[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-42]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS AND THE TRANSITION TO FRIGATE CLASS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 3, 2017
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-835 WASHINGTON : 2018
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama, Vice Chair JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Jodi Brignola, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces......... 3
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces....... 1
WITNESSES
Boxall, RADM Ronald A., USN, Director, Surface Warfare (N96)..... 4
Neagley, RADM John P., USN, Program Executive Officer, Littoral
Combat Ships................................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Boxall, RADM Ronald A., joint with RADM John P. Neagley...... 27
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Byrne.................................................... 36
Mr. Langevin................................................. 35
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS AND THE TRANSITION TO FRIGATE CLASS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 3, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Wittman. The meeting will come to order. And we welcome
the witnesses today. We are on an interesting time constraint
today, so, Admiral Boxall, Admiral Neagley, thank you so much
for joining us. I am going to jump right in, and I appreciate
our witnesses here today.
As we know, we are here to discuss littoral combat ship and
the transition to frigate. Appearing before us to discuss this
important topic are two esteemed Navy witnesses, Admirals
Boxall and Neagley.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your service and, just
as important, thank you for appearing before this subcommittee
on this most important issue.
The Navy has developed a broad fleet architecture that
presumes a high-low mix of surface combatants. At the high end
in terms of capabilities and cost, the Navy continues serial
production of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. But at $1.8
billion for each destroyer, the overall shipbuilding plan
cannot afford a fleet of destroyers and drives development of a
small surface combatant. In response to cost-efficiency, Navy
developed a littoral combat ship at a price point of $550
million that is less than a third of their more robust
destroyer counterpart.
The challenge before this committee is to ensure the
correct high-low balance of surface combatants that best
responds to fleet requirements in the most efficient manner.
My friends, this subcommittee is at a crossroads with the
littoral combat ship program. The eventual transition from a
littoral combat ship to frigate may be the most difficult issue
that our subcommittee needs to assess.
The littoral combat ship initially had a requirements
foundation that was built on unstable ground. While cost had
steadily improved with serial production, the issues of
requirements stability, technology insertion, and anticipated
employment of the littoral combat ship still confound the Navy.
For example, certain critical components of the mission modules
associated with the littoral combat ship continue to elude
introduction to the fleet.
While there are many challenges with this program, there
are also many bright areas. For example, the shipbuilders at
both Austal and Marinette Marine are constructing the littoral
combat ship at a reduced cost and an ever-increasing quality.
When I visited the construction yards in Mobile and Marinette
this year, the pride of construction and efficiency of effort
was evident. These shipbuilders are regional job engines and
serve as great examples of American innovation.
But great shipbuilders can only construct ships that have a
solid requirements foundation. Moving forward, requirements for
the littoral combat ship and the frigate will likely pose the
greatest challenge. And I find it imperative that the Navy
clearly articulates its desires for each platform to industry.
I read the witnesses' opening statements and was pleased to
note that the Navy intends to review the requirements
associated with the littoral combat ship program and the
eventual transition to frigate. I am particularly pleased to
note that significant support for the fleet is being provided
during this requirements review.
From my assessment of the program, I believe that
additional survivability, increased cruising range, and
additional development margin for future expansion are needed
improvements. I also believe a decrement in speed could be
provided to best optimize these increased capabilities. I look
forward to assessing Navy proposed requirements associated with
the new frigate program.
As to the current littoral combat ship acquisition, I
continue to be concerned about the Navy's intended strategy.
Ship construction is rife with examples of an immature design
being used before it is ready. Invariably, an immature design
leads to cost growth.
Navy appeared to be set toward repeating this hard-learned
lesson with the frigate's construction earlier this year but
has since decided to review the frigate requirements, allowing
the ship construction yards valuable time to better develop
complete designs. In my opinion, this was a wise decision.
Another problem with the acquisition strategy is the
construction rate proposed by the last administration of only
one ship in each of the fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020. This
construction rate simply does not support both yards. I am
committed to keeping both yards operational until the
downselect to frigate occurs.
I think that we can all agree that we need to improve the
littoral combat ship acquisition strategy and better support
the requirements for the transition to the frigate.
To best review this issue, I am pleased that we have our
two distinguished panel experts with us today, and I would like
to thank them for joining us. We have Rear Admiral Ronald A.
Boxall, Director, Surface Navy, N96, and Rear Admiral John P.
Neagley, Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships.
Thank you both again for testifying today, and we look
forward to your thoughts and insights as to how to best improve
the littoral combat ship and the eventual transition of
frigate.
I would now like to turn to our ranking member, Mr.
Courtney, for any remarks that he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Chairman Wittman.
And thank you to both admirals for joining us here today
for this very timely and important hearing on the future of the
Navy's future frigates.
There has been much debate during the history of the
littoral combat ship and the debate of its successor, a new
class of frigate, and, again, we are back at it. But our debate
today is not simply about a name; it is about capacity and
capability.
Ten years ago, the second hearing I ever attended as a
freshman member of this panel was on the topic of LCS [littoral
combat ship]. Since then, I have seen this program twist and
turn again and again as we have struggled to understand the
Navy's shifting plans and requirements. We are not here to
rehash the turbulent history of the LCS program, but I do hope
that we can take some of the hard lessons learned from the
history of this program to help better inform the decisions
ahead.
As we have heard from combatant commanders, our fleet
requires a mix of both high- and low-end ships. We cannot
afford nor does it make sense to simply build highly advanced
yet very expensive destroyers.
The LCS has come a long way from where it began from both a
cost and capability standpoint. If the follow-on frigate can
expand on the lethality and survivability further, I believe it
will be exactly in line with the distributed fleet concept that
our Navy leaders continue to say that we need.
The frigate, which was the result of the in-depth review
conducted by the Navy's Small Surface Combatant Task Force in
2014, provided a framework through which the existing hull
designs could be utilized to provide increased capabilities
that the fleet desired.
Based on previous testimony, the Navy has said that the new
frigate will move away from the modular concept of the LCS to a
multimission-capable ship that can operate independently or as
part of a larger strike group or even surface action group.
