    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             NUCLEAR DEAL FALLOUT:
                           THE GLOBAL THREAT OF IRAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 24, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-28

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          AMI BERA, California
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 DINA TITUS, Nevada
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             NORMA J. TORRES, California
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
        Wisconsin                        TED LIEU, California
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Ilan Berman, senior vice president, American Foreign Policy
      Council........................................................     5
    Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East
      studies, Council on Foreign Relations..........................    16
    Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for Middle East
      Policy, Brookings Institution..................................    24

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Ilan Berman: Prepared statement..............................     7
    Ray Takeyh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................    18
    Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................    26

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    52
    Hearing minutes..................................................    53
    The Honorable Bradley S. Schneider, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Illinois: Prepared statement.................    54
    Written responses from Mr. Ilan Berman to questions submitted for
      the record by the Honorable William Keating, a Representative
      in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.............    56

                             NUCLEAR DEAL FALLOUT:
                           THE GLOBAL THREAT OF IRAN

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2017

                         House of Representatives,

            Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
        Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
    statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
    subject to the length limitation and the rules.
        I will make my opening statement.
        Two years ago, Iran and six major world powers reached an
    agreement regarding its program of nuclear capability. That
    deal was a result of a decade of tough U.S. and international
    sanctions placed on the Iranian regime because of its dangerous
    nuclear ambitions.
        The mullahs in Tehran felt the pain of sanctions. That is
    why they came to the negotiating table. At that moment, we had
    the most leverage over the regime. But, unfortunately, a deal
    that the past administration brokered turns out to be seriously
    flawed.
        For starters, the deal simply put Iran's nuclear plans on
    hold for 10 to 15 years. After that time, Iran is free to
    develop a nuclear weapon and menace the world. Even worse, the
    deal did not address Iran's continued sponsorship of terrorists
    with American blood on their hands. It also did nothing to curb
    the development of ballistic missiles.
        Iran gained immediate access to hundreds of billions of
    dollars, and the promise of yet more to come, due to the
    sanctions' relief. Only weeks after the announcement of the
    deal, reports indicated that Iran had significantly increased
    funding to Hezbollah and Hamas, both terrorist groups. This
    increased funding allowed Hezbollah to increase its operations
    in Syria, where the group has deepened its sectarian divide.
    Hezbollah has also used this new funding to obtain highly
    developed new armaments, including advanced technologies used
    by professional state militaries. While Hezbollah has been busy
    helping its Iranian masters prop up the brutal Assad regime in
    Syria, they have contracted out their violently anti-Israel
    agenda.
        In 2016, Israeli authorities arrested a Palestinian cell
    organized and funded by Hezbollah that had planned to carry out
    suicide bombings. Iran also cemented its ties with the
    Palestinian terror group Hamas by providing them with missile
    technologies that enabled them to build their own rockets to
    target Israeli citizens. Iran helped Hamas build its terrorist
    tunnel infrastructure that was destroyed by Israel in 2014.
        Since the nuclear deal, Iran terrorist plots have been
    uncovered in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah and
    Iran also remain active in Latin America where they operate
    criminal networks that yield even more money for Tehran to
    invest in terrorism. Back at home in Iran, the mullahs are busy
    dedicating more time and money to their ballistic missile
    program.
        Since the announcement of the nuclear deal, Iran has
    conducted 14 ballistic missile tests. Earlier this month, Iran
    attempted to launch a cruise missile from one of its midget
    submarines, the same type of submarines the terrorist regime in
    North Korea is developing. Iran and North Korea are the only
    countries that deploy this class of submarine.
        The failed test reminded the world of Iran and North
    Korea's long history of collaboration on this ballistic and
    even nuclear programs. Their dangerous relationship goes all
    the way back to the 1980s. Now the two rogue regimes are
    believed to be working on developing intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, ICBMs. Why is Iran moving ahead with a ballistic
    missile program? Because ballistic missiles are the best
    delivery system for nuclear weapons.
        So while they wait 10 years till they can develop a bomb,
    Iran is ensuring they have the technology to deliver that
    payload. And there are some doubts about whether Iran is
    actually complying with the deal.
        Members of the National Council of Resistance of Iran
    claimed last month that Iran is still working on weaponization,
    the final step on the path to nuclear weapons. It is clear this
    deal has allowed the mullahs to increase their support of
    terrorism and proliferation.
        Leading up to the deal, the past administration assured us
    that the U.S. would continue to fight against Iran's maligned
    behavior. It is time now we get serious about that. We cannot
    allow Iran to continue threatening the United States and our
    allies unchecked. The question is: How do we do that? That is
    why we are having this hearing, and we have these three experts
    that will give us the answers to all of that.
        And I will now yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts,
    Mr. Keating, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And thank you for the
    witnesses that are here today to testify.
        This hearing is very timely, coming less than a week after
    the reelection of Iranian President Rouhani, who was a key
    figure in reaching the nuclear agreement. It also comes at a
    time when President Trump is making his first trip abroad in
    the sphere threatened by Iran's malign acts. So it is fitting
    that we take up Iran in this subcommittee this afternoon, as
    this is a time when both countries are reassessing their
    security posture toward each other.
        I supported, and continue to support, the Iran nuclear deal
    because it made us and our allies more secure and brought Iran
    more in line with international principles of nonproliferation.
    I also support aggressive, robust monitoring and enforcement of
    the deal so that we are certain that Iran never waivers in
    upholding their commitments under the agreement.
        However, Iran's nuclear ambitions were not the only threat
    they posed to the region and to the United States' security
    interests. Iran has continued to conduct several ballistic
    missile tests in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution
    2231, and to support terrorist organizations operating
    throughout the region, actively involved in the civil conflicts
    in Syria and in Yemen, and, as a result, is exacerbating the
    continued bloodshed in both countries, and further stalling
    resolutions to these conflicts.
        Iran's human rights record is also appalling. Participation
    in civic life is severely restricted with the regular arrest of
    journalists and activists and repression of free speech, not to
    mention the ongoing imprisonment of American citizens. The
    United States' posture toward Iran must take into account all
    layers of Iran's aggressive stance toward the world.
        However, that also includes taking into account the
    powerful role of Iranian public opinion. As we consider U.S.
    policies toward Iran and our response to Iranian threats to
    stability and security, we cannot do so without also
    considering Iran's domestic context, and recognizing that the
    President, President Rouhani, just received broad support from
    a diverse range of voters in Iran on Friday.
        Here in Congress, and within the U.S. Government, we must
    be committed to curbing Iran's malign activities, and we must
    do so diligently. Iran's destabilizing action throughout the
    Middle East threatens the United States and must be met with
    clear condemnation for the sake of the countless human lives at
    stake and of the global rule of law. Yet we must take note of
    the complex reality that accounts for the domestic context in
    Iran today.
        Therefore, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and
    hear about how Congress can navigate these many security
    threats from Iran without running afoul of our international
    commitments, without backsliding on progress made so far and
    bringing Iran into compliance with international law and norms.
        With the reelection of President Rouhani, I believe we must
    seize any possible opportunity to move forward in curbing
    Iran's support for terrorist organizations, undeterred
    ballistic missile testing, continued involvement in conflicts
    across the region, and its gross human rights violations. We
    should do so with the support of our allies, and our actions
    should be carried out swiftly, yet deliberately.
