    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       SYRIA AFTER THE MISSILE STRIKES:
                                 POLICY OPTIONS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 27, 2017

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-27

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          AMI BERA, California
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 DINA TITUS, Nevada
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             NORMA J. TORRES, California
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
        Wisconsin                        TED LIEU, California
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Michael Singh, Lane-Swig senior fellow, managing director,
      The Washington Institute for Near East Policy..................     4
    Mr. Charles Lister, senior fellow, Middle East Institute.........    15
    Dafna H. Rand, Ph.D., adjunct professor, National Defense
      University.....................................................    28

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Michael Singh: Prepared statement............................     7
    Mr. Charles Lister: Prepared statement...........................    18
    Dafna H. Rand, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    78
    Hearing minutes..................................................    79
    The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of New York:
      Statement of Raed al-Saleh, head, Syria Civil Defense or White
        Helmets......................................................    81
      Statement of Church World Service (CWS)........................    82
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    83

                       SYRIA AFTER THE MISSILE STRIKES:
                                 POLICY OPTIONS

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2017

                           House of Representatives,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
    room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order.
        The title of this hearing, colleagues, is Syria After the
    Missile Strikes: Policy Options.
        Some of us had the opportunity over the last week with what
    are called the White Helmets and these are Syrian volunteers.
    These are civil society people. I think one who I talked to was
    an accountant. She was an accountant. Another one was a
    firefighter. But they come from all ethnic, and religious, and
    political factions inside Syria. What these civil society
    people all have in common is that they are the ones that you
    see on television who are rushing in to collapsing buildings to
    rescue people, a stranger or a friend, and then try to take
    them to the hospital and many of these hospitals are under
    bombardment. They have saved some 70,000 people. And if you
    have an opportunity, you should hear their stories and hear
    their plea that we all try to use whatever political leverage
    we have to try to get Assad and the other factions to the
    table.
        But this morning we consider options for Syria in the wake
    of this month's renewed chemical attacks by Bashar al-Assad and
    the bold response we saw from the administration.
        On April 4th, facing an opposition offensive against key
    infrastructure, the regime in Syria launched a sarin gas attack
    in southern Idlib Province. Eighty-five people--including many
    children--died from that attack. The effects of sarin gas are
    immediate: The nose runs, eyes water, the mouth drools and this
    progresses to convulsions, paralysis, and in many cases death
    in less than 10 minutes. There is a reason indiscriminate
    killing of chemicals and chemical attacks cross a ``red line.''
    There is a reason for that. And the reason is it is abhorrent.
        Assad was sending a demoralizing message to the civilian
    population there. It was: ``I can kill with impunity--with some
    of the worst weapons of war--and no one will help you.''
        But in a matter of days, the Syrian regime did pay a price.
    Two days later, nearly 60 Tomahawk missiles--fired from U.S.
    Navy ships operating in international waters--targeted the
    Syrian airfield from which the sarin attacks had launched. In a
    limited and targeted response, U.S. forces destroyed 23 Syrian
    warplanes and supporting infrastructure.
        This use of force was proportional, legitimate, and
    welcomed by our allies in the region and around the world. For
    after 6 years of unrestrained murder of Syrians, Assad was
    finally on the receiving end. Finally, ``red lines'' mattered.
    Finally, the United States was leading. And this week, the
    Treasury Department sanctioned 270 individuals involved in
    Syria's production of chemical weapons.
        Now, having taken military action, the United States has a
    chance to take Syria policy on a different path. As one witness
    will testify today, ``Determined U.S. leadership backed up by
    the credible and now proven threat of force presents the best
    opportunity in years to strong-arm actors on the ground into a
    phase of meaningful de-escalation, out of which eventually a
    durable negotiation process may result.''
        A good place to start this forceful diplomacy would be to
    make Russia and Iran pay a price for supporting Assad. So far,
    they have had no incentive to negotiate an end to the conflict
    in Syria, as they have been able to pursue their goals with
    little cost. That calculus would surely change if Mr. Engel's
    Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act was passed by the
    Congress, signed into law, and vigorously enforced. This
    sweeping sanctions bill is guaranteed to get attention in
    Moscow and Tehran, and give the U.N.-backed process aimed at
    finding a political solution a chance.
        And while the administration sticks to an ``ISIS first''
    strategy, this, too, can push the political process along. As
    U.S.-backed forces gain ground in the east, Assad could be
    confined to the west, opening up sanctuaries in which Syrians
    might find refuge and establish basic governance. From there,
    the United States and their allies must work together to
    advance a plausible vision of a post-Assad Syria.
        This won't be easy but Syria cannot keep going on and on
    like this. That is not in our humanitarian interest, not in the
    interest of the region, or America's national security
    interest. This has to change.
        I know turn to the ranking member, who has long been
    focused on this conflict, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me
    also thank our witnesses and welcome you all to the Foreign
    Affairs Committee.
        This morning, the committee will continue its examination
    of a challenge that for more than 6 years global powers have
    been unable or unwilling to resolve: The brutal war that Bashar
    al-Assad and his enablers have waged against the people of
    Syria. Hundreds of thousands are dead at the hands of this
    butcher. Millions more have been driven from their homes and
    every time the potential for a resolution has been in sight,
    Assad has been granted another lifeline.
        The missile strike earlier this month escalated American
    involvement against Assad to a new level. I think the response
    was appropriate. But a few weeks down the road, we are left
    asking, where do we go from here? What are our objectives in
    Syria? What is the strategy? And the short answer is this: At
    this point, there seems to be no strategy. A pinpoint missile
    strike is not a strategy. That is a problem for the people of
    Syria and it is part of a troubling pattern from the White
    House.
        In 100 short days, the administration has escalated
    tensions with North Korea with reckless saber-rattling, gone
    hot and cold on China, cozied up to Putin, and caused
    diplomatic embarrassment for some of our closest allies. At the
    same time, most top State Department posts remain vacant and
    the expertise of our diplomats is clearly being ignored. You
    cannot fly by the seat of your pants when it comes to foreign
    policy.
        On the global stage, policy by improvisation confuses our
    friends and tees up opportunities for our adversaries. For
    example, I am convinced that the administration's reversal on a
    long-held policy of removing Assad emboldened him to carry out
    the sarin gas attack in the first place.
        If indeed there is a strategy, Congress has been kept in
    the dark. We were told that the administration would soon
    present us with its plan. That has not happened.
        I think back to the 2011 strike in Libya, which also took
    place during a recess, and there was a lot of criticism for
    that, but the week Congress returned, Secretary Clinton,
    Secretary Gates, Chair of the Joint Chiefs Mullen, and DNI
    Clapper were all here on Capitol Hill telling lawmakers about
    the path forward. Whether we agreed with it or didn't agree
    with it, we at least learned about it. So far, no such briefing
    has been scheduled on Syria. And of course, no administration
    witnesses are testifying before us today because so few senior
    State Department officials are in place.
        So while we wait for the administration to draw up a
    strategy, there are a few things that the President and his
    team should bear in mind. First, military action alone will not
    solve the crisis in Syria. Only a political transition, one
    that removes Assad from power, will put the Syrian people on
    the path toward rebuilding and re-charting the course for their
    country's future. We need the means to help push that process
    forward.
        My bill that I introduced with Chairman Royce, the Caesar
    Syria Civilian Protection Act, would provide some of those
    tools to pressure Assad and his patrons in Moscow and Tehran.
    The House passed the bill unanimously last year and I am
    grateful to Chairman Royce for planning to mark up this
    legislation again next week.
        We also need senior diplomats in place who can drive the
    policies that will lead to a solution. It is nearly May. The
    President has only just announced his pick for Deputy Secretary
    of State and he hasn't even nominated an Under Secretary for
    Political Affairs, or Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
    Affairs. And rather than working to fill these vacancies as
    quickly as possible, the administration, instead, seems intent
    on slashing the resources needed to conduct effective
    diplomacy. We learned about that at the last hearing we had.
        Second, there must be no further American military action
    in Syria without congressional say-so. The 60-day War Powers
    Resolution clock started ticking when President Trump notified
    Congress of the missile strike. The President must come to
    Congress if the Syria strategy includes military involvement.
    No matter anyone's view of how we should grapple with this
    problem, Congress' voice must be heard and we will not simply
    give this administration or any administration a blank check.
        For now, I will keep pushing the administration for answers
    and pressing for a strategy that will advance a political
    solution, get Assad out of power, and end the suffering of the
    Syrian people.
        I am grateful to our witnesses for sharing their views on
    what such a strategy looks like and I yield back the balance of
    my time.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We did pass our bill
    out of this committee and out of the House last year. We are
    going to have an opportunity, in light of events--we couldn't
    get it out of the Senate last year but we are going to try to
    get it out of the Senate this year.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and, as usual, your help
    was invaluable.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
        And now this morning we are pleased to be joined by a
    distinguished panel. Mr. Mike Singh is the managing director of
    the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and previously he
    served at the White House, where he oversaw the Middle East
    policy from 2005 to 2008.
        And we have Mr. Charles Lister. He is a Senior Fellow at
    the Middle East Initiative. Previously, Mr. Lister was a
    visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has been
    deeply focused on Syria policy for some time.
        Dr. Dafna Rand is an adjunct professor at the National
    Defense University. Previously, she served as the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau for Democracy, Human
    Rights, and Labor.
        So without objection, our witnesses' full prepared
    statements are going to be made part of the record and members
    here will have 5 calendar days to submit any statements as
    well, or any questions of you, or any extraneous materials for
    the record.
        And so, Mr. Singh, this always works best if you could
    summarize your remarks and we will begin with you.

       STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SINGH, LANE-SWIG SENIOR FELLOW,
       MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
                                 POLICY

        Mr. Singh. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, members of
    the committee, thank you for having me here and thank you for
    your hard work on this issue.
        Our past efforts to resolve or contain the conflict in
    Syria did not succeed; far from it. It is not now a civil war
    but a regional conflict that has drawn in Syria's neighbors and
    has had broad geopolitical ramifications beyond, including
    terrorism, and a refugee crisis in Europe, and political
    turbulence throughout the West.
        Our problem in Syria is not simply an ISIS problem but runs
    much deeper and I want to talk about those broader
    ramifications.
        The Trump administration's start, I agree with both of you,
    has been promising. The April 7th strike was decisive and it
    served a clear, if narrow, interest in deterring the use of
    chemical weapons and enhancing our military credibility in
    Syria. But devising our broader Syria policy will be much more
    complicated and will require a similarly clear understanding of
    our interests and objectives and the development of options to
    advance them. And I think we need to begin with a quick
    assessment of the situation, which will reveal just how much
    the conflict has broiled the regional politics.
        This is not, in fact, a single conflict but it is playing
    out over I would say four distinct zones. Each one of those
    zones has different internal and external actors involved. So
    for example, in western Syria, both Iran and Russia are
    defending the Assad regime's remaining territory, which is
    stronger, but for different reasons. Iran seeks to preserve
    Syria as a channel for the projection of power into the Levant;
    whereas, Russia I think wants to reassert a global role, thwart
    American aims in Syria, and preserve and expand its influence
    in the Middle East.
        Turkey, for its part, has long advocated that the Assad
    regime--that Assad, himself, should step aside. But
    increasingly, Ankara is focused on preventing the
    aggrandizement of the Kurds. And its chief aims now seem to be
    preventing the establishment of a continuous Kurdish territory
    along the Syrian side of the Turkish border and preventing the
    United States from providing heavy weapons and training to the
    Kurds and their Arab partners in the SDF, the Syrian Democratic
    Forces.
        If we look at Israel, Israel, for its part, is alarmed at
    the possibility of Iran and Hezbollah establishing a presence
    along the Golan Heights and very wary about what seems to be an
    emerging Russia-Iran-Hezbollah axis.
        And then finally, Jordan, our other good partner in this
    region, worries about new refugee flows. It is already dealing
    with almost a million refugees, as well as the ISIS and Iranian
    presence on its northwestern border.
        It is an enormously complex situation and I think we need
    to avoid framing our policy as an effort to sort of solve
    Syria, as it were, in one fell swoop or one neat package.
    Instead, we need to focus on setting discrete objectives that
    will protect our interests and I recommend three in particular.
        First, I think we need to seek to prevent the Syrian
    conflict from further destabilizing the region. It could get
    worse, as bad as it is now in this region. So in western Syria,
    including the Idlib region, where the fight is increasingly
    between the Assad regime and its backers on the one hand and a
    jihadist-dominated opposition on the other, I think our chief
    concern needs to be for the millions of civilians who are
    caught in the middle of that fight.
        So, we should continue providing humanitarian relief--we
    have provided more than any other country so far--providing
    escape routes for those civilians. But I think we also need to
    make clear, building on the April 7th strike, that further
    atrocities against civilians by Assad, and by his backers,
    could prompt a further use of force. I think that credible
    military threat needs to be there.
        In southern Syria, we need to support our allies Israel and
    Jordan as they seek to prevent the conflict from spilling over
    their borders and as they seek to push ISIS back from their
    borders.
        And then in northern Syria, where we have recently had this
    Turkish bombing of Kurdish positions, I think our chief aim
    needs to be to calm those Turkish-Kurdish tensions, urging
    Ankara to not engage in any more uncoordinated bombing but also
    urging the Syrian Kurds, the YPG, to sever their ties with the
    PKK, which is a terrorist group and where Turkey has a
    legitimate concern.
        And as we plan Raqqa's liberation, I think we need to aim,
    ideally, to keep local Arab forces up front and to involve both
    the Turks and Kurds to the extent we can in the operation,
    rather than choosing one or the other in a way that will
    unbalance the politics there.
        I think we also need to consider modestly increasing our
    own troop commitment, as we have in northern Iraq, so that we
    can play an effective coordinating role between those various
    forces.
        Our second objective, I think, should be to push back on
    Iran and prevent it from using the Syrian conflict to expand
    its power. Iran is deeply entrenched in western Syria but it
    shouldn't get a free pass for its use of foreign fighters and
    its support for the Assad regime. And we need to keep up the
    pressure on Iran and Iranian entities that are involved in this
    effort. And now is the time also to ramp up the pressure on
    Hezbollah and to renew our support for the Government of
    Lebanon, which is deeply involved in this issue as well.
        And then finally, we need to work with Israel and Jordan to
    ensure that Iran and its proxies don't establish a new front
    along the Golan Heights that I think would inflame tensions in
    this region for years to come.
        Finally, thirdly, and quickly, our third objective needs to
    be to ensure that ISIS and al-Qaeda are denied safe haven after
    Raqqa's liberation so they can't return, so we are not dealing
    with this problem yet again in the coming years.
        So the training and equipment we provide those local
    partners I think needs to be oriented not just toward defeating
    ISIS, not just that near-term goal, but also providing security
    for the local population afterwards. And we shouldn't just
    support security forces. We need to support local civil society
    who can help with the governance and rebuilding of eastern
    Syria.
        I think both of these efforts will require international
    assistance and I think, to the extent we can, we should push
    our Arab allies to get involved in that effort, rather than
    having this be a U.S.-only effort.
        Just in closing, members of the committee, it is critical
    that we defeat ISIS but how we go about defeating ISIS and how
    we pursue our other aims in Syria are going to have lasting
    ramifications for the geopolitics of the Middle East and for
    our own security.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        Mr. Lister.

      STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES LISTER, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST
                               INSTITUTE

        Mr. Lister. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members
    of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today to
    testify on this very important subject.
        Today, the Assad regime has sat more comfortably in
    Damascus than at any point since the start of the crisis in
    early 2011. Its recent use of chemical weapons is almost
    certainly a result of that confidence. However, if anyone
    believes that Assad is now the key to stabilizing Syria, they
    are sorely mistaken. Assad will never be capable of putting
    Syria back together again. Not only does his continued survival
    represent radicalization gold dust but it also fuels the
    continued exodus of his own population.
        So what now? Clearly, the status quo is not working.
    Determined U.S. leadership backed up by a credible threat of
    force and a holistic underpinning strategy represents the best
    opportunity to strong-arm actors into a phase of meaningful de-
    escalation, out of which a durable negotiation process may
    eventually result.
        Punitive strikes and other assertive acts of diplomacy will
    be inevitable but if anything is now clear, it is that we have
    far more freedom of action in Syria than the previous
    administration was ever willing to admit. Opponents of limited
    U.S. intervention, who long and confidently pronounced the
    inevitability of conflict of Russia, are now faced with the
    reality that Russia failed to lift a finger when American
    missiles careened toward Assad regime targets.