There may be additional changes to the frigate's
requirements that may be warranted, and certainly there are
many valid questions about the way forward that need to be
addressed as we begin deliberations in the 2018 defense
authorization bill. However, I am very concerned that the Navy
and some in Congress could be considering yet another change
and approach that could further complicate this program and set
back our efforts to meet the force structure needs of the Navy.
However flawed the LCS acquisition plan has been over the
years, there is little doubt that the shipyards have made
tremendous strides. With investment in their production lines
and workforce and a relatively stable production rate, the cost
of the LCS has come down considerably. And while there is still
more work to be done, major disruptions in the acquisition
plans and production rates at this point would be a tremendous
setback to that progress.
This is a panel that understands that shipbuilding is a
long game. Affordability and success in shipbuilding requires
stability in design and requirements and, above all, certainty
in production rates in the short and long term. Constantly
changing directions and strategies does a disservice to our
industrial base and, ultimately, to meeting the needs of our
naval forces. At some point, we need to decide on a plan and
stick to it.
We are at a pivotal point both in the future of our Navy
and the effort to transition the LCS to a frigate. How we move
ahead will have significant consequences for the fleet and the
industrial base. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
about their plans to move forward in a way that meets the
Navy's force structure requirement, gets the fleet the
capabilities it is asking for, and provides the certainty that
our industrial base needs.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Admiral Boxall, we will go to you now for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF RADM RONALD A. BOXALL, USN, DIRECTOR, SURFACE
WARFARE (N96)
Admiral Boxall. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Courtney, members of the Seapower and Projection Forces
Subcommittee. Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity
to be with you today to talk about the small surface combatant
class of ships, namely the littoral combat ship and follow-on
frigate.
My testimony today reflects the impact of the concept of
distributed maritime operations, featuring a dispersed and
connected architecture of more lethal and resilient ships
operating independently or in small formations.
In thinking about the concept of a network and distributed
force, we conducted a series of war games and analytics that
have revealed the set of capabilities our small surface
combatants need to deter and fight in a complex, contested
environment. These efforts contributed directly to the 2016
Force Structure Assessment released last fall and revalidated
the requirement for 52 small surface combatants and focused on
increasing the capability of the class.
Additionally, three separate, independent, and
congressionally mandated alternative future fleet architecture
studies conducted in 2016 concluded that the nature of the
threats we face required that the small surface combatant class
needed to evolve.
These disparate but related intellectual pursuits have come
together to create a more refined and appropriate set of
capability requirements to meet the fleet challenges of
tomorrow.
We are currently working through the requirements process,
taking into account cost and capability trades to optimize the
value that the frigate of the future brings to the warfighter.
The bottom line, however, is the future small surface
combatants must be an even more survivable and lethal
contributor in the distributed environment.
It would be incorrect to assume that because we are moving
to a more capable frigate design that we value LCS any less.
Quite the contrary. We need LCS in the fleet as quickly as we
can get it to fulfill the mission requirements the ship was
designed to meet--missions that include anti-surface warfare,
anti-submarine warfare, and mine countermeasures. The
flexibility and modularity of these ships also ensure decades
of capability upgrades, as they serve their estimated service
lives of 25 years.
LCS will carry out its missions, and the frigate will carry
out others, but both of these members of the small surface
combatant family will relieve pressure on the large surface
combatant force, which is currently stretched thin.
I look forward to your questions today, questions that I
will answer as completely as I can, considering the impending
submittal of the 2018 DOD [Department of Defense] budget.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Admiral Boxall. We will now go to
Admiral Neagley.
STATEMENT OF RADM JOHN P. NEAGLEY, USN, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS
Admiral Neagley. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Courtney, and
distinguished members of the Seapower and Projection Forces
Committee, good afternoon. I welcome the opportunity to testify
today on the littoral combat ship and the future frigate
program.
Before I begin, I would like to ask the full text of our
written statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. Wittman. Without objection.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Boxall and Admiral
Neagley can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]
Admiral Neagley. As the program executive officer for the
littoral combat ships, I have cradle-to-grave responsibility
for the acquisition and life cycle of LCS and the associated
mission packages. As we deliver more and more of these ships to
the fleet, I work in close contact with our fleet partners, and
their demand for these platforms continues to be strong.
Today, we have eight ships in the fleet, with four more
delivering this year. Initial operational testing and full ship
shock trials are complete for both variants, and the LCS design
is stable and mature. Three littoral combat ships have deployed
to East Asia, and others have participated in a wide range of
fleet operations.
As we gain operational experience with LCS, the Navy
continues to improve the effectiveness of these ships. Lessons
learned from construction, post-delivery test and trials, fleet
operations, have informed changes that have rolled into the
production and the ship design/manufacturing process to improve
reliability and operational availability.
But as the maritime threat evolves, the Navy is placing
greater emphasis on distributed operations, highlighting the
need for the full complement of small surface combatants and
increasing the need for frigate design with improved lethality
and survivability. The Navy is working to ensure frigate
requirements deliver the right mix of capability, flexibility,
and affordability.
We understand the potential implications to future
acquisition strategies, their shipyards, and their workforces,
and these are considerations we do not take lightly. We are
committed to delivering increased capability to our sailors for
the best value for the American taxpayer, and that includes
maintaining a competitive, healthy industry base.
We welcome your input and oversight as we work through the
transition of the LCS to the frigate. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Neagley, thank you, and, Admiral
Boxall, thanks so much for your opening statements.
I am now going to go to our ranking member, Mr. Courtney,
to begin the questions.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rear Admiral Boxall, recent reporting has suggested that
the Navy is taking another look at existing and even foreign
designs as alternatives to the current seaframes.
In 2014, the Small Surface Combatant Task Force, which
testified before our committee a number of times in the last
Congress, concluded definitively that both current existing
U.S. designs and foreign designs did not meet even current LCS
survivability requirements and would require major structural
improvements to bring them to those minimal requirements. This
was deemed to have even a greater cost impact than a new
design.
What has changed, and why is the Navy again questioning the
exhaustive process of the Small Surface Combatant Task Force?
Admiral Boxall. Thank you, sir.
