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MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO–ASIA–PACIFIC REGION

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO–ASIA–PACIFIC REGION

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 26, 2017.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

No one needs reminding of the escalating tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Recent weeks have witnessed intentionally provocative words and actions from the North Korean regime. We are all concerned that the decades of self-imposed isolation of North Korean leaders, and especially the cruel, erratic behavior of its current leader, make confrontation potentially more likely.

In my view, we must work even more closely with our key allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea; we must continue to encourage China to help put North Korea on a different path; and we must increase our military presence and capability in the region. Enhanced missile defense is especially important.

Of course, none of us wants another military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but we must also remember the lessons of the past. As T.R. Fehrenbach wrote on the first page of his classic history on the Korean War, "This Kind of War," quote, "Storm signals had been flying for more than 4 years, but the West did not prepare for trouble. It did not make ready because its peoples, in their heart of hearts, did not want to be prepared," end quote.

Well, whether we want it or not, we have to be prepared.

Of course, North Korea is not the only concern in the PACOM [Pacific Command] area. China continues to build islands in the South China Sea and to militarize them. The future direction of the Philippines is unclear, and we are moving toward a closer relationship with new and developing allies like Vietnam. All of this and more are on the plate of our PACOM commander, Admiral Harry Harris, whom we are pleased to welcome today.

Before turning to him, I would yield to the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Smith, for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here and for your leadership in the Pacific. And I agree with the chairman's comments about the importance of the region. U.S. presence in that region has never been more important. Our presence, working with our allies, can be a calming influence in what is a very unstable place, as the chairman described.

And most disturbing, and most concerning, obviously, is North Korea. I would say, I don't think we are ignoring it this time. This is not like the first Korean war. I think there has been a great deal of attention paid to this problem in North Korea for several administrations. And I think that is helpful, because the number one biggest thing that we need is a clear deterrent to North Korea. We are not going to make Kim Jong-un a rational leader. We are not going to make North Korea anything other than a pariah state anytime soon. Nor are we going to stop them from having some military capability. We are aware that they have already developed a nuclear bomb.

But the one thing we can do is make it clear that we stand with our allies in the region, with South Korea and Japan in particular, and we will be a credible deterrent to any military action in North Korea. I think that is the most important thing to do, is to make it clear to Kim Jong-un that if he does anything, we have the power and the will to respond and destroy him, because the only positive thing I can think about North Korea is that there is no evidence that their regime is suicidal. They don't want to be taken out. So we have to make sure we maintain a credible deterrent.

And China fits into this as well. China wants increased influence in Asia, and on a certain level, that is understandable. They are a growing power. They want to have influence. What we need to do is to work with them to make sure that that influence is for positive instead of for ill, and North Korea is a very, very good place to start. They could be a lot more helpful than they have been being on calming those tensions, and it is in their best interests. They don't want war to break out in North Korea any more than anybody else does. It would have a far more devastating impact on their interests.

So there are a lot of challenges. I will just close by saying, I think there are also a lot of opportunities. The chairman alluded to some of those. We have a lot of allies in the region, and a lot of those relationships are growing.

I would also mention—well, I am not sure—India in South Asia is certainly an ally and one that could become even more so. Australia. There are a lot of countries in that part of the world that want to work with us and that give us an opportunity to work together to make that place and the world a more peaceful place.

And with that, I look forward to the admiral's testimony. I thank him for his leadership and for his attendance today.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, again, thank you for being with us. You are recognized for any comments you would like to make.

STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. Thank you Chairman Thornberry, Representative Smith, and distinguished members. It is an honor for me to appear again before this committee. There are many things to talk about since my last testimony 14 months ago.

I do regret that I am not here with my testimony battle buddy, U.S. Forces Command Commander General Vince Brooks, but I think you will all agree that he is where he is needed most right now, on the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately for all of you, that means my opening statement is going to be just a tad longer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your reference to the T.R. Fehrenbach's book, "This Kind of War," which is on the PACOM reading list.

Mr. Chairman, I request that my written posture statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, without objection, it will be part of the record. I have to say, not to you, but to other folks, we got it about 9 o'clock last night, which means nobody has read it, as well as General Brooks' statement.

So, again, not directed to you, but to all of the layers that such written statements have to go through, they need to be more timely for this committee if they are going to be relevant to our hearing. If it is just putting words down on paper, then fine. But we need to do better in the future. And I needed to say that, again not directed to you, but at those who seem to not have a sense of promptness.

So without objection, so ordered. Please continue.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks.

As the PACOM commander, I have the extraordinary privilege of leading approximately 375,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, coastguardsmen, airmen, and DOD [Department of Defense] civilians serving our Nation around half the globe. These dedicated patriots are really doing an amazing job, and thanks to them, America remains the security partner of choice in the region.

That is important because I believe that America's future security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. And it is a region that is poised at a strategic nexus, where opportunity meets the four challenges of North Korea, China, Russia, and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].

It is clear to me that ISIS is a threat that must be destroyed now. The main focus of our coalition's effort is rightfully in the Middle East and North Africa, but as we eliminate ISIS in these areas, some of those surviving fighters will likely repatriate to their home countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. And what is worse, they will be radicalized and weaponized. So we must eradicate ISIS before it grows in the PACOM area of responsibility.

Then there is North Korea, which remains the most immediate threat to the security of the United States and our allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. This week, North Korea threatened Australia with a nuclear strike, a powerful reminder to the entire international community that North Korea's missiles point in every direction.

The only nation to have tested nuclear devices in this century, North Korea has vigorously pursued an aggressive weapons test schedule with more than 60 ballistic missile events in recent years. With every test, Kim Jong-un moves closer to his stated goal of a preemptive nuclear strike capability against American cities, and he is not afraid to fail in public.

Defending our homeland is my top priority, so I must assume that Kim Jong-un's nuclear claims are true. I know his aspirations certainly are. And that should provide all of us a sense of urgency to ensure PACOM and U.S. Forces Korea are prepared to "fight tonight" with the best technology on the planet.

That is why General Brooks and I are doing everything possible to defend the American homeland and our allies in the Republic of Korea [ROK] and Japan.

That is why the ROK–U.S. alliance decided last July to deploy THAAD, that is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, which will be operational in the coming days and able to better defend South Korea against the growing North Korea threat.

That is why the USS *Carl Vinson* Carrier Strike Group is back on patrol in Northeast Asia. That is why we must continue to debut America's newest and best military platforms in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. That is why we continue to emphasize trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States, a partnership with a purpose if there ever was one.

And that is why we continue to call on China to exert its considerable economic influence to stop Pyongyang's unprecedented weapons testing. While recent actions by Beijing are encouraging and welcome, the fact remains that China is as responsible for where North Korea is today as North Korea itself.

In confronting the reckless North Korean regime, it is critical that we are guided by a strong sense of resolve, both privately and publicly, both diplomatically and militarily. As President Trump and Secretary Mattis have made clear, all options are on the table. We want to bring Kim Jong-un to his senses, not to his knees.

We are also challenged in the Indo-Asia-Pacific by an aggressive China and a revanchist Russia, neither of whom seem to respect the international agreements they have signed onto. For instance, the arbitral tribunal in The Hague ruled last year that China's so-called Nine-Dash Line claim is illegal under the Law of the Sea Convention. Despite being a signatory to the convention, China ignored this legally binding, peaceful arbitration.

In fact, China continues a methodical strategy to control the South China Sea. I testified last year that China was militarizing this critical international waterway and the airspace above it by building air and naval bases on seven Chinese man-made islands in the disputed Spratlys.

Despite subsequent Chinese assurances that they would not militarize these bases, today they now have facilities that support long-range weapons emplacements, fighter aircraft hangars, radar towers, and barracks for troops. China's militarization of the South China Sea is real.

I am also not taking my eyes off Russia, which just last week flew bomber missions near Alaska on successive days for the first time since 2014. Russia continues to modernize its military and ex-

ercise its considerable conventional and nuclear forces in the Pacific.

So despite the region's four significant challenges, since my last report to you, we have strengthened America's network of alliances and partnerships. Working with like-minded partners on shared security threats like North Korea and ISIS is a key component to our regional strategy. Our five bilateral defense treaty alliances anchor our joint force efforts in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

So I continue to rely on Australia for its advanced military capabilities across all domains and its leadership in global operations. As Vice President Pence and Secretary Mattis reaffirmed during recent trips to Northeast Asia, our alliance with South Korea remains steadfast and our alliance with Japan has never been stronger.

Even with some turbulence this past year with the Philippines, I am pleased that we are proceeding with an enhanced defense cooperation agreement, and we are looking forward to conducting the Balikatan exercise with our Filipino allies next month.

And this past February, I visited Thailand to reaffirm our enduring alliance and to communicate that we look forward to Thailand's reemergence as a flourishing democracy.

We have also advanced our partnerships with regional powers like India and Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and many others, all with a view toward reinforcing the rules-based security order that has helped underwrite peace and prosperity throughout the region for decades.

But there is more work to be done. We must be ready to confront all challenges from a position of strength and with credible combat power. So I ask this committee to support continued investment to improve our military capabilities.

I need weapon systems of increased lethality, precision, speed, and range that are networked and cost effective. And restricting ourselves with funding uncertainties reduces warfighting readiness, so I urge the Congress to repeal sequestration and to approve the proposed Defense Department budget.

Finally, I would like to thank the Congress for proposing and supporting the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative. This effort will reassure our regional partners and send a strong signal to potential adversaries of our persistent commitment to the region.

As always, I thank Congress for your enduring support to the men and women of PACOM and to our families who care for us. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Let me just remind all members that immediately upon the conclusion of this open hearing we will have a closed classified session with Admiral Harris, and it will happen immediately after this open hearing has concluded. I know when we have done this before there has been some confusion about time apparently. So whenever we finish here, it will be upstairs as we usually do.

Admiral, I appreciate your very strong comments about budgets. Obviously, that is of key importance to us this week, and no one

suffers the consequences of our failure to do our job than you do on the front lines.

I want to ask my questions on defending against missiles, and actually I want to ask it in two different areas. You described some additional forces that we are putting into the region. I know there have been some press reports that say that somehow those forces are not able to defend against missiles launched from North Korea.

Let me just ask, can American military forces in that region defend themselves against missiles launched from North Korea?

Admiral HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, absolutely. There was an article that came out this morning from one of the outlets that suggested that the *Carl Vinson* Strike Group—and I think it is appropriate that we are talking about the *Carl Vinson* here in this room, the Carl Vinson Room—that the *Carl Vinson* Strike Group, with its incredible capability, to include two guided-missile destroyers, the *Wayne E. Meyer* and the *Michael Murphy,* and the *Lake Champlain* cruiser, that somehow that that carrier strike group would not be able to defend itself against ballistic missiles. I believe that that article and articles like that are both misleading and they conflate apples and oranges, if you will.

We have ballistic missile ships in the Sea of Japan, in the East Sea, that are capable of defending against ballistic missile attacks. North Korea does not have a ballistic missile antiship weapon that would threaten the *Carl Vinson* Strike Group.

The weapons that North Korea would put against the *Carl Vinson* Strike Group are easily defended by the capabilities resident in that strike group. If it flies, it will die, if it is flying against the *Carl Vinson* Strike Group. So I am confident in that strike group's ability to not only defend itself, but to project power if that is the call that we received from the President and Secretary of Defense, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, then let me ask you more broadly about missile defense. We have some limited interceptors in Alaska and California. You mentioned some ships. We are, with the South Koreans, installing THAAD. So there are several pieces of this. But would you agree with my proposition that we probably need to amp up, to increase our missile defense capability in this region?

Admiral HARRIS. I agree with you completely, Mr. Chairman. I believe that across the range of integrated air and missile defense, IAMD, that we can and need to do more. I believe that the interceptors that we have that defend our homeland directly in Alaska and California are critical. I have suggested that we consider putting interceptors in Hawaii that defend Hawaii directly and that we look at the defensive Hawaii radar to improve Hawaii's capability.

I believe that the Flight IX DDGs, [guided-missile] destroyers that are coming online, are exactly what were needed in the ballistic missile defense space, if you will. And those are coming online, and I am grateful to the Congress for funding those.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Focusing on the chairman's question in terms of domestic defense, the missiles in Alaska and in California, what greater capa-

bility do we need in those missiles? Do we not have enough? Are we not confident that the ones we have are going to work? What capabilities is it that you are specifically focused on?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am going out of my level of—my range of expertise, because that is a question that NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] is concerned more with, North American Air Defense Command. But I do believe that the numbers could be improved; in other words, we need more interceptors.

And then I believe that for the defense of Hawaii, which is covered also by those interceptors, could stand strengthening itself, and that is in terms of the defensive Hawaii radar and potentially interceptors. So that is something we need to study much more deeply, but I think it certainly merits further discussion.

We have one of our key systems that is deployed now in the Pacific, the SBX [Sea-Based X-Band] radar. It is an X-band radar that is on an old oil platform that is self-propelled with a golf ball-like antenna. We only have one of those, and we use it a lot, and, you know, we have to be concerned about the material condition of the platform itself, which is old, and the civilian crews that man it.

Mr. SMITH. What actions do you potentially see North Korea, Kim Jong-un, taking that are most concerning? And by that, I mean, putting aside for the moment what sort of capability they are building, what might they do offensively militarily? A few years back, I believe, they sank a South Korean vessel, they launched some missiles at a South Korean-controlled island. Do you see similar things that North Korea could do?

I mean, I don't think any of us anticipate that they are just going to do a full-scale war because they know the cost of that, but are there places where they would try to push the envelope? And if so, what are your concerns about what they might do militarily against either our assets in the region or our allies?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not as certain about this as you are, that North Korea won't do something precipitous, because the——

Mr. SMITH. Oh, I am not saying I am certain they are. I am asking what it would be.

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I mean, it could be what we have seen before, I mean, which provocations like the sinking of the *Cheonan* or the attacks on YP-Do Island and the continuing evolution of their nuclear and their ballistic missile testing. So all of that.

Mr. SMITH. Just to be clear in the purpose of the question, I am not at all certain that they are not going to do something. I am confident, Admiral—I am not certain of anything at this point in my life, it is just the nature of the world—but I am reasonably confident that North Korea sees the threat of launching a full-on war against South Korea or Japan and the consequences of that.

What I am worried about is that they will do these sort of little small things, thinking they can get away with it, and be wrong. And I am trying to get a greater clarity of what those small things are, which is why I cited those two previous examples.

In the current environment, what are you worried about? Are they likely to, once again, you know, try to sink a South Korean ship? Are there disputed territories that they might try to take over? Where should we be looking for that small thing that could lead to the larger, much more dangerous war?

Admiral HARRIS. First off, sir, I don't share your confidence that North Korea is not going to attack either South Korea or Japan or the United States or our territories or our States or parts of the United States once they have the capability.

Mr. SMITH. Unprovoked, you think——

Admiral HARRIS. I won't say that they will, but I don't share your confidence that they won't, with absolute certainty that they won't do that.

Mr. SMITH. Not absolutely certain, just playing the percentages here. But go ahead.

Admiral HARRIS. All right. But I believe that we have to look at North Korea as if Kim Jong-un will do what he says. Right now, there is probably a mismatch between KJU's rhetoric and his capability. He has threatened by name Manhattan, Washington, Colorado, Australia, Hawaii, and there is a capability gap probably in whether he can or not.

Mr. SMITH. And I am sorry to belabor this point, because I want to get onto some other people here, but he has threatened those things in the context of don't mess with us. Are you saying he simply threatened them as he is going to do it no matter what we do?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I can't read his mind.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I am not asking you to read his mind.

Admiral HARRIS. All I can do is understand what he says. And when he threatens the United States, then that is one level, but when he threatens the United States with a capability of realizing that threat, that is a different place. And when that happens, that is an inflection point and we are going to have to deal with that, I believe.

Mr. SMITH. I will let other folks get in here, and this is probably more for a classified setting, but understanding why he threatens the United States, I think, is enormously important. And again, granting your point that there is no certainty, there are still things that we can learn to understand why those threats are made, and it would definitely inform how we would respond to those threats. So we can do that more in a classified setting.

I will yield back to the committee. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral, thank you for being here and for your service to our country.

If this needs to wait until the classified session, please say so, but one of the needs you highlighted in your written statement was more munitions. We are running short of some critical munitions. Would you want to elaborate on that, or should we be more specific when we go up to the classified?

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. I can elaborate on it in general here and then would ask that we reserve the details for the classified session.

In general, we are short on things like small diameter bombs. You know, these are not exciting kinds of weapons. These are mundane sort of weapons. But they are absolutely critical to what we are trying to do, not only in North Korea—against North Korea—but also in the fights in the Middle East.

And so we have a shortage of small diameter bombs throughout the inventory. So the stockpile of small diameter bombs that

PACOM has, for example, we send them to the fight we are in, and rightfully so, to CENTCOM, to Central Command and AFRICOM [Africa Command].

And so that is the fight we are in, and they need them. And so, you know, we send them there. And they use them, which is a good thing, but that means they are going to be short again, and we are going to send some more. So that is the fight we are in.

We are also short in AAW, anti-air warfare weapons like AIM–9X and AIM–120Ds. These are weapons that our fighter aircraft use in air-to-air. I can use more of those.

And in a bigger sense, the submarine issue itself. You know, I think our submarine numbers are low and getting smaller. And so the number of submarines, without going into the precise detail here, the Navy can only meet about 50 percent of my stated requirement for attack submarines, these are SSNs, and that is based on a submarine force today of 52 SSNs. By the end of the 2020s, that number is going to be down to 42.

So the requirement I have is not going to get smaller, but the percentages against the total number of submarines we have is going to be exacerbated because of that. And so those are the kinds of munitions that I worry about. Also, you know, Mark 48 torpedoes, and all of that.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And I hope we can address those issues seriously in the upcoming fiscal year NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and appropriations bills.

And lastly, what kind of leverage does China have over North Korea? I don't think it is well understood how much. They don't, I think, admit to having a lot of leverage to outsiders. I think we could benefit from your insight.

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. North Korea is China's only treaty ally. So that says one thing right there, right? So we have five bilateral defense treaties, they are all in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and two multilateral treaties, the NATO and the Rio Pact. China has North Korea. So they are obligated by treaty to have this kind of relationship with North Korea.

Eighty percent of North Korea's economy is based on China, exports primarily. So 80 percent of their economy is based on China. So I believe that is a significant lever that China can employ, if it so chose to, against North Korea.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Appreciate your service once again. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Harris, good to see you again. Thanks for helping us out last year. You were able to come talk to several of us last year, and I appreciate that.

I want to explore a little bit more based on Mr. Lamborn's comments, but specific to on the military side, because we discussed sanctions a lot, we discussed the State Department role, Treasury's role with regards to North Korea.

But I am wondering if you have any assessment about China's relationship with DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] on the military side and if there is influence or if you are aware of any influence the PLA [People's Liberation Army] can play on DPRK

with regards to them pursuing both the more advanced nuclear weapons program and missile testing.

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not aware of any direct relationship between the People's Liberation Army and all its various subunits and the DPRK, New People's Army.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, okay. All right. Thanks.

Related as well to our relationship or what we are trying to achieve on the peninsula, are you having or do you have any advice on whether or not you feel like you are in the position to sort of play every role, that is not just the Pacific commander but also somewhat of a diplomat's—diplomatic role? Because we have a Secretary of State position, but we don't have Deputy Secretaries of State, we don't have Assistant Secretaries of State. We are only now getting ambassadors without having anyone. So there is a gap in that policymaking structure and that outreach structure. Are you having to fill that gap?

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir. You know, I have been accused of many things, but never of being diplomatic. So——

Mr. LARSEN. All of us here too. Well, perhaps me.

Admiral HARRIS. Part of the role of the combatant commander is to have relationships with not only our military counterparts, but also the leadership in the countries and the regions over which we exercise some degree of authority and influence. So I do have relationships with our partner nations, our allies in the region. But I think the State Department has a key role to play here, and I would defer in every case to Secretary Tillerson.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. And my point isn't that you want to fill that role as much as, for whatever reason, the Senate hasn't confirmed, the administration hasn't put up folks to fill in those spots.

Admiral HARRIS. Sure.

Mr. LARSEN. And therefore you are left having to fill the gap with your——

Admiral HARRIS. And so I am happy to do what I can in that regard. You know, just recently I was in Thailand and asked to deliver some messages about their return to democracy, which I was happy to do. And I think that is part and parcel of one of the roles of a geographic combatant commander in today's military structure.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. It is also the role of ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries of State who aren't in place. So——

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. LARSEN. And I don't know if you can answer this here, which is probably a prelude that you can't answer it here. Yeah, but I have to ask, right? There is the issue of the nuclear tests and the issues of the missile tests, both of them, obviously, both very concerning. But I guess, I would like to hear your assessment maybe a little later about is there one—is it more concerning to have missile tests or nuclear tests? What is the difference between a sixth nuclear test from North Korea based on the fifth nuclear test as opposed to advances in missile testing?

Admiral HARRIS. So I view them both very seriously. And the difference between the sixth nuclear test and the fifth nuclear test is if we notice an improvement between the two. So as I said in my opening statement, KJU is not afraid to fail in public and he fails

a lot. But I think Edison failed a thousand times before he got the light bulb to work. And so here we are, right?

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah.

Admiral HARRIS. So he is not afraid to fail in public and he continues to try. And then he is experimenting not only with—"experiment" is probably not the right word. He is developing missiles that have solid fuel propellants. And I can talk in the other hearing about the implications of that.

So we have that weapons development going on, longer-range weapons going on. He has a ballistic missile submarine, an SSB. It is not a BN [ballistic missile, nuclear powered]; it is not nuclear powered, of course, but it is an SSB. That is troubling. And then he is doing his nuclear testing.

So all of that, if he puts all of that together, miniaturizes the nuclear weapon, puts it on an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that he is testing over here, and then he figures out a way to have that thing survive reentry, then we have a serious problem on our hands, to go back to Congressman Smith's comments earlier.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Your assessment is very important. I appreciate it. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, could you talk about the value of joint military exercises with South Korea? It seems that whenever we do them, it seems to excite North Korea. Is there an advantage in terms of doing those?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, absolutely, Congressman. I would say it is critical, right? So we are obliged to defend South Korea by treaty, and so South Korea is one of those treaty partners. They have a very strong and capable military, as we do. But if we are going to defend them, if we are going to fight with them on the peninsula, then we have to be able to integrate with their military, we have to be able to work with their military, we have to understand their military, and vice versa.

So we share a lot of common systems, you know, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, Aegis weapon system on their destroyers and our destroyers and cruisers, and on and on and on. And so we have to be able to operate together in peacetime so that we can operate together in wartime, if it comes to that.

So we are at an armistice now on the peninsula, and that is what we have to do. We have to maintain our degree of readiness, not only unilateral readiness, but also our combined and joint readiness with our brothers and sisters in the ROK military.

Mr. COFFMAN. To what extent would you say that there was pressure by the Chinese Government on South Korea to put pressure on them not to accept the THAAD system?

Admiral HARRIS. There is clear pressure from China, economic pressure, against companies like Lotte Corporation, which owns the place that the THAAD is going to go into, Samsung, and other companies, big corporations in South Korea.

And so I find it preposterous that China would try to influence South Korea to not get a weapon system that is completely defensive against the very country that is allied with China. So if China

wants to do something constructive, then they ought to focus less, in my opinion, on South Korea's defensive preparations and focus instead more on North Korea's offensive preparations.

And I think we are in a good place, I am reasonably optimistic now that China is having an influence and they are working in the right direction with regards to North Korea, thanks to the efforts by our President and theirs.

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you think that China holds all the cards in any kind of negotiated settlement to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don't think they hold all the cards, but they hold a good number of them and important cards. Because regardless of whether I think that China's influence on North Korea is waning, it still is the country that has the most influence on North Korea during peacetime. And I think if it came to a harder place, then we would exert the most influence. But in peacetime, China has the most influence on North Korea.

Mr. COFFMAN. Am I correct that the South Korean or, I guess, Republic of Korea security forces have taken operational control of joint military operations and that we do not have forces on the Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]?

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir. The OPCON transfer, the transfer of operational control, that is now pushed to the right, and it is a conditions-based transfer. So the ROK does not have operational control of our forces. But General Brooks, who is the U.S. Forces Commander, is also the United Nations Commander and the CFC, the Combined Forces Commander. So he is actually the commander of all of the forces on the peninsula, including the Korean forces, in terms of war.

Mr. COFFMAN. Is that a goal though, operational control?

Admiral HARRIS. Ultimately, OPCON transfer is a goal, but it has to be conditions based. You know, it has to be when they are ready to do it and all the other conditions are met.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Can you speak to whether or not we have—if you can speak in this setting—but do we have conventional forces on the Demilitarized Zone itself?

Admiral HARRIS. We have conventional forces along the Demilitarized Zone just south of that, and I can go into more detail in the other session.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral Harris. I enjoyed meeting you on a CODEL [congressional delegation] recently to Hawaii.

On Guam, Admiral, you know we are directly and uniquely impacted by national security and foreign policy decisions in the region. So we seek to understand what if any strategy this administration has for the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

We are in the process of realigning marines from Okinawa throughout the Pacific, which, as you noted in your testimony, is critical for modernizing our force posture in the region. So could you briefly discuss the military necessity, particularly the movements of marines to Guam, for which the Japanese are contrib-

uting over one-third of the cost. You highlighted funding levels, but I am especially interested in not just the financial but also the political capital the Government of Japan has expended for its part.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, Congresswoman.

The whole issue of moving marines from Okinawa elsewhere is important to our alliance relationship with Japan. And so the movement involves—today we have roughly 20,000 or so marines in Okinawa, and ultimately we want to get to a point around 10,000 or 11,000 or so. And part of that is to move about 4,000 marines to Guam, about 3,000 or so to Hawaii, and about 1,300 or so to Australia. So that is sort of the rotation.

