[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-46]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES AND
POSTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
SPACE ENTERPRISE
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 19, 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-868 WASHINGTON : 2017
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RO KHANNA, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Buck, Lt Gen David J.. USAF, Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command............ 3
Cardillo, Robert, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 6
Hill, John D., Performing the Duties of Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy................................ 7
Raymond, Gen John W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command... 2
Sapp, Betty, Director, National Reconnaissance Office............ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Buck, Lt Gen David J......................................... 50
Cardillo, Robert............................................. 70
Hill, John D................................................. 79
Raymond, Gen John W.......................................... 31
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 29
Sapp, Betty.................................................. 63
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 99
Mr. Franks................................................... 91
Mr. Hunter................................................... 97
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 94
Mr. Rogers................................................... 91
FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES AND POSTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
ENTERPRISE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Friday, May 19, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 7:59 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good morning, and welcome to the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee hearing, ``Fiscal Year 2018 Priorities and
Posture of the National Security Space Enterprise.'' We are
honored to have a panel of expert witnesses who are leaders in
our national security space program to join us here today. And
before I introduce them, though, I want to take a moment to
acknowledge that, while I can't imagine there being a better
place to work than for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the
House Armed Services Committee, apparently, somebody thinks
there is a better job in Washington, DC. This will be the last
hearing that Steve Kitay will be in his current position. He is
leaving us to go work for the Secretary of Defense, he will be
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. And our
loss is the Secretary's gain. So we are going to miss him. He
has been with as long time and does a great job. But I know he
will do a great job for our country in his new capacity as
well. So good luck, buddy.
Today we have some witnesses that are very familiar to this
committee, and do a great job for our country: General John
``Jay'' Raymond, Commander, Air Force Space Command; Lieutenant
General David Buck, Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space [JFCC Space]; Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of
National Reconnaissance Office; Robert Cardillo, Director of
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and Mr. John Hill,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
After we finish this unclassified testimony and questions
and answers, we will adjourn to a closed session to continue
our oversight in an appropriately secure fashion.
In Secretary Mattis' confirmation hearing in front of
Senate earlier this year, his official testimony stated, quote,
``While our military maintains capable air, land, and sea
forces, the cyber and space domains now demand an increasing
share of attention and investment,'' close quote. And I fully
agree with the Secretary's statement.
Our military and intelligence leaders have been clear in
their warnings, some going back many years, that our use of
space could be taken away from us in the next military
conflict. However, we have not moved with the conviction and
urgency to respond to these warnings. And this has left us with
a growing crisis to confront in outer space.
While I have the full faith and confidence in each of our
expert witnesses here today, I do not have faith in the tangled
bureaucratic structure they must work with. Meanwhile, China,
for example, is advancing rapidly in space and counterspace and
has established a new military organization to focus its space,
cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Dr. John Hamre,
former Deputy Secretary of Defense, eloquently stated in an
earlier hearing to this subcommittee, quote, ``We are not well
organized to deal with the new challenges we face in space. The
old structure may have been sufficient when space was an
uncontested area of operations. That time has passed.'' Again,
I couldn't agree more.
Ladies and gentlemen, now is the least capable our
adversaries will be in space. And now is the time for reform,
even if it is disruptive today.
With that, I look forward to hearing all your perspectives
on space priorities and posture. I thank all of you for being
here and working with us on this important topic.
I now recognize my friend and colleague from Tennessee, the
ranking member, Mr. Jim Cooper.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add my
note of congratulations to Steve, well done. And I thank you
for this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate especially your
focus on strengthening America's space capabilities. There is
no more important goal.
There are many issues before us and before the Air Force in
particular, but I am glad we are addressing them in a
bipartisan, joint, and substantive fashion. I look forward to
the testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I now recognize our witnesses. The
witnesses were asked to summarize. Their prepared statements
will be submitted for the record. Without objection, so
ordered. If you could take your statements and keep them to 5
minutes or less so we can get to questions, that would be
awesome.
General Raymond, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN W. RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Raymond. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper. Let me also pile on and say congratulations to Steve
Kitay. We look forward to having you sitting here next to us
next year.
Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you as the commander of Air
Force Space Command. It is my distinct privilege to lead and
represent nearly 36,000 professional and dedicated airmen
providing resilient and affordable space and cyberspace
capabilities for the joint force and our Nation. It is also a
distinct privilege to testify with my friends and panel of
experts and close partners.
This is a very exciting year for both the Air Force and the
Air Force Space Command. In 2017, September of 2017, our Air
Force celebrates our 70th birthday, and Air Force Space Command
celebrates a 35th birthday, although, as an Air Force, we have
been involved in space since 1954 and since the beginning.
We have come a long way and done a remarkable job
integrating space capabilities into joint warfighting. Today,
there is nothing we do, and I repeat, nothing we do as a joint
force that isn't enabled by space. Integration has been our
strength. Nevertheless, we find ourselves at the intersection
of high reliance and vulnerability in the space domain. Today,
in no uncertain terms, space is a warfighting domain, just like
air, land, and sea. Potential adversaries are developing
capabilities to deny us access to and the benefits of the space
domain. Let me be very clear, we do not want a conflict that
extends into space, but one way to keep that from happening is
to make sure that we are prepared for it and be able to fight
and win that conflict if it were to occur. I think it shouldn't
be lost on anybody that our space program is the envy of the
world.
My near-term priorities are fourfold. First, in partnership
with Betty Sapp, is to operationalize the National Space
Defense Center, and provide them with command and control
capability necessary to operate in a contested domain.
Secondly, we must improve space situational awareness,
transforming from a cataloging focus to a warfighting focus
required of this domain.
Third, we need to transition our space architecture into a
defendable space architecture to provide resilient and
defendable capabilities for the current strategic environment
that we face.
And finally, we need to continue to professionally develop
Air Force Space Command airmen.
I thank you for your support, I thank you for your active
leadership, and look forward to continuing to work closely with
you in the years ahead. I also look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in
the Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Rogers. General Buck.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN DAVID J. BUCK, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Buck. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your steadfast
support of our men and women in uniform, the space enterprise,
and this Nation.
As this committee is well aware, we have turned an
educational corner of sorts. It is now widely acknowledged that
space is critical to our way of life. This, coupled with an
understanding of the compelling and compounding threats to our
freedom of action in space is the burning platform to evolve
our national security space enterprise.
We don't need a clean-slate approach, but certainly, an
overhaul is necessary to guarantee our freedoms in, through,
and from space.
This is a challenge, because our national security space
architecture and processes were largely conceived to provide
services, or commodities, during an era when our most
significant co-orbital threat was debris. Given the emerging
threats, we no longer approach space with simply a service
provider mentality. Our foremost responsibility is to gain and
maintain space superiority. This is a prerequisite to
protecting and defending the space joint operating area, and
for providing space force combat engagement with the joint
forces across the globe.
Over the past year, we have made substantial progress,
especially with respect to all-domain operations and our
ability to protect and defend the national security space
enterprise. We are better warfighters. There are, however,
areas that require continued focus and vigilance. We must
continue to normalize operations across the enterprise. This
includes space situational awareness, as well as improving
foundational intelligence, and the ability to provide robust
indications and warning. We also must continue the full-court
press to deliver a next generation battle space awareness and
command and control capability. At the same time, we must
review and update the associated authorities and rules of
engagement for operations in space. And we must continue, we
must continue to push on fielding required capabilities on
operationally relevant timelines.
Looking forward, we are focused on maintaining freedom of
action in space. It is an imperative of our joint force. As a
learning organization, we will continue to review and mature
our approaches and organizational structures. We can accept no
less, because the speed and complexity of future fights demands
operationally agile organizations.
Every challenge is an opportunity, and we have many
opportunities in space. Freedom of action in space is not a
birthright; it must be secured, and it must be preserved. This
requires constant vigilance, strong partnerships, and active
participation. I thank the committee for your leadership and
for your advocacy. I look forward to our continued partnership.
[The prepared statement of General Buck can be found in the
Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, General Buck. Ms. Sapp you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BETTY SAPP, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE
Ms. Sapp. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to be here on behalf of the National
Reconnaissance Office, or NRO. The NRO is responsible for
developing, acquiring, launching, and operating the Nation's
overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
architecture. We are the foundation of the U.S. global
situational awareness. We contribute to global intelligence,
military and homeland security operations, while simultaneously
assisting with the formation of national policy, and achieving
diplomatic goals. We provide direct support to U.S.
warfighters, help protect U.S. borders, and contribute
significantly to the fight against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria] and other counterterrorism operations worldwide.
The foundation of NRO mission capabilities and
contributions are our people. Our people are behind every
mission success, and enable the direct support we provide to
the combatant commands, their service and functional
components, and deployed tactical units. The NRO workforce is
not just dedicated to mission, but talented and empowered to
innovate.
We instill a culture of innovation and risk tolerance in
everything we do. NRO innovation comes in many forms to include
using existing capabilities differently, developing new apps
for our space and ground systems, and developing the new
capabilities critical to closing intelligence gaps.
We are also working with our mission partners to ensure we
fully leverage commercial products, services, and capabilities.
The NRO is a small, flat, end-to-end organization, fully
capable of successfully delivering an increasingly capable,
integrated, resilient, and affordable architecture.
We have control of every function required, from the R&D
[research and development] that enables us to stay ahead of
targets and threats, to the acquisition of new space and ground
capability, to the operations required to use, adapt, and
upgrade those capabilities to respond to new and changing
mission imperatives in the field.
We are performing extremely well. All 15 of our major
system acquisitions are ``green,'' meaning they are meeting or
exceeding cost, schedule, and performance metrics. This year,
we received our eighth consecutive clean financial management
audit, demonstrating our ability to properly manage all
resources entrusted to us. And we continue to improve our
collection capabilities and the resiliency to stay ahead of
targets and threats. But staying ahead of the adversaries who
threaten our space capabilities is a challenge. Those
adversaries are making space a priority, investing heavily and
accepting the risk necessary for rapid progress.
The U.S. has not been keeping pace. I believe we have not
made the investment that would indicate space is a priority or
fundamental to the U.S. Our requirements budget and acquisition
processes are disconnected, and none of them moves quickly.
Failure is not well-tolerated, even in the research and
development activities required to keep our space capabilities
relevant and vital, or to improve their resiliency.
National security space is a team sport, and everyone on
the team, those in the executive branch, and in the Congress,
must do all they can to advance its capabilities and improve
its resilience to threats. We must have processes that are
integrated, that move faster, and that demonstrate greater risk
tolerance. We must recommit to space as a national priority and
imperative.
This committee has been out in front trying to drive the
changes required. The NRO is inspired by this committee's
efforts to address the barriers to change and the pace of
change required to advance national security space. The NRO,
and the broader national space community, have people with the
talent, commitment, and passion necessary to take us forward.
We only need to empower and enable them to succeed.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
your continued support of the National Reconnaissance Office,
its people, and its mission.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the
Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Ms. Sapp. The chair now recognizes
Mr. Cardillo for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Cardillo. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and members of the committee. I, too, am pleased to
testify before you today with my distinguished colleagues as a
member of the team of national security professionals.
NGA is the primary provider of geospatial intelligence, or
GEOINT, for the Department of Defense and the intelligence
community. Our support to military services, combatant
commands, and warfighters includes safety in navigation,
precise targeting, disaster recovery, and tailored intelligence
support, just to name a few. I also have the job of being the
Functional Manager for the National System of Geospatial
Intelligence. And I strengthen the overall enterprise by
ensuring that those combatant command needs are met through
future overhead architectures. More specifically, the GEOINT
enterprise capability document which serves as a framework to
translate those needs into the key enterprise functions and
capabilities that our analysts require to resolve our most
vexing intelligence challenges.
Now, global persistent GEOINT provides an architecture to
monitor these intelligence challenges, enables NGA to provide
national and tactical leaders the intelligence and early
warning needed for decision advantage. It leverages the
exquisite capabilities of the National Reconnaissance Office to
allow the combatant commands to hold strategic targets at risk.
It also integrates the capabilities of our international
partners to fill gaps in our enterprise.
Now, the explosion of data has driven the GEOINT discipline
beyond the limits of human interpretation and explanation. By
combining all of the data now available to us, and with the use
of algorithms, automated processing, machine-to-machine
learning, and artificial intelligence, we believe we can
automate as much as 75 percent or more of the rote tasks we
perform today. This will free our analysts to spend more time
and focus on those hard intelligence problems. Getting to that
point will require significant investments in our IT
[information technology] architecture, as well as in our
research and development.