The Small Surface Combatant Task Force, the environment
when they created that task force was, I will call it, reactive
in nature. We were responding to, you know, criticisms and to
get to a more capable, survivable ship and LCS as quickly as
possible. And there was also fiscal guidance that was given at
that time, but it was direction, kind of, to them.
And I don't want to speak for that force; I was not on it.
But as we go through our own analysis, we are making
assumptions about the different capabilities, what we think we
need. We look at the, you know, space, weight, power
requirements that we think we need, with the capabilities that
we have already looked at from the task force and as we
continue to refine that.
And as we look at it, we see indications that say, you
know, every capability option you look at and every provider
potentially of an offer of the future has to make some changes.
And so the question really becomes, how big are the changes,
and are they going to be cost-effective?
From our view, we have less data on the foreign designs
than we do most of the other designs in the U.S. But having
said that, what we also learned from the Small Surface
Combatant Task Force was that we have--we made some assumptions
then that weren't exactly right even with regard to the LCS
variants.
And so, if you take that same thinking and you extrapolate
that to what we are doing now, you say, well, we don't know if
they can or can't do that with a foreign design or a U.S.
builder with a foreign partner, and so we believe it is in the
interest of the Navy to look at the requirements and to be able
to include anyone who could provide full and open competition
to get us the best capability at the best price.
Having said that, there are challenges, like I said, with
any option that, you know, they will have to get through to
make it happen. We still have a timeline we want to get to,
because time is of the essence, and we also have capability
that we want to get. And, you know, the ones that are out there
with designs that exist and we don't have a lot of information
on it, we don't know if they will or will not be able to meet
what we need.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, again, I think in some ways this
is sort of the question of the day for our subcommittee. Again,
I am sure there will be followup with staff and other members.
Again, I know time is a constraint, so I am going to stop
there and let the chairman call on folks from his side.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Thank you. And we can always come
back for additional questions. I know we have a vote here, but
we do plan on coming back after the vote.
So Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Well, thank you.
And let me--for the uninitiated, I mean, I have watched--I
have been here as long as Mr. Courtney has and watched the LCS
go through its various iterations.
Can you help me understand what the frigate will actually
do? Is it a gunship? Is it a missile? What is it that it will
provide in terms of capability that you keep talking about? Can
you describe that for me? And can you work that into the cost?
Is it comparable to what the LCS is currently running at?
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir. Certainly we don't have any final
solutions yet, but I will kind of give you the thinking.
Certainly, if you looked at the frigate design as we had
that was based on the work of the task force that was
originally done, they had taken what was a single-mission ship,
a modular design, where you could put anti-submarine warfare
and anti-surface or a mine countermeasures mission package into
that ship. And so, as we went forward with the Small Surface
Combatant Task Force, the output there was to say let's combine
and add anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare, put
some more survivability in.
From a lethality standpoint, we added an over-the-horizon
missile to all mission package combinations. You know, that was
a hull seaframe addition. And that is kind of where we stopped,
because, again, the guidance on that was the costs--that was
about where the knee in the curve was for the cost guidance
that was given.
The difference this time, I think--and we have taken an in-
house look from the Navy standpoint. This was us deciding that
we said, you know, we have heard a lot of, you know, the design
requirements and the GAO [Government Accountability Office]
report that has talked about, you know, going too quickly to a
design without adequately giving it time to think through, and
we have kind of a running start based on the work that we have
done.
But we do believe that there is an opportunity to get more
survivability into the ship to allow it to conceptually, in
this distributed maritime operations environment that we
believe the ship will be operating in for its lifetime----
Mr. Conaway. So help me understand what--in that fleet
operations, where will this----
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Will this be the outer edge of whatever it is
you are doing?
Admiral Boxall. So we are still working----
Mr. Conaway. I am trying to figure out where this ship goes
in the fight.
Admiral Boxall. Yes. So, right now, the ship is going to
be--it remains a forward-deployed asset that will kind of be in
theater. So it will be for combatant commanders to combine with
carrier strike groups either operating independently or they
could work with them.
One of the things that we are also looking at now that
probably was not looked at as closely with the Small Surface
Combatant Task Force was the commonality with other existing
systems. So the idea that we could plug and play with the fleet
as we needed, whether it be with weapons, sensors, the
networks, and those types of things so that----
Mr. Conaway. The networking between, say, a carrier strike
group would be as robust as you need?
Admiral Boxall. So one of the things we are looking at to
try to do in the requirements is to ensure that this ship can
be a provider of information and also a receiver. So it can be
a node, if you will, though I hesitate to use that term, but
the idea that it can plug and play and be used as an asset for
the fleet commander to decide in a distributed environment how
we can properly use that.
So it really is a combination to operate disaggregated or,
if we have to aggregate with other ships, that we would
envision it to be able to do that.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Well, a lot of convincing to do.
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. And I will yield back at this point.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
We will now go to Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you for your service.
My colleagues are going to get into much of the detail we
are speaking of. I am going to talk about capacity, in looking
down the road with our ever-expanding fleet, and the numbers
remain to be homed in on.
When we look at what we are producing today, the two
shipyards that are going at it, and we are trying to look down
the road, we only have X amount of shipyards available to us.
There are only so many people who are skilled trades.
How much does that factor into some of the decisions you
are trying to make today? Or does that say, well, we are going
to be over capacity, this one is going to fall off the edge?
Because you have to consider, we have great plans, but if
we can't build it, it means nothing.
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir. Great question.
Part of our assessment and part of the design review that
we will execute as we look at potential frigate designs, a part
of that will be, can that particular offeror produce that
design? Do they have the production capacity to produce the
design that they are offering? So part of our assessment of the
design is also an assessment of their capacity to build that
particular design.
We certainly have two shipyards that have invested a great
deal in the littoral combat ship. That investment, as we have
talked about, has driven down costs and provided stability. So
we want to leverage as much of that work as possible. But part
of our assessment of the frigate design will be assessment of
the offeror to provide the production and capacity to build
that design.
Mr. Norcross. But let me drill down a little bit on that.
So you are only looking at that one capacity to build that one
ship. But, overall, there are going to be many more
requirements. Obviously, we don't have enough shipyards to put
them out at the speed that we are going to need them.
