[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-40]
THREE DECADES LATER: A REVIEW AND
ASSESSMENT OF OUR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES 30 YEARS AFTER
THE CREATION OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 2, 2017
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana JIM COOPER, Tennessee
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair JACKIE SPEIER, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Pete Villano, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Neve Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.. 1
WITNESSES
Thomas, GEN Raymond A., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 5
Whelan, Theresa, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M....................................... 25
Thomas, GEN Raymond A........................................ 34
Whelan, Theresa.............................................. 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 57
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 62
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 61
THREE DECADES LATER: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF OUR SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES 30 YEARS AFTER THE CREATION OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 2, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. I call this hearing of the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee to order. I am pleased to welcome everyone this
morning to a very important hearing entitled, ``Three Decades
Later: A Review and Assessment of U.S. Special Operation Forces
30 Years After the Creation of U.S. Special Operations
Command.''
This year marks the 30-year historical point for our
special operations forces [SOF] when Congress added an
amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation that
created the United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM].
Since that time, this force has been preserving strategic
options for our Nation, and their track record is second to
none.
During my time in Congress and as chair of this
subcommittee, I have traveled to many war zones and embassies
and seen this force in action. I can say from firsthand
experience that I am continually impressed and humbled by the
men and women conducting these important missions, and our
Nation can truly be proud of their accomplishments.
And although this hearing offers an opportunity for
reflection, in some ways the threats that special operations
forces respond to are as timeless as warfare itself and have
existed in the form of irregular and asymmetric challenges from
state and nonstate actors alike. These challenges, and indeed
those of the past 16 years since 9/11, have demanded a heavy
focus on counterterrorism and direct action skills for this
force, but how much that experience will shape our thinking
about future conflicts remains to be seen. And despite this
constant theme, the world at large continues to change, and we
must not let today's war overshadow the need to prepare for the
wars of tomorrow.
While the global CT [counterterrorism] fight continues,
adversarial advances in synthetic biology, quantum computing,
information warfare, and, indeed, the proliferation of more
than 10 trillion sensors and devices connected to the internet
presents risks for tomorrow. However, if managed right, these
risks become great opportunities for this highly capable force.
In thinking about the years ahead, we must ask hard
questions after nearly 16 years of constant war, including:
What parts of this force are broken and what needs to be
repaired quickly? What adversarial nation-states are advancing
faster and achieving a qualitative edge over our forces? And
what must we do to ensure that our special operations forces
are postured for the next 30 years to mitigate our most
pressing national security concerns and to continue to preserve
strategic options for our Nation?
As in the past, Congress will play a major role by aligning
resources and policy to keep special operations effective,
silent, globally postured, and when necessary, absolutely
lethal. To do that, we will need the help of our witnesses
before us this morning: Ms. Theresa Whelan, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)], and General Raymond Thomas,
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
It is worth noting that Ms. Whelan, although also
performing the duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
is appearing today before the committee in her capacity as
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.
I would like to turn now to my friend and ranking member,
Mr. Jim Langevin from Rhode Island, for any comments he would
like to make.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik.
And thank you, Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, for being
here today. I look forward to your testimony this morning. And,
General, in particular, I want to thank you for your service to
the Nation, and all the men and women who serve under your
command.
Despite not having a detailed budget request submitted by
the administration, there are many issues regarding the command
and our special operations forces to be discussed by the
committee today. Approximately 30 years ago, Congress
established SOCOM to ensure joint and ready special operations
forces capable of defending U.S. national security interests.
For the last decade and a half, we have relied heavily on
SOF to perform activities in support of counterterrorism
operations. However, we must keep in mind that SOF activities,
such as unconventional warfare [UW], foreign internal defense,
counter-messaging, and hostage rescue, remain equally important
to countering aggression of other actors, including nation-
states.
Despite drawdowns of conventional forces and overseas
contingencies, the demand for SOF remains high across the
combatant commands. SOF is still very much engaged in battle.
Sadly, we lost three Army Special Forces in Afghanistan
fighting ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] just in
April. This high operation tempo has created stress on the
force and has affected readiness. Precision and discrimination
in use of SOF remain fundamental to not breaking the force.
We must also ensure that SOF are employed under policies,
guidance, and authorities conducive to achieving our broader
national security goals and objectives set forth in clear
strategies. This includes both in and outside areas of active
hostilities in each theater, against each threat. This requires
us to be mindful when considering or legislating operational
authorities.
SOCOM and the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict clearly have a lot on their plate.
In addition, last year SOCOM was assigned the responsibility
for synchronizing the countering weapons of mass destruction
[CWMD] mission from Strategic Command [STRATCOM]. SOCOM has
always been involved in CWMD and brings a depth of knowledge to
employing a left-of-boom approach conducive to our strategy.
The threats our Nation faces today are ever-evolving and
complex and will continue to shape our special operations
forces and policies for employment of those forces. I certainly
look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on these
topics.
Again, I thank you for all the extraordinary work that you
and the special operations forces perform on behalf of our
Nation day in and day out in very dangerous areas, performing
very dangerous missions, and we thank you all for your service.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Immediately following this open hearing, the committee will
reconvene upstairs in 2337 for a closed classified roundtable
discussion with both of our witnesses.
Before we begin, I remind our witnesses that your full
written statements will be submitted for the record, and we ask
that you summarize your comments in 5 minutes or less.
Secretary Whelan, we will begin with you, and we look
forward to your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT
Ms. Whelan. Thank you. Chairwoman Stefanik, Congressman
Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to appear before you today in my capacity as the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. I am pleased to share
this table with General Tony Thomas, who has served at the
forefront of the special operations forces at all levels of
command. Our entire SO/LIC team is proud to partner with him
and his command in forging the future of DOD [Department of
Defense] special operations.
I would like to thank you and your predecessors for the
foresight to create SO/LIC and SOCOM 30 years ago, and for your
commitment to maintaining that vision over the last three
decades. We are grateful for this committee's support for
special operations, as evidenced by the resources, authorities,
and depth of understanding you provide in your oversight. Our
military is stronger and more capable due to your efforts.
Today I will focus on three topics. First, winning the
current fight and defeating emerging threats. Second, building
on the foundations of section 922 ASD(SO/LIC) authorities. And
third, continuing to hone the edge of SOF personnel and
capabilities.
SOF is a vanguard force in countering emerging threats at
the leading edge of the modern security landscape. In the last
15 years, we have encountered a networked enemy. We flattened
our organizations and accelerated our targeting cycles and we
built a network to defeat them. We now face advanced
transregional threats that demand greater levels of
coordination and collaboration, and we are redoubling our focus
on building relationships with international and interagency
partners.
