HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING
ON
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
U.S. MARINE CORPS

HEARING HELD
APRIL 5, 2017
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

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THE CURRENT STATE OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 5, 2017.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:16 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. WILSON. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to welcome you all here today and call this unclassified hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Readiness Subcommittee, on “The Current State of the United States Marine Corps” to order.

The consistent theme of the 115th congressional session of the House Armed Services Committee is to continue the drumbeat of our current state of overall military readiness, and in many cases, where we are not providing necessary resources to enable power projection and exercise the principle I strongly believe, and that is peace through strength.

The Marine Corps currently has over 20 percent of its Active Duty force deployed in 37 countries, so you clearly play an integral part in deterring adversaries and reassuring our allies. And even today, with the chemical attack in Syria, it is actually reassuring to me to know that there is a presence that can help the people of that war-torn tragic country.

Over the past several weeks, both of our full committee and this subcommittee have listened keenly to briefings and hearings from leading national security experts and senior military leaders describing the current threats we face and the current state of the military. After listening to these sobering assessments, there is no question in my mind we are sadly, indeed, in a readiness crisis.

In addition, earlier this morning, we received testimony from each of the service chiefs on the consequences of another continuing resolution. This continuing resolution would only worsen the damage to our military and its readiness.

The Marine Corps provides our Nation with a versatile set of capabilities, ranging from crisis response, amphibious operations, and theater security cooperation. We must assist your efforts to restore readiness where it is lacking for today’s threats and integrate necessary skills to address tomorrow’s challenges.

I am personally concerned about the lasting impacts incurred as a result of the Marine Corps prioritization, quote, “near-term readi-
ness,” end of quote, at the expense of other areas, such as capacity, capability, modernization, and facility sustainment.

I believe the first responsibility of the Federal Government is to secure its citizens, and therefore, it is our duty to better understand the readiness situation the Marine Corps finds itself in and then aid in that recovery.

This is especially appropriate since the originally required by the 82nd Congress and subsequently referred by the 114th Congress, the Marine Corps is the, quote, “Nation’s expeditionary force of readiness,” end of quote.

This afternoon, we are honored and grateful to have Lieutenant General Ron Bailey, United States Marine Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations.

We have Lieutenant General Mike Dana, the U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant of Installations and Logistics; and senior executive servant, William E. Taylor, the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation.

I want to thank each of you for your admirable and extraordinary service to the Corps and this Nation. I believe it is worth noting that our panel—this is amazing—has 110 years of combined experience, and this will be extremely helpful as this subcommittee seeks to address readiness challenges moving forward.

We now ask the senior leaders of the Marine Corps here today to offer us their candid and best military advice related to the current state of readiness, which includes home facility—home station facilities, deployed force capabilities, and those units training to be the next to go forward in harm’s way.

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and thank you for testifying today as you highlight the current state of the Marine Corps readiness.

I now would like to turn to the ranking member, Representative Joe Courtney, from Connecticut, for any opening remarks he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 23.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CONNECTICUT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would only edit your comment by saying I am the temporary ranking member of the subcommittee, because Ms. Bordallo, again, is back home in Guam taking care of some family affairs, and obviously other work in her home district.

She has a written statement, which, again, I would just, again, ask to be entered for the record.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

Mr. COURTNEY. And she did ask me just to read a very brief comment as well, which is that she, again, is unable to be here today, but she communicated that she is looking forward to seeing the Marine realignment to Guam continue forward without delay. The Marine Corps and the Department of Defense should take necessary steps to ensure that the challenges are being promptly and adequately addressed.
General Neller, again, did an excellent job this morning. It is my understanding he flew in at 5:00 this morning from overseas and got to the committee. So he deserves bonus points for, again, his efforts this morning and his concise comments, which was also really, I think, very effective in terms of his presentation here.

So, again, thank you, again, to the witnesses. And with that, I would yield back.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Courtney.

And indeed, we are really grateful for the service of Delegate Madeleine Bordallo. At this time of the year, she provides a report to the people of Guam, and so it is a tradition that she so effectively represents the very patriotic people of the territory of Guam.

Now, we will be proceeding with the combined opening statement from the panel being delivered by Lieutenant General Bailey.

STATEMENT OF LTGEN RONALD L. BAILEY, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS; LTGEN MICHAEL G. DANA, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND WILLIAM E. TAYLOR, ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS

General Bailey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Good afternoon, Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness.

On behalf of Lieutenant General Dana, Mr. Taylor, and I, we thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and report on the readiness of your United States Marine Corps.

Congress and the American people have high expectations for the Marine Corps as our Nation’s naval expeditionary force in readiness. As we sit here today, there are over 34,000 Marines deployed in 37 countries around the globe to assure our allies and partners, to deter our adversaries, and to respond when our Nation’s citizens and interests are threatened.

While today’s force is capable and our forward-deployed forces are ready to fight, we are physically stretched to maintain readiness across the breadth of the force in near term, and to modernize for future readiness against the threats we will face.

Rebuilding a balanced Marine Corps will require both near-term actions and also longer-term efforts. To rebalance our readiness for current operations and future contingencies, it will require both time and sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding.

On behalf of all of our Marines, sailors, civilians, and their families, we thank the Congress and this committee for the support that you have provided and for this opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Marine Corps faces. We look forward to your questions.
Mr. Wilson. General, thank you very much. And Mr. Warren is going to keep us strictly on a 5-minute rule, and so we will begin with me at 5 minutes.

And indeed, today, General, it is such a chilling reminder of what we face. The chemical weapons used in Syria by the Assad regime, which has been propped up by the Russian Federation and the regime in Tehran, the Iranian regime.

And then virtually simultaneously, as the President of China is here to visit with President Trump, it is no surprise that North Korea has another missile launch. And somehow, you would hope that the People’s Republic would understand that the instability in North Korea and Pyongyang is really a threat to them too. But, again, the Marine Corps has never been more important as we face challenges around the world.

And this is the same time there was a terrorist attack with mass killings by Islamic terrorists, extremists in Pakistan. And this is after, of course, the attack on the subway system in Saint Petersburg, Russia, and again, a chilling reminder this week of what you face and the courage and bravery of our U.S. Marine Corps.

Under the Bipartisan Budget Act and the Budget Control Act funding levels, what are the hardest readiness choices that you continue to have to make, and what impact do these have on your ability to meet mission requirements in the National Defense Strategy? And please provide specific examples. And General Bailey, you first and then your colleagues.

General Bailey. Sir, the most difficult readiness challenge is that we have centers around the framework that we have established when we look at readiness, that is high-quality people. And when you think about the challenge that we have, it is very, very important that we have the opportunity to recruit high-quality people.

When we are operating off of a budget that is in CR [continuing resolution], then we can’t dedicate the money that we need towards that. In addition to that, we look at capability and capacity. And so just as you described, all of those challenges that are out there, those threats that are out there, when you start talking capability and capacity, when you do not have the funds to, one, develop a force to be able to counteract that, that creates a tremendous challenge for our forces.

We have clearly recognized that we are devoting money and time towards those forces that are deployed and preparing to deploy. But in order for us to continue, we need to have a budget, a budget that is predictable, reliable.

And one other thing that I would like to add to that before I turn to my colleagues is that when we start talking modernization of our equipment, that is a big challenge for us. You have got to have modernized equipment. The enemy that we face, as you describe, is an enemy that is in complex terrain. That enemy can also cut us off when we start talking electromagnetic spectrum.

They have capabilities now to detect signatures. That enemy can also fire long-range precision fires. And so we need modernized
equipment to be able to compete on a battlefield so that we can stay at the top and stay at the top of our game.

Mr. WILSON. General Dana.

General DANA. Chairman, if I could add to that. As you look at World War II—and General Milley talked about that today—that is a three-dimension fight, sea, air, and land, and now we have space and cyber. And as we look at our near-peer competitors and the weapons that they can bring to bear, we require more standoff distance and we need to be more distributed.

So as we look at that modernization effort and we look at all our shoot, move, and communicate platforms, the only things that are getting refreshed or that we are actually getting new platforms for are the ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle], JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle], and G/ATOR [Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar] radar.

