[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 15, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-41
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, vice chairman, Open Russia.............. 9
Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya, Ira Weiner fellow, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 13
Mr. Brian Katulis, senior fellow, Center for American Progress... 23
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza: Prepared statement...................... 11
Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya: Prepared statement...................... 15
Mr. Brian Katulis: Prepared statement............................ 25
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
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THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then
hear from our esteemed panel, and the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made a part of the record. Members may have
5 days to insert statements and questions for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
For far too long, the United States has acted timidly in
the face of increased Russian aggression, unwilling to confront
Putin for fear of provoking a confrontation, even though Putin,
like other tyrants, only responds to a position of strength.
And it isn't just the executive branch: Congress has played its
role too.
For years, administrations have been offering concessions
to Russia, and Congress has allowed this to happen. The Bush
administration presented a civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement, a 123 agreement to Congress, despite concerns Russia
was then providing Iran with nuclear technology and providing
Syria with advanced conventional weapons in violation of the
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. In fact, the
Bush administration had sanctioned state-owned Russian entities
for Iran-related violations. I led the effort then to block
that agreement. President Bush withdrew the proposed nuclear
accord, but only after Russia invaded Georgia.
That didn't stop the Obama administration from falling into
the same trap, officially submitting to the U.S.-Russia Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement to Congress in 2010, despite overwhelming
evidence of Russian involvement in Iran's nuclear and
conventional weapons program and congressional efforts to
strengthen sanctions against Iran.
Russia repeatedly acted as interference for Iran at the
U.N., protecting it from scrutiny and increased sanctions, all
the while itself violating U.S. sanctions against the world's
foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Yet we fail to hold Russia
accountable. In fact, as part of the Obama administration's
reset, the U.S. lifted several sanctions against Russia,
including sanctions against the arms exporter Rosoboronexport,
which admitted it was shipping advanced missile defense systems
to Syria.
In 2010, the administration agreed to sign over the control
of Uranium One, the U.S. uranium processing facility to the
Russian Government. Again, despite overwhelming national
security concerns. As then ranking member of this committee, I
spearheaded a letter alongside the ranking members of the House
Financial Services, Armed Services, and Homeland Security
Committees urging the Treasury Secretary to oppose this move.
Another consequence of ignoring Russia's behavior was the
decision to overturn the Jackson-Vanik amendment, paving the
way for Russia to join the WTO, World Trade Organization, and
granting Putin permanent normal trade relations. This was part
of the deal with the Devil in order to get the Magnitsky Act
signed into law. And though we managed to get that signed into
law, an important bill, the previous administration failed to
use its authorities to sanction Russia's worst human rights
violators.
So where are we now? We have established a long history of
failing to use the tools the United States has available to it
in order to hold Putin and the Russian regime accountable.
Putin's support for Assad has guaranteed that the conflict
will continue and that tens of thousands more will die. His
alliance with Iran has given Tehran the tools it needs to one
day become a nuclear power with strong conventional arms,
including advanced missile defense capabilities. He is
bolstering General Haftar in Libya, making it almost certain
that no progress toward reconciliation will be made there in
the near future. Reports indicate that Russia may be deploying
troops or possibly wanting to set up a base at the border of
Libya and Egypt. Putin is ensuring that Russia ties itself to
the energy and military sectors of many countries in the
region, giving him leverage and influence in countries that
have viewed us with mistrust since the Arab Spring and the Iran
nuclear deal.
Russia is not our ally, not in Syria, not in Iran, not on
human rights issues. We should not be afraid to push Putin
back. He is a strong man, and tyrants like him only respond to
strength, not just perceived strength but actual strength.
Russia is fragile, and this show of force is just that, a show
by Putin. It is time for the U.S. to reclaim our leadership
role on the global stage and, particularly, in the Middle East
and with respect to Russia.
Yesterday, the Senate passed an amendment to the Iran
sanctions bill that included Russia sanctions. And while I
support efforts to hold Russia accountable for its cyber
activities and its activities related to Crimea, I hope that
this will be only the first step toward a more holistic
approach to holding Russia accountable for its activities,
which threaten U.S. national security interests and global
peace and security.
And with that, I am proud to yield to my ranking member,
Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
agreeing to hold today's hearing.
Russia has been in the news a great deal lately. But what
has been absent in much of the reporting is a clear analysis of
what exactly Russia's foreign policy objectives are under
Putin's rule.
Today, we have a chance to focus on the Middle East where
Russia has demonstrated again and again a disregard for human
rights and for human life. Russia's posture in the Middle East
would be troubling in any context, but given the bizarre
relationship between this administration and Russia, it is even
more pertinent that we as the United States Congress understand
why ceding our role as the leader in the Middle East to Russia
runs counter to our own national security interests. And we
cannot have a full understanding of this administration's
foreign policy until we know more about this administration's
ties to Russia.
Russia's relationship with Iran, its support for the Assad
regime in Syria, and its willingness to align itself with
authoritarians shows brazen disregard for international norms
and the rule of law.
Are these decisions made solely to counter American
objectives and form a bulwark against the United States? I
mean, the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, and the relationship between
Iran and Russia has remained close ever since. No nation has
contributed more to Iran's nuclear programs, sold more weapons
to Iran, or been more willing to defend Iran's indefensible
actions in international fora. As Iran has worked to
destabilize nearly every country in the Middle East, Russia
seems willing to overlook every Iranian transgression in
pursuit of its own ambitions.
In no Middle East country has Russia done more to deserve
international condemnation than in Syria. Not only has Russia
propped up Syria's war criminal President with arms and funds,
but Putin's forces have actively attacked opposition forces
aligned with the United States, as well as countless civilian
targets on behalf of the Assad regime. Reports from Aleppo
indicate that Russia used bunker-busting munitions to attack
hospitals on a regular basis, reducing to rubble underground-
held facilities that had been out of reach to Syrian forces.
When Assad ordered chemical attacks on civilian populations
in April of this year, the planes flew out of a base shared
with the Russians, and one would be hard-pressed not to
conclude that the Russians were aware that gas was stored at
that base. Yet Russia chose not to condemn the attack, which
violated the very agreement Russia helped negotiate to rid the
country of chemical weapons, or to apologize for their
complicity. Instead, they spent days blocking meaningful U.N.
Security Council resolutions condemning this heinous attack on
children and babies.
Russian actions in Syria have lent support to Hezbollah, a
terrorist organization, and other Iranian-backed militias.
There are reports that Russia has provided Hezbollah with long-
range tactical missiles, laser-guided rockets, and antitank
weapons, and on more than one occasion, Russia has provided air
cover for Iran-backed operations.
Oddly, the Russian Ambassador to Israel this week went to
great lengths to explain why Russia doesn't consider Hezbollah
or Hamas terrorist organizations, stating that they have yet to
attack Russia or Russian interests. Claiming his involvement in
Syria is a way to prevent the spread of ISIS terrorism, Putin
has been willing to cast aside international norms and order to
ensure his own political future.
Our President has repeatedly talked about how nice it would
be if we could fight ISIS together with Russia, except there is
one problem. Russia has repeatedly attacked the very forces the
United States has aligned itself with in the fight against
ISIS, while supporting the action's very regime that we
consider the largest state sponsor of terrorism.
I am not sure we need clearer proof that Russia's strategic
objectives in the region are in clear contravention with our
own. Is the Kremlin's willingness to align itself with the
region's worst actors a projection of strength or, rather, a
reflection of Putin's deep insecurities? We have an
administration that seems to be willing to give Putin the
benefit of the doubt and even to drive policy in the region
without much questioning.
We must push back against every effort from this President
and his allies to legitimize Russian behavior, or to draw false
equivalence between Russian actions and those of the United
States, as the President did on national television when asked
on Fox News about Putin being a killer.
Even as Russia supported brutal dictators and worked to
undermine American alliances, President Trump has complimented
Putin, calling him a very strong leader, and benefiting from
the Russian interference in our elections, suggested
partnership with the Kremlin, shared the closely held secrets
of allied intelligence agencies with Russia's top diplomats.
There is obviously a lot more to discuss. Russian activity
now spans throughout the region, but I am confident that our
conversation today will only solidify the fact that the United
States should not, by any means, let Russia drive policy in the
critical region in the Middle East.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And I will yield to our members for their opening
statements. And if I may start with Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The previous administration's withdrawal from America's
traditional leadership role left a power vacuum around the
globe, one that Putin gladly took advantage of. And
unfortunately, we are now paying the consequences.