Today, SO/LIC provides oversight and advocacy for the
special operations budget, which is approximately 1.8 percent
of our defense budget in 2017, and we directly manage over $2
billion in various budgets that support counterterrorism and
counternarcotics efforts.
The three-decades-long partnership between SOCOM and SO/LIC
has generated a force capable of dealing with emerging threats,
and a force that is able to translate those gains across the
Department. We will win the fight against the VEOs [violent
extremist organizations] and protect our citizens' vital
interests, allies, and partners. This requires a long-term
strategic approach that combats terrorists, disrupts terrorist
networks, discredits extremist ideologies, and diminishes
factors that contribute to recruitment and radicalization.
Sustaining funding and flexible legislative authorities
have been instrumental to these efforts. I want to thank the
committee for establishing section 127e, formerly known as
section 1208, as a permanent authority. The maturation of this
program has provided our warfighters a powerful tool to employ
to support our allies, attack our enemies, and protect our
force, and is a great example of interagency synergy, enabled
by strong congressional support and oversight.
Congressional support for countering threat finance and
transnational organized crime is also crucial to our overall
efforts. Terrorists, insurgents, and other threat networks
depend upon illicit revenue streams and criminal facilitators
for logistic support, money laundering, and also obtaining
weapons and fraudulent documents.
Thank you also for codifying the responsibilities of
ASD(SO/LIC)'s important oversight role comprised of the
complementary tasks of monitoring and advocacy in the fiscal
year 2017 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. USSOCOM
has made dramatic advances during wartime in response to urgent
battlefield demands, gains that require an institutional
foundation to endure.
The service secretary-like authorities in section 922 serve
as a strategic linchpin, ensuring that we lock in these hard-
won gains. These authorities empowered the Special Operations
Policy Oversight Council, which we have used in the past year
to resolve base infrastructure and casualty evacuation issues
among USSOCOM and the services.
Ultimately, these gains can be leveraged across the entire
force with SOF best practices in technology and talent
management serving as templates for the Department in
addressing emerging challenges.
A key part of SO/LIC's role is to advance the state of the
art in concepts, technologies, and strategies for both humans
and hardware. Our Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
[CTTSO] leads this effort within SO/LIC by developing cutting-
edge technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law
enforcement.
The SOF truths state that humans are more important than
hardware. As we continue to provide agile and innovative
capabilities, we must also continue to maintain and sustain an
elite workforce suited to the unique and diverse demands of
21st century warfare.
For more than 30 years, SOF has remained at the leading
edge of global megatrends. We have employed SOF in
consequential battles and we have seen SOF diminish threats
before they evolve. We take lessons from every operation, and
those lessons have informed and fostered innovation through SOF
and across the larger force and Department. We will continue to
work closely with Congress to ensure that we have the right
policy, agile authorities, and necessary resources to employ
SOF effectively.
I thank Congress for its continued support of our men and
women in uniform and their families, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.
General Thomas.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND A. THOMAS, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Thomas. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member
Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am especially
grateful to be here with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Whelan in a session dedicated exclusively to special
operations, as it provides us the opportunity to discuss in
detail the unique requirements, capabilities, and challenges
associated with your United States Special Operations Command.
This body legislated us into existence a little over 30
years ago to act as a unique Department of Defense
organization, a dual-headed service-like entity responsible for
both the manning, training, and equipping of special operations
forces, as well as a globally focused, functional combatant
command.
In fulfilling the first role, which continues to be our
primary function, I believe we have consistently provided the
world's best special operations forces to the geographic
combatant commanders. However, it is in the second role, as a
globally focused combatant command, where SOCOM has evolved the
most.
As we carry out both of these roles today, special
operations forces are more relevant than ever to the current
and enduring threats facing our Nation. We have been at the
forefront of national security operations for the past three
decades, to include continuous combat over the past 15\1/2\
years. This historic period has been the backdrop for some of
our greatest successes as well as the source of our greatest
challenge, which is the sustained readiness of this magnificent
force.
We are thankful for the resources you have provided not
only to operate this force, but also to perform the critical
sustainment efforts that underpin our most precious resource,
our people.
Last month was particularly difficult for USSOCOM, losing
its 407th hero, Staff Sergeant De Alencar, in a firefight in
Nangahar Province in Afghanistan while operating alongside his
Afghan partners. Then, last week, we lost Ranger Sergeants
Thomas and Rodgers, our 408th and 409th casualties,
respectively. This comes on the heels of 16 other combat
fatalities since I assumed command a year ago and is a stark
reminder that we are a command at war, and will remain so for
the foreseeable future.
My current priorities for the command fall into three broad
categories.
First, we must win the current fight, which consists of
carrying out assigned missions running the gamut from defeating
Islamic extremism, both Sunni and Shia, to countering Russian
aggression, to preparing for contingencies in Korea, as well as
various security operations to defend the homeland.
Second, we must continue to transform our enterprise to
remain relevant in this rapidly changing security environment.
Finally, we must take care of our people and their
families, as they form the foundation upon which our force is
built.
My first year in command has seen us focused on these
priorities as we transform the way DOD looks at many of the
national military strategy challenges, in our role as the
coordinating authority for countering transregional threats,
and more recently we have also poured significant resources
into defining our role as the DOD synchronizer for countering
weapons of mass destruction.
Both of these substantive roles are additive to the current
missions, where approximately 8,000 SOF are deployed in over 80
countries working with international, interagency, and DOD
partners in support of the geographic combatant commanders'
priorities.
This focus is also occurring during a period of
unprecedented recapitalization of substantive parts of our
warfighting capability, to include the conversion of our entire
C-130J--our fleet to J model C-130s, as well as other major
platforms. We are extremely thankful to the services for
enabling this transformation to the force, as it sets us on the
path of success for decades to come.
We are equally grateful to the support of Congress for
required resourcing that in turn has produced a SOCOM which is
relevant to all the current and enduring threats facing the
Nation. We appreciate the continued oversight and advocacy for
your United States Special Operations Command.
I look forward to your questions today as well as the
planned closed session to follow. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Thomas can be found in
the Appendix on page 34.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, General Thomas.
I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be
allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions.
Is there objection?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
My first question is for Ms. Whelan. In your written
statement you note that adversarial powers are increasingly
turning towards unconventional warfare to pursue their
objectives, including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
And as you know, this committee shares this concern, and in
the NDAA for FY 2016 we included a provision directing the
Secretary of Defense to coordinate with the interagency and
submit a strategy to counter these unconventional threats. This
strategy, which is now almost 2 years late, ultimately can help
provide a way to ensure that our ends, ways, and means are
aligned to help counter these unconventional threats.