Not only is that data exploding, conservative estimates
over the next 10 years predict that over 9,000 commercial
satellites will be launched compared to fewer than 1,500 in the
last 10 years. Accordingly, NGA will partner with the NRO to
engage with and access the most mature of these new space via
the commercial GEOINT activity. Through it, we will identify
and evaluate emerging commercial GEOINT data and services
against those needs that we capture and maintain.
In closing, the national security space enterprise is vital
to NGA's ability to provide advantage to warfighter commanders
and policymakers, to give them the decision space and the
operational time they need to do their job. Timely, relevant,
and accurate GEOINT is only possible through the combined
efforts of the IC [intelligence community], the Department of
Defense, emerging industry, and allied partners.
I am happy to address any questions you might have and I am
pleased to be here. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cardillo can be found in the
Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Cardillo. Mr. Hill, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today here with my distinguished
colleagues.
In the months ahead, understanding and addressing the
implications of the growing threats in space is critical as
this administration prepares the President's new national
security strategy, and the national defense strategy, and as
Congress carries out its responsibilities for oversight and
funding of the programs and activities necessary to realize
those strategies.
No less important, strategic success requires increased
resources, an end to defense budget caps, an end to the years-
long pattern of extended continuing resolutions, and a return
to strategy-focused resourcing. Today, we consider space
security in an era when Russia and China present anti-access/
area denial [A2/AD] strategies intended to prevent or counter
U.S. intervention in crises or conflicts, and to undercut our
ability to secure our interests.
Diplomatic solutions remain our preferred option to
settling the differences that divide nations. But American
diplomatic influence rests on the credibility and capability of
our military power, which is fundamental to deterrence and to
the confidence of our allies in knowing that they do not have
to submit to the coercive pressures of large and powerful
neighbors.
America's space posture underwrites deterrence by enabling
the U.S. military to project power globally, respond to crises
rapidly, strike swiftly and precisely, and command forces in
multiple theaters simultaneously. Potential adversaries know
well our reliance on space systems that many perceive as
vulnerable, leading to an unstable situation in which some have
concluded that in times of conflict, attacking U.S. military
space systems may make an irresistible and most tempting
choice.
Disabusing them of such misguided notions is a strategic
priority. That is why, in the Department of Defense, we are
making such a concerted effort to strengthen the mission
assurance of our space capabilities, and to deny aggressors the
benefits of attacks in space. We are changing our investments
and operations, and increasing our partnering with commercial
entities and allies. More importantly, we are changing
attitudes by recognizing that space is a warfighting domain and
preparing ourselves to deter conflict in space and prevail if
deterrence fails.
Finally, I want to recognize this committee's priority on
strengthening national security space organization, management,
and leadership. This question has the attention of the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. They expect to be
presented with sound analysis and a full range of options, and
they mean for us to meet the deadline of reporting to Congress
this June.
In conclusion, I want to thank this committee for keeping
the challenges of securing space before the public. I look
forward to working together to ensure that we have the right
strategy and resources, and the necessary programs, posture,
and organizational structures to sustain deterrence, to prevail
if deterrence fails, and to increase the incentives nations
have to settling their differences by peaceful means. Thank
you.
And I would add, as the person acting in the job that Mr.
Kitay will be doing, nobody is happier to have him come in than
I am. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
Appendix on page 79.]
Mr. Rogers. I hear you. Thank you, Mr. Hill.
I recognize myself first for questions. This will be a
question for anybody who is willing to swing at it. We passed a
law about 10 years ago that directed how the Operationally
Responsive Space [ORS] Office would be run. And I have heard
instead of being streamlined, ORS options are still forced to
go through the traditional Pentagon processes, including the
Defense Space Council [DSC]. So rather than a small number of
decisionmakers focused on moving fast with respect to
operationally responsive requirements and acquisition, the
recent decision meeting of the ORS program included over 60
attendees, with 54 more than we had envisioned. To me, this
example is indicative of the extremely fragmented space
organization and bureaucratic kudzu--my word--you have got to
be from the south to know what kudzu is--that comes in and
strangles out the life of the DOD space programs. It is a
situation where everyone can say ``no,'' but no one can say
``yes.''
So how do we fix that? General Raymond, swing first.
General Raymond. I will swing first. I am familiar with
kudzu.
Mr. Rogers. You are recognized.
General Raymond. Chairman, thanks for the question. Sixty
people were not involved in that decision. As you stated, the
ORS EXCOM [executive committee] law is pretty clear. There are
six ORS EXCOM members by law. The PDSA [Principal DOD Space
Advisor] has the ability to designate others that are critical
to that decision.
In this case, I wasn't in the room, but my understanding is
that those six were the voting members, plus two or three
others, that was it. It is under the framework of a larger DSC,
but the decisionmakers were the eight- or nine-person level,
those were the voting members and the decision actually went
pretty quick.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I understand that there were six voting
members, but weren't there 60 people in the room?
General Raymond. Yes, there were 60 people in the room, but
there is also some goodness in transparency of having others
there. They didn't vote, they didn't influence the decision,
they were there. I will tell you, after those folks make that
decision, a lot of those folks then have to be the ones that go
execute that decision to make sure they have a common
understanding. So it was a very small number of folks that was
consistent with the legislation that was passed for a small,
tight decision-making process for ORS EXCOM. And I am pretty
comfortable that it was a pretty rapid decision.
Mr. Rogers. So six people were the decisionmakers?
General Raymond. As I mentioned to you, there were six that
were by law, and then there was a couple others that added by
the----
Mr. Rogers. So there were eight people?
General Raymond. I wasn't in the room, but it was small
numbers.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Six to eight people?
Betty Sapp, do you have to have six to eight people to make
decisions on acquisition process programs with your
organization?
Ms. Sapp. I have at least two people to make decisions, one
on the IC side and one on the DOD side. There are a lot of
people, as you mentioned, who review the package of
documentation for sufficiency before it gets to those
decisionmakers. And, again, there is a whole lot of staff on
the IC side, there is a whole lot of staff on the DOD side. So
a lot of people look at it before it even gets on the calendar
for the decisionmakers.
Mr. Rogers. The people that look at it, do they have the
authority to stop it or say no?
Ms. Sapp. Yeah, the authority to stall it.
Mr. Rogers. Is that the case with the ORS, General Raymond?
Those other people, can they slow it down or stop it?
General Raymond. My understanding is they do not have a
vote in that process. They have the--as by law, the----
Mr. Rogers. How about the lead-up process to get to that
room, before it gets to that room for decisionmaking.
General Raymond. The PDSA schedules the Defense Space
Council, and it is done relatively routinely, and it was done
pretty quickly in this process. I didn't sense a slowdown on
this.
Mr. Rogers. Anybody else want a swing at it? All right.
Mr. Hill. Chairman, I will give you a comment as one of
those nonvoting people who was in the room.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Hill. What the Principal DOD Space Advisor also did
was, she used that to tee up a decision that is also necessary,
which is the long-term solution for weather--so ORS is an
important gap in the ORS program that was before us. An
important gap [inaudible] that General Hyten had put forward
and had been brought in the Air Force. That went pretty
quickly. The discussion also then said to everybody are we also
moving on the requirements process for the longer term, which
she used that effectively in that respect.
Mr. Rogers. Great. In the testimony to the SASC [Senate
Armed Services Committee] earlier this week, General Goldfein
talked about the need to integrate space. The Joint Staff is
who is responsible for overall space integration forces. On
that Joint Staff, there are 11 Air Force general officers. Of
those 11 general officers, how many space professionals are
included? Anybody want to guess? It would be zero. Do you know
how many are pilots? That would be nine. If we look at the
specific combatant command, according to EUCOM [U.S. European
Command] there are over 28,000 Air Force personnel supporting
EUCOM. And how many of those 28,000 are dedicated to work space
issues? That would be two.
We do need to integrate space. I completely agree with
General Goldfein on that with the air, and our land and sea,
and cyber obligations. It is what combatant commanders do. But
they are also designed to fight and win wars in a joint manner.
So General Buck, how do we integrate space capabilities
better into our war plans and combatant commands? To me, that
starts with people, and I am interested in your perspective.
General Buck. Thank you. I agree with you. I would like to
get more space officers, general officers on the Joint Staff.
But the chief's very focused on developing joint officers, and
I think that is a focus area for us as well. When we look
across the enterprise, you look at United States Strategic
Command, we have two space officers working in joint jobs at
U.S. Strategic Command. I am in a joint billet myself as
commander of JFCC Space.
The way we--I serve as--my JSpOC [Joint Space] Operations
Center at Vandenberg, serves as space coordinating authority
for the combatant command, so they have reach-back authority
back to get those space effects out to theater.
As far as developing joint operations, General Raymond, I
think we are doing a pretty good job, and that is a focus area
as we go forward.
General Raymond. I would say, Chairman Rogers, you bring up
a great point. The challenges that we face as a Nation today
are transregional, if not global, multidomain and
multifunctional. They are not confined to a line on the map. It
is not just one geographic commander's responsibility; it is
pretty much all the combatant commanders' responsibility. Each
combatant commander has what is called a coordinating authority
for space. Each of those combatant commanders has delegated
that authority down to the CFACCs [combined force air component
commanders], or the air component of that. In the air
components around the globe, we probably have a senior space
officer called the director of space forces. We have--and
General Goldfein testified to this. He was the space
coordinating authority at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] at the
time. We have a senior space officer called the director of
space forces. He has a staff of about five. And then in every
single division in the AOC [air operations center], we have
space professionals embedded in those divisions.
So what we have done is prioritized putting the weight of
effort in those AOCs where the combatant commander has
designated that authority, too. And that is where we do that
multidomain integration work, that is the hub of that
multidomain integration work.
Mr. Rogers. You mentioned that General Goldfein, at one
time, was the space advisor?
General Raymond. No, sir, he was the CFACC, the Air Force's
component commander for CENTCOM. And in that role, the CENTCOM
commander delegates to him the authority called the space
coordinating authority. And his AOC, where he operated out of,
is that multidomain center that integrates air, space, and
cyber into that fight, and that is where we focus a significant
portion of our space operations.
Mr. Rogers. General Buck, you were going to say something.
General Buck. I am sorry to interrupt. I will say that
probably in CENTCOM, we have the preponderance of space
officers in CENTCOM right now. That is our weight of effort.
And if you look at CENTCOM right now, in the director of
space force office we probably have 8, maybe 10 space officers
in the director of space force offices there. But what is a
real win for us, when not just we have a director of space
force office there, but when we embed space officers in ISRD
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance division] and
COD [combat operations division] and CPD [combat planning
division], that is a win; when we start not being an add-on,
but we are baked into the processes over there. And I think we
are doing better. Our focus right now is on CENTCOM, but I will
tell you, sir, we are getting better in PACOM [U.S. Pacific
Command] and EUCOM across the board.
Mr. Rogers. Great. The chair recognizes the ranking member
for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to focus
in my questioning on how crowded space is and how it is going
to get a lot more crowded. Mr. Cardillo mentioned in his
testimony on page 5 that in the last 10 years, we saw something
like 1,500 satellites go up, but in the next 10 years,
something like 9,000. That is 2\1/2\ satellites a day going up
in space. That is amazing. But we have seen launches like in
India recently that they put up 100 sats [satellites] just in
one launch. So as space gets more crowded, it gets more
treacherous. General Buck mentioned in his testimony, it used
to be that the main threat we faced was debris; now we face
traffic, we may face threats. So I am particularly interested
in this idea of the nonmilitary space traffic management.
Again, I understand, General Raymond, you embarked on a pilot
program with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] on that?
General Raymond. Thank you, Ranking Member Cooper. We have.
As I testified before to this panel, I share your concern;
space is clearly congested and contested, but in this case, on
the congested side. General Buck and his team track 23,000
objects a day, take about 400,000 observations a day to keep
track of all that, act as the space traffic control for the
world and keeps the domain safe for all.
It is very important, and I think General Buck will agree
with me, I will pass it to him here, but it is very important,
for national security purposes, that we have the ability to
have radars, to task those radars, to collect the data for
those radars, to be able to maintain the awareness that we need
for that domain. However, I don't think we need to be the
organization that makes the notifications around the world and
acts as the traffic cop.
So I have met with the FAA administrator a couple months
ago, and asked if he would join us in developing a pilot
program, if you will, to see if we could inform this going
forward. General Buck has the lead on pulling that together.
And, David, if you want to give an update on where we are.
General Buck. Thank you, General Raymond.
I am really proud of the team and how far we have come with
the FAA. I have talked to Dr. Nield directly, and we have
agreed jointly to begin that pilot program. I expect that pilot
program to begin this summer, probably August timeframe.
I do agree with General Raymond, there are some aspects of
the space traffic management that are not military, inherently
military. And we could load-shed them to a civil agency.