        The first step to developing a more effective Syria policy
    is to acknowledge that Syria can be divided into dozens of
    unique semi-contained conflicts and that countering terrorism
    isn't enough to protect our interests. We need a holistic
    strategy that treats all of Syria's various symptoms as
    interlinked components of one big root cause.
        The fight against ISIS in Syria has made significant
    progress but we must acknowledge the challenges ahead and the
    disadvantageous effects of certain aspects of our strategy. The
    big looming challenge is the fight for Raqqa and the issue at
    hand is who our local partners are for that battle. The favored
    status given thus far to the Kurdish YPG has created serious
    issues with our NATO ally Turkey, which claims the YPG is
    affiliated to the PKK, a movement that we, ourselves, consider
    a terrorist organization. In fact, the YPG's direct affiliation
    with the PKK was publicly acknowledge repeatedly by our very
    own National Counterterrorism Center, until we began working
    with the group in 2014.
        We need Turkey as a constructive partner. Laudable efforts
    have been undertaken to recruit Arabs to fight alongside the
    YPG but the YPG retains overwhelming influence over tactics,
    strategy, and outcomes. The YPG also maintains ambiguous
    relations with the Assad regime. Already, territory captured
    from ISIS thanks to intensive U.S. assistance has been handed
    back to the Assad regime and to Russia. A YPG-led victory in
    Raqqa would almost certainly lead to a similar result, which
    would embolden extremists and create the conditions for new
    conflict.
        We do not need to rush Raqqa and it is not at all clear
    that our existing partners are capable of taking the city.
    Instead, we should use our influence with Turkey to push for a
    ceasefire with the PKK, which may help ease tensions with the
    YPG in Syria. As part of a package deal, we could then offer to
    include a portion of Turkey's anti-Assad forces, most of which
    are already vetted by the CIA and CENTCOM, into a broader Raqqa
    offensive. This would be a similar arrangement to that which we
    worked out for Mosul in Iraq.
        While our eyes have been firmly fixed on ISIS, al-Qaeda has
    thrived in Syria. It sought to deeply embed itself into Syria's
    broad opposition movement. It has adapted its narrative to fit
    that of much of the opposition and it studiously avoided many
    of the extremist practices typically associated with al-Qaeda.
    This use of what I call controlled pragmatism is in marked
    difference from ISIS and means that countering al-Qaeda in
    Syria necessitates the use of a very different toolkit. This is
    a struggle defined by a competition for narrative victory. Six
    years of violence and no determined international action to
    stop it has provided al-Qaeda with an increasingly pliable
    population and an opportunity to exploit its principle
    advantage, its power in battle. Determined action to protect
    civilians and deter regime war crimes, paired with a
    substantial reduction in conflict would represent a serious
    threat to al-Qaeda.
        However, greater pressure is needed on its most important
    area of operations, the Province of Idlib. This is a problem
    that only Turkey is well-placed to tackle, though it would
    require substantial U.S. support. Here, we would seek to
    replicate Turkey's actions against ISIS and the YPG north of
    Aleppo to create a reality on the ground of steadily expanding
    ink spots. In Aleppo, those ink spots have since turned into de
    facto safe zones from which adversaries were defeated, al-Qaeda
    fled, reconstruction has now re-begun, refugees are returning,
    moderate rebel groups are being trained, and police are taking
    over from armed groups. The opposition interim government now
    plans to establish offices in this area.
        Beyond countering terrorism, there is no immediate opening
    for a nationwide settlement. As such, we should pursue an
    interim solution, imposing calm to distinct geographic zones.
    Creating zones of calm along Syria's borders will assist an
    eventual process of refugee resettlement and constrain or even
    stop the flow of weapons and money intended for armed
    activities. It would give opposition territories the
    opportunity to begin governance and service provision free from
    aerial bombing and it will allow some level of interim
    reconstruction to begin.
        Creating multiple facts on the ground will also represent a
    considerable source of pressure on Assad and may eventually
    allow for a meaningful initiation of negotiations. For this
    reason, the United States would need to pursue an intensive
    track of bilateral negotiations with Russia throughout the
    lead-up to and as these zones of calm take form.
        For this reason, America and its allies must be prepared
    for enforcement. Credible threats of punitive force can create
    meaningful diplomatic leverage but only when part of a clearly
    defined strategy.
        Finally, this deterrence should encompass more than the use
    of internationally banned weapons. It is important for us to
    establish a moral equivalency. Conventional weapons are far
    more deadly than sarin gas. In fact, Assad's aerial bombing of
    his own population has killed at least 57 times as many people
    as the use of chemicals and banned chemical weapons. It should
    not be a matter of the murder weapon that defines whether
    murder is acceptable or not.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lister follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        Dr. Dafna Rand.

    STATEMENT OF DAFNA H. RAND, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, NATIONAL
                           DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

        Ms. Rand. Thank you. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman
    Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank
    you for inviting me to testify.
        Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the White Helmets and I would
    like to start there because I agree that it is a remarkable
    story. I would note that 140 or so of these White Helmets,
    these civilian protection forces, have been directly targeted
    when they go out to rescue. So there have been 140 casualties
    in the past 2 years alone. That is just one statistic of the
    suffering, displacement, and state-led atrocities that have
    occurred in Syria. Eighty percent of the population is now in
    need of humanitarian assistance, 12 million Syrians are
    displaced inside and outside the country. In short, this is the
    greatest humanitarian tragedy and crisis in our current world
    today.
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Engel, and
    members of the committee for making and keep the Syrian people
    at the center of your policymaking work here.
        The strikes on April 6th may have been a justifiable
    appropriate response to the use of sarin gas against Khan
    Sheikhoun. Yet, these strikes appear to be divorced from a
    larger strategy for U.S. engagement. It is particularly
    alarming that the administration comments on Syria policy after
    these strikes continue to be so disjointed and unclear.
    Americans, our allies, and the Syrian people would benefit from
    understanding what these strikes signify and where they fit
    within the larger policy goals.
        I see at least four objectives for the U.S. in Syria and
    each will require a sustained strategy that combines public and
    private diplomacy. None of these will succeed without a fully
    staffed and empowered State Department serving as a coequal in
    the interagency and none of them can be sustained without
    adequate foreign assistance.
        First, as my colleagues have mentioned, a negotiated
    agreement in the de-escalation of the fighting should be the
    most immediate and most important objective. Fighting ISIS,
    countering WMD, helping civilians, these goals are very
    critical but they will all be enabled by conflict resolution.
    Because this is a foundational objective, it is alarming to
    read public statements from the administration flippantly
    suggesting that whether Assad stays or goes is irrelevant.
    Defining the end game as a negotiated settlement between the
    regime and the opposition is the critical first task.
        Secretary Tillerson will have to use these strikes and the
    leverage they have generated to push Moscow back to a position
    where it will be able and willing to be a genuine partner. That
    means holding Moscow accountable publicly and privately when
    ceasefires promised by the regime never materialize and when
    aid convoys promised by Damascus and organized by the U.N.
    never reach the besieged areas.
        It is true that pushing Moscow and Tehran to make Damascus
    concede will be very, very tough but we have leverage. For
    example, let's refuse CT cooperation to Moscow if it doesn't
    comply with the next round of de-escalation or humanitarian
    talks.
        Second, defeating ISIS is an obvious priority but the
    administration needs to be smart about the diplomacy and
    foreign assistance that will sustain any military offensive.
    Pushing Daesh out of Raqqa will be the easy part. What will be
    hard will be working with Turkey to negotiate YPG influence, as
    has been mentioned, or to ensure that the SAC, the Syrian Arab
    Coalition, and the SDF, the combination of Kurdish and Arab
    liberators, can effectively govern this very vast area of
    Syria.
        What we know about global terrorism is this: They prey on
    ungoverned spaces remote from central control, where citizens
    are disaffected and angry. We cannot let these territories of
    Syria fall into this trap again. And that is why I am
    particularly concerned about rumored and alleged reductions in
    things like food aid or reductions in support for governance to
    local councils that will be formed in the wake of the Daesh
    liberation in these areas of Syria.
        And because a sustainable defeat of ISIS requires regional
    consideration, I am concerned about reports that ESF to Jordan,
    to Tunisia, to Lebanon are reportedly going to be cut.
        Third, the chemical weapons deterrence is a key objective.
    The strikes may deter Assad from using CW again. We don't
    really know because he has been using CW as a weapon of
    desperation. Still, we need to also continue the really hard
    multilateral diplomatic work.
        I would note Russia's relative cooperation with the 2013
    U.N. Resolutions on the U.N. regarding Syria's gas attack and
    what generally the 2013 to 2014 U.N. Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW's efforts to destroy
    1300 tons of weapons. Clearly, this was imperfect. Clearly,
    there was cheating and hidden weapons but for Syria's neighbors
    and for the citizens and for U.S. troops on the ground,
    certainly destroying something was better than nothing. And
    that is why today multilateral diplomacy is critical. That is
    why we need to continue to support the OPCW and U.N.
    investigatory bodies and we will need to do this through
    diplomacy by pushing the Russians and other members of the
    international community.
        Fourth, protecting the Syrian people must remain at the
    heart of U.S. policy in Syria. This effort includes
    humanitarian assistance, support for civil society, and support
    for local governance in liberated and opposition-controlled
    areas, and it includes accountability measure for the ongoing
    human rights violations and atrocities that have been
    committed, including accountability for the Khan Sheikhoun
    attack.
        Since the start of this conflict, the U.S. has been the
    largest single bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to
    the Syrian people but in the past months, the aid that is
    flowing from the U.S. and other donor nations has not been
    reaching most of the Syrians in need. Some organizations on the
    ground are estimating that only 10 percent of international aid
    is arriving into opposition-controlled areas of Syria. That is
    over five million people. So this crisis of access will require
    continued American leadership.
        In conclusion, absent a clear and consistent articulation
    of U.S. strategy toward Syria, these limited strikes earlier
    this month will have little to no material impact. In fact,
    there is a danger that our friends may feel, over time, even
    more betrayed, as many within Syria and the region cheered the
    strikes on the premise that they signaled a significant shift
    in policy.
        A clear strategy will help us mobilize our partners. For
    example, at this particular moment, we need our Gulf partners
    to help us play a moderating role with the armed opposition. So
    pushing for the resumption of negotiations will be hard but a
    strategy that focuses on diplomacy and U.S. leadership is the
    only option.
        Finally, I thank this committee for understanding how a
    fully funded, empowered State Department and U.S. Agency for
    International Development will be critical to pursue all of the
    objectives that I have outlined.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Rand follows:]
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        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        You know it seems that Russia and Iran have very different
    goals here for Syria and some of you have commented on that. In
    terms of trying to figure out next steps, it looks as through
    the goal on the part of the Iranians is a land bridge that
    would stretch to Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon, where
    for some time now the Islamic Republic of Iran has been trying
    to move these larger and larger missiles or longer range
    missiles. I guess this morning there are reports that the IDF
    put a strike in against a shipment that had landed of these
    missiles, right?
        So, as Iran's obsession with their stated policy of wiping
    Israel off the map continues, you have Moscow with a very
    different goal. Their goal is not to wipe out Israel. Their
    goal seems to be to increase Russia's leverage. And I wonder if
    that suggests that the two could be split here in terms of the
    long-term interest of trying to get some stability, because as
    long as the Iranians remain on the ground, the problem there is
    going to be the recruitment of training for additional
    Hezbollah units that you are now seeing, as well as the in-
    migration of the Revolutionary Guard Corps on the ground, and
    these other entities, they are not seeking to calm the
    situation. I mean all across the Middle East they are creating
    additional, whether it is Yemen or Bahrain, they are involved
    in conflict.
        And I would just ask our panelists for their opinion on a
    strategy that would allow some kind of a direct negotiation on
    that concept and whether you think it would be possible because
    that might allow us then to move Assad out of the equation and
    bring in someone else on the Alawite side that would have an
    interest in the long-term survivability of Syria as a state.
        Mr. Singh.
        Mr. Singh. Sure. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think you are
    absolutely right about differing Russian and Iranian interests,
    as I mentioned in my testimony.
        I think the challenge is in the short-term I think there is
    a sort of co-dependency between Russia, and Iran, and Syria.
    They need each other. Russia is providing actually quite a
    small military force but a decisive one, providing air cover,
    for example, for the ground forces which are largely provided
    by the Iranians. The Iranians have contributed, from the
    numbers I have seen, upwards of 100,000 fighters, not Iranians
    all but Iranian-backed fighters. So theirs is sort of
    complementary to Russian and Iranian activities there and I
    think either would be hard-pressed to succeed without the
    other.
        But I do think that Iran is committed to the Assad regime
    in a way that, perhaps over the long-run, Russia isn't because
    I think that Iran could not be guaranteed its position in Syria
    with any ruler other than Bashar al-Assad, even if it were
    someone else from his sector, someone else from his sort of
    territory.
        And it does, over the long-run, perhaps open up the
    possibility of splitting the two. But I think it is very much
    over the long-run. I think it is not something that it is there
    in the short-term.
        Perhaps the Russians will come to see that they are
    embroiled in a counterinsurgency that there is very little easy
    escape from. No one is going to come and rescue the Russians
    from the insurgency which they are facing around Idlib, and
    Aleppo, and so on and so forth. We are certainly not going to.
    We certainly shouldn't and I don't think anyone else is
    prepared to do so either. And hopefully, that will prompt the
    Russians, at some point, to recognize, especially if there is a
    credible threat of American military force.
        Chairman Royce. Well, maybe Mr. Lister can comment on this
    but it seems to me that the Russian objective here is partly to
    maintain access to the Mediterranean. Their goal is not
    necessarily to see this thing deepen and yet, for the Iranians,
    they are gaining battlefield experience for their forces. They
    are honing their skills. They are replacing Sunni populations
    with Lebanese Hezbollah families that they are bringing in to
    Old Damascus and areas like this. This is the exact opposite,
    it would seem to me, of Russia's long-term interest.
        And so Mr. Lister, what is your observations?
        Mr. Lister. Thank you for the question.
        For me, this is essentially about differing goals and
    differing needs between Iran and Russia. These are two
    countries playing extremely different, though as my colleague
    says, complementary roles in Syria.
        For Russia, the objective is to compete and outplay the
    United States and to show that we aren't the power that we
    think we are, that we are not capable of exerting the kind of
    influence in the region that we used to, and also, of course,
    immediately to shore up what was in 2011 Russia's most reliable
    and most intensive relationship in the region, which was the
    Assad regime. Since the Soviet Union times, Russia has relied
    on the Syrian Army----
        Chairman Royce. Right.
        Mr. Lister [continuing]. Intensively for a relationship in
    the region, almost exclusively. And so for Russia, this is a
    strategic or geostrategic calculous, largely as a reflection of
    its rivalry with the United States.
        And for Iran, this is a zero-sum issue. There is, as of
    now, in today's dynamics, no negotiation for Iran. It is Assad,
    or nothing, or we carry on fighting.
        And the key issue, the key worry we should all have in our
    minds, is that we have invested so much energy over the last 2
    or 3 years based on an assumption that Russia has the leverage
    necessary to result in the kind of policy result that we want,
    which is a negotiation process that means something and that
    results in a conclusion that we all want, which is an end to
    conflict and some extent of political transition in Damascus.
        Unfortunately, as my colleague said, Russia is actually
    operating in Syria on a shoe string with very little ground
    influence, beyond Special Forces dotted around in a few
    specific areas.
        You know I have spent the last 18 months meeting
    periodically with Russian officials who work on the Syrian
    issue. And one of the things they revealed to me, which is very
    interesting, is that as of 2 or 3 months ago, the assessment
    within Moscow was that the Syrian Army had no more than 20,000
    offensively deployable, sufficiently trained, and loyal
    soldiers that the Russian Government was willing to work
    alongside--20,000 for all of Syria. It is a pittance.
        In comparison, the Iranian Government has successfully
    established what I would estimate to be at least 150,000
    militiamen, Syrians, predominately, but also Iraqis, Lebanese,
    Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis, and possibly some Yemenis. Twenty
    thousand Syrian forces as compared to 150,000 militiamen who
    are there potentially to die for a religious cause, rather than
    for a strategic cause, is an issue we need to worry about in
    terms of how we invest our resources, in terms of pushing
    things to create the possible conditions for the result that we
    want.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you. Mr. Engel.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask my
    questions, I ask unanimous consent to enter two statements into
    the record. One is a statement by Raed al-Saleh, head of the
    Syria Civil Defense, as you mentioned before, known as the
    White Helmets, on behalf of Nobel Peace Prize-nominated rescue
    organization that has rescued over 90,000 Syrian lives.