        I thank the witnesses. I look forward to your testimony.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
        The Chair will now have opening statements by members of
    the committee, 1-minute opening statements.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you for recognizing me. I appreciate it.
    And thank you for your testimonies.
        I think it is important, on the heels of Memorial Day, that
    we really identify what it looks like for Iran to be the
    largest state sponsor of terrorists. It has become a phrase
    that has become so cliche in recent past. And what that really
    means, on the heels of Memorial Day, is it is Iranian hands
    that have made IEDs, the explosively formed projectiles that
    tore through our Up-Armored Humvees in Iraq. And it is Iranian
    hands that packed improvised explosive devices with nuts and
    screws and bolts and so many pieces of shrapnel that were
    placed in places like Afghanistan to put so many holes in our
    servicemembers that they could never be plugged before they
    bled out. That is what it looks like to be the largest state
    sponsor of terror. And I just think it is important that we
    keep that as a frame of reference, especially on the heels of
    Memorial Day, as we have this conversation.
        I thank you for your time testifying today, and I look
    forward to hearing from you.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
        The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
    Mr. Boyle.
        Mr. Boyle. Thank you to the chair and ranking member.
        I would say that--and I happen to have been someone on the
    democratic side of the aisle who voted against the Iran deal.
    And I know there were good, principled arguments on both sides
    of that.
        What I am most interested in, though, is not continuing to
    beat a dead horse of the political fight over this and moving
    beyond the politics of the deal, and whether or not it was a
    good idea, and accepting the reality, and moving forward. And,
    specifically, focusing on--my comments very much dovetail after
    the last ones we just heard--going after Iranian funding for
    Hamas, for Hezbollah, for their continued role in the Syrian
    civil war, for what they are doing in Yemen. I believe that
    should be our focus.
        And rather than continuing to relitigate the past of the
    Iran deal, let's focus on that. Because, at the end of the day,
    it is cliche for a reason, they are the largest state sponsor
    of terrorism throughout the world. And that will continue
    unless we go after their funding.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time.
        Without objection, all of the witnesses' prepared
    statements will be made part of the record.
        I ask that each witness keep their presentation to no more
    than 5 minutes. When the red light comes on in front of you,
    that means stop. And I will help you enforce that rule. I will
    introduce each witness and give them time for their opening
    statements.
        Ilan Berman is the senior vice-president of the American
    Foreign Policy Council. He is an expert on regional security in
    the Middle East and has consulted for both the CIA and the
    Department of Defense.
        Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for Middle East studies
    at the Council of Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the CFR,
    he was a senior advisor on Iran at the State Department.
        And Dr. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for
    Middle East Policy at Brookings. His research focuses on
    counterterrorism and Middle East security.
        Mr. Berman, we will start with you, and you have 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF MR. ILAN BERMAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
                         FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL

        Mr. Berman. Thank you, Judge Poe. And thank you, Judge. And
    thank you, Ranking Member Keating. And I really appreciate the
    opportunity to be here today to discuss the 2015 nuclear deal
    between Iran and the P5+1 powers.
        A good place to start is to recognize that more than a year
    after its implementation, the effects of the agreement have
    been profound, and they have been profoundly negative both for
    the stability of the Middle East and for American interests
    there. And much of this problem revolves around the fact that,
    while the agreement was only intended to be tactical in nature,
    to deal strictly with one aspect of the global threat that is
    posed by Iran, its effects for Iran have been both extensive
    and they have been strategic in nature.
        Most notably--and I have a more detailed discourse in my
    written statement, which you have in front of you. But, most
    notably, I would point out that the JCPOA has had a material
    effect on reinvigorating the global ambitions of a regime that
    truly thinks globally, that thinks about itself as a regional
    hegemon and as a country with power projection capabilities far
    beyond its borders. And you can see this evident in several
    lines of effort that the Iranian regime is pursuing currently.
        The first is a multispectrum military modernization that is
    both reinvigorated and is sustained in nature. And it
    encompasses things like the expansion of Iran's national
    defense budget to 5 percent of GDP; the acquisition of billions
    of dollars of new hardware from supplier states, like Russia
    and China; and substantially deeper investments in cyber
    warfare capabilities both for defense and for offense.
        You can see Iran's focus on stepped-up regional activism,
    including greater assistance to the Assad regime in Syria, and
    also serving as a facilitator for a secondary state-directed
    foreign fighter flow that is bringing Afghans, Yemens, Shiites
    of non-Syrian origin to the Syrian battlefront. And you can see
    this in the solidification of Iranian influence over Iraqi
    politics through its extensive sponsorship of both Shiite
    militias and patronage of Shiite politicians in Iraq.
        And, also, as all the members noted, you see a substantial
    surge in the amount of money, already extensive, that Iran has
    allocated toward the activities of organizations like Hezbollah
    in Lebanon and also in Syria and Hamas in the Palestinian
    territories.
        The cumulative effect of this is that General Joseph Votel,
    the commander of U.S. Central Command, testified about
    approximately 1\1/2\ months ago, that these initiatives have
    made Iran, quote, deg. ``the most significant threat
    to the central region and to our national interests and to the
    interests of our partners and allies there.'' And I think that
    is a significant development. It is a significant escalation in
    the threat that is posed by Iran.
        And this, I think, leads us to the question of: What can be
    done? I think that the Trump administration's Iran policy is
    still a work in progress. They are undergoing a comprehensive
    policy review that is going to touch on all aspects of Iran
    policy, including the nuclear deal, and other issues. But, as
    they do, I think they would be very well-advised to focus on
    four priorities.
        The first is to reestablish economic leverage over Iran.
    The JCPOA has put in motion a fundamental unraveling of the
    global sanctions regime against Iran for a host of reasons. And
    Washington needs to restore the economic leverage that it once
    had against Iran, and it can do so through measures like the
    additional blacklisting of entities engaged in illicit
    behavior, and also a comprehensive blacklisting on the Iranian
    Revolutionary Guard Corps, which controls a third or more of
    Iran's national economy.
        The second priority should be to ensure compliance with the
    terms of the nuclear deal. Because as much as termination of
    the JCPOA was a campaign issue last year, it is abundantly
    clear that the contours of the agreement will remain in force,
    at least for the near future. And that means that we have to
    focus on ensuring compliance, in material terms, the hiring of
    additional inspectors, gaining access to facilities that are
    currently obscured, and, most of all, constructing a menu that
    talks about what constitutes a material breach of the agreement
    so that all the members of the P5+1 can be on the same page
    about whether Iran is in violation of its obligations.
        Very briefly, the other two priorities that the
    administration should focus on would be mechanisms by which it
    can constrain Iranian expansionism, to include the construction
    of a regional security architecture very much along the lines
    of what the Trump administration has begun discussing in its
    current trip to the Middle East.
        And, lastly, the reconstruction of American credibility,
    vis-a-vis, the Iranian people. Historically, the United States
    has served as a champion for ordinary Iranians in their
    struggle against the clerical state. This is a moral high
    ground that the U.S. has retreated from over the last 8 years
    in the service of a tactical arrangement with the Iranian
    regime. And this is ground that we need to make up. And we can
    make this up in a number of different ways, from different
    statements, to more robust broadcasting, to other
    demonstrations of the fact that this administration is not
    prepared to accept the current political status quo in Tehran.