How do you determine, or is it above you that makes the
determination, you know, we want this shipyard to produce this
model instead of your model? How does that factor into that
final selection?
Admiral Neagley. So, again, when we look at--as we come
through the design process and then we evaluate the ability of
the contractor to produce that design, we look at things like
workload curves. What is the current workload in that
particular shipyard that is proposing to kind of build that
ship? Do they have the capacity to take on that additional work
to meet the numbers that we have asked for as part of the
proposal?
So we look at that capacity piece based on what the
individual offerors are offering, to evaluate whether they can
meet that capacity given their current workloads, their current
manning, their current infrastructure in the yard. Do they have
the capacity in the yard from a materials standpoint to produce
those ships? And do they have the skilled workforce that can
produce those ships on the schedule that we need them on?
Mr. Norcross. So what I am hearing is you are not
anticipating any conflicts of capacity?
Admiral Neagley. Well, we would understand what other
work--when we are evaluating those proposals, we would
understand what other work is going on in those yards. So we
wouldn't do it in a vacuum. If we----
Mr. Norcross. But if you had made that decision last year,
it would be a much different scenario than you are looking at
at, say, 6 months from now, right? Because a year ago, nobody
was talking about the expansion of our fleet the way we are
today.
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Exactly.
Mr. Norcross. So those demands that are going to come upon
us----
Admiral Neagley. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. Weren't even part of that
evaluation.
Admiral Neagley. Correct.
Mr. Norcross. They will be in 6 months from now.
Admiral Neagley. Correct. Right. We will look across the
entire shipbuilding plan to see where we are going to build
those ships across the fleet architecture and then where LCS
and the frigate fit to make sure we have capacity and those
shipyards are going to produce those ships to deliver on the
schedules that we are required to do.
Mr. Norcross. But from what you are seeing now, you don't
anticipate any capacity issues from the requirements that you
are putting out?
Admiral Neagley. We have to come through the requirements,
but no.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Norcross.
We are going to break to go vote, and we will be back at
4:35. So I would ask all of our members to come back. We have,
I think, some important questions to offer, so we will do that.
And, Admiral Boxall, Admiral Neagley, if you will indulge
us, we will be back at 4:35.
Admiral Neagley. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. And we are in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Wittman. I will reconvene the Subcommittee on Seapower
and Projection Forces.
And our next questioner will be Mr. Byrne from the great
State of Alabama.
Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Admiral Boxall, and good afternoon, Admiral
Neagley. Thank you for your patience, by the way. We have had
this vote, and we appreciate you sticking around.
What we just voted in there, an appropriation bill for
fiscal year 2017 that includes funding appropriations for three
littoral combat ships. Three ships a year maintains an
equilibrium with the industrial base and the skilled and
experienced workforce of the shipbuilders while driving down
the individual cost of each ship, as you have already said.
Admiral Neagley, to get to the frigate in FY20 [fiscal year
2020], as you have stated, it seems clear to me that the Navy
needs three LCSes in fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in
order to preserve the industrial base and cost efficiencies. Do
you agree with that?
Admiral Neagley. So I agree that three ships a year from an
efficiency standpoint in the shipyard is the right level. That
gets us efficient schedules, efficient costs.
The number of ships in those years will be discussed as
part of the POM [program objective memorandum] process for the
requirements for the Navy. But, certainly, from a cost-
efficiency standpoint, leveraging the investments we have
already made in those shipyards to produce ships efficiently,
three ships a year is the correct number.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you.
Admiral Boxall, are there plans to backfit the existing LCS
with some of the requirements we can assume will be part of the
frigate, like adding an over-the-horizon missile to the
Coronado, for example?
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir. Actually, even as we speak, we
have, as you may know, LCS 4 [USS Coronado] is deployed out of
Singapore, and she is carrying an over-the-horizon missile
right now.
It is our intention to continue to put an OTH [over-the-
horizon] missile on to backfit the LCS. Again, making those
ships have offensive capability, to the extent we can afford to
do so, is in line with the idea that we want to be very
offensive with our ships as well.
We have already approved, internal to the Navy, our--we
have changed the key systems attribute, which is the way we
inform the joint process of our intentions to make that a
capability on that ship. And so that is our--we are full on our
way.
Obviously, as Admiral Neagley will tell you, we are still
waiting for a July response for the request for proposal on the
over-the-horizon missile, as you know.
Mr. Byrne. Well, Mr. Courtney and I had the pleasure of
being on the Coronado back in July at sea, and they were very
pleased with the operation of the missile. And we heard later
from Admiral Harris that he really likes the idea of having
those things with missiles out there, because you can move them
around and have some distributed lethality that we have talked
so much about.
Do you intend to leverage the money you have already spent
on both LCS hulls in the frigate development path to
incrementally increase the lethality of these ships as a phased
approach to the frigate, especially for the hulls procured
between now and the frigate in 2020?
Admiral Neagley. So, yes, sir, there are specific lethality
and survivability changes that we have already incorporated in
the current contract that we intend to install on the follow-on
ships based on funding available, so things like OTH,
lightweight tow, additional magazine protection, protection
around the chilled water systems that protect the SeaRAM
system. So we have those already as options in the contract to
go execute as part of the ships as we go forward.
Mr. Byrne. So that is a certain amount of progress towards
the frigate before we even get to the frigate, because you are
incorporating some of those concepts into the LCS until we get
to fiscal year 2020.
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir. Some of those attributes would
be the same as we would pursue in the frigate design.
Mr. Byrne. Let me ask you one final question. With regard
to the two shipyards, obviously, we have several years--more
than several years of experience there. We have trained
workforces. They have done the things they need to do to make
the shipyards themselves a more efficient way to produce their
ships.
Is it reasonable to expect that they could continue over
the next couple years without having that same level of
production, three LCSes a year?
Admiral Neagley. Sir, I would say those shipyards invested
and optimized those shipyards for producing two ships a year on
a 4-month build cycle, to deliver two ships a year on 6-month
centers. So I think if the profile is lower than that, we would
be less efficient. There would have to be other work coming
into the yards.
Mr. Byrne. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Byrne.
We will now go to Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Needless to say, this is a very troubled
water in which we are working here. What is the total number of
LCSes that are scheduled to be built?