And I forgot to mention upfront, we appreciate every penny you give us, because we are good stewards of the taxpayer dollars. So I am bringing these requirements up. We appreciate whatever you can provide us.

So in that new what I call extended battlespace, we need these new capabilities like the 53K [CH–53K], the MV–22, the ACV to ensure that we can have the standoff distance and then be able to go ashore, and then have the capability to move logistics ashore, again, with platforms like the 53K. And we are looking at unmanned platforms also.

The other thing I would bring up is we plan on a 5-year window with our equipment and with our facilities, and we have a very rigorous process. The Commandant holds my feet to the fire. We can't waste any money. And when we develop that plan and you have either sequestration, a CR, or reduction in funding, it throws the plan off track.

So thank you for listening.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. And on the aviation side, our biggest risk is our ability to balance future readiness versus current readiness. Future readiness is derived through sustainable readiness as a function of recapitalization. Not too many people think of it in that terms, but recapitalization isn't just for the purpose of fielding capability. It is also for the purpose of fielding sustainable readiness as compared to what we call “tired iron.”

The legacy aircraft, for instance, the 53 Echo [CH–53E], on average the 53E was 28 years old. I was a member of the unit that first sent the 53E on its first operational deployment and that was 34 years ago. And then there is the F–18. The F–18 we are struggling to maintain. Again, several variants of the F–18 are 28 years old, and just the fundamental material condition of the aircraft is almost unmanageable at this point.

We send it to the depot, they peel back a panel, they find corrosion, they peel back another panel. There has been, to my knowledge, at least half a dozen F–18s recently that were inducted into the depot only to be stricken halfway through and they realized it is not even salvageable.

So we are bouncing the criticality of getting out of “tired iron” and fielding our new aircraft as soon as possible versus current
readiness, current readiness being our readiness accounts. They have been underresourced consistently over a period of about 12 years now, whereas a sustainable level of readiness in terms of those readiness accounts is around 85 percent.

Over those 12 years, the readiness levels have deteriorated in those accounts to an aggregate level of about 67 percent. So that equates to our inability to support the legacy aircraft we have on the flight line. And that has manifested itself in deteriorating non-mission-capable supply rates; so, in other words, of the aircraft that are available on the flight line today, in the aggregate, 23 percent of our inventory on the flight line is not available due to parts.

And that percentage actually masks the fact that that metric is agnostic to how many parts that aircraft is down for. So it assumes it is one part when, in fact, it can be multiple parts after constant cannibalization by the maintainers to try and keep a certain percentage of aircraft up.

So our biggest risk is balancing future readiness through procurement of new aircraft so that we can have sustainable readiness versus current readiness in robustly funding those readiness accounts.

Mr. WILSON. And thank each of you for your clarity.

We now proceed to Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I said earlier, I had a chance to meet with the panel earlier, so I am going to defer my questions for now to Congresswoman Gabbard, who is next in line.

Mr. WILSON. And Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard from Hawaii.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.

I want to bounce a little bit off of Mr. Taylor's comments mentioning aviation readiness. This is something that has been identified as an area of acute need, both with the aircraft and the maintenance but as well as the ability for our pilots to have enough training hours to have the experience they need to complete their missions.

Can you talk a little bit about the plan to get to where we need to be in both of those respects with regard to aviation, and how either a CR or a supplemental will impact the execution of that plan?

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. I will take that first one. So Marine aviation is about 2½ years into a readiness recovery plan. Our ultimate objective is to have 1,065 aircraft available on the flight line, not necessarily up, but available for maintenance, available for training, available to support operational plans.

Where we are right now is we have about 983, so we are about 82 short of that goal. The intent is to achieve that 1,065 and have what they call a ready bench around the 2022 timeframe. So we have an interim goal, an interim goal of what they call Ready Basic Aircraft, and that essentially means the aircraft is up and available for training or tasking.

And our goal is an interim goal of fiscal year 2020 to have about 589 of those aircraft available for tasking. We are currently sitting at about 433 or 156 short. So that is really talking about current readiness, so that is really talking about our readiness accounts.
And I could just refer you to, if we go long term, what this means in terms of specific accounts. I will just pick out a couple to give you an idea if we continue down this path of a full year CR or we don’t get the supplemental, here is just a comparison.

For the aircraft depot maintenance account, we are talking 84 percent versus 88 percent funding levels. The air systems support is essentially what Naval Air Systems Command uses to pay their engineers, to take care of engineering issues, logistics issues, to monitor the air worthiness of an aircraft. We are talking about 58 percent versus 93 percent, so a big dip there.

And then aviation logistics, that is our 1A, 9A account as we call it, that is essentially what we pay for like PBL [Performance Based Logistics] services and such. And on that one, we are talking about 80 percent versus 94 percent.

And the biggest one, I earlier referred to our biggest risk on the current readiness being spares, the difference would be 83 percent—I am sorry—73 percent versus 88 percent. So that is probably the most significant one aside from the air systems support, spares at 73 percent versus 88 percent.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you.

General Dana.

General DANA. I am from New York so I am going to talk fast because I have got a minute, 30. But there is three quick points I would like to bring up. If you look at our depot funding over the past 10 years, we have been funding to 80 percent of the requirement. So that means 20 percent of that work is being deferred and pushed to the right. And anytime we have interruption in funding, it really impacts the schedule in a negative way.

The other thing is, in 2013, when we had the furlough, it did two things: 888 pieces of gear were not inducted for maintenance that were critical to the shoot, move, and communicate portfolio that I talked to previously; plus, we broke faith with the workers. Because just to retain, you know, our artisans, our skilled workers, I mean, it is a very close relationship that we have. We have education programs for them. We do a lot to mature them and grow them. And then when you furlough them, they look at you and go, what are you doing? You are breaking faith.

General BAILEY. I would like to add that in all of that, it comes home to me because I need those aircraft to train. And so when those aircraft are not available for us to train with, that creates a tremendous amount of challenges for a portion of the Marine air-ground task force, and that task force cannot conduct all this training to be ready for the missions to support requirements that may be deemed by the national command authority or combatant commander.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Gabbard.

We now proceed to Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service; 110 years, that is a long time in anybody’s book, so we have been honored to have you.
General Bailey, many of my constituents work at the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany. Some are even family over there, although I don’t tell them. Don’t tell the command over there when I am visiting. The work that is performed at those depots is key to the fight and enabling the warfighter and our readiness.

The impact in the current budget environment on readiness that we keep talking about, what specific challenges do you face with the Marine depots operating at current capacities and being able to successfully execute the maintenance missions?

General BAILEY. Congressman, we have an expert here who works in that field, so I am going to pass that question off on him because he has spent the bulk of his career working in that area.

Mr. SCOTT. General Dana.

General DANA. Sir the biggest challenge—and we are going to foot stomp this all day today, and we really appreciate you listening—is stable, uninterrupted, consistent funding so we can do our 5-year planning window. The Commandant has told us, he has given direction that we will know what equipment we have, what condition it is in, and what we need to do to sustain it.

And I have to provide him a brief and walk through all our depot requirements for all of our equipment. And when I lay out that 5-year plan, sir, and then we don’t get the funding or we are funded to 80 percent or the funding is interrupted, the schedule blows apart.

Now, where I am seeing that is in our top 25 items that I mentioned earlier, our shoot, move, and communicate; that, for instance, AAVs [Assault Amphibious Vehicles] are at 65 percent readiness across the Marine Corps. I mean, that is our main connector to get to the beach in an amphibious operation or an expeditionary operation.

We are looking at LAV [Light Armored Vehicle] readiness around 70 percent, tanks around high 70s. So all these critical warfighting assets just keep—it is slow, but it is gradual, it is discernible, and it is measurable, and we are seeing the impact to readiness. So what we are asking for, whatever money we get, we will use it wisely, we will plan accordingly, but we just need consistent funding.

Mr. SCOTT. General Dana, I am going to hang with you for a second. As you know, there was recently significant storm damage to the infrastructure at the Marine Corps logistics base in Albany. We have got big storms on the ground right now in that area.