Things--safety of flight, debris management, norms of behavior.
I don't think those are inherently military. I think it is
important to make a distinction, too, between what is space
traffic management and what is space situational awareness. For
me, as a warfighter, I need space situational awareness; I need
to know what an object is, where it is going, what its
capabilities are, what its vulnerabilities are, those types of
things.
What I don't need to be doing, I don't think, are things
like notifications for conjunction assessment and norms of
behavior. And I think that is better suited for a civil agency,
and I think that is where we are going, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Let me add some color to your remarks. General
Raymond said in a very calm fashion, we keep space safe, or
something like that. We are protecting other countries' $1
billion satellites from a piece of shrapnel that might be
traveling at 33,000 miles an hour, but could destroy the
machine, and for that, we get not even a thank-you note. You
know, it is kind of amazing that we provide this magnificent
worldwide service and little appreciation. Plus, as you said,
when we consider load-shedding, it is a burden on our folks
that doesn't necessarily need to be borne by them.
General Raymond. Other people--not all countries--some
countries do send us thank-you notes, do talk a lot more to us,
others don't. We are really doing it because we want to keep
the space domain safe for all to use, including us. And so that
is the emphasis behind that. We need to be able to operate in
space, and it is our way of helping to make sure that we can do
that.
Mr. Cooper. But it is also an essential truth-telling
function. Like, if you look at the downing of the Malaysian
airliner over the Ukraine, there was worldwide debate and
dispute over what caused that plane to crash. And even though
we have excellent air traffic control in most parts of the
world, there was still a significant dispute. And when it comes
to separating news from fake news and propaganda, you know, I
think in the space domain, it would be nice if we established a
sort of gold standard of truth so we would know if it was
debris, we would know if it was something less benign than
that. So I am worried that while I hope the pilot program gets
off to a good start this summer, I hope it will soon be able to
establish a standard, but even with air traffic, we are having
difficulty isolating causes when it should be, with all of our
plane radars and things like that, an easier thing to prove
than it is in space. So I hope we will get on that task.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Lamborn. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for the great service that you provide for our country. And
General Raymond, I am going to follow up on a question we
touched on in our conversation yesterday. With BMC2 [battle
management command and control], I remain concerned about the
prospect of repeating the same mistakes we made with JMS [Joint
Space Operations Center Mission System], whereby lab prototypes
and custom government development efforts were prioritized over
utilizing proven commercial capabilities, which, unfortunately,
led to huge scheduling and cost overruns. Can I get your
commitment that you will prioritize the utilization of
commercial capabilities to the maximum extent practicable
first, and then fill in with government development for the
truly unique military requirements that don't reside in the
commercial marketplace?
General Raymond. I am a big proponent of commercial data. I
have said for many years in front of this committee that we
need all sources of data. We need data from commercial, all the
way up to the high-end intelligence data. And on what our
strategy going forward on the battle management command and
control system that you reference is to do just that, is to use
commercial companies in a consortium to help us develop those
requirements.
It is analogous to the iPhone. You've got the iPhone and
then you have apps. And we want to have open standards and open
consortium so all players can play in feeding us that data and
to do so quickly. We have to get it on the floor. We have to
get it in the National Space Defense Center as quick as we
possibly can.
Therefore, what we did was, we switched the program, and I
gave that to the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, who has
already done this. They have already taken the capability,
built an open-architected system, has a consortium approach,
and it has worked very well. So we are fast-forwarding this
capability by giving it to the folks that can move rapidly,
that have already done it in another capability in the air
domain. And what this will allow us to do is also get at that
multidomain integration.
So the whole purpose of this program going forward is to
enable a lot of commercial data and other source data to be
integrated to give General Buck the data that he needs to have
to do the mission that he is responsible for.
General Buck. If I could just make a comment along the same
lines. Ranking Member Cooper stressed the importance of domain
awareness. It is really important that we ingest non-
traditional data into our space surveillance network as well.
That is a hard thing to do, but we are making progress. And I
think this summer some time, we are going to bring out a
capability called the non-traditional data preprocessor that
will begin to allow ingestion of commercial data into our space
surveillance network. So I think that is a move in the right
direction for domain awareness and non-traditional ingestion,
like commercial sensors, if you will.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you both.
Changing gears, I have heard some rumors about insufficient
funding for GPS [Global Positioning System] III in the fiscal
year 2018 request. What are we doing to keep this important
program on track?
General Raymond. So Congressman, we have not submitted the
2018 budget going forward. We have, in my opinion, a pretty
healthy GPS constellation in that we have got 31 operational
satellites on orbit. We actually have 37 on orbit, 31 are
operational. We are moving forward with the [GPS] OCX [Next
Generation Operational Control System] program. Although that,
as many folks have testified previously, would not be the model
program that we would hold up as the standard. And we are
clearly not out of the woods yet. And I won't be comfortable
until that capability is operational on the OPS [operations]
floor for General Buck's team to be able to operate.
So I am pretty comfortable where we are with a relatively
healthy GPS constellation that is on orbit and progress being
made on the ground control----
Mr. Lamborn. What does that mean for the budget for next
year?
General Raymond. The budget is going to be released next
week. And so, I would prefer not to speculate on what might be
released in the budget until that gets released.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Ms. Sapp, in 40 seconds, I am going to
give you a huge question, but you referred to how we don't have
the commitment we need for space going forward. What can we do
better as a country to show that commitment and that resolve?
Ms. Sapp. I think we really need help on the budget side,
not just investment in space, but the ability to use the
investment. As we are fielding new things to improve our
resiliency, it was very hard to move ahead with new things
under our continuing resolution. It is not allowed. So that is
just slowing the pace of progress, even after we get it out of
the executive branch, which is no mean feat. So you could help
a lot on that front.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much.
General Raymond. I would echo that as well on behalf of Air
Force Space Command.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Garamendi, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to forego the usual GPS backup. I
assume that is moving along, and if not, there will be a piece
of legislation that will move it along perhaps even faster.
Not exactly sure how far to go with this. I represent Beale
Air Force Base. There are certain activities going on, I am not
sure we should be talking about them here. But I would like to
take that up, because I think it integrates with most of what
is being discussed here.
Just in general, the integration of information from a
variety of sources, I think this is something that is happening
just in general. Your views on that progress?
General Raymond. In general, I think it is going really
well. And in fact, as largely the model that I use to make the
decision to go with the approach that we talked about in the
battle management command and control conversation we just had
with Congressman Lamborn. I would be more than happy to talk
more in the closed session with you.
Mr. Garamendi. I think I will let it go at that point. Oh,
no, I have one more. We picked this up yesterday in going on--a
plan for the next decade of critical assets that need to be
developed and deployed, and the approximate cost of those. I
think we need to have a long-term vision here about where we
are going to deploy perhaps the most essential asset of all,
which is our financial resources. I have not seen such a
display of those things that we--that you, the military in
general, and certainly the Air Force specifically in the space
area, need, want, must have. I think it is really essential
that we look at that. There will be insufficient money for
everything, particularly if the tax cuts are real.
And, so, we are going to need to make some tough decisions
about prioritization, and that means the long view, 10 years
minimum, so that we can say, Okay, these things will be funded,
those are not, or we are going to fund all of it and not fund
something else. So Mr. Chairman, if we could move in that
direction so we can have that long-term vision.
General Raymond. Could I--I would welcome an opportunity to
come back to you and walk you through the Space Enterprise
Vision. That is our longer-term vision for space. It is done in
very close partnership, it is an integrated vision with the
NRO. I want to take a moment--I do this every time I can, and I
am not saying it because Betty Sapp is here--Betty Sapp is a
huge partner for us.
Mr. Garamendi. Two minutes, eight seconds. Go for it.
General Raymond. But I would be more than welcome to come
back and walk you through that vision, walk you through the
priorities as we see them and inform you on that.
Mr. Garamendi. We heard some of this yesterday from General
Goldfein about different directions, or at least a different
set of priorities for the future. Much of it involved your
work, so I wanted to get a fix on that and other things that we
may not, but is a priority. Thank you for that.
I didn't mean to cut you off, I really meant you had 2
minutes and 8 seconds to answer.
General Raymond. No, I didn't want to take your time. I
wanted to see if you had more questions.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The chair recognizes Mr. Bridenstine for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When you think
about the consortium, General Raymond, that you talked about
for the BMC2 piece of the National Space Defense Center. That
consortium, of course, is trying to rapidly develop a
capability where we are currently maybe lagging behind. And, of
course, I think everybody on this committee fully supports that
effort.
In the meantime, is there an SSA [space situational
awareness] gap that needs to be filled that could be--
commercial could help with? And maybe General Buck, if you
would like to answer that as well.
General Buck. Well, thank you, sir. Good seeing you again.
Mr. Bridenstine. Always.
General Buck. I mentioned a non-traditional data
preprocessor. I think that is a step in the right direction. I
think you will agree with me, the ability to ingest some of
those non-tradi--that helps. What also we have is, we have SBSS
[Space Based Space Surveillance] that is online--on orbit right
now, that is being extended. The life on that is extended past
its--I think the dates are classified, but that is going to be
extended, and plus ORS-5 [Operationally Responsive Space 5]
gives us, provides us that gap-filler capability as well. So I
think those three things together give us the capability to
fulfill that gap.
General Raymond. Just as a general statement, more data is
better, from a South Carolina kudzu guy. More data is better.
We need data across the full spectrum, and we do get that
across the full spectrum. The other thing that we have done is
develop partnerships, and we have got--don't quote me on the
numbers--over 50 or 60 SSA sharing agreements with partners. It
is largely one-way sharing, but there are two-way sharing
pieces. I would like to make that stronger. When we get the new
JMS system up with more capacity and more ability to ingest
that data, that will take off. But more is better.
Mr. Bridenstine. More is better. I would like to maybe
continue on what Ranking Member Cooper was talking about, this
effort to create a partnership with the FAA for space
situational awareness specifically. Can you share with us how
that is being funded? And is it coming out of your budget? Is
it coming out of their budget? Is there something Congress
should do here to help?
General Buck. My understanding is there is going to be a
fiscal year 2018 budget request coming out of the FAA. But I am
hesitant to say that because I am getting in the FAA's lane a
little bit. But I think there is a funding request for 2018
that is coming out of the FAA, sir, but I don't have the
specifics on that.
Mr. Bridenstine. That is good to hear. Again, I know that
is not your lane. I don't want to get you in trouble, but I
think this committee would be very supportive of that
partnership. Right now, we have heard testimony over and over
again how we are providing free situational awareness to the
entire world, and to all the commercial partners, and at the
same time, the tasking that it has imposed on our warfighters
at the JSpOC has been problematic, to the extent I hear this
from other Members of Congress that they want to--and I heard
you use the word ``load-shed''--they want to load-shed the
mission, but they do not want to load-shed the funding. And I
want everybody on this committee to know, the Air Force was
never funded to provide space situational awareness to the
entire world and commercial operators for free. That has not
ever been in your mission description. And yet, that is what
you are doing by default out of goodness of your hearts. I say
the goodness out of your hearts, but the reality is we need to
protect our own assets, and we all know that.
So I just want to reiterate the fact that if we can create
a space situational awareness environment that can be led by a
civilian agency and free your manpower to actually be focused
on fighting and winning wars, I think everybody on this panel
would fully support that effort. And if we need to do an
appropriation, I think that that is something we should be
advocating for. So with that--go ahead.
General Raymond. I agree with everything you said. I just
also want to make sure that we state the criticality that the
national security space mission needs to make sure that they
have the space situational awareness.
Mr. Bridenstine. Absolutely.
General Raymond. So I agree with you that there is a role
here for others, but it is critical to our national security
that we also maintain the capability to have that awareness.
Mr. Bridenstine. One hundred percent, Air Force must and
will always do space situational awareness, and, of course,
space defense; I 100 percent agree with that. It is the--not
just the conjunctional analysis, but it is the warning that
takes a lot of the manpower away from your----
General Raymond. I am with you.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. All right. With that, Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Larsen, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I was going to jump in on
this, but given that I am the ranking member of the Aviation
Subcommittee on Transportation, and we are writing an FAA bill,
I guess would be reluctant to have the satellite-tragedy-to-be
tracking dumped on the FAA as well. And you are not saying that
is happening, General Buck, you are not saying that. I am more
concerned that Congress gets out over the tips of its skis on
this and assigns it without money or help; rather, negotiating
out a solution is a better idea. I think it is probably a
better place for it, in fact. But one question I am sure the
FAA would have, I would have as the ranking member is, What
advantage does the FAA--what can it get from it from actually
doing the activity as opposed to just another set of
activities?
