[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE BALKANS:
THREATS TO PEACE AND STABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State........ 4
Gordon N. Bardos, Ph.D., president, South East European Research
and Consulting................................................. 30
The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi, founding president, Albanian
American Civic League (former Member of Congress).............. 46
Daniel Serwer, Ph.D., academic director of conflict management,
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University..................................................... 55
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee: Prepared statement........................... 7
Gordon N. Bardos, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 33
The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi: Prepared statement............ 49
Daniel Serwer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 57
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 76
Hearing minutes.................................................. 77
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York:
Report from the Humanitarian Law Center dated March 1, 2017.... 78
Letter from the National Federation of Croatian Americans...... 80
Statement of the National Federation of Croatian Americans
Cultural Foundation.......................................... 82
The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi:
``The Macedonian Crisis--A failure of EU conflict
management?,'' by the Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS)....................................................... 85
``Crisis brewing in Macedonia,'' by Roland Gjoni and Shirley
Cloyes DioGuardi............................................. 88
Interview of Albanian Security Guard on Violence in Macedonian
Parliament................................................... 91
Photos supplied for the hearing................................ 96
Internet link for ``Albania's Prosecutor's Office, Judicial
Reform, & the Role of US Ambassador Donald Lu in Tirana''
submitted for the record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging
Threats, and ``The Explusion of the Albanians'' submitted for
the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi................ 99
Questions for the record submitted to Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee and
Daniel Serwer, Ph.D., by:
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher................................. 100
The Honorable Francis Rooney, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida......................................... 101
The Honorable Lee M. Zeldin, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York........................................ 102
THE BALKANS:
THREATS TO PEACE AND STABILITY
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I call to order this hearing of the
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. Today's
topic is, The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability.
After the ranking member and I each take our 5 minutes to
make opening remarks, each member present will have the
opportunity to make an opening statement for themselves. We
will, then, proceed with our first of two panels.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record.
Building peaceful, democratic, and stable states in the
Balkans has been an issue that has been close to me for many
years. As I know, it has also been close to several of our
friends here. Especially I hope that the ranking member might
stop in, Mr. Engel, who has also been involved in the Balkans
for such a long time.
I am pleased to be holding this hearing and thankful that
we have an official from the State Department to take part in
the hearing. As we are now at the start of a new Congress and
the start of a new administration, this is an ideal time for us
to reflect on the situation in the region and to recommit
ourselves to playing a positive role in that part of the world.
While the Western Balkan nations have achieved some major
steps forward over these last two decades, including the
independence of Kosovo, much remains to be done. Issues of
governance, political development, corruption, judicial
independence, media freedom, economic security, xenophobia, and
reconciliation between democratic players in that region.
Today witnesses will get into specific details of the
challenges and opportunities that exist in the region. But
several points to appear very clear to me.
First, while European integration provides a framework or
goal for the Balkan nations, that has proven to be an
insufficient motive to inspire or compel political
decisionmakers in the Balkans to do the right thing in far too
many cases. Leadership from the United States remains
absolutely essential. Obviously, Brussels can't hack it on
their own.
Second, we should remain committed to our shared values and
hold the governments of the region accountable to the standards
they profess. Perhaps we have been too tolerant of democratic
backsliding and authoritarian politicians dressed up as
democrats.
Third, at a time when foreign assistance and development
aid accounts are set for reduction, they will be reduced, we
need to rethink our points of influence and how we engage in
that region. As an example, I will remind the panel that I have
put forward a plan for a mutual land swap or, what would be
more likely, a border change between Serbia and Kosovo as part
of a process of normalizing relations.
If the Serb community in northern Kosovo wishes to be
governed by Belgrade, they have every right and we should
acknowledge it. This is the same principle that led us to
support Albanian Kosovars in their desire for self-
determination. Border adjustments are not just a magic bullet,
but forcing populations to live in outdated borders or borders
that are imposed upon them is a poor use of limited diplomatic
resources.
To help the subcommittee work through current issues and
find creative solutions, we have an excellent panel of experts
today. But, first, we will be hearing testimony from the State
Department, and certain activities of the State Department and
USAID in the region have been subject to some controversy with
allegations of impropriety being lodged, especially those
allegations that are actually presented by several United
States Senators. We look forward to the answers on those topics
that have been brought up.
So, Ranking Member Meeks, I will yield to you for your
opening statement, and anyone else after that who would like to
have a short opening statement.
Mr. Meeks?
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing to provide us with a timely update on the Western
Balkans region. With the EU understandably consumed by domestic
politics, we must not forget the importance and delicate state
of progress in the Balkans. It is an opportunity to examine the
tough issues and the potential for advancement for a region
that is struggling to move beyond its history, outside
influence, and difficult social and economic factors.
I am especially pleased to have Mr. Yee from the
administration with us today. As I have stressed throughout my
tenure on the Foreign Affairs Committee, the work that our
diplomats do in the field to advance American interests under
difficult circumstances is undervalued. And I would like to
take this opportunity to thank you for your service and let you
know that there is bipartisan concern. Thank you collectively
for what you have done, but there is bipartisan concern about
the administration's planned budget cuts to the State
Department.
I am not saying because I am worried about your job, Mr.
Yee. We think your job is okay. But I am saying this today
because I am worried about America's place in the world and
what a rudderless Balkan region would mean.
The administration has not given our diplomats the tools or
the human resources to do the daily diplomatic work in the
Balkans. Without the appointees needed to direct the ship, the
aforementioned vacuum will grow.
Into this space comes the Kremlin which exploits the
troubles on the ground. Young political actors and fragile
institutions are pressured by corruption, a dismayed
population, and other temptation. In some cases, it is the
Slavic culture ties which the Kremlin plays. Economically
speaking, easy money talks. Corrupt Russian money has brought
up critical infrastructure, flooded the airways with this
information, and hung a cloud over democracy and transparency.
``We are all corrupt,'' the Kremlin narrative goes, and the
West is made out not to be any different.
History has proven that democracy requires hard work,
attention, and investment from leadership. In Ukraine, for
example, groundwork has been laid for reform, but with
President Poroshenko at the top, who is reluctant to divest
from his business, the work is easily undermined.
Unfortunately for us, as of late, here in the United States
we have a leader who attacks the press, threatens our
independent judicial system, which undermines our democracies,
demands loyalty to him over country, and who refuses to have
transparency with reference to his economics. It is immensely
more difficult to encourage reforms when our very institutions
are threatened here in the United States.
Today European politicians are growing skeptical toward
enlargement. America, one can argue, is turning inwards. And
with respect to the Balkans and this autopilot approach, it is
damaging. It is up to Congress to support healthy democratic,
economic, and peaceful progress on the ground.
The United States has invested billions of dollars and many
lives in order to ensure peace and prosperity in the region. I
hope that in today's hearing we can examine the broader U.S.
interest in the region, integration into western institutions.
Croatia, and soon Montenegro, provide proof that the European
Peace Project is alive and still very attractive in the region.
Macedonia, we learned of encouraging news, as a government may
soon be formed that will work to protect the rights of all
minorities.
Nevertheless, there are pockets of trouble on a microscale
that are bubbling to the surface. Government boycotts in
Albania, Kremlin-supported coup and assassination attempts in
Montenegro, and worries by ethnic groups are just a few of the
current events that threaten to derail peace in the region.
Governments there, as well as important civil society
actors and members of the press, should know that we are
concerned with the state of affairs after this hearing. We look
forward to following up on what is discussed at this hearing.
The Kremlin's work to destabilize the situation is not
going unnoticed, but I fear if we willfully ignore or are
welcomed by some, there will be dangerous consequences for the
region as well as the United States of America.
So, I look forward to hearing and having a constructive
discussion where we can explore what Congress can offer and do
to help, because the Balkans are very important in the global
world order and to the United States of America. We cannot--we
cannot--take our eyes off the prize of working with and in the
Balkans.
And I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Congressman Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Meeks, for holding this hearing today. And thank
you to our witnesses for being with us today.
I just returned this past week from a very useful and
informative Judiciary Committee trip to the Balkans where we
visited Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo. What really
struck me at the time was the central importance to each of
these countries that the U.S. continue to support their
democracies and their deep gratitude for America's strong
presence in the region, and the danger of any retreat from our
participation or engagement in the region, as Congressman Meeks
just outlined.
But there remain serious challenges to good governance, to
judicial reform, to serious economic development, and to
efforts to ream out corruption. And I was reminded during the
trip of the famous words of Winston Churchill who once said,
``The Balkans produce more history than they can consume.''
But what was very clear to me was that, after many years of
war and turmoil and change, the Balkans have found a fragile
peace. And I strongly believe it is in the best national
security interest of the United States to continue to support
reform, development, reconciliation, and maintaining the peace
in the Balkans, and that this is not a time for us to retreat
in any way, but to continue to understand the importance of
this region, the importance of our partnership with our allies
in this region, and the danger of creating space for others
with less virtuous objectives.
And so, I very much look forward to our hearing today, and
I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Our first witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Hoyt Yee. He was appointed to his current post in the Bureau of
Europe and Eurasia in September 2013. He is a career Foreign
Service Officer and previously stationed in Montenegro, Greece,
and, most recently, as the Deputy Chief of mission in Croatia.
In the past, he served as Director for European Affairs on
the National Security Council, and before that, he worked at
NATO headquarters as Deputy Director of the private office to
the Secretary General.
So, Mr. Secretary, if you could give us 5 minutes' worth of
your thoughts and, then, we will give you some questions in
return.
STATEMENT OF MR. HOYT BRIAN YEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the
situation in the Western Balkans. Over the years, Congress, and
in particular this subcommittee, have played an important role
in working with the countries of the region and in shaping an
environment that advances U.S. interests, and we welcome very
much this partnership.
Mr. Chairman, although the Balkans no longer dominate
international headlines as they once did, the region still
faces enormous challenges that, left unaddressed, pose a threat
to U.S. interests in Europe. Ethnic tensions throughout the
Balkans are once again on the rise.
The recent violence in Macedonia underscores the severity
of its political problems. As progress in the Serbia-Kosovo
dialog stalls, stability in the Balkans will remain vulnerable.
And without needed structural reform, Bosnia is at risk of
becoming a failed state.
Across the region, nationalism is growing and domestic
political rhetoric is increasingly divisive. From teargas in
Kosovo's Parliament to challenges from the Republic Srpska, to
the authority of Bosnia's Constitutional Court, nationalist
politicians are openly testing democratic norms and
institutions.
Compounding the trouble, lackluster economic growth has
failed to deliver the standards to which people in the Western
Balkans have aspired. In no small part, this is due to
significant public corruption and endemic weaknesses in the
rule of law. Even more alarming, a small number of those who do
not or cannot leave are increasingly vulnerable to the twisted
message of violent extremism, ISIS and other violent groups are
finding success in recruiting fighters and supporters from the
Balkans.
Finally, Russia is increasingly working to undermine
progress in the Balkans. From a bold attempt to undermine the
government in Podgorica, to more subtle support for
secessionist rhetoric in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia seeks
to thwart advancement toward NATO and EU membership wherever it
can.