        And the time to do so, in my opinion, is now. The U.S.
    Government needs to move robustly to implement a new approach
    that begins to roll back Iranian influence and activities in
    the region, activities that have been emboldened, in no small
    measure, by the agreement that was signed in July 2015.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
        Dr. Takeyh.

    STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., HASIB J. SABBAGH SENIOR FELLOW
         FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

        Mr. Takeyh. Thank you.
        I know from previous representations in front of Judge Poe,
    5 minutes means 5 minutes. So I will stay diligently within the
    timeframe that I am sure you will insist upon.
        Terrorism, the use of political violence, is an enduring
    aspect of the Islamic Republic. The regime's victims, as was
    mentioned, span the region. But the most vulnerable targets of
    that state-sponsored violence have always been the Iranian
    people themselves.
        The key actors defining Iran's regional policies are not
    its diplomats but its Revolutionary Guard Corp, particularly
    the famed Quds Brigade. For the commander of the Quds Brigade,
    General Soleimani, the struggle to evict America from the
    region began in Iraq, has now moved to Syria. For the
    hardliners, the Sunni states' attempt to dislodge Bashar Assad
    is really a means of weakening Iran. Thus, the survival or the
    success of the Assad regime at this point is one of the central
    elements of the Iranian foreign policy.
        The question then becomes what impact the nuclear deal have
    on Iran and its regional surge. The proponents of the agreement
    at one point insisted that whatever windfall there was would be
    funneled for domestic purposes and Iran's depleted economy. By
    their telling, Iran had prioritized its malign activities even
    during the times of economic stress. Two years later, we see
    some of the aspects of those claims cannot be substantiated.
        Iran's defense budget has gone up by about 50 percent. It
    used to be about 2.7 percent of the GDP. Between now and year
    2020, it is likely to be 5 percent of the GDP. So it has about
    doubled.
        Iran's model for operating in the Middle East today is
    drawn from its experiences in Lebanon in the early 1980s. It
    was at that time that Iran amalgamated various Shia parties
    into the lethal Hezbollah. In essence, Iran created a militia
    outside the control of the weak Lebanese state. In the
    meantime, Iran sought to manipulate the politics of Lebanon to
    its advantage by making sure that the central government
    remains weak.
        A decentralized state not in full command of coercive power
    is a model that Iran has used first in Lebanon and now in Iraq
    and, of course, in Syria.
        Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has sought to
    take advantage of the disorder there and extend its influence.
    The Islamic Republic has trained Shia militias, as was
    mentioned, that are responsive to its orders and has sought to
    sharpen the sectarian divides in Iraq as a means of dividing
    that nation against itself. The rise of the Islamic State has
    actually provided Iran an opportunity for further inroads in
    Iraq. Under the auspices of fighting the Islamic State, Iran
    has further projected its power in that nation. So long as
    Iraq's trouble continues, Iran can be counted on to further
    exacerbate them.
        Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Iranian
    officials maintained that the Assad regime will survive. This
    assessment stood in contrast to those Western powers who assure
    themselves that the forward march of history would envelop the
    Syrian dictator. The Iranian model of operation in Syria,
    again, is very much similar to that of Iraq and, previous to
    that, Lebanon.
        Once more, Iran deployed to develop militias outside the
    control of the state, deployed a large number of Revolutionary
    Guards and Hezbollah proxies, and, essentially, took command of
    the ground forces. Without Iranian assistance and guidance,
    Syrians may have been spared some of the carnage that has
    wrecked their country.
        Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei today stands as the most
    successful Persian imperialist in the history of Iran. In the
    1970s, at the height of his power, the Shah did not enjoy
    commanding influence in Iraq, Lebanon's confessional politics
    eluded him, and the Assad regime was not a mere subsidiary of
    Iran, and the Persian Gulf States resisted his pretensions.
        Today, Iran has essential control of much of the Iraqi
    state. It is the most important external actor in Syria, and
    Hezbollah provides it with not just means of manipulating
    Lebanese politics, but also shock troops that can be deployed
    in various war fronts.
        It is important to appreciate that, actually, Israel
    remains the principal victim of Iranian terrorism. Iran's
    hostility toward Israel is one of the most enduring and
    perplexing aspects of its history. Iran's animosity toward
    Israel can be traced back to the founding of its revolution. In
    the eyes of the founder of the revolution, the creation of
    Israel was the most unforgettable sin. In a perverse way,
    Iran's opposition to Israel exceeds even its opposition to the
    United States, because it objects to various American acts, not
    to its existence as it does with Israel.
        A regime as dangerous to U.S. interests as Islamic Republic
    requires, as was mentioned, a comprehensive strategy to counter
    it. This means exploiting all of Iran's vulnerabilities,
    increasing the cost of its foreign adventures, weakening its
    economy, supporting its domestic discontents. Pursuing this
    strategy will take time, but, eventually, it will put the
    United States in a position to impose terms on Iran. And we
    should, as was mentioned, put human rights at the top of the
    agenda, not look the other way as Iran's leaders oppress their
    people.
        And my time has ran out exactly at 5 minutes.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman.

    STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
               MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

        Mr. Byman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to emulate
    Dr. Takeyh.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, members of this subcommittee,
    thank you very much for this opportunity to testify.
        Iran's terrorism and destabilization efforts are primarily
    a threat to U.S. interests and U.S. allies in the Middle East.
    Support for militant and terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria,
    Yemen, and elsewhere enable Tehran to show up key allies like
    the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad. It also gives Iran leverage
    with regional rivals like Saudi Arabia. And ties to militant
    groups strengthen pro-Iran voices in the region, increasing
    Iran's influence in some of the capitals in the region, but
    also in some of the more remote hinterlands. Iran believes that
    support for militants pays policy dividends.
        The Assad regime, once teetering, is now ascendant or at
    least in a stronger position. Iran's support to various groups
    in Iraq have given Tehran influence at both the local and
    national level. And Hezbollah has proven a loyal ally that has
    helped Iran project its influence in Lebanon and in neighboring
    states and against Israel.
        Iran does not appear to be actively targeting the U.S.
    homeland with terrorism, but its capacity remains latent.
    Tehran uses its ability to strike U.S. assets outside war zones
    to deter the United States and as a contingency should the
    United States attack Iran.
        Iran spends billions of dollars on supporting its proxies
    and deploying its own military forces. This is a huge sum for a
    country with significant economic problems and a limited
    military budget.
        In addition, the nuclear deal raised expectations of
    economic improvements among the Iranian people, and spending
    more on militants abroad makes it harder for the regime to
    satisfy these demands at home.
        For the Trump administration to better counter Iranian
    influence in the Middle East, it should seize the opportunity
    to reset U.S. relations with key regional allies. Many Middle
    Eastern allies had lost faith in the Obama administration, and
    several, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia, are going to
    elaborate lengths to ignore the missteps and often
    contradictory behavior of the Trump administration in hopes of
    closer cooperation. Additional pressure on entities like the
    Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would help send the right
    message to allies and to Iran. Washington should also highlight
    the cost of Iran's adventurism to ordinary Iranians to raise
    domestic awareness and discontent with the regime's foreign
    policy.
