[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE
U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 13, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-40
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, senior global fellow, The
Joseph H. Lauder Institute of Management and International
Studies, University of Pennsylvania (former United States
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)..................... 9
The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, director for gulf Affairs,
Middle East Institute (former Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department
of State)...................................................... 17
Ms. Karen Elliott House, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University................................. 28
The Honorable Tom Malinowski (former Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State)... 36
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Joseph W. Westphal: Prepared statement............. 12
The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein: Prepared statement........... 19
Ms. Karen Elliott House: Prepared statement...................... 30
The Honorable Tom Malinowski: Prepared statement................. 39
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 66
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa: Letter submitted for the record.. 68
The Honorable Ted Lieu, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Letters submitted for the record.......... 71
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP
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TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come it order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then
hear from our witnesses.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
And, without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days
to insert statements and questions for the record subject to
the length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. This
hearing has become especially timely. In recent days, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain have taken serious
diplomatic actions against the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
nation of Qatar. This move surely raised a lot of eyebrows, but
it shouldn't come as a surprise. Many of us on this
subcommittee have been calling attention to Qatar's history of
financing terror, including its support for Hamas and its
unwillingness to enforce existing sanctions against individuals
within its borders.
In fact, nearly 3 years ago, this subcommittee held a
hearing on Qatar's support for Hamas and other extremist
groups. We raised many of the same issues that Saudi Arabia,
UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain also have raised. Shortly after the
hearing, I sent a letter along with Ranking Member Deutch and
Ted Poe and Brad Sherman and signed by 20 other colleagues of
the Foreign Affairs Committee to the Treasury Department in
2014 urging more action against Qatar and Turkey for their
roles in terror financing.
And, with no objection, I would like to include this letter
into the record.
Qatar has long been a permissive terrorist financing
environment, and if nothing else, this Saudi-led response will
at least get the conversation started. This is the same Qatar
which was entrusted to monitor the Taliban Five, even though we
knew it continued to fund ISIS, Hamas, the Taliban, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and countless other extremist groups. This is a
conversation that we need to be having. We cannot continue to
allow Qatar to get away with all that it does against our
interests, just because we worry about the consequences of our
U.S. base station there. Of course, it is an important
consideration, but let's not make it the only consideration,
much like we shouldn't be overlooking Turkey's support for
terror groups like Hamas because Turkey is a NATO ally that
houses also a large U.S. military base, or Turkey's negative
impact throughout the region working against our interests,
which includes the unhelpful measure its Parliament approved
recently to send troops to Qatar, a move that will surely upset
our partners in the region. And while it is true that Saudi
Arabia has presented us with similar problems in the past, the
Kingdom has prioritized its security cooperation efforts with
the U.S. to fight extremism.
During the previous administration, there seemed to have
been a concerted effort to realign not just our traditional
alliance with Saudi Arabia, but to elevate Iran, a U.S.-
designated state sponsor of terror. We are all too familiar
with the quote attributed to President Obama in an article last
year where he insisted that Saudi and Iran should ``share the
same neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.'' And
I ask: Share the neighborhood with the foremost state sponsor
of terror; how is that a good plan for regional stability?
Because while Saudi Arabia is a key partner in our effort to
fight ISIS and violent extremism, Iran has worked at every turn
to undermine the stability of the region and foment terror.
From its support of the Houthis in Yemen to its support of
Hezbollah, a group which the Arab League, led by Saudi Arabia,
designated as a foreign terrorist organization last year, and
its support for Assad in Syria, Iran is working against almost
every objective we share with Saudi Arabia. It is no secret
that, in the lead up to, during, and after the Iran nuclear
deal, the JCPOA, our relations with Saudi Arabia and the rest
of the GCC were strained and we were viewed with mistrust as
having abandoned our allies for Iran.
I hope that the President's recent trip shows that we
perhaps have turned that corner. That is not to say we should
turn a blind eye to the Kingdom's shortcomings, particularly
its troublesome human rights record. On women's rights more,
much more needs to be done, my goodness, to ensure a more
inclusive society. Instead of arresting opposition dissidents,
the Kingdom must allow for the free exchange of ideas and a
free space for all Saudi citizens to express their thoughts.
Instead of jailing human rights defenders and activists, and
those calling for reform, the Kingdom must welcome their calls
and listen to ideas in order to implement real reforms.
The Saudis allege that their Vision 2030 plan will do just
that. With the Vision 2030 plan, Saudi Arabia has shown that it
recognizes that it can no longer rely on its old model of
governance. We all know there is a large youth population in
Saudi Arabia, and if we see the Vision 2030 start to take shape
and strengthen the viability of Kingdom's future, we have a
better chance of steering them away from extremism.
I look forward to hearing from our panel, who between them
have a wealth of knowledge and experience with the intricacies
of the U.S.-Saudi alliance on how we can advance our own
national security interests and objectives in the region
together with the Saudis.
I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thanks to our truly esteemed panel for being here today and
thanks to every one of you for your service.
We are greatly appreciative of the work of our American
diplomats. And I hope that we continue to rely on the
experienced diplomats and recognize the importance of
diplomacy. I know we have an opportunity to show that as we
move into the budget season.
Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is no doubt vital to the
Middle East. We should be clear from the outset that we are
allies and we share common goals. But we should be honest in
assessing where those goals and interests diverge.
The President's trip to Saudi Arabia was welcomed. Few
could argue that this President needs to do outreach to the
Arab world. The visit provided a clear message to Iran that the
United States stands united with our Gulf allies against its
dangerous and destabilizing behavior in the region. The
affirmation of cooperation on counterterrorism and a commitment
to increasing regional interoperability and bolstering the
defenses of our allies were important signals to send.
But the President's decision to focus solely on security
issues was a mistake. While Saudi Arabia has made slow progress
on human rights, failing to acknowledge abuses occurring in the
Kingdom gave the impression to the world that the United States
is willing to forsake human rights, justice, and equality when
the messaging is inconvenient.
It is true that reform has begun, albeit slowly, and we
should praise and encourage those reforms, particularly when it
comes to women's rights. Raising human rights is not about
lecturing another country, it affects all aspects of our
relationship. Foreign businesses are skittish to enter a
country where they fear corruption or lack of transparency.
This kind of investment and diversification is critical to
the Saudi's Vision 2030, which we should be actively
supporting. Jobs for youth and the middle class are key to
economic stability, which, as we have seen across the region,
in turn helps stem the tide of extremism.
Moreover, the administration's visits seem to empower the
Saudis and others to move ahead with a very public split from
Qatar. Qatar's behavior has been problematic and we have long
struggled to rein in its affinity for harboring terrorists. We
should push back against Al Jazeera's biased coverage and
promotion of groups that destabilize its neighbors. Qatar's
relations with Iran are clearly troubling for a region in which
Iran seeks to sow instability. However, I am concerned that
this crisis could have negative impacts on our interests,
particularly the operation of the U.S.-led collation fighting
in Syria.
Today gives us an opportunity to unpack some of these
issues, like what leverage we have with respect to Qatar's
support of terrorism and the importance of unity in the GCC to
U.S. strategic objectives. We should be viewing our
relationship with Saudi Arabia through the prism of our own
interests. How mutually beneficial is our relationship? Where
do our priorities align?
The Saudis have been preoccupied with their campaign in
Yemen, which they rightfully see as a direct threat to their
national security. The U.S. is right to support the defense of
Saudis' borders, instability inside the Kingdom will threaten
the region, and we share the concern that Iran is using the
Houthis as a proxy. But in terms of our own national security,
it has long been AQAP operating in Yemen that has been thought
to be the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda.
The conflict in Yemen has also taken the Saudis' and
others' attention away from the fight against ISIS, arguably
our greatest threat at this time. Ambassadors, I know you have
been intimately involved in trying to resolve the Yemen
conflict over the past 5 years. If no political solution is on
the horizon, how can we best support the Saudis while ensuring
that the laws of armed conflict are obeyed? Without being a
formal member of the coalition, what leverage do we really
have? And I have been deeply troubled by the reports of
civilian casualties throughout this campaign.
The decision to move forward with the sale of precision-
guided missiles has raised a host of issues surrounding the
Saudis' capabilities to use these weapons in a way that
minimizes collateral damage. I am not sure that Congress has
been convinced that these weapons can be used appropriately.
Our colleagues Mr. Lieu and Mr. Yoho have been leading the
effort here to get an accurate assessment of the progress that
the Saudi Royal Air Force has made in its adherence to a no-
strike list and, frankly, have yet to receive adequate answers
from the administration.
Furthermore, I have real concerns that the sale of
offensive weapons, like the PGMs and the announced $110 billion
arms deal, do not provide the Saudis with the real defensive
capabilities they need to protect and defend their borders or
increase counterterrorism operations.
Frankly, we don't know yet enough about the proposed sale
or how it will affect Israel's qualitative military edge.
Following the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, the Obama
administration launched an effort to bolster defense in the
Gulf. The U.S. GCC strategic partnership aimed to strengthen
missile and cyber defense along with a host of other technical
support from the U.S. Where are we on those deliverables that
could help our allies defend themselves against real threats?
Finally, being an ally does not mean being given a blank
check. We must ensure that we are supporting our allies and
making decisions that are in our best interest first and
foremost. There is no shortage of issues to discuss today. We
have certainly assembled an all-star team of experts, and I
look forward to a very productive discussion.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch, for that
thoughtful opening statement.
Now we will turn to our other members for their opening
statements, starting with Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
The U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship has been noticeably
strained in recent years. The degree of discord between the
previous administration, the Obama administration, and Saudi
leadership, was only exacerbated by a number of things: Oil
prices, the growing threats of terrorism in the region,
differences over the Iranian nuclear program, which I intend to
believe that the Saudis were right and the Obama administration
was wrong on that one. And although we may not see eye to eye
on everything with our Saudi partners, there is no question
that having their support in the fight against terror in the
region is very, very important.
I am encouraged by President Trump's trip to Saudi Arabia.
I believe it could be a great opportunity to strengthen the
U.S.-Saudi relationship while recognizing the Saudis'
shortcomings in a number of areas, for example funding mosques
across the globe, some of which have tolerated, if not
promoted, radical fundamentalist ideology, and that has been a
real problem. As well as the suppression of women in their own
society; it is just intolerable and continues to be. Even
though there have been some improvements, they are few and far
between.