        Chairman Royce. Without objection.
        Mr. Engel. And the second statement is from Church World
    Service.
        Chairman Royce. Again, without objection.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said in a press
    briefing, shortly after the U.S. airstrikes, if you gas a baby,
    if you put a barrel bomb into innocent people, I think you will
    see a response from this President.
        This appeared to add a new red line to U.S. policy that
    Assad's use of barrel bombs, an all too frequent occurrence,
    would invite a U.S. response. But later the White House
    clarified that he meant chlorine-filled barrel bombs.
        Now for anyone who thinks that I am going tough on the
    White House, maybe you should know that I was equally tough on
    the previous administration's miscalculation that Assad would
    somehow fall and so cause them to do things or not do things.
    And of course, here we are many years later, Assad hasn't
    fallen. I think we made a terrible mistake when we didn't aid
    the Free Syrian Army 4 years ago, when the President's national
    security team all was in favor. I think it was a
    miscalculation. I also think when you draw lines in the sand,
    you need to back up those lines but you also need to be
    consistent.
        And what we are seeing from the administration is there is
    an introduction and retraction of new red lines. It muddies
    U.S. strategy in Syria. And as I mentioned before, I think it
    is very important that the President tell the Congress what his
    plans are in Syria and then the Congress needs to give him
    authorization to make any kind of military moves.
        So when we have introduction and retraction of new red
    lines, it muddies the strategy in Syria. I want to ask Dr.
    Rand, how do we expect our allies and adversaries to react to
    this?
        Ms. Rand. Thank you, Congressman Engel. This is a big
    concern of mine as well, that the inconsistency is sending
    different signals and that our allies will see in the
    administration and White House's different statements what they
    want to hear. Right? So certain allies have different views and
    they will seize on one Secretary or another Secretary's
    statements, if they diverge, to say that is U.S. administration
    policy. That is a concern.
        On the issue of what is the red line, is it just a CW
    deterrence or is it a general deterrence about crimes against
    humanity, I would note that in the couple days after the sarin
    gas attacks, there were very damaging atrocities committed by
    the Syrian regime again. So if that, indeed, was Mr. Spicer's
    red line, it was passed already, shortly after the time he was
    making those statements.
        But I would agree with the concern about allies. I would
    also add the concern about the Syrian people, who are left
    confused about what is the new shift in U.S. policy toward
    intervention.
        Mr. Engel. Anybody else care to comment?
        Mr. Singh. Well, Congressman, I would agree with the
    general principle that credibility is important. And I think to
    have credibility, we also need to have clarity. I agree with
    that. And that is why it is important that we have a very
    rigorous policy process where we decide what are those lines
    are for the United States that sort of both threaten our
    interest, threaten civilians on the ground. What are we
    prepared to do in response? And then that we communicate those
    things to the appropriate channels. Sometimes a public message
    is right. Sometimes private messages to places like Moscow and
    elsewhere are the right methods.
        But that all requires a rigorous policy process and I think
    that will be the key for us.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. Let me ask a question about the
    chemical weapons program. In 2013, the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons certified, and we remember
    this, that it had removed 1300 tons of declared chemical
    weapons from Syria. And of course, we now know that Syria held
    back some chemical agents from declaration and removal because
    it used those agents in the April 4th sarin gas attack.
        Now, I supported the U.S. response, as I said before, 59
    Tomahawk missiles, because I thought it was an appropriate
    demonstration to Syria and their Russian enablers that there
    would be consequences for the use of chemical weapons. But
    these strikes are not a long-term solution and they will not
    help to eliminate the threat posed by Syria's continued
    possession of chemical weapons.
        So let me ask any of the witnesses what recommendations do
    you have to work toward full implementation of the U.N.
    Security Council Resolution 2118, which sought to remove
    Syria's chemical weapons, and what particular responsibility
    does Moscow have in the implementation of this resolution and
    in removing chemical weapons from Syria?
        Anyone who cares to answer.
        Ms. Rand. Sure, I will start. I think this is an excellent
    point. And I mentioned in my testimony there is a JIM, the
    Joint Investigative Mechanism, that was commissioned by the
    U.N. in 2015 to go and actually name perpetrators and some of
    the chemical weapons. And this mandate was extended last year
    to 2017. It will run out I think sometime this summer or the
    fall.
        So it is really critical. This is an urgent diplomatic--
    again, it is not a sufficient diplomatic solution to the
    chemical weapons bomb, but it is part of the solution and it is
    urgent that the U.S. show its leadership at the U.N. and push
    Moscow and other powers to agree to continue this mandate of
    the JIM.
        Mr. Lister. I would add, if I may, you know frankly
    speaking, Russia bears the weight of responsibility for the
    fact that this chemical weapons attack took place. And we
    shouldn't forget that Russia had troops and almost certainly
    aircraft up until a certain time at this air base from which
    the attack was launched.
        We should all be asking the question, and I am sure we all
    are, did Russia in fact know that the Assad regime had retained
    some extent of its chemical weapons capabilities. And if it
    did, then we would be justified in, I think, putting and
    placing more pressure, whether through sanctions or other
    diplomatic means, on the Russian Government to force it to see,
    through a broader package of policies on Syria, the more
    holistic one that I described in my opening statement.
        But in the end, Russia isn't going to achieve its ultimate
    objective in Syria which is stability. For Russia, Syria is
    still something to be negotiated over. And I think what the
    Russians are discovering, almost on a week-by-week basis now,
    is that having invested resources in Syria and in rescuing the
    Assad regime, achieving their ultimate long-term objective
    isn't happening and it is not going to happen for a long time.
    So I do think we have a responsibility to put more pressure on
    Russia.
        And more broadly, I think the sanctions on I think 271
    Syrians connected to the chemical weapons program is a good
    step. I noted that a number of that size suggests that we are
    not just targeting senior officials but we are also targeting
    people further down the ladder of seniority and I think that is
    wise. I think using what I would term escalatory sanctions--
    starting from the ground level and moving up--is an excellent
    way of putting more pressure and a sense of paranoia within the
    regime's military, intelligence, and otherwise the regime's
    apparatus, that we know what they are doing. We know who they
    are. We know everything about them and they will face
    consequences for being involved in these kind of criminal acts.
    And I think there is a lot that we can do to add to that
    pressure further.
        Mr. Singh. If I could just make a brief point, Congressman.
    I want to make sure that there is a clear understanding that
    this is not just a humanitarian issue for the United States
    because the CWC is a nonproliferation treaty. And if we allow
    that nonproliferation treaty to be breached, I think that has
    strategic ramifications for the United States for
    nonproliferation broadly. So we need to keep that frame of
    reference in mind as well.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Okay, we go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of
    Florida.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        And while Congress must be consulted before any long-term
    escalation of force in Syria, I supported the missile strikes
    that took place earlier this month and I hope that they serve
    as a warning that the United States will no longer tolerate
    Assad's chemical weapons attacks against the innocent
    civilians. The missile strikes proved our willingness to use
    force. That is a necessary ingredient whose absence doomed any
    previous chance of a negotiated outcome in Syria.
        But I am still very concerned about the lack of a
    comprehensive strategy in Syria, a problem that has stretched
    across both administrations and our seeming insistence on
    treating the symptoms, rather than the disease. And as so many
    of us have said over the years, it is not possible to defeat
    ISIS while Assad remains in power, I fear that our narrow focus
    on short-term tactical successes will only exacerbate the
    problems that we are trying to solve.
        So I wanted to ask you, Mr. Lister, can we hope to defeat
    ISIS while Assad remains in power? A lot of you spoke about
    what would happen if. And how does Assad's presence and tactics
    contribute to the growth and the narrative appeal of ISIS, as
    well as the al-Qaeda-linked and other jihadist groups in Syria?
        And if Assad is not removed by countering Iran, by finding
    leverage with Russia, or otherwise, is it possible for this
    conflict and its associated costs to come to an end?
        Mr. Lister. Thank you very much for a really excellent
    question. And I think to answer it, we need to consider context
    as well, some historical background, but I will stay in the
    immediate term for now.
        The reason why we have had success against ISIS or one of
    the reasons why we have had success with little other negative
    knock-on effects up until now, is because ISIS purposefully
    detached itself from the other dynamics of the Syrian conflict.
    With the exception of about a 6-month period of time, ISIS
    never sought to work with the opposition. It never sought to
    become part of the revolution against the Assad regime. It
    explicitly sought to establish an Islamic State with or without
    help and it would kill anyone who got in its way.
        And for that reason, we have been able to attack ISIS in
    isolation from the rest of the conflict with relative success,
    up until now, but I think, as I hope is becoming clear, we are
    now seeing some of those disadvantageous knock-on effects
    becoming clear. For example, our NATO ally Turkey is
    effectively now at war with our local partner fighting ISIS, as
    of last night. And all of that is because, as you say, we
    didn't base all of this on a more holistic strategy. We didn't
    appreciate enough all of the broader dynamics. So, that is
    today.
        In terms of Assad staying, I think the most important thing
    to bear in mind here is some history. In 2003, when the United
    States prepared to invade Iraq, as in fact American troops
    crossed on day one, the Grand Mufti then in Syria, the State-
    appointed, Assad-appointed Grand Mufti, issued a fatwa in which
    he declared it religiously obligatory on all Muslims globally
    to launch resistance movements in Iraq against American troops,
    using any means necessary. And that order was given to men and
    women. And that was, essentially, an instruction from the Assad
    Government.
        Within 11 days of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, 5,000 foreign
    jihadi fighters crossed into Iraq, crossed Syria's borders;
    they flew into Aleppo and Damascus airports; were bussed in
    government buses to the Iraqi border and waived through open
    border crossings.
        And in the 7 or 8 years that followed, during the war in
    Iraq, it would not be an exaggeration, I think to say, that
    hundreds of American troops would still be alive if the Assad
    regime had not continued its assistance to ISIS' predecessor
    movement, the Islamic State in Iraq. ISIS wouldn't be what it
    was today if those foreign jihadi fighters hadn't been given a
    free hand to train in Syria, to use Syrian Government medical
    facilities, and then to cross Syria's borders into Iraq.
        And that support for jihadists didn't stop when American
    troops left Iraq in 2010. In 2011, whilst the Assad regime was
    arresting pro-democracy protesters, and women, and children, it
    was releasing jihadists from prison. Two of the seven founding
    members of the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria were released from
    prison at the beginning of the protests. At least ten, as far
    as I am aware, of ISIS' most senior leaders in Syria were
    released from Assad prisons under an amnesty in 2011.
        And since then, it is common knowledge that, at the very
    least, trade in gas, trade in other resources, has continued
    between the Assad regime. In fact, this very government here
    has sanctioned several Syrian officials for facilitating those
    trades.
        So the argument is right. I know I am taking some time but
    the argument is right to say that while Assad stays in power,
    there is very little chance that that kind of facilitation of
    jihadists for Syrian goals, for Assad regime reasons, will not
    continue. And most importantly, the narrative for their very
    existence will continue to exist.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        Mr. Greg Meeks from New York.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank all
    three of the witnesses. I think you have been absolutely
    excellent and very insightful. And I really appreciate your
    testimony.
        Let me start by stating declaratively I think that any
    rational, reasonable person would strongly, as I do, condemn
    the atrocities that took place in Syria and the utilization of
    chemical weapons but I believe just overall because, as one of
    the witnesses testified, people are dying, whether it is by
    chemical weapons or by conventional weapons. Death is death and
    they are dying by the numbers and we have to make sure we get a
    handle on that. And that we must, and the whole international
    community, must put our best efforts into addressing the crises
    there.
        That has been what my position has been since the start of
    the conflict and it remains so today. That being said, many of
    my colleagues here, and as you have indicated, I think each and
    every one of you have indicated your thoughts on what should be
    next. I wish that the President of the United States would also
    tell us, as Members of Congress, what should be or what the
    strategy is next. You know we cannot be left wondering after
    the launch of 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles what Congress is to
    do. Congress should never be left wondering what next after the
    use of military force and never, especially in a situation
    where there is no imminent threat to our homeland. The United
    States needs--and why is that? Because we have a Constitution
    and the President should abide by that Constitution. And so the
    President should get congressional authorization for military
    action.
        And as I sit here, I am extremely uneasy that we have no
    updated AUMF. And the President has stated, basically, that he
    has acted impulsively, without clearly articulating a strategy
    on Syria. Why do I know that? Because the President said he
    happened to have seen a picture of babies and that made him
    decide to do something that he had said just a few weeks before
    that he wasn't going to do. So he just acted impulsively,
    without a real strategy as to what to do next.
        And when we talk about drawing red lines, and I felt this
    also, when President Obama had the red line, he came to
    Congress. Congress punted on what to do in Syria.
        So I would hope as we look to and ask President Trump to
    come to Congress, and I hope he does, that we don't punt. We
    listen to the issues. Let's take the responsibility ourselves.
        The most difficult decision for me, and I have been here
    for 19 years, the most difficult vote that I have had to make
    is the vote to make the determination of whether or not we were
    going to authorize the use of force, whether it was in the
    Kosovo struggles, in the Balkans when President Clinton was
    there, whether it was Iraq and Afghanistan. I want, and I think
    my constituents expect me, to have a vote in that regard and we
    must make sure that we have that. We cannot shirk our
    responsibility as Members of Congress.
        And so I don't want to then say, whether it is President
    Trump or any other President after him, to say we punted, as
    Members of Congress, and then we criticized what the President
    did do or didn't do thereafter. Let us, I mean we should do our
    jobs.
        Clearly, as I said, and someone mentioned Iraq, I think Mr.
    Lister did, clearly shock and awe. And many of us came back,
    many Members of Congress, came back after the shock and awe and
    we thought it was all over; we had won; it was victory. And
    then we saw that there was not strategy thereafter.
        Let us have learned from that lesson that we can't just be
    so high and happy because we have had--there was a strike, 59
    missiles that seemed to be sending a message that is over; we
    did the right thing. Let's talk now. Let's learn from what we
    didn't do in the past and talk a strategy and work with our
    allies.
        I think that Dr. Rand talked about how important it is to
    make sure we are having a dialogue and a conversation with our
    allies as well as to make sure we are doing what is on the
    ground.
        I think Mr. Lister was talking about how in fact during the
    war the Syrian Government was still active in putting folks in
    and trying to turn around the minds of individuals on the
    ground. Both he and Dr. Rand were absolutely correct. If we are
    cutting off humanitarian aid, if we are not putting in place
    things on the ground, if we are refusing to let refugees into
    the United States, we are not then doing what we need to do to
    make sure that even the folks on the ground to keep ISIS, or
    Daesh, as I call them, from recruiting individuals on the
    ground thinking that we are the bad guys.
        So I really had a question but I am out of time. I was just
    so impressed with your testimony and with the way that you have
    been answering questions.
        You know I think, Mr. Chairman, maybe this is the youngest
    panel we have had. We need to make sure we have more young
    people whose future is really on the line. They are really
    thinking about tomorrow because it is their today. And so this
    is on both sides, all the witnesses, you and Mr. Engel should
    be really complimented about the witnesses that you have
    brought here today.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
        We now go to Dana Rohrabacher of California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much and I would like to
    echo what Mr. Meeks just said about the value of the testimony
    today.
        What is interesting is you sort of dumped a heap of facts
    onto us and you are trying to make some sense out of it, like
    some sort of a jigsaw puzzle. And here you are. You have
    studied this, you have spent your whole time studying, and you
    can't come up with what the jigsaw maps out of this quagmire
    is. And so we appreciate you letting us know the series of
    facts that we need to deal with and maybe we can work together
    and come up with some ideas.
        I was heartened that our chairman, Mr. Royce, whom I have
    deep respect for, during his questions mentioned how we might
    really benefit negotiating with Russia on this issue.