As you know, there are only two depot sites, a lot of talk about BRAC [base realignment and closure] concerns, people in the area. We obviously have one on the east coast, one on the west. One, would you talk about where we are specifically with the cleanup in Albany; what do you need from us to get back to full capacity; and then, why is it so crucial to have two depots in the Marine Corps?

General DANA. Yes, sir. Great question. Thank you.

Having the two depots—I mean, it has been proven by this unfortunate tornado, which inflicted $100 million worth of facilities damage on the Albany depot. Thank God, no one was hurt. It was on a Sunday. We didn’t have any workers. Today we sent the workers home because we are in a high state of storm alert down in Albany, so we are making sure we are taking care of the workforce.
So as we look at the depots, we are working very hard to get after this issue. We moved $45 million in facilities sustainment, readiness, modernization money to work on the current damage to Albany, but that takes away from another account for other bases.

So we also, sir, have the $233 million in equipment damage at Albany, which will be another bill, but we are looking at that very closely to make sure that that is an accurate number before we come to Congress. So in review, $100 million on the facilities side, $233 [million] on the equipment side, and we are taking care of the workforce.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you for your service, and thank you for the time to discuss these issues in our office and how we can be more efficient with the taxpayer dollars.

Gentlemen, I appreciate all of your service. And I don’t know how much time I have left, but I am pretty sure it is not 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. You have a perpetual 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. I will yield whatever time.

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much, Congressman Scott.

And indeed, our thoughts and prayers are with the people of Georgia and South Carolina today as they are under a tornado and storm alert and watch.

Mr. SCOTT. Chairman, there are four tornados on the ground in my district right now.

Mr. WILSON. An extraordinary storm coming through toward capital city of Columbia and Lexington and Aiken.

We now proceed to Congressman Salud Carbajal of California.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Chairman Wilson and Ranking Member Courtney.

And thank you to all of you for addressing us today. And thank you for your service, most of all.

I believe we are all in agreement in terms of the negative impacts of sequestration and how Congress’ inability to pass an actual budget is making it difficult for the Marines, along with all other services, to execute any type of good planning.

Last month, the full committee held a hearing on the state of the military, where I expressed my concerns not only in regards to sequestration but also how we are going to balance the growing defense budget versus a shrinking domestic agenda.

The Marine Corps conducted a bottom-up review of the force entitled “Marine Corps Force 2025.” During this review, did the Corps take any steps to identify wasteful spending and possible efficiencies? And if it did, can you provide us with some examples.

Additionally, a part of readiness is investing in our infrastructure, as was touched on earlier. What are some immediate infrastructure needs the Marine Corps has identified?

General BAILEY. Sir, let me start with “Marine Corps Force 2025”. The Commandant had taken the time to kind of look at the threat. Some Marine Corps intelligence activity put together an assessment that stated that in 2025, these are the capabilities that we are going to need in order to be competitive to be able to compete with our adversaries.

So in this review—and it is still going on—he is looking at all aspects of our Corps in terms of the organization of our Corps, the
number of our different squad sizes, the logistics, the aviation. So he is looking completely across the Corps.

In his look, it is looking to see where we can gain efficiencies. And the reason we need to gain efficiencies is because we have got to develop a skill set. And a skill set that we need, we have determined that we need about 3,000 Marines to fulfill that skill set, that skill set in cyber, that skill set in information operations, that skill set to have someone maintain the ability to identify electromagnetic signature release, and on and on and on.

So in that process, we have all looked across at the Marine air-ground task force from a ground combat element side, from a logistics side, from an aviation side, and from the command element side. And I can assure you we will gain some efficiencies, and that in itself will cut back on the wasteful activity.

From the infrastructure side, I am going to turn to my counterpart here and let him talk about infrastructure.

General Dana. Sir, great question.

On the efficiency side, we are making sure we know what we have and we are spending it wisely. The Commandant has directed we conduct 149 what we call FSMAOs [Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office]. I know you remember what one of those are, but it is a supply and maintenance inspection, to make sure that we know everything that we have and that if people are using the proper procedures to, you know, have accountability for equipment, how they are spending money. And those reports are briefed out to him personally by me. If you get a good grade, it is good for that commander; if you don't, it is bad day for that commander.

Next, on the infrastructure, we have an infrastructure installation reset strategy where we are looking at our entire portfolio, the 24 bases and stations. And what we do is we look at consolidation, demolition, refurbishment, and new build. That plan is briefed to the Commandant. So every penny that we are spending, he is vetting the entire plan on what we are doing with our facilities.

Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I thought you were going to tell me you got rid of “hurry up and wait” in the Marine Corps.

Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wilson. And Congressman Carbajal, thank you very much for your insight.

And we now proceed to Congresswoman Vicky Hartzler of Missouri.

Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for your service in difficult times.

I wanted to follow up on some of the earlier discussion about the aviation shortfalls and ask you to just start off and review—maybe Mr. Taylor—where we are at in the process of transitioning to the F–35s, and how many are coming online, how many F–18s are you still operating with, how many are able to fly at any given day, and come and give the transition plan there again.

Mr. Taylor. Okay. As far as the transition, I believe we currently have inventory of 45. We have three operational squadrons at this point. The transition goes through—the transition end date, or FOC [full operational capability], goes through 2031 based on assumptions with respect to the procurement profile and rate. The
biggest struggle is whether or not our F–18 fleet can be maintained that long.

General Davis has recently made a decision to revise the transition plan, whereas it was previously a mix of transitioning Harrier squadrons and Hornet squadrons. He has reprioritized based on the material condition of the Hornet, and he has made a definite decision that the next three transition squadrons will be F–18s, and potentially the next five.

Because of some of the things we have done to invigorate the health of the Harrier, that is one of the least of our problems right now. So we believe we can get the Harrier to the finish line in its current state by monitoring it. It was, in fact, our first type model series that we put through an independent readiness review to make recommendations as to how to sustain it long term. So at this point, it is whether or not the F–18s can last that long.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So are you asking for some new F–18s to fill in in the meanwhile?

Mr. TAYLOR. We are not asking for new F–18s. We don’t have a requirement for that. In fact——

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, the Navy asked for unfunded requirement, so——

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, they did. General Davis’ view of this is, why would we want a fourth-generation fighter, another one. The F–35 is a fifth-generation fighter. We have already accommodated fourth-generation requirements by procuring over 380 H–1 aircraft, that also include the AH–1 attack aircraft. So we have fourth-generation capability level of effort. So we are——

Mrs. HARTZLER. Gotcha. I am sorry to cut you off. We have limited time.

So let’s talk about the parts issue though because this is really serious what you were sharing, you know, that they open them up and, you know, it is not even worth fixing. We have had issues—I have Whiteman Air Force Base, the B–2s having the parts.

Mr. TAYLOR. Right.

Mrs. HARTZLER. We have been working on the parts sustainability. So what are you—are you taking any efforts to try to get the parts that you need for these F–18s to help carry over——

Mr. TAYLOR. So I mentioned the independent readiness review for the Harrier. That was the first of five that have now been executed. After completing an independent readiness review for the 53, after Harrier, we did the 53, we did the V–22, we did the H–1, we did a ground safety mishap review, and now we are about T-minus a month away from launching an independent readiness review of the legacy Hornet.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. That is great.

I want to switch real fast in my last minute to talk about——

Mr. TAYLOR. The real answer is to get out of the legacy Hornet business as fast as possible and transition to the F–35.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. End strength. So Congress has authorized the Marine Corps to halt its end-strength drawdown during fiscal year 2017, but the current continuing resolution does not fund the Marine Corps at this level. And Secretary Mattis wrote in January of this year a guidance that the President’s budget request for fis-
cal year 2018 will, quote, “grow force structure at the maximum responsible rate.”

So what is the maximum responsible rate the Marine Corps can grow by, and how big does the Marine Corps need to be to carry out its current missions and potential contingencies?

General Bailey. Ma'am, thank you very much for that question. As I had mentioned earlier, we looked at the 3,000 as the Marines that we needed to give us the capability for a 2025 fight. The Commandant has stated that 3,000 Marines per year is the way we plan on bringing in new recruits and Marines to build up the capability that we need. And so that is the responsible way to do that, when you start talking about keeping high-quality Marines in our Corps, and so that we can provide the Nation the crisis reaction force that you expect us to have. So that is the direction that we are going at this point.