General Buck. My discussions with Dr. Nield and his staff
is that they see this as a real opportunity to do things that
are more like air, air-centric, establishing norms of behavior,
establish patterns for safety of flight in space. So they--not
to speak for FAA, but my conversations with them have led me to
believe that there is goodness, they see some goodness in this
and they are anxious to take on specific aspects of the space
traffic management mission.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, that is great. I look forward to hearing
from Dr. Nield and from you at some point. I will talk to staff
here about getting you all together to discuss this, so we
have, I wouldn't call it adult oversight on this, I would never
accuse us of doing that sometimes, but certainly some
oversight. There is a lot of debate going on right now in the
FAA about reorganizing it overall. And tossing this into the
mix is--it is going to get done, putting that in context of all
the other things we are trying to do at the FAA is important.
That is my main point. Thanks a lot. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Raymond, the Air Force has specifically expressed
that rocket system development is a better way to maintain our
dominance in space. Therefore, is it still the Air Force's
approach to fund a rocket system versus only rocket components?
Would you tell us how you see the government collaborating with
industry in funding the rocket system development. What is your
vision of how industry should meet the Air Force's evaluation
criteria?
General Raymond. Thank you for the question.
The Air Force's strategy remains threefold. First of all,
it is critical that we have assured access to space. You have
to have that. The second component is that we would like to
support competition. We see the benefits of competition in the
launch industry. And the third aspect of that is we would like
to get off the RD-180 engine. That strategy remains the same.
We are investing in launch services. We don't procure rockets,
we procure launch services and that strategy remains the same
and is on track.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General. General Raymond, I
understand that price is an important consideration in any
procurement effort, but in my experience, other factors are
also important. Given the cost of many of the payloads and how
essential they are to our national security, can you discuss
how the Air Force evaluates and includes, in its procurement
decisions, qualitative items such as reliability or maintaining
the industrial base?
General Raymond. All that comes into play, it is not just
cost based; it is a full-spectrum analysis. There is a pretty
high bar that we go through for certification. We would not put
on contract a launch if we didn't think that that was going to
be assured to get on to space. It is a full range, and it is
mission by mission; some missions are more complex than others.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Anybody on this could answer this. It is
my understanding that the Space Based Infrared System, SBIRS,
is the current and primary method to detect ballistic missile
defense threats, and we are dependent on SBIRS; we have been
dependent on SBIRS since the 1970s. Are there other systems
envisioned to complement SBIRS? That may be for the classified
brief. How robust are those other systems that supplement
SBIRS? How vital is Buckley Air Force Base and SBIRS to our
space mission?
General Raymond. Let me just say SBIRS is a national
security priority. It provides strategic missile warning for
our Nation. It is probably one of the most critical systems
that we operate. The wing up at Buckley, the 460th Space Wing
led by Colonel Dave Miller is a premier organization. It is
extremely critical to the success of that mission area.
I was just up there a month or so ago and they are doing
great work. I would--as we look to the future, we look to make
the constellations more resilient. And I would have further
conversations with you in the closed session to get into more
specifics.
Mr. Coffman. General Buck, in your testimony, you reference
a transition of training our satellite officers from a
technician-based focus to a warfighter-based focus. I think
this depicts the increasing counterspace efforts of our
adversaries and the threats they pose to our national security.
Would you go into detail regarding the training to counter
these threats, and the transition to a warfighter focus?
General Buck. What I was referring to was the Space Mission
Force construct that we have implemented in the wings. The 50th
Space Wing is complete with a Space Mission Force transition.
Currently the 21st Space Wing and the 50th Space Wing are
undergoing the same transformation.
What this does in the Space Mission Force construct for 4
months at a time, we have space crews that are in the fight,
they are focused on the current fight, while the other portion
of the crew force at these wings are focused on advanced
training, tactics, techniques, and procedure development for
the future fight, and how they can codify those into their
doctrine. So that is what I was referring to. And I am really
proud of the progress they have made and the way ahead and
General Raymond, some of that is in your OT&E [organize, train,
and equip] lane.
General Raymond. I would also add, it is broader than just
space for space sake. So we are also integrating our space
operators into joint exercises, into exercises called Red Flag,
into war games that are joint and international. We just
developed a Space Flag construct. So it is developing depth of
space expertise, but then also working the multidomain
integration piece, because this isn't space for space sake.
This is integrating airspace and cyber for the goodness of our
Nation and we are tackling both portions.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Hanabusa, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Raymond, I have got to admit, when I see Air Force,
I have been thinking about missile defense as well as your role
in the triad system. And reading your testimony, it has raised
a different set of questions for me. First of all, what I
couldn't get past was this one paragraph, and if you could
explain this to me, in your testimony at page 3, you talk about
the first 7 months of your command, you aggressively pushed
implementation of the--basically of the AFSPC [Air Force Space
Command], and the National Reconnaissance--NRO Space Enterprise
Vision with a new space warfighting construct. The warfighting
construct is the framework for turning the Space Enterprise
Vision into reality. What I am interested in is what is this
warfighting construct that you are talking about in terms of
space?
General Raymond. Thank you, and it is nice to meet you.
Ms. Hanabusa. It is nice to meet you.
General Raymond. The Space Enterprise Vision is, as I
mentioned earlier, is the vision that is a shared vision
between us and the National Reconnaissance Office. And I will
pass this over to Betty Sapp as well, but it is the shared
vision for moving forward on how do you make the domain--our
architectures more resilient to be able to survive the
contested domain that we find today. The warfighting construct
really talks about several things that we have talked about
this morning. It takes that vision and builds a CONOPS [concept
of operations]. How do we plan to operate together? And so that
is the foundation of this. We have worked very closely with the
NRO to develop that CONOP, so we know how we are going to work
together.
There is another layer, that is also the part that we just
talked about on developing and training our forces; the Space
Mission Force construct is part of that. There is another layer
on it, is how do you develop the partnerships that we need,
both interagency with our commercial partners and with our
allies, to be able to respond to the strategic environment that
we face today.
Ms. Hanabusa. Before you pass me on, let me explain to you
why, why my curiosity. Because in Mr. Hill's testimony--maybe I
will bypass Ms. Sapp. No offense. But to ask and take it to Mr.
Hill is, his testimony speaks about the, quote/unquote, our
threats that we hear about all the time in here, Russia and
China. He also speaks about A2/AD and the concerns that we
have.
And he says, ``Both will continue to pursue a full range of
antisatellite weapons as a means to reduce U.S. military
effectiveness.'' So what I thought you were going to tell me
about the war construct was that it was in line of that--in
other words, where we think about the oceans, the land, and so
forth, this is another layer of, quote, war that we must be
ready to fight.
And I, quite candidly, I am not sure when you have Russia
and China, they can undermine everything in terms of
diplomatic--this nice kind of cooperation that we are all
talking about here. I really would like to know, to the extent
that you can tell me here today, what exactly does this all
mean in terms of our military, and what do you need, when you
come to see us, in order to fight that battle?
General Raymond. First of all, we don't talk about a war in
space. We talk about a war that extends into space. We are
not--this isn't space for space sake.
Ms. Hanabusa. Is that something that is unrealistic? I
mean, is it conceivable that we could actually have, quote,
``war in space''? In other words, could our satellites be the
first target? Because once you take out our satellites, you
have basically destroyed our effective communication mechanism,
so could they not be a first line of offense against us?
General Raymond. If you look at what some of our potential
adversaries are talking about, they are talking about a full
range of capabilities that range everywhere from reversible
jamming of communication and GPS satellites like we have seen,
all the way up to the direct ascent ASAT [antisatellite weapon]
that we saw from China in 2007.
Our posture is, we want to deter that. We have no interest
in fighting that fight, and as I said, one way to do that is be
prepared for it. The space warfighting construct develops the
partnerships, the plans, the concept of operations, the
training needed to be able to respond.
Ms. Hanabusa. In the minutes, seconds that I have left, Mr.
Hill, would you like to comment on it, because it is your
testimony that triggered my line of----
Mr. Hill. Certainly. And I say in my testimony, there is
scant evidence that anybody is looking for a war in space. It
is about the terrestrial issues that they have, political
differences that countries have, and it is their conclusion
that if they want a military option, they have to be able to
act in space as well. And as you are suggesting, that could be
early.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for being here and for just all you do for the cause of
human freedom.
General Raymond, just a quick, direct question. Do you
believe it is fair to say that space has been weaponized?
General Raymond. I believe it is fair to say that space is
a contested domain just like--and it is a warfighting domain
just like air, land, and sea.
Mr. Franks. Do you believe we need a more robust defensive
space sensor layer to adequately identify the latest in
emerging threats to our space assets?
General Raymond. I think it is imperative that we have a
level of domain awareness that is required to operate just like
in any other warfighting domain.
Mr. Franks. Should this U.S. space--should we treat space
as a warfighting domain?
General Raymond. Space is a warfighting domain just like
air, land, and sea, and we need to treat it that way.
Mr. Franks. Yeah. Should the U.S. develop defensive
capabilities to counter kinetic attacks against our space
security architecture?
General Raymond. It is an imperative, in my opinion, that
we develop resilient architectures to be able to operate in the
contested environment that we face today.
Mr. Franks. General Buck, do you have any thoughts on that?
General Buck. Space is a warfighting domain, and if you
look at the other domains, air, land, sea, they have defensive
capabilities. They have other capabilities. We can't afford to
treat space any differently.
Mr. Franks. Is it fair to say that some of our near-peer
adversaries' offensive space capabilities have outpaced our
ability to defend our space assets? And I might ask the two of
you.
General Raymond. I would like to have that conversation in
closed.
Mr. Franks. I got you. Makes sense.
All right. Do you see--and I will throw this out to the
entire panel. Do you see value in establishing an annual
capstone training exercise, sort of the equivalence of the Red
Flag, only, say, a Space Flag event for space operators?
General Buck. We have had our first Space Flag this year.
Although it is nascent, we are having the conversation, and we
are moving in the right direction. I see this first Space Flag
as the first of many to follow. General Raymond.
General Raymond. I agree.
Mr. Franks. I sometimes----
General Raymond. As I mentioned earlier, that is important,
but there is the other aspect of it that it has got to be, how
do you integrate air, space, and cyber together, and how do you
integrate it with not just air, space, and cyber, but with the
land and the sea, and so there is other opportunities, in
addition to Space Flag, that provides that capability as well.
General Buck. And those are space-specific Schriever War
Games. Those are the global series, on and on. The JSpOC and
the NSDC [National Space Defense Center] participated in north
of 70 exercises last year, integrating space into the larger
fight, so I am really proud of that effort.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I think I will probably leave the
rest of my questions for the classified session. I thank all of
you so much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
California, Mr. Carbajal, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
of you for being here today.
I represent Vandenberg Air Force Base, and recently had the
great privilege of joining General Buck on a tour of the
facility, the JSpOC facility in addition to other facilities
there. I guess, for my colleagues and just for me to--for it to
sink in, you could never hear it enough, could you share,
General Buck, the contribution of the Vandenberg Air Force Base
JSpOC to our national space strategy and capability, and
perhaps close with how that relates, or what the nexus is to
the new JSpOC in Colorado?
General Buck. Thank you, sir. Good seeing you again.
We have two primary command and control centers. At
Vandenberg Air Force Base, we have the Joint Space Operations
Center. In this operation center, we have our commercial
partners on the OPS [operations] floor, we have our allied
partners, FVEY partners on the OPS floor. They are
doing the day-to-day, heavy lifting support to the terrestrial
fight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FVEY is the abbreviation for ``Five-Eyes,'' an
intelligence alliance involving Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When a combatant commander needs space support, space
effects, they go to the JSpOC, and they provide military
satellite communications, precision navigation and timing, all
those space effects, and they do it better than anybody else.
The National Space Defense Center located at Schriever Air
Force Base is responsible for looking up, protecting the space
joint operating area, if you will. So JSpOC at Vandenberg in
the current fight right now, support to the terrestrial fight;
the National Space Defense Center at Schriever Air Force Base
in Colorado, responsible for protecting and defending the space
joint operating environment.
General Raymond. And I would pile on today that JSpOC is
the operational DOD space command and control facility, period,
dot, and they do spectacular work. I have had the privilege of
being stationed at Vandenberg four times. Second Lieutenant Jay
Raymond showed up there in 1984, and they are absolutely
wonderful airmen and joint--not just airmen, but joint partners
that keep that domain safe for all, provide a critical
capability to all of the warfighters around the globe, and is
the only operational DOD space center that we have today.