So I have two questions on that front. Can you provide an
update on the strategy and how the Department is coordinating
with the interagency, and also when Congress can expect to
receive it?
Ms. Whelan. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the
question.
We have been engaged on the issue of UW, and actually we
appreciate the language in the NDAA in fiscal year 2016 asking
us to focus on this issue set. We have been, I think as you
noted in your opening statement, quite focused on the
counterterrorism fight for the last 15 years, and UW is an
emerging area.
We have as a consequence had to shift resources to focus on
this and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had to a
certain extent atrophied over the years. But also because the
nature of UW has fundamentally changed because of 21st century
technologies and techniques, we really in many ways have been
starting from scratch, and that has been one of the challenges
that we faced as we dug into this over the last 18 to 24
months.
We have been working with our interagency partners, and
actually, as we have conducted that work with our interagency
partners, we have begun to realize the extent to which UW in
the 21st century really is an interagency team sport involving
multiple parts of the U.S. Government and posing multiple
threats to the U.S. Government because of the ways that our
adversaries are using it.
Studies by USASOC [U.S. Army Special Operations Command],
and also work that Georgetown University has done on UW, have
indicated that our adversaries, particularly the more
sophisticated ones, are actually focusing on the seams between
our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams
and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in
the space that essentially is below conventional war, the space
that we now refer to as the gray zone or hybrid warfare.
What we are doing and have set in motion is two research
projects. One, Johns Hopkins University is conducting a study
on the nature of Russian unconventional warfare in particular.
We also have engaged CTTSO, our RDT&E [research, development,
test and evaluation] enterprise, to look at developing
predictive analytic technologies that will help us identify
when countries are utilizing unconventional warfare techniques
at levels essentially below our normal observation thresholds
so that we can identify these early and be able to use that to
develop our strategies. Once we complete the Russia UW
strategy, we will also move on to look at Iran and China.
Again, this continues to be an evolving threat. So we look
forward to continuing to work with you as we iterate and try to
get our heads around what is probably one of the most
interesting areas in terms of the emerging warfare techniques
in the 21st century. We do expect to have an interim answer
with our thoughts to you before the end of June.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.
My second question is for both you and General Thomas. In
terms of countering unconventional warfare threats, are we any
closer to linking all of our tools and capabilities, such as
conventional, unconventional, economic, cyber, intel, and IO
[information operations], in an effort to counter adversarial
threats?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I think you actually hit on the problem, the challenge that
we are facing right now, is how to achieve that level of
exquisite integration across multiple components of not only
the Defense Department, but also the U.S. Government, and also
to include the issues that bleed into the homeland space where,
of course, we have a number of different laws and authorities
that govern how we in the Defense Department operate, let alone
how DHS [Department of Homeland Security] operates. These are
some of the very things that we are trying to understand better
as we look at the tactics and techniques that our adversaries
are trying to use to exploit us.
Ms. Stefanik. General Thomas.
General Thomas. Chairwoman, to really dovetail with the
first question as it plays to your second one, we are working
closely with the Department for the overall strategy, but I
think as importantly and more practically, we are focused on
the resources and the authorities that would underpin that
strategy. So we actually are having some pretty substantive
discussions, specifically as it applies towards countering
Russian aggression.
On that end, and to your second question, I do think you
are seeing an increasingly enhanced and capable blend of
everything that we bring to the table in terms of military
capabilities, information operations, influence operations,
partner capacity, all the way through to DA [direct action],
although less applicable in some of the UW environments that we
are currently in, but always kind of the hold card, but also
cross-cued with everything the interagency can bring and with
our host nations.
I do think that you are seeing a trend in the right
direction, as I think your question hopes we are moving in that
regard.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again, thanks to our witnesses today for your testimony.
Ms. Whelan, section 922 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 focused on solidifying
the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as
related to the administrative matters of SOCOM.
Can you please provide an update on how this provision is
being implemented and how the relationship between ASD(SO/LIC)
and SOCOM has been shaped by the provision?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
We very much actually appreciate the language in the NDAA
for fiscal year 2017 in section 922 that further clarified and
strengthened the role of ASD(SO/LIC) in the oversight and
management of the Special Operations Command in the context of
its service-like responsibilities for the joint SOF enterprise.
This is, we think, a very important step forward in terms of
enhancing the joint SOF enterprise.
What we have done so far internally within the Department
is we have established a tiger team under the direction of
Deputy Secretary of Defense Work--now, of course, that will
continue into the future--to fully flesh out the areas in which
we need to organizationally adjust ourselves within the Office
of Secretary of Defense and within ASD(SO/LIC) to more
effectively carry out these responsibilities.
But in the interim, we have also achieved seats on the
Deputy's Management Action Group. It is an independent seat for
ASD(SO/LIC), so that ASD(SO/LIC) can, similar to the other
service secretaries, represent the service interests of SOCOM.
We have achieved a similar seat on the Special Access Programs
Oversight Committee for the same purpose, to represent the
interests of the joint SOF enterprise. We have also made gains
in achieving for ASD(SO/LIC) the authorities provided to other
service secretaries with regard to management of some personnel
and hiring issues for SOCOM.
So we are slowly establishing greater precedents for
ASD(SO/LIC) to act in those service-like secretary functions
within the Department. We will continue to find ways to work
more effectively to represent SOCOM in the Department and to
the Secretary of Defense, and we appreciate, again, the
language and the clarity that was provided in the terms of the
role that ASD(SO/LIC) should be providing.
Mr. Langevin. So ASD(SO/LIC) office has not seen an
increase in resources for many years. In your opinion, is the
office of ASD(SO/LIC) properly resourced to carry out the roles
and responsibilities outlined in section 922?
Ms. Whelan. Thanks for the question, Congressman.
So you are correct, we have not seen an increase. In fact,
we have actually downsized because of requirements for
downsizing of the Federal workforce, particularly at major
headquarters organizations.
However, that is one of the functions of the tiger team, is
looking at the language in 922, determining what functions the
ASD(SO/LIC) must provide in order to fully implement that
language, and then essentially determining a troop-to-task
requirement and whether or not, how we can meet those in terms
of the workforce while staying within the requirements for
downsizing.
Mr. Langevin. And what is the status of the Special
Operations Oversight Council?
Ms. Whelan. The SOPOC, the Special Operations Oversight
Council, actually meets regularly. It meets at multiple levels,
a working level, a mid-level, a sort of general officer, one-
star, deputy assistant secretary level, and it also meets at
the principals level, the assistant secretary level. It has had
multiple meetings at the working level on a day-to-day basis to
resolve issues that come up related to SOCOM and management,
personnel, training issues, and also resourcing issues.