Since the end of the wars in the 1990s, we and our European
allies have incentivized the necessary political and economic
reforms and reconciliation with neighbors by linking these
actions to eventual membership in the European Union and NATO.
Those linkages have been powerful and effective, but there is
reason to be concerned that they are losing their drawing
power, as the prospects for further expansion appear to dim.
It is clear that we cannot take for granted stability and
democracy in the Balkans. The risk of renewed conflict is on
the rise and the forces against democracy are growing. Left
unattended, the problems of the region will fester and generate
conflicts that will almost inevitably draw us in. However, with
active engagement, we can keep this region on the Euro-Atlantic
path and manage the challenges without a disproportionate
expenditure of resources.
Recent history has repeatedly shown us there is no
substitute for active U.S. leadership in the Balkans and strong
partnership with the European Union. Our work in the Balkans
helps make Americans safer as the countries of the region have
partnered with us more effectively to fight terrorism and
extremism and are becoming net contributors to international
peace and stability operations rather than the subjects of
them.
On April 21, the United States ratified the accession
protocol for Montenegro to join NATO. Montenegro's entry into
NATO on June 5th will be the result of years of reforms
completed with assistance from the United States and other
partners. Montenegro's experience provides a clear example that
structural reform strengthens a country's economy and
democracy, allowing it to become a better and stronger security
partner and, ultimately, a force for regional stability.
When it comes to tracking and disrupting terrorist
activity, we continue to have strong, willing partners
throughout the Balkans, and they need our support. Excellent
regional cooperation with Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo broke
up an attempted terrorist attack against an Albania-Israel
football match in Shkoder last November.
These countries in the Balkans can help us, however, only
if they are politically stable and the region is peaceful. We
continue to work toward that end, but more needs to be done.
We have also developed a multifaceted approach to push back
against Russian malign influence. Our focus on anti-corruption
and rule-of-law reforms in the region forms the backbone of our
strategy.
Increased government transparency and accountability
counters Russia's efforts to exploit corrupt practices to make
countries more vulnerable to Russian pressure. We are
supporting independent media and investigative journalists
through small grants and training, and we are sending American
experts to the region to speak with opinion leaders.
In order to reduce vulnerabilities, we are promoting energy
security, including through diversification. We are also using
our military assistance programs to counteract Russian malign
influence by fortifying the human capital of militaries of the
region and presenting options that allow countries to move away
from overdependence on Russian military equipment.
Mr. Chairman, looking ahead, we have much work to do, but
also much to build on. I want to thank you for this opportunity
to testify before this committee. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yee follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. I have a few
questions for you and, then, we will let Mr. Meeks proceed as
well.
Let me just ask, right now, how would you rate the peace?
The basic issues that brought us into the Balkans into the
first place with Kosovo and Serbia. Is that a peace that is
holding? What are you expecting from that? Are you optimistic
or are you pessimistic, or what is your take on that peace?
Mr. Yee. Mr. Chairman, I am optimistic about the prospects
for reconciliation and peace, peaceful relations between Serbia
and Kosovo. Since 2013, these two countries have been working
to normalize their relations through a process facilitated by
the European Union with strong U.S. support. And while the
progress has been slow and at times painful, we believe it is
headed in the right direction. There have been a number of
agreements reached by both governments which a few years ago,
back before 2013, many of us would have thought to be, if not
impossible, extremely difficult.
So, there is agreement now on an agenda of items that were
concluded or reached agreement in August 2015. They are now in
the process of implementing such agreements as the relations
between the Kosovo-Serb population with the rest of the
country, and the elimination of parallel institutions. So,
there is no longer a Serb set of institutions and a Kosovo
Government set of institutions. There will be only one set.
That is not to say that it will be easy to implement these
agreements or that the relations will be always smooth. I am
certain there will still be more areas of disagreement and a
lot of hard work going forward, but the important element that
makes me optimistic is that the European Union and the United
States Government remain committed to helping these countries,
along with other partners, to implement what they have already
agreed and to go further to find a long-lasting solution.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, you mentioned about the European
Union and the role it plays, but the European Union seems to
be, from a distance, seems to be actually not in a situation
where its power and influence is actually increasing. It looks
like from a distance that it is even disintegrating back home.
What is your prediction in terms of the European Union's
weakening and how that will impact on the Balkans?
Mr. Yee. Mr. Chairman, I would agree that the incentive of
EU membership, the drawing power of the prospect for many
countries in the Western Balkan to join the European Union has
weakened in recent years, for many of the reasons you
mentioned.
However, what is important for both Kosovo and Serbia is
that, as they make progress on the reforms that they are being
asked to make in order to become more compatible with EU
standards, as they make progress, they are given positive
feedback from the EU and from us. And it is still the case for
Kosovo, in particular, but also for Serbia, that if Kosovo will
take the steps necessary, it will gain further--rewards is too
strong a word, but reinforcement from the EU that they are on
the right path.
The example I would use, Mr. Chairman, is on the border
demarcation agreement with Montenegro that Kosovo signed
several years ago, which now needs to be ratified by its
Assembly. The European Union has assured Kosovo that, if the
Assembly of Kosovo adopts this agreement, ratifies the
agreement, the people of Kosovo will, then, get what every
other citizen of Europe has, which is visa-free travel. And
that is an important step forward. That is still a real
possibility.
So far, it has not been the European Union withdrawing that
possibility. It has been Kosovo not willing, not able to take
that step. As long as these incentives are still valid, still
exist, we and the European Union can still help them make these
reforms.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, it would be a positive influence. One
of the things that we have heard, and we have this letter from
several United States Senators, is that George Soros, who many
of us believe holds beliefs that are contrary to what our
country, what America is all about, anyway, that he has
actually been very involved in the Balkans and, also, very
involved in the Balkans in cooperation with various American
programs. What programs has we been working with George Soros
on? And is that a good thing?
Mr. Yee. Mr. Chairman, first, as a general statement, I
want to say that recent stories, accusations about the Open
Society Institute and Mr. Soros himself playing an outsized
role in the Balkans are greatly exaggerated. And what I want to
make clear to this subcommittee, this committee, is that the
efforts by the United States Government, by the European Union,
are their own. In other words, we are not under the influence
of any one person, any one institution, not Mr. Soros or anyone
else.
Rather, it is the other way around; that individuals and
NGOs and other organizations are supporting what the European
Union and the United States Government have been promoting in
terms of advancing the types of reforms, whether it is rule of
law, fighting corruption, strengthening free media,
strengthening an independent judiciary, strengthening civil
society. All these efforts are efforts that are led primarily
by the international community, by the EU and U.S.
Where we have seen support from Open Society over the
years, many years in the Balkans, has been particularly in the
area of strengthening civil society, of citizens and citizen-
led groups to become contributors to stability, contributors to
the reforms that we believe also are important.
So, there has been some cooperation. There has been both
from the EU and there has been from the United States some
support to Open Society over the years in promotion of certain
projects, but at a much smaller level than many people would be
led to believe by some of the narrative that is circulating now
about this disproportionate influence by Mr. Soros.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, you are confirming for us that,
indeed, there has been cooperation with George Soros' projects,
but they have been exaggerated in terms of the influence that
Mr. Soros' organizations have had?
Mr. Yee. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Meeks, you may proceed.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
And, Mr. Secretary, again, welcome.
Now let me ask--and I think you touched on this in your
remarks--that the Kremlin exploits weaknesses in the region. We
know that when we have ethnic tensions and economic malaise and
high unemployment, lack of transparency, lack of a free press,
and even a stalled progress toward the EU, that that leaves a
lot of space for the Kremlin to act.
So, my question to you is, what do you think are the
Kremlin's goal in the region, in your humble opinion?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for that question.
It would be difficult to predict or to read the mind of
Vladimir Putin, but I can say that it seems to us that the
efforts most recently in the Balkans by Russia tend to be aimed
at increasing the influence of Russia, tend to be to discourage
the countries of the Western Balkans from advancing toward the
West, Western institutions, whether it's the European Union or
NATO. It tends to be as much as possible to create greater
dependency of these countries on Russia as opposed to on the
West.
So, there does not, in my view, appear to be a kind of
grand strategy; rather, an opportunistic approach at how to
weaken certain governments that may be favorably disposed
toward the West, to help governments become, if possible, more
dependent or more friendly toward Russia. And, of course, there
is a commercial motivation behind a lot of what Russia does as
well. For example, in the energy area, to increase the
dependence of Europe, including the Balkans, on Russian sources
of hydrocarbons.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. Well, let me ask the opposite
question, too. We have a new administration here in the United
States. So, what would you say in our engagement, what is new
in the United States engagement? Is it something new? Is it the
same as in the past administration? Are there any differences
or any changes in our goals? That is why I am delighted to have
you here, because we are trying to figure that out. Unless we
have individuals like yourself, we don't have anyone to ask.
So, I am trying to figure out what are our goals or the
administration's goals and whether they have changed? Are they
different? If they are different from the prior administration,
what are they? And please give me an answer to that.
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, for that question. U.S.
policy in the Balkans, for good reason I believe, has been
consistent over the last several administrations, going back at
least two decades, where I believe all of the administrations,
the United States administrations, have focused on protecting
and advancing U.S. interests in the Balkans, a very volatile
area, an area where there has been considerable instability.
Our interests are supported by the sorts of efforts that
you mentioned, sir, in your opening statement, as well as the
chairman, that it is very important for the United States that
the region be peaceful, it be secure, it be stable; that
elements, sources of instability, whether it is corruption or
malign influence from Russia, are dealt with firmly and
swiftly. We believe that continues to be the interest of the
United States, to continue helping the region advance toward
integration with the rest of Europe, to stronger institutions,
to closer partnerships with the United States, helping us in
areas such as fighting terrorism, dealing effectively with mass
migration flows, and, also, reinforcing operations or exercises
by NATO.
So, I think the consistency in our policy is based on the
consistency of American interests in----
Mr. Meeks. Because I am, you know, concerned because our
President has said different things about NATO--once it was
irrelevant; maybe it is relevant again--different things about
the EU. And when I have talked to some of our allies, they are
confused also. That is why I am concerned.
Our President has said he knows more than any of our State
Department, our intelligence folks, or anything of that nature,
and that he was going to review and change everything because,
even though two or three past administrations, Democratic and
Republican, he says they all are wrong; that no one is smarter
than he.
And so, I want to be sure that we are staying on the same
path and there has not been any indication or any order to
change the direction, because I think the region is interested
in wanting to be secure as to what the United States is doing
because too many places folks don't know. And you are telling
us that you are going to stay the course.
All right. I think we are going to do another round, right?
Mr. Rohrabacher. If you would like.
Mr. Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Secretary Yee.
I want to just follow up on Mr. Meeks' last set of
questions. Have you had discussions with Secretary Tillerson
directly about the administration's strategy toward the
Balkans? And can you share with us, if you have, how our
thinking about the Balkans relates to our strategy in the
larger region?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, sir, for that question. I have not
discussed directly with Secretary Tillerson our strategy in the
Balkans. However, I can assure you that much of what I have
described in my testimony has been thoroughly circulated and
vetted, reviewed by the senior levels of the State Department.
