frankly, what Venezuela
    is going through is devastating. Seventy-five percent of their
    population has experienced a weight loss of at least 19 pounds
    over the past year because they cannot get enough calories and
    food to sustain their body weight. Medicines are now in short
    supply because the people can't afford them. The government
    can't afford them. You have got diseases that were once
    eradicated coming back, and the reason I bring up these topics
    is we have been warned by the Congressional Budget Office and
    by the Comptroller General of the United States of America and
    by the Government Accountability Office, that America's current
    financial path is unsustainable, which means that, in the
    future, we are risking a similar collapse. And you can imagine
    the adverse effect that would have on our military capabilities
    in particular if we go through the same thing that economic
    reality dictates is going to happen if we don't change our
    trajectory.
        That being the case, and I don't know if any of you all are
    in a position to answer this question, but what can you do in
    the areas that you oversee to increase efficiency so that
    taxpayers can get more bang for the buck, or in the
    alternative, what can you eliminate if the need arises, thereby
    saving money, that might reduce the dangers associated with our
    deficit? And if you can't do anything in the fields that you
    personally oversee, what do you think we should be doing on a
    larger scale to minimize our risk of a debilitating insolvency
    and bankruptcy that our financial gurus warn us is in our
    future?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, thank you for the question, and I
    understand your point--Trident has been a program, Strategic
    Systems Programs has been in existence for 61 years, and as we
    build the new Columbia class, the Navy's number one priority in
    shipbuilding, that boat will be in the water through 2084. As I
    have looked at my contribution to that program, the strategic
    weapons system, we recently in discussions with Lockheed
    endorsed their plan to move our workforce out of an extremely
    high-cost area to two other locations within the United States
    which----
        Mr. Brooks. I hope Alabama is on that list?
        Admiral Benedict. No, sir.
        Mr. Brooks. You might want to look at the cost of doing
    business in Alabama. Go ahead. I am sorry. Go ahead.
        Admiral Benedict. But, once we do this, and it is a very
    fast-paced move--we will move to Colorado and to Florida--the
    returned savings to the program is somewhere in excess of $55
    million a year. So we understand our contribution to the
    strategic deterrent, to the triad, to the Nation. We also
    understand our responsibility to do so in the most cost-
    effective manner possible. So that is I would say one of the
    solution spaces that we constantly review and invoke within the
    program, given the long-term future that we have in support of
    this mission.
        Mr. Brooks. Vice Admiral Benedict, that is wonderful news.
    Does anybody else have any suggestions as to what we can do to
    try to protect America's financial status?
        Dr. Zangardi. In the area that I work in the, sir, in the
    CIO [Chief Information Officer] area, I am specifically tasked
    to look at effectiveness and efficiency, and I work very
    closely with the DCMO [Deputy Chief Management Officer] for the
    Department of Defense. And we are looking at competition, more
    importantly in the IT [information technology] space, if you
    will, much of what we procure is commercial off-the-shelf
    technology, so increased use of commercial off-the-shelf
    technology where we don't engage in making changes to it. So
    imposing and using change management to constrain costs in the
    procurement of business systems is very important, I know not
    directly related to this, but the savings you generate from
    those systems can be used for other purposes. For example, we
    are looking at the Defense Travel System right now, and we are
    looking at moving to commercial applications. I am currently
    assessing pilots to put in place about 15,000 to 30,000 users
    to see how it goes and eventually to move to something that is
    commercial with very little change management.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Dr. Zangardi.
        We are running out of time. I have got 10 seconds. I would
    strongly encourage each of you to do whatever you can to try to
    put more efficiency into the Federal acquisition process,
    particularly the Federal acquisition regulatory process. In my
    experience and observation over the decades, it seems that the
    procurement process has gotten drawn out more and more at
    higher and higher cost, and there has to be a way to fix that.
    Thank you for your time and insight.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
    Norcross, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Klotz, I want to
    follow up on your comments on MOX. I was down there last year,
    and some of the numbers that you were quoting are in direct
    contradiction to what we saw and what we heard in terms of the
    percentage finished of the plan. Literally, a few weeks ago, we
    allocated $345 million, and you said, in year 2018, we had $279
    million. What is that being used for if you are canceling the
    project?
        General Klotz. The actual amount would be $270 for the MOX
    Fuel Fabrication Facility itself. There is another $9 million
    that is associated with other aspects of our plutonium
    disposition mission. In any large government contract,
    particularly one, a large construction effort that has been
    underway for some years in South Carolina, there are
    termination costs. There are a series of steps we have to take
    dictated by statute and dictated by our own regulations to wind
    down a contract. So, if the Congress agrees with the
    administration's proposal to terminate MOX, then we will come
    back to you with a specific plan as to what we have to do to
    meet those regulatory requirements and at the same time how we
    will proceed with the facility that has been constructed thus
    far.
        Mr. Norcross. So a half a billion dollars for termination
    fees?
        General Klotz. I would be happy to come back to you and lay
    out what the costs are associated with termination.
        Mr. Norcross. So, a year ago, they were almost 70 percent
    complete. I assume they got further along?
        General Klotz. Well, we don't, quite frankly, and with
    respect to those who calculate a higher percentage, the
    standard practice for calculating percent complete, at least
    within the Federal Government, is costs already expensed and
    costs to go. So, if you accept our estimates--or you don't have
    to take my estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the
    total project cost is $17 billion. We have already spent, as I
    indicated, $5 billion. That would leave $12 billion to go. So 5
    divided by 12 is less than 50 percent. So our assumption of the
    way in which we calculate percent complete is different than
    others have calculated it.
        Mr. Norcross. Certainly, then, we have to get to the bottom
    of that because we are talking some considerable money as
    compared to what we just heard about a few minutes ago.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    South Carolina, Chairman Wilson, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you Chairman Mike Rogers for your leadership of
    the subcommittee with the bipartisan input of Ranking Member
    Jim Cooper. Again, thank each of you for your service. It is
    extraordinary on behalf of our Nation.
        And, of course, General Klotz, I am keenly interested in
    the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. Last year, Congress
    thoughtfully, in a bipartisan manner, rejected the prior
    administration's shortsighted proposal to terminate the Mixed
    Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, the MOX Program, which is 70
    percent completed in the area of South Carolina and Georgia.
    The Congress had many concerns with alternatives, including the
    legal, regulatory, and political issues with storing the
    entirety of 34 metric tons; the fact that it does not comply
    with the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement, PMDA, with
    the Russian Federation; and the fact that Congress does still
    not have a complete valid cost estimate of the MOX program
    because the Department of Energy never completed a full
    rebaseline. Ultimately, the authorizers and appropriators both
    agreed to continue construction of MOX as the best path forward
    and included legislative text requiring it in the fiscal year
    2015, 2016, and 2017. And the question: Has an industrial-scale
    dilute and dispose method with weapons-grade plutonium ever
    been done before? If not, what is the--if not processed, what
    is the timeline for removal from South Carolina and Georgia?
        General Klotz. Thank you very much, Congressman Wilson. In
    terms of what we know about dilute and dispose, we already have
    5 metric tons of diluted plutonium largely from the Rocky Flats
    facility that used to be in Colorado in WIPP as we speak. We
    have also diluted plutonium that existed at South Carolina--was
    in South Carolina and have shipped that to WIPP. In fact, we
    have done three shipments already this year since. As was
    alluded to earlier, WIPP has reopened for operations.
        I went down to WIPP about a month or so ago and personally
    toured the site and was briefed on what they believe the
    capacity of WIPP is to hold not only nonweapons-grade plutonium
    but all 34 metric tons, and I came away from that quite
    convinced that 34 metric tons can fit within the WIPP facility.
        So the other, I think, very, very interesting point about
    this whole process is it allows us to get plutonium out of the
    State of South Carolina far sooner than would be the case with
    MOX.
        Mr. Wilson. Let's get to that now, because WIPP is not
    industrial grade now, but you are describing something
    industrial grade.
        And what is the timeline? And, specifically, how many years
    are you talking about, because my constituents are very
    concerned about it being a dump and a disposal area, which puts
    our region at risk.
        General Klotz. Well, I don't understand the term
    industrial----
        Mr. Wilson. Capability to truly process a large amount.
        General Klotz. Yes. We have the ability to--what we would
    have to do is--like I said, we are already processing plutonium
    at Savannah River. What it would require would be adding----
        Mr. Wilson. Back again, because time is running out. What
    is the timeline? My constituents and the people of South
    Carolina and Georgia would like to know.