We have had also a number of meetings at the deputy
assistant secretary, general flag officer level to take on a
little bit more thornier issues, including some requirements
for new authorities. We have had two meetings so far this year
at the assistant secretary level in which we actually, as I
mentioned in my remarks, were able to resolve some particularly
thorny issues in the favor of SOCOM with the services on
infrastructure and casualty evacuation requirements.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
My time has expired, but hopefully, if we do a second
round, I would want to get to General Thomas and just ask you
for an update on the countering weapons of mass destruction
synchronization responsibility that was transferred from
STRATCOM to SOCOM. Hopefully we can do a second round.
I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And thank you very much to both of our witnesses this
morning.
General Thomas, I wonder if you could talk a little bit
more about the extent to which we are seeing a changing
national security environment, how quickly it's changing, and
what those demands mean in terms of conflict with near-peer,
peer-to-peer competitors, give us an assessment of sort of the
rapidity of that change and how that is affecting your
fundamental mission and what some of those changing
requirements might be.
General Thomas. Congresswoman, as you stated in the
question, the evolution of change in terms of the threat
environment is almost at kind of a frantic level in terms of
number of threats, the transregional aspect that pertains, and
the varied nature of the threats, so running the gamut from
hybrid threats all the way through to high-end, arguably
existential threats.
The challenge to our force, obviously, is to maintain the
current effort towards combating violent extremism while we
transform the force to be prepared for both current and
emerging threats as I described them here. So we recognize the
challenge. I think we are changing consistent with the specific
campaign plans relative to each one of those threats. But it is
a continuous evolution.
Ms. Cheney. And as you look at the overall threat
environment and the sort of initial mission and dealing with
the counterterrorism challenge, talk a little bit about the
issue of safe havens, if you would, please, in terms of
specifically the separate campaign missions that we might have
and particularly separate missions we might have within
individual countries. But is there an effort underway to look
broadly, to say what are we doing globally to deny safe haven
to ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], what are we doing
globally to deny safe haven to Al Qaeda, and how do the SOF
assets fit into that?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, I would be very happy to go
into much greater detail in the closed session. But to your
point, I think it is worth reminding ourselves that the reason
we got involved in Afghanistan in the first place was that we
were attacked from that sanctuary, where there was a symbiotic
relationship between Al Qaeda and other forces there that
enabled them to attack our country.
Obviously, we want to avoid that situation in the future,
both in declared areas of hostility and other locations where
the adversary is inclined to migrate. And they do have a
tendency to migrate to ungoverned spaces, which drives the need
for strategies to deal with those locations.
Again, I would be happy to go into much more detail,
because we are not just observing the problem, we are
addressing that tendency.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you.
And in terms of the work that we are doing with partner
nations--and this is also a question for Secretary Whelan--with
partner forces, how we are working in terms of building
capacity in those partnership relationships, could you talk a
little bit about how that is developing and how we can be most
effective in terms of working with our allied forces in
partnership capacity training?
Ms. Whelan. Thanks, Congresswoman, for the question.
Actually, I think that we have made significant advances in
the area of capacity building. DOD now, thanks to the new
legislation, triple three [section 333], has, I think, greater
flexibility in the use of title 10 resources, which we are now
also working with State Department to ensure that those
resources are implemented in a complementary fashion to the
title 22 FMF [foreign military financing] resources that they
have.
So not only do we have the flexibility that we need, but I
think that we are continuing to develop improved ways of
managing the programs such that we can assess the effectiveness
of those programs in terms of achieving our strategic
objectives. We are continuing to iterate and work with the
COCOMs [combatant commands] in terms of program design, as well
as program evaluation at the back end, and then flowing that
evaluation into adjustments to program design.
So this is a continual process, but fundamentally capacity
building is a critical part of our strategy. It is not just
something that is separate from our strategy that we do
independently. It is a fundamental element of our strategy,
because we need partners in many of the areas of the world that
we work. And so building their capacity to make them
essentially security providers as opposed to countries that
absorb security or require security will enhance our security
in the long run.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much. I will yield back and look
forward to pursuing both of these topics further in the closed
session.
Ms. Stefanik. Mrs. Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you.
Thank you, General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, for being here
today and for your testimony.
As I shared with General Thomas at the Special Ops Caucus
breakfast this morning, I had the honor of serving in OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] SO/LIC in the Special Ops/
Countering Terrorism Directorate in the mid-2000s, and I am
grateful to be engaging on this issue today, and I am looking
forward to visiting SOCOM headquarters on Friday this week with
my colleague Congresswoman Kathy Castor.
Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, as you know, this committee
is very focused on finding ways that the Department can improve
its acquisition processes to keep pace with rapid technology
advancements. I understand that SOCOM uses alternative
acquisition authorities and exemptions with great success,
including the regular use of other transactional authority,
which was granted to the Department as an alternative business
process to quickly and flexibly fund research and prototype
development. For example, I understand that SOCOM has set up a
business and technology incubator called SOFWERX using OTA
[other transaction authority].
Can you talk a little bit about what SOFWERX does in
downtown Tampa and discuss where SOCOM's use of alternative
business processes has helped field game-changing technology?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, thanks for the question, and
I look forward to your visit this Friday, and hopefully you
will have a chance to visit our facility in Tampa.
First off, on exquisite acquisition authorities: our
acquisition director would actually tell you that our
authorities aren't that much significantly different from the
services'. The advantage we do have is that he works directly
for me, and so we have a very direct kind of affiliation, daily
affiliation, I would offer. He has been extraordinarily
creative, as has the rest of the organization, in trying to
create an environment that enables and encourages innovation
from our problem-solving base through to how we codify it in
our organization.
SOFWERX, as you mentioned, is a relatively new endeavor,
about a year and a half old, which was really established as an
offsite, specifically and intentionally, off the MacDill
compound to provide an environment where, as he would describe
it, we have the opportunity for a collision of acquisition
types, technologists, and most importantly, operators.
So as you visit that site, you will find very current
operational individuals who have the problem-solving ideas and
kind of ethos that is then married with academia,
technologists, and acquisition types so that we can rapidly
consider alternative sourcing, alternative problem-solving
methods, and really get to the crux of the matter of providing
enabling technology to our force.
So, again, I hope you have a chance to see it. I have
probably done a disservice, but as you have the opportunity to
visit, I think you will appreciate how nuanced and really
effective this new process has been.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you.
Do you have any thoughts on how we could encourage the
Department to more frequently use this rapid acquisition
authority and tools that have already been provided to DOD on a
larger scale?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, there is actually a very
good news story here. I would normally tell you about our
interdependence on the services. While they provide us
platforms that we then transition with our funding authorities
to create SOF platforms, what you are seeing is a trending in
the opposite direction, where based on our research and
development and some of our acquisition activities, we are now
enabling the services, and even more so, we are enabling some
of our foreign counterparts.