So there is a whole range of issues that we need to focus
on. I apologize, I have several hearings happening at the same
time, I won't be able to stay for the whole hearing. But thank
you for holding this important hearing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And welcome to our panel.
I don't know that I agree with my friend from Ohio, though
he and I often agree. I don't know that I am as heartened by
the Trump visit to Saudi Arabia as he is, because I am worried
about what was not discussed, including basic human rights,
including the rights of women, including the suppression of the
LGBT rights, including the right to assemble, including the
right to have political opposition.
Saudi Arabia has been an anchor and a counterweight to Iran
that has served our interests and I think have served for some
stability in that region, but that doesn't change history. The
Saudis, at the same time, while condemning Qatari support for
terrorism, have financed extreme Wahhabism all over the Muslim
world. It has actually destabilized society in some cases and
certainly been a source radicalism throughout. Fifteen of the
19 hijackers in 2001 were Saudis. Osama bin Laden, the master
mind of that attack, was a Saudi. We have to look at this
relationship clear-eyed. We have interests; they have
interests. But it is anything but a perfect or stable
relationship.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Schneider is recognized.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And as have my colleagues, I want to thank the panel, a
truly extraordinary panel on a very important issue as we look
at this region and the important relationship with Saudi
Arabia.
The recent announcement of the new strategic partnership
for the 21st century obviously draws much attention. And as was
previously stated, as we look to have this conversation today,
I hope it will touch on the impact it is going to have in the
region, in particular with respect to preserving Israel's
qualitative military edge in a dangerous region, but also, as
you have talked about in your written testimony, the importance
of U.S. interests, our strategy. What are our priorities and
goals? And what is the best strategy to address those? I think
you have to look at those in the broad context of the region,
not just, as was mentioned, with what is going on with Qatar,
but Iran and JCPOA, Yemen, Syria, but also the generational
challenges within Saudi Arabia and the region, in particular
with respect to Vision 2030.
So, again, I thank the witnesses.
I thank the chairman and ranking member for calling this
hearing.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
And thank you to the witnesses.
I am going to be paying close attention to what you have to
say. Over these last 30 years, there has been nothing more
perplexing than our relations with countries like Saudi Arabia
and like Qatar, realizing that, for example, as my colleague
just said, of the hijackers, 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11
were Saudis. And I happen to believe that Saudis financed 9/11
as well. And so we need your advice as to how we should deal
with a situation like that. What is just not the problem, but
what is our policy going to be to take Saudi Arabia away from
supporting terrorists and Qatar away from supporting
terrorists? What do we do to achieve that goal? That should be
our main goal. So thank you very much. I will be paying
attention to your advice.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
We are so pleased to be joined by the chairman of our full
committee, but, first, we will go to Mr. Cicilline for his
statement, thank you.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Deutch, for calling this hearing on Saudi Arabia.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Saudi Arabia has captured our attention in many ways
recently so this hearing comes at an opportune time. The
President chose to make his first foreign trip to Saudi Arabia.
And although the administration has not established a clear
policy toward Saudi Arabia, what they didn't say sent its own
message.
Neither the President nor any senior administration
officials held Saudi leaders accountable for their enduring
reckless disregard for human rights, nor does it seem there was
any discussion about the quickly deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Yemen where Saudi Arabia is engaged in an extended
campaign with U.S. support against Houthi rebels.
Saudi Arabia's recent decision, along with other members of
the GCC, to cut ties to Qatar, the site of the Al Udeid Air
Base, which houses the biggest concentration of U.S. military
personnel in the Middle East, is troubling. And the Trump
administration's handling of this serious situation has been
ham-fisted and confounding.
The relationship with Saudi Arabia, a partner with whom we
sometimes are at odds, is extremely important and equally
complex. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, to
hear their perspectives on this administration's engagement
thus far and their recommendations for how we move forward.
And thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
And we have been joined, as I said, with the presence of
the full committee chairman, Mr. Royce of California, and he is
recognized for as much time as he would like.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I do thank you for holding this important hearing. And
let me just make an observation at the outset here, and that is
Qatar's relationship with Hamas remains very concerning. Senior
leaders of Hamas and the military wing of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which is an Islamist group, designated as
terrorists by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab
Emirates, all reside in Qatar today. And earlier this month,
and I think this is what is most concerning for all of us here,
more Hamas tunnels were found underneath two U.N. Relief Works
Agency's schools in Gaza. So Hamas is still using civilians and
children to hide its activities and that, to me, does not sound
like a legitimate resistance movement.
And it is deeply concerning that, in the face of mounting
international pressure, Qatar has doubled down on its
relationship with Hamas. Just a day ago, Qatar's Foreign
Minister called Hamas a legitimate resistance movement. And
that is one of the reasons why I have joined with Ranking
Member Engel and Representative Brian Mast and Representative
Josh Gottheimer and several other members of this committee in
introducing the Palestinian International Terrorism Support
Prevention Act. This bill will impose sanctions on foreign
persons and agencies and, yes, on governments that assist Hamas
or assist Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the affiliates of these
two groups. And, specifically, this legislation will sanction
anyone that provides Hamas with diplomatic or financial support
or who shelters their operatives. This practice needs to end
now. There is no such thing as a good terrorist group.
And I thank the chairman emeritus for yielding to me and I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for those welcome
remarks.
And I hope that we can move that legislation along. Thank
you, Mr. Royce.
Ms. Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much and thank you to my
colleagues from Florida, the chair and ranking member.
I thank you all for being here. I look forward to your
testimony.
I just want to state a concern that I have that maybe you
will be able to address, I wish there was someone from the
State Department here because I would ask them directly, and
that is the coordination or maybe the lack of coordination
between the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump,
and the State Department in regards to the relationship between
Saudi Arabia and their alliance and Qatar. We know that Saudi
Arabia just announced with the coalition the cutting of ties to
Qatar, and then it seemed like the President, our President,
said that was a great thing. Then you have the Secretary of
State basically trying to calm the waters, and so I am a little
confused, I don't really know what the United States' position
is.
So I would be interested to know if any of you know what
the United States' position is. I think today, just today, our
Ambassador to Qatar resigned because I don't know if she knows
what the position of the United States is supposed to be. So I
would be interested in knowing if you know what it is. And I
would also like to know what you think it should be.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Ms. Frankel.
And I would like it note that we have been trying to get
the State Department for years to come in front of our
subcommittee to talk about Saudi Arabia, but that has not been
successful.
We have been calling the wrong folks, Mr. Connolly? Okay.
Thank you.
I am so pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have a star-
studded panel today. First, we are delighted to welcome
Ambassador Joseph Westphal, who served as U.S. Ambassador to
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from March 2014 to January 2017.
Dr. Westphal currently works as a senior global fellow at the
Joseph H. Lauder Institute of Management and International
Studies and as a senior fellow at the Center for Leadership and
Change Management, both at the Wharton School at the University
of Pennsylvania. Prior to his appointment, Ambassador Westphal
was the Under Secretary of the Army, and its Chief Management
Officer from 2009 to 2014 [speaking foreign language], he is a
wonderful friend and it is great to have him here.
Next, we would like to welcome back another great friend,
Ambassador Feierstein, who was the Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and served as U.S.
Ambassador for Yemen from 2010 to 2013. Over the course of his
career, the Ambassador has served in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Jerusalem, Pakistan, Oman, Tunisia. Yikes, all over the place.
Mr. Feierstein helped develop and implement State Department
policies and programs to counter violent extremism.
Welcome back, friend.
In addition, we would like to welcome for the first time
Ms. Karen Elliot House.
Thank you, ma'am.
She is currently a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School
of Management. She authored ``On Saudi Arabia: Its People,
Past, Religion, Fault Lines--and Future.'' So I think she is a
good expert on this. She is also a chairman of the board of the
RAND Corporation and serves on multiple nonprofit boards,
including The Trilateral Commission.
We look forward to your testimony, Ms. House, thank you so
much.
And we would like to welcome Mr. Tom Malinowski--thank
you--who served as an Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor until this year. Prior to
this position, he worked as Washington director for Human
Rights Watch, a wonderful organization. Mr. Malinowski served
as Senior Director for Foreign Policy Speechwriting at the
National Security Council.
And we welcome you. We look forward to your testimony.
So, Mr. Ambassador, we will begin with you, Mr. Westphal.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH W. WESTPHAL, SENIOR GLOBAL
FELLOW, THE JOSEPH H. LAUDER INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (FORMER
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA)
Ambassador Westphal. Good morning, Madam Chair, Ranking
Member Deutch, distinguished members of the committee. I am
delighted to be here. I am delighted to be with you, Madam
Chair, and thank you for your introduction.
I am just going to summarize a few points rather than read
a statement. If you think about it, since the Iranian
revolution, and that is nearly four decades ago, we have been
spending a significant amount of our resources, our focus, and
attention in the Middle East region. And there is no end in
sight for that. Not only is it financial resources, but it is
human resources--its stability, its security, a lot of issues.
All of you touched on a number of issues that are
critically important for us to be engaged in a more aggressive
fashion. Especially if we are going to be able to devote more
attention to other critical issues around the world than just
what is happening in the Middle East.
Funding for terrorist organizations has been something that
we have been working on and I would urge this committee, Madam
Chair and Ranking Member Deutch, to consider perhaps bringing
in the Treasury Department, because we have been working with
them very extensively--Ambassador Feierstein can speak to this
as well--on trying to get these Gulf countries and Middle East
countries to pass laws and enforce these laws that prevent the
movement of money to terrorist organizations. Saudi Arabia, for
example--and I think Treasury will verify this--has the
strongest laws of any country in the Gulf region. Mostly
because of our efforts and our drive to push that over the last
10 years. We have met with a lot of success recently.
Qatar has not been a success. Kuwait has been an issue as
well, and there are other countries where this needs to be
applied more aggressively.
As some of you pointed out, our relationships can't be just
about fighting terrorism. They also have to be about a number
of other things that affect our security and stability in the
region.
The fact of the matter is that this discord between the
Saudis, Emirates, and Qatar is long-standing. These are tribal
countries. They have had issues in the past. They just emerged
again. And it is in our interest. I believe that what Secretary
Tillerson said in his brief remarks is the right way to go. I
think we have to be more engaged in trying to resolve these
issues by getting these countries to have a dialogue, but also,
as you said, Madam Chair, to agree to end the funding of
terrorist organizations.