Putin's engagement in Syria and the Middle East has
complicated our own strategy for dealing with ISIS and Iran and
a litany of other major issues in the region. As the U.S. works
to defeat ruthless terrorist groups, Mr. Putin undermines our
efforts the entire way by lending support to the Assad regime,
continuing to test the limits of our allies, and supplying
weapon systems to Iran.
It is clear that Putin hopes to restore Russia's economic,
military, and geopolitical influence around the world by
capitalizing on the instability in the Middle East. Putin saw
an opportunity to win over regional leaders by questioning the
credibility of long-term support from the United States, and to
some extent, this strategy has worked. However, I also believe
that there are plenty of tools for this new administration to
use to bring both stability and balance back to the region, and
I hope we discuss some of those today.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And you and Mr. Chabot and my friends, but to listen to
both of you, you would never know Donald Trump is in the White
House. Apparently, everything going on in the Middle East is
the fault of somebody else whose name is not Donald Trump.
You would never know that Donald Trump is under
investigation and his campaign is under investigation because
of his ties and their ties to Russia. You would never know
Russia hacked into our election campaign, verified by all of
our intelligence community. You would never know that Donald
Trump boasted of firing the FBI director because of the Russia
thing with the Russian foreign minister. You would never know
that it was Donald Trump that praised Vladimir Putin as a
strong man and liked the fact that Putin had said nice things
about him.
Could that be enabling behavior? I think so. And I think
that is the 800-pound gorilla in the room we need to be talking
about. So you can pretend all you want that it is all Obama's
fault, but we have got a real-life problem right now in real
time in this White House, and that is the Donald Trump
Presidency.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. An enabler.
Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Four days ago, it was the 30th anniversary
of President Reagan going to Berlin and saying tear down the
wall. While having been a senior speech writer for President
Reagan for 7\1/2\ years, I had a chance to have some input, but
I did not write that speech. However, I was the one who
smuggled that speech to President Reagan so that the senior
staff wouldn't take it out before he had a chance to see it.
And once he did see it, he withstood enormous pressure to go
there and speak the truth.
Ronald Reagan then led this country to peace with the
Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan believed in peace through strength.
But let's make it very clear, he believed in peace, and he was
the one who brought whatever good chance we have to have peace
in that part of the world. He is the one who made it happen.
And I will tell you that what we have right now, and I am
afraid I disagree with all of my colleagues, what we hear now
is war talk, something that will only lead to war, and it is
not leading to treating Russia as a power that we need to
negotiate with, as Reagan did, for the cause of peace.
I will tell you right now that I called up Condoleezza Rice
early on when I heard that their economy was in such a free
fall because the West isolated Russia economically after
communism fell. They needed to put their scientists to work.
They made an agreement with Iran. And I said, this is horrible.
But they have got to do it, because they have to make the
money. And I said to Condi, I said, look, let's offer them a
deal. They could make two nuclear power plants in Australia or
New Zealand, financed by the World Bank, it won't cost a penny,
and then they won't have this horrible country, Iran, the
mullah regime, with nuclear weapons 20 years from now. You know
what she said? She said, that is never going to happen, Dana.
Well, I will tell you this much, we have people who can't
get over the Cold War, and they are pushing us toward policies
of antagonism and repeated unrelenting hostility that will lead
us to war. Ronald Reagan wanted peace in this world, and so do
I. This is not the way to a more peaceful world or even a freer
world.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Lieu of California.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Madam Chair and ranking member, for
this important hearing on Russian aggression.
I find it highly disturbing that just yesterday, The Wall
Street Journal reported our President still questions the
intelligence community's assessment that Russia engaged in
massive cyber attacks on the United States last year.
I am one of four computer science majors in Congress. I
read the classified report. I have had classified briefings,
and the President of the United States is simply lying when he
says another country could have done it. It was Russia. And we
cannot properly respond to Russia if our own President will not
accept basic facts. But thank goodness we have Congress. Thank
goodness the U.S. Senate today overwhelmingly passed increased
sanctions on Russia. I urge the House of Representatives to do
the same.
We had a foreign power commit hostile acts against this
country. That is not acceptable.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I guess we are going to be in a debate over the
administration and not Russia. I will remind everybody, though,
that President Trump, actually, is the person that enforced the
red line in Syria and destroyed an airfield as a result of
these chemical weapons.
Madam Chair, thank you for doing this.
And I thank our guests for being here and giving us your
time.
I just want to say, in my opening statement, that Russia
has blood on their hands in Syria as well as many other places.
In 2015, America mistakenly and tragically bombed a
hospital in Afghanistan. And as a result, the world rightfully
called that out, and America made amends; we found ourselves
accountable. But every day, medical facilities, hospitals,
places where innocent people live and work and simply try to
exist in their life are bombed by the Assad regime and backed
and bombed by the Russian regime. This is pure and despicable
evil.
When our country makes a mistake, we hold ourselves
accountable to it and try to make sure we do it better next
time. When Russia--they don't make mistakes. They target with
precision-guided munitions innocent lives. This is not a
country that we can put an olive branch out to and say, you are
just like us. You are also a great power. This is a country
with an economy the size of Italy.
With that, Madam Chair, I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very eloquent. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Deutch, for calling this important hearing today.
And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for offering
your testimony.
I want to especially thank you, Mr. Kara-Murza, and say how
glad I am to see you here healthy and as outspoken as ever,
drawing light to the Russian Government's activities at home
and around the world. Your bravery in the face of intimidation
is an example to us all and a reminder of how lucky we are as
Americans to be able to speak our mind, question our
Government, and call out corruption when we see it. We thank
you for your continuing willingness to speak out.
There is no doubt that Russia is seeking to expand its
influence and reach throughout the Middle East. While I hope
that we can partner with Russia and the horrific conflict in
Syria, we have to remember that their goals in the region are
not the same as ours.
We seem to have an administration that wants to give Russia
the benefit of the doubt, despite years of evidence that they
will use this to manipulate events to their benefit. Moreover,
the overwhelming budget cuts proposed by President Trump will
leave our foreign policy apparatus decimated and unable to
respond, namely, to crises and provocations. By ceding our
leadership role around the world so thoroughly, we will be
giving Vladimir Putin the opening he has so desperately sought
to create over the last dozen years to increase his power and
influence in the Middle East.
I hope our witnesses can shed some light on Russia's
intentions in the region and suggest steps that Congress can
take that will ensure that American interests and national
security are protected.
And I will end with one expression of concern, and that is
that the Senate passed some strong sanctions yesterday. And it
is already being reported that the White House is reaching out
in an effort to weaken these sanctions. And I hope that we can
send a very strong message that the Congress of the United
States is very united in ensuring that severe sanctions are put
into place and the Russians are held fully to account.
And with that, Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Well put. Thank you, Mr.
Cicilline.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman and ranking
member, for calling this hearing, Russia's Strategic Objectives
in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Middle East and North Africa is a region that our
interests run both deep and broad, as is going to be said,
having read the advanced testimony, history matters. I don't
want to take away something you said, but history does matter
here, and it is important to understand the history of the
region, the history of different interests in this region. I
look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Again, thank you
for being here.
But I think we also have to look at this in the context of
a discussion that is taking place in this chamber, that is
taking place broadly in the country, and that is the
President's desire to cut our investment in diplomacy and in
development. It is a three-legged stool, and if we are going to
promote our interests in this region, we need to continue to
invest in diplomacy and development as well as defense. And I
hope the witnesses will be able to touch a bit on that.
I know we are also going to talk about the sale of weapons
into the region and how that plays out, and I think that is an
important issue that we understand.
And finally, I just want to associate myself with my
colleague from Rhode Island's remarks about the concern on
sanctions. It is important that we continue to push back on
Russia's interests and Russia's efforts to destabilize this
region. Again, not to take anything away from what the
witnesses are going to say, but the sense that this is a zero-
sum game, if Russia seeks to win, we have to lose, we can't let
that be the case. We have to work with our allies to secure our
interests.
And with that, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Any other members wish to make a statement?
And now I am pleased to introduce our wonderful set of
panelists. I am delighted to welcome my friend and a true hero
of democracy, as Mr. Cicilline referred to him, Mr. Vladimir
Kara-Murza, who currently serves as the vice chair of Open
Russia, a Russian pro-democracy movement. He was a long-time
colleague and adviser to opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. And
here he is. And this is an actual poster that was used with the
bullet holes there. Thank you.