So we have a number of memorandums of understanding with
foreign counterparts that is enabling them to keep pace with us
as they can afford it and sustain it, and then really driving
towards interoperability. But that in the past has been thought
of just a niche SOF approach that now has expanded to our
services. So there are a few good examples where we are
returning the favor back to the services for things that we
have already done the trailblazing research and development,
and they are inclined to leverage us.
So I think it is a good news story.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. And then do you think you can outline
some of the more difficult advanced technology requirements
that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, the one that we discussed
very briefly today that I am fascinated and arguably stunted as
a 58-year-old to get my head around, and that is leveraging
machine learning, deep learning, cognitive computing, that I
know it, I can see it, you know, I can see it in action in
terms of corporate applications, I know the requirement in
terms of how we are dealing, literally swimming in the morass
of information and intelligence, a mixed bag, but how we sort
through that in terms of applying business solutions is right--
we are on the cusp of it. And the good news is we are starting
to marry up the right people with our operators and our problem
solvers to get at this wicked problem of information management
and deep data, all the things that go with it that arguably
corporations have already addressed.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairwoman Elise Stefanik, for your
leadership on Emerging Threats.
And, Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here
today. It is especially meaningful to me. My second son is a
doctor in the Navy. He trained with SEAL Team 2. He has served
in Baghdad with the Rangers and the SEALs. I was on a
delegation one time with Congressman Mike Pence of Indiana, and
while we were there my son gave you the highest backhanded
compliment. He claimed that the Rangers are good too.
And so I was so proud of his service and what it means to
our country. So I know firsthand how significant.
General, your organization is funded differently from other
commands, but can you highlight the effects, particularly on
readiness, of your organization if we do not successfully
address the issue of sequestration?
General Thomas. Congressman, first of all, thanks for the
compliment on the Ranger regiment. I will take that home with
us.
To your first point, we are very appreciative for the level
of funding that we currently enjoy. We entail about 2 percent
or less of the DOD budget for all the activities that we are
endeavoring to accomplish. I would also acknowledge that we get
matching funds, so to speak, from the services that amount to
about double that budget, again, emphasizing our dependency on
the services. But a small price, 2 percent, provides you the
special operations capability that you see manifest everywhere
in the world these days.
The short answer for sequestration, the impact on us is
catastrophic going forward. And I cannot imagine the ripple as
much, because I don't appreciate the ripple to the services on
whom I am so dependent. So I can probably itemize it for us
internally and then I can only speculate how even more tragic
it would be in terms of our interservice dependence.
Mr. Wilson. And, General, something I would appreciate, at
a later date, if you could provide to me what the catastrophic
effects are so that I can distribute that to our colleagues,
because they need to know. Sadly, this just hasn't been
recognized.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Mr. Wilson. Additionally, General, can you outline to the
committee the role that special operations has in Iraq, Syria,
Afghanistan, other areas of active hostilities? What
authorities do you have? Are there any concerns about the
authorities you have? What can we do to help?
I am particularly concerned about rules of engagement.
There have been reports where the restrictive rules of
engagement have actually resulted in mass deaths, particularly
of SEALs, where there were restrictions that simply went beyond
common sense.
I also want to thank you, with Congresswoman Cheney your
referencing, truly restating Afghanistan. The American people
have forgotten 9/11, that indeed, this was an attack on the
American people, mass murder, from a cave in Afghanistan. And,
sadly, the media doesn't ever connect the dots. And we are in a
global war on terrorism, and we here support you on that.
Additionally, I am grateful. I actually had a son serve for
a year in Afghanistan too. So thank you for referencing the
significance of Afghanistan.
So back again to the authorities you have, and then have
there been any adjustments to the rules of engagement?
General Thomas. Congressman, I would like to give you a
much more detailed response to that in closed session, if I
can, for the specific roles we are playing. I just returned
from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, the entire Middle East where we
have forces, Lebanon, et cetera. So I can go into great detail.
I would tell you that I ask that question everywhere I go:
Do you have the authorities you need to do your job? And I am
very satisfied that we have affected the authorities under the
current leadership of the combatant commanders who we are
supporting to enable our force.
Anecdotally, I can tell you where there are still
shortcomings. I just recently was in Helmand, where there was a
particular nuance to the mission set that I was able to address
back to that commander. And, again, I can get in more detail
there. But that is the consistent question our leadership is
asking our folks every day: Do you have the authorities you
need? If not, how do we fix that going forward? But, again, if
I can go into more detail in the closed session, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Wilson. Well, again, I appreciate your leadership so
much.
And, Secretary Whelan, as we are looking ahead to fiscal
year 2018, what cuts do you see that are coming that could
impact special operations capabilities?
Ms. Whelan. Thanks for the question, Congressman.
I think the concerns that we have mostly are in readiness
across the force. And we have been operating at such a high
OPTEMPO [operations tempo] for the last decade-plus, and with
budgets going down, what we have had to do is essentially we
have had to eat our young, so to speak. I mean, we have
mortgaged the future in order to facilitate current operations.
That has impacted readiness and it has also impacted the
development of force for the future, and as the threats grow,
this is only going to get worse.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Good morning. Thank you both for being here.
Given the unprecedented integration between special
operations forces and the intelligence community, I am
wondering if you can, as best you can in this unclassed forum,
talk about this integration, how it has been going,
particularly focused on how the Department of Defense conducts
oversight over this? And at what point is the decision made
when concerning title 50 activities how and where our special
operators are used?
Ms. Whelan. Congresswoman, thanks for the question. I think
it would be best if we answered that in the closed session in
terms of the details. It gets us into some very sensitive
areas.
Ms. Gabbard. Are you able to talk about the oversight
portion of this?
Ms. Whelan. What I can say is that we have a very proactive
relationship with the commands and then also our counterparts
in the intelligence community, and there is an active dialogue
that takes place all the way up to the Secretary of Defense,
and he engages with his counterpart regularly. So I think I
would say that we have very effective oversight between the two
elements of the U.S. Government.
Ms. Gabbard. Okay. Thanks. Looking forward to continuing
this in the closed session.
Given the unique capabilities that you both have talked
about here that our special forces offer to today's
environment, the high operational tempo has resulted in some of
the readiness challenges that you have mentioned as well. Can
you talk a little bit about how to address that? Is there a
look to increase the numbers of special forces that we have to
deal with and address the environment that we are facing, how
much and how quickly, and how can we get to a place where this
is sustainable and it is not creating such a stress on our
troops and their families?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, I will take a shot at that
one. Part of the friction, I would offer, is driven by two
aspects. One is the deployment tempo, in some cases
unforecasted. For instance, Afghanistan, the expectation was
that we were going to be finished in 2014. We are now
throttling into 2017 and beyond. So that unexpected aspect of
continued deployment where we would otherwise recapitalize
people and capabilities elsewhere is something that has been a
challenge to manage, but we are able to do so right now.