Admiral Boxall. Well, right now, I mean, the plan we have
through 2017 would give us--we hit 28 through 2017. I don't
know the exact right now.
Admiral Neagley. So it would be--so we have 30 LCSes in the
plan right now.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry. I couldn't hear you, sir.
Admiral Neagley. Thirty in the plan, counting the LCS.
Mr. Garamendi. And we have 12 that are on--8 are in water
and 4 more that are about to be in the water?
Admiral Boxall. We have nine delivered right now, but we
have--obviously, you know, when we say ``delivered,'' that, you
know, completes delivery. And then we are on a short schedule
this year to finish up to the number--what do you have right
now?
Mr. Garamendi. So let me just short it there, because time
will go by.
Admiral Boxall. Yeah.
Mr. Garamendi. So we basically have 9, 10, maybe 12 that
are out there, and we are going to go to 30, and we don't think
they work.
Admiral Boxall. Well, we actually--I think they do work.
We----
Mr. Garamendi. If modified and if there is money to modify
them. Is that what I heard you say, with regard to magazines
and water systems and drive systems and so on and so forth? Do
you have any idea what the cost of all of that is so that they
actually have some survivability?
Admiral Neagley. So let me clarify my statement. So the
ship meets the survivability requirements as validated by DOT&E
[Director, Operational Test and Evaluation]. So the additional
capability or additional attributes we are talking about are
above and beyond the requirement.
Mr. Garamendi. I guess I missed this whole thing. I was
here from the beginning, and all the talk was about
survivability not being sufficient.
Admiral Boxall. We want to get more survivability to
improve its ability to do other missions to take some of that
off of the higher-end ships, so to get it into the level
where--right now, the mission of the ship is single-mission. It
is an anti-submarine warfare/anti-surface warfare/mine
countermeasures. So if it is doing those missions in an area
that is a higher-threat area, then they would need to have a
ship with higher survivability with it to protect it.
Mr. Garamendi. So, in order to do what they are supposed to
do, they have to be higher survivability than they presently
have.
Admiral Boxall. We think, in the future, by making them
more survivable, it makes them more flexible, and it will take
some pressure off the wider force. So we certainly would like
to get--I mean, any ship we want to make as survivable as we
can for the mission it has been needed to do.
Mr. Garamendi. So we should go ahead and build another 20
of these ships even though they are not survivable in what they
are supposed to do unless we increase their survivability?
Admiral Boxall. Sir, as of today, we have only nine of
those ships out there, and they are still in kind of the post-
shakedown availability. We only have--one of the three mission
packages is operational, but two will be coming on in the
next--in 2018 and 2019.
The ASUW, anti-surface, mission package is going to be the
most capable we have on any ship in the Navy right now. The
anti-submarine warfare package that delivers IOC [initial
operating capability] in 2019 is the exact same system we have
on our best destroyers out there to find submarines and also
has a variable-depth sonar and the same helicopter and
torpedoes that we have on our very best platforms.
So they are clamoring for that capability in theater, both
in the Mediterranean and whether you are in the Gulf or whether
you are in----
Mr. Garamendi. So, assuming all of that, we are now going
to go build frigates, which is different than this, but yet we
are going build another 20 of these. It doesn't quite----
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir. We have a requirement right now
for 52 small surface combatants and 104 large surface
combatants. As of today, we have--I think the number is 87
large and we have 20 small, of which 11 of those are mine
sweepers. So you can see we are noticeably short on what we
need.
So we want to get as many of those out there to assist and
ensure the force has more capable anti-submarine warfare, the
ability to protect themselves against small boats that are out
there. We are seeing these threats today in the Bab-el-Mandeb,
in an area that has a lot of small-boat activity. So these
ships will be very welcome in those environments.
Mr. Garamendi. Final question. Downsizing or downselecting.
The frigate already is more expensive, and detail design has
not been even thought about. So what is the cost of the frigate
that is the follow-on to the LCS which needs to be upgraded in
order to survive?
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir. So as we come to the
requirements process and come through what the requirements,
what capability needs to be on that frigate, we will go through
a design process where we will mature that design. We will do a
service cost--or a cost estimate of what that design costs, and
then we will do an independent cost estimate to assess what
that cost is for the set of requirements that are required for
the frigate design.
So that is work in front of us to do.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Right on time. Thank you very
much.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
We will now go to Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Boxall, Admiral Neagley.
Admiral Neagley, I think the last time I saw you was at
Marinette, so it is good to see you. It is a somewhat warmer
climate than it was that time.
I would like to follow up on what my colleague Mr. Byrne
said and just make sure that we are all clear on what would
happen pending some decisions we are about to make.
In a recent LCS hearing before this committee, Secretary
Stackley described what he called a very skilled set of labor
in the shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding, he testified,
requires unique skills in terms of shipfitters, pipefitters,
and production control in the shipyard. What we can't afford to
have happen is a sawtooth effect in terms of hiring and firing
at our shipyards.
He went on to describe this sawtooth effect, saying, ``We
will be continually dealing with learning in terms of the labor
themselves, and we will lose the skilled labor. They will go to
other areas where there is a more stable employment
environment, and that will come back to us in terms of cost and
quality. So we have to maintain those two key elements in our
industrial base. And it is particularly fragile at a time when
your shipbuilding rates are below where you believe they need
to be.''
So, as I understand it, based on what you have said, what
Secretary Stackley has said, anything less than three ships in
fiscal year 2018 will indeed lead to this sawtooth effect,
which, according to Secretary Stackley, will come back to the
taxpayers in terms of cost and quality.
Should the plan to fund one or two ships this year move
forward and we fail to maintain a steady rate of three ships
entering the shipyard pipelines, layoffs will occur at both
yards.
Admiral Neagley, do you agree with Secretary Stackley's
assessment that these sawtooth layoffs would result in
significant costs to taxpayers in terms of cost, quality, and
schedule?
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir, I agree with that, his
assessment. Stability and predictability, particularly in the
shipyard, is a key to driving cost and have a predictable
schedule.
Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Neagley, I would also like to follow
up by talking a bit about the learning curve associated with
the initial development and production of first-in-class ships.