He currently chairs the foundation that bears Nemtsov's
name. In response to his activism and opposition, Vlad was
poisoned, not once but twice, by the vile Putin regime.
Putin's cronies continue cracking down on dissidents. Just
a few weeks ago, his regime detained a popular opposition
leader for simply walking down the street and protesting with
his presence. Many people involved are likely eligible to be
added to the Magnitsky list. We must show Putin and his
henchmen that they will not get away with these abuses.
So thank you, my friend, for continuing to stand up against
oppression. We all look forward to your testimony, Vladimir.
And next, we would like to welcome Ms. Anna
Borshchevskaya--I am so proud, I am going to say it again,
Borshchevskaya--who serves as the Ira Weiner Fellow at The
Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the
Middle East. She is also a fellow at the European Foundation
for Democracy and was previously with the Peterson Institute
for International Economics and the Atlantic Council.
We look forward to your testimony. Thank you.
And finally, we want to re-welcome Mr. Brian Katulis.
Saying that right, too. Mr. Katulis is a senior fellow at the
Center for American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S.
national security strategy and counterterrorism policy. His
past experience includes work at the National Security Council
and the U.S. Departments of State and Defense during President
Bill Clinton's administration.
Welcome back. We look forward to your testimony.
And, Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, we will begin with you, Vlad.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA, VICE CHAIRMAN, OPEN
RUSSIA
Mr. Kara-Murza. Madam Chairman, thank you very much for
your kind introduction. Far too kind, as always. Thank you also
for your leadership here on this Hill for so many years on
issues that are so important for so many people. And thank you,
in particular, for your leadership.
You mentioned Boris Nemtsov in your opening remarks, and
thank you for your leadership in sponsoring the House bill,
H.R. 1863, that would designate the space in front of the
Russian Embassy here in Washington, DC, as Boris Nemtsov Plaza
to commemorate him and his memory. This is very important to
very many people.
Thank you, also, to the member of the subcommittee, Mr.
Connolly, for cosponsoring this same piece of legislation.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, esteemed
members of the subcommittee, thank you so much for holding this
important and timely hearing and for the opportunity to testify
before you.
Our subject today is Russia's strategic objectives in the
Middle East. And I think before we discuss the substance, it is
important also to clarify the terms. What we are talking about
today are the objectives of Vladimir Putin's government. For
many Russians, including myself, it is a very uncomfortable
equivalence to make between our country and the current regime
in the Kremlin that has not resulted from democratic elections.
The Kremlin's involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs
today is the most active it has been since the heyday of the
Cold War.
Just like Hafez al-Assad, with whom Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev professed to be ``fighting shoulder to shoulder,'' was
Moscow's ally in the 1970s and 1980s, so was his son, Bashar
al-Assad today. From the start of the internal conflict in
Syria in 2011, Mr. Putin has been a staunch defender of the
Assad regime, providing it not only with political support and
diplomatic cover but also, since 2015, with direct military
help as the Russian aerospace forces have conducted bombing
raids against Assad's opponents.
The Kremlin has blocked eight Syria-related resolutions at
the U.N. Security Council. Most recently, on April 13 of this
year, Russia's acting U.N. Ambassador, Vladimir Safronkov--and
I should add, behaving in a manner more appropriate for a bar
brawl than for the U.N. Security Council--vetoed a draft
resolution calling for an international investigation into the
chemical gas attack in Khan Sheikhoun.
Vladimir Putin's support for the Syrian dictator is
consistent with his longstanding hostility to popular
movements, not only in the Middle East, but also in post-Soviet
countries, like Georgia and Ukraine, where mass protests have
toppled authoritarian governments.
In the fates of these strong men driven from power, he sees
his own possible fate. In fact, he has himself publicly
compared the mass demonstrations that swept across Russia
earlier this year when tens of thousands of people went out to
the streets to protest against authoritarianism and corruption;
most recently just 3 days ago, both to the Arab Spring and to
the Maidan revolution in Ukraine. These protests in Russia were
met with a very harsh response, with peaceful demonstrators
beaten up by riot police and with more than 1,500 people
arrested on a single day.
The official foreign policy concept of the Russian
Federation that was signed by Mr. Putin mentions ``the growing
threat of international terrorism.'' Yet the Kremlin's approach
to this issue has been ambivalent at best. For example, unlike
the United States and the European Union, the Russian
Government refuses to recognize Hamas and Hezbollah as
terrorist organizations. This is what Ranking Member Deutch
referred to in his opening remarks.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has met on several
occasions with Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. In January of this
year, Mr. Lavrov hosted a meeting in Moscow at the foreign
ministry for representatives of several Palestinian groups,
which included Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the
popular front for the liberation of the Palestine that are also
designated by the U.S. and the EU as terrorist organizations.
Asked in a recent interview why the Russian Government
considers some terrorists to be bad and others good, the
Russian Ambassador to Israel, Alexander Shein, responded that,
and I quote, ``We do not consider them''--meaning Hamas and
Hezbollah--``terrorists at all.'' This comes despite the fact
that Russian citizens in Israel have been among the victims of
these groups.
With so many cultural, historical, emotional, and family
ties between Russian and Israeli societies, and with fully one-
fifth of Israelis, including members of Israel's Government,
speaking Russian as their first language, it would seem natural
that Russia should treat the state of Israel as a close
partner. Instead, the Kremlin's principal ally in the region,
alongside Bashar al-Assad, is the Islamic Republic of Iran,
where Moscow remains the largest supplier of weapons, where it
is actively pursuing new contracts in atomic energy, and which
it continues to provide for significant diplomatic support.
Vladimir Putin's objectives in the Middle East have been
consistent both with his domestic behavior and with his
approach to other parts of the world: Support fellow dictators
and undermine efforts of democratization, what his foreign
policy concept refers to as ``ideological values imposed from
outside.''
Military involvement in Syria has also been used by the
Kremlin for the purposes of domestic propaganda, both to divert
attention from economic difficulties at home and to back up the
claim that Mr. Putin has restored Russia's status as a great
power, a claim that is hardly consistent with reality. A
reminder of this came just last month as the leaders of what is
now known as the G-7 held their annual summit in Sicily, for
the fourth time now without Russia, which was suspended from
the group of major world powers because of Mr. Putin's
violations of international law.
Thank you very much, once again, for the opportunity to
testify. I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kara-Murza follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.
Good to see you healthy.
And now we will begin with you. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MS. ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA, IRA WEINER FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
Deutch, honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.
In my written testimony, I have gone into detail about
Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic objectives in the
Middle East and how those work against our own national
security interests. But for the sake of brevity, let me
summarize.
First, Vladimir Putin's intervention in Syria in September
2015 had taken many by surprise, but it is important to
remember that Russia's presence in the Middle East is not new.
It is its absence during Boris Yeltsin's Presidency in the 1990
that is the deviation from history. Putin sought to bring
Russia back to the Middle East from the very beginning when he
officially came to power in May 2000, and he did so in an anti-
Western zero-sum approach. For Putin to win, the United States
had to lose.
In the Middle East, and especially in Syria, Putin has
multiple goals, but fundamentally, Putin's priority is the
survival of his own regime. He wants to stay in power. And
survival for him is connected to undermining the West. Thus,
Putin uses the Middle East to that end. He steps into vacuums
wherever the West retreats and asserts Russia's influence,
which sows instability and contributes to terrorism.
Putin says he wants to work with everyone in the region,
but his actions show a clear preference for the anti-Sunni and
anti-U.S. forces. Putin's growing relationship with Iran and
continued support pursuing President Bashar al-Assad, two major
forces that contribute to terrorism, are a testament to this.
Russia's growing alliance with Iran, in particular,
presents a major challenge to U.S. interests in the region. We
increasingly talk about a post-ISIS environment, and it is in a
post-ISIS environment that this issue becomes especially
important. Russia-Iran military ties continue to grow and,
frankly, the overall level of closeness between the two
countries is unprecedented in the grand scope of over 500 years
of history.
Together, Moscow and Tehran are in a better position to
undermine the U.S. in the Middle East than on their own. For
years, Moscow consistently worked to dilute sanctions against
Iran and claimed that concerns about Iran's nuclear program
were overblown. Moscow also, at the very least, looked the
other way when Russian weapons reached Hezbollah. And as was
mentioned previously, Hezbollah is not designated as a
terrorist organization in Russia.