        General Klotz. Let me give you the specific timeline. It is
    not showing up on what I have right here sitting in front of
    me. But I will tell you it is far faster than anything that can
    be done with MOX.
        Mr. Wilson. And that timeline would be? Because the
    reprocessing is going, but what you are describing could take
    years.
        General Klotz. Okay. Here is our estimate: If we went down
    what we call the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project, we
    expect that we would complete the work that we need to do that
    by 2027 and plutonium disposition would begin in 2028 and end
    in 2049. If we go down the MOX route, we would not complete the
    project until 2048. That is, my rough calculation, 20-some odd
    years later, and we would not begin disposing of plutonium
    through a MOX facility until the year 2050 to 2051, assuming
    that we get all the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Council] licensing
    completed, and plutonium disposition would not end until 2065,
    which is, again, 15, 20 years after what we would be able to do
    with the surplus--the approach we would like.
        The main difference, however, is the total project cost for
    MOX we estimate to be $17 billion. The total project cost for
    the surplus disposal that we have suggested, right now we have
    a range of $200 million to $500 million to do that. And if
    Congress gives us the authority----
        Mr. Wilson. My time is up. And please look at the--we want
    it removed by reprocessing the weapons-grade plutonium. What
    you are describing is, I consider, long term. But thank you
    very much.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms.
    Hanabusa, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am going to direct
    this question to Dr. Soofer because of the fact that your
    testimony referenced it. We are in the process of doing the
    Nuclear Posture Review--or you are in the process of doing
    that. And I think it is a review that is usually done every 5
    to 10 years. I think the last one was in 2010.
        My question is really one more practicality. We have heard
    people take positions on the triad and what we should be
    funding. I think even the Secretary of Defense at one time had
    taken a position questioning whether or not the triad is the
    way to go.
        We have someone who we have all listened to in terms of his
    review of the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], and that, of
    course, is former Secretary of Defense William Perry at
    Stanford, who has said, basically, he doesn't like the triad
    system and questions the whole use of long-range missiles, for
    example. And I think, at one point, he even questioned whether
    we should have the concentration of ICBMs as well.
        So, given that and given the fact that this review isn't
    going to be done until the end of the year--and I understand
    that we should continue along the way--decisions that are to be
    made on major expenditures, such as the new bomber, B-21s, and
    all the different types of what is expected to do the nuclear
    defense posture for this country, how do you justify that at
    this particular point in time where we have got people whose
    opinions some of us value, I think most of us at least will pay
    attention to--how can you come before us and take a position
    when we know that there is at least enough of a concern that
    the posture has been required to be reviewed?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think there is a
    sense we--we feel there is a sense of urgency to get on with
    the program of record, because the current systems will age out
    within the next 10 to 15 years. And if we do not begin or
    continue the process of acquiring new systems, there will be a
    gap in deterrence capability.
        The previous administration has laid in a nuclear
    modernization program that, again, appears to be consistent
    with general principles of nuclear deterrence. We will examine
    these principles and determine in light of the new strategic
    environment whether they still obtain.
        But there are some basic fundamentals, such as maintaining
    a nuclear triad, that the Secretary of Defense has already
    endorsed. And so, quite frankly, it is just a sense of urgency
    that, if we do not continue the programs this year, there may
    be a gap if it is ultimately determined that the systems are
    needed.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Well, I understand that the Secretary may
    have said he is endorsing it now, but there was a point in
    time, maybe it was before he became Defense Secretary, that he
    called into question the premise of the triad as well. And the
    fact that the NPR has basically now been mandated is
    problematic.
        I understand--the urgency that we speak about here,
    theoretically, I understand all of that, however, we have never
    had such an emphasis, that I recall, where most of the
    briefings that we have had in a very short period of time has
    concentrated on our nuclear position. And I understand it is
    probably triggered by Russia, China, and North Korea. However,
    the concept of developing a systematic posture and to review
    that posture seems to be one that we need to be very certain
    about that threat and how we best address that threat. And that
    is why, for the expenditures that we are being asked to
    authorize, how do we know that this is the best way for us to
    proceed?
        And I am out of time. So we may have to take----
        General Rand. If I may, ma'am, I need to comment on one
    comment that you made about the B-21. We can have the
    discussion about the nuclear posture and the triad, but the B-
    21 will be a dual-capable airplane. There is a requirement for
    long-range strike conventionally, and that will be, obviously,
    what that airplane would be doing. Any delay to that program
    would be devastating. Our newest bomber is 25 years old.
        Ms. Hanabusa. I understand that, General. The question is
    more a matter of number, whether it is 100 or 200. We have
    heard two numbers. That is a huge amount of numbers, but
    shouldn't we know whether----
        General Rand. The requirement right now is for 100 B-21s.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Chair, I yield back. I think that votes
    were called.
        Mr. Rogers. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr.
    DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.
        Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the Chair. This will be a question
    for Ms. Cange and General Klotz.
        During our Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
    hearing in March on NNSA's deferred maintenance and
    infrastructure challenges, we briefly discussed how certain OMB
    directives have negatively impacted NNSA's ability to get after
    its decaying infrastructure. In particular, OMB Management
    Procedures Memorandum 2015-01 was identified as a huge problem,
    because it, perhaps unintentionally, slows NNSA's ability to
    tear down old buildings and build new ones. General Klotz can
    you give us your personal views on that OMB memorandum and
    whether it impedes NNSA from making smart decisions and moving
    efficiently to deal with infrastructure problems?
        General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question. I
    think the intent behind the directive, which is, as you build
    new buildings, you ought to dispose of excess facilities, is a
    good one. In the--when I was in the Air Force, the rule used to
    be: Build a building, tear a building down. Otherwise, you see
    this behavior where people start to move into those buildings
    which you have moved out of, and you still have an
    infrastructure issue. However, I think the notion that you have
    to do this simultaneously is more constraining than it needs to
    be. I hear anecdotally, I haven't had a chance to get the
    empirical data on that, that maybe some site directors would
    choose to wait to build a new building until they knew they had
    enough money that they could dispose of an older building.
        So I would like to see--it is good intent, but I would like
    to see a little more flexibility in terms of how we actually
    balance new construction with demolition and disposition of old
    buildings.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
        And, General, I understand your budget request would put an
    additional $195 million above the fiscal year 2017 appropriated
    level toward deferred maintenance and repair needs at NNSA and
    that you, Ms. Cange, have a line in your budget for $225
    million to deal with four excess facilities at Y-12 and
    Lawrence Livermore.
        This is good news, but I need to ask you, General Klotz,
    could you execute additional money on deferred maintenance and
    repair needs if it was provided by Congress?
        General Klotz. The backlog of deferred maintenance is so
    large that what we have asked is not going to buy all of it
    down.
        So it is a question of, you know, timing in terms of which
    the money comes. We do have--there are some capacity limits in
    terms of local craft and companies to be able to do that. The
    other challenge we have at NNSA, and this is where Ms. Cange
    could--has to help us out is many of the facilities you have,
    particularly facilities in Y-12 and our other laboratories are
    contaminated with, you know, either radioactive materials or
    other contaminants, and we have to go through the process of
    decontaminating those facilities first before we can do the
    standard, you know, demolition of that.
        So there are some significant costs associated with some of
    our--some of our facilities.
        Dr. DesJarlais. So the $3.7 billion backlog isn't going to
    get fixed without additional funding in all likelihood?
        General Klotz. Well, thanks to this committee's strong
    support, we stabilized the level of deferred maintenance we had
    in fiscal year 2016. With 2017, we will see it--we will see it
    decrease slightly, modestly. And if the Congress supports the
    fiscal year 2018 budget, we will continue that downward slope.
        I am might add, again, through the support of Congress, one
    of the good news things that came out of the passage of the
    omnibus, fiscal year 2017 omnibus bill, is we will be able to
    proceed with the demolition of the Bannister Federal Complex in
    Kansas City, which is a 5-million-square-foot facility, World
    War II facility, of which we used about 3 million. That is
    now--with the funding provided by the Congress, we will now be
    able to go ahead and do that and also save the Federal
    Government a considerable amount of money in how we do that by
    allowing a private developer to do the demolition and the
    remediation of the property.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Ms. Cange, do you expect to continue
    into fiscal year 2019 and beyond the excess facilities line
    with environmental management program? I think it is a great
    idea, and I would encourage you to continue it, but is that
    your intent?
        Ms. Cange. Yes, we certainly hope to be able to continue to
    address excess contaminated facilities across the DOE complex.
    I will mention that the 2016 report to Congress that the
    Department submitted on excess contaminated facilities
    estimates approximately $32 billion to address all of the
    excess facilities across the Department's entire complex.
        Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. We have about 9 minutes left to vote. So
    I am going to go ahead and try to get Mr. Garamendi in before
    we head over to the Chamber, and then we will come back after
    votes for the closed session.
        The gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Obviously, all of this is extremely important. I want to go
    to follow up on Mr. O'Rourke's questions about commonality,
    and, specifically, Admiral Benedict, you have a couple of new
    bombs that are being reworked, the W-88 and W-76. Are those--my
    understanding is those are supposed to last some 20 years or
    more into the future? Is that correct?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, our planning factors are--the life-
    extension programs are 30-year extensions to the existing life
    of the weapon itself.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So some 30 years. Do you need the
    interoperable weapon?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, at the direction of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, the Navy, the Air Force, and NNSA were
    directed to conduct a study. That study was scheduled to
    commence in 2020, and we will do both the technical analysis of
    the IW [interoperable warhead] as well as the cost analysis.
    That information will be presented approximately late 2021,
    2022 to the Nuclear Weapons Council for review, concurrence,
    and approval, if they so deem so.
        Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry. Late 2021, 2022, what is that?
        Admiral Benedict. 2020, 2021.
        Mr. Garamendi. For the next 3 years, we will continue to
    spend money on the interoperable----
        Admiral Benedict. We will spend money to do the technical
    analysis between the services and NNSA----
        Mr. Garamendi. If I--excuse me.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. Back and forth here and I hope in a way that
    it is not--so if you have a--two weapons that currently work on
    the missiles and your missiles are good for 30 years and your
    weapons are good for 30 years, do you ever need an
    interoperable for those 30 years?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, I would say--and then I will defer
    to General Klotz here for one second--the Navy does not have a
    requirement for a third reentry body. However, as we look at
    the complex in total, this issue of IW is larger than just a
    single Navy issue. It involves Navy, Air Force, and the NNSA.
        Mr. Garamendi. So where would the Air Force use this new
    interoperable?
        General Klotz. If I could, Congressman Garamendi, the--
    first of all, there is no money in the NNSA account for working
    on the interoperable.
        Mr. Garamendi. There is some money somewhere.
        General Klotz. Well, not explicitly for interoperable in
    ours. We--recall, a few years ago, we deferred the need date
    for that until 2030. So our expectation as we have laid it out
    is we will begin the very serious work on that in 2020 because
    it is about a 10-year process.
        And the reason why we have been proceeding down the path of
    having an interoperable is there is an Air Force system that
    will require a life-extension program in about the 2030
    timeframe. That is the W78 warhead.
        So there was--the thinking when this strategy was developed
    was, well, if we are going to do a life-extension program to an
    Air Force system, wouldn't it make sense in terms of long-term
    cost and efficiency if, as you did that particular warhead, you
    designed it in such a way that it could be used by both the Air
    Force and the Navy and subsequent interoperable warheads so
    that you had some commonality beyond back and forth between the
    two services as you got in the 2030, 2040, 2050 timeframe.
        Mr. Garamendi. And your 50 to 80 new pits--your requirement
    for 50 to 80 new pits, plutonium pits, is it based on this
    interoperable scheme that is somewhere out there in the future?
        Mr. Klotz. It is based on a number of factors. One the
    factors is requirements for, you know, the next series of life-
    extension programs, which would include the interoperable
    warhead----
        Mr. Garamendi. We don't have too much time to get into
    this, but I really want to get into this in great detail,
    because it seems to me that we are about to spend billions of
    dollars to do something that ultimately isn't going to happen.
    This interoperable warhead, I'm looking over here at the Navy
    and they're saying, not for 30 years. And I haven't had a
    chance to get to General Rand about this, but I would like know
    exactly when his 30-year period is going to begin.
        And I am out of time, and we have votes, and thank you so
    very, very much.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        Just in closing, before we recess to meet after votes in
    the SCIF [secure compartmented information facility] for the
    closed session, I want to put on the record, General Rand, in
    2006, the Air Force identified the UH-1N helicopter is not
    effective for the ICBM security mission. Last year, Secretary
    James recommended an acquisition strategy that would have sole-
    sourced these helicopters. Secretary Carter then shelved that
    strategy and directed full and open competition.
        General Rand, can you commit that you will make it clear to
    the entire Air Force that anyone who attempts to interfere with
    the acquisition of this capability will have absolute hell to
    pay?
        General Rand. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir. We are in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                  May 25, 2017

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                  May 25, 2017

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

        Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, would you please describe to us why
    Secretary Moniz tasked the three NNSA laboratory directors to carry out
    the study titled ``U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the Coming Decades''?
    What did it examine and why? What were some of its high-level
    conclusions?
        General Klotz. Secretary Moniz tasked this study as part of the
    Department's mission to ensure an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent
    through the application of science, technology and engineering. The
    Department of Energy (DOE) strives to ensure U.S. nuclear capabilities
    meet the challenges of known and future geopolitical and technology
    trends.
        The 2014 tri-laboratory study 1) examined known and projected
    future characteristics of global nuclear stability; 2) provided
    perspective on the evolution of U.S. strategic deterrence; 3) assessed
    current policy and programs; 4) examined potential future geopolitical
    and technological trends and scenarios that test the robustness of U.S.
    capabilities; and 5) outlined preliminary recommendations and areas
    meriting further study. The study examined these topics to challenge
    U.S. thinking about DOE programs of record and inform future decisions
    to reduce the risk of technological or geopolitical surprise.
        The three national laboratories agreed that the United States
    needed to take action to ensure that U.S. nuclear capabilities can meet
    the challenges of emerging geopolitical and technological trends. A key
    recommendation was to conduct and periodically update a comprehensive
    assessment of the current and emerging threats to the effectiveness of
    the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including the review of options to address
    identified gaps.
        Mr. Rogers. Please tell us about the Joint Strategic Deterrence
    Review (JSDR) process that was created in December 2016? Why was it
    created and what does it do? How does the Trump administration view the
    JSDR process? How is it incorporating this type of process into the
    Nuclear Posture Review?
        General Klotz. The Joint Strategic Deterrence Review (JSDR) was a
    recommendation that came out of the deterrence study that was tasked to
    the national laboratory directors. The Deputy Secretaries of Energy and
    Defense signed a memorandum of agreement on JSDR to strengthen
    Department of Defense, Department of Energy and the Intelligence
    Community cooperation in analyzing potential threats to the United
    States' ability to maintain strategic deterrence as well as potential
    options for mitigating those threats.
        Each new Administration since the mid-1990s has conducted a Nuclear
    Posture Review. This Administration has followed suit and has directed
    an NPR to be conducted to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern,
    robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter
    21st-century threats and reassure our allies. NNSA will contribute to
    DOD's review, which will account for a broad range of views.
        All NPR deliberations are under executive privilege and not
    releasable. The NPR will be in full accord with the President's
    direction given in the National Security Presidential Memorandum on
    Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces from January 27, 2017.
        Mr. Rogers. The bad idea fairy seems to visiting some folks in this
    town and proposing that we should defer spending on the LRSO and GBSD
    programs until the Nuclear Posture Review is complete. Does the
    administration support this idea?
        General Klotz. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget Request for
    NNSA supports the program of record for W80-4 Life Extension Program,
    which is intended for integration into the Air Force's Long Range
    Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile, as determined by the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. Both the LRSO and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
    are Air Force programs of record.
        Mr. Rogers. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
    request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
    is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
    more difference? Does the FY18 budget request in these areas deviate
    from the Obama administration's plans in any very substantial way?
        General Klotz. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 President's Budget Request
    continues the program of record detailed in the FY 2017 Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan. NNSA's Weapons Activities budget
    includes planned increases to the program of record as well as
    increases to adapt to emerging changes, such as updates to the baseline
    costs for the B61-12 Life Extension Program and the W88 Alteration 370.
        Mr. Rogers. Please tell us about the Joint Strategic Deterrence
    Review (JSDR) process that was created in December 2016? Why was it
    created and what does it do? How does the Trump administration view the
    JSDR process? How is it incorporating this type of process into the
    Nuclear Posture Review?
        Dr. Soofer. The JSDR is a joint project between the Department of
    Defense and the Department of Energy to ensure our nuclear programs
    remain informed by the future threat environment. Because we will be
    fielding recapitalized forces decades from now, it is important we
    anticipate the future operational environment so these forces can
    perform their intended functions. The Nuclear Posture Review is
    similarly focused on both the current and future threat environments,
    and is informed by the work of the JSDR.