And, certainly, there has been a lot made about what is
working, what isn't working.
What extra risks do these ships typically run in terms of
schedule delays, cost overruns, or quality issues compared to
subsequent iterations? How long does it typically take for
these first-of-class issues to sort themselves out?
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir. So, in terms of learning curve,
if you look at the first two ships we delivered--so LCS 1--I
can talk in hours--so we delivered it in about 4.8 million
hours. LCS 9, which is going to deliver this year, is down to
about 2.9 million hours.
So we have seen across both shipyards direct production
labor come down about 40 to 60 percent in learning. So that is
cost and schedule that is real.
Mr. Gallagher. And it would be fair to say is real anytime
you are deploying a first-of-class ship.
Admiral Neagley. Certainly, there is a steep learning curve
to start a new design and a new shipyard. You know, that
initial cost would be much higher than a ship that has been in
production for a while and captured the lessons learned and
captured the changes in line.
Mr. Gallagher. And those lessons learned, would it be fair
to say, are being captured every day by the men and women who
are working on the ship? And just talk to me a little bit about
how having that experienced labor force contributes to greater
efficiencies in cost that you are realizing every single day in
both shipyards.
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir. So having both a shipyard that
is facilitized to produce the ships that the Navy requires and
to have a skilled workforce that can produce those ships on the
timelines that we talk about is critical.
In LCS, we are particularly advantaged. You know, we
operated those ships early, so we have a lot of lessons learned
from operational experience, and we are able to fold those into
the production lines now, so the learning rate is quicker.
With our ability to kind of capture lessons learned from
underway deployments, fold those into pretty mature production
lines, it is a way to kind of improve the capability quickly
over time.
Mr. Gallagher. And, Admiral Boxall, if the Navy's frigate
program were to experience delays following the expected award
in fiscal year 2020, how would that impact the Navy's overall
ability to meet its small surface combatant requirements?
Admiral Boxall. Well, sir, obviously, we would like to get
ships out there to the numbers that we--you know, so the faster
we get to 52 to meet the requirement, the less load we place on
our forces out there. So, obviously, that would be an impact.
If the delay goes, we want to make sure that we still--we
produce the capability that we need out there in the ships. It
would require either working those ships a little more or
having the large surface combatants kind of pick up the slack,
those types of mitigations.
Mr. Gallagher. But, I mean, obviously, the large surface
combatants are far more expensive, a different set of
requirements. So can we get to 355 if we don't fully meet the
small surface requirement?
Admiral Boxall. So 355, I mean, one of the challenges we
have in the shipbuilding program writ large with regard to the
entire force is that--I would liken this to a bathtub that is
draining faster than you are filling it.
Mr. Gallagher. Uh-huh.
Admiral Boxall. So we have the same problem with--you know,
there are a lot of ships we have built--about the time they are
starting to decommission, we will start seeing those ships
retire at a faster rate than we are producing them, whether it
be large or small surface combatants. So that trend is
obviously something that is concerning to us.
Mr. Gallagher. All right. Thank you both for your time.
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
We will now go to Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admirals, thank you for your time today.
You have testified a Frigate Requirement Evaluation Team is
redefining the frigate requirements to improve its ability to
operate in a more contested environment than LCS and to enhance
its role in distributed maritime operations.
Now, as I understand it, there is a current effort underway
to outfit the LCS and the frigate with an over-the-horizon
weapons system, for which there is a wide spectrum of
anticipated options that could be chosen, each with different
capabilities. These range from inexpensive anti-ship solutions
with limited utility in contested environments to highly
advanced anti-ship solutions that could hold peer-nation
surface vessels at risk in GPS [Global Positioning System]-
denied environments, which may be the environment in the
Pacific area, where these vessels would certainly operate.
If the Navy is redefining the role of the frigate, either
it is envisioning over-the-horizon weapons as LCS-only
solutions or it is reevaluating the correct capability for an
anti-ship missile for the new frigate.
Can we expect to see the Frigate Requirement Evaluation
Team reevaluate the anti-ship capability needed for a frigate
the Navy now says will operate in contested environments?
And the second question to it: How will this impact the
scope of the competition, which did not envision such operating
conditions and appears to be disconnected with the work of the
Frigate Requirement Evaluation Team?
Admiral Boxall. Thank you, ma'am.
We are still working, as I said, through--most of the
efforts that we are looking at right now are focused on the
survivability aspect of that, so you could say in improving the
air defense capability, so protecting that ship. When you think
about survivability of a ship, we look at the susceptibility,
which is what we call the ability of it to keep from getting
hit or taking out a threat as it comes at it.
So the over-the-horizon missile, from an offensive
capability, we already have a request for proposal out there
right now on the requirement that has been validated for both
the LCS and for the frigate in the CDD [capability development
document] that we have submitted.
So, as far as any additional capability, if we put
flexibility--for example, if we choose to go with a vertically
launched system that could take any other longer-range missile
of the future, that would be a bonus, if you will. It increases
the flexibility for it to adapt to future weapons.
But from an anti-surface standpoint, that is not one of the
focuses of this team this time, although we continue to
evaluate across the spectrum of capability.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Admiral.
And I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. I appreciate your
questions.
Admiral Boxall, Admiral Neagley, again, thank you so much
for joining us today. This is important testimony.
Before I begin the questions, I do want to give a shout-out
to Commander Crossman, who is extraordinary. He was given a
mission set when we were traveling to the yards down in the
Gulf, and he performed extraordinarily. He even stayed with me
late into the evening to have a special shipman meet us back at
the airport.
So, Commander Crossman, extraordinary performance. I have
to thank you explicitly for that. So I want to make sure both
Admiral Boxall and Admiral Neagley realize how valued we are as
a Navy to have you there serving our Nation. So thank you.
I want to begin, Admiral Boxall, by talking a little more
in depth about the capabilities for our upcoming frigate class.
So a lot of discussion about what should be in that requirement
set, talking about area air defense capability, enhanced
survivability, expanded range, an additional margin for future
weapons systems. I think all those things are very critical.