        Chairman Royce. Well, I didn't get to the second part of my
    question. We would replace Putin, as well as Assad, in
    negotiations. I just wanted to clarify, Mr. Rohrabacher.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. But what we heard today is that there was
    a civil war in Syria, an organized effort supported by
    outsiders to overthrow the Government of Assad. That civil war,
    where people came in to support that has now morphed into
    regional anarchy, basically. And let me just say that I don't
    believe that Assad was any more brutal, any more dictatorial
    than a number of our friends and allies in that region. If
    there was a civil war being financed against any number of
    those governments, they would wipe out their opponents. And I
    do believe there is a moral equivalency between dropping a bomb
    on people and killing those same people with gas. You are
    killing innocent people. We have to stop the killing and we
    have seen that there is killing of innocent people.
        And obviously, when we bombed, we ended up bombing their
    air base because 85 civilians suffered effects from gas and
    died. At the same time, while we are engaged in bombing in
    other parts nearby, and our bombs are killing ten times or five
    times that number of civilians, no. The killing should stop.
    That should be our goal and we should be willing to work with
    Russia in order to try to find some overall regional solution
    now and it shouldn't just be Assad has to go.
        Let me just suggest what Erdogan is doing now, especially
    in his latest attacks, Erdogan is doing more damage to our
    national security by his basically power grab inside his own
    country and his Islamicization of his own country, he is doing
    much more damage than Assad could ever have dreamed of doing to
    our security. And yet, we are going to continue giving support
    to Mr. Erdogan, even after this incredible power grab that he
    has just participated in, a corrupt election that gives him the
    power to move that country. And now we find he is actually
    attacking Kurds now, rather than just trying to work with us in
    some ways.
        Here is the question. All these facts that you are talking
    about and--again, I appreciate, deeply appreciate the facts
    that you have given us today to consider. Do we now need, if we
    are going to have peace in that region, a regional type of
    grand meeting somewhere like they did after World War I, and
    redraw the borders, and have newly accepted areas where the
    Kurds could have their area, and you could have various
    recognition, rather than trying to have a situation where today
    it obviously isn't working and we obviously have a double
    standard for Assad and Russia than we do for our own friends?
        So let me put that out on the table.
        Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman. I think that the way I
    would interpret what has happened here in Syria is maybe a
    little bit different in the sense that I see in 2011 a peaceful
    protest that was brutally suppressed by the Assad regime.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And do you think any of our allies, the
    Saudis, the Qataris, the Kuwaitis, if they thought that there
    was a civil war being financed by some other country in their
    region, would not have been just as brutal as Assad was?
        Mr. Singh. Well, sir, I don't think that that was what
    happened here. I think this was, actually, as I said, peaceful
    protests by Syrians that were suppressed by the Syrian regime.
    And I think that the Syrian regime created the conditions for
    the rise of an extremist opposition that, as Charles pointed
    out----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. But you are talking about an evolution
    because what happens is, we have seen it over and over again,
    peaceful demonstrations, you have a dictator, a gangster, he
    slaughters innocent people and then all of a sudden it
    escalates. That has happened a dozen times.
        Mr. Singh. Well this is on a very different scale,
    Congressman, than anything that has happened in the region, as
    I think Dr. Rand pointed out because you have hundreds of
    thousands of people, millions of people displaced. And I think
    what we really need is now to show leadership, which we didn't
    show in the past, to get on the same page of our allies to try
    to resolve the situation, where we haven't in the past.
        Chairman Royce. Okay, we need to go to Mr. Bill Keating of
    Massachusetts.
        Mr. Keating. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
    thank the chairman and the ranking member because this
    committee, since I have been involved in it for several years
    now, has been thoughtful, and substantive in its action, and
    instrumental in many of our policies.
        And along those lines, I want to just mention that as
    valuable as the testimony is today, I want to see going
    forward. I see a pattern on these issues where we are not
    having Trump administration officials in front of this
    committee and I think that is important to flesh out the
    strategy itself.
        Chairman Royce. That is a good point, and if the gentleman
    will yield for a moment, Mr. Engel and I have had the
    opportunity to speak to the Secretary of State and we are
    extending an invitation to the committee.
        Mr. Keating. I am not surprised. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. And I just want to comment, too, that that
    will help flesh out a strategy and that is what we are talking
    about here.
        You know today's testimony and the brutal conflict itself
    has proven that ending these atrocities and reaching a
    resolution requires a strategy, a strategy that reflects the
    complexities on the ground and cooperation at the international
    level. And I think a one-off military strike, which I thought
    was appropriate, yet one that wasn't followed up with a plan,
    and the inadequate staff in the State Department to meaningful
    engage, and also budget proposals that undermine our ability to
    be strategic are all issues.
        Now, I also want to concentrate on something that I
    struggle with, and I think it has been brought up in today's
    testimony and that's the fact that Mr. Lister, in particular,
    started along these lines. In one sense, we are getting
    testimony and a general feeling among people looking at this
    issue that Assad is such a problem, we can't have a final
    resolution with his maintenance of power. Yet, we are also
    saying we need Russia to perform such a meaningful role in
    dealing with a resolution.
        And Mr. Lister started along an area I wanted to pursue
    when he said Russians were at that airbase before the chemical
    weapons attack. And there were open source and unofficial
    reports that Russian-controlled drones were going over the
    hospital prior to the attack doing intelligence and
    recognizance, for what purpose, ahead of time. And how
    complicit is Russia, not just in their ignoring their
    responsibilities under the treaty that was negotiated in 2013,
    but complicit in some of these actions? As Dr. Rand said, it
    doesn't matter how people are killed. They were complicit in,
    you know I think, just the slaughter of civilians in their
    bombing and their military tactics, the same way working side-
    by-side with Assad.
        So how can Russia be so pivotal in one sense to what we are
    doing, if they were complicit with Assad and Assad complicates
    this? If you can, delve into that. I know it is a difficult
    question but I appreciate all your thoughts on it.
        Mr. Lister. If I may, it is an excellent question, again,
    and an extremely important one. This is the meaty, horrible
    side of politics. Russia is our direct adversary in terms of
    Syria policy and yet, it is also part of the solution. It will
    have to be part of the solution. If it is not part of the
    solution, we won't get a solution.
        The reason why I single out Russia as being part of that is
    largely because, as I said earlier, for Russia, Syria is
    something to be negotiated over. For Iran, this is zero-sum;
    there is nothing to negotiate.
        So our only opening here is to convince the Russians that
    their current plan of action is unsustainable and it won't lead
    to the eventual objective that they want, which is, ultimately,
    ideally, for Assad to be still be in Damascus and in control of
    100 percent of his territory. It is not going to happen.
        We also need to bear in mind, in terms of your complicity
    question, Russia has a very different military philosophy. We
    saw, I believe in 1990, in its operation in Grozny in Chechnya,
    the idea of fighting terrorism for Russia was scorched earth.
    And this is precisely how Russia has further emboldened Assad's
    scorched earth policy. This is why I described the Syrian Army
    as a result of----
        Mr. Keating. And my time is running out but I think it is
    important to distinguish as well there is such a perception I
    think in our country that Russia is our ally targeting ISIS.
    And frankly, that is not the case there. Could you just maybe
    throw some of your knowledge that you have in this area toward
    at least breaking up that myth, to a degree?
        Mr. Lister. Sure. Well, I would be lying to say that Russia
    hasn't fought ISIS but I would be telling the truth to say it
    is far from their first priority.
        Russia has pivoted on different priorities over time. When
    it has successfully negotiated with the international community
    to enforce a ceasefire between the opposition and the regime,
    it has then celebrated the success of having established a
    ceasefire, and then with all the world's media watching,
    pivoted to fight ISIS for a couple weeks.
        Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. My time is up. I would yield
    back but thank you for shedding some light on this.
        Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am very grateful
    for the leadership today of Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking
    Member Eliot Engel to hold a hearing as we discuss the long-
    term stability of not just Syria but the Middle East as a
    whole. And I am really pleased, too, how bipartisan this is.
    Indeed, I am happy to join with Congressman Greg Meeks to point
    out that we have a very insightful panel and I wish you well in
    your careers.
        More than 500,000 people have been killed and 14 million
    driven from their homes as the result of the unending conflict.
    This gruesomely sad situation should have been dealt with
    earlier and I am disheartened that it has taken until a few
    weeks ago where action was taken against Assad after he
    conducted another chemical weapons attack, committing mass
    murder against his own people.
        We find ourselves in a difficult situation today, as we
    have let Russia and Iran take an unnecessarily active role in
    shaping Syria's future. More should be done in Syria and more
    will be done.
        I want to thank all of you for the testimony. For each of
    you, how do you assess the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the
    neighboring nations resolving itself? And I actually am trying
    to be positive. When we talk about a stable and prosperous
    Syria after the missile strikes, what you would you say are the
    most important milestones to achieve in order to incentivize
    millions of displaced Syrians to come home, beginning with Mr.
    Singh?
        Mr. Singh. Well thank you, Congressman. Thank you for your
    kind words.
        It is a difficult question because I think we are actually
    quite far away from--and I appreciate you are trying to be
    optimistic but I think we are actually quite far away from any
    such milestones.
        I do want to reiterate that while we talk quite a bit about
    Assad, and Russia, and Iran, and appropriately so, again, I
    think we need to bear in mind that this conflict is no longer
    sort of a single conflict and those actors, which are, I think,
    malign actors, are largely active in western Syria. And so you
    have these other quadrants of the conflict in which, for
    example, we wouldn't want to invite Assad, and the Russians,
    and the Iranians to have influence over the liberation of Raqqa
    and what is happening in eastern Syria.
        I think what we need to do is to look at each of these
    quadrants separately, do what we can to stabilize each of them,
    and to empower local actors. And in doing so, perhaps return
    some semblance of stability to them, at least in the short-term
    preventing them from getting worse.
        So as I look at southern Syria, for example, the Jordanians
    worry that renewed fighting in southern Syria, close to their
    border, where there is now an ISIS branch that has been
    established, could result in more refugee flows across their
    border. And as I said, they are already hosting up to upwards
    of a million refugees, which is a big strain. So at least
    preventing that from getting worse, I think, will be quite
    important.
        Once we have achieved some measure of stability in one or
    more of those quadrants, then I think over the longer term you
    can think about how do you knit this back together. But I think
    the reality is, for the foreseeable future, you are not going
    to see Syria reunified. There is no single actor that has that
    capability and we shouldn't pursue that goal, first and
    foremost. It should be stability in these zones.
        Mr. Lister. Very briefly, I would say I would refer you to
    my full written testimony in which I do try to suggest, at
    least, and as I said in my opening comments, that there are
    interim things that we can do which I think can alleviate some
    of the very dire humanitarian situation. And there are things
    we can do with relatively minimal effort, although increasing
    investment from where we currently stand to allow refugees to
    come back into Syria, to allow interim reconstruction to begin.
    And all of that compiled together results in some indirect
    pressure on the Assad regime to consider negotiations in a
    serious way.
        And I would encourage you to look, although it is far from
    perfect and certainly Turkey has problems in terms of being our
    ally at the moment, I would refer you to look at what was done
    in northern Aleppo and how effective, on a humanitarian level,
    that is now becoming. I would say 40,000 refugees have returned
    to that area now, which is, effectively, a safe zone, in the
    last 4 to 6 weeks or so. That gives us a signal of what is
    possible.
        Ms. Rand. Thank you, Congressman. I would agree completely
    with my colleagues and just add two more very important points.
        One, I think I mentioned earlier this access issue. There
    are five million or so Syrians living under opposition control
    or sort of non-regime control that are being denied access, it
    seems, to some of the humanitarian aid that even we are paying
    for. So the access issue, through the cross border, through
    Turkey, that is a key issue. That is a diplomatic issue. It is
    pushing our partners and pushing the Russians to help get this
    aid into Idlib Province and other provinces under the
    opposition control. So point number one is the access.
        And second, to go back to the very good questions from your
    colleague from Massachusetts, you know the Russians are playing
    not only a scorched earth policy but their air war tactics are
    driving civilians from Syria in rapid numbers. And so they turn
    it on and off and they divert, as Mr. Lister said, to the ISIS
    fight for a moment and then go back to targeting.
        But just in this month, I believe, the Russians have
    increased their targeting of civilians' Idlib homes and other
    places. And that really drives the refugee crisis because they
    are targeting hospitals. They are targeting civilian
    infrastructure sites. And that is what is making people leave
    their homes, when they are----
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, each of you.
        Chairman Royce. Dr. Ami Bera.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to expand on
    something that my colleague, Mr. Keating, touched on. You know
    none of us questions the measured response in response to the
    use of chemical weapons. But at this juncture, we are given a
    task as Members of Congress to start thinking about what next.
    And we can't do that without--none of you speak on behalf of
    the administration. You are providing your opinion.
        And let me just put that in context. When President Obama
    was asking Congress to take actions, we had a hearing in this
    very committee in September 2013. And again, no disrespect to
    the panel, but we had Secretary of Defense Hagel; we had
    Secretary of State Kerry; and we had the chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs General Dempsey, and we were able to ask those
    questions.
        So let me remind the President that he doesn't have the
    authorization to take additional actions against Assad without
    consultation of Congress. And I know both the chairman and
    ranking member are doing their best to get those individuals
    from the administration in front of this committee but the
    President needs to understand that separation of powers and it
    is incredibly important.
        Again, the measured response supported broadly by
    bipartisan members here, but in isolation, that response of
    Tomahawk missiles doesn't accomplish anything. It is the what
    next.
        And I appreciate the testimony of the witnesses. I think
    you are providing valuable insight and opinion but we need the
    administration here so we can ask directly what their strategy
    is. And thus far, the President hasn't stated what next
    strategy is and that is a real concern.
        You know, Dr. Rand, you touched on something and I think
    all of you would agree on when we think about our foreign
    policy: There are really three pillars here. There is certainly
    the defense but then there is the diplomacy and the development
    aspects of foreign policy. And when we think about staffing
    levels at the State Department, I am incredibly worried about
    our readiness for the second and third pillars of whatever the
    next strategy is.
        Dr. Rand, do you want to touch on the lack of staffing at
    State, and the vulnerability, and our readiness here?
        Ms. Rand. Thank you, Congressman for that question. First,
    I should say that there are many, many dedicated career civil
    servants, and foreign service officers, and the majority of the
    State Department, USAID, who are there working day in and day
    out on this issue, in particular. And I applaud their
    consistent contribution to this issue. It is a really tough
    tragedy to work on.
        But yes, that is a concern. The way the State Department
    works is that the political appointees who sit at the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary level interact with
    their Department of Defense colleagues to make sure that the
    three Ds are actually working--the development, defense, and
    diplomacy--work synergically together comprehensively. If you
    don't have those level of appointees or those levels of leaders
    to go to the meetings and to work with the military, you are
    inherently going to erode the contributions at the civilian
    levels of U.N. foreign policy.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Would either one of you want to comment?
        Mr. Singh. I just want to say one thing on this. I had
    spent some time myself at the State Department. I was a Special
    Assistant to Secretaries Powell and Rice. And I think that I
    agree with Dr. Rand on the principle that we need to get the
    State Department staffed up. We need to staff our diplomacy. I
    am concerned about some of the reports of big cuts to the State
    Department budget.
        On the other hand, it is also important that we have the
    right organization at the State Department and, as I understand
    it, that is one of the things that Secretary Tillerson is
    looking at.
        Because I think one lesson that I would take from the last
    administration is that we have to be careful that we have a
    unified Middle East strategy and that we empower our officials
    to look not just at one slice of the salami, as it were, but
    that we empower them to look at the entire region. So I would
    like to, for example, see an Assistant Secretary of State for
    Middle Eastern Affairs who actually has the power to look at
    multiple issues across the region and integrate them into a
    single strategy.
        And I will also say my impression is, without minimizing
    your concerns, Congressman, that inside, for example, the
    National Security Council, the Trump administration is looking
    very carefully at this issue and what our strategy in Syria
    should be.
        Mr. Bera. And again, I would just reiterate that may be
    taking place but there is a role for Congress and there is a
    role for that consultation with Congress. That is how our
    Government is set up.
        And let me just say, not to minimize, we have great
    Government employees. We have great employees with the State,
    DoD, et cetera, that are doing a tremendous job.
        So, again, I would just urge the administration to respect
    this committee. And I will yield back.
        Chairman Royce. We go to Jeff Duncan of South Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know we have a great panel. You guys are very well-
    versed in the topic. I just want to point out that we may have
    had some people from the administration here to testify, had
    some of the administration's appointments not been slow to be
    confirmed on the Senate side due to obstruction over there. And
    that is unfortunate because this is a very timely issue.