        Mr. Rogers. The bad idea fairy seems to visiting some folks in this
    town and proposing that we should defer spending on the LRSO and GBSD
    programs until the Nuclear Posture Review is complete. Does the
    administration support this idea?
        Dr. Soofer. No, the Administration does not support any delay to
    these programs and requested full funding for these and all other
    nuclear recapitalization programs. Further delays in recapitalizing our
    nuclear forces could create critical capability gaps and undermine our
    ability to meet deterrence requirements as our current forces age out
    of service. At this critical juncture in the LRSO and GBSD programs,
    deferring or reducing funding would lead to significant delays and
    effectively prejudge the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.
    Therefore, we urge Congress to continue its ongoing support for the
    current recapitalization programs as we conduct the Nuclear Posture
    Review. Should the Administration conclude that changes to these
    programs are required, we will work with Congress to adjust
    accordingly.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the consequences if we were to defer spending
    on LRSO and GBSD until we have a completed Nuclear Posture Review in
    hand? How would that impact the programs and the Air Force's ability to
    meet STRATCOM's requirements and schedules?
        Dr. Soofer. There is virtually no schedule margin between legacy
    system age out and the deployment of modernized replacement systems. As
    a result, delays in recapitalizing our nuclear forces could create
    critical capability gaps and undermine our ability to meet deterrence
    requirements as our current forces age out of service. At this critical
    juncture in the LRSO and GBSD programs, deferring or reducing funding
    would lead to significant delays and effectively prejudge the outcome
    of the Nuclear Posture Review. Therefore, it is essential that we
    continue to support the current program of record in order to ensure
    the U.S. maintains a credible, effective nuclear deterrent into the
    future.
        Mr. Rogers. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
    request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
    is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
    more difference? Does the FY18 budget request in these areas deviate
    from the Obama administration's plans in any very substantial way?
        Dr. Soofer. The fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget for DOD nuclear forces
    and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities reflects more continuity than
    change. The FY 2018 budget supports, as did the FY 2017 budget,
    continued recapitalization of each element of our nuclear forces and
    infrastructure.
        Mr. Rogers. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of
    delaying or cancelling key nuclear modernization programs--such as the
    GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range stand off
    (LRSO) cruise missile, or the new Columbia-class submarine? How firm is
    the need for the current schedules for these programs--is there room
    for slipping their schedules? Do you believe these programs are
    executable on-schedule and on-budget, if they are funded on-time by
    Congress?
        Dr. Soofer. There is virtually no schedule margin between legacy
    system age out and the deployment of modernized replacement systems. As
    a result, further delays in recapitalizing our nuclear forces would
    create critical capability gaps and undermine our ability to meet
    deterrence requirements as our current forces age out of service.
    Therefore, it is essential that we continue to support the current
    program of record in order to ensure the U.S. maintains a credible,
    effective nuclear deterrent into the future. We appreciate Congress'
    continued support for these vital development efforts, and we are
    making every effort to ensure these programs deliver on-time and within
    budget. However, we need everyone to understand that our choice is not
    whether or not to modernize our forces now or later. Rather, the choice
    is between modernizing those forces or watching an unacceptable
    degradation in our ability to field a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear force--an outcome that incurs significant risk in our ability
    to deter strategic threats to the nation.
        Mr. Rogers. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
    operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
    over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
    with this estimate? CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly
    6 percent of the total defense budget during this time period. Do you
    believe this is an appropriate amount to be spending on nuclear
    deterrence?
        Dr. Soofer. The DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
    approximately $230-$290 billion from FY 2018 to FY 2040, in constant FY
    2018 dollars. This projection includes the total cost of nuclear-only
    systems, and a portion of the cost of the B-21 bomber, which will have
    both conventional and nuclear roles. The DOD projection for total
    recapitalization cost also includes modernizing nuclear command,
    control, and communications systems. I would defer to my Department of
    Energy colleagues for specifics relating to estimated NNSA costs. U.S.
    nuclear weapons deter the only existential threat to the Nation. The
    nuclear enterprise is affordable if nuclear deterrence is prioritized
    appropriately. During the coming period of increased recapitalization
    spending, nuclear forces will remain a small fraction of the DOD
    budget--with annual funding levels that are projected to range from
    approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending. This
    includes spending to sustain and operate the existing force--currently
    about $12-14 billion per year--as well as recapitalization spending to
    develop and field modernized replacements.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you think that NATO allies should be asked to share
    part of the costs of the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP)? Would having
    the NATO allies pay for part of the LEP be contrary to the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty?
        Dr. Soofer. Forward-deployment of B61s is a key aspect of our
    commitment to extend deterrence to our NATO Allies in Europe. NATO has
    repeatedly affirmed the role of nuclear deterrence as a core element of
    its defense strategy and posture, including in the July 2016 Warsaw
    Summit Communique. It is not in the best interest of the United States
    to ask NATO Allies to provide direct funding of the B61 LEP. The B61
    LEP is a key element of our strategic Triad as well as our extended
    deterrence posture around the world, and is not solely focused on the
    deterrence and defense of NATO. Further, allied funding would almost
    certainly create a perception problem regarding U.S. and allied
    compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
        Mr. Rogers. We know there are military requirements on the books
    that the U.S. cannot meet because of our adherence to the INF Treaty--
    the treaty that Russia continues to violate. General Selva and others
    have said that they see no indication the Russians will ever return to
    compliance with this treaty. How does the Trump administration view
    this violation and Russia's other arms control violations? What
    response options are being pursued? When will decisions be made on this
    and plans announced?
        Dr. Soofer. Currently we are able to satisfy both our military
    requirements as well as remain in compliance with the Intermediate-
    range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Although there is a military
    requirement to prosecute targets at ranges covered by the INF Treaty,
    those systems do not have to be ground-based. However, ground-based
    systems would increase both the operational flexibility and the scale
    of our intermediate-range strike capabilities. The Administration is
    conducting an extensive review of Russia's ongoing INF Treaty violation
    in order to assess the security implications to the United States and
    its allies and partners. The status quo is untenable and the
    Administration is considering potential response options that could
    address the threat and also remind Russia why it agreed to the INF
    Treaty in the first place. The United States must consider all
    possibilities in developing our response including a world without the
    INF Treaty.
        Mr. Rogers. A United Nations disarmament panel recently released
    its first draft of a proposed global treaty to ban nuclear weapons. The
    U.S. and other nuclear powers have all boycotted these negotiations.
    What is the Trump administration's position on this treaty? Are these
    negotiations damaging the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? How would
    this treaty affect our ability to uphold our extended deterrence and
    assurance commitments? How might it affect our ability to forward-
    deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable aircraft? What would be the
    U.S. view towards any of our allies that might support or sign onto
    this treaty?
        Dr. Soofer. The Administration strongly opposes a nuclear weapons
    ban treaty, which completely disregards the realities of the
    international security environment that make nuclear deterrence
    necessary. The proposed ban treaty would not result in the elimination
    of a single nuclear weapon and would not enhance any country's
    security. Instead, such a treaty risks creating an unbridgeable divide
    among the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Parties, further
    polarizing the political environment. Although the draft treaty clearly
    attempts to undermine the legitimacy of extended deterrence--our
    extended deterrence partners have been clear that they will not support
    a treaty that is in conflict with NATO policy, with our alliance
    commitments, or with the NPT.
        Mr. Rogers. The last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was published 7
    years ago. The world was very different in 2010, particularly when
    talking about Russia. Today, it's hard to see Russia as the partner and
    friend like the 2010 NPR envisioned. Would you please provide us your
    on what has changed in the world since the 2010 NPR? How will this
    affect the NPR and its deliberations?
        Dr. Soofer. The Nuclear Posture Review's analytical process will
    include a full assessment of the strategic environment, including what
    has changed since the 2010 NPR. Recent years have indeed brought
    changes to the security environment that U.S. nuclear policy must
    address. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions against its neighbors
    and threatened the United States and its NATO Allies--including nuclear
    threats. It has elevated strategies of nuclear first use in its
    strategic thinking and military exercises, is modernizing a large and
    diverse non-strategic nuclear weapons force, and is violating the
    landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. While Russia
    presents significant set of challenges, it is only one element of an
    increasingly complex global strategic environment. The President
    directed the Department of Defense to review U.S. nuclear posture and
    ensure that our nuclear forces are modern, robust, flexible, resilient,
    ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and
    reassure our allies and partners.
        Mr. Rogers. How important are dual-capable aircraft to the U.S.
    nuclear posture? Do they constitute a critical and necessary component
    of our nuclear deterrence and assurance?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes. U.S. dual-capable aircraft are a critical and
    necessary component of U.S. nuclear posture. The United States must
    continue to maintain the capability to forward-deploy dual-capable
    aircraft as part of its extended nuclear deterrence posture.