        The United States should step up efforts to build a
    credible and modern Syrian opposition to put additional
    pressure on Iran's Syrian ally. And in Yemen, Washington should
    support negotiations to end the war, as the current Saudi
    approach is giving both Iran and the al-Qaeda affiliate in
    Yemen an opportunity to expand their influence.
        At the same time, the Trump administration must remember
    that Iran can push back. The 2015 nuclear deal, for all its
    flaws, remains better than any current plausible alternative,
    and pulling out of the agreement would be a mistake. In
    addition, Iran has leverage and many vulnerabilities to
    exploit, given its role in fighting the Islamic State and the
    exposure of U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria to Iranian-directed
    violence.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for this opportunity to
    testify.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. And I thank all of you for your testimony. I will
    recognize myself for some questions.
        I have introduced H.R. 478, the IRGC Terrorist Sanctions
    Act, and it would designate the IRGC for its terrorist activity
    under Executive Order 13224.
        I want to ask each of you if you support that concept or
    you don't. And it is either a yes or a no.
        Mr. Berman?
        Mr. Berman. I do, sir.
        Mr. Poe. Dr. Takeyh?
        Mr. Takeyh. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Poe. And Dr. Byman?
        Mr. Byman. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Poe. There are many things that I would like to go
    into, but let me just start with the first one.
        Mr. Berman, you mentioned that the United States needs to
    develop a better relationship with the Iranian people, letting
    them understand that it is the regime that we don't support,
    but we support the people of Iran to be able to have self-
    determination to rule their own country and not the mullahs.
    Can you expound on how we could do that?
        Mr. Berman. I can try, sir.
        I think that a relatively underutilized tool that the
    United States has at its disposal is our ability to bypass the
    regime and communicate directly to the Iranian people through
    mechanisms like The Voice of America's Persian News Network and
    other broadcasting tools. And, here, what we say is as
    important as how loud we say it.
        Programming that emphasizes the endemic corruption within
    the regime; that elevates the plight of individual political
    prisoners that are being maligned by the regime; that
    demonstrates to the Iranian people that, despite the economic
    benefits of the JCPOA, there has been no trickle-down effect
    that have benefited the ordinary Iranians. All of those things,
    I think, would help diminish the credibility of the Iranian
    regime, elevate America's standing in the eyes of the Iranian
    people, and really, I think, amplify all of the other elements
    of the Trump administration's strategy as it begins to be
    formed.
        Mr. Poe. So if I understand you correctly, we should do
    everything we can to let the world and the Iranian people know
    that we support them in changing the regime in a peaceful way,
    that should be the U.S. policy as opposed to ultimate conflict,
    militarily, with Iran. Is that a fair statement?
        Mr. Berman. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Poe. All of you mentioned Assad and also mentioned
    Iraq. What is Syria's relationship to Iran? Is it a puppet
    state? Same question about Iraq: Is Iraq becoming a puppet
    state of Iran? How would you characterize that relationship
    with Iran and those two countries?
        Mr. Berman, you first
        Mr. Berman. Absolutely. I will go very quickly, and I will
    allow my colleagues to step in.
        I think it is necessary to think about Syria in the context
    of what it does for Iran, both as a strategic partner and as a
    buffer state. Syria is part of that access of resistance that
    Iranian officials continually talk about withstanding pressure
    from the west, from the United States, and from Israel. Syria
    is a very important link in that access because of the land
    bridge that it provides to Iran's chief terrorist proxy,
    Hezbollah, in Lebanon. And the idea of a Syria that is no
    longer managed by a compliant partner, that is Balkanized or is
    subverted by a radical Sunni group, is anathema to Iran's long-
    term strategic interests, which goes a long way toward
    explaining why Iran has sunk so much blood and treasure into
    preserving the current status quo in Syria.
        Mr. Poe. Dr. Takeyh?
        Mr. Takeyh. I would agree with that on Syria.
        I would actually suggest that--I wouldn't characterize Iraq
    as a state that today is a subsidiary of Iran. I think Iraqis
    don't want to be proxies of Iran. Iraq has institutions. It has
    some sort of a democratic structure, highly imperfect. And
    there is a lot of discussion nowadays about pushing back on
    Iran in the region.
        I think the place that one can do so, perhaps as
    effectively as elsewhere, would be in Iraq, because Iraq has a
    history of being the seat of civilization as opposed to being a
    subsidiary of a Persian empire. And I do think Iraqi
    politicians, really across the board, would like to be
    emancipated from the Iranian influence. There are a lot of
    reasons they are not. They are not welcome--Iraq is not welcome
    in the council of Sunni Arab powers. That is something the
    United States can work on. And gradual integration of Iraq as a
    Shia state in a Sunni Arab--emphasizing their ethnic identity.
        So I think Iraq is a place where it is struggling to be
    free of Iran. But it----
        Mr. Poe. Let me ask you this last question.
        And, Dr. Byman, you can give me your answer in writing.
    United States presence in Iraq, should it remain about the
    same? Should we ratchet up, militarily, our presence? Or should
    we just leave Iraq? Three options.
        Mr. Takeyh. I would imagine there has to be an enhanced
    military presence, but also an enhanced civilian presence in
    terms of Iraqi ministries, bureaucracy, and rehabilitating the
    institution. There has to be a greater degree of American
    presence, military as well as the civilian counterparts.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you.
        The Chair will yield time to the gentleman from
    Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think everyone, almost universally, whether they favored
    or didn't favor the JCPOA, acknowledged that they were about 8
    to 12 weeks away from having a nuclear weapon. That was pretty
    well understood at that time. So as we are talking about a
    rejuvenated Iran, in all likelihood, we would be sitting here,
    in the absence of that agreement, having an Iran that had
    nuclear weapons. How could that not improve their influence and
    their malign activities coming from a strong point of having
    nuclear weapons to begin with? We are learning in North Korea
    how difficult that is.
        Mr. Byman?
        Mr. Byman. Mr. Keating, I favored the nuclear deal for
    exactly that reason. There are plenty of flaws with it, and we
    could spend more than this hearing pointing them out. But there
    aren't particularly good alternatives. And Iran without a
    nuclear weapon or Iran with a delayed nuclear weapon is better
    than Iran with a nuclear weapon right now.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you. That is where I--there were flaws.
    But you can't ignore that reality. As a matter of fact, Mr.
    Berman mentioned the Trump administration is embedded with
    this. They are not any more embedded than when the President
    said, on day one, he would tear up the agreement.
        So what happened since the election?
        Mr. Berman. Well, sir, I think it is one thing entirely to
    talk about tearing up the deal on day one as part of a stump
    speech during the campaign season. It is another thing entirely
    to recognize that, even though the JCPOA is an executive
    agreement and therefore can be terminated at the leisure of the
    next executive, it is actually a multilateral pact, and,
    therefore, the United States walking away from the JCPOA could
    end up in a situation where American leverage, notwithstanding,
    the JCPOA remains----
        Mr. Keating. Wouldn't that have been the case just at the
    time of the signing? It is all clear that the other
    participants in our coalition of sanctions--people, countries
    putting sanctions on Iran, they were ready to walk away then.