The Saudis, for example, imposed a situation where they
have done due diligence on charities. They have a list of
charities that one can donate to, that are approved by the
government. And only those charities can you provide money and
resources to as a Saudi. And if you provide to any other
charity, you are subject to punishment by law. So they are
trying very aggressively to do this. Is it foolproof? I cannot
tell you that, I don't know. But I think they are making some
efforts to stop the flow of money, at least through formal
banking channels. And, again, I would urge you to consider
talking to Treasury about that.
The war in Yemen, another issue you brought up, continues
to be a real problem for a lot of reasons, not just the human
resources issue and humanitarian issues. We come very, very
close to some settlement of the Yemen conflict. And, again,
Ambassador Feierstein is far more knowledgeable than anybody
here on this issue, having served there. But there were times
when we came very close in the recent past to perhaps coming
with an agreement, working with the Government of Oman and
especially with the U.N. Special Envoy, who has done a
phenomenal job of trying to bring everybody together, and as we
got close, then things would break open. So I think we need to
continue that effort working with all of the countries. The
relationship between Oman and Saudi is not a great relationship
and that needs--we need to empower these countries to work
together to resolve these issues. As some of you stated, they
need to work at it. So I think that that is an area where we
need to do.
On the PGM issue, which is going to come up today in the
Senate and undoubtedly come to the House for your vote on it,
and it will be an important issue. We labored with this issue
of how to provide munitions, offensive munitions, to a country
when at the same time we are trying to get them to reduce their
military operations and come up with some kind of an agreement
with the Houthis and perhaps Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces there
and some resolution without dividing the country.
So I think, again, our efforts there ought to be to push
hard: If you are going to receive the assistance from us, these
PGMs from us, then we insist that we are going to need to work
harder to train your forces on how to use them. So we are not
going to just deliver munitions and that is the end of it. We
need to be more engaged in helping them. And, again, the State
Department was doing--DRL was doing a lot in trying to train
them on how to look at civilian casualties and assess their
operations. So there is a lot more we can do than just sell
them a weapons system without any constraints. We can put a lot
of constraints.
I will stop here and say there is a lot more to discuss. We
need to talk about the transformation plan. It is important for
both human resources issues as well as military and security
issues. There are a lot of things that we ought to be doing
more aggressively to partner up with Saudi Arabia, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Westphal follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
And, Ambassador Feierstein, we will go with you. Thank you,
sir.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GERALD M. FEIERSTEIN, DIRECTOR FOR
GULF AFFAIRS, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Ambassador Feierstein. Thank you chairman Ros-Lehtinen,
Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee. Thank you for
this opportunity to testify about an issue of considerable
importance related to U.S. foreign policy and national security
interests, not only in the Middle East but globally.
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S.-Saudi
relationship has been a principal pillar of regional security
and stability. It has joined the U.S. in resisting
expansionism, advocated moderate solutions to the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, and cooperated in the fight against
violent extremism and terrorism.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia's role in ensuring price and
production stability in the oil market has contributed to
overall economic growth and stability around the world for
decades.
In recent years, our relationship has frayed over
differences from the Arab Spring to human rights, Iran to
Syria. Even Yemen, despite a fundamental agreement on the
nature of the conflict and the legitimacy of Saudi
intervention, became a source of bilateral friction.
Seeing the arrival of the Trump administration as an
opportunity to repair the damaged relationship, the Saudis made
clear their support for the three core regional policy
objectives identified by the administration. The fight against
violent extremism, a united front challenging Iran, and helping
on achieving progress in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
In Riyadh, the two sides announced billions of dollars in
new economic cooperation, including bilateral investments
designed to advance each side's domestic political goals.
For its part, the Trump administration made clear that it
would roll back some of the restrictions placed on defense
cooperation by the Obama administration and restore arms sales
as well as intelligence and logistics cooperation with the
Saudi military.
It is premature to assess the significance of the new era
of cooperation, however. Despite the positive indications,
subsequent developments, including the current intra-GCC
tensions with Qatar, have reinforced the view that much of
progress advertised in Riyadh remains nascent and tenuous.
Among the most well-received elements in Trump's speech to
the assembled Arab and Islamic leaders on May 21st was his
promise that his administration would refrain from lectures on
human rights and civil liberties. Many of the leaders had
viewed the Obama administrations emphasis on these issues as
overweening and overly sanctimonious. But the proper way to
restore the balance in our approach is not to adopt a values-
free foreign policy. The U.S. is locked in a battle of ideas
with those who believe that there is a model of development
that permits rapid economic progress while retaining
authoritarian political systems. The U.S. needs to push back on
that notion and make clear that the values we advocate are
central to our conception of the appropriate relationship
between the government and its citizens because they reflect a
system of political behavior, time tested, that produces
stable, durable, and just societies.
Saudi Arabia represents a particularly difficult challenge
for the U.S. on human rights issues. Its society is built
around fundamentally different conceptions of social
relationships and civil rights. We have made little progress
over the years in convincing them that our approach will help
them build a stronger society, and there is little evidence to
suggest that the majority of Saudis agree with us, rather than
their government, on these issues.
Vision 2030, however, presages not only a dramatic
replacement of the public sector by the private sector as the
main engine of economic development, it also signals a
fundamental shift in the traditional relationship between the
government and its citizens. That can become a driver for a
revamped approach to civil liberties and human rights. Thus,
economic reality, rather than political or social reform, may
become the main instrument for a new, more open Saudi society.
In conclusion, as the U.S. seeks to restore stability and
security in the Middle East, defeat violent extremism, and roll
back Iranian expansionism, Saudi Arabia will remain a vital
partner. But Saudi Arabia itself is at a crossroads and the
country will necessarily devote its energy primarily to
addressing internal challenges in the coming years. Through
quiet diplomacy, the U.S. can contribute to the kind of
economic and social initiatives that will enable political
reforms, leaving Saudi Arabia a more open, democratic society.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to
responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feierstein follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.
Ms. House.
STATEMENT OF MS. KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Ms. House. Thank you. Like Ambassador Westphal, I am going
to simply make some points.
As has been said by some of you and the witnesses, there
are enormous uncertainties in the Middle East now about the
stability of borders, about the outmoded economic systems and
can they provide jobs, as the chairwoman said, for this bulge
of young people.
Those power vacuums are being exploited by both Iran and
Saudi Arabia, who are in competition for influence in the
region. And the fact that the U.S. had little strategy or
engagement in the region over the past at least half dozen
years other than promoting the security of a nuclear deal with
Iran has left the whole region like an unruly schoolyard: With
no teacher on duty, the biggest bully is the winner.
And I think it is important that we all understand right
now Iran is the winning this competition. And it is not in the
interest of the U.S. for Saudi Arabia to be destabilized or
feel unsupported. So President Trump's visit to the region has
clearly signaled that the U.S. is back in the game and back on
the side of Saudi Arabia.
The Saudis and everyone else, as the Ambassador said, it is
too early to say that this is a lasting change with lasting
impact, because it will take more than a high-profile visit to
actually rebuild the trust that was so badly destroyed over the
last half dozen years and the consequences of that.
The decision by the President to back the Saudis and their
colleagues against Qatar does signal that he is willing to
engage--that he means what he says about reducing extremism in
the region. And as has already been said, the support of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas, all by Iran and Qatar,
has to be a source of concern and something that the U.S. seeks
to counter.
A year ago, the Saudis were fundamentally in a crouched
position, feeling unsupported. At least now they are upright
with the sense that the U.S. is behind them and beginning to at
least shadowbox with Iran and Qatar and their adversaries.
I want to spend my last minute and a half focused on the
domestic Vision 2030, because I have just come back from 3
weeks there, and I think it is also important that we
understand things are changing in Saudi Arabia, not as fast as
we might wish, but the opportunities offered to women, the fact
that the government has banned the religious police from
arresting people for being unveiled or gender mixing has
produced a quite--in my view--remarkable relaxation, even in
Riyadh, one of the most conservative places. Black abayas are
obviously meant to mask a woman's figure. You now see young
women not only abandoning black, but fitting them at the waist,
making the figure very revealed, or walking around with them
completely open, showing their tight T-shirts and Levis. I
don't mean to make too much out of just a dress code change,
but it is significant in a country where, unlike here, where
individualism is prized; there, being part of the group and not
stepping outside is what is prized. And the fact that people
are courageous enough to begin to do these things I think we
shouldn't diminish.
So I believe that Vision 2030 and supporting economic
reform, which I believe they now must do, because oil prices
aren't likely to recover, is one way the U.S. can begin to
expand human rights in the Kingdom.
And I agree with what has already been said, that we should
make clear that it is important for people to have the right to
free speech, but Saudis are taking it more and more on Twitter
and the internet so that there is something of a virtual
opposition. And yes, the government still arrests people who
get too critical. And we should make clear that we don't agree
with that. But this is an opportunity for the U.S. to both help
stabilize and change Saudi Arabia by supporting Vision 2030 and
helping them deal with change internally and when they have all
these external problems. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. House follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much Ms. House. Mr.
Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Can you pull that microphone a little
closer?
Mr. Malinowski. Is that good?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Maybe hold the gizmo.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM MALINOWSKI (FORMER ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you for having me today.
I fully agree that it is important for us to try to have a
good relationship with Saudi Arabia. We have a lot of interests
in common. We have done a lot to try to deepen our partnership
with the Saudis over the last several years. And it is
perfectly reasonable for a new administration to try to improve
the relationship further.
At the same time, I think we have to be honest that Saudi
Arabia's agenda in the Middle East is not identical to our own.
Where there is overlap, we should try to cooperate, and where
there is not, we should be guided by our interests and values.
How we engage with Saudi Arabia is also symbolically
important around the world. My responsibilities at the State
Department were global, and I think I may want to begin with
this point because it is something that I saw in my engagement
with countries all over the world. I think all of us agree,
judging from the various statements, that defending human
rights and democratic freedoms in the world is part of who we
are as a country and very much in our interest. Doing this in
Saudi Arabia is obviously very, very challenging, but as
someone who led our Government's efforts to promote our values
around the world, let me stress this is as strongly as I can:
We cannot have a credible global human rights policy unless we
also apply it somehow to Saudi Arabia.