        Mr. Rogers. What role do dual-capable aircraft serve in the
    deterrence posture of the NATO alliance? What are the consequences that
    would result from a delay in the initial operating capability of dual-
    capable F-35 to our NATO allies?
        Dr. Soofer. The Department of Defense projects no significant delay
    in the delivery of dual-capable F-35A fighters to our NATO Allies. The
    F-35 program maintains schedule margins to account for various risks of
    short-term delay, and those margins remain adequate today. A longer-
    term delay could impact the ability of Allies to support the dual-
    capable aircraft (DCA) mission. Therefore, it is essential that the
    program remain fully-funded and mitigate schedule risk.
        Mr. Rogers. What role do dual-capable aircraft serve in our
    deterrence and assurance posture on the Korean Peninsula?
        Dr. Soofer. The United States maintains the capability to forward-
    deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft in
    support of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. Allies and
    partners. Deployment of DCA signals U.S. resolve and commitment, and
    provides a forceful reminder to an adversary that might be
    contemplating aggression. The United States remains firmly committed to
    the defense of the Republic of Korea and to strengthening extended
    deterrence using all elements of national power, including the U.S.
    nuclear umbrella, as well as conventional strike and missile defense
    capabilities.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the consequences if we were to defer spending
    on LRSO and GBSD until we have a completed Nuclear Posture Review in
    hand? How would that impact the programs and the Air Force's ability to
    meet STRATCOM's requirements and schedules?
        General Rand. Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the
    nation's replacement program for the aging Minuteman III (MMIII) weapon
    system. The GBSD program is currently funded through the Technology
    Maturation Risk Reduction (TMRR) (concept design) phase of the program
    (2020). We expect the TMRR contract to be awarded in the 4th Quarter
    Fiscal Year 2017. Public sources identify the Nuclear Posture Review as
    being completed by the end of the year 2017. If spending was delayed
    beyond the end of TMRR in 2020, there will be a significant sustainment
    cost to support continued MMIII operations through 2035 and beyond.
    MMIII reliability and effectiveness will continue to degrade and it
    will be difficult to maintain a plausible deterrent force that meets
    warfighter needs with assets falling below New START levels in 2030.
    For example, MMIII flight system (or missile itself) begins to age out
    in 2026 followed by obsolescence and attrition of assets affecting
    other crticial weapons systems and facilities issues that have only
    received minimum sustainment pending a major upgrade such as GBSD.
        Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) is the replacement for the aging
    Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which was designed in the 1970s,
    fielded in the 1980s is twenty years past its 10-year life expectancy.
    ALCM is no longer cost effective to maintain past 2030 an in future
    years, enemy air defense modernization will challenge ALCM's
    penetration capability. Additionally, testing attrition is depleting
    the inventory. LRSO is currently on schedule to meet its threshold
    Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date of 2030: just in time
    replacement for the ALCM. Deferred spending on LRSO will delay IOC and
    the United States would lose significant deterrence/assurance
    capability. Down-select will occur in August, and if spending were
    delayed to wait on a signed Nuclear Posture Review, numerous waterfall
    effects would occur. Of note, numerous bomber and facility
    modernization and upgrade tests would be impacted, as these test are
    waiting on LRSO to ``set the stage'' or lay the infrastructure for
    them. Additionally, the LRSO schedule is aligned with its associated
    warhead, the W80-4, and a delay in the cruise missile will have
    significant negative effects on the warhead development and production
    schedule.
        Mr. Rogers. Please describe the military requirements that are
    driving U.S. nuclear modernization plans in your respective services.
    What do we see other countries doing and how does that impact our
    requirements? How does aging or vulnerabilities in our own U.S. nuclear
    forces impact requirements and modernization plans?
        General Rand. [The information provided is classified and retained
    in the committee files.]
        Mr. Rogers. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of
    delaying or cancelling key nuclear modernization programs--such as the
    GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range stand off
    (LRSO) cruise missile, or the new Columbia-class submarine? How firm is
    the need for the current schedules for these programs--is there room
    for slipping their schedules? Do you believe these programs are
    executable on-schedule and on-budget, if they are funded on-time by
    Congress?
        General Rand. If the Air Force does not develop and produce the B-
    21, the U.S. will lose bomber penetration capabilities in highly
    contested threat areas. The B-21 will support the nuclear Triad,
    providing a visible and flexible nuclear deterrent capability that will
    reassure allies and partners. A fleet size of 100 B-21s is appropriate
    and ensures sustained high-end conventional operations while supporting
    the nuclear Triad as a visible and flexible deterrent to assure allies
    and partners. Analysis has shown that the B-21 is needed to address
    decreasing survivability and combat capabilities in our current bomber
    force, ensuring penetration capabilities in highly contested combat
    airspace. Delaying B-21 production or procuring any less than 100 B-21s
    will have a detrimental impact on the B-21 contract, causing increases
    in the average procurement unit cost and total program cost similar to
    what was seen with the B-2 program. Global Strike Command has developed
    its Bomber Vector based on the current B-21 development and production
    schedule. The Bomber Vector lays out planned modernization,
    sustainment, and aircraft retirement plans. Any delays or decreases to
    the B-21 program will result in capability gaps and/or Bomber Vector
    adjustments requiring additional modernization programs, manpower
    solutions, and costly force mix decisions.
        Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the nation's replacement
    program for the aging Minuteman III (MMIII) weapon system. The GBSD
    program is currently funded through the Technology Maturation Risk
    Reduction (TMRR) (concept design) phase of the program (2020). We
    expect the TMRR contract to be awarded in the 4th Quarter Fiscal Year
    2017. Public sources identify the Nuclear Posture Review as being
    completed by the end of the year 2017. If the program was delayed
    beyond the end of TMRR in 2020, there will be a significant sustainment
    cost to support continued MMIII operations through 2035 and beyond.
    MMIII reliability and effectiveness will continue to degrade and it
    will be difficult to maintain a plausible deterrent force that meets
    warfighter needs with assets falling below New START levels in 2030.
    For example, MMIII flight system (or missile itself) begins to age out
    in 2026 followed by obsolescence and attrition of assets affecting
    other critical weapons systems and facilities issues that have only
    received minimum sustainment pending a major upgrade such as GBSD. GBSD
    is just in time, no room to slip, to meet critical MMIII age out,
    obsolescence and asset depletion/attrition issues. The program is ready
    to execute and award the TMRR contract on time and on schedule.
        If we do not develop and produce the Long Range Stand Off missile
    (LRSO), the U.S. could lose the following capacities. Deterring
    potential adversaties from nuclear weapon usage--central to today's
    national security strategy. Deterrence requires a range of US military
    capabilities and LRSO is a key piece of this strategy. An option the
    president currently has and a capability that our peers/near-peers
    already have or are developing. Flexible stand-off capability supports
    hedge requirements in the event another leg of the Triad encounters
    issues. LRSO allows the U.S. to continue to impose costs on potential
    adversaries long into the future, as it provides continued flexibl
    response options. LRSO is a force multiplier compatible with the B-52,
    and the B-21; extends range, enables simultaneous targeting of multiple
    targets, lowers risk to aircrew/aircraft by reducing target overflight
    requirements, reduces tanker and support requirements. LRSO assures
    U.S. allies by signaling resolve to defend itself and its allies. This
    resolve is significantly enhanced by the credibility of the bomber
    force to hold almost any target at risk by extending its effective
    range with standoff capability. LRSO provides presidential options and
    overt strategic messaging to peer nations as a visible indication of
    operational status and national intent, e.g. bombers on nuclear ground
    alert.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the military effectiveness and cost
    implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III
    missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue
    GBSD?
        General Rand. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of
    Alternatives that received Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
    Analysis and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) sufficiency review concluded
    that investment is required to extend intercontinental ballistic
    missile life beyond 2030. The analysis revealed a replacement system,
    mitigating capability shortfalls, as the most cost-effective strategy.
    ``Life Extending'' Minuteman III will cost more than full system
    recapitalization, and would not address warfighting capability gaps
    validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The following
    are the analysis of alternatives costs identified:
      Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 50 year life cycle cost--$159.2B
      Minuteman III Service Life Extension Program (Baseline) life cycle
            costs--$160.3B
        Over the next twenty years, nearly the entire Minuteman III system
    requires investment to address declining reliability, aging and
    supportability issues.
        Mr. Rogers. Why is LRSO required if we also have a B61-12 nuclear
    gravity bomb carried by a penetrating B-21 bomber--is this duplicative?