Mrs. Hartzler. My time has expired. Thank you very much. I yield back.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Hartzler.

We now proceed to Congressman Trent Kelly of Mississippi.

Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and answering these questions.

I want to start with, I heard—Task Force Smith in Korea was what happens when we are not ready to meet the challenges of today. I brought this up in a full committee hearing, but I think so many of the American people don’t understand that regardless of how well trained and how much heart you guys as Marines have, if we don’t have the right equipment, the right munitions, the right amount of equipment that works or right repair parts, it doesn’t matter if we have a next generation, an F–35 in waiting, the enemy will not wait until we are ready to attack. And if they are smart, they will attack while we are not ready, which is what we would do.

And so I am so scared with all this BCA [Budget Control Act] and sequestration and all these things that people are failing to understand that we are at critical risk in this Nation of asking our armed services to take massive casualties because we are not giving them the right amount of dollars to have the right munitions, the right equipment, the right parts, and the right training to meet those objectives on the day.

I think, Mr. Taylor, you said, or it may have been you, Lieutenant General Bailey, about 65 to 70 percent OR [operational readiness] rate among many of our—to get our Marines the equipment they used to get from the ships to the beach. Is that correct?

General Dana. Yes, sir, that is correct, 65 percent.

Mr. Kelly. Okay. Now, going back to the time when I was a lieutenant and a company commander and a battalion commander and all those things, pre-9/11, battalion commanders and brigade commanders and division commanders got fired if they had an operational readiness rate, an OR rate of less than 90 percent, in many cases. But now it is acceptable to have equipment at 65 to 70 percent because that is the best we could do. Is that correct?
General DANA. Sir, how I would like to address that is, that is a great question. As we look at the war plans and you look at the Korea set, and I won't get into a lot of detail, but that is a very demanding logistics and equipment plan, that—you know, based on our Korean war experience.

Just to give you an order of magnitude, as you look at General MacArthur in the Pacific, the logistics that he needed for that fight was 83 percent less than was used in Korea. And that fight generated a cost of $157 billion.

So as we look at across our portfolio, we need $11.2 billion for modernization of our equipment to get us where we need to be. That is the new field I talked about, in refreshing our other equipment. We need $9 billion in facilities sustainment, readiness, modernization because the bases and stations are platforms to deploy from and get people out.

So if we get that funding, we will be on a higher step. But what I will say, and I think the Commandant who was sitting here and General Bailey would say is, we are the “fight tonight” force. We have got what we have got. We will do the best we can with it. But if you give us this funding, we will be more expeditionary, more capable, more punch on the other end.

Mr. KELLY. And a CR, without the supplemental and even just not doing the appropriations process like it is, that does not get you any closer to being able to modernize and equip our Marines that go into the fight at the level that they deserve to be. Is that correct?

General BAILEY. Sir, that is correct. And let me just kind of go down. We are talking about the CR and the supplemental. And so here is what we are talking: Loss of Active Duty Marines; we are going to have to cancel Reserve Force drills; we have to stop our CONUS [contiguous United States] flights; cease the recovery from the tornado down in Albany; we will lose one amphibious ship; it will reverse modernization. It will push us back.

And then Mike just talked about the facilities aspect of it, but those are the things that if we don’t get the supplemental, that we will be impeded and create challenges for us there.

Mr. KELLY. And I think this is you, Lieutenant General Dana, but one thing, we talk about standoff a lot. And I understand what standoff is because I am an engineer and I am a military guy and spent some time. I don’t think most civilians though or most people understand what standoff really is.

And so I am going to try to explain it, and you tell me if I am right. It is the whatever weapon system we are talking about, the range, like 2,500 meters for a tank if we want to use that, at which it has a 50/50 chance of hitting an enemy target. And if the enemy has 3,000 meters and we have 2,500, that 500 meters difference is a standoff, the distance where he can kill us but we can’t kill him back. Is that true?

General DANA. Sir, you nailed it.

General BAILEY. Yep.

Mr. KELLY. And right now, because of munitions and lack of fifth-generation fighters, those kinds of things create more standoff for the enemy, especially in some areas like artillery, that we have
the capabilities but we right now don’t have the equipment to take care of that standoff. Is that correct?

General DANA. Yes, sir, on target.

Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much, and I yield back. And thank you, gentlemen.

General Bailey. Sir, let me add something to that also, because in addition to that standoff, and we have said this over the years, that the—our adversaries have not sat idle. And while we were engaged in combat for the past 15 years, they have been developing their capability and developing their capability to allow them to be able to work in the cyber world, have standoff, have precision weapons. And so that is what we are pushing towards when we start saying we need the money for modernization to be competitive against our adversaries.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Kelly, and thank you for your military engineering insight.

And now we proceed to someone with a military aviation insight, Congresswoman Martha McSally of Arizona.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

We talked this morning, the full committee, about the impact of a CR. Those of us who are here, obviously—I don’t want to speak for everybody else, but we are very committed and understand the impacts of the military.

As we look at the timing, obviously we need to fund the government and the DOD [Department of Defense] by the end of April to get off the CR, but then there is a supplemental issue, the supplemental request. Can you give a sense of—I know immediately is probably the answer—but the supplemental resources, is there a—if we don’t get that solved by the middle of May, let’s just assume we pass the fiscal year 2017 in an omnibus, a cromnibus or whatever for the baseline, but now we are dealing with a supplemental; if we don’t get that by, you know, a certain date like this is when you are really in a crisis. I am just trying to understand the impact of the prioritizations here and better understand when we really need to be getting that supplemental done. And I know earlier is always better, but can you give us a good sense of the impacts of——

Mr. TAYLOR. On the aviation side, I can really only speak to the impact of continuing this CR for the whole year.

Ms. McSALLY. Yeah.

Mr. TAYLOR. And the Commandant essentially nailed that this morning.

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah, we got that. I am talking about the timing of the supplemental now.

Mr. TAYLOR. Right. I can’t help you with the supplemental. It is percentages.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Any other insights on baseline funding versus——

General DANA. You know, ma’am, no new starts, I mean, in the MILCON [military construction] realm.

Ms. MCSALLY. No, again, assume we pass an omnibus bill to fund the government, which includes the fiscal year 2017 DOD appropriations before the end of April, then there is a DOD supple-
mental for the fiscal year 2017 as well. I am asking specifically—I am not talking about a CR anymore—the timing of the supplemental money and what that does to you. Does that make sense?

General BAILEY. Ma’am, let me take that for the record because you are asking specific dates and times. I understand your question.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah, we heard this morning for example, you know, if we are on a CR, you know, airplanes are going to be grounded starting in June.

So there is a very specific thing related to a CR. I am now saying, let’s just say we get this first land mine out of the way of funding the government for fiscal year 2017, supplemental versus not supplemental, we need to understand that impact and timing. That would really help us as we are working with our colleagues here.

Mr. TAYLOR. I can give you a partial answer on the aviation side. However, trying to tie it to a direct date is——

Ms. MCSALLY. Challenging.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Is kind of cloudy because I can’t predict whether or not they will be able to make fourth-quarter contract awards. I won’t be able to predict whether or not it is marked as a result of the late award.

But in terms of numbers, we are talking three V–22s, four C–12s, two C–40s, 53 Echo——

Ms. MCSALLY. In the supplemental.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Degraded visual environment——

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. MV–22s, CC–RAM [Common Configuration Reliability and Maintainability]. It is an attempt to try and take 77 configurations and consolidate around 1 configuration. So there are impacts. I just don’t know if I am able to tie them to a direct date.

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would have to have a crystal ball.

Ms. MCSALLY. And are you all agnostic as to whether they are together or passed in separate vehicles? Is that mox nix to you guys?

General BAILEY. If it passed separate, we just want to make sure it is passed.

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it. Thanks.

Mr. Taylor, back to the aviation issues, your assumptions on the F–18s for the transition of the F–35, obviously concerning based on what you talked about, that every time they go in for maintenance you peel back and you see it worse and worse. Media reports saying you are pulling a couple dozen out of the boneyard.