We are looking at, as you know, the movement of the bulk of the marines to Guam would occur in the 2024 to 2028 timeframe and then to Hawaii after that. And we are already rotating forces through Australia now.

Japan has invested a lot in this. This is all about, for everyone else's benefit, to reducing the footprint in Okinawa and also closing Futenma. So the Futenma air base is an air base in an incredibly populated area, and so the Japanese have asked us to move that air base. It is a key base of operations for us in that region.

So we told the Japanese back in the 1990s that we would do that, but their obligations under the treaty is to provide us a place from which to operate. Our obligations under the treaty is to protect Japan. And so their obligation is to provide a place. They selected a place called Henoko, right outside of Camp Schwab, and that is kind of where we are.

So ultimately, when Henoko is ready, we will shut down Futenma and move to Henoko. But until then, we have to operate somewhere, and Futenma is where we are operating from. And then part of that agreement was to remove a large number of forces from Okinawa, and that is where the relocation to Guam, Hawaii, and so on.

Ms. BORDALLO. So I think, Admiral, what I am trying to get is everything is on target, is that correct, pretty much?

Admiral HARRIS. I believe things are on target. I think Henoko is delayed a little bit. I don't know the amount. You know, that is something that we would have to ask the Japanese about. But they have said that they would have Henoko ready by 2022. I testified last year that I thought that that was in question. So now I am going to have to defer to the Japanese for a better year estimate.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, we have waited a long time for this, so we want it to continue. And we do have a visa problem on Guam now, a labor shortage, so I am working on that.

But what importance would you give to the fifth SSN in Guam? Related, would your forces be better enabled by robust ship repair facilities in the Western Pacific? Just a yes or a no.

Admiral HARRIS. On the SSN in Guam, I am a big fan of moving the fifth SSN to Guam. It is a Navy decision, and I am in consultations with Admiral Richardson and the Navy on it. But I believe it is important that we move that capability forward because it gets it closer to the fight.

On the ship repair facility, I simply don't know. I would defer to the Pacific Fleet commander—it is a Navy issue—on whether they

need a ship repair facility in Guam or if the facilities in Hawaii and eastward are adequate.

Ms. BORDALLO. Okay. I have one last question, Admiral. As you know, a decade ago, PACOM issued a UON [urgent operational need] for significantly upgraded offensive antiship weapons to keep pace with evolving threats, and Congress has funded a rapid acquisition effort to field this capability.

With significant munition shortfalls, I presume the requirements continue to grow. Would that be accurate? And can you discuss the risks we take with the shortfalls in standoff weapons like the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile? If you could just briefly.

Admiral HARRIS. Ma'am, sure. I believe the UON is as relevant today as it was when PACOM—one of my predecessors issued it, I think it was Admiral Willard—issued it a decade ago. I am pleased and grateful to the Congress for funding weapon systems like Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles, LRASM, putting money against advanced Tomahawk and SM–6 in the antiship mode. So these are helpful, and this is good, and I am grateful for that.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, how many of China's land-based cruise and ballistic missiles have a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers?

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that number is about 95 percent. In other words, 95 percent of China's land-based cruise and ballistic missiles, 95 percent fall in that range and would be precluded by the Intermediate [Range] Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF Treaty, if they were a signatory to that treaty, which they are not.

Mr. ROGERS. How many land-based cruise and ballistic missiles of that range do you have in your PACOM arsenal?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I have none in that range in my arsenal, nor does the U.S. military writ large have that, because we are a signatory to INF and we follow those rules religiously.

Mr. ROGERS. In your opinion, should we consider renegotiation of the INF Treaty or withdrawing, declaring Russia in material breach of the INF Treaty?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, that is a policy question that I know is being looked at, and I believe that there are aspects of the INF Treaty which are salutary, the nuclear part of it that reduces the nuclear weapons and all of that.

I am concerned that on the conventional side, both in terms of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, we are being taken to the cleaners by countries that are not signatories to the INF because there is no expectation, right, we should have no expectation that China follow the INF because they are not a signatory to it.

On the other hand, General Selva has recently testified that Russia has violated the conventional part of the INF. And so the INF Treaty is just us and Russia and a few of the other Soviet successor states, but it is really about us and Russia. And so Russia doesn't adhere to it as strictly as we do.

China and other countries, Iran, for example, don't have an obligation to follow it. And they are proceeding apace in their weapons development. The DF–21, DF–26, for example, both would be pre-

cluded by INF. And then here we are without a weapon in this 500- to 5,500-kilometer range, a critical range to be able to conduct warfare in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Mr. ROGERS. So my understanding is that you are saying that we are basically unilaterally disarming when it comes to that capability?

Admiral HARRIS. I would say we are unilaterally not being creative in developing our weapons.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral Harris. Good to see you again. I just want to follow up on your comments to Mr. Lamborn regarding the need for submarines to fill the requirements that you have out there.

Again, you mentioned we have a fleet today of 52 going down to 41 in the 2020s. Your testimony, on page 16, actually tallied the number of submarines between Russia, North Korea, and China today, which is 160, which, again, I think helps sort of frame your comments even more sharply.

And last December, Secretary Mabus came out with his Force Structure Assessment, which called, again, for an increase in the fleet size to 355. Mr. Wittman and I just got back a report from CBO [Congressional Budget Office] a few days ago that talked again about the sort of fiscal challenge of trying to achieve that goal.

If you had to prioritize, again, in terms of fleet architecture about as we find our way forward to hit that target, what end of the fleet would you really want to emphasize in terms of new platforms to be available?

Admiral HARRIS. Right. So I am not a fleet guy anymore. I am a joint guy. But from a joint combatant commander perspective, I need more submarines. And the Navy's plan to build up to 355 ships, 66 of those are submarines. And right now we are at 52 going to 42, and that is completely in the wrong direction.

And if we go from 52 to 42 to 66, that would make me a happy combatant commander, because I would think then that in that number of 66 that I would be able to meet more of the requirements than I am able to have met now. So really right now I am at 50 percent of my stated requirement. It will be worse, it will be exacerbated when we go down to 42, but if we go up to 66, that will be better.

But that number is an important number because it highlights the shortfalls that we are currently in with regards to not only submarines, but other assets. So in that 355-ship number is a 12th aircraft carrier and all the ships that go with that. I think these are really important as we move out to face the threats that are going to confront us beyond those that already are extant now.

And while we are doing this, China and Russia are significantly improving their submarine capabilities and their antisubmarine warfare capabilities. So today, I mean, today there is no comparison. I mean, it would be like comparing, I don't know, a Model T to a Corvette. But there is no comparison between a U.S. *Virginia*-class submarine and anything that China can field.

But that is not the point. The point is that in 20 years or so, that China will work hard to close that technological gap. And if we don't continue to resource our submarine fleets and our military in general, then they will be able to close that gap, and that would put us, I think, in a bad place.

Mr. COURTNEY. Another point in your testimony on page 10 was, again, talking about Russia's more aggressive posture in the Asia-Pacific. Again, the Pacific Fleet now is a new development in terms of, again, this whole question of your ability to meet requirements, isn't that correct, that they are now back in business?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you.

Last week I had an opportunity to go out and visit one of our *Seawolf*-class subs, which were part of the pivot to Asia, the USS *Connecticut,* believe it or not. But I raise that point because that sub actually was supposed to be in for repair availability for—it was a big job. It was supposed to be about 2 years. It ended up being 4 years. And, again, it is because of this whole question of the Navy's strain in terms of the public shipyards.

I mean, again, that is another part of this story in terms of your ability to get your requirements met when, again, the pipeline in terms of repairs is just not moving fast enough. And, again, that obviously was a pretty key platform that you could use right now, I am assuming.

Admiral HARRIS. It is. And so the numbers are affected. The numbers that I get, as opposed to the numbers that I have asked for in terms of submarines, are driven not only by the number of submarines—that is the easy answer, 52 spread out across all the combatant commanders—but it is also driven by availability. And the availability is driven by the industrial base and its capacity to repair the submarines that are going in for overhauls and all of that.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you again, Admiral.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would like to hone in the questions on China some more and also readiness. So China has been investing in several next-generation military technologies, including hypersonic missiles, directed-energy weapons, autonomous weapons systems, and space-based weapons. Now, are you concerned about the progress China is making in its development of these technologies, and how can the United States maintain its edge?

Admiral HARRIS. Without going into classified, I will answer yes to all of that. I am very concerned about their developments in these systems, particularly hypersonics. But what we can do is to develop our own hypersonic weapons and improve our defenses against theirs.

One of the problems we have, though, is this INF Treaty issue before us. So hypersonics that could match the Chinese weapons would be precluded by INF. So we are precluded from developing land-based weapons that can match the Chinese land-based weapons by treaty.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Yeah, that is an excellent point. I am glad my colleague brought that up. We need to address that for sure.

What is your assessment of China's use of hybrid warfare methods, and how does China influence or otherwise affect our Asian partners and our allies?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So I believe that China is a learning machine. They are a learning organism. And they have watched the Russian example in Ukraine, and they are applying aspects of that in the South China Sea, particularly with their maritime militia, which is a compilation of fishing boats, merchant ships, and other small ships and entities that roam throughout the South China Sea.

And they are using these in lieu of grey hull military ships. And I think they are having some effect with them, and we need to continue to monitor that activity and to call them on the carpet when they do something that would be counter to good seamanship and the like.

Mrs. HARTZLER. In addition to their economic strategy, which I am very concerned about too, very shrewd on their part, but I want to move to readiness. So we have heard from the service chiefs and vice service chiefs of all the military branches, and there are a few common themes, such as: Due to our inability to modernize our forces our adversaries have closed the capability gap we once enjoyed.

They also shared: The quality and quantity of training opportunities have declined significantly over the past several years, which has decreased our readiness. And they have talked about how our forces are undermanned.

So I am wondering how these factors have affected you in PACOM.

Admiral HARRIS. So today I believe I can meet the strategy in terms of fight tonight forces. And so that involves—you know, principally we are worried about North Korea. So my forces are ready to fight tonight if called on to do that.

The readiness shortfalls and the challenges that the services have and how that affect me is on follow-on forces. So the fight tonight literally is tonight. But a lot of those forces, though, come from the mainland United States. And so that is an issue.

And then the follow-on forces, the surge forces, how good is our airlift, how good is our sealift, how can we get all this stuff out there. And I worry about that quite a bit. And I think the lack of a budget is going to hurt us if we don't get one.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Hopefully we will address that this week.

Now, you have talked a little bit about the South China Sea, what they are doing. China's attempts at land reclamation expansion in that area, coupled with its growing military capabilities, as you know, are causing tension across the globe. If these tensions continue to rise to the point where military confrontation is necessary, are you confident in both the quality and quantity of forces you will receive from the services? And will you have enough weapons and assets with access to the threat in order to reduce the risk to our forces and maximize their capability?

Admiral HARRIS. So I can get into more details in the classified hearing on that. But I am concerned about China's bases in the

South China Sea, because that complicates the anti-access/area denial problem that we face if we are called upon to conduct operations against China.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. I will look forward to visiting with you in the classified setting.

I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much for joining us here today.

I was the gentleman who asked Vice Chairman Selva about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the treaty that President Reagan signed in the mid-1980s with the Soviet Union. So I wanted to start with that following on my colleagues' questions.

What has been our response to Russia's violation of the treaty?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don't know what our——

Mr. MOULTON. I am not aware of a response either.

Admiral HARRIS. I know that General Selva brought it up.

Mr. MOULTON. Yeah. I am not aware of any response either.

Typically, when one party to a treaty violates the treaty, what do you try to do? You try to hold that party accountable. So there are other options than simply withdrawing from the treaty ourselves. Is that right?

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. MOULTON. Have we thought about having such a treaty with China as well?

Admiral HARRIS. I have not, and I am not aware of discussions that would bring China into either the existing INF Treaty or a separate treaty with China. You know, when the INF Treaty was signed back in 1985, it was a bilateral treaty in a bipolar world. Now we are in a multipolar world with threats that we weren't thinking about in 1985.

Mr. MOULTON. I agree. I agree. I think President Reagan would be pretty shocked to hear that our initial response to a violation—to Russia's violation of the treaty would be simply to abrogate the treaty ourselves.

But I want to go back to North Korea. The Trump administration has said that, quote, "All options are on the table," regarding a preemptive military strike. What range of options do we have?

Admiral HARRIS. We have the full range of options, whether it is continued negotiations, continued——

Mr. MOULTON. I am sorry, Admiral, specifically military options. I mean, what effective military options would we have to counter the North Korean threat with a preemptive strike?

Admiral HARRIS. The full range of options on the military side, whether it is presence operations, pressure operations, or kinetic operations.

Mr. MOULTON. I am asking specifically about a preemptive strike.

Admiral HARRIS. Okay.

Mr. MOULTON. Not about continued pressure, not diplomatic pressure, not the presence of our submarines or carriers. But what sorts of preemptive strike options do we have against the North Koreans?

Admiral HARRIS. I will just say, sir, we have a lot of preemptive options, but I couldn't begin to talk about them in this hearing.

Mr. MOULTON. And what would the typical response, do you think, be from the North Koreans to such a preemptive strike?

Admiral HARRIS. It depends on the level of the preemptive strike, sir.

Mr. MOULTON. Would we be able to take out their artillery aimed at Seoul?

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that we would have the ability to affect North Korea's military calculus in preemptive strikes depending on the type of strike. But I am really treading on ground that I am——

Mr. MOULTON. I am not asking you to get into anything classified. There has been a lot of unclassified material about this.

Admiral HARRIS. Right. But nothing from me on this.

Mr. MOULTON. But my concern, Admiral, is that when you look at the options that we have in terms of a preemptive strike, there is not a lot we can do about North Korea's artillery. And this has been well discussed in the open press, that a lot of South Koreans and Americans in South Korea might die if that option were exercised.

Would you agree with that assessment?

Admiral HARRIS. I will say that what we are faced with is that on one hand and a lot more Koreans and Japanese and Americans dying if North Korea achieves its nuclear aims and does what KJU has said it is going to do.

Mr. MOULTON. I agree with you. I agree with you. But just to be clear, in that scenario, a lot of South Koreans and Americans in South Korea would be in trouble.

Admiral HARRIS. Sure.

Mr. MOULTON. Are you concerned about a conflict between North and South Korea escalating into a conflict between United States and China? Is that a risk?

Admiral HARRIS. It is a risk. I think it is a manageable risk, and I think that we would work hard to manage that risk.

Mr. MOULTON. How would we manage that risk?

Admiral HARRIS. I think communications with China, a relationship with China. I think the relationship between President Trump and President Xi is positive and encouraging, and I think that will go a long way to ameliorating the risk.

Mr. MOULTON. So you are basing that off their recent meeting.

Admiral HARRIS. No, not just the recent meeting. I am basing it on the idea that if we have a positive, productive relationship with China, then——

Mr. MOULTON. I agree. The Trump administration's idea throughout the campaign and until that meeting was to have an unproductive relationship with China, to call him a currency manipulator, et cetera.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral, thank you very much for your being here today. And 2 years ago, I had the extraordinary opportunity of visiting with you in Hawaii, and I saw firsthand of your capabilities in the

briefings that you provided us. Your rapport with your personnel, it was just very, very inspiring. And your personal history and background is equally so inspiring to the American people, and I want to thank you for your service. I particularly say that as the grateful dad of a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy today, serving in Beaufort, South Carolina, hopefully maybe in PACOM sometime in the future.

As we face these issues, North Korea continues to be a significant threat to the security of the American people and our allies in the region. Can you explain how important the recent deployment of the THAAD system is to the people of South Korea?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think it is very important. I mean, this system is a defensive system that will help protect South Korea from ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. It is a purely defensive system. It is aimed north, not east—or not west, rather. It poses no threat to China. And it is designed to protect our Korean allies and our American service men and women and their families and businessmen and others who live and work in Korea.

Mr. WILSON. And I want you to be aware that Congress voted 2 weeks ago overwhelmingly, 398 to 3, bipartisan obviously, to support the THAAD deployment and your service and back you up. So you have obviously incredible bipartisan support here in Congress.

As North Korea continues to develop and test ballistic missile technology, can you explain who is supporting these activities with resources? Specifically, is there Iranian collaboration?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don't know if there is Iranian collaboration or not, but I will find out and get back to you on that or I will have an answer by the classified hearing.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And, Admiral, the President has recently stated that all options are on the table concerning North Korea, as correctly cited by Congressman Seth Moulton just now. As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, I am concerned of noted shortages in funding, required munitions, and backlog maintenance on our ships and aircraft.

What readiness concerns have you seen in the Pacific Command?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, just what you have said, sir. I am concerned about munitions shortfalls, maintenance backlogs, and development of weapons that would keep us ahead of our adversaries, principally China and Russia but that would have an effect in North Korea.

Mr. WILSON. And are there specific shortfalls in munitions that we can help address here?

Admiral HARRIS. There are. Small diameter bombs; AIM–9X and AIM–120D, AAW, anti-air warfare weapons; and Mark 48 torpedoes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral Harris, for coming here today.

The administration has sent the USS *Michigan* to South Korea as a show of force and continues to escalate its rhetoric against the current leader of North Korea. There is no question as to the sig-

nificant threat North Korea poses in the region, especially as it continues to pursue its missile and nuclear ambition.

However, I am extremely concerned about the provocation and direction this administration is taking to address the North Korea threat. It seems the United States has not developed a coherent national strategy when it comes to North Korea, and yet we are deploying military assets, increasing tensions, and considering military options against North Korea.

When dealing with an unpredictable regime, empty rhetoric can be dangerous. And I think this committee would be interested to hear why there was so much confusion as to where the USS *Carl Vinson* was deployed to or not.

Admiral Harris, what is the feasibility of the U.S. taking on North Korea without China becoming involved? What type of coalition effort would be required to take military action against North Korea?

Denuclearization, at this point, seems unachievable unless the U.S. wages an outright war against North Korea or North Korea undergoes a regime change. What other options, other than denuclearization, are you and the administration looking at in order to limit the North Korean threat?

Quite the question.

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, thanks for your—that is quite a number of questions. I will try to get through them.

First is, I disagree that we lack a strategy on North Korea, sir. I believe we do have a strategy. I believe the President has that strategy. And my job is to provide options, and, as a military commander, my job is to provide military options. And that is what I do; that is what I have done.

With regard to the *Carl Vinson,* that is my fault on the confusion, and I will take the hit for it. So I made the decision to pull the *Carl Vinson* out of Singapore, truncate the exercise that it was going to do south of Singapore, cancel the support visit to Australia, and then proceed north. And where I failed was to communicate that adequately to the press and the media. So that is all on me.

But we have done exactly that, right? So we pulled out of Singapore, truncated the exercise, canceled the port visit, and then moved it north. And today it sits in the Philippine Sea, just east of Okinawa, in striking range and power projection range of North Korea if called upon to do that. And then, in a few days, I expect it will continue to move north.

You started your questions by talking about the *Michigan.* The USS *Michigan,* an SSGN, a guided-missile, nuclear-powered submarine, is in fact in Busan, Korea, now as a show of solidarity with our Korean allies. It will be there for a few days, and then it will leave port and be operating in the area. This is a show of solidarity with our South Korean allies and a flexible deterrent show of force to North Korea, should they consider using force against South Korea.

Now, with regard to coalition effort, I believe our biggest coalition partner in this effort, if it comes to some kinetic operation on the peninsula, is Korea itself, naturally, South Korea. And then, of course, Japan and our other friends, allies, and partners in the re-

gion, I feel, would support the United States as we support our treaty ally of South Korea.

Mr. CARBAJAL. I guess the only question I continue to have is, it has been difficult to discern that strategy. And I am hoping at some point we can hear a little bit more, whether it be in a classified hearing or not. But, to date, I don't have the confidence to feel good about the statement you just made, that we do have a coherent strategy.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Mr. Chair, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I am over here.

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BYRNE. It is good to see you again.

Before I get started, I just wanted to tell you there were 15 of us that met 2 weeks ago with General Brooks in Seoul, and I think we all came away from there understanding the seriousness of the situation, but we had 100 percent confidence in his leadership and the troops he has under his command and where he is going with that. And I just wanted to say that after having an hour and a half with him that day.

Last year, you and I visited in Hawaii at the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] exercise. And the, I think, 2 hours you spent with the eight of us that were there, I just have to tell you, that was a tour de force. Rarely in my lifetime have I been in the room with somebody who had such complete command over everything that you were talking to us about over an incredibly broad and diverse theater. So I wanted to compliment you on that.

You and I had a little bit of a colloquy about the littoral combat ship [LCS], and you were talking to me about how it helped you increase and distribute your lethality in the theater. And you reminisced about the days when you were a young naval commander and you were dealing with the Soviet corvettes, the little, smaller vessels that the Soviets had that they could put a missile on. And you were very good about going over with me and the others there about having that small combatant out there, particularly now that we can put Harpoon missiles on them and add to what you are doing.

Two months ago, I was in Singapore, and I noticed that you had an LCS and some EPFs [expeditionary fast transports] there. Last week, Admiral Gabrielson stated, "We're ready and excited to welcome multiple LCSs to the region and put them to work, and there's no shortage of meaningful work for these ships."

Can you discuss the impact of having the LCSs and the EPFs in the theater?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. So I have gone on record as being a fan of the littoral combat ship in both its principal forms, and I am a fan of it. I would be a bigger fan of the up-gunned, if you will, LCSs which——

Mr. BYRNE. The frigate?

Admiral HARRIS. The frigate—thanks to the Congress, we are going to get. And I think it is important.

I want to acknowledge our great friend in Singapore, or Singapore as our great friend, that is, who allow us to rotationally deploy these ships to their country. So I am grateful for that.

I think the Navy and Vice Admiral Rowden at SURFPAC, Surface Forces [Pacific], are on the right track with this theory of distributed lethality. And I think the LCS has a role to play in that. So, again, I am a fan of LCS.

The story I told was, when I was a tactical action officer on the USS *Saratoga* back in the eighties, one of my jobs was to keep track of all these little ships that the Soviets had—the Nanuchkas, Tarantuls, and Osa II boats. These are small, small patrol boats. But the reason we had to keep track of them, the reason we were worried about them, the reason the captain and the admiral were on my case all the time—"Where are these guys?"—is because each one carried a Styx missile or more. So they carried a missile that could threaten the carrier and the carrier strike group, punching far, far above their weight.

And I think that LCS should do that. And I want the Chinese every day to worry about where the LCS is, just like I used to worry about where the Osas, the Nanuchkas, the Tarantuls were back in the eighties.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I think the proposal from the Navy, or at least the way they are working on it today, both variants of LCS upgraded to be a frigate would have multiple missile tubes on them and would be able to respond the way that you said.

So just to make sure I am understanding what you are saying, you want them to have the sort of missile capability that the Navy is trying to get to with the new frigate design.

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely. And I am agnostic on the type of missile. You know, that is a service decision. But I want them to be equipped with missiles that can sink ships.

Mr. BYRNE. And having multiple numbers of those, not just—we only have the *Coronado* out there right now—but having more than one, having several out there that you can place around wherever you want, that adds to what the Chinese or any other adversary has to worry about with the placement of our fleet out there.

Admiral HARRIS. Right. On our combat side, it does it, absolutely. And on the everyday, noncombat peace operations, humanitarian assistance, the whole range of operations and missions that the Navy has in the region, the LCS adds to that.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I really appreciate your comments on that. But, once again, your leadership, General Brooks' leadership, I have a high level of confidence that we have the right people and the right things in place to do what we have to do if something bad happens there. And I appreciate your leadership and his leadership.

And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi.

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you so much for your testimony today, and thank you for your service to our country.

You said that the *Carl Vinson* is now in the Philippine Sea. God forbid you had to fly from the *Carl Vinson* to North Korea, how long a flight time is that?

Admiral HARRIS. About 2 hours. Well within their capability.

Mr. SUOZZI. And there wouldn't be any need for refueling to get there and back?

Admiral HARRIS. There would be, but a modern carrier strike group has its own refuelers.

Mr. SUOZZI. On the——

Admiral HARRIS. On the ship.

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay.

When you talked about the basic munitions like small diameter bombs, is that a problem throughout the Navy, or is that a problem for just for the Pacific Command?

Admiral HARRIS. No, it is not a Navy problem, it is a joint force problem, and it is a shortage across the joint force. And so, you know, we are sending them out to CENTCOM, Central Command, now because they are needed in the fight in the Middle East. So, you know, I have an allocation, other combatant commanders have an allocation——

Mr. SUOZZI. So you are sharing your allocation——

Admiral HARRIS. I am.

Mr. SUOZZI [continuing]. With Central Command.

Admiral HARRIS. Right. Except they don't share them back, right? Hopefully they don't share them back, because hopefully they use them. And so then they will need more.

Mr. SUOZZI. So how would I go about finding out, like, what is the status of that, what is the inventory overall and where they are and that kind of thing?

Admiral HARRIS. You just ask the question, and I will get back to you, sir.

Mr. SUOZZI. Well, I am asking that question.

Admiral HARRIS. You just did, and I will get back to you.

Mr. SUOZZI. And what were the other two weapons that you mentioned before that were your priorities, other than the small diameter bombs?

Admiral HARRIS. Anti-air warfare missiles, AAW missiles, AIM–9X, AIM–120D. These go on our fighter aircraft. And Mark 48 torpedoes.

Mr. SUOZZI. So I would like to—I am trying to develop—I am new here, I have only been here for 100 days, and I am trying to develop an inventory of all the different equipment that we have and understand where things are and how much we use of what——

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I will get that to you.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. Thank you so much.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here.