I want to get your perspective on what you believe--just
generally. I understand you will be coming at it with
requirements, but, just generally, what do you think are the
most important mission capabilities on that small surface
combatant frigate class? And what do you think the scope of
cost range is that that ship should fall within? And I
understand that that is going to be something that you are
putting out there, but just give us a general sense.
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir.
First, with regard to Commander Crossman, as a former
Carney CO [commanding officer], I was also the commanding
officer of Carney, and he has been a great one. I have known
him for a long time. So thank you for that.
Mr. Wittman. Extraordinary.
Admiral Boxall. With regard to the capability of--we are
focusing this effort in, kind of, the main area of
survivability, which--air defense piece.
And when we say ``area air defense,'' I think, as a former
Aegis [U.S. Navy phased array radar-based combat system]
commanding officer, that we think about protecting large areas,
you know, against cruise missiles and long-range missiles and
things like that. We are not looking at that level. We are
looking at something greater than the self-defense capability
that we have, which is pretty robust when you include the
systems. And I will keep it at the unclassified level here,
but, certainly, we have a combination of systems that we think
work in concert to protect itself in a reasonable environment.
And then, if you look towards, you know, a more complex,
contested environment, then we look at, you know--you have to
look at the quality of the radar. So that is something that we
are focusing on. So the quality of the radar right now--we have
had a rotating radar. We are having a dialogue on whether a
fixed radar or a rotating radar that is solid state is going to
be the best choice.
And, again, when you look at that radar, you look at the
combat system and the commonality with the other one. So its
ability to operate with other ships, the destroyers and
cruisers out there, as part of a network force out there is
very important. So we look at communications. Does it have the
right COMs [communications] gear? Are there electronic warfare
systems on there that are compatible and allow for a give-and-
take between ships?
So when you look at all those things and we look at--you
know, we don't know exactly what cost is going to be.
Obviously, we had estimates when we were looking at what the
frigate would be. Obviously, if we do get more capability, we
have a choice of either taking some more things off of there
and keeping the price about the same or increasing slightly.
Those are the types of discussions we will have with OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] and with the Hill to
ensure that we all think, going forward, we can depend on this
level of support for this much capability.
We also want to make sure this remains a low part of the
high-low mix. So we have constrained ourselves to ensure that
we are getting the most bang for the buck, to ensure that we
are not making this so big that it will become cost-prohibitive
to having the capacity that we need out there.
So I hope that gives you about the things you were looking
for, sir.
Mr. Wittman. It certainly does. And I appreciate your
willingness to make sure you have discussions with us on the
Hill. Because we are going to have to make sure there is a
coordination there about what the requirement set ultimately
ends up with--where that ends up on the affordability range.
And as I have talked earlier, for this subcommittee and for
the full committee going forward, as we look at growing the
fleet, the two elements that I think are extraordinarily
important are time and resources. And that means, as we are
going through this, we have to make sure we use time to our
advantage, and that is get from concept to operation as quickly
as we can, making sure that we have mature designs so we know
how to work that, we know how to save money, and then making
sure, as you said, to make sure in the high-/low-end mix the
low end has the right capability in the right price range and
that we deliver that on time.
So scale, as you heard a lot of other members talk about
too, scale of production is another important element. Because
you are going to pay more if you are building a smaller number
than you are if you are building a large number. So we want to
make sure that we have that scaled properly.
Let me ask this. Going to the LCS as we see it today and
with the mine countermeasure package not being available until
2021, give me your perspective on what we are going to do to
have that mine countermeasure capability going forward until we
get that system delivered and operationally proficient on the
LCS. Are we going to keep Avenger class going? What are we
going to do with Sea Dragon? Can we do that in the Asia-Pacific
and make sure we have that capability? Because, as you know,
that is the area, as Admiral Harris talked about, where there
is a real demand signal from the COCOMs [combatant commands].
So give me your perspective on how we make sure, you know,
we have that right capability now. Because we planned on having
it sooner than where we will ultimately end up with it.
Admiral Boxall. Yes, sir.
So, with the mine warfare capability, obviously, we are--we
keep hearing from, you know, both the Pacific and the European
theater that mine capability is incredibly important. And so we
are looking at different ways to mitigate now both with and
without LCS.
But I will say I am not the requirements sponsor for mine
warfare. That is obviously Major General Owens.
Mr. Wittman. Right.
Admiral Boxall. But to your question of keeping the Avenger
class around, obviously, that class is getting tired, those
ships. And so we are at a critical point of making those
decisions of do we take the risk or add the cost to keep those
at a much higher rate of readiness. And the return on
investment, the operational availability of those ships, is
getting harder and harder to keep up.
So I won't answer the question for him, but I will say that
I think we know that we have to get that plan right, or else
the Avenger class is going to--you know, it will cease being
useful, and we will be caught with a gap.
So, in the meantime, I know we are working interim
mitigating measures, and we are actually finding some
innovative ways to adjust to that, both with and without LCS
until that comes on line.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Admiral Neagley, I want to go back to get you to elaborate
a little bit on questions that were asked earlier, and that is:
The Navy's LCS request for proposals had in it LCS projections
from 2018 through 2020 at one ship per year. And you heard many
other members talking about the challenges that that faces or
provides for the industry, the cost associated with that.
Give me your perspective on where you see us finishing out
this current LCS design and construction, what the build-out
there would be, and when you would envision us moving to
construction of frigate class as that decision is made. So if
you can give me those numbers each year, what you project we
need, obviously keeping in mind the industry, and then
transitioning to frigate.
Admiral Neagley. Yes, sir.
So, for the frigate, we intend to award the frigate by
fiscal year 2020, is our target to get to frigate. So we will
have a series of design activities to mature that design, to
get to a design award, a detailed design and contract award, in
fiscal year 2020.
We talked about the industrial base and what the industrial
base is required to build ships efficiently between now and
then. The numbers of ships for each one of those years will be
based on--the Navy's requirements will be articulated in the
budget. So that will be informed by, you know, not all of Navy
priorities.
So I really can't speak to specific numbers in those years,
but, certainly, from an efficiency standpoint for the
shipyards, we have articulated that we think about 3 ships a
year or 1.5 per shipyard a year is the right number to maintain
the workforce and to leverage the efficiencies from the
investment in those yards.