In almost every authoritarian country I dealt with as
Assistant Secretary, people would ask me, ``Do you criticize
your Saudi allies the way you criticize us?'' assuming the
answer would be no. Fortunately the answer was yes. Although we
may not do it as loudly in Saudi Arabia as we do in some
places, we have pressed the Saudis on dissidents, on women's
and migrants' rights, on religious freedom, on the war in
Yemen. I would not have had a leg to stand on with Russia or
China or Iran or Cuba if I couldn't have said that.
And that is why President Trump's very clear public message
in Riyadh that we will no longer press the Gulf States on these
issues was so harmful. We can't have a credible global human
rights policy if we say to the whole world that we are giving
the Saudis a pass.
And I think Secretary Tillerson's subsequent very
appropriate criticism of the Iranian elections was deeply
undermined by his refusal to say anything at the same time
about Saudi Arabia. That is a gift to everybody who wants to
portray American advocacy for human rights as just a weapon
that we use to beat up our enemies rather than a principled
policy that we try to apply to everybody.
And I think the problem was compounded by the clear
contrast between how the administration is engaged with Saudi
Arabia and its treatment of our allies in Europe and elsewhere.
It is one thing to go to Saudi Arabia with the legitimate aim
of improving our relationship. I think it was, frankly,
dispiriting and even disgraceful for the President to say in
Riyadh that we will not lecture countries in that part of the
world and then to deliver what was clearly a lecture in
Brussels to democratic allies that have fought and bled with us
all over the world and that share our values about what they
allegedly owe to the United States. I think some corrective
from the Congress is needed here.
In the meantime, our approach to Saudi Arabia should be
based on realistic assessment of where our aims do and do not
coincide. With the current crisis over Qatar, for example,
there is absolutely a legitimate concern, as you mentioned
Madam Chair, about that country's funding to terrorist groups.
But I think it would be a mistake to assume that this is the
principal reason why Saudi Arabia acted against Qatar given
Saudi Arabia's own extremely complicated, to say the least,
relationship with violent extremism. Our interest lies in
seeing this dispute resolved peacefully and with concerns about
terrorist financing addressed by all sides rather than trying
to take sides.
With respect to Iran, the United States and Saudi Arabia
share a paramount interest in opposing that country's malign
influence in the region, but this is about countering the
policies of the current regime in Iran. It is not in our
interest to be seen more broadly as supporting Saudi Arabia and
opposing Iran per se in some kind of zero-sum struggle for
dominance in the Middle East. Absolutely, it is not in our
interest to be viewed as aligned with Sunnis in an existential
struggle with Shia Muslims or to encourage the formation of an
alliance which is defined in sectarian religious terms. We have
many Shia friends in the region: In Iraq, we are fighting ISIS;
in Bahrain; in Lebanon. Why would we signal to them that we are
somehow engaged on one side of a religious war?
Finally, with respect to Yemen, the United States and Saudi
Arabia clearly have a common interest there in combatting
Iranian influence, in denying safe haven to al-Qaeda,
protecting sea lanes. We do not have an interest in giving the
Saudis a blank check to make bad decisions for which the United
States will then share responsibility. We provided very
generous support to the Saudi-led coalition. We tried to help
them improve their performance, including the effort that
Ambassador Westphal mentioned that my bureau led on civilian
casualties. But the intervention there clearly hasn't achieved
its aims. The Saudis have continued to strike targets that
exacerbate the humanitarian situation, suggesting they have
sometimes made a conscious effort not to follow our advice.
There is, as you know, a looming famine in Yemen. This is
not an abstraction. Over 3 million people are now suffering
acute malnutrition. There are 100,000 case of cholera. Saudi
strikes on roads, bridges, and ports have kept aid form those
in need. We are involved in this.
Now, if we think unconditionally supporting our ally is
worth that human cost, then we should honestly say so and
accept our share of responsibility for that cost. I personally
believe it is not and that we should therefore temper--not
withdraw, but temper our support to the Saudis to encourage an
outcome more in keeping with our interests. I think that is
what the vote in the Senate is about today.
On all these issues, offering partnership where our
interests align and honesty where they do not, in my view, is
the best way to build long-term trust and a better relationship
with Saudi Arabia.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Thank you to all of our panelists. And for the panel, I
will start the questions.
The JCPOA and the previous administration's willingness to
elevate the Iranian regime's profile came at the expense of our
traditional alliances with the Saudis and the rest of the GCC,
and that eroded our credibility. Iran is probably the greatest
threat to Saudi Arabia and is certainly one of the greatest
threats to regional stability and U.S. national security
interests. Iran's proxy war in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and the
presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon have the entire region on
edge.
The new administration is intent on reversing the policy of
seeing Iran and Saudi Arabia share the neighborhood with
supposedly similar beliefs, and we know that that cannot
happen.
What can Congress do with our Saudi partners to address our
mutual concerns with the Houthis, Iran's support for Assad and
Hezbollah, and its desire to spread its ideology throughout the
region?
Ambassador Westphal. Well, Madam Chair, in my 3 years
there, I spent quite a bit of time talking to the Saudi
leadership, from the King, the Crown Prince, the Deputy Crown
Prince, about the role of Congress. And I think you have
touched on something that I think has been--I am not going to
say absent--but something that needs to be really pushed
harder, which is your role as the most important branch of
government in these matters. So, for example, delegations that
travel there, I have been telling the Saudis that it is
important for them to hear what you are saying because you
represent the interests of the American people. And you speak
for the American people in ways that even Presidents can't do
because you all represent different constituents.
As such, I think try to get them to strengthen their
relationships to have a better relationship with their GCC
partners to include countries like Oman, for example, which
they see as a link to Iran, to try to understand how they can
carry on a GCC dialogue on these issues, much like you do in
Congress when you have big differences between parties or
ideologies here; you carry on the dialogue. I think that that
is important to do. And I think Congress can play a role, not
in directing foreign policy, but in shaping it in the future,
given all your interests that you represent.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Anyone else?
Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Feierstein. Thank you, very much, Madam
Chairman.
What I would say is that, in the region, you have two
elements that are the drivers of instability and the weakening
of societies and governments. You have violent extremism on one
side, and then you have Iran on the other side. And both of
them are fundamentally responsible for destabilizing the
region.
In my own view, the Iranians and the violent extremist
organizations pursue the same tactics and achieve success in
the same way, and that is that they take advantage of the
weakness of governments and societies in order to exert their
influence through money, through military assistance and
training. Certainly, my experience in Yemen was precisely that,
that Iran was able to establish a foothold, to establish a
relationship with the Houthis, primarily because the Government
of Yemen was weak and was unable to provide for the needs and
the demands of their own citizens.
And so, in my view, the way to push back on Iranian
expansionism is the same way that we push back on violent
extremism, and that is that we need to help these societies
build up their institutional capacity in order to take on their
responsibilities and to provide governance, to provide law and
order, and to address the needs of their entire population. So
I would hope that the Congress, as it is looking at the budget,
as it is looking at the requirements moving forward, would
continue the long-standing U.S. position of helping these
societies build their states, build their governments, build
their institutions, and that is was ultimately what is going to
allow us to achieve success in these fights.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
I know you would have remarks, but my time is up.
I am pleased to yield to Mr. Deutch for his time. Thank
you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. More than one of you mentioned the
issue of Saudi financing of terrorism. There was a New York
Times piece last year that referred to the Saudis as both the
arsonists and the firefighters when it comes to the spread of
extremism.
Secretary Malinowski, you describe the Saudi funding of
Wahhabism around the world as having done incalculable damage,
even if Saudis leaders have recognized the problem. When Saudi
and others are demanding that Qatar change its behavior on
terror financing, how do we reconcile these two positions? Is
it appropriate to equate what the Saudis do with what the
Qataris do? Is one worse than the other? How do we sort that
out?
Mr. Malinowski. I think--I never think it is helpful to
kind of do a ranking; you know, who is worse than who? Is Iran
worse than Saudi Arabia on human rights or vice versa? Are the
Qataris or the Saudis worst in terms of the arsonist part of
that equation?
But I think it is important here to stress that there are a
lot of complicated things going on in this dispute between
Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And a principled objection to Qatari
financing of groups like the ones that you mention I don't
think is really at the very top of the list. And I think if we
were to lead with what I think is our core interest here, which
is to reduce and eliminate funding for violent extremist groups
and the broader phenomenon of tens of billions of dollars
emanating primarily from Saudi Arabia to change the character
of how Islam is practiced in many parts of the world--if we
were to lead with that, we would have a lot to say to every
country in the region, including Saudi Arabia. And I hope that
this Qatar crisis, rather than inducing us to simplistically
take sides with the Saudis and the UAE, forces a deeper
examination of those problems.
Mr. Deutch. Well, Ambassador Westphal, I imagine, during
your tenure, this issue arose frequently. And so what is the
correlation between the acknowledgment that you received from
the leadership that this is a problem and steps that were
actually taken to address that?
Ambassador Westphal. Well, first of all, President Obama
made four visits to Saudi Arabia, and in three of those that I
sat in, he brought up the issue very directly. Now, he brought
it up in terms of the large disparity between the crime and the
punishment issue.
And then, on the funding, Secretary Kerry and others, and
myself----
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Westphal, I am sorry. I don't question that
it was brought up by visits from Secretary Kerry and the
President. But what was the response from the Saudis, and to
what extent did they acknowledge and to what extent did they
address it?
Ambassador Westphal. They acknowledged the issue, and they
addressed it by actually passing a lot of laws. And, again,
like I said earlier, working with us in multiple meetings
through Treasury and our other agencies to try to stop the flow
of resources. So they have made some significant progress in my
view.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. And just moving on in the remaining time
I have. I would like to be supportive of the U.S.-Saudi
alliance. It is critical. But I also believe that it is
important for us to ensure that the steps we take to strengthen
our allies don't ultimately run counter to our own interests,
as I said earlier. And as Congress contemplates this arms sale,
starting with PGMs, help us understand the implications of
selling these weapons without having adequate assessment of how
the Saudi Air Force can and will use them versus the
implications of not selling them and the impression that that
would give to Iran. Ms. House or Ambassador Feierstein?
Ms. House. On the weapons sales, I would just like to
repeat what somebody already said. It is not the selling them
weapons that actually does any good in my view. We need to be
working with them to make them a much more efficient and
effective military, not largely an employment operation, their
defense department. I think they understand that and would be
willing to cooperate.