And we have, of course, kept Secretary Tillerson informed of
our activities, of our plans, and particularly since the
Secretary has participated in meetings with NATO allies, that
he had to decide whether to sign or not to sign the Protocols
of Accession of Montenegro for NATO membership, and also to
advise the President, that he is well aware of the importance
of the region. I believe as we have more time, we will be able
to----
Mr. Cicilline. Okay. I understand that. I just wanted to be
sure that there was--it would be helpful to know if the
Secretary of State has actually discussed directly with you
kind of the administration's strategy about this area and the
region. I take it the answer is no.
The same thing, I just want to follow up on Mr.
Rohrabacher's question. The reference to the Soros Foundation
was actually made on our trip as well. Of course, it turns out
it is a very modest participation, and it is through a
competitive grant process.
I want to just ask you whether or not there is any
difference in your mind in the work that is supported by the
Soros Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy or
the International Republican Institute, those agencies that are
doing work on governance, judicial reform, rule of law,
strengthening civil society. Is there any difference?
Mr. Yee. Is there any difference? Sorry, sir. Is there any
difference between the approach before in the last
administration----
Mr. Cicilline. So, the work that is being done by the Soros
Foundation in those areas, aren't those the same kinds of
things that are happening with the National Endowment for
Democracy and the Republican Institute?
Mr. Yee. Yes. Yes, thank you for that question. Yes,
absolutely. The type of work that we support, the U.S.
Government supports or the European Union is supporting through
implementing partners which are selected according to open and
transparent criteria, includes a wide range of organizations,
including those that you mentioned, sir.
The Soros Institute, Open Society Institute, actually makes
up a very small percentage of the assistance programs that are
supported by the U.S. Government and also by the European
Union, as far as I know. The types of criteria that the
nongovernmental organizations, including the Open Society, need
to meet are consistent across the board throughout the Balkans.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Also, would you just tell us a little bit about what your
assessment is? There have been proposals of very substantial
cuts to foreign assistance to the Balkans and how that might
impact the U.S.-Balkan relationships, and what are the both
short-term and long-term national security interests of the
United States, if the level of cuts that have been proposed by
this administration, what the impact would be?
Mr. Yee. Thank you for the question, sir. The State
Department is confident that it will be able to carry out the
foreign policy priorities set by this administration within the
budget blueprint that has been put forward by the
administration.
Mr. Cicilline. With a 37-percent cut in foreign assistance?
Mr. Yee. We will, as always, sir, make the absolute best--
--
Mr. Cicilline. Well, I guess the question isn't whether you
make the best. Will it have an adverse impact on the work we
are doing in the region, the partnerships that we are building
with these governments to promote transparency, rule of law,
judicial reform, good governance, and to combat the growth of
extremism? Because if it is not having any impact on it, we
maybe shouldn't spend any money there. I mean, that is clearly
not the case. So, are you saying that a proposed reduction of
37 percent will not have an adverse impact on the work we are
doing and the long-term national security interest of the
United States?
Mr. Yee. Well, sir, I will make two points on that. First,
of course, there is an impact. If we spend less or we spend
more, there is an impact, because our implementation of
programs based on U.S. assistance we do believe has an impact.
So, there will be.
But the question on whether----
Mr. Cicilline. And it will be a negative impact? When there
is a nearly 40-percent cut, that would not advance the national
security interest of the United States, in your opinion?
Mr. Yee. Well, sir, I would say we would have to see what
the impact is going to be, based on our prioritization and our
focus that will be a necessity after we receive the budget from
the Congress.
Mr. Cicilline. But you are not suggesting we are going to
have greater influence and be a better partner in the region if
we spend 40-percent less resources devoted to the work?
Mr. Yee. Well, sir, I would make this point: That U.S.
leadership and the impact of American diplomacy is, of course,
reliant in great part on our assistance, but it is by no means
the only means in which we have an influence on the region.
Much of what we are doing today in places like Macedonia and
Albania is not dependent on the amount of dollars that we put
into our programs. So, again, we, of course, consider these
programs to be very helpful.
What is important is that these countries, the populations,
the citizens, the parties understand that the U.S. is
committed, is willing to demonstrate the leadership necessary
in order to help them solve problems, some of which, of course,
do require resources, but some require leadership and a
willingness to stand up to authoritarian leaders, corrupt
leaders, organized crime, narcotics traffickers. Many of these
efforts depend on U.S. leadership.
Mr. Cicilline. And resources?
Mr. Yee. And resources.
Mr. Cicilline. Okay. But I just want to conclude, Mr.
Chairman, by welcoming Ambassador Faber who is here, who I had
the pleasure of meeting in Albania, and I want to welcome her
to the hearing room.
And I will yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. At the request of Mr. Meeks, we will have
a second round.
Let me just ask right off the bat here, what you are
describing is, of course, that the United States is deeply
involved. When you have a democratic election in countries like
this, does that mean that we are trying to superimpose what we
believe would be the best government in a democratic process?
Are we telling people that their democratic process is
important, but here is what you should be doing because that is
our opinion? Isn't that what these Soros operations are all
about?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. We are
absolutely not imposing our will or our preferences for one
party or one policy.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But we are interfering, are we not?
Mr. Yee. I would not----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You wouldn't say that giving money that
goes into helping one party organize this group of people or
that group of people, even though it is not on election day,
that that is not interfering with them?
Mr. Yee. I would say it is not, sir. It is not going, all
the assistance does not go to one party or one group of
citizens. It is distributed in a way that is nonpartisan, that
is supportive of civil society or other sectors of society.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, if nonpartisan is an idea that one
party believes in a set of ideas and it just happens to be that
we are helping those ideas, promoting those concepts through
whatever nonprofits that we have there, then that isn't
considered helping the party that is advocating exactly those
things and hurting the party that is advocating in another
direction? That seems to be interference.
In Macedonia, we have some pictures up here, and I will
find out exactly what they are about. But a majority was
elected in Macedonia, and the reports that we have are that our
Ambassador actually encouraged a situation in which the
Macedonian Government, rather than having it the majority, the
party that won the majority take over, we have been encouraging
obstructionism and some kind of coalitions to try to make sure
that the party that won didn't actually take power. Is that an
accurate assessment?
Mr. Yee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. No, it
is not an accurate description.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Yee. Actually, quite the opposite took place. Let me
begin with the first part, just to make clear on interference.
There is no question that the United States is assertive in
defending U.S. interests we believe should be accepted by
countries that want to be partners with us. And this is
important to mention, that Macedonia wants to join NATO.
Macedonia wants to join the European Union, and Albania also
wants to join the European Union.
We, as partners, are trying to help them meet the standards
necessary to achieve that goal. So, when, for example, we
advocate for rule of law, when we advocate for judicial
independence, when we advocate for human rights, it is not
always popular to the government in power. But we believe, as
partners and as potential allies, it is important to make clear
and to help them implement reforms that will advance what we
believe is a shared interest. But, if the government does not
want to support rule of law, does not want to support human
rights, it is their sovereign right to do so. It is still our
obligation to make clear what our priorities are.
Mr. Rohrabacher. As long as the government is
representative of an election process, they are the real
government, whoever.
Mr. Yee. Absolutely.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We believe the majority of people will
decide who is the government. And if we are there undermining
that, for whatever reason, we want the government to go the
opposite direction, we are interfering with people's right to
choose their government.
And we have Mr. Meeks who is very concerned about any
influence the Russians might have. Okay. They have their
national interests; we have our national interests. But perhaps
it is better for us. I mean, the result that I see in
Macedonia. I used some not totally accurate words when someone
asked me about it that got quoted all over the world. But they
don't have, and I shouldn't have said a country, they don't
have a government. And they don't have a government because
there has been people there from the outside, I believe, who
are convincing people not to either respect the majority or,
No. 2, not to make the compromises that are necessary for
democratic government to work.
And if we are down there watching out for our interests,
and we have decided that that is tied to social goals that may
or may not be what the people there believe in, we are
interfering with that system to the point that it is totally
broken down. And you don't have--correct me if I am wrong--the
government right now, they still do not have a functioning
government in Macedonia. Am I wrong?
Mr. Yee. There is an interim government, sir, to answer
your question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. An interim government, right?
Mr. Yee. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Yee. But, to answer your question, in Macedonia the
elections did result in a situation in which no one party had a
majority. And therefore, it was incumbent among the parties to
form a coalition that would have the majority of seats in
Parliament, so the government could be formed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Was it a majority of the vote or a
majority of the people elected in the Parliament?
Mr. Yee. It was proportionally. So, it was essentially the
same; that the party----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, no party won a majority?
Mr. Yee. No party won a majority. However, there was a
coalition of members of Parliament that did represent a
majority that is supposed to receive under normal European
democratic norms a mandate from the President of the country to
form a government. And up until today, up until today, the
President has been withholding that mandate from the majority.
And we have been advocating very strongly, sir, for the
President to observe the constitution, observe European
democratic norms, along with their European partners.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So, we have been suggesting that the
President send that letter and make that recognition? Is that
it?
Mr. Yee. That he allow the formation of a government, not
one party or the other, but to give the mandate to the
majority. This is the basic democratic principle. And today he
did that. So, we have advanced beyond the next step out of this
crisis.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It seems to me that this has been going on
for a while now, and it is only a little country. And we do
have, as you say, a lot of influence in that part of the world.
Quite frankly, I think that we have screwed it up, and I will
leave it with that.
Mr. Meeks?
Mr. Meeks. I will just say, you know, we always talk about
the United States being a leader and try to protect and make
sure that there are human rights. So, we are not trying to
force a government to do something, but I think that if we see
human right violations are wrong, we should challenge the
countries on their human rights. When we see there is not
freedom of the press, we should challenge the government on
whether or not there is freedom of the press. When we see that
there is corruption, we should challenge the government on
those corrupt issues, and not just look away and say that is
the will of the people. Because, clearly, when you have certain
leaders, the will of the people is not heard because of the
will of the leader and they prevent the people when you
suppress freedom of the press, when you suppress humanitarian
rights, when you use certain tactics. And I think that that is
still a very good role for the United States of America to
play.
The fact of the matter is we talk about Russian influence.
You know, I want to challenge them. I think that the President
of the United States, when he had the Foreign Minister in the
White House, as opposed to talking about secrets that we had,
he should have been questioning Russia on human rights, on
freedom of the press, on various things. And we shouldn't want
to be like them. I think that we set the standard, and we
should be the ones that are moving forward in that regard.
A couple of quick questions. You said in your testimony
that of secession rhetoric in Bosnia, you said it was being
leveraged by the Kremlin. How so?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, for that question. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in the Republic Srpska, there
is a strong interest and efforts by Russia to maintain and
increase its influence with the Government of the Republic
Srpska, both through financial means and also political means.