One, just again, it is a joint problem, the number of munitions and the lackage of stockpile that we have in order to comply with all contingencies that we would have at this time. Is that correct, Admiral Harris, in your opinion?

And then I want to go back just a little bit to the leader of North Korea. And to the ranking member's questions, like you, I don't

share the same confidence that he understands the cost-benefit analysis of any actions towards the United States. And I thank you for being on the front lines, you and all our service members for being on the front lines every day.

Do you know of any source, other than, I guess, maybe China, but does he—do you think based on the news sources and the people around him that are his advisers, do you think he gets any advice that he cannot totally annihilate the United States? Do you think there is any source that he gets that from?

Admiral HARRIS. I do not. In his circle of advisers, you know, they pretty much, you know, follow his line or he pretty much eliminates the source of distrust or questioning.

Mr. KELLY. I was with some friends when I was on the district work period, and I mentioned—I said, you know, some people think that God controls their actions or directs their actions or that they are in link with God's actions. It is almost like he is a little more than that; he may even think he is God, based on the number of advisers. And if you in any way go against what he says is right, he has you killed, whether you be his brother, his uncle, anyone else. Would that be correct?

Admiral HARRIS. That would be correct, sir.

Mr. KELLY. The number of ships—and I know—but how does that impact PACOM directly, in an unclassified area, the lack of submarines and other surface ships?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, so, as I have said before, the Navy fulfills about 50 percent of my stated submarine needs. And so the submarine force, in an unclassified way, for example, deal with the Russian submarine threat, the Chinese submarine threat, and they are also involved in surveillance missions and other kinds of missions, themselves, directly for Pacific Fleet, for the fleet, if you will.

And so, because of the numbers of Chinese submarines that are underway and the types of submarines, and the same with the Russians, you know, I need to be able to keep track of those submarines in every way that I can. And by not having the number of submarines that I need to do that, then I have to make risk calculations and risk-based decisions on which ones to maybe not keep track of or what surveillance missions we are not going to do because I don't have the submarine to do that, I need it to do something else.

So those kinds of calculations are being done in real time every day, not only by me and by the PACOM staff but by Admiral Swift and the Pacific Fleet staff and on down the chain. So that is just one example.

You know, right now, the *Carl Vinson* is on deployment. I extended the *Carl Vinson* by a month in order to ensure that we have a carrier available should the President need one, because the carrier that is based in the Western Pacific, the *Ronald Reagan,* is in maintenance right now. And so, you know, I wouldn't have a carrier there right now were it not for the ability to extend the *Carl Vinson.*

So, you know, that is just two examples for you right there.

Mr. KELLY. And when I first got into the military many, many years ago, we always had a five-paragraph operations order. And, lately, you know, 10 years ago, we started adding risk. And that

is a risk that we as Congress can source to reduce some of that risk, but it is a—we ought to be doing the same risk assessment. If we don't source this, then you take risk, and that means the lives and material and equipment and treasure.

Would that be correct, Admiral Harris?

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely correct.

Mr. KELLY. And then final question. We hear quite often about the funding at the Joint Chief level, the CRs and the impacts of CRs at the joint level. But at your level, as a commander, the PACOM commander, how significant is it to have funding that you can plan on to make sure we have the right strategic plans in place?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, it is very significant. And, you know, just in broad brush because of time, if we don't get a budget or if we go into another CR, the services are going to start to enact some draconian measures in order to balance their books, right?

And that includes things like they are going to cut back on carrier air wing training, which means that the pilots that deploy won't be ready to deploy. The Air Force is going to cut back over 100,000 flight hours across the Air Force. The Army will cut back exercises, important exercises like Pacific Pathways and things like that, in order to balance those books. And that will have an effect on the combatant commanders directly and on me directly in the Pacific.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral Harris, thank you very much for your service and for being with us today.

I wanted to ask you—and this is somewhat in line with some of the questions that people have been asking partly because I think it is what the public right now is looking for. In your testimony, you said that your goal is to bring Kim Jong-un to his senses but not bring him to his knees. And in light of that, what are you and General Brooks doing to reduce tensions on the peninsula specifically and prevent what some people are concerned could be an overreaction on our part?

Admiral HARRIS. So I believe the best way to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula is to provide credible combat power 24/7. So if you are a weak country or you have a weak military, then I think that encourages adventurism and puts us in a place with countries like North Korea that we wouldn't want to be in if we had a choice.

So we have a choice. And General Brooks and I provide those options up the chain to the President, but, within our own areas of authority, we provide that credible combat power to our allies in Japan and Korea.

So bringing the *Vinson* up is one example of that. Bringing the USS *Michigan,* a guided-missile nuclear submarine, into Busan is another example of that. These B–1 and B–52 flights that we fly throughout the area are another example of credible combat power, which I believe has the effect of ameliorating Kim Jong-un's worst impulses.

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. Is there anything else you could share with us regarding your own work, essentially, with the White House through some of these escalations?

Admiral HARRIS. No, ma'am. I would be hesitant to share with you discussions that I have had with the National Command Authority.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir.

I also wanted to turn to the budget discussions that we have been having here, which are critically important. In fact, in your testimony, you listed budget uncertainty as a noteworthy challenge, next to China, Russia, territorial disputes, North Korea, and ISIS.

And when General Milley was here just a few weeks ago, he talked about the fact that what he views here in Congress actually is professional malpractice if we don't pass this budget and get on with this important work. I suspect you probably share that, that sentiment in some way?

Admiral HARRIS. I wouldn't be quite as forthcoming as General Milley is, ma'am.

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. But it is a real critical need. And——

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I will say that the need is there, without criticizing the Congress by name. But the need——

Mrs. DAVIS. But sometimes that is appropriate, right? Okay.

Admiral HARRIS. Please note I am silent on that. The need, though, is real.

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh.

Admiral HARRIS. I believe we must have a budget. And I believe we must repeal sequestration.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. And I——

Admiral HARRIS. To do otherwise is going to put us in a very bad place.

And those signals I was talking about earlier, the signals that I talked about earlier with North Korea and all of that, KJU will interpret that in a bad way.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. One of the things you just said in response to my colleague is that you think that commanders are going to start taking some draconian measures.

Admiral HARRIS. I think the services are—when I said commanders, it is the services, because they have to man, train, and equip the military for their use of the joint force. But when I say the services, I mean the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Is there something that you see, and maybe even in some trends, that we continue to do that, in fact, given some other technologies or changes, that we don't need to do any longer?

Admiral HARRIS. I would have to think about that a little bit. I think that, in terms of R&D, research and development, that we are, in fact, looking at new ways of doing new business. And I think the Third Offset, for example, is getting at some of that. DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit Experimental]—I don't know what that stands for, but it sounds cool—the DIUx is another way to try to jump-start some ideas. And I think these are all helpful.

So I would say that the Department of Defense is looking at innovation as a means to overcome some of the challenges that we face from other——

Mrs. DAVIS. Could I ask you, just briefly, because time is almost up, is the fact that we have struggled so much to have an audit out of the Pentagon, is that an issue for you?

Admiral HARRIS. No, ma'am, it is not for me.

Mrs. DAVIS. So no audit is not a problem, from your perspective.

Admiral HARRIS. No, I don't want to imply that, but if there is a problem with an audit in the Pentagon, that doesn't affect me, as a combatant commander, directly.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma'am.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral Harris, thank you for your leadership and what you are doing and your diplomacy and tact towards Congress. I thank you for that. But I would say it would be professional malpractice if we don't get a budget passed and take care of our military right.

I wanted to get your professional opinion for the committee here, just how hard it is and challenging to defend South Korea, with the location of Seoul and the number of artillery that North Korea has. Could you just go into a little detail, just the challenges that we are going to face if Kim Jong-un becomes aggressive?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, it is a very dramatic challenge. So Seoul is, I believe, the most densely populated city on the planet, 25 million people in a relatively small area, within artillery range of the DMZ and the heights north of the DMZ, where Kim Jong-un has a vast array of rocket forces and artillery. So it does pose a significant challenge.

Mr. BACON. And it is an extraordinarily hard challenge to counter.

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. BACON. Do you think we have enough long-range strike aircraft, air-to-ground, air-to-air, close enough that deters Kim Jong-un? Or do we need to add additional permanent presence in Japan, Guam, so forth? I know we have rotating forces, but is it enough to make clear to Kim Jong-un that he will lose if he crosses the line?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I believe that the military forces we have are sending the right signal to Kim Jong-un.

So we routinely fly B–1 and B–52 flights. Just 2 days ago, we had an operation where we had a ship in the East Sea, Sea of Japan, and on the West Sea with the Koreans. The Japanese were involved, and we had a B–52 fly through there. The Japanese handed it off to the Koreans, who then escorted the bomber through the Korean Peninsula to the other side.

So this is a pretty complicated operation, and it demonstrated to our allies and friends and also to Kim Jong-un that we have this capability, that we can bring these forces to bear from all around the Pacific to focus on him if need be.

So I am pleased with the array of forces that we have, in terms of "fight tonight" forces. But as I answered a previous question, I am concerned about follow-on forces——

Mr. BACON. Right.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And the means to get them there, all of which is affected by readiness, which is affected by the budget, and on and on.

Mr. BACON. It seems to me part of this is a whole-of-government response. Are we doing enough in the non-military instruments of power? For example, in the nineties, we used banking sanctions that I thought were very effective. Are there other things we should be doing to help put pressure on North Korea?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, sir, I believe that it is a whole-of-government effort and a whole-of-government effort would be required. And I believe that different parts of our government are involved in the North Korean problem set.

Mr. BACON. Should we go back to the banking sanctions? It seems like, to me, that worked.

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not smart on banking sanctions.

Mr. BACON. Okay. One last thing. Thinking of Kim Jong-un, he is the grandson of a dictator, son of a dictator. He has been surrounded by people his whole life that tell him what he wants to hear. So I sort of question his rational decision making on this, but how would you interpret his strategic objectives? What is he trying pursue? What are his goals with his behavior?

Admiral HARRIS. So I believe there is an element of respect that he is going after. I believe he wants to be considered a nuclear state, a nuclear-capable state. I believe he seeks unification of the Korean Peninsula to his favor. And I believe that he seeks to have that dominance in that part of the world.

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris, aloha. Welcome.

Admiral HARRIS. Aloha.

Ms. GABBARD. I have just returned back to Washington yesterday after holding a whole string of town hall meetings across the State of Hawaii on each island. And the question and concern raised about North Korea's threat, yes, to the United States but specifically to Hawaii, was a constant question and theme that came up on each of our islands there.

Given Hawaii is home to your headquarters, how do you characterize the threat of North Korea specifically to Hawaii? And how confident are you in our current BMD [ballistic missile defense] capabilities against that threat?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. Thanks, Congresswoman.

I am concerned about it. I believe that our ballistic missile architecture is sufficient to protect Hawaii today, but it can be overwhelmed. And, you know, if Kim Jong-un or someone else launched ballistic missiles, ICBMs, against the United States, then, you know, someone would have to make the decision on which ones to take out or not. So that is a difficult decision.

I think that we would be better served—my personal opinion is that we would be better served with a defensive Hawaii radar and interceptors in Hawaii. I know that that is being discussed, and I don't want to get ahead of those discussions. But I think we ought

to study it, for sure, and then make that decision as a department on what the best way forward is.

But Kim Jong-un is clearly in a position to threaten Hawaii today, in my opinion.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. And in what you are suggesting, having a radar as well as interceptors in Hawaii specifically, how confident are you in that technology that is being discussed in being able to effectively intercept an ICBM coming towards us?

Admiral HARRIS. It depends on the systems. You know, we are getting ahead of—I am getting ahead of ourselves just a little bit because, you know, I am suggesting that we study the basing of interceptors in Hawaii. The type of interceptors, you know, that is the next level of detail, which I am not part of that discussion.

I think that the defensive Hawaii radar is coming. I think the interceptors piece is something that is yet to be determined. But I believe we should certainly look at it, and I think we would be somehow not doing our job if we didn't look at it.

Ms. GABBARD. And could you expand a little bit on what you mentioned on the current BMD capability being sufficient but if overwhelmed would create a situation where difficult choices would be made? Could you maybe just lay out a scenario?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. In this hearing room, I will just say that we have X number of interceptors that can shoot down Y number of targets, and if the opposition fired Y plus one, then that is at least one that will get through.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Recently, I think about a month ago, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State made a statement basically saying that the pivot to Asia is effectively over. What is your take on that statement, and how have you seen the practical implications of that?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So I believe that the phrase was—well, you know, the term "pivot" and the term "rebalance," those are just words that describe what America is doing. And I believe that what we are doing is continuing to place an importance on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. I believe that Secretary Mattis' first trip was to the region. The Vice President, I was with him when he returned from the region through Hawaii.

I believe that these send the right signal to our friends, allies, and partners and others that the United States remains steadfast in our placing of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region as the most important region for America's future.

I think the President's relationships with Prime Minister Abe in Japan, with President Xi in China, and all of that are positive. And it demonstrates to the folks out there that we do value what is happening in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Now, even though the terms, quote/unquote, "pivot" or "rebalance" or something may be out of vogue, I think our Nation remains focused on the region, as we should.

Ms. GABBARD. Yeah. It is what is actually happening that matters.

I appreciate your leadership through your long tenure of service based in Hawaii but really always bringing to light the challenges as well as the opportunities that we face there in the region. Thank you.

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Cheney.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, for your service to the country and for your very frank answers and helpful answers here today.

I wanted to follow up first on some questions about the INF Treaty and see if you could elaborate a little bit on the extent to which that treaty is now only, in fact, prohibiting the United States, only binding us, in many ways, if the Russians are violating it and if the Chinese are moving ahead in the production of weapons that we can't produce under that treaty.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think you have said it all. And my concern—so the INF Treaty doesn't affect China's weapons development or any other country's weapons development with the exception of ours and Russia's because they are not signatories to the treaty. It is a bilateral treaty signed in 1985 during a bipolar world, us and the Soviet Union and then now Russia and some of the republics that have come out from that.

I don't know if Russia is wholesale violating the treaty. I do know that General Selva testified that they have violated it in certain aspects. So we should hold them to account for that.

On the nuclear side of the INF Treaty, I believe it is holding, and I would be hesitant to call for us to pull out of the treaty, because anything you could do to limit nuclear weapons is a good.

But the treaty not only governs nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons in the ballistic and cruise missile regimes. And that is what I am worried about. So I am worried about Chinese weapons and what we are going to do about it.

So we can't stop the Chinese from developing weapons that run counter to INF, because they are not a signatory to INF. But we can't develop weapons that can match those because we are a signatory to it and we follow it like you would expect America to follow a treaty, to the letter.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. And, in particular, one of those kinds of weapons that they are developing that we are precluded from developing are the hypersonic weapons. Is that right?

Admiral HARRIS. That is correct.

Ms. CHENEY. Could you talk a little bit about missile defense against hypersonic weapons, in terms of, you know, what the capabilities are, if any, that we might have today?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I really don't want to get into that in this hearing. Happy to discuss it in the classified section.

Ms. CHENEY. Okay. Thank you. In terms of missile defense and our allies, is there more that we could be doing, for example, with respect to the sale of Aegis Ashore sites or THAAD to Japan?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I believe that there is more that we can do, and we should make available, I think, those systems to countries that are our allies and close friends that would want them. You know, I don't want to get into a discussion with Japan, for example, on what is better. I think they can make that decision. But we should encourage them to go down that path.

I think that, within our treaty structure, our alliance structure in Northeast Asia, for example, one of the things that could be done, which we can improve on, is the relationship between Japan

and South Korea, right? They both have Aegis weapons systems, they both have Patriot, they both have ballistic missile defense. And they need to get along better. And I am happy to report that they are, that we are having an effect in that, and they recognize the need to do this. And the relationship between both of them and the trilateral relationship is improving, which is helpful.

Ms. CHENEY. And then just a little bit more on China. It has long been, sort of, the policy, including in the previous administrations, the Bush administration, the Obama administration, today, that we need to get the Chinese to put pressure on North Korea, as you have discussed at some length here.

But could you talk a little bit about what you see as their real interests? I mean, if you look at the developments that they are making to prevent us from access in the same area, you know, how much do we really think we could count on them, in terms of—some of their interests seem very aligned with the North Koreans' interests.

Admiral HARRIS. So I think that, in regards to the peninsula, the Korean Peninsula, China's interests include they don't want to see a North Korean regime that collapses and then have a refugee problem from the millions of North Koreans that would probably head into China. So that is one problem. They don't want to see a unified peninsula that is unified with Seoul, Korea, as its core. They don't want an American ally on their borders. So that is problematic for them.

So those are, I think, historically, their big concern with what is happening on the peninsula. And that has driven their actions. That has driven them to be helpful in some points and less helpful in others, both in terms of actual things and in the temporal sense.

But I think that President Trump has convinced President Xi that there are other benefits to having a denuclearized North Korea and it is to China's benefit that it be that way, and then we will go forward and see where it goes. And I think it is early days, for sure, but China seems to be helpful here, and, you know, I want to acknowledge that and be optimistic.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Halleran.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris, thank you for being here today. And I really want to thank you and all of your women and men underneath your command.

I am going to get off of the subjects that we will deal with in the classified meeting, but I want to go back to ISIS for a second. You had mentioned that there were ISIS-inspired terrorism in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. These countries don't have the best history as far as being able to adapt to those types of situations. And they are countries also that are within your area that could be helpful in the future.

How do you see this developing as far as, if ISIS does get in there, how do we address that situation? And how confident are you that they are able to address it themselves or need our help?

Admiral HARRIS. So I am encouraged by the activities of those countries—the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh—principally because they understand the problem set. And one of the subordinate commands to PACOM, Special Operations Com-

mand Pacific, or SOCPAC, is involved in advising and assisting the militaries of those countries. And I think that is important.

So SOCPAC is in the southern Philippines, for example, helping the AFP, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, go after the problem set themselves. So this is a Philippine problem set. The Philippine authorities are the ones taking direct action, and we are helping them where we can and where they want to have help.

So I think that is the approach that is good for the Pacific, and it is working, I think, right now.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. And do any of these countries, Admiral, have the ability to assist in anything that would occur in the South China Sea? Or if they don't, what do we have to do in order to get them up to that level?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think they are reluctant to be involved in activities in the South China Sea that would put them in a position of confrontation with China. It is the Philippines, though, that we have to remember is the one who started the arbitration case which got us in the place we are in the legal framework.

But, you know, these countries are subject to economic pressures and other pressures from China. And they all have issues—not all of them, but Malaysia, for example, has issues in the South China Sea with China, as does Indonesia in an area north of Natuna, and Malaysia with the South Luconia Shoals, and all of the issues that we know about with the Philippines.

So I think that we need to encourage them to stand up to China, and we need to backstop them where we can, especially with countries that we are allied with, like the Philippines. They are a treaty ally of the United States.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. But the Philippines also have some internal problems——

Admiral HARRIS. Sure.

Mr. O'HALLERAN [continuing]. That can cause us some problems. I guess, from your remarks, I am going to take it that depending on them for substantial help in that area is probably minimal.

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. O'HALLERAN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris, thank you for being here today.

In 2010, a Republic of Korea Navy ship was sunk by what is believed to be a North Korean torpedo. That same year, the U.S. Navy issued an urgent operational need to accelerate the development of the Navy's Surface Ship Torpedo Defense system, which provides an advanced torpedo detection, classification, and countermeasures system to protect the Navy's high-value surface ships and aircraft carriers from increasing torpedo threats.

Since then, torpedo threats have continued to increase, with adversary submarines operating within torpedo range of carrier battle groups, as evidenced by encounters in 2015 with the USS *Ronald Reagan* battle group and today, highlighted by the current and aggressive threats we face from North Korea.

I understand that four systems have been successfully tested, installed, and deployed since 2014 to help counter this threat, with over 20,000 operational hours on board high-value units. However,

I also understand that budget constraints may be threatening the further development and deployment of this system on all CVNs [aircraft carriers].

This is particularly concerning considering the recent provocations from our adversaries and specific threats this week from North Korea stating their intent to sink a U.S. Navy strike group led by USS *Carl Vinson.*

With nearly $530 million invested in this technology to date, is there a renewed priority to ensure this system development continues and is rapidly deployed on every high-value unit in our fleet?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not an expert on the system, but I will say that the budget constraints are such that the Navy will have to make difficult decisions, and this will likely be one of those decisions that will be made. The system would be cut if we don't get, you know, the budget or if the Navy doesn't get the resources that it has asked for.

Mr. BANKS. Can you defend the priority?

Admiral HARRIS. I don't know what the Navy has put above this in terms of other systems that they would keep and this one they would cut. But I will trust the Navy to be able to prioritize all of the systems they have, and then they are going to have to take cuts. I mean, you know, in a finite fiscal environment, then you can't have everything. And I think the Navy will make those difficult decisions.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, welcome. And thank you for your testimony here this morning, and, most especially, thank you for your great service to the Nation.

So we have recently seen an increase in military operations by the new administration, such as the cruise missile strikes in Syria and the large-yield bomb dropped in Afghanistan. And while I certainly think that both of those actions were appropriate, if we move the aperture over to North Korea, I fear that employing similar actions without broader, more strategic goals in place may have disastrous effects on the 20 million South Koreans and 24,000 U.S. troops living within range of North Korean Army artillery.

How is PACOM ensuring that the broader strategic implications are being weighed when planning action on the Korean Peninsula?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think it is a good question, sir, and, as I talked earlier, I believe that the best thing that we can do, as PACOM, the best thing that I can do is to ensure that we have credible combat power available all the time to face whatever threat comes out of North Korea. I think the lack of a strong, credible combat deterrence is actually an encouragement to Kim Jong-un to do things that are provocative or dangerous or both.

And so if we don't have that capability or if he thinks we don't have the capability, then that will make him, I think, adventurous. And that would, in fact, then threaten those 25 million people who live in Seoul. That would then require a response by us and our South Korean ally, and then we would be at it again.

So I believe that the best thing that I can do is to provide that credible combat force in the face of Kim Jong-un's provocations.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

On another topic, I strongly believe that multilateral exercises with our partners and allies are critical at achieving a unified front in the face of some of our more aggressive and challenging adversaries, whether they be in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, in the EUCOM [European Command] arena, or elsewhere. Unfortunately, we constantly hear that these exercises are at increasing risk of being canceled due to budget constraints and uncertainty.

What lessons do you fear we risk losing if we are unable to work with our allies? And will these partnering countries seek or be approached by other powerful nations in the region to fill the void that the U.S. leaves?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, clearly, the exercises are important on a number of levels. For those countries that are our military peers, you know, the high-end militaries in the region—Japan, Korea, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand—you know, these are high-end militaries that we need to exercise with because we might be in a position to have to rely on them for some operation or they might be in a position to rely on us for some operation, and if we don't know how to work with them, then it will be unproductive in the early days.

And then there are countries that seek to be better, and exercises with us and countries like us are desired. If we can't provide that level of exercise support, then the other countries will step in and do that in lieu of us. And when I say "other countries," that is a euphemism for China.

And so China will step in, and they will become, or they will try to become, the security partner of choice, if you will, for countries that we are their security partner of choice today, but that is because we invest time and resources and equipment, and the American people, reflected in the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, we invest in our relationships with these countries.

And if we don't do that because of budget constraints—and exercises are clearly on the table. The services will cut stuff and I will cut exercises in order to make my books balance. And the end result of that is we will have a lesser-capable military alliance structure, not only because our allies would be less capable but we will be less capable. And then we will also have less professional relationships with our friends and partners in the region.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. You have confirmed a lot of things that I feared or had concerns about. So thank you for the work you are doing. I have other questions I will submit for the record.

But, Admiral, thank you for your service and the extraordinary work you are doing. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral, for being here. I always appreciate people like yourself that give your life to protecting the rest of us.

Admiral, you know that some of the times when we ask you questions, it is not just to be enlightened; it is sometimes we even have some idea what the answer is, but we are trying to inform

policy decisions, sometimes even use it for leverage for policy decisions. So that might reflect some of my questions here today.

So the first one is a general question. About, in general, how much did we spend to field the Aegis Ashore test site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility [PMRF]?

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don't know, but I will find out for you and get back to you.

Mr. FRANKS. All right. That would be fine.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FRANKS. Then a followup: Does it make sense to defend Hawaii from Alaska, instead of using this particular site?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, in response to an earlier question, I believe we should do both—we should consider doing both.

Mr. FRANKS. Redundancy.

Admiral HARRIS. I think so. And while I am not advocating for interceptors in Hawaii, I am advocating that we study the issue of putting interceptors in Hawaii, which I think is prudent.

Mr. FRANKS. Sure. Well, we have the Navy's new SPY–6 and the TPY–2 radar at the Pacific Missile Range Facility. Can we use those radars to add to the defense of Hawaii today?

Admiral HARRIS. I believe we can, but I am advocating for the defensive Hawaii radar a different radar, a different kind of radar. I think that there are two different—or a couple of defense contractors that are interested in providing that. So, you know, I don't have a view as to which radar is better or all of that, but I think we need to have a defensive Hawaii radar system, and then we should look at the interceptors that would naturally go with that.

Mr. FRANKS. Would it be better, in terms of some of the those mechanisms, to wait several years to conduct the environmental impact statement process and analysis of alternative processes to build a brand-new radar?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I think we have to follow the rules, right? And so the EIS, the environmental impact statement, and all of that is important, and I think we must follow those rules.

That said, there is a sense of urgency here. I mean, Kim Jong-un just a few days ago threatened Australia.

And so, you know, we have a sense of urgency and the rules, and I think we can bring them together in ways that don't violate the law but also move this thing forward.

Mr. FRANKS. Are you suggesting that if a warhead landed that it might have an environmental impact?

Admiral HARRIS. It might have that, sir.

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Should we evaluate the capability of the SM–3 Block IIA to defend Hawaii from North Korea and its ICBMs?