Mr. TAYLOR. It is actually upwards of 23 perhaps and 7 additional from within——

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Twenty-three. That is close to a couple dozen, isn’t it, in the boneyard, to address that. But the sunset date is until 2018 for the F–18. Right? What are you doing between—what is the——

Mr. TAYLOR. Negative.
Ms. McSALLY. All right. So talk through how you sustain the F–18 until it is completely replaced by the F–35, and are the assumptions good?

Mr. TAYLOR. It is an art not a science. I will start with that statement. So they have already extended the service life of the legacy Hornet twice, once beyond 8,000 and once to 9,000. They may have to consider extending the life to 10,000. That is one.

Another effort—another initiative that is being prototyped as we speak is trying to take this myriad of disparate maintenance efforts, field events, depot events, which make no logical sense right now.

All they do is guarantee that the aircraft is not available to the operating squadrons, because this week it is out for this inspection, they return it to the flight line, and that next day it is out for another inspection or a modification.

So right now, NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] is under work in prototyping two logical consolidated depot events to try and guarantee more aircraft availability on the flight line once they come out of that depot event. So that is looking very promising.

And the rest is really driven by the extent to which our readiness accounts are funded in terms of spares, in terms of engineering disposition. That is another big one. A lot of time is wasted waiting for an engineer to reach back to NAVAIR proper and get engineering disposition on a certain risk event, and that consumes a lot of time.

So, for instance, NAVAIR just put another—a second engineer down at Beaufort, as just one example of some of the ways they are trying to mitigate that.

Ms. McSALLY. Great. My time has expired. But I appreciate it. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Congresswoman McSally. We now proceed to Congresswoman Elise Stefanik of New York.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for your service and for your testimony today.

In the context of readiness I want to focus on emerging threats, specifically in the 21st century battlefield. The Marine Corps operating concept acknowledges going beyond physical terrain and operating in the information domain. This is something that my subcommittee, the Emerging Threats Subcommittee has spent a significant amount of time on.

Can you describe how the Marine Corps is doing this and some of the challenges it has encountered in the cyber domain?

General BAILEY. There have been a tremendous amount of challenges that we have encountered in the cyber domain and that is the reason why we are eager to get the 3,000 Marines to get trained in cyber information operations and electromagnetic spectrum.

And so what I would like to say, Congresswoman, is that when you talk about the cyber world, we are talking about the fight that starts now. We are in that fight right now. And so we put together 13 of these cyber teams, we expect them to be at FOC [full operational capability] in 2018, that is to give us an offense and defense capability. But the most important aspect of it is that we are pushing those down to the Marine expeditionary force level so that
they can operate and function and so we can train and prepare our Marine air-ground task forces as they go out to be able to fight in that environment.

That environment is very dynamic, it is ever changing, and it is extremely complicated. And so as we move forward there are a couple of things that happen.

And I say thank you because you have given us the authorization to stand up a three-star and so the Commandant is standing up a Deputy Commandant for information operations in that field so that we can continue to expand our capability and also focus in on the challenges that we will have and prepare us for the future threat.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you for that.

In the hearing at the full committee this morning which was focused on the consequence of a continuing resolution, General Neller highlighted an interaction that he had with a Marine who specialized in cyber who asked him, and I quote, “Sir, how can you afford to keep me?” That’s extremely problematic. And that’s extremely concerning for members of this committee.

Can you talk about those challenges of maintaining Marines with specialized skills, such as those in the cyber field, and what options we can explore to retain them?

General Bailey. So I actually did hear that testimony this morning and I heard the Commandant describe that situation. And he said that basically we are going to establish the same approach that we established with our special operators. And one of the things that we are doing is to allow Marines to stay in that field, to work in that field.

For example, because of how we started and the different Marines that we pulled in to the particular MOS [military occupational specialty], we really need the opportunity one, to develop the field. It takes a tremendous amount of training and schooling to get qualified in it.

And so we are going to have to do several things. We are going to have to keep them in the billet, pay them their different types of bonuses and programs that you can establish so that you can keep the Marines in it, and allow the Marines to work in that field, because what they want—they’re just like pilots, pilots want to fly. Marines who are good in cyber want to work in cyber, but the competition, as you know, is out there. And we are not just competing against the other services, but we are competing against all the other businesses that are needing cyber expertise.

So that is just a couple of the things that we are going to look towards to ensure that we can keep those Marines in that field. It’s a growing process and when you give Marines the opportunity, they look forward to staying in that field and working in that field. And then you back that up with schools, jobs, and good command climate, they stay.

Ms. Stefanik. Absolutely. I think that increased flexibility is the right direction, particularly when there are opportunities outside of the military certainly within the government broadly, but also in the private sector.

And we want to make sure that our best and brightest continue to see opportunities in cyber within the Marines.
So thank you for that answer and I yield back.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairwoman Elise Stefanik of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee. She does a great job and we appreciate that.

I was happy that she referenced earlier today with the Joint Chiefs. And I want to commend each of you, you have really continued making the points that are so important to Chairman Mac Thornberry of where consistent funding be established that indeed a long-term continuing resolution would be a threat to our military personnel, our military families, and a threat to readiness.

And with this, we are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 5, 2017
Ladies and gentlemen, I want to welcome you all here today, and call this unclassified hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Readiness Subcommittee, on “The Current State of the United States Marine Corps” to order.

The consistent theme for the 115th congressional session of the House Armed Services Committee has been to continue the drumbeat of our current state of overall military Readiness, and in many cases where we are not providing necessary resources to enable power projection and exercise the principle I believe strongly in—“peace through strength”. The Marine Corps currently has over 20 percent of its active duty force deployed in 37 countries so you clearly play an integral part in deterring adversaries and reassuring our allies. Over the past several weeks both our full committee and this subcommittee have listened keenly to briefings and hearings from leading national security experts and senior military leaders describing the current threats we face and the current “State of the Military”; after listening to these sobering assessments, there’s no question in my mind we are indeed in a readiness crisis. In addition, earlier this morning we received testimony from each of the Service Chiefs on the consequences of another continuing resolution. Another continuing resolution would only worsen the damage to our military and its readiness.

The Marine Corps provides our nation with a versatile set of capabilities ranging from crisis response, amphibious operations, and theater security cooperation – we must assist your efforts to restore readiness where it is lacking for today’s threats and integrate necessary skills to address tomorrow’s challenges. I am personally concerned about the lasting impacts incurred as a result of the Marine Corps prioritizing “near-term readiness” at the expense of other areas, such as capacity, capability, modernization, and facility sustainment.

I believe the first responsibility of the federal government is to secure its citizens and therefore, it is our duty to better understand the readiness situation the Marine Corps finds itself in, and then aid in that recovery. This is especially appropriate since originally required by the 82nd Congress and subsequently reaffirmed by the 114th Congress, the Marine Corps is the “nation’s expeditionary force in readiness.”
This afternoon we are honored to have with us:

- Lieutenant General Ron Bailey, US Marine Corps
  Deputy Commandant Plans, Policies, and Operations
- Lieutenant General Mike Dana, US Marine Corps
  Deputy Commandant Installations and Logistics
- Senior Executive Servant William E. Taylor
  Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation

I want to thank each of you for your admirable and outstanding service to your Corps and this nation. I believe it is worth noting that our panel of witnesses provides us with over 110 years of combined experience and that will be extremely helpful as this subcommittee seeks to address readiness challenges moving forward.

We now ask the senior leaders of the Marine Corps here today to offer us their candid and best military advice related to their current state of readiness – which includes home station facilities, deployed force capabilities, and those units training to be the next to go forward into harm’s way.

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses and thank you for testifying today as you highlight the current state of Marine Corps Readiness.

I would now like to turn to our Ranking Member, Representative Joe Courtney, from Connecticut for any opening remarks he may have.
As we have heard from the other services, years of unpredictable and reduced funding from continuing resolutions and sequestration have forced our military to accept risk and defer spending for critical accounts that support and maintain our people, systems, and equipment. While readiness is often a joint issue, the Marine Corps, as the Department of Defense’s “ready” force, has not been immune to this reality and we have seen the unfortunate and unacceptable consequences. Aviation has been highlighted significantly in recent years, and it has is clear that our Marine pilots are not able to sufficiently train, amplified by maintenance deficits. Infrastructure investments also continue to be deferred, incurring greater long-term costs and limits not only training, but also affects critical sustainment and support facilities. As the spotlight continues to shine on readiness, it will be necessary to understand how the Marine Corps would use increased funding to effectively prioritize its needs, as well as what other authorities it needs from Congress to accomplish the mission at hand.