The other part is the transformation piece I mentioned
earlier. Again, based on some assumptions on when we might be
able to afford the opportunity to transform some of our
platforms, particularly our C-130s and others, good assumptions
were made. They are being challenged by current events. So it
adds a little extra friction.
I mention that because I closely monitor the parts of our
force that are under the most stress. And I can get into them
specifically in the closed hearing probably better, but there
are forces that are meeting themselves coming and going in some
regards, others are in better balance. And we are trying to
kind of create better balance across the force in its entirety
going forward, but it is a challenge.
Ms. Gabbard. Can you talk about the rate of suicide amongst
your troops and how it compares to the rates that we are seeing
in other branches of the military, and what the defense health
services are doing to help address that?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, we are as, or more,
challenged than the other services in the Armed Forces. That
may come as a surprise to you, and I don't want to get into the
morbid statistics, but we are suffering the same challenges as
the rest of the services.
We have doubled and tripled our efforts in terms of
awareness amongst both our leaders--and truthfully this is
not--this is leadership as it permeates down to the lowest
level of our force. We have doubled and tripled our efforts in
terms of availing our service members to the services that
otherwise might mitigate the challenges that they are facing.
But nonetheless, we still suffer from this challenge and we are
absolutely trying to rectify it. It is a primary focus for us.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thanks. Look forward to continuing
the conversation.
I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. A few members have additional questions
before we go to the closed classified session.
My question, General Thomas, broadly, you note that SOCOM
is preparing for conflicts of the future. What are future
conflicts you fear the most and how are you prioritizing
preparation for those conflicts?
General Thomas. Chairwoman, I don't fear the future
conflicts as much as I am concerned about our ability to get it
right, to anticipate the real--the essence of the requirement.
I think anyone who is paying attention to the news these
days knows the number and type of threats that would challenge
DOD to the greatest extent possible. And we are integral to
every one of those preparatory activities.
So I think you can extrapolate from that, and I would be
glad to get into more details in closed session on the
specifics of what we are preparing to do, but suffice to say,
we are integral to all the preparatory activities that are
currently undergoing.
Ms. Stefanik. And my next question is, it is mentioned in
the discussion today how heavily dependent SOF is on OCO,
Overseas Contingency Operations funding, and portions of the
force remain in very high demand with minimal time to reset.
U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in particular fall into
this category.
What readiness concerns do you have and how are you dealing
with shortfalls in this area? And do you anticipate that the
fiscal year 2018 budget request will help you in this area?
General Thomas. Thanks very much for that question,
Chairwoman, because it is a point of emphasis for us, and I
know you are attentive to it.
Given the current trending for budgeting, SOCOM will be
leveraged to OCO to the tune of about 30 percent of our total
obligation authority, 30 percent relative to the services, who
typically have about a 7 percent reliance an OCO. So we are
three to four times more dependent on OCO.
I think you know, because it has been a topic of discussion
for the last 5 years among my predecessors, that OCO has
purchased, has acquired us enduring capabilities that we think
are applicable to future threats, but it is not in the base.
So therein lies the rub, that if for whatever reason OCO
was to dissipate without a transition to baseline, SOCOM as it
is right now is a large facade, and it is mostly manifested in
one of our most prominent forces. And I can get in more detail
in the closed session, but it would absolutely undercut their
ability to continue performing to the level I think the Nation
requires.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
I recognize Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Thomas, if I could go back to the question I wanted
to talk about. If you would provide an update on the countering
weapons of mass destruction synchronization responsibility that
was transferred from STRATCOM to SOCOM, and in particular, have
all the necessary resources been transferred from STRATCOM to
SOCOM to carry out this role?
General Thomas. Congressman, as you know, we picked up that
mission in January based on a Presidential decision last year.
The actual effective transfer was in January. So we have had
the mission for about 5 months now.
We held our first semiannual synchronization conference
with an extraordinary turnout of both interagency and
international partners, and kind of the enthusiasm was palpable
in the room in terms of a real community of action vice a
community of interest.
We are very enthusiastic about pushing this mission set
forward. We are in the throes of rewriting the campaign plan as
well as conducting an assessment that I hope to provide our
Secretary in about the August timeframe.
On your very practical question about resourcing, I
appreciate your attention there. We are in the midst of some
pretty substantive discussions in terms of the resources
required. We have already done some internal task organization
to get at the problem so we didn't sit idly by while we waited
on resources.
We did receive some very extraordinary capabilities
resident in DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, that
were transferred with the mission set to us, so about 50-some
folks there. And so we are in the process of kind of cobbling
together our new task organization for this problem. So I am
confident, I am somewhat confident, that we will get the
resourcing required to enhance our capability in this critical
mission set.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. We look forward to have you keep us
posted on that.
And what organization changes at DTRA and SOCOM have
occurred?
General Thomas. Congressman, not so much organizational. We
actually morphed in terms of SOCOM structure. So I put a flag
officer against this mission to kind of emphasize the
criticality of it. I was lucky to have a plans officer that I
could dual hat there. We applied some of our contractor focus.
More importantly, we immediately adopted part of our
infrastructure into a fusion cell for our common operating
picture for this mission set.
The interaction with DTRA really has been more of the
nature of exchanged liaison officers and then really a process,
kind of a binding process in terms of our interoperability with
our existing SOCOM staff with the DTRA component. So we just
tightened the lash-up there. We had a preexisting relationship,
but it is much tighter and more process focused now.
Mr. Langevin. Are there any priorities and challenges that
you have identified so far or is it still a work in progress?
General Thomas. Still a work in progress, Congressman.
Obviously, quite a few challenges on the WMD front. Again,
going back to one of the earlier questions, I am concerned
about how we see this problem in the morass of information that
is out there, especially in terms of dual-use technology, how
do we see the flow of innocuous dual-use technology and
otherwise nefarious technology, and then how it is integrated
into our whole-of-government and our international approach to
the problem set.
So I am concerned going in only because I am not as attuned
to the set as I probably want to be, but we are endeavoring to
get there.
Ms. Stefanik. Mrs. Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. This is a follow-up to the last question I had
for you. You had identified some of the areas that are
important for you to have to maintain a competitive advantage
on the battlefield, including what you just discussed,
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and such.