Mr. Carbajal. Well, it was extremely impressive, and I just
want to thank General Buck for his being so hospitable and
giving me an opportunity to interface with many of the troops
and many of your command team there. It was a great visit, it
was a great learning opportunity, and I just really appreciate
what you do.
General Buck. Sir, it is our pleasure. Thank you for
joining us, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The chair would like to
ask a few more questions before we go into closed session. Talk
a little bit about launch.
General Raymond, how long do you plan to maintain the Delta
IV, and I would like for you to differentiate between Delta IV
Medium versus Delta IV Heavy, and do you plan to keep the Delta
IV Heavy specifically until a new launch vehicle is certified,
and if so, how?
General Raymond. Yeah. There is three Delta IV Mediums that
are left. The final launch for the Delta IV Medium is scheduled
in fiscal year 2019. We have seven more Delta IV Heavies. Six
of those are national security space launches; one of those is
a NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] launch,
and there is an option for one more. Final launch will be in
fiscal year 2023, and we are comfortable that we will have a
new capability on line to be able to support the requirements
going forward.
Mr. Rogers. You just heard, Ms. Sapp, him make reference to
the national security payloads. How important is it to your
mission to have the Delta IV Heavy or an equivalent available?
Ms. Sapp. It is essential to my mission that they are
available in the near term. I tell you, General Raymond has
mentioned the partnership between us in the NSDC and in
operations. We couldn't have better launch partners than we do
in the Air Force. They have taken care of our mission. We buy
on their contracts. They made sure we had Delta IV Heavy
coverage with a lot of transition margin to get to a new
booster, so we have just been very satisfied with their
support.
Mr. Rogers. You heard General Raymond say that he believes
that by 2023, we will have a replacement certified. I hope so,
too, but if we don't, do you believe that we should let the
Delta IV Heavy go before we have an alternative certified?
Ms. Sapp. I believe we have time to see how the new
programs mature before we cannot go back on the Delta IV Heavy.
I wouldn't carry it in the near term. Again, we have got them
funded through launches in 2023, so we have some time here to
make the right decision for the Nation.
Mr. Rogers. That was a lawyerly response. As a lawyer, I
appreciate that.
Separately, General Raymond, since the Air Force originally
developed its strategy to invest in the development of
commercially viable launch vehicles, there has been another new
entrant in the commercial launch market. Earlier this year,
Blue Origin announced it has started to get commercial
customers for their New Glenn launch vehicle, and maybe they
will even compete for the launch service agreement funding.
Has this changed your strategy, and do you think that
government's role--it is the government's role to build a new
commercial launch vehicle if they are already being built by
the commercial sector?
General Raymond. Chairman Rogers, it doesn't affect our
strategy at all. Our strategy remains three things, as I
mentioned: assured access to space, competition, and get off
the RD-180 engine. Our acquisition strategy is flexible and it
encourages multiple competitors for national security launch
services. I don't see it affecting it at all, and we are not
building commercial launch vehicles.
Mr. Rogers. What do you know about the BE-4's testing
setback that we had in recent days? Was its powerpack
completely destroyed, and how does this impact your schedule?
General Raymond. My understanding, Chairman, is that Blue
Origin has announced that they conducted a test that resulted
in the loss of a powerpack test hardware. Obviously, that
mishap is regrettable, but it isn't unprecedented in the
development of in--isn't uncommon in development efforts.
I think this adds credibility to our strategy to make sure
that there is multiple engines being developed. I think we have
visibility, pretty significant visibility into ULA's [United
Launch Alliance's] processes, although it is ULA's final
ultimate decision, and then once that decision is made,
obviously, the Air Force, as a significant customer of that
launch service, will do its own independent review.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. The chair now recognizes the ranking
member for any final questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Raymond, in your testimony on page 12, you mention
that GPS III SV01 has been completed and is in storage, with an
initial launch capability date set to occur in spring 2018.
That struck me as an unnecessary mothballing of a perfectly
good satellite. Why the delay?
General Raymond. There is a couple of pieces that we are
still working on. One, obviously, we are working on making sure
we can command and control the GPS III satellite with OCX block
phase zero, which will be up by then, and then also there is
work to be done on--integration work to be done with the launch
provider that will launch that satellite.
Mr. Cooper. Is this customary to have a year or more delay
in launching a satellite?
General Raymond. There are satellites that have been in
storage significantly longer than that. It is not uncustomary.
We will launch it when it is safe and ready to do so, and we
can get it onto orbit, and then command and control it. And as
I mentioned earlier today, earlier in the hearing, that today
we have a pretty significant GPS constellation on orbit as we
speak.
Mr. Cooper. So this is not an issue of assured access to
space?
General Raymond. It is an issue of making sure that we can
command and control that capability when it is on orbit, and
then working the final details of being able to--for them to
integrate with the launch vehicle provider that we will launch
it.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the ranking member. The committee will
now go into a brief recess as we move to a secure location for
the classified portion of this briefing.
[Whereupon, at 9:15 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 19, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 19, 2017
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 19, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. General Raymond--there was a recent Washington Post
article which reported on a company called Ligado, which prior to a
restructure was called Lightsquared, and its plan to build a wireless
network with ground and satellite based systems. Have the issues
pertaining to GPS been resolved and what are the economic/national
security risks if we get this wrong?
General Raymond. No, the issues pertaining to Ligado and GPS have
not been resolved. The bottom line is that the preliminary results of
Department of Transportation's Adjacent Band Compatibility Testing
indicates that the proximity of the Ligado proposed network to the
primary GPS L1 frequency band results in interference the Air Force,
Department of Defense and other U.S. government agencies believe is
unacceptable. If we get this wrong, the network will degrade the
performance of numerous GPS-based applications to include but not
limited to important national defense, science, transportation,
agriculture, banking, communications (e.g., broadband wireless &
cellular services), health and safety, and environmental systems. This
will directly impact the economic well-being of the nation and severely
limit the development of GPS applications in the future. The Ligado
proposal is a direct challenge to those applications' use of GPS
technology and is inconsistent with the National Space Policy direction
to sustain the radiofrequency environment in which critical U.S. space
systems operate.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Is it fair to say some of our near-peer adversaries'
offensive space capabilities have outpaced our ability to defend our
space assets?
Do you believe the Air Force as an institution has placed the
appropriate amount of resources and focus on space commensurate to the
current and emerging threats?
Do you see value in establishing an annual capstone training/
exercise, or ``Space Flag'' event for space operators (similar to Red
Flag)?
General Raymond. Near peer adversaries have not outpaced our
ability to defend our space assets today, but I am concerned about the
future. Our adversaries are rapidly developing capabilities that will
be able to hold every U.S. space asset in every orbital regime at risk
in the not too distant future. We need to take action now to address
our vulnerabilities, so your assertion does not become a true statement
in the future.
Unfortunately, the Air Force is facing critical shortfalls in
readiness and modernization in every one of its mission areas; space is
one of them. At the same time we are trying to grow cyber capabilities
and recapitalize fighters, bombers, mobility and nuclear forces, we
must find a way to restructure our space architectures to create
resilient systems that can be better protected and defended as an
enterprise. All of these things are important national priorities. The
Air Force is asking for a 20 percent increase in space funding in the
FY18 budget request and will need similar increases in future years.
However, with all of the budget shortfalls the Air Force faces we have
to consider the possibility that that the Air Force alone cannot afford
to make the investment needed to transform our space enterprise to
operate effectively in a contested environment; we may need to look at
national funding sources that are beyond what the Air Force alone is
able to provide.
Absolutely, the effort is already underway to provide tactical-
level training focused on evolving threats levering knowledge gained
during rounds of experimentation at the National Space Defense Center.
The first Space Flag was conducted 17-21 April 2017 at Schriever AFB,
CO. It was a successful, computer assisted exercise that included four
operational space squadrons, the National Space Defense Center, the
Joint Space Operations Center and several other associated
organizations. Our vision and intent is to grow Space Flag to become
the comprehensive, robust event that trains our Airmen similar to Red
Flag. We will continue building upon the initial Space Flag to create
an environment where the space enterprise can come together and
exercise our toughest scenarios and challenges against a thinking
adversary in a safe and realistic manner.
Mr. Franks. Do you believe it is fair to say space has been
weaponized?
Do you believe we need a more robust defensive sensor layer to
adequately identify the latest and emerging threats to our space
assets?
General Raymond. Space is a contested warfighting domain, just like
land, air, sea and cyberspace. As a nation we need to embrace this
fact. We need to be prepared to use multi-domain capabilities to
protect our space systems. If we fall short protecting against threats
in space, the effect will certainly be felt across all warfighting
domains.
Yes, we need a more robust defensive sensor layer to adequately
address the threat to our space assets. This is one on my top
priorities. Today we are leveraging our existing space surveillance
capabilities and are developing new capabilities such as the Space
Fence, as well as expanding our partnership with the NRO. We also
continue to enhance situational awareness sharing partnerships to
provide us additional space surveillance data. Finally, we are
developing a battle management command and control system which will
allow us to more fully leverage additional data sources from commercial
capabilities to high end intelligence data.
Mr. Franks. Should the U.S. treat space as a warfighting domain?
Should the U.S. develop defensive capabilities to counter kinetic
attacks against our space security architecture?
General Raymond. Yes. I stand by my opening statement to the
committee: ``Today, in no uncertain terms, space is a war fighting
domain just like air, land and sea. Potential adversaries are
developing capabilities to deny us access to and the benefits of the
space domain. Let me be very clear, we do not want a conflict that
extends into space. But one way to keep that from happening is to make
sure that we're prepared for it and be able to fight and win that
conflict if it were to occur.''
We are already investing in systems to improve the space
situational awareness that is foundational for defense to include Space
Based Surveillance System and Geosynchronous Space Situational
Awareness Program and Space Fence. We are also taking steps to build
more on-board and off-board protection capabilities into our future
systems to make them more resilient against both kinetic and non-
kinetic threats.
Mr. Franks. Is it fair to say some of our near-peer adversaries'
offensive space capabilities have outpaced our ability to defend our
space assets?
General Buck. The pace at which potential near-peer adversaries are
pursuing capabilities to deny US advantages in space is certainly
concerning and I see no slowing in the future. Potential adversary
capabilities have yet to eclipse our ability to defend; however, our
architectures and systems were designed in and for an era without such
threats. We must continue to train our forces and field new systems
with an eye to maintain our edge in today's contested, degraded and
operationally-limited environment. And, we must do so faster than our
adversaries can adapt, which means our acquisitions cycles must be
nimble enough to bring capabilities to the fight on operationally-
relevant timelines.
Mr. Franks. Do you believe the Air Force as an institution has
placed the appropriate amount of resources and focus on space
commensurate to the current and emerging threats?
General Buck. We are in the midst of a significant shift in the DOD
space enterprise; moving from a service-provider mindset to operational
warfighter mindset. As we make this shift, we have identified several
areas that require added focus to ensure they meet the demands of
maintaining freedom of action in space. Beyond organizational changes,
these areas include space intelligence support, robust battle
management command and control and space situational awareness
capabilities and ensuring we have the right authorities and rules of
engagement in place. We are making strides in these areas; however, the
budgetary uncertainty driven by sequestration and past shortfalls makes
addressing the challenges more difficult.
Mr. Franks. Do you see value in establishing an annual capstone
training/exercise, or ``Space Flag'' event for space operators (similar
to Red Flag)?
General Buck. Absolutely, yes. Training our space warfighters to
operate in a contested, degraded and operationally-limited environment
is vital. Such advanced training is foundational to our Space Mission
Force construct and underpins our push to normalize operations. As we
normalize space operations, we must also balance the need to stress and
train our own space crew forces with the need to practice how we
synchronize space operations and effects into large-scale exercise
planning and execution.
Mr. Franks. Do you believe it is fair to say space has been
weaponized?
General Buck. We have no desire to weaponize space and we are
working hard to ensure no country believes they can gain an advantage
by extending a conflict to space. A conflict which extends to space is
in no one's best interest and would have drastic and enduring second
and third order economic effects, not just on the U.S., but on the
entire world. But, it is certainly clear that potential adversaries are
developing systems with the sole intent to destroy, deny or degrade DOD
space systems. It's important to understand that like all nations we
have the inherent right of self-defense, so purposeful interference
with space assets vital to our national security will be met by all
necessary means. No one wants a war in space. The best way to avoid
such conflict . . . to deter future adversaries . . . is to always be
prepared to protect and defend unfettered access in, through and from
space.
Mr. Franks. Do you believe we need a more robust defensive sensor
layer to adequately identify the latest and emerging threats to our
space assets?