    And then we would have had the U.S., by itself, in Iran with a
    bomb. But that is just, I think, the real reason that tearing
    it up day one didn't occur, not because it was embedded.
        But another question I have too, again, Mr. Berman. You
    said that it is the last 8 years that there has been a
    situation where Iran has advanced and gone through, implying
    that it was just under the Obama administration that that
    occurred. Nothing happened under the Bush administration? They
    weren't moving forward to its nuclear weapons and that
    capability? Nothing happened during that stage?
        Mr. Berman. No. Sir, to clarify my point, I mentioned the
    two terms of the Obama administration in the context of America
    changing its relationship with the Iranian people directly. I
    think if you track the change in official rhetoric during the
    course of President Obama's two terms--and you can see that,
    for example, manifested in the annual New Year's greetings that
    every President since Gerald Ford has issued to the Iranian
    people on March 20th of every year. What you see is a
    trajectory that begins with communications to the Iranian
    people.
        Mr. Keating. Well, if I could interrupt. You know, we all
    know that security officials in the U.S. say they give
    Christmas greetings when they are making phone calls. But let
    me just put that in the context of saying, there was a
    progression of nuclear development during that year.
        You know, I think we have to get, as much as we can, beyond
    the partisanship here, and that is the reason I pointed to
    those questions. These issues are far too important, and that
    is why I focused on that. But I must say that I favor too very
    strong sanctions in this area. And we can do that with no
    interference whatsoever with the agreement. There is plenty of
    options for the U.S., and I support them, because of Iran's
    military ballistic testing, ballistic missile testing, because
    of their human rights positions and actions, and because they
    are an exporter and enabler of terrorism through the whole
    region.
        So I think we could do that. There is plenty of areas of
    agreement in that respect. So I want to thank you all for doing
    this and just say, on this important issue that we all agree is
    a central issue to our security, the extent that we move away
    from branding political partisan actions, we will all be
    stronger.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Colonel Cook.
        Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        Dr. Takeyh, I wanted to ask you--I want to shift gears a
    little bit.
        Saudi Arabia, since we are on the subject of nuclear
    weapons, there was a lot of speculation about the fact that
    with this agreement, that Saudi Arabia would unilaterally
    purchase or develop a nuclear device, because they are the, at
    least in recent years, the traditional enemy.
        Do you have any comments on that in terms--I know it is
    hypothetical, but there was quite a bit of talk about it at the
    time.
        Mr. Takeyh. I think there were many things wrong with the
    Iranian JCPOA nuclear agreement. It is a flawed agreement. But
    I was never persuaded entirely of the cascade effect. Namely,
    that other countries would seek to emulate that capability. For
    one thing, I don't think the Saudis have this scientific
    foundation or a cadre to be able to, at this point, man an
    indigenous atomic nuclear program.
        Mr. Cook. How about a purchase from a country like
    Pakistan?
        Mr. Takeyh. I am not a Pakistan expert. But should Pakistan
    have sold a nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia, it would be the
    first state to actually transfer nuclear weapons to another
    state. Without precedent. Now, if anybody can break precedent,
    it is the Pakistanis. I just don't know enough about Pakistan.
    Every time I would ask somebody who knows something about
    Pakistan, they will say they would do it.
        Mr. Cook. Okay. Can I switch gears a little bit?
        I want to talk about Bahrain, and the number of Shia
    residents there, and the influence of Iran on a pivotal
    country. Obviously, that is where our fleet is and everything
    like that. Do you have any comments on that? Because the
    Bahrain is involved in the war in Yemen, and which I am sure
    is, you know, as part of the Saudi coalition, and whether that
    is the next, if you will, in this domino effect of countries
    that Iran has supported.
        Mr. Takeyh. In the Gulf today, Bahrain remains a country
    that has been most vulnerable to Iranian subversion, and the
    activity of Iran subversion in Bahrain utilizing the Shia
    population is increasing to the extent of, I think, even
    dispatching arms. So Bahrain is becoming a specific target of
    Iran's, as they will say, malign activities, more so than, I
    think, other places in the Gulf, simply because there have been
    disturbances there in the aftermath of 2011, and Iran always
    tries to fish in muddy waters. So I think you are seeing a
    greater degree of subversive participation in Bahrain at this
    point.
        Mr. Cook. Okay. And last question or issue I want to talk--
    and, Mr. Berman, I haven't picked on you. And I apologize. But
    the war in Yemen, and particularly, once again, the Saudi
    investment, in terms of that escalating, this is tremendous
    consequences for the Red Sea and the closure of the Suez. If
    that continues, with an escalation, how do you think that could
    play out in terms of involvement of those countries in the
    region and the United States?
        Mr. Berman. I will attempt very briefly.
        I think that the proper lens through which to view what is
    happening in Yemen--and, incidentally, it is worth noting that
    Yemen is in the throws of three separate security crises, not
    simply the civil war. However, the instability that is
    localized there now has the potential to have a very large
    catalytic effect on the safety and security of energy shipping
    through the Bab al-Mandab and other strategic waterways. And it
    is also, I think, correct to view what is happening in Yemen
    as, at least in part, a proxy battle between Iranian-supported
    rebels on the one hand, and the Saudi state, and the Gulf
    monarchy, the Sunni Gulf monarchies, on the other.
        There is, I think, a very high potential for escalation
    because of these characteristics, and it is a crisis that I
    think the Unites States needs to navigate very carefully.
        Mr. Cook. Thank you, very much. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, we have just heard for the last few days a lot
    about the President's trip to the Middle East and to Israel.
    And so we have heard him talk about cooperation and new
    directions and all of that. And that is why I would just point
    out, again, that while your testimony is very interesting, and
    I thank you for being here, it is not all that helpful moving
    forward. It is good analysis, but we really need to hear from
    members of the administration to put some meat on the bones
    here. Just what are the plans? What are the details? What do
    they have in mind going forward with this new direction?
        I would just ask you, quickly, Mr. Berman, you mentioned
    several times the need to reach out beyond the government to
    the people of Iran. I wonder if you know what the new budget
    does to Voice of America, for example.
        Mr. Berman. Ma'am, I do. I think the conversation about the
    current shape and content of U.S. broadcasting toward Iran
    specifically is a work in progress. I can divulge--I have on
    public forums--that my organization, the American Foreign
    Policy Council, has been asked to do an independent third-party
    review of content relating to Persian-language broadcasting,
    and I will reserve all judgment until the findings of that
    study come back. But I would hope that those findings will have
    an impact upon how the administration sees the utility of
    strategic communication.
        Ms. Titus. I hope so too, because at a time when apparently
    we need it even more, it is being cut by about 9 percent. So
    let's just get that on the record.
        I will now ask you, Dr. Byman. In your written statement,
    you note that--and I will quote you, if you don't mind: ``The
    new initiative or form of pressure is going to require our
    allies. Economic pressure requires support from European and
    Asian allies, while military and diplomatic pressure requires
    Middle Eastern help as well.''