        I want to speak on behalf of my constituents because I get
    a lot of messages to my office, Facebook, Twitter, other things
    that say this: What are the U.S. national security interests
    that are at stake in Syria and how do these Syria-specific
    interests relate to broader U.S. regional or global interests?
    What are we doing in Syria? Why is it important to the United
    States?
        And I will start with Mr. Singh.
        Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman and it is a great
    question. And I think your constituents are absolutely right to
    ask that, as we should of every foreign policy issue.
        I think we have several interests at stake here. Number one
    is counterterrorism, first and foremost, because obviously we
    are focused on defeating ISIS and trying to do it in a way
    which is sustainable, so that ISIS doesn't come back. And I
    think that is something that ordinary Americans are concerned
    about.
        Second, we don't want to see Iran increase its power or
    increase its ability to project power, whether against our
    interests or against our allies like Israel and Jordan. And one
    thing that we have seen, as others have discussed, is that Iran
    is, in fact, attempting to do that.
        There is also an element here where we have Russia trying
    to thwart American interests, American objectives in this
    region and project its own power globally.
        And then just finally----
        Mr. Duncan. Let me just ask you--I mean we tried that in
    Vietnam. How is this going to be different when we try to
    thwart another country like Russia's engagement in a certain
    region of the world? Can you touch on that?
        Mr. Singh. Well, I don't know that we are aiming to thwart
    Russia's engagement in this region of the world. As my
    colleague mentioned, Russia has had influence in Syria for a
    long time. I think it is actually reverse. I think Russia is
    trying to, in principle, prevent the United States from
    succeeding in this region. And that is a big concern, I think,
    for any policymaker, whatever your view of what a relationship
    with Russia should be in the long-run.
        And I would just add one more thing, which is obviously we
    have seen this conflict cause tremendous instability in Europe.
    And instability in Europe is I think, also, a concern of the
    United States.
        Mr. Duncan. Any of you others want to comment on that?
        Mr. Lister. I don't want to repeat what my colleague has
    said but I would want to reiterate the obvious is, of course,
    counterterrorism as an interest. We focused almost explicitly
    on ISIS for the last several years but we seem to have
    forgotten al-Qaeda. And that, for me in my area of work, is a
    very significant concern and we can come to that, perhaps with
    further questions.
        The issue of international norms and American credibility
    is also at stake; I could speak at length at how American
    credibility has been severely damaged with regards to our
    treatment of the Syrian crisis over the last 6 years. And there
    are things, as my remarks said, that we can do to rescue some
    of that credibility.
        Iran and Hezbollah are increasing like we have never seen
    them before. Hezbollah is now arguably more powerful than some
    Eastern European militaries.
        Mr. Duncan. It is interesting that you mentioned that
    several times today about Iran and Hezbollah. Do you believe
    that Iran is emboldened based on the Iranian deal that gave
    them $400 billion plus that they could use to export terrorism
    to finance Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations? Do they
    feel more emboldened because they have the financial ability
    now from that deal?
        Mr. Lister. It is hard to say with certainty, although, I
    would find it hard to believe they didn't find themselves
    feeling more emboldened. I think the one key difference I can
    tell after the JCPOA in terms of Iran's strategy in Syria is
    that they have managed to train these Shia militiamen from all
    across the region, and far more intensively, and far more
    professionally than they were before. Whereas, we saw 2 or 3
    years ago tens of thousands compiled of Afghan Hazara Shia
    militiamen essentially being cannon fodder in strategic areas.
    They are now highly capable forces. And that can only have been
    the result of increased funding, logistical support, training
    facilities, and of course, travel across the region.
        Mr. Duncan. I know Dr. Rand wants to get in here and I have
    30 seconds but let me just make a point and ask Dr. Rand. Do
    you think if the United States hadn't pulled out of Iraq
    prematurely without leaving a contingency there, things would
    be different in western Iraq and Syria?
        Ms. Rand. Thank you, Congressman.
        You know the Iraq point is a very good one and I actually
    would disagree slightly that the Shia militia training, the
    cause and effect of that probably predates the JCPOA. It
    probably goes back many, many years. I mean you could date it
    even to 2006-2007, when these Shiite militias were forming.
        So I don't think it is the 2011-2010 period that we are
    talking about. I think we are talking--if you want to cite Iraq
    as a causal variable that led to the growth of the Shiite
    militia movement and their ability to train and seize power, I
    would go even earlier to 2005, 2006, 2007.
        Mr. Duncan. My time is up.
        Mr. Chairman, I reiterate it would be nice to have some
    administration officials here.
        Chairman Royce. Very good.
        Dina Titus of Nevada.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I am going
    to be saying the same thing that most of my colleagues have
    said because I share their sentiments.
        I think the meandering policies of the Trump administration
    have done nothing to end the civil war in Syria. We all agree
    it is a complicated situation. That is why we need a clear
    strategy with a focused execution and leadership and that is
    not what we have.
        The only thing this administration has been clear about is
    that Assad, apparently, gets to stay in power and he is the
    person who has been willing to kill more 500,000 of his own
    people.
        We haven't received any details about how the President
    wants to work with others in the area. We haven't seen this
    super-secret plan to get rid of ISIS. All we have seen are some
    so-called messages that have been sent to Iran and North Korea.
    And we have had the mother of all bombs dropped. We have had
    the Armata going somewhere; we don't know where. We have had
    saber-rattling that has upset some of our closest allies. It
    seems to me a kind of mass confusion and it is very
    unpredictable, which means it is unstable and can lead to
    mistakes.
        In the meantime, the State Department has been sidelined in
    the whole process of forming any kind of cohesive foreign
    policy strategy.
        I will agree with Mr. Keating, Dr. Bera, Mr. Duncan, you
    all are wonderful. You are the experts, obviously, but we have
    had nobody from the administration. Your analysis is
    interesting to us but you are think tank people. You are
    academics. You are former administration folks. You are not who
    is there now and supposed to be making the decisions.
        I know we are trying to get the Secretary here. Maybe we
    need to get Ivanka here--she has her brother whispering that
    she is the one who suggested they do the bombing--or Jared
    Kushner. Maybe they are the ones doing the policy. So maybe we
    need to bring them in front of us and ask them what is going
    on.
        In the meantime, I would just ask Dr. Rand, you know it has
    been 20 days since we dropped all the missiles on Syria. Now,
    President Trump all the time has said I will never forecast
    what I am going to do. Unlike the previous administration, I am
    not going to warn the enemy. Well, they warned Russia and they
    hightailed it out of there. Russia warned Syria; they got out
    of there. They were using the airfield the very next day. Those
    precious babies that so moved our President when they were hit
    with the chemical gas are still being killed by barrel bombs or
    are washing up on the shores of Greek islands because they are
    refugees.
        What was the effect of that, that message? What good did it
    do? Doctor, do you see any effect on the regime of that strike?
    Would you advise doing more strikes, less strikes, what?
        Ms. Rand. Yes, thank you Congresswoman. Three weeks later,
    it is hard to say exactly what the impact was in terms of the
    civil conflict, in terms of the war against ISIS, and in terms
    of our allies. I think there were a lot of raised hopes and
    expectations among many allies in many different parts of the
    world. And the neighbors had different views, as I said, and
    they read into the strikes what they want U.S. policy to be,
    which often conflicts with each other, which is of concern.
        But no, I didn't see a deterrent effect in terms of slowing
    down Assad's killing machine, nor slowing down Russian support
    for Assad in the past 3 weeks.
        Ms. Titus. So the message wasn't very clear or wasn't very
    effective?
        Ms. Rand. Yes, I don't think that message had that sort of
    impact.
        Ms. Titus. Mr. Lister?
        Mr. Lister. The message was clear in one single act but
    there is no strategy. The only impact I can say that we have
    seen is that there clearly is still some concern within the
    Assad regime about the fact that we did conduct the attack
    because they have redeployed almost of their aircraft to
    Russia's military base in the northwest of the country for
    protection.
        So clearly, the impact of one strike of 59 cruise missiles
    has made people ask questions about whether or not we will do
    it again but they shouldn't just be asking the questions. It
    should be clear from our side whether or not there will be any
    more or whether there will not be.
        So clearly, as I said in my opening remarks, we do need an
    underpinning strategy to have the proper effect that we want.
        Ms. Titus. All right.
        Mr. Singh. You know I confess I disagree slightly with my
    colleagues on this. I think of the narrow purpose of these
    strikes was to deter the use of chemical weapons and to lend
    credibility to American military threats, I think that it is
    possible that they will succeed in that narrow basis but,
    again, that is narrow. So I wouldn't be quite as negative about
    it, perhaps, as you suggest.
        Ms. Titus. I think that you say it is possible that it will
    succeed. What happens if it doesn't deter them and they do it
    again? That is the big question that looms out there. What
    next, I guess, is the point.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        As is often the case in this committee, I feel like I am
    compelled to correct the record by the time it comes to my
    opportunity to ask some questions. So I am just going to take
    some time to remind everybody who says that we must have a
    strategy and that this side opposes such a thing, nothing could
    be further from the truth. We believe that we must have a
    strategy and that the President must come to us as well for
    further and continued military action.
        That having been said, let's just be reminded that he has
    been in office for about 100 days. Meanwhile, for 8 years prior
    to this, we still didn't see a strategy and, when we did, well
    it was a red line, and then I am going to take some military
    action, and then when the American people disagree with it,
    then I am going to go to the Congress, and then I am not going
    to do anything. And if this is complicated, which it is, I
    would say that whatever the strategy was during the last
    administration has a lot to do with the complications we are
    dealing with right now, which includes Russian involvement,
    which the United States effectively kept out of the Middle East
    for 60 years under previous policy. Let's not forget that.
        All right, moving on. Does anybody on the panel believe
    that Moscow was aware of Assad's use of chemical weapons
    beforehand and/or approved of it or was it beyond its control,
    Russia? Mr. Singh, do you know?
        Mr. Singh. I don't know but it is hard for me to imagine
    that Russia and Iran wouldn't be aware of those types of
    things, given the integration between these militaries.
        Mr. Perry. Mr. Lister?
        Mr. Lister. Just to add briefly, the French Government
    released an investigation into the attack yesterday. They
    actually deployed assets to the town that was attacked.
        One of the things they found was the chemical hexamine was
    used as a mixing agent for sarin. The key thing about hexamine
    is it takes many, many hours, if not 1 to 2 days, to actually
    complete the process of forming sarin. It is composed of--it is
    a binary chemical.
        Mr. Perry. Right.
        Mr. Lister. There have been media reports here in the
    United States citing unnamed intelligence officials saying that
    we had detected people linked to the chemical weapons program
    going to the Shayrat Air Base in the days preceding the attack.
    If those reports are true and we indeed did detect those
    things, there is no way in my mind that Russia, having troops
    on the base itself, could not have known.
        Mr. Perry. Wouldn't know. Wouldn't know, right.
        So it would seem that Russia, potentially, at least at this
    point, could be complicit and it seems to be pointing in that
    direction.
        Dr. Rand, do you have a countervailing opinion?
        Ms. Rand. Well I agree. I think actually the most guilty
    behavior was afterwards, where there was a disinformation
    campaign in the weeks subsequent, where Russia was denying this
    attack to place in the face of the hospital reports from
    Turkey, the----
        Mr. Perry. Overwhelming evidence.
        Ms. Rand. Yes. So that actually, I don't know the answer to
    your question but that was pretty damning.
        Mr. Perry. To what extent can Assad defy Russia? I mean
    they are trying to influence. They have their base there. They
    want to keep Assad to that extent but I would agree they are
    looking for stability that they are not going to get. What kind
    of leash does he have? Does he have a pretty broad range of
    authority where he can still receive compliance from Russia and
    things like what we just discussed, potentially?
        Mr. Singh. That is an awfully tough question to answer,
    Congressman. I think he, as Charles mentioned, he needs Russia
    and Iran, especially, to have any hope of success militarily in
    the battlefield. At the same time, they need him. There is no
    Assad regime without Assad.
        Mr. Perry. Right.
        Mr. Singh. So there is a codependency. And exactly what is
    the dynamic in that relationship, I would be hard-pressed to
    say.
        Mr. Perry. But I would think, at a minimum, we are hard-
    pressed to put a whole lot or really any degree of trust in
    Russia in some kind of bilateral operations or negotiations. I
    mean we are forced to it because they are at the table because
    the last administration essentially allowed them at the table
    or they forced themselves to the table. But we can't trust them
    in anything we are doing. Would that be a fair assessment?
        Mr. Singh. I think that our history of negotiations so far
    have shown that, as Mr. Lister mentioned, they have a pretty
    poor track record when it comes to enforcing ceasefires and
    getting Assad to do what he needs to do.
        Mr. Perry. Just looking further, what would their objective
    be in Libya and Egypt? Is this the beginning of further
    influence in the region?
        Mr. Singh. Well I think, broadly, Russia is trying to
    reassert itself as a global power. It is trying to reestablish
    its influence in regions like the Middle East but not only the
    Middle East. And look, having a presence there on NATO's
    southern flank, you know they obviously have quite a presence
    on NATO's eastern flank, gives them a bit of influence and
    leverage over especially those southern NATO countries.
        So I think that there are a lot of different things in
    play.
        Mr. Perry. Yes, so I think we need to be wary of that and
    aware of that.
        Regarding future negotiations and stability, and your
    assertion that it is not going to come anytime soon, and I
    would agree with you, are there decision points for Russia? And
    if there are, and I imagine there are, do you have any
    inclination to what they would be?
        And finally, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, would you
    just acknowledge that it was protocol to allow the Russians to
    know that our missiles indeed were inbound. It was not
    collaboration or collusion, it is protocol.
        Mr. Singh. It is protocol and I think it is prudence, as
    well, frankly.
        Mr. Perry. Okay. And the previous question?
        Mr. Singh. The decision points for Russia.
        Mr. Perry. Yes.
        Mr. Singh. Russia is obviously most active in that western
    sort of quadrant of the conflict, as well as a bit in the
    southern quadrant. And it seems right now they are trying to
    establish control around Idlib.
        And so I think that seems to be the focus but I think
    whether or not that remains the focus, how that goes will
    depend also in part on what happens in the rest of the country.
    I think, for example, a successful operation to liberate Raqqa
    changes the sort of facts on the ground because it really,
    especially if we are starting to empower local actors there, it
    eliminates the possibility that Assad can somehow regain
    control of the country and perhaps changes the dynamics for
    Russia, for Assad, for Iran.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go to Brad Schneider, Brad
    Schneider of Illinois.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you,
    again, for calling this hearing. To the witnesses, your
    testimony, your written testimony in particular, was
    extraordinarily helpful.
        I want to associate myself with my colleagues about the
    need for a strategy, the need for the administration to be here
    speaking to us. But also I want to, as maybe starting a trend,
    set the record straight because it was indicated that it is
    obstruction that is slowing down having people in place. And I
    just want to point out that there have been very few
    nominations made within the State Department, among other
    departments.
        There are two upcoming nomination hearings. The Senate is
    moving quickly. We need the senior officials to be nominated
    and in place to make sure that we implement the strategy we
    need to have in place.
        Moving to questions, Mr. Lister, you indicated in your
    testimony that Assad cannot put Syria back together again. Is
    that a statement about Assad or is it more a statement about
    Syria in general?
        Mr. Lister. I take it to mean the latter part of your
    question is implying whether partition is possible?
        Mr. Schneider. No, the question is can Syria be put
    together again or is it something that we are trying to do the
    impossible?
        Mr. Lister. Fundamentally speaking, a very significant
    proportion of Syria's population have seen the wrath of the
    Assad regime and the methods he uses--so the Assad regime's
    chief motto is Assad or we burn the country. Assad frequently
    says he is cleansing his country of the impure.
        With Assad still in place and with his foreign intelligence
    apparatus, you have every single piece of information about
    anyone who could potentially be opposed to his regime. While he
    stays in power, six and a half million Syrians will never go
    back.
        Mr. Schneider. And I agree that Assad can't. But is it
    possible to put Syria back together at this point?
        Mr. Lister. I think so, yes, in the long-term. The key
    thing for everyone to bear in mind is that the only thing, in
    my experience, that unites the opposition and the regime is an
    opposition to Syria falling apart. Both of them oppose
    partition 100 percent.
        Mr. Schneider. Good.
        Mr. Singh, turning to you. You talked about Syria being a
    conflict spread over four zones. And as I look at it and others
    were talking about it, it is maybe more. There are more facets
    to this challenge.