Where we have seen the malign influence in Russia, in
particular, has been in encouraging, words of encouragement,
what we are aware of in public at least, and we can only
imagine in private, encouragement by the Russian Federation of
the secessionist plans and movement by certain politicians to
break away from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would be in violation
of the Dayton Accords, which we believe would be tremendously
destabilizing and would undo many years of hard work in
stabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina and bringing it toward the
European Union and, if it decides, to NATO as well.
So, our efforts in the Republic Srpska and Bosnia in
general are to strengthen institutions, which will make it more
difficult for Russia or other external factors who wish to
maintain a malign influence, including by strengthening rule of
law, by strengthening the free media, and strengthening the
judiciary, independence of the judiciary, so they are not
able----
Mr. Meeks. Let me ask another question. And I don't know,
maybe they are doing good things. Maybe they are checking human
rights, et cetera. But, back in 2012, the Russians and the
Serbian Government established the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian
Center, I think it was in Nis. And that was founded in order to
provide humanitarian emergency response in Serbia and other
Balkan states.
How do you assess that arrangement and the activities that
are going or working with the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian
Center in Serbia?
Mr. Yee. Thank you for that question, Mr. Meeks. We believe
it is very important to be vigilant in general about all
Russian moves in the region, since we have seen recent moves by
Russia which are undermining the interests of the countries in
the Western Balkans and, also, of the United States, we
believe, most recently and most dramatically, in Montenegro,
where the Russian Government attempted to undermine the
elections and the government itself in Montenegro.
It is very important to be vigilant. I think we have some
questions about why Russia is trying to set up a ``humanitarian
center'' in Nis and why it is seeking special status for this
facility. We don't believe the intentions are pure. And so, we
are advising Serbia to ask the hard questions, to ask Serbia
why it needs this facility and why it needs to have a special
status, and what it is going to do that it can't already do
from Belgrade or from existing facilities.
Mr. Meeks. Let me make one last question. Well, actually,
it is a statement, but you might want to answer it. It is
piggybacking off of Mr. Cicilline. Because you spent much of
your testimony on incentives driving countries in the region
toward better behavior. But now, if we have these severe budget
cuts, aren't you going to gut the very incentives which could
help countries move forward? Because a lot of the incentives,
you know, it takes personnel. Personnel cost money as well as
other things. And you won't be able to maintain with a 40-
percent cut personnel as well as other areas. And so,
therefore, a lot of the incentives that we have been giving
out, with a 40-percent budget cut, where even a general said
that, if you cut the State Department, we are going to just
spend the same money in bullets, but isn't that contrary?
Wouldn't we be losing out on those incentives to move forward?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. There is no doubt,
as Mr. Cicilline also made clear, that the resources that are
used in providing assistance to countries of the Western
Balkans is important and has had a positive impact. And whether
we spend more or less, there will be an impact.
The point I want to make in terms of the incentives for the
region is that the assistance, in terms of the financial
assistance in particular, is not the most important driver. The
most important drivers are the types of reforms these countries
need to make. It is the help, political help especially, these
countries need to make these reforms.
So, for example, a lot of the countries in the region
actually are led by people who do not want to see the country
join the European Union or to move forward, because they are
invested in the status quo, invested in systems that allow them
to exploit state-run enterprises, to maintain control over all
the instruments of power in their countries.
So, it is somewhat of a paradoxical situation in which we
are trying to convince the governments, which tell us that they
want to join the European Union, that they need to make
substantial changes in their political system, in the way of
doing business. And these, of course, do--these processes,
these reforms are assisted by our programs. But the most vital
element is the political will necessary by the leaders in these
countries to move forward to make these changes.
Mr. Meeks. I am out of time. I just want to thank you again
for your service. I always think that those who work for the
State Department are underappreciated. I think that the budget
proposal to the State Department shows that underappreciation.
And I know you have got to stand there and take the grate here,
but it has not gone unnoticed about the service that the men
and women of the State Department do on an everyday basis. When
we travel and we go see what is happening on the ground, and we
see how you serve our country, you know, I salute every person
that is in the military, but I also salute every person that is
in the State Department because I see members of the State
Department putting their lives on the line.
And just as we need to increase, and they are looking at
ways to increase the defense budget to some degree, we need to
make sure that we do the same thing with our State Department,
at the very least maintain it, because your job and your work
is something that is of tremendous service to the United States
of America, and I thank you for it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
And now, Mr. Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin just to respond a little bit to the
chairman's suggestion that our foreign policy should be
indifferent to values, that there is something wrong with
supporting an effort in a country where there is a particular
party that is supporting one set of ideas versus another.
Because if you imagine that there were one political party
that was supporting free press, judicial integrity, good
governments, the respect for human rights, free and fair
elections, and there was another entity that was supporting
repression of human rights, judicial corruption, corruption in
the election system, violation of human rights, our foreign
policy ought to reflect our values as a country. We are not
indifferent to those things. We have to a conclusion as a
country that we will promote peace and stability around the
world and the long-term national security interest of the
United States by encouraging things like respect for human
rights, honest elections, good governance, judicial integrity,
free press.
And the notion that we sort of should be indifferent to
that would mean we wouldn't have any foreign policy that
reflected our values as a country. And so, I think in the
Balkans it is particularly important to reject the notion that
it doesn't matter which of those values are being reflected,
because it does matter.
And I think on the issue of Macedonia, I heard from our
Ambassador directly about the efforts to encourage the
constitutional application of the mandate and the forming of a
government. I am delighted that happened today.
But that is exactly the role the United States should play:
Respect for rule of law, respect for fair elections, and to
support the governments and the countries that are doing that
work. So, I think it is important to push back on this notion
of indifference in our foreign policy. I think it is exactly,
sadly, what we have heard from the Secretary of State a little
bit, and I think it is a very dangerous direction. So, I am
happy to hear that you understand the importance of that.
One thing that we heard from everyone that we met with in
the Balkans was how important EU accession and NATO membership
was. And I just want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, about how
you think those objectives play in the kind of long-term
national security interests of the United States, the deep
interest in all of the Balkan countries to be part of the EU
and to be part of NATO.
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline, for those remarks and
also the question. Fortunately, the Western Balkans still
believe very strongly in American leadership; still believe
very strongly in the importance and value of joining the
European Union and joining NATO.
The facts speak for themselves, that countries that are in
NATO, in the European Union, are more prosperous. They are more
stable. They have better futures for their young people. And
so, it continues to be a draw.
And as Chairman Rohrabacher mentioned, as the prospect for
joining those institutions weakens, the motivating force we
have in part weakens. So, we need to continue, I think, to keep
these processes moving forward, both so we can encourage the
European Union to continue the European Project, but also to
keep NATO's open door open. That has been tremendously
important in helping Montenegro, Albania, and Croatia motivate
themselves and their populations to take some difficult reform
steps.
And if I could just make one short comment on the issue of
values, the Secretary of State, Vice President Pence, and
Secretary Mattis have all made clear to their staffs that
values do matter; that human dignity, respect for human rights,
for justice, rule of law, and democracy are all the important
ingredients that bind us and Europe together. So, I think there
is high-level support, although it may not have been
articulated directly with respect to the Balkans. I believe
that our leadership has made clear that the values do matter
and that we should be fighting for them.
Mr. Cicilline. And my last question, Mr. Secretary, is, if
the United States were to pull back in a significant way from
our engagement in the Balkans, do you believe that we would see
a greater likelihood of this spread of extremism and a rise in
terrorism and, if so, in which countries do you think the risk
is greatest?
Mr. Yee. I believe it is--thank you for the question, sir--
I believe it is a risk if the West turns its back, or appears
to be turning its back, on the Western Balkans. They will, the
countries of the Western Balkans will look for other options.
They will look to either Russia or China or other powers that
are providing alternatives to the first option, which is the
West for most of these countries.
So, I think it is absolutely crucial that we continue to
help them make the reforms needed, including the areas you
mentioned of fighting extremism, of providing jobs for young
people who otherwise will turn to less appropriate uses of
their time and energies. If we don't do this, then I think we
can fear that things will deteriorate, not only with respect to
violence and extremism and terrorism, but with regards to the
economy, which, if not improved, will lead to mass migration
outside of the region into Europe, but also to the United
States. And if brain drain increases in that region, the
problems of these countries will only get worse.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask to associate myself
with the remarks of Mr. Meeks with respect to our men and women
in the Foreign Service. I am always in awe of the tremendous
service of the men and women who serve our country all over the
world, sometimes in very dangerous places. And this was no
exception on my trip to the Balkans. We have extraordinary
professionals that have dedicated their lives to representing
our country and the interests of the United States, and they do
it with tremendous dedication and make us all very proud, and
that includes you. So, thank you for your service. And we will
do all we can to protect resources for the important work that
you do.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like to now welcome the ranking
member of the full committee, Mr. Engel, who has had decades'
long interest in this region. I know because we came in
together and we are both very active since day one, and a man
who I deeply respect. And I am very happy that he stopped in
and joined us at this hearing today.
You are recognized, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for those kind words. We have worked together for a long, long
time.
Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the Ambassador of
Albania to the United States, my friend Floreta Faber. She is
here. I want to recognize her and thank her for coming.
Of course, I want to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary
Hoyt Yee who works so hard and so long. Hoyt, it is always good
to see you, and I am grateful for working so closely with you
through the years. And thank you for your service. I agree with
Mr. Cicilline about how we are in awe of people in the Foreign
Service that work so hard on what I consider a shoestring and
do such wonderful work.
So, if we take away a message, one message, from today's
hearing, it is that our work in the Balkans is not over. The
project that began in the 1990s with the breakup of the former
Yugoslavia still requires active engagement by the United
States and by our allies in Europe.
First, the good news: There has been real progress in the
Balkans. Two countries, Slovenia and Croatia, have joined the
EU. Three, Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania, have entered NATO,
and a fourth, Montenegro, is on the way. That is good.
Since the brutal wars of the 1990s, peace and democracy
have, indeed, been the norm in the region, but all is not well.
The democracies established with each country's independence
are now fraying on the edges. Press freedoms are narrowing in
Serbia. Macedonia has not yet been able to form a government,
although today I hear there is real progress. And Albania's
opposition Democratic Party is refusing to take part in next
month's parliamentary vote. Kosovo's elections next month,
spurred by a parliamentary no-confidence motion, seem
relatively normal in comparison. But Kosovo's troubles remain
right around the corner, as Serbia remains unwilling to
normalize relations and recognize its neighbor, Kosovo.
On top of the regional concerns, Vladimir Putin has added
Balkan countries to the list of targets with his contention and
undermining confidence in democracy. The Kremlin attempted a
coup in Montenegro which, fortunately, failed. It is selling
advanced weapons to Serbia, including MiG-29s and T-72 tanks.
And it is getting involved in Macedonia's domestic politics,
aiming to prevent the resolution to the governing crisis in
Skopje.
So, Hoyt, I am glad you are here to help us understand what
is going on and what the United States is doing to get the
region moving forward again.
I would like to make a few points. First, President Trump's
State Department and foreign assistance budgets will devastate
America's ability to promote our interests and protect our
security. This is as true in the Balkans as it is anywhere
else. Since the wars of the 1990s, we have invested billions in
the Balkans, and we have made progress. It would be foolhardy
at best to squander that investment simply to further an
ideological drive to make deep cuts throughout the government.