Admiral HARRIS. I think we should evaluate that. That should be one of the systems that we look at to see what is best for the defense of Hawaii.

Mr. FRANKS. In terms of Hawaii's defense, and specifically with North Korea in mind, is there anything that you would tell this committee that you think is a priority that has not been essentially elaborated on here today?

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir. I think I have been pretty clear that I am advocating for a defensive Hawaii radar, I am advocating for a study to see if it is worthwhile to put interceptors in Hawaii to improve Hawaii's capability against North Korean missiles—or anyone else's missiles, for that matter.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Admiral, thank you, and we will save any other questions for the classified moments. Thank you, sir.

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Hello, Admiral Harris. Good to see you.

And I would like to thank Congressman Franks for his concern over Hawaii. Some people think we are just an island, and it is good to hear that my colleagues are concerned about the safety of our islands.

Congressman Franks also brought up PMRF, which I have always felt is essential to the defense not only of the PACOM or Indo-Asia-Pacific area but also for the rest of the United States.

And I think what we are getting at here—and if we can't talk about it except in a classified setting, I can understand that—and that is really, the land mass that we have, the question is whether we can have a permanent interceptor in Hawaii and still not sacrifice the missile ranges now, what it tends to do, which is to do all the testing.

Do you have an opinion as to whether the two can coexist? Because I have heard the use of the phrase "conditional permanent" versus an actual permanent structure.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I believe they can coexist. And I also believe that PMRF, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, is a national treasure.

Ms. HANABUSA. I agree with you. I think you can't duplicate it anywhere——

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Ms. HANABUSA [continuing]. Especially with the undersea component of it.

Admiral HARRIS. The whole thing, the size of the airspace, the size of the range space, it cannot be replicated. It is a national treasure.

Ms. HANABUSA. And I guess on that note, we should tell our colleagues in Hawaii that they should be very receptive to extending the lease surrounding PMRF, because that, of course, has kept it in the position that it is in.

I am also interested in the concept of the undersea warfare that you wrote about in your testimony and that fact that out of the 230 of the world's 400 foreign submarines that are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, 130 of them belong to China, North Korea, and Russia.

I guess my other question is, who do the others belong to? But in addition to that, what is the capabilities of these submarines that we find?

Admiral HARRIS. So the others are friends, allies, and partners and us—Japanese, Koreans, Indonesians, Indians, you know. And so they all add up.

The capabilities vary depending on the country. Some are very, very capable. The Japanese submarines, the French submarines that Australia is going to buy, highly capable submarines. Others are not so capable, the North Korean subs, for example.

China has a range, so they have capable submarines at the high end and less capable older ones. But they are trying to make the capable submarines even more capable and close the gap with us. China has the full range—diesel boats, nuclear boats, guided-missile submarines, ICBMs—or SSBNs, their *Jin*-class ballistic missile submarines, and so on. So it kind of covers the range.

Russia's most advanced and newest class of submarines are now in the Pacific. The *Dolgorukiy*-class SSBN is now in the Pacific.

So these are dramatic improvements in capability of competitor submarine forces.

Ms. HANABUSA. And we hate to say this, but how do they compare to our submarines, Russia's newest, top-grade submarines?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, as I have said before, I believe that there is no submarine on the planet that can touch an American submarine, a *Virginia*-class submarine.

That said, that gap between us and the next best and the third next best is closing, and our competitors are working and investing hard to close those gaps. And we have to continue to resource our submarine force in order to keep that gap a gap.

Ms. HANABUSA. In the testimony or the statement by General Brooks, he talks about a successful testing of North Korea's developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile. Now, I am curious as to whether it launched from North Korea's submarine or—and how many of them do they have floating out there?

Admiral HARRIS. They have one. It is designated as SSB, as opposed to SSBN, because it is a conventional submarine. It is the *Gorae, G-o-r-a-e*. And that is the rudimentary ballistic-missile-capable submarine that North Korea has.

Ms. HANABUSA. But it can launch, nonetheless, a ballistic missile?

Admiral HARRIS. It can. It is a rudimentary submarine, but it can launch a ballistic missile.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Abraham.

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, for being here and for your very informative answers and direct answers.

And I would postulate that, save the North Korean-Chinese border being heavily armed by their militia and their armies, that China would already be having a significant refugee crisis from North Korea because of the starving citizens under Kim Jong-un's leadership.

You answered most of the questions. I just have one. For your intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, your ISR requirements, in your command specifically—your command is so vast—are those requirements being met on the ISR platforms?

Admiral HARRIS. They are not, sir. But I believe any combatant commander would sit here and tell you that his or her ISR requirements are not being met.

Dr. ABRAHAM. So it could use, certainly, more drones, more aircraft, certainly.

Admiral HARRIS. Right. All of the above. You know, I call myself—I have an insatiable need for stuff because I think you all have an insatiable need for security.

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you so much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, it is good to see you again, and thanks for your service. I served for 26 years. My squadron was on the hook in OPLANs [operation plans] to go support your theater if needed.

I am deeply concerned about the North Korean threat. It certainly didn't come overnight, but I think there is a sense of urgency, the grave nature of it, for them to be heading towards a potential to hold hostage United States cities with a nuclear weapon. From my view and many of us here, that is a nonstarter, and I am sure you agree with that.

But as you have talked today, eloquently, about some of the options of how to address that, they are not easy options, right? And some people will argue whether we are dealing with a rational actor or not, trying to manage that escalation potential, while we ensure we have the combat power that you need to have a real deterrent. Because deterrence means you have to have capability and intent, right, in order to stop his action. And whether he is rational or not, these are all the factors that are needing to be considered.

China is often considered to be in a critical role here, and some people think that maybe they are stepping up finally. But they have really not acted in good faith in the past. You know, they support U.N. [United Nations] Security Council resolutions, but then they don't really enforce them. They are trying to kind of have it both ways.

I am wondering, in your perspective, as a sailor, statesman, and your strategic mind and your understanding of the dynamics in the area, has something shifted recently, with China realizing it is in their best interest to do whatever it takes to stop this threat from happening? And if so, could you just share some of your perspectives on that?

Admiral HARRIS. So, on the question of China being helpful now in the current framework, I think it is early days. And so President Trump had, I believe, an excellent meeting with President Xi, and China is doing things.

Whether they continue to do things or not, I mean, we are going to have to wait and see. As you say, in the past, China has said they were going to do things and not done them or not said it and then done them and all of that. So it is early days. So we will just have to see how this goes.

I am encouraged——

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And I believe that Kim Jong-un has noticed that there is a change afoot with regard to China, and I think that is important.

With regard to the issue of whether he is a rational actor or not, I think the term "rational" or "crazy" or "irrational," I don't think those are helpful, because he is what he is. This is what Dr. Perry

said a long time ago. You have to deal with Korea as it is, not as you want——

Ms. MCSALLY. Not as you want it to be.

Admiral HARRIS. And so he is what he is. Rational or not, he is in control of his country, he is in absolute control of his military——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. But that matters for our deterrence theory, right, whether somebody is doing that cost-benefit analysis.

Admiral HARRIS. It does. It does.

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah.

Admiral HARRIS. And he is on a quest for nuclear weapons and has stated——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. Threatened American cities, Australian cities, and the like.

I believe that part of deterrence is also signaling. You know, so you have capability times result times signaling. And the signaling part is what we are doing. I think that is where your military comes into play.

So all that together comes down to what I responded to earlier, that my job is to provide options to the President but also to provide credible combat power——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right.

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. Visibly, so that KJU will think about that when he does the things that he does.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. And, in your testimony, I am also concerned—and you laid it out pretty clearly—about the aggressive increase of China's activity in the South China Sea, East China Sea. And these are things we have talked about the last few years.

A lot of the public, I think, is not aware. You know, they have created islands where they previously didn't exist before—7 military bases, capability for 72 fighter hangars. They are closing the capability gap.

Are our options in the area, militarily, complicated by the fact that we are now sort of pressuring China to deal with North Korea in addressing their aggressiveness in the region? It seems we have to look at it all together.

Admiral HARRIS. I believe, Congresswoman, that we can walk and chew gum at the same time, and great powers can have disagreements in one area and agree in another and can do both.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay.

Admiral HARRIS. And I think that we should encourage China and be appreciative of what they are doing with us with regards to North Korea, and we should also be willing to criticize them for their aggressiveness and coerciveness in the South China Sea.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. And these bases they have created, you have talked eloquently about the destruction to the marine ecosystems and how this is being an environmental catastrophe. Are you hearing, since last year when we talked about this, any outcry from environmentalists, international groups? I mean, this is a major destruction. Are you seeing anything shift?

Admiral HARRIS. I am not seeing anything from the environmental community. Dr. McManus and his team down at the University of Miami continue to say that this is the worst ecological

disaster in human history. The U.S.-China Commission, which is an arm of Congress, has written about this in their 2016 report, about the damage that China has done to the fragile ecosystems in the South China Sea.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. I am over my time, but the silence is deafening, I think. Thanks. I yield back, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Khanna.

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Harris, for your service.

As you know the history, President Clinton, in 1994 through 2002, got North Korea to agree to freeze plutonium production. And the fact is that we had a deal where we were going to buy all of their medium and intermediate missiles. And then President Bush came and disregarded both of those deals and labeled North Korea as part of the axis of evil.

Isn't it a fact that if President Clinton's approach had been followed and those agreements had been followed through on, that we wouldn't be in the situation we are in today?

Admiral HARRIS. You know, as I review the history, I don't want to be accused of, you know, being a revisionist historian, but I believe that, you know, agreements have to go both ways, and I don't know that we could have believed with certainty that Kim Il-sung would have followed that agreement.

We know that Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un—or Kim Jong-il, I guess, in 1992, and Kim Jong-un have raised the level—especially KJU has raised the level of threats against us and our treaty allies. And that is what I have to focus on. What I think about is where we are today.

Mr. KHANNA. But we know, sir, that for 8 years there was no plutonium production. Do you believe that direct talks, the kind that President Clinton initiated, where we had a plan to buy the long and medium-size missiles, would be an approach? And do you think it was a mistake in 2002 to label them part of the axis of evil and give up on both diplomatic efforts of the Clinton administration?

Admiral HARRIS. Again, sir, you are asking me to grade the homework of a Commander in Chief, and I am just not going to do it.

Mr. KHANNA. The other question I had is: The recent ballistic missile launch in North Korea was launched with Prime Minister—the Japanese Prime Minister's visit. And I am sure you are familiar with Nobusuke Kishi, the Prime Minister's grandfather. The Prime Minister's grandfather was, under the United States, labeled a war criminal. And the North Korean—KJU's grandfather fought Nobusuke Kishi in World War II.

Do you think the North Korean missile launch may have had something to do with the fact that Prime Minister Abe's grandfather, who was a war criminal and fought the Koreans, fought his own grandfather, had something to do with the history?

The reason I ask these questions is I feel our foreign policy needs to be dictated with an understanding of the complexity of history in President Clinton's approach, which, in my view, was successful.

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I will just say that my father fought my mother's relatives in Japan. My father was an American sailor in

World War II, my mother's family are Japanese, and they fought each other. But that doesn't change the fact that Japan and the United States are the closest of allies today.

And I don't think that—my personal opinion is I don't think that KJU's grandfather's history with Prime Minister Abe's grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, I don't think that that affects how KJU acts today in Northeast Asia.

Mr. KHANNA. I mean, he has been making these threats, and I agree with your testimony, sir, about the crazy threats against Australia and New Zealand. And he has been making these threats for the last number of decades. But you would not—would you be open to at least exploring direct talks again of the kind we had in the Clinton administration? And do you think that there is any possibility to get to buying missiles?

And the reason I say this, because you understand better than any of us—and I admire not just your service but your family's service to this country—that the nuclear missiles there—as I understand it, there are 15,000 underground sites that have this. North Korea is not—they have got 200,000 special forces or an army. I mean, it is not an insignificant country.

And so, when we are looking at what the options are, shouldn't one option be the type of diplomatic approach that President Clinton took?

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that, as the President has said, that all options should be on the table, whether they are all kinetic options, where I come in, or whether they are other options, where the State Department could come in, Treasury, Commerce, and the like. I think we need to have all the options on the table.

But simply because North Korea is getting stronger militarily is no reason for us to turn our back on our allies and on ourselves and acknowledge and roll over and suggest that because they are stronger we should do nothing.

Mr. KHANNA. I appreciate your service, sir.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. I am over here, Harry.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, and appreciate you being here, your service.

Trent Franks' comments about self-serving questions, I am a cosponsor of the 12th carrier authorization. Would that make life easier in the Pacific, if you had another carrier at your disposal?

Admiral HARRIS. In the Pacific? Yes, sir, it would.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. You mentioned a couple of times that you have to balance your books. Turning to a little more mundane issue that doesn't rise to the level of criticality of some of the other things we are talking about but nevertheless important, you have mentioned balancing your books several times, sequestration impact, CR's impact. I am concerned that the Navy cannot audit its books and records, as everyone in the system is concerned.

Are there any issues—and your team is not directly responsible for auditing, but you buy a lot of stuff, you have a lot of internal controls that have to be functioning in order to be auditable. Are

there any things going on in your command that you can't get fixed in order to allow the Navy to reach their audit capabilities?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, sir, I am not an expert on the audit issue. And the combatant commands don't—we don't buy a lot of stuff. You know, we don't have—you know, the services get the budget, their part of the budget. They are the ones that go out and buy ships, airplanes, submarines, tanks, and all that kind of stuff.

Mr. CONAWAY. Right.

Admiral HARRIS. But I——

Mr. CONAWAY. But you buy fuel, you buy ammunition. You are responsible for keeping track of fuel, ammunition, other things that do affect——

Admiral HARRIS. Right, the services are, through the service components underneath PACOM.

Mr. CONAWAY. Right.

Admiral HARRIS. But I am not charged with auditing what Pacific Fleet does with fuel and that kind of stuff.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I know, but you are in charge of those who do.

Admiral HARRIS. I am.

Mr. CONAWAY. Is it an issue that, if it came to your attention, you would weigh in on it——

Admiral HARRIS. I would, if I could understand how my weighing in would have an effect or if it can move the process along.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

Admiral HARRIS. I believe in auditing. I think it is important that not only we have enough money to buy the things that we need, that we buy them in ways that comport with the law and no wastage.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. At some point, though, American taxpayers' support for getting you enough money will hinge on whether or not we can prove to the American people that we keep track of it properly through these audits.

Turning back to North Korea, the election is next month for a new President. Any sense of what impact that will have on our alliance, our relationship with that country?

Admiral HARRIS. I don't think it will have any impact on our alliance or our relationship. I think that the North Korean threat is so big that the Korean people writ large appreciate the alliance and what the alliance does for them and for us. It is a two-way street.

And I believe the major candidates—you know, we are down to five candidates now. And the frontrunners have come out strongly in favor of THAAD, strongly in favor of the alliance. And I think that it will be good no matter who wins.

And I think that is a tribute—you know, we should acknowledge what this is. I mean, here you have an ally, a country, South Korea, that is under this enormous threat. Their President was impeached. They have a strong military. And yet they are proceeding apace with the democratic process, which I think is just terrific. And they are going to elect a new leader here, a new President here, the 10th or the 9th or so of May, and I think we will go forward from there.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well put. I think the strength of that democracy and the republic there is shown by the ability to handle these cri-

ses that are going on right now. And we are proud of those folks, but obviously want to make sure that they know that they have our support to make sure that whatever that threat is up north is handled.

Again, thank you for your hospitality when I was in your area a couple years ago, and appreciate that. Thank you for your service. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Admiral.

And, luckily, this was just brought up. What is the current communication and decisionmaking process, considering that South Korea is going through a political leadership vacuum right now? Who is our counterpart? Who is helping at least the South Koreans make the civilian military decisions?

I am concerned, obviously, that we are going through an election, and I am glad that, obviously, it is going to continue going forward. But in these tough times, like, who are we talking to within the South Korean leadership right now on the political side and on the military side also?

Admiral HARRIS. So, on the political side, they have an acting President. They have a strong Minister of Defense.

Mr. GALLEGO. But——

Admiral HARRIS. And so I think on the political side things are working fine.

On the military side, even more so. I mean, my counterpart is General Lee, the chairman of the ROK military. General Brooks, U.S. Army, the U.S. Forces Command Korea commander, is in-country. You know, he would normally be here except he is busy right now. And so he has daily, if not even hourly, contact with General Lee and with the folks, the military folks, and with Minister Han, the Minister of Defense there in Korea.

We have a chargé d'affaires there, in lieu of an ambassador. And General Brooks and the chargé are closely connected so that the military and the diplomatic dimensions of American power are in place and operating with their South Korean counterparts on the peninsula against the North Korean threat. I am very confident in General Brooks and his team.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Admiral. But it does scare me that we don't have a South Korean ambassador while at the same time South Korea doesn't have a fully vested President.

Does the acting President right now have the full confidence of its military leadership, or at least the political backing of the parties, to act in concert with whatever needs to occur in the next couple weeks, should something occur?

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely. I mean, as I mentioned to the previous question, I think South Korean democracy is very strong, very vibrant. And the military in South Korea understands its place in the civil-military structure and that civilian control of the military is primary there just as it is here in America.

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, let me just touch on a few things we haven't gotten to yet. Maybe one or two sentences on our mil-to-mil relationship with some other countries? So, for example, Philippines?

Admiral HARRIS. We have a great mil-to-mil relationship with the Philippines, despite some of the perturbations that we have talked about over the past year. We have a strong relationship with them, with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and in all the areas that we have had before, we still have.

So we have Balikatan. We have Sama Sama, a new exercise. We are continuing with the EDCA, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and working on those sites with the Philippines. SOCPAC, Special Operations Command Pacific, is deeply involved in the counterterror operations in the south, in support of—not in lieu of, but in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

So I am positive about our relationship in the mil-to-mil space, and I am encouraged by it.

The CHAIRMAN. Vietnam?

Admiral HARRIS. Vietnam is a great opportunity for us. I believe that the work that is being done in maritime security is positive.

And we have this theory, this approach, called sense, share, and collaborate. It is where we are now building out their ability to sense what is going on in the maritime domain. Soon, they will be able to share that with each other and the other countries in the area; and then to coordinate with us and other countries with what they find in their maritime domain.

So I am very positive about where we are with Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. How about India?

Admiral HARRIS. India presents, I think, the biggest opportunity for us. We share values, both large democracies, a lot of cultural commonalities with Indian Americans here in the United States and Americans who live and work in India.

Their military is strong and growing. I think that we could be helpful to them in terms of jointness and demonstrating to them the value of jointness within their military. They are a major defense partner of us. We are helping them across the space and the defense realm.

So I am very pleased with where we are with India. I have had the chance to address the Raisina Dialogue in its first two iterations, and I hope to return to India within a year to continue the relationships that we have built up with the Indian military.

The CHAIRMAN. And, finally, we haven't really talked about the freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. How frequent? Do you command those? Can you talk a little about that effort?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, so I command them through Pacific Fleet, down echelon. So the Pacific Fleet commander, he does the same with 7th Fleet. So, you know, generally it is a Navy operation, and so that will go through the fleet.

I command them from a combatant commander perspective. I take direction and guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the National Command Authority on the conduct of those operations. I think we will be doing some soon.

But that is kind of where we are on that today.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mrs. Murphy, do you have a question?

Mrs. MURPHY. Yes. Thank you. Admiral Harris, thank you for being here today.

I had the pleasure of working for Admiral Fallon in the CAG [Commander's Action Group], and I appreciate your assessment of the security challenges in the region and how these conditions compared to my time at PACOM years ago.

I wanted to know a little more about your vision for strengthening and modernizing our alliances and partnerships in the region. You described the effort in your testimony as "partnerships with a purpose." What does partnerships with a purpose look like, and where are there opportunities for growth?

And I am asking you this today because I am introducing two bills to try to get at the enormous security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening both our interagency and international commitments to the region.

The first bill would create an interagency intelligence integration cell, which would streamline, synthesize, and synchronize intel on North Korea so that U.S. national security policymakers would have the best information possible to make decisions.

And the second bill would authorize the President to create an Asia-Pacific defense commission comprised of the U.S. and willing partner nations to deepen cooperation between the United States and its regional allies to improve our ability to address some of the security challenges in the area.

I think you may agree that the strength of our relationships in the region comes from trust, credibility, and across time. And these measures were meant to send a clear signal to both our allies and our adversaries that the U.S. is committed to the Asia-Pacific region in a credible and enduring manner.

Admiral HARRIS. I think that on the partnerships with a purpose—and you will recall from your time there that almost all of our relationships heretofore have been hub-and-spoke relationships. These are bilateral relationships with all of the different countries that we have relationships with.

I get it that our treaty allies by nature are bilateral, and that is what they want and that is what we want, for treaty allies. But I think that we need to go beyond hub-and-spoke to have partnerships with a purpose. And I will give you three quick examples.

Our two treaty allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and Korea—we are really about defending Northeast Asia, So that becomes a naturally forming trilateral relationship. There is no way, I don't think, that Japan and Korea are going to have an alliance, but we should have a trilateral relationship focused on defending Northeast Asia.

I think there is a naturally forming, democracy-centric, multilateral, quadrilateral relationship between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. I think there is a naturally forming partnership focused on counterterrorism: Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, us, and Australia and New Zealand.

So these are some of the ideas that we are trying to advocate for and forward and push these partnerships with a purpose.

And I think the legislation that you have described, I think they are excellent. And I will need to study it more to get into the eaches of it, but I think, on the surface, based on what you just said, that they are commendatory.

Mrs. MURPHY. Well, I appreciate that. Thank you.

And what do you think are some of the resource challenges or opportunities in actually resourcing the ability to do partnerships with a purpose?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, so I think that, in the resources world, all I face are challenges, right? There is no glut of resources.

But I think that the work of the Congress to forward the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative is terrific, if that comes through. The last 2 years, we have had the Maritime Security Initiative, about $500 million or so spread out over a number of years, and I think that is helpful. But the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative I think will help significantly as we go forward over the next few years.

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. Thank you.

Admiral HARRIS. You bet.

Mrs. MURPHY. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. For what it is worth, I think you all made the right call in keeping General Brooks on duty, given what is happening in the world. I appreciate your answers.

The committee will reassemble upstairs in classified session in approximately 5 minutes or so.

And, with that, this hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

April 26, 2017

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 26, 2017

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS JR., U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
26 APRIL 2017

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This is my second posture assessment since taking command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in 2015. During this time, I've had the extraordinary privilege to lead the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians standing the watch in the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These men and women and their families inspire me with their relentless devotion to duty, and I'm proud to serve alongside them.

This past January 1st, USPACOM commemorated its 70th birthday. For 70 years, our joint military forces have protected the territory of the U.S., its people, and its interests throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Working in close concert with other U.S. government agencies, defending our homeland and our citizens is always "Job number 1" at USPACOM. It is my top command priority. And together with our allies and partners, USPACOM enhances stability in the region by promoting security cooperation, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This security approach is based on shared interests, partnerships, military presence, and readiness.

The U.S. has enduring national interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. In fact, I believe America's future security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical region, which is now at a strategic crossroads where real opportunities meet real challenges. Of the five global challenges that currently drive U.S. defense planning and budgeting – ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), North Korea, China, Russia and Iran – four are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. We cannot turn a blind eye to these challenges. We must not give any country or insidious non-state actor a pass if they purposely erode the rules-based security order that has served America and this region so well for so long.

Rising from the ashes of World War II, the rules-based international order, or what I sometimes call, "the Global Operating System," has kept the Indo-Asia-Pacific largely peaceful and created the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region. Ironically, China is the country that has benefitted the most. The collective respect for, and adherence to, international rules and standards have produced the longest era of peace and prosperity in modern times. These conditions are not happenstance. In my opinion, they have been made possible by a security order underwritten by seven decades of robust and persistent U.S. military presence and credible combat power. This security order has been reinforced by America's five bilateral security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand. This order is further bolstered by our growing partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, and Vietnam.

This Global Operating System upholds critical principles – the rule of law, adherence to standards, peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation for all civilian and military

vessels and aircraft, and open access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. Its outcomes are two-fold: enhanced security and unimpeded lawful commerce. Sustainable security requires effective and enduring institutions, both civilian and military, that are guided by these principles. Defense, diplomatic, and development efforts are intertwined and continue to reinforce each other to promote stability in both conflict-affected and steady state environments to build and sustain stable democratic states.

The Indian and Pacific Oceans are the economic lifeblood linking the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australia, Northeast Asia, Oceania and the U.S. Oceans that once were physical and psychological barriers that kept us apart are now maritime superhighways that bring us together. Each year, approximately $5.3 trillion in global trade transits the South China Sea and $1.2 trillion of this sea-based trade involves the U.S. Fifty-five percent (55%) of the global gross domestic product (GDP) comes from this region (including the U.S.). Five of America's top 10 trading partners are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and it's a destination for one-fourth of our exports. The diverse region drives global economic growth and is home to the world's two largest economies after the U.S. (China and Japan) and led by the three fastest growing large economies (China, India, and the 'ASEAN Five' (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam)). Nine of ten megacities in the world are in this region (including Karachi, Pakistan).

The Indo-Asia-Pacific has the world's most populous democracy (India), and is home to more than half the world's population. Some estimates predict that percentage could rise to near 70 percent by 2050, which will lead to further competition for dwindling resources. Indonesia, an important security partner of the U.S., is a maturing democracy, and the world's largest Muslim-majority state. Eleven of the top 15 largest militaries in the world are in or adjacent to the region, as are two-thirds of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons.

Simply stated, what happens in the Indo-Asia-Pacific matters to America. And the region needs a strong America, just as America needs the region.