General Buck. Yes, and what is critical at this juncture is to
ensure the enterprise on the whole is capable of responding to emerging
threats. This includes the right architectures, the right CONOPS and
definitely the capabilities necessary to identify threats in order to
defend our space assets. This is where it is imperative to improve our
capabilities for space intelligence and indications & warnings and
battle management command and control systems.
Mr. Franks. Should the U.S. treat space as a warfighting domain?
General Buck. Yes, space is a warfighting domain, fundamentally no
different that land, air or sea. It is clear by potential adversary
actions that we must be prepared to protect and defend the space joint
operating area. But, there is no space war, just war and normalize
space operations is critical to maintaining freedom of action in,
through and from space.
Mr. Franks. Should the U.S. develop defensive capabilities to
counter kinetic attacks against our space security architecture?
General Buck. Yes, and space situational awareness capabilities are
the cornerstone of defending our space assets. We must continue to
pursue SSA capabilities that go beyond satellite catalog maintenance
and move to joint warfighting battlespace awareness capabilities.
Mr. Franks. Is it fair to say some of our near-peer adversaries'
offensive space capabilities have outpaced our ability to defend our
space assets?
Do you believe the Air Force as an institution has placed the
appropriate amount of resources and focus on space commensurate to the
current and emerging threats?
Do you see value in establishing an annual capstone training/
exercise, or ``Space Flag'' event for space operators (similar to Red
Flag)?
Mr. Hill. Russia and China are continuing to pursue a full range of
anti-satellite weapons that are designed to reduce U.S. military
effectiveness, and both countries are increasingly considering attacks
against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine. As
such, maintaining the advantages U.S. forces derive from space requires
unprecedented mission-assurance efforts. This must include more
resilient architectures, measures to improve the defense of our space
assets, and the ability to reconstitute lost capabilities on
operational timelines. These counterspace challenges began to emerge in
the late 1990s. Although the Department of Defense was initially slow
to respond, efforts in recent years have greatly increased the focus
and resources applied to the task. Nevertheless, we must all recognize
that the growing threats to space systems and capabilities are an
enduring condition of modern warfare, requiring that we sustain and
reinforce those mission assurance efforts in the years ahead in order
to sustain our advantages.
Mr. Franks. Do you believe it is fair to say space has been
weaponized?
Do you believe we need a more robust defensive sensor layer to
adequately identify the latest and emerging threats to our space
assets?
Mr. Hill. It is fair to say that the space domain and space-based
capabilities are fully intertwined with the other domains in modern
warfare, and that we must take the necessary steps to protect and
defend the important assets deployed in space. Just as we place sensors
in space and other domains to help us understand threats and to predict
and attribute developments in the terrestrial battlespace, so too does
defense of our space-based capabilities require that we improve our
sensor networks, both space-based and terrestrial-based, to understand
threats and to predict and attribute activities in the space domain.
Mr. Franks. Should the U.S. treat space as a warfighting domain?
Should the U.S. develop defensive capabilities to counter kinetic
attacks against our space security architecture?
Mr. Hill. Yes, the United States should and does treat space as a
warfighting domain. The Department of Defense is taking appropriate
measures to assure the missions that our space-based capabilities
support in the face of growing counterspace threats, such as kinetic
attacks.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. I understand that there have been delays in the Air
Force's Pathfinder 2 initiative due to property management and
appropriations law constraints related to the use of transponders and
satellite bandwidth. To what extent could these delays be avoided with
more flexible spending authority? What is the timeline for completion
of Pathfinder 2 and Pathfinder 3?
General Raymond. The flexibility to use Procurement funds for
acquiring commercial communication services, in addition to the ability
to buy a fully funded end item, would have been beneficial to awarding
Pathfinder #2 earlier than currently planned. As a result of the
appropriations law and property management challenges, several
Pathfinder #2 objectives were deferred to Pathfinders #3 and #4.
COMSATCOM Pathfinder #2 is on track to complete all award activities in
1QFY18. COMSATCOMM Pathfinder #3, which is utilizing an OTA, is on
track to award in 4QFY17.
Mr. Lamborn. As you know, satellite communications have never been
more vital to the security of our nation or come under such assault. To
address the cyber threats to our satellite communications and
accelerate adoption of built-in cyber defenses, the Department
developed information assurance requirements for commercial providers.
To what extent does the Department use information assurance criteria
in its evaluation and acquisition of COMSATCOM? What is the process for
evaluating commercial suppliers' information assurance capabilities?
General Raymond. To address cybersecurity in our use of commercial
providers for satellite communications, Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC) and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) efforts use
DISA's cyber Risk Management Framework (RMF) to assess risk during
source selection. The RMF consists of an extensive set of cybersecurity
questions that the bidder must address. In evaluating industry
responses, a pass/fail assessment for information assurance is
determined against the industry responses to the RMF questions. SMC
invites a DISA member, familiar with their cyber RMF, to participate in
the source selection and this member determines the pass/fail
assessment. United States Strategic Command has appointed DISA as the
Authorizing Official (AO) for DOD Commercial Satellite Communications
(COMSATCOM) systems. DISA has extensive experience evaluating
cybersecurity for leased COMSATCOM services and coordinates these
assessments with their customers to ensure the customer is aware of any
risks and can implement proper mitigations. SMC is leveraging DISA and
National Security Agency (NSA) practices in the procurement of
commercial products under the COMSATCOM Pathfinder and Pilot efforts.
Mr. Lamborn. What steps for the new EBMC2 program or other related
efforts (e.g., market research, acquisitions, demonstrations,
evaluations, exercises, experiments, prototypes, proof of concepts,
pilots, numerical validations, operations, etc.) has the USAF taken to
identify commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and services that
can, in whole or in part, help satisfy the USAF's needs for improved
SSA and BMC2?
General Raymond. Air Force Space Command has taken several steps to
identify commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and services that
can, in whole or in part, help satisfy the USAF's need for improved SSA
and BMC2. First, the Space and Missile Systems Center released a
Request for Information on a broad range of Enterprise Space BMC2
(ESBMC2) requirements in January 2017 that resulted in 26 industry
responses. No single commercial company stated that they have the
capabilities to address the full set of mission and infrastructure
requirements for ESBMC2. Therefore, SMC is refining the acquisition
strategy that will enable rapid integration of multiple commercial,
defense industry, and government solutions to meet requirements. Our
goal is to complete this overarching acquisition strategy by December
2017. The strategy will incorporate preceding operational prototype
capabilities from the BMC2 Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) and
Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office and create an enduring rapid
application delivery process that will incorporate the best
capabilities from commercial and defense industry.
Mr. Lamborn. Have any commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and
services been identified that will help satisfy the USAF's needs for
improved SSA and BMC2?
General Raymond. Yes, Air Force Space Command has taken several
steps to identify commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and
services that can, in whole or in part, help satisfy the Air Force's
need for improved SSA and BMC2. First, the Space and Missile Systems
Center released a Request for Information on a broad range of
Enterprise Space BMC2 (ESBMC2) requirements in January 2017 that
resulted in 26 industry responses. While no single commercial company
stated that they have the capabilities to address the full set of
mission and infrastructure requirements for ESBMC2, commercial services
exist that can address some of our requirements. Second, the Space and
Missile Systems Center released a Broad Area Announcement (BAA) on 22
May 2017 seeking capabilities from Commercial and Defense Industry to
address technology maturation concepts for the broad range of
Enterprise Space BMC2 requirements. Third, AFSPC is independently
validating and verifying several commercial data providers to augment
the Space Surveillance Network via the Non-Traditional Data Pre-
Processor (NDPP) program. Finally, SMC is also implementing several
commercial SSA capabilities as part of the Joint Space Operations
Center Mission System Increment 2 effort.
Mr. Lamborn. In all of its efforts, including the RCO program and
consortium, what is the USAF's plan to prioritize the use of commercial
SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and services to the maximum extent
practicable first before then filling in any remaining operational gaps
with government prototyping and redevelopment for the truly unique
military requirements that don't reside in the commercial marketplace?
How is this prioritization reflected in the USAF's current FY17 funding
plan as well as in the proposed FY18 budget going forward through the
FYDP?
General Raymond. In the USAF's current FY17 funding plan as well as
in the proposed FY18 budget going forward through the FYDP, the Air
Force will first leverage, to the maximum extent practicable,
commercial tools in all areas where they cost-effectively meet
government requirements to include mission requirements, resiliency,
supportability, and cybersecurity. This includes support for improved
space situational awareness, satellite control, and event analysis. In
the FY17 and FY18 ESBMC2 execution plan, the Air Force is pursuing
commercial and defense industry technologies via a Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA) which posted to Federal Business Opportunities on 22
May 2017. This BAA continues for five years. In FY17 and FY18, efforts
under the AFRL-led BMC2 JEON will continue to evaluate commercial and
other applications that improve decision timeliness, decision quality
and the ability to handle simultaneous adversary actions.
Infrastructure elements and software applications, regardless of
origin, that provide the most capability improvement will receive
priority. Recent market research has identified numerous commercial
solutions that address subsets of the battle management and command and
control requirements. The Air Force plans to further work with the
commercial vendors of these solutions to asses if they meet
requirements and then rapidly integrate them into a multi-level, cyber
defensible network to achieve initial capabilities. As we operationally
identify improvements needed to the existing capabilities and gaps in
overall capability, we will aggressively pursue Other Transaction
Authority and other contractual vehicles that enable the Air Force to
pursue a commercial DevOps software development model. This model will
enable us to push commercial vendors to improve existing and build new
products that satisfy known and evolving requirements for BMC2. In
concert with the rapid software development and fielding, SMC will
fulfill their enterprise management role by building the logistical
tail required to support this construct.
Mr. Lamborn. Given that the USAF continues to not follow this
prioritization on the JMS program, under the JEON, and with the NDPP,
what steps are being taken to change this and ensure AFSPC, SMC, AFRL,
RCO and all other supporting organizations follow through on this
prioritization?
General Raymond. JMS brought in commercial capabilities for event
processing (reentry, closely-spaced objects, launch, deorbit, breakup),
and event generation for training and exercises. JMS also evaluated
commercial capabilities for catalog processing, but did not incorporate
either commercial capability because they did not meet accuracy
performance requirements. ESBMC2 will incorporate additional commercial
processing as part of the planned multi-hypothesis event analysis
capabilities. The AFRL JEON is planning to add additional commercial
vendors to the team via a formal procurement process. This will allow
additional commercial capabilities to be incorporated. The Non-
Traditional Data Pre-Processor (NDPP) effort, once operationally
accepted in July 2017, will be a conduit for accessing data sources to
perform several functions. These include:
1. Use of commercial data and non-traditional data (IC, commercial,
academia, foreign, etc.)
2. Establishment of data standards
3. Application of cyber resilience and protection requirements
4. Enabling of operational test for future sensors
The RCO Prototype and SMC efforts are conducting market research
for their activities. These efforts will consider all proposed
commercial capabilities when making content decisions. These decisions
will be made following evaluation of cost (procurement, development and
sustainment), schedule, integration complexity and requirement
satisfaction for multiple commercial and industry tools as well as new-
development options.
Mr. Lamborn. How do you plan to train and incentivize people to
follow this prioritization and then hold them accountable, as
necessary?
General Raymond. Training starts with an understanding of the
threat environment. Adopting and improving commercial solutions that
meet government requirements is one of the simplest ways to acquire
capabilities on a timeline to outpace threats. Personnel are trained to
look at all commercially available technologies and existing
capabilities when building acquisition strategies to meet requirements,
developing technical solutions, and issuing Requests for Information.
Senior leaders provide oversight and hold organizations/personnel
accountable for providing space capabilities to the nation.
Mr. Lamborn. I understand that there have been delays in the Air
Force's Pathfinder 2 initiative due to property management and
appropriations law constraints related to the use of transponders and
satellite bandwidth. To what extent could these delays be avoided with
more flexible spending authority? What is the timeline for completion
of Pathfinder 2 and Pathfinder 3?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command and General Raymond as to the specifics of
Pathfinder acquisition. Commercial SATCOM is vital to the joint fight
and we will continue to work closely with Air Force Space Command.
Mr. Lamborn. As you know, satellite communications have never been
more vital to the security of our nation or come under such assault. To
address the cyber threats to our satellite communications and
accelerate adoption of built-in cyber defenses, the Department
developed information assurance requirements for commercial providers.
To what extent does the Department use information assurance criteria
in its evaluation and acquisition of COMSATCOM? What is the process for
evaluating commercial suppliers' information assurance capabilities?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
as to the criteria related to COMSATCOM acquisitions. It is absolutely
critical to ensure cyber protections are in place for space systems
within the DOD space enterprise and we are confident AFSPC and DISA are
the appropriate agencies to ensure appropriate criteria are applied to
satellite communications acquisitions.