Secondly, I was taken aback at the initial United States
opposition to Kosovo's plans to form an army. If our
recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent democracy
means anything, it means we must stand by Pristina when it
pursues policies well within the bounds of what is accepted for
any other normal country. And saying Kosovo's development of a
military should take place gradually just doesn't cut it
anymore. Kosovo is in its tenth year of independence. We are
past gradual; we are now approaching glacial. Rather, let's
help the Kosovars consult with their domestic constituencies,
their neighbors, and the international community, so that can
formally establish their nonthreatening defensive force.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, our work is not done in the
Balkans, as you well know. We need to keep the region on the
path toward democracy and the rule of law. We need to continue
to integrate the countries in the North American community, and
we need to ensure that Europe's soft underbelly does not become
a low-hanging fruit ripe for Putin's picking.
This means that the United States must step up our
engagement in the region and support each nation as it
continues its path forward. Anything less will risk bringing
further instability and difficulties back to a region that
deserves a real chance of freedom and prosperity.
So, I guess I will just ask you to comment on anything I
said or might say. And I also want to ask you about the name of
Macedonia with Greece, so problems there. Have there been any
changes of authority in terms of the name for Macedonia?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for your statement
and your questions. I agree largely with everything you have
said, sir, with one possible clarification I wanted to make
about Kosovo and its military. We do, in fact, support Kosovo's
aspirations to create an army. We have agreed with Kosovo since
2011 on a strategy, the security sector strategy review that
includes a number of steps that Kosovo will undertake before it
transforms its security force into an army. That strategy
includes having onboard all the parties in the country and the
government also, including the minority Serbs.
The Kosovars have agreed that, for reasons of stability, it
would be much better to have all of the different peoples in
the country supportive of this step before it happens. So, what
we are asking for is for Kosovo to follow the strategy that we
have laid out and agreed together, that Kosovo honors its
commitments to its partners because, after all, Kosovo, while
it is a sovereign country, also has the presence of a NATO-led
peacekeeping force, KFOR, which expects Kosovo to meet its
commitments.
So, in other words, if Kosovo is going to take any step
that will possibly affect the conditions for the NATO-led
peacekeeping force or for security in general, these steps need
to be coordinated in advance. And when we did make clear to the
Kosovars that we thought they needed to return the strategy was
when it appeared a couple of months ago that Kosovo was going
to proceed with the formation of an army outside of the
framework of the agreement that it had agreed with us and with
other NATO partners.
So, we do support formation of an army, but it should be in
accordance with the strategy that we have already agreed with
them, and it should be done in a way that does not upset the
security situation, which might lead to a weakening of support
from NATO allies for the Kosovo security force, the KFOR, the
peacekeeping force led by NATO.
And, in general, on Russia, I just want to add again what I
mentioned earlier, sir; that we believe it is very important to
stand up to Russian malign influence and we are engaged in many
different efforts to strengthen the ability of all the
countries in the Western Balkans to resist illegal or ill-
intended efforts by Russia to increase its influence, including
in Kosovo, including in Albania, in places which have
traditionally been, more or less, thought to be immune from
this kind of influence. And now, we are beginning to see where
it could, in fact, be coming into play.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, if you would just indulge me, I would like to
ask one more question, and say that I am deeply concerned with
the lack of justice for murders and crimes committed by the
Government of Serbia during and after the Kosovo war. There
have been no charges brought against anyone for the murders of
the three American citizens, the Bytyqi brothers, despite
widespread understanding of who was behind them.
On January 31st of this year, the respected Humanitarian
Law Center of Belgrade released a dossier called ``The Cover-up
of Evidence of Crimes During the War in Kosovo: The Concealment
of Bodies Operation.'' This report described mass graves in
Serbia containing the bodies of 941 Kosovo Albanians, mainly
civilians killed outside combat situations in Kosovo during
1999.
According to the report, ``The evidence corroborated the
decision to conceal evidence of crimes committed was planned as
early as March 1999 at the highest level of the Serbian
Government.'' And on top of this, Belgrade has not brought to
justice those responsible for attacking and setting fire to the
U.S. Embassy in 2008. I want to know when Belgrade will face
facts and bring to justice the people, including high officials
in its government, who are behind these very serious crimes.
The murder and mass burial of almost 1,000 incident civilians
is a crime against humanity, but the perpetrators have since
gone unpunished.
At the same time, the European Union has looked the other
way and has been willing to proceed with Serbia's accession
process. This has to stop and stop now. Until Serbia brings
those who have committed these crimes to justice, the EU should
not move ahead with Belgrade's accession and the United States
should think twice before advancing our relations with Serbia.
I also think that Serbia should stop throwing roadblocks in
Kosovo's way and Kosovo's attempt to join the European Union.
If both of them are to join the European Union--and I have no
objection to that ultimately--then I think that each should
help the other join the Union, not resist and make it almost
impossible by throwing up roadblocks.
So, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask unanimous consent to
put in the record HLC's one-page summary of the dossier I just
mentioned.
And I thank you for your indulgence.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, and thank you very much for
your years of services on this issue and your focus all of
these years. And I don't think it is due to the fact that you
have massive numbers of Serbian or Kosovar residents in your
district. I have got to feel it is just from your heart and
representing a truly principled position, which I may disagree
with certain things about.
Mr. Engel. Well, we have disagreed on a number of things,
Mr. Chairman, through the years, but I think mostly we have
agreed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me just note that my positions
were mentioned in several testimonies. And as a matter of
courtesy, I will yield myself some time to respond.
First of all, and again, I would hope, and what my
disagreement with Eliot is, that we close the books on that war
and Serbia starts cooperating with Kosovo. And bringing up who
killed who 35 years ago or 30 years ago is going to harmful to
bringing about that cooperation. So, I would recommend both
sides just drop it, close the book, realize bad things were
done, and try to form a better relationship.
In terms of our influence, let me note that several times
what we have heard here today is how we must be concerned about
Russia's, we have to stand up to Russia's trying to increase
its influence. What is that all about? I mean, this is Russia
phobiaism, Russia phobia. They are no longer the Soviet Union.
They are a major power. They have every right to try to expand
their influence by influencing people in various parts of the
world, as we do, and we are all over the map in these things,
and we have our military all over the world trying to do that
through the military even.
And, yes, Russia has every right to try to become an
influential force, especially on countries that border Russia.
What is going on? I mean, we went up to the Baltics, and after
hearing the words ``Russian military aggression'' in the
Baltics over and over and over again for a year, I went up
there and we had a hearing. And there was no Russian military
aggression in the Baltics. I mean, not once have their troops
gone into one of these countries.
And, yes, we actually put more troops on their borders than
they actually put inside their own country next to these
countries. So, again, I think this idea that we are now
treating Russia the same way we did during the Soviet Union is
harmful to peace and undermines our ability to get things done
and promote peace in the world.
One last thing about this whole thing about Macedonia and
Soros and these other things. Here is where we disagree. No, if
a country decides they have political parties based on their
social norms, whether it is--yes, they have a right to have a
political party and say, ``No, we are not going to,'' and I'm
not stepping on, trying to attack anybody here or anything.
Just we have a right to determine what we consider to be
acceptable in our national parade. Okay?
And I know we have had problems with that. What I see is
that you have Christian groups in these countries. Soros and
his gang don't like the Christian groups. They don't like
family groups, people who have more traditional, conservative
principles. And I am not saying those principles are right. I
am just saying the people of these various countries have the
right to do that without interference from us, without us
shipping in money to try to help them organize politically to
get the guys who are on the other side of those social norms.
And finally, let me just say that, when we are talking
about what really is the motive going on here, who is seeking
influence about what, Mr. Secretary or Deputy Secretary, what
we are going to call you today, my read of this is that what we
have here is the same sort of thing that we have seen with the
EU elsewhere, like what they did in Ukraine. It is a power grab
by suggesting any country who wants to get into the EU has to
do this, has to jump through hoops.
The attempt at control isn't Russia. The attempt at control
is that we are backing up the EU's demand for control in this
part of the world. And that is what their goal is. And
unfortunately for these folks, I would say that the EU is not
proving to be as viable as it presents itself. I think the EU
is going down, and instead, it is using its leverage based on
us to try to get these new governments down in the Balkans, to
get them to toe the line, the line that they create for that
European market as they see it.
This is German bankers, basically, telling the Balkans what
to do. And I am sorry, I see that far differently than the
Russians--as far more of a detriment to freedom than I do that
the Russians are trying to gain influence on this or that
legislature or this or that leader in that part of the world.
However, I will, as a courtesy, give you 1 minute to refute
it. And then, we are going to our next one.
Mr. Cicilline. I just was going to ask unanimous consent
that Secretary Yee may have an opportunity to respond, so that
it is clear to anyone who is watching that what you have just
articulated is not the policy of the United States.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You've got it. You've got it. [Laughter.]
Mr. Cicilline. So, maybe Secretary Yee could clarify that.
I think it is important. I have traveled with the chairman,
and we have had this lively discussion before. But I think,
since we have an administration official here, responding to
the administration's view of that would be useful.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, I learned this about Macedonia,
too. You don't want anyone to determine that they think you are
talking for the United States Government. I am not even talking
for our new President.
Mr. Cicilline. Well, nor originally the members present
today. [Laughter.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Yee. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline,
too.
Very briefly, I just want to say I agree with the chairman
that sovereign countries should have the right to decide. And
this is perhaps where we disagree, sir; that it is an
assessment of the United States Government that countries like
Macedonia and Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other members
of the Western Balkans, want to join the European Union, want
to join the West. They want to join NATO.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Mr. Yee. In order to do that, there are certain standards
they need to meet: Rule of law, respect for human rights,
respect for a free media, freedom of the speech.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How about economic policies? They also
demand?
Mr. Yee. Also, economic, certain economic standards.
So, what we are doing is helping them to achieve their
goal. We are not telling them that they must join NATO or they
must join the European Union, but they must meet certain
standards if they do want to advance.
Russia is fundamentally against what these countries are
trying to do. That is the difference. We are trying to help
these countries join the West. Russia is trying to hold them
back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Thank you. And thank you, Mr.
Secretary. We appreciate you coming here.
And let me just note that we will be having a codel to the
Balkans this summer. And we are all invited to go, and we hope
maybe even to see you there, or at least get a briefing before
we go. And we are going.
So, we are watching this situation very closely. And it
seems to me that what we had for so long, over the years all we
have heard is, ``the Baltics,'' ``the Baltics,'' again, the
military aggression in the Baltics. And we didn't hear anything
about the Balkans. And the Baltics, as we find out, in terms of
Russia, it is a locked door. They are not going through the
Baltics. But the Balkans seem to be a broken door. And
whichever way people are going to go in and out right now, it
will be determined by what we do as a nation and what we can do
to help those people there have a more efficient, effective,
and free government.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We will now call on the second panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. The hearing is called to order.