In fact, the need for American engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is demonstrated in the long history of U.S. commitment to the region. It's overwhelmingly in America's security and economic interests to defend the rules-based order against challengers that would seek to unilaterally rewrite it or alter its fundamental principles. It's overwhelmingly in America's interests to deepen our diplomacy in the region while backing up peaceful resolution of disputes with undisputed, credible combat power. It's overwhelmingly in America's interests to remain the region's security partner of choice by working closely with our allies and partners who share our commitment to uphold peace, economic prosperity and security.

This document is my assessment of the regional security challenges and opportunities of strategic value. First, I will outline some of the specific challenges we face in the Indo-Asia-

Pacific including threats to the Homeland. I will highlight critical needs in order to seek your support for budgetary and legislative actions to improve U.S. military readiness in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. I will discuss the value of U.S. strategic force posture and forward presence and how these preconditions improve the readiness of our joint force to fight tonight, enhance our ability to reassure allies and partners, and maintain regional stability. And finally, I will discuss how USPACOM strengthens existing alliances and cultivates critical partnerships with regional actors – both of which deliver strategic benefits and improve readiness to protect and defend U.S. interests.

Overview

As we look ahead to the next quarter century, if not the next few months or years, security and stability are threatened by a range of regional state and non-state actors who are challenging the rules-based security order that has helped underwrite peace and prosperity for America and throughout the region for over 70 years.

North Korea continues to disregard United Nations sanctions by developing, and threatening to use intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons that will threaten the U.S. Homeland. China has fundamentally altered the physical and political landscape in the South China Sea through large scale land reclamation and by militarizing these reclaimed features. Beijing continues to press Japan in the East China Sea, is stepping up diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan, and is methodically trying to supplant U.S. influence with our friends and allies in the region. Furthermore, China is rapidly building a modern, capable military that appears to far exceed its stated defensive purpose or potential regional needs. China's military modernization is focused on defeating the U.S. in Asia by countering U.S. asymmetric advantages. China's military modernization cannot be understated, especially when we consider the Communist regime's lack of transparency and apparent strategy. China is committed to developing a hypersonic glide weapon and advanced cyber and anti-satellite capabilities that present direct threats to the Homeland. China's near term strategy is focused on building up combat power and positional advantage to be able to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight while asserting de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features and spaces in the region. Russia is modernizing its military and once again exercising its conventional forces and nuclear strike capabilities in the Pacific, which also threaten the Homeland. Transnational terrorists, inspired by and in some cases led by ISIS, have set their sights on the Indo-Asia-Pacific by supporting and encouraging attacks in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Malaysia while recruiting and fund-raising there and elsewhere. Drug trafficking, human smuggling, piracy, weapons proliferation, natural disasters – as well as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing – further challenge regional peace and prosperity.

To counter these challenges, USPACOM is enhancing U.S. force posture, presence, and resiliency, while modernizing U.S. force capability and training to ensure our forces are ready to

fight tonight and win in any contingency. USPACOM is working with our many and invaluable allies and partners on a bilateral – and increasingly multilateral – basis to address these common challenges. The growth in multinational "partnerships with a purpose" demonstrates that the countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific view the U.S. as the security partner of choice. By working together, we enhance capability and capacity to respond to the range of threats endemic to the region.

Key Challenges

North Korea: North Korea remains our most immediate threat in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It dangerously distinguishes itself as the only country to have tested nuclear weapons in this century. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry once said, we must deal with North Korea "as it is, not as we wish it to be." Kim Jong-Un has stated repeatedly that denuclearization is not an option. He is on a quest for nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them intercontinentally. The words and actions of North Korea threaten the U.S. homeland and that of our allies in South Korea and Japan. That's North Korea as it is.

I know there's some debate about the miniaturization and other technological advancements made by Pyongyang. But an aggressive weapons test schedule, as demonstrated by yet another ballistic missile launch this April, moves North Korea closer to its stated goals. As a military commander, I must assume that Kim Jong-Un's claims are true – his aspirations certainly are. USPACOM must be prepared to fight tonight, so I take him at his word. That means we must consider every possible step to defend the U.S. Homeland and our allies. That's why the ROK-U.S. alliance has decided to deploy THAAD – the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system – in South Korea as soon as possible. That's why the United States continues to call on China – North Korea's principal ally – to exert its considerable influence to stop Pyongyang's unprecedented campaign of nuclear weapons ballistic missile tests. That's why we continue to emphasize trilateral cooperation between Japan, ROK, and the U.S. That's why American leaders and diplomats continue to rally the international community to loudly condemn North Korea's unacceptable behavior.

North Korea vigorously pursued a strategic strike capability in 2016. We assess that the progress made in several areas will encourage Kim Jong-Un to continue down this reckless and dangerous path. Pyongyang launched more ballistic missiles last year than it did in the previous few years combined. This included the first launches of the Musudan intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Both systems experienced noteworthy – and often spectacular – failures, but they also both achieved some successes. Just as Thomas Edison is believed to have failed 1000 times before successfully inventing the electric light bulb, so too, Kim Jong-Un will keep trying. One of these days soon, he will succeed. The 2016 SLBM test and the numerous land-based tests employed solid-fuel engines, another indication that Kim Jong-Un is continuing to modify and improve missile

reliability and performance. Those successes advance North Korea's technical and operational base and allow continued development. Aggressive rhetoric since the New Year strongly suggests North Korea will not only continue to test these proscribed systems, but is also likely to attempt a first launch of a similarly prohibited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

At the same time, North Korea's nuclear scientists and engineers are hard at work attempting to transform fissile nuclear materials into reliable nuclear weapons. Pyongyang defied the international community and detonated nuclear devices five times – including two in 2016. Kim Jong-Un has threatened the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. and other regional targets. Kim's strategic capabilities are not yet an existential threat to the U.S., but if left unchecked, he will gain the capability to match his rhetoric. At that point we will wake up to a new world. North Korea's existing capabilities are already a significant threat to several of our regional treaty allies and the 90,000 U.S. troops stationed in the Western Pacific.

North Korea fields the fourth largest conventional military in the world. Despite a number of noteworthy shortfalls in training and equipment, we must take seriously the substantial inventory of long-range rockets, artillery, close-range ballistic missiles, and expansive chemical weaponry aimed across the Demilitarized Zone at the Republic of Korea and U.S. forces stationed there. North Korea also maintains sizeable numbers of well-trained, highly disciplined special operations forces. Pyongyang made a point recently of publicizing a Special Forces exercise that attacked and destroyed a detailed mock-up of the ROK Presidential complex in an attempt to underscore the capability and lethality of its forces.

Pyongyang's emphasis on strategic and military capabilities comes at the expense of the North Korean people, who continue to struggle with a lifeless economy and international isolation.

In confronting the North Korean threat, it is critical that the U.S. be guided by a strong sense of resolve both publicly and privately in order to bring Kim Jong-Un to his senses, not his knees.

China: The rapid transformation of China's military into a high-tech force capable of regional dominance and a growing ability to support aspirations for global reach and influence is concerning. A February 2017 study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded that Chinese weapons and air power in particular are "reaching near-parity with the west." Studies from DOD's Office of Net Assessment further confirm this trend in our decreasing capability overmatch. I agree with these reports. Our dominance in high tech advanced weapons cannot be taken for granted. To do so would be a strategic mistake.

China's activities on the seas, in the air, and in cyberspace have generated concerns about its strategic intentions. For the past two years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been implementing an extensive reorganization which has so far included the creation of

geographically focused Theater Commands, each organized and equipped for specific regional contingencies. This reorganization may be the most important development in the PLA's growing ability to organize for modern combat. The structural reforms that created the Theater Commands institutionalized a joint command and control concept to allow the PLA to maximize the individual services' warfighting strengths into a more cohesive joint force. However, it is likely to take several years before the full benefit of this change is realized. One early indicator that China is already addressing some of the challenges of joint operations is the recent unprecedented appointment of a Navy Admiral to replace an Army General as the commander of the largely maritime-focused Southern Theater.

China's equipment development and fielding programs are comprehensive and impressive. The PLA Navy (PLAN) boasts some of the most advanced warships in the region, including the Type 052D (Luyang-III) guided missile destroyer and the Type 039A (Shang) attack submarine. Within the next two years the first Type 055 (Renhai) guided missile cruisers will join the fleet. These modern, multi-functional ships can support a range of missions and employ sophisticated air defense, surface attack, and subsurface munitions, including anti-ship missiles with ranges far exceeding existing U.S. Navy anti-ship weapons. The PLAN's aircraft carrier program is progressing with the CV-16 (Liaoning) serving as a test and development platform while China builds its first indigenous aircraft carrier, anticipated to be at full operational capability early in the 2020s, and expected to be a spiral upgrade in capabilities. CV-16's deployment to the South China Sea in December and January showed China's growing ability to employ carrier-based aviation. The Type 094 (Jin) ballistic missile submarine can launch nuclear missiles capable of reaching parts of the continental U.S.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are similarly fielding greater numbers of advanced fighters, bombers, and special mission aircraft while aggressively developing new platforms. Flying prototypes of J20 and J31 multi-role fighters portend a near-term capability to field near-5th generation fighters. A new heavy lift transport (Y-20) will give China a greater ability to move troops and equipment anywhere in the world. New and/or upgraded bombers, electronic warfare, command and control, and anti-submarine aircraft all expand PLA abilities to conduct a wide range of operations.

PLA ground forces are large, modern, and well trained. Also reorganized in 2016, the PLA increasingly operates in combined arms formations – integrating attack helicopters, artillery, electronic warfare, and other arms into their training activities. They've incorporated some of the training methods used by the U.S. (e.g., combat training centers with dedicated opposing forces and instrumentation) to increase realism and sophistication in their training.

Another component of the ongoing PLA reorganization is the expansion of capabilities and numbers of the PLA Navy Marines. While the full scope of the change is unclear – some reports

have the number of marines increasing five-fold to as many as 100,000 troops – what is clear is the growing importance China places on building the ability to project power using an expeditionary capability. PRC media has highlighted recent marine deployments for training in harsh weather conditions and on unfamiliar terrain. Chinese leadership likely envisions using the expanded marine capability as an expeditionary force to both seize Taiwan and protect Chinese interests overseas.

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) controls the largest and most diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. This fact is significant because the U.S. has no comparable capability due to our adherence to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. (Approximately, 95% of the PLARF's missiles would violate the INF if China was a signatory.) The PLARF is organized for a range of missions, with large numbers of missiles targeted against Taiwan, and others intended to strike targets as far away as Guam and the so-called second island chain, and intercontinental-range missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to strike the continental U.S. China is also heavily investing in advanced missile technologies like hypersonics and, on average, launches more than 100 missiles each year for training or research and development.

The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was established last year to better manage and employ the PLA's impressive array of cyber, space, and other specialized capabilities. The PLASSF is a potential game-changer if it succeeds in denying other countries the use of space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and networks.

To train and integrate these capabilities, Chinese forces have increased the scope of operations in number, complexity, and geographic range. Submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, air exercises in the Middle East, and port visits to Europe or South America are on the rise. For example, President Xi will travel to Djibouti in the near future to officially open the Chinese naval base there. The base is strategically positioned on the narrowest point of the strategic strait of Bab al Mandeb, a key intersection for international commercial and defense related navigation. This base could support Chinese force projection through the Indian Ocean and into the Mediterranean and Africa.

An encouraging sign that China is willing to shoulder a greater role in international affairs is the expansion of Chinese peacekeeping missions, something we promote in our interactions with the PLA. My goal remains to convince China that its best future comes from peaceful cooperation, meaningful participation in the current rules-based security order, and honoring its international commitments.

Territorial Disputes and Maritime Claims: A number of friction points where competing territorial claims overlap exist throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific, e.g., between Russia and Japan

(Northern Territories) and between the Philippines and Malaysia (Sabah) – but none are as fraught with the potential for escalation and military conflict as the South and East China Seas.

South China Sea: The U.S. takes no position on competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, but we encourage all countries to uphold international law, including the law of the sea as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, and to respect unimpeded lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and overflight, and peaceful dispute resolution.

There are three notable disputes over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. The first dispute is between China, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, which China took by force from Vietnam and has occupied since 1974. The second dispute is between China, Taiwan, and the Philippines over Scarborough Reef. In 2012, the U.S. brokered a deal between the Philippines and China where both countries committed to keep their naval forces away from Scarborough. While the Philippines honored the commitment, China continued to operate with its Navy and Coast Guard and, soon after, expelled Philippine fishermen. The third dispute involves multiple claimants within the Spratly Islands where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines each claim sovereignty over some or all of the features.

The past year included some major developments in the status of these disputes. The landmark ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal under the Law of the Sea Convention (the Tribunal) in July 2016 addressed the status of features and maritime claims specified in the Philippines' arbitration case. While the tribunal did not rule on the sovereignty of specific features, the tribunal did declare a number of China's maritime claims and actions unlawful. However, China ignored the ruling and maintains and even articulated new excessive maritime claims throughout the South China Sea. All the activities underway before the ruling, including the militarization of the artificial landforms created by China and the provocative actions of military and law enforcement forces, continue unabated.

China's military-specific construction in the Spratly islands includes the construction of 72 fighter aircraft hangars – which could support three fighter regiments – and about ten larger hangars that could support larger airframes, such as bombers or special mission aircraft. All of these hangars should be completed this year. During the initial phases of construction China emplaced tank farms, presumably for fuel and water, at Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs. These could support substantial numbers of personnel as well as deployed aircraft and/or ships. All seven outposts are armed with a large number of artillery and gun systems, ostensibly for defensive missions. The recent identification of buildings that appear to have been built specifically to house long-rang surface-to-air missiles is the latest indication China intends to deploy military systems to the Spratlys. During my Congressional testimony last year, I reported my belief that China was clearly militarizing the South China Sea. China's activities since then have only reinforced this belief. We should cease to be cautious about the language we use to

describe these activities. Despite its claims to the contrary, China has militarized the South China Sea through the building of seven military bases on artificial islands constructed through the large-scale damage of a fragile environment in disputed areas.

The presence of these military capabilities undermines China's consistent claim that these massively expanded features are for safety and humanitarian purposes. Recently China has tried to obscure the military purposes of its Spratly Islands efforts by calling for private investment, residential settlement, and tourism. The latter may prove especially problematic as China's land creation effort over the past few years has destroyed the once vibrant marine ecosystem surrounding the features.

China's naval, coast guard, maritime militia, State Oceanic Administration, and air force presence in the South China Sea remains substantial. China Coast Guard (CCG) ships remain present near Chinese outposts and other features. CCG and PLAN ships also continue to control activities near Scarborough Reef, a feature also claimed by the Philippines. In February, China announced it was seeking to revise its domestic Maritime Traffic Safety Law to empower its maritime services to control or penalize foreign ships operating in "other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China" beyond those allowed under international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Given China's continued rejection of the Tribunal ruling and continued articulation that much of the South China Sea is "under its jurisdiction," we can only assume China intends to improperly apply its domestic law to foreign ships operating lawfully in the area.

China protests the legal and long-standing U.S. presence in the South China Sea by falsely claiming Washington is the cause for tensions. U.S. military forces have been operating routinely and persistently on, below, and above the South China Sea for more than 70 years – this hasn't changed. What has changed the status quo in the South China Sea in recent years is the increased coercive behavior by China's military, Coast Guard, and a vast network of private vessels controlled by the PRC that act as a maritime militia of "little green fishermen." Furthermore, China's unprecedented artificial island construction and land reclamation has increased tensions with other claimants and its neighbors. The U.S. has consistently called for all claimants to find a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to their land and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

Specifically, since 1979, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation program has peacefully challenged excessive maritime claims by coastal states all around the world (including those of our friends and allies). This program consists of diplomatic communications and operational assertions, which are not provocative and are not a threat to any country. These operations are conducted globally to maintain open seas and open skies, which underpins economic prosperity for the U.S. and all countries.

Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) are conducted for exactly what the title says – to exercise the right of all nations to operate freely at sea and in the air wherever international law allows. In 2016, USPACOM forces conducted three FONOPs near disputed features in the South China Sea. These and future routine FONOPs demonstrate that the U.S. military will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, especially where excessive maritime claims attempt to erode the freedom of the seas.

East China Sea: Tensions between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands continue to worsen. This past year saw a sharp rise in the number PLAAF aircraft operating over the East China Sea. China persistently challenges Japan's administration over the islands by deploying warships into the area, sailing Coast Guard ships inside the territorial waters surrounding the Senkakus, and protesting Japanese reconnaissance flights. The presence of military and law enforcement assets in close proximity to one another and the accompanying rhetoric create an environment conducive to miscalculation and unintended incidents. U.S. policy is clear here: the Senkakus are under the administration of Japan and we will defend them in accordance with the U.S. – Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security. Secretary Mattis recently said during his trip to Japan that, "…our longstanding policy on the Senkaku islands stands. The U.S. will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands and as such Article 5 of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty applies."

Russia: Although focused on Europe and the Middle East, Russia is engaged militarily and politically in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. I share General Lori Robinson's view that Russia continues to exhibit increasingly aggressive behavior, both regionally and globally.

The Russian Pacific Fleet operates and exercises throughout the region. The second Borey (Dolgorukiy-class) nuclear ballistic missile submarine transferred to the Pacific Fleet last fall, and the Kremlin announced the acquisition of 6 new advanced Kilo attack submarines for the Pacific by 2021. The Russian Pacific Fleet's five Project 949A (Oscar II) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines have a mission to track and attack aircraft carriers and other priority targets – including land targets – in the event of war. In late 2015 Russia announced a plan to upgrade the Oscar II to fire new, more-advanced long-range missiles. The first Steregushchy-class guided missile corvette was commissioned in January 2017 with more planned as part of ongoing military modernization efforts. Russian troops and warships held combined island-seizure training with China in the South China Sea last summer. On land, Russian forces fielded long-range anti-ship missiles along the coast, moved S-400 strategic air defense missiles to the east, and stationed the advanced Su-34 fighter-bomber to patrol the skies. Nuclear-capable bombers continue to fly missions focused on rehearsing strikes on the U.S. mainland or regional targets. Additionally, Russia has introduced a new generation of highly precise, conventionally armed cruise missiles that can reach the United States and our allies.

Of particular note are Russian efforts to build presence and influence the high north. Russia has more bases north of the Arctic Circle than all other countries combined and is building more with distinctly military capabilities.

Russian economic and political outreach brings both positive and negative impacts for the region. Expanding exports of Russian natural gas and oil provides new, diversified sources for Asia's growing energy demands. Japan and ROK are among the leading importers of Russian coal. Japanese investment in the Russian Far East may prove extraordinarily helpful to regional growth and stability. But Russia also seeks to mitigate the effects of international sanctions imposed in response to its military operations in Ukraine, and may be trying to wedge itself into new relationships by opportunistically providing economic aid packages and military assistance (e.g., the Philippines).

ISIS / Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): ISIS is a clear threat that must be defeated. The main geographic focus of the U.S.-led counter-ISIS coalition has rightfully been in the Middle East and North Africa. But, as ISIS is defeated in Iraq, Syria and Libya, it will undoubtedly seek to operate in other areas. Increasing numbers of returning fighters alone have already forced USPACOM to think ahead about "what's next" in the fight against ISIS. As I mentioned earlier in this testimony, there are far more Muslims living in the Indo-Asia-Pacific than in the Middle East and North Africa. The vast majorities are peaceful people who seek to live lives free from the curse of terrorism. But even if a very small percentage of the Muslims in the USPACOM AOR are radicalized, there could be deadly results.

In 2016 alone, we witnessed ISIS-inspired terrorism in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Additionally, it's clear to me that as our military operations in the Middle East continue to deny ISIS territory, some foreign fighters originally from the Indo-Asia-Pacific will try to return home. They'll come back to their home countries radicalized and weaponized. So we must stop them now at the front end and not at the back end when the threat can become more dangerous. But we cannot do it alone. To halt ISIS' cancerous spread, we must work together with like-minded nations in the region and across the globe.

USPACOM seeks to advance multinational partnerships with a purpose. Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand are partners we are engaging to tackle the threat against ISIS and other VEOs. Many Indo-Asia-Pacific countries like Australia and New Zealand have joined the coalition dedicated to ISIS' complete destruction. Through multinational collaboration, we can eradicate this disease before it metastasizes in the USPACOM area of responsibility.

Countering violent extremism in the Indo-Asia-Pacific requires close collaboration with U.S. government interagency partners like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Treasury, and the various agencies of our intelligence community. Through an interagency network reinforced by liaison officers embedded in USPACOM headquarters and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) we are able to leverage tools from across our government to fight terrorist organization.

Transnational Crime: Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), many of whom operate as sophisticated global enterprises that traffic in human beings, weapons, drugs and other illicit substances, exist throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The revenue from criminal endeavors threatens stability and undermines human rights. Corruption follows wherever these organizations flourish, weakening governments and contributing to regional instability.

Methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug threat in to the U.S. from the region. Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) reports that while Asia-sourced methamphetamine production is significant, methamphetamine produced elsewhere supplements the region's increasing demand. Maritime container shipments of China-sourced chemicals account for the bulk of the precursors used by Latin American drug trafficking organizations to manufacture methamphetamine and heroin, most of which is intended for the U.S. market – a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Additionally, China-sourced fentanyl and new psychoactive substances are now a growing threat to the U.S.

While much remains to be done, USPACOM forces, including JIATF-W, are coordinating with our interagency and foreign partners to address these threats.

Proliferation Issues: The Indo-Asia-Pacific has the busiest maritime and air ports in the world. Technological advances have outpaced many countries' ability to effectively manage export controls to counter the proliferation of component technology. Trade includes dual-use technology, such as commercial items controlled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control regimes, including manufactured or re-exported materials from other countries with limited export control enforcement. USPACOM's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) community supports proliferation operations throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific by addressing concerns through key leader engagements, combined and joint exercises, and international security exchanges focused on counter proliferation activities.

Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific region remains the most disaster prone region in the world. 75 percent of Earth's volcanoes and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the "Ring of Fire" surrounding the Pacific Basin. According to a 2015 UN report, disasters over the last 10 years

took the lives of a half a million people in the region, with over 1.5 billon people affected and damages of over a half a trillion dollars.

In the 2015 Nepal earthquake response, in coordination with the Nepalese government and USAID, USPACOM's Joint Task Force 505 delivered about 120 tons of emergency relief supplies and transported 553 personnel and conducted 69 casualty evacuations. This last fall USS SAMPSON (DDG 102) and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft assisted New Zealand in its response to an earthquake on its South Island.

While disaster response is not a primary USPACOM focus, a key element of our Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) is building capacity with allies and partners to improve their resiliency and capability to conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). HA/DR cooperation is also an effective means to deepen and strengthen relationships. USPACOM's Center for Excellence for Disaster Management (CFE-DM) increases regional governments' readiness to respond to natural disasters by serving as a node for distribution of best practices. Our service components are prepositioning HA/DR stocks to facilitate timely response and to build access. And, when possible, U.S. military forces can and do assist with unique capabilities in the areas of air and sealift, infrastructure restoration, and emergency medical support.

Budget Uncertainty: Fiscal uncertainty injects substantial risk to USPACOM's long-term mission. The Budget Control Act and yearly Continuing Resolutions degrade USPACOM's ability to effectively plan.

I've said this many times before – sequestration must be repealed.

In 2013, sequestration cut every defense program equally. As a result, real readiness suffered. For example, we were forced to cancel an important joint exercise, NORTHERN EDGE. We need predictable funding to meet our current mission requirements and to prepare for the future. Keeping self-imposed spending cuts is a long-term threat to our national security.

Fiscal uncertainty and reduced funding levels have forced the services to make offsets in crucial investments toward modernization, infrastructure, and future readiness. These tradeoffs will continue to have a negative impact on the Indo-Asia Pacific Theater strategy. Equally important, the uncertainty of the current fiscal landscape places a heavy burden of unpredictability onto our service members and their families, our government civilians, Department of Defense contractors, and supporting industry. The U.S. will experience degraded warfighting capabilities unless decisive actions are taken to end fiscal uncertainties.

The strategic priorities from the Services must be funded to provide USPACOM what we need in order to provide for the national defense.

Without a bipartisan agreement that provides relief from the Budget Control Act caps, the Department of Defense will be forced to decrease investments that have given our warfighters the technological edge they have enjoyed for decades. Our near-peer competitors like China and Russia are quickly closing the technological gap. I need weapons systems of increased lethality that go faster, further, are networked, are more survivable, and affordable. If USPACOM has to fight tonight, I don't want it to be a fair fight. If it's a knife fight, I want to bring a gun. If it's a gun fight, I want to bring in the artillery, and the artillery of all of our allies. But as I said during Congressional testimony last year, sequestration could reduce us to wielding a butter knife in this fight. We must not let that happen. In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we must invest in critical capabilities, build a force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities and increases our resiliency, and reassure our allies and partners while encouraging them to be full and cooperative partners in their own defense and the defense of the rules-based international order.

Critical Capabilities

The most technical, high-end military challenges America faces in the region continue to grow. While forward presence, alliances, and partnerships address these challenges, USPACOM requires our most technologically advanced warfighting capabilities to fully meet them. The critical capabilities in this section demand our attention and treasure. We must preserve our asymmetric advantages in undersea and anti-submarine warfare, and we must strengthen our abilities to counter strategies designed to limit our freedom of action.

China has developed and fielded capability and capacity to challenge our regional maritime dominance. I need increased lethality, specifically ships and aircraft equipped with faster and more survivable weapons systems. Longer range offensive weapons on every platform are an imperative. And, then we must network this force and take advantage of man-machine teaming to improve our responsiveness.

Pacing the threats we face in this region is not an option in my playbook. We must work hard and invest the money to outpace the competition to develop and deploy the latest technology to USPACOM. Examples include Navy Integrated Fires and the AEGIS Flight III destroyer and its Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) – essential tools in today's complex operating environment.