Kremlin's actions shows that Putin cares more about his own
interests than international regional security. In Syria, Putin
protected Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning and in
multiple ways. Putin says he went into Syria in September 2015
to fight terrorists, mainly ISIS, so that they don't return to
Russia. But as was mentioned several times here today, numerous
reports indicate that he has primarily targeted everyone else.
Putin wants to put the U.S. in front of a choice: It is
either ISIS or Assad. And as Putin enables Assad, Assad
continues an ethnic cleansing in Syria, which increases refugee
flows into Europe, thus helping Putin weaken and divide the
West.
Russia's role in Libya is particularly important to watch.
Putin has been gaining a foothold there by supporting Libya's
General Khalifa Haftar. And in the context of U.S. absence,
Putin could attempt to do in Libya what he has effectively done
in Syria, step into a vacuum, create a short-term fix, and take
credit for it and cede long-term instability.
The line between domestic and foreign policy in Russia is
often blurred, and it is hard sometimes to understand because
it is different from the West. It is a point that often gets
missed. Putin seeks to distract Russia's domestic audience from
his own failings. His foreign adventures, pointing to the U.S.
as the enemy, these are all distractions in many ways. This is
how he legitimizes his regime. Putin fears domestic protests,
and he believes that the West orchestrates regime change
throughout the world, be it color revolutions in the post-
Soviet space, the Arab Spring, or domestic protests against
Putin himself.
Moscow's overall military moves from Ukraine to Syria
suggest that Putin is trying to create antiaccess/denial, the
so-called A2/AD bubbles, to limit our ability to maneuver in
the region. These are, essentially, ever-growing buffer zones
that he is trying to create. Thus, access to warm-water ports
has been especially important to Putin along with political and
economic influence in the region.
I made a number of policy recommendations in my testimony,
but my top few are the following: First, Putin cannot be a
reliable partner in fighting terrorism. We cannot work
effectively with someone who perceives us as the enemy and
seeks to undermine us and who enables forces that contribute to
terrorism in the region in the first place.
Second, the United States must actively engage in the
Middle East, such as increase security cooperation with our
partners to reassure our allies and counter Kremlin's
propaganda efforts more effectively. This is the best way to
limit Putin's influence.
Lastly, we have to remember that there are no quick and
easy fixes, but with strategic and moral clarity, the U.S. can
reclaim its leadership position in the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Borshchevskaya follows:]
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Mr. Donovan [presiding]. Thank you.
Our next witness.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS
Mr. Katulis. Great. I would like to thank the acting
chairman and the ranking member and all members of the
committee for the invitation. It is great to be with you today.
My bottom line analysis upfront is that Russia's increased
engagement and assertiveness in the Middle East since 2015 has
accelerated three negative trends within the region that affect
U.S. national security interests.
One is it has accelerated State fragmentation; two, it has
actually heightened the terrorist threat posed in the region
and to the United States; and three, it has reinforced a trend
toward autocratic and authoritarian rule. It has done this
primarily through its longstanding cooperation with Iran, but
its backing most recently of the Assad regime in Syria.
Another bottom line upfront assessment is that though it is
still too early to tell in the Trump administration, I believe
that we are seeing the emergence of a strategic posture of the
United States in the Middle East that is quite incoherent and
not clear where the pieces do not add up.
I would like to use my remarks to talk, first, for a minute
about the strategic landscape in the Middle East, because I
think it is very important to stress one key point: That the
region itself is in the midst of a long and complicated period
of fluid change, and the drivers of that change largely come
from within the region. Outside actors like the United States,
like Russia, have an important sway and influence, but the
primary drivers of change inside the region come from within
the actors.
Some of it is this competition for influence between Saudi
Arabia and Iran. Some of it are these tensions we have seen
recently between other major actors like Qatar and other Gulf
States. And a big part of it is this rise of nonstate actors
that we have seen over the last 15 to 20 years, including al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State.
This competition within the region is multidimensional. It
has a military and security aspect, but it has political and
economic features that I am happy to talk about. It is
multipolar, meaning that there is not one single actor or force
that I see as dominant within the region. So I think this
complicated landscape is one that is subject to fracturing,
fragmentation, and every action the United States takes, every
action outside actors like Russia takes, it makes a major
impact, and it is quite vulnerable.
In my written testimony, I outline seven key objectives
that I see in Russia's behaviors in the Middle East. I would
like to just highlight a few and then move to my assessment of
U.S. policy.
Number one, it is clear to me that Russia and its actions,
particularly since 2015, have been aimed to safeguard against
attempts to isolate Russia geopolitically for its destabilizing
actions in Europe, in Ukraine, in the United States, and other
parts of the world. Part of the reason I think it got engaged
was not only to try to undermine U.S. influence in the region,
but also to, again, arrest the attempts to isolate it through
various means.
Secondly, it has tried to maintain a degree of military
presence at strategic locations across the Middle East and
North Africa, primarily, we see in eastern Mediterranean and
Syria.
And then, lastly, it states that it seeks to contain
Islamist terrorism and prevent its expansion into Russia and
its own borders. But, again, if you go back to my bottom line
assessment, the consequence of its actions have been to
exacerbate and to worsen that threat.
In my last minute, I just wanted to briefly talk about what
I see as very worrisome trends, and I think an important role
that Congress has to play in asking questions. We have moved
from a policy in the previous decade under the Bush
administration of, perhaps, overreach and trying to do so much
to change these societies to one under President Obama of
reticence and restraint, to what I think at this stage, 5
months into a new administration, which is quite incoherent at
this point. The pieces don't add up.
Three points I would stress in the emerging strategic
posture in the Trump administration and why I think it is
important that you are having this hearing and Congress should
engage on these issues:
Number one, we see a proposed unilateral disarmament of the
tools of U.S. national security power, particularly in
diplomacy and economic tools. And that is why this bill that
several of the members talked about that is in the Senate, I
think is an important tool in the arsenal to shape the actions
of Russia and Iran in ways that benefit our interests.
Secondly, we see an overreliance on military tactics in the
absence of a clear strategy. And thirdly, I also see what I
term a creeping U.S. military escalation and a silent surge of
U.S. troops in multiple parts of the Middle East, in Syria and
Yemen and other places, but all of this is in absence of
overarching strategy.
What is the best way to deal with Russia in the Middle
East? The best and most effective thing is to have a coherent
U.S. strategy, something that I would submit that we have not
had for more than a decade and a half. In large part because of
our own unforced errors, in large part because of this
complicated landscape I tried to depict in my written testimony
and in my remarks today. But Congress has an important role in
helping this new administration find greater coherence and
develop greater coherence in its engagement strategy.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katulis follows:]
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Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much.
I thank all of our witnesses for appearing today and for
their testimony.
My colleague, Ann Wagner, has to be at a markup in
Financial Services, so I am going to yield my time and
recognize Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Well, I thank the chair very, very much for
his indulgence and generosity there. And I thank us all for
participating in this important hearing, especially our
witnesses today.
It is important that the committee actively tracks Russia's
military partnerships and military sales in the Middle East and
in North Africa.
Mr. Kara-Murza--and I hope I am getting everyone's
pronunciations correct today--you are, sir, a brave supporter
of Russia's democratic opposition and shoulder great personal
risk, sir. I read an interview with you in the National Review
and was blown away by your insight into Putin and obstacles to
democracy in Russia. I appreciate your leadership. I associate
myself with your stubbornness and your willingness to be here
today.
I am wondering if you could flush out for us, on the
record, the difference between Russia's perspective on Ukraine
and the Baltic States? What about Ukraine poses a threat to
Putin in a way that the Baltics do not?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you very much. Make sure the mic is
on.
Thank you, Madam Congresswoman, and thank you for your very
kind words. Far too kind. Again, it is an honor for me to be
here.
And it is a very important question that you pose, and
there is actually, a qualitative and substantive difference, I
think, between Mr. Putin's perception of what is happening, for
example, in the Baltic States and what is happening in the
Ukraine.
Successful democratic European Baltic States would not
necessarily be a direct example for Russian society, because we
are so different in many ways. A successful democratic European
Ukraine would be an inspiration to so many people in Russia,
because of our proximity, we have, in many ways, a shared
history. We have the same faith. We have a very similar
language, many cultural links. And when Mr. Putin saw those
images of the Maidan in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014, when he saw
hundreds of thousands of people standing on the streets of the
capital as the corrupt authoritarian leader, Mr. Yanukovych,
was hastily getting in his helicopter and fleeing, that was an
analogy too close to home for Vladimir Putin. That was not a
precedent he enjoyed.