How are you staying ahead in the research and development
in these areas when your budget has been steadily declining
over the last few fiscal years?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, I think we have the
advantage of having an attractive mission set that regardless
of our--and I don't--I wouldn't say our budget has declined. We
have flatlined a little bit. But nonetheless we are able to
track the right kind of innovative business leads, who
essentially invest in our problem without a great resourcing
expense at the moment. Again, it depends on where we take it.
But I am somewhat satisfied that we have the attractiveness
of our mission set and really the ability to cross-cue what
they are doing from a business standpoint to where we are
trying to apply it to military challenges, that there is enough
of a nexus there to drive a less resource-intensive problem-
solving approach.
Mrs. Murphy. And then can you talk a little bit about your
cyber warfare and cyber operations requirements? And also, how
is SOCOM working with USCYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command]?
And are there any policy or authority concerns?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, the bottom line is we have
an extraordinary level of coordination and collaboration with
CYBERCOM, so I am very comfortable there. Probably, if I could
wait to the closed session to get into the details of what we
are endeavoring to do from a SOCOM standpoint. But clearly we
have the same challenge that CYBERCOM has in terms of both
defending a network and then seeking offensive capabilities as
required for the respective problem sets. And, again, I would
be glad to talk in the closed session in more detail.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. And I look forward to the closed
session.
I will yield back my time.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you to the witnesses for your
testimony. We will now adjourn and reconvene in about 5 minutes
in Rayburn 2337.
[Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 2, 2017
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 2, 2017
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 2, 2017
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
General Thomas. (U) Over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), the
combination of Budget Control Act (BCA) caps, our heavy reliance on
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding and an extremely high
OPTEMPO rate bring USSOCOM dangerously close to sinking below a
reasonable degree of readiness risk. Impacts across USSOCOM can be best
summarized as 1) reducing and/or eliminating training and exercises
which result in degraded proficiency and operational readiness, and 2)
degrading C5ISR support which will negatively impact USSOCOM's ability
to provide timely and essential mission support to deployed operators
and sustainers.
(U) DETAILS: USSOCOM has only examined potential sequester impacts
at strategic levels. The following list is intended to capture probable
impacts related to readiness reductions, reduced or eliminated growth
in selected procurement programs and RDT&E and deferred critical
facilities recapitalization on USSOCOM Headquarters entities,
Components, and Sub-Unified Commands:
(U) AFSOC: Severe cuts to Flying Hour Program (FHP) will degrade
aircrew proficiency and qualifications--impacting safety, as well as
slowed growth in Remotely-Piloted Aircraft (RPA), intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and full motion video (FMV)
processing, exploitation & dissemination (PED).
(U) MARSOC: Unable to fully resource Military Intelligence Program
(MIP) in support of intelligence collection (e.g., Joint Threat Warning
System (JTWS), ATLAS STEALTH, Palantir and Hostile Forces Tagging,
Tracking and Locating (HFTTL) operations).
(U) NAVSPECWARCOM and USASOC: Reduced or eliminated training and
ISR support drives high risk and safety/vulnerability issues to current
and future deployed operations; results in units requiring additional
time and resources above what is currently programmed to improve
current readiness levels.
(U) CLASSIFIED Operations: Will adversely impact classified
activities. Details can be provided upon request.
(U) HQ, USSOCOM and AT&L: Reduced or eliminated exercises and
training on various platforms and simulators results in shutdown of
both CONUS and OCONUS sites drives future redeployment and re-fielding
costs upward. Reduced civilian labor and program management office
personnel in various headquarters activities that directly support
classified USSOCOM missions.
(U) SUB-UNIFIED Commands: Reduced operating supplies/equipment for
deployed operators and possible delays in establishing new teams at
deployed locations impede relationships and preparation of the
environment efforts within the GCC/USSOCOM footprint. A loss in
sustained field support capabilities elevates risk levels to the force
and diminishes force protection benefits derived from better
situational awareness. Reduced, delayed, or deferred critical C4I
equipment maintenance and lifecycle replacements/upgrades directly
impact network operations which increase network latency, degrade
communication capabilities and constrain the ability to successfully
perform mission essential tasks. Degraded intelligence support impacts
the ability to provide timely and essential intelligence in support of
missions, named operations and objectives.
(U) In addition to the above impacts to USSOCOM equities, SOF
readiness is directly linked to and dependent upon Service funding
levels. While an MFP-11 sequester would present challenges, USSOCOM
remains more concerned with the sequester impact on the Services'
ability to support SOF. The Services have not yet fully identified
where they would absorb future budget reductions; therefore, impacts on
support to SOF cannot be itemized or assessed. Given the historical
impacts and lack of the Services' ability to absorb reductions, it is
highly likely that their ability to optimally support SOF will be
diminished, further straining an already challenged support structure
and eventually affecting SOF operations and training in an adverse
manner. [See page 14.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 2, 2017
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. What recommendations would you make to improve how we
conduct building partnership capacity and security force assistance
missions, especially when trying to train and equip partner forces? Are
we investing in developing or acquiring tools and technical
capabilities that we can share with our partners and allies that are
both releasable and sustainable from a maintenance and support
perspective.
Ms. Whelan. The Department greatly appreciates the expanded and
consolidated security cooperation (SC) authorities in the new chapter
16 of title 10, as enacted by the FY17 National Defense Authorization
Act. The Department shares the committee's strong interest in providing
capabilities to partners that they can absorb, apply, and sustain to
support U.S. defense objectives. As we work to implement these new
authorities, we are implementing a new assessment, monitoring, and
evaluation (AM&E) policy. This new AM&E effort, along with the new
requirements for all train and equip programs and activities to include
a defense institution building focus, human rights training, and
quarterly reporting requirements, will require the Department to work
with your committee on future resourcing requests. These new AM&E
efforts will inform additional Department recommendations for further
improving our SC missions, which we will share with the committee.
Ms. Stefanik. What recommendations would you make to improve how we
conduct building partnership capacity and security force assistance
missions, especially when trying to train and equip partner forces? Are
we investing in developing or acquiring tools and technical
capabilities that we can share with our partners and allies that are
both releasable and sustainable from a maintenance and support
perspective.
General Thomas. (U) 4. USSOCOM recommends a holistic planning
methodology to building partner capacity (BPC) that is consistent with
a whole-of-government approach and can be executed in the context of
other strategic security challenges.
(U) 4a. Include the Interagency and the country-in-question's U.S.
Embassy Country Team (Office of Defense Cooperation, Defense Attache
Office, U.S. Agency for International Development, Political Counselor
Office, etc.) in the early stages of planning to enhance the Geographic
Combatant Command (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Command's (TSOC)
country engagement plans. The Interagency and, particularly, the
Country Team can provide insights into suitable goals and objectives
given a particular partner nation's capability, capacity, and interests
that will inform and influence the direction of long range planning.