    Do we need both?
        General Rand. [The information provided is classified and retained
    in the committee files.]
        Mr. Rogers. We understand that the Air Force and its potential
    contractors are considering a more mobile concept for the command and
    control of the GBSD missile system, rather than relying on the
    redundancy and survivability of a distributed system of many fixed
    launch control centers as in the current ICBM fields. As STRATCOM has
    pointed out, this is a technologically challenging approach with
    considerable risk. Why is the Air Force going down this path? What is
    the Air Force doing to address these risks and ensure this concept does
    not decrease the size of the missileer career field such that it is no
    longer sustainable?
        General Rand. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Force
    Development Concept does pursue capabilities such as a hybrid/mix of
    mobile command and control (C2), similar launch control centers as
    utilized in Minuteman III, on-base integrated launch control center,
    and an alternate/airborne launch control system (ALCS). The concept
    does not provide exact numbers of nodes. A from-the-ground-up GBSD
    system design allows for Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) to
    take advantage of technologies to pursue a more cost effective and
    efficient approach on to how intercontinental ballistic missiles
    (ICBMs) are operated, maintained, and secured. The final number of
    launch control centers will be assessed for survivability and apply
    robust risk management even if it is the same number of centers used in
    Minuteman III. AFGSC is adding additional oversight in cyber, wireless
    (if this is included in the final solution), and nuclear safety areas
    to manage risk.
        The Airborne Launch Control System--Replacement program executing
    in parallel may advance launch control center suite development and
    provide the hooks in design to become common with the GBSD application.
    This would allow commonality in missileer training and operations,
    versus the differences which currently exist between Minuteman III ICBM
    console and ALCS console. Mobile and integrated operations using a
    common console would enhance career opportunity and offer different
    operating environments for the missileer career field.
        Mr. Rogers. How important are dual-capable aircraft to the U.S.
    nuclear posture? Do they constitute a critical and necessary component
    of our nuclear deterrence and assurance?
        General Rand. Global Strike Command's B-2 and B-52 are both dual-
    capable bombers. The B-21 is being developed as a dual-capable bomber
    and will be nuclear capable within two years of declaring conventional
    initial operational capability (as directed by the Fiscal Year 2013
    National Defense Authorization Act). These bombers, along with the
    weapons they carry, constitute the entirety of the air-breathing leg of
    the Triad. Additionally, they are the most visible leg of the nuclear
    Triad, and inherently stabilizing. The process of arming bombers and
    delivering weapons is a time consuming effort requiring hours to days,
    not minutes. Bombers are the leg of the Triad seen as the least
    threatening to stability, which is why arms control experts afforded a
    discount for bomber weapons in New START. Second, bombers are
    intrinsically stabilizing in the nuclear arena due to the ability to be
    launched and then recalled prior execution. Third, nuclear bombers
    offer the ability to signal National intentions in a very visible
    manner. Fully loaded nuclear bombers on alert are a very powerful
    message. This visibility is critical to providing nuclear deterrence
    for our adversaries and even more critical to providing assurance to
    our allies. The bomber, since its inception, has been a sysmbol of
    America's commitment to its allies and serves as a deterrent to the
    proliferation of nuclear capabilities.
        Mr. Rogers. Please describe the military requirements that are
    driving U.S. nuclear modernization plans in your respective services.
    What do we see other countries doing and how does that impact our
    requirements? How does aging or vulnerabilities in our own U.S. nuclear
    forces impact requirements and modernization plans?
        Admiral Benedict. In order to support the Commander, STRATCOM
    mission requirement for sea-based strategic deterrence, the Navy must
    provide a minimum force of 10 operational SSBNs. Today, we meet that
    requirement with 14 OHIO Class SSBNs. In the future, we will meet the
    requirement with a force structure of 12 COLUMBIA Class SSBNs, as the
    class will not require a lengthy engineered refueling overhaul due to a
    life of ship core. The Navy has already extended the existing OHIO
    Class service life from 30 years to 42 years, and there is no
    engineering margin left for further extension. This extension provides
    an additional 40 percent service life and will result in the OHIO Class
    being in service longer than any SSBN or SSN in U.S. history. Any delay
    to the COLUMBIA Class program could reduce the total SSBN force
    structure below that required to provide 10 operational SSBNs during
    the transition period from the OHIO Class to the COLUMBIA Class, which
    would prevent the Navy from meeting the STRATCOM at-sea requirements.
        The assumptions of adversaries' nuclear force structures,
    capability developments, and doctrines play a major role in our
    assessments of the current and future threat environment and contribute
    to strategy and force structure decisions. Maintaining our ability to
    deter and, if deterrence fails, respond to future threats underpins our
    national strategy. The results of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review
    will inform any recommendations to the existing nuclear triad program
    of record.
        Mr. Rogers. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of
    delaying or cancelling key nuclear modernization programs--such as the
    GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range stand off
    (LRSO) cruise missile, or the new Columbia-class submarine? How firm is
    the need for the current schedules for these programs--is there room
    for slipping their schedules? Do you believe these programs are
    executable on-schedule and on-budget, if they are funded on-time by
    Congress?
        Admiral Benedict. There is no margin in the COLUMBIA Class SSBN
    program--it is imperative that we remain on schedule. The OHIO Class
    SSBN was originally designed for a 30-year service life. In 1998, Naval
    Reactors and NAVSEA completed a detailed engineering analysis including
    evaluation of the current material condition of the class, remaining
    fuel levels, and expected future operational demands of the platform.
    At that time, the OHIO Class service life was extended to 42 years (a
    40 percent increase). Any further extension would erode the engineering
    safety margin to an unacceptable level. The longest serving nuclear
    submarine to date was the USS KAMEHAMEHA at 37 years of service. Any
    delay to the COLUMBIA Class program could reduce the total SSBN force
    structure below that required to provide 10 operational SSBNs during
    the transition period from the OHIO Class to the COLUMBIA Class, which
    would prevent the Navy from meeting STRATCOM at-sea requirements. While
    there is no schedule margin left, the COLUMBIA Class program of record
    is executable, assuming adequate and stable funding. This is true for
    the entire nuclear enterprise in general. The nation chose to defer
    modernization efforts on our nuclear weapons enterprise after the Cold
    War and it cannot be deferred any longer without loss of capabilities.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
        Mr. Cooper. What is your (military) opinion of the value of the new
    START Treaty? What would the risk be of preventing negotiations to
    extend the New START Treaty as long as Russia is not in compliance with
    the INF Treaty?
        General Rand. This question was covered quite extensively during
    the ratification process for New START by a wide variety of witnesses.
    As noted at the time by the CDRUSSTRATCOM (Gen Chilton), New START
    ``does not constrain America's ability to continue to deter potential
    adversaries, assure our allies and sustain strategic stability''. I
    believe those observations remain true today. I would also note that
    New START limits the number of Russian warheads that can target the
    United States. New START's flexible limits on deployed and non-deployed
    delivery platforms retain sufficient flexibility to manage our Triad of
    deterrent forces to hedge against tactical or geopolitical surprise.
    Lastly, New START continues a strategic nuclear arms control
    verification regime of notifications and on the ground observations/
    inspections of Russian strategic forces by U.S. personnel. There are
    obvious risks in preventing negotiations on extending New START due to
    Russian non-compliance with the INF Treaty. First, having the U.S. tie
    discussions on one treaty to disputes in another would likely cause
    Russia to adopt the same approach. In my opinion, this would
    unnecessarily complicate resolving issues in either treaty. Secondly,
    while I vigorously support holding Russia to account for complying with
    all treaties, we have to keep in mind that without treaty constraints,
    Russia is free to do as it wants. It is important to weigh the impact
    of treaty disputes against the possibility of a treaty not being
    extended, or of Russian withdrawal from one or more treaties. The
    issues that we have with Russian non-compliance with INF are serious
    and should be dealt with, however my recommendation is that the U.S.
    not bring INF issues in other treaty areas.
        Mr. Cooper. Is there a military requirement for a conventional
    Long-Range Stand-Off weapon? What would the costs be to make it
    conventional?
        General Rand. [The information provided is classified and retained
    in the committee files.]
        Mr. Cooper. What is your (military) opinion of the value of the new
    START Treaty? What would the risk be of preventing negotiations to
    extend the New START Treaty as long as Russia is not in compliance with
    the INF Treaty?