He feared that a success of this experiment, of the
democratic experiment in Ukraine, would provide an inspiration
for many people in Russia. And I think the primary motivation
for Vladimir Putin's aggression against Ukraine for what he has
been doing to Ukraine since 2014 has been the desire to prevent
the success of the Maidan in Kiev before it would become a
model for Maidan in Moscow.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you very much. And I concur.
Ms. Borshchevskaya, you have written extensively on the
Putin-Erdogan relationship. Do you believe that Erdogan's
decision to no longer voice support for the ousting of Assad is
related to Turkey's partnership with Russia in the Syrian war?
And further to that, how has Russia's historic support for the
Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, in Turkey altered how Erdogan
approaches the Syrian war?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Thank you for the question. Yes, I
believe that is exactly the reason why Erdogan has changed his
mind. Frankly, I am not sure if Erdogan is realizing how
unequal the relationship is right now between himself and
Putin, precisely for the reason that you mentioned, because
Russia has longstanding, very deep ties to Kurds. The PKK,
essentially, was created by a communist proxy, and Moscow's
ties to the Kurds go back over 200 years.
This is what Erdogan fears the most. And I think he,
essentially, changed his position on Assad. He said for years
Assad must go. He no longer says this in exchange for his
ability to at least have some sort of influence in Syria.
Mrs. Wagner. In my brief time left, Russian Ambassador to
Turkey, Andrey Karlov, was fatally shot in December in Turkey.
And at the time, Russia and Turkey stated that the murder was a
result of terrorism. And one Russian center said that the
answer would be to redouble the fight against terrorism in
Syria.
Ms. Borshchevskaya, can you explain how Russia has directly
or indirectly reacted to the murder in the months since then?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Well, for one thing--you know, the
first thing that came out in the Russian Kremlin-controlled
press that I remember, was talk about how these are--the
murder, that these are all--it is a plot to divide Erdogan and
Putin, that there is some kind of conspiracy theory. And,
therefore, Erdogan and Putin are just going to keep working
together more closely, that they are not going to let these
fictitious enemies, these terrorists, keep them apart.
You know, beyond that, there was a very general statement
about terrorism, but again, as we have talked before, these are
not real attempts to fight terrorism.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. And I know my time has lapsed. I
yield back, and again, appreciate the indulgence of the chair.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, again, to the witnesses for really excellent
testimony. We appreciate you being here.
I would like to start with the point I made in my opening
remarks, which gets to the fundamental difference in Russia's
approach to the region, and that is the interview the Russian
Ambassador to Israel gave just this week where he made very
clear that Russia does not view ISIS the same way it views
Hezbollah. And according to translations of the interview he
said, ``You equate ISIS with Hamas and Hezbollah, but we think
this is wrong.''
When pressed by the interviewer with, that is all you can
say, there are bad terrorists and good terrorists, his response
was, ``No, we do not consider them to be terrorists at all.''
So it is no wonder that Russia has had no problem aligning
itself with Hezbollah in Syria and Iran, the largest state
sponsor of terrorism.
Russia's interests in Syria are about making sure Russia
isn't affected by ISIS, and if it means propping up a brutal
dictator or empowering a different terrorist organization, one
that it sees as less of a threat to its own territory, that
seems to be just fine.
Apparently, Russia should be reminded that Hezbollah has
launched attacks in Europe or that Hezbollah has 120,000
rockets aimed at Israel where more than 1 million Russians
live. This is precisely the reason that when our President says
he wants to work with Russia to fight ISIS, we have deep
concerns.
I, frankly, see no outcome in which Russia suddenly
separates itself from the Assad-Iran-Hezbollah alliance. And
any deal that leaves a permanent Hezbollah or Iranian presence
in Syria should be unacceptable to the United States. A
sustained military presence in Syria would pose a serious
threat to our interests in the region and only serve to further
ferment Iran's destabilizing behaviors throughout the region.
So I would ask the panel, what is Russia's relationship
like with Hezbollah on the battlefield, and to what extent are
they cooperating and coordinating with Hezbollah, Iran, or
other Iranian-backed militias?
Ms. Borshchevskaya.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Sure. I can address this. Sorry. There
have been multiple reports that Hezbollah has been learning
from the Russian military. They have--and Putin, actually, has
made it no secret. He repeatedly said that the Syria campaign
provided direct life training for the Russian military, and
this was one among many objectives. He said, you know, that
there is no better training than real-life combat. And, in
fact, the Russian military already had three such campaigns in
the last several years: Georgia, Ukraine, and now Syria.
So with respect to Iran and Hezbollah, you know, if you
look at what is happening in Syria right now, on the Syria-Iraq
border, as you know, it was reported in the press that U.S., in
fact, is getting more involved. There were some clashes with
pro-Assad forces. What was happening there is Russia was
providing air cover for Hezbollah operations. So from reports
that we have seen, there's been a lot of learning, and
Hezbollah members even talked positively about how much they
have learned from watching the Russians operate.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Katulis?
Mr. Katulis. If I could underscore a point, Congressman,
that you stressed. Hezbollah is our adversary. It is an enemy.
It has threatened, as recently as last week, U.S. troops in
southern Syria, as Anna just highlighted. There were clashes.
And I talked about a creeping military escalation and a
silencer to the U.S. troops. We don't have the large numbers of
troops that we had in Iraq and Afghanistan, thank heavens, in
the previous decade, but we do have a garrison in southeastern
Syria that, just last week, was threatened by Hezbollah.
So the strategic incoherence that I simply do not
understand and I think Congress needs to ask tough questions of
the Trump administration of how are you going to work with
Russia, which has been in alignment with Iran, which is an
adversary to Israel? And nobody, I think, has answered that
question in any clear way, especially while Hezbollahis
threatening our troops.
Mr. Deutch. And just if you could be--if you could be very
direct, the result of a Russian-trained Hezbollah force in a
post-conflict Syria with Hezbollah remaining in place means
what to U.S. troops and to our--and to our ally Israel?
Mr. Katulis. Well, to our ally Israel, when I go to Israel,
they talk about Iran being their deepest strategic threat, so
this approach is existential. And if I might add, when I look
at the Trump administration's budget proposal for 2018 and
things that it proposes to do in terms of cutting security
assistance to some of those partners, including in Lebanon,
that are fighting Hezbollah and its influence, it seems to me
that the Trump administration has an incoherent formula that is
going soft on Hezbollah, and it is perplexing.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, the incoherent formula Mr. Katulis describes
that is not only going soft on Hezbollah but helping to train
Hezbollah imperils our own troops and imperils Israel, and the
administration has to acknowledge as much and the policy has to
change. That is why this hearing is so important.
I appreciate the opportunity. And I apologize, I am a
ranking member on another committee that I have to run to, but
I thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Donovan. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Before my friend leaves, let me just note
that perhaps you have forgotten that Assad has had three
decades of a truce with Israel. And let me add that, during
that time, we were allied with countries that wanted to destroy
Israel, our now Saudi new friends. I just wanted to--in your
last statement--yes, please.
Mr. Deutch. Would the gentleman yield?
I mean, if the gentleman--if my friend from California is
suggesting that somehow it is in the best interest of the
United States to not only accept but encourage a Syria run by a
brutal dictator propped up by a Russian Government----
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is not what my statement was.
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Propped up by a Russian Government
that will simultaneously strengthen Hezbollah and Iran, who is
an existential threat to Israel----
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is not my----
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. I would disagree with that, and
I----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, that is the way to dodge my
point, but you are absolutely wrong in your analysis that
Assad, over these last 30 years, has been some kind of enemy of
Israel. The fact is, we have been supporting enemies of Israel
for the last 30 years. Assad is at a truce, the one country
where they could have had a truce, and--I have given you your
chance. Okay. You didn't answer--you didn't answer it.
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. The point is Assad is a murderous
thug, though----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I gave him his chance to
answer my disagreement. He chose not to.
The fact is that we have been allied with people who are
much more warlike than Assad. And Assad, over these last 30
years, have been the one country in which Christians could come
and seek refuge. Even from countries in which they were our
friends, the Christians would come and seek refuge with Assad,
because we--they, Assad, was not putting up with the
persecution and destruction of the Christian community.