        But I wonder is it one conflict over four zones or it is
    four conflicts with intersections, or using Mr. Lister's term,
    interlinked conflicts?
        Mr. Singh. Congressman, I mean I guess you would apply
    almost either terminology to it. I think the point, from my
    point of view, is that you can't treat Syria as one problem, in
    a sense. In fact, you have distinct but, perhaps, overlapping
    problems. So for example, we have the problem that has erupted
    in recent days of the Turks and the Kurds in their tensions to
    one another and clashes with one another now. We have the
    problem of Iran and Hezbollah trying to establish a presence
    along the Golan Heights. We have the problem, potentially, of,
    if there is renewed fighting in the south, refugees flowing
    into Jordan and the Jordanians feeling as though they have to
    do something perhaps to push ISIS back from their own borders.
        And then we also have the sort of issue that really we are
    focused on in this hearing of western Syria and the plight of
    civilians who are caught between the Assad regime and its
    backers and the opposition which is, as I said, increasingly
    jihadist dominated in that area.
        So these are all sort of parts of the Syrian conflict but I
    think that to make good policy, we may need to look at them not
    separately, not totally distinctly, but as sort of discrete
    problems, if you know what I mean.
        Mr. Schneider. Dr. Rand, I don't know if you have comments
    to add to that.
        Ms. Rand. Concurring.
        Mr. Schneider. Okay. As I try to understand what is
    happening and, again, thank you for sharing your insights, it
    seems that we need to have certainly a multi-faceted strategy,
    if not overlaying strategies that are distinct.
        On the one level, we have this humanitarian crisis that we
    have to deal with with, not just the internally displaced but
    the pressure it is putting on the region.
        Mr. Singh, as you touched on, we have the regional issues
    in what is happening at the north along the Turkish borders is
    distinct from what is happening on the highway between Damascus
    and Aleppo, distinct from what is happening near the Golan. And
    having that tragedy on the regional and then the global, we are
    running out of time, but the issue of the prospect of a failed
    state in Iraq being a haven for terrorist groups and, Mr.
    Lister, thank you for emphasizing al-Qaeda because it is not
    just ISIS. We have to have a strategy with all of those.
        So I guess I am going to finish with a statement for a
    question because I am out of time. But it is imperative that we
    have the administration here sharing with us, so that Congress
    can exercise its responsibility to understand and ultimately
    make the decision of what role the United States should be
    playing in these conflicts.
        So with that, I yield back. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you for those questions.
        We will now go to Chairman McCaul from Texas.
        Mr. McCaul. All right, thank you, Chairman.
        My first question is to Mr. Lister and maybe for the panel.
    I have been briefed on this Democratic Federation of Northern
    Syria that operates, obviously, in the northern part of the
    country. On December 29th, the 165 leaders, Kurdish, Christian,
    Yazidi, and Arab populations came together to form a counsel
    and declare the creation of a government known as the
    Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. And it was sort of
    intriguing to me. I know some of our Special Forces may be
    working with them to defeat ISIS but what intrigued me about
    this group was that, at some point, if and when Assad falls, we
    are going to have to have some model of governance, some
    template for the country. And I think that is something that we
    have seen historically in the past we have made mistakes on,
    when a dictator falls and there is no governance, then the
    terrorists take over.
        And so my question is can you tell me more about this
    Federation and the prospects of it and other groups like it
    becoming sort of a model governance?
        Mr. Lister. Sure. Well, the formation you speak of is
    essentially a result of the Kurdish YPG's policy in
    northeastern Syria, which is to establish a semi-autonomous
    region of the country either with or without the tacit
    acceptance of the United States and with or without the tacit
    acceptance of the Assad regime, both of whom it retains contact
    with.
        You know many of the underpinning philosophies underpinning
    it are good and laudable. The idea of freedom of
    representation, in theory, the theory of equal opportunities
    for the sexes is all good, and there are many, many more. There
    are problems with it, though, within this Federation territory,
    it has become all the more common now for any portions of
    opposition or any other Kurdish parties that aren't the YPG
    have had their offices raided, burnt down, arrested. It is now
    illegal, according to that Federation for any of the leaders of
    those other Kurdish parties to even enter the territory.
        So it is potentially a good stabilizing measure in the
    interim period but it isn't part of a solution I can see other
    Syrians and the rest of the country being part of.
        Mr. McCaul. Is it something the United States should be
    supporting?
        Mr. Lister. In the interim, perhaps, yes, I mean because it
    works for now. It has stabilized northeastern Syria. It has
    resulted in the defeat of ISIS in those areas. But we need to
    be very, very aware of how poisonous, and I use that word, how
    poisonous the YPG's political philosophy is perceived by
    Syrians on both sides of the opposition-regime conflict. There
    are significant fears.
        I will end just by saying I was part of a significant Track
    II process for 3 years, which involved almost a thousand
    Syrians from across all sides of the conflict, highly
    influential people in their own regard. The only actor not
    involved in that process was the PYD, the political wing of the
    YPG. And the only reason for that is nearly every single Syrian
    involved in that process said they would boycott the process if
    the PYD was involved.
        It is just worth us remembering that using that as a model
    for the rest of Syria will not work, whilst it may work in the
    northeast. But it is not translatable for the rest of the
    country.
        Mr. McCaul. Well, following on the YPG, on Tuesday, Turkey
    launched an airstrike against groups, Kurds, including the YPG
    in Syria. We have been working with them to defeat ISIS. I know
    there were communications to Turkey not to do this. The
    President is meeting with President Erdogan next month.
        As a member of NATO, how do you propose that the United
    States balance this issue?
        Mr. Lister. Well, I would refer you to my earlier testimony
    and to my prepared remarks. I refer to the fact that Turkey has
    many faults but also we have many faults with this situation.
        We have pretended that the YPG isn't part of the PKK, which
    is a designated terrorist organization in this country. The PKK
    is also the primary national security threat for Turkey and it
    has been for 30 or 40 years.
        So there are things we do need to do to build confidence
    back up with the Turks and the primary policy recommendation I
    would have there in the immediate term is to try to encourage
    or force Turkey to reconsider a ceasefire with the PKK inside
    Turkey, which would then have the positive knock-on effect of
    de-intensifying the hostilities between Turkey and the YPG.
        For me, that is the only way around it.
        Mr. McCaul. I assume the other witnesses agree with this
    assessment?
        Ms. Rand. Yes, this is exactly right. I would just add that
    the President and the new administration seem to be trying to
    warm relationships with Turkey. There were a number of phone
    calls, including after the referendum 10 days ago,
    congratulating President Erdogan. This is a new warm
    relationship that has to be translated into tough talk and
    negotiations on these types of issues to promise to work on the
    YPG issue in exchange for restraint and not to target people
    that our Special Forces are working with and partnering with.
        Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you for those questions.
        We will now go to Mr. Espaillat from New York.
        Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Engel. And esteemed witnesses, thank you for your excellent and
    enlightening testimony.
        I don't mean to pile on but, however, thus far, so far in
    Congress and with full control of both the Senate, the House,
    and the White House, it is perplexing that we have not heard
    from a State Department official who might really play a
    constructive role in answering some of the questions that we
    may have.
        Just yesterday we heard from Secretary of State Tillerson
    and General Mattis on the North Korea issue. And we have not
    used military force there, yet. So I think it is imperative
    that we hear from the administration on their plan, their
    strategic long-term plan to address this humanitarian crisis in
    Syria. Close to half a million civilians have died or exactly
    480,000, and 14 million people have been displaced, and maybe
    50 or more percent of the country's infrastructure has been
    destroyed.
        So this is truly a humanitarian crisis and beyond the
    attack on the airfield, we have not really heard from the
    President or his administration on the long-term strategic plan
    to deal with this particular humanitarian crisis. And we saw
    how while he warned the Russians of the planned military
    action, he ordered the launch of 59 Tomahawks on Shayrat
    Airfield in Syria. And he very emotionally and appropriately
    stated that Assad choked out the lives of helpless, men, women,
    and children. It was a slow and brutal death for many of them.
        But less than 24 hours after the attack, the Syrian
    Government and their Russian allies were able to continue to
    fly missions out of the airfield. When will they fly another
    mission with chemical weapons? That is the question that we
    must all ask ourselves. In fact, there are recent allegations
    that even after the airfield attack, the regime has used
    chlorine gas against civilians.
        And so we want to know, I want to ask is there any
    evidence? Have you heard of any evidence of this being true
    that they have, in fact, after the sarin attack, they have used
    other chemical weapons on the Syrian people?
        Mr. Lister. Briefly, yes, or as much evidence as we can
    glean without being there ourselves. Doctors on the ground have
    treated chlorine-like symptoms, difficulty breathing, tearing
    from the eyes in, as far as I am aware, at least three
    different locations since our cruise missile strikes, including
    one of the times which was literally the day after our cruise
    missile strike. And those attacks are taking place just outside
    Damascus and elsewhere in the north of the country.
        Mr. Espaillat. So the bombing of the airfield has not
    deterred the Assad regime from continuing in its bad ways. And
    so we must hear from the administration on the strategic long-
    term plan in the region. The President, in his first 100 days
    has issued executive orders to a 4-month halt on allowing
    refugees in to the United States. We just heard in the past
    days how his assistant and First Daughter Ivanka contradicted
    that particular policy, saying that allowing Syrian refugees
    into the United States has to be part of the discussion. Maybe
    we should allow that statement into the record, Mr. Chairman,
    but we must continue to highlight America's long-standing
    tradition to offer humanitarian aid and allow refugees from
    troubled parts of the world to enter America, where they will
    protected and shielded from bodily harm. This is an important
    component of who we are as a nation and we must continue to
    look in that direction.
        Trump is proposing cuts on the State Department and we
    heard how General Mattis has stated that if we cut diplomacy,
    we just buy additional bullets. And so we are in the crossroad
    where we have not heard from the administration with proposing
    cuts on the State Department, the Assad regime continues to
    violate human rights. We are not clear on where we are going
    and yet, we are not speaking to each other. And we speak to
    each other about North Korea, as we should and yet, we have not
    used physical force there.
        So we must continue to support refugees coming in. We have
    a good vetting system to ensure that they are not here to harm
    our nation. And whether they are children being killed in El
    Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, or Syria, they are children that
    we should help across the world.
        And I am asking President Trump to reverse his course on
    the executive order and to come to Congress with a long-term
    foreign policy strategy on Syria.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho [presiding]. Thank you, sir. It is now my turn and
    so I am going to ask you guys, and I appreciate your patience
    being here. I want to go back to the subject of this hearing,
    Syria After the Missile Strikes: Policy Options.
        I was torn when President Trump ordered those Tomahawk
    missiles in there because I was a strong opponent of President
    Obama going in there when they were going to do the no-fly
    zones because was saw what happens with no-fly zones in Libya.
    It leads to a failed state. There is nobody to take over and
    that was our concern back then. And this was a limited strike.
        And I want to go back to some of the stuff that you said.
    Mr. Lister, you said you noted that the mode of death--whether
    it is bombs, bullets, I threw in beheading, or chemicals--it is
    still death but the chemical weapons have been deemed an
    unacceptable form of warfare. And if we go back to the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, it comprehensibly prohibits the use, the
    development, the production, stockpiling, and transfer of
    chemical weapons. Any chemical used for warfare is considered a
    chemical weapon by the Convention. And then we have the
    chlorine barrel bombs that Assad has been using. And we have
    written bills to prevent that. We can't get the traction
    because everybody says chlorine is not considered a use but
    within the chemical weapons treaty it says the use of any toxic
    chemical as a weapon, when used to produce fatalities solely or
    majoritively through its toxic action is in and of itself
    forbidden by the treaty.
        So my question to you is: We have pretty much every country
    in the world signed on to the CWC and there are four of them
    that haven't. So the consensus is, with all the countries, the
    192 that have agreed to this, is that chemical weapons should
    not be used. So we are in agreement there.
        Is there an enforcement mechanism or is it just an
    agreement we are not going to use them? And if somebody crosses
    that red line and uses them, is there an international response
    written down anywhere and, if not, would you recommend there
    should be and it should be an international coalition of all
    nations?
        What are your thoughts, Mr. Singh?
        Mr. Singh. Well, Congressman, thanks for the question. I
    confess I am not an expert in the CWC. So I am not sure I have
    the answer to your questions.
        But I think if the treaty is going to mean anything and it
    is a lesson also for other nonproliferation treaties, which we
    put a lot of emphasis on, there have to be sanctions. There
    have to be penalties for those who violate them and it can't be
    just American penalties and American sanctions. It needs to be
    international.
        Mr. Yoho. And that is what I want to come out of this so
    that it gives clarity for a nation because I don't want America
    to have to do this alone but after 5 years of slaughter over
    there and pushing 500,000 people and, as Ms. Titus brought up,
    you know this administration has done nothing. Well, we can
    blame a lot of administrations for not doing anything. And we
    need to have the clarification of if this does happen and we
    have signed on to these agreements, somebody needs to back them
    up.
        Mr. Lister, do you have any thoughts on that?
        Mr. Lister. I am also not an expert on the treaty either or
    the Convention and I would echo what Mr. Singh has said. It is
    our responsibility as an international community to enforce
    conventions like this.
        Mr. Yoho. All right, and I know you guys aren't the experts
    or want to talk about the policy side of that but you are
    experts in your fields. So I am asking you to give us the
    information that you would draft as far as a wording that we
    could go to the U.N. and say we want this or go to our State
    Department and say we want this wording put into the
    international community that if you cross this red line, not
    just America, but all the members that have signed up to this
    are coming after you.
        Dr. Rand? And Mr. Lister you said--you looked like you had
    something else to add.
        Mr. Lister. I will just finish. I think the responsibility
    to protect is a useful mechanism here. If chemical weapons are
    proven to be being used against civilian populations
    repeatedly, that may give us one opportunity under some kind of
    a U.N. mandate to at least push for some kind of response and
    consequences for it.
        Yes, that is what I would offer.
        Mr. Yoho. Dr. Rand?
        Ms. Rand. I would agree with the RTP, the responsibility to
    protect method of advancing this but I would also add that you
    know last week at the U.N. there was a resolution, or 2 weeks
    ago right after the missile strikes, to condemn it and to
    investigate it and Russia vetoed it, in fact, on the one
    paragraph on the information about they didn't like the way it
    was worded or something. But I think the main diplomatic task
    ahead is to go back on this particular strike and ensure that
    there is an investigation because that is part of the norm
    against CW is the international community goes in, and
    investigates, and holds accountable individuals, including by
    name, by the way. The PCW has been very good at finding the
    perpetrators in the past 2 years.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Ms. Rand. It has a published list of names.
        Mr. Yoho. And my goal is that we have an enforcement
    mechanism that has teeth behind it because that is the only way
    I could justify what President Trump did is the slaughter that
    has been going on for over 5 years, that it has to be brought
    to an end. And if we just sit by as a world, we are all guilty
    of watching this happen. And so I am glad he stepped in but
    before we go any further, we need to have clarification.
        And my time is out.
        And we will go now to Mr. Brad Sherman from California.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        We have three separate goals in Syria and there is a
    tendency to mash them together. We have to keep them separate,
    evaluating every policy as to whether it helps at least one of
    those goals without setting back one of the others. And we
    shouldn't attack a proposal just because it does nothing to
    achieve two of our goals if it, in fact, helps us achieve one
    of the three goals.
        Our first goal is to protect the Syrian people and we
    would, eventually, like to see good governance in Syria. Our
    second goal is to destroy ISIS. And our third goal is to
    preserve the Chemical Weapons Convention that bans the use of
    poison gas.
        And there has been discussion here about how the mode of
    death doesn't matter. You are just as dead if you are hit by a
    bullet or a bomb as if you are hit with sarin. But the fact is
    that we live in a world in which mankind at least achieved the
    Chemical Weapons Convention.
        One could write an account or history where chemical
    weapons were invented before gunpowder and in that account or
    history, chemical weapons are allowed and explosives are not
    but that is not the way history unfolded. We have a convention
    against the use of chemical weapons that has saved countless
    millions of lives and it is worth standing up for that
    convention, even if we realize that Assad has killed half a
    million people, or the war that he created has killed half a
    million people, and only a very, very small percentage of those
    died from chemical weapons.