Mr. Deutch. Ambassador Feierstein on the PGMs?
Ambassador Feierstein. I believe that we should move
forward on the PGM sale. I think that it is important to help
the Saudis improve their capability. One of the things that
happened over the course of the conflict in Yemen is that we
actually withdrew some of the advice and assistance that we
were providing to the Saudis in their air operations center. I
think we should restore that. It was an important element of
how we could help them improve. But the PGMs themselves, if
used appropriately, will actually result in reduced civilian
casualties and reduced collateral damage. And for that reason,
I think we should go forward with it.
Mr. Malinowski. Could I just pick up on that? We, I think,
do have a small disagreement on this point. PGMs, in principle,
can be very helpful in reducing civilian casualties. But that
has not been the case in Yemen because the problem there has
not been an absence of precision. The problem there has been
that the Saudis have been hitting the wrong targets. If you are
hitting a bridge or a medical facility or a port facility that
you shouldn't be hitting, having a very precise weapon is not
going to help, and that was the reason why we ultimately made
the decision to withhold those sales.
I am absolutely in favor of selling defensive weapons
systems and a whole host of other things that the Saudis can
use to protect their border. But these in particular make us
complicit in the strikes that are creating the humanitarian
crisis. And I think, if that is a priority for us to reduce,
then I think we do need to temper it.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Donovan of New York.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ambassador Westphal, you had testified before about the
Saudis' attempt to curtail terrorist funding by designating
specific charities and restricting others. Just last year, our
Nation gave Iran $1.7 billion. That was designated as $400
million for sales that we had never paid them for in previous
decades. And the additional $1.3 billion was the interest on
the $400 million that they gained in our financial services
community for us retaining that money. There are no
restrictions, obviously, on the use of that money. And I think
we all suspect how they used that $1.3 billion in interest from
American banks.
As we look toward our allies, our friends in the Middle
East, the people that we are negotiating with, when we look at
ourselves, do you think that there are some restrictions that
the United States could put into place that could curtail what
may end up being our supporting or giving money to some
organizations who may use that money then to harm ourselves?
Ambassador Westphal. Yes. I think that as I was leaving the
country----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Put the microphone on.
Ambassador Westphal. I am sorry.
As I was leaving the country and had a conversation with
King Salman and the other leadership, we talked about the fact
that sanctions against Iran need to be continued and
strengthened. Particularly, I think, their biggest problem with
the agreement with Iran was that in addition to the nuclear
program, we did not negotiate their activities in the region,
in Iraq, in Syria, and in Yemen. They did not understand why
President Obama and the administration did not push harder on
those issues as part of the agreement. And so we talked about
the fact that maybe, in this new administration, there could be
a more aggressive effort to do that.
Mr. Donovan. And to the rest of the panel--apparently my
time is up already, it started at 1 minute.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It's alright. We just messed up the time.
Go ahead.
Mr. Donovan . Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Not for Mark Meadows. Not for New
Yorkers. You talk fast.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much.
For the remaining members of our panel, each of you spoke
about the difference in our values that we treasure and hold in
human rights, freedoms of religion, freedoms from persecution,
civil rights, women's rights. How do we deal with countries
that don't embrace our same values? And at the same time, I
guess--because we think they are self-governing countries and
maybe we should respect their decisions their countries make,
it is hard for us to respect what other nations do to women and
people who are persecuted because of their religious beliefs.
So I am just curious if you guys have an idea of how we balance
those two competing interests?
Ambassador Westphal. I have two things that I think are
absolutely critically important. The first is primary/secondary
education. The Saudis understand that their system is in dire
need of help, particularly on teacher development and education
and the curriculum. So, recently, the Minister of Education
declared that religion would be only taught for a very short
period of time during school hours. But the curriculum revision
needs help. And I offered them that we could help in many
different ways. They put out a proposal for teacher development
to bring teachers to the United States to mentor their teachers
here and got no takers on the proposal. They are going to put
another one out.
So education, primary education, is where all this
Wahhabism and all this intense religious teaching took its
roots. And if you change that system and you improve education
at the lowest levels--not higher education but lower, primary/
secondary.
And the second is their judicial system. They also said to
me: We have got old judges. We have got an old system under
sharia law that needs modification, needs reform. We need to
help train judges, train prosecutors, train defense attorneys.
To do that, you will get a better human rights record. You will
get a better record for business. If you are a businessman and
you want to do business in Saudi Arabia, you want to make sure
your interests are protected and your lawyers can fight for
you. Right now, that is not always the case. So we need to help
them in those two areas in my view.
Ms. House. And I just reinforce the education point. It is
one of the opportunities for America. I am shocked to hear that
nobody responded. The Canadians are helping retrain teachers.
When I was doing my book, the Saudis were promising to change
the textbooks. But as the man in charge of that told me, when
you shut the door and the teacher is in charge, at some level,
it doesn't matter what the textbook says. So there is a big
need for both what the Ambassador said, starting at a young age
to teach something other than hatred of Jews, Christians,
Shias.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. House.
These New Yorkers. You know, give them a finger, they take
your whole hand. You are out of time.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair and welcome the panel.
And I am going to ask some rapid-fire questions and ask you
to be as concise as you can because I want to fit a lot in.
Mr. Ambassador, in listening to Ms. House, I hear this
dystopian wreckage of a relationship over the last 6 years, and
thank God Donald Trump arrives in Riyadh to try to restore some
semblance of order in the relationship.
You sat, personally, in meetings with the President of the
United States and the Saudi King. Is that correct?
Ambassador Westphal. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Three times? Four. Three.
Ambassador Westphal. [Nonverbal response.]
Mr. Connolly. Plus the secretary of state separately.
Ambassador Westphal. [Nonverbal response.]
Mr. Connolly. Yeah.
Could it be that some of the trouble in the relationship
was the Saudis were hearing things they did not want to hear?
Because if I heard your direct testimony, the President
personally brought up human rights issues and other issues that
matter in terms of U.S. values. Is that correct?
Ambassador Westphal. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. And they don't like hearing that? It was not
well received?
Ambassador Westphal. You know, the answer----
Mr. Connolly. Go quick. Because I am going to run out of
time. That is all. Go ahead.
Ambassador Westphal. The answer is, yes, they didn't want
to hear it. But, yes, they did take actions. And, yes, we did
follow up.
Mr. Connolly. So it was efficacious even if it wasn't
always welcome.
Secondly, I think--and I don't mean to put words in Ms.
House's mouth. But I assume she was inferring that one of the
big problems was JCPOA, that the Saudis, on principle, did not
want to see the United States, let alone the Group of 5, engage
with the Iranians on anything. Would the Saudis have preferred
the kinetic option, as the military refers to it, rather than a
negotiated agreement to try to roll back the nuclear
development program?
Ambassador Westphal. No. And they clearly said to me, very
directly, all of the leaders said: We don't oppose the nuclear
agreement. We oppose the fact that nothing else was tied to it.
Mr. Connolly. Got it. But when we negotiated with the
Soviets, we didn't apply that standard. When John Kennedy
signed the first nuclear test ban agreement with Nikita
Khrushchev, he didn't make it an all-comprehensive agreement,
because that wouldn't have worked. We didn't try to
circumscribe Soviet behavior all over the world. We didn't have
a list of objectionable behaviors that, oh, by the way, needs
to be included in a nuclear test ban agreement. We built
relationships one agreement at a time, because that is the way
it works. Fair enough?
Ambassador Westphal. [Nonverbal response.]
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Was that a yes, for the record?
Ambassador Westphal. That is a yes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski, Ambassador Feierstein said that the Saudis
see our human rights advocacy--and other advocacies for press
freedoms and so forth--as ``overweening and self-righteous''
sometimes. Gee, we don't want to be seen as overweening or
self-righteous, do we? I mean, shouldn't we abandon all of
those efforts so that we clear that up and we are no longer
seen as self-righteous or overweening?
Mr. Malinowski. It would be so much easier, wouldn't it?
Mr. Connolly. Wouldn't it? That is the argument I hear from
Duterte in the Philippines, from President Xi of China, from
Kim Jong-un in North Korea: Stay out of our business. Who are
you to judge? Why do you bring up these ancillary issues that
only cloud the relationship?
And I think it is a fair--in terms of the dialectic of
American foreign policy, it is a fair question. Always has
been, by the way, going back to the founding of the Republic.
But the idea that we would abandon our advocacy of our own
values, even if it makes other people uncomfortable, is, to me,
a very troubling development in our own foreign policy. And I
wonder, since you had that portfolio, whether you want to
comment on that?
Mr. Malinowski. Sure. And I would note I think Ambassador
Feierstein and I agree on this 100 percent.
Mr. Connolly. And I don't mean to say--you weren't
advocating. You were describing. I hope I got that right.
Mr. Malinowski. Look, in the business of promoting human
rights and democratic values, you cannot be effective and
agreeable at the same time. That is almost a truism. Because if
we are being effective, then an authoritarian regime that
doesn't want to change is going to be upset about that.
We are actually fairly soft with the Saudis. They are a
close ally. We don't yell and scream at them the way we yell
and scream at some countries. And sometimes we are criticized
for not saying enough, as you well know.
But we have raised these issues. We did in the Bush
administration. We did the in the Obama administration. We were
sometimes effective.
I think they care about their international reputation. A
very interesting example of this is the case of the blogger
Raif Badawi, who is still, unfortunately, in prison in Saudi
Arabia, but who was sentenced to 1,000 lashes because he tried
to set up a human rights group in the country.
Mr. Connolly. Is that because of sharia law?
Mr. Malinowski. It is because he set up----
Mr. Connolly. Is there sharia law in Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Malinowski. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Sharia law, that so many of my friends on the
other side of the aisle campaigned in the United States
against--we don't want to see that here--but it is in our solid
ally Saudi Arabia's code. Is that correct?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, yes. And, of course, there are many
different interpretations of sharia law. And as Ambassador
Westphal rightly pointed out, there is a huge problem in just
the absence of clarity about law and what the judiciary is
supposed to do.
But in that case, he was sentenced to 1,000 lashes.