Anything--that is what I mean by unrelenting hostility, but you
can't see and in any way accept that or deal with it.
We are going to come up with the wrong policies, just like
our friend--and I respect the open Russia movement. I respect
the people that are struggling to get rid of the massive
corruption that you have in that country. And I--unfortunately,
I don't think you are making much headway right now. And it is
not just removing Putin. It is removing a lot of other people
in power, the oligarchs, et cetera.
But with that said, for you to suggest that the removal of
Yanukovych in Ukraine was part of a democratic experience or
experiment, ladies and gentlemen, you had a democratically
elected government removed by force. And without that
happening, I believe that Yanukovych would have been removed
overwhelmingly in the next election. And collusion with Europe
and the United States, powerful forces in the Ukraine,
overthrew the Yanukovych regime, not allowing democracy to
work; it destroyed democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I happen to be the chairman of the committee
that has oversight over this part of the world, and I would
never have a panel of at least some disagreement on the panel.
And the bottom line is, you are about as close to any
disagreement on it, and you don't.
The fact is that we need--if we are going to have peace in
the world, we have got to make sure we are talking with Russia
honestly and trying to confront these issues, whether it is
Yanukovych or whether--you know, look, our people in the Middle
East, they are not democratic countries. You think the Saudis
are democratic countries? And the Saudis were involved with
killing 3,000 Americans on 9/11. What about the Qataris we are
talking about right now? You think they wouldn't slaughter the
large populations they have, if they ever rose up against them?
We have to quit trying to judge Russia on a double standard
if we want peace in this world. Because we have to reach out to
them and say, okay. Let's be honest. What is in your interest?
What is in our interest? I have to believe that peace is in the
interest of both of our countries, especially when you have got
radical Islam that is killing a bunch of Russians just like
they are killing Americans.
So with that said, I will ask a question and try to get--
but I am disappointed that the panel doesn't have at least one
witness to try to have a dialogue about these particular
issues.
By the way, just for my friend--and I am sorry he left, and
I would have given him a chance to say this as well--but when
you complain about any type of this administration's
relationship or President, you know, Donald Trump's
relationship with Russia before he was President, I mean, no
one's--that doesn't sound anywhere near as insidious as the
tens of millions of dollars that were put into the Clinton
fund. Look, Clinton has a foundation in which oligarchs put
millions and millions of dollars and paid her husband huge sums
of money into his pocket. And what happened very shortly after
that? Well, they get a contract to have America's uranium. My
gosh. No one's even mentioning it, as if all the other stuff,
talking to some--talking to an Ambassador is some sort of a
secret, insidious thing, which it is not. That is what the
Ambassador is there for--versus exchanges of millions of
dollars? No.
We have got--if we want to have peace--I think free people
should be for peace. Our major goal should be for peace because
peace will override and destroy lives and destroy democracy
every time. And I thank God that Ronald Reagan brought peace
between Russia and the United States. He eliminated the Soviet
Union. The Russians pulled back in the greatest peaceful
removal of force in a large chunk of territory dealing with
their borders in the history of human kind. And then what did
we do? We didn't let them in the EU. We isolated them
economically.
And I will just say that I played little parts in this. I
mentioned the thing about trying to make sure that their
nuclear physicists wouldn't be working with Iran. We forced
them into the--into this relationship with Iran.
And I will tell you one other incident for the record,
because I have been following this stuff, the Russians offered
to back out of the agreement with the Iranians. I had this
directly from players in this game, not Russians, but
Americans. They offered to withdraw their agreement with the
Iranian nuclear agreement if we would work with them on
developing the next generation of nuclear power, which is safe
and you can't melt it down, et cetera. And you know what? We
turned them down. And we said, go play with the Iranians.
So a lot of the problems we have now, I think, have been
based on we have not reached out to try to work with an honest
discussion of differences with the country in which--yes, I am
not trying to say that Putin is a democratic leader. He is
oppressive and he has lied, and he is tied in the oligarchs
that are crooked and draining the money from the Russian
people, which should be used for their benefit. So I am sorry.
I know it sounds like they are saying he is Putin's man. I am
not Putin's man. But I am the only one who is willing to make
the arguments on the other side and trying to see that in order
to create a more peaceful world.
And so with that said, I am sorry I took up my whole 5
minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would let them refute me, and I will
shut up.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you. And we will let them do
that, but let me go to Mr. Cicilline first.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madame Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses. I think one of the things that
we understand is that our military is most effective when it
works in conjunction with our diplomatic work and, of course,
with our development professionals.
And I am just wondering whether or not any of the panelists
think that it is possible for us to push back against Russian
aggression and build the kind of competence in American
leadership that we need through our military expenditures alone
or should we, as members of this committee, continue to fight
for robust investments in both foreign assistance and
development aid that are such important parts of our foreign
policy. As you might know, the President's budget proposes very
deep, deep cuts in those areas. Yes? Everyone agrees?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you very much. And I want to just
briefly say thank you for your kind words also during the
introductory remarks.
I would like, Madame Chairwoman, if you would allow me very
briefly to respond to what Congressman Rohrabacher said.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes. And I won't take from Mr.
Cicilline's time.
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you. First of all, it is very
refreshing to see disagreement and genuine debate in a
legislative body.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Kara-Murza. That is something we have long forgotten in
my country. As you know, as a former speaker of the Russian
Parliament, Mr. Gryzlov has said, Parliament is not a place for
discussion. And, unfortunately, that is what it has become
under Vladimir Putin.
The last time my country had anything resembling a free and
fair election was more than 17 years ago, in March 2000. And
this is not me saying it. This is according to observers from
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. So
when I say again and again that please don't equate Russia with
the Putin regime, it means very simply that the current regime
is not a product of Democratic election. It is not a product of
a free choice of our people.
And you said, Congressman, one thing which I completely
agree with. You said, let's not treat Russia with a double
standard, and I think this is very important.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Mr. Kara-Murza. We are not worse than you are. We are
entitled to the same rights and freedoms that you have. Russia
doesn't exist in a vacuum. Russia is a member of the Council of
Europe. Russia is a member of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe. We have clear international commitments
with regard to such areas as free elections, freedom of
assembly, freedom of the press, the rule of law and due
process. The Putin regime has been violating these commitments
and these principles for years, and it is not okay, if I could
say this, for Western politicians, for Western political
leaders to say, ah, forget it. You know, let them do whatever
they want to do inside their country. Let's do realpolitik.
Let's do business as usual with Mr. Putin. Let's deal with him
as if he is, you know, a normal democratic-elected leader. That
is not right. That is insulting. Because, you know, we have
political prisoners in our country who are sitting in jails for
their political beliefs.
Three days ago, we had peaceful opposition rallies on the
streets of Russia, and more than 1,500 people were arrested and
put to jail, including women, including teenagers. This is not
okay. We have no freedom of the press in our country on a large
scale. All the major media, all the major television networks
are controlled by the government. And as I already mentioned,
we have no free elections and have not had free elections for
many years.
So I think it is very important to remember the values. You
mentioned President Reagan several times today. And what
President Reagan is remembered for in our part of the world is
that he always attached great importance to values. And, yes,
he engaged with the Soviet leadership on several areas,
including arms control, but he also, every time he had a
meeting with Soviet leader, he put on a list on a desk, the
list of Soviet political prisoners, and he demanded their
release. It would be nice to see something similar in terms of
principles from the current generation of Western leaders.
Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. This is sort of building off of
those comments. According to CNN, our President has spoken
positively of President Putin over 70 times, calling him
``highly respected within his own country and beyond'' and
saying he is doing, and I quote, ``a great job.''
I am wondering if you could share what you think the impact
of that kind of posture by the American President is with
respect to our allies in the region and with respect to our
enemies in the region. What message does that communicate? It
is sort of mystifying to me, but I am just wondering what are
the geopolitical implications.
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you very much. And, well, I think
there is enough talk in this town about Russians meddling in
your domestic policy, so I don't want to be one more. So I
don't think it is my place to comment on, you know, the
administration or any political dynamic in the U.S. But I would
say this: I think, you know, if you watch Russian state TV, if
you watch Kremlin propaganda outlets, you will hear that we,
members of the Russian opposition, go to the West and we ask
for money, we ask for political support, we ask for regime
change. Of course, none of that is true. All we ask for are two
things from Western leaders, including the Government of the
United States of America, the most important democracy in the
world. We ask only two things.