We are grateful that we have a fine panel of witnesses. I
would ask the witnesses, if they could, to provide 5 minutes'
worth of oral testimony. Anything you want to put in the record
will be put into the record. But 5 minutes, and that will give
our panel, our committee members here, a chance to go into a
dialog about the points that you have made in your 5-minute
remarks.
So, first, I will introduce all of them, and they will
start with Mr. Bardos after that.
Gordon Bardos is president of the South-east European
Research and Consulting. It is a political risk analysis firm
specializing in Southeastern Europe. He previously served as
director for the Association for the Study of Nationalities and
as a linguist for NATO-led stabilization forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Joseph DioGuardi, no? I should know that after all our
years. I have been mispronouncing it every time I have seen him
for the last 30 years. A former Member of Congress, a member of
this committee, and while in office and later as a prominent
Albanian-American leader, he has worked tirelessly to focus the
attention of the American Government on the Balkans. He is
responsible for helping bring about the first congressional
hearing on Kosovo in 1987. Today he is president of the
Albanian American Civic League.
And finally, Mr. Daniel Serwer, who is an academic director
of conflict management at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies. He is also a scholar in the Middle East
Institute. Previously, he was a minister/counselor at the
Department of State, serving as U.S. Special Envoy and
Coordinator for the Bosnian Federation.
So, we have some people who have got experience on the
ground and a great deal of knowledge to share. And we
appreciate you joining us.
Dr. Bardos, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF GORDON N. BARDOS, PH.D., PRESIDENT, SOUTH EAST
EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND CONSULTING
Mr. Bardos. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me to share some thoughts with you on
the current situation in Southeastern Europe. I will focus my
remarks on four issues: The current crisis of Balkan
democracies, the dangers inherent in opening a Balkan front in
the new Cold War, the need to improve the economies of the
Balkan states, and the challenge of confronting Islamist
terrorist groups in Southeastern Europe.
Just in the 2 weeks since this hearing was scheduled, two
Balkan Governments have essentially fallen. And overall, as one
European diplomat has noted, two states in the Western Balkans
are on the verge of disintegration and three are in deep
political crisis.
International democracy monitoring organizations such as
Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy
Index, all agree that democratization in the region has either
stalled or backslided over the past 10 years.
I was going to do a glance around the region, but I think
Secretary Yee already did that. So, there is no need for that.
I will concentrate on something else.
In the midst of all of these troubles, most people's
attention is focused on what Russia is doing in the Balkans. I
want to argue that this obsession with Russia and the Balkans
is as misguided and potentially as detrimental as the
discussion about WMDs in Iraq was, because turning the Balkans
into another front in the new Cold War will sacrifice democracy
in the region for yet another generation.
By almost any measure, military, diplomatic, and economic,
the U.S. and the EU have achieved dominant positions in
Southeastern Europe. To give just two examples, and more
provided in my written testimony, every country in Southeastern
Europe is currently a member of NATO or a member of the
Partnership for Peace Program. Russia currently has formalized
military alliances with none of the countries in the region.
In 2015, Serbia conducted two military exercises with
Russia. In the same year, Serbia conducted 22 military
exercises with NATO.
To sum up my argument, I would use a sports analogy. In the
game with the Russians in the Balkans we are leading by 78 to
13. Some people think we need to keep on running up the score.
I would argue that it would be better for us to call this game
and start preparing for the challenges posed by next week's
opponent.
Viewed in this context, the challenge presented by next
week's opponent is going to be stabilizing and strengthening
the Balkans' failing democratic institutions and resuscitating
the region's stagnant economies. To put the economic situation
in the Balkans in some perspective, the states in the region
have gone through an economic depression that has lasted far
longer and cut far deeper than anything the United States
experienced in the 1920s.
In 2015, Serbia's GDP was still 25 percent below what it
was in 1989. According to the World Bank, Bosnia currently has
the highest youth unemployment rate in the world. And, of
course, the Greek debt crisis is still far from over.
Unfortunately, promoting the Balkans' democratic and economic
development will be impossible if the region becomes yet
another front in the new Cold War.
Finally, we need to address a serious problem in the region
that I believe is getting insufficient attention, the growth
and spread of Islamist extremist movements. Thanks in part to
the work of Saudi, Qatari, Iranian, and other groups, a
militant form of Islam has been steadily encroaching on the
region's traditionally more mild traditions. Albania, Bosnia,
and Kosovo are estimated to have produced more jihad volunteers
per capita than any other countries in Europe. The importance
of the Balkans in the international jihadi movement is also
evident from the frequency with which a Balkan connection can
be made to almost every terrorist incident in Europe.
The Balkans also play an important role in the European
terrorist threat matrix as a source of armaments. Thanks to the
Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s and Albania's near meltdown in 1997-
1998, jihadis can obtain practically whatever weapons they
might want in Southeastern Europe's black market arms bazaars.
What should be of particular concern is the degree to which
Balkan militant islamists can or have established ties with
Southeastern Europe's flourishing organized crime networks,
which are amply skilled in human trafficking and drug and
weapons smuggling.
Indeed, given the current state of the Balkans, it would
not be difficult to put together all of the elements needed to
make everyone's nightmare scenario, terrorists acquiring
nuclear weapons, come true. At least three times over the past
5 years the FBI has helped to thwart efforts to sell nuclear
and radioactive material in Moldova. We have been lucky so far,
but the combination of weapons-grade uranium on the black
market and apoplectic terror groups with known ambitions to
acquire nuclear weapons should be a loud wakeup call to
everyone concerned.
To deal with all these problems, we need to make several
adjustments to our policy toward the region. First, we need to
align our political ambitions and political projects more
closely to the region's political culture and political
tradition. Far too often over the past 20 years, we have been
engaged in political and social experimentation that simply
will not work in the Balkan environment.
Second, we need to start entertaining the possibility that
the stability-versus-democracy tradeoff might be a false
dichotomy. A strong argument could be made that leaders and
groups that believe they enjoy Washington's favor or believe
they know how to manipulate American policymakers will
increasingly press their advantages against both domestic and
foreign opponents, resulting in less democracy internally and
more aggressive policies externally.
Third, we need to spend less of our diplomatic time and
energy on micromanaging states and more on organizing a
coordinated and coherent approach to the region by major powers
such as Turkey, Russia, and, of course, the EU. Whether we care
to admit it in the current political atmosphere, each of these
actors will be needed in promoting stability and peace in the
Balkans over the coming years.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to share some
thoughts with you on the situation in the Balkans, with you and
the committee. I have discussed all of these matters in more
detail in my written testimony, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bardos follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much.
Joe?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH J. DIOGUARDI, FOUNDING
PRESIDENT, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE (FORMER MEMBER OF
CONGRESS)
Mr. DioGuardi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We were here 2 years ago. You had a wonderful hearing, and
it was mainly on Kosovo and Macedonia.
And you can see the photo all the way to the--it is being
blocked by the fellow from Voice of--excuse me. The chair,
could you move, please?
There is Mr. Ziadin Sela with you 2 years ago being greeted
after the hearing up there, surrounding by his family and
friends from where he was the mayor of Struga. He was
announcing that he was now going to embark on an impossible
task of reforming, politically reforming, the state of
Macedonia.
Two years later it was Ziadin Sela and his party that was
able to meet the qualifications of the mandate. And under the
constitution, as bad as that constitution was, and other
European law naturally, he had to be given by President Ivanov
the right to form a government after the ruling party, under
the strongman Mr. Gruevski, was not able to.
So, you were right in your comments before. He was able to
get a coalition of parliamentarians, Slav and Albanian, to be a
majority and form the government.
When he was supposed to form the government on September
27th, look at the result. There he is in a hospital bed. Right
below you will see his face bloody. He is being pulled out by a
thug.
And just to show you how big these Slav thugs that were
hired by Mr. Gruevski, take a look at this right here, the guy
with the beard. He is one of them.
That was the beginning of the melee. What happened on the
27th was Gruevski's attempt to be sure that there would be no
reforms, that there would be no new government, because he
knows how high his crimes are and he is afraid to be prosecuted
and put in jail. So, he must keep control.
So, what you heard today is like we heard from Mr.
Milosevic so many times when we were able to get hearings here.
The day of the hearing they released prisoners. They did this;
they did that.
So, just today, because our Civic League has advertised
this, has told the world that this hearing was going to be
really important for Macedonia--and in this room I daresay that
90 percent of the participants are ethnic Albanians from
Macedonia whose families are still there suffering. They came
one from Alaska, many from Chicago, two from Iowa. They are
here because they wanted to show you their concern, just the
way the Kosovars did many times when we had those hearings.
But look at this. Now he is being pulled out here. Look at
the blood on his face. He was given up for dead. Now the only
reason he is in that hospital bed is that there was a security
guard, the only Albanian hired by the Macedonian Government, to
show you the economic discrimination in this country. That
Albanian security guard realized that he was not dead; he was
still breathing. They walked away from him. He took him and put
him in a room, hid him until the place cleared out. Then, he
was delivered by an ambulance or an armored car to the
hospital.
Ziadin couldn't come here. He wanted to be here, but I was
naive in thinking he could. He has had so many concussions. If
you look at the picture, you are not just seeing dry blood; you
are seeing pummeling, constant fists to the face and to the
head. They were there to kill him.
They advertised this weeks and weeks in advance, that this
man was an enemy of the state. It reminds me of what Milosevic
called me, an enemy of the state. They called him an enemy of
the people. This is a signal to UDBA or the security forces to
eliminate that person, and that is what they tried to do on
September the 27th.
They went 2\1/2\ hours. They put the uniformed police
outside. They only came in after 2\1/2\ hours when they thought
they had beat up everybody and killed Ziadin, only to find out
that he was put in the hospital, resuscitated.
His doctor, Arben Taravari--Arben, stand up for just a
minute--is right here. He flew in. He is a neurosurgeon. He had
operations, but for 1 day he said, ``I have to come here and at
least take Ziadin's place and let people know that this man is
going to come back to reform the government.''
So, what do you make of today? This is not going to
continue. Whatever Ivanov did, it is not going to last. It is
too dangerous for Gruevski to have a new government.
You have to remember, Mr. Chairman, 20,000 audiotapes were
made public by the Slav opposition of Mr. Gruevski, Mr. Zaev,
whose party now--I think it is LSDM--is in coalition with the
party of Ziadin Sela.
He is not going to allow that coalition to go forward
because he knows everything has been publicized. The only
answer to Gruevski to those wiretaps was, ``Where did they come
from, some foreign thing?'' He won't deny them.
And you can't believe what some of these wiretaps say. And
also, I mean, what they say are things like, ``Those Albanians
that we set up in this Monster case.'' And you know what? They
have long jail sentences. They couldn't adequately defend
themselves. They were set up. They were not even guilty, but
now they are in long prison sentences.
You have Knova when they set up this phony operation and
called it the Albanians from Kosova coming into military
action. They were actually hired by Slavs to do that for an
excuse to go further in their opposition or their repression of
the Albanian people.