It is also fitting that the Government Accountability Office report on the Marine Realignment was released today. There are several poignant observations contained within it that raise questions about how the Marine Corps is looking at its Guam laydown as well as what best practices are in place to ensure that Marines are manned, trained, and equipped in the Pacific. In its report, GAO identifies numerous areas in which the Marine Corps and Department of the Navy have failed to adequately prepare for or identify and adapt to challenges associated with this distributed laydown. In particular, I am concerned that the Department has not created a risk-management plan for Guam, which has led to delays, potential cost overruns, and second- and third-order challenges, a deficiency DOD evidently concurred with and one which I am eager to see addressed. More broadly, more than 40 identified DOD training gaps related to several realignment elements exist in the Pacific, particularly on the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as agreed to in the bilateral Defense Policy Review Initiative. These elements will fill these deficiencies, enabling our forces and our allies to train better together. However, the Marine Corps has ineffectively addressed this mission, to the detriment of our readiness and our ability train and operate with key allies and partners in the most consequential region of the world. I remain concerned that the Marine Corps has not put its full weight into this critical endeavor and continues to take an approach that will leave even more readiness gaps for the Marine Corps in the Pacific. We have been at the realignment of Marines
from Okinawa for more than 10 years now. We have a solution that is agreed upon by the United States and Japan and we need to put some more meat on the bone. I hope the FY18 budget submission will include robust funding for the realignment, and I hope that Navy and Marine Corps leadership will take appropriate steps to address current impasses on Guam so that we can finally break ground on the main cantonment area.

This hearing will help draw out answers to these and other important questions as our committee seeks to help the Marine Corps build back readiness.
STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD L. BAILEY
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS

AND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JON M. DAVIS
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION

AND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL G. DANA
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

ON
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARINE CORPS

APRIL 5, 2017
Lieutenant General Ronald L. Bailey

Lieutenant General Ronald L. Bailey currently serves as the Deputy Commandant Plans, Policies, and Operations.

Lieutenant General Bailey was born in St. Augustine, Florida and graduated from Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, TN in 1977 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology. After graduation from The Basic School, Infantry Officers Course and the Basic Communication Officers Course in August 1978, he was ordered to the 3d Marine Division in Okinawa, Japan to serve with 2d Battalion, 4th Marines as a Rifle Platoon Commander and 81mm Mortar Platoon.

In October 1979, Lieutenant General Bailey was assigned to Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC as a Series Commander, Battalion S-3 and Commanding Officer of Company F, 2d Recruit Training Battalion. During this tour, he earned a Master’s Degree in Business Management and Administration from Webster University. After graduation from Amphibious Warfare School in 1984, he joined 1st Battalion, 6th Marines at Camp Lejeune where he served as the Commanding Officer of Company C and Weapons Company Commander.


In June 1998, he was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower Management office as the ground Lieutenant Colonels Monitor. In June 2000, he was assigned as the Deputy, Joint Contact Team Program and Plans Officer, J-5, Headquarters US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. From 2002 to 2004, Lieutenant General Bailey commanded the 2d Marine Regiment. In May 2006, he assumed duties as Deputy Director for Operations, J-3 Joint Staff. In July 2007, he assumed command of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and concurrently began duties as the Deputy Commanding General, III MEF.

In August 2009, he transferred to San Diego, California and assumed command of Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Western Recruiting Region. Lieutenant General Bailey assumed command of Marine Corps Recruiting Command in January 2011. In June 2011, Lieutenant General Bailey was assigned to Camp Pendleton, California and assumed command as the Commanding General 1st Marine Division. In June 2013, Lieutenant General Bailey was promoted to his current rank and assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps as the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations.
Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis

Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis assumed his current position as the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps in June 2014.

Commissioned in May 1980 through the PLC Program, LtGen Davis completed the Basic School in August 1980, and then reported for flight training. Upon receiving his wings in September of 1982, he was selected to fly the AV-8A Harrier.

He reported to VMAT-203 in October 1982, completed Harrier training and reported to VMA-231 in 1983 where he deployed aboard the USS Inchon. In 1985 he transferred to VMAT-203 serving as an instructor pilot. In 1986 he attended the WTI course at MAWTS-1. In 1987 he transferred to VMA-223 serving as the "Bulldogs" WTI and operations officer. From 1988 to 1991 he served as an exchange officer with the Royal Air Force. After training in the United Kingdom, he deployed to Gutersloh, Germany for duty as a GR-5/7 attack pilot with 3(F) squadron. From 1991 to 1994 he served as an instructor at MAWTS-1 in Yuma, AZ. From 1998 to 2000 he commanded VMA-223. During his tour, VMA-223 won the CNO Safety Award and the Sanderson Trophy two years in a row, and exceeded 40,000 hours of mishap free operations. After completing the Executive Helicopter Familiarization Course at HT-18 in Pensacola in 2003, he was assigned to MAWTS-1 where he served as Executive Officer and from 2004 to 2006 as Commanding Officer. From 2006 to 2008 he served as the Deputy Commander Joint Functional Component Command -- Network Warfare at Fort Meade, Maryland. He commanded the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing from July 2010 to May 2012. From May 2012 to June 2014, he served as the Deputy Commander, United States Cyber Command.

His staff billets include a two year tour as a member of the 31st Commandant’s Staff Group, and two years as the Junior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In 2003, he served as an Assistant Operations Officer on the 3rd Marine Air Wing staff in Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2004, he served in Iraq as the Officer in Charge of the 3d Marine Aircraft Red Team. He served as the Deputy Assistant Commandant for Aviation from 2008 to 2010. In the course of his career he has flown over 4,500 mishap free hours in the AV-8, F-5 and FA-18 and as a co-pilot in every type model series tilt-rotor, rotary winged and air refueler aircraft in the USMC inventory.

LtGen Davis graduated with honors from The Basic School and was a Distinguished Graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He is a graduate of the Tactical Air Control Party Course, Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course (WTI), The School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He holds a Bachelor’s of Science from Allegheny College, a Master’s of Science from Marine Corps University and a Masters of International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins.
Lieutenant General Michael G. Dana

Lieutenant General Dana was promoted to his current rank and assumed his duties as Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics in September 2015.

Lieutenant General Dana was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in June of 1982 following graduation from Union College in Schenectady, New York. From 1983-1986, Lieutenant General Dana was assigned to 2nd Tank Battalion, deploying with Battalion Landing Team 1/8 to the Mediterranean. In 1986 he was assigned as the Combat Cargo Officer aboard USS Duluth (LPD-6), deploying to the Western Pacific with Battalion Landing Team 1/9 embarked.


From 2003-2005 he was assigned to III MEF, serving as the G-7/3D MEB Chief of Staff, III MEF Deputy G-3, and OIC of the MARCENT Coordination Element at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

From 2005-2007, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSG-37, including a deployment to Iraq from 2006-2007. From 2010-2012 Lieutenant General Dana served as the Commanding General, 2d Marine Logistics Group, including a deployment to Afghanistan from 2011-2012. He was then assigned as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Logistics (LP) until October 2012.

Joint assignments include service with EUCOM, NORTHCOM and, most recently, PACOM. Lieutenant General Dana is a graduate of Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting and the Naval War College.
Introduction

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, we appreciate the opportunity to testify on the current state of Marine Corps readiness. As chartered by the 82nd Congress and reaffirmed by the 114th Congress, the Marine Corps remains unwavering in its commitment to being the nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. We greatly appreciate the continued support of Congress and, in particular, the support of this subcommittee for your understanding of the Marine Corps’ pivotal role to our nation’s defense and in ensuring we remain ready when the nation is least ready.