Mr. Wittman. So it will be logical, then, to assume that
going forward the request would be to keep it at that level at
least through 2019, which is when you would transition in 2020
to the new frigate class. Am I safe in assuming that? And I
understand that it comes from decision makers above you, but
just to be able to get your perspective on it.
Admiral Neagley. So I think there is a desire that we get
to frigate as soon as possible. And, again, the specific
numbers in those years will be based on not only considerations
for the industrial base and the shipyard but the competing Navy
priorities to budget for those ships. So it is hard for me to
predict what that budget--that shipbuilding profile will look
like.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Thanks, Admiral Neagley.
I know we have, I think, a desire for some more questions,
so I will go to Mr. Garamendi, who has indicated an interest
for additional questions.
Mr. Garamendi. I don't have any more. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. All right. Very good.
Do any other members have additional questions?
Hearing none, I want to thank our witnesses, thank our
members for being here today.
And our subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 3, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 3, 2017
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 3, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. You have spoken publicly about the Navy's concept for
a network of armed nodes that require the adversary to deal with the
entire system, not just a single ship or surface action group, not just
one carrier strike group, or not just one submarine. I am curious about
the role of the LCS in this concept, and how we might be able to refine
the mission set of the LCS going forward.
Can you speak to how LCS's modularity interfaces may allow for the
inclusion of the latest technology and how this modularity may differ
on other classes of ships?
What might this mean to the warfighter in terms of ability to
deploy unmanned surface, subsurface, and aviation assets in a
distributed but netted fashion?
Additionally, what might this mean in terms of future weapon
systems, such as directed energy systems, or railgun?
Admiral Boxall. LCS was specifically designed with modular, open-
systems architecture inherent in the ship and its combat system allow
for rapid integration of technological solutions that increase
capability at reduced cost. The ship possesses common Navy systems
across the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
(C4I) suite, which can be leveraged by the fleet commander to increase
battlespace awareness. LCS includes designated weapons and mission
spaces that provide defined support functions via common interfaces,
codified in an Interface Control Document (ICD)--to include limitations
of Space, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) which apply to both ship
variants. SWaP-C is a critical factor in determining the feasibility of
incorporating future weapon systems such as directed energy or railgun.
The open-systems architecture of the LCS enables integration of these
changes with less intrusive installation effort on the ship. Unlike
traditional ship designs where installation of new systems may require
significant alterations (such as structural modifications to provide
space and foundations, cable runs to accommodate power requirements,
changes to piping, etc.), LCS can support installation of new systems
with minimal ship impact and cost. The Navy is investigating upgrades
and backfits to LCS to improve the lethality and survivability,
including upgrades that enable LCS to increase its contribution to the
Fleet's netted tactical picture. For example, LCS has already
successfully demonstrated its ability to deploy an unmanned aerial
vehicle (``Firescout'') in the 7th Fleet Area of Responsibility. LCS
modularity and ICD specifications provide a streamlined path for
insertion of new technology and weapons systems such as over-the-
horizon missiles and directed energy systems. These attributes provide
the Combatant Commanders greater flexibility to deploy a more lethal
LCS combined with the warfighter's ability to employ multiple unmanned
systems as a netted force multiplier.
Mr. Langevin. As it pertains to both current LCS and future frigate
variant acquisition strategies, I am concerned about throwing the
industrial base into flux as design requirements change and procurement
levels are drastically altered. What are your concerns regarding the
industrial base, and how can we help mitigate any potential unintended
consequences?
Admiral Boxall. The industrial base for the Small Surface
Combatants including LCS and FFG are extremely important to achieving
our force structure goals in an affordable manner. The FFG(X) award
delay until FY20 to mature the design and pursue full and open
competition is supported by the continued procurement of LCS in FY18
and FY19 to deliver much needed capability and keep the industrial base
stable. The Navy's most recent (2016) Force Structure Assessment (FSA)
validates the warfighting requirement for 52 Small Surface Combatants
(SSCs). As maritime threats continue to evolve and as the operating
environment becomes increasingly complex, the Navy is placing greater
emphasis on distributed operations, highlighting the need for a FFG(X)
with improved lethality and survivability as a part of the full
complement of 52 SSCs.
Mr. Langevin. As it pertains to both current LCS and future frigate
variant acquisition strategies, I am concerned about throwing the
industrial base into flux as design requirements change and procurement
levels are drastically altered. What are your concerns regarding the
industrial base, and how can we help mitigate any potential unintended
consequences?
Admiral Neagley. The Navy recognizes the critical nature of
maintaining the shipbuilding industrial base while transitioning from
LCS to Frigate. PB18 defers procurement of the Frigate until FY2020,
with additional LCS being procured in FY2018 and FY2019. This plan
allows the Navy to mature the Frigate design and better understand the
cost drivers across the various design options while preserving
viability of the current small surface combatant industrial base and
allowing them to remain competitive ahead of the pending Frigate award
in FY2020.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE
Mr. Byrne. The Navy should be commended for utilizing expertise and
relevant and developed technologies from allied navies with significant
experience in the littorals. I'm aware that the LCS program has brought
engineering and manufacturing of these technologies to the U.S.,
creating U.S. jobs. I believe we can bring more of these jobs to U.S.
shores. I think we can provide the best ships, with the best
technologies for our sailors, leveraging our allies' investment to
create U.S. jobs.
How will the Navy continue to leverage this foreign investment
moving forward with the frigate program?
Admiral Neagley. To promote and provide for full and open
competition, the Navy will consider any hull form--foreign and
domestic--that meets the requirements. Having multiple offerors compete
for the FFG(X) design will ensure competitive pricing and enable the
Navy to select the best value design. Any future competitive
solicitation for the Detail Design and Construction of FFG(X) shall
include the requirements of U.S.C. 7309, which mandates that no major
component of the hull or superstructure of any vessel constructed for
the armed forces may be constructed in a foreign shipyard. Surface
Vessels of War and Technical Data are included in the U.S. Munitions
List and therefore subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) restrictions. Therefore, any interested parties must comply with
all U.S. export control laws and regulations.
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