Munitions, Fuels, and Logistics Networks: Critical munitions shortfalls are my top warfighting concern. Munitions are a large part of determining combat readiness in pursuit of national strategic objectives. We are short in "here-and-now" basic munitions like small diameter bombs. Our near-peer competitors continue to modernize their weapons systems and

leverage new technologies to close capability gaps between us and them. We must maintain our capability to operate in contested environments. Additionally, we must continue to expand cross domain fires capabilities and focus on joint integration to strengthen deterrence and enable joint combined maneuver.

Priorities include long-range and stand-off strike weapons, anti-ship weapons, advanced air-to-air munitions, theater ballistic/cruise missile defense, torpedoes, naval mines, and a Cluster Munitions replacement. With respect to ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions that allow us to defeat an aggressor from greater range, we are looking at capabilities similar to Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER). In the air-to air realm, I am seeking advancements in munitions that will provide us an advantage in a denied environment, such as the AIM-120D and AIM-9X2 air superiority missiles. We must modernize and improve our torpedo and naval mine capabilities to maintain our undersea advantage. Continued improvements in the capability and capacity of ballistic/cruise missile defense interceptors will further enhance homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In support of the Korean Peninsula, I support efforts to acquire a replacement for Cluster Munitions – we need an Area Effects Munition replacement now.

As new inventory becomes available, current storage capacity will become critical. Current, legacy storage locations are inadequate to store specific types of modernized munitions and meet the requirements of FY21 Department of Defense Explosive Safety Standards. To meet security and safety standards for future inventory, additional new military construction (MILCON) will be required. When munitions storage MILCON projects lose to competing projects and are not funded we put unnecessary risk on our personnel. We must fund these MILCON projects.

Fuel is a critical commodity, and its strategic positioning is a key pillar of our logistics posture. Ensuring we have the right fuel, in the right amount, at the right location, at the right time, is vital to USPACOM's ability to project power throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. I remain committed to building the capacity of our prepositioned war reserve stocks of fuel, including resiliency of the facilities, infrastructure, and supply chain on which these stocks depend.

Finally, our nation's ability to project power rides on the backbone of airlift and sealift. This is most true in USPACOM. Our Air Force made tough decisions to transition airlift to Backup-Aircraft Inventory (BAI) status and transition Active Components to Guard and Reserve in order to meet budget constraints. Unfortunately, these decisions resulted in a lack of flexibility and readily available capacity for combatant command war plans. Today's global competition for airlift resources hinders the joint force's ability to promptly achieve operational objectives. In war, this shortcoming can result in greater loss of life, increased risk on USPACOM-fielded forces, and risk to our Nation's credibility with partners and allies. I remain concerned about the

current airlift posture and support an increase in airlift capacity, resources, and innovative deployment technologies. The long-term health of the U.S. flag commercial fleet and the availability of the merchant marine is also a concern.

Taken collectively, these individual gaps and shortfalls in our logistics capabilities represent overall erosion in USPACOM's operational readiness and require an initiative like APSI to reverse those negative trends. A strategic initiative to arrest and reverse those trends would be beneficial and worth consideration.

Air Superiority: In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific we must possess the capabilities that allow us to gain air superiority at a time and place of our choosing and we must be able to maintain that air superiority long enough to complete critical missions. For the last several decades the U.S. has enjoyed unmatched air superiority including 4th generation fighters and air-battle-management platforms. Our potential adversaries, however, are rapidly closing the gap as both Russia and China have fielded their own versions of 5th generation fighters just as the U.S. has begun the fielding of our 5th generation platforms in the Pacific. While we continue to invest in 5th generation platforms, we must also find innovative ways to make our 4th generation aircraft more capable. Regardless of the pace of 5th generation fielding, these 4th generation platforms will be in our active inventory for years to come and we will have to rely on them to address the same threats.

Undersea Warfare: Roughly 230 of the world's 400 foreign submarines are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, of which approximately 160 belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. Potential adversary submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels, requiring a corresponding increase of U.S. activity to maintain undersea superiority. China is improving the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines and building quieter, high-end diesel and nuclear powered submarines. China has four operational nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and at least one more may enter service by the end of this decade. When armed, a Jin-class SSBN will give China an important strategic capability that must be countered. Russia is modernizing its existing fleet of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and producing their next generation Severodvinsk Yasen-class SSGNs. Russia has also homeported their newest Dolgorukiy-class SSBN in the Pacific, significantly enhancing its strategic capability. USPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage in undersea warfare capability including our attack submarines, their munitions, and other anti-submarine warfare systems like the P-8 Poseidon and ship-borne systems. Additionally, the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), including the Surface Towed Array Sensor Systems (SURTASS), plays a key role to theater operations and must be resourced appropriately to ensure it remains relevant. Maintaining pace with submarine activity growth is necessary and I support the Secretary of the Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment which calls for a 355-ship navy including 66 attack submarines.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): The challenge of gathering credible deep and penetrating intelligence cannot be overstated. The Indo-Asia-Pacific presents a dynamic security environment requiring flexible, reliable, survivable deep-look and persistent ISR to provide indications and warning and situational awareness across a vast geographic area. As previously noted, USPACOM faces a variety of challenges and potential flashpoints. Our treaty allies rely on U.S. ISR capabilities to support mutual defense treaties. ISR is required to prevent strategic surprise, buy decision space for national leadership, accurately assess the security environment and, if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. Continued advancements of our near-peer competitors requires additional advancements to how our intelligence is collected and processed – including the risks involved – to avoid greater long-term risk. Our ISR capabilities must be suited to our unique operating environment.

Space and Cyberspace: USPACOM relies on space based assets for satellite communications (SATCOM), ISR, and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities to support missions across the range of military operations. USPACOM's region spans over half the globe and space-based assets are high-demand, low-density resources. As the space grows increasingly congested and contested, our adversaries have and continue to develop means to deny our space-enabled capabilities. USPACOM requires resilient and responsive space based capabilities to support operations. China continues to pursue a broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which includes direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, cyber-attack and exploitation, directed energy weapons and ground-based satellite and PNT jammers.

Freedom of maneuver across the cyberspace domain is critical to USPACOM's ability to execute military operation. We face constant threats in this domain from both state and non-state actors and must ensure we have a robust and capable cyber force, as well as the equipment necessary to operate and defend the U.S. military's portion of the Department of Defense Information Network within USPACOM's area of operations. In addition, USPACOM requires an agile and defensible network infrastructure to enable information sharing and collaboration with our mission partners. This network infrastructure will foster better command and control in joint and coalition efforts, and will provide a true fight tonight communication capability that does not currently exist.

Our offensive cyber capabilities, currently under the responsibility of USCYBERCOM, continue to develop. As the command and control relationships continue to mature between USPACOM and USCYBERCOM, and between USCYBERCOM and its subordinate headquarters, we continue to advocate for increased unity of effort and unity of command for all cyber forces within USPACOM's area of operation. It is important that we strike the right balance between maintaining a sufficiently capable cyber force within our theater working directly for USPACOM and its subordinates and developing a capable cyber force under USCYBERCOM.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): USPACOM faces unique IAMD challenges despite efforts to forward station additional IAMD sensors and weapons capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific to protect our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are part of our Homeland and must also be defended. North Korea's persistent research, development and active testing of both its missile and nuclear programs and China's development and operational fielding of advanced counter-intervention technologies that includes fielding and testing of highly maneuverable re-entry vehicle/warhead (i.e., hypersonic weapons) capabilities challenges U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical freedom of movement and maneuver. Other notable challenges include challenging new cruise missiles and Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) technologies.

USPACOM's IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible, and sustainable ballistic missile defense presence by forward deploying the latest advancements in missile defense technologies to the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, TPY-2 radars in Japan, the THAAD system on Guam, and the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) based in Hawaii defend the Homeland and our allies. USPACOM and USFK with the support of the DOD, the U.S. Army and MDA are working bi-laterally with South Korea to ensure the emplacement of a THAAD battery on the Korean peninsula in the next few months. The U.S. Navy is moving forward with the port shift of the USS MILIUS from San Diego to Yokosuka, Japan in 2017. Since the arrival of the USS BENFOLD and USS BARRY to Japan in fiscal year 2016, the U.S. Seventh Fleet is in a better position to support the U.S.-Japan alliance with more flexible missile defense capability. USPACOM will continue working with Japan, the ROK, and Australia to improve our level of staff coordination and information sharing and the goal of creating a fully-integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture that must also address the increasing cruise missile threat.

Innovation: Innovation continues to be critical to addressing USPACOM's capability gaps and maintaining our military advantage. USPACOM partners with DOD-wide organizations, national laboratories, and industry to provide innovative solutions to fill capability requirements. USPACOM also continues to work closely with the OSD Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to develop and field game-changing technologies for the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM recognizes that advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, large data analytics, and predictive forecasting will enable our warfighters to make better decisions and to confront the challenges of our near-peer adversaries. The DOD Third Offset Strategy provides the mechanism to invest in innovative capabilities that will enhance the joint warfighter given the challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Theater. As I have stated, this is not about winning wars on the cheap, as some critics may suggest. It's about winning wars on the smart. USPACOM will continue to push the boundaries of innovation and "fail smartly" so that we can ultimately develop and field the best solutions for the joint warfighter.

Fires…Achieving Multi-Domain Battle (MDB): Over the past two decades, China has developed numerous ground and air launched missile systems that far outrange U.S. systems. They have done this at a fraction of the cost of some of our more expensive systems. Constrained in part by our adherence to the INF treaty, the U.S. has fallen behind in our ability to match the long-range fires capabilities of the new era. China is not a signatory to the INF treaty and the other main signatory, Russia, has repeatedly violated the treaty as they develop capabilities that could prevent the U.S. from fulfilling its alliance obligations.

Just as our adversaries have adapted to counter our asymmetric advantages, we, too must adapt the way we fight to leverage new technologies and approaches to operations to maintain our edge. We need systems that are fast, long-range, lethal, survivable, networked, rapidly deployable, and maneuverable. Given existing technology, such systems should be relatively inexpensive.

With this in mind that I have become a strong advocate for the operational concept known as Multi-Domain Battle (MDB). The Deputy Secretary of Defense has called MDB, "the first operational concept of the third offset." MDB is the ultimate joint concept that allows a commander to achieve cross-domain effects. Because of this, it gives a commander multiple options from across the joint force and confuses our adversaries by making them face multiple dilemmas. MDB calls for combined arms operations across all domains with joint force capabilities being brought to bear in the long-range fight as well as close combat. Recognizing that we may no longer be able to maintain broad sea and air control as we did in the past, one benefit of MDB in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is the addition of ground, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and cyber forces operating across archipelagic regions to augment sea and air forces to create temporal pockets of dominance that can be exploited to gain tactical and operational advantage.

We already have much of the capability for MDB in our force. However, one of the biggest capability gaps in terms of joint effects is the lack of connectivity between the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Army's THAAD and Patriot Systems, and the USMC's C2 systems. I know the Services are working on this problem. The technology is out there and the proof is in the lethal systems developed by our adversaries. More importantly, MDB requires a new jointness to bring it all together. MDB conceptualizes bringing jointness further down to the tactical levels allowing smaller echelons to communicate and coordinate directly while fighting in a decentralized manner that still allows for clearance of fires and deconfliction of efforts. I have tasked my component commands at USPACOM to test this operational concept in a major exercise. We are well on our way to meeting that goal thanks to a great team of service component commanders and their organizations.

Strategic Force Posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific

The tyranny of distance and short indications and warnings timelines place a premium on robust, modern, and agile forward-stationed forces at high levels of readiness. USPACOM requires a force posture that credibly communicates U.S. resolve, strengthens alliances and partnerships, prevents conflict, and in the event of crisis, responds rapidly across the full range of military operations. USPACOM's force posture is also supplemented by the deployment of rotational forces and the fielding of new capabilities and concepts that address operational shortfalls and critical gaps.

Global Force Management (GFM): The Department of Defense is continuing several GFM initiatives that include adding the Navy's newest airborne early warning and control aircraft, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, to the USS RONALD REAGAN Strike Group in Japan, and increasing the presence of ballistic missile defense-capable surface ships. The Army is stationing a THAAD battery in South Korea and maintains the rotation of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), plus enabling forces, to the Korean Peninsula. The Army also continues to support collective training and forward presence across the region through Pacific Pathways, thus enhancing partnership opportunities, avoiding permanent basing, and increasing Army readiness. The Air Force deploys a broad range of assets to the region, including F-22s, F-16s, E-8s, RC-135s and strategic bombers, including B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers, to maintain presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The forward stationing and deployment of 5th generation airframes to the region continues to be a priority for USPACOM – notably the Marine Corps has deployed the first F-35B squadron based in Japan. The Marine Corps continues to execute a reduction in the footprint on Japan by distribution of the capability across the region. Rotational forces west of the International Date Line are positioned to deter and defeat potential aggressors in the region.

Force Posture Initiatives: As geopolitical issues and challenges in the security environment continue to evolve, the importance of infrastructure recapitalization and the fielding of advanced capabilities have increased. In support of USPACOM's ability to execute national tasking and meet national objectives, fiscal year 2017 military construction projects support the arrival of next-generation platforms and capabilities to include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Kadena Air Base, Japan), DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class Destroyers (San Diego, California and forward operating locales), RQ-4 Global Hawk (Andersen Air Base, Guam), and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft (Yokota Air Base, Japan). Other investments support increased resiliency for the joint force via projects in Japan, Guam, and Australia, increased critical munitions storage capacity in California and Guam, and quality of life investments for our forces and their families in South Korea and Japan.

Host country support at established locations remains robust. Two examples of this include our efforts in Korea (Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan), and Japan (Okinawa

Consolidation and the Defense Policy Review Initiative). In support of these initiatives, the Government of Japan committed up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations. This funding includes approximately $300M for the joint military training ranges Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas (CNMI). Additionally, the Government of Japan committed $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. Finally, The Japan is also funding Okinawa Consolidation and the Futenma Replacement Facility at ~$4 billion. Outside of the above initiatives, Japan and Korea continue to provide other support, which play a critical role in supporting U.S. presence in the region.

Furthermore, USPACOM is expanding its activities to include the continued execution of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) in Australia, and Bilateral Air Contingent Events-Philippines (BACE-P. Additionally, we are attempting to increase presence by seeking the assignment of additional ISR and BMD assets in the region.

USPACOM continues to execute five major force posture initiatives: (1) U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) / USMC Distributed Laydown, (2) U.S. Forces Korea Realignment, (3) Resiliency, (4) Agile Logistics and (5) Agile Communications.

DPRI/USMC Distributed Laydown: DPRI is a vital part of the larger U.S. military Integrated Global Basing and Presence Strategy. A major goal of DPRI is to create an environment that supports the enduring presence of U.S. forces in Japan. USPACOM maintains significant focus and effort on these initiatives. DPRI is one of the largest construction efforts since the end of the Cold War. Much work by both the U.S and Japan remain, but progress is being made towards realigning U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and build-up of facilities at other locations such as Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni.

Another critical cooperative effort, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab/Henoko, will enable the U.S. to fulfill its security obligations to Japan while also enabling the return of MCAS Futenma to Okinawa. More than ever before, U.S. troop presence in Okinawa matters today. The presence of U.S. forces brings unique capabilities that cannot be replicated. So it was encouraging to see the 10 February joint statement between President Trump and Japan Prime Minister Abe that reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to construct the FRF. This solution maintains our presence at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma for another decade until the FRF is completed.

USFK Realignment: The consolidation of U.S. forces in Korea via the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) continues to move ahead and is a success story. Construction will triple the size of Camp Humphreys and increase the base's population to ~46,000 troops and family members. The ROK is bearing the majority of the relocation's cost,

committing $10 billion. USPACOM appreciates the Congress' continued support of DOD's largest peace-time relocation project.

Resiliency: USPACOM resiliency efforts include investment in a more robust infrastructure in ally and partner countries, ensuring proper dispersal and optimization of critical enablers including communication nodes, fuel repositories, medical readiness, logistic support equipment and infrastructure, and the hardening of discrete facilities. For example, USPACOM continues to harden facilities in Guam as well as enhancing airfields at dispersed sites throughout the theater.

Agile Logistics: USPACOM continues to face significant force posture challenges, the largest being the distance and fragility of the lines of communication within the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The tyranny of distance and short timelines to respond to crises require investment in infrastructure to properly preposition capabilities and capacity throughout the region. Ensuring that our logistics – munitions, fuel, and other war materiel – are properly prepositioned, secured, and available to meet requirements is essential to providing flexible and rapid force closure in support of national defense planning.

Agile Communications: The ability to communicate with our allies and partners underpins all efforts from command and control interoperability through logistics coordination. Today's Defense communications systems continue to be hampered by obsolete encryption technology that forces us to build or contort information networks to comply with restrictive information sharing policies. Our acquisition systems cannot support the pace of rapid information technology advancements. As a result, we are not fully postured with the latest technology to interoperate with multiple partner combinations over all the phases of military operations. Furthermore, we will not have the communication capacity and sharable encryption capability to support the most modern warfighting platforms and associated weapon systems as they are built and deployed.

Readiness: USPACOM is a "fight tonight" theater with short response timelines across vast spaces. Threats as discussed earlier require U.S. military forces in the region maintain a high level of readiness to respond rapidly to crisis. USPACOM's readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which place a premium on forward-stationed, ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations' militaries and follow-on forces able to respond to operational contingencies.

Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date Line increase decision space and decrease response times, bolster the confidence of allies and partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential adversaries.

The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces is an asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. Over the past two decades of war, the U.S. has of necessity prioritized the readiness of deploying forces at the expense of follow-on-forces and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A shortage of ready surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed maintenance periods due to sequestration, and training pipeline shortfalls limit responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly increase risk. These challenges grow each year as our forces downsize while continuing to deploy at unprecedented rates. We are at risk of overstressing the force if the Services are not assured fiscal stability to establish conditions to reset their force elements.

Fiscal uncertainty requires the Department to accept risk in long-term engagement opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S. relations and prestige. Continued budget uncertainty and changes in fiscal assumptions in the FYDP degrade USPACOM's ability to plan and program, leading to sub-optimal utilization of resources. Services must be able to develop and execute long-term programs for modernization while meeting current readiness needs. Budgetary constraints have limited procurement and fielding of 5th generation fighter aircraft (F-35) in sufficient quantities to maintain pace with potential adversary advancements. Modernization of 4th generation aircraft (F-15, F-16, F/A-18) is essential to prevent capability gaps. Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II and during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure requires investment to extend its service life but the Services struggle to maintain infrastructure sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts at appropriate levels. If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will experience reduced warfighting capabilities and increased challenges in pacing maturing adversary threats.

Allies and Partners

Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships are top USPACOM priorities. USPACOM's forward presence, force posture, and readiness reassure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to a stable and secure Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM is building a network of likeminded nations committed to the current rules-based order that is anchored by our treaty allies. Partnerships with many other countries and organizations create an environment of cooperation that allows us to work together on the shared challenges we face.

Bilateral and Multinational "Partnerships with a Purpose": USPACOM is directly connected to regional leaders. I am in frequent communication with my regional counterparts and appreciate the ability to reach out at any time to share perspectives. USPACOM maintains a close link with allies and partners through staff exchange and liaison officers, in addition to a series of formal bilateral mechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty obligations, and are guided by USPACOM's principal bilateral event with Australia, the

Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM's military-to-military relationship with Japan is guided by the annual Japan Senior Leader Seminar. Military Committee and Security Consultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanisms that guide the ROK and U.S. alliance. Each year, USPACOM, with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board to deal with 21st-century challenges. USPACOM conducts annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to address security concerns and reinforce U.S. commitment to democratic principles. Formal bilateral mechanisms also exist with non-alliance partners throughout the region, including India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

Our multilateral cooperation is further enhanced by numerous Flag and General Officer (FOGO) exchange officers that work for the U.S. at USPACOM. These foreign officers from our "Five Eye" (FVEY) partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) serve under my Command as fully integrated members of the USPACOM team. Our operations and intelligence watch centers are FVEY environments. Our service components also have embedded FOGOs serving as Deputy Commanders and senior staff officers.

The future lies in multilateral security mechanisms. USPACOM is broadening key bilateral relationships into multilateral partnerships with a purpose that will more effectively address shared security concerns. For example, U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in response to North Korean provocative behavior is improving. The ROK and Japan each recognize that provocative actions by North Korea will not be isolated to the peninsula and greater coordination and cooperation are required. Historical tensions between the nations have lessened and cooperation and collaboration with the ROK have improved. U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation is benefitting from these developments. The November 2016 signing of the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is a major accomplishment in improving bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and lays an essential foundation for expanding cooperation enabling the U.S. to work more closely with both allies. This cooperation also led to two successful U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral missile defense information link maritime exercises in 2016. I look forward to increasing the frequency and complexity of trilateral information sharing while simultaneously enhancing trilateral security cooperation.

To encourage multilateral cooperation, USPACOM hosts the Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHODs) annually. The CHODs conference location normally rotates between Hawaii and a regional partner. In 2016, 31 countries attended the CHODs conference in Manila, Philippines. USPACOM also participates in Australia-Japan-U.S. trilateral defense dialogues, including the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF). The 2017 conference will be held in Victoria, British Columbia, in September.

The trilateral relationship between the U.S., Japan, and India is growing stronger. All three countries share democratic values, interests in protecting sea lanes of commerce, and respect for international law. The three sides launched a trilateral HA/DR working group at the first Ministerial meeting in 2015 and agreed to establish a maritime domain awareness working group. On the security front, all three countries participate in India's increasingly complex annual Malabar military exercise as well as the multinational Rim of the Pacific exercise. As a next step, USPACOM is encouraging the addition of Australia to form a quadrilateral partnership with a purpose. India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. working together will be a force for the maintenance of the Global Operating System.

Allies

Australia: The U.S.-Australia alliance anchors peace and stability in the region. Australia plays a leading role in regional security, capacity-building efforts and addressing disaster response. Australia is a key contributor to global security and a significant contributor to counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria and the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With the implementation of force posture initiatives, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin successfully completed its fifth deployment while increasing its presence from 1,177 to 1,250 U.S. Marines. The sixth deployment began this month and will include four MV-22 Osprey aircraft, providing a more robust capability. Cooperative activities under Enhanced Air Cooperation, another force posture initiative, formally commenced in February 2017 with the deployment of F-22 aircraft to northern Australia. The U.S. and Australia are increasing collaboration in counter-terrorism, space, cyber, integrated air missile defense, and regional capacity building. Australia is procuring high-tech U.S. platforms that will further increase interoperability. These include the F-35A Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, EA-18G Growler, Global Hawk UAVs, and MH-60R helicopters. To enhance interoperability, the Australian Government provides a General Officer and Senior Executive (civilian) to USPACOM and a General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific on a full-time basis. Australia has also set a goal of reaching 2% of its GDP on defense spending over the next decade.

Japan: The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone for peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Operational cooperation and collaboration between USPACOM and the Japan Joint Staff continue to increase. Japan's Peace and Security Legislation authorizing limited collective self-defense and the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation have significantly increased Japan's ability to contribute to regional stability more broadly. Japan continues to support USPACOM activities to maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and remains concerned about Chinese activities in the East China Sea.

Republic of Korea (ROK): The U.S.-ROK alliance remains ironclad. We continue to work with our ROK allies as they move toward obtaining the capabilities required under the

Conditions Based OPCON Transition Plan (COT-P). In response to the evolving threat posed by North Korea, the U.S. and the ROK made an Alliance decision to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the ROK to improve the Alliance missile defense posture. North Korea's provocative actions, and its refusal to engage in authentic and credible negotiations on denuclearization, compelled our Alliance to take defensive measures. The decision to deploy THAAD to the Korean Peninsula is based solely on our commitment to defend our allies and our forces from the North Korean threat.

The Philippines: The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains resolute. Through frank and frequent dialogue with Philippine leadership we continue to maintain a robust defense relationship comprised of 258 activities for calendar year 2017, which include joint and service-to-service exercises. All plans, activities, exercises, and construction in the Philippines are done in close coordination with, and with the full approval of, Philippine leadership. On January 12, 2016, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the new Philippine administration is also supportive of this agreement. Project development at various Philippine bases will improve interoperability and build partner capacity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Maritime Security, Maritime Domain Awareness, and HA/DR capabilities. We remain committed to supporting the AFP to counter-terrorism not only in the Southern Philippines, but in the tri-border area in Sulu and Celebes Seas. At the request of several Philippine administrations, Special Operation Command Pacific (SOCPAC) continues to provide counter-terrorism support and assistance. We will continue to consult with the Government of the Philippines and tailor our activities and assistance to address our shared security concerns. I am convinced that with some strategic patience and mutual respect, our Philippine alliance will remain strong and continue to stabilize the region as it has for over 60 years.

Thailand: The longstanding U.S.-Thailand alliance is supported by deep bilateral military-to-military ties that go back to our 1950 Agreement Respecting Military Assistance between the Government of the united States of America and Government of Thailand. Thailand offers unique training opportunities and essential logistical nodes for our forces. The most significant exercise being Cobra Gold, the largest multilateral military exercise in Southeast Asia. I spoke at the opening ceremony for this year's exercise in February and reiterated U.S. commitment to Thailand. Thailand is committed to a return to democracy with national elections in 2018, and we remain important alliance partners. I remain convinced that the best way for the U.S.to promote security and healthy civil-military relations in Thailand is to engage more, not less, with Thai military leadership.