Where did this all start? You said that the country of
Yugoslavia disappeared, disintegrated in 1991-1992. Somehow the
Government of Macedonia slipped in with no opposition as an
independent state in 1992 with an old-type constitution under
the former Yugoslavia. And when they formed the state, it
clearly says this is a state for Macedonian Slavs. They don't
mention Albanians. They don't mention Bulgarians. And by the
way, there is no majority in this state. One-third Bulgarian,
one-third Albanian, and one-third Macedonian Slav. That is the
kind of state it is.
But the Albanians have practically no rights whatsoever.
Five percent or less of the Serbs in northern Kosovo have much
greater rights, including language rights, than probably 40
percent of the country or let's say at least 35 percent of the
country in Macedonia. So, what is here for Albanians?
We should have had a solution to this 16 years ago to stop
the violent conflict between the Albanians in Macedonia and the
Slavs. We guaranteed with Europe something called the Oher/
Ohrid Agreement. Sixteen years have passed by and things have
only gotten worse because Gruevski, like a racketeer, the way
he is, he co-opted the junior Albanian Party that came into
office, and nothing has been done.
So, one of the recommendations I am going to make to you is
that we have to go forward with the State Department, the U.S.
taking a much more active role in a framework to implement the
rights of the Ohrid Agreement. We must get that constitution
changed so that it codifies the fact that you have at least two
major ethnic groups in this state that need equal rights,
because there is nothing like equal rights.
You talk about the economic discrimination and the
political corruption against the Albanian people. It is
monstrous, and just economic discrimination. Many jobs are
given out in the government. If you have 33 percent and they
were supposed to get up to 25 or 30 percent on the Albanian
side, they haven't put 10; it is around 7 percent, no jobs. The
unemployment rate must be just like what is going on in Bosnia
right now, the highest in Europe.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Joe, you have----
Mr. DioGuardi. May I put on the record--I have just
summarized by comments. I want to read my full testimony on the
record in writing.
I would like to, then, put the interview by the person who
saved Ziadin Sela, the Albanian security guard. I had it
translated from Albanian to English.
I want to put in some of the photos you haven't seen,
because when he was here 2 years ago he also met with Senator
McCain. And hopefully, that will be done by the doctor before
he goes back.
And I want to put on the record this statement that I put
on the record in 1991 when Chairman Pell was the chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in 1998 when Senator
Biden was. It is the expulsion of the Albanians by Vaso
Cubrilovic, 1937. This paper is the modus operandi of the Slavs
and the Serbs. They wanted to get rid of all Albanians. I have
quoted it in my testimony. I want to put the entire document on
the record, so you can see they are not going to give up on
this.
And two articles, sir, one from Mr. Foray, one of the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Joe, without objection, all that will be
put into the record.
Mr. DioGuardi. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But you did twice as much as everybody
else.
Mr. DioGuardi. Thank you. I appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DioGuardi follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Serwer?
STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, PH.D., ACADEMIC DIRECTOR OF
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Serwer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Meeks. With
permission, I would like to submit a written statement for the
record and use a few minutes for just three key points.
First, the countries of the region made remarkable progress
in the 10 years or so after the NATO intervention in Bosnia in
1995. But in the last 10 years, these past 10 years, the U.S.
effort to pass the baton of leadership to the European Union
has allowed slippage in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia.
There are now risks of instability that could trigger a
regionwide convulsion. That would reflect badly on America's
global leadership role, unravel three peace agreements, and
cost us far more than conflict prevention.
Second, those who say ethnic partition through
rearrangement of borders would be a viable solution are playing
with matches near a powder keg. Moves in that direction would
lead to violence, including ethnic cleansing, crimes against
humanity, and even genocide.
It happened in the 1990s and it could happen again. Mono-
ethnic states cannot be achieved without a massive and
expensive peacekeeping deployment. Ethnic partition would not
only be violent, it would also generate a new flood of refugees
and creation of Islamic mini-states in parts of Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Serbia proper.
This was the main reason we refused to move borders in the
1990s. Americans should be even more concerned about it today.
The Islamic state and al-Qaeda have had more success
recruiting in the Balkans than many of us thought possible,
given the pro-Western and pro-American attitudes of most
Muslims in the region. Reducing Balkan Muslims to rump mono-
ethnic states would radicalize many more.
Damage would not be limited to the Balkans. Russia would
welcome ethnic partition because it would validate Moscow's
destructive irredentist behavior in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transnistria, Crimea, and Donbass, as well as give Moscow a
stronger foothold in the region. It would also leave a
geographic gap in NATO and the EU that we have long hoped would
be filled with friends and allies.
My third point is this: I see no serious alternative in the
Balkans to the political and economic reforms required for each
of the countries of the region to be eligible for NATO and EU
membership. All want to join the EU, which, unfortunately, will
not be able to begin admitting them until 2020 at the earliest.
That leaves NATO membership as the vital carrot for reform
except in Serbia. We need to do more to enable Balkan countries
that want to do so to join the alliance, as Montenegro is doing
right now.
Let me summarize what this really means. In Macedonia it
means Europe and the U.S. need to tell Greece it will be
invited to join NATO once it reestablishes transparent and
accountable democratic governance.
In Kosovo it means ensuring Pristina develops an army
designed for international peacekeeping that poses no threats
to Serbs. For that, Serbia will need to accept Kosovo's
sovereignty and territorial integrity by allowing U.N.
membership.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO members should tell Republic
Srpska secession will gain no Western recognition or aid for it
or any country it joins, including from the IMF and the World
Bank.
These and other suggestions in my written testimony would
put the region back on track and prevent the peace agreements
of the 1990s and 2001 from unraveling. So, too, would ensuring
that Balkan countries have access to energy supplies from
countries other than Russia: Natural gas from Azerbaijan, LNG
from the U.S., or eventually Mediterranean gas from Cyprus or
Israel.
Mr. Chairman, I have just outlined a substantial list of
diplomatic tasks. If the administration commits to them,
implementation might require an American Special Envoy. But a
policy should come first, one based on maintaining current
borders, preventing ethnic partition, and pushing hard for NATO
and EU membership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. I think you get the Golden Cup for being
right on time. Okay. [Laughter.]
I will start the questions and, then, we will move from
there to Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Bardos, you have used for the first time the words that
I know would eventually emerge, the words ``the new Cold War.''
I don't know who wants it, but somebody wants war with Russia.
And it is more than just a fear of Russia; somebody wants there
to be a new Cold War.
I have spent a considerable part of my life trying to
defeat the Soviet Union, both in the White House and in the
field against Soviet troops, et cetera. And I started, anyway,
when I was a teenager.
But the bottom line is that we don't want a Cold War; the
American people don't want a Cold War. Yet, we have an
unrelenting hostility that says that we have to watch out for
even Russia's influence on a region. I see no reason why Russia
shouldn't be able to sell energy to any country that it wants
to or any country. I don't see that as a hostile act to the
United States.
Let me just note, if we are going to solve this, we have
got to move forward in a positive way rather than looking at
this as some kind of we are going to do this, so just screw the
Russians. That is not going to bring about a better world.
But we know something needs to be done in the Balkans
because it is not working. And just like you said, Doctor, when
the EU took over, basically, some of the major leadership from
the United States, things started going haywire. And it has
continued to go haywire for the last 10 years.
So, with that, why not make a different kind of approach. I
think what is motivating us is there are some very powerful,
monied interests in Europe that want to see the Balkans toeing
the line that they dictate.
What about encouraging these countries to form a new
Southern European Economic Union together? They can't call it
Yugoslavia, but they can call it whatever else they want to
call it. The bottom line is that, if you had open-borders type
of free trade by these countries, it would be a tremendous
benefit to them. So, instead of us pushing to try to get them
to do whatever the German banks tell them to do in order to get
into the EU, maybe we should be telling them, ``Why don't you
start working together and opening up trade between each other
and tearing down these boundaries, economic boundaries?'' What
do you think about that? Please, 1 minute, we will start with
Bardos. Start with Joe in the middle and, then, go to the
right. Go ahead.
Mr. DioGuardi. Okay. It is not going to work, Mr. Chairman.
Let me tell you why. You have got such political corruption now
in Albania, in Macedonia, in Kosovo, in Serbia. The rich are
getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer. The people are
not being served by these governments.
I don't know what is going to happen after the elections in
Kosovo and in Albania. Nobody agrees on anything, apparently. I
think that it is time for the U.S. to realize that, by
abandoning the Balkans to the European Union, we have failed.
The Ohrid Agreement was guaranteed by the U.S. and by the
European Union. It did nothing. It is worse now than it was
before.
So, how could we look at normal ways of thinking to create
an economy in Southeast Europe?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Got it, Joe, but now tell us your 30-
second answer of your plan.
Mr. DioGuardi. The plan--and I hate to see these cuts for
the State Department; it doesn't make any sense--we need to be
much more engaged than we are. We are fooling ourselves if----
Mr. Rohrabacher. What are we pushing for?
Mr. DioGuardi. For instance, get Ohrid back on. It was
signed off, but let's have an ``implementation framework'' that
we are monitoring very closely. Not saying, well, let the
European Union do it and we will figure out what goes on later.
So, we have got to take baby steps. This is not going to be
solved very fast. The racism that exists from the Slavs to the
Albanians is so great because of the paper I just mentioned:
``We have got to get rid of the Albanians at all costs.''
Basically, that is what this paper says.
And that is one of the reasons why Milosevic went to The
Hague, because we brought him to The Hague and made sure that
paper was put on the record, so that they knew Albanians could
never coexist in Serbia and in Kosovo with this kind of
thinking. And now, Gruevski is doing it in Macedonia.
So, I don't know what the answer is.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, let's go to the doctor who may
know the answer.
Mr. Serwer. Mr. Chairman, I won't claim to know the answer.
What I will tell you is that it is worth a look. I think we
have not maximized the economic advantages of peace after----
Mr. Rohrabacher. And cooperation.
Mr. Serwer [continuing]. After 1995 and 2001.
These countries do have good access to European markets
through their stabilization and association agreements. I think
they have quite a bit of access to each other's markets as
well. But that is a proposition that would have to be studied
in some depth and with some care. And I, frankly, haven't seen
such a study. Maybe, Gordon, you know.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Dr. Bardos?
Mr. Bardos. Well, it is a very commonsensical and logical
idea. As a matter of fact, the current Serbian Prime Minister,
soon to be President, Vucic, proposed something like that a few
weeks ago, a kind of Balkan common market.
The problem with it, I think a lot of the problem with it
right now is political. Emotions are still too raw among the
different peoples in the region. Some people think that Serbia
will wind up dominating such an arrangement and they don't want
to see that happening. Some people think it might be like a
recreation of the old Yugoslavia, and they don't want that, to
see that happening.
I think there is something in place--and, unfortunately, I
am not an economist, so I don't know this in great detail--
there is something called CEFTA, the Central European Free
Trade Association or Agreements. I can't remember all the
specifics of it. Something like that does exist.
I think a good step in this direction, though, would be to
start promoting what might be politically possible, and to
start promoting as many bilateral free trade agreements as
possible, start opening up the markets that way.