        I would like to go back to the point that our ranking
    member was making about the nuclear agreement. Another
    statement that came out of the travels of the President from
    Saudi Arabia was that, and I quote again: ``Iran's interference
    poses a threat to the security of the region and the world, and
    the nuclear agreement with Iran needs to be reexamined and some
    of its clauses.''
        This was a statement coming from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
    Now, Saudi Arabia wasn't part of that original agreement. So it
    is kind of confusing. And on the other hand, we are hearing
    that Iran lived up to its agreement. Now we are hearing we need
    a new direction involving Saudi Arabia.
        Could you tell us what you think the other members of the
    original agreement are going to think about opening up again
    and looking at some of these provisions and working with people
    who weren't even part of the original agreement?
        Mr. Byman. As you know, the agreement required painful and
    also painstaking diplomacy. And I think many countries walked
    away, not completely satisfied, but at least getting some sense
    of what they were hoping for. The problem with opening this up
    again is that it looks like it is the United States that is
    doing it when, at the same time, the United States is
    certifying that Iran has lived up to its side of the bargain in
    letter. Not always in spirit but in letter.
        And, as a result, many of our allies would be skeptical of
    this, and I think we would end up worse off than we were in
    2011, that the economic pressure that was brought to bear in
    2011 would be very difficult to rebuild because the problem
    would be seen as emanating from Washington rather than from
    Tehran.
        My hope would be that we could build economic pressure on
    other issues, not the nuclear issue, but terrorism, such as the
    subject of this hearing, for exactly that reason. I think Iran
    should be pushed to move away from much of its nasty activity,
    but doing so, on the nuclear agreement, without a clear
    violation from Iran, in my mind, would be a mistake.
        Ms. Titus. So you don't think that, say, Russia or China or
    some of the European countries would think this was a good
    idea?
        Mr. Byman. I hate to invoke Russia or China, because I
    think they would happily rush in to exploit any sense of a U.S.
    misstep or a weakness. But I would even say real allies, allies
    in Europe, for example, most of them would think it was a
    mistake.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
    Perry.
        Mr. Perry. Good afternoon, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Berman, looking for, and I think you kind of enumerated
    some in your testimony, but I would like to go back through it
    a little bit. Iran's use of the funds released from the JCPOA
    to increase funding to terrorist organizations and activities.
    If we could kind of delve into that a little bit, the amount,
    to who, and how that is verified.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you, sir. And I am happy to provide more
    details. I have written about it and I have documented it
    elsewhere. So please forgive if I provide--if my incomplete
    memory----
        Mr. Perry. An overview will be good.
        Mr. Berman. The Congressional Research Service in July
    2015, about 2 or 3 weeks after the passage of the JCPOA, was
    asked by the office of Congressman Mark Kirk--of Senator Mark
    Kirk to outline what it believed was the scope of Iranian,
    then-sanctioned Iran, its funding, the scope of its funding for
    international terrorism. At that time, what was returned by the
    CRS was not a figure, but it was a range. It was a range
    between $3\1/2\ billion and $16 billion annually, at a time
    when Iran was still constrained by multilateral sanctions. And
    that range encompassed everything from between $100 million and
    $200 million annually to Hezbollah to up to $6 billion
    annually, at that time, for support for the Assad regime in
    terms of troops and materiel, to several dozens of millions of
    dollars for Iraqi militias. There were sort of very clear sort
    of line items that were enumerated in that report. And I am
    happy to make that available to you.
        I think sort of the takeaway from the time that has elapsed
    since has been that while a full snapshot of how much Iran is
    spending on this portfolio is still incomplete, at least in the
    Open Source, it is clear from certain data points in the Open
    Source Press, for example, that Iran has ratcheted up this
    financial activity with regard to Hamas, with regard to
    Hezbollah, in a way that is very detrimental to regional
    security because it expands the threat capabilities.
        Mr. Perry. So at what level? How do we determine at what
    level? And can you, with any confidence, conclude, for
    instance, missile technology Tomas, is directly attributable to
    the money that was received from Iran, from the United States
    as a result of the JCPOA?
        Mr. Berman. Sir, I think it would be very hard to point to
    a smoking gun in terms of direct transfer as a result of the
    JCPOA. What I would note, at least for the purposes of this
    hearing, is the overall expansion of available funds that are
    fungible that Iran can use for a variety of----
        Mr. Perry. We all get that, obviously. So currently, only
    the IRGC Quds force is designated by the Treasury for its
    terrorist activities. And I am thinking, you know, Mr. Mast, my
    time in Iraq where Iran, it was directly attributed, their use
    and manufacture of EFPs, explosive form penetrators, which is a
    cheap manned sabot round, goes right through an engine block,
    and certainly a human is--you can understand the devastation. I
    am wondering how we are going to--how we are going to sanction
    the broader IRGC under the requirements designated in the
    Executive Order 13224 and if we want to. But, first of all, I
    think we should. But maybe you have a different opinion. But
    how do we justify that?
        I mean, when we know these things are--you know, the IRGC
    is a big operation in Iran, controlling most of the activities
    of the country in a meaningful sense. So how do we get to that?
        Mr. Berman. Well, sir, in sort of--in the very short time I
    have allotted, I would point out two things. First of all,
    there is a policy goal of preventing a full normalization of
    trade with Iran that the administration has articulated. And in
    this context, the IRGC is very much low-hanging fruit. They
    control a third or more of Iran's national economy. They have
    controlling interests in the telecom sector, in the
    construction sector, and various other aspects of Iran's
    economy, and, therefore, a designation would have a chilling
    effect on--can be expected to have a chilling effect on foreign
    countries and companies that are involved in those sectors.
        Mr. Perry. So what would be the downside and how do you--
    can we justify it currently? I know we got 30 seconds. Can we
    justify it currently and is there a downside?
        Mr. Berman. I think there is a downside. There is always a
    downside in these sort of designations. I believe that it could
    create not insubstantial trade disruptions between the United
    States and countries that are heavily leveraged in the Iranian
    market. I think this is not an insurmountable obstacle as well.
    And I think what we will find is that the lion's share of
    countries and companies that are involved in the Iranian market
    are much more heavily leveraged in the American market, and we
    can force them----
        Mr. Perry. I am not worried about the leveraging.
        Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence--the justification, can
    there be any justification under the current circumstances to
    designate the greater IRGC?
        Mr. Berman. You mean a precipitating event, sir?
        Mr. Perry. How do we know where they are spending the
    money? I mean, how do you prove the justification for
    designating them? If we haven't done it already, what has
    changed?
        Mr. Berman. Well, the lack of a designation up until this
    point, sir, I would argue is actually a failure of policy, and
    it reflects sort of a desire to turn a blind eye to the----
        Mr. Perry. Okay. So you are saying we currently have the
    justification.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
        Mr. Berman. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
    California, Mrs. Torres.
        Mrs. Torres. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
    you to our panel for being here.
        How could the Trump administration policies toward Russia,
    in recent statements during his trip to the Middle East about
    Iran, affect the United States' ability to pursue its
    objectives in curbing Iran's destructive influence in the
    region?