Partners

India: India continues to emerge as a significant strategic partnership in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. In June 2016, India was designated as a Major Defense Partner to the U.S. This declaration is unique to India and places it on the same level as many of our closest allies for the purposes of defense trade and technology sharing. U.S. and Indian militaries participated together in three major exercises and more than 50 other military exchanges this past year, in addition to conducting a joint-course in peacekeeping for ten African partners. We signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) after more than a decade of negotiation to further deepen our military-to-military relationship and serve as a force multiplier during exercises and real world HA/DR operations. We also held our first annual 2+2 U.S.-India Maritime Security Dialogue last year to help identify and implement our common strategic interests. The US-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) continues to expand opportunities for cooperation, adding new working groups to focus on areas of mutual interest. Defense sales are at an all-time high with U.S.-sourced airframes, such as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s and CH-47s. We recently concluded a deal for 145 M777 howitzers. USPACOM will continue to advance the partnership with India as the "new normal" by strengthening our relationship and working toward additional enabling agreements that enhance interoperability between our forces.

Indonesia: Indonesia plays an essential role in the security architecture of the region. We maintain a robust defense relationship comprising 221 activities for calendar year 2017. USPACOM continues to partner with Indonesia, particularly in maritime security. Indonesia desires to play a larger role in international economic and security issues. Their goal to provide 4,000 deployable peacekeeping troops by 2020 is another important area where we can engage. Indonesia continues to build and exercise in strategic maritime border areas to bolster its defense capabilities, and has concerns with Chinese activities in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands.

Malaysia: Our close security ties with Malaysia are based on our Comprehensive Partnership. Malaysia's regional leadership role, technologically advanced industry, sizeable economy, and capable military make it an important partner in securing peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. We continue to assist Malaysia in building an amphibious force to address non-traditional threats in and around their territorial waters. Malaysia has reached a trilateral agreement with the Philippines and Indonesia for improving the maritime security environment in the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Malaysia also has an on-going dispute with China with respect to the Luconia Shoals, which China also claims. Nevertheless, Malaysia has demonstrated the capacity and resolve to contribute to regional security, and we continue to support Malaysia's emerging maritime security requirements.

Mongolia: Mongolia endures as a small yet strong partner in Northeast Asia and continues to demonstrate staunch support for U.S. regional and global policy objectives – especially those linked to the Global Peace Operations Initiative and security operations in Afghanistan. The government engages with the U.S. and other countries as part of their "Third Neighbor" policy. Mongolia also markets itself as a model for emerging democratic countries such as Burma, Nepal, and Timor Leste. I visited Mongolia last summer and spoke at the KHAAN QUEST 2016 closing ceremony, reaffirming that USPACOM's goals are to assist the Mongolian Armed Forces through their defense reform priorities to include development of professional military education for officers and non-commissioned officers, developing a professional NCO corps, and developing an Air Force and ready reserve force. The Mongolians punch above their weight and we should continue to support them where we can.

New Zealand: Our military-to-military relationship has reached new heights over the past two years, despite longstanding differences over nuclear policy. Relations remain strong and are the most encouraging in decades. The November 2016 visit of the USS SAMPSON (DDG 102), the first ship visit to New Zealand in more than thirty years, marked a new milestone. New Zealand remains a respected voice in international politics and a leader in the South Pacific that shares common security concerns with the U.S., including the need to address terrorism, transnational crime, and maritime security.

Singapore: A key strategic partner in Southeast Asia, we depend on Singapore for its insights on regional dynamics and its support to U.S. security priorities. Singapore has been a major security cooperation partner for over a decade and provides us invaluable access including hosting of Littoral Combat Ships, Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft, and the Seventh Fleet's Logistics Force headquarters. Recently, our partnership expanded into new areas including cyber security and counter-proliferation. We conduct dozens of military exercises with Singapore each year and Singaporean military officers regularly attend U.S. professional military education. This combination of forward deployed forces, logistics, and deep training relationships contributes to readiness, builds deeper ties and allows the U.S. to promote maritime security and stability with regional partners.

Sri Lanka: President Sirisena, elected in January 2016, is serious about addressing Sri Lanka's human rights issues. Throughout the last year he continued Sri Lanka's path toward reconciliation and democracy following its civil war. I believe it is in America's interest to increase military collaboration and cooperation with Sri Lankan forces. Accordingly, I visited Sri Lanka last November – the first 4-star to do so since 2008. USPACOM has expanded military leadership discussions, rule of law training, increased naval engagement, and focused security cooperation efforts on defense institution building in areas such as demobilizing and military professionalism. I look forward to continuing to expand our relationship in the future

Vietnam: Vietnam continues to expand cooperation with the U.S. at a moderate, but steady pace. USPACOM provides support for Vietnam's modernization and capacity building, focusing on maritime security, peacekeeping, and disaster response. The U.S. will transfer maritime security vessels including maintenance and training packages to Vietnam's Coast Guard over the next few years, which will build their capacity for maritime domain awareness. In addition, we are discussing a proposal to improve our mutual ability to cooperate in the field of HA/DR as well as enhance ongoing bilateral cooperative activities.

Other Key Actors

Oceania: Maintaining strategic influence in Oceania is becoming ever more important to U.S. national security. The provisions included in the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are important mechanisms that guide the relationships, including U.S. obligations for their defense. In return, these agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or deny access to another nation's military forces which allows the U.S. to maintain a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. I strongly urge Congress to pass legislation to approve and implement the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement at the earliest opportunity. The passage of this legislation will have a significant impact on our defense relationship with Palau, and will provide a measurable advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific. Continued U.S. commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner with other Pacific island countries enhances American influence and sends a strong message of reassurance throughout the region.

ASEAN: ASEAN turns 50 this year and the U.S. will commemorate the 40th year of U.S.-ASEAN dialogue relations. The U.S. and ASEAN share the common principles of a rules-based order, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The ten ASEAN member states, under the chairmanship of Laos last year and the Philippines this year, continue to seek ways to improve multilateral security engagements and advance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. During this past year, the U.S. strengthened its commitment to ASEAN with engagements at the Secretary of Defense and Presidential levels where agreement on whole-of-government approaches to shared challenges in areas of maritime security and maritime domain awareness were reached. Throughout the past year USPACOM participated in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements, and practical multilateral cooperation related to the spectrum of shared transnational challenges. Malaysia and the U.S. will co-chair the ASEAN Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief with Malaysia over the next three years.

Burma: Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy's election victory was a historic milestone. While challenges remain during the transition to civilian leadership, USPACOM's

goal is to support and empower the civilian government, while encouraging the professionalization of its military. Our assistance through defense engagement programs is designed to bring together civilian and military officials to promote cooperation and understanding. These limited programs also promote the development of a professional military in a democratic system of government and broaden the exposure of isolated military officials to international norms of conduct and civilian control.

China: The U.S.-China relationship remains complex. While Chinese actions and provocations create tension in the region, there are also opportunities for cooperation. USPACOM's approach to China is to cooperate where we can to collectively address our shared security challenges, but remain ready to confront its provocative actions where we must. USPACOM's engagements with the People's Liberation Army, governed by section 1201 of the FY2000 NDAA, improve transparency and reduce risk of unintended incidents.

USPACOM conducted numerous bilateral and numerous multilateral engagements last year with China. USPACOM co-led the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) plenary and working group focused on operational safety in November 2016. Encounters between our forces at sea and in the air are generally safe, but the MMCA provides a forum for continuous dialogue to identify and address safety issues when they arise.

Areas of common interest that allow military cooperation include counter piracy, military medicine, and disaster response. USPACOM forces participated in the annual Disaster Management Exchange with the People's Liberation Army in Kunming, China designed to share HA/DR lessons learned from real world events. USPACOM encourages China's participation in international efforts to address shared challenges in a manner consistent with international law and standards.

Taiwan: Democratic elections in January 2016 reflect the shared values between Taiwan and the U.S. The U.S. maintains its unofficial relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan and we continue supporting Taiwan's security. USPACOM will continue to fulfill U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. Continued, regular arms sales and training for Taiwan's military are an important part of that policy and help ensure the preservation of democratic institutions. As the military spending and capability of the PRC grow every year, the ability of Taiwan to defend itself decreases. We must continue to help Taiwan defend itself and demonstrate U.S. resolve that any attempt by China to force reunification on the people of Taiwan is unacceptable.

Activities, Direct Reporting Units, and Mission Partners

Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM's Security Cooperation approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing partner capability gaps, and building partner capacity. One of the more powerful engagement resource tools is the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF enables USPACOM to meet regional challenges to include border security issues, disaster response, counterterrorism, and maritime security.

USPACOM will continue to leverage the FY16 NDAA section 1263 "Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative" authority to enhance maritime domain awareness and maritime capacities and capabilities of partners and allies in the South China Sea region, through assistance to, and training of, partner and allied country maritime security forces.

USPACOM will continue to rely on FMF as a source of providing major end items to eligible countries. MSI support notified pursuant to the Section 1263 authority should be viewed as complementary and additive in nature to these FMF plans. Under MSI, PACOM plans to provide niche capabilities, more multi-mission types of equipment, and connective tissue that will help partners better deploy and employ these maritime security capabilities – both domestically to protect their sovereign territory and as a means of fostering greater regional interoperability.

Additionally, USPACOM is looking forward to leveraging the consolidated Security Cooperation authority in FY17 NDAA as a responsive tool for building partner capacity as security situations and relationships evolve. I am concerned the changes in the FY17 NDAA could impact both operational support to foreign law enforcement and capacity building efforts focused on countering narcotics flows and transnational crime. We are currently working with the rest of the Department of Defense to develop the policies needed to implement this new law.

Maritime Domain Awareness: Southeast Asian partners support U.S. security cooperation efforts in the area of maritime domain awareness. USPACOM will continue to leverage MSI and the new Section 1263 authority and other existing authorities to develop multilateral approaches to information sharing to develop a regional maritime picture. USPACOM and the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (DKI APCSS) co-hosted a policy level workshop on best practice for information sharing. Additionally, the Philippines, Australia, and the U.S. co-hosted an operational level workshop to discuss regional maritime security best practices. These workshops facilitate whole-of-government discussions on maritime challenges that support creation of a regional maritime domain awareness network to share information between Southeast Asian partners. USPACOM will continue to support these workshops to improve regional awareness. We need to go beyond Maritime Domain Awareness to improve our partners' and allies' multi-domain awareness and increase their domain denial capability so that they can better protect their territory and enforce their maritime rights.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Indo-Asia-Pacific countries provide over 30% of the world's uniformed peacekeepers to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide and of these peacekeepers, 62% of the peacekeepers come from the 12 GPOI partners in the Indo-Asia-Pacific where they support 15 of the 16 UN peacekeeping missions. Not only is GPOI helping to build the capability and capacity of our partners to deploy forces, the USPACOM GPOI is focused on providing high-quality, action-oriented, challenging scenario-based training so that peacekeepers are better prepared to implement the mandates contained in UN Security Council Resolutions – protecting vulnerable civilians, halting conflict-related sexual violence, working to put a stop to the use of children soldiers, addressing misconduct and trying to bring long-term peace and security to conflict torn regions. Partners are working towards meeting program goals of achieving self-sustaining, indigenous training capability. Most recently in March 2017, USPACOM and Nepal cohosted Shanti Prayas-3 – a multinational peacekeeping exercise – training personnel from 34 countries for deployment to UN peacekeeping missions. USPACOM will continue improving partner military peacekeeping skills and operational readiness and provide limited training facility refurbishment. This program not only supports our efforts to improve UN peacekeeping, it is also helping to strengthen interoperability with U.S. forces and builds the trust required to improve interoperability in other relevant areas.

Joint Exercise Program: USPACOM's Joint Exercise Program deliberately synchronizes frequent, relevant, and meaningful readiness exercises and engagements across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region to ensure the joint force is prepared for crises and contingency operations. This important joint exercise program, funded through the Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement Training Transformation (CE2T2) program, provides the critical means and enablers to improve readiness of forward deployed assigned forces. It also advances many Theater Campaign Plan objectives to include strengthening our alliances and partnerships while sustaining USPACOM's military preeminence. USPACOM appreciates Congress' continued support of these important programs to maintain progress made in joint readiness.

Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W): The drug trade in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is a growing concern that threatens regional stability as drug trafficking organizations expand into new markets and develop new and disturbing partnerships across the globe. USPACOM combats drug trafficking in the region through JIATF-W by disrupting flows of drugs and precursor chemicals that transit the region and hardens the theater against the continued growth of transnational criminal organizations.

Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian chemical producers continue to be the primary source of precursors for synthetic drugs, including powerful synthetic opioids like fentanyl, as well as more traditional drugs like cocaine and heroin. JIATF-W identifies avenues of cooperation with the government of China on this issue to assist U.S. law enforcement with seizures of these

chemicals and drugs. JIATF-W identified and tracked chemical flows resulting in the seizure of roughly 140,000 kilograms of methamphetamine precursor chemicals in 2016.

As demonstrated by its effect on the Philippines, the illicit drug trade can have far reaching, and even strategic impacts. The internal pressures caused by criminal organizations and their operations, as well as the associated corruption and the demands placed on society by the need for treatment and prosecution, can and do cause enormous stress on governance. These stresses ultimately affect U.S. interests in the region. JIATF-W continues to build partner capacity to counter illicit trafficking of narcotics in the coastal areas of the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and the border regions of Bangladesh and Thailand.

In Australia, cocaine prices reach ten times the retail prices in the U.S., providing a strong incentive for drug traffickers to expand their reach across the Pacific. The drug trade feeds enormous amounts of cash back into the Mexican and South American drug cartels. This, in turn, contributes to challenges faced by our law enforcement agencies on the Southwest border. JIATF-W works closely with agencies throughout the South Pacific, including the French Armed Forces in Polynesia, as well as both Australian and New Zealand law enforcement, military and intelligence services to counter this lucrative drug trade.

Center for Excellence for Disaster Management (CFE-DM): CFE-DM increases capacity of U.S. and partner nation military forces to respond effectively to disasters through its education training and applied research and information sharing programs. The Center annually trains about 8,000 military and civilian annually. This includes training deployable forces and foreign audiences. Broad based partnerships encourage a robust collection of best practices.

The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS): While DKI APCSS is no longer a Direct Reporting Unit to USPACOM, I have formally designated it as a "Mission Partner" to underscore its importance to the USPACOM mission set. DKI APCSS builds and sustains key regional partnerships and partner nation capacity and in enhances cooperation on regional security challenges. The Center's courses, workshops, dialogues, and alumni engagements directly support OSD-Policy and USPACOM priorities and are integrated into USPACOM's Theater Campaign Order. Focus areas include rule-of-law based governance emphasizing civilian oversight of militaries, defense institution building, enhancing regional security architecture – particularly ASEAN, collaborative approaches to maritime security and domain awareness and counterterrorism, and improved capability and cooperation in HADR. DKI APCSS has major competitive advantages in location, credibility, convening power, and alumni network. Those advantages and the Center's focus on substantive and sustainable outcomes have broadly improved security sector governance. Specifically, this organization is leading DOD in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Women, Peace, and Security) and the U.S. National Action Plan to achieve greater inclusion of women in the security sector.

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC): U.S. Transportation Command's JECC responds rapidly and effectively to events in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. JECC's support is critical to USPACOM's ability to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill Global Response Force (GRF) execution, and bridge joint operational requirements by providing mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages. JECC supports real-world real world contingencies and operational plans.

Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs): USPACOM continues to view LSAs as critical Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) enablers. We have 14 agreements in the region, to include the recent agreement with India. We continue to actively work with eligible but as yet uncommitted partners to conclude as many of these agreements as possible, and I personally stress their importance in my engagements with partner country leadership. The logistics agreement with Japan was especially useful during the Kumamoto earthquake disaster, and I often share this experience with our other partners.

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS): PASOLS is an annual forum that brings together senior logisticians from 30 countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The goal is to strengthen regional cooperation, improve interoperability, and develop partner capacity to cooperatively address regional challenges. Singapore hosted PASOLS 45 in November 2016. PASOLS is our most important annual logistics engagement event.

Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS): PALS is an annual forum that brings together senior leaders of allied and partner nations throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific to discuss key aspects amphibious operations, capabilities, crisis response, and interoperability. 22 countries participated in PALS 2017, which was hosted by the Republic of Korea Marine Corps.

Conclusion

U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are real and enduring. The growing challenges to our interests are daunting and cannot be overstated. In order to deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we must continue to invest in critical capabilities, build a force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities and increases our resiliency, and reassure our allies and partners while encouraging them to be full and cooperative partners in their own defense and the defense of the rules-based international order. Our allies and partners are hedging and need reassurance. We must demonstrate our commitment in actions. The good news is that America's resolve is strong. I ask this committee to continue support for future capabilities that maintain our edge and prevent would-be challengers from gaining the upper hand.

Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our families who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific – a region critical to America's future.

Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr.
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Admiral Harris was born in Japan and reared in Tennessee and Florida. Following graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1978 and designation as a naval flight officer, he was assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP) 44. His subsequent operational tours include tactical action officer aboard USS Saratoga (CV 60); operations officer in Patrol Squadron (VP) 4 at Barbers Point, Hawaii; three tours with Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 1 at Kami Seya, Japan; director of operations for U.S. 5th Fleet at Manama, Bahrain; and director of operations for U.S. Southern Command.

Harris commanded Patrol Squadron (VP) 46, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 1, Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, the U.S. 6th Fleet, Striking and Support Forces NATO, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Harris has served in every geographic combatant command region, and participated in the following major operations: S.S. Achille Lauro terrorist hijacking incident, Attain Document III (Libya, 1986), Earnest Will (Kuwaiti reflagged tanker ops, 1987-88), Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Willing Spirit (Colombia hostage rescue, 2006-7) and Odyssey Dawn (Libya, 2011). For Odyssey Dawn, he served as the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander afloat.

Harris' graduate education focused on East Asia security. He attended Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, and Oxford University. He was a MIT Seminar 21 fellow.

Harris' staff assignments include aide to commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan; chief speechwriter for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); and three tours on the Navy Staff, including as an action officer in the Strategic Concepts Branch, director for the current operations and anti-terrorism/force protection division, and deputy chief of naval operations (CNO) for Communication Networks (OPNAV N6).

In October 2011, he was assigned as the assistant to the CJCS where he served as the Chairman's direct representative to the secretary of state and as the U.S. roadmap monitor for the Mid-East Peace Process. Harris was promoted to Admiral and assumed command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in October 2013. He was designated as the Theater Joint Force Maritime Component commander. In May 2015, he assumed command of the U.S. Pacific Command.

Harris has logged 4,400 flight hours, including more than 400 combat hours, in maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. His personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal (2 awards), Defense Superior Service Medal (3 awards), Legion of Merit (3 awards), the Bronze Star (2 awards), the Air Medal (1 strike/flight), and the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award. He is a recipient of the Navy League's Stephen Decatur, the CIA's Agency Seal Medal, the Ellis Island Medal of Honor, and APAICS Lifetime Achievement awards. He is the Navy's current "Gray Owl" – the NFO who has held this designation for the longest period.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 26, 2017

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL VINCENT K. BROOKS
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND;
AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
IN SUPPORT OF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND'S TESIMONY
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

April 26, 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

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1. Introduction

Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture of our forces and operations in Korea. On behalf of the military members, government civilians, and family members of the United Nations Command (UNC), the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) and United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the United States Forces Korea (USFK), I thank the committee for your continued support.

I am honored to submit this statement on the first anniversary of my assumption of command in late April 2016. A year of fast-paced, high-stakes activity -- including the most active period in the years of Kim Jong Un's rule in terms of missile launches, capability development, nuclear coercion, and attempts at intimidation -- led to a broad review of the situation and our approach to addressing it. From the review, three key conclusions emerged.

First, the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance, of which the military relationship is the centerpiece or heart, proved to be strong and resilient under incessant pressure.

Second, our deterrence efforts continue to serve as a bulwark for regional stability, successfully preserving the 64-year old Armistice that has prevented a resumption of combat. Yet, the same efforts have proven insufficient to deter the broadening threats (particularly intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a weaponized nuclear capability) to our northeast Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, as well as the U.S. homeland and territories.

Third, our efforts to increase regional cooperation, to deepen the extent to which we operate in a combined fashion with the R.O.K. Armed Forces, and increased participation of United Nations Command Sending States in exercises and exchanges, are bearing fruit.

2. The Three Commands

USFK, CFC, and UNC offer distinct yet complementary platforms to support American interests and honor commitments in Korea and the Asia-Pacific. The cultivation of each of these three distinct Commands is critical, bringing not only clarity, but also better alignment of the resources to support the operations and capabilities of each Command with its respective mission and strategy. Understanding the distinctions among the commands is important.

USFK -- living proof of America's commitment to South Korea -- is a unilateral subordinate unified command of U.S. Pacific Command with a command and staff structure that guides and directs U.S. military activities from all services on the Korean Peninsula and assists the U.S. Ambassador with representing U.S. interests to the Republic of Korea.

CFC -- the heart of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance -- is a bilateral warfighting command that provides the structure for U.S. and R.O.K. militaries to secure Korea's future together under a common command, led by the senior U.S. general.

UNC-- the home for international commitments to the Korean Peninsula -- is a multinational unified command founded in 1950 to fight the Korean War under U.S. leadership and U.N. authority, now responsible for 64 years of armistice maintenance and much more. The command remains useful as it is a standing mechanism to help like-minded nations contribute unique capabilities before, during, and after conflict.

Each of the three Commands is engaged in ongoing actions aimed toward improving the security and prosperity of South Korea and northeast Asia.

3. Current Situation

a. North Korea. Kim Jong Un is determined to sustain his regime and the Kim family dynasty, even at great expense to the North Korean state and people. North Korea's top priority is the development of a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent any external intervention in North Korean affairs. The regime believes that it can dictate its own terms internationally if it can sufficiently check the military capabilities of the United States, South Korea, and other countries in the region while holding the homelands of each at risk through its nuclear arsenal and threats of employment. The cohesion among the five parties (China, Russia, U.S., R.O.K., and Japan) who could drive North Korea to the negotiating table remains a target for Kim Jong Un to disrupt – sowing friction and fissures among the five in order to buy time for capability development.

During the past year, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests and an unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches. These tests included the first test flight of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and successful testing of North Korea's developmental Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).

North Korea also garrisons much of its combat power – including its long-range artillery forces – in forward areas, maintaining the capability to do extensive damage to the Seoul metropolitan area, a modern "megacity" of over 25 million people. Furthermore, it continues to invest in asymmetric capabilities such as special operations forces and cyber capabilities. The North's special operations forces are its best trained and equipped units and its cyber capabilities are maturing, with cyberwarfare operators capable of conducting a variety of offensive operations including computer network attack and network exploitation.

It is my view that the Alliance's most effective response is for our alliance militaries to remain deeply committed, well-integrated, highly capable, and ever-ready. The Alliance has taken a series of steps -- B-52 and B-1 overflights of Osan Air Base and the Demilitarized Zone; naval operations in the waters off Korea's east coast; the deployment of carrier strike groups led by the USS *John C. Stennis* and later the USS *Carl Vinson* to the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula at different times in the last year; a combined R.O.K.-U.S. visit to view U.S. strategic assets in Guam, including the ballistic missile submarine USS *Pennsylvania*; and the Alliance deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Together, these actions send a persistent, deterrent message to the North while assuring our allies of our committed presence and our extended deterrence beyond the forward presence.

Each North Korean provocation strengthens the will of the international community to stand together against North Korea's illicit activities, the expansion of its offensive military capabilities, and its human rights abuses. UNC, CFC, and USFK have made important military contributions to support the diplomatic, information, and economic-focused responses of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance. These responses deter North Korean conventional attack and weapons of mass destruction use and continue to assure the R.O.K. public and our international partners.

b. Regional Considerations. We, along with the rest of the international community, are looking closely at how China approaches its relations with North Korea since the implementation of UNSCRs 2270 and 2321 and in light of the Alliance's decision and actions to deploy THAAD. The USFK team assesses that China is frustrated with North Korean actions, but Beijing is hesitant to take measures that fundamentally threaten North Korea's stability. Recent

steps such as the cessation of Chinese coal imports from North Korea are positive. It is our hope that Beijing comes to realize that North Korean denuclearization is in the shared interests of China, the United States, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

China's weakening support for Kim Jong Un's regime creates an opening for stronger Russia-North Korea bilateral ties, but Russia's extensive involvement in conflicts at home and across the Middle East has limited its capacity in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia enforced recent Security Council resolutions, directing its banking sector to cease transactions with North Korea. However, Russia also partnered with China in voicing opposition to the deployment of THAAD, their leaders recently agreeing to respond with "further countermeasures."

Public support for greater cooperation between South Korea and Japan, two critical U.S. allies, continues to progress. The two governments made hard choices in 2016 that significantly strengthened both countries' security. North Korean provocations have resulted in greater consultation, missile defense cooperation, and intelligence sharing between Seoul and Tokyo. In meeting with senior Japanese military leaders in October 2016 and in visiting Japan in November 2016 I found Japan's national security leaders to be deeply committed in their role as host of our United Nations Command Rear. In the event of conflict on the Peninsula, Japan's support will be critical to the fight. We are grateful for their enduring support.

c. Republic of Korea. For 64 years the Alliance has played a key role in helping to maintain a stable environment for South Korea, enabling both nations to prosper as vibrant democracies, trading partners, and deeply committed Allies. The R.O.K. Government remains a trustworthy ally firmly committed to maintaining advanced capability to defend themselves, to committing

fiscal resources to support R.O.K. forces and U.S. forces, and to modernizing their combat capabilities. In 2016, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided $826M in support of USFK activities that would otherwise have been paid for by the U.S. Treasury. The SMA, only one component of overall R.O.K. financial support, provides contributions covering 41 percent of U.S. Non-Personnel Stationing Costs. The Agreement also provides much-needed flexibility to respond to the changing security environment and shift funds toward emerging requirements such as the THAAD site improvements.