Over 15 years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have focused investment and resources on ensuring Marines were prepared for the current fight. During that time, those conflicts consumed much of the life for many of our legacy equipment systems while modernization was necessarily delayed. A focus on those operations, the decrease in funding levels, fiscal instability, and the lack of an operational reprieve have left your Marine Corps in a state that is not optimized for the future. Under the current funding levels and those we stand to face in the near future - the current Continuing Resolution and the Budget Control Act (BCA) - your Marine Corps will experience increasingly significant challenges to the institutional readiness required to deter aggression and fight and win our Nation’s battles. While today’s force is capable and our forward deployed forces are ready to fight, we are fiscally stretched to maintain readiness across the breadth of the force in the near term, and to modernize for future readiness against threats we will face. The Marine Corps will require sufficient resources to remedy this situation.
Your Marine Corps Today

Today, your Marine Corps continues to operate at a very challenging tempo, as it has over the past 15 years. With a dynamic and complex operating environment, Marines and our unique naval and expeditionary capabilities continue to be in high demand from all our combatant commanders around the globe. During the past year, your Marines executed approximately 185 operations, 140 security cooperation events with our partners and allies and participated in 65 major exercises.

As we sit here today, there are over 34,000 Marines deployed around the globe to assure our allies and partners, to deter our adversaries, and to respond when our Nations citizens and interests are threatened. Nearly 23,000 Marines remain stationed or deployed west of the International Date Line to maintain regional stability and deterrence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. In 2016, our Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) continued to support the joint force by executing counterterrorism (CT) operations throughout the U. S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (USCENTCOM AOR) and North Africa, providing support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in Japan and Haiti, and remain forward deployed to respond to crises and emerging threats. With our partners in the State Department, we employed Marine Security Guards across the globe in 146 countries, at 176 embassies and consulates. Altogether, over two thirds of the force have been deployed or stationed overseas during calendar year 2016.

Since 2013, Marines have had to rely on land-based locations to operate from due to the limited inventory of operationally available amphibious ships. Joint Force requirements remain high, and the number of available amphibious ships remains below the requirement. Due to a shortfall in amphibious shipping, your Marine Corps has had to employ land-based Special
Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs). This year we sourced SPMAGTFs to Central Command, Africa Command and Southern Command and our Black Sea Rotational Force remains forward deployed in Europe. Where an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) may have been the response force of choice in the past, these SPMAGTFs have been called on to conduct operations in support of Geographic Combatant Commands. Although SPMAGTFs have met a limited requirement for the Joint Force, they lack the full capability, capacity and strategic and operational agility that are organic to a fully ready and equipped Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) embarked aboard Navy amphibious ships.

What Tomorrow’s Marine Corps Requires

The way the Marine Corps looks at readiness is based upon the foundation of five pillars: Unit Readiness; Capability and Capacity to Meet Joint Force Requirements; High Quality People; Infrastructure Sustainment; and Equipment Modernization. We require proper balance across these pillars and a balanced Marine Corps is a force that has a sustainable operational and personnel tempo and is able to train with the right equipment for all assigned missions. The result of this balance is optimally trained and equipped forces that deploy when required, with the right quantity of forces, on the required timeline with a ready reserve of non-deployed forces that can surge to meet the demands of a large-scale major combat operation or unplanned contingency. First, to maintain unit readiness the operating forces are dependent upon funding for training and maintenance of equipment to safeguard readiness. Although deployed Marine forces are at the highest levels of readiness, this readiness comes at the expense of non-deployed units. Second, simply put, when the Commander-in-chief calls, we must have both the
capabilities and capacity necessary to answer and meet Joint Force requirements. Third, the most important pillar of our readiness has and will always be our Marines. Recruiting and retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining the Marine Corps’ high state of readiness. Recruiting quality youth ultimately translates into higher performance, reduced attrition, increased retention, and improved readiness for the operating forces. The Marine Corps needs the right quantities and occupational specialties to fulfill its role as an expeditionary force in readiness. Fourth is the readiness of our infrastructure. Adequately resourcing the sustainment of our bases, stations, and installations is essential as these are the platforms for generating ready units through training and deployment, as well as providing support to our Marines, Sailors and their families. Modernizing our training systems, ranges and facilities will be key in attacking our current challenges in readiness across the force. Having adequate funding levels will provide the resources we need to sustain our installation capabilities. And fifth, we must accelerate equipment modernization. Ground and aviation equipment must meet the needs of the current and emerging security environments and is essential in our transformation to a 21st Century Marine Corps.

Achieving this balance must be accomplished as we are confronted by increasingly capable threats. As we engage in the current fight and maintain our forward presence in order to respond to crises, our enemies and potential adversaries have not stood idle. They have developed new capabilities which now equal, or in some cases exceed, our own. These potential adversaries are, for example, capable of creating combined arms dilemmas using information, cyber, deception, unmanned ISR, and long-range precision fires in highly advanced and lethal ways. In a 21st century characterized by rapid change, it is imperative that we keep pace with
change for, as our Commandant has noted, history has not been kind to militaries that fail to evolve and adapt to the changing security environment.

Unit Readiness

Given the current fiscal environment, we will continue to prioritize deployed and preparing to deploy units and provide them the mission critical resources to the greatest extent possible. We will have to continue to make tough choices and balance our available resources to meet current operational commitments and, at the same time, try to build the readiness of non-deployed units – our “ready bench” – to respond to a potential contingency. In addition, we must modernize to achieve tomorrow’s readiness.

The most dire readiness situation lies within our Aviation element. An unhealthy percentage of our aviation units lack the minimum number of ready basic aircraft (RBA) for training, and we are significantly short ready aircraft for wartime requirements. We simply do not have the available aircraft to meet our squadrons’ requirements. This means that flight hour averages per crew per month are below the minimum standards required to achieve and maintain adequate training and readiness levels. Although deployed squadrons remain trained for their assigned mission, next-to-deploy squadrons are often achieving the minimum readiness goals just prior to deployment. Depot level maintenance capacity remains constrained. Reduced acquisition rates for the F-35 and the CH-53K require the Marine Corps to continue to operate legacy aircraft well beyond their planned lifespan; recapitalization of attack helicopters and reset of heavy lift helicopters are two examples of ways we are addressing RBA shortfalls. The real key to reducing risk in capacity and recovering readiness, however, is in transition – recapitalizing the strike/fighter fleet with the F-35B/C, completing the H-1 transition, and soon initiating the transition to the CH-53K. Every delay in the procurement of future systems
increases both the cost and complexity of maintaining our aged legacy systems beyond their projected life. Every dollar spent on aviation modernization now has a direct positive effect on current and future aviation readiness. With sufficient resources for these initiatives and procurement timelines, Marine aviation expects to achieve T 2.0 in FY20.

Ground equipment readiness is in a better situation than aviation but there are still significant challenges. With Congress’ continual support of our efforts, the Marine Corps has reset over 90 percent of its legacy ground equipment. However, our most important ground legacy capabilities continue to age as modernization efforts are not moving quickly enough. For example, our Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) are now more than four decades old. Our AAV Survivability Upgrade (SU) Program will sustain and marginally enhance the capability of the legacy AAV, but this does not remove the need to modernize this nearly obsolete platform. A similar example is our Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). The average age of LAV’s within our inventory is 26 years; the oldest vehicle is 34 years old. As of today, there is no program identified to replace this capable but outdated platform. All the while, we continue to incur increasing costs to extend the life of this vehicle. Our AAVs and LAVs are two of the four systems that consume 50 percent of the Marine Corps’ annual depot maintenance budget. As we continue on this path with limited fiscal resources to sustain legacy and outdated systems while deferring modernization, the comparative advantage in capability against potential adversaries is steadily shrinking.

Sufficient resources are needed to facilitate the conduct of exercises and training, reduce shortfalls in repair parts, and address aviation specific operations and maintenance funding. The Marine Corps has a plan to regain and sustain unit readiness. And with your continued support, we can execute our plan to restore and maintain the balance of our institutional readiness.
Joint Force Requirements and Capacity to Respond

As directed under the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), combined with fiscal constraints, the Marine Corps decreased its Active Component end strength from 202,000 to 182,000. Those decisions based on the 2014 QDR assessments and assumptions identified challenges and a security environment unlike the situation that exists today with the re-emergence of near-peer state adversaries. As you know, we as a nation are still working to counter violent extremist organizations along with deterring provocative and aggressive actions from other competitors. Equipment readiness and force structure levels remain critical requirements to improve our readiness. Additionally, equally as important as sufficient, consistent and predictable funding is time in order rebuild readiness. It has taken more than a decade to reach this point; it will take several years and more than a singular budget cycle to recover.