        Admiral Benedict. I believe that bilateral and verifiable arms
    control agreements are a key component of our national security and
    provide insight into potential adversary capabilities to maintain the
    strategic status quo. However, further reductions of nuclear forces
    should only be undertaken after a complete assessment of the current
    security environment, particularly in regards to our nuclear armed
    adversaries. Any future arms control agreements should take into
    account prior actions, verifiability, and the arms control agreement's
    contribution to maintaining strategic stability. These things, along
    with a full intelligence assessment of the present and future threat
    environment will be central to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The
    results of the NPR will inform any decisions on adjustments to
    strategy, force structure, and recommendations on how to best address
    the future threat environment.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
        Mr. Franks. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
    request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
    is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
    more difference?
        General Klotz. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 President's Budget Request
    continues the program of record detailed in the FY 2017 Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan. NNSA's Weapons Activities budget
    includes planned increases to the program of record as well as
    increases to adapt to emerging changes, such as updates to the baseline
    costs for the B61-12 Life Extension Program and the W88 Alteration 370.
        Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
    operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
    over the next 10 years-including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
    with this estimate?
        CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
    total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
    appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
        General Klotz. NNSA publishes future year cost estimates in our
    annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP), but NNSA has not
    estimated costs for the Department of Defense portion of the $400
    billion estimate and therefore has no basis by which to judge its
    accuracy. The DOE portion of Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) $400
    billion estimate was $134 billion. Our own current estimate for that
    period (2017-2026), as detailed in the SSMP, is $112-120 billion.
        Since the end of the Cold War, investments in the strategic
    deterrent have fallen to under 4 percent of the defense budget, but
    historically has been much higher than 6 percent during periods of
    recapitalization, particularly prior to the end of the Cold War. Over
    the past 40 years, Weapons Activities funding has ranged from 1.0 to
    1.7 percent of total Defense discretionary spending. At currently
    planned levels, Weapons Activities spending over the next 10 years
    would constitute about 1.6 percent of defense spending.
        The National Nuclear Security Administration's missions include
    maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of the
    nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation
    and nuclear terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear
    propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and
    submarines. NNSA's budget is vital to ensuring that U.S. nuclear forces
    are modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately
    tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure America's allies.
    NNSA's budget represents a prudent investment in a key component of our
    overall defense strategy. Significant and sustained investment is
    needed to replace aging infrastructure, provide for warhead life
    extension programs, revitalize our production capabilities, continue to
    advance the science which guarantees the safety, reliability and
    effectiveness of the stockpile, and sustain our highly talented
    workforce. Failure to make the right investments could significantly
    impact the deterrent.
        Mr. Franks. Looking at the Trump administration's FY18 budget
    request for DOD nuclear forces and NNSA's nuclear weapons activities,
    is there more consistency between the Obama administration's plans, or
    more difference?
        Dr. Soofer. As NNSA Administrator Lieutenant Colonel Klotz noted in
    testimony, the President's FY 2018 budget request reflects an increase
    for NNSA nuclear weapons activities. For the Department of Defense
    portion, the fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget reflects more continuity than
    change. The FY 2018 budget supports, as did the FY 2017 budget,
    continued recapitalization of each element of our nuclear forces and
    infrastructure.
        Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
    operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
    over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
    with this estimate?
        CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
    total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
    appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
        Dr. Soofer. The DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
    approximately $230-$290 billion from FY 2018 to FY 2040, in constant FY
    2018 dollars. This projection includes the total cost of nuclear-only
    systems, and a portion of the cost of the B-21 bomber, which will have
    both conventional and nuclear roles. The DOD projection for total
    recapitalization cost also includes modernizing nuclear command,
    control, and communications systems. I would defer to my Department of
    Energy colleagues for specifics relating to estimated NNSA costs. U.S.
    nuclear weapons deter the only existential threat to the Nation. The
    nuclear enterprise is affordable if nuclear deterrence is prioritized
    appropriately. During the coming period of increased recapitalization
    spending, nuclear forces will remain a small fraction of the DOD
    budget--with annual funding levels that are projected to range from
    approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending. This
    includes spending to sustain and operate the existing force--currently
    about $12-14 billion per year--as well as recapitalization spending to
    develop and field modernized replacements.
        Mr. Franks. The last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was published 7
    years ago. The world was very different in 2010, particularly when
    talking about Russia. Today, it's hard to see Russia as the partner and
    friend like the 20101 NPR envisioned.
        Would you please provide us your assessment on what has changed in
    the world since the 2010 NPR?
        How will this affect the NPR and its deliberations?
        Dr. Soofer. The Nuclear Posture Review's analytical process will
    include a full assessment of the strategic environment, including a
    review of how that environment has changed since the 2010 NPR. Recent
    years have indeed brought changes to the security environment that U.S.
    nuclear policy must address. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions
    against its neighbors and threatened the United States and its NATO
    Allies--including nuclear threats. It has elevated strategies of
    nuclear first use in its strategic thinking and military exercises, is
    modernizing a large and diverse non-strategic nuclear weapons force,
    and is violating the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
    Treaty. However, while Russia presents a significant set of challenges,
    it is only one element of an increasingly complex global strategic
    environment. The President directed the Department of Defense to review
    U.S. nuclear posture and ensure that our nuclear forces are modern,
    robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter
    21st-century threats and reassure our allies and partners.
        Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
    operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
    over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
    with this estimate?
        CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
    total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
    appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
        General Rand. The $400 billion estimate is based on a snapshot in
    time. Global Strike Command's portion for the nuclear enterprise
    funding was included in the CBO estimate, therefore I can't speak for
    our sister services and the Department of Energy. The estimated amount
    could fluctuate based on future budgets, adversary advancements, and
    new/competing requirements. Increases from 2015 are rightly attributed
    to modernization and replacement programs becoming more mature.
        While the CBO report covers 2017-2026, the current cost estimates
    for Air Force Global Strike Command peak in 2030 when a number of
    modernization and replacement programs are going on all at once.
    Considering the deterrence and assurance provided by our nation's
    nuclear weapon programs, the CBO's number of 5-7% of the total national
    defense budget is quite a bargain. While I can't speak to Navy and
    Department of Energy costs, the CBO numbers on Air Force Global
    Strike's portion of sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear
    deterrent are in line with our projections.
        It is encouraging that the CBO included estimates for the command
    and control, communications (NC3) and early warning systems in the
    report. When discussing nuclear modernization, these critical systems
    are omitted from discussions. This country relies on positive command
    control of nuclear forces. Only the President may authorize the use of
    nuclear weapons by utilizing NC3 systems.
        Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
    operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
    over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
    with this estimate?
        CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
    total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
    appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
        Admiral Benedict. The CBO estimate of $400 billion represents many
    elements across multiple agencies and services within the overall
    nuclear deterrence mission. The 1-2 percent of the national defense
    budget for the sea-based strategic deterrent is appropriate and
    consistent with what our nation previously invested to build both the
    ``41 for Freedom'' in the 1960s and the first nuclear modernization
    with the OHIO Class in the 1980s. The Navy is continually reviewing and
    validating the requirements needed to sustain the sea-based leg of the
    triad. A safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent underpins our
    ability to conduct conventional operations around the world. Beyond
    deterring the threat of nuclear attack on the United States, having
    credible nuclear forces is essential to assuring our allies of our
    extended deterrence commitments, thereby convincing them that they do
    not need to pursue their own nuclear weapons. Recapitalization is a
    significant investment that happens every other generation, making it
    critically important that we do it right. We remain focused on cost-
    efficiency to ensure an affordable sea-based strategic deterrent.
        Mr. Franks. CBO has recently estimated the cost of sustaining,
    operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent to be $400 billion
    over the next 10 years, including both DOD and NNSA costs. Do you agree
    with this estimate?
        CBO estimates this $400 billion represents roughly 6 percent of the
    total defense budget during this time. Do you believe this is an
    appropriate amount to be spending on the nuclear deterrence?
        Dr. Zangardi. The Congressional Budget Office's cost estimate for
    sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear deterrent is not the
    same dollar amount that DOD will provide Congress in its classified
    Fiscal Year 2018 annual report on the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,
    Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear
    Weapons Command and Control System (the ``Section 1043 Report''). I
    believe that the proposed funding stated in the Department of Defense's
    Section 1043 Report reflects the funding needed to support our Nation's
    nuclear deterrence.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. Why do we need the IW-1 rather than a life-extended
    W78? What steps is NNSA taking to ensure that any changes to the
    warhead, including any modifications to the nuclear components, do not
    affect the reliability of the warhead?