        Now not only do we have those three goals, the Syrian
    people, ISIS, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, they are not
    equally important goals, but we have a couple of caveats. And
    that is we want to do that all without excessive U.S.
    casualties and without a war with Russia. We don't want another
    Iraq War. We don't want another Cuban Missile Crisis.
        Now, one of our colleagues said that he thought that there
    was a moral equivalence between Assad and other authoritarian
    regimes in the Middle East. I would say Mubarak did not kill
    hundreds of thousands of people. In fact, he allowed himself to
    be, or was allowed to leave power, rather than killing hundreds
    of thousands.
        Not every authoritarian regime in the Middle East is
    responsible for aiding the killing of hundreds of Americans, as
    Mr. Lister pointed out, the Assad regime is.
        Not every Middle East authoritarian regime has tried to
    develop nuclear weapons the way Syria did until they were
    bombed in 2007, and no doubt they paid North Korea for the
    material and the technology. So, they proliferated in that
    direction as well. That is money in the hands of North Korea.
        And there are 500,000 dead Syrians. That does not equate to
    Erdogan. And I have been one of the harshest critics of Erdogan
    on this committee.
        The Obama administration forced Assad to give up 2,600
    pounds of chemical weapons. That was a tremendous
    accomplishment. And our hope is that the action taken by
    President Trump will prevent Assad from using whatever he has
    left. We will have to see.
        There is discussion of chlorine versus other chemical
    agents. It is my understanding that the Chemical Weapons
    Convention would prohibit Syria from even possessing sarin and
    other chemical agents. They are allowed to possess chlorine.
    You can't have a modern society without chlorine and
    chlorinated water but it prohibits the use of chlorine as a
    weapon.
        And of course when chlorine is used, you can't always be
    sure it was the Assad regime. Chlorine is a much more available
    item and the rebels, or the terrorists, or others might have
    it.
        The question I have requires an understanding of Russian
    politics. So if I don't see a volunteer, maybe you could
    comment for the record. And that is, there is, among other
    things in the Middle East, a civil war between Shiites and
    Sunnis. The Russians have adopted the Shiites. Their own Muslim
    population is overwhelmingly Sunni. How does Putin, the man who
    at least asserts that his hold on power is dependent upon the
    consent of the government, side with the Shiites in this effort
    without an incredible blowback? We all have ethnic and
    religious communities in our districts and I doubt that we
    would fail to take into account their historical view in
    looking at international affairs.
        Does anybody have a comment on how and why Putin can side
    with the Shiites when he has tens of millions of Sunnis?
        Mr. Lister. Very briefly, just academically, I would push
    back on the idea that Syria, at least within the frame of
    reference of Syria, that it is all just about Shiite versus
    Sunni. There are many Sunnis who have remained loyal to the
    Assad regime, just as many have turned to the opposition. And
    Russia has actually tried to frame it that way.
        Mr. Sherman. But Hezbollah and Iran are there supporting
    Assad out of a Shiite----
        Mr. Lister. Exactly but Russia has tried to frame its
    policy in Syria domestically as not being protecting the Shia.
        It is also worth remembering one thing that is going on
    right now which is having very little media coverage, in Aleppo
    city, having captured it, the Russian Government is now trying
    very hard to prevent Iran and the Assad regime from populating
    eastern Aleppo, which was previously under the opposition
    control. It is trying to prevent them from populating that area
    with Shia. And it is insisting that Sunnis, including from
    opposition areas, should be given the opportunity to come back
    to eastern Aleppo.
        And so I would remind you that it is a little more
    complicated, domestically and also on Syrian than the binary--
    --
        Mr. Kinzinger [presiding]. The gentleman's time has
    expired. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair recognizes the Chair for 5 minutes.
        I just want to dispel very quickly--there is a lot of talk
    about nonintervention in Syria and using Libya as the example.
    I think it is really important to point out that Libya has
    massive challenges. Part of that was a failure in follow-up
    after regime change, I believe.
        But secondly, if you compare the case of intervention in
    Libya versus the case of nonintervention in Syria, Libya, with
    all its challenges, is far better off than not intervened--in
    Syria.
        I remember back in 2013 I was one of the few Republicans
    outspoken about the need to enforce the red line in Syria. And
    I heard from people all over, a lot in my own party, some
    members on this committee, that said if we intervene and we
    strike Syria, we will begin World War III, and another major
    intervention in Syria, in the Middle East, World War III will
    commence and everybody will be gone.
        I would like to point out that also people said that if we
    intervened, it will get way worse in Syria. But when we didn't
    intervene, it actually got way worse than we ever could have
    imagined, which is where we are at today.
        So as we look at going forward and we imagine all the
    terrible possibilities and probably most of them are terrible,
    I would like to remind people that I think it can get even
    worse than it is right now, which is almost unimaginable.
        As Mr. Lister mentioned in his statement, a very important
    thing happened after the strike on the airbase in Syria, which
    is the people who sat around said what are the Russians going
    to do, they got their question answered, which is absolutely
    nothing. They do not have the ability to respond, to react.
    Russia is not the former Soviet Union. It is a military where
    half of its planes can't even fly and it is very underfunded.
    So I think that is important to note, too, as we look at what
    we are going to do going forward.
        Mr. Lister, let me ask a question. What is Bashar al-
    Assad's ultimate fear? What is the one thing that, if we push
    on that button, would drive President Assad, Dictator Assad, to
    the table to negotiate?
        Mr. Lister. My theory would be his ultimate fear is America
    gets really serious about Syria and not just about ISIS.
        The only substantive evidence I can recall for that is back
    in August 2013, after the chemical weapons attack, in the brief
    period of time where it looked like the United States may
    conduct limited punitive strikes, I knew Syrians who were in
    Damascus at the time on the government side who said that
    nearly half of the Syrian Parliament packed up their homes and
    fled to Lebanon because they feared that limited, very limited
    American military action was going to set forth a chain of
    events that would have completely caused chaos within the
    regime, not the state, but the regime's inner circles.
        So the biggest fear for Assad isn't terrorism. In fact, he
    has used terrorism for his own means, not just during this
    crisis but before, his biggest fear is that we get serious
    about solving Syria. And he has enjoyed the last 6 years
    because we haven't.
        Mr. Kinzinger. So would you say that ultimately he fears
    his own life in that process? So if he would lose power in the
    regime, or his life, or whatever, that is what can be used as a
    trigger point to drive to a negotiated solution because short
    of that, short of any fear of losing power, he has no incentive
    whatsoever to negotiate an end to this war on anything but his
    own terms.
        So I guess my point is, as the administration goes forward,
    they ought to look at using further air strikes against regime
    targets as a method to drive a negotiated solution here, as the
    diplomatic instrument of power against an adversary can only be
    effective when backed by the military instrument of power. We
    see that in North Korea. We see that here.
        Let me ask you another question. Can Bashar al-Assad ever
    gain ultimate control of all of Syria again? I mean short of
    the entire world backing his regime, can he ever gain control
    of Syria?
        Mr. Lister. You can't discount anything but if he is going
    to militarily conquer the rest of his country, it is going to
    take a very, very, very long time, and it is going to cause a
    huge further exodus of civilians and many, many more deaths,
    and it could take 10, 20, 30 years to do so.
        So, the real answer is, effectively, no if the answer is
    that he is then putting the country back together again. You
    know, it is essentially that.
        Mr. Kinzinger. So without a strategy against Assad, be it
    negotiated or otherwise, you see part of regime controlled
    territory and you see a large part of the country, which is
    Afghanistan pre-9/11, basically, with some terrorist groups,
    some opposition groups running around.
        So what would Assad staying in power, very briefly because
    my time is up, what does that do to the al-Qaeda affiliate in
    Syria?
        Mr. Lister. Okay, as fast as possible. Al-Qaeda has spent
    the last 6 years embedding itself in an opposition narrative in
    Syria. It has devoted all of its resources to fighting Assad,
    not creating an Islamic State, not fighting a transnational
    jihad. And for that reason only, the continued existence of
    Assad in Damascus and his continued brutality against his
    people, every single day emboldens al-Qaeda's narrative in the
    eyes of other Syrians who don't buy into a transnational jihad.
    And this is the fear: Every single day more and more people
    think, huh, maybe this group has got it right. They have always
    told us the international community will never come to our aid.
    So because they are right, because they are there, because they
    are powerful on the battlefield, maybe these are the guys that
    we should be joining. And that is the state where we are today.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. My time has expired.
        I think it is Mr. Cicilline from Rhode Island.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
    the chairman and ranking member for calling this hearing. Thank
    you to our witnesses.
        It has been 3 weeks since President Trump launched a
    missile attack against the Assad regime and we are no closer to
    achieving a solution to this crisis. The Trump administration
    has not formulated any coherent policy to address ISIS or the
    ongoing atrocities being committed against the Syrian people by
    Bashar al-Assad.
        In actuality, the inconsistency and confusion displayed by
    members of the Trump administration has emboldened Assad and
    his patron, Vladimir Putin. A monstrous chemical weapons attack
    deployed against innocent civilians, including women and
    children, came just days after Secretary of State Tillerson
    signaled to Assad and Putin that the United States was willing
    to accept Assad's continued role, which represented a stark
    turnaround from previous American policy.
        And in the meantime, President Trump continues to push for
    his cruel and unnecessary ban on Syrian refugees, as well as
    draconian cuts to our foreign affairs budget. Each of these
    actions will only worsen the suffering of the Syrian people and
    that is why I, along with Congressman Beyer and Congresswoman
    Jayapal, are leading a letter to President Trump asking him to
    reverse his executive order and support funding for
    humanitarian assistance.
        And finally, I am extremely troubled by the
    administration's seeming lack of understanding of the
    constitutionally-mandated congressional oversight of American
    military action. If the President intends to escalate our
    military involvement further, as he has indicated he will
    consider, then he has a responsibility to send a plan to
    Congress and seek authorization for any further action.
        My questions are really--I have two. One is the
    humanitarian assistance budget is expected to decimated if
    President Trump's budget is adopted. Would you speak to how
    these proposed cuts would affect the United States' ability to
    work toward stability in Syria and in neighboring countries
    that are taking on the enormous burden of housing the large
    majority of Syrian refugees, particularly our ally Jordan?
        Ms. Rand. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for that important
    set of questions.
        First on the refugee ban, it is interesting that the media
    actually hasn't covered the foreign policy disadvantages of the
    refugee ban because you know Syria's neighbors are taking in
    four million, five million Syrian refugees. The generosity of
    the Turks, the Jordanians, the Lebanese, and other neighbors is
    incredible.
        And so you know last year in 2016, the U.S. took in 12,000
    Syrian refugees. I mean that is nothing compared to these
    smaller and less well-off countries. So we are trying to
    convince our allies surrounding Syria to be generous toward
    these refugees, to continue to give them housing, to continue
    to give them education, to continue to work with the U.N. and
    other international organizations. And that is a really
    important signal that hasn't been covered. So I just wanted to
    mention that because we haven't discussed that so far today.
        Specifically, on the humanitarian budget, it is unclear
    because there are still reports of what the cuts will be but
    the cuts to humanitarian assistance, international development
    account, the IDA account, cuts to the food aid budget will all
    significantly affect Syria and its refugees, also the IDPs who
    have stayed within Syria.
        And then the cuts to ESF, to the economic support funds to
    the Jordanian Government are very concerning. I mean it is just
    confusing as to why you would cut ESF to one of your closest
    partners and allies in the region that is both being generous
    to the Syrian refugees but trying to help you in some of the
    counterterrorism operations that we have discussed today.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
        Finally, I would just ask any of the panelists, you know we
    always have discussions about a military solution to this
    conflict. And I think in the absence of American boots on the
    ground, which I strongly oppose, I wonder whether there is a
    military solution and what that would look like. And if not, if
    it is exclusively a diplomatic solution, what is the strategy
    or your recommendations as to how we get to that?
        Mr. Singh?
        Mr. Singh. Well, thank you, Congressman. I personally say
    that, as in so many of these situations, there is no
    exclusively military solution. There is no exclusively
    diplomatic solution. Ultimately, to the extent our policies are
    successful, they are successful when we combine all of our
    tools--diplomatic, military, aid, intelligence, and so forth--
    and when we do it in conjunction with allies, with a coalition
    of like-minded countries. And I think that is what is going to
    be required here.
        I do think that, frankly, the April 7th strike is useful in
    building the credibility of American threats of force. I, for
    one, would say that it may be that if we already have some
    American boots on the ground, it may be that there is a role
    for some more but I don't think it should be the United States
    in front sort of taking on the heaviest military roles. That
    should be up to our local partners.
        But I think it is going to be force backed by diplomacy,
    diplomacy backed by force, which is going to be part of the
    answer here.
        Mr. Cicilline. Anyone else?
        Mr. Lister. I agree.
        Mr. Cicilline. Great. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Kinzinger. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
    recognizes the gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Wagner, for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important
    hearing. It is high time that the United States grapple
    strategically with how to end the Syrian conflict.
        It is patently clear that there can be no resolution with
    Assad in power, especially as he continues to prioritize a war
    against moderate groups seeking democracy over a war against
    ISIS. His slaughter of innocent civilians is barbaric and the
    United States cannot hope to defeat ISIS with Assad as the only
    alternative.
        Dr. Rand, the Southern Front has been effective in keeping
    extremist groups from expanding control in southern Syria. How
    can we, along with our allies in Israel and Jordan, further
    support the Southern Front and help them protect against Assad?
        Ms. Rand. Thanks, Congresswoman. This is an important
    issue. And actually because of the focus on Idlib and Aleppo in
    the past year or so, I think a lot of the attention has shifted
    away from the Southern Front. So I think it is important to
    raise it again.
        You know a year and a half ago the governance of the
    Southern Front provided kind of a model of the multiethnic,
    multisectarian type of governance. They issued a communique
    talking about inclusion and representations among the different
    sects. It seemed quite hopeful and seemed potentially a
    paradigm that could be transported for other parts of Syria.
        So the key here I think is two-fold. One is to support the
    continued moderation of the leadership of the Southern Front to
    make sure they continue to support different ethnic groups and
    you know there is some inclusion of al-Qaeda elements, I will
    let my colleague talk about it, but overall, they have been
    more moderate than some of the other oppositionists. But
    second, is just to support them in their counterterrorism needs
    against ISIS and other more extremists that might challenge
    their hegemony in this part of Syria.
        Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Dr. Rand.
        Mr. Lister, can you discuss coordination between Kurdish
    forces, such as the SDF, and YPG, and, frankly, and other
    moderate forces, and I will say local groups? In what ways
    could the U.S. help advance cooperation between the Kurdish and
    moderate forces across the country to ensure that areas freed
    from the Assad regime can, in fact, remain free of terrorism?
        Mr. Lister. Again, that is a very important question. I
    mean I think what I have tried to focus on in my remarks is to
    suggest that Syria can't be looked at as a whole. So what we
    have seen develop in the northeast with the Kurdish YPG and its
    various allies is one specific component of a much broader
    reality. What works in the northeast doesn't work in the south.
    We are not going to see a reflection of the Kurdish
    Confederation in the northeast suddenly appearing in southern
    Syria, with a predominately Sunni Arab population.
        So I think we should kind of take care of what we have
    helped to develop in the northeast but we also need to also be
    aware of the negative knock-on effects of some of these other
    actors' actions.
        And so I genuinely am concerned that if we pursue what I
    think we will pursue, which is a YPG-SDF led offensive on
    Raqqa, they will very seriously consider whether it takes 1
    month or 12 months, some kind of power sharing agreement with
    the Assad regime.
        Ms. Wagner. Power sharing.
        Mr. Lister. Now that kind--it has already happened. As I
    said in my opening remarks, in northern Aleppo they have handed
    territory over to the Assad regime. Now, if that happens in
    Raqqa, that is a jihadist's dream. It fulfills everything they
    have said for 6 years, that not only will the West not help
    protect your civilians but, eventually, they will come in and
    do their selfish thing, which is fight terrorism and then,
    eventually, they will give it over to the dictator again. So,
    we must be very, very careful of preventing a scenario like
    that from coming true.
        And comments from senior military officials here that we
    have no control over the decisions of our local partners,
    frankly, is a cop-out.
        Ms. Wagner. It is a cop-out. Thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Singh, the Assad regime uses aerial bombardment and
    terrorizing weapons to strategically displace the civilian
    populations in opposition areas. In what ways have Sunni
    extremist forces and pro-Iranian militias taken advantage of
    Assad's attacks and displacement of civilians?