Outrageously, they subjected him to 50. But I think in part
because this is an outcry around the world, this is
embarrassing for Saudi Arabia. That sentence has not fully been
carried out, and I am still hopeful there may be a way--and I
hope that the Trump administration will continue our efforts in
this--to try to get that brave young man out of prison.
Mr. Connolly. My time is up, and I thank you all for your
testimony.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, very much, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Just to remind everyone that, when John Kennedy made that
great agreement with the Russians, yes, it got a lot of people
optimistic, but it was followed by--some of the worst parts of
the Cold War happened immediately after that. The Soviets did
not take that as a sign of peace. They took it as a sign of
weakness and doubled their support for revolutionary units all
over the world. And I would suggest that the mullah regime in
Iran with their now $1.7 billion in cash from the Americans
probably don't think of us as being anything but patsies and
weak for doing such a thing.
Let me ask about Saudi Arabia. Specifically, do any of our
witnesses know if there are still officials in power in Saudi
Arabia who were in authority at the time when 3,000 Americans
were slaughtered on 9/11? Do we still have any Saudis still in
positions of authority that were there when that happened?
Ambassador Westphal. Yes. Well, the King was the Governor
of Riyadh. So he was an authority.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh. He was part of the clique that ran
the country then, right?
Ambassador Westphal. Well, yeah. He is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So the King--and that is true all
the way through, right? We have the same clique running Saudi
Arabia that slaughtered 3,000 Americans. And that shouldn't
be----
Ms. House. Well, the most important young leader right now,
Mohammed bin Salman, is only 30. So he was alive, but he was
not ruling then.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's hope that he doesn't learn from his
elders.
The fact is, is that most people who I have talked to
believe that the clique that runs Saudi Arabia knew what Osama
bin Laden was planning, and they did nothing to stop it. At the
worst, they did nothing to stop it. Some of them actually
probably participated in helping.
So is today that clique in Saudi Arabia helping to finance
the Taliban and finance Pakistan, of course, who is financing
the Taliban in Afghanistan? Is any of that money from Saudi
Arabia going to Pakistan and then, thus, on to the Taliban?
Ambassador Westphal. They have made every effort to stop
that funding completely. Taliban----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So they don't give money--Saudi Arabia
does not give money now to Pakistan?
Ambassador Westphal. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. They cut Pakistan off?
Ambassador Feierstein. No. No. No. Saudi Arabia, as does
the United States, of course, provides money to the Government
of Pakistan.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is correct. Over some of our
objections, I might add.
Ambassador Feierstein. But we do.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the Saudis are still financing
Pakistan, who is the main sponsor of the Taliban and other
terrorist groups in that region. And the Saudis are financing
it. Some of the officials who were part of the clique before 9/
11 are still there. And how about, are the Saudis still using
their wealth--to go with some of the questions that have been
asked--to promote these madrasas? Or has there been any real
reform of the message--of the horrible message--that has been
given to young people throughout the Islamic world by these
madrasas, which is filled with hate for the West and Israel but
the West as well?
Ambassador Westphal. I will mention one, Congressman, a
very recent one. Any imam who leaves Saudi Arabia to go to a
conference or to go preach in a mosque anywhere else in the
world has to have the permission of the government. And to get
that permission, they do due diligence on what he is going to
say, who he is going to speak to, what his own views are. And
if an imam goes without permission, as was the case at least in
one example I know, they are arrested and----
Mr. Rohrabacher. And they are arrested at--now we are then
trusting the group that is running Saudi Arabia to make sure
that those people who are leaving are ideologically correct and
philosophically going to promote a better world. Does the rest
of our panel believe that that is the case? I find it very
difficult to believe that the establishment in Saudi Arabia is
censoring these folks in their madrasas--unless you can tell
me. I guess you mentioned that you think they are.
What about you? Do you think they are?
Mr. Malinowski. I think they have made some efforts. But,
no, I would not say it is nearly what it needs to be.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And I will have to say----
Ms. House. Can I just add on that point----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure. Go ahead.
Ms. House [continuing]. The Saudis understand that their
reputation here has taken a hit over the last at least 20
years. And the fact that--somebody asked earlier, what can
Congress do? The fact that Congress plays a bigger role and the
Kingdom leadership is beginning to understand that dealing with
America is not as simple as just having a meeting with the
President. So they do understand that Congress has a bigger
role, as Ambassador Westphal said, representing the American
public. And it is having an impact on--not a cure, but a
beginning impact--on things like what you are discussing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We are going to watch this very closely. I
don't think that we can cross our fingers and try to pretend
that bad things aren't happening and then they will just go
away if we show we are friends. And I think there has been a
lot of that irrational optimism that has gone into our
relations with the Saudis over the years.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Irrational exuberance as our former Fed
Reserve head said.
Ms. Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you to the witnesses. This has been a very
interesting conversation here.
Mr. Malinowski, you, in your testimony or in some answer,
you said something about what was the real motive of the Saudis
to cut off the ties from Qatar. What do you think was the real
motive?
Mr. Malinowski. I think there were multiple and very
complicated motives. And my first point was that the public
talking point, that it is just legitimate anger over Qatari
funding for extremist groups around the world, was probably not
the first and most important reason.
I think Saudi Arabia's most intense preoccupation over the
last few years has been to combat what we can loosely refer to
as the Arab Spring, the challenges in multiple countries in the
region to established authoritarian regimes. Coming from
everything, from liberal young kids who want to see democracy
to the Muslim Brotherhood on the other side. And one of their
beefs with Qatar is that they view Qatar as having encouraged
some of that, funded some of that, promoted it through Al
Jazeera, which has, you know, a lot of stuff on it that I don't
like, but also is a freewheeling space for freedom of speech
where people can criticize their governments and corruption and
so forth. And this has led to a rivalry between the two States
that has played out in the way that we have seen.
There are a lot of other issues involved, as well, where I
don't think it is in the interests of the United States to take
sides with one country or the other. It is in our interests to
try to resolve this peacefully as quickly as possible.
Ms. Frankel. Well, if I understand what you just said, you
think their primary motive actually sounds like the opposite of
what they publicly said was their motive. I mean, does anyone
else want to make a comment on----
Ms. House. The Saudis believe that Qatar seeks to overthrow
their regime, just like they believe the Iranians do, and that
all of this terrorist financing is part of destabilizing their
country. So it is very personal.
Ms. Frankel. Excuse me. That is not what I heard. What I
heard Mr. Malinowski say is that----
Ms. House. He wasn't willing to be as politically incorrect
as----
Ms. Frankel. No, listen. But what I heard him say--that is
why I wanted to just make sure--is that they were trying to
promote an Arab Spring-type situation, which would be--I
interpret that as something different than promoting terrorism.
Mr. Malinowski. Let me put it this way.
Ms. Frankel. All right.
Mr. Malinowski. ISIL wants to overturn the existing
political order in the Middle East. The United States, to the
extent we believe in free elections and human rights, we want
to overturn the existing political order in the Middle East. So
does the Muslim Brotherhood in its own way. So do liberal human
rights activists. So do a lot of people who are profoundly
different from one another.
The problem, I think, with Saudi policy sometimes is that
they conflate all of these things as if they are part of one
threat whereas we, the United States, do not conflate all these
things. We think it would be a good thing if dictatorships in
the region evolve toward a more democratic form of government.
We are at war with ISIL. And we want to make sure that our
allies are with us primarily in that fight. We don't want to
mix it up with all of these other things that are, frankly,
less legitimate and appropriate from our point of view.
Ms. Frankel. All right.
Someone else made a comment about the United States, I
think, needs to do more than just sell arms to Saudi Arabia.
There was a comment that we should support Vision 2030. Could
you tell me what some ideas would be for that?
Ambassador Feierstein. There are two components to Vision
2030. One is the economic side. And, of course, there is a
great deal of interest on the part of the Saudis to see more
U.S. investment, to see more engagement by the U.S. private
sector in helping--economic diversification is a big part of
the Vision 2030. And so the United States and American private
sector could potentially be a major partner in helping to
implement those parts of the Vision 2030. But Vision 2030, of
course, goes beyond that and also includes a major fundamental
reshaping of what has always been understood as a social
contract in Saudi Arabia between government and the citizens,
the idea being that government would provide cradle-to-grave
services. They would provide free health, free education,
housing, jobs as the major employer. And so they are
fundamentally reshaping that, and they are moving away from
that and now talking about the role of the private sector as
the major employer. They are reducing subsidies. They are doing
a lot of other things that make them less of that cradle-to-
grave social support, social safety net, that they used to be.
And, therefore, that is also changing the way the people relate
to the government. If you are not going to provide the
services, the understanding before was that the people would
stay out of government, they would stay out of public policy,
in exchange for all of these services. If you are not going to
provide the services, then there is an assumption that the
people will have a greater say in the public policy and some of
the basic decisions that the government is going to make.
And so we can help foster that. We can help through some of
our programs. We can help build up the capacity on the part of
people to understand how to engage, what are the roles of
nongovernmental organizations in civil society, and other
things that would allow them to be a stronger voice, a stronger
advocate for political liberalization, hopefully.
Ambassador Westphal. Can I add one point to this that I
think is even more significant beyond the economic piece? And
that is the social/cultural reforms that the transformation is
putting forth. So the latest version of this is that women, who
must have a guardian approve all of their legal actions, their
education, their travel, their visa, everything, now there is a
new law that was just passed a few weeks ago that allows women
now to not use a guardian, to be free. Not in every single
case, but--yeah. It was just approved. No? That is what I
heard.
Ms. House. The King asked for a review of all the
ministries to list their restrictions where they had asked a
woman to have a guardian. But he has not yet removed. You still
have to have a guardian to get out of prison. You have to have
a guardian to get married, which most women say is totally un-
Islamic. So there is a review. But there is not yet a change.
The hope is, by women, that the fact of asking for the
review means the change will come. And there are people who
believe that after Ramadan ends at the end of June, there is a
chance women will be allowed to drive. You know, there is a
hope of a lot of social change. And there is already--as I was
trying to say, there is some social change. I probably didn't
do a good job describing it. But they understand that they
can't expect people to manage their own lives in this new
private economy----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ms. House [continuing]. With the government controlling
everything.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Wild times in the Kingdom.
Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
Mr. Meadows, who is my occasional Member of Congress when I
go with my family for a week in North Carolina, and now you are
threatening to take that away, you and the Freedom Caucus. Come
on.