        General Klotz. The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC's) August 2016
    Strategic Plan reaffirmed the need for the interoperable warhead 1
    (IW1) as the first ballistic missile in the 3+2 Nuclear Stockpile
    Strategy. The 3+2 Strategy is a long-term strategy with emphasis on
    reduced warhead types, interoperability to enable smaller inactive
    stockpile, and reduced burden on production infrastructure. The IW1
    objective is to deploy an interoperable nuclear explosive package for
    use in the Mk21 intercontinental ballistic missile aeroshell and the
    Mk5 submarine-launched ballistic missile aeroshell with adaptable non-
    nuclear components.
        IW1 will accomplish the following: 1) replaces capability currently
    provided by the aging W78; 2) rebalances sea-leg deployment to reduce
    risk against technical failure; and 3) along with IW2, enables
    replacement of capability provided by the W88. A W78 life extension
    program may not provide the capability envisioned for IW1 or meet the
    long-term requirements of the 3+2 Strategy. The pending NPR may shed
    greater light on this issue.
        Warhead reliability is one of many requirements established by the
    Department of Defense in what are called Military Characteristics
    (MCs). The IW1 MCs will be generated by the DOD and approved by the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), but they are not officially established
    yet. As with all ongoing nuclear warhead life extensions programs and
    major modifications, NNSA performs extensive testing and analytical
    assessments to meet reliability requirements prior to deployment of the
    warhead. With over 70 years of experience, the NNSA (through its Design
    and Production Agencies) has established proven processes to meet
    reliability and other objectives for both newly manufactured and reused
    components and expects to do so for IW1.
        Mr. Garamendi. The Trump administration has decided to terminate
    the MOX project, noting that ``major cost overruns and schedule
    slippages have led to a re-examination of how best to achieve [our
    nonproliferation commitments]'' and ``It would be irresponsible to
    pursue this approach when a more cost-effective alternative exists.''
        Why did this administration decide to terminate the MOX Project?
    Have any new reviews taken place under the new administration?
        Is DOE considering other missions for Savannah River Site? Which
    ones?
        General Klotz. Independent cost reviews and estimates directed by
    Congress have all concluded that the MOX program of record is
    significantly more expensive and would take more time than originally
    planned. The new Administration reviewed all independent reports and
    met with all parties including MOX Services, the current contractor,
    and their parent companies to fully understand the costs, challenges,
    and risks associated with constructing the MOX project or pursuing the
    dilute and dispose approach. After careful review, the Administration
    came to the same conclusion as the last Administration--that the
    current MOX program of record is unaffordable and the dilute and
    dispose approach meets the nonproliferation requirements much faster
    with significantly lower cost and risk.
        Most of the information reviewed by the new Administration and key
    decision makers were from prior studies, including the recent U.S. Army
    Corps of Engineers report on the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility
    contract structure and the Government Accountability Office's Plutonium
    Disposition report to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
    Strategic Forces.
        Mr. Garamendi. To what extent are Weapons Activities infrastructure
    investments driven by the 50-80 pits per year production requirement
    and to what extent is the 50-80 pits per year production requirement
    driven by the IW-1?
        General Klotz. NNSA's Plutonium Strategy includes a number of
    investments intended to sustain the capabilities necessary to support
    stockpile requirements. These include a combination of line-item
    projects and resource investments that help reduce mission dependency
    on aging facilities, modernize our infrastructure, and help NNSA meet
    statutory pit production requirements, including achieving a 50-80 war
    reserve (WR) pits per year (ppy) production capacity in the 2030s. Much
    of this investment would be required, regardless of the pit production
    requirement.
        The January 16, 2014, Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Pit Production
    Requirements Report to Congress confirmed the need for achieving 50-80
    ppy production capacity by 2030, citing multiple drivers. Key among
    these drivers are both the need to support future stockpile planning
    requirements and address stockpile needs due to pit aging. The
    requirement to achieve a 50-80 ppy production capacity was codified by
    Congress most recently in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act
    (Sec. 3140). Although the current build plan of Interoperable Warhead 1
    (IW1) is the main driver for the current pit production requirements,
    any replacement life extension program for the W78 warhead could
    require similar, if not higher, production requirements.
        Mr. Garamendi. Previous Nuclear Posture Reviews, which are
    comprehensive, interagency reviews of our nuclear weapons policy, have
    often taken more than a year to complete. This administration plans to
    complete its Nuclear Posture Review in about 8 months. Should we take
    this to mean that the review is a forgone conclusion and that it will
    reaffirm the status quo? Why such a constrained timeline? Further, how
    will the lack of confirmed appointees at relevant offices and bureaus
    at the State Department (such as the Under Secretary for Arms Control
    and International Security, Bureau of Arms Control Verification and
    Compliance, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation)
    affect non-DOD input on the process?
        Dr. Soofer. The Nuclear Posture Review includes subject matter
    experts from across the government, including the Department of State.
    The effort is being overseen by the Secretary of Defense and will
    include a full and thorough assessment of our nuclear weapons policy to
    ensure that our nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible,
    resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century
    threats. If more study time is necessary we will extend the review to
    ensure we adequately meet the President's objectives.
        Mr. Garamendi. President Obama stated in 2013 that ``After a
    comprehensive review, I've determined that we can ensure the security
    of America and our allies--and maintain a strong and credible strategic
    deterrent--while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up
    to one-third.'' Do you agree with that statement? Should the United
    States seek further reductions in coordination with Russia?
        Dr. Soofer. The President tasked the Department of Defense to
    review U.S. nuclear posture and ensure that our nuclear forces are
    modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored
    to deter 21st-century threats. The security environment has changed
    since President Obama's statement; I will not prejudge the outcome of
    the NPR and endorse this statement. If any future reductions are
    possible for the U.S., they should not be done unilaterally.
        Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe that it would be in the national
    security interests of the United States to pursue an extension of the
    treaty in 2021? Would you advocate for any modifications? What would
    the risk be of preventing negotiations to extend the New START Treaty
    as long as Russia is not in compliance with the INF Treaty?
        Dr. Soofer. It is too early to consider extending or modifying the
    New START Treaty. This year, we are focused on completing our force
    reductions under the Treaty and ensuring that Russia meets its
    obligations by February 2018 when the Treaty's central limits go into
    effect. Russia remains in compliance with the New START Treaty and the
    Treaty continues to provide predictability of and transparency into
    Russia's strategic forces. The President directed the Department of
    Defense to review U.S. nuclear posture and ensure that our nuclear
    forces are modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats.
        Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Soofer, do you believe it is within the ability
    of the Department of Defense to provide to Congress a 25-year cost
    estimate of DOD's portion of our nuclear deterrent, including
    operation, sustainment, and modernization?
        Dr. Soofer. In making these long-term cost projections, there are
    always legitimate questions about what to include, what timeframe to
    cover, and what level of uncertainty is reasonable to expect. At this
    time a reliable 25-year cost estimate for of the Departments of
    Defenses portion of our nuclear deterrent does not exist. However, the
    attached chart provides a cost estimate of operation, sustainment and
    modernization of our nuclear deterrent through 2040.
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        .epsMr. Garamendi. Dr. Soofer, thank you for providing your 20-year
    cost estimate for DOD's nuclear modernization costs and for providing a
    clear and full explanation of which costs and programs are included.
    However, your cost estimate is provided in constant FY18 dollars,
    making comparisons with most other congressionally mandated nuclear
    cost estimates which use then-year dollars difficult. Please provide to
    the committee an updated version of this cost estimate using then-year
    dollars.
        Dr. Soofer. DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total
    approximately $230-$290 billion spread over more than two decades, from
    fiscal year (FY) 2018 to FY 2040, in constant FY 2018 dollars. In then-
    year dollars the range is adjusted to $280-$350 billion.
        Mr. Garamendi. There have been some changes to this year's funding
    requests for the LRSO and GBSD in comparison to the FY18 plans in last
    year's budget. GBSD was reduced by $78 million and LRSO was increased
    by $31 million. General Rand, can you briefly explain those changes?
        General Rand. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) focus
    since the Milestone A decision has been on source selection related to
    the Technical Maturation Risk Reduction Contract Award we expect to be
    awarded in the 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2017. Some planned activities
    were deferred due to the source selection activity. The program is
    currently funded to the Independent Cost Estimate.
        The $31 million adjustment to the Fiscal Year 2018 budget for Long
    Range Standoff Missile (LRSO) is in response to the updated cost
    estimate developed and approved during the Milestone A approval
    process. This updated estimate was approved after the Fiscal Year 2017
    President's Budget submission. The $451.3 million Fiscal Year 2018
    funds support technology maturation and risk reduction weapon
    development, test planning, and aircraft integration efforts.

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