        Mr. Singh. Well, I think that is an important question,
    Congresswoman. And Mr. Lister referred to this before but I
    think there is no doubt that the brutalization of civilians,
    the brutalization of the populations is a boon to the extremist
    groups who, as Mr. Lister pointed out, play on this sort of
    anti-Assad narrative to boost their own fortunes. And we have
    seen exactly that occur because we have seen, I think,
    especially in western Syria, the extremist forces amongst the
    opposition gain in strength in recent months.
        As for the Iranians, the Iranians, I think, are complicit
    in Assad's actions. And so it is not necessarily right to talk
    about them gaining from them, they are actually part of those
    actions because it is the Iranians that I think have the
    greatest force on the ground backing Assad and I think we need
    to ascribe blame to them for much of what he does.
        Ms. Wagner. All right, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
    my time has run out.
        Mr. Garrett [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair would now
    recognize Mr. Suozzi from New York for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
    stating the obvious, which is this is incredibly complicated.
    And I want to thank all of you for sharing your knowledge with
    us today.
        I am going to echo what all of my colleagues have said is
    that we really need to hear from the administration as to what
    their plan is to address this very complicated part of the
    world.
        There is an epic struggle going on in the world and, unlike
    the Cold War, where it was clear that it was the Soviets versus
    the Americans, this is much more complicated. It is stability
    versus instability. It is control versus chaos, as Tom Friedman
    said in his book. And we have gone from 35 million refugees in
    the world 10 years ago to 65 million refugees today and many of
    them are from Syria. And as the doctor pointed out in her
    testimony a few minutes ago, this is destabilizing other
    countries, as they try and deal with all these refugees in
    Jordan, and Lebanon, and other countries, in Turkey. And this
    region is so complicated by the fact there are so many parties
    involved with Assad--Iran and Russia--and then the rebel
    forces, America, ISIS, and al-Qaeda, the Turks don't like the
    Kurds. I mean there are so many pieces here and it is so
    complicated. But we have to choose in this world that is facing
    the struggle of stability versus instability where we are going
    to focus our resources and where we are going to--we have to
    make choices as to where we are going to pay attention and what
    we are going to do.
        And we have heard from I think it was Brad Sherman before
    and Congressman Kinzinger about some of these choices we have
    to make. And for me, you know let's put chemical weapons aside,
    which I think was a bipartisan, international agreement that we
    have to combat the best way that we can. But if the choice is
    between, for right now, what is right in front of us, you have
    to choose between fighting al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, or
    trying to protect the Syrian people and undoing Assad and
    forcing to the negotiating table, you have to choose between
    those two, what is the most important thing in front of the
    United States right now in our national interest? Is it to
    combat al-Qaeda and ISIS or is to stop Assad and force him to
    the negotiating table?
        Which is the most important thing before us right now? And
    you have to choose, each one of you. Mr. Singh, you go first.
        Mr. Singh. Congressman, I am going to disappoint because I
    think it is a false choice, frankly. I think if you go back to
    my initial statement, I think in fact we have now sort of
    several discrete conflicts which are going on within Syria that
    implicate our interests in the region and implicate the
    security of our allies. And we can't neglect one for the sake
    of the other. We have to address all of them.
        But it is a mistake to think, as Mr. Lister has said, that
    we can address all of them together in one neat package, sort
    of look at them as one problem to be solved. We have to address
    them in a distinct way.
        So in eastern Syria, there is no doubt that our priority
    has to be al-Qaeda and ISIS.
        Mr. Suozzi. Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
        Mr. Singh. And then not just defeating ISIS but thinking
    about what comes next because we don't want ISIS to return. But
    if----
        Mr. Suozzi. Well the focus now is on Raqqa.
        Mr. Singh. On Raqqa, right.
        In western Syria, though, absolutely, the continued
    brutality of the Assad regime, the expansion of Iranian power,
    the expansion of Hezbollah's power is a tremendous concern not
    just for us but for Israel, for Turkey, for our allies in the
    region.
        Mr. Suozzi. Now, I have learned somewhere that 85 percent
    of the population of Syria is in western Syria. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Singh. Correct.
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay.
        Mr. Singh. That is correct.
        Mr. Lister. If I may, briefly. I mentioned in an earlier
    answer that we have found ourselves capable for about 2 years
    to combat ISIS primarily in isolation from the rest of the
    conflict. But we are now discovering that when we reach Raqqa,
    which is an Arab town, there are big knock-on effects of doing
    that with certain actors and we are finding, suddenly, the
    proliferation of knock-on effects along the northern Syrian
    border.
        And it is for that reason that I would agree with my
    colleague, Mr. Singh, that combating terrorism in Syria and
    protecting civilians are inextricably linked. Terrorist
    narratives, no matter what kind of terrorist you are, is linked
    to the fact that there is suffering, chaos, instability, and
    brutality in their world.
        Mr. Suozzi. So that is empowering them.
        Mr. Lister. And it is empowering them like nothing else
    that would be possible. And so I would suggest it is impossible
    for us to win against terrorism, whatever that might mean,
    without encompassing in that strategy, the protection of
    civilians, a de-intensification of the conflict, and
    challenging the Assad regime's freedom to use any means at his
    disposal to continue to kill people en masse.
        Mr. Suozzi. Doctor?
        Ms. Rand. Thank you. I would agree completely about an
    inextricability between these two options. And I would give as
    an example something that we have talked about extensively
    today that I think exemplifies this.
        After Raqqa is liberated, there will be a number of
    political governance and humanitarian questions before us,
    essentially, as those who have trained the militias that oust
    the ISIS terrorists and those include who will govern, whether
    they are Kurdish or Arab, and how much leverage we can push on
    them to not hand over to the regime. Those questions will
    affect how much we can protect the civilians in that liberated
    area of Syria. And those are things within our purview, within
    our power, within our leverage through our training and
    assisting of the partners that will do the liberation.
        Mr. Suozzi. I know my time has expired. I just want to make
    this one last point.
        By us going after ISIS and al-Qaeda, which is in our own
    self-interest, obviously, and national security, and so we must
    do it, we are aiding Assad, and Russia, and Iran in the process
    because they have the same enemy.
        Anyway, I am sorry.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The Chair will yield to chair.
        I want to be really clear in expressing my high esteem and
    regard for my honorable colleagues who have spoken earlier, but
    I have rarely seen such a mind-numbing display of
    misinformation and disinformation. So, I want to clear some
    things up.
        My colleague from Nevada previously mentioned over 500,000
    killed, quote, deg. ``by the Assad regime.'' In fact,
    the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates, and that is
    the highest estimate of deaths in the conflict, that there have
    been roughly 500,000 casualties, that about a third of those
    have been to pro-regime forces, that is deaths.
        I presume, then, that Mr. Assad is not responsible for all
    500,000 casualties. Is that an accurate assessment, Ms. Rand--
    Dr. Rand?
        Ms. Rand. The different human rights organizations have
    different estimates. They range between----
        Mr. Garrett. The question is, is President Assad
    responsible for all half a million deaths in Syria?
        Ms. Rand. At least 80 percent of those 500,000.
        Mr. Garrett. Okay, so a fact that a third of the deaths
    have been to pro-regime forces, you are intimating then that he
    killed about one-third of that third himself?
        Ms. Rand. No, there is also Russian--there are civilians
    that have not survived because of Russians.
        Mr. Garrett. Right, I would direct your attention to the
    Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and their statistics.
        My colleague from Nevada also made reference to a MOAB
    drop. That was actually about 2,300 miles away in Afghanistan,
    right? That wasn't actually in Syria, was it? Yes, so that
    would be some misinformation.
        And then she made reference to no cohesive foreign policy
    strategy that we have seen from this administration. Mr. Singh,
    the Trump administration was sworn in about January 20th of
    2017. Is that correct?
        Mr. Singh. That is correct.
        Mr. Garrett. Right and so the Syrian civil war really began
    in earnest, as did other events in the Arab Spring, roughly
    2010-2011 and was sort of coopted by first al-Qaeda, and then
    ISIS moved in to fill a vacuum in the east of the nation,
    probably about 6 or 7 years ago?
        Mr. Singh. Absolutely right.
        Mr. Garrett. And would you characterize the U.S. foreign
    policy, particularly through the State Department, from 2011
    forward as cohesive and clearly articulated?
        Mr. Singh. Absolutely not; we had no Syria strategy, I
    think.
        Mr. Garrett. And so if, in fact, U.S. policy is not
    cohesive and clearly articulated now, that is no departure from
    the previous 6-plus years?
        Mr. Singh. Well, it certainly isn't but I agree with you,
    Congressman, that it is still early going. And so my hope is
    that the Trump administration will be coming forward with a
    strategy.
        Mr. Garrett. And so too do I. I really do because I would
    agree that there is not a clearly articulated policy but that
    there hasn't been one that the previous administration had, by
    my rough mathematical estimates, about 24 times as much time to
    formulate one.
        So, we also have recent open source intelligence that
    relates to what has been our stated goal that is to attack and
    crush ISIS in Syria. And would it not be your agreement, Mr.
    Lister, that the number of air strikes and attacks directly on
    ISIS assets since January 20, 2107 have been stepped up and
    that the apparent success of those attacks is greater than
    heretofore?
        Mr. Lister. I can't speak personally to have seen
    statistics that suggest that but it wouldn't surprise me
    because we are entering, of course, the phase of an intensive
    operation for Raqqa.
        Mr. Garrett. Okay and there was also an intimation by one
    of my colleagues that it was inappropriate to have warned the
    Russians of an impending United States military strike on a
    facility where Russian forces were probably co-located.
        Would you agree with the idea that we shouldn't have let
    the Russians there were inbound explosive cruise missiles?
        Mr. Singh. Well, I would disagree that it was wrong to do
    that. I mean we do have deconfliction protocols and, to me, it
    was prudent to have warned the Russians in the way that we did.
        Mr. Garrett. Right. In fact, had we not warned the
    Russians, the Russians might have been even more incensed by
    the American action without any sort of heads up, if you will
    pardon the colloquialism.
        Now, were there regime chemical weapons attacks prior to
    the assumption of power of the Trump administration?
        Mr. Singh. Yes, there sure were.
        Mr. Garrett. Okay. And there were also chemical weapons
    attacks, to be fair, perpetrated by Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat
    Fateh al-Sham, obviously a renaming of al-Nusra, who was sort
    of infiltrated by al-Qaeda. They have used chlorine as well, we
    think, as has ISIS.
        Mr. Singh. So I am not sure I have the best information but
    I think I would draw a distinction between the types of
    chemical attacks, sarin attacks, and so forth, and the types of
    attacks you are talking about, Congressman.
        Mr. Garrett. Okay. Is it fair to say that there aren't a
    whole lot of clean hands as it goes around to atrocities
    committed in Syria? For example, you know setting aflame a
    Jordanian captured pilot wasn't perpetrated, to our knowledge,
    by the regime.
        Mr. Singh. There have been atrocities committed by several
    sides in this conflict.
        Mr. Garrett. Sure. In fact, I would argue everybody.
        Ms. Rand. Congressman, I would just add on that point there
    is no moral equivalency between the regime has done and what
    the other actors have done. I mean the regime is responsible
    for the vast amount of the destruction.
        Mr. Garrett. Okay. Well, I haven't asked this question yet
    but so let me make sure I understand this right.
        Okay, we have ISIS. We understand who they are. We have got
    Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, who is sort of a derivative of al-Nusra.
    It is fair to say that al-Nusra was sort of coopted by al-
    Qaeda. Correct?
        In the north, regionally strong we have YPG and Kurds but
    they don't have any real desire, based on tribal affinity, to
    rule the nation, or the nation accept a Kurdish-led rule.
        And so if we are going to start establishing moral
    equivalencies, then would we rather ISIS, al-Qaeda, or the
    Assad regime to be in charge? Now, that is a rhetorical
    question.
        The bottom line I think that I am driving at is, before we
    engage in regime change activities, we ought to have a plan on
    who is going to fill the vacuum that we create because what
    five and a half million to six and a half million displaced
    people have in common is they didn't want to be displaced. But
    this nation led from behind, in our own words, and worked to
    create vacuums by encouraging uprising and revolts without any
    regard for who would fill the vacuum. And we saw Christians
    beheaded on the beaches in Libya, and we see half a million
    dead by the hands of many bloody actors in Syria, and we are
    partly responsible.
        We should not engage in regime change activities without
    contemplating who fills the vacuum that we create. Would you
    agree, Mr. Lister?
        Mr. Lister. Frankly speaking, it is not about regime
    change. It is about upholding international norms to ensure
    that governments don't commit repeated war crimes on a daily
    basis. And our objective, so far as I am concerned, is not
    regime change, we are not invading the country like we did in
    Iraq, it is to set up conditions that will allow a political
    process to be more meaningful and for all actors on all sides
    to treat it seriously.
        Mr. Garrett. So I couldn't agree more. And that sort of
    jives with what Secretary Tillerson had indicated to the
    Russians before the missile strike on the airfield. That is, we
    don't have to see Assad go but we have to see stability and
    peace in the region. That should be our goal.
        Mr. Lister. Well, I mean, the conclusion of the political
    process is up to Syrians. I think we ought to have, morally, a
    conclusion that Assad should go but it is not our choice to
    make that decision. But it is our responsibility, as a
    significant portion of the international community, to allow
    all Syrians to have that choice.
        Mr. Garrett. Right.
        Mr. Lister. And they haven't had it for 6 years.
        Mr. Garrett. Right, absolutely. Thank you. And I have gone
    way over.
        Mr. Engel. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Garrett. I have gone way over so I would not yield.
        Mr. Engel. You would not yield?
        Mr. Garrett. I am out of time.
        Mr. Engel. You could still yield to me. You are in the
    chair.
        Mr. Garrett. I am not going to yield.
        Mr. Engel. You are not going to yield? Well, I am sorry
    that the bipartisanship that we have had here for so many
    years, that you don't follow the lead of the chairman and
    myself.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, I apologize.
        Mr. Engel. I am really very sorry about that.
        Mr. Garrett. I forgive you.
        Mr. Engel. I have been on this committee----
        Mr. Garrett. I----
        Mr. Engel. I don't need your forgiveness.
        Mr. Garrett. I don't understand the----
        Mr. Engel. I don't need your forgiveness.
        Mr. Garrett. Well, you have been on this committee long
    enough to know the protocol and I don't.
        Mr. Engel. Long enough to know----
        Mr. Garrett. So, I will yield you 30 seconds.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. It is common courtesy that people are
    yielded time when they ask their colleagues.
        Let me just say, first of all, that when I grew up I
    learned from my parents that two wrongs don't make a right.
    Many of us on this side of the aisle were critical of the
    previous administration and what it did, and we said so at the
    time. There is no reason to not be critical of what is
    happening with the current administration just because the
    administration didn't do what should have been done.
        I will agree with you, and I have been saying this for
    years, that we made a misstep when we did not aid and abet,
    help the Free Syrian Army way back when. And we made a mistake
    when the previous President drew a line in the sand and then
    didn't follow through.
        But that doesn't absolve the current administration from
    its responsibility. And its responsibility has been that it
    needs to come to Congress with any plan that it has. It needs
    to tell us what their attempts are in Syria and what their
    goals are.
        We have learned for many, many years, giving any
    administration a blank check to create war is not something
    that this Congress should do.
        And I think there is no doubt in my mind, and in everybody
    else's mind, that Assad is really the butcher of Syria. That
    yes, there have been killings on both sides, but it was the
    Assad regime's reaction to the Arab Spring when peaceful
    Syrians went out to demonstrate against their dictatorial
    government that Assad decided he would respond with deadly
    force.
        And so I blame all the atrocities that happened in Syria on
    the bloody hands of Assad because had he not acted the way he
    acted, this would not have happened.
        I just want to set the record straight. I do agree that
    there were missteps by the previous administration but that
    doesn't mean that we have to overlook missteps by this
    administration.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you and I apologize again to Mr. Engel,
    as it relates to not yielding. I did not, literally, know the
    protocol of the committee. So I will take that lump.
        I want to thank the time of the witnesses today. These are
    very critical issues. Your expertise and insight is important
    and I think, candidly, despite the tone that some of this took,
    we all want the same thing, and that is a world in which people
    can live where they choose to live, free from fear of
    persecution or death. And Syria is one where, if we ultimately
    get it right, we might take a good step in the right direction
    toward ensuring that going forward in the future because it is
    certainly a tough rubric.
        Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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