        Mr. Byman. It is a very big question. So I will say perhaps
    the most important first step is to restore confidence of U.S.
    allies in U.S. leadership. And that requires a sense that the
    United States is going to hear their concerns, but also that
    the United States is going to become and stay a major player in
    the Middle East. And that requires military presence. It also
    requires a political presence. It requires high-level
    engagement, and it requires almost constant lower-level
    engagement as well. And maintaining those ties, making sure
    allies are on the same page, making sure we have a plan, that
    is going to be necessary. That is hard for any administration.
    And I hope that the Trump administration can use any momentum
    from the recent trip to try to restore and build that
    coalition, and then develop the capacity within Washington to
    carry that energy forward.
        Mrs. Torres. Lower-level engagement as in?
        Mr. Byman. We need deputy assistant secretaries. We need
    people who are political figures throughout the administration
    who are often the counterparts. Any President, no matter how
    energetic, cannot handle every aspect of diplomacy 24 hours a
    day. Secretary of State cannot do so. And we need experts and
    advisors and mid-level officials, and that is vital to any
    administration's success.
        Mrs. Torres. I was hoping you would say that. Thank you.
        This subcommittee has previously heard testimony regarding
    the role of Iran and Russia in supporting the Taliban and the
    Shiite militias. How do their shared security interests impede
    U.S. objectives in the region and what options does the U.S.
    have in confronting those efforts?
        Mr. Takeyh. This is one of the more curious aspects of
    Iran's policy in a sense that it is willing to, at times, align
    itself with even radical Sunni groups. There are some
    indications of some level of relationship with al-Qaeda. There
    is always a relationship with some members or aspects of
    Taliban, and Russia has been doing the same thing.
        In this sense, there is a measure of amorality in terms of
    Iran's policy, particularly as it looks east in terms of
    Afghanistan. One of the ways of combatting that, as Judge Poe
    has his own legislation on the revolutionary guards, one of the
    ways we principally over the time have tried to impose
    penalties and costs on Iran is through economic measures.
    Whether they have been successful or not is hard to say. But
    that economic leverage, I think, is important to suggest, that
    coercive economic leverage is attenuated because of JCPOA.
    There are barriers and obstacles to that. So JCPOA is a nuclear
    agreement, but its restrictions also affect the progress of the
    United States in exercising the economic leverage tool that
    historically has deployed.
        Mrs. Torres. Anyone else?
        Mr. Berman. If I could, ma'am. I would point out, this, to
    me, is one of the central questions in our conversation about
    Russia and sort of where Russia fits. And I think there has
    been quite a learning process that the new White House has gone
    through.
        In the early days of the Trump administration, there was a
    lot of talk about whether it was possible to flip Russia on
    Iran, whether it was possible to get Russia, with a more
    specific relationship overall, to get Moscow to cooperate
    better on Tehran. But what we have discovered is that this is
    actually much harder than it looks, for a whole host of very
    practical reasons.
        Russia needs Iranian assistance and support in order to
    preserve a long-term presence in Syria, for forced projection
    in the Middle East. Russia, whose own economy is not doing
    well, needs those tens of billions of dollars of arms deals
    that has now concluded with Iran. And for these and other
    reasons, it is, I think, a little bit facile to think about the
    fact that Russia, with enough inducements, with enough carrots,
    will actually play ball on Iran. I think we need to start
    thinking more creatively about what tools of leverage we have
    that can separate the Russians from the Iranians in what is
    manifestly a very robust----
        Mrs. Torres. I want to get a last quick question in there.
    What cooperation, if any, is there between Iran and North Korea
    regarding ballistic missile development?
        Mr. Berman. I have 10 seconds, so I will have to be very
    brief. I would point out that the strategic relationship dates
    back to the late 1980s, but it extends beyond ballistic
    missiles. Every single nuclear test that the North Korean
    regime has carried out in the past decade has had observers,
    Iranian engineers as observers. And this----
        Mrs. Torres. On the ground?
        Mr. Berman. On the ground. And this speaks to a larger,
    deeper, and more nefarious strategic relationship, not only on
    ballistic missiles, but on other strategic programs as well.
        Mrs. Torres. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the 17 seconds.
        Mr. Poe. You are welcome.
        I know the State Department is looking for deputy
    secretaries. I think maybe three are right here sitting in
    front of us, though. You don't have to comment on that.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Garrett.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Sort of trying to wrap my brain around this is something,
    because, you know, I have only been here for a few months, and
    my background is as a company grade military officer and a
    prosecutor. And yet I look at the JCPOA, which at the risk of
    getting myself in trouble, I refer to as the JCPOS, and I
    wonder who wrote it. And what I mean by that is, if you look at
    U.N. Resolution 1929 that was controlling in 2010, the wording
    of the document read: Iran shall not undertake any activity
    related to ballistic missiles capable of--right? And then under
    the JCPOA we were handed language: Iran is called upon not to
    undertake any activities related to the development of
    ballistic missiles.
        Dramatic pause for effect. Right? You don't have to be that
    good a lawyer and certainly not that experienced a legislator
    to understand the difference between ``may'' and ``shall'' or
    ``shall not'' versus ``is called upon not to.''
        Mr. Berman, at what possible point did any individual
    commissioned by the United States of America and the P5+1 think
    this wording made sense, and could you please shed some light
    on to why?
        Mr. Berman. Sir, I can't. And I say this advisably as a not
    very good lawyer who is recovering currently. I would point out
    that that language is dispositive. And what you have seen--and
    it is not only on the ballistic missile portfolio but on other
    aspects of multilateral pressure against Iran, where we have
    seen a watering down in the service of the nuclear agreement.
    And this is the only explanation I have for it, that in the
    service, in the hope that we could delay and potentially later
    derail Iran's nuclear program, we were willing to roll back the
    language, the compulsory nature of our international
    restrictions so far.
        As we have seen, I think this was a bargain that hasn't
    manifested itself as a good one, and I think we are now sort of
    trying to make up lost ground as a result.
        Mr. Garrett. So, Mr. Byman, you testified that Iran has
    lived up to its side of the bargain, and this is a quote: ``In
    a letter if not in the spirit.''
        I am not aware of your educational background, but does it
    shock you that when the previous oversight of Iran, as it
    related to U.N. Resolution 1929 was ``shall not undertake,''
    and the JCPOA--JCPOS--JCPOA says, ``is called upon not to,''
    does it shock you that Iran has engaged in ballistic missile
    activity?
        Mr. Byman. Not at all, sir.
        Mr. Garrett. And does anybody at the table know who it was
    that we empowered as a Nation and where they went to law
    school, who thought that this language is a good idea? Right?
        Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me for a moment, it is
    not just about the procurement of a nuclear device. Right? A
    nuclear device needs a delivery mechanism. And so while you
    might take some short-term windows and say we have moved that
    back as we watched North Korea right now, not in the SCIF, we
    also know that there is miniaturization and mating a nuclear
    device to a delivery mechanism.
        And so you contemplate the terms of breakout. Is it not
    possible that Iran is angling toward a creep-out knowing that
    the mechanisms for delivery are being enhanced under our very
    nose by a language that we allowed, that someone was either
    criminally negligent or was aware of the intent, and that we
    are going to have a creep-out scenario where Iran not only has
    a nuclear weapon but also their delivery mechanism by which to
    essentially hold hostage the entire region if not the world?