Mr. Lamborn. What steps for the new EBMC2 program or other related
efforts (e.g., market research, acquisitions, demonstrations,
evaluations, exercises, experiments, prototypes, proof of concepts,
pilots, numerical validations, operations, etc.) has the USAF taken to
identify commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and services that
can, in whole or in part, help satisfy the USAF's needs for improved
SSA and BMC2?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command and General Raymond as to the specifics of SSA/
ESMBC2 acquisitions. Based on recent requests for information, however,
it does not appear that a single commercial company or commercial
capability can address the full set of ESBMC2 requirements. ESBMC2 is a
complex challenge to overcome; this is why we continue to work closely
with AFSPC and SMC to ensure operational equities are accounted for in
the requirements definition process and to guide the delivery of
capabilities to address the most critical operational needs first.
Mr. Lamborn. Have any commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and
services been identified that will help satisfy the USAF's needs for
improved SSA and BMC2?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command and General Raymond as to the acquisition of
commercial SSA/BMC2 software capabilities. However, my team is in lock-
step with both Air Force Space Command and the Space and Missile
Systems Center as they work toward an SSA/BMC2 solution that meets
warfighter requirements to include incorporating commercial data
through systems such as the Non-traditional Data Pre-Processor (NDPP).
In addition, when the JICSpOC began in July 2015, we realized early no
one set of tools for space protection was available. With the help of
the 50th Space Wing, we brought commercial SSA and Battle Management
Command and Control tools into the JICSpOC, and leveraged other
commercial data providers to augment our SSA picture during
experimentation. The lessons from experimentation have informed follow-
on ESBMC2 acquisition planning.
Mr. Lamborn. In all of its efforts, including the RCO program and
consortium, what is the USAF's plan to prioritize the use of commercial
SSA/BMC2 software capabilities and services to the maximum extent
practicable first before then filling in any remaining operational gaps
with government prototyping and redevelopment for the truly unique
military requirements that don't reside in the commercial marketplace?
How is this prioritization reflected in the USAF's current FY17 funding
plan as well as in the proposed FY18 budget going forward through the
FYDP?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command as to the acquisition of commercial SSA/BMC2
software capabilities and services and associated Air Force budget
plans. We continue to work closely with both Air Force Space Command,
Space and Missile Systems Center and the Air Force Research Lab toward
an SSA/BMC2 solution that meets warfighter requirements.
Mr. Lamborn. Given that the USAF continues to not follow this
prioritization on the JMS program, under the JEON, and with the NDPP,
what steps are being taken to change this and ensure AFSPC, SMC, AFRL,
RCO and all other supporting organizations follow through on this
prioritization?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command and General Raymond as priorities of AFSPC, SMC,
AFRL and RCO. JFCC SPACE will continue to work closely and provide
feedback on the JMS program.
Mr. Lamborn. How do you plan to train and incentivize people to
follow this prioritization and then hold them accountable, as
necessary?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to Air
Force Space Command and General Raymond as priorities and
accountability of AFSPC, SMC, AFRL and RCO. JFCC SPACE will continue to
work closely and provide feedback on the JMS program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. The FY17 NDAA requires DOD to avoid the use of LPTA
source selection criteria in inappropriate circumstances that
potentially deny DOD the benefits of cost and technical trade-offs in
the source selection process. And yet DISA continues to use LPTA for
commercial SATCOM acquisitions for critical national security missions
such as the Army's Blue Force Tracking, the Navy's Commercial Broadband
SATCOM program, and Air Force's Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance SATCOM requirements. Each of these missions and more
require mission assurance in their satellite communication yet are
being awarded under LPTA procurement methods without technical
discrimination of information assurance, availability, reliability,
etc.
What steps are being taken to ensure mission critical warfighting
services, like Commercial SATCOM, are performance based acquisitions
with proper technical trade-offs rather than LPTA? What process is in
place to adjudicate and report on the correct application of LPTA
methodologies by DISA and other agencies?
General Raymond. Acquisition agencies utilize an array of methods
along the best value continuum in executing competitive procurements
based on the number of considerations. At one end of the best value
continuum, LPTA can be appropriate where requirements are well defined,
the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, agency needs
can be satisfied by meeting minimum threshold levels, and where the
agency does not require paying higher costs for higher performance. In
addition, LPTA also takes into consideration the use of a firm fixed
price type contracts. Contract type often takes into account factors
such as the size of the effort, the type of effort, the complexity of
the requirement, the maturity of technology, and availability of the
supplies or services in the commercial market place. For AFSPC efforts,
the Space and Missile Systems Center continues to examine the use of
LPTA versus a broader best-value tradeoff as part of the review process
associated with Acquisition Strategy Documents and Source Selection
Plans. Approaches such as a Value Adjusted Total Evaluated Price are
being considered as an alternative that may protect open competition
while valuing more varied capabilities presented by COMSATCOM
operators. Each acquisition examines a variety of items including
industry capabilities, technology maturity, risk, requirements, and
other acquisition related factors when developing the acquisition
strategy, selecting the contract type, and determining the competitive
method of evaluation to satisfy requirements. When the acquisition
strategy is briefed to senior leadership, rationale for using LPTA (or
not) is discussed, as appropriate.
Mr. Hunter. The FY17 NDAA requires DOD to avoid the use of LPTA
source selection criteria in inappropriate circumstances that
potentially deny DOD the benefits of cost and technical trade-offs in
the source selection process. And yet DISA continues to use LPTA for
commercial SATCOM acquisitions for critical national security missions
such as the Army's Blue Force Tracking, the Navy's Commercial Broadband
SATCOM program, and Air Force's Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance SATCOM requirements. Each of these missions and more
require mission assurance in their satellite communication yet are
being awarded under LPTA procurement methods without technical
discrimination of information assurance, availability, reliability,
etc.
What steps are being taken to ensure mission critical warfighting
services, like Commercial SATCOM, are performance based acquisitions
with proper technical trade-offs rather than LPTA? What process is in
place to adjudicate and report on the correct application of LPTA
methodologies by DISA and other agencies?
General Buck. As Commander JFCC SPACE, I respectfully defer to DISA
as to the LPTA methodologies used. Commercial services are critical to
joint warfighters worldwide. In fact, JFCC SPACE has found immense
value in partnering with commercial entities through our Commercial
Integration Cell at the Joint Space Operations Center. Such
relationships are vital to ensuring a broad range of information is
available for critical warfighting services.
Mr. Hunter. The FY17 NDAA requires DOD to avoid the use of LPTA
source selection criteria in inappropriate circumstances that
potentially deny DOD the benefits of cost and technical trade-offs in
the source selection process. And yet DISA continues to use LPTA for
commercial SATCOM acquisitions for critical national security missions
such as the Army's Blue Force Tracking, the Navy's Commercial Broadband
SATCOM program, and Air Force's Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance SATCOM requirements. Each of these missions and more
require mission assurance in their satellite communication yet are
being awarded under LPTA procurement methods without technical
discrimination of information assurance, availability, reliability,
etc.
What steps are being taken to ensure mission critical warfighting
services, like Commercial SATCOM, are performance based acquisitions
with proper technical trade-offs rather than LPTA? What process is in
place to adjudicate and report on the correct application of LPTA
methodologies by DISA and other agencies?
Ms. Sapp. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) uses the best
value trade off process for nearly all its requirements. The best value
source selection process allows the NRO to place greater emphasis on
technical and other non-cost categories and select the proposals that
offer the best solutions in terms of technical performance and cost.
This approach encourages industry to provide innovative, high
performing systems and quality services. More specifically, multiple
recent NRO source selections have used evaluation criteria that clearly
state that non-cost factors are either significantly more important or
approximately equal to cost or price and that the Government may select
other than the lowest proposed cost. To emphasize this approach, the
DNRO introduced the Executable Contracts Initiative to improve
acquisition outcomes and award contracts with attainable schedules and
realistic prices. This initiative emphasizes investing in early
acquisiton planning to create tighter Statements of Work to clearly
define requirements, develop incentives that clearly reflect NRO
priorities, use all contracting tools available, conduct thorough
market research to ensure industry has both the capacity and capability
to perform, emphasize cost realism not proposed cost, and conduct
overall risk assesments that evaluate past performance, capabilities,
cost, and schedule. The lowest priced technically acceptable process is
rarely used by the NRO and is generally reserved for acquisitions with
less complex technical requirements such as commodity or commercial
goods and services.
Mr. Hunter. The FY17 NDAA requires DOD to avoid the use of LPTA
source selection criteria in inappropriate circumstances that
potentially deny DOD the benefits of cost and technical trade-offs in
the source selection process. And yet DISA continues to use LPTA for
commercial SATCOM acquisitions for critical national security missions
such as the Army's Blue Force Tracking, the Navy's Commercial Broadband
SATCOM program, and Air Force's Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance SATCOM requirements. Each of these missions and more
require mission assurance in their satellite communication yet are
being awarded under LPTA procurement methods without technical
discrimination of information assurance, availability, reliability,
etc.
What steps are being taken to ensure mission critical warfighting
services, like Commercial SATCOM, are performance based acquisitions
with proper technical trade-offs rather than LPTA? What process is in
place to adjudicate and report on the correct application of LPTA
methodologies by DISA and other agencies?
Mr. Cardillo. The National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency (NGA)
conducts source selections in a variety of ways in accordance with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). NGA may uses FAR part 15,
``Contracting by Negotiations,'' FAR Part 12, ``Acquisition of
Commercial Items,'' or FAR part 13, ``Simplified Acquisition
Procedures,'' depending on which approach best meets the need of the
Government for a given set of requirements.
Every acquisition is viewed independently. Each Contracting Officer
(CO) has the fiduciary responsibility to weigh all options to determine
which is in the best interest of the Government. The CO presents and
justifies their approach to the Contracts Review Board, chartered by
the Senior Procurement Executive. The criteria for determining whether
to use Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) or best value trade-
off include the importance of the need and the complexity of the
requirement. NGA's Acquisition Plans, Acquisition Strategies, and
Negotiation Memorandums capture the CO's decision and why LPTA or best
value trade-off was chosen.
Although NGA periodically sends funds to the Defense Information
Systems Agency via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests for
various efforts, including Comsat/Transport Services, NGA does not
provide direction or guidance and has no insight regarding how DISA
manages its acquisition activities.
Mr. Hunter. The FY17 NDAA requires DOD to avoid the use of LPTA
source selection criteria in inappropriate circumstances that
potentially deny DOD the benefits of cost and technical trade-offs in
the source selection process. And yet DISA continues to use LPTA for
commercial SATCOM acquisitions for critical national security missions
such as the Army's Blue Force Tracking, the Navy's Commercial Broadband
SATCOM program, and Air Force's Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance SATCOM requirements. Each of these missions and more
require mission assurance in their satellite communication yet are
being awarded under LPTA procurement methods without technical
discrimination of information assurance, availability, reliability,
etc.
What steps are being taken to ensure mission critical warfighting
services, like Commercial SATCOM, are performance based acquisitions
with proper technical trade-offs rather than LPTA? What process is in
place to adjudicate and report on the correct application of LPTA
methodologies by DISA and other agencies?
Mr. Hill. DOD is complying with the referenced requirements of
section 813 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (Public Law 114-328) (NDAA for FY 2017). The evaluation criteria
for each commercial satellite communications (COMSATCOM) lease are
considered independently based on a review of the requirement and
consultation with the customer organization. The use of lowest price
technically acceptable (LPTA) is determined to be appropriate when: the
minimum requirements are clearly definable; the Government would
realize minimal to no value from a proposal exceeding the minimum
requirements; varying technical approaches would require little to no
subjective judgment for acceptability; proposals would not result in
the identification of factors that could provide value or benefit; and
the price reflects full life-cycle costs. The LPTA source selection
process is appropriate when best value is expected to result from
selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the lowest
evaluated price. (FAR 15.101-2(a)). Thus, in certain cases, this
approach can yield great competitive value for the Government in
meeting its well-defined requirements. Approximately 85 percent of the
current COMSATCOM contracts procured through the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) are for transponded capacity, or pools of
bandwidth supporting diverse missions over specific regions.