Two significant projects, the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), comprise one of the Department of Defense's largest relocation projects. YRP restations the majority of U.S. forces from the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA) to new facilities primarily at U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, approximately 50 miles south of Seoul. LPP restations most U.S. forces from multiple posts, camps, and stations north of the GSMA to new facilities at USAG Humphreys.

Construction of new facilities under YRP is 100 percent R.O.K. funded, while those under the LPP are 100 percent U.S. resourced. Total project costs are approximately $10.8B, of which only 8 percent of that comes from U.S. appropriated funds. It is noteworthy that, in addition to funding 100 percent of YRP related construction, our R.O.K. allies are outfitting the new YRP facilities with furnishings through purchase and relocation, underwriting the relocation costs of U.S Forces and their families, and paying a portion of state-of-the-art Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities throughout the new facilities.

LPP, although a U.S. responsibility, utilizes SMA contributions for most LPP-related construction.

South Korea is also investing significantly in its own military capabilities, increasing its defense budget by four percent in 2017, to $34.77 billion, or 2.6 percent of national GDP. Many of their acquisitions directly benefit the U.S. economy, as the R.O.K. spends approximately 90 percent of its weapons budget on U.S. systems, including the F-35, Apache E-model attack helicopters and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense systems. The R.O.K. defense ministry also decided this year to accelerate Korean Air and Missile Defense programs to enhance responses to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

The Republic of Korea is also making important progress outside the Alliance to achieve its own national security priorities, many of which also benefit the Alliance, U.S. interests, and global security imperatives. In November, the R.O.K. Government agreed with the Government of Japan to improve intelligence-sharing through a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). This milestone agreement will expand the information South Korea has available when responding to North Korean threats and will make significant contributions to both Korean and Japanese security.

In addition to the notable actions that the R.O.K. Government took toward improved national security, they also contribute significant forces worldwide. Their contributions to global security initiatives include 1,106 peacekeepers in six countries, financial support to reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and West Africa.

I have great confidence in this blood-ally, with whom the United States has fought, side-by-side, in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

4. Accomplishments of the Past Year

In 2016, the Command supported and implemented a wide array of national policy decisions, undertook combined exercises and deterrent operations, updated military plans to reflect changes in the security environment, and advanced transformation and relocation of U.S. military forces in Korea.

The Alliance decision to deploy THAAD will provide an additional layer to an integrated ballistic missile defense aimed to protect South Korea. The decision to temporarily station a Heavy Attack and Reconnaissance Squadron (AH-64E) at Suwon until airfield construction is complete at USAG Humphreys further demonstrates the Alliance commitment to finding innovative solutions to shared problems. Less publicized but equally important initiatives, like an increase in combined naval and special operations exercises, improve our interoperability. U.S. Naval Forces Korea recently completed a five-year transformation to become the only U.S. military headquarters in Korea located on a R.O.K. installation, collocated with the R.O.K. Fleet. Likewise, the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined 2nd Division under Eighth Army places U.S. and R.O.K. Soldiers together to reinforce our military bonds and interoperability at the tactical level.

In 2016, each of the three Commands made unique contributions to strengthen the Alliance. UNC operations demonstrated the essential coordinating role of the command. Actions to curtail illegal Chinese fishing in the Armistice-controlled Han River Estuary and the emplacement of

artificial reefs helped prevent clashes between Chinese and Korean fisherman in an area where disputes could easily escalate. These missions under UNC authority provided a crucial element of international legitimacy, allowing the Alliance to achieve its objectives without escalating tensions. Also, during the 2016 Exercise ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, UNC successfully tested the establishment of an integrated headquarters for United Nations Command Sending States. Canada sent its largest contingent in recent history, deploying a division headquarters of 104 personnel while Australia, Denmark, Columbia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom also contributed significantly.

USFK planning continues to move forward with the approval of a new bilateral effort and U.S. initiatives in support of the Alliance. CFC efforts concluded with approval of a new plan that accounts for regional interests in the event of conflict with North Korea. Contingency planning between the United States and South Korea continues to progress to increase responsiveness to a variety of potential North Korean provocations. USFK also drove refinements of the flow of U.S. forces and continues to refine plans to counter the changing challenges posed by North Korea and other actors in the region. The key to our success continues to be integration with our R.O.K. allies and other partners.

The CFC is working to support the commitment of the U.S., R.O.K., and Japanese governments to expand trilateral cooperation. This year, CFC participated in the first regularized series of consultations among the three governments in response to successive North Korean provocations and tested missile-defense cooperation through exercise PACIFIC DRAGON. In

November, the Command also supported the first trilateral meeting of U.S., Korean, and Japanese Chiefs of Defense in Washington.

I would also like to acknowledge the contributions that each U.S. Service made to the Command in 2016. Specifically, the U.S. Army displayed exceptional innovation and flexibility in sourcing THAAD systems and personnel to South Korea on a timeline that allowed the Alliance to demonstrate the ability to quickly deploy advanced BMD capabilities. The Army also introduced a rotational Heavy Attack and Reconnaissance unit to the peninsula, continues its enduring Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) rotational deployments and is considering deploying additional enabling capabilities. This added commitment complements units based in Korea, improving overall readiness. U.S. Air Force employed regional assets in support of numerous flexible response options and large-scale exercises such as FOAL EAGLE, while Naval Forces worked to strengthen bilateral and trilateral coordination by conducting several key exercises and promoted goodwill during numerous port visits to Korea. U.S. Marines conducted a continuous series of exercises with their R.O.K. counterparts to build partner capacity and interoperability while enhancing their expeditionary capabilities through combined amphibious landing exercises and participation in a major offload associated with the Combined Joint Logistics Over the Shore Exercise (CJLOTS).

5. Key Congressional Support

The Command is deeply appreciative of Congressional support for the additional capabilities we have brought to bear this year, particularly your support of the THAAD

deployment, which will add to our layered ballistic missile defenses. Additionally, Congressional Delegation visitors in 2016, interested in the welfare of our service members, government civilians, and our community's families assisted the Command in focusing attention toward many of the challenges to timely and effective relocations to the expanded base at Camp Humphreys. I thank this committee and the U.S. Congress for supporting our efforts in Korea as a high priority.

6. Looking to the future

The UNC will continue to assert UN Command Authorities over areas covered by the Armistice Agreement and support efforts for increased self-accountability for Armistice compliance by South and North Korea. The UNC will also work closely with the Republic of Korea to support development of Visiting Forces Agreements for UN Sending States and endeavor to increase training and exercise opportunities for international partners in Korea and Japan.

CFC will continue to meet its readiness obligations, prepared to "fight tonight", as it strives to transform the Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. CFC and our R.O.K. counterparts continue to make progress toward the conditions-based transition of wartime operational control (OPCON transition) from the United States to South Korea. In coming years, U.S. and R.O.K. planners will negotiate a new strategic document that will more clearly define the Alliance relationships during this transformation period leading towards OPCON transition. Also, U.S. and R.O.K. planners will design a Future Command framework this year that builds upon our

long traditions of combined operations, and one that balances the synergies of both nations to preserve our "Fight Tonight" capabilities. Progress on these efforts will be reported at the Military Committee Meeting and Security Consultative Meeting later this year.

USFK will sustain and enhance the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance by increasing interaction between standing R.O.K. and U.S. component commands to "set the theater" with key U.S. capabilities for a transition from Armistice to Crisis or War. USFK will also strive to sustain the forward-deployed U.S. force and establish a new normal associated with our changing posture. We will continue to ensure that our plans are nested with those of supporting commands and agencies, and continue to host strategic level events in Korea like our Korean Strategic Seminar and bi-annual exercises. We will simultaneously participate in integrated planning events to ensure readiness and to better inform senior leaders on critical subjects such as force flow, extended deterrence, posture, integrated campaign plans addressing trans-regional and multi-domain challenges, and joint readiness issues. By sustaining key relationships through ongoing dialogue, we will continue to ensure the Alliance is enabled with the full support of the capabilities that the greater enterprise can bring to bear in times of crisis. This persistent engagement plan amongst commands and agencies is essential to our ability to accomplish our mission.

The Command is also undergoing significant changes to its basing posture. USFK's Relocation Program will consolidate U.S. forces into two enduring hubs – a Central Hub around the cities of Osan and Pyeongtaek, and a Southern Hub around the city of Daegu. The program underwent a significant inflection point in 2015 when the emphasis of the project shifted from construction-centric activities to efforts aimed at moving closer to our desired schedule for

movement and occupying new spaces. In 2016, continued efforts saw significant progress in bringing us closer to our relocation plan. Now slated for occupancy in 2017 are a new middle school at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, several troop barracks, a televideo center, a new railhead, and dental and troop medical clinics. Significant numbers of personnel and their families will be relocating in 2017.

This summer, Eighth Army will relocate to its new headquarters, a modern nerve center for the largest U.S. Army element in Korea. By the end of 2017, the Garrison Humphreys census will nearly double, with growth from its current population of approximately 16,000 service members, families, civilian employees, and contractors, to almost 29,000 personnel. That growth will increase to more than 36,000 individuals by the end of December 2020 as most units complete their restationing.

2016 brought significant progress to the Relocation Program, yet some challenges remain. Construction issues, most of which result from contractor inefficiency and unsatisfactory quality, have caused delays in completing several of the facilities. Nevertheless, USFK continues to work closely with our R.O.K. counterparts to ensure the suitability of new facilities for our service members and their families.

Actions by the U.S. Army Installation Management Command, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the South Korean government reversed issues that were evident in construction that would have hindered timely and efficient occupation of the hospital. The project has undergone substantial improvements since last year, with significantly improved quality of the hospital infrastructure, rework of known deficiencies and an improved schedule. Numerous

mitigations are now in place to accommodate the growing census on the newly expanded base to meet healthcare requirements. The command has put in place initiatives such as increased USAG Humphreys transportation, extended troop medical clinic hours, bi-lingual healthcare support at TRICARE–approved local Humphreys Hospitals, stork nesting program for our pregnant members and dependents, and a nurse helpline for 24/7 healthcare support.

7. Capability Challenges

In the broadest terms, the greatest support comes in the form of recognizing the extraordinary characteristics of the R.O.K. – U.S. Alliance and ensuring that the U.S. commitment to the blood-alliance of the past 67 years remains strong and evident into the future. However, we continue to face capability challenges in the following areas:

a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Increased ISR capability is critical to improve Indications and Warning (I&W), determining North Korea's intent, and reducing risk. Deep look ISR and moving target indicators would provide the ability to continuously track I&W targets over longer durations. As North Korea's pattern of provocations continues, it is essential to have the fullest possible picture of activities above the Military Demarcation Line in all domains (land, air, maritime, cyber, and space, as well as the human domain).

b. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). These capabilities form the heart of interoperability. For example, seamless military-to-military data-sharing enables the Alliance to act under a Common Operating Picture or to employ an effective

and coordinated missile defense. Policies, agreements, and technologies must lean toward enabling bi-national and multi-national cooperation.

c. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). We have made significant and important strides this year, with commitment to thicken the layers of air and missile defense through THAAD, PAC-3 missiles, missile upgrades, and Surface-Based-at-Sea interceptors. As North Korea constantly seeks to improve its missile forces, we must also continue to expand our defensive capabilities so that North Korea is diminished in its ability to hold the alliance at risk with threatening weapons.

d. Critical Munitions. The Command identified specific munitions that would be required in the early days of conflict on the Peninsula, and we are working closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it procures the appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions.

With these capabilities, our Alliance will stay ahead of our adversary. R.O.K. and U.S. military leaders agree that these are the most critical tools to position the Alliance to deter North Korea, defend South Korea and maintain regional stability. We thank you for your consideration.

I would also like to acknowledge the importance of ongoing U.S. Service efforts aimed at filling capabilities gaps that will yield improvements to the readiness and interoperability of forces in Korea. The U.S. Army's efforts to procure critical munitions, the U.S. Air Force emphasis on weapon system sustainment, the U.S. Navy focus on assured command and control, and the U.S. Marine Corps push for improved aircraft modernization and maintenance are each examples of initiatives that will solve service challenges as well as mitigating some of our existing shortfalls. We are dependent upon the services to provide us with ready forces, and,

similarly, we are impacted by any shortcomings in resourcing the services due to sequestration and unpredictable funding.

8. Conclusion

As Commander, I can report that, in 2016, as North Korea continued its development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities, the Alliance and its international supporters responded decisively with an increase in commitment, cooperation, and capabilities. These practical steps improved the position of our Alliance military forces.

However, North Korea has not responded favorably to this concerted, nearly unanimous international response. As the North continues to develop offensive military capabilities in contravention of the will of the international community, the Alliance must also maintain its resolve to stay ahead and to decisively counter the rising threat to the U.S., R.O.K., and the Asia-Pacific. The most effective way to do this is to take military actions that complement and advance the diplomatic, informational, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial efforts the R.O.K. and U.S. governments are undertaking.

As our three Commands take those actions, we are grateful for the continued support of Congress and the American people, as well as the partnership of our Korean allies and the UN Sending States. The leadership and support provided by senior U.S. and R.O.K. civilian and military leaders, including the USPACOM Commander, Admiral Harry Harris, with whom we remain very closely coordinated, provides our forces on freedom's frontier with the capability

and the will to fight and win. Thanks to the committee for your support and for the opportunity to communicate the current posture.

I am honored and blessed to lead American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, our government civilians, and their counterparts from the Republic of Korea.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

April 26, 2017

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you briefly discuss how ISIL and various other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have moved into the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, what additional risks that poses, and how PACOM is monitoring and disrupting that challenge? Does that focus detract from PACOM's more traditional focus? How successful in disrupting these extremist networks have the multinational efforts with host nations been?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. As terrorist fighters in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have made their way to the Middle East and North Africa to train and gain tactical experience, has intelligence-sharing between CENTCOM and PACOM been proactive in regard to identifying and tracking potential actors before they pose a significant threat?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. Information sharing is critical to our success across the globe. We have systems and processes that allow us to share information quickly. For example, USPACOM and USCENTCOM coordinate on a bi-weekly basis through a USPACOM-hosted video tele-conference (VTC) regarding terrorism issues that affect the seam between the USPACOM and USCENTCOM AORs. Regarding the broader issue of foreign fighters, USPACOM and USCENTCOM, along with other combatant commands and the interagency, coordinate as often as twice per week through various venues hosted by Operation Gallant Phoenix out of Zarqa, Jordan. Operation Gallant Phoenix is a multi-national coordination effort to disrupt the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Intelligence coordination through all of these various venues has resulted in a number of operational effects, to include kinetic strikes against Indo-Asia-Pacific-origin foreign fighters operating in the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. Even so, we will remain challenged to discover threats against our allies and Westerners due to the complex nature of the adversary and improving extremist abilities to protect information.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP

Mr. BISHOP. How important is it to maintain our U.S. defense, economic and political relationships with the Freely Associated States, which include the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands? Does the U.S. relationship we currently have with the FAS play any importance to the overall strategy of PACOM?

Admiral HARRIS. The relationships that the U.S. Government maintains with the three Freely Associated States provide valuable strategic advantages. First, the Compact agreements allow the U.S. military to establish defense sites in these countries. These sites could potentially include new airfields or expansion/modification of existing airfields. These sites could also include port facilities, bases for land forces, radar and weather facilities, and communication stations. These locations are just as strategically important today as they were 75 years ago during World War Two. Indeed, as our adversaries' power projection capabilities grow, these areas are becoming more strategically important over time. They would play a vital role in a future contingency. Second, the Compact agreements permit the U.S. to foreclose these countries to the military forces or military purposes of any third party nation. This provision is absolutely essential in preventing third party nations from establishing a military foothold in these countries which would be detrimental to U.S. interests. In addition to maintaining defense relationships with these countries, the economic and political relationships are just as vitally important. It requires a strong bilateral partnership to maintain these Compact relationships in a fully-operable condition. When the U.S. asks for defense sites in some future contingency scenario, the speed and efficiency with which those sites will be established will rely heavily on the bilateral relationship which has been fostered to date.

Mr. BISHOP. Under the current terms of our Compact of Free Association with the Freely-Associated States (FAS), the United States provides guaranteed financial assistance over a 15-year period in exchange for full international defense authority and responsibilities of the FAS. Through our Compacts with these tiny island na-

tions, PACOM essentially has charge over an area of the Pacific larger than the width of the continental United States. How important to PACOM's defense strategy is having this vast swath of the Pacific under strong U.S. influence?

Admiral HARRIS. The Compact agreements give the U.S. an enormous zone of strategic advantage in the western Pacific. This provides significant advantages in establishing the air and maritime dominance that would be required to ensure U.S. military capabilities in a contingency involving our allies in the region such as the Philippines or Japan, or our partners, such as Taiwan. More broadly, air, maritime, land, and logistics dominance in this zone is essential to maintaining our interests throughout East Asia. Military advantage in the western Pacific sustains the credibility of U.S. combat power and defense commitments that underpin our influence and relationships regionally. Were an adversary to control these areas, the results could be catastrophic for U.S. power and influence, and regional stability and prosperity.

Mr. BISHOP. In 2010, the U.S. and the Republic of Palau conducted a review and renewal of the Compact, which was then signed by both nations, but has yet to be authorized by the Congress. In the interim, China has expanded its soft power reach into Palau through the construction of luxury beach resorts and other economic development projects, in an obvious attempt to undermine the U.S. relationship with the island nation. It is reasonable to anticipate that China will continue to move-in a similar fashion to their regional neighbors by expanding its footprint either through military posturing or tempting gestures of economic assistance. Does PACOM have specific concerns on the impact to U.S. interests potentially caused by continued delay by our government in living up to its commitments in funding the Compact with Palau?

Admiral HARRIS. The authorization by Congress of the 2010 U.S.-Palau Compact Review Agreement will send a strong message not only to Palau, but to the entire region. Specifically, it will undermine adversarial moves, it will reinforce U.S. commitment and legitimacy, and it will enhance regional confidence. Chinese interest in development projects in Palau is particularly concerning. If the U.S. is unable to maintain its financial commitments to Palau, it is unclear how willing Palau will be to adhere to Compact requirements and resist commercial projects from China which have a dangerous dual-purpose potential. Without financial assistance, U.S. influence may erode to the point where it becomes detrimental to U.S. security interests. When it comes to influence in Palau, the U.S. will ultimately get what it pays for.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. Outline the value of the Palau Compact for you as PACOM Commander? What does it enable in terms of hard- and soft-power for the United States in the region, and at what cost? Would you advocate for Congress to renew this compact?

Admiral HARRIS. The Palau Compact allows the U.S. military to maintain presence in a critical location in the Western Pacific. In terms of soft power value, it offers us the ability to assure Palau and regional neighbors that the U.S. is committed to stability and security in the region. Simultaneously, it provides us the hard power option of serving as a base of power projection to address issues in the South China Sea while in close proximity to our allies in Australia, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand. The U.S.-Palau Compact is, by a large margin, the least expensive of the three Compact agreements. If the 2010 U.S.-Palau Compact Review Agreement is authorized by Congress, it will cost only a fraction of what the U.S. currently provides in direct assistance to the Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia. However, despite the low cost of its Compact, Palau occupies one of the most advantageous strategic locations in the region, providing the U.S. with its greatest return on investment of all three Compacts.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

Mr. FRANKS. How much did we spend to field the Aegis Ashore test site at Pacific Missile Range Facility?

Does it make sense to defend Hawaii from Alaska instead of using this site?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FRANKS. We have the Navy's new SPY–6 radar and the TPY–2 at Pacific Missile Range Facility. Can we use those radars to add to the defense of Hawaii today?

Or would you rather wait several years to conduct environmental impact statement process and analysis of alternatives processes to build a brand new radar?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FRANKS. Should we evaluate the capability of the SM–3 IIA to defend Hawaii from North Korea and its ICBMs?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. Long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in an anti-access/area denial environment is critical in gathering the necessary intelligence against threats in the PACOM strategic environment. I understand that USPACOM has assessed the current capabilities and needs to support Pacific theater exercises and maritime operations and has identified ISR gaps which need to be addressed.

1. What are PACOM's long-range surveillance capability needs in the Pacific, particularly in light of China's deployment of long-range surface to air missile systems?

2. Does PACOM believe that it is positioned to meet current and future ISR requirements in light of this threat?

3. Are you aware of budgetary and/or authority shortfalls that are need to addressed in order to meet these capability needs?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY

Mrs. MURPHY. In 2008, U.S. Pacific Command identified, and the Navy issued, an Urgent Operational Need Statement calling for a significantly upgraded offensive anti-ship weapon to keep pace with high-threat maritime targets. The U.S. Navy requested, and Congress has funded. a rapid acquisition effort to field an advanced anti-ship capability in 2018 through the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) program. During this acquisition timeline, however, the number of high-threat adversary surface combatants has grown considerably, by some accounts in the order of roughly 6 times what it was in 2008.

I understand that the initial requirement 8 years ago called for 110 munitions. 1) Has the requirement for offensive anti-ship weapons kept pace with the increased threat? 2) Can you please characterize our nation's capacity to counter heavily-defended, moving maritime surface action groups in severely contested electronic attack environments with limited or no surveillance support 1) at present, and 2) over the 5-year defense plan (FYDP)?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER

Mr. GALLAGHER. China, and now Russia, continue to field advanced anti-ship missile systems to hold our Navy at risk. Just recently, an *Admiral Grigorovich*-class Russian frigate was sent to hold off the USS *Porter* and USS *Ross,* off from the coast of Syria. Armed with 8 advanced SS–N–26 Strobile missiles, the 3,000-ton ship has more capability than both 9,000-ton destroyers combined. Considering the increased lethality of peer nation frigates, what specifically ought the fleet be planning to field on our frigates? Are we doing enough to field a U.S. capability that holds enemy peer combatants at risk and to deter, dissuade and, if need be, defeat these threats?

Specifically, I understand that there is an effort underway to arm LCS with an offensive anti-ship missile. In 2008, U.S. Pacific Command issued an "Urgent Operational Need", or UONs, calling for a significantly upgraded offensive anti-ship weapon to keep pace with high-threat maritime targets. This urgent requirement called for a weapon capable of striking heavily-defended, moving maritime surface action groups in severely contested electronic attack environments with limited or no surveillance support. Will this effort to outfit the LCS with an over-the-horizon weapons system meet the requirements PACOM outlined in the Urgent Operational Need Statement?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. You have testified in the past that 80 percent of North Korean imports to China is coal. Because China has ceased acceptance of North Korean coal imports, to what extent will this impact China's leverage in negotiating an end to North Korea's nuclear ambitions?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. GAETZ. To what extent will North Korean resources for nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities be impacted by China's prohibition of North Korean coal imports?

Admiral HARRIS. China announced on 26 February 2017 it was suspending coal imports from North Korea (NK) after having reached the United Nations-imposed annual quota of $400 million/7.5 million tons. That decision is unlikely to have a significant negative near-term impact on Pyongyang's nuclear development and ballistic missiles programs. Pyongyang will continue to prioritize its strategic weapons programs and will likely allocate/divert funds generated from other sectors to ensure its strategic weapons programs research and development is minimally impacted. Despite China's "enforcement" of banning coal imports from NK, cross-border trade activity continue between the two countries. Total NK-China trade volume increased by approximately 37 percent ($220 million) in the first quarter of 2017 from the same period in 2016. NK exports to China surged nearly 20 percent in the first quarter of 2017 after China announced its decision to suspend coal imports from NK. NK exported approximately $500 million worth of goods to China, to include minerals, seafood, and manufactured garments to China. NK's ore exports to China also surged 270 percent in January and February compared with the same period in 2016. Despite the coal ban, NK continues to attempt to export coal to Chinese buyers illicitly, exploiting the lack of transparency and loose enforcement of sanctions. Multiple NK vessels reportedly carrying coal were previously identified at Chinese ports. Pyongyang will likely seek out other potential customers willing to purchase NK coal. Additionally, NK very likely will aggressively pursue alternative means to generate foreign currency in an effort to offset revenue losses caused by China's ban on NK coal imports. NK was able to unload approximately 6,300 metric tons of coal in Malaysia in March 2017, a month after China announced its coal ban. NK's overseas laborers are assessed to generate approximately $350 million annually, in addition to an estimated $40 million generated annually through its overseas information technology-related businesses.

Mr. GAETZ. How will China respond to a rapidly destabilizing situation on the Korean peninsula? What is China's tactical response in relation to North Korean nuclear assets?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. GAETZ. Given the increasingly mobile nature of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, how will this impact the United States need for enhanced capability in the missile defense realm?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE

Mr. BYRNE. Given the rising tensions with North Korea and the proximity of Hawaii as the closest U.S. State to the DPRK, how do you characterize the threat to Hawaii and our current defensive capabilities? You have previously cited on record your desire to activate the Aegis Ashore site at PMRF with the Standard Missile-3 in order to enhance our defense immediately; and a number of subject matter experts have publically shared your views. Has your opinion on this or the urgency surrounding the need to activate the site changed?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. BYRNE. MDA has indicated plans to develop a new discrimination radar (HDR–H) in order to enhance defense of Hawaii against the North Korean threat. Are you concerned that MDA's plan is a new development program, in a remote location which will not be operational until 2024 at the earliest? While more and larger sensors are always desirable, based on the imminent threat, should we be more focused on a near-term defense solution? Would you advocate spending resources on leveraging the existing assets (Aegis Ashore, AN/TPY–2, THAAD) and filling the launchers with additional inventory or procuring the new discrimination radar?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. BYRNE. Appreciating Hawaii's unique location relative to the threat and the challenges that presents from a defense perspective (cruise missiles, ICBMs, sub-launched threats, air threats), should a new radar for HI be designed as strictly a ICBM radar or should it be more multifunctional?

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

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