So, maybe, obviously, it might not work between Serbian and
Kosovo now or between Kosovo and Macedonia, but if you could
see something, you could see trade freeing up considerably
between Serbia and Bosnia, for instance, or between Croatia and
Bosnia, and permutations like that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We know something has to happen. The
bottom line is that you have people suffering there
economically. You have young people who have no hope of jobs.
Mr. Bardos. Right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You have got people who are--when people
lose hope, they turn to extremism. And the last thing we need,
whether they are Christian extremists or whether they are
Muslim extremists, we do not need them turning to their
religion and becoming extremists and, then, joining in with
others to commit acts of violence. And that is a real not only
possibility; it has already been in your testimony. You
mentioned that that is being seen now for not the first time,
but it we are easing into a situation where that didn't exist,
and now it is becoming a part of the reality of the Balkans.
So, we need to get moving. We need to be engaged. And I
will have a very short closing statement, but Mr. Meeks has the
floor now.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.
Interesting dialog. Let me just pick up where some are
talking about. I know I will start with Dr. Serwer. In March
2017, this year, the leaders of Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia met. They all got together
to, I guess, reignite this regional cooperation and reaffirm
their shared interests in eventually joining the EU, if
possible, and putting forward a plan for the Western Balkans.
And I think they have planned another meeting sometime this
year. I think it is July.
So, my question to you is, do we, the United States of
America, should we have an interest in these meetings, in these
meetings continuing? Are these meetings a positive step that
may lead to something or toward mutual cooperation? And if you
think it is, how do you think the United States should support
such meetings?
Mr. Serwer. Mr. Meeks, I am under the impression that the
United States has given ample support to these kinds of
regional arrangements which exist among the Defense Ministers,
among the Interior Ministers, and also for regional, economic
and infrastructure cooperation. There is, however, very little
progress on regional infrastructure. The EU has promised a lot
of money, but hasn't really started the digging yet.
I am under the impression that we have provided a lot of
diplomatic support to those efforts. We don't have the kind of
bilateral assistance money that helps much in this game. We,
frankly, have been out of the infrastructure game for the most
part. We need to see the World Bank, in particular, and the
European Union pick up the bills for roads, for railroads, and
for airports in the region.
I think it would have been better to have asked Mr. Yee,
but I think he would say, ``Look, we have been fully supportive
of all the regional cooperative arrangements.'' And they are
quite successful, I must say. These guys meet all the time.
Mr. Meeks. Mr. Bardos, you mentioned that the new Serbian
President talked about having a Western Balkans custom union or
something of that nature. You mentioned that. Is that a good
idea? Was that something that would help some of the economic
instability in the region? Is that a step in the right
direction? And what influence do you think that the new
President of Serbia will have in the region?
Mr. Bardos. It is a very good. It is, as I said, very
commonsensical, very logical, if it would reduce tariff
barriers, make transporting goods easier, moving labor or
capital, and so forth. It could be a spurt to economic
development and activity in the region, and so forth.
But, again, the problem right now at this point is
political. I think there is too much--as I said, the emotions
are too raw right now. People are still very leery about
anything that looks like recreating Yugoslavia. And there is
also the fear that this might be, the Europeans might be
offering this in place of European Union membership. So, that
is what a lot of people in the region are afraid of, too; that,
okay, the Europeans have given up on taking the Western Balkans
into the EU. So, this is kind of our consolation prize. So, you
are getting a little kind of political and emotional pushback
because of that as well. But it is a very good idea.
Mr. Meeks. Do you agree?
Mr. DioGuardi. When you mentioned Radovan Karadzic, you are
talking about the people that were wounded by Slobodan
Milosevic. The biggest racist you are ever going to find, what
he did, he got convicted. Well, he died in a prison cell
because he didn't take his heart medicine, but he was about to
get convicted for war crimes and genocide against the Albanian
people.
What did Radovan Karadzic say recently? They signaled that
they will definitely come in to support Gruevski, the guy that
did this. And what they want is in an ethno-ethnic name; they
want an excuse. They want to see the Albanians out so badly
that they want to see an ethno-ethnic. Even though it is a
political conflict and an economic problem, they want it to be
ethno-ethnic because that would throw Russia in, and then,
Russia would probably support, obviously, the Serbs. And it
would be, again, a war against the Albanians. So, we have got
to be very careful here.
Mr. Meeks. My last question. I see I am just about out of
time, and I know we have got votes getting ready to come up.
My other concern is Bosnia and its current troubles with
its ethnic minority population, of course, and the corruption
and its relatively weak central government. How can we
encourage others in the region, the regional actors to better
cooperate and to support an independent Bosnia? I think that is
real important. Is there something that we can do, is there a
role that we can play to help make that happen? Dr. Serwer?
Mr. Serwer. Yes, in short, we should be encouraging
Belgrade to do what it has any number of times said it would
do, which is to be supportive of a sovereign and integral
Bosnia. But much more is needed because we have in Republic
Srpska somebody who has promised an independence referendum,
who clearly is in violation of the Dayton Accords. We have
designated him under our Treasury regulations. And we need to
do more to ensure that he is not a dominant political force in
Bosnia, if Bosnia is going to stay in one piece.
The way to do that in my view is to talk with the
Europeans. I mean, the Europeans have to be worrying. When we
designate somebody using the Treasury's powers, the Europeans,
more often than not, do not follow suit. They use those tools
much more sparingly than we do, and that has to do with
politics inside the EU. We need to be getting them to follow
suit. I think preventing Mr. Dodik himself and some of his
people from traveling in and using the financial system of the
European Union would be a very serious sanction.
So, I think Serbia is ready in many ways to do the right
things, but it is Europe that hasn't done as much of the right
things as I would like to see.
Frankly, Bosnia is a problem because of the constitution
that we wrote for the country and that they wanted for the
country. It is very hard to change that constitution, but I
have no doubt but that we will be having problems with Bosnia
until it at least has a clause in its constitution that says
the central government has the authority, all the authority it
needs, to negotiate and implement the rules of the European
Union. That would be my simple solution in Bosnia.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, and I want to thank all of you for
your testimony. I am simply out of time here, and I know that
we have votes coming up and the chairman wants to do his
closing remarks.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Remarks. There you are.
Mr. DioGuardi. I wanted to make a comment on that. Can I?
Just one quick comment, please?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, yes, sure, Joe.
Mr. DioGuardi. You can't trust Serbia. Mr. Dodik is taking
his orders from Belgrade. Serbia wants at some point not only
to have influence in Srpska, but to make it part of Serbia, the
same thing that is going on in northern Kosovo.
And listen, Serbia still has not recognized Kosovo. They
want to become part of the European Union. Part of that was
good neighborliness. What good neighbors are Serbs to Kosovo
and Albanians? They have gotten worse, not better. So, you have
got to watch out for Serbia. They are the bad man in the
neighborhood, and you are not going to get them to change
anything because the issue is not ``Greater Albania''; it is
``Greater Serbia.''
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that was an interesting last bit of
testimony: Watch out for Serbia.
Mr. DioGuardi. Yes. Am I right? [Laughter.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well----
Mr. DioGuardi. Ask the Albanians. [Applause.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. My theory is watch out for bad guys.
Listen, there are good people in every one of those ethnic
groups that you are talking about.
Mr. DioGuardi. Right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. There are good people----
Mr. DioGuardi. You're right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. There are good people who are Serbs and
there are good people who are Albanians. There are good
Muslims. There are good Christians. And what we have to try to
do, if there is going to be peace, is try to seek out the good
people in all those communities and say it is about time we get
moving. We have stagnated enough. We have 20 years of going
nowhere because we are only concerned about the bad guys over
there and there are all the bad guys.
The fact is that there are bad guys, as I say, in all of
these countries, but there are good guys. And the good guys I
think are capable of working together if the United States
provides leadership. And we have to provide leadership with
people knowing that we care about things like that. When you
have people being beaten up, we care about that. And we have to
be forceful and let people on the other side know that is
unacceptable. And we also have to have some creative
approaches.
Let me just say that this idea, I don't know, every time I
have gone down to the Balkans, they seem to have the same
concept: Let's get a part, we have got to get a part of the EU,
and we have got to be part of NATO. Well, this is like, ``I've
really got to get to the Titanic before it sails.'' And, in
fact, the Titanic has already sailed. ``I'll pay you to put me
on the Titanic. Get me a rowboat or get me a motorboat and get
me on that ship.''
The EU is the past and it is not working. If we can come up
with some positive solutions and have some energy and some
excitement about really economic coalitions that work--let's
look back when things were really bad. And I can tell you,
there were really bad guys in Germany in World War II, and we
came along with the Marshall Plan. I have read about the
Marshall Plan. Probably some of you, probably the doctor knows
a lot more than me.
But the Marshall Plan, what did it do? What was the most
important thing it did? It made sure that all of these
inhibitors to trade between their countries, the European
countries that had been at war with each other, they got rid of
those impediments, and they encouraged people to economically
cooperate. So, that is what made the European situation better
in the first place.
None of that has been tried in the Balkans. I will tell
you, Joe, if a lot of Serbs are bad, there were a lot of
Germans that were bad at that time, and we made sure that we
integrated them into a situation. And now, of course, they are
calling the shots on the World Bank and a lot of other places.
Mr. DioGuardi. Mr. Chairman, you made a very good point.
The people are good; it is the governments that are bad.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. All right.
Mr. DioGuardi. How do you deal with these corrupt
governments? That is the problem.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it is up to us to make sure that we
are encouraging the good people, and I don't know, we do
respect democracy. We do respect who gets elected and the rules
of the game.
Let me just say this committee paid a lot of attention to
the Baltics. And as I say, as we got in the Baltics, I did not
find the Russian military aggression everybody was talking
about.
And we have spent a lot of time in this committee going
over Turkey, and Turkey has turned out to be the disaster that
we thought it might be.
And this subcommittee has held numerous hearings with
numerous ideas going into this. I can assure you that now we
are going to be focusing on the Balkans to try to come up with
ways that we can actually work with people there, the good
people there in all of these countries, try to find some
cooperation, some areas of cooperation, and make it happen.
So, with that said, you can count on us, this is just the
second of a hearing series. We are going and there will be a
codel, a major codel, just to the Balkans probably in August.
We will visit these areas, and we would really be happy for any
advice that any of you could give us as to who we would meet
with there.
So, with that said, I want to thank the witnesses and thank
Mr. Meeks. We had a good one again.
Mr. Meeks. A good one again.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And this committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a
Representative in Congress from the State of New York
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a
Representative in Congress from the State of New York
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a
Representative in Congress from the State of New York
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi,
founding president, Albanian American Civic League (former Member of
Congress)
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi,
founding president, Albanian American Civic League (former Member of
Congress)
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi,
founding president, Albanian American Civic League (former Member of
Congress)
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Note: ``Albania's Prosecutor's Office, Judicial Reform, & the Role of
US Ambassador Donald Lu in Tirana,'' submitted for the record by the
Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and
Emerging Threats and ``The Explusion of the Albanians,'' submitted for
the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi, founding president,
Albanian American Civic League (former Member of Congress), are not
reprinted here but may be accessed on the Internet with the following
link:
http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=105978
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printing.]
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