For the long-term success of an activity, we must understand our
partners' priorities, capabilities, and constraints from the outset. If
U.S. planners assume our partners' needs and desires are the same as
our own, our expectations will be mismatched and the outcomes are
unlikely to support U.S. national objectives in the long term. Early
inclusion of the Country Team and Interagency not only provides key
insights to direct planning, but it also permits the TSOC to better
nest within the GCC's theater campaign plan (TCP). At a transregional
level, USSOCOM is able to advocate for BPC opportunities and benefits
that are either unique to development of SOF-peculiar capabilities to
support our objectives, or capacity that ultimately benefits the U.S.
in areas of responsibility outside of the partner's specific GCC-
affiliation.
(U) 4b. Invest more in the development of foreign defense
institutions. A key element of DOD's 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is
building the capacity of partner nations to share the costs and
responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the
Under Secretary for Policy uses several security cooperation (SC) and
security assistance (SA) programs to help partner countries build the
capacity of their defense ministries. In addition and crucially
important is that GCCs and services engage in defense institution
building (DIB) in response to the SC focus areas in the Guidance for
Employment of the Force. DIB includes activities that develop
accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. Since these
institutions will ultimately manage and sustain the capabilities we are
helping to build, it is important to the success of our efforts that
the foreign defense institutions with which we engage be accountable,
effective, and efficient. USSOCOM relies on OSD, DSCA, the Services and
GCCs to provide defense institution building measures to complement
operational level SOF BPC activities.
(U) 4c. Utilize prior and routine assessments of ongoing SC
activities to ensure progress toward goals and objectives is being
realized. While SC remains an important instrument of the U.S.
government and DOD, one key challenge for policymakers and GCCs is
gaining a more complex understanding of the real value of those
activities geared toward BPC. Assessments of BPC activities have become
increasingly important, especially given the current fiscal climate and
budgetary limitations, to ensure these activities are meeting their
objectives. USSOF assessments have informed our decision making for the
types of authorities and funding we have requested from Congress.
Ms. Stefanik. SOCOM has a lot of missions it is responsible for,
and has had several new ones added to it. Are there any of those
missions that should go away or be reassigned?
General Thomas. (U) 5. There are no missions that should go away or
be reassigned. Missions assigned to USSOCOM are appropriate and
commensurate with our skill set. The only new mission assigned to
USSOCOM is the CWMD mission, which was directed by the President and
Secretary of Defense and the mission transfer has been comprehensively
coordinated with stakeholders from U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint
Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense and our interagency partners, to
include required transfer of resources. We have a process that
prioritizes the many requirements that we receive for SOF capabilities
in support of GCC requirements. I provide my best military advice to
the SECDEF on which requirements I can meet, based on capacity, through
the Global Force Management and Global Synchronization of SOF
processes.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Are there policy concerns with adding responsibility of
Global synchronization of all DOD activities to counter the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) to a force that
already bears unprecedented global demand of its resources?
With this added responsibility, are you aware if there are moves at
DOD to provide additional authorities to SOCOM to counter the five
current and enduring threats of violent extremist organizations (VEOs),
Russia, Iran, North Korea and China?
Ms. Whelan. There are no policy concerns with adding CWMD
responsibilities to USSOCOM. The Department continually reviews our
authorities to determine if there are gaps. We recently completed an
authority review based on the President's request to update the defeat
ISIS strategy. We are working with the Office of Management and Budget
to ensure the Department's authorities are matched to current
strategies.
Mr. Franks. Considering Russia's investment and continued increase
in their own special forces totaling approximately 62,000 and likely
growing, can we sustain our continued dependency on our SOF without
further investment in personnel?
General Thomas. (U) 1. Under current mission prioritization, U.S.
special operations forces (SOF) personnel growth is not required to
off-set perceived numerical superiority by Russian Special Forces.
Further, countering Russian SOF activities is not a U.S. unilateral
action. USSOF, combined and synchronized with NATO allied and other
partner nation SOF, with the global reach and complementary
capabilities these alliances and partnerships provide, far outweigh any
perceived numerical advantage. Any increase in investment in USSOF
should focus upon force modernization and enabler support growth and
technical evolution. Steady-state activities below the level of
conflict represent the greatest SOF challenge against peer competitors
and continuing to invest in advancing those capabilities is the best
way to continue to outpace competitors.
Mr. Franks. How should we counter the degradation of skill sets and
training which ensure the dominance of our SOF community with their
current OPTEMPO without decreasing deployments and allowing for
necessary time to maintain critical proficiency in language skills,
cultural training, and professional development?
Typically Special Forces are inserted in order to minimize the U.S.
footprint in a given area--only to end up increasing U.S. military
presence in that area; would it make sense to reassess the conditions
which dictate SOF requirements and the value of adding a larger more
broadly specialized element, as opposed to inserting SOF?
General Thomas. (U) 2a. Although current demand for SOF is high and
sustained OPTEMPO creates significant challenges to our force, USSOCOM
has not observed a degradation of skill sets or training that puts our
dominance on the current battlefield at risk. Attaining and maintaining
proficiency across the SOF enterprise in language, regional expertise
and culture (LREC), professional development, and advanced SOF skills
takes dedicated dwell time focused on training and remains a priority
for USSOCOM. We continue to deliver highly skilled, proficient, and
capable SOF ready to meet the demands of Geographic Combatant Commands
(GCC). USSOCOM continuously explores and expands ways of reducing
personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) while maximizing training and professional
development opportunities. Use and expansion of modeling and simulation
and live, virtual, and constructive environments (LVC) ensures we
continue to provide trained, educated, and combat ready SOF while
reducing the impacts of high OPTEMPO. [J7-T&E]
(U) 2b. USSOCOM and its Service Components manage OPTEMPO impacts
through adherence to established force generation models and force
element sustainable capacities. Limiting deployments in this manner
provides units, generally speaking, between 12 and 18 months to reset
and train to full spectrum readiness. This has not always been the
case, but has received renewed emphasis and is closely monitored. [J32]
(U) 2c. Combatant Command requirements for SOF are scrutinized at
the Theater Special Operations Commands prior to submission to the
Combatant Commands and at USSOCOM against Special Operations Forces
Mission Criteria, the first being: Is it an appropriate mission or
activity for Special Operations. While USSOCOM cannot dictate what
requirements are submitted, we have emphasized that the Theater Special
Operations Commands should request conventional forces and consider the
potential for partner nation sourcing. On multiple occasions, USSOCOM
has requested that the Joint Staff consider conventional force sourcing
of requests for SOF. [J32]