One is honesty, to be open and honest about what is
happening in Russia. Don't pretend that something is happening
that is not happening. Don't call things for what they are not.
Just call things for what they are. Just be honest and open
about the situation. That is the first thing.
And the second thing we ask for of Western leaders,
including the United States, is please be true and be faithful
to your own principles. Don't enable the export of corruption
and abuse from the Putin regime to the West. Don't enable this
behavior by providing havens, as so many Western countries have
for so long, to those human rights abusers and those crooks and
those corrupt officials from the Putin regime who steal in
Russia but prefer to spend in the West and who keep their money
in Western banks, who send their kids to study in Western
schools, who buy real estate and properties and mansions and
yachts in Western countries.
And the Magnitsky Act, which was passed by this Congress
almost 5 years ago, which introduced this very concept of those
people who engage in human rights abuse and corruption should
not be allowed to enter the U.S. or use the U.S. financial
system. Boris Nemtsov, who was already mentioned in these
hearings, he and I were sitting in the House Visitor Gallery on
the day the Magnitsky law was being passed. And I think every
one of you present here voted for this law. And he called it,
Boris Nemtsov called it the most pro-Russian law ever passed in
a foreign Parliament, because it targets those people who abuse
the rights of Russian citizens and who steal the money of
Russian taxpayers. And that is commitment to principle. So this
is all we would ask for of the U.S. Government or any other
government in the Western world.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I have two other questions, and I
am going to just pose them and you will have as much time as
you need to answer them, I hope, Madame Chairman.
The first is how is Russia managing to pay for all of its
costly interventions around the world, particularly in Syria,
and to really begin to become even more engaged in the areas
around the Middle East? Are they perceiving that they are
getting a good return on their investment? And have the Russian
people made the connection between a decline in their quality
of life and Russian efforts in the Middle East? And does that
either encourage the Russians to more deeply engage or what is
the kind of long-term implications of that? Because my sense is
they don't have the resources to do this without misleading the
Russian people about the benefits of that.
And then the second thing is, we now know that Russian
propaganda RT, a very powerful outlet for Russian propaganda,
has an Arabic channel. And I would like to know a little bit
about what Russia is investing in this propaganda in the Arab
world and is it having an impact and what should we be doing
and thinking about in terms of responding to the powerful
spread of propaganda by the Russians through RT in the Arab
world? So those are the two.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. I want to respond to Congressman
Rohrabacher. I agree with everything Vladimir said. I also just
want to add very briefly in terms of President Reagan, you
mentioned him a lot. President Reagan didn't only talk to the
Soviet Union, he defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. For
example, he understood that military strength was also
important. You know, and I as a child growing up in the Soviet
Union, I----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know that I fought in Afghanistan
against Soviet troops. You know that, okay?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Sure, but I just wanted to make that
point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I was a special assistant to President
Reagan.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Sure. No, I just want to highlight that
point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. And in terms of your earlier questions
about engagement in the Middle East, the military and so forth,
so first, one thing we can do is we can increase cooperation
with our regional allies. And this doesn't require a lot of
spending. We need to increase, for example, and I mentioned
this in my testimony, increase port visits to the Eastern
Mediterranean to enforce the notion with our regions that
America supports our allies but it is not retreating.
The military could augment exercises beyond those that we
already conduct with Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan and so forth.
This is a small but very important, effective measure that we
can take. More broadly, in terms of strategic thinking in the
region, what the air strikes of April 7 have shown to Putin for
the first time is that the United States will stand by certain
red lines, that it is not just talk.
Unfortunately, it seemed that it was just a one-off, and as
Brian had mentioned, we don't really seem to have a clear
strategy. But if Putin understands that there is a clear
strategy and that we will back up our talk with actions, that
it is not just talk, that is incredibly important to curbing
his influence in the region.
In terms of spending, in terms of how is Russia managing to
do this, I don't have reliable numbers. I am not sure if
anybody really does, because this is a very opaque system.
Officially, what Putin had said is that Russia spent something
around $400 million in March 2016. I suspect the real numbers
are probably higher. That said, it is still not a lot, if you
compare it to the Russian military budget. What he has been
trying to do is do this on the cheap.
In Syria, for example, he let Iran do most of the heavy
lifting, and this is why his interventions have worked so far
for him. How long this is--whether or not it is sustainable,
that is a different question.
And lastly, in terms of your question about RT Arabic, yes,
RT Arabic is active in the region. It fuels conspiracy
theories, frankly, just as it does in other languages. What we
should do is not be on the defensive. We are always on the
defensive. We are always trying to refute stories that RT puts
out, and one reason for that, and I cited a report in my
testimony, first impressions tend to be very resilient. And
because Russian propaganda, Kremlin propaganda is not concerned
with the truth, they often have a monopoly on first impression
because they don't need to think about--investigate what really
happened.
We need to work with our regional partners, perhaps
establish outlets so that we cannot just be on the defensive
but actually be on the offensive on this issue. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Mr. Katulis. If I could add, your first question about the
cuts and the proposed cuts on the State Department, in my
opening statement, I characterized it as unilateral
disarmament. And in the type of strategy that Russia has for
engaging in the region it truly is unilateral disarmament. Just
the assistance component of it. And, Congressman, you mentioned
Christians in the Middle East, and it is something that touches
my heart and we have done a lot of work on at the Center for
American Progress.
Today, the fight in Mosul and Iraq, there is a postconflict
stabilization effort where we are not even in the ball game
that affects those communities. Some of the oldest Christian
communities in the world over the last decade and a half have
been run out of the region. And we know what it is like in
human history to see when people are killed and murdered simply
for what they believe in. And by unilaterally disarming, we are
actually leaving those most persecuted and vulnerable
populations, even more vulnerable, because others will fill the
gap. In Iraq, it seems that Iran is coming in and trying to buy
up property and things like this. And I think it is important
for us to talk more about it.
Secondly, on the question of RT, I mean, it is of my view,
and I mentioned for the last decade and a half, I don't think
we have had a coherent strategy across the region, and that is
especially the case in the battle of ideas, that after the 9/11
attack in our country here we had a lot of talk about how do
you win that battle of ideas. And the latest episode we see I
think coming from the Trump administration is his visit to
Saudi Arabia and this new countering violent extremism center
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the image of the glowing orb, if you
remember this.
This is a place where the United States and Congress needs
to ask, what is going on there? What is our involvement? Where
is the imprint of our values to talk about values? Where is the
imprint of respect for religious minorities like Christians? Is
that part of your conception of countering violent extremism in
building this partnership with these countries? And I am all
for building partnerships, I have written about it, with
countries like this, but on our terms, not their terms.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And I thank the chair, and I
yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Donovan is recognized.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Madame Chair. And I am so proud of
the leader of our committee, our chairwoman, for being able to
pronounce your names. It has taken me 2 years to say Ros-
Lehtinen, and then she announced she is retiring after I got it
down.
So I would just ask all of our panelists the same question.
A lot of the conversation today has been about the
administration's policies toward the Middle East, toward
Russia. Besides restoring the proposed cuts in the budget, what
do each of you think Congress alone could do to have an impact
on many of the issues that each of you have brought to our
attention today?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you. Congressman, thank you for the
question. I think my answer would be to stay true to their
values and just to remember the importance of the values,
because actually a lot of--we haven't really touched on this
today, but a lot of the actions that Vladimir Putin takes on
the international arena and foreign policy is a direct
continuation of what he does domestically in our own country.
I mean, if you look at modern Russian history, it has
certainly been a pattern, a longstanding pattern that domestic
repression eventually will translate into external aggression.
Because after all, why should you expect a regime that violates
the rights of its own people and that disregards its own laws
to then respect other country's interests or international law?
There is no reason. And, you know, those people in the
leaderships of Western democracies for so many years, I must
say, turned a blind eye to the abuses of democracy, human
rights, and rule of law by Putin domestically. You know, the
violations of freedom of the press, political prisoners, the
rigging of elections and so on and so forth one day woke up to
the external aggression of his regime in Georgia and the
Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and now what he has been
doing in the Middle East. These things are connected.
So I think it is very important to remember the importance
of the principles and the values and issues such as rule of
law, human rights, and democracy, both in your approach to
U.S.-Russian relations and also to wider approach to foreign
policy. And that is what I would say. Thank you very much for
the question.