Mr. Meadows. Well, based on past history, I think your
August recess is probably safe.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. All right. Look forward to being in North
Carolina.
Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank each of you for
your testimony.
So let me make sure I have got this right. Ms. House, you
are supportive of the $110 billion arms deal to the Saudis. Is
that correct?
Ms. House. Yes. I mean, I am not an arms expert. But, yes,
selling weapons so long as----
Mr. Meadows. You and I don't need an interpreter. We use
three or four syllables for every word, don't we? Thank you.
All right. Mr. Malinowski, you are opposed to it. Is that
correct?
Mr. Malinowski. I am opposed to the PGMs. First of all----
Mr. Meadows. And you are opposed to that for what reason?
Mr. Malinowski. I am opposed to it because it is an
offensive weapon that is being used right now in ways that we
have advised, repeatedly, the Saudis not to use, to strike
targets that are exacerbating----
Mr. Meadows. So, apparently, for humanitarian purpose--let
me make sure I understand this. Because, right now, they have
knocked out bridges and so forth in Yemen and that is why you
are opposed to them. Is that correct?
Mr. Malinowski. We have given them lists of targets that
they should not strike. And they have continued to strike those
targets, at least up until the point where I was an Assistant
Secretary of State. I think, Congressman----
Mr. Meadows. So, if that is the case, would you not agree
that the strategic ability of those arms has nothing to do with
whether they hit a bridge or not?
Mr. Malinowski. I think that----
Mr. Meadows. Because you are making a circular reasoning.
You are saying you don't want them to be strategically able to
do it, but they are going to do it regardless. So what does
that have to do with the arms sales?
Mr. Malinowski. I think it makes the United States
complicit in something that we have tried to stop.
Mr. Meadows. So it would be better if we sold them
nonstrategic arms where they could bomb everything and
eventually get the bridge?
Mr. Malinowski. Absolutely not. I think we should sell them
defensive arms that are----
Mr. Meadows. Because Mr. Feierstein said that it actually
helped, from a humanitarian standpoint----
Mr. Malinowski. It does not.
Mr. Meadows [continuing]. Make sure that their strategic
target actually gets hit the first time instead of the second
or third time.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, we don't want it to be hit. That is
the point.
Mr. Meadows. But my whole point is, it doesn't matter; if
they are going to hit it regardless, I mean, whether it is a
strategic weapon or not, they are still going to take out the
bridge.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, perhaps, we should then sell these
weapons to the Russians in Syria, because, after all----
Mr. Meadows. All right. Well, let's go there. Because what
you are suggesting--let's go there. So you are suggesting that
we should stay out of it. Is that correct?
Mr. Malinowski. Absolutely not----
Mr. Meadows. We should take a neutral position as it
relates to Qatar versus Saudi. I think that was your sworn
testimony. Is that correct?
Mr. Malinowski. Qatar versus Saudi, yes. I think we should
do what Secretary Tillerson is trying to do, which is to try to
resolve this----
Mr. Meadows. So they are exactly the same as they relate to
their support for terrorism?
Mr. Malinowski. No. They are not exactly the same.
Mr. Meadows. So then why should we take a neutral position?
Mr. Malinowski. Because we have an interest--first of all,
we have a very strong alliance relationship with both
countries.
Mr. Meadows. I agree. Actually, I have got to go, because I
have got to meet the Qatari Ambassador here in just a couple of
seconds. So let me ask you this: How do we send, according to
your testimony, a very clear signal on what we should or should
not tolerate when we take a neutral position?
Mr. Malinowski. I think we can send a very strong signal to
both countries about what we do and do not tolerate, as I think
we have been doing.
Mr. Meadows. But your whole testimony has said that we need
to make sure that we are clear. And when we take a neutral
position, that does not clarify our position from a diplomatic
standpoint. So how do we take a clear position from a neutral
point of view?
Mr. Malinowski. We should not be neutral with respect to
behavior by either country that we disprove of, but that does
not mean that we necessarily should be supporting a blockade or
potentially acts of war by one country against another; that
would not be in our interest to support.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So how do we send a clear message?
What would be the message I should take to the Ambassador here
in just a couple of minutes? What should be the message that I
take it from a non-neutral point of view? Because I am not
neutral in this. You know, I think we have to be very clear
that, when there is an enemy, we expect our allies to support
our position. Wouldn't you agree with that?
Mr. Malinowski. I absolutely do. And I think----
Mr. Meadows. I thought you would. That was a softball. So
what should I tell them?
Mr. Malinowski. I think if you have got a concern, and I
assume you do, about Qatari----
Mr. Meadows. I am assuming that you don't.
Mr. Malinowski. I do.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. So we share a concern.
Mr. Malinowski. I don't approve of anyone who supports
Hamas.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So, if we are doing that, what
should be the message?
Mr. Malinowski. The message should be: Cut it out. Now,
that doesn't mean that we support a blockade by Saudi Arabia
against a country that is hosting our troops in the middle of a
war against ISIS when Saudi Arabia also has some of those
problems, which I hope you will raise with the Saudi Ambassador
when you meet him.
Mr. Meadows. Well, I have. And I will be glad to do that.
This is one of the reasons why I am in Congress. So let's look
at that. If we are saying, ``cut it out,'' how do we enforce
that?
Mr. Malinowski. I----
Mr. Meadows. Is it just a phone call and all of a sudden a
Member from North Carolina says, ``cut it out,'' and they are
going to do that?
Mr. Malinowski. I think it is pretty clear, given the
stakes involved in this crisis, that it is extremely important
to both Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE and other countries
in the region to have the support of the United States. And I
think we should be very stingy----
Mr. Meadows. So we should threaten that they won't have the
support?
Mr. Malinowski. We should be very stingy in offering that
support to both Qatar and to Saudi Arabia and focus on being
supportive of the efforts of Secretary Tillerson. I have been
critical of him on other things. But I think he is doing the
right thing here.
Mr. Meadows. But how do we distinguish--you know, you are
saying be neutral. If one is doing a better job than the other,
then we can't be neutral, Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. You have to be a mediator. And that is what
this situation calls for. It is a mediation between two sides
on the opposite side of a dispute. If you go into that and you
say, ``I am on their side 100 percent,'' you can't be a
mediator.
Mr. Meadows. I don't think anybody sees us in that form.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. What a great hearing. Thank you, Mr.
Meadows.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony,
for being here, and for your work and the conversation we are
having on, clearly, not a simple issue.
Ambassador Feierstein, you say in your testimony that Saudi
Arabia--I am going to quote you--are replicating a similar
hopeful moment from 8 years earlier and--call it a reset. Where
do you see them making a mistake, if you do, in this
hopefulness that they sought from 8 years ago?
Ambassador Feierstein. Well, I think that, 8 years ago, in
2009, the Saudis as well as many of the other states in the
region, were very frustrated with the Bush administration,
frustrated with the mismanagement of the Iraq invasion and
occupation, as well as some of the assertions by either members
of the Bush administration or those associated with them
concerning a very aggressive policy of regime change, of
structural political change in the region that might be imposed
through force.
So, when President Obama came into power, there was a sense
that he was going to change the approach. He made a very well-
received speech at Cairo University in 2009 where he talked
about a new kind of relationship between the United States and
the region, where he had pledged to withdraw forces from Iraq.
And so they saw that as an antidote, if you will, to the things
that they disliked about the Bush administration.
As we went along, some of the issues that we have discussed
over the course of this hearing began to change their
perception of the Obama administration. And so the unhappiness
about the way Obama was addressing things--whether we are
talking about the Arab Spring, throwing Hosni Mubarak under the
bus, if you will, a perception that was widely held in the
region, unhappy about what we were doing in Syria, unhappy, as
I think Ambassador Westphal outlined, not so much about the
JCPOA but about what they saw as the failed commitment of the
Obama administration to address these other issues. That was
really what the problem was. It was that the Obama
administration had basically said: If you support us on the
JCPOA, if you go along with this, we will pledge that we will
continue to take a very strong position on Iran's other
activities, its expansionism, its support for terrorism, its
support for a number of other things. And then they believed
that the Obama administration didn't do that.
So now we have a new administration in Washington which is
promising to basically return or to repair some of the things
that they hated about Obama. So we are going back to a very
strong defense and security cooperation relationship. We are
supporting them on Yemen. We are not going to press them on
human rights. Those things make them hopeful.
Mr. Schneider. Just because I have only limited time, I
understand--if I can turn to you, Mr. Malinowski, you talk
about--in this reset, I suspect that some of the frustration
the Saudis had with previous administrations is that we came
with expectations, that we came with certain priorities and
values that reflected our interests. And you have raised the
concern that we are witnessing something different this time,
again, from your written testimony, and a policy rebalance that
may not necessarily serve our national interests and may leave
us with challenges. I was hoping you could expand on that a
little bit.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, I was trying to put this in a more
global context.
I think how we should engage with Saudi Arabia is a
difficult question that we have debated within certain limits
for many years. It is a close ally. We have to be engaged with
them on a lot of different issues. We have concerns about some
of their conduct domestically and internationally. We have to
balance these things.
Ambassador Feierstein and I, we had dozens of conversations
about this. When we served, we usually agreed. Sometimes we had
a different emphasis. That is very normal. What I find very
striking about the direction that the Trump administration has
gone in is that it seems that the President at least has simply
a far greater comfort level dealing with authoritarian, family-
run regimes in the Middle East than he does with our closest
democratic allies in the world that have fought and bled with
us, that share our values, that contribute everything they
possibly can to our common security. And I think that contrast
is creating questions around the world that--you know, people
are wondering, what do we stand for, and who do we stand with,
and has that fundamentally changed?
Mr. Schneider. I agree with you. And I have the concern of,
if we don't stand by our principles and values, then people
can't look to our Nation and have a clear sense of who we are
and what we are trying to achieve domestically and
internationally. That sends very dangerous signals to the rest
of the world. So I thank you for that.
I know I am out of time. So I appreciate the extended time.
I will just add--and for, perhaps, written consideration--that
the arms sales you all have talked about before and the threat
it poses to our closest ally, most strategic ally in the
region, Israel, I think it is imperative for the administration
to make very clear that we will ensure and protect Israel's
qualitative military edge, not just in the context of selling
these weapons to Saudi Arabia, but, God forbid, any of these
weapons were to get into the hands of nonstate actors.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent point.
Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, again, to our witnesses.
My first question, Ambassador Feierstein, is, what do you
think is Saudi Arabia's endgame in Yemen? It doesn't seem as if
they have been able to militarily prevail or been successful in
bringing about a diplomatic solution. What do you think is the
endgame?
Ambassador Feierstein. Well, I think that is actually the
big problem, is that there is no clear endgame. I think that
the Saudis, like we, in 2015, thought that we would be able to
very quickly restore stability, have the Hadi government go
back to power in Sana'a, and continue the political transition
there. It hasn't worked out that way.
Like Ambassador Westphal, I believe that the Saudis have
been looking for a political way out of this conflict for at
least the last year or year-plus. They entered into a dialogue
with the Houthis to try to bring the Houthis away from the
Iranian relationship and to support the political dialogue. I
think we were all very hopeful last summer that there was going
to be a political agreement in Kuwait in the negotiations led
by the U.N. That failed, and we have been trying to get back to
that point ever since.
I still believe that the Saudis would be very interested in
and would welcome a political way forward. But what we need to
focus on is how we can get back to that U.N. negotiation and
hopefully have a different outcome this time.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski, you looked like you wanted to add
something.
Mr. Malinowski. No.
Mr. Cicilline. So I think we are all familiar with the
horrific human rights record of Saudi Arabia: Under sharia law,
beheading protesters and condemning young people to death for
crimes they committed as children, flogging bloggers for
perceived insults.
And, Mr. Malinowski, I would ask you whether you have seen
any evidence of any improvement in their human rights record,
and what is the impact of the President agreeing to an arms
sale without attempting to use that desire from the Saudis as a
way to leverage or at least to raise some expectation that they
improve their behavior with respect to universal human rights?
Mr. Malinowski. I agree with my colleagues here that there
have been some modest signs of potential improvement. I am
qualifying that very carefully. You have less of the religious
police out on the streets abusing people. There is this
potential move on the guardianship system that Ms. House
described.
But, fundamentally, these problems do persist. And although
I think 95 percent, 98 percent, of the dynamic that may lead to
change is going to come from within Saudi Arabia, I do think
there is a role for Saudi Arabia's friends in raising these
issues and debating them publicly to create, you know, in the
minds of those in Saudi Arabia who care about the Kingdom's
reputation the sense that they have to keep moving in this
direction. And I think it has been efficacious on specific
cases. No question about that.
In terms of the arms sale, I have never said that we should
hold up arms sales to Saudi Arabia because of their general
human rights record. I am a pragmatist about this. But I do
think where a specific weapons system is being used in the
commission of human rights abuses, then I think we have a
different kind of obligation and have to have a different kind
of debate.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
A significant portion of global terrorist funding emanates
from Saudi Arabia, and I know that, in the past, the United
States' officials have been frustrated at the limited capacity
of Saudi authorities to clamp down on those funding streams.
And I wonder whether in anyone's judgment the situation has
improved over the last few years. Has the United States been
supportive of Saudi efforts to rein in terrorist financing?
What more can we do? What more can they do? But it appears to
remain a serious problem.
Ambassador, looks like you have some thoughts.
Ambassador Feierstein. Can I just say, I was the number two
in our bureau of counterterrorism in 2006 and 2007 when we were
very focused at that time on the issue of counterterror
finance. We had strong concerns about the records of all of the
states in the Gulf about their ability, their willingness to
actually intercede effectively and aggressively to try to cut
off the flow of financing to some of these violent extremist
organizations. I would have to say that, in my own view, while
we have not had success in any particular, you know, complete
way, all of them are better today than they were 10 years ago.
All of them have taken steps. I do believe, actually, that the
President's approach in Riyadh, when he was speaking to the
assembled Arab and Islamic leaders, was the right approach,
which is the need to build up a broad-based coalition, build a
consensus that all of the States need to do a better job, need
to take on this issue aggressively. I think that that is the
right way to go forward.
Unfortunately, where we are right now is that that effort
to build the coalition is being blown apart by this conflict
that we have right now with Qatar. And, therefore, I agree
absolutely with Assistant Secretary Malinowski and with my
other colleagues that what we need to do is help resolve that
issue peacefully and get back to that coalition and consensus-
building effort that we were engaged in just a few weeks ago.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
And now we turn to the Twitter ninja of the House par
excellence, my friend, Mr. Lieu, of California.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That Twitter game is strong.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
I don't think any of us here objects to the United States
assisting our ally Saudi Arabia. But what many Members of
Congress do object to on a bipartisan and bicameral basis is
that the Saudi Arabia-led military coalition has committed
multiple war crimes in Yemen, and the U.S. is aiding and
abetting in those war crimes. In addition to refueling some of
these Saudi jets that strike civilians, we have also sold them
weapons that have struck civilians. And this freaked people out
so much that the State Department lawyers actually started
looking at, can our military personnel and other personnel be
liable for war crimes under international law for this
assistance?
So my first question to you, Secretary Malinowski, is did
the State Department attorneys finish that review or come to a
conclusion, do you know, before you left?
Mr. Malinowski. I would say, before I left, they raised
these concerns and made them known to policymakers. I don't
know whether work has continued on that effort.
Mr. Lieu. The reason that the Obama administration stopped
the sale of precision-guided munitions was because the Saudi-
led military coalition was using these munitions to target
civilians. It is not as if they were trying to hit a tank and
they accidentally hit a hospital. They very precisely hit
hospitals. They very precisely hit schools. They very precisely
hit a wedding party with lots of civilians. They very precisely
hit a large funeral twice with munitions. So the problem is we
are now enabling the Saudi Arabia coalition to precisely kill
civilians. And that is what was such a huge problem.
And now that the Trump administration wants to reverse, Ted
Yoho and I, and other bipartisan Members of Congress, wrote a
very simple letter to the State Department and Department of
Defense basically asking, hey, you just tell us, has the
conduct of the Royal Saudi Air Force changed so that they are
no longer precisely hitting civilians with weapons the United
States sells them? That letter is dated April 6. So we got a
response on April 26 from the Secretary of Defense, response on
May 2 from the Secretary of State. They basically were
nonresponsive letters.
So, Madam Chairwoman, I would like to enter these letters
in the record.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Lieu. I want to ask the panel, have you seen changes in
the operative conduct of their Saudi-led military coalition so
that they are not striking civilians anymore? Or do they
continue to do the same thing?
Ambassador Feierstein. Mr. Lieu, you and I had an
opportunity to have a conversation about these issues several
times when I was still with the State Department. And I have to
say that I disagree with the premise of your question. I don't
believe that the Saudis did precisely hit civilians or
specifically targeted civilians.
Mr. Lieu. That is wrong. In the funeral case, the Saudi
Arabian military acknowledged they hit that funeral. They
assumed there might be some rebels there, but they intended to
strike that funeral. They intended to hit it, and they did.
Ambassador Feierstein. Mr. Lieu, if you recall exactly what
the explanation was, they did acknowledge that they hit the
funeral. And I have to say that friends of mine were killed in
that funeral home. So I feel very strongly about it.
Mr. Lieu. Right. And they weren't trying to hit a tank.
They were trying to hit that funeral, and they did.
Ambassador Feierstein. But they acknowledged, sir, that
they were basing that on the basis of wrong intelligence. They
acknowledged that they hit it, but that it was a mistake that
was based on poor intelligence that they had received, that
that was actually a military----
Mr. Lieu. Right. And the weapons enabled that to happen.
Look, if it is one funeral, I get it. Maybe if it is two
funerals, I get it. When it is 70-some air strikes documented
by multiple organizations, then it is a pattern of either gross
incompetence or direct targeting of civilians. So I am just
asking, has that conduct changed?
Ambassador Feierstein. I would have to say, again, that the
issue was not that they were targeting. And I think----
Mr. Lieu. In that case, they were targeting their funeral.
They were targeting the funeral. Is that correct?
Ambassador Feierstein. They acknowledge that they hit the
funeral based on wrong intelligence.
Mr. Lieu. So they were targeting the funeral, and they hit
it.
Ambassador Feierstein. But they did not realize it was a
funeral. They did not target----
Mr. Lieu. They hit a Doctors Without Borders hospital,
right?
Ambassador Feierstein [continuing]. They understood it was
a military target.
Mr. Lieu. They hit a Doctors Without Borders hospital. They
intended to hit that hospital, correct?
Ambassador Feierstein. And I think if you go back and look
at the bipartisan investigations that have been done on many of
those instances----
Mr. Lieu. They weren't bipartisan. They were done by the
Saudi Arabian military itself.
Ambassador Feierstein [continuing]. You would see that, in
fact, the situation was not the way it was portrayed in the
press.
Mr. Lieu. What was the bipartisan investigation you are
talking about?
Ambassador Feierstein [continuing]. And that there is----
Mr. Lieu. What is the bipartisan investigation you are
talking about?
Ambassador Feierstein. There is a group of people who have
undertaken investigations, at the behest of the Saudis, who are
not Saudi and who take a look at these things and have come
back and issued reports. And those reports are available
publicly. And you can see that, in some of these instances,
what was considered to be a strike on a Medecins Sans
Frontieres hospital or other kinds of targets, that, in fact,
there were legitimate military targets that were colocated or
very nearby and that they were not targeting these facilities,
but, in fact, there was collateral damage from hits on
legitimate targets. So this is a very complicated----
Mr. Lieu. All right. So my time is up. So I just want to
make sure that you are really saying this. You are saying the
strike on a Doctors Without Borders hospital was a legitimate
strike?
Ambassador Feierstein. I think that it was not a strike on
a Doctors Without Borders hospital. It was a strike on a----
Mr. Lieu. They pretty much demolished it.
Ambassador Feierstein [continuing]. Colocated facility.
Mr. Lieu. I yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
And I think Mr. Deutch wanted to make a statement.
Mr. Deutch. I did. I was just hoping, Madam Chairman, you
might introduce the newest members of our subcommittee who are
here with us today.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I am so pleased to be joined by two of
our eldest granddaughters: Morgan, who will 8 on July 15th, and
Caroline, who just turned 5 last week, so she said she is going
to be 6.
And, with that, thank you, Mr. Deutch.
With that, our subcommittee will now be adjourned.
Excellent panelists. Excellent questions.
Thank you to the audience.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and chairman,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Lieu, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California
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[all]