Our current end strength challenges our ability to support Joint Force requirements while sustaining a minimum acceptable deployment to dwell (D2D) ratio. This minimum time at home stations and bases is necessary to reconstitute our units and train for the next deployment, ensuring they are capable of executing across the full range of military operations. At our current end strength, coupled with the current operational tempo, the impacts to our force are not sustainable.

Our sustainable deployment to dwell (D2D) ratio is 1:3, which equates to every six month deployment being followed by 18 months at home station. It is during this time at home station that readiness is rebuilt during pre-deployment training when units complete a comprehensive individual, collective, and cohesive unit training program. The operational demands of today with our current requirements impose a 1:2 D2D ratio on many of our units.
For some units, it is even less. The Marine Corps prides itself on its ability to provide the right force at the right time. Under the existing operational environment, we can provide the necessary capabilities but may not have the required capacity or the necessary “ready bench” - ready units at home - to respond to larger crises at the readiness levels and in the time required by Combatant Commanders.

High Quality People

In the Marine Corps we have an expression that is known by leaders at all levels - “Mission first, Marines always.” The meaning behind that phrase is to never lose sight of what our greatest asset is and will always be, Marines. The best plan or strategy will never succeed without Marines of high caliber, character, and capabilities to execute it. This is what makes them the cornerstone of our readiness. Nearly 70 percent of our Marines are serving in their first enlistment, and approximately 35,000 Marines leave the Marine Corps each year. We must continue to fill those ranks with the same high quality of men and women. Our recruiting efforts continue to succeed in finding talented and patriotic men and women willing to serve their country. Despite our continued successes, we must always seek self-improvement and find ways to better recruit and retain our most highly qualified and skilled Marines. In order to improve our ability to retain Marines, we require the resources to offer incentives to Marines with experience, critical skills and valuable specialties.

Marine Corps Force 2025, a year-long, comprehensive, bottom-up review of the force identified various end-strengths and the associated capabilities and modernization required to operate in the future security environment. Our FY 2018 Budget request will be informed by this review. We thank you for passing the 2017 NDAA that authorizes 185,000 active
component Marines. Your authorization, combined with the appropriations we still require, puts your Marine Corps on the right path to realize necessary growth that will enhance readiness.

**Installation Capability**

Marine Corps installations are the platforms at which we generate ready forces and from which we project power. It is from our installations that we man, train, and equip our combat-ready forces. As we have had to prioritize deployed readiness, we have had to assume risks from deferred infrastructure and facility investments and modernization. The continued deferment of Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) requires increased infrastructure investment now or we incur further risks as future FSRM costs are likely to increase. We ask for your continued support to restore and modernize our facilities.

In addition to facilities sustainment and recapitalization, we require investment in military construction (MILCON). Those investments will provide us the facilities necessary to support the fielding of new equipment and state of the art simulation systems. These facilities will provide a direct correlation to enhancing our training standards as well as readiness. Improving training areas, including aerial and ground ranges, will require your support for special use airspace and additional land to replace degraded and inadequate facilities.

**Modernization**

Modernization is the keystone in providing operationally relevant forces to deter and counter emerging threats. As was the case with our other pillars of readiness, deferred modernization has allowed our adversaries to shrink the gap between their capabilities and our own. We have had to expend resources maintaining aging and obsolete legacy systems and
platforms. As General Dunford testified last year, “we should [never] send Americans into a fair fight.” Continued delays in modernization will lead to just that, or worse. Investing in and accelerating our modernization programs directly contribute to improved readiness by achieving efficiencies and providing needed capabilities sooner.

Our Aviation Modernization Plan requires acceleration after suffering recent delays, many attributed to funding deficiencies. Increasing the procurement of the F-35 and CH-53K will result in similar and greater Marine aviation capability improvements. Our first operational F-35B squadron, VMFA-121, relocated to Iwakuni, Japan in January. By the end of this year, that squadron will fill both the 31st MEU requirement and the land-based requirements within PACOM. We also look forward to the stand-up of our first F-35C squadron in FY19, further enhancing the 5th generation capabilities of our Navy-Marine Corps Team. Additionally, the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement remains critical to maintaining the battlefield mobility our force requires. The acceleration of these key modernization programs will directly improve our readiness and allow us to retire aircraft that have reached or exceeded their intended life.

For our ground combat element, in order to maintain our technological advantage we must accelerate the modernization of ground systems. Our Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle (GCTV) modernization strategy is to sequentially modernize priority capabilities, reduce equipment inventories wherever possible, and judiciously sustain remaining equipment. The fiscal environment has prevented us from accelerating procurement of critical ground systems. Our fleet of AAVs is over four decades old and is a top priority for replacement. Procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) to replace our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) also needs to be accelerated. Thirty years ago, the HMMWV was not developed to address the threat of asymmetric warfare and improvised explosive devices (IED).
The JLTV will give our Marines a more survivable and capable platform with which to operate. There is currently no replacement program for our legacy Light Armored Vehicle fleet. We need to develop and invest in a next generation replacement for this system. Additionally, we need to establish programs that develop, procure, and deliver active protection systems, counter-UAS and increased long-range precision fires capabilities.

A critical component in building, training, and maintaining an expeditionary forward presence and contingency response capability is the availability and readiness of amphibious ships. Amphibious platforms provide the sovereignty, strategic mobility, unmatched logistical support, operational reach, and forcible entry capability required to deter and, when necessary, defeat our Nation’s adversaries. Our amphibious concepts have been validated throughout our history, and we will remain a conduit for innovation. As the operating environment changes, the Marine Corps will continue to innovate as we implement our new Marine Corps Operating Concept. The availability of amphibious shipping remains paramount to our relevancy, responsiveness, resiliency and readiness. The Nation’s amphibious warship requirement remains at 38. The current inventory of 31 vessels falls well short of this requirement. Maintenance challenges in the aging amphibious fleet significantly exacerbate that shortfall. The decreased quantity and availability of amphibious warships, the preferred method of deploying and employing Marine Corps capabilities inhibits our Navy-Marine Corps Team from training to our full capabilities, impedes our shared ability to respond to an emergent crisis, and increases the strain on our current readiness. Sufficient resources for amphibious shipbuilding plans, as well as surface ship-to-shore connectors programmed to replace the Landing Craft Air Cushioned and Landing Craft Utility platforms, will improve our overall amphibious capability and capacity.
As we move towards a 21st Century Marine Corps we must be able to dominate all five domains – air, land, maritime, cyber and space. In the information environment, enabling and protecting our ability to command and control (C2) Marine forces widely distributed across an area of operations is critical to future success. This requires transforming MAGTF C2 capabilities through a unified network environment that is ready, relevant, responsive and resilient.

Conclusion

On behalf of all of our Marines, Sailors, civilians and their families, we thank the Congress and this committee for this opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Marine Corps faces. We thank you for your support as articulated in the recent 2017 NDAA. We have a plan to reset, recapitalize and modernize your Marine Corps into a 21st century force. The most important actions that Congress can take now is to immediately repeal the caps on defense spending in the Budget Control Act and provide a defense appropriation that ensures sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding to train, man, and equip the FY17 NDAA authorized force. The Marine Corps must begin to rebalance and modernize for the future. Resourcing the Marine Corps will enable future readiness and create a multi-domain force with overmatch that can deter and, when necessary, defeat a highly capable near-peer adversary. With your help, we can begin the deliberate journey to overcome these challenges and rebuild your Marine Corps for the 21st century.
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY

General Bailey. The Marine Corps assumed receipt of FY17 Additional Appropriations in May 2017 when the request for additional appropriations was submitted. If funding was received after June 1, 2017 there would be the potential that some of the funding appropriated would not be executed prior to October 1, 2017. [See page 15.]