        Mr. Takeyh.
        Mr. Takeyh. A nuclear weapon requires a number of things.
    It requires ability to enrich uranium with dispatch. Iran is
    currently developing the capacity with the advancement of this
    high-level velocity centrifuges, which are permissible by
    JCPOA. It requires ability to design--weaponization design.
    That is impossible to detect. Weaponization design could be a
    room in an office somewhere, so I imagine that is taking place.
        Third is projectiles to deliver that missile, and that is
    also excluded from the agreement, and therefore, they are
    developing those ballistic missiles. So the triad of a nuclear
    weapon is being developed right now.
        Mr. Garrett. I have a finite amount of time. I respect the
    answer, and I will come back to you. But essentially, it wasn't
    excluded from the agreement. We included--that is the delivery
    mechanism development. We included words in the JCPOA that at
    least politicians could come back to the American and global
    consuming public and go, oh, look, we have called upon them not
    to undertake the development, right, whereas we all understand
    ``may'' versus ``shall'' versus ``called upon not to,'' right?
        So we didn't deny anything other than agreeing to a
    reduction of the number of centrifuges and eliminating
    plutonium centrifuges for a period of time. Am I correct?
        Mr. Takeyh. The plutonium capability has, I think, been
    foreclosed but not the enrichment capacity--enrichment
    capability. And you are right. In the Resolution 1929, it was
    impermissible for Iran to develop ballistic missiles. That
    language has obviously been attenuated, as you know.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
    Schneider.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
        And I apologize, I am in another hearing where we are
    having a vote, so if I jump up abruptly, please don't take
    offense. But thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your
    work. I was not able to be here for your testimony here, but I
    have studied your submitted testimony carefully, and I very
    much appreciate it.
        I think, Dr. Takeyh, you describe in your--you close in
    your remarks that, in the end, the nuclear agreement offered
    Iran all that it wanted and go on to identify that. I think
    that, for me, at the time was one of my concerns with the
    agreement, as well as the matter of time. But we are stuck with
    this agreement now. We are where we are. And I am sure you have
    talked about it in previous discussion, the need to enforce
    this agreement, enforce it to its letter.
        Mr. Berman, in your testimony, you talk about ensuring
    compliance and akin to the question. There is a great deal--you
    say there is a great deal that must be done in this regard.
    Could you highlight some of the specifics of what you see being
    absolutely necessary and what the Congress can do to move this
    forward to make sure that we absolutely lock down this
    agreement for the time we have it to make sure Iran doesn't get
    any closer to a nuclear weapon?
        Mr. Berman. Sir, I can hazard sort of the start of a guess.
    I think there is a more fulsome response that requires some
    study. But I would point out that the current regime--
    monitoring regime structure that exists under the JCPOA is
    inadequate for a couple reasons. First of all, it is not fully
    sourced in the sense that the facilities that the United States
    Government believes are Iranian nuclear facilities are not
    completely covered by the inspections regime that is baked into
    the JCPOA.
        There are additional facilities that need to be looked at.
    There are many facilities that are co-located with military
    bases that are overseen by the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which
    are of specific concern.
        And there is also a--there have been limitations that have
    been imposed by the Iranian regime on free, unfettered access
    for the inspectors that do exist in their coming, going to
    these facilities.
        All of these ambiguities, as a start, should be assessed
    and discussed in order to determine whether or not we have
    adequate confidence that with this limited regime we can see
    everything there is to see.
        Mr. Schneider. Great. Thank you.
        Dr. Byman--and I promise, Dr. Takeyh, I am going to come to
    you as well.
        But, Dr. Byman, you say that the administration should, and
    I will quote you, ``lay down clear red lines regarding Iran's
    support for militant groups,'' and other things. What are the
    red lines you see? Again, what can Congress do to help state
    those, articulate them as clearly as possible but make sure
    that if those lines are crossed, there is articulated
    consequences as well?
        Mr. Byman. To say some that I hope are obvious and
    therefore could gather support across a wide spectrum of
    Americans would be any targeting, of course, of the U.S.
    homeland or any targeting of American assets overseas.
        And one thing we haven't done in the past is we have
    frequently ignored plots and focused on actual attacks, which I
    understand the political logic of that, but that is crazy,
    because some of the attacks could have easily happened. We were
    just a little lucky and a little skillful. And so that is where
    I put the emphasis. Obviously, any transfer of unconventional
    weapons to a terrorist group should be red lined.
        The thing I would emphasize, though, is this is something
    Congress should be heavily involved in because we have to show
    that this will span administrations; that regardless of who is
    in the White House, that the United States will act to stop
    those.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I can't agree more with what you
    just said. And one of my issues with the JCPOA is that it is
    not just administrations but generations. And my concern with
    this 15-year term, and we see with the recent election, is that
    the people who signed this deal on the Iranian side have every
    expectation that they will be in power when the deal expires
    and can just wait it out.
        Dr. Takeyh, I want to come back to you. I want to give you
    the last word. You very, I think, cogently said--and, again, I
    am going to quote: ``A regime is dangerous to U.S. interests as
    the Islamic Republic requires a comprehensive strategy to
    counter it.''
        Hopefully, we can see a comprehensive strategy coming from
    the administration in conjunction with working with Congress.
    But are there things that you believe have to be--absolutely
    necessary--be a part of that comprehensive strategy, and,
    again, what can Congress do to further that?
        Mr. Takeyh. Well, one of the things--one of the things I
    would say is--I think it has been mentioned before--is the
    rebuilding of the alliances in the Middle East. Those alliances
    for a variety of reasons have been battered in the past few
    years, and once again, rekindling that particular capability of
    those.
        I would say in terms of hemming Iran's influence, as I
    mentioned before, I think Iraq is a place where we can more
    aggressively and effectively push back on Iran. That
    essentially is a very important battleground for Iran because
    it is far more important to their national interests and
    security objectives than I think Syria is. And it is the place
    where the United States has a greater degree of assets.
        Finally, I will say, I continue to stress that it is
    important to put economic pressure on Iran. But, again, I have
    to emphasize, that ability to impose economic pressure to some
    extent is weakened by JCPOA and its provisions of economic
    relief that have to come about, particularly in the realm of
    financial institutions. Because one of the things we found out,
    maybe belatedly, in between 2011 and the aftermath, is that the
    United States has the ability to segregate Iran from the global
    financial institutions. And that has a real effect on its
    domestic economy and its ability to project power, subsidize
    militias, and everything.
        And I think that particular instrument is now largely--not
    entirely, but to some extent weakened by JCPOA, particularly in
    terms of central bank sanctions and so on.
        Mr. Schneider. Right. No, I think we are limited. I hope
    that as a body, as was stated, that we can make it clear to
    Iran that it is the policy of our Nation, of this Congress, not
    just now, not just for the term of the agreement but forever
    that this regime will never get a nuclear weapon.
        So, again, I thank the witnesses for their testimony, and I
    yield back my time.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Illinois.
        And I thank all three of you all for being here today, for
    your excellent testimony. There may be more questions that
    members have. They will put them in writing, and they will
    submit them to the Chair, and we will submit them to you all
    for quick answers.
        So thank you very much. The subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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