Transponded capacity requirements are well-defined with established
service-level agreements providing high availability and reliability
standards that do not allow for value from a proposal exceeding the
minimum requirements. The Government has been very well served by the
highly competitive use of LPTA in appropriate cases. For example, in
the specific cases of Blue Force Tracking and the Commercial Broadband
Satellite Program (CBSP) Satellite Services Contract (CSSC), the basic
requirement was for large amounts of satellite capacity, teleport
services, and terrestrial backhaul. The specific performance standards,
such as coverage and availability, continued to be well-defined as
stated above. The competitive award of Blue Force Tracker in 2013
resulted in an estimated life cycle cost (LCC) savings of approximately
$169.2M when compared to the predecessor contract. Similarly, the
competitive award of the CSSC in 2016 resulted in an estimated LCC
savings of approximately $139.5M. Performance on both of these
contracts remains acceptable.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. Will JMS Inc 2 Full Deployment satisfy growing
processing requirements associated with increased observations from new
SSA sensors like Space Fence, ORS-5, etc, prior to delivery of ESBMC2?
General Raymond. Yes, JMS Inc 2 will be able to support 3 million
observations a day, 50+ million observations accessible in the database
and a catalog of 100,000 objects as required in the JMS Capabilities
Development Document. These requirements were set for JMS to ensure it
can handle the catalog capacity that is expected in the future.
Mr. Bridenstine. Do you anticipate that JMS Inc2 Full Deployment
will fulfill all SSA processing requirements from implementation until
delivery of ESBMC2?
If not, what is the USAF's plan to mitigate this gap? Will COTS
capabilities with mature TRLs be considered for timely and cost-
effective implementation?
General Raymond. No, JMS Inc 2 will replace legacy space
situational awareness (SSA) capabilities and also includes SSA
enhancements to include a TS/SCI catalog, increased system throughput
to support Space Fence and other future sensors, and automation of many
legacy capabilities. Other SSA enhancements such as an Electro-magnetic
Spectrum Common Operating Picture and a Special Access Program enclave
will be completed by ESBMC2. To facilitate the transition from JMS Inc
2 to ESBMC2, AFSPC initiated the Global Sensor Watch (GSW) program. GSW
integrates the Space Surveillance Network by leveraging Element Sets
produced by legacy C2 at Dahlgren, VA (current) and JMS Inc 2 in the
future (once JMS is operationally accepted). The GSW architecture was
built within the JMS AFRL ARCADE development environment and will
directly connect to JMS and the BMC2 Joint Emergent Operational Need
(JEON) Spiral Capability sets. Collaboration has already begun between
the SMC and the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (AFRCO) to ensure
that these evolving SSA processing capabilities will continue to align
with the future ESBMC2 architecture. Yes, the USAF will consider COTS
capabilities with mature Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) for timely
and cost-effective implementation. The Air Force will balance urgent
operational needs with life-cycle costs, since JMS Increment 2 has
shown that COTS capabilities may require significant time and
investment in order to become an integrated piece of a comprehensive
solution. The plan to mitigate the gap between the JMS Increment 2 Full
Deployment Decision and full delivery of ESBMC2 includes JEON ST-0006
and the AFRCO Operational Prototype.
Mr. Bridenstine. The FY17 Defense Appropriations Bill appropriated
$5M for the Commercial Weather Data Pilot Program. What is the status
of the program? What is the anticipated overall timeline and budget for
the pilot?
General Raymond. The Air Force has appointed the Air Force Life
Cycle Management Center as the Systems Programs Office to oversee the
pilot program. The program is scheduled to initiate in July 2017,
pending initial distribution of FY17 appropriations. Current plans are
to leverage available space weather data sources to assess the
viability of commercial satellite weather data in supporting DOD
operations. The Air Force intends to complete industry solicitations by
this summer and evaluate data quality and impacts to existing models
used to characterize the natural space environment. This effort is
expected to be completed by October 2018, using the FY17 funds. If
funding were to be available in FY18 and beyond, additional evaluations
could be initiated on commercial data sources from airborne and ground
based sensors and their potential to improve global battlespace
awareness and numerical weather prediction capabilities.
Mr. Bridenstine. How does your recent Space Flag exercise enhance
our space warfighter capability?
General Raymond. April 2017, we conducted a proof of concept
exercise, Space Flag 17-1, with involvement from the 50th Space Wing,
NSDC, JSpOC and Air Force Warfare Center. As a first event and proof of
concept, we had modest goals for the exercise. However, the event was a
huge success. We were able to exercise multiple crews from one of our
operational space wings in a realistic threat scenario. They were able
to develop new tactics, work on intelligence integration but most
importantly, focus on fighting our systems in realistic threat
environment. Our intent moving forward is to build on this success and
have Space Flag events tied to each Space Mission Force training cycle.
Mr. Bridenstine. The ability to provide responsive launch is a
crucial aspect of space resilience. What efforts are being undertaken
to ensure the nation has a range of flexible and responsive launch
options that include expendable, partially reusable, and completely
reusable assets? What funding levels are necessary to get a responsive
launch capability demonstration program initiated?
General Raymond. Flexibility and responsiveness are key parts of
the Space Warfighting Construct. The foundation of our current
architecture is fully expendable launch systems. Looking forward, the
Space and Missile Systems Center has been actively engaged in
continuing to expand the launch options for National Security Space. It
is pursuing a number of initiatives including: new requirements for
increased capabilities; multi-manifest (rideshare) opportunities in
partnership with NASA; research and development of reusable launch
systems; beginning to evaluate how to certify previously flown hardware
and systems for future National Security Space launches; moving towards
an Autonomous Flight Safety System; and leveraging allied capabilities
in a contingency role for National Security Space launches. SMC is also
partnering with NASA on a demonstration called Orbit Transfer Element
to investigate a concept of operations to leverage lower cost launch
capabilities by launching spacecraft to a Low-Earth Orbit and using
other more efficient and cost effective technologies to move the
spacecraft into a Geosynchronous Earth Orbit. We identified a Launch-
on-Demand (LOD) system as a part of the Space Enterprise Vision
architecture. However, a defined requirement for a demonstration
program and associated funding cannot be established until an
achievable roadmap to a future end-state and key enabling technologies
are developed. The Small Payload Rideshare Association (SPRSA) held a
workshop with SMC and the NRO to discuss rapid launch and LOD
initiatives in April 2017. The workshop included industry members
Virgin Orbit, Rocket Lab, Orbital ATK, and X-Bow (pronounced Cross-Bow)
Launch Systems. The goal of this workshop was to gain awareness of
industry capabilities and timelines required to execute small Launch-
on-Demand missions. The Air Force Launch Enterprise Directorate at SMC
will independently meet with each company to discuss costs and planning
required to meet DOD responsive/rapid launch concepts and desired
capabilities. Additionally, Congress increased the Space Test Program's
budget this year by $15 million to explore procuring a Venture Class
Launch service. The SMC team will work with the current Venture Class
providers to demonstrate a rapid commercial launch of DOD research and
development payloads to low earth orbit by the first quarter of FY19.
This demonstration will provide insight into cost and capabilities
available for future Launch-on-Demand missions.
Mr. Bridenstine. As the SATCOM Pathfinders continue to progress are
there any contracting obstacles that can inhibit success? For example,
would a shift to multiyear contract authority (or another) help? If so,
how?
General Raymond. Currently, there are no contracting obstacles that
inhibit Pathfinder success. Use of multi-year contract authority should
not be a consideration as this time. It may be a consideration in the
future if decisions are made to acquire all transponder communication
capacity on several commercial satellites as a block type buy to meet
warfighter protected tactical communication needs.
Mr. Bridenstine. What benefits would a NATO ally launch back-up
provide? Are efforts underway to explore such options? What is the
necessary funding to study the feasibility of back-up launch capability
with NATO allies?
General Raymond. Having a NATO ally launch capability could
potentially provide access to space for critical national security
space assets in the event of catastrophic incidents occurring within
the United States that affect U.S. launch capability. Beginning in
2013, the Space and Missile Systems Center conducted an initial study
into the possible use of allied launch systems by means of publicly
available information. In the past 2 years, after deciding on
Arianespace as a candidate ally launch system, SMC pursued an exchange
of technical information with Arianespace in order to perform a study
on the feasibility of their ability to provide a potential backup
launch capability. The study is nearly complete and its findings are
awaiting Air Force review.
Mr. Bridenstine. Will JMS Inc 2 Full Deployment satisfy growing
processing requirements associated with increased observations from new
SSA sensors like Space Fence, ORS-5, etc, prior to delivery of ESBMC2?
General Buck. We look forward to JMS increment 2 reaching full
operational capability, especially as new sensors come on-line. JMS Inc
2 is critical to incorporating data from these new sensors. As an
example, we expect the Space Fence to provide a ten-fold increase in
capabilities--moving from cataloging 23,000 object to over 100,000
objects--and a fully-operational JMS Inc 2 will be absolutely key in
leveraging these new capabilities.
Mr. Bridenstine. Do you anticipate that JMS Inc2 Full Deployment
will fulfill all SSA processing requirements from implementation until
delivery of ESBMC2?
If not, what is the USAF's plan to mitigate this gap? Will COTS
capabilities with mature TRLs be considered for timely and cost-
effective implementation?
General Buck. JMS Inc 2 replaces our legacy space situational
awareness (SSA) capabilities, some of which have been operational since
the early 1990s, while also improving system throughput and automation.
This is especially important as we look toward the IOC in early 2019 of
the Space Fence and the projected increase in capability. ESMBC2 will
expand upon JMS Inc 2 to include higher security levels and an enhanced
common operating picture. The Air Force will certainly consider
commercial capabilities to mitigate any gaps between the full delivery
of JMS Inc 2 and future ESBMC2 capabilities. We would expect to see
similar possible solutions to that of the non-governmental SSA contract
we are currently using to support the NSDC experimentation to address
possible gaps between JMS and ESBMC2.
Mr. Bridenstine. How does your recent Space Flag exercise enhance
our space warfighter capability?
General Buck. Space Flag is a critical tool for providing advanced
training under our Space Mission Force construct. Unlike a ``Red Flag''
multi-domain exercise, where space forces are typically employed in
support of a larger air campaign, Space Flag allows space crews to
learn how to fight their own weapon systems. Space Flag give crews
specific, realistic, threat-based scenarios to ``fight through.''
Focusing on fighting their specific weapon systems helps operators move
from an engineering, or service-provider mindset to a warfighting
mindset. We intend to build and mature Space Flag events within the
Space Mission Force construct.
Mr. Bridenstine. The ability to provide responsive launch is a
crucial aspect of space resilience. What efforts are being undertaken
to ensure the nation has a range of flexible and responsive launch
options that include expendable, partially reusable, and completely
reusable assets? What funding levels are necessary to get a responsive
launch capability demonstration program initiated?
General Buck. The ability to provide responsive launch is a crucial
aspect of space resilience. What efforts are being undertaken to ensure
the nation has a range of flexible and responsive launch options that
include expendable, partially reusable, and completely reusable assets?
What funding levels are necessary to get a responsive launch capability
demonstration program initiated? Answer: As Commander JFCC SPACE, I
would respectfully defer to Air Force Space Command and General Raymond
on the acquisition and funding of space launch systems.
Mr. Bridenstine. The ability to provide responsive launch is a
crucial aspect of space resilience. What efforts are being undertaken
to ensure the nation has a range of flexible and responsive launch
options that include expendable, partially reusable, and completely
reusable assets? What funding levels are necessary to get a responsive
launch capability demonstration program initiated?
Mr. Hill. In light of the enduring and rapidly evolving threats to
our space capabilities, we need to continue to improve operational
responsiveness and resiliency across all space mission areas, including
launch, to provide overall space mission assurance. DOD acquires space
launch services from U.S. commercial providers, which are making many
innovative investments to reduce costs and diversify options, including
partially reusable capabilities and more responsive systems. DOD's
Fiscal Year 2018 investments focus on maintaining assured access to
space by investing in the U.S. commercial launch base, and funding
Research and Development, such as the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency's (DARPA) Experimental Spaceplane 1, to mature and
transition key technologies and operational processes for less
expensive, responsive next-generation launch systems.
Mr. Bridenstine. What benefits would a NATO ally launch back-up
provide? Are efforts underway to explore such options? What is the
necessary funding to study the feasibility of back-up launch capability
with NATO allies?
Mr. Hill. The Department of Defense is required by statute and
policy to launch National Security Space (NSS) payloads on U.S.-
manufactured launch vehicles, unless the Secretary of the Air Force
determines that there is a national security issue that precludes the
use of U.S. commercial providers. Pursuant to the NDAA for FY 2017,
Section 1604, DOD is developing a plan to use allied launch vehicles to
meet the requirements for achieving the policy relating to assured
access to space set forth in section 2273 of title 10, U.S. Code, in
the event that such requirements cannot be met, for a limited period,
using only launch vehicles of the United States. Work on this plan is
ongoing, is funded, and is on schedule for submission to Congress in
September 2017.
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