Mr. Katulis. I have two very specific ideas. One, I think
it is very important for Congress to consider a new
authorization of the use of military force because of this
creeping military escalation, that the U.S. actually has more
forces nearer to the front lines of very complicated battles,
and the legal frameworks that we are operating underneath are
about a decade and a half old. And it is not just a legal
issue; it is what is our responsibility as a nation to, when we
are sending people into harm's way, to actually have a coherent
understanding of the strategy from the administration. And I
think having that debate over a new authorization can press
this administration to clarify what it is doing.
Secondly, there are a number of arms sales that are
proposed with partners in the region, and I have written before
in reports like this that we need to use sort of these tools as
leverage. We have an enormous amount of leverage. And in this
year alone, I have been to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the UAE,
Egypt, Morocco, a number of countries for my studies, and I
have talked to most of the top leaders. And we are the
strategic partner of choice, no matter what Russia has done in
the last couple of years. We don't use those tools, including
arms sales and military cooperation, to benefit stability.
So it is those two things. How do we use the tools in
addition to the toolkit on the diplomacy and development? How
do we use sort of the authorization for the use of force to
press the Trump administration on what its Middle East strategy
is? Because we could find ourselves in a shooting war with Iran
directly at a moment's notice this summer or our troops at the
receiving end of a chemical attack from ISIS. It is not
inconceivable, but we aren't having that debate.
And then secondly, the levels of weapons sales that have
been proposed, how does this fit within a strategic concept
that brings stability to the region?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Yes. So I would just add so I think
first authorization of use of force is very important. You
know, one of the things that I highlighted in my testimony, and
I just want to come back to that issue, Putin is trying--he is
trying to limit our ability to maneuver physically, militarily
in the region in the Middle East. He hasn't quite created full
A2/AD bubbles. We can still operate, but now we have to think
twice. He wants us to think twice. He doesn't want us to just--
before, we were able to just go in and now we can't do that
anymore. We have to think how is Putin going to react. For
example, we use cruise air strikes. The reason why we are using
them is because, again, we are afraid for our pilots.
So authorization of military use of force. And, you know, I
agree with everything that Brian said. And I certainly agree
very much with the issue of emphasis on values. Holding
hearings like this, frankly, I think the hearing on Russia and
the Middle East like this is way overdue. Putin has been
involved in this region for a long, long time.
Lastly, I think sanctions, and we have seen this happen
just this week. Congress is passing sanctions on Iran and
Russia. So more conversations along those lines are very
important. This is very concretely what Congress can do.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you to all of you.
Thank you, Madame Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Donovan.
And I will ask questions if that is okay, Mr. Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Of course.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I have been in and out. I am
sorry. Mr. Donovan did a very good job of holding down the
fort.
Vladimir, you know the Putin regime and you have been a
target of his repression. You understand the motivating factors
for his actions. Can you tell us a little bit more about how
Putin's domestic issues impact his foreign policy agenda? How
important is it for him to be able to say that he beat the
United States in Syria, for example? And what is his mindset
when it comes to deciding when and how to intervene in many
matters in the Middle East?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you, Madame Chairman, for this
question. And as you know, the Putin regime has been described
on many occasions as a virtual reality regime because it is so
dependent on the propaganda image, on the television that--you
know, the image that it creates itself. As you recall, one of
the first actions of Mr. Putin in office was to shut down or
take over all independent national television networks so that
he would control the entire information picture, almost all of
it.
And so I think it is sometimes underestimated in Western
countries how much of what Putin is doing is actually geared
for that domestic propaganda image. We already discussed this
hearing, the relationship between his aggression against
Ukraine and the domestic needs. He was very unhappy about this
precedent of mass protests toppling a corrupt authoritarian
government. And he was certainly not very happy or not at all
happy about the prospect of something like this happening in
Russia. And, again, he has been open about it. As we mentioned
earlier during the hearing, he has himself compared the mass
protests against his own rule in Russia to the one down in
Ukraine to those color revolutions in post-Soviet countries, to
the Arab Spring, and so on. So a lot of the aggression against
Ukraine that he has been engaged in was motivated by domestic
considerations to prevent the success of the democratic
European experiment in Ukraine before it would become a model
and inspiration for the same thing in Russia.
And as regards to Middle East and his involvement in Syria,
if you watch Russian state television, which I would advise you
not to do if you value your nervous system, but we have to,
unfortunately, and if you watch it, you will see that most of
it, most of the political talk shows, most of the news programs
are dominated by the foreign policy agenda, by Putin's foreign
policy adventurism. Before it was Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine and
now in the last couple years it is all mostly Syria, Syria,
Syria.
You are not going hear about economic problems in Russia.
You are not going to hear about the sanctions that Putin
himself introduced on the Russian people when he banned
imports, for example, or food products from the U.S. and
European Union 3 years ago. You are not going to hear about the
problems with healthcare or education or the many social
political and economic problems we have at home. All you are
going to hear about, you know, are these reports of new
military strikes, new bases, or new deals to make, you know, to
extend the lease of Tartus and Khmeimim. You are going to hear
about--you are going to see those images of Russian troops,
Russian air space forces halfway around the world, you know,
carrying out the valiant mission that President Putin has
ordered them to.
You see this used for propaganda purposes 100 percent, and
it is a very important reason in many ways for what Putin is
doing to divert attention of the Russian public from the many
problems at home and to back up the fraudulent, in my view,
image that he has created of, you know, a Russia rising from
its knees and being a great power again.
All I say to this is, you know, in the 1990s, which
according to Putin were a time of humiliation for Russia when
we had a democratic system of government under President
Yeltsin, Russia was invited to join the G8, the most
prestigious world club, the group of leading world powers.
Under Vladimir Putin we were expelled from the G8, so where is
humiliation in there?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ms. Borshchevskaya, in case you want to chime in on that.
Borshchevskaya. There we go.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. No. I just want to echo what Vladimir
said, and I always make the point, and this is why I said
earlier in my remarks the blurred line between domestic and
foreign policy in Russia. These are distractions and, you know,
it is unclear how long Putin is going to be able to sustain
this, but the fact of the matter is, up to date, he has been
able to do that. And I think we need to recognize that, you
know, we are in this for the long haul, that this isn't just
going to disappear in a year or 2, that Putin is here to stay,
at least in the near future, and we need to have a strategic,
coherent response.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And finally, Mr. Katulis, you state that the leading powers
in the region are engaged in a complicated struggle for
influence, for power, and the key actors use a wide range of
tools to assert their interests. Obviously, this is playing out
between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain against Qatar,
and there are concerns that this will align Qatar more closely
with Iran. Russia and Iran obviously have a close relationship.
So do you think that there is a space that Russia will move
in to take advantage of, and if, so how? How will it align
itself with this power struggle? How should the U.S. move to
prevent a potential Iran-Qatar-Russia nexus?
Mr. Katulis. I think the first thing the United States
should do is speak with a much clearer and coherent voice than
it has. And I have met with officials from the Gulf in the past
week from a number of these countries, and I think it is hard
for most Americans to understand the complexities of the
tensions there. It kind of feels like the Hatfields and the
McCoys in Arabia because there is a history there and it goes
back, and it is a little tribal. Yes, it touches upon
perceptions of security threats and terrorism and things like
this.
But bottom line, the number one thing I think the United
States should do is have the senior figures in its
administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and especially the President of the United States,
speak with a much more unified voice about this, and I think it
is in their own self-interest. We have an administration which,
again, I try to be clinical in my analysis and assessments, and
I think it is still largely too early to tell what the
complexion of the Trump administration's posture in the region
will be. I think they have not sorted out a lot of their own
internal sort of debates. Unfortunately, we have seen some of
these internal debates sort of fully exposed on Twitter or in
different statements or in different gestures.
So the most important thing to prevent a cohesive alignment
there--and I don't think it is inevitable in any means,
especially going back to a point I was making about weapon
sales. The United States is about to sell billions more to
Qatar, which is where we have a major air base. This is a point
of leverage with all of these partners. We are better when our
partners are unified, and a lot of the messaging and the
gestures coming from the Trump administration just in the last
few weeks cuts against the grain of what I think they were
trying to do in talking about an Arab NATO and other things.
So a steadier approach, one where we are working together
and trying to tease out all of these complexities, rather than
create this unity or present this unity I think would be the
most important thing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you so much.
Thank you to all three of you. What excellent testimony,
and we appreciate it. We hope to have a follow-up hearing on
this. And thank you to the audience as well and the members of
